[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 141 (Monday, July 25, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-17947]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: July 25, 1994]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
[Docket No. 94-18]

 

Roland W. Jones III, M.D.; Revocation of Registration

    On August 25, 1993, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, (then-
Director), Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA), issued an Order to Show Cause to Roland W. Jones, III, M.D. 
(Respondent), of Orange, Texas. The Order to Show Cause proposed to 
revoke Dr. Jones' DEA Certificate of Registration, AJ1690406, and deny 
any pending applications for renewal of such registration. The Order to 
Show Cause alleged that Respondent was not currently authorized to 
handle controlled substances in the State of Texas and that 
Respondent's continued registration would be inconsistent with the 
public interest, as that term is used in 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 
824(a)(4).
    The Order to Show Cause alleged that on November 9, 1990, the Texas 
State Board of Medical Examiners (Board) placed Respondent's license to 
practice medicine on ten years probation with several terms and 
conditions. The Board found that Respondent engaged in the intemperate 
use of alcohol, that he had been disciplined by a hospital, and that he 
failed to keep accurate records of purchases and disposals of 
controlled substances.
    The Order to Show Cause further alleged that based upon 
Respondent's failure to follow the terms and conditions of the November 
9, 1990 probation order, effective August 20, 1992, the Board suspended 
Respondent's state license to practice medicine. In addition, effective 
June 26, 1992, the Texas Department of Public Safety canceled 
Respondent's state registration to handle controlled substances. As a 
result, Respondent is no longer authorized by state law to handle 
controlled substances.
    Respondent filed a request for a hearing on the issues raised by 
the Order to Show Cause, and the matter was docketed before 
Administrative Law Judge Mary Ellen Bittner. On January 24, 1994, the 
Government filed a motion for summary disposition, which was 
accompanied by a copy of the Texas Department of Public Safety 
Certification of Non-Registration. Respondent did not file a response 
to the Government's motion.
    On February 28, 1994, in her opinion and recommended decision, the 
administrative law judge found that the Respondent did not deny that 
his state license to practice medicine has been suspended or that his 
state registration to handle controlled substances has been canceled. 
The administrative law judge therefore, granted the Government's motion 
for summary disposition and recommended that Respondent's DEA 
Certificate of Registration be revoked.
    On March 30, 1994, The administrative law judge transmitted the 
record to the Administrator. The Deputy Administrator has carefully 
considered the entire record in this matter and, pursuant to 21 CFR 
1316.67, hereby issues his final order in this matter based upon 
findings of fact and conclusions of law as hereinafter set forth.
    The Deputy Administrator adopts the opinion and recommended 
decision of the administrative law judge in its entirety. The Drug 
Enforcement Administration cannot register or maintain the registration 
of a practitioner who is not duly authorized to handle controlled 
substances in the state in which he conducts his business. 21 U.S.C. 
802(21), 823(f) and 824(a)(3). This prerequisite has been consistently 
upheld. See James H. Nickens, M.D., 57 FR 59847 (1992); Elliott Monroe, 
M.D., 57 FR 23246 (1992); Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR 11919 (1988).
    The administrative law judge properly granted the Government's 
motion for summary disposition. It is well-settled that when no 
question of fact is involved, or when the facts are agreed upon, a 
plenary, adversary administrative proceeding involving evidence and 
cross-examination of witnesses is not obligatory. The rationale is that 
Congress does not intend administrative agencies to perform meaningless 
tasks. Phillip E. Kirk, M.D., 48 FR 32887 (1983), aff'd sub nom Kirk v. 
Mullen, 749 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1984); Alfred Tennyson Smurthwaite, 
N.D., 43 FR 11873 (1978); see also, NLRB v. International Association 
of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers, AFL-CIO, 549 F.2d 634 
(9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Consolidated Mines and Smelting Co., 
Ltd., 455 F.2d 432, 453 (9th Cir. 1971).
    Since Respondent is not currently authorized to handle controlled 
substances in the State of Texas, it is not necessary to reach a 
conclusion regarding whether his continued registration is inconsistent 
with the public interest.
    Accordingly, the Deputy Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, pursuant to the authority vested in him by 21 U.S.C. 
823 and 824 and 28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.104 (59 FR 23637), hereby orders 
that DEA Certificate of Registration, AJ1690406, previously issued to 
Roland W. Jones, III, M.D., be, and it hereby is, revoked and that any 
pending applications for renewal of such registration be, and they 
hereby are, denied. This order is effective August 24, 1994.

    Dated: July 15, 1994.
Stephen H. Greene,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 94-17947 Filed 7-22-94; 8:45 am]
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