[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 106 (Friday, June 3, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-13509]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: June 3, 1994]


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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

[Recommendation 94-1]

 

Improved Schedule for Remediation in the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Complex

agency: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

action: Notice; recommendation.

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summary: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a 
recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a 
concerning improved schedule for remediation in the defense nuclear 
facilities complex. The Board requests public comments on this 
recommendation.

dates: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this 
recommendation are due on or before July 5, 1994.

addresses: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this 
recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana 
Avenue, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC 20004.

for further information contact: Kenneth M. Pusateri or Carole C. 
Morgan, at the address above or telephone (202) 208-6400.

    Dated: May 31, 1994.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.

Improved Schedule for Remediation in the Defense Nuclear Facilities 
Complex

    The halt in production of nuclear weapons and materials to be used 
in nuclear weapons froze the manufacturing pipeline in a state that, 
for safety reasons, should not be allowed to persist unremediated. The 
Board has concluded from observations and discussions with others that 
imminent hazards could arise within two to three years unless certain 
problems are corrected.
    We are especially concerned about specific liquids and solids 
containing fissile materials and other radioactive substances in spent 
fuel storage pools, reactor basins, reprocessing canyons, processing 
lines, and various buildings once used for processing and weapons 
manufacture.
    It is not clear at this juncture how fissile materials produced for 
defense purposes will eventually be dealt with long term. What is clear 
is that the extant fissile materials and related materials require 
treatment on an accelerated basis to convert them to forms more 
suitable for safe interim storage.
    The Board is especially concerned about the following situations:
     Several large tanks in the F-Canyon at the Savannah River 
Site contain tens of thousands of gallons of solutions of plutonium and 
trans-plutonium isotopes. The trans-plutonium solutions remain from 
californium-252 products; they include highly radioactive isotopes of 
americium and curium. These tanks, their appendages, and vital support 
systems are old, subject to deterioration, prone to leakage, and are 
not seismically qualified. If an earthquake or other accident were to 
breach the tanks, F-Canyon would become so contaminated that cleanup 
would be practically impossible. Containment of the radioactive 
material under such circumstances would be highly uncertain.
     The K-East Basin at the Hanford Site contains hundreds of 
tons of deteriorating irradiated nuclear fuel from the N-Reactor. This 
fuel has been heavily corroded during its long period of storage under 
water, and the bottom of the basin is now covered by a thick deposit of 
sludge containing antinide compounds and fission products. The basin is 
near the Columbia River. It has leaked on several occasions, is likely 
to leak again, and has design and construction defects that make it 
seismically unsafe.
     The 603 Basin at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 
(INEL) contains deteriorating irradiated reactor fuel from a number of 
sources. This basin also contains sludge from corrosion of the reactor 
fuel. The seismic competence of the 603 Basin is not established.
     Processing canyons and reactor basins at the Savannah 
River Site contain large amounts of deteriorating irradiated reactor 
fuel stored under conditions similar to those at the 603 Basin at INEL.
     There are thousands of containers of plutonium-bearing 
liquids and solids at the Rocky Flats Plant, the Hanford Site, the 
Savannah River Site, and the Los Alamos National Laboratory. These 
materials were in the nuclear-weapons-manufacturing pipeline when 
manufacturing ended. Large quantities of plutonium solutions are stored 
in deteriorating tanks, piping, and plastic bottles. Thousands of 
containers at the Rocky Flats Plant hold miscellaneous plutonium-
bearing materials classed as ``residuals'', some of which are 
chemically unstable. Many of the containers of plutonium metal also 
contain plastic and, in some at the Rocky Flats Plant, the plastic is 
believed to be in intimate contact with the plutonium. It is well known 
that plutonium in contact with plastic can cause formation of hydrogen 
gas and pyrophoric plutonium compounds leading to a high probability of 
plutonium fires.
    We note that removal of fissile materials from the 603 Basin at 
INEL has begun. We are also following the plans for remedying several 
of the other situations listed. In general these plans are at an early 
stage. In addition, we are aware of steps DOE has taken to assess spent 
fuel inventories and vulnerabilities. We also note that a number of 
environmental assessments are being conducted in relation to the 
situations we have listed above. Finally, we note that a draft DOE 
Standard has been prepared for methods to be used in safe storage of 
plutonium metal and plutonium oxide.
    These actions notwithstanding, the Board is concerned about the 
slow pace of remediation. The Board believes that additional delays in 
stabilizing these materials will be accompanied by further 
deterioration of safety and unnecessary increased risks to workers and 
the public.
    Therefore the Board recommends:
    (1) That an integrated program plan be formulated on a high 
priority basis, to convert within two to three years the materials 
addressed in the specific recommendations below, to forms or conditions 
suitable for safe interim storage. This plan should recognize that 
remediation will require a systems engineering approach, involving 
integration of facilities and capabilities at a number of sites, and 
will require attention to limiting worker exposure and minimizing 
generation of additional waste and emission of effluents to the 
environment. The plan should include a provision that, within a 
reasonable period of time (such as eight years), all storage of 
plutonium metal and oxide should be in conformance with the draft DOE 
Standard on storage of plutonium now being made final.
    (2) That a research program be established to fill any gaps in the 
information base needed for choosing among the alternate processes to 
be used in safe conversion of various types of fissile materials to 
optimal forms for safe interim storage and the longer term disposition. 
Development this research program should be addressed in the program 
plan called for by (1) above.
    (3) That preparations be expedited to process the dissolved 
plutonium and trans-plutonium isotopes in tanks in the F-Canyon at the 
Savannah River Site into forms safer for interim storage. The Board 
considers this problem to be especially urgent.
    (4) That preparations be expedited to repackage the plutonium metal 
that is in contact with, or in proximity to, plastic and to eliminate 
the associated existing hazard in any other way that is feasible and 
reliable. Storage of plutonium materials generated through this 
remediation process should be such that containers need not be opened 
again for additional treatment for a reasonably long time.
    (5) That preparations be expedited to process the containers of 
possibly unstable residues at the Rocky Flats Plant and to convert 
constituent plutonium to a form suitable for safe interim storage.
    (6) That preparations be expedited to process the deteriorating 
irradiated reactor fuel stored in basins at the Savannah River Site 
into a form suitable for safe interim storage until an option for 
ultimate disposition is selected.
    (7) That the program be accelerated to place the deteriorating 
reactor fuel in the K-East Basin at the Hanford Site in a stable 
configuration for interim storage until an option for ultimate 
disposition is chosen. This program needs to be directed toward storage 
methods that will minimize further deterioration.
    (8) That those facilities that may be needed for future handling 
and treatment of the materials in question be maintained in a usable 
state. Candidate facilities include, among others, the F- and H-Canyon 
and the FB- and HB-Lines at the Savannah River Site, some plutonium-
handling glove box lines among those at the Rocky Flats Plant, the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, and the Hanford Site, and certain 
facilities necessary to support a uranium handling capability at the Y-
12 Plant at the Oak Ridge Site.
    (9) Expedited preparations to accomplish actions in items (3) 
through (7) above should take into account the need to meet the 
requirements for operational readiness in accordance with DOE Order 
5480.31.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.
[FR Doc. 94-13509 Filed 6-2-94; 8:45 am]
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