[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 191 (Tuesday, October 4, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-24412]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: October 4, 1994]


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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

[Recommendation 94-3]

 

Rocky Flats Seismic and Systems Safety

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice; recommendation.

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SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a 
recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a 
concerning Rocky Flats seismic and systems safety. The Board requests 
public comments on this recommendation.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this 
recommendation are due on or before November 3, 1994.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this 
recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana 
Avenue NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004-2901.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Kenneth M. Pusateri or Carole C. Morgan, at the address above or 
telephone (202) 208-6400.

    Dated: September 28, 1994.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.

[Recommendation 94-3]

Rocky Flats Seismic and Systems Safety

Dated: September 26, 1994.
    In its Recommendation 90-5, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 
Board (Board) recommended that a site-wide Systematic Evaluation 
Program be conducted at the Rocky Flats Plant (now the Rocky Flats 
Environmental Technology Site), to determine if safety upgrades should 
be instituted to enable the defense nuclear buildings and facilities to 
meet current safety requirements. The mission of the Rocky Flats 
Environmental Technology Site has changed since the issuance of 
Recommendation 90-5, and the Implementation Plan for the Recommendation 
has been revised to more directly address the current mission of the 
Site.
    The Board has been informed in briefings by the Department of 
Energy (DOE) that Building 371 is considered to be structurally the 
best on-site facility for the storage of plutonium, and that steps are 
therefore scheduled that in time will move the major part of the Site's 
plutonium inventory into storage in this building. As a result, 
Building 371 will assume a unique role as the storehouse which contains 
the largest single accumulation of plutonium in the DOE complex. It 
follows that potential health and safety issues associated with this 
proposed use of the building also assume very high importance.
    Accordingly, the Board has been reviewing potential public health 
and safety issues at Building 371, and in particular, the building's 
capacity to provide reasonable assurance of protection of public health 
and safety should it be subjected to external forces from natural 
phenomena (earthquakes, extreme winds, and floods). The Board has 
observed that DOE's ongoing studies in the Systematic Evaluation 
Program to better identify the potential hazards from natural phenomena 
at Building 371 and to establish means of protecting against them are 
not well integrated. An effective systematic Evaluation Program 
requires a more thorough application of the systems engineering 
process. The Board has concluded that activities currently underway in 
this respect, to prepare Building 371 for its extended role in storage 
of plutonium, are not logically structured and are not sufficiently 
encompassing in either detail or scope to assure that the health and 
safety of the public will be adequately protected.
    Therefore, the Board recommends:
    1. That an Integrated Program Plan be formulated to address the 
civil-structural-seismic safety issues and evaluations related to the 
planned use of Building 371 for storage of plutonium and related 
functions. This plan needs to be founded on the principles of systems 
engineering and realistic schedules. Several studies, pertinent to such 
a plan, are geologic fault investigations, groundmotion studies, 
dynamic building analyses, and soil-structure interaction analyses. 
These studies and other elements need to be combined with the building 
mission and any other functional criteria using systems engineering 
principles to develop the Integrated Program Plan.
    2. That the above plan address and explain any requirements for 
changes to the current Safety Analysis Report and how such changes will 
be accomplished. This includes effects from earthquakes, extreme winds, 
and floods.
    3. That a comprehensive document be completed describing in detail 
the structural analysis methodology and standards for the building 
analysis. This includes explaining analytical methods used and their 
applicability to the configuration of Building 371.
    4. That the integrated program plan use both deterministic and 
probabilistic methods to establish the vibratory groundmotion criteria 
that will be used in the structural evaluation of Building 371. This 
includes a rationale for reconciling differences between the two 
methods. Moreover, these criteria should incorporate the results of a 
carefully planned and executed site geological faulting investigations.
    5. That a hazard classification be selected for Building 371 which 
is supported by rational analysis. This requires consideration of the 
mission, period of intended use, and importance of the building.
    6. That the Integrated Program Plan, consistent with the hazard 
classification, include the plan for classification of safety systems 
on a rational basis consistent with the mission, life, and importance 
of Building 371. Issues associated with hazard classification and 
classification of safety systems are discussed in the Board's April 29, 
1994, letter to Under Secretary Curtis.
    7. That any standards used in evaluating hazards from natural and 
man-made phenomena be comparable to those used in commercial nuclear 
practice.
    8. That the Program Plan and the results of its activities be used 
to specify building upgrade and improvements consistent with the 
mission of Building 371.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.
September 26, 1994.
The Honorable Hazel R. O'Leary,
Secretary of Energy,
Washington, DC 20585.
    Dear Secretary O'Leary: On September 26, 1994, the Defense 
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 
Sec. 2286a(5), unanimously approved Recommendation 94-3 which is 
enclosed for your consideration. Recommendation 94-3 deals with 
Rocky Flats Seismic and Systems Safety.
    42 U.S.C. Sec. 2286d(a) requires the Board, after receipt by 
you, to promptly make this recommendation available to the public in 
the Department of Energy's regional public reading rooms. The Board 
believes the recommendation contains no information which is 
classified or otherwise restricted. To the extent this 
recommendation does not include information restricted by DOE under 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2161-68, as amended, 
please arrange to have this recommendation promptly placed on file 
in your regional public reading rooms.
    The Board will publish this recommendation in the Federal 
Register.
    Sincerely,
John T. Conway,
Chairman.
[FR Doc. 94-24412 Filed 10-3-94; 8:45 am]
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