[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 159 (Thursday, August 18, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-20261]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: August 18, 1994]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-280, 50-281, 50-338, 50-339]

 

Virginia Electric and Power Company (Surry Power Station Units 1 
and 2) (North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2); Exemption

I

    Virginia Electric and Power Company (the licensee) is the holder of 
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37, which authorize 
operation of the Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2, and NPF-4 and NPF-
7, which authorize operation of the North Anna Power Station Units 1 
and 2. The licenses provide, among other things, that the licensee is 
subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or 
hereafter in effect.
    The facilities consist of two pressurized water reactors at each of 
the licensee's two sites, Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2, located in 
Surry County, Virginia, and North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2, 
located in Louisa County, Virginia.

II

    Title 10 CFR 73.55, ``Requirements for physical protection of 
licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological 
sabotage,'' paragraph (a), in part, states that ``The licensee shall 
establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and 
security organization which will have as its objective to provide high 
assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not 
inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an 
unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.''
    10 CFR 73.55(d), ``Access Requirements,'' paragraph (1), specifies 
that ``The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle 
access into a protected area.'' 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) requires that ``A 
numbered picture badge identification system shall be used for all 
individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without 
escort.'' 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) also states that an individual not 
employed by the licensee (i.e., contractors) may be authorized access 
to protected areas without escort provided the individual ``receives a 
picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be 
returned upon exit from the protected area * * *''
    The licensee proposed to implement an alternative unescorted access 
control system which would eliminate the need to issue and retrieve 
badges at each entrance/exit location and would allow all individuals 
with unescorted access to keep their badge with them when departing the 
site.
    An exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to allow 
contractors who have unescorted access to take their badges offsite 
instead of returning them when exiting the site. By letter dated May 
27, 1994, the licensee requested an exemption from certain requirements 
of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) for this purpose.

III

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission 
may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own 
initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the 
regulations in this part as it determines are authorized by law and 
will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, 
and are otherwise in the public interest. Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the 
Commission may authorize a licensee to provide alternative measures for 
protection against radiological sabotage provided the licensee 
demonstrates that the alternative measures have ``the same high 
assurance objective'' and meet ``the general performance requirements'' 
of the regulation, and ``the overall level of system performance 
provides protection against radiological sabotage equivalent'' to that 
which would be provided by the regulation.
    Currently, employee and contractor identification badges, coupled 
with their associated access control cards, are issued and retrieved on 
the occasion of each entry to and exit from the protected areas of the 
Surry and North Anna sites. Station security personnel are required to 
maintain control of the badges while the individuals are offsite. This 
practice has been in effect at the Surry and North Anna Power Stations 
since each operating license was issued. Security personnel retain each 
identification badge, as well as the associated access control card, 
when not in use by the authorized individual, within appropriately 
designed storage receptacles inside a bullet-resistant enclosure. An 
individual who meets the access authorization requirements is issued an 
individual picture identification card and an individual access control 
card which allows entry into preauthorized areas of the station. While 
entering the plant in the present configuration, an authorized 
individual is ``screened'' by the required detection equipment and by 
the issuing security officer. Having received the badge, the individual 
proceeds to the access portal, inserts the access control card into the 
card reader, enters a personal identification number (PIN), and passes 
through the turnstile which unlocks if the preset criteria are met. 
Once inside the station, the individual's PIN is not required in order 
to further utilize the access authorization card.
    This present procedure is labor intensive since security personnel 
are required to verify badge issuance, ensure badge retrieval, and 
maintain the badges in orderly storage until the next entry into the 
protected area. The regulations permit employees to remove their badges 
from the site, but an exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to 
permit contractors to take their badges offsite instead of returning 
them when exiting the site.
    Under the proposed system, all individuals authorized to gain 
unescorted access will have the physical characteristics of their hand 
(hand geometry) recorded with their badge number. Since the hand 
geometry is unique to each individual and its application in the entry 
screening function would preclude unauthorized use of a badge, the 
requested exemption would allow employees and contractors to keep their 
badges at the time of exiting the protected area. The process of 
verifying badge issuance, ensuring badge retrieval, and maintaining 
badges could be eliminated while the balance of the access procedure 
would remain intact. Firearm, explosive, and metal detection equipment 
and provisions for conducting searches will remain as well. The 
security officer responsible for the last access control function 
(controlling admission to the protected area) will also remain isolated 
within a bullet-resistant structure in order to assure his or her 
ability to respond or to summon assistance.
    Use of a hand geometry biometrics system exceeds the present 
verification methodology's capability to discern an individual's 
identity. Unlike the photograph identification badge, hand geometry is 
nontransferable. During the initial access authorization or 
registration process, hand measurements are recorded and the tamplate 
is stored for subsequent use in the identity verification process 
required for entry into the protected area. Authorized individuals 
insert their access authorization card into the card reader and the 
biometrics system records an image of the hand geometry. The unique 
features of the newly recorded image are then compared to the template 
previously stored in the database. Access is ultimately granted based 
on the degree to which the characteristics of the image match those of 
the ``signature'' template.
    Since both the badge and hand geometry would be necessary for 
access into the protected area, the proposed system would provide for a 
positive verification process. Potential loss of a badge by an 
individual, as a result of taking the badge offsite, would not enable 
an unauthorized entry into protected areas.
    The access process will continue to be under the observation of 
security personnel. They system of identification badges coupled with 
their associated access control cards will continue to be used for all 
individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without 
escorts. Badges will continue to be displayed by all the individuals 
while inside the protected area. Addition of a hand geometry biometrics 
system will provide a significant contribution to effective 
implementation of the security plan at each site.

IV

    For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the NRC staff 
has determined that the proposed alternative measures for protection 
against radiological sabotage meet ``the same high assurance 
objective,'' and ``the general performance requirements'' of the 
regulation and that ``the overall level of system performance provides 
protection against radiological sabotage equivalent'' to that which 
would be provided by the regulation.
    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
73.5, an exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or 
property or common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public 
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Virginia Electric and 
Power Company an exemption from those requirements of 10 CFR 
73.55(d)(5) relating to the returning of picture badges upon exit from 
the protected area such that individuals not employed by the licensee, 
i.e., contractors, who are authorized unescorted access into the 
protected area, can take their badges offsite.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the 
quality of the human environment (59 FR 40927).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of August 1994.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Steven A. Varga,
Director, Division of Reactor Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 94-20261 Filed 8-17-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M