[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 146 (Monday, August 1, 1994)] [Unknown Section] [Page 0] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov] [FR Doc No: 94-18638] [[Page Unknown]] [Federal Register: August 1, 1994] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 73 RIN 3150-AE81 Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Action: Final rule. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its physical protection regulations for operating nuclear power reactors. The amendments modify the design basis threat for radiological sabotage to include use of a land vehicle by adversaries for transporting personnel and their hand-carried equipment to the proximity of vital areas and to include a land vehicle bomb. The amendments also require reactor licensees to install vehicle control measures, including vehicle barrier systems, to protect against the malevolent use of a land vehicle. The Commission believes this action is prudent based on an evaluation of an intrusion incident at the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power station and a bombing of the World Trade Center. The objective of this final rule is to enhance reactor safety by protecting against the use of a vehicle to gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas. Further, the amendments will enhance reactor safety by protecting vital equipment from damage by detonation of a large explosive charge at the point of vehicle denial. EFFECTIVE DATE: August 31, 1994. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Phillip F. McKee, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, telephone (301) 504-2933. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background On November 4, 1993 (58 FR 58804), the Commission published a proposed rule in the Federal Register for public comment that presented amendments to the physical protection requirements for operating commercial nuclear power reactors. The amendments proposed to modify the design basis threat for radiological sabotage to include use of a land vehicle by adversaries for transporting personnel, hand-carried equipment, and/or explosives. A total of 35 letters of public comment were received from respondents representing more than 160 individual comments. Comments received in association with a public meeting conducted by the NRC on May 10, 1993, on this same topic have also been analyzed as part of this final rulemaking. An additional 11 comments were received as a result of the meeting, representing an additional 38 individual comments. Written comments received from the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) and public comments made at a February 10, 1994, meeting of the ACRS are also addressed under the following analysis. Copies of the public comments received on this proposed rule are available for inspection and copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Public Comment Analysis General Public comment on the rule was received from 25 licensees that operate commercial nuclear power reactors; two industry groups, the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) and the Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group (NUBARG); two public citizens and one citizen's group, Ohio Citizen's for Responsible Energy; two advocacy groups, the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) and the Committee to Bridge the Gap; one State nuclear safety agency; and two vendors. Additional comments were received as a result of an NRC-sponsored public meeting of May 10, 1993. Comments were received from eight private citizens (the letter from one enclosed a petition signed by 40 individuals); two utilities; and one public interest group, Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy. The proposed rule indicated that comments regarding malevolent use of vehicles submitted in association with the meeting would be treated under this final rule and that duplicate comments need not be submitted. Many of these respondents recommended strengthening the design basis threat to cover the maximum credible threat and increasing the number of security force members at power reactor sites as the best method to counter a terrorist vehicle bomb attack. The aforementioned petition, submitted to the Chairman of the NRC, indicated, among other things, that Congress should strengthen safeguards at nuclear facilities and should legislate the use of Federal guards at NRC-licensed sites. Comments received from 2 utilities that operate commercial nuclear power reactors either indicated support for the then-developing NUMARC comments or were similar to comments received on the proposed rule. A variety of general comments were received on the proposed rule and supporting documentation. Several strongly supported the rulemaking as proposed and expressed the view that rulemaking on this topic was the proper, proactive approach. A number of comments strongly supported a belief that vehicle intrusion and vehicle bomb threats exist. These comments refer to the Three Mile Island intrusion event and the World Trade Center bombing event as evidence of these threats. The NCI commented that the rule was long overdue. Some of those that supported the rule offered more detailed comments proposing further expansion of the design basis threat and placing more rigid controls on licensee actions to implement the rule. NUMARC provided detailed comments on behalf of the industry. Fourteen utilities confirmed their support or agreement with NUMARC's comments. NUMARC commented that industry believes that it is important to deter unauthorized land vehicle penetration challenges to a licensee's protected area and that industry recognizes that facilities must be able to shut down safely in the unlikely event of the detonation of an explosive device outside the protected area. NUMARC considers these actions to be prudent for the protection of its employees, investment, and public confidence. NUMARC commented that because the NRC (as expressed in the proposed rule) and NUMARC agree in principle, the issue should be addressed in an integrated manner using a reasonable and realistic approach without imposing unnecessary conservatism. The details of NUMARC's comments identified areas where they considered the proposed rule took too conservative an approach. NUMARC also expressed general concerns about the backfit justification for the rule and the schedule for implementation. NUBARG, whose members include 15 nuclear utilities, provided comments that generally challenge the backfitting and regulatory analyses based on their concerns that the analyses did not provide a sufficient quantified basis for finding the requisite ``substantial increase'' in safety under the NRC's backfitting rule. Two of the comment letters provided by utilities confirmed their support or agreement with NUBARG's comments. Several comments expressed the view that the proposed rule could not be substantiated based on the current threat. As support for this position, comments referred to conclusions reached by the NRC in denial of a 1991 petition for rulemaking to require licensees to protect against truck bombs. Other comments indicated that two isolated events (the Three Mile Island intrusion event and World Trade Center bombing) did not justify rulemaking, particularly in light of the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), by their account, does not support the position that the threat of malevolent use of vehicles has increased and the NRC position is that no actual vehicle bomb threat against power reactors exists. Several comments opposed the proposed rule because they considered that it did not provide a substantial increase in protection of public health and safety or common defense and security at a justifiable cost. Other comments indicated that the rule was extreme and unnecessarily burdensome with little if any safety benefit and that contingency plans for vehicle bombs currently in place adequately addressed the threat of malevolent use of vehicles. The NRC staff presented the proposed rulemaking package to the Security Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) on November 3, 1993, and the full committee on November 4, 1993. The full committee was briefed on December 10, 1993, in a closed session, by the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. Following these briefings, ACRS's December 10, 1993 letter to the Chairman raised concerns about the rulemaking, particularly the justification for the rule, the lack of a quantitative risk assessment to support it, and the expedited nature of the rulemaking. A minority of four members of the ACRS expressed a view that the proposed rule represents a prudent and effective step toward enhancing public health and safety. On February 10, 1994, the ACRS heard presentations on the rulemaking from the NUMARC, the NCI, one public citizen, and the NRC staff members. On April 7, 1994, the staff briefed the ACRS in a closed session regarding additional, quantitative evaluations that supported this rulemaking. Issues raised by the ACRS in their December 10, 1993, letter are encompassed by issues raised by the public and are addressed in the following responses. Like the ACRS, NUMARC, NUBARG, and numerous utilities expressed concern that the safety benefit was not adequately justified or quantified. They challenged the validity of the regulatory and backfit analyses because of lack of quantification of the threat. They contended that the analyses contain no quantified risk data or safety goal evaluation to support the conclusion that the proposed regulations result in a substantial increase in public health and safety. Another comment, while acknowledging the potential difficulty in quantification of the threat, stated that the analyses were no more than ``conclusionary'' and fall short of demonstrating the requisite substantial increase in radiological safety. The Commission notes that the use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) as a tool for estimating risk is sound when based on results from demonstrable, repeatable events and test data--for example, establishing the probability of failure and the mean time to failure for aircraft wing root structures due to metal fatigue or for valve failures due to water hammer or corrosion, etc. The NRC has examined the use of PRA to predict sabotage as an initiating event and concluded that to do so would not be credible or valid because terrorist attacks, by their very nature, may not be quantified. Past attempts to apply PRA techniques to acts of sabotage have resulted in similar findings. For example, in 1978, NUREG/CR-0400, the ``Risk Assessment Review Group Report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission'' stated, ``it was recognized that the probability of sabotage of a nuclear power plant cannot be estimated with any confidence.'' For this same reason, according to this report, consideration of risk of sabotage was deliberately omitted in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400). In the ``Policy Statement on Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants'' published on March 14, 1983 (48 FR 10772), the Commission stated: The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear materials is not presently included in the safety goal. At present there is no basis on which to provide a measure of the risk of these matters. It is the Commission's intention that everything that is needed shall be done to keep such risks at their present, very low, level; and it is our expectation that efforts on this point will continue to be successful. With these exceptions it is our intent that the risk from all various initiating mechanisms be taken into account to the best of the capability of the current evaluation techniques. In the 1983 Indian Point licensing hearings, the NRC staff testified that PRA is unable to predict the probability of sabotage as an initiating event. Also, in a June 11, 1991, petition to institute an individual plant examination program for threats beyond the design basis, the NCI stated a position similar to the NRC's by recognizing that PRA-type methods cannot be used to analyze for core damage frequency since one cannot quantify the likelihood of a terrorist attack. The Commission continues to believe that arbitrary selection of numbers to ``quantify'' threat probability without demonstrable, actual, supporting event data would yield misleading results at best. Knowledgeable terrorism analysts recognize the danger and are unwilling to quantify the risk. Over the past several years, a number of National Intelligence Estimates have been produced addressing the likelihood of nuclear terrorism. The analyses and conclusions are not presented in terms of quantified probability but recognize the unpredictable nature of terrorist activity in terms of likelihood. The NRC continues to believe that, although in many cases considerations of probabilities can provide insights into the relative risk of an event, in some cases it is not possible, with current knowledge and methods, to usefully quantify the probability of a specific vulnerability threat. The NRC notes that, although not quantified, its regulatory analysis recognizes the importance of the perception of the likelihood of an attempt to create radiological sabotage in assessing whether to redefine adequate protection. The NRC's assessment that there is no indication of an actual vehicle threat against the domestic commercial nuclear industry was an important consideration in concluding that neither the Three Mile Island intrusion nor the World Trade Center bombing demonstrated a need to redefine adequate protection. The NRC does not agree that quantifying the probability of an actual attack is necessary to a judgment of a substantial increase in overall protection of the public health and safety (a less stringent test of the justification for a rule change). Inherent in the NRC's current regulations is a policy decision that the threat, although not quantified, is likely in a range that warrants protection against a violent external assault as a matter of prudence. The potential threat posed by malevolent use of vehicles as part of a violent external assault and the need to protect against it have been the subject of detailed consideration and reconsideration by the Commission for more than fifteen years. The original requirements for physical security at power reactor sites proposed in the mid-1970s included a requirement for barriers to prevent ready access to vital areas by ground vehicles. The Commission decided not to include the requirement at that time. The Commission reexamined the vehicle issue in great detail in the 1980s. In 1986, the Commission concluded that, even though perimeter chain link fences would not prevent vehicle intrusion, the requirement for prompt response by guards armed with shoulder-fired weapons would limit actions of intruders. In reconsidering the risk from use of a vehicle to gain proximity to vital areas, the NRC's regulatory analysis does not suggest that the likelihood of a violent external assault has increased. Rather, the staff focussed its regulatory analysis on whether a vehicle could provide an advantage to an adversary with the characteristics of the design basis threat. The NRC assessed lessons learned from the TMI intrusion and concluded that a vehicle could provide advantages to an adversary not previously considered. In SECY-86-101, ``Design Basis Threat--Options for Consideration,'' March 31, 1986, the NRC concluded that, even though perimeter chain link fences would not prevent vehicle intrusion, the requirement for prompt response by guards armed with shoulder-fired weapons would limit actions of intruders. Accordingly, in 1986, the NRC concluded that the installation of vehicle barriers might not constitute a substantial overall increase in the protection of public health and safety. More recently, the NRC has analyzed the capability of existing licensee security measures to protect against a violent external assault that includes a vehicle as a mode of transportation. These new analyses support the NRC's conclusions in the regulatory analysis for the proposed rulemaking. The NRC believes that the vehicle intrusion issue alone warrants the installation of vehicle barriers at nuclear power plants. In the 1980s, the NRC also consulted with other Federal agencies, including the National Security Council, regarding the use of vehicle bombs in the Middle East and their possible impact on the domestic threat situation. In June 1988, the NRC decided that it would not be necessary to change the design basis threat for radiological sabotage (10 CFR 73.1(a)(1)) nor to require long-range planning by power reactor licensees for permanent protection against land vehicle bombs. However, as a matter of prudence, it directed development of NRC and licensee contingency plans for dealing with a possible land vehicle bomb threat to power reactors, should one arise. On June 11, 1991 (56 FR 26782), the Commission denied a petition for rulemaking to revise the design basis threat to include explosive- laden vehicles (PRN-73-9). In denying that petition, the NRC noted that the decision was based, in part, on the fact that only one truck bomb attack (1970) had occurred in the United States; there had been no other vehicle bomb attacks in the Western Hemisphere; there had been none outside areas of civil unrest; and there had been none directed against a nuclear activity. The vehicle bomb attack on the World Trade Center represented a significant change to the domestic threat environment that changed many of the points used in denying the petition and eroded the basis for concluding that vehicle bombs could be excluded from any consideration of the domestic threat environment. For the first time in the United States, a conspiracy with ties to Middle East extremists clearly demonstrated the capability and motivation to organize, plan, and successfully conduct a major vehicle bomb attack. Regardless of the motivations or connections of the conspirators, it is significant that the bombing was organized within the United States and implemented with materials obtained on the open market in the United States. Accordingly, the Commission believes that the threat characterized in the final rule is appropriate. As a result of the World Trade Center bombing, the NRC believes that the construction of a vehicle bomb is more likely to develop without advance indications. The NRC does not believe that it can quantify the likelihood of vehicle bomb attack. However, it has performed a conditional probabilistic risk analysis for an existing power reactor site, assuming an attempt to damage a nuclear power plant with a design basis vehicle bomb placed at locations within the protected area that would create the greatest risk to public health and safety. The analysis indicated that the contribution to core damage frequency could be high. Barriers installed to protect against vehicle intrusion into protected areas would also protect, to varying degrees, against vehicle bombs. The NRC believes that adjusting the location of barriers where necessary to ensure a capability of protecting vital equipment against a design basis vehicle bomb would provide an additional, substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety. Further, the NRC believes that the incremental costs to licensees to analyze the degree of protection against a vehicle bomb and to make adjustments in vehicle control measures in limited cases are justified, particularly considering the provisions in the rule allowing licensees to propose alternative measures if a site-specific analysis indicates that the costs of fully meeting the rule's design goals and criteria are not justified by the added protection that would be provided. The NRC's additional deterministic evaluations and limited probabilistic assessments have supported the NRC's earlier findings that protecting against vehicle intrusion and a vehicle bomb would substantially increase the overall protection of public health and safety. The NRC has updated the regulatory analysis to include these evaluations. Additional issues raised and the NRC response to these issues are provided in the sections listed below that follow: I. Threat Considerations A. Coupling Vehicle Intrusion and Vehicle Bomb Threat B. Characteristics of Design Basis Vehicle/Explosive C. ``Margin of Prudence'' D. Design Basis Threat Re-Evaluation E. Applicability of 10 CFR 50.13 F. ``Threat'' or ``Alert'' Program II. Regulatory and Backfit Analyses A. Redundant Engineered Safeguards Systems B. Peer Review of Analyses C. Clarification III. Rule Implementation A. Schedule B. NRC Review and Approval of Submittals C. Vehicle Barriers D. Passive Vehicle Barriers E. Active Vehicle Barriers F. Alternative Measures to Protect Against Explosives IV. NRC Inspection V. Miscellaneous A. Research Reactors B. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations C. Office of Management and Budget Supporting Statement I. Threat Considerations A. Coupling Vehicle Intrusion and Vehicle Bomb Threat Comment. NUMARC and several utilities commented that the proposed rule unnecessarily linked vehicle intrusion with a vehicle bomb. NUMARC commented that the proposed rule contemplates that the intruding vehicle would be fully loaded with personnel, equipment, and a large explosive device. NUMARC also commented that any considerations of a vehicle bomb should be for a stationary vehicle. NUMARC stated that coupling the vehicle intrusion event and vehicle bomb event added unnecessary conservatism. For example, to protect against a moving vehicle, bomb barriers would, in some cases, need to be more substantial to stop penetration of vehicle. NUMARC proposed that the revised design basis threat should include either a land vehicle intrusion or a detonation of explosives outside the protected area, but not a combination of the two. Along this same line, one comment expressed the opinion that the proposed language implies the need to protect against a vehicle used for transport, not for breaching a barrier or for use as a truck bomb. Another comment expressed a concern that a major defect in the rule is the lack of the assumption that the adversary could blast away a fence if a licensee were to choose to use, for example, cabling in the fence as the means to stop a vehicle. The respondent proposed that any barrier should be a heavy mass which would be resistant to destruction. Response. The Commission agrees with the NUMARC comment that the proposed rule could be read to imply that licensees would be required to provide protection against an intrusion by adversaries using a vehicle for transportation coincident with a vehicle bomb. This was not the intent and the rule wording has been revised to clarify this point. Commission deliberations on the rule have considered use of the vehicle as transportation for an adversary and a vehicle bomb as separate threats to be protected against. Any coupling of adversary tactics associated with the rule was intended to allow for more efficient and cost effective protection against either a vehicle intrusion to gain rapid access to vital areas, as a single act, or against a vehicle bomb. Meeting the requirements of the final rule will result in substantial protection from a vehicle bomb whether it is moving or stationary. The NRC's regulatory analysis indicated that, because of the short distances between vital areas and portions of some protected area boundaries, protection against a vehicle at those boundaries would be inconsistent with NUMARC's stated goal of being able to safely shut down a plant following the detonation of an explosive device outside the protected area. Regarding the comment that the rule should include the assumption that adversaries may use devices to destroy less substantial barriers and then gain access, the Commission does not agree that this assumption should be included in the rule. The NRC assessment of the threat environment does not support this assumption. Further, use of such a technique by an adversary would tend to diminish one of the major advantages of use of a vehicle--the element of surprise. B. Characteristics of Design Basis Vehicle/Explosive Comment. NUMARC provided a detailed proposal for characteristics of a design basis vehicle that could be used to attempt penetration of a nuclear power plant protected area and a design basis bomb that could be used in an attempt to damage plant equipment. Other comments indicated that vehicle speed should take into consideration terrain and seasonal conditions and that the proposed vehicle explosive device size was excessive and not justified by historical experience, particularly that in the United States. Response. The Commission notes that it has relied on analogous historical data when enumerating the attributes of a design basis threat because there has never been a terrorist attack on an NRC- licensed power reactor facility or a credible threat of an attack. This was the methodology used in formulating the original design basis threat statements in the late 1970s, and it was used in defining the proposed design basis vehicle threat. The design basis vehicle was defined after examining several hundred actual vehicle bombing attacks occurring worldwide during approximately the past decade. Historical data indicates that vehicle bombs, similar to the design basis vehicle, have been used in the past and their use can reasonably be expected to continue to occur in the future. The Commission has made some changes in the detailed characteristics of the design basis vehicle. The revised characteristics will require licensees to provide substantial protection against a moving vehicle bomb. In addition, the NRC's implementation guidance discusses how the design of barrier systems can account for site-specific limits on the speed that a vehicle could attain because of factors such as terrain. Comment. One comment expressed confusion over reference to the design basis vehicle as a ``4-wheel drive vehicle'' in that this could imply that non 4-wheel drive vehicles would not have to be protected against. The comment recommended that the final rule language be changed to require protection against all land vehicles. Response. The Commission disagrees that the term ``4-wheel drive vehicle'' needs clarification. It reasons that protection against intrusion by a 4-wheel drive vehicle encompasses protection against a land vehicle with less than 4-wheel drive. Comment. Other comments noted that the regulatory language should be changed to remove reference to equipment and explosives capable of being hand-carried, as opposed to that which the vehicle could carry. Response. As stated previously, this issue is being clarified by a revision of the design basis threat statement to separate the threat of intrusion versus vehicle bomb. In an intrusion event, the vehicle is obviously capable of transporting the equipment and explosives proposed to be hand-carried by an adversary. While the vehicle could carry more equipment than can be carried by the persons being transported, it is unlikely that this additional equipment would be of use to the adversaries. The vehicle is essentially a means of transport for the adversaries, and it is unlikely that once adversaries have left the vehicle they would be able to return to obtain additional equipment or explosives. Comment. One utility provided specific questions regarding several assumptions associated with the vehicle bomb. These included whether: The vehicle is under control by adversaries up to the point of detonation; The vehicle bomb automatically detonates when the adversary loses control of the vehicle or after a pre-defined time period; The vehicle is used in combination with a secondary external event, e.g., loss of offsite power; and, Point of detonation, i.e., crash point or at a later point as vehicle rolls towards a facility. Response. With respect to a vehicle bomb, for analysis purposes the device would be considered to detonate at the point where the vehicle impacted the vehicle barrier system. Whether adversaries still have control of the vehicle or whether the detonation of the device is delayed should have little impact on the analysis of the effect of the explosive blast. Because the barrier system is intended to protect against vehicles gaining proximity to vital areas, the barrier system should not allow a vehicle to fully penetrate it and continue to roll towards a facility. With respect to a secondary external event, power reactor licensees must protect against all capabilities and attributes described by the design basis threat for radiological sabotage. This would not include protection against other natural events, such as damage from a hurricane, coincident with a sabotage threat. However, with respect to loss of off-site power, licensees should consider its loss, if vital equipment is assumed damaged, in their analysis of the effects of a vehicle bomb. This consideration is compatible with the basic premise that equipment not designated and protected as vital is vulnerable to damage and is not available. C. ``Margin of Prudence'' Comment. NUMARC and several utilities commented on NRC's use of the term ``margin of prudence'' as the basis for support of the proposed rulemaking. NUMARC commented that it is inappropriate to use such an undefined concept as a basis for rulemaking. These comments indicated that NRC expansion into matters of prudence is unwarranted and would result in expansion of the NRC's sphere of regulatory influence beyond plant safety. Response. Use of the term ``margin of prudence'' must be put in perspective as used by the NRC in this rulemaking. The NRC requires an established level of security at nuclear power reactor sites as a provision against possible security contingencies that might arise. The NRC has concluded that a satisfactory level of security is one that is designed and implemented to protect against a hypothetical threat (design basis threat) that contains certain adversary attributes. These attributes have been selected based on Commission analyses of actual terrorist attributes and on judgment. The term ``margin of prudence'' was used in recent Commission deliberations to suggest that the World Trade Center bombing and the Three Mile Island intrusion had caused a change in the domestic threat environment or in the NRC's understanding of the sabotage threat that was not satisfactorily addressed by the existing design basis threat. Further, the term was used to suggest that a modification of the design basis threat was necessary to reestablish a level of security commensurate with the nature of security contingencies that might arise. Its use was illustrative only of the relationship between an actual threat and the hypothetical design basis threat and the change in that relationship caused by the World Trade Center and Three Mile Island events. The NRC intended no wider or expanded use of the term. D. Design Basis Threat Re-Evaluation Comment. NUMARC and several utilities commented that the revision to the design basis threat to address malevolent use of vehicles should be addressed in an integrated manner so that rulemaking on this topic would not be impacted after completion of an ongoing, more comprehensive review of the design basis threat. Other comments expressed concerns about deficiencies in the design basis threat that need to be addressed. Deficiencies identified by these comments included: protection against more than one insider, protection against a larger number of external attackers, capability of attackers to operate as more than one team, and use of aquatic vehicles. One comment was made that ongoing considerations for reductions in the insider requirements should be part of the overall reconsideration of the design basis threat. Response. The Commission notes that use of a vehicle by adversaries was addressed under Phase I of a re-evaluation of the design basis threat which the NRC began in the Spring of 1993. This phase of the re- evaluation has been completed. Other attributes associated with the design basis threat, such as those characterized in comments on the proposed rule, have been reviewed and considered as part of Phase II of the re-evaluation. NRC staff recommendations on this part of the re- evaluation were provided to the Commission in a classified paper on March 15, 1994. E. Applicability of 10 CFR 50.13 Comment. NUMARC, NUBARG, and several utilities stated that the proposed change in the design basis threat to include malevolent use of a vehicle amounts to escalation of the threat to efforts by an enemy of the United States. The comments contended that the proposed changes to the design basis threat are, therefore, in conflict with 10 CFR 50.13, which specifies that licensees are not required to provide for design features to protect against attacks and destructive acts by an enemy of the United States. One comment recommended that NRC should re-evaluate the design basis threat assumption to now include foreign enemies of the United States. Response. In 10 CFR 50.13, which was promulgated on September 26, 1967 (32 FR 13445), the regulations provide that applicants for construction permits, operating licenses, or amendments thereto, need not provide for design features or other measures to protect against the attacks or destructive acts, including sabotage, by an enemy of the United States. The issue raised in a contested application for a power reactor construction permit, which led to the promulgation of 10 CFR 50.13, was whether the reactor should be constructed to withstand a missile attack from Cuba. There is a significant difference in the practicality of defending against a missile attack and constructing a vehicle barrier at a safe standoff distance from vital areas. The statement of considerations for 10 CFR 50.13 makes it clear that the scope of that regulation is to relieve applicants of the need to provide protective measures that are the assigned responsibility of the nation's defense establishment. The Atomic Energy Commission recognized that it was not practical for the licensees of civilian nuclear power reactors to provide design features that could protect against the full range of the modern arsenal of weapons. The statement concluded with the observation that assessing whether another nation would use force against a nuclear power plant was speculative in the extreme and, in any case, would involve the use of sensitive information regarding both the capabilities of the United States' defense establishment and diplomatic relations. The new rule, with its addition to the design basis threat and added performance requirements, is in response to a clearly demonstrated domestic capability for acts of extreme violence directed at civilian structures. The participation or sponsorship of a foreign state in the use of an explosives-laden vehicle is not necessary. The vehicle, explosives, and know-how are all readily available in a purely domestic context. It is simply not the case that a vehicle bomb attack on a nuclear power plant would almost certainly represent an attack by an enemy of the United States, within the meaning of that phrase in 10 CFR 50.13. Further, characterizing the threat as ``para-military'' adds little to the understanding of the intent of 10 CFR 50.13. ``Para-military'' suggests an armed, trained group acting outside of a legally constituted military organization. In that sense, the design basis threat prior to this amendment already described a ``para-military'' group. ``Para-military'' groups of entirely domestic origin exist. Accordingly, the amended regulation and supporting analyses need not address 10 CFR 50.13, either on the grounds that a vehicle bomb attack is an attack by an enemy of the United States or the action of a ``paramilitary'' group. That regulation is irrelevant to the present rulemaking. The implication of the comments regarding 10 CFR 50.13 is that the simple addition of a vehicle bomb to the design basis threat should shift the function of providing physical security for nuclear power plants from the licensee to the Federal Government. The respondents present no real evidence or persuasive arguments for such a radical change in the regulatory environment. F. ``Threat'' or ``Alert'' Program Comment. One comment suggested that the NRC develop and implement a ``threat or alert'' program similar to the Department of Defense's Defense Condition ``DEFCON'' program. It was recommended that, under such a program, the NRC would immediately notify the industry when information is received from the intelligence community of an impending security alert and provide a recommended level of action. Licensees, in turn, would be required to develop security response plans based on NRC-established threat levels. Response. The Commission believes that its current Information Assessment Team approach for notifying licensees of significant events has been effective in disseminating and coordinating such information. The Information Assessment Team (IAT) assesses in a timely manner reported threats to NRC-licensed facilities, materials, and activities to determine credibility and make recommendations to NRC management. The IAT is composed of experienced Headquarter's and Regional staff who are on-call 24 hours a day and bring a variety of expertise to the assessment process, such as reactor systems, site specific information, and liaison with other Federal agencies, including close coordination with the Department of Energy on threat advisories to the utility industry and NRC licensees. The IAT was established in 1976, and since that time has supported NRC decision makers responding to a range of threats, from bomb threats against reactors to times of international tension during Operation Desert Shield and Storm. For example, coordinated threat advisories related to the latter were issued by the IAT on August 24, 1990, January 9, 1991, and April 2, 1991. However, the NRC does not believe that the IAT is an adequate alternative to vehicles barriers at nuclear power plants. II. Regulatory and Backfit Analysis A. Redundant Engineered Safeguards Systems Comment. One comment indicated that the proposed rule did not adequately take into consideration the existing engineered safeguards systems installed at nuclear power plants. The comment was made that unauthorized access and possible damage to any one vital area does not necessarily prevent the safe shut down of the nuclear reactor. Response. The Commission agrees that consideration should be given to engineered safeguards systems and believes that flexibility has been built into the rule to allow for consideration of such existing systems. The redundancy and diversity of existing engineered safeguards systems was considered in the NRC analysis of the capability of existing licensee security measures to protect against a violent external assault that includes a vehicle as a mode of transportation. Specific plant equipment layout can be a factor in protective considerations against a vehicle bomb. Equipment that is redundant or provides backup to equipment assumed to be damaged by a vehicle bomb may be considered in the analysis for determining whether protective measures established to protect against vehicle intrusion fully meet the design goals and criteria for protection against a land vehicle bomb. B. Peer Review of Analysis Comment. One comment recommended that any research results, risk analyses, cost calculations and other work by the NRC should be subject to peer review. Response. The NRC believes that its work is subject to various types of review and, in a sense, is subject to peer review. Portions of the risk analyses were conducted by groups with appropriate expertise, including threat assessment, physical security system performance evaluation, critical target set analysis, safety system inspections, probabilistic risk analysis, vehicle barrier design, and vehicle bomb analysis. In addition, the types of efforts mentioned by the comment are often the subject of multiple office review within the NRC. Several technical review groups, both within and external to the NRC, provide further consideration of NRC staff work. Finally, with respect to rulemaking, analyses are the subject of public comment. C. Clarification Comment. One comment noted that the wording associated with the backfit analysis in the proposed Federal Register notice did not precisely coincide with that found under 10 CFR 50.109 (a)(3). Response. The Commission notes that the wording in the notice is wording that is used for most NRC rules that are subject to backfitting. The Commission considers that this wording is consistent with the requirement cited. III. Rule Implementation A. Schedule Comment. A large number of comments were received on the schedules associated with the proposed rule. Some indicated that the proposed schedule to submit a summary description of the barrier system and results of vehicle bomb comparison within 90 days was not long enough. One comment was received supporting the proposed schedule. Those commenting that the schedule was too tight expressed concern that 90 days did not provide sufficient time to perform a thorough design analysis, particularly if alternative measures were to be proposed. NUMARC, and several other respondents, recommended that licensees be provided 180 days after issuance of the rule to provide a summary description of the barrier system. A number of comments were also received stating that the proposed schedule to confirm implementation within 360 days after issuance of the rule was not long enough. Those commenting that the schedule for completion of installation was too tight expressed concern that the schedule did not adequately account for material procurement and availability, outage schedules, and weather circumstances. NUMARC and several other respondents recommended that licensees be provided 18 months after issuance of the rule to complete installation of measures to meet the rule. A few comments were received that recommended that implementation schedules be established on a case-by-case basis. Response. The Commission agrees that an extension to the schedule is reasonable based on the fact that this is a new program for power reactor sites, that there may be some difficulty in procurement of active vehicle barrier systems, and that possible deleterious effects on scheduling may result from the weather or planned outages. Accordingly, the time period for submission of the summary required by 10 CFR 73.55(c)(9)(i) is extended from 90 to 180 days from the effective date of the rule. The implementation period required under 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(9)(ii) is extended from 360 days to 18 months from the rule's effective date. B. NRC Review and Approval of Submittals Comment. Three comments recommended that the NRC should review and approve all licensee submittals, including the summary description of the proposed measures to protect against vehicle intrusion, the results of the vehicle bomb comparison, and, for applicable licensees, alternative measures to protect against an explosive device. Response. The NRC believes that approval of all summaries submitted under 10 CFR 73.55(c)(9)(i) would unnecessarily delay expeditious implementation of this rule. All licensees are required to amend their physical security plans to commit to the implementation and use of the vehicle barrier system described by the regulations. These commitments are fully inspectable and enforceable by the NRC. The NRC would review and approve the limited number of requests expected to use alternative measures that might not fully meet the design goals and criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb. The final rule has been changed to clarify that proposals for alternative measures be submitted in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90. C. Vehicle Barriers Comment. NUMARC and several other respondents expressed concern that barrier systems would be required to be ``nuclear grade'' and that this would unnecessarily escalate costs. Another comment expressed the opinion that, instead of licensees certifying to the NRC that vehicle barriers meet requirements, they be able to choose barriers from some pre-approved list. NUMARC commented that design and certification needed to utilize existing technology and barrier device test results, or costs would unnecessarily escalate. NUMARC also requested that the discussion in the Regulatory Guide be expanded to describe flexibility available to licensees in designing and installing barriers. Response. The NRC is unaware of any requirement for ``nuclear grade equipment'' and notes that the expression does not appear in the proposed rule or supporting guidance. The NRC agrees with the industry comment that commercially available materials suffice for the construction of the vehicle barrier if the barrier is capable of countering the design basis vehicle threat. As suggested by many respondents, the NRC recommends that affected licensees take advantage of available information on vehicle barrier testing, much of which has been conducted by Federal laboratories and agencies. With respect to the use of ``pre-approved barriers,'' the Commission believes that most vendors of commercial vehicle barrier systems know what the ``stopping powers'' of their barriers are. Licensees should use this as a resource in determining what barrier can counter the attributes of the Commission's design basis vehicle most cost effectively. In addition, the NRC has provided information on performance levels of several types of barriers to affected licensees. The Commission agrees with the NUMARC comment concerning expansion of the discussion on the flexibility of designing and installing barriers in the regulatory guide supporting the rule. The regulatory guide now reflects this. Comment. NUMARC expressed the view that compensatory measures, not explicitly addressed in the proposed rule or regulatory guide, for maintenance or repair of barriers should be determined by the licensee. Another comment stated that compensatory measures required if a barrier is temporarily inoperable, as with maintenance, need to be addressed at an early stage. Response. The NRC anticipates that vehicle barriers, particularly passive barriers, will infrequently become non-functional once installed. For those infrequent cases, any compensatory measures should take into consideration the type and cause of the problem and the time the barrier will be non-functional. For example, for short term problems with active or passive barriers, compensatory measures would not be expected to be extensive. In cases where barriers are non- functional for longer periods, compensatory measures may include placement of heavy vehicular equipment, concrete highway median barriers arranged in a serpentine fashion, installation of strands of airplane arresting wires, or the positioning of an officer armed with a high power contingency weapon may be appropriate. The regulatory guide issued in support of this rulemaking has been revised to include guidance regarding compensatory measures. D. Passive Vehicle Barriers Comment. One comment was directed at the guidance that specified measures should be established to periodically verify the integrity of passive barriers outside the protected area. It was commented that passive barriers by their nature (ditches, berms, concrete filled embedded poles, etc.) do not require inspection, or if so, the period for inspecting should be on the order of several years. If licensees were to install a unique passive barrier that should need periodic inspection, it should be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Response. The Commission agrees that the components of many passive barrier systems do not need to be inspected on a weekly or monthly basis due to the nature of their construction. Observations by routine security patrols should be sufficient to detect any degradation in the barrier. Some types of barriers may be more susceptible to deterioration, damage, or tampering and therefore should be subject to more frequent observation by security patrols or, in some cases, periodic inspection. Given the large variation in components of passive barriers, the Commission considers it appropriate to provide licensees with flexibility on how to assure the continued integrity of barrier components. If the barrier system is damaged, the Commission expects that such damage would be identified in a reasonable period and actions would be taken promptly to repair the damage. E. Active Vehicle Barriers Comment. Two comments were received requesting that the wording in the proposed regulatory guidance clarify that only one active barrier is needed to deny access. Also, one utility commented that the provision in the regulatory guide that specified vehicles and their operators be authorized for entry before being permitted access inside the vehicle barrier system would preclude their current practice of searching the vehicle after entry inside the active barrier. Response. The NRC agrees with these comments and the guidance in the regulatory guide supporting the rule has been changed. Comment. Another comment recommended that specific kinetic energy be identified for use in design of active barriers with documented performance satisfying specific energy requirements because this approach would help avoid costly independent testing to demonstrate performance. Response. Guidance previously forwarded to licensees, designated as Safeguards Information, defines the kinetic energy associated with the design basis vehicle. As previously stated, the NRC has provided information to affected licensees on performance levels of several types of barriers to help avoid costly independent testing. F. Alternative Measures to Protect Against Explosives Comment. One comment objected to the rule's provisions that would allow some licensees to provide only ``substantial protection'' and not equivalent protection to fully meet the Commission's design goals and criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb. One comment indicated that the NRC should not be considering costs in determining the acceptability of alternative measures because costs should not be considered relative to enforcing adequate protection. NUMARC commented that it was reasonable for licensees to have the option to propose alternative measures for Commission review when the design goals and criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb cannot be met without a significant resource burden. Response. The NRC's regulatory analysis concluded that neither the Three Mile Island or World Trade Center events demonstrated a need to redefine adequate protection. The NRC's basis for the backfit being implemented by this rulemaking was a determination that it would result in a substantial increase in protection of the public health and safety. Paragraph 50.109(a)(3) of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, authorizes such a backfit only if the costs of implementation are justified in view of the increased protection. The NRC concluded that the estimated costs for all licensees to provide barriers to protect against vehicle intrusion were justified. However, at some sites, the location of barriers to protect against vehicle intrusion could provide substantial protection against a vehicle bomb without fully meeting the NRC's design goals and criteria for protection against an explosive device. For these licensees, the incremental costs for placing barriers further from vital areas or for providing additional protective measures to fully meet the design goal and criteria may not be justified by the incremental protection beyond the substantial level. Comment. NUMARC objected to the provision that licensees proposing alternative measures must compare their costs with the costs of measures needed to fully meet the design goals and criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb and must provide an assessment supporting a finding that the additional costs are not justified by the added protection that would be provided. NUMARC asserted that the NRC was requiring licensees to perform analyses beyond what the NRC staff has done in support of the proposed rule. NUBARG similarly asserted that the NRC was requiring licensees to prove that alternative measures substantially increase safety, which is unfair. NUBARG asserts that this requires licensees to perform a backfit analysis on why they should not install a proposed modification (one that would fully meet the design goals and criteria) and that this runs counter to the backfit principle of the NRC providing the analysis. Several respondents stated that they understood that the rule and regulatory guidance specified that those licensees proposing alternative measures would need to submit to the NRC a quantitative analysis to justify that the cost of plant specific measures are not justified by the added protection afforded. The comments indicated that, based on this understanding, such a task would be difficult, if not impossible. A public interest group expressed the opinion that contingency planning as part of alternative measures is unacceptable when compared to a permanent vehicle control system. Response. The optional licensee analysis provided for in the revised regulations is intended to be similar in approach to that performed by the NRC in the development of the regulatory analysis for the rulemaking. The Commission recognizes the difficulties with respect to quantification of the protection provided (see general discussion) and would expect licensees to provide a more deterministic analysis in comparing the relative protection provided by alternative measures taken by the licensee that don't fully meet the Commission design goal and criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb. The Commission did not intend to require its licensees to do more of an analysis or a different type of analysis than that performed by the NRC. The quantitative aspects of the analysis required by the regulation only apply to cost considerations, particularly the comparison of costs needed to fully meet the Commission's design goals and criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb with the cost of alternative measures. The comment that contingency planning would be an unacceptable alternative to permanent vehicle barriers does not recognize the provision in the rule that specifies that all licensees are required to establish a vehicle barrier system to protect against use of a land vehicle as a means of transportation to gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas. Licensees may not substitute contingency plans for vehicle barriers. Rather, contingency plans were identified as one possible option for licensees (those few where it may be practical for them to propose alternative measures to protect against explosives) to supplement protection provided by the licensee's vehicle barrier system for protection against a vehicle bomb. IV. NRC Inspection Comment. One comment indicated that the NRC should establish procedures to assure licensee compliance with the rule. Response. The NRC plans to inspect licensee implementation of the rule as part of the ongoing reactor inspection program. Most likely the inspection will be accomplished using a temporary inspection procedure, which is planned to be prepared after publication of the rule but before the required implementation date. As previously stated, all affected licensees are required to amend their physical security plans in response to this rule. All commitments in physical security plans are fully inspectable and enforceable by the NRC. V. Miscellaneous A. Research Reactors Comment. One comment recommended that, in light of the upcoming 1996 Olympics, all reactor fuel, heavy water, and kilocuries of Co and Cs be removed immediately from the Georgia Tech campus. Response. While research reactors do not fall within the scope of this rulemaking, the Commission notes that its threat assessment activities are performed on a continuing basis, in close liaison with the intelligence community. Should the level of domestic threat change at any time, appropriate action will be taken by the NRC. Specifically, the Atlanta Field Office of the FBI has established liaison with all Federal agencies in Georgia, including the NRC, relative to the Olympics. The FBI is the lead law enforcement agency in charge of the Olympics and, to date, has not indicated that there is any threat to NRC-licensed facilities or materials relative to the Olympics. B. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Comment. NUMARC commented that independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs) should be clearly exempted from the rule. Response. The NRC did not intend for ISFSIs to be subject to this regulation because of the lower consequences associated with storage of irradiated fuel removed from a power reactor core, particularly since spent fuel stored at ISFSIs must be aged for at least one year. The NRC is currently preparing a proposed rule to clarify physical protection requirements for ISFSIs. The lessons learned from the TMI intrusion will be considered in that rulemaking. In addition, the NRC is attempting to quantify the consequences of a vehicle bomb detonated in the vicinity of an ISFSI. The results of this study will assist in making a determination as to whether vehicle bomb protection is needed at ISFSIs. In the interim, the staff believes that the inherent nature of the fuel, along with the degree of protection provided by the approved storage means for spent fuel, provides adequate protection against a vehicle bomb. C. Office of Management and Budget Supporting Statement Comment. One comment identified that the NRC-estimated financial burden to licensees did not include capital costs for modifications. Response. The NRC notes that the financial burden cited by the comment was derived from the Office of Management and Budget Supporting Statement, required under the Paperwork Reduction Act. This statement deals solely with the licensee recordkeeping and reporting burden resulting from the new rule, i.e., the paperwork burden. Actual construction costs are considered in the regulatory analysis that supports the rule. Summary of Changes Made to Rule The following changes have been made as a result of public comment analysis: 1. The design basis threat statement for radiological sabotage has been clarified to separate the threat of a land vehicle used for intrusion with that of a land vehicle used as a vehicle bomb. 2. ISFSIs have been specifically exempted from the rule. 3. Clarification of what is meant by ``the Commission's design goals and criteria'' has been added to the regulatory text. 4. The appropriate means for submitting alternative measures has been clarified under 10 CFR 73.55(c)(9)(i) by adding the phrase ``in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90.'' 5. Summary and implementation schedules have been revised--from 90 to 180 days for summary submittals, and from 360 to 540 days (18 months) for completion of implementation. Both time periods are from the effective date of the rule which is 1 month from the date of publication in the Federal Register. Availability of Supporting Guidance Two guidance documents are being developed by the NRC in support of this rule and are expected to be distributed to affected licensees before the effective date of the rule. These documents are: (1) Regulatory Guide 5.68, ``Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants'' and (2) NUREG/CR 6190, ``Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants.'' Regulatory Guide 5.68 will be available for inspection and copying for a fee at the Commission's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Copies of issued guides may be purchased from the Government Printing Office at the current GPO price. Information on current GPO prices may be obtained by contacting the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 37082, Washington, DC 20013-2171. Issued guides may also be purchased from the National Technical Information Service on a standing order basis. Details on this service may be obtained by writing NTIS, 5825 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161. Copies of NUREG/CR-6190 may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 37082, Washington, DC 20013-7082. Copies also will be available from the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161. A copy also will be available for inspection and copying for a fee in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Electronic Submittals Required paperwork may be submitted, in addition to an original paper copy, in electronic format on a DOS-formatted (IBM compatible) 5.25 or 3.5 inch computer diskette. Text files should be provided in WordPerfect format or unformatted ASCII code. The format and version should be identified on the diskette's external label. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule is not a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and, therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required. The rule involves installation of vehicle barriers at operating power reactor sites and an evaluation of these barriers by the licensee to determine whether they provide acceptable protection against a land vehicle bomb under design goals and criteria established by the Commission. Implementation of these amendments will not involve release of or exposure to radioactivity from the site. Construction activities associated with passive vehicle barriers will involve some earth movement, either for excavation or development of berms, and possible destruction of trees and shrubbery. Since most active vehicle barriers are hydraulically operated, there may on occasion be leakage of this fluid to the environment. The activities required to implement these amendments involve no significant environmental impact. The environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact on which this determination is based are available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact are available from: Carrie Brown, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, telephone (301) 504- 2382. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This final rule amends information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget approval number 3150-0002. The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 500 hours per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to the Information and Records Management Branch (MNBB-7714), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-3019, (3150-0002), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. Regulatory Analysis The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered by the Commission. Interested persons may examine a copy of the regulatory analysis at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Robert J. Dube, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 504-2912. Regulatory Flexibility Certification As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Commission certifies that this final rule does not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The rule affects only licensees authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor. The utilities that operate these nuclear power reactors do not fall within the scope of the definition ``small entities'' as given in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Small Business Size Standards promulgated in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration (13 CFR Part 121). Backfit Analysis As required by 10 CFR 50.109, the Commission has completed a backfit analysis for the final rule. The Commission has determined, based on this analysis, that backfitting to comply with the requirements of this final rule provides a substantial increase in protection to public health and safety or the common defense and security at a cost which is justified by the substantial increase. The backfit analysis on which this determination is based reads as follows. I. Statement of the specific objectives that the proposed action is designated to achieve. To publish a rule in response to direction from the Commission in a staff requirements memorandum dated June 29, 1993. The Commissioners' decision to proceed with expedited rulemaking was the result of two events. On February 7, 1993, there was a forced vehicle entry into the protected area (PA) at Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit 1. On February 25, 1993, a van bomb, containing between 500 and 1,500 pounds of TNT equivalent, was detonated at the World Trade Center in New York City. In its subsequent review of the threat environment, the NRC staff concluded that there is no indication of an actual vehicle threat against the domestic commercial nuclear industry. Nonetheless, in light of the vehicle intrusion at TMI and the World Trade Center vehicle bombing, the NRC staff concluded that a vehicle intrusion or bomb threat to a nuclear power plant could develop without warning in the future. The objective of the rulemaking is to enhance reactor safety by maintaining a prudent margin between what is the current threat estimate (low) and the design basis threat for radiological sabotage specified in 10 CFR 73.1(a) (higher). II. General description of the activity that would be required by the licensee or applicant in order to complete the proposed action. The rule requires each licensee authorized to operate a nuclear power plant to establish vehicle control measures to protect against the use of a design basis land vehicle as a means of transportation to gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas. This provides two benefits. First, it enhances a licensee's ability to interdict an adversary attempting to use a vehicle as an aid to reach critical safety equipment. Second, it provides protection against a land vehicle bomb. The rule requires licensees to evaluate the effectiveness of their vehicle control measures with respect to the protection they provide against a land vehicle bomb. Licensees are required to confirm to the Commission that the vehicle control measures to protect against vehicle intrusion, alone or in combination with additional measures, fully meet the Commission's design goals and criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb. Licensees that can show that the additional costs for measures required to fully meet the Commission's design goals and criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb are not justified by the added protection that would be provided have the option to propose alternative measures to the Commission. These licensees will not be relieved of the requirement to protect the facility against vehicle intrusion. Licensees that propose alternative measures are required to describe the level of protection that these measures would provide against a land vehicle bomb and compare the costs of the alternative measures with the costs of measures necessary to fully meet the criteria. The NRC will approve the alternative measures if the measures provide substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb and if the licensee demonstrates by an analysis, using the essential elements of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.109, that the costs of fully meeting measures needed to protect against a vehicle bomb are not justified by the added protection provided. III. Potential change in the risk to the public from the accidental offsite release of radioactive material. The potential change in the risk to the public from the accidental offsite release of radioactive material is discussed in detail in pages 4 through 7 and 10 through 14 of the regulatory analysis that supports the rulemaking. Failure to protect against attempted radiological sabotage could result in reactor core damage and large radiological releases. Based on its assessment, the NRC concludes that amending its regulations to protect against malevolent use of a vehicle against a nuclear power plant provides a substantial increase in overall protection of the public health and safety. In summary, the TMI event demonstrated some aspects regarding use of a vehicle by a potential adversary that could present some challenges not previously considered by staff and licensees. The NRC considers that providing vehicle intrusion protection provides substantial enhancement against such a threat. Enhancements to protect against the vehicle intrusion threat also provide, to varying degrees dependent on site characteristics, enhancement for protection against vehicle bombs. The World Trade Center event demonstrated a capability within the United States to construct a truck bomb undetected. This recently demonstrated capability indicates that although a vehicle bomb attack at a nuclear power plant is not reasonably to be expected, it is somewhat more likely to develop without advance indications than the NRC previously believed. Therefore, the NRC considers that providing permanently installed vehicle bomb protection provides substantial enhancement against such a threat. IV. Potential impact on radiological exposure of facility employees and other onsite workers. By enhancing protection against the malevolent use of a vehicle, the rule decreases the potential for radiological exposure of facility employees and other onsite workers. Although the threat of a determined, violent attack at a nuclear power plant is considered to be low, the rule also decreases the risk that onsite workers could be injured by weapons fire or an explosion. V. Installation and continuing costs associated with the action, including the cost of facility downtime or the cost of construction delay. Estimates of installation costs are discussed in detail on pages 7 through 10 and 14 of the regulatory analysis. Ranges in cost estimates for three vehicle types illustrate the strong influence of vehicle characteristics. In addition, site-specific characteristics influence costs, including the need at some sites to extend the vehicle exclusion area beyond portions of the current PA boundary or providing a more substantial passive barrier. The NRC staff estimates that about 80 to 90 percent of the sites will provide safe standoff distances against a vehicle bomb by providing a vehicle barrier in proximity to the present PA boundary. For these sites, cost estimates range from $290K for protecting the smallest protected area against a passenger vehicle to $2,955K for protecting the largest protected area against a large truck. (The characteristics of the design basis vehicle used to establish protection goals are described in a Safeguards Information document provided separately to affected licensees.) For the remaining 10 to 20 percent of the sites, cost estimates range from $440K to $3,655K. An important consideration in assessing costs for the 10 to 20 percent of the sites that may have to protect beyond the existing protected areas is that the only definitive requirement for all licensees is that they provide measures to protect against the use of a land vehicle as a means of transportation to gain proximity to vital areas and that they assess any incremental measures, if necessary, to meet the design goal for a land vehicle bomb. The NRC will accept alternative measures if the measures provide substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb and if the licensee demonstrates by an analysis, using the essential elements of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.109, that the costs of fully meeting measures needed to protect against a vehicle bomb are not justified by the added protection provided. Continuing costs to maintain barriers should be small. Implementation of the rule will not require facility downtime or construction delay. VI. The potential safety impact of changes in plant or operational complexity, including the relationship to proposed and existing regulatory requirements and NRC staff positions. There should be no adverse safety impact from the rule. Construction of barriers will be near or beyond existing protected area perimeters and should not delay authorized access to the protected area. VII. The estimated resource burden on the NRC associated with the action and the availability of such resources. There should be no new resource burden on the NRC. There will be no NRC staff licensing review of licensees' vehicle control measures before implementation. Licensees will be required to retain their analyses on site for NRC staff review during routine inspections. Inspection of the approximately 67 total sites for explosive protection will be about 1 FTE. Reviewing licensee proposals for alternative measures and 10 CFR 50.109 type analyses will require approximately 1 FTE and 40K of technical assistance from the United States Army Corps of Engineers. VIII. The potential impact of differences in facility type, design, or age on the relevancy and practicality of the proposed action. The action is relevant for all nuclear power reactors. The action should also be practical at most sites. If a barrier stopped a vehicle at the PA perimeter with little or no further penetration, about 90 percent of the sites would provide significant protection against the design basis vehicle bomb. In those cases where licensees determine additional security measures may be needed to protect safe shutdown capability, the rule permits licensees to either implement the additional security measures or develop alternative protection strategies. The licensee may propose alternative measures if the measures provide substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb and if they demonstrate by an analysis, using the essential elements of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.109, that the costs of fully meeting measures needed to protect against a vehicle bomb are not justified by the added protection provided. The NRC staff will review licensee's alternative proposals and make an acceptability determination. The Commission will be notified of such NRC staff action. NRC staff's analysis also indicates that there is a high likelihood that all sites will be capable of achieving and maintaining safe shutdown if a design basis bomb were detonated at any land accessible location of a nuclear power plant outside of the owner controlled area. IX. Whether the proposed action is interim or final, and if interim, the justification for imposing the proposed action on an interim basis. The action is to promulgate a final rule. The rulemaking does not involve interim actions. List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73 Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures. For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 73. PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS 1. The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as follows: Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec.147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844). Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2232, 2241, (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99-399, 100 Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169). 2. In Sec. 73.1, the introductory text of paragraph (a) and the text of (a)(1)(ii) are revised and new paragraphs (a)(1)(i)(E) and (a)(1)(iii) are added to read as follow: Sec. 73.1 Purpose and scope. (a) Purpose. This part prescribes requirements for the establishment and maintenance of a physical protection system which will have capabilities for the protection of special nuclear material at fixed sites and in transit and of plants in which special nuclear material is used. The following design basis threats, where referenced in ensuing sections of this part, shall be used to design safeguards systems to protect against acts of radiological sabotage and to prevent the theft of special nuclear material. Licensees subject to the provisions of Sec. 72.182, Sec. 72.212, Sec. 73.20, Sec. 73.50, and Sec. 73.60 are exempt from Sec. 73.1(a)(1)(i)(E) and Sec. 73.1(a)(1)(iii). (1) * * * (i) * * * (E) A four-wheel drive land vehicle used for transporting personnel and their hand-carried equipment to the proximity of vital areas, and (ii) An internal threat of an insider, including an employee (in any position), and (iii) A four-wheel drive land vehicle bomb. * * * * * 3. In Sec. 73.21, a new paragraph (b)(1)(xiii) is added to read as follows: Sec. 73.21 Requirements for the protection of safeguards information. * * * * * (b) * * * (1) * * * (xiii) Information required by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55 (c) (8) and (9). * * * * * 4. In Sec. 73.55, new paragraphs (c) (7), (8), (9), and (10) are added to read as follow: Sec. 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage. * * * * * (c) * * * (7) Vehicle control measures, including vehicle barrier systems, must be established to protect against use of a land vehicle, as specified by the Commission, as a means of transportation to gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas. (8) Each licensee shall compare the vehicle control measures established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7) to the Commission's design goals (i.e., to protect equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure of which could directly or indirectly endanger public health and safety by exposure to radiation) and criteria for protection against a land vehicle bomb. Each licensee shall either: (i) Confirm to the Commission that the vehicle control measures meet the design goals and criteria specified; or (ii) Propose alternative measures, in addition to the measures established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7), describe the level of protection that these measures would provide against a land vehicle bomb, and compare the costs of the alternative measures with the costs of measures necessary to fully meet the design goals and criteria. The Commission will approve the proposed alternative measures if they provide substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb, and it is determined by an analysis, using the essential elements of 10 CFR 50.109, that the costs of fully meeting the design goals and criteria are not justified by the added protection that would be provided. (9) Each licensee authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor shall: (i) By February 28, 1995 submit to the Commission a summary description of the proposed vehicle control measures as required by 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7) and the results of the vehicle bomb comparison as required by 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(8). For licensees who choose to propose alternative measures as provided for in 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(8), the proposal must be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90 and include the analysis and justification for the proposed alternatives. (ii) By February 29, 1996 fully implement the required vehicle control measures, including site-specific alternative measures as approved by the Commission. (iii) Protect as Safeguards Information, information required by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55(c) (8) and (9). (iv) Retain, in accordance with 10 CFR 73.70, all comparisons and analyses prepared pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55 (c) (7) and (8). (10) Each applicant for a license to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to 10 CFR 50.21(b) or 10 CFR 50.22, whose application was submitted prior to August 31, 1994, shall incorporate the required vehicle control program into the site Physical Security Plan and implement it by the date of receipt of the operating license. * * * * * Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of July 1994. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. John C. Hoyle, Acting Secretary of the Commission. [FR Doc. 94-18638 Filed 7-29-94; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P