[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 122 (Monday, June 27, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-15482]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: June 27, 1994]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-029]

 

Yankee Atomic Electric Company (Yankee Nuclear Power Station); 
Exemption

I

    The Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC or the licensee), is the 
holder of Facility Operating License (Possession Only) No. DPR-3 which 
authorizes possession and maintenance of the Yankee Nuclear Power 
Station (YNPS or plant). The license provides, among other things, that 
the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the 
Commission now or hereafter in effect.
    The facility is a permanently shutdown pressurized water reactor, 
currently in the process of being prepared for decommissioning, and is 
located at the licensee site in Franklin County, Massachusetts.

II

    The licensee, by letter dated February 27,1992, supplemented by 
letter dated January 19,1 993, informed the NRC and YAEC had 
permanently ceased power operations, removed the fuel from the reactor 
to the fuel pool, and had begun to develop detailed plans to 
decommission the facility. The reactor was actually shut down on 
October 1, 1991; thus, the fuel has now undergone over two years and 
seven months of decay. The NRC in a license amendment dated August 5, 
1992, modified License No. DPR-3 to possession only status. The license 
is conditioned so that YAEC is not authorized to operate the reactor 
and fuel may not be placed in the reactor vessel, thus formalizing the 
YAEC commitment to permanently cease power operations.
    By letter dated September 28, 1992, the licensee requested an 
amendment to the Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) Indemnity 
Agreement No. B-17 which would reduce the primary level of financial 
protection maintained at the plant to $4.5 million from the current 
level of $200 million and provide relief from participation in the 
industry retrospective rating plan (secondary level). This letter was 
supplemented by the licensee letter to the Commission dated January 19, 
1993.

III

    The justification presented by the licensee for amendment of its 
indemnity agreement is that because of the permanently shutdown status 
of the plant, defueled condition of the reactor, and possession only 
license amendment (which prohibits operation), 10 CFR 140.11 no longer 
applies to YAEC. Given these considerations, the licensee contends that 
10 CFR 140.12, which describes financial protection for reactors not 
covered by 10 CFR 140.11, applies to YAEC. The licensee also addressed 
past NRC actions with respect to relief granted to the consolidated 
Edison facility, Indian Point Unit 1. Consequently, the licensee has 
requested that its indemnity agreement be amended such that the 
licensee would no longer be required to participate in the secondary 
protection program, and that its primary financial protection be 
reduced to the minimum required under 10 CFR 140.12, which is $4.5 
million.
    The staff has determined on its own initiative that an exemption 
from the requirements of 10 CFR 140.11 is required in order to 
implement an amendment to the licensee indemnity agreement. The bases 
for providing this exemption to 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) are provided 
herein.
    The NRC staff independently evaluated the legal and technical 
issues associated with the application of the Price-Anderson Act to 
permanently shut down reactors in SECY-93-127, ``Financial Protection 
Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During 
Decommissioning,'' dated May 10, 1993. In this evaluation, the staff 
concluded that the Commission has discretionary authority to respond to 
licensee requests for a reduction in the level of primary financial 
protection and withdrawal from participation in the industry 
retrospective rating plan. Depending on the plant-specific 
configuration and the time since permanent shutdown, the staff also 
concluded that potential hazards may exist at permanently shutdown 
reactors for which financial protection is warranted. The staff 
concluded that accidents and hazards insured against under the Price-
Anderson Act go beyond design basis accidents and beyond those 
considered ``credible'' as that term is used in 10 CFR Part 100 and 
cases interpreting the application of that regulation. The Commission 
issued a SRM in response to SECY-93-127 on July 13, 1993. In this SRM, 
the Commission approved a staff recommendation to permit a reduction of 
primary level coverage to $100 million through the exemption process 
after an appropriate spent fuel cooling period and after allowing 
withdrawal from participation in the secondary level of financial 
protection.
    In the exercise of its discretionary authority, the Commission may, 
as long as a potential hazard exists at a permanently shutdown reactor, 
require the full amount of primary financial protection and full 
participation in the industry retrospective rating plan. At such time 
that the hazard is determined to no longer exist or to be significantly 
reduced, the Commission may reduce the amount of primary financial 
protection and permit the licensee to withdraw from participation in 
the industry retrospective rating plan.
    Since the legislative history of the Price-Anderson Act does not 
explicitly consider the potential hazards that might exist after 
termination of operation, the staff generically evaluated the offsite 
consequences associated with normal and abnormal operations, design 
basis accidents, and beyond design basis accidents for reactors that 
have been permanently defueled and shut down. The staff concluded that 
where an appropriate cooling time has elapsed since plant shutdown, 
aside from the handling, storage, and transportation of spent fuel and 
radioactive materials, no reasonably conceivable potential accident 
exists that could cause significant offsite damage.
    As summarized in SECY-93-127, a severe transportation accident 
could potentially result in local contamination requiring cleanup and 
offsite liabilities resulting from traffic disruption and consequential 
damages. This type of accident would warrant maintaining some level of 
liability insurance. The liabilities an indemnification requirements 
associated with the transfer of spent fuel from the licensee to the 
Department of Energy will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis at a 
future time when spent fuel is shipped to a repository.
    As further set forth in SECY-93-127, the most significant accident 
sequence for a permanently defueled and shutdown reactor involves the 
complete loss of water from a light water reactor spent fuel pool. This 
beyond-design-basis accident sequence could result in a zirconium fuel 
cladding fire that could propagate through the spent fuel storage pool 
and result in significant offsite consequences. The potential 
consequences of such an accident could involve billions of dollars. 
Although such an accident is beyond the design bases, it may be 
considered ``reasonably conceivable'' and could warrant requiring 
substantial financial protection. Such an accident is possible during 
the first year after reactor shutdown for a low density spent fuel 
storage configuration and during the first two or three years after 
shutdown for spent fuel stored in certain high density configurations.
    Accident scenarios involving blockage of coolant channels in 
conjunction with loss of spent fuel pool water could hypothetically 
extend the time within which a zirconium fuel cladding fire could 
occur. However, in addition to being less likely than loss of water, 
air flow to react with the zirconium and to disperse fission products 
would likely be inhibited by such blockage. The staff believes that 
this sequence approaches the strictly hypothetical.
    Once the requisite cooling period after reactor shutdown has 
elapsed, the zirconium fuel cladding fire sequence after a postulated 
loss of spent fuel pool water is no longer a concern since the fuel 
would air cool sufficiently to avoid zirconium fuel cladding 
combustion. Possible accident scenarios, after these cooling period 
have elapsed, have greatly reduced consequences but could still result 
in small releases or precautionary evacuations which could result in 
offsite liability.
    With respect to the Yankee Nuclear Power Station plant-specific 
evaluation, the NRC staff independently evaluated the legal and 
technical justifications for this exemption. In particular, the NRC 
evaluated the current Yankee status, that is, the plant is permanently 
shut down and defueled, the license has been amended to authorize 
``possession only,'' the possession only license amendment prohibits 
fuel movement from the spent fuel pool into the reactor building, and 
the fuel is stored in a low density configuration. The staff concludes, 
after evaluation of the remaining spectrum of accidents and considering 
that the stored fuel has decayed for over two years and seven months 
and is stored in a low density configuration, that any such accident 
would result in greatly reduced offsite consequences. Thus, the staff 
further concludes that the YNPS meets the criterion established in 
SECY-93-127 for relief from the full financial protection requirements.
    Although the licensee presented legal views and opinions regarding 
the applicability of 10 CFR 140.12 versus 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4), the 
staff did not concur with those legal views and opinions and concludes 
that the licensee has not demonstrated the applicability of 10 CFR 
140.12 to the YNPS. The staff has also concluded that the Three Mile 
Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) claims settlement experience (an accident which 
did not result in a significant release of radioactivity) provides a 
reasonable basis for establishing the appropriate level of primary 
insurance coverage. Because TMI-2 claims have reached $60 million and a 
large number of TMI-2 claims are still unsettled, the staff concluded 
that a level of $100 million for primary financial protection coverage 
is warranted. This level of primary insurance coverage is consistent 
with the SRM dated July 13, 1993, based on SECY-93-127, for relief from 
financial protection requirements.

IV

    The staff, based on its independent evaluation, consistent with the 
Commission July 13, 1993 SRM based on SECY-93-127, ``Financial 
Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During 
Decommissioning,'' has concluded that sufficient bases exist for 
approval of a partial exemption from the financial protection 
requirements for the YNPS. The staff has also concluded that granting 
the proposed exemption does not increase the probability or 
consequences of any accidents or reduce the margin of safety at the 
facility.

V

    Based on the discussion presented in Sections III and IV above, the 
Commission has determined, that pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, this 
exemption is authorized by law and is otherwise in the public interest. 
Therefore, the Commission grants an exemption from the requirements of 
10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) to the extent that primary financial protection in 
the amount of $100 million shall be maintained, and an exemption from 
participation in the industry retrospective rating plan (secondary 
level financial protection) is granted for the YNPS.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the 
quality of the human environment (59 FR 31651).
    This exemption is effective immediately.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 20th day of June 1994.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Brian K. Grimes,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Support, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 94-15482 Filed 6-24-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M