[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 146 (Monday, August 1, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-18638]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: August 1, 1994]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 73

RIN 3150-AE81

 

Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power 
Plants

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Action: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its 
physical protection regulations for operating nuclear power reactors. 
The amendments modify the design basis threat for radiological sabotage 
to include use of a land vehicle by adversaries for transporting 
personnel and their hand-carried equipment to the proximity of vital 
areas and to include a land vehicle bomb. The amendments also require 
reactor licensees to install vehicle control measures, including 
vehicle barrier systems, to protect against the malevolent use of a 
land vehicle. The Commission believes this action is prudent based on 
an evaluation of an intrusion incident at the Three Mile Island (TMI) 
nuclear power station and a bombing of the World Trade Center. The 
objective of this final rule is to enhance reactor safety by protecting 
against the use of a vehicle to gain unauthorized proximity to vital 
areas. Further, the amendments will enhance reactor safety by 
protecting vital equipment from damage by detonation of a large 
explosive charge at the point of vehicle denial.

EFFECTIVE DATE: August 31, 1994.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Phillip F. McKee, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, 
telephone (301) 504-2933.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On November 4, 1993 (58 FR 58804), the Commission published a 
proposed rule in the Federal Register for public comment that presented 
amendments to the physical protection requirements for operating 
commercial nuclear power reactors. The amendments proposed to modify 
the design basis threat for radiological sabotage to include use of a 
land vehicle by adversaries for transporting personnel, hand-carried 
equipment, and/or explosives. A total of 35 letters of public comment 
were received from respondents representing more than 160 individual 
comments. Comments received in association with a public meeting 
conducted by the NRC on May 10, 1993, on this same topic have also been 
analyzed as part of this final rulemaking. An additional 11 comments 
were received as a result of the meeting, representing an additional 38 
individual comments. Written comments received from the Advisory 
Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) and public comments made at a 
February 10, 1994, meeting of the ACRS are also addressed under the 
following analysis. Copies of the public comments received on this 
proposed rule are available for inspection and copying for a fee at the 
NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW (Lower Level), Washington, 
DC.

Public Comment Analysis

General

    Public comment on the rule was received from 25 licensees that 
operate commercial nuclear power reactors; two industry groups, the 
Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) and the Nuclear 
Utility Backfitting and Reform Group (NUBARG); two public citizens and 
one citizen's group, Ohio Citizen's for Responsible Energy; two 
advocacy groups, the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) and the Committee 
to Bridge the Gap; one State nuclear safety agency; and two vendors.
    Additional comments were received as a result of an NRC-sponsored 
public meeting of May 10, 1993. Comments were received from eight 
private citizens (the letter from one enclosed a petition signed by 40 
individuals); two utilities; and one public interest group, Ohio 
Citizens for Responsible Energy. The proposed rule indicated that 
comments regarding malevolent use of vehicles submitted in association 
with the meeting would be treated under this final rule and that 
duplicate comments need not be submitted. Many of these respondents 
recommended strengthening the design basis threat to cover the maximum 
credible threat and increasing the number of security force members at 
power reactor sites as the best method to counter a terrorist vehicle 
bomb attack. The aforementioned petition, submitted to the Chairman of 
the NRC, indicated, among other things, that Congress should strengthen 
safeguards at nuclear facilities and should legislate the use of 
Federal guards at NRC-licensed sites. Comments received from 2 
utilities that operate commercial nuclear power reactors either 
indicated support for the then-developing NUMARC comments or were 
similar to comments received on the proposed rule.
    A variety of general comments were received on the proposed rule 
and supporting documentation. Several strongly supported the rulemaking 
as proposed and expressed the view that rulemaking on this topic was 
the proper, proactive approach. A number of comments strongly supported 
a belief that vehicle intrusion and vehicle bomb threats exist. These 
comments refer to the Three Mile Island intrusion event and the World 
Trade Center bombing event as evidence of these threats. The NCI 
commented that the rule was long overdue. Some of those that supported 
the rule offered more detailed comments proposing further expansion of 
the design basis threat and placing more rigid controls on licensee 
actions to implement the rule.
    NUMARC provided detailed comments on behalf of the industry. 
Fourteen utilities confirmed their support or agreement with NUMARC's 
comments. NUMARC commented that industry believes that it is important 
to deter unauthorized land vehicle penetration challenges to a 
licensee's protected area and that industry recognizes that facilities 
must be able to shut down safely in the unlikely event of the 
detonation of an explosive device outside the protected area. NUMARC 
considers these actions to be prudent for the protection of its 
employees, investment, and public confidence. NUMARC commented that 
because the NRC (as expressed in the proposed rule) and NUMARC agree in 
principle, the issue should be addressed in an integrated manner using 
a reasonable and realistic approach without imposing unnecessary 
conservatism. The details of NUMARC's comments identified areas where 
they considered the proposed rule took too conservative an approach. 
NUMARC also expressed general concerns about the backfit justification 
for the rule and the schedule for implementation.
    NUBARG, whose members include 15 nuclear utilities, provided 
comments that generally challenge the backfitting and regulatory 
analyses based on their concerns that the analyses did not provide a 
sufficient quantified basis for finding the requisite ``substantial 
increase'' in safety under the NRC's backfitting rule. Two of the 
comment letters provided by utilities confirmed their support or 
agreement with NUBARG's comments.
    Several comments expressed the view that the proposed rule could 
not be substantiated based on the current threat. As support for this 
position, comments referred to conclusions reached by the NRC in denial 
of a 1991 petition for rulemaking to require licensees to protect 
against truck bombs. Other comments indicated that two isolated events 
(the Three Mile Island intrusion event and World Trade Center bombing) 
did not justify rulemaking, particularly in light of the fact that the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), by their account, does not 
support the position that the threat of malevolent use of vehicles has 
increased and the NRC position is that no actual vehicle bomb threat 
against power reactors exists.
    Several comments opposed the proposed rule because they considered 
that it did not provide a substantial increase in protection of public 
health and safety or common defense and security at a justifiable cost. 
Other comments indicated that the rule was extreme and unnecessarily 
burdensome with little if any safety benefit and that contingency plans 
for vehicle bombs currently in place adequately addressed the threat of 
malevolent use of vehicles.
    The NRC staff presented the proposed rulemaking package to the 
Security Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards 
(ACRS) on November 3, 1993, and the full committee on November 4, 1993. 
The full committee was briefed on December 10, 1993, in a closed 
session, by the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 
Safeguards. Following these briefings, ACRS's December 10, 1993 letter 
to the Chairman raised concerns about the rulemaking, particularly the 
justification for the rule, the lack of a quantitative risk assessment 
to support it, and the expedited nature of the rulemaking. A minority 
of four members of the ACRS expressed a view that the proposed rule 
represents a prudent and effective step toward enhancing public health 
and safety. On February 10, 1994, the ACRS heard presentations on the 
rulemaking from the NUMARC, the NCI, one public citizen, and the NRC 
staff members. On April 7, 1994, the staff briefed the ACRS in a closed 
session regarding additional, quantitative evaluations that supported 
this rulemaking. Issues raised by the ACRS in their December 10, 1993, 
letter are encompassed by issues raised by the public and are addressed 
in the following responses.
    Like the ACRS, NUMARC, NUBARG, and numerous utilities expressed 
concern that the safety benefit was not adequately justified or 
quantified. They challenged the validity of the regulatory and backfit 
analyses because of lack of quantification of the threat. They 
contended that the analyses contain no quantified risk data or safety 
goal evaluation to support the conclusion that the proposed regulations 
result in a substantial increase in public health and safety. Another 
comment, while acknowledging the potential difficulty in quantification 
of the threat, stated that the analyses were no more than 
``conclusionary'' and fall short of demonstrating the requisite 
substantial increase in radiological safety.
    The Commission notes that the use of probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA) as a tool for estimating risk is sound when based on results from 
demonstrable, repeatable events and test data--for example, 
establishing the probability of failure and the mean time to failure 
for aircraft wing root structures due to metal fatigue or for valve 
failures due to water hammer or corrosion, etc. The NRC has examined 
the use of PRA to predict sabotage as an initiating event and concluded 
that to do so would not be credible or valid because terrorist attacks, 
by their very nature, may not be quantified. Past attempts to apply PRA 
techniques to acts of sabotage have resulted in similar findings. For 
example, in 1978, NUREG/CR-0400, the ``Risk Assessment Review Group 
Report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission'' stated, ``it was 
recognized that the probability of sabotage of a nuclear power plant 
cannot be estimated with any confidence.'' For this same reason, 
according to this report, consideration of risk of sabotage was 
deliberately omitted in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).
    In the ``Policy Statement on Safety Goals for the Operation of 
Nuclear Power Plants'' published on March 14, 1983 (48 FR 10772), the 
Commission stated:

    The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear 
materials is not presently included in the safety goal. At present 
there is no basis on which to provide a measure of the risk of these 
matters. It is the Commission's intention that everything that is 
needed shall be done to keep such risks at their present, very low, 
level; and it is our expectation that efforts on this point will 
continue to be successful. With these exceptions it is our intent 
that the risk from all various initiating mechanisms be taken into 
account to the best of the capability of the current evaluation 
techniques.

    In the 1983 Indian Point licensing hearings, the NRC staff 
testified that PRA is unable to predict the probability of sabotage as 
an initiating event. Also, in a June 11, 1991, petition to institute an 
individual plant examination program for threats beyond the design 
basis, the NCI stated a position similar to the NRC's by recognizing 
that PRA-type methods cannot be used to analyze for core damage 
frequency since one cannot quantify the likelihood of a terrorist 
attack.
    The Commission continues to believe that arbitrary selection of 
numbers to ``quantify'' threat probability without demonstrable, 
actual, supporting event data would yield misleading results at best. 
Knowledgeable terrorism analysts recognize the danger and are unwilling 
to quantify the risk. Over the past several years, a number of National 
Intelligence Estimates have been produced addressing the likelihood of 
nuclear terrorism. The analyses and conclusions are not presented in 
terms of quantified probability but recognize the unpredictable nature 
of terrorist activity in terms of likelihood. The NRC continues to 
believe that, although in many cases considerations of probabilities 
can provide insights into the relative risk of an event, in some cases 
it is not possible, with current knowledge and methods, to usefully 
quantify the probability of a specific vulnerability threat.
    The NRC notes that, although not quantified, its regulatory 
analysis recognizes the importance of the perception of the likelihood 
of an attempt to create radiological sabotage in assessing whether to 
redefine adequate protection. The NRC's assessment that there is no 
indication of an actual vehicle threat against the domestic commercial 
nuclear industry was an important consideration in concluding that 
neither the Three Mile Island intrusion nor the World Trade Center 
bombing demonstrated a need to redefine adequate protection.
    The NRC does not agree that quantifying the probability of an 
actual attack is necessary to a judgment of a substantial increase in 
overall protection of the public health and safety (a less stringent 
test of the justification for a rule change). Inherent in the NRC's 
current regulations is a policy decision that the threat, although not 
quantified, is likely in a range that warrants protection against a 
violent external assault as a matter of prudence.
    The potential threat posed by malevolent use of vehicles as part of 
a violent external assault and the need to protect against it have been 
the subject of detailed consideration and reconsideration by the 
Commission for more than fifteen years. The original requirements for 
physical security at power reactor sites proposed in the mid-1970s 
included a requirement for barriers to prevent ready access to vital 
areas by ground vehicles. The Commission decided not to include the 
requirement at that time.
    The Commission reexamined the vehicle issue in great detail in the 
1980s. In 1986, the Commission concluded that, even though perimeter 
chain link fences would not prevent vehicle intrusion, the requirement 
for prompt response by guards armed with shoulder-fired weapons would 
limit actions of intruders. In reconsidering the risk from use of a 
vehicle to gain proximity to vital areas, the NRC's regulatory analysis 
does not suggest that the likelihood of a violent external assault has 
increased. Rather, the staff focussed its regulatory analysis on 
whether a vehicle could provide an advantage to an adversary with the 
characteristics of the design basis threat.
    The NRC assessed lessons learned from the TMI intrusion and 
concluded that a vehicle could provide advantages to an adversary not 
previously considered. In SECY-86-101, ``Design Basis Threat--Options 
for Consideration,'' March 31, 1986, the NRC concluded that, even 
though perimeter chain link fences would not prevent vehicle intrusion, 
the requirement for prompt response by guards armed with shoulder-fired 
weapons would limit actions of intruders. Accordingly, in 1986, the NRC 
concluded that the installation of vehicle barriers might not 
constitute a substantial overall increase in the protection of public 
health and safety. More recently, the NRC has analyzed the capability 
of existing licensee security measures to protect against a violent 
external assault that includes a vehicle as a mode of transportation. 
These new analyses support the NRC's conclusions in the regulatory 
analysis for the proposed rulemaking. The NRC believes that the vehicle 
intrusion issue alone warrants the installation of vehicle barriers at 
nuclear power plants.
    In the 1980s, the NRC also consulted with other Federal agencies, 
including the National Security Council, regarding the use of vehicle 
bombs in the Middle East and their possible impact on the domestic 
threat situation. In June 1988, the NRC decided that it would not be 
necessary to change the design basis threat for radiological sabotage 
(10 CFR 73.1(a)(1)) nor to require long-range planning by power reactor 
licensees for permanent protection against land vehicle bombs. However, 
as a matter of prudence, it directed development of NRC and licensee 
contingency plans for dealing with a possible land vehicle bomb threat 
to power reactors, should one arise.
    On June 11, 1991 (56 FR 26782), the Commission denied a petition 
for rulemaking to revise the design basis threat to include explosive-
laden vehicles (PRN-73-9). In denying that petition, the NRC noted that 
the decision was based, in part, on the fact that only one truck bomb 
attack (1970) had occurred in the United States; there had been no 
other vehicle bomb attacks in the Western Hemisphere; there had been 
none outside areas of civil unrest; and there had been none directed 
against a nuclear activity. The vehicle bomb attack on the World Trade 
Center represented a significant change to the domestic threat 
environment that changed many of the points used in denying the 
petition and eroded the basis for concluding that vehicle bombs could 
be excluded from any consideration of the domestic threat environment. 
For the first time in the United States, a conspiracy with ties to 
Middle East extremists clearly demonstrated the capability and 
motivation to organize, plan, and successfully conduct a major vehicle 
bomb attack. Regardless of the motivations or connections of the 
conspirators, it is significant that the bombing was organized within 
the United States and implemented with materials obtained on the open 
market in the United States. Accordingly, the Commission believes that 
the threat characterized in the final rule is appropriate.
    As a result of the World Trade Center bombing, the NRC believes 
that the construction of a vehicle bomb is more likely to develop 
without advance indications. The NRC does not believe that it can 
quantify the likelihood of vehicle bomb attack. However, it has 
performed a conditional probabilistic risk analysis for an existing 
power reactor site, assuming an attempt to damage a nuclear power plant 
with a design basis vehicle bomb placed at locations within the 
protected area that would create the greatest risk to public health and 
safety. The analysis indicated that the contribution to core damage 
frequency could be high.
    Barriers installed to protect against vehicle intrusion into 
protected areas would also protect, to varying degrees, against vehicle 
bombs. The NRC believes that adjusting the location of barriers where 
necessary to ensure a capability of protecting vital equipment against 
a design basis vehicle bomb would provide an additional, substantial 
increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety. 
Further, the NRC believes that the incremental costs to licensees to 
analyze the degree of protection against a vehicle bomb and to make 
adjustments in vehicle control measures in limited cases are justified, 
particularly considering the provisions in the rule allowing licensees 
to propose alternative measures if a site-specific analysis indicates 
that the costs of fully meeting the rule's design goals and criteria 
are not justified by the added protection that would be provided. The 
NRC's additional deterministic evaluations and limited probabilistic 
assessments have supported the NRC's earlier findings that protecting 
against vehicle intrusion and a vehicle bomb would substantially 
increase the overall protection of public health and safety. The NRC 
has updated the regulatory analysis to include these evaluations.
    Additional issues raised and the NRC response to these issues are 
provided in the sections listed below that follow:

I. Threat Considerations
    A. Coupling Vehicle Intrusion and Vehicle Bomb Threat
    B. Characteristics of Design Basis Vehicle/Explosive
    C. ``Margin of Prudence''
    D. Design Basis Threat Re-Evaluation
    E. Applicability of 10 CFR 50.13
    F. ``Threat'' or ``Alert'' Program
II. Regulatory and Backfit Analyses
    A. Redundant Engineered Safeguards Systems
    B. Peer Review of Analyses
    C. Clarification
III. Rule Implementation
    A. Schedule
    B. NRC Review and Approval of Submittals
    C. Vehicle Barriers
    D. Passive Vehicle Barriers
    E. Active Vehicle Barriers
    F. Alternative Measures to Protect Against Explosives
IV. NRC Inspection
V. Miscellaneous
    A. Research Reactors
    B. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations
    C. Office of Management and Budget Supporting Statement

I. Threat Considerations

A. Coupling Vehicle Intrusion and Vehicle Bomb Threat

    Comment. NUMARC and several utilities commented that the proposed 
rule unnecessarily linked vehicle intrusion with a vehicle bomb. NUMARC 
commented that the proposed rule contemplates that the intruding 
vehicle would be fully loaded with personnel, equipment, and a large 
explosive device. NUMARC also commented that any considerations of a 
vehicle bomb should be for a stationary vehicle. NUMARC stated that 
coupling the vehicle intrusion event and vehicle bomb event added 
unnecessary conservatism. For example, to protect against a moving 
vehicle, bomb barriers would, in some cases, need to be more 
substantial to stop penetration of vehicle. NUMARC proposed that the 
revised design basis threat should include either a land vehicle 
intrusion or a detonation of explosives outside the protected area, but 
not a combination of the two. Along this same line, one comment 
expressed the opinion that the proposed language implies the need to 
protect against a vehicle used for transport, not for breaching a 
barrier or for use as a truck bomb.
    Another comment expressed a concern that a major defect in the rule 
is the lack of the assumption that the adversary could blast away a 
fence if a licensee were to choose to use, for example, cabling in the 
fence as the means to stop a vehicle. The respondent proposed that any 
barrier should be a heavy mass which would be resistant to destruction.
    Response. The Commission agrees with the NUMARC comment that the 
proposed rule could be read to imply that licensees would be required 
to provide protection against an intrusion by adversaries using a 
vehicle for transportation coincident with a vehicle bomb. This was not 
the intent and the rule wording has been revised to clarify this point. 
Commission deliberations on the rule have considered use of the vehicle 
as transportation for an adversary and a vehicle bomb as separate 
threats to be protected against. Any coupling of adversary tactics 
associated with the rule was intended to allow for more efficient and 
cost effective protection against either a vehicle intrusion to gain 
rapid access to vital areas, as a single act, or against a vehicle 
bomb.
    Meeting the requirements of the final rule will result in 
substantial protection from a vehicle bomb whether it is moving or 
stationary. The NRC's regulatory analysis indicated that, because of 
the short distances between vital areas and portions of some protected 
area boundaries, protection against a vehicle at those boundaries would 
be inconsistent with NUMARC's stated goal of being able to safely shut 
down a plant following the detonation of an explosive device outside 
the protected area.
    Regarding the comment that the rule should include the assumption 
that adversaries may use devices to destroy less substantial barriers 
and then gain access, the Commission does not agree that this 
assumption should be included in the rule. The NRC assessment of the 
threat environment does not support this assumption. Further, use of 
such a technique by an adversary would tend to diminish one of the 
major advantages of use of a vehicle--the element of surprise.

B. Characteristics of Design Basis Vehicle/Explosive

    Comment. NUMARC provided a detailed proposal for characteristics of 
a design basis vehicle that could be used to attempt penetration of a 
nuclear power plant protected area and a design basis bomb that could 
be used in an attempt to damage plant equipment. Other comments 
indicated that vehicle speed should take into consideration terrain and 
seasonal conditions and that the proposed vehicle explosive device size 
was excessive and not justified by historical experience, particularly 
that in the United States.
    Response. The Commission notes that it has relied on analogous 
historical data when enumerating the attributes of a design basis 
threat because there has never been a terrorist attack on an NRC-
licensed power reactor facility or a credible threat of an attack. This 
was the methodology used in formulating the original design basis 
threat statements in the late 1970s, and it was used in defining the 
proposed design basis vehicle threat. The design basis vehicle was 
defined after examining several hundred actual vehicle bombing attacks 
occurring worldwide during approximately the past decade. Historical 
data indicates that vehicle bombs, similar to the design basis vehicle, 
have been used in the past and their use can reasonably be expected to 
continue to occur in the future. The Commission has made some changes 
in the detailed characteristics of the design basis vehicle. The 
revised characteristics will require licensees to provide substantial 
protection against a moving vehicle bomb. In addition, the NRC's 
implementation guidance discusses how the design of barrier systems can 
account for site-specific limits on the speed that a vehicle could 
attain because of factors such as terrain.
    Comment. One comment expressed confusion over reference to the 
design basis vehicle as a ``4-wheel drive vehicle'' in that this could 
imply that non 4-wheel drive vehicles would not have to be protected 
against. The comment recommended that the final rule language be 
changed to require protection against all land vehicles.
    Response. The Commission disagrees that the term ``4-wheel drive 
vehicle'' needs clarification. It reasons that protection against 
intrusion by a 4-wheel drive vehicle encompasses protection against a 
land vehicle with less than 4-wheel drive.
    Comment. Other comments noted that the regulatory language should 
be changed to remove reference to equipment and explosives capable of 
being hand-carried, as opposed to that which the vehicle could carry.
    Response. As stated previously, this issue is being clarified by a 
revision of the design basis threat statement to separate the threat of 
intrusion versus vehicle bomb. In an intrusion event, the vehicle is 
obviously capable of transporting the equipment and explosives proposed 
to be hand-carried by an adversary. While the vehicle could carry more 
equipment than can be carried by the persons being transported, it is 
unlikely that this additional equipment would be of use to the 
adversaries. The vehicle is essentially a means of transport for the 
adversaries, and it is unlikely that once adversaries have left the 
vehicle they would be able to return to obtain additional equipment or 
explosives.
    Comment. One utility provided specific questions regarding several 
assumptions associated with the vehicle bomb. These included whether:
    The vehicle is under control by adversaries up to the point of 
detonation;
    The vehicle bomb automatically detonates when the adversary loses 
control of the vehicle or after a pre-defined time period;
    The vehicle is used in combination with a secondary external event, 
e.g., loss of offsite power; and,
    Point of detonation, i.e., crash point or at a later point as 
vehicle rolls towards a facility.
    Response. With respect to a vehicle bomb, for analysis purposes the 
device would be considered to detonate at the point where the vehicle 
impacted the vehicle barrier system. Whether adversaries still have 
control of the vehicle or whether the detonation of the device is 
delayed should have little impact on the analysis of the effect of the 
explosive blast. Because the barrier system is intended to protect 
against vehicles gaining proximity to vital areas, the barrier system 
should not allow a vehicle to fully penetrate it and continue to roll 
towards a facility.
    With respect to a secondary external event, power reactor licensees 
must protect against all capabilities and attributes described by the 
design basis threat for radiological sabotage. This would not include 
protection against other natural events, such as damage from a 
hurricane, coincident with a sabotage threat. However, with respect to 
loss of off-site power, licensees should consider its loss, if vital 
equipment is assumed damaged, in their analysis of the effects of a 
vehicle bomb. This consideration is compatible with the basic premise 
that equipment not designated and protected as vital is vulnerable to 
damage and is not available.

C. ``Margin of Prudence''

    Comment. NUMARC and several utilities commented on NRC's use of the 
term ``margin of prudence'' as the basis for support of the proposed 
rulemaking. NUMARC commented that it is inappropriate to use such an 
undefined concept as a basis for rulemaking. These comments indicated 
that NRC expansion into matters of prudence is unwarranted and would 
result in expansion of the NRC's sphere of regulatory influence beyond 
plant safety.
    Response. Use of the term ``margin of prudence'' must be put in 
perspective as used by the NRC in this rulemaking. The NRC requires an 
established level of security at nuclear power reactor sites as a 
provision against possible security contingencies that might arise. The 
NRC has concluded that a satisfactory level of security is one that is 
designed and implemented to protect against a hypothetical threat 
(design basis threat) that contains certain adversary attributes. These 
attributes have been selected based on Commission analyses of actual 
terrorist attributes and on judgment. The term ``margin of prudence'' 
was used in recent Commission deliberations to suggest that the World 
Trade Center bombing and the Three Mile Island intrusion had caused a 
change in the domestic threat environment or in the NRC's understanding 
of the sabotage threat that was not satisfactorily addressed by the 
existing design basis threat. Further, the term was used to suggest 
that a modification of the design basis threat was necessary to 
reestablish a level of security commensurate with the nature of 
security contingencies that might arise. Its use was illustrative only 
of the relationship between an actual threat and the hypothetical 
design basis threat and the change in that relationship caused by the 
World Trade Center and Three Mile Island events. The NRC intended no 
wider or expanded use of the term.

D. Design Basis Threat Re-Evaluation

    Comment. NUMARC and several utilities commented that the revision 
to the design basis threat to address malevolent use of vehicles should 
be addressed in an integrated manner so that rulemaking on this topic 
would not be impacted after completion of an ongoing, more 
comprehensive review of the design basis threat. Other comments 
expressed concerns about deficiencies in the design basis threat that 
need to be addressed. Deficiencies identified by these comments 
included: protection against more than one insider, protection against 
a larger number of external attackers, capability of attackers to 
operate as more than one team, and use of aquatic vehicles. One comment 
was made that ongoing considerations for reductions in the insider 
requirements should be part of the overall reconsideration of the 
design basis threat.
    Response. The Commission notes that use of a vehicle by adversaries 
was addressed under Phase I of a re-evaluation of the design basis 
threat which the NRC began in the Spring of 1993. This phase of the re-
evaluation has been completed. Other attributes associated with the 
design basis threat, such as those characterized in comments on the 
proposed rule, have been reviewed and considered as part of Phase II of 
the re-evaluation. NRC staff recommendations on this part of the re-
evaluation were provided to the Commission in a classified paper on 
March 15, 1994.

E. Applicability of 10 CFR 50.13

    Comment. NUMARC, NUBARG, and several utilities stated that the 
proposed change in the design basis threat to include malevolent use of 
a vehicle amounts to escalation of the threat to efforts by an enemy of 
the United States. The comments contended that the proposed changes to 
the design basis threat are, therefore, in conflict with 10 CFR 50.13, 
which specifies that licensees are not required to provide for design 
features to protect against attacks and destructive acts by an enemy of 
the United States. One comment recommended that NRC should re-evaluate 
the design basis threat assumption to now include foreign enemies of 
the United States.
    Response. In 10 CFR 50.13, which was promulgated on September 26, 
1967 (32 FR 13445), the regulations provide that applicants for 
construction permits, operating licenses, or amendments thereto, need 
not provide for design features or other measures to protect against 
the attacks or destructive acts, including sabotage, by an enemy of the 
United States. The issue raised in a contested application for a power 
reactor construction permit, which led to the promulgation of 10 CFR 
50.13, was whether the reactor should be constructed to withstand a 
missile attack from Cuba. There is a significant difference in the 
practicality of defending against a missile attack and constructing a 
vehicle barrier at a safe standoff distance from vital areas.
    The statement of considerations for 10 CFR 50.13 makes it clear 
that the scope of that regulation is to relieve applicants of the need 
to provide protective measures that are the assigned responsibility of 
the nation's defense establishment. The Atomic Energy Commission 
recognized that it was not practical for the licensees of civilian 
nuclear power reactors to provide design features that could protect 
against the full range of the modern arsenal of weapons. The statement 
concluded with the observation that assessing whether another nation 
would use force against a nuclear power plant was speculative in the 
extreme and, in any case, would involve the use of sensitive 
information regarding both the capabilities of the United States' 
defense establishment and diplomatic relations.
    The new rule, with its addition to the design basis threat and 
added performance requirements, is in response to a clearly 
demonstrated domestic capability for acts of extreme violence directed 
at civilian structures. The participation or sponsorship of a foreign 
state in the use of an explosives-laden vehicle is not necessary. The 
vehicle, explosives, and know-how are all readily available in a purely 
domestic context. It is simply not the case that a vehicle bomb attack 
on a nuclear power plant would almost certainly represent an attack by 
an enemy of the United States, within the meaning of that phrase in 10 
CFR 50.13.
    Further, characterizing the threat as ``para-military'' adds little 
to the understanding of the intent of 10 CFR 50.13. ``Para-military'' 
suggests an armed, trained group acting outside of a legally 
constituted military organization. In that sense, the design basis 
threat prior to this amendment already described a ``para-military'' 
group. ``Para-military'' groups of entirely domestic origin exist. 
Accordingly, the amended regulation and supporting analyses need not 
address 10 CFR 50.13, either on the grounds that a vehicle bomb attack 
is an attack by an enemy of the United States or the action of a 
``paramilitary'' group. That regulation is irrelevant to the present 
rulemaking.
    The implication of the comments regarding 10 CFR 50.13 is that the 
simple addition of a vehicle bomb to the design basis threat should 
shift the function of providing physical security for nuclear power 
plants from the licensee to the Federal Government. The respondents 
present no real evidence or persuasive arguments for such a radical 
change in the regulatory environment.

F. ``Threat'' or ``Alert'' Program

    Comment. One comment suggested that the NRC develop and implement a 
``threat or alert'' program similar to the Department of Defense's 
Defense Condition ``DEFCON'' program. It was recommended that, under 
such a program, the NRC would immediately notify the industry when 
information is received from the intelligence community of an impending 
security alert and provide a recommended level of action. Licensees, in 
turn, would be required to develop security response plans based on 
NRC-established threat levels.
    Response. The Commission believes that its current Information 
Assessment Team approach for notifying licensees of significant events 
has been effective in disseminating and coordinating such information. 
The Information Assessment Team (IAT) assesses in a timely manner 
reported threats to NRC-licensed facilities, materials, and activities 
to determine credibility and make recommendations to NRC management. 
The IAT is composed of experienced Headquarter's and Regional staff who 
are on-call 24 hours a day and bring a variety of expertise to the 
assessment process, such as reactor systems, site specific information, 
and liaison with other Federal agencies, including close coordination 
with the Department of Energy on threat advisories to the utility 
industry and NRC licensees. The IAT was established in 1976, and since 
that time has supported NRC decision makers responding to a range of 
threats, from bomb threats against reactors to times of international 
tension during Operation Desert Shield and Storm. For example, 
coordinated threat advisories related to the latter were issued by the 
IAT on August 24, 1990, January 9, 1991, and April 2, 1991. However, 
the NRC does not believe that the IAT is an adequate alternative to 
vehicles barriers at nuclear power plants.

II. Regulatory and Backfit Analysis

A. Redundant Engineered Safeguards Systems

    Comment. One comment indicated that the proposed rule did not 
adequately take into consideration the existing engineered safeguards 
systems installed at nuclear power plants. The comment was made that 
unauthorized access and possible damage to any one vital area does not 
necessarily prevent the safe shut down of the nuclear reactor.
    Response. The Commission agrees that consideration should be given 
to engineered safeguards systems and believes that flexibility has been 
built into the rule to allow for consideration of such existing 
systems. The redundancy and diversity of existing engineered safeguards 
systems was considered in the NRC analysis of the capability of 
existing licensee security measures to protect against a violent 
external assault that includes a vehicle as a mode of transportation. 
Specific plant equipment layout can be a factor in protective 
considerations against a vehicle bomb. Equipment that is redundant or 
provides backup to equipment assumed to be damaged by a vehicle bomb 
may be considered in the analysis for determining whether protective 
measures established to protect against vehicle intrusion fully meet 
the design goals and criteria for protection against a land vehicle 
bomb.

B. Peer Review of Analysis

    Comment. One comment recommended that any research results, risk 
analyses, cost calculations and other work by the NRC should be subject 
to peer review.
    Response. The NRC believes that its work is subject to various 
types of review and, in a sense, is subject to peer review. Portions of 
the risk analyses were conducted by groups with appropriate expertise, 
including threat assessment, physical security system performance 
evaluation, critical target set analysis, safety system inspections, 
probabilistic risk analysis, vehicle barrier design, and vehicle bomb 
analysis. In addition, the types of efforts mentioned by the comment 
are often the subject of multiple office review within the NRC. Several 
technical review groups, both within and external to the NRC, provide 
further consideration of NRC staff work. Finally, with respect to 
rulemaking, analyses are the subject of public comment.

C. Clarification

    Comment. One comment noted that the wording associated with the 
backfit analysis in the proposed Federal Register notice did not 
precisely coincide with that found under 10 CFR 50.109 (a)(3).
    Response. The Commission notes that the wording in the notice is 
wording that is used for most NRC rules that are subject to 
backfitting. The Commission considers that this wording is consistent 
with the requirement cited.

 III. Rule Implementation

A. Schedule

    Comment. A large number of comments were received on the schedules 
associated with the proposed rule. Some indicated that the proposed 
schedule to submit a summary description of the barrier system and 
results of vehicle bomb comparison within 90 days was not long enough. 
One comment was received supporting the proposed schedule. Those 
commenting that the schedule was too tight expressed concern that 90 
days did not provide sufficient time to perform a thorough design 
analysis, particularly if alternative measures were to be proposed. 
NUMARC, and several other respondents, recommended that licensees be 
provided 180 days after issuance of the rule to provide a summary 
description of the barrier system.
    A number of comments were also received stating that the proposed 
schedule to confirm implementation within 360 days after issuance of 
the rule was not long enough. Those commenting that the schedule for 
completion of installation was too tight expressed concern that the 
schedule did not adequately account for material procurement and 
availability, outage schedules, and weather circumstances. NUMARC and 
several other respondents recommended that licensees be provided 18 
months after issuance of the rule to complete installation of measures 
to meet the rule. A few comments were received that recommended that 
implementation schedules be established on a case-by-case basis.
    Response. The Commission agrees that an extension to the schedule 
is reasonable based on the fact that this is a new program for power 
reactor sites, that there may be some difficulty in procurement of 
active vehicle barrier systems, and that possible deleterious effects 
on scheduling may result from the weather or planned outages. 
Accordingly, the time period for submission of the summary required by 
10 CFR 73.55(c)(9)(i) is extended from 90 to 180 days from the 
effective date of the rule. The implementation period required under 10 
CFR 73.55 (c)(9)(ii) is extended from 360 days to 18 months from the 
rule's effective date.

B. NRC Review and Approval of Submittals

    Comment. Three comments recommended that the NRC should review and 
approve all licensee submittals, including the summary description of 
the proposed measures to protect against vehicle intrusion, the results 
of the vehicle bomb comparison, and, for applicable licensees, 
alternative measures to protect against an explosive device.
    Response. The NRC believes that approval of all summaries submitted 
under 10 CFR 73.55(c)(9)(i) would unnecessarily delay expeditious 
implementation of this rule. All licensees are required to amend their 
physical security plans to commit to the implementation and use of the 
vehicle barrier system described by the regulations. These commitments 
are fully inspectable and enforceable by the NRC. The NRC would review 
and approve the limited number of requests expected to use alternative 
measures that might not fully meet the design goals and criteria for 
protection against a vehicle bomb. The final rule has been changed to 
clarify that proposals for alternative measures be submitted in 
accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90.

C. Vehicle Barriers

    Comment. NUMARC and several other respondents expressed concern 
that barrier systems would be required to be ``nuclear grade'' and that 
this would unnecessarily escalate costs. Another comment expressed the 
opinion that, instead of licensees certifying to the NRC that vehicle 
barriers meet requirements, they be able to choose barriers from some 
pre-approved list. NUMARC commented that design and certification 
needed to utilize existing technology and barrier device test results, 
or costs would unnecessarily escalate. NUMARC also requested that the 
discussion in the Regulatory Guide be expanded to describe flexibility 
available to licensees in designing and installing barriers.
    Response. The NRC is unaware of any requirement for ``nuclear grade 
equipment'' and notes that the expression does not appear in the 
proposed rule or supporting guidance. The NRC agrees with the industry 
comment that commercially available materials suffice for the 
construction of the vehicle barrier if the barrier is capable of 
countering the design basis vehicle threat. As suggested by many 
respondents, the NRC recommends that affected licensees take advantage 
of available information on vehicle barrier testing, much of which has 
been conducted by Federal laboratories and agencies.
    With respect to the use of ``pre-approved barriers,'' the 
Commission believes that most vendors of commercial vehicle barrier 
systems know what the ``stopping powers'' of their barriers are. 
Licensees should use this as a resource in determining what barrier can 
counter the attributes of the Commission's design basis vehicle most 
cost effectively. In addition, the NRC has provided information on 
performance levels of several types of barriers to affected licensees. 
The Commission agrees with the NUMARC comment concerning expansion of 
the discussion on the flexibility of designing and installing barriers 
in the regulatory guide supporting the rule. The regulatory guide now 
reflects this.
    Comment. NUMARC expressed the view that compensatory measures, not 
explicitly addressed in the proposed rule or regulatory guide, for 
maintenance or repair of barriers should be determined by the licensee. 
Another comment stated that compensatory measures required if a barrier 
is temporarily inoperable, as with maintenance, need to be addressed at 
an early stage.
    Response. The NRC anticipates that vehicle barriers, particularly 
passive barriers, will infrequently become non-functional once 
installed. For those infrequent cases, any compensatory measures should 
take into consideration the type and cause of the problem and the time 
the barrier will be non-functional. For example, for short term 
problems with active or passive barriers, compensatory measures would 
not be expected to be extensive. In cases where barriers are non-
functional for longer periods, compensatory measures may include 
placement of heavy vehicular equipment, concrete highway median 
barriers arranged in a serpentine fashion, installation of strands of 
airplane arresting wires, or the positioning of an officer armed with a 
high power contingency weapon may be appropriate. The regulatory guide 
issued in support of this rulemaking has been revised to include 
guidance regarding compensatory measures.

D. Passive Vehicle Barriers

    Comment. One comment was directed at the guidance that specified 
measures should be established to periodically verify the integrity of 
passive barriers outside the protected area. It was commented that 
passive barriers by their nature (ditches, berms, concrete filled 
embedded poles, etc.) do not require inspection, or if so, the period 
for inspecting should be on the order of several years. If licensees 
were to install a unique passive barrier that should need periodic 
inspection, it should be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
    Response. The Commission agrees that the components of many passive 
barrier systems do not need to be inspected on a weekly or monthly 
basis due to the nature of their construction. Observations by routine 
security patrols should be sufficient to detect any degradation in the 
barrier. Some types of barriers may be more susceptible to 
deterioration, damage, or tampering and therefore should be subject to 
more frequent observation by security patrols or, in some cases, 
periodic inspection. Given the large variation in components of passive 
barriers, the Commission considers it appropriate to provide licensees 
with flexibility on how to assure the continued integrity of barrier 
components. If the barrier system is damaged, the Commission expects 
that such damage would be identified in a reasonable period and actions 
would be taken promptly to repair the damage.

E. Active Vehicle Barriers

    Comment. Two comments were received requesting that the wording in 
the proposed regulatory guidance clarify that only one active barrier 
is needed to deny access. Also, one utility commented that the 
provision in the regulatory guide that specified vehicles and their 
operators be authorized for entry before being permitted access inside 
the vehicle barrier system would preclude their current practice of 
searching the vehicle after entry inside the active barrier.
    Response. The NRC agrees with these comments and the guidance in 
the regulatory guide supporting the rule has been changed.
    Comment. Another comment recommended that specific kinetic energy 
be identified for use in design of active barriers with documented 
performance satisfying specific energy requirements because this 
approach would help avoid costly independent testing to demonstrate 
performance.
    Response. Guidance previously forwarded to licensees, designated as 
Safeguards Information, defines the kinetic energy associated with the 
design basis vehicle. As previously stated, the NRC has provided 
information to affected licensees on performance levels of several 
types of barriers to help avoid costly independent testing.

F. Alternative Measures to Protect Against Explosives

    Comment. One comment objected to the rule's provisions that would 
allow some licensees to provide only ``substantial protection'' and not 
equivalent protection to fully meet the Commission's design goals and 
criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb. One comment indicated 
that the NRC should not be considering costs in determining the 
acceptability of alternative measures because costs should not be 
considered relative to enforcing adequate protection. NUMARC commented 
that it was reasonable for licensees to have the option to propose 
alternative measures for Commission review when the design goals and 
criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb cannot be met without a 
significant resource burden.
    Response. The NRC's regulatory analysis concluded that neither the 
Three Mile Island or World Trade Center events demonstrated a need to 
redefine adequate protection. The NRC's basis for the backfit being 
implemented by this rulemaking was a determination that it would result 
in a substantial increase in protection of the public health and 
safety. Paragraph 50.109(a)(3) of Title 10, Code of Federal 
Regulations, authorizes such a backfit only if the costs of 
implementation are justified in view of the increased protection. The 
NRC concluded that the estimated costs for all licensees to provide 
barriers to protect against vehicle intrusion were justified. However, 
at some sites, the location of barriers to protect against vehicle 
intrusion could provide substantial protection against a vehicle bomb 
without fully meeting the NRC's design goals and criteria for 
protection against an explosive device. For these licensees, the 
incremental costs for placing barriers further from vital areas or for 
providing additional protective measures to fully meet the design goal 
and criteria may not be justified by the incremental protection beyond 
the substantial level.
    Comment. NUMARC objected to the provision that licensees proposing 
alternative measures must compare their costs with the costs of 
measures needed to fully meet the design goals and criteria for 
protection against a vehicle bomb and must provide an assessment 
supporting a finding that the additional costs are not justified by the 
added protection that would be provided. NUMARC asserted that the NRC 
was requiring licensees to perform analyses beyond what the NRC staff 
has done in support of the proposed rule.
    NUBARG similarly asserted that the NRC was requiring licensees to 
prove that alternative measures substantially increase safety, which is 
unfair. NUBARG asserts that this requires licensees to perform a 
backfit analysis on why they should not install a proposed modification 
(one that would fully meet the design goals and criteria) and that this 
runs counter to the backfit principle of the NRC providing the 
analysis.
    Several respondents stated that they understood that the rule and 
regulatory guidance specified that those licensees proposing 
alternative measures would need to submit to the NRC a quantitative 
analysis to justify that the cost of plant specific measures are not 
justified by the added protection afforded. The comments indicated 
that, based on this understanding, such a task would be difficult, if 
not impossible.
    A public interest group expressed the opinion that contingency 
planning as part of alternative measures is unacceptable when compared 
to a permanent vehicle control system.
    Response. The optional licensee analysis provided for in the 
revised regulations is intended to be similar in approach to that 
performed by the NRC in the development of the regulatory analysis for 
the rulemaking. The Commission recognizes the difficulties with respect 
to quantification of the protection provided (see general discussion) 
and would expect licensees to provide a more deterministic analysis in 
comparing the relative protection provided by alternative measures 
taken by the licensee that don't fully meet the Commission design goal 
and criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb. The Commission did 
not intend to require its licensees to do more of an analysis or a 
different type of analysis than that performed by the NRC. The 
quantitative aspects of the analysis required by the regulation only 
apply to cost considerations, particularly the comparison of costs 
needed to fully meet the Commission's design goals and criteria for 
protection against a vehicle bomb with the cost of alternative 
measures.
    The comment that contingency planning would be an unacceptable 
alternative to permanent vehicle barriers does not recognize the 
provision in the rule that specifies that all licensees are required to 
establish a vehicle barrier system to protect against use of a land 
vehicle as a means of transportation to gain unauthorized proximity to 
vital areas. Licensees may not substitute contingency plans for vehicle 
barriers. Rather, contingency plans were identified as one possible 
option for licensees (those few where it may be practical for them to 
propose alternative measures to protect against explosives) to 
supplement protection provided by the licensee's vehicle barrier system 
for protection against a vehicle bomb.

IV. NRC Inspection

    Comment. One comment indicated that the NRC should establish 
procedures to assure licensee compliance with the rule.
    Response. The NRC plans to inspect licensee implementation of the 
rule as part of the ongoing reactor inspection program. Most likely the 
inspection will be accomplished using a temporary inspection procedure, 
which is planned to be prepared after publication of the rule but 
before the required implementation date.
    As previously stated, all affected licensees are required to amend 
their physical security plans in response to this rule. All commitments 
in physical security plans are fully inspectable and enforceable by the 
NRC.

V. Miscellaneous

A. Research Reactors

    Comment. One comment recommended that, in light of the upcoming 
1996 Olympics, all reactor fuel, heavy water, and kilocuries of Co and 
Cs be removed immediately from the Georgia Tech campus.
    Response. While research reactors do not fall within the scope of 
this rulemaking, the Commission notes that its threat assessment 
activities are performed on a continuing basis, in close liaison with 
the intelligence community. Should the level of domestic threat change 
at any time, appropriate action will be taken by the NRC. Specifically, 
the Atlanta Field Office of the FBI has established liaison with all 
Federal agencies in Georgia, including the NRC, relative to the 
Olympics. The FBI is the lead law enforcement agency in charge of the 
Olympics and, to date, has not indicated that there is any threat to 
NRC-licensed facilities or materials relative to the Olympics.

B. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations

    Comment. NUMARC commented that independent spent fuel storage 
installations (ISFSIs) should be clearly exempted from the rule.
    Response. The NRC did not intend for ISFSIs to be subject to this 
regulation because of the lower consequences associated with storage of 
irradiated fuel removed from a power reactor core, particularly since 
spent fuel stored at ISFSIs must be aged for at least one year. The NRC 
is currently preparing a proposed rule to clarify physical protection 
requirements for ISFSIs. The lessons learned from the TMI intrusion 
will be considered in that rulemaking. In addition, the NRC is 
attempting to quantify the consequences of a vehicle bomb detonated in 
the vicinity of an ISFSI. The results of this study will assist in 
making a determination as to whether vehicle bomb protection is needed 
at ISFSIs. In the interim, the staff believes that the inherent nature 
of the fuel, along with the degree of protection provided by the 
approved storage means for spent fuel, provides adequate protection 
against a vehicle bomb.

C. Office of Management and Budget Supporting Statement

    Comment. One comment identified that the NRC-estimated financial 
burden to licensees did not include capital costs for modifications.
    Response. The NRC notes that the financial burden cited by the 
comment was derived from the Office of Management and Budget Supporting 
Statement, required under the Paperwork Reduction Act. This statement 
deals solely with the licensee recordkeeping and reporting burden 
resulting from the new rule, i.e., the paperwork burden. Actual 
construction costs are considered in the regulatory analysis that 
supports the rule.

Summary of Changes Made to Rule

    The following changes have been made as a result of public comment 
analysis:
    1. The design basis threat statement for radiological sabotage has 
been clarified to separate the threat of a land vehicle used for 
intrusion with that of a land vehicle used as a vehicle bomb.
    2. ISFSIs have been specifically exempted from the rule.
    3. Clarification of what is meant by ``the Commission's design 
goals and criteria'' has been added to the regulatory text.
    4. The appropriate means for submitting alternative measures has 
been clarified under 10 CFR 73.55(c)(9)(i) by adding the phrase ``in 
accordance with 10 CFR 50.90.''
    5. Summary and implementation schedules have been revised--from 90 
to 180 days for summary submittals, and from 360 to 540 days (18 
months) for completion of implementation. Both time periods are from 
the effective date of the rule which is 1 month from the date of 
publication in the Federal Register.

Availability of Supporting Guidance

    Two guidance documents are being developed by the NRC in support of 
this rule and are expected to be distributed to affected licensees 
before the effective date of the rule. These documents are: (1) 
Regulatory Guide 5.68, ``Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles 
at Nuclear Power Plants'' and (2) NUREG/CR 6190, ``Protection Against 
Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants.''
    Regulatory Guide 5.68 will be available for inspection and copying 
for a fee at the Commission's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. 
(Lower Level), Washington, DC. Copies of issued guides may be purchased 
from the Government Printing Office at the current GPO price. 
Information on current GPO prices may be obtained by contacting the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 
37082, Washington, DC 20013-2171. Issued guides may also be purchased 
from the National Technical Information Service on a standing order 
basis. Details on this service may be obtained by writing NTIS, 5825 
Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.
    Copies of NUREG/CR-6190 may be purchased from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 37082, Washington, 
DC 20013-7082. Copies also will be available from the National 
Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 
22161. A copy also will be available for inspection and copying for a 
fee in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level), 
Washington, DC.

Electronic Submittals

    Required paperwork may be submitted, in addition to an original 
paper copy, in electronic format on a DOS-formatted (IBM compatible) 
5.25 or 3.5 inch computer diskette. Text files should be provided in 
WordPerfect format or unformatted ASCII code. The format and version 
should be identified on the diskette's external label.

Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability

    The Commission has determined under the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 
Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule is not a major Federal 
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment 
and, therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required. The 
rule involves installation of vehicle barriers at operating power 
reactor sites and an evaluation of these barriers by the licensee to 
determine whether they provide acceptable protection against a land 
vehicle bomb under design goals and criteria established by the 
Commission.
    Implementation of these amendments will not involve release of or 
exposure to radioactivity from the site. Construction activities 
associated with passive vehicle barriers will involve some earth 
movement, either for excavation or development of berms, and possible 
destruction of trees and shrubbery. Since most active vehicle barriers 
are hydraulically operated, there may on occasion be leakage of this 
fluid to the environment. The activities required to implement these 
amendments involve no significant environmental impact.
    The environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact 
on which this determination is based are available for inspection at 
the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), 
Washington, DC. Single copies of the environmental assessment and 
finding of no significant impact are available from: Carrie Brown, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, telephone (301) 504-
2382.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

    This final rule amends information collection requirements that are 
subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et 
seq.). These requirements were approved by the Office of Management and 
Budget approval number 3150-0002.
    The public reporting burden for this collection of information is 
estimated to average 500 hours per response, including the time for 
reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and 
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the 
collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate 
or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing the burden, to the Information and Records 
Management Branch (MNBB-7714), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001; and to the Desk Officer, Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-3019, (3150-0002), Office of 
Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

Regulatory Analysis

    The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this 
regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the 
alternatives considered by the Commission. Interested persons may 
examine a copy of the regulatory analysis at the NRC Public Document 
Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of 
the analysis may be obtained from Robert J. Dube, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 504-2912.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification

    As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 
605(b), the Commission certifies that this final rule does not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
The rule affects only licensees authorized to operate a nuclear power 
reactor. The utilities that operate these nuclear power reactors do not 
fall within the scope of the definition ``small entities'' as given in 
the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Small Business Size Standards 
promulgated in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration 
(13 CFR Part 121).

Backfit Analysis

    As required by 10 CFR 50.109, the Commission has completed a 
backfit analysis for the final rule. The Commission has determined, 
based on this analysis, that backfitting to comply with the 
requirements of this final rule provides a substantial increase in 
protection to public health and safety or the common defense and 
security at a cost which is justified by the substantial increase. The 
backfit analysis on which this determination is based reads as follows.
    I. Statement of the specific objectives that the proposed action is 
designated to achieve.
    To publish a rule in response to direction from the Commission in a 
staff requirements memorandum dated June 29, 1993. The Commissioners' 
decision to proceed with expedited rulemaking was the result of two 
events. On February 7, 1993, there was a forced vehicle entry into the 
protected area (PA) at Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit 1. On February 25, 
1993, a van bomb, containing between 500 and 1,500 pounds of TNT 
equivalent, was detonated at the World Trade Center in New York City.
    In its subsequent review of the threat environment, the NRC staff 
concluded that there is no indication of an actual vehicle threat 
against the domestic commercial nuclear industry. Nonetheless, in light 
of the vehicle intrusion at TMI and the World Trade Center vehicle 
bombing, the NRC staff concluded that a vehicle intrusion or bomb 
threat to a nuclear power plant could develop without warning in the 
future. The objective of the rulemaking is to enhance reactor safety by 
maintaining a prudent margin between what is the current threat 
estimate (low) and the design basis threat for radiological sabotage 
specified in 10 CFR 73.1(a) (higher).
    II. General description of the activity that would be required by 
the licensee or applicant in order to complete the proposed action.
    The rule requires each licensee authorized to operate a nuclear 
power plant to establish vehicle control measures to protect against 
the use of a design basis land vehicle as a means of transportation to 
gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas. This provides two benefits. 
First, it enhances a licensee's ability to interdict an adversary 
attempting to use a vehicle as an aid to reach critical safety 
equipment. Second, it provides protection against a land vehicle bomb.
    The rule requires licensees to evaluate the effectiveness of their 
vehicle control measures with respect to the protection they provide 
against a land vehicle bomb. Licensees are required to confirm to the 
Commission that the vehicle control measures to protect against vehicle 
intrusion, alone or in combination with additional measures, fully meet 
the Commission's design goals and criteria for protection against a 
vehicle bomb. Licensees that can show that the additional costs for 
measures required to fully meet the Commission's design goals and 
criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb are not justified by the 
added protection that would be provided have the option to propose 
alternative measures to the Commission. These licensees will not be 
relieved of the requirement to protect the facility against vehicle 
intrusion.
    Licensees that propose alternative measures are required to 
describe the level of protection that these measures would provide 
against a land vehicle bomb and compare the costs of the alternative 
measures with the costs of measures necessary to fully meet the 
criteria. The NRC will approve the alternative measures if the measures 
provide substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb and if the 
licensee demonstrates by an analysis, using the essential elements of 
the criteria in 10 CFR 50.109, that the costs of fully meeting measures 
needed to protect against a vehicle bomb are not justified by the added 
protection provided.
    III. Potential change in the risk to the public from the accidental 
offsite release of radioactive material.
    The potential change in the risk to the public from the accidental 
offsite release of radioactive material is discussed in detail in pages 
4 through 7 and 10 through 14 of the regulatory analysis that supports 
the rulemaking. Failure to protect against attempted radiological 
sabotage could result in reactor core damage and large radiological 
releases. Based on its assessment, the NRC concludes that amending its 
regulations to protect against malevolent use of a vehicle against a 
nuclear power plant provides a substantial increase in overall 
protection of the public health and safety.
    In summary, the TMI event demonstrated some aspects regarding use 
of a vehicle by a potential adversary that could present some 
challenges not previously considered by staff and licensees. The NRC 
considers that providing vehicle intrusion protection provides 
substantial enhancement against such a threat. Enhancements to protect 
against the vehicle intrusion threat also provide, to varying degrees 
dependent on site characteristics, enhancement for protection against 
vehicle bombs.
    The World Trade Center event demonstrated a capability within the 
United States to construct a truck bomb undetected. This recently 
demonstrated capability indicates that although a vehicle bomb attack 
at a nuclear power plant is not reasonably to be expected, it is 
somewhat more likely to develop without advance indications than the 
NRC previously believed. Therefore, the NRC considers that providing 
permanently installed vehicle bomb protection provides substantial 
enhancement against such a threat.
    IV. Potential impact on radiological exposure of facility employees 
and other onsite workers.
    By enhancing protection against the malevolent use of a vehicle, 
the rule decreases the potential for radiological exposure of facility 
employees and other onsite workers. Although the threat of a 
determined, violent attack at a nuclear power plant is considered to be 
low, the rule also decreases the risk that onsite workers could be 
injured by weapons fire or an explosion.
    V. Installation and continuing costs associated with the action, 
including the cost of facility downtime or the cost of construction 
delay.
    Estimates of installation costs are discussed in detail on pages 7 
through 10 and 14 of the regulatory analysis. Ranges in cost estimates 
for three vehicle types illustrate the strong influence of vehicle 
characteristics. In addition, site-specific characteristics influence 
costs, including the need at some sites to extend the vehicle exclusion 
area beyond portions of the current PA boundary or providing a more 
substantial passive barrier.
    The NRC staff estimates that about 80 to 90 percent of the sites 
will provide safe standoff distances against a vehicle bomb by 
providing a vehicle barrier in proximity to the present PA boundary. 
For these sites, cost estimates range from $290K for protecting the 
smallest protected area against a passenger vehicle to $2,955K for 
protecting the largest protected area against a large truck. (The 
characteristics of the design basis vehicle used to establish 
protection goals are described in a Safeguards Information document 
provided separately to affected licensees.) For the remaining 10 to 20 
percent of the sites, cost estimates range from $440K to $3,655K.
    An important consideration in assessing costs for the 10 to 20 
percent of the sites that may have to protect beyond the existing 
protected areas is that the only definitive requirement for all 
licensees is that they provide measures to protect against the use of a 
land vehicle as a means of transportation to gain proximity to vital 
areas and that they assess any incremental measures, if necessary, to 
meet the design goal for a land vehicle bomb. The NRC will accept 
alternative measures if the measures provide substantial protection 
against a land vehicle bomb and if the licensee demonstrates by an 
analysis, using the essential elements of the criteria in 10 CFR 
50.109, that the costs of fully meeting measures needed to protect 
against a vehicle bomb are not justified by the added protection 
provided.
    Continuing costs to maintain barriers should be small. 
Implementation of the rule will not require facility downtime or 
construction delay.
    VI. The potential safety impact of changes in plant or operational 
complexity, including the relationship to proposed and existing 
regulatory requirements and NRC staff positions.
    There should be no adverse safety impact from the rule. 
Construction of barriers will be near or beyond existing protected area 
perimeters and should not delay authorized access to the protected 
area.
    VII. The estimated resource burden on the NRC associated with the 
action and the availability of such resources.
    There should be no new resource burden on the NRC. There will be no 
NRC staff licensing review of licensees' vehicle control measures 
before implementation. Licensees will be required to retain their 
analyses on site for NRC staff review during routine inspections. 
Inspection of the approximately 67 total sites for explosive protection 
will be about 1 FTE. Reviewing licensee proposals for alternative 
measures and 10 CFR 50.109 type analyses will require approximately 1 
FTE and 40K of technical assistance from the United States Army Corps 
of Engineers.
    VIII. The potential impact of differences in facility type, design, 
or age on the relevancy and practicality of the proposed action.
    The action is relevant for all nuclear power reactors. The action 
should also be practical at most sites. If a barrier stopped a vehicle 
at the PA perimeter with little or no further penetration, about 90 
percent of the sites would provide significant protection against the 
design basis vehicle bomb.
    In those cases where licensees determine additional security 
measures may be needed to protect safe shutdown capability, the rule 
permits licensees to either implement the additional security measures 
or develop alternative protection strategies. The licensee may propose 
alternative measures if the measures provide substantial protection 
against a land vehicle bomb and if they demonstrate by an analysis, 
using the essential elements of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.109, that the 
costs of fully meeting measures needed to protect against a vehicle 
bomb are not justified by the added protection provided. The NRC staff 
will review licensee's alternative proposals and make an acceptability 
determination. The Commission will be notified of such NRC staff 
action.
    NRC staff's analysis also indicates that there is a high likelihood 
that all sites will be capable of achieving and maintaining safe 
shutdown if a design basis bomb were detonated at any land accessible 
location of a nuclear power plant outside of the owner controlled area.
    IX. Whether the proposed action is interim or final, and if 
interim, the justification for imposing the proposed action on an 
interim basis.
    The action is to promulgate a final rule. The rulemaking does not 
involve interim actions.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73

    Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Nuclear 
materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

    For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of 
the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is 
adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 73.

PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

    1. The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, 
sec.147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as 
amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 
5844).

    Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 
Stat. 2232, 2241, (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also 
issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 
note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99-399, 100 
Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169).
    2. In Sec. 73.1, the introductory text of paragraph (a) and the 
text of (a)(1)(ii) are revised and new paragraphs (a)(1)(i)(E) and 
(a)(1)(iii) are added to read as follow:


Sec. 73.1   Purpose and scope.

    (a) Purpose. This part prescribes requirements for the 
establishment and maintenance of a physical protection system which 
will have capabilities for the protection of special nuclear material 
at fixed sites and in transit and of plants in which special nuclear 
material is used. The following design basis threats, where referenced 
in ensuing sections of this part, shall be used to design safeguards 
systems to protect against acts of radiological sabotage and to prevent 
the theft of special nuclear material. Licensees subject to the 
provisions of Sec. 72.182, Sec. 72.212, Sec. 73.20, Sec. 73.50, and 
Sec. 73.60 are exempt from Sec. 73.1(a)(1)(i)(E) and 
Sec. 73.1(a)(1)(iii).
    (1) * * *
    (i) * * *
    (E) A four-wheel drive land vehicle used for transporting personnel 
and their hand-carried equipment to the proximity of vital areas, and
    (ii) An internal threat of an insider, including an employee (in 
any position), and
    (iii) A four-wheel drive land vehicle bomb.
* * * * *
    3. In Sec. 73.21, a new paragraph (b)(1)(xiii) is added to read as 
follows:


Sec. 73.21   Requirements for the protection of safeguards information.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (xiii) Information required by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 
73.55 (c) (8) and (9).
* * * * *
    4. In Sec. 73.55, new paragraphs (c) (7), (8), (9), and (10) are 
added to read as follow:


Sec. 73.55  Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities 
in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (7) Vehicle control measures, including vehicle barrier systems, 
must be established to protect against use of a land vehicle, as 
specified by the Commission, as a means of transportation to gain 
unauthorized proximity to vital areas.
    (8) Each licensee shall compare the vehicle control measures 
established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7) to the Commission's 
design goals (i.e., to protect equipment, systems, devices, or 
material, the failure of which could directly or indirectly endanger 
public health and safety by exposure to radiation) and criteria for 
protection against a land vehicle bomb. Each licensee shall either:
    (i) Confirm to the Commission that the vehicle control measures 
meet the design goals and criteria specified; or
    (ii) Propose alternative measures, in addition to the measures 
established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7), describe the level 
of protection that these measures would provide against a land vehicle 
bomb, and compare the costs of the alternative measures with the costs 
of measures necessary to fully meet the design goals and criteria. The 
Commission will approve the proposed alternative measures if they 
provide substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb, and it is 
determined by an analysis, using the essential elements of 10 CFR 
50.109, that the costs of fully meeting the design goals and criteria 
are not justified by the added protection that would be provided.
    (9) Each licensee authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor 
shall:
    (i) By February 28, 1995 submit to the Commission a summary 
description of the proposed vehicle control measures as required by 10 
CFR 73.55 (c)(7) and the results of the vehicle bomb comparison as 
required by 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(8). For licensees who choose to propose 
alternative measures as provided for in 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(8), the 
proposal must be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90 and include 
the analysis and justification for the proposed alternatives.
    (ii) By February 29, 1996 fully implement the required vehicle 
control measures, including site-specific alternative measures as 
approved by the Commission.
    (iii) Protect as Safeguards Information, information required by 
the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55(c) (8) and (9).
    (iv) Retain, in accordance with 10 CFR 73.70, all comparisons and 
analyses prepared pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55 (c) (7) and (8).
    (10) Each applicant for a license to operate a nuclear power 
reactor pursuant to 10 CFR 50.21(b) or 10 CFR 50.22, whose application 
was submitted prior to August 31, 1994, shall incorporate the required 
vehicle control program into the site Physical Security Plan and 
implement it by the date of receipt of the operating license.
* * * * *
    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of July 1994.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John C. Hoyle,
Acting Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 94-18638 Filed 7-29-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P