[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 149 (Thursday, August 4, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-19055]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: August 4, 1994]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
[Docket No. 92-48]

 

Avner Kauffman, M.D.; Denial of Application for Registration

    On April 7, 1992, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of 
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), issued an 
Order to Show Cause to Avner Kauffman, M.D., (Respondent), 12620 S. 
Harlem Avenue, Palos Heights, Illinois 60463. The Order to Show Cause 
sought to deny Respondent's application for a DEA Certificate of 
Registration, alleging that Respondent's registration would be 
inconsistent with the public interest as that term is used in 21 U.S.C. 
823(f).
    The Order to Show Cause asserted in part that Respondent's 
registration would be inconsistent with the public interest in light of 
his 1985 felony conviction for delivery of a controlled substance. 
Respondent's previous DEA Certificate of Registration was revoked by 
the DEA in September 1985. The Order to Show Cause further alleged that 
following the revocation of Respondent's DEA Certificate of 
Registration, he continued to prescribe controlled substances in 
violation of the Controlled Substances Act.
    Respondent, through counsel, requested a hearing on the allegations 
raised in the Order to Show Cause and the matter was placed on the 
docket of Administrative Law Judge Mary Ellen Bittner. On September 29 
and 30, 1992, a hearing was held in Chicago, Illinois. On September 22, 
1993, the administrative law judge issued her opinion, recommended 
ruling, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decision. Neither the 
Government nor Respondent filed exceptions to the recommended ruling. 
On October 22, 1993, the administrative law judge transmitted the 
record in this proceeding to the Administrator. Having considered the 
record in its entirety, and pursuant to 21 CFR 1316.67, the Deputy 
Administrator hereby issues his final order in this matter based upon 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth below.
    At the hearing, a lieutenant from the Illinois State Police 
testified that on January 27, 1984, he purchased 2.2 grams of cocaine 
from Respondent during an undercover investigation. The next contact 
between the two occurred on January 31, 1984, when the lieutenant spoke 
to Respondent on the telephone. During the conversation, Respondent 
informed the lieutenant that he would sell the lieutenant half an ounce 
of cocaine for $1,100. Respondent and the lieutenant met later that 
day, but Respondent was unable to deliver the cocaine as discussed. 
Respondent, however, gave the lieutenant six tablets of Seconal, a 
Schedule II controlled substance. Respondent did not conduct a physical 
examination of the lieutenant and the Seconal was not provided for any 
medical purpose. Additionally, Respondent offered to provide the 
lieutenant with Quaaludes, then a Schedule II controlled substance. 
During their meeting, Respondent also informed the lieutenant that he 
had once smuggled a kilogram of cocaine from Florida; had previously 
lost about $30,000 worth of cocaine in bad drug deals; and could obtain 
another kilogram of cocaine for $50,000 if the lieutenant were 
interested.
    The lieutenant and Respondent next spoke on February 1, 1984, to 
discuss another cocaine purchase. At a meeting later that night at 
Respondent's office, the lieutenant bought 14 grams of cocaine from 
Respondent for $1,100. During the meeting, Respondent commented on the 
quality of the cocaine and promised that it was better than the cocaine 
previously sold to the lieutenant. The lieutenant testified that this 
was the last time he purchased cocaine from Respondent, although he 
attempted additional undercover buys on several occasions.
    Respondent was arrested on February 9, 1984. Following his arrest, 
Respondent stated that he had purchased cocaine ``10-15'' times and had 
smoked cocaine. Respondent was indicted on March 2, 1984, on three 
counts of delivery of a controlled substance. Respondent pled guilty to 
one count and was sentenced on February 1, 1985, to three years 
probation and a $3,000 fine.
    As a result of his conviction, on March 23, 1984, the Illinois 
Department of Registration and Education summarily suspended 
Respondent's controlled substance license. In June 1985, Respondent 
entered into a Consent Agreement suspending Respondent's medical 
license but staying the suspension, placing him on probation and 
suspending his controlled substance license for five years. Respondent 
was further ordered to perform 120 hours of volunteer medical service 
for each year of probation, to continue psychiatric treatment, and to 
file biennial reports certifying compliance with these conditions. 
Based on his lack of state authorization to handle controlled 
substances, the then-Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration revoked Respondent's previous DEA Certificate of 
Registration, effective September 23, 1985.
    Respondent's Illinois Physician and Surgeon License expired on July 
31, 1987. He continued to practice medicine but did not renew his 
license until December 1988. In April 1990, the Illinois Department of 
Professional Regulation (IDPR) issued an order finding that Respondent 
had practiced medicine without a license, reprimanded him, and imposed 
a $1,000 fine. At the hearing in this matter, Respondent admitted that 
he had a made a mistake by not renewing his license immediately.
    Respondent filed an application for registration with the DEA on 
June 8, 1990. At that time, a DEA investigator conducted a pharmacy 
survey for the period 1988-1990. The investigator found that five 
prescriptions for controlled substances had been called in to local 
pharmacies, allegedly by Respondent, after his DEA Certificate of 
Registration was revoked. Some prescriptions contained the names and 
DEA registration numbers of other doctors and had Respondent's name 
crossed out on the prescription. One prescription contained 
Respondent's retired DEA registration number and another contained 
Respondent's revoked DEA registration number. Respondent testified 
during the hearing in this matter that he may have authorized the 
prescriptions and explained that he mistakenly thought that he was 
permitted to prescribe controlled substances. Respondent added that in 
late 1990, after consulting his attorney, he ``completely stopped'' 
authorizing prescriptions for controlled substances.
    An investigator with IDPR testified that in 1991 he began an 
investigation of Respondent after receiving a complaint from a local 
pharmacist. The pharmacist was concerned about Respondent's use of the 
non-controlled substance Stadol. The pharmacist found Respondent's 
purchases of Stadol unusual for a pediatrician. Testimony was presented 
at the hearing regarding Respondent's alleged misuse of Stadol. 
However, as the administrative law judge correctly noted, Stadol is not 
a controlled substance. Therefore, these allegations were not granted 
great weight by either the administrative law judge or the Deputy 
Administrator.
    Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a)(4), the Deputy 
Administrator may revoke a DEA Certificate of Registration or deny an 
application for registration if he determines that the registration 
would be inconsistent with the public interest. Section 823(f) requires 
that the following factors be considered: (1) The recommendation of the 
appropriate State licensing board or professional disciplinary 
authority; (2) the applicant's experience in dispensing, or conducting 
research with respect to controlled substances: (3) the applicant's 
conviction record under Federal or State laws relating to the 
manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of controlled substances; (4) 
compliance with applicable State, Federal or local laws relating to 
controlled substances; and, (5) such other conduct which may threaten 
the public health and safety.
    The Deputy Administrator may rely on any one or any combination of 
these factors when determining whether an application should be denied 
or a registration revoked. See Neveille H. Williams, D.D.S., 51 FR 
17556 (1986); Anne L. Hendricks, M.D. 51 FR 41030 (1986). The 
administrative law judge correctly found that all these factors were 
relevant to a determination of whether Respondent's registration would 
be in the public interest.
    The Deputy Administrator finds that the Illinois licensing board, 
IDPR, has taken action against Respondent on more than one occasion. 
IDPR summarily suspended Respondent's controlled substance license 
based on his felony conviction and later reprimanded him for practicing 
without a license. The Deputy Administrator also finds that 
Respondent's past conduct indicates a cavalier attitude towards the 
dispensing and prescribing of controlled substances. Providing the 
undercover officer with Seconal for no legitimate medical purpose 
reveals a serious lack of judgment, as does Respondent's explanation 
for his continued prescribing of controlled substances following the 
revocation of his DEA Certificate of Registration. Respondent's felony 
conviction for distribution of cocaine again evidences a dangerous 
indifference for the law. This conviction, along with Respondent's 
failure to abide by DEA regulations, proves that Respondent cannot be 
trusted to comply with laws relating to controlled substances.
    The Deputy Administrator agrees with the administrative law judge 
that, after considering the applicable factors pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 
823(f), Respondent's registration would not be in the public interest 
and adopts her recommended decision in its entirety. Accordingly, the 
Deputy Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, pursuant 
to the authority vested in him by 21 U.S.C. 823 and 824 and 28 CFR 
0.100(b) and 0.104 (59 FR 23637), hereby orders that Avner Kauffman's 
application for registration be, and it hereby is, denied. This order 
is effective August 4, 1994.


    Dated: July 28, 1994.
Stephen H. Greene,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 94-19055 Filed 8-3-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-M