[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 118 (Tuesday, June 21, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-15119]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: June 21, 1994]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

 

Notice of Intent To Prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact 
Statement for Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile 
Materials

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of Intent (NOI) to Prepare a Programmatic Environmental 
Impact Statement (PEIS) for Long-Term Storage and Disposition of 
Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials.

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SUMMARY: The changes in the aftermath of the Cold War have significant 
implications for the management of weapons-usable fissile materials 
(primarily plutonium and highly-enriched uranium). The large reductions 
in nuclear weapons agreed to by the United States and Russia reduces 
our national security requirements for fissile materials and, as a 
result, storage and disposition decisions for these materials will be 
required.
    The national policy outlined by the President in September 1993 is 
to seek to eliminate where possible the accumulation of stockpiles of 
highly-enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, and to ensure that where 
these materials already exist they are subject to the highest standards 
of safety, security and international accountability. In addition, the 
President has initiated a comprehensive review of long-term options for 
plutonium disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation, 
environmental, budgetary and economic considerations.
    The Department of Energy (DOE), which is the agency responsible for 
management, storage and disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials 
from United States nuclear weapons dismantlement and weapons production 
processes, proposes to prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact 
Statement (PEIS) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) to evaluate alternatives for long-term storage of all weapons-
usable fissile materials, and disposition of weapons-usable fissile 
materials declared surplus to national defense needs by the President.
    The results of the environmental analysis in the PEIS, information 
from technical and economic studies, and national policy objectives 
will form the basis for decisions regarding long-term storage of all 
weapons-usable fissile materials and the disposition of surplus 
weapons-usable fissile materials. The PEIS may be followed by project-
specific NEPA documents to the extent necessary to implement any 
decisions.
    The purpose of this NOI, which is the initial step in the NEPA 
process, is to inform the public of the PEIS proposal, to solicit 
public input, and to announce that a scoping process will be conducted 
so that the public may express its opinions and views regarding the 
alternatives to be considered and the scope of the issues to be 
addressed in the PEIS.
    Written comments on the scope of the PEIS for Storage and 
Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials are invited from the 
public. To ensure consideration in preparation of the PEIS, written 
comments must be postmarked by October 17, 1994. Late comments will be 
considered to the extent practicable. Public scoping workshops to 
provide and discuss information, and receive oral comments on the scope 
of the PEIS will be held during August and September 1994, both 
regionally and in the vicinity of the sites which may be affected by 
potential decisions and their implementation. DOE will announce the 
location, date and time for these public scoping workshops in a 
subsequent Notice in the Federal Register, and by other appropriate 
means as early as practicable. The Department will endeavor to provide 
30 days notice prior to any applicable workshops. Following this 
scoping period, the Department will issue an Implementation Plan which 
will describe, among other things, the scope of the PEIS, the 
alternatives that will be analyzed, and the schedule for completing the 
PEIS.

    Note: A definition of terms is included at the end of this NOI.

ADDRESSES: Written comments on the scope of the PEIS, requests for 
copies of Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, a 
1994 report prepared by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), 
requests for copies of the PEIS Implementation Plan (when available), 
and requests for copies of the PEIS or PEIS Executive Summary (when 
available) should be sent to: U.S. Department of Energy, c/o Oak Ridge 
Institute for Science & Education, P.O. Box 117, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-
0117, Attn: Robert Menard, EESD.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general information on the DOE 
NEPA process, please contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of 
NEPA Oversight, EH-25, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence 
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600 or 1-800-472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

National Policy Objectives

    On September 27, 1993, the President outlined a major principle of 
U.S. nonproliferation policy:

    Our national security requires us to accord higher priority to 
nonproliferation, and to make it an integral element of our 
relations with other countries.

    The policy further states that the U.S. will:

    Seek to eliminate where possible the accumulation of stockpiles 
of highly-enriched uranium or plutonium, and to ensure that where 
these materials already exist they are subject to the highest 
standards of safety, security and international accountability.

    In addition, the President called upon the Government to:

    Initiate a comprehensive review of long-term options for 
plutonium disposition, taking into account technical, 
nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary and economic 
considerations.

    The Department's objectives in furtherance of this policy include:
     To strengthen national and international arms control 
efforts by providing an exemplary model for storage of all weapons-
usable fissile materials and disposition of surplus weapons-usable 
fissile materials;
     To ensure that storage and disposition of weapons-usable 
fissile materials is carried out in compliance with environmental, 
safety and health standards;
     To minimize the prospect that surplus United States 
weapons-usable fissile materials could be reintroduced into the 
arsenals from which they came and therefore increasing the prospect of 
reciprocal measures by Russia and other nuclear powers;
     To minimize the risk that surplus United States weapons-
usable fissile materials could be obtained by unauthorized parties; and
     To accomplish these objectives in a timely and cost-
effective manner.

Purpose of, and Need for, the PEIS

    The Department of Energy (DOE), the agency responsible for 
management, storage and disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials 
from United States nuclear weapons dismantlement and weapons production 
processes, proposes to prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact 
Statement (PEIS) to evaluate alternatives for long-term storage of all 
weapons-usable fissile materials, and disposition of weapons-usable 
fissile materials declared surplus to national defense needs by the 
President.
    The results of the environmental analysis in the PEIS, information 
from technical and economic studies, and national policy objectives 
will form the basis for decisions regarding long-term storage of all 
weapons-usable fissile materials and the disposition of surplus 
weapons-usable fissile materials. The PEIS may be followed by project-
specific NEPA documents to the extent necessary to implement any 
decisions.
    The purpose of this NOI, which is the initial step in the NEPA 
process, is to inform the public of the PEIS proposal, to solicit 
public input, and to announce that a scoping process will be conducted 
so that the public may express its opinions and views regarding the 
alternatives to be considered and the scope of the issues to be 
addressed.

Background

    In early 1994, the National Academy of Sciences published a report, 
Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium. This study, 
commissioned by the President's National Security Council, provides 
information regarding management and disposition of surplus nuclear 
materials, in particular plutonium. Copies of this National Academy of 
Sciences report are available upon request to the address stated above.
    In the United States, weapons-usable fissile nuclear materials are 
currently stored at several DOE sites, including Pantex (Amarillo, 
Texas), Hanford Site (Richland, Washington), Idaho National Engineering 
Laboratory (Idaho Falls, Idaho), Rocky Flats Plant (Denver, Colorado), 
Savannah River Site (Aiken, South Carolina), Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory (Livermore, California), Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (Los Alamos, New Mexico), and Oak Ridge Reservation (Oak 
Ridge, Tennessee).
    The Department is currently performing vulnerability studies to 
determine the environmental, safety, and health (ES&H) risks associated 
with the current storage of plutonium, highly enriched uranium (HEU), 
and other weapons-usable fissile materials. These studies will form the 
basis for Departmental actions to ensure safe, secure interim storage 
of weapons-usable fissile materials until the long-term storage or 
disposition actions are implemented. In addition, plans for bilateral 
or International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection and 
verification of the surplus material in storage are being developed and 
may require action. If any actions required to establish these interim 
conditions are considered major federal actions that might have a 
significant impact on the environment, appropriate NEPA analysis will 
be prepared and documented prior to proceeding. The results of these 
efforts will establish the interim condition of safe, controlled, 
inspectable storage.
    Recent nuclear arms reduction agreements and pledges, along with 
Presidential decisions concerning what stocks of plutonium, HEU, and 
other nuclear materials are to be reserved for national defense will 
largely determine how much and when material will be declared 
``surplus'' and will become available for disposition. Discussions are 
ongoing with the Nuclear Weapons Council to determine what materials 
are surplus and what must be maintained as a reserve. DOE anticipates 
that these amounts will be identified so that the analysis planned for 
the PEIS can address the storage and disposition alternatives.
    Several kilograms of plutonium, or several times that amount of 
HEU, are sufficient to make a nuclear weapon. Although both plutonium 
and HEU can be used to make nuclear weapons, they pose different risks 
and require different controls. HEU is produced by ``enriching'' 
natural uranium using one of several technologies, all of which are 
complex isotopic separation technologies that require commitment of 
significant funds and industrial resources. As stated by the National 
Academy of Sciences in its study, HEU can be blended down with 
naturally occurring, depleted or low-enriched uranium to make a low-
enriched uranium (LEU) reactor fuel that poses lower proliferation risk 
and can return a substantial economic benefit. In fact, LEU is the fuel 
for most of the world's nuclear power reactors.
    In contrast, blending cannot reduce the proliferation risks of 
plutonium because all plutonium isotopes can be used to make a nuclear 
weapon. Separating plutonium from other elements with which it might be 
mixed or from unirradiated reactor fuel containing plutonium requires 
only well-understood chemical processing techniques. Thus, the 
management of plutonium in any form is a greater challenge than the 
management of HEU.

HEU Long-Term Storage and Disposition Alternatives

    DOE has proposed to consolidate HEU into secure interim storage at 
Oak Ridge in the Y-12 facility (see 59 FR 11783), and may reduce its 
surplus by blending down some of the HEU. The resulting LEU could then 
be made available for commercial sale.
    The PEIS will consider the following alternatives for HEU 
disposition: Blending down surplus HEU with other, more abundant, 
naturally occurring uranium, depleted uranium or other LEU, to make LEU 
for reactor fuel; and any other reasonable alternatives identified in 
the scoping process. Additionally, the no-action alternative of 
maintaining surplus HEU in a storage facility indefinitely will be 
evaluated.
    HEU can be made highly proliferation resistant by blending it down 
into a LEU (less than 20 percent U-235), and there may be significant 
economic benefits that would offset the costs associated with this 
alternative. Consequently, alternatives which do not exploit the 
economic value of the surplus HEU, such as blending it down into LEU, 
are likely to be considered reasonable for disposition of most of the 
surplus HEU. However, some HEU may have impurities that make this 
material unacceptable as a reactor fuel when blended down and would 
have to be disposed of as waste. For these materials, blending down to 
less than 20 percent U-235 to prevent use in nuclear weapons, followed 
by disposal as waste, may be the only reasonable alternative.

Plutonium Long-Term Storage and Disposition Alternatives

    The Department proposes to use the report prepared by the National 
Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons 
Plutonium, as the starting point for evaluating alternatives regarding 
the long-term storage and disposition of plutonium. The Academy 
concluded that the existence of surplus fissile materials worldwide 
constitutes a ``clear and present danger to national and international 
security.'' The Academy further noted that:

    None of the options yet identified for managing this material 
can eliminate this danger; all they can do is to reduce the risk. 
Moreover, none of the options for long-term disposition of excess 
weapons plutonium can be expected to substantially reduce the 
inventories of excess plutonium from nuclear weapons for at least a 
decade.

    As a result, the Academy recommended that:

    It is important to begin now to build consensus on a road map 
for decisions concerning long-term disposition of excess weapons 
plutonium. Because disposition options will take decades to carry 
out, it is critical to develop options that can muster a sustainable 
consensus.

Standards for Action

    In its report, the Academy identified standards for managing the 
risks associated with surplus weapons plutonium. These standards 
include:

The Stored Weapons Standard

    The high standards of security and accounting applied to storage of 
nuclear weapons should be maintained for weapons-usable fissile 
materials throughout the process of dismantlement, storage and 
disposition. The Academy concluded that storage should not be extended 
indefinitely because of nonproliferation risks and arms reduction 
objectives.

The Spent Fuel Standard

    The National Academy of Sciences recommended that options for long-
term disposition of plutonium should seek to meet a ``spent-fuel 
standard'' in which the plutonium is as inaccessible for weapons use as 
the plutonium in spent nuclear fuel from commercial power reactors.
    The Department is seeking public comment on the appropriateness of 
these standards as well as others.

Long-term Storage Alternatives

    The Department proposes to evaluate alternatives for long-term 
storage of plutonium, HEU and other weapons-usable fissile materials: 
(1) In the current interim storage facilities (the no-action 
alternative); (2) in facilities upgraded as necessary to comply with 
current ES&H and design requirements; or (3) in a new consolidated 
storage facility. Five candidate sites for a new consolidated long-term 
storage were selected from those evaluated during the Reconfiguration 
Program in preparation for development of the Reconfiguration PEIS, 
addressing the nuclear weapons complex for the post-Cold War era. They 
are the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the Savannah River Site, 
the Oak Ridge Reservation, the Pantex Plant, and the Nevada Test Site. 
In addition, ongoing evaluation of interim storage sites may result in 
other sites being considered reasonable alternatives for consolidated 
long-term storage.

Surplus Plutonium Disposition Alternatives (Including Other Surplus 
Nuclear Materials Except HEU)

    Controlled, interim storage will be required until the materials 
are either placed into long-term storage or dispositioned into a more 
proliferation resistant form. As mentioned previously, the alternatives 
for disposition of plutonium and certain other surplus nuclear 
materials were evaluated by the Academy. In general, the Academy 
identified several broad alternatives for meeting the ``spent fuel 
standard.''
     Mixed Oxide fuel alternative, in which the surplus 
plutonium would be used as fuel in existing, modified, or new nuclear 
reactors, that would consume a fraction of the plutonium and embed the 
rest in highly radioactive spent fuel similar to that now produced by 
commercial power reactors, and which would be stored and ultimately 
disposed of in a geologic repository;
     Immobilization alternative, in which the surplus plutonium 
would be vitrified or embedded in a ceramic or other material, either 
alone or mixed with radioactive high-level wastes, to form glass or 
ceramic logs for ultimate disposal in a geologic repository; and
     Geologic disposition alternative, in which plutonium in 
some other acceptable form would be placed directly in suitable 
canisters and buried in deep boreholes drilled into the earth, or in a 
mined geologic repository.

Beyond the Spent Fuel Standard

    Because plutonium disposition alternatives meeting the ``spent fuel 
standard'' result in a form that still entails a risk of use in 
weapons, and because the barriers to use diminish with time as the 
radioactivity decays, it will be prudent to consider further steps to 
reduce long-term proliferation risks. Thus, the alternatives that 
result in the plutonium becoming essentially inaccessible or destroyed 
include:
     Accelerator based conversion, in which a large fraction of 
plutonium would be fissioned in a sub-critical reactor aided by 
neutrons produced by an accelerator; and
     ``Deep Burn'' Reactors, in which the plutonium is 
fissioned so completely in reactors, without spent fuel reprocessing 
and recycling, that only a small amount of plutonium would remain in 
the spent nuclear fuel.
    There may be other alternatives that are reasonable for disposition 
of surplus plutonium (and other surplus weapons-usable fissile 
materials) into a form which is substantially and inherently 
proliferation resistant. The PEIS will include consideration of any 
other reasonable alternatives identified in the scoping process.
    The purpose of the PEIS is to develop information to support 
decision making concerning long-term storage of all plutonium, HEU, and 
other weapons-usable material and disposition of the surplus plutonium 
and other weapons-usable fissile materials so that the risk of 
proliferation is minimized. Some of the alternatives to accomplish 
disposition may require substantial research and development, and could 
entail subsequent NEPA analysis prior to any decision concerning 
implementation.
    The Academy study also considered plutonium disposition 
alternatives that the Academy judged to be unreasonable. These 
alternatives were: sub-seabed disposal; ocean dilution; underground 
detonation; and disposal in space. Comments regarding these, and any 
other alternatives, are encouraged to aid DOE in establishing the 
reasonable PEIS alternatives for disposition of surplus plutonium (and 
other weapons-usable fissile materials).

The NEPA Process

    This PEIS is being prepared pursuant to section 102(2)(C) of the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended (42 U.S.C. 
4321 et seq.) and the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 
regulations (40 CFR parts 1500-1508). The reason for this PEIS is that 
there might be significant environmental impacts from implementing 
decisions on the long-term storage and disposition of weapons-usable 
fissile materials. Such decisions would be a major Federal action 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the 
meaning of NEPA and, therefore, requiring the preparation of an 
environmental impact statement (EIS).
    NEPA requires review of any major Federal action which may 
significantly affect the quality of the human environment. The review 
is documented through an EIS. The NEPA process is described in the CEQ 
regulations implementing NEPA [40 CFR, Parts 1500-1508] and DOE NEPA 
regulations at 10 CFR Part 1021. The draft and final PEIS will be 
prepared in accordance with these requirements.
    A PEIS is a broad-scope environmental analysis of a program or 
policy [40 CFR 1500.4(i)]. A PEIS provides an opportunity for NEPA 
review to coincide with meaningful points in agency planning and 
decisionmaking [40 CFR 1502.4(b)]. A PEIS may be used to support later 
NEPA documents of narrower scope (called ``tiering''), such as site-
specific or project-specific NEPA reviews. NEPA documents tiered from 
the PEIS would focus on specific actions when they are ripe for review 
[40 CFR 1502.20]. Following preparation of an EIS, an agency issues a 
Record of Decision (ROD) to document its decision [40 CFR 1505.2]. The 
ROD explains how the EIS analysis was balanced against other factors 
leading to the agency's decision. DOE has determined that potential 
decisions and their implementation regarding the long-term storage and 
disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials would be a major 
Federal action within the meaning of NEPA; and that the several actions 
which might be anticipated under this effort are connected [40 CFR 
1508.25] and would constitute a broad agency program [40 CFR 1502.4]. 
Accordingly, DOE has decided that a PEIS is appropriate to analyze the 
environmental consequences associated with long-term storage and 
disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials and to factor 
environmental considerations into DOE decisions.
    At this point in the NEPA process, all alternatives, especially 
those identified for plutonium disposition, are broadly stated. This 
has been done intentionally so that public input during scoping can be 
optimally utilized to identify which alternatives should be 
specifically addressed and which significant issues should be included 
within the scope of the PEIS. Based on comments received during the 
scoping process, the reasonable alternatives to be included in the 
PEIS, a discussion of the methodology and the issues to be addressed 
will be identified in a PEIS Implementation Plan.

Environmental Issues

    The PEIS will identify and analyze direct, indirect, and cumulative 
impacts resulting from the alternatives for potential decisions and 
their implementation. The impact analyses will address the following 
resources: air, water, land, biota, human health and safety, social and 
economic, cultural, energy and minerals, transportation, and any other 
issues identified as appropriate during the scoping process. The impact 
analyses will be at the programmatic level for the proposed action and 
each alternative and will not deal with specific site environmental 
resource issues unless an alternative proposes a site-specific 
activity. Subsequent to the decisions made upon the completion of this 
PEIS, DOE may undertake site-specific actions based upon such decisions 
and may also perform separate NEPA analyses on those actions prior to 
any site implementation. Such analyses would include a detailed 
examination of the site-specific environmental impacts of those 
activities. DOE invites public comments specifically on the scope of 
the PEIS analysis.

Classified Material

    DOE plans to prepare the PEIS in unclassified form; however, DOE 
will review classified material while preparing the PEIS. In the event 
any classified material is included in the completed PEIS or its 
associated Record of Decision (ROD), such material would be in a 
classified appendix which would not be available for general public 
review. This material would, however, be considered by DOE in reaching 
a decision on long-term storage and disposition of fissile nuclear 
materials. DOE will provide as much information as possible in 
unclassified form to assist public understanding and input.

Other DOE NEPA Documents

    There are several other NEPA documents in preparation by DOE that 
have a direct bearing on this PEIS. These are:
     The Reconfiguration PEIS which will no longer address 
long-term storage of plutonium and HEU since the PEIS which is the 
subject of this NOI will address alternatives for long-term storage of 
all weapons-usable fissile material. The Reconfiguration PEIS will 
continue to describe the remaining missions in the nuclear weapons 
complex and will evaluate alternatives for tritium supply and recycle.
     The Pantex Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
will address alternatives for interim storage of plutonium pits. This 
interim storage of plutonium pits is part of the no-action alternative 
for long-term storage of all plutonium which includes other forms of 
plutonium, along with pits, and which will be addressed in this PEIS.
     The Oak Ridge Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium 
Environmental Assessment (EA) will address interim storage alternatives 
for enriched uranium. This interim storage also forms part of the no-
action alternative for long-term storage of HEU which will be addressed 
in this PEIS.
     The Environmental Restoration and Waste Management PEIS 
will address the programmatic level decisions for treatment, storage 
and disposal of waste within the DOE complex. If any actions to dispose 
of weapons-usable fissile materials result in a waste form, these waste 
forms would be treated, stored and disposed of in accordance with the 
decisions resulting from the Environmental Restoration and Waste 
Management PEIS.
     Other EIS's and EA's involving weapons-usable fissile 
materials are or will be in progress for the purpose of establishing 
the interim conditions for some of these materials.

Definitions

    As used in this Notice of Intent, the following definitions apply:
     Disposition is a process of use or disposal of materials 
that results in the remaining material being converted to a form that 
is substantially and inherently more proliferation-resistant than the 
original form.
     Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is uranium which has an 
isotopic content of uranium-235 of 20 percent or more.
     Interim Storage refers to the safe, controlled, 
inspectable storage facilities and conditions that will be established 
in the near term and will remain in effect until the long-term storage 
or disposition actions are implemented.
     Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) is uranium which has an 
isotopic content of uranium-235 of less than 20 percent. Most 
commercial reactor fuel is enriched to about 4 to 5 percent uranium-
235.
     Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials is used to refer to a 
specific set of nuclear materials that may be utilized in making a 
nuclear explosive for a weapon. Weapons-usable fissile materials 
include uranium with uranium-235 isotopic content of 20 percent or 
more, plutonium of any isotopic composition, and other isotopes such as 
uranium-233, americium-241, and neptunium-237 which have been separated 
from spent nuclear fuel or irradiated targets. The term weapons-usable 
fissile materials does not include the fissile materials present in 
spent nuclear fuel or irradiated targets from reactors.

Invitation to Comment

    DOE invites comments on the scope of this PEIS from all interested 
parties, including affected Federal, State and local agencies and 
Indian tribes. DOE solicits comments regarding the scope of the PEIS 
analysis, suggestions on significant environmental issues, alternatives 
to be included in the PEIS, and other matters of content.
    To ensure consideration of comments in preparing the draft PEIS, 
written comments must be postmarked by October 17, 1994. Late comments 
will be considered to the extent practicable. Agencies, organizations, 
and the general public are invited to present oral comments pertinent 
to preparation of the PEIS at public scoping workshops. DOE will also 
accept written material at the workshops. Written and oral comments 
will be given equal weight in the scoping process.
    Public scoping workshops to provide information and discuss and 
receive comments on the scope of the PEIS will be held during August 
and September 1994, both regionally and in the vicinity of the sites 
which may be affected by the proposed action. A national public scoping 
workshop will also be held in Washington, DC. DOE will announce the 
location, date and time for these public workshops in a subsequent 
Notice in the Federal Register, and by other appropriate means as early 
as practicable. The Department will endeavor to provide 30 days notice 
prior to any applicable workshops. Advance registration to provide oral 
comments at these workshops will be facilitated using an ``800 number'' 
that will be provided in the Federal Register notice. On-site 
registration to provide oral comments will be accommodated to the 
extent possible.

    Signed in Washington, DC this 15th day of June 1994, for the 
United States Department of Energy.
Tara O'Toole,
Assistant Secretary, Environment, Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 94-15119 Filed 6-20-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P