[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 108 (Tuesday, June 7, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-13745]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: June 7, 1994]
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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
Resolution of Potential Conflict of Interest
The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has identified
and resolved a potential conflict of interest situation related to its
contractor, Mr. Duane C. Sewell. This Notice satisfies the requirements
of 10 CFR 1706.8(e) with respect to publication in the Federal
Register. Under the Board's Organizational and Consultant Conflicts of
Interests Regulations, 10 CFR part 1706 (OCI Regulations), an
organizational or consultant conflict of interest (OCI) means that
because of other past, present or future planned activities or
relationships, a contractor or consultant is unable, or potentially
unable, to render impartial assistance or advice to the Board, or the
objectivity of such offeror or contractor in performing work for the
Board is or might be otherwise impaired, or such offeror or contractor
has or would have an unfair competitive advantage. While the OCI
Regulations provide that contracts shall generally not be awarded to an
organization where the Board has determined that an actual or potential
OCI exists and cannot be avoided, the Board may waive this requirement
in certain circumstances.
The Board's mission is to provide advice and recommendations to the
Department of Energy (DOE) regarding public health and safety matters
related to DOE's defense nuclear facilities. This includes the review
and evaluation of the content and implementation of health and safety
standards including DOE orders, rules, and other safety requirements,
relating to the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of
DOE defense nuclear facilities. In late 1991, Congress amended the
Board's enabling Act, broadening the Board's jurisdiction over defense
nuclear facilities to include the assembly, disassembly, and testing of
weapons. With this increase in responsibility, the Board revised its
priorities to include reviews of additional facilities, including
principally the Pantex Plant, Nevada Test Site (NTS), the weapons
design laboratories, and additional facilities at Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant.
Two matters of immediate concern to the Board were the safety of
ongoing weapons disassembly operations and maintenance of the
capability to safely conduct nuclear testing operations. While the DOE
had been engaged in these activities for decades, significant changes
in the national security posture resulted in shifts in emphasis within
DOE. Unprecedented numbers of simultaneous nuclear weapon retirements
strained DOE's capabilities to develop and implement safe and well-
engineered procedures. A Congressionally-mandated and Presidentially-
extended nuclear testing moratorium removed the primary mechanism
(i.e., an active, on going testing program) by which the capability to
execute tests safely was exercised and ensured. At the same time, the
weapons programs at the nuclear weapons laboratories were losing
skilled and experienced personnel due to retirement, downsizing, and
reassignments. This combination of issues required the Board to
increase its attention, and with it the number of associated reviews,
at both Pantex and the NTS. Further, the Board recognized that it
needed individuals with expertise in multiple technical disciplines,
not previously required, to effectively meet the challenges and
responsibilities of its new authority. These technical disciplines
included conventional and nuclear explosive technology and safety,
nuclear materials handling and storage, criticality safety, and nuclear
weapons assembly, disassembly, storage and testing.
While the Board initiated an employee recruitment effort for
individuals with formal training and experience in weapons related
disciplines, it also recognized a need for technical assistance from
outside experts who have direct relevant experience in this area. The
Board identified Mr. Duane C. Sewell as an individual with the
requisite knowledge and experience needed to provide the Board with
immediate assistance in the weapons area. Specifically, Mr. Sewell can
and will provide the Board with expertise in strategic safety issues
associated with defense nuclear facilities involved in the assembly,
disassembly, and testing of nuclear weapons, as well as assistance in
the planning and performance of the Board's oversight functions at such
facilities. The scope of work will be limited to those operations
associated with production, dismantlement/disposition, safe handling,
testing, and storage of nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices, and
nuclear weapons components, and the nuclear and hazardous materials
used in these items. A major portion of Mr. Sewell's effort will be
directed toward assisting the Board in understanding the existing and
needed involvement of the DOE weapons design laboratories in these
activities, and evaluating the sufficiency of current and proposed
efforts. He is not expected to become involved, however, in detailed
technical reviews of operations at defense nuclear facilities.
During a routine preaward review, Mr. Sewell informed the Board of
a potential conflict of interest situation arising from his current and
past association with DOE and its weapons program. Mr. Sewell's
involvement with this nation's nuclear weapons development activities
dates back to 1941, when he joined the Manhattan Project. He has been
associated with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL or the
Laboratory) since it was established in 1952 and has held positions of
increasing authority and responsibility, including Deputy Director.
Although he retired from LLNL in July 1993, the Regents of the
University of California (the operator of LLNL) awarded Mr. Sewell the
title of Deputy Director Emeritus and provided him with an office and
secretary at the Laboratory. Since that time, he has been using the
office of LLNL approximately twice a week. While the time spent at LLNL
is his own, and without pay, he occasionally provides advice to
individuals who are currently directly involved in Laboratory
activities at Pantex regarding the disassembly of nuclear weapons
designed by LLNL. Additionally, for the year prior to his retirement,
Mr. Sewell was directly involved with Laboratory activities regarding
Pantex, and he attended meetings in May 1993 with the management and
operating contractor of that facility to discuss weapons disassembly
procedures.
Consequently, the Board had concerns regarding actual or potential
conflicts of interest based primarily on two issues. First, would Mr.
Sewell's continuing relationship with LLNL as Deputy Director Emeritus
affect his ability to provide impartial assistance or advice to the
Board. Second, would Mr. Sewell be placed in a situation as a
consultant to the Board where he would be reviewing his own work on
weapons-related matters conducted within a few years of his retirement.
The Board reviewed this situation and concluded that, even if the
circumstances could give rise to a potential conflict of interest
situation, it is nonetheless in the best interests of the Government to
have Mr. Sewell provide this support for the reasons described below.
Mr. Sewell's comprehensive knowledge of weapons development and
assembly procedures, gained through approximately fifty years of direct
experience, is invaluable to the Board in its health and safety reviews
of weapons disassembly and related activities and thus is vital to the
Board program. His experience includes the initial organization of the
LLNL weapon testing operations in the early 1950's, and serving as
Chairman of the Nevada Test Site Planning Board, Deputy Director of
LLNL in 1973, and Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs of DOE from
1978 to 1981. In the last position, he was responsible for DOE defense
programs, which included: Research, development, testing, production,
and maintenance of all nuclear warheads; defense nuclear materials
production, safeguard and security of all DOE materials and operations;
and international security affairs related to nuclear matters.
Furthermore, the Board recognized that it is unlikely that the work to
be performed by Mr. Sewell could be satisfactorily performed by anyone
whose experience and affiliations would not give rise to a conflict-of-
interest question. That is because the individuals who have the
requisite expertise in this area could only have obtained such
expertise through previous or current employment or consulting
relationship with one or more of the weapons designs laboratories. The
pertinent experience of other qualified individuals would therefore
likely raise similar conflicts questions.
The Board also examined Mr. Sewell's current relationship with LLNL
and the University of California. As noted above, LLNL provides him
with an office and clerical support, but the value of those services is
unlikely to be large enough to affect his objectivity in his work for
the Board. Also, although Mr. Sewell does not receive any compensation
from LLNL currently, he does participate in the University of
California Retirement Plan and a related savings plan and defined-
contribution plan maintained by the University of California. However,
he has informed the Board that the pension from the University of
California is vested, and the amount paid calculated according to fixed
formulas, and that his payments from the other plans depend on the
levels of prior contributions and ongoing investment returns rather
than on the financial condition of the University of California. The
possibility that he could use his work for the Board in the weapons
complex to affect the ability of the University of California to make
the vested pension payments to him is remote. Accordingly, the Board
concluded that Mr. Sewell's financial interest in the University of
California and his current LLNL privileges are not so substantial as to
be likely to affect the integrity of his services in advising the Board
on DNFSB matters, including, without limitation, any matters affecting
LLNL, Los Alamos National Laboratory, or NTS.
Finally, as the Board is required under its OCI Regulations, where
reasonably possible, to initiate measures which attempt to mitigate an
OCI, Mr. Sewell and the Board agreed to the following restrictions
during contract performance. The Board will not task Mr. Sewell to
review issues which would involve the direct assessment of LLNL program
activities at LLNL, Pantex, or elsewhere in the complex. In fact, as
noted above, since Mr. Sewell will assist the Board on strategic safety
issues, he is not expected to be involved in any assessments of
specific program activities. Also, the efforts of Mr. Sewell will be
overseen by experienced technical staff of the Board to ensure that all
of his resultant work products are impartial and contain full support
for any findings and recommendations issued thereunder. Further, Mr.
Sewell will not use the clerical support made available to him by LLNL
in his work for the Board and he will avoid any discussions with LLNL
employees regarding the work of the Board. Mr. Sewell has agreed to all
of these restrictions.
Accordingly, on the basis of the determination described above and
pursuant to the applicable provisions of 10 CFR part 1706, the Chairman
of the Board granted a waiver of any conflicts of interests (and the
pertinent provisions of the OCI Regulations) with the Board's contract
with Mr. Duane C. Sewell that might arise out of his previous or
existing relationship with LLNL.
Dated: May 31, 1994.
Kenneth M. Pusateri,
General Manager.
[FR Doc. 94-13745 Filed 6-6-94; 8:45 am]
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