[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 84 (Tuesday, May 3, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-10569]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: May 3, 1994]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

 

Finding of No Significant Impact for the Urgent-Relief Acceptance 
of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel

AGENCY: United States Department of Energy (DOE).

ACTION: Finding of no significant impact.

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SUMMARY: In compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 
U.S.C. 4321 et seq., the Council on Environmental Quality's 
implementing regulations, 40 CFR parts 1500-1508, DOE's implementing 
procedures, 10 CFR part 1021, and Executive Order 12114, Environmental 
Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions, the DOE has prepared an 
Environmental Assessment (DOE/EA-0912, April 1994) to evaluate the 
potential environmental impacts of the proposed urgent-relief 
acceptance of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel.
    The Environmental Assessment analyzed the potential environmental 
impacts under the proposed action of accepting up to 409 spent nuclear 
fuel elements from eight reactors in Europe for storage in an existing 
DOE wet storage facility to meet the urgent needs of certain foreign 
research reactor operators and to avoid failure of a key United States 
nuclear weapons nonproliferation objective of minimizing and eventually 
eliminating the use of highly enriched uranium in civil programs 
worldwide. Specifically, the Environmental Assessment analyzed the 
potential impacts of transporting the spent nuclear fuel elements by 
commercial or chartered vessel from eight reactors in Europe to any one 
of five ports of entry in the United States (Wilmington, North 
Carolina; the Army Military Ocean Terminal at Sunny Point, North 
Carolina; Charleston, South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; and 
Jacksonville, Florida), off-loading the spent fuel at the port of entry 
and transporting it by truck or rail to the Savannah River Site, near 
Aiken, South Carolina; and storing the spent fuel there until decisions 
are made regarding interim storage and ultimate disposition. The 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act authorizes ultimate disposal of the spent fuel 
in a geologic repository.
    In October 1993, DOE provided a draft Environmental Assessment for 
comment to the States of Georgia and South Carolina, and the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, and interested individuals and organizations. 
In February 1994, DOE provided a revised draft Environmental Assessment 
to the States of Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, 
the Commonwealth of Virginia, and to individuals and groups known to 
have an interest in the proposed action, and requested that comments on 
the draft Environmental Assessment be submitted by March 7, 1994. On 
February 10, 1994, Federal, State and local government representatives, 
citizen groups, individuals and members of the international community 
attended a meeting in Washington, DC, to present their views concerning 
the proposed action. DOE also held public meetings in communities 
potentially affected by the proposed acceptance of foreign research 
reactor spent fuel. On March 18, 1994, the comment period on the draft 
Environmental Assessment was extended until April 8, 1994, to provide 
an additional opportunity for stakeholders to provide comments. The 
Environmental Assessment has been revised, where appropriate, to 
reflect comments received during the comment period.
    Based on an evaluation of the use of either commercial or chartered 
vessels, the proposed ports of entry and alternative modes of 
transporting the spent nuclear fuel (truck or train) from the port of 
entry to the Savannah River Site, DOE has concluded that no significant 
impact would result from receipt of the spent fuel at any of the five 
proposed ports and overland transport by rail or truck from the port of 
entry to the Savannah River Site. Therefore, based on the analysis in 
the Environmental Assessment and after careful consideration of all 
comments from Federal, State and local officials, members of the public 
and from the international community, DOE has determined that the 
acceptance of up to 409 spent nuclear fuel elements from eight foreign 
research reactors in Europe for storage at the Savannah River Site does 
not constitute a major Federal action significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment, within the meaning of the National 
Environmental Policy Act. Accordingly, an Environmental Impact 
Statement is not required and the DOE is issuing this Finding of No 
Significant Impact.
    However, upon further consideration, and in an effort to balance 
the domestic and international interests at stake, DOE has decided to 
implement the proposed action as follows. The spent fuel will be 
shipped either by commercial or chartered vessel from Europe to the 
Army's Military Ocean Terminal at Sunny Point, North Carolina to the 
maximum extent practicable (rather than allowing the shipper to select 
from among any one of the five proposed ports as described in the 
Environmental Assessment), and transported overland by rail (rather 
than truck). Should DOE determine that another port or mode of 
transport (from among those considered as the proposed action) is 
necessary, DOE will provide direct notice of the change to State and 
local government officials of the affected States and will notify the 
public through local media and other means, as appropriate.

ADDRESSES AND FURTHER INFORMATION: Persons requesting additional 
information regarding this action or desiring a copy of the 
Environmental Assessment should contact: Mr. David Huizenga, Office of 
Environmental Management, U.S. Department of Energy (Mail Stop EM-30), 
1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-9441. 
Copies of the Environmental Assessment are available for public review 
at the following DOE reading rooms and public libraries:

Aiken, South Carolina
    DOE Public Reading Room, Gregg-Graniteville Library, 171 University 
Parkway, Aiken, SC 29801, (803) 641-3465
Charleston, South Carolina
    Charleston County Public Library, 404 King Street, Charleston, SC 
29403, (803) 723-1645
Savannah, Georgia
    Chatham County Public Library, 2002 Bull Street, Savannah, GA 
31499-4301, (912) 234-5127
Jacksonville, Florida
    Haydon Burns Public Library, Attn: Technical Services Dept., 122 N. 
Ocean Street, Jacksonville, FL 32202, (904) 630-2665
Wilmington, North Carolina
    New Hanover County Public Library, Attn: Daniel Horn, 201 Chestnut 
Street, Wilmington, NC 28401, (910) 341-4390
Brunswick County, North Carolina
    Brunswick County Manager's Office, Attn: Joyce Johnson, P.O. Box 
249, 45 Courthouse Drive, Bolivia, NC 28422 (910) 253-4331
Washington, DC
    DOE Freedom of Information, Reading Room, Forrestal Building, Room 
1E-190, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-
6020

    For general information regarding DOE's National Environmental 
Policy Act process, please contact: Ms. Carol M. Borgstrom, Office of 
National Environmental Policy Act Oversight, U.S. Department of Energy 
(Mail Stop EH-25), 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585, 
(202) 586-4600 or (800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In the 1950's, as part of the ``Atoms for 
Peace'' program, the United States began providing assistance in the 
peaceful application of nuclear technologies to countries that agreed 
to forego the development of nuclear weapons. This assistance included 
the provision of highly enriched uranium for use in research reactors 
around the world. After irradiation in the reactor, the used (spent) 
fuel was transported to the United States, where it was reprocessed to 
extract the uranium still remaining in the spent fuel. In this way, the 
United States maintained control of the highly enriched uranium, which 
otherwise could be used to make nuclear weapons.
    To reduce the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation, the United 
States began a program in 1978 aimed at minimizing and eventually 
eliminating the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian reactor 
programs worldwide. This effort (the Reduced Enrichment for Research 
and Test Reactors Program) was directed at replacing the highly 
enriched uranium used in research reactors with low enriched uranium, a 
material that is not directly usable in nuclear weapons. Research 
reactors are of particular interest because the major civilian use of 
highly enriched uranium is as fuel in research reactors. If research 
reactors worldwide were to convert to low enriched uranium fuels, 
highly enriched uranium essentially would be eliminated from use in 
civil commerce.
    For research reactors converting to low enriched uranium fuel, 
acceptance of spent fuel by the United States was viewed as essential 
to offset the substantial expenses and reduction in reactor efficiency 
and capability resulting from conversion. The United States accepted 
highly enriched uranium spent fuel for several decades, until the 
program was allowed to expire in 1988.
    DOE decided in mid-1993 to prepare an Environmental Impact 
Statement on a new proposed policy to accept, over a 10-15 year period, 
up to 15,000 spent fuel elements containing uranium enriched in the 
United States. The goal of the proposed long-term policy would be to 
recover highly enriched uranium exported from the United States, while 
giving foreign research reactor operators sufficient time to develop 
their own long-term solutions for storage and disposal of spent fuel. 
Although the Environmental Impact Statement is under preparation, DOE 
does not expect to complete the analysis and make a decision on whether 
to implement the policy until mid to late 1995.
    Because DOE has not accepted any spent fuel containing uranium 
enriched in the United States for more than five years, several foreign 
research reactor operators are running out of storage capacity and 
facing safety and regulatory issues associated with the presence of 
spent fuel at their sites. If the United States is unable to commit now 
to the near-term acceptance of a small amount of foreign research 
reactor spent fuel, several reactor operators soon will either shut 
down their reactors or ship their spent fuel offsite for reprocessing. 
Neither option would serve the nonproliferation interests of the United 
States. Thus, at the urging of the Department of State, DOE is 
proposing to accept a small number of highly enriched uranium spent 
fuel elements in the near term for storage in an existing federal 
facility in South Carolina.
    DOE believes that preparation of the Environmental Assessment, 
which analyzes the potential environmental impacts of the proposed 
urgent-relief acceptance of a small number of spent fuel elements 
before the Environmental Impact Statement is completed, fully complies 
with the National Environmental Policy Act and its implementing 
regulations. The proposed near-term acceptance is justified 
independently of the decision on whether to establish a new policy on 
the proposed long-term acceptance of foreign research reactor spent 
fuel. Until the Environmental Impact Statement is completed and a 
decision made whether to implement the proposed long-term acceptance 
policy, the proposed acceptance of a small number of spent fuel 
elements is necessary to maintain the United States program of 
encouraging the conversion by research reactors to low enriched uranium 
fuel. Further, while there is an obvious relationship between the two 
proposals, a decision to accept such a small number of fuel elements 
does not foreclose or prejudice future decisions regarding 
establishment of a new spent fuel acceptance policy, or the decisions 
regarding interim storage or ultimate disposition of spent nuclear 
fuel. (In the Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Environmental 
Impact Statement, due to be completed by June 1995, DOE is considering 
where to manage all spent fuel within the DOE complex nationwide for 
the interim period prior to ultimate disposition.)
    In October 1993, to ensure that countries currently possessing 
spent fuel continue to support the nonproliferation initiatives of the 
United States embodied in the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test 
Reactor Program until the ongoing Environmental Impact Statement can be 
completed, DOE issued for comment a draft Environmental Assessment 
which evaluated the proposed urgent-relief acceptance of up to 700 
elements of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing 
uranium enriched in the United States. It was apparent from the 
comments that DOE received in response to the October 1993 draft that 
many people did not agree that there is a need for the United States to 
accept this spent fuel. Others expressed concerns regarding DOE's plans 
for implementing the proposed action. Subsequent to the release of the 
October 1993 draft Environmental Assessment and after consideration of 
comments received, teams of experts from the United States visited 
foreign research reactors in Europe and Australia to assess the near-
term need for acceptance of foreign research reactor spent fuel 
elements before the Environmental Impact Statement on the proposed 
long-term acceptance policy is completed.
    In February 1994, a revised draft Environmental Assessment, which 
included revisions made in response to comments received on the October 
1993 draft Environmental Assessment, was prepared and issued for public 
review and comment. The proposed action evaluated in the February draft 
Environmental Assessment was to accept 448 highly enriched uranium 
spent fuel elements shipped by sea to any one of seven ports (Newport 
News, Norfolk, or Portsmouth, Virginia; Charleston, South Carolina; 
Wilmington, North Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; and Jacksonville, 
Florida) and then by truck to DOE's Savannah River Site near Aiken, 
South Carolina, for storage. The comment period on the revised draft 
Environmental Assessment was scheduled to close on March 7, 1994. On 
February 10, 1994, DOE and the Department of State co-hosted a meeting 
of stakeholders from State and local governments, Congress, 
environmental and non-proliferation public interest groups, other 
private sector interest groups, foreign research reactor operators and 
key affected communities. The purpose of that meeting was to involve 
stakeholders in a meaningful and constructive dialogue on the proposed 
urgent-relief acceptance of a small number of spent fuel elements from 
foreign research reactors. Subsequent to that meeting and based on 
concerns raised by local communities potentially affected by the 
proposed action, DOE extended the comment period on the February draft 
Environmental Assessment until April 8, 1994.

Proposed Action

    The DOE proposes to accept up to 409 spent nuclear fuel elements 
containing highly enriched uranium of United States origin from eight 
research reactors in seven European countries (Austria, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland). The spent fuel 
would be shipped across the ocean in up to 15 spent fuel transportation 
casks from the country of origin to one or more United States eastern 
seaboard ports. The casks are expected to be transported in the next 
several months either by commercial container ships or chartered ships. 
Several casks could be transported together on a single ship to any one 
of the five proposed ports of entry: Wilmington and the United States 
Army's Military Ocean Terminal at Sunny Point, North Carolina; 
Charleston, South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; and Jacksonville, 
Florida.
    After arriving in the United States, the casks would be transported 
to DOE's Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina, where the fuel 
elements would be stored underwater in an existing storage facility 
(the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels).

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

    Routine Operation: During routine (non-accident condition) ocean 
transport, there would be no impact to the marine environment. 
Radiation exposure from the very small radiation fields being emitted 
from the casks--about 1 millirem per hour at 1 meter from the cask 
surface--would be limited primarily to crew members who inspect the 
cargo on a daily basis to ensure secure stowage and structural safety 
of the vessel. Incident-free dose estimates to these crew members would 
be essentially the same regardless of the port of entry, largely 
because the exposure is proportional to the numbers of inspections over 
time. Distances and time of transit are similar from the European ports 
to the proposed United States ports of entry. Assuming that the ship 
makes three intermediate port stops and then unloads at the fourth 
stop, the incident-free dose to a ship cargo inspector is estimated to 
be 4.3 millirem for shipments into Sunny Point and Wilmington, North 
Carolina; 4.5 millirem for shipments into Charleston, South Carolina; 
and 4.6 millirem for shipments into Jacksonville, Florida and Savannah, 
Georgia. The likelihood of a single fatal cancer among the entire crew 
of all the ships used in the proposed action is approximately one in 
450,000. If no intermediate port stops are assumed, the collective dose 
would be reduced by approximately 30 percent.
    Because container cargo handling is relatively uniform throughout 
the world, exposure to port workers (handlers/inspectors) also would be 
essentially the same regardless of the port of entry. Using a 
conservative assumption, i.e., the same handler/inspector inspects all 
shipments, the maximally exposed port worker would receive a dose of 
approximately 5.2 millirem. The collective exposure (assuming the same 
crew of handlers/inspectors for all shipments) to the handlers/
inspectors is estimated as 0.078 person-rem (0.0052 rem  x  15 
workers). The likelihood of a single individual port worker dying from 
cancer as a result of the proposed action is about 1 in 380,000. Dose 
to members of the general public during port operations would be 
extremely low because residences are separated from dock facilities by 
buffer spaces such as parking lots, warehouses and other port 
facilities.
    During truck transport of the spent fuel from the port of entry to 
the Savannah River Site, the maximally exposed individual truck crew 
member (assuming the same person is involved in all truck shipments) 
would receive 2.4 millirem for shipments from Charleston, South 
Carolina; 2.7 millirem for shipments from Savannah, Georgia; 4.1 
millirem for shipments from Wilmington, North Carolina; 4.5 millirem 
for shipments from Sunny Point, North Carolina; and 3.9 millirem for 
shipments from Jacksonville, Florida. The likelihood of a single crew 
member dying from cancer as a result of transporting spent fuel from 
Sunny Point to the Savannah River Site is about 1 in 440,000.
    The maximum exposure to an individual not actively involved in 
shipping the spent fuel during routine transport was estimated for two 
cases: (1) a member of the public who lives beside the highway route 
(this individual was assumed to be exposed to each of the 15 truck 
shipments at a distance of 30 meters); and (2) an individual located 
near a stopped truck, e.g., in a traffic jam. The maximum in-transit 
dose under the first instance was calculated to be 0.002 millirem for 
routine operations. A dose of 0.002 millirem would increase the risk of 
a latent cancer fatality by 1 in one billion. For the second case, an 
individual could receive doses higher than 0.002 millirem depending on 
the duration of the stop and the distance of the individual from the 
truck. For example, in the unlikely event that a person was standing 
outside a stopped truck for a period of 1/2 hour at a distance of two 
meters, the person could receive a dose of one millirem.
    Since port workers, inspectors, and truck drivers are not 
considered radiation workers, as defined by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC), the maximum annual allowable exposure for these 
personnel would be 100 millirem, the same radiation dose limit 
established by the NRC to protect the individual members of the general 
public. As discussed above, during normal transport of the spent 
nuclear fuel, the maximum annual exposure to the public, port workers, 
inspectors, and truck drivers would be well below the 100 millirem dose 
limit, and no doses large enough to result in acute health effects are 
predicted among either the workers or general public for the proposed 
action. The cumulative annual incident-free dose from the proposed 
activity to all persons potentially exposed would range between 0.12 
person-rem (Charleston and Savannah) and 0.16 person-rem (Sunny Point).
    Currently, the average annual individual worker dose at the 
Receiving Basin for Off-Site Fuels (RBOF) for all operations 
(unloading, handling and storage of the spent nuclear fuel elements) is 
approximately 150 millirem. Based on very conservative assumptions, 
i.e., all 409 spent fuel elements are received in a one-year period and 
the same individuals unload all 15 casks, the maximum annual increase 
in the average individual dose to a worker at RBOF is estimated to be 
60 millirem. This dose would be well below both the DOE limit of 5,000 
millirem per year for radiation workers and the DOE Administrative 
control level of 2,000 millirem per year per person, for all DOE 
activities. Once the spent fuel elements were stored under water in the 
RBOF, the increase in radiation exposure to facility personnel from the 
storage of the foreign spent fuel elements would not be detectable.
    Only minor environmental impacts would be expected from the 
proposed action because the receipt and storage of up to 409 spent fuel 
elements represents only a small increase to existing site activity and 
involves no new construction. Approximately 15 cubic feet of laundry 
type waste and 5.5 cubic feet of solid waste would be generated per 
cask. The proposed action would add less than 4 percent to the average 
annual solid waste normally generated at RBOF. Receipt and storage of 
foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel would have no effect on the 
types, quantities or utilization of hazardous compounds stored at RBOF, 
and no incremental risk to workers would be expected.
    Accident Conditions: The Environmental Assessment evaluates the 
potential for accidents during ocean transport (port departure, ocean 
crossing, and port arrival), overland transport, and storage at RBOF.
    In the extremely unlikely event of an accidental fire at sea in 
which a cask was sufficiently damaged by the fire to release its 
contents, members of the ship crew near the fire would be exposed to 
the released radioactive material. However, any crew member close 
enough to the fire to suffer a significant radiation dose likely would 
be more severely injured from the fire than the radiation dose. If crew 
members were to survive the fire, radiological impacts would be similar 
to those resulting from a severe accident in port, which would result 
in a maximum exposure to workers and the public of approximately 0.21 
person-rem. This exposure would result in an approximately one in 9,500 
chance of one additional cancer in the entire exposed population. If 
such an accident were to occur at sea, however, there would be 
essentially no exposure to members of the public, and all released 
activity would be deposited in the ocean. Assuming that the spent fuel 
cask lay on the ocean floor where it slowly released its radioactive 
inventory, the peak doses to biota residing on the ocean floor in or 
near the uppermost sediment layer are estimated to be 0.11 rad 
(radiation adsorbed dose) per year for fish, 0.17 rad per year for 
crustaceans and 7.3 rad per year for mollusks. The radioactive material 
would be expected to disperse and to be diluted due to the influence of 
ocean currents. Since deleterious effects of chronic irradiation have 
not been observed in natural populations at dose rates of less than 365 
rad, no significant impacts would be expected. Further, uranium, the 
major constituent of the spent fuel, has not been found to 
bioaccumulate in fish and bioaccumulates only slightly in crustaceans 
and mollusks. No significant chemical hazard would be expected from the 
release of the contents of the spent fuel elements into the open ocean.
    Spent fuel casks are designed to withstand at least a 15-meter 
immersion, and it has been demonstrated that the cask seals will remain 
intact at much greater depths. Further, damaged and undamaged casks can 
be recovered readily from water up to 200 meters deep. Recovery from 
depths of up to 2,000 meters may be possible, but would be costly.
    In an extreme situation, where the accident occurs in coastal 
wasters, the spent fuel is not recovered, and both the spent fuel and 
cask are damaged, the peak dose to an individual is estimated to be 11 
millirem per year. This individual is assumed to reside near the shore 
and to eat seafood (fish, mollusk, seaweed) harvested from the area in 
the immediate vicinity of the spent fuel cask.
    In the event of the most severe port accident (major mechanical 
damage, fire, oxidation of 100 percent of the fuel, and release of 
radioactive material from a cask containing 33 spent fuel elements), 
the dose to a maximally exposed individual, i.e., an individual assumed 
to be standing outside approximately 100 feet away from the event and 
remaining there for 24 hours, would be 25 rem. At such close distance, 
it is highly probable that the individuals, if not evacuated, would be 
harmed more by the explosion and fire engulfing the cask than by the 
radiation dose. If the individual were inside a building approximately 
100 feet away and remained there for 24 hours after the accident, the 
dose would be reduced to 0.22 rem. At a more likely distance, where an 
individual may be located outside for a period of 24 hours after the 
accident, the dose at 0.6 miles would be 0.21 rem. If the person were 
inside at the same distance, the dose would be 0.002 rem. When 
considered in conjunction with the unlikely probability of occurrence 
(approximately 1 chance in 7.7 million), the accident has an extremely 
small risk. For example, the risk of developing a single fatal cancer 
for the most severe case, i.e., individual outside, 100 feet away for 
24 hours receiving 25 rem, is about 1 chance in 600 million.
    In the event of an overland accident, assuming the surrounding 
population remains there for a 24-hour period, the estimated population 
dose risk is 0.0000015 person-rem for transport from Savannah, 
0.0000018 person-rem from Charleston, 0.0000028 person-rem from 
Wilmington, 0.0000024 person-rem from Jacksonville, and 0.0000035 
person-rem from Sunny Point. While there would be slightly different 
risks among the different ports, no significant impacts would result.
    Four hypothetical accidents at RBOF were evaluated that could 
potentially release radionuclides to the atmosphere. These accidents 
include: (1) A nuclear criticality incident; (2) a fire and explosion 
at RBOF; (3) accidental cutting of fuel element cores; and (4) rupture 
or failure of fuel elements during underwater storage. The maximum dose 
was attributed to the unlikely accident of 1000 foreign fuel elements 
rupturing during storage at RBOF. This event would result in an 8.3 
millirem maximum dose to the individual at the site boundary and a 70 
person-rem dose for the offsite population. The probability of such an 
accident occurring, however, would be less than one in 2000 years. When 
the probability is taken into account, there would be an additional 1 
in 500 million chance that the individual at the site boundary would 
develop a fatal cancer, and a 1 in 55,000 chance that a single fatal 
cancer would occur in the exposed populations.

Environmental Impacts of Alternatives

    Alternatives considered in the Environmental Assessment include no 
action, receipt of a greater or lesser number of spent fuel elements, 
alternate ports of entry, alternative modes of transport from the 
receiving port to the Savannah River Site, and reprocessing abroad and 
transport of low or highly enriched uranium to the United States.
    No Action: Under the No Action Alternative, there would be no 
environmental impact in the United States. However, United States 
nonproliferation policy would be adversely affected. Foreign reactor 
operators will try to avoid shutting down their reactors. The operators 
of two reactors can elect to reprocess their spent fuel at an existing 
facility in Scotland, although one of the two would need United States 
authorization to do so. Reprocessing would allow the uranium to be 
extracted for reuse, and thus would increase the threat of nuclear 
proliferation. Reactor operators in Belgium and Germany resorted to 
reprocessing on four occasions in 1993 and 1994.
    Six of the eight research reactors from which DOE proposes to 
accept spent fuel either do not have the option to reprocess their 
spent fuel or could not obtain regulatory authority to reprocess in 
time to avoid shutdown. Shutdown of these reactors would severely 
undermine the United States' credibility as a reliable partner in 
matters of nuclear cooperation. This, in turn, could influence other 
reactor operators to cease their conversion to low enriched fuel or to 
revert to the use of highly enriched fuel if they have already 
converted. In fact, several reactor operators have stated that, if the 
United States is unable to accept spent fuel, they will cancel or delay 
their reactor conversions to low enriched uranium fuel. Such actions 
would encourage development of a world market for highly enriched 
uranium, thereby undermining a key aspect of the United States 
nonproliferation program.
    Selection of the No Action Alternative would also adversely affect 
the upcoming 1995 international conference on the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The conference will consider the 
indefinite extension of the Treaty, which the United States strongly 
supports. Other Treaty parties will want assurance that the United 
States has fulfilled its obligations under the Treaty to share the 
benefits of peaceful nuclear cooperation. If several countries that are 
parties to the Treaty are compelled to shut down their research 
reactors, thereby foregoing the benefits from these reactors, the 
United States may be accused, fairly or unfairly, of not sharing the 
benefits of peaceful nuclear cooperation. Such an accusation, however 
ill-founded, could create or increase opposition to the indefinite 
extension of the Treaty, which is the foundation for the international 
nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime.
    Greater or Lesser Number of Spent Fuel Elements Accepted: In 
addition to the proposed action (shipment of up to 409 spent nuclear 
fuel elements), the environmental impacts of shipping alternative 
numbers of spent fuel elements (i.e., 953, 359, 291, and 248 spent fuel 
elements) were also considered in the Environmental Assessment. The 
risks for the 953-element alternative are slightly more than double the 
risks for shipping 409 elements through the proposed ports. Conversely, 
the risks of shipping 359, 291 and 248 elements are less than the risks 
for shipping 409 elements. While there are differences in the risks 
depending upon the number of elements shipped, the impacts associated 
with the shipment of any alternative number of elements are extremely 
small.
    Acceptance of up to 409 spent fuel elements would allow the foreign 
research reactors to ship full casks, and would not force the two 
reactors that can ship spent fuel to Scotland for reprocessing to do 
so. (Acceptance of 359 spent fuel elements, i.e., shipment in partially 
full casks, also would not force these two reactors to reprocess.) In 
proposing to accept full casks, DOE took note of the fact that there is 
no significant difference in the environmental impacts between shipping 
full and partially full casks. Further, shipping full casks is the 
customary shipping procedure, and more cost-effective. Accordingly, 
proposing to accept full casks appeared to be a prudent course to 
encourage the continued participation of foreign research reactors in 
the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors Program.
    Other Ports of Entry: The Environmental Assessment also evaluated 
the impacts of shipping 409 spent fuel elements through alternate 
commercial and military ports using two assumptions: (1) No 
intermediate port stops and eight casks per vessel; and (2) three 
intermediate port stops and one cask per vessel. Dose to handlers and 
port workers would be essentially the same from port to port. During 
ocean transport, dose to the ship's crew would be generally the same 
regardless of the port of entry. However, dose to the truck's crew 
showed some slight variation consistent with the distance of travel, 
i.e., slightly higher doses are associated with greater distances 
traveled. The dose to the ship's crew and the dose to the truck crew 
would be well below the 100 millirem limit for nonradiation workers.
    None of the alternate ports appeared as advantageous for the 
proposed receipt of spent fuel as the five proposed ports based on the 
application of screening criteria drawn from the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, and additional criteria 
recommended by a panel of maritime experts at a DOE-sponsored workshop 
on port selection criteria for shipments of spent fuel. While there are 
comparative advantages and disadvantages among the five proposed ports, 
all five of the proposed ports appear comparatively more advantageous 
than other United States seaports for the proposed action.
    Other Modes of Overland Transport: The spent nuclear fuel could be 
transported by rail from the port of entry to the Savannah River Site. 
The incident-free dose to spent fuel cask handlers would depend on how 
the casks were handled in port. If two casks are shipped per rail car, 
the handler would continue to receive a small dose from the first 
loaded cask as the second cask is loaded. Dose would also be influenced 
by the number of cargo transfers required. For example, if the spent 
fuel cask cannot be off-loaded directly from the ship to a rail car, 
spent fuel cask handlers would receive an additional small dose during 
the transport by truck to the rail car and from the transfer of the 
cask from the truck to the rail car. In addition, rail cargo is 
inspected after loading and prior to off-loading. As a result, 
transport by rail would result in a slightly higher dose to port 
handlers/inspectors and rail crew than transport by truck. Dose to the 
public, however, would be generally lower, partly because rail stops 
would normally occur in rail yards (removed from the general 
population). For example, rail transport from Sunny Point to the 
Savannah River Site would result in an annual dose of 0.16 person-rem 
total to port handlers/inspectors, other port workers and rail crew, 
and in a dose of 0.0017 person-rem to members of the public. Truck 
transport of the spent fuel from Sunny Point to the Savannah River Site 
would result in an annual dose of 0.08 person-rem to port handlers/
inspectors, other port workers and truck crew and a dose of 0.067 
person-rem to members of the public. Neither mode of transport would 
result in a significant health effect.
    Reprocessing Abroad and Transport of Low or Highly Enriched Uranium 
to the United States: The potential environmental impact of 
transporting low enriched uranium by ship to the United States after 
reprocessing the spent fuel abroad was analyzed in detail in two 
recently issued Environmental Assessments prepared by the United States 
Enrichment Corporation. Low enriched uranium was found to be a common 
commercial product that has been shipped safely around the world in 
large quantities by air, water, and land transport modes for over 30 
years without significant impact. Consequently, if the spent nuclear 
fuel elements were reprocessed in Europe (i.e., at Dounreay, Scotland), 
blended down to low enriched uranium, and the low enriched uranium was 
returned to the United States, no significant impacts would be 
expected.
    If the spent fuel were reprocessed in Scotland, but not blended 
down, then highly enriched uranium could be transported from Scotland 
to the United States for blending. The shipment of highly enriched 
uranium would require extensive security activities and would involve 
the use of military assets for protection and safety. The military has 
had considerable experience in shipment of highly enriched uranium and 
has safely transported such materials throughout the world without 
significant impact.
    These options, however, would not serve the nonproliferation 
interests of the United States. As discussed above and in greater 
detail in the Environmental Assessment, reprocessing would likely 
result in reactor operators postponing conversion from highly enriched 
uranium fuel, or reverting back to its use if conversion has already 
been completed. This is because the only current reprocessor of highly 
enriched uranium does not reprocess low enriched uranium fuel, and 
reactor operators have only limited capacity to store spent fuel 
generated as a result of operating. Thus, to continue operating, 
research reactors would have to continue to use highly enriched uranium 
fuels. In addition, for those reactors for which United States consent 
is not required for reprocessing to occur, there is no mechanism to 
implement or to enforce a blending requirement by the reactor operators 
or reprocessors. Consequently, reactor operators could elect to have 
their fuel reprocessed, but not blended. This would result in the 
continued use of highly enriched uranium fuel by research reactors, 
contrary to United States nonproliferation policy.
    Enhanced Storage in Europe: DOE considered but rejected as 
unreasonable the alternative of assisting foreign research reactors to 
expand spent fuel storage capacity at the reactor sites or at other 
sites in Europe. By the time new facilities could be constructed and 
licensed, or existing facilities modified, the reactors from which DOE 
proposes to accept spent fuel would have been forced to send their 
spent fuel to Scotland for reprocessing, where that is an option, or to 
shut down. For the reasons discussed above and in greater detail in the 
Environmental Assessment, forcing research reactors to shut down or 
reprocess would undermine the gains already realized in converting to 
low enriched uranium fuels under the Reduced Enrichment for Research 
and Test Reactors Program. The governments in the countries where these 
reactors are located have stated that acceptance of spent fuel has 
become a measure of the United States' reliability in worldwide nuclear 
cooperation. A perceived lack of reliability could complicate upcoming 
negotiations for renewal of important nonproliferation agreements.

Cumulative Impact

    In addition to the environmental impacts from the proposed action, 
the Environmental Assessment also considered the cumulative dose of 
transporting other shipments of spent fuel to the Savannah River Site 
and shipments of low-level radioactive materials to the Barnwell 
facility, east of the Savannah River Site. No significant cumulative 
effects were identified.

Determination

    Based on the analyses in the Environmental Assessment, and after 
careful consideration of comments received, DOE has determined that the 
acceptance of up to 409 spent nuclear fuel elements from eight foreign 
research reactors in Europe for storage at the Savannah River Site does 
not constitute a major Federal action significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment, within the meaning of the National 
Environmental Policy Act. Therefore, an Environmental Impact Statement 
is not required and DOE issues this Finding of No Significant Impact.
    Based on an evaluation of the five proposed ports of entry 
(Jacksonville, Florida; Savannah, Georgia; the Army Military Ocean 
Terminal at Sunny Point, and Wilmington, North Carolina; and 
Charleston, South Carolina) and alternative modes of transporting the 
spent nuclear fuel from the port of entry to the Savannah River Site 
(truck or train), DOE has concluded that no significant impact would 
result from any combination of proposed port and mode of transport from 
the port of entry to the Savannah River Site.
    However, upon further consideration, and in an effort to balance 
the domestic and international interests at stake, DOE has decided to 
implement the proposed action as follows. The spent nuclear fuel will 
be shipped by commercial or chartered vessel from Europe to the Army's 
Military Ocean Terminal at Sunny Point, North Carolina to the maximum 
extent practicable (rather than allowing the shipper to select from 
among any one of the five proposed ports as described in the 
Environmental Assessment) and transported overland by rail (rather than 
truck). Should DOE determine that another port or mode of transport 
(from among those considered as the proposed action) is necessary, DOE 
will provide direct notice of the change to State and local government 
officials of the affected states and will notify the public through 
local media and other means, as appropriate.

    Issued at Washington, DC, this 22nd day of April, 1994.
Tara O'Toole,
Assistant Secretary, Environment, Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 94-10569 Filed 5-2-94; 8:45 am]
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