[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 160 (Friday, August 19, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-20364]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: August 19, 1994]


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Part V





Department of Transportation





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Coast Guard



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33 CFR Part 168




Escort Vessels for Certain Tankers; Final Rule
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 168

[CGD 91-202]
RIN 2115-AE10

 
Escort Vessels for Certain Tankers

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Coast Guard is requiring escort vessels for certain oil 
tankers transiting Prince William Sound, Alaska, and Puget Sound, 
Washington. This rulemaking is mandated by the Oil Pollution Act of 
1990 (OPA 90). The regulations will reduce the chances of a tanker 
running aground or colliding as a result of loss of propulsion or 
steering control, thereby potentially reducing the risk of an oil 
spill.

EFFECTIVE DATE: November 17, 1994.

ADDRESSES: Unless otherwise indicated, documents referred to in this 
preamble are available for inspection or copying at the office of the 
Executive Secretary, Marine Safety Council (G-LRA/3406), U.S. Coast 
Guard Headquarters, 2100 Second Street SW., room 3406, Washington, DC 
20593-0001 between 8 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday, except 
Federal holidays. The telephone number is (202) 267-1477.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas Jordan, Project Manager, OPA 90 
Staff, at (202) 267-6751.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Drafting Information

    The principal persons involved in drafting this document are Thomas 
Jordan, Project Manager, Oil Pollution Act (OPA 90) Staff, and Mary-Jo 
Cooney, Project Counsel, Oil Pollution Act (OPA 90) Staff.

Regulatory History

    On July 7, 1992, the Coast Guard published a notice of proposed 
rulemaking (NPRM) entitled ``Escort Vessels for Certain Oil Tankers'' 
in the Federal Register (57 FR 30058). When the Coast Guard received 
comments to the NPRM which were not as extensive as expected, it 
reopened the comment period (58 FR 16391, March 26, 1993) to solicit 
more specific comments on certain issues.
    The Coast Guard also published an advance notice of proposed 
rulemaking (ANPRM) (58 FR 25766, April 27, 1993) seeking comment on 
other U.S. waters where an escort should be required, and other vessels 
that should also be escorted. That regulatory project (CGD 91-202a) is 
ongoing.
    In response to many comments, public hearings were held in 
Anchorage, Alaska on June 3, 1993, Valdez, Alaska on June 5, 1993 and 
Seattle, Washington on June 7, 1993 (58 FR 25959, April 29, 1993; and 
58 FR 29157, May 19, 1993). The Alaska hearings were also 
teleconferenced to include several outlying communities in the Exxon 
Valdez impact area. Transcripts of those hearings have been placed in 
the public dockets for these rulemakings (CGD 91-202 and CGD 91-202a) 
and are available for inspection or copying at room 3406, U.S. Coast 
Guard Headquarters.
    At this time, the Prince William Sound Disabled Tanker Towing Study 
(DTTS) Group is sponsoring a special study concerning the present 
tanker escort operations in Prince William Sound (PWS). The study group 
is made up of representatives from five regional interest groups: the 
PWS Tanker Association, the PWS Regional Citizens' Advisory Council, 
Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, the Alaska Department of 
Environmental Conservation, and the Coast Guard. Although the DTTS is a 
separate project from this rulemaking, it is of particular value to 
this rulemaking because of the technical information it will develop on 
the maneuvering characteristics of disabled tankers under the control 
of different combinations of escort vessels. Part 1 of the DTTS, 
entitled ``Evaluation of Existing Equipment, Personnel and 
Procedures,'' has been completed and is available to the public through 
the National Technical Information Service (NTIS). The Coast Guard 
published a notice of availability (NOA) (59 FR 1411; January 10, 1994) 
for Part 1. The NOA reprinted the Executive Summary from Part 1, and 
provided information for ordering copies of the study from NTIS. Part 2 
of the study is expected to be completed in spring 1994; the Coast 
Guard will publish another NOA when details are available.

Background and Purpose

    Section 4116(c) of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) (Pub. L. 
101-380) requires the Secretary of Transportation to initiate 
rulemaking to define areas where single-hulled tankers over 5,000 gross 
tons (GT) transporting oil in bulk must be escorted by at least two 
``towing vessels'' (as defined in 46 U.S.C. 2101) or by some other 
vessels which the Secretary considers appropriate. By statute, these 
defined areas must include Prince William Sound, Alaska, and Rosario 
Strait and Puget Sound, Washington (including those portions of the 
Strait of Juan de Fuca east of Port Angeles, Haro Strait, and the 
Strait of Georgia subject to United States jurisdiction). The Secretary 
also has the authority to extend the escort rule to other U.S. waters 
as appropriate.
    The rulemaking authority has been delegated to the Coast Guard, 
which will implement section 4116(c) in two separate rulemaking 
projects: CGD 91-202 addresses escort requirements for the Prince 
William Sound and Puget Sound waters named in the statute, and CGD 91-
202a addresses escort requirements for other waters.

Discussion of Comments and Changes

    Comments received by the Coast Guard in response to the NPRM and 
public hearings are discussed as follows:
    1. Role of escort vessels. Four comments suggested that the 
guidelines concerning the role of the escort must be clearly specified 
and defined. One comment stated that the principal purpose of the 
escort should be to prevent tanker accidents by steering or retarding 
disabled tankers. One comment stated that an escort should be able to 
safely assist a tanker moving near its maneuvering speed, alter the 
tanker's speed or course, apply lateral force, and overtake the tanker 
within confined waters.
    The Coast Guard generally agrees with these comments. The role of 
the escort vessels is to assist a tanker that is experiencing a loss of 
propulsion or steering control and is therefore at risk of collision or 
grounding. However, it must be pointed out that escort vessels may not 
always be able to prevent all tanker accidents. This rule requires that 
reasonably capable escort vessels be immediately on hand to assist a 
tanker as circumstances permit. The decision to respond, however, must 
be left to the professional judgement of the escort vessel's master, 
who must always first consider the risk to the escort vessel and its 
crew.
    2. Benefit of escort vessels. Four comments stated that they did 
not believe that the presence of escort vessels improves the safety of 
the transit; two comments further stated that safety is actually 
reduced because of increased vessel traffic (due to the escort vessels 
themselves) which increases opportunities for collisions. Additionally, 
another comment asserted that tug escorts would increase the risk of 
collision in Puget Sound. However, one comment points out that there 
are significant safety benefits gained by providing escorts for certain 
vessels.
    Although escort vessels may not always be able to prevent a tanker 
accident, the Coast Guard believes that escort vessels can successfully 
control a tanker under many circumstances. Having reasonably capable 
escort vessels on hand, coupled with the tanker master's duty to 
operate the tanker within the performance capabilities of the escort 
vessels, will provide the maximum feasible assurance that the transit 
can be safely made. The Coast Guard disagrees that vessel traffic would 
be substantially increased: in Prince William Sound the increased 
traffic would be two escort vessels once every two months; in Puget 
Sound the increased traffic would average four escort vessels per day, 
which is not a significant increase.
    3. Definitions. Thirteen comments related to the various 
definitions proposed in the NPRM, or proposed additional definitions. 
Accordingly, Sec. 168.5 of this rule adds, revises, and deletes certain 
terms that were proposed in the NPRM.
    Definitions of ``disabled tanker'' and ``escort transit'' have been 
added.
    The definition of ``escort vessel'' has been revised in order to 
reflect the fact that a variety of vessel types can perform escort 
services other than just the ``towing vessels'' cited in the statute. 
Furthermore, a vessel that may be suitable for escorting a particular 
tanker under certain transit conditions may not be suitable for 
escorting other tankers, or even the same tanker under other 
conditions. The necessary elements of an escort vessel are that: it is 
dedicated exclusively to the tanker for the duration of its transit; 
and it is properly equipped for its intended role in an emergency 
response (pushing, towing, etc.). The second element means that it is 
not necessary for the escort vessels to have duplicative capabilities. 
For example, one escorting vessel does not have to be outfitted with 
towing gear if another escorting vessel is adequately outfitted.
    The definition of ``laden'' replaces the NPRM's definition of 
``transporting oil in bulk'' because it is more precise.
    The definition of ``single hull tanker'' has been added, although 
it still maintains the same vessel applicability as proposed in the 
NPRM: any tanker that is not double-hulled.
    Definitions of ``tanker owner or operator'' and ``tanker master'' 
have been added. They distinguish a shoreside owner or management 
organization (that has overall operational control of the tanker), 
including a demise (bareboat) charterer, from a tanker's master (who is 
the licensed, onboard person in charge of the tanker).
    The NPRM's definition of ``static bollard pull'' has been deleted 
because it is not used in the rule.
    4. Responsibilities. The NPRM originally made the tanker master 
responsible for selecting the escort vessels. Six comments were 
received on this issue, and all of them generally expressed the opinion 
that the tanker master should not be responsible for selecting or 
deciding escort vessel suitability. Some comments argued that the 
tanker master may not be sufficiently familiar with the local waters, 
weather conditions or other navigational considerations to select the 
best escort vessels; these are some of the reasons why pilots are 
embarked when any vessel enters a port. Some comments also argued that 
escort vessel selections might be made by the tanker's shoreside 
management company, putting the tanker master under considerable 
pressure to accept whatever vessels have been dispatched.
    The Coast Guard generally agrees that proper selection of escort 
vessels requires some specialized knowledge and pre-planning which 
might be beyond the abilities of the tanker master to accomplish. Such 
knowledge might have to be developed from tanker-specific maneuvering 
and control studies. Also, tanker owners or operators may wish to make 
contractual arrangements with escort vessel operators to ensure 
appropriate vessels are available at favorable rates. Because the 
resources to conduct studies or make contractual agreements are 
controlled by the tanker's owners or operators (shoreside management), 
it is more appropriate that they should be ultimately responsible for 
the escort vessel selection and providing the tanker master with any 
specialized information.
    Therefore, Sec. 168.10 makes the tanker owners or operators 
responsible for escort vessel selection and informing the tanker master 
of the performance capabilities of the escort vessels. The master is 
responsible for operating the tanker within those performance 
capabilities.
    The regulations do not preclude owners or operators from 
authorizing masters or other agents to make selections, although the 
tanker owners or operators will have to furnish the necessary technical 
information for proper escort vessel selection.
    5. Applicable vessels. OPA 90 specifically targets single hull tank 
ships of more than 5,000 gross tons (GT) (5,000 GT corresponds to 
approximately 10,000 deadweight tons (DWT), which is the tonnage 
measurement more commonly applied to tankers). The NPRM proposed to 
include tankers with only double bottoms or double sides but exclude 
double hulled tankers.
    Eight comments to the NPRM addressed the issue of hull design (i.e. 
single hull, double hull, double bottom, or double sides). Most of 
these comments stated that double hulls should not be excluded from the 
escort requirements. Two comments did agree with the double hull 
exclusion, another comment also agreed with the double hull exclusion 
and stated that double bottom tankers should also be excluded. One 
comment suggested that the escort requirements should apply to all 
tankers over 5,000 GT, (regardless of construction) and another comment 
suggested that they should apply to all vessels carrying oil 
(regardless of construction or size). One comment suggested that all 
single-hulled oil tankers should be included whether laden or unladen. 
The Coast Guard is of the opinion that Congress did not intend for 
tankers that meet the OPA 90 double hull design requirements to be 
escorted. Therefore, the originally-proposed hull design standard has 
not been revised: double hull tankers are excluded, but all other 
single hull, double bottom, and double side tankers are included.
    Eleven comments addressed size limits for applicable tankers, 
suggesting either to raise the gross tonnage threshold (thereby 
excluding some tankers greater than 5,000 GT) or require escorts for 
only those tankers carrying more than a particular quantity of oil. One 
comment pointed out that smaller tankers are less of a threat to the 
environment than larger ones, and therefore should not have to be 
escorted. Two of the comments support the proposed size requirements. 
OPA 90 specifically includes tankers down to 5,000 GT; therefore, the 
proposed size limit has not been changed.
    Four comments were received which advocated excluding those tankers 
with twin screw propulsion systems, on the grounds that a simultaneous 
failure of both propulsion systems was unlikely. OPA 90 requires 
tankers that are not double-hulled to be escorted, regardless of 
propulsion system.
    Therefore, Sec. 168.20 makes the regulations applicable to all U.S. 
and foreign-flag single hull tankers of more than 5,000 GT, including 
tankers with only double bottoms or double sides, or double hull 
tankers that do not meet the dimensional standards of 33 CFR 157.10d 
(which are the OPA 90 double hull standards). The regulations do not 
apply to tankers less than 5,000 GT or tank barges of any size.
    6. Applicable cargoes. The NPRM proposed to include ``oil'' 
cargoes, without distinguishing between petroleum and non-petroleum 
(i.e., animal or vegetable) oils. Six comments indicated that tankers 
carrying animal and vegetable oils should be excluded from the escort 
regulations. One comment went on to say that if these oils are 
included, then the ruling would have a detrimental economic impact on 
his small business. The issue of requiring escorts for tankers carrying 
only animal and vegetable oils, and other non-petroleum oils, warrants 
further consideration. This will be addressed in the ongoing rulemaking 
(CGD 91-202a) which concerns other U.S. waters where an escort may be 
required and other criteria for defining the vessels that should be 
escorted. Therefore, Sec. 168.30 of this rule applies only to petroleum 
oils (MARPOL Annex I), which are listed in 46 CFR Table 30.25-1 as 
pollution category I cargoes.
    Four comments noted that many hazardous chemical cargoes can pose 
serious risks to the marine environment or public health, and argued 
that vessels carrying these cargoes should also be escorted. One 
comment stated that additional regulations are needed to cover the 
transfer of hazardous substances not covered by the proposed 
regulations. The Coast Guard has determined that including hazardous 
material cargoes is outside the statutory authority of OPA 90. However, 
the Coast Guard will be seeking further comment on this issue as part 
of the ``other waters'' escort vessel rulemaking and may propose 
regulations to include certain hazardous material and or NLS cargoes 
under authority of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (33 U.S.C. 1221 
et seq.).
    7. Applicable waters. Twenty comments addressed what U.S. waters 
should be included under the escort regulations.
    For Prince William Sound, 12 comments stated that escorts should be 
continuously required all the way from Port Valdez to Hinchinbrook 
Entrance (including the mid-Sound region). Four comments stated that 
escorts should only be required at Port Valdez and Hinchinbrook 
Entrance but not in mid-Sound because there is enough sea room in mid-
Sound for a tanker to safely drift while waiting for the arrival of 
assist tugs dispatched from Port Valdez. The Coast Guard agrees that 
escorts are appropriate for all regions of Prince William Sound, and 
the rule so provides.
    For the Puget Sound escort zone, the NPRM proposed a western 
boundary of longitude 123 deg.24.5' West, but excluded tankers 
transiting to and from the Ediz Hook anchorage of Port Angeles (which 
would require them to skirt just inside that boundary). Three comments 
suggested moving the western boundary of the escort zone to the 
entrance to the Straits of Juan de Fuca (Cape Flattery), while 2 
comments suggested moving the western boundary eastwards to coincide 
with the existing escort zone established by Washington state. One 
comment suggested the applicable area be extended to the Ediz Hook 
anchorage adjacent to the Port Angeles Harbor. As a result of comments, 
this rule revises the western boundary by shifting it approximately 11 
nautical miles eastwards to include the U.S. waters east of the line 
connecting New Dungeness Light (Washington) with Discovery Island Light 
(Canada). This new boundary location therefore coincides with the 
existing Federal boundary line governing maximum tanker size in Puget 
Sound waters (33 CFR 161.143), as well as the boundary line for 
escorting as required by the existing Washington state regulations. 
This change still excludes the Ediz Hook anchorage.
    The remaining comments nominated additional waters besides Prince 
William Sound and Puget Sound, such as Cook Inlet, Alaska, and the 
Olympic coast, Washington. These comments will be considered in the 
separate ``other waters'' rulemaking project (CGD 91-202a).
    8. Number of escort vessels. One comment suggested that the Coast 
Guard define the required capabilities of an escort vessel rather than 
only specifying any particular number of escort vessels. Another 
comment supported the requirements for two escorts in Prince William 
Sound. Two comments suggested that smaller tankers be allowed to use 
only one escort vessel. Two comments disagreed with requiring the usage 
of two escort vessels and suggested that one would be adequate in most 
cases. OPA 90 requires a minimum of two escort vessels for the Prince 
William Sound and Puget Sound waters stipulated in the statute. 
Therefore, regulations for those waters which cite OPA 90 authority 
must incorporate this statutory minimum requirement.
    9. Relative positioning of escort vessels. Among other provisions, 
the NPRM proposed that the escort vessels be ``available in close 
proximity to the tanker at all times.'' Twelve comments addressed the 
issue of where the escort vessels should be positioned (relative to the 
tanker) during the escort transit. In lieu of a close proximity 
requirement, some comments suggested a specified maximum distance from 
the tanker, such as one-half mile. However, other comments argued that 
a specified distance was unnecessarily restrictive. The latter comments 
pointed out that the closer any vessel is to a tanker, the greater the 
risk of a collision. These comments argued that, in open waters, the 
escort vessel should have the flexibility to position itself at any 
safe distance as judged by its master, so long as it could still 
respond in a timely fashion. The Coast Guard agrees with the ``timely 
response'' approach, and has revised this rule accordingly. This will 
effectively require the tanker and escort vessel masters to 
continuously evaluate the situation and reposition themselves, as 
appropriate, at different points along the transit route. This does not 
preclude the escort vessels from remaining in the shelter of the 
tanker's lee if weather conditions and prudent seamanship warrant; the 
tanker should then adjust its speed to compensate for any delays before 
the escort vessels could move into position to render assistance in an 
emergency.
    10. Performance requirements. The NPRM proposed that the escort 
vessels be ``capable of providing sufficient maneuvering forces to 
substantially influence the speed and direction of travel of the 
tanker.'' Twelve comments addressed the issue of performance 
capabilities of the escort vessels. One comment recommended that a tug 
escort have the capability to push or tow a disabled ship away from the 
danger of grounding or collision. One comment suggested that tug 
escorts should have the ability to stop a disabled vessel within 10 
vessel lengths from the declaration of an emergency (this comment 
qualified its suggestion by recognizing that such a standard would be 
very dependent upon the harbor conditions). Another comment suggested 
that tug escorts be capable of meeting the demands of assisting the 
escorted tanker. Another comment contended that performance and design 
criteria for tug escorts will be dictated by an effective escort 
program, and suggested that local geography, local man-made hazards, 
and regulated vessel speeds be considered when developing tug escort 
capabilities criteria. Four comments addressed the performance 
standards as outlined in the NPRM. One comment suggested that 
performance standards should be geographically-specific. Two comments 
recommended that performance based criteria be coupled with the 
tanker's tonnage, weather, or sea conditions. Additionally, one comment 
was specifically concerned with weather conditions and suggested that 
oil tankers only be allowed to operate in Prince William Sound when 
weather conditions would permit safe operation of the tug escorts. This 
comment further suggested that the realistic adverse weather limits for 
safe escorting operations is approximately 40-knot wind speed in 10-
foot seas. Another comment generally supported the performance-based 
criteria as proposed in the NPRM, but suggested that operating 
parameters also be considered.
    The Coast Guard agrees that performance requirements should be more 
detailed. Accordingly, Sec. 168.50 of this rule has been revised to 
include towing, stopping, holding, and turning requirements for 
controlling a tanker within specified parameters under various failure 
and weather scenarios, and to require that the tanker not be operated 
beyond a speed at which the escort vessels can reasonably be expected 
to bring it safely under control within the navigational limits of the 
waterway. The requirements were developed after reviewing several 
tanker/tug maneuvering studies that were submitted to the docket, and 
considering that the largest tankers in Prince William Sound are about 
265,000 DWT (deadweight tons) and the largest in the Puget Sound waters 
are 125,000 DWT.
    The underlying basis of the performance requirements is to: (1) 
Ensure sufficient power to perform a rescue tow of a tanker (or to 
substantially reduce its drift rate in severe winds); and (2) provide 
steering and stopping forces that are equivalent to what the tanker 
could do itself (with its own steering and propulsion system) at a 
speed of 6 knots. The Coast Guard believes that, in conjunction with an 
appropriate tanker speed during the transit, both conventional tugs and 
tractor tugs that meet the performance requirements can reasonably be 
expected to safely accomplish effective emergency control of disabled 
tankers. Discussion of the specific performance requirements is as 
follows:
    Towing: The regulations require an escort vessel to be capable of 
towing the tanker at 4 knots in calm conditions and hold it in a steady 
position against a 45-knot headwind.
    Stopping: The regulations require that the escort vessel(s) be able 
to stop the tanker within the same distance that the tanker would have 
been able to crash-stop itself from a speed of 6 knots using its own 
propulsion system.
    Holding on steady course: The regulations require that the escort 
vessel(s) be able to hold the tanker on a steady course against a 35-
degree locked rudder at 6 knots. This means that the escort vessels 
must be able to apply a counteractive turning moment equal and opposite 
to the turning moment generated by the locked rudder, taking into 
consideration the geometry of the escort vessel's applied force on the 
tanker's hull (points of application, angle of assist, etc.).
    Turning: The regulations require that the escort vessel(s) be able 
to turn the tanker 90 degrees, assuming a free-swinging rudder and an 
initial speed of 6 knots, in the same distance (advance and transfer) 
as it would have been able to turn itself using a hard-over rudder. The 
geometry of the escort vessels' applied forces on the tanker must 
similarly be taken into consideration.
    These requirements are based upon the 6-knot maneuvering 
characteristics of the tanker because this is the upper speed limit at 
which conventional tugs can safely make connections to the tanker. 
However, the Coast Guard recognizes that not all steering or propulsion 
failures will require immediate intervention by the escort vessels. In 
many instances, there could be enough sea room in the waterway for the 
tanker to safely drift to a stop without assistance from escort 
vessels. The regulations, therefore, allow a tanker to transit at any 
speed provided that there is sufficient sea room to accommodate the 
disabled tanker's travel (advance and transfer) until it has naturally 
slowed down to the speed where the escort vessels can move in and bring 
it under control. For example, a tanker can make a transit at 10 knots 
if there is adequate sea room on both sides of its trackline to 
tolerate a locked rudder at that speed. In a constrained waterway, 
however, or in adverse weather conditions, prudent seamanship may 
require the tanker to reduce its transit speed, or expand the 
performance capabilities of its escort vessels (such as by adding 
another escort vessel, pre-tethering, etc.), or both.
    11. Other operational requirements. One comment concerning other 
operational requirements suggested that escort vessels be required to 
be pre-tethered to a tanker before entering especially constrained 
waterways (the hazard presented by Middle Rock in Valdez Narrows was 
specifically mentioned as an example). Although the Coast Guard agrees 
that, under certain conditions, pre-tethering may be appropriate, it 
may not be necessary under other circumstances. Pre-tethering may 
entail a safety risk to the escort vessel and its crew; it should be 
viewed as an option that the tanker and escort vessel masters may 
utilize after discussing the sea and weather conditions at the 
anticipated time of transit.
    Six comments on other operational requirements urged that specific 
speed limits be set as part of the regulations; however, three comments 
disagreed. The Coast Guard also does not agree that specific speed 
limits are necessary because Sec. 168.50(a)(3) requires that a tanker 
not be operated beyond a speed at which the escort vessels can 
reasonably be expected to safely bring the tanker under control.
    12. Escort plans. The NPRM proposed that escort vessel operators 
prepare written information on the capabilities of their vessels and 
submit the information to the local Coast Guard Captain of the Port 
(COTP) for review and approval. The approved information would then be 
used by the tanker master to select escort vessels during the pre-
escort conference. Ten comments recommended requiring tanker-specific 
escort plans rather than escort vessel-specific plans (on the argument 
that the appropriate approach to escort vessel selection must be based 
on the needs of the tanker rather than the abilities of the escort 
vessels). Two comments suggested alternatives to selecting the escort 
vessels at the pre-escort conference: one comment recommended that the 
Coast Guard COTP be responsible for prior approval and designation, and 
the other comment recommended that each affected port establish a 
clearinghouse for certified escort vessels.
    Because the regulations contain specific performance criteria, and 
because the responsibility for selecting appropriate escort vessels is 
on the tanker owners or operators, the Coast Guard has reconsidered its 
originally proposed requirement for submittal and approval of written 
escort plans, and decided that there is no longer any need. Tanker and 
escort vessel owners or operators can work together to match tanker 
needs with escort vessel capabilities without Coast Guard 
participation. Tanker owners or operators can make arrangements for 
appropriate escort vessels in advance of the tanker's arrival, and 
retain the flexibility of making those arrangements in several ways, 
such as pre-contracting, establishing local clearinghouses of escort 
vessels, etc. Therefore, the NPRM's original requirement for submittal 
of written escort plans has been deleted.
    13. Pre-escort conference. The NPRM originally had two purposes for 
the pre-escort conference: (1) for the tanker master to determine the 
suitability of the escort vessels (on the basis of written information 
submitted at the conference); and (2) a joint conference for the tanker 
master, pilot and escort vessel masters to discuss and plan the escort 
transit.
    Eight comments were received concerning the pre-escort conference. 
In general, the comments agreed that it could be used for exchanging 
safety and tactical information between the tanker master, pilot, and 
escort vessel masters. One comment noted that the current briefing 
practice in Washington state is sufficient. However, four comments 
pointed out that the conference, as proposed, would occur too late to 
actually select the escort vessels. Rejection of an escort vessel at 
that point could lead to tanker delays and congestion while waiting for 
a replacement escort. They argued that dispatching several escort 
vessels to meet a tanker, of which only two or three would be selected, 
would waste the time and expense of the non-selected vessels. Two 
comments were concerned that lengthy pre-escort conferences would 
similarly cause delays and congestion. Further, one of the comments 
indicated that this would cause undesirable economic pressure for the 
vessel master and pilot.
    The Coast Guard recognizes that the pre-escort conference may be 
too late for selecting or rejecting the escort vessels. As previously 
discussed in paragraph (4), escort vessel selection is now the 
responsibility of the tanker owner or operators. This will allow them 
to make arrangements for appropriate escort vessels in advance of the 
tanker's arrival (or departure, if outbound).
    Section 168.10 has been revised to reflect the changed 
responsibilities for selecting escort vessels and to state more clearly 
the purpose of the conference and the topics to be discussed.
    14. Additional mission requirements. Fourteen comments addressed 
additional mission requirements for the escort vessels, nominating 
firefighting, salvage, lightering, and pollution response capabilities 
(the spill response capability of the Alyeska Pipeline Service 
Company's Ship Escort and Response Vessel System (SERVS) vessels in 
escort service in Prince William Sound were specifically mentioned). 
One comment stated that spill containment and firefighting are 
excessive secondary functions that the escort should not be expected to 
perform. The Coast Guard has determined that none of these capabilities 
can be easily retrofitted aboard the existing fleet of tugs, which will 
make up the bulk of the escort vessel resources. This is because most 
tugs do not have sufficient deck area to accommodate the additional 
mission equipment, nor sufficient above-water height (and associated 
stability) to serve as effective firefighting platforms. However, the 
regulations do not preclude using vessels with such capabilities if 
they are available.
    15. Coordination with vessel response plans (VRPs). Five comments 
suggested coordination of the escort regulations with the special 
vessel response plan (VRP) requirements for tank vessels operating in 
Prince William Sound, as required by section 5005 of OPA 90 and the 
Interim Final Rule for vessel response plans (58 FR 7376, February 5, 
1993). One of these special VRP requirements is to provide ``escort 
vessels with skimming capability.'' The concern of the comments is that 
there will be two Federal definitions of ``escort vessel:'' one 
definition in the VRP regulations (which would include skimming 
requirements), and the other definition in the escort vessel 
regulations (without any skimming requirements). This could lead to 
confusion or unnecessary expense.
    The Coast Guard agrees that there should be a single, consistent 
definition of ``escort vessel'' throughout all the OPA 90 rulemakings. 
The intent of the special VRP requirement is for a vessel with skimming 
(response) capability to accompany a laden tanker across Prince William 
Sound. The Coast Guard has determined that this is a spill response 
capability that is separate from the emergency control measures that 
the escort vessels are intended to provide under this rulemaking. 
Accordingly, the final rule for the VRP rulemaking will be revised by 
eliminating the term ``escort vessel'' and substituting in its place 
the term ``escorting response vessel.'' As previously noted, this does 
not preclude a single, appropriately-equipped vessel from fulfilling 
both requirements (escorting and skimming) in Prince William Sound.
    16. Prince William Sound Disabled Tanker Towing Study. Nine 
comments were received suggesting that the escort regulations should be 
postponed until completion of the Prince William Sound Disabled Tanker 
Towing Study (DTTS), in order to benefit from the findings of that 
study.
    At this time the Coast Guard has reviewed Part 1 of the DTTS, as 
well as several other technical studies concerning escorting and 
control of disabled tankers, and expects that the regulations will be 
supported by the final DTTS results. Therefore, the Coast Guard 
believes that it can now move ahead with this rulemaking.
    17. Discussion of other comments. Two comments suggested that the 
Vessel Traffic Systems (VTS) be expanded instead of requiring escort 
vessels. One comment, however, disagreed with the usage of the VTS 
system, saying that such a system failed in the EXXON VALDEZ disaster; 
this comment suggested using another emergency towing arrangement. Two 
comments recommended that VTS control be employed for small tallow 
tankers. Further, one of these comments suggested that when such 
employment is not feasible, a single escort should be used. The Coast 
Guard does not agree that a VTS can substitute for the immediate, on-
site assistance that an escort vessel can provide. It should be noted 
that the VTS and escort vessel requirements of OPA 90 are separate, and 
the use of one does not obviate the need for the other.
    One comment recommended that the Coast Guard should ensure 
construction of double hull U.S. flag vessels which have a redundant 
propulsion system. The Coast Guard has determined that this is beyond 
the scope of the escort vessel rulemaking.

Assessment

    Because of substantial public interest, this rule is a significant 
regulatory action under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and has 
been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget under that order. 
It requires an assessment of potential costs and benefits under section 
6(a)(3) of that order. It is significant under the regulatory policies 
and procedures of the Department of Transportation (44 FR 11040; 
February 26, 1979). A final Assessment is available in the docket for 
inspection or copying where indicated under ADDRESSES.

Summary of Final Assessment

    Certain oil tankers transiting through both Prince William Sound 
and Puget Sound are already subject to state-level escort requirements. 
The final Assessment for this rulemaking evaluates the economic impact 
of the proposed Federal regulations by analyzing the incremental cost 
increases beyond the costs already incurred due to the state 
regulations. In Prince William Sound, the crude oil tankers operating 
out of Port Valdez are already escorted in accordance with the Alyeska 
Pipeline Service Company contingency plan which was approved by the 
State of Alaska. Therefore, there is not much incremental impact from 
the Federal regulations: only approximately six tankers per year 
deliver refined products to the Navy fuel depot at Whittier (these 
tankers are not required to be escorted under Alaska regulations). In 
Puget Sound, an estimated 1,256 tanker transits per year are affected: 
approximately 879 transits where one escort vessel is already engaged 
(under Washington state regulations) will now require at least one 
additional escort vessel to meet the Federal regulations. Also, because 
the Federal regulations encompass tankers down to 5,000 GT 
(approximately 10,000 DWT), an estimated 377 additional tanker transits 
per year will now require at least two escort vessels (these tankers 
presently do not require any escorts because the Washington state 
regulations only extend down to 40,000 DWT). Therefore, the regulations 
are estimated to initially increase vessel traffic by 12 escort vessel 
transits per year in Prince William Sound and 1,633 escort vessel 
transits per year in Puget Sound. However, these numbers will decline 
as single hull tankers are phased out of service.
    The OPA 90 phase-out schedule requires single hull tankers to be 
removed from service by 2010, but allows certain tankers with double 
sides or double bottoms to remain in service until 2015. Because it was 
not possible to project how many tankers of each design (single-hulled, 
double-bottomed, or double-sided) will be in service over the next 20 
years, the Assessment assumes that all tankers subject to this 
rulemaking are single-hulled (i.e., will be removed from service by 
2010). Therefore, the incremental escort vessel cost to the oil tanker 
industry will decrease to zero by that year. The Assessment 
conservatively assumes the same phase out schedule as used for the 
Regulatory Evaluation of the double hull rulemaking, although tanker 
owners or operators in these waters may choose to replace their single 
hull tankers at an earlier time.
    As a result of comments to the NPRM, the regulations have been 
revised in certain respects. These revisions also affect some of the 
economic assumptions and calculations in the original preliminary 
Regulatory Evaluation. Accordingly, the final Assessment has been 
revised as follows:
    (1) Certain costs have been recalculated, using new cost data for 
escort vessel services. The Assessment assumes the average cost of an 
escort vessel is $1,350 per hour;
    (2) New costs have been added, recognizing that tanker owners or 
operators may have to conduct various sea trials and computer 
simulation studies (in order to determine the maneuvering and control 
characteristics of their tankers). Even though this information is not 
directly required by regulation, it is still an indirect cost that will 
be borne by industry;
    (3) The benefit analysis has been significantly revised (discussed 
later);
    (4) Costs and benefits have been recalculated at a 7 percent 
discount rate, in order to be consistent with current OMB directives 
and other OPA 90 regulatory assessments (the original preliminary 
Regulatory Evaluation discounted all costs at 10 percent).
    In Prince William Sound, the Assessment estimates that the 
incremental escort cost is $94,500 per tanker transit from Hinchinbrook 
Entrance to Whittier (via Bligh Reef pilot station) and return, using 
two escort vessels dispatched from Port Valdez. This cost-per-transit 
is relatively high because the tanker must pay for the total round-trip 
dispatch time of the escort vessels. Because these tankers are operated 
or chartered by the Navy, the escort costs will ultimately be borne by 
the U.S. Government (Department of Defense).
    In Puget Sound, the Assessment assumes that there is sufficient 
inbound or outbound tanker traffic such that a tanker will only be 
paying for one-way dispatch time of the escort vessels. However, unlike 
Prince William Sound, there are several possible destination terminals 
in Puget Sound; accordingly, escorted transit times range from 1 to 7 
hours. Therefore, the average cost-per-transit is estimated to be 
$6,750 (5 hrs at approximately $1,350 per hour) for all tankers, in 
1994 dollars.
    The Assessment estimates that the first-year cost of the 
regulations (1995) will be $11.4 million, and the total discounted 
program cost (1995 to 2015) will be $57.7 million, in 1990 dollars. The 
tanker industry can reduce these costs by switching to double-hulled 
tankers earlier than assumed in the Assessment, or it can increase 
these costs by continuing to use double-sided or double-bottomed 
tankers after 2010.
    The original preliminary Regulatory Evaluation attempted to 
statistically estimate the benefits of the regulations. The Coast Guard 
has subsequently determined that there is no statistical basis for such 
estimations without making extreme assumptions of debatable validity. 
This is because the occurrence of a steering or propulsion failure is 
not related to the size of the tanker or its cargo capacity. Further, 
such failures do not necessarily result in a collision or grounding, 
nor do collisions or groundings necessarily result in rupture of cargo 
tank(s). And even if a tank were ruptured, there is no predicting the 
actual amount of outflow that would occur.
    Therefore, the final Assessment makes a presumption of 
effectiveness by assuming that the regulations would avert at least one 
collision or grounding that would otherwise spill 300,000 barrels of 
oil (This is derived from the approximate capacity of two cargo tanks 
on a midsize oil tanker of 80,000 DWT.). This averted oil spill could 
occur at any time during the 15-year period from 1995 (the first full 
year that the regulations will be in effect) to 2010 (when the last 
single hull oil tanker is phased out of service).
    The monetary benefits of these regulations include avoided cleanup 
costs, third-party compensation (lost earnings to fishermen, etc.) and 
natural resource damages. Historically, these costs have varied 
enormously from spill to spill because of the great range of factors 
affecting the impact of oil spills, such as type of product, 
environment, time of year, location, and weather conditions. 
Accordingly, it is not possible to establish a definitive monetized 
(dollar) benefit value for unspilled oil. Therefore, the Assessment 
does not perform benefit calculations using dollar amounts. Instead, it 
uses the unspilled oil quantity, discounted at 7 percent back to 1990 
barrels. If the averted 300,000 barrel spill were assumed to occur in 
1995, the discounted quantity would be 213,896 barrels. If it were 
assumed to occur in 2010, the discounted quantity would be 77,526 
barrels.
    Accordingly, the final Assessment has determined that the cost of 
these regulations ranges from $270 to $744 per discounted barrel of 
unspilled oil.

Small Entities

    The Coast Guard has evaluated the impact of this rulemaking on 
small entities in accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 
U.S.C. 601 et seq.). The small entity impact analysis is incorporated 
into the final Assessment for this rulemaking.
    In response to the NPRM and public hearings, only six comments have 
been received to date concerning the impact of escort regulations on 
small businesses. The comments stated that the regulations would have 
detrimental economic impact on small businesses in the Puget Sound 
region if tallow and vegetable oil cargoes were included. However, the 
regulations do not include non-petroleum oil cargoes.
    The Coast Guard has determined that most of the tankers that are 
affected by the regulation in Prince William Sound and Puget Sound are 
owned either by oil companies or large shipping corporations. Since few 
small entities will be affected, the Coast Guard certifies under 
section 605(b) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) 
that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.

Collection of Information

    This rule contains no collection-of-information requirements under 
the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). The original NPRM 
contained collection of information requirements in the form of written 
information that had to be prepared by escort vessel operators and 
submitted to the local Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP). As 
discussed elsewhere, the requirement has been deleted.

Federalism

    The Coast Guard has analyzed this rule under the principles and 
criteria contained in Executive Order 12612 and has determined that 
this rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant 
the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.
    This rule establishes standards and requirements for the escort of 
single hull tankers over 5,000 GT in Prince William Sound, Alaska and 
Puget Sound (and certain associated waters around Puget Sound), 
Washington. The authority to regulate such traffic is delegated to the 
Coast Guard by the Secretary of Transportation whose authority is 
committed by statute.
    While these regulations establish minimal requirements for escort 
of certain tanker traffic through these designated areas, the Coast 
Guard does not intend to preempt the states from issuing more stringent 
requirements provided they are not in direct conflict with Federal law 
or this rulemaking.

Environment

    The Coast Guard considered the environmental impact of this 
rulemaking and concluded that the preparation of an Environmental 
Impact statement is not necessary. An Environmental Assessment and a 
Finding of No Significant Impact are available in the docket for 
inspection or copying where indicated under ADDRESSES.
    The primary effect of the regulation will be a reduction in the 
probability of petroleum oil spills in Puget and Prince William Sounds. 
The only other impact will be a minor increase in vessel traffic 
(escort vessels) moving through Puget and Prince William Sounds: the 
estimated 1,276 additional escort vessel transits per year represent an 
average of 3 to 4 additional vessels per day; this will decrease as 
single hull tankers are phased out of service.

List of Subjects in 33 CFR Part 168

    Cargo vessels, Navigation (water), Oil pollution, Water pollution 
control.

    For the reasons set out in the preamble, the Coast Guard adds 33 
CFR part 168 as follows:

PART 168--ESCORT REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN TANKERS

Sec.
168.01  Purpose.
168.05  Definitions.
168.10  Responsibilities.
168.20  Applicable vessels.
168.30  Applicable cargoes.
168.40  Applicable waters and number of escort vessels.
168.50  Performance and operational requirements.
168.60  Pre-escort conference.

    Authority: Section 4116(c), Pub. L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 520 (46 
U.S.C. 3703 note).


Sec. 168.01  Purpose.

    (a) This part prescribes regulations in accordance with section 
4116(c) of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) (Pub. L. 101-380). 
The regulations will reduce the risk of oil spills from laden, single 
hull tankers over 5,000 GT by requiring that these tankers be escorted 
by at least two suitable escort vessels. The escort vessels will be 
immediately available to influence the tankers' speed and course in the 
event of a steering or propulsion equipment failure, thereby reducing 
the possibility of groundings or collisions.
    (b) The regulations in this part establish minimum escort vessel 
requirements. Nothing in these regulations should be construed as 
relieving the master of a tanker from the duty to operate the vessel in 
a safe and prudent manner, taking into account the navigational 
constraints of the waterways to be traversed, other vessel traffic, and 
anticipated weather, tide, and sea conditions, which may require 
reduced speeds, greater assistance from escort vessels, or other 
operational precautions.


Sec. 168.05  Definitions.

    As used in this part--
    Disabled tanker means a tanker experiencing a loss of propulsion or 
steering control.
    Escort transit means that portion of the tanker's voyage through 
waters where escort vessels are required.
    Escort vessel means any vessel that is assigned and dedicated to a 
tanker during the escort transit, and that is fendered and outfitted 
with towing gear as appropriate for its role in an emergency response 
to a disabled tanker.
    Laden means transporting in bulk any quantity of applicable cargo, 
except for clingage and residue in otherwise empty cargo tanks.
    Single hull tanker means any self-propelled tank vessel that is not 
constructed with both double bottom and double sides in accordance with 
the provisions of 33 CFR 157.10d.
    Tanker master means the licensed onboard person in charge of the 
tanker.
    Tanker owner or operator means the owner or shoreside organization 
(individual, corporation, partnership, or association), including a 
demise charterer, responsible for the overall management and operation 
of the tanker.


Sec. 168.10  Responsibilities.

    (a) The tanker owner or operator shall:
    (1) select escort vessels that can meet the performance 
requirements of this part; and
    (2) inform the tanker master of the performance capabilities of the 
selected escort vessels. This information must be provided to the 
master before beginning the escort transit.
    (b) The tanker master shall operate the tanker within the 
performance capabilities of the escort vessels, taking into account 
speed, sea and weather conditions, navigational considerations, and 
other factors that may change or arise during the escort transit.
    (c) In an emergency, the tanker master may deviate from the 
requirements of this part to the extent necessary to avoid endangering 
persons, property, or the environment, but shall immediately report the 
deviation to the cognizant Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP).


Sec. 168.20  Applicable vessels.

    The requirements of this part apply to laden, single hull tankers 
of 5,000 gross tons or more.


Sec. 168.30  Applicable cargoes.

    The requirements of this part apply to any petroleum oil listed in 
46 CFR Table 30.25-1 as a pollution category I cargo.


Sec. 168.40  Applicable waters and number of escort vessels.

    The requirements of this part apply to the following waters:
    (a) Prince William Sound: Each tanker to which this part applies 
must be escorted by at least two escort vessels in those navigable 
waters of the United States within Prince William Sound, Alaska, and 
the adjoining tributaries, bays, harbors, and ports, including the 
navigable waters of the United States within a line drawn from Cape 
Hinchinbrook Light, to Seal Rocks Light, to a point on Montague Island 
at 60 deg.14.6' North, 146 deg.59' West, and the waters of Montague 
Strait east of a line between Cape Puget and Cape Cleare.
    (b) Puget Sound and certain associated waters: Each tanker to which 
this part applies must be escorted by at least two escort vessels in 
those navigable waters of the United States and Washington State east 
of a line connecting New Dungeness Light with Discovery Island Light 
and all points in the Puget Sound area north and south of these lights. 
This area includes all the navigable waters of the United States within 
Haro Strait, Rosario Strait, the Strait of Georgia, Puget Sound, and 
Hood Canal, as well as those portions of the Strait of Juan de Fuca 
east of the New Dungeness-Discovery Island line.


Sec. 168.50  Performance and operational requirements.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of Sec. 168.10, at all 
times during the escort transit each tanker to which this part applies:
    (1) Must be accompanied by escort vessels that meet the performance 
requirements of paragraph (b) of this section (but not less than the 
number of escorts required by Sec. 168.40).
    (2) Must have the escort vessels positioned relative to the tanker 
such that timely response to a propulsion or steering failure can be 
effected.
    (3) Must not exceed a speed beyond which the escort vessels can 
reasonably be expected to safely bring the tanker under control within 
the navigational limits of the waterway, taking into consideration 
ambient sea and weather conditions, surrounding vessel traffic, 
hazards, and other factors that may reduce the available sea room.
    (b) The escort vessels, acting singly or jointly in any combination 
as needed, and considering their applied force vectors on the tanker's 
hull, must be capable of--
    (1) Towing the tanker at 4 knots in calm conditions, and holding it 
in steady position against a 45-knot headwind;
    (2) Stopping the tanker within the same distance that it could 
crash-stop itself from a speed of 6 knots using its own propulsion 
system;
    (3) Holding the tanker on a steady course against a 35-degree 
locked rudder at a speed of 6 knots; and
    (4) Turning the tanker 90 degrees, assuming a free-swinging rudder 
and a speed of 6 knots, within the same distance (advance and transfer) 
that it could turn itself with a hard-over rudder.


Sec. 168.60  Pre-escort conference.

    (a) Before commencing an escort transit, the tanker master shall 
confer, by radio or in person, with the tanker pilot and the masters of 
the escort vessels regarding the escort operation.
    (b) The purpose of the pre-escort conference is for all parties to 
plan and discuss particulars of the escort transit.
    (c) At a minimum, the following topics must be addressed during the 
pre-escort conference:
    (1) The destination, route, planned speed, other vessel traffic, 
anticipated weather, tide, and sea conditions, and other navigational 
considerations;
    (2) The type and operational status of communication, towing, 
steering, and propulsion equipment on the tanker and escort vessels;
    (3) The relative positioning and reaction time for the escort 
vessels to move into assist positions, including, if appropriate, pre-
tethering the escort vessels at crucial points along the route;
    (4) The preparations required on the tanker and escort vessels, and 
the methods employed in making an emergency towline connection, 
including stationing of deck crews, preparation of messenger lines, 
bridles, and other towing gear, and energizing appropriate deck 
equipment;
    (5) The manner in which an emergency towline connection would be 
made (which escort vessel will respond, how messengers and towlines 
will be passed, etc.);
    (6) Other relevant information provided by the tanker master, pilot 
or escort vessel masters.

    Dated: August 12, 1994.
Robert E. Kramek,
Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant.
[FR Doc. 94-20364 Filed 8-18-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-14-P