[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 117 (Monday, June 20, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-14018]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: June 20, 1994]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 93-NM-142-AD; Amendment 39-8938; AD 94-12-10]

 

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 767 Series Airplanes 
Equipped With Pratt & Whitney PW4000 Series Engines

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive 
(AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 767 series airplanes, that 
currently requires repetitive inspections, tests, adjustments, and 
functional checks of the thrust reverser system and of selected engine 
wiring. This amendment adds a requirement for installation of a 
terminating modification, repetitive operational checks of that 
installation, and repair of any discrepancy found. This amendment is 
prompted by the identification of a modification that ensures that the 
level of safety inherent in the original type design of the thrust 
reverser system is further enhanced. The actions specified by this AD 
are intended to prevent deployment of a thrust reverser in flight and 
subsequent reduced controllability of the airplane.

DATES: Effective July 20, 1994.
    The incorporation by reference of Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-
0062, Revision 2, dated June 3, 1993; and Revision 3, dated February 
24, 1994; as listed in the regulations, is approved by the Director of 
the Federal Register as of July 20, 1994.
    The incorporation by reference of Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-
0046, Revision 1, dated September 17, 1992, as listed in the 
regulations, was approved previously by the Director of the Federal 
Register as of November 24, 1992 (57 FR 53258, November 9, 1992).
    The incorporation by reference of Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-
0051, dated October 9, 1991, and Boeing Document D630T002, ``Boeing 767 
Dispatch Deviation Guide,'' Revision 9, dated May 1, 1991, as listed in 
the regulations, was approved previously by the Director of the Federal 
Register as of November 8, 1991 (56 FR 55066, October 24, 1991).

ADDRESSES: The service information referenced in this AD may be 
obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, 
Washington 98124-2207. This information may be examined at the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules 
Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of 
the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, 
Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Richard Simonson, Aerospace Engineer, 
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 
Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 
Washington 98055-4056; telephone (206) 227-2683; fax (206) 227-1181.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal 
Aviation Regulations by superseding AD 92-24-03, amendment 39-8408 (57 
FR 53258, November 9, 1992), which is applicable to certain Boeing 
Model 767 series airplanes, was published in the Federal Register on 
October 7, 1993 (58 FR 52243). The action proposed to continue to 
require repetitive inspections, tests, adjustments, and functional 
checks of the thrust reverser system and of selected engine wiring; and 
to add a requirement for installation of a terminating modification, 
repetitive operational checks of that installation, and repair of any 
discrepancy found.
    Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate 
in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to 
the comments received.
    -One commenter supports the proposed rule.
    -Two commenters request that specific references to page numbers 
and revision dates of the Boeing 767 Airplane Maintenance Manual (AMM), 
which are specified in paragraph (f) of the proposal, be removed from 
the proposed rule. Boeing recommends that the proposed AD specify only 
the ATA Chapter-Section-Subject, pageblock title, and task title. 
Boeing explains that the AMM's are customized for each operator to 
reflect all of the equipment in that operator's fleet. Therefore, the 
number of pages for any given procedure is variable, depending on the 
number of different equipment configurations documented in an 
operator's AMM. Boeing also indicates that AMM procedures are revised 
periodically for non-technical reasons. Boeing adds that changes to the 
structure of the procedures are necessary to accommodate an upgrade of 
the publishing system that is currently under way, which, in addition 
to repagination, will necessitate the issuance of revised AMM pages.
    -Boeing also requests that a reference to a specific Temporary 
Revision (TR) number, which is specified in ``NOTE 4'' under paragraph 
(c) of the proposal, be eliminated from the proposed rule. Boeing 
explains that because of the customization of AMM's for each operator, 
multiple TR's may be issued to address a technical concern. While 
changes to the procedure can be identical for all operators, the page 
layout of each operator's AMM can require a unique TR to allow the 
operator to correctly integrate the TR into the AMM. Since each unique 
TR has a different number, the specific TR referenced in the proposal 
only applies to the AMM's for three operators of a possible 18 
operators. Additionally, TR's are removed from an operator's AMM and 
destroyed when the data is incorporated in a subsequent regular 
revision. The procedural changes in the TR cited in the proposal were 
incorporated into the AMM in November 1992, and instructions were 
provided in an AMM transmittal letter to remove the TR. Therefore, it 
is probable that operators no longer have the TR that was cited in the 
proposed rule.
    -Boeing concludes that the net effect of specifying AMM page 
numbers, AMM revision dates, and TR's in the AD would be that operators 
may be unable to use the procedure contained in the AMM to perform 
certain tests required by the AD. Each operator would be required to 
maintain an obsolete version of the procedure, or to request FAA 
approval of an alternative method of compliance with the AD that would 
allow the use of the current version of the AMM.
    -The FAA concurs partially. In light of the information submitted 
by the commenters, the FAA finds that specific reference to the TR 
cited in ``NOTE 4'' under paragraph (c) of the proposal should not be 
specified in the final rule. Accordingly, ``NOTE 4'' has been removed 
from the final rule. Additionally, the FAA's objective in proposing 
periodic operational checks of the sync-lock device, as specified in 
paragraph (f) of this AD, is to ensure the integrity of the locking 
function. However, since the issuance of the proposal and receipt of 
Boeing's comments to the proposal, Boeing has submitted to the FAA 
separate procedures for accomplishment of the operational checks of the 
sync-lock integrity. Therefore, these procedures have been defined in 
paragraph (f) of the final rule, and the AMM references specified 
previously in paragraph (f) of the proposal have been removed from the 
final rule.
    -The Air Transport Association (ATA) of America, on behalf of its 
members, states that, while ATA members are not opposed to 
accomplishing the proposed checks as part of their maintenance 
programs, these members are opposed to accomplishing the checks as part 
of the requirements of an AD. The commenters believe that the 
requirement for operational checks is equivalent to issuing a 
Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMR) item by means of an AD.
    ATA adds that, if the FAA finds sufficient justification to include 
the requirement for operational checks in the AD, an alternative to 
accomplishment of the checks should be provided in the final rule. ATA 
reasons that an alternative is justified because no data exist to show 
that repetitive checks of a modified thrust reverser cannot be handled 
adequately through an operator's maintenance program. The suggested 
alternative follows: Within 3 months after accomplishing the sync-lock 
installation, revise the FAA-approved maintenance inspection program to 
include an operational check of the sync-lock. The initial check would 
be accomplished within 1,000 hours time-in-service after modification. 
The AD would no longer be applicable for operators that have acceptably 
revised the maintenance program. Operators choosing this alternative 
could use an alternative recordkeeping method in lieu of that required 
by Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 91.417 or 121.380. The FAA would 
be defined as the cognizant Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI) for 
operators electing this alternative.
    The FAA recognizes the concerns of the commenter regarding the 
requirement for periodic operational checks of the sync-lock following 
its installation. However, the FAA finds that the operational checks 
are necessary in order to provide an adequate level of safety and to 
ensure the integrity of the sync-lock installation. The actions 
required by this AD are consistent with actions that have been 
identified by an industry-wide task force as necessary to ensure 
adequate safety of certain thrust reverser systems installed on 
transport category airplanes. Representatives of the Aerospace 
Industries Association (AIA) of America, Inc., and the FAA comprise 
that task force. Representatives from other organizations, such as ATA, 
have participated in various discussions and work activities resulting 
from the recommendations of the task force.
    The FAA acknowledges that the operational checks specified in this 
AD and CMR items are similar in terms of scheduled maintenance and 
recordkeeping. This AD addresses an unsafe condition and requires 
installation of the sync-lock to correct that unsafe condition. The FAA 
has determined that the requirement for operational checks is necessary 
in order to ensure the effectiveness of that installation in addressing 
the unsafe condition. This determination is based on the fact that the 
sync-lock is a new design whose reliability has not been adequately 
proven through service experience. In addition, service experience to 
date has demonstrated that failures can occur within the sync-lock that 
may not be evident during normal operation of the thrust reverser 
system and may not result in activation of the sync-lock ``unlock'' 
indicator. The ATA's suggested alternative to accomplishment of the 
operational checks would permit each operator to determine whether and 
how often these checks should be conducted. In light of the severity of 
the unsafe condition, however, the FAA has determined that allowing 
this degree of operator discretion is not appropriate at this time. 
Therefore, this AD is necessary to ensure that operators accomplish 
checks of the integrity of the sync-lock installation in a common 
manner and at common intervals.
    The FAA also finds that addressing operational checks of the sync-
lock integrity in a recommended action, such as an MRB report, will not 
ensure an acceptable level of safety with regard to the thrust reverser 
system. However, the FAA recognizes that an operational check interval 
of 4,000 hours time-in-service, which will be recommended by Boeing for 
inclusion in the next revision to the MRB report, corresponds more 
closely to the interval at which most of the affected operators conduct 
regularly scheduled ``C'' checks. The FAA has reconsidered the proposed 
interval of 1,000 hours time-in-service for accomplishment of 
repetitive operational checks. In light of the safety implications of 
the unsafe condition addressed and the practical aspects of 
accomplishing orderly operational checks of the fleet during regularly 
scheduled maintenance where special equipment and trained maintenance 
personnel will be readily available, the FAA finds that accomplishment 
of the checks at intervals of 4,000 hours time-in-service will provide 
an acceptable level of safety. Paragraph (f) of the final rule has been 
revised accordingly.
    Since issuance of the notice, the FAA has reviewed and approved 
Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-0062, Revision 3, dated February 24, 
1994. This revised service bulletin is essentially identical to the 
previous revision (which was cited in the notice), but contains certain 
minor editorial changes. The FAA has revised the final rule to include 
this revised service bulletin as an additional source of appropriate 
service information.
    After careful review of the available data, including the comments 
noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public 
interest require the adoption of the rule with the changes previously 
described. The FAA has determined that these changes will neither 
increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of 
the AD.
    There are approximately 88 Model 767 series airplanes of the 
affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 26 
airplanes of U.S. registry will be affected by this AD, that it will 
take approximately 480 work hours per airplane to accomplish the 
required modification, and 1 work hour to accomplish the required 
operational checks, at an average labor rate of $55 per work hour. 
Required parts will be provided by the manufacturer at no cost to 
operators. Based on these figures, the total cost impact of the AD on 
U.S. operators is estimated to be $687,830, or $26,455 per airplane.
    The total cost impact figure discussed above is based on 
assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the 
requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish 
those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted.
    The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct 
effects on the States, on the relationship between the national 
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in 
accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final 
rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the 
preparation of a Federalism Assessment.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is 
not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866; 
(2) is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a 
significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial 
number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action 
and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained 
from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption 
ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment.

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of 
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. App. 1354(a), 1421 and 1423; 49 U.S.C. 
106(g); and 14 CFR 11.89.


Sec. 39.13  [Amended]

    2. Section 39.13 is amended by removing amendment 39-8408 (57 FR 
53258, November 9, 1992), and by adding a new airworthiness directive 
(AD), amendment 39-8938, to read as follows:

94-12-10 Boeing: Amendment 39-8938. Docket 93-NM-142-AD. Supersedes 
AD 92-24-03, Amendment 39-8408.

    Applicability: Model 767 series airplanes equipped with Pratt & 
Whitney PW4000 series engines; certificated in any category.
    Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished 
previously.

    Note 1: Paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD restate the 
requirements of AD 92-24-03, amendment 39-8408, paragraphs (a) and 
(b). As allowed by the phrase, ``unless accomplished previously,'' 
if the requirements of AD 92-24-03 have been accomplished 
previously, paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD do not require that 
they be repeated.

    Note 2: Paragraph (c)(1) of this AD restates the requirement for 
an initial and repetitive inspections, tests, adjustments, and 
functional checks contained in paragraph (c)(1) of AD 92-24-03. 
Therefore, for operators who have previously accomplished at least 
the initial inspection in accordance with AD 92-24-03, paragraph 
(c)(1) of this AD requires that the next scheduled inspection be 
performed within 3,000 flight hours after the last inspection 
performed in accordance with paragraph (c)(1) of AD 92-24-03.

    Note 3: Paragraph (c)(2) of this AD restates the requirement for 
an initial and repetitive checks of the grounding wire contained in 
paragraph (c)(2) of AD 92-24-03. Therefore, for operators who have 
previously accomplished at least the initial inspection in 
accordance with AD 92-24-03, paragraph (c)(2) of this AD requires 
that the next scheduled inspection be performed within 1,500 flight 
hours after the last inspection performed in accordance with 
paragraph (c)(2) of AD 92-24-03.

    To ensure the integrity of the fail safe features of the thrust 
reverser system, accomplish the following:
    (a) Within 7 days after August 23, 1991 (the effective date of 
AD 91-18-51, amendment 39-8069), accomplish the following:
    (1) Deactivate both left and right thrust reversers in 
accordance with Section 78-31-1 of Boeing Document D630T002, 
``Boeing 767 Dispatch Deviation Guide,'' Revision 9, dated May 1, 
1991.
    (2) Add the following to the Limitations Section of the FAA-
approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). This may be accomplished by 
placing a copy of this AD in the AFM.
    ``Reduce by five percent the available accelerate-stop distance 
resulting from the Airplane Flight Manual takeoff performance 
analysis when the runway is wet or contaminated.''
    (b) Within 60 days after November 8, 1991 (the effective date of 
AD 91-22-09, amendment 39-8069), modify the thrust reverser system 
in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-0051, dated 
October 9, 1991. Once this modification is accomplished, the thrust 
reverser system shall be re-activated and the AFM limitation 
required by paragraph (a)(2) of this AD may be removed.
    (c) Accomplish the actions specified in paragraphs (c)(1) and 
(c)(2) of this AD at the times specified in those paragraphs.
    (1) Prior to the accumulation of 3,000 flight hours since 
manufacture, or within 30 days after November 24, 1992 (the 
effective date of AD 92-24-03, amendment (39-8408), whichever occurs 
later, perform all inspections, tests, adjustments, and functional 
checks of the thrust reverser control and indication system and 
engine wiring specified in Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-0046, 
Revision 1, dated September 17, 1992, in accordance with the 
procedures described in that service bulletin.
    (i) Repeat those actions thereafter at intervals not to exceed 
3,000 flight hours.
    (ii) Whenever maintenance action is taken that could disturb any 
portion of the thrust reverser control system, the functional test 
or tests relative to the system shall be performed in accordance 
with the Boeing 767 Maintenance Manual. After this test(s) is 
accomplished, the repetitive inspections, tests, adjustments and 
functional tests required by paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this AD shall 
continue.
    (2) Prior to the accumulation of 1,500 flight hours since 
manufacture, or within 30 days after November 24, 1992 (the 
effective date of AD 92-24-03), whichever occurs later, perform a 
check of the grounding wire for the thrust reverser directional 
control valve (DCV) in accordance with Section III, paragraph B., of 
Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-0046, Revision 1, dated September 17, 
1992. Thereafter, repeat this check at the times specified in 
paragraph (c)(2)(i) and (c)(2)(ii) of this AD.
    (i) At intervals not to exceed 1,500 flight hours; and
    (ii) Whenever maintenance action is taken that could disturb the 
DCV grounding circuit.
    (d) If any of the inspections, tests, adjustments, and/or 
functional checks required by paragraph (c) of this AD cannot be 
performed successfully as specified in the service bulletin, prior 
to further flight, deactivate the associated thrust reverser in 
accordance with Section 78-31-1 of Boeing Document D630T002, 
``Boeing 767 Dispatch Deviation Guide,'' Revision 9, dated May 1, 
1991. The thrust reverser shall remain deactivated until all 
inspections, tests, adjustments, and functional tests required by 
paragraph (c) of this AD are completed successfully.
    (e) Within 3 years after the effective date of this AD, install 
an additional thrust reverser system locking feature (sync-lock) in 
accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-0062, Revision 2, 
dated June 3, 1993, or Revision 3, dated February 24, 1994. 
Installation of this additional locking feature constitutes 
terminating action for the requirements of paragraph (c) of this AD.
    (f) Within 4,000 hours time-in-service after accomplishing the 
modification required by paragraph (e) of this AD, or within 4,000 
hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, whichever 
occurs later; and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 4,000 hours 
time-in-service: Perform the integrity test of the thrust reverser 
synchronous shaft locks specified below to detect latent failures of 
the components and to ensure the integrity of the thrust reverser 
system. Prior to further flight, repair any discrepancy found in 
accordance with procedures described in the Boeing 767 Maintenance 
Manual.

THRUST REVERSER SYNC-LOCK--ADJUSTMENT/TEST

1. General
    A. There are two sync-locks for each engine thrust reverser. The 
sync-lock is installed on the lower non-locking hydraulic actuator 
of each thrust reverser sleeve.
    B. The Thrust Reverser Sync-Lock Integrity Test has two tasks:
    (1) The first task tests the electrical circuit which controls 
the operation of the sync-lock on each thrust reverser sleeve.
    (2) The second task tests the mechanical function of the sync-
lock on each thrust reverser sleeve.
    C. The thrust reverser sync-lock is referred to as the sync-lock 
in this procedure.
2. Thrust Reverser Sync-Lock Integrity Test
    A. Equipment
    (1) Multi-meter, Simpson 260 or equivalent--commerically 
available.
    B. Prepare to do the Integrity Test for the sync-locks.
    (1) Supply electrical power.
    (2) For the left engine, make sure these circuit breakers on the 
overhead circuit breaker panel, P11, are closed:
    (a) L ENG T/R CONT
    (b) L ENG T/R IND
    (c) L ENG T/R SSL CONT
    (3) For the right engine, make sure these circuit breakers on 
the overhead circuit breaker panel, P11, are closed:
    (a) R ENG T/R CONT
    (b) R ENG T/R IND
    (c) R ENG T/R SSL CONT
    (d) FOR ETOPS AIRPLANES, CLOSE THESE ADDITIONAL CIRCUIT 
BREAKERS:
    1) R ENG T/R CONT ALTN
    2) R ENG T/R IND ALTN
    (4) Open the fan cowl panels.
    C. Do the Electrical Integrity Test for the sync-locks.
    (1) Do these steps to make sure there are no ``hot'' short 
circuits in the electrical system that may accidentally supply power 
to the sync-locks:
    (a) Remove the electrical connector, D20194, from the sync-
locks, V170, on the left sleeve of the thrust reverser.
    (b) Remove the electrical connector, D20196, from the sync-lock, 
V171, on the right sleeve of the thrust reverser.
    (c) Use a multi-meter on the plug end of the applicable 
electrical connector to make sure that these conditions are correct: 


------------------------------------------------------------------------
     From Equipment            To Equipment             Condition       
------------------------------------------------------------------------
D20194, PIN 1..........  D20194, PIN 2..........  -3 TO +1 V DC AND     
                                                   CONTINUITY (LESS THAN
                                                   5 OHMS)              
D20196, PIN 1..........  D20196, PIN 2..........  -3 TO +1 V DC AND     
                                                   CONTINUITY (LESS THAN
                                                   5 OHMS)              
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (d) If you did not find these conditions to be correct, you must 
do these steps:
    (1) Make a careful visual inspection of all the electrical wires 
and connectors between the sync-lock and its power circuit breaker.
    (2) Repair all the unserviceable electrical wire and connectors 
that you find.
    (3) Use the multi-meter again to make sure there are no ``hot'' 
short circuits in the electrical system that can accidentally supply 
power to the sync-locks.
    (e) If you find the correct conditions, do the Mechanical 
Integrity Test for the sync-locks.
    D. Do the Mechanical Integrity Test for the sync-locks.
    (1) Supply hydraulic power.
      WARNING: MAKE SURE ALL PERSONS AND EQUIPMENT ARE CLEAR OF THE 
AREA BEHIND EACH THRUST REVERSER. IF YOU DO NOT OBEY THIS 
INSTRUCTION, INJURIES TO PERSONS OR DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT CAN OCCUR IF 
THE SYNC-LOCKS DO NOT OPERATE CORRECTLY AND THE THRUST REVERSER 
EXTENDS.
    (2) Move the L(R) reverser thrust lever aft to try to extend the 
thrust reverser.

    Note: If the thrust reverser sleeves do not extend, the sync-
locks are serviceable. If the thrust reverser sleeve extends, the 
applicable sync-lock did not operate correctly.

    (3) Replace the sync-lock(s) for the thrust reverser sleeve(s) 
that extended.
    (4) Make sure the reverse thrust levers are in the fully stowed 
position.
    (5) Install the electrical connectors, D20194, on the sync-
locks, V170, on the left sleeve of the thrust reverser.
    (6) Install the electrical connector, D20196, on the sync-lock, 
V171, on the right sleeve of the thrust reverser.

      WARNING: MAKE SURE ALL PERSONS AND EQUIPMENT ARE CLEAR OF THE 
AREA BEHIND THE THRUST REVERSERS. IF YOU DO NOT OBEY THIS 
INSTRUCTION, INJURIES TO PERSONS OR DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT CAN OCCUR 
WHEN THE THRUST REVERSERS ARE EXTENDED.

    (7) Move the L(R) reverser thrust lever aft to extend the thrust 
reverser.

    Note: If the thrust reverser sleeves extend, the sync-locks are 
serviceable. If the thrust reverser sleeve did not extend, the 
applicable sync-lock did not operate correctly.

    (8) Replace the sync-lock(s) on the thrust reverser sleeve(s) 
that did not extend when you moved the reverse thrust levers.
    E. Repeat the Thrust Reverser Sync-Lock Integrity Test for the 
opposite engine.
    F. Put the airplane back to its usual condition.
    (1) Move the reverser thrust levers to fully retract the thrust 
reversers on the two engines with hydraulic power.
    (2) Remove the hydraulic power if it is not necessary.
    (3) Remove the electrical power if it is not necessary.
    (4) Close the fan cowl panels.

    (g) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the 
compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be 
used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification 
Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall 
submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal 
Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the 
Manager, Seattle ACO.

    Note 4: Information concerning the existence of approved 
alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be 
obtained from the Seattle ACO.

    (h) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with 
sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 
CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where 
the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
    (i) The installation shall be done in accordance with Boeing 
Service Bulletin 767-78-0062, Revision 2, dated June 3, 1993; or 
Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-0062, Revision 3, dated February 24, 
1994. The incorporation by reference of these documents was approved 
by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 
552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. The inspections, tests, adjustments, and 
functional checks shall be done in accordance with Boeing Service 
Bulletin 767-78-0046, Revision 1, dated September 17, 1992. The 
incorporation by reference of this document was approved previously 
by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 
552(a) and 1 CFR part 51 as of November 24, 1992 (57 FR 53258, 
November 9, 1992). The modification and deactivation shall be done 
in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-0051, dated 
October 9, 1991; and Boeing Document D630T002, ``Boeing 767 Dispatch 
Deviation Guide,'' Revision 9, dated May 1, 1991. The incorporation 
by reference of these documents was approved previously by the 
Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) 
and 1 CFR part 51 as of November 8, 1991 (56 FR 55066, October 24, 
1991). Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, 
P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. Copies may be 
inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind 
Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal 
Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.
    (j) This amendment becomes effective on July 20, 1994.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 3, 1994.
Darrell M. Pederson,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 94-14018 Filed 6-17-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-U