[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 110 (Thursday, June 9, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-14014]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: June 9, 1994]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

28 CFR Part 16
[AAG/A Order No. 90-94]

 

Exemption of System of Records Under the Privacy Act

AGENCY: Departmet of Justice.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Justice, FBI, proposes to exempt a Privacy 
Act system of records from subsections 5 U.S.C. 552a (c)(3), (c)(4), 
(d), (e)(1), (2), and (3), (e)(4)(G) and (H), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f) and 
(g) of the Privacy Act. The system of records is the FBI Counterdrug 
Information Indices System. Information in the system consists of 
automated indices related to the law enforcement activities and 
responsibilities of the FBI regarding drug law enforcement. These 
exemptions are necessary to avoid interference with the law enforcement 
functions and responsibilities of the FBI. Reasons for the exemptions 
are set forth in the text below.

DATES: Submit any comments by July 11, 1994.

ADDRESSES: Address all comments to Patricia E. Neely, Staff Assistant, 
Systems Policy Staff, Information Resources Management, Justice 
Management Division , DOJ, Washington, DC (Room 850, WCTR Bldg.)

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Patricia E. Neely, (202) 616-0178.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In the notice section of today's Federal 
Register, the FBI provides a description of the FBI Counterdrug 
Information Indices System.
    This order relates to individuals rather than small business 
entities. Nevertheless, pursuant to the requirements of the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, it is hereby stated that the order 
will not have ``a significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities.''

List of Subject in Part 16

    Administrative Practices and Procedure, Courts, Freedom of 
Information Act, Government in the Sunshine Act, Privacy Act.

    Pursuant to the authority vested in the Attorney General by 5 
U.S.C. 552a and delegated to me by Attorney General Order No. 793-78, 
it is proposed to amend 28 CFR part 16, as set forth below.

    Dated: June 3, 1994.
Stephen R. Colgate,
Assistant Attorney General for Administration.

    1. The authority for part 16 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301, 552, 552a, 552b(g), 553; 18 U.S.C. 4203 
(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, 534; 31 U.S.C. 3717, 9701.

    2. It is proposed to amend 28 CFR 16.96 by adding paragraphs (l) 
and (m) as set forth below.


Sec. 16.96  Exemption of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)--limited 
access.

* * * * *
    (l) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a 
(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(1), (2), and (3), (e)(4)(G) and (H), (e)(5), 
(e)(8), (f) and (g).
    (1) FBI Counterdrug Information Indices System (CIIS) (JUSTICE/FBI-
016)
    (m) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in 
this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2). 
Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the 
following reasons:
    (1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record 
subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her 
would reveal investigative interest by not only the FBI, but also by 
the recipient agency. This would permit the record subject to take 
appropriate measures to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy 
evidence, intimidate potential witnesses or flee the area to avoid the 
thrust of the investigation.
    (2) From subsection (c)(4) to the extent it is not applicable 
because an exemption is being claimed from subsection (d).
    (3) (i) From subsections (d), (e)(4) (G) and (H) because these 
provisions concern individual access to records, compliance with which 
could compromise sensitive information, interfere with the overall law 
enforcement process by revealing a pending sensitive investigation, 
possibly identify a confidential source or disclose information which 
would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another individual's 
personal privacy, reveal a sensitive investigative technique, or 
constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law 
enforcement personnel.
    (ii) In addition, from paragraph (d), because to require the FBI to 
amend information thought to be incorrect, irrelevant or untimely, 
because of the nature of the information collected and the essential 
length of time it is maintained, would create an impossible 
administrative and investigative burden by forcing the agency to 
continuously retrograde its investigations attempting to resolve 
questions of accuracy, etc.
    (4) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not possible in all 
instances to determine relevancy or necessity of specific information 
in the early stages of a criminal or other investigation.
    (ii) Relevance and necessity are questions of judgment and timing; 
what appears relevant and necessary when collected ultimately may be 
deemed otherwise. It is only after the information is assessed that its 
relevancy and necessity in a specified investigative activity can be 
established.
    (iii) In any investigation the FBI might obtain information 
concerning violations of law not under its jurisdiction, but in the 
interest of effective law enforcement, dissemination will be made to 
the agency charged with enforcing such law.
    (iv) In interviewing individuals or obtaining other forms of 
evidence during an investigation, information could be obtained, the 
nature of which would leave in doubt its relevancy and necessity. Such 
information, however, could be relevant to another investigation or to 
an investigative activity under the jurisdiction of another agency.
    (5) From subsection (e)(2) because the nature of criminal and other 
investigative activities is such that vital information about an 
individual often can only be obtained from other persons who are 
familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such 
investigations it is not feasible to principally rely upon information 
furnished by the individual concerning his own activities.
    (6) From subsection (e)(3) because disclosure would provide the 
subject with information which could impede or compromise the 
investigation. The individual could seriously interfere with undercover 
investigative activities and could take appropriate steps to evade the 
investigation or flee a specific area.
    (7) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information 
for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance 
what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. With the 
passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may 
acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to 
light. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the 
ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise 
their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the 
development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law 
enforcement.
    (8) From subsection (e)(8) because the notice requirements of this 
provision could seriously interfere with a law enforcement activity by 
alerting the subject of a criminal or other investigation of existing 
investigative interest.
    (9) From subsection (f) to the extent that this system is exempt 
from the provisions of subsection (d).
    (10) From subsection (g) to the extent that this system of records 
is exempt from the provisions of subsection (d).

[FR Doc. 94-14014 Filed 6-8-94; 8:45 am]
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