[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 73 (Friday, April 15, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-9214]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: April 15, 1994]


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Part III

Department of Housing and Urban Development
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
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Department of Justice
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Department of the Treasury
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Office of Thrift Supervision

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Federal Reserve System
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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
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Federal Housing Finance Board
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Federal Trade Commission
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National Credit Union Administration
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Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending; Notice
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
[Docket No. N-94-3751; FR-3706-N-01]

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
[Docket No. 94-04]
Office of Thrift Supervision
[Docket No. 94-41]

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

[Docket No. R-0834]

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE BOARD

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION

 
Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending

AGENCIES: Department of Housing and Urban Development; Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight; Department of Justice; Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury; Office of Thrift 
Supervision, Treasury; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; Federal Housing Finance 
Board; Federal Trade Commission; National Credit Union Administration.

ACTION: Notice of approval and adoption of ``Policy Statement on 
Discrimination in Lending''; and Solicitation of Comments regarding its 
application.

SUMMARY: The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the 
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), the Department 
of Justice (DOJ), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System (Board); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC); Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB), the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), and the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) 
(collectively, ``the Agencies'') have adopted a statement entitled 
``Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending'' that describes the 
general principles that these Agencies will consider to identify 
lending discrimination in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
or the Fair Housing Act. The principles outlined are general in nature. 
Their application in specific situations will depend on the facts 
involved and is subject to continuing development. The Agencies welcome 
comments about application of the principles to specific policies and 
practices. The Agencies anticipate providing further clarification and 
elaboration on the application of the principles in the future.

DATES: Effective date: April 15, 1994.
    Comment due date: June 14, 1994.

ADDRESSES:
    HUD: Comments should be directed to the Rules Docket Clerk, Office 
of General Counsel, Room 10276, Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 451 Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC 20410. 
Communications should refer to the above title.
    OFHEO: Comments should be directed to: Communications and Public 
Affairs, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, 1700 G Street, 
Fourth Floor, NW., Washington, DC 20552.
    DOJ: Comments should be mailed to: U.S. Department of Justice, 
Housing and Civil Enforcement Section, P.O. Box 65998, Washington, DC 
20035-5998.
    OCC: Comments should be directed to: Communications Division, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 250 E Street SW., 
Washington, DC 20219, Attention Docket No. 94-04. Comments will be 
available for public inspection and photocopying at the same location.
    OTS: Send comments to: Director, Information Services Division, 
Public Affairs, Office of Thrift Supervision, 1700 G Street NW., 
Washington, DC 20552, Attention Docket No. 94-41. These submissions may 
be hand delivered to 1700 G Street NW., from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. on 
business days; they may be sent by facsimile transmission to FAX number 
(202) 906-7755. Comments will be available for inspection at 1700 G 
Street NW., from 1 p.m. until 4 p.m. on business days. Visitors will be 
escorted to and from the Public Reading Room at established intervals.
    BOARD: Comments should refer to Docket No. R-0834 and mailed to 
William W. Wiles, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, Washington, DC 20551. Comments addressed to Mr. Wiles may also 
be delivered to room B-2222 of the Eccles Building between 8:45 a.m. 
and 5:15 p.m. weekdays, or to the guard station in the Eccles Building 
courtyard entrance on 20th Street NW (between Constitution Avenue and C 
Street NW) at any time. Comments may be inspected in room MP-500 of the 
Martin Building between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. weekdays, except as provided 
in the Board's rules regarding the availability of information (12 CFR 
261.8).
    FDIC: Comments should be directed to: Robert E. Feldman, Acting 
Executive Secretary, FDIC, 550 17th Street NW., Washington, DC 20429. 
They may be hand delivered to room 402, 1776 F Street NW., Washington 
DC between 8:30 a.m. and 5:15 p.m. on business days. Comments may also 
be faxed to (202) 898-3838.
    FHFB: Comments should be directed to: Elaine L. Baker, Associate 
Director and Executive Secretary, Federal Housing Finance Board, 1777 F 
Street NW., Washington, DC 20006.
    FTC: Comments may be filed in person or mailed to: Secretary, 
Federal Trade Commission, 6th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue NW., 
Washington, DC 20580.
    NCUA: Comments should be directed to: Mr. Michael J. McKenna, Staff 
Attorney, Office of General Counsel, National Credit Union 
Administration, 1775 Duke Street, Alexandria, VA 22314-3428.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
    HUD: Peter Kaplan, Director, Office of Regulatory Initiatives and 
Federal Coordination, (202) 708-2904 (voice) or 1-800-877-TDDY (Federal 
Information Relay Service).
    OFHEO: Kevin G. Chavers, Chief of Staff, Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight, (202) 414-3800.
    DOJ: Alexander C. Ross, (202) 514-2303, or Richard J. Ritter, (202) 
514-4739, Housing and Civil Enforcement Division, or (202) 514-0383 
(TDD).
    OCC: R. Russell Bailey, Fair Lending Specialist, Compliance 
Management, (202) 874-4446; Margaret Hesse, Attorney, Bank Operations 
and Assets Division, (202) 874-4460.
    OTS: Timothy R. Burniston, Deputy Assistant Director for Policy, 
(202) 906-5629; David H. Enzel, Special Counsel, (202) 906-6844; or 
Vicki Hawkins-Jones, Senior Attorney, (202) 906-7034.
    BOARD: Glenn E. Loney, Associate Director, (202) 452-3585; or 
Michael S. Bylsma, Senior Attorney, (202) 452-3667; Division of 
Consumer and Community Affairs, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System.
    FDIC: Ken A. Quincy, Chief, Compliance and Special Review Section, 
Division of Supervision, (202) 898-6753; Bobbie Jean Norris, Deputy 
Director, Office of Consumer Affairs, (202) 898-6760; Ann Loikow, 
Counsel, (202) 898-3796.
    FHFB: Sylvia C. Martinez, Director, Housing Finance Directorate, 
(202) 408-2825 (voice) or (202) 408-2579 (TDD).
    FTC: Peggy L. Twohig, Assistant Director for Credit Practices, 
Bureau of Consumer Protection, (202) 326-3224.
    NCUA: Robert M. Fenner, General Counsel, or Michael J. McKenna, 
Staff Attorney, Office of General Counsel, (703) 518-6540.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The following Federal Agencies--HUD, OFHEO, 
DOJ, OCC, OTS, the Board, FDIC, FHFB, FTC, and the NCUA--sharing a 
concern that some prospective homebuyers and other borrowers may be 
experiencing discriminatory treatment in their efforts to obtain loans, 
formed an Interagency Task Force on Fair Lending to establish uniform 
policy against discriminatory lending.
    On March 8, 1994, the Interagency Task Force on Fair Lending met to 
approve or recommend approval to their respective Agencies of the 
``Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending,'' published in this 
notice, as a statement of the Agencies' general position on the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act and the Fair Housing Act for purposes of 
administrative enforcement of those statutes. The Policy Statement is 
intended to be consistent with those statutes and their implementing 
regulations and provide guidance to lenders seeking to comply with 
them. The Policy Statement does not create or confer any substantive or 
procedural rights on third parties which could be enforceable in any 
administrative or civil proceeding.
    The Agencies have all approved the Policy Statement and welcome 
comments from the public about application of the principles set forth 
in the Policy Statement to specific lending policies and practices. The 
Agencies anticipate providing further clarification and elaboration on 
the application of the fair lending principles, and these comments will 
be taken into consideration as they do so.
    Accordingly, the following policy statement is the Policy Statement 
on Discrimination in Lending adopted by the Interagency Task Force on 
Fair Lending.

Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending

    The Department of Housing and Urban Development (``HUD''), the 
Department of Justice (``DOJ''), the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (``OCC''), the Office of Thrift Supervision (``OTS''), the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the ``Board''), the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (``FDIC''), the Federal Housing 
Finance Board (``FHFB''), the Federal Trade Commission (``FTC''), the 
National Credit Union Administration (``NCUA''), and the Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (``OFHEO'') (collectively, ``the 
Agencies'') are concerned that some prospective home buyers and other 
borrowers may be experiencing discriminatory treatment in their efforts 
to obtain loans. The 1992 Federal Reserve Bank of Boston study on 
lending discrimination, Congressional hearings, and agency 
investigations have indicated that race is a factor in some lending 
decisions. Discrimination in lending on the basis of race or other 
prohibited factors is destructive, morally repugnant, and against the 
law. It prevents those who are discriminated against from enjoying the 
benefits of access to credit. The Agencies will not tolerate lending 
discrimination in any form. Further, fair lending is not inconsistent 
with safe and sound operations. Lenders must continue to ensure that 
their lending practices are consistent with safe and sound operating 
policies.
    This policy statement applies to all lenders, including mortgage 
brokers, issuers of credit cards, and any other person who extends 
credit of any type. The policy statement is being issued for several 
reasons, including:
     To provide guidance about what the agencies consider in 
determining if lending discrimination exists; and
     To provide a foundation for future interpretations and 
rulemakings by the Agencies.
    A number of federal statutes seek to promote fair lending. For 
example, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (``HMDA''), 12 U.S.C. 2801 et 
seq., seeks to prevent lending discrimination and redlining by 
requiring public disclosure of certain information about mortgage loan 
applications. The Community Reinvestment Act (``CRA''), 12 U.S.C. 2901 
et seq., seeks affirmatively to encourage institutions to help to meet 
the credit needs of the entire community served by each institution 
covered by the statute, and CRA ratings take into account lending 
discrimination by those institutions. The Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., prohibits discrimination against persons 
with disabilities in the provision of goods and services, including 
credit services. This policy statement, however, is based upon and 
addresses only the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (``ECOA''), 15 U.S.C. 
1691 et seq., and the Fair Housing Act (``FH Act''), 42 U.S.C. 3601 et 
seq , the two statutes that specifically prohibit discrimination in 
lending.
    This policy statement has been approved and adopted by the 
signatory Agencies listed above as a statement of the Agencies' general 
position on the ECOA and the FH Act for purposes of administrative 
enforcement of those statutes. It is intended to be consistent with 
those statutes and their implementing regulations and to provide 
guidance to lenders seeking to comply with them. It does not create or 
confer any substantive or procedural rights on third parties which 
could be enforceable in any administrative or civil proceeding.
    This policy statement will discuss what constitutes lending 
discrimination under these statutes and answer questions about how the 
Agencies will respond to lending discrimination and what steps lenders 
might take to prevent discriminatory lending practices.

A. Lending Discrimination Statutes and Regulations

    (1) The ECOA prohibits discrimination in any aspect of a credit 
transaction. The ECOA is not limited to consumer loans. It applies to 
any extension of credit, including extensions of credit to small 
businesses, corporations, partnerships, and trusts.
    The ECOA prohibits discrimination based on:
     Race or color;
     Religion;
     National origin;
     Sex;
     Marital status;
     Age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract);
     The applicant's receipt of income derived from any public 
assistance program; and
     The applicant's exercise, in good faith, of any right 
under the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
    The Federal Reserve Board's Regulation B, found at 12 CFR part 202, 
implements the ECOA. Regulation B describes lending acts and practices 
that are specifically prohibited, permitted, or required. Official 
interpretations of the regulation are found in Supplement I to 12 CFR 
part 202.
    (2) The FH Act prohibits discrimination in all aspects of 
residential real-estate related transactions, including, but not 
limited to:
     Making loans to buy, build, repair or improve a dwelling;
     Purchasing real estate loans;
     Selling, brokering or appraising residential real estate; 
and
     Selling or renting a dwelling.
    The FH Act prohibits discrimination based on:
     Race or color;
     National origin;
     Religion;
     Sex;
     Familial status (defined as children under the age of 18 
living with a parent or legal custodian, pregnant women, and people 
securing custody of children under 18); and
     Handicap.
    HUD's regulations implementing the FH Act are found at 24 CFR Part 
100.
    Because both the FH Act and the ECOA apply to mortgage lending, 
lenders may not discriminate in mortgage lending based on any of the 
prohibited factors in either list.
    Liability under these two statutes for discrimination on a 
prohibited basis is civil, not criminal. However, there is criminal 
liability under the FH Act for various forms of interference with 
efforts to enforce the FH Act, such as altering or withholding evidence 
or forcefully intimidating persons seeking to exercise their rights 
under the FH Act.
    What is prohibited. Under the ECOA, it is unlawful for a lender to 
discriminate on a prohibited basis in any aspect of a credit 
transaction and, under both the ECOA and the FH Act, it is unlawful for 
a lender to discriminate on a prohibited basis in a residential real 
estate related transaction. Under one or both of these laws, a lender 
may not, because of a prohibited factor:
     Fail to provide information or services or provide 
different information or services regarding any aspect of the lending 
process, including credit availability, application procedures, or 
lending standards;
     Discourage or selectively encourage applicants with 
respect to inquiries about or applications for credit;
     Refuse to extend credit or use different standards in 
determining whether to extend credit;
     Vary the terms of credit offered, including the amount, 
interest rate, duration, or type of loan;
     Use different standards to evaluate collateral;
     Treat a borrower differently in servicing a loan or 
invoking default remedies; or
     Use different standards for pooling or packaging a loan in 
the secondary market.
    A lender may not express, orally or in writing, a preference based 
on prohibited factors or indicate that it will treat applicants 
differently on a prohibited basis.
    A lender may not discriminate on a prohibited basis because of the 
characteristics of:
     A person associated with a credit applicant (for example, 
a co-applicant, spouse, business partner, or live-in aide); or
     The present or prospective occupants of the area where 
property to be financed is located.
    Finally, the FH Act requires lenders to make reasonable 
accommodations for a person with disabilities when such accommodations 
are necessary to afford the person an equal opportunity to apply for 
credit.

B. Types of Lending Discrimination

    The courts have recognized three methods of proof of lending 
discrimination under the ECOA and the FH Act:
     ``Overt evidence of discrimination,'' when a lender 
blatantly discriminates on a prohibited basis;
     Evidence of ``disparate treatment,'' when a lender treats 
applicants differently based on one of the prohibited factors; and
     Evidence of ``disparate impact,'' when a lender applies a 
practice uniformly to all applicants but the practice has a 
discriminatory effect on a prohibited basis and is not justified by 
business necessity.
    Overt Evidence of Discrimination. There is overt evidence of 
discrimination when a lender openly discriminates on a prohibited 
basis.

    Example: A lender offered a credit card with a limit of up to 
$750 for applicants aged 21-30 and $1500 for applicants over 30. 
This policy violated the ECOA's prohibition on discrimination based 
on age.

    There is overt evidence of discrimination even when a lender 
expresses--but does not act on--a discriminatory preference:

    Example: A lending officer told a customer, ``We do not like to 
make home mortgages to Native Americans, but the law says we cannot 
discriminate and we have to comply with the law.'' This statement 
violated the FH Act's prohibition on statements expressing a 
discriminatory preference.

    Evidence of Disparate Treatment. Disparate treatment occurs when a 
lender treats a credit applicant differently based on one of the 
prohibited bases. Disparate treatment ranges from overt discrimination 
to more subtle disparities in treatment. It does not require any 
showing that the treatment was motivated by prejudice or a conscious 
intention to discriminate against a person beyond the difference in 
treatment itself. It is considered by courts to be intentional 
discrimination because no credible, nondiscriminatory reason explains 
the difference in treatment on a prohibited basis.

    Example: Two minority loan applicants were told that it would 
take several hours and require the payment of an application fee to 
determine whether they would qualify for a home mortgage loan. In 
contrast, a loan officer took financial information immediately from 
nonminority applicants and determined whether they qualified in 
minutes, without a fee being paid. The lender's differential 
treatment violated both the ECOA and the FH Act.

    Redlining refers to the illegal practice of refusing to make 
residential loans or imposing more onerous terms on any loans made 
because of the predominant race, national origin, etc., of the 
residents of the neighborhood in which the property is located. 
Redlining violates both the FH Act and the ECOA.
    Disparate treatment may more likely occur in the treatment of 
applicants who are neither clearly well-qualified nor clearly 
unqualified. Discrimination may more readily affect applicants in this 
middle group for two reasons. First, because the applications are all 
``close cases,'' there is more room and need for lender discretion. 
Second, whether or not an applicant qualifies may depend on the level 
of assistance the lender provides the applicant in preparing an 
application. The lender may, for example, propose solutions to problems 
on an application, identify compensating factors, and provide 
encouragement to the applicant. Lenders are under no obligation to 
provide such assistance, but to the extent that they do, the assistance 
must be provided in a nondiscriminatory way.

    Example: A nonminority couple applied for an automobile loan. 
The lender found adverse information in the couple's credit report. 
The lender discussed the credit report with them and determined that 
the adverse information, a judgment against the couple, was 
incorrect since the judgment had been vacated. The nonminority 
couple was granted their loan. A minority couple applied for a 
similar loan with the same lender. Upon discovering adverse 
information in the minority couple's credit report, the lender 
denied the loan application on the basis of the adverse information 
without giving the couple an opportunity to discuss the report.

    Example: Two minority borrowers inquired with a lender about 
mortgage loans. They were given applications for fixed-rate loans 
only and were not offered assistance in completing the loan 
applications. They completed the applications on their own and 
ultimately failed to qualify. Two similarly situated nonminority 
borrowers made an identical inquiry about mortgage loans to the same 
lender. They were given information about both adjustable-rate and 
fixed-rate mortgages and were given assistance in preparing 
applications that the lender could accept.

    Both of these are examples of disparate treatment of similarly 
situated applicants, apparently based on a prohibited factor, in the 
amount of assistance and information the lender provided. The lender 
might also generally exercise its discretion to disfavor some 
individuals or favor others in a manner that results in a pattern or 
practice of disparate treatment that cannot be explained on grounds 
other than a prohibited basis.
    If a lender has apparently treated similar applicants differently 
on the basis of a prohibited factor, it must provide an explanation for 
the difference in treatment. If the lender is unable to provide a 
credible and legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation, the agency may 
infer that the lender discriminated.
    If an agency determines that a lender's explanation for treating 
some applicants differently is a pretext for discrimination, the agency 
may find that the lender discriminated, notwithstanding the lender's 
explanation.

    Example: A lender rejected a loan application made by a female 
applicant with flaws in her credit report but accepted applications 
by male applicants with similar flaws. The lender offered the 
explanation that the rejected application had been processed by a 
new loan officer who was unfamiliar with the bank's policy to work 
with applicants to correct credit report problems. However, an 
investigation revealed that the same loan officer who processed the 
rejected application had accepted applications from males with 
similar credit problems after working with them to provide 
satisfactory explanations.

    When a lender's treatment of two applicants is compared, even when 
there is an apparently valid explanation for a particular difference in 
treatment, further investigation may establish disparate treatment on a 
prohibited basis. For example, seemingly valid explanations for denying 
loans to minority applicants may have been applied consistently to 
minority applicants and inconsistently to nonminority applicants; or 
``offsetting'' or ``compensatory'' factors cited as the reason for 
approving nonminority applicants may involve information that the 
lender usually failed to consider for minority applicants but usually 
considered for nonminority applicants.
    A pattern or practice of disparate treatment on a prohibited basis 
may also be established through a valid statistical analysis of 
detailed loan file information, provided that the analysis controls for 
possible legitimate explanations for differences in treatment. Where a 
lender's underwriting decisions are the subject of a statistical 
analysis, detailed information must be collected from individual loan 
files about the applicants' qualifications for credit. Data reported by 
lenders under the HMDA do not, standing alone, provide sufficient 
information for such an analysis because they omit important variables, 
such as credit histories and debt ratios. HMDA data are useful, though, 
for identifying lenders whose practices may warrant investigation for 
compliance with fair lending laws. HMDA data may also be relevant, in 
conjunction with other evidence, to the determination whether a lender 
has discriminated.

Evidence of Disparate Impact

    When a lender applies a policy or practice equally to credit 
applicants, but the policy or practice has a disproportionate adverse 
impact on applicants from a group protected against discrimination, the 
policy or practice is described as having a ``disparate impact.'' 
Policies and practices that are neutral on their face and that are 
applied equally may still, on a prohibited basis, disproportionately 
and adversely affect a person's access to credit.
    Although the precise contours of the law on disparate impact as it 
applies to lending discrimination are under development, it has been 
clearly established that proof of lending discrimination using a 
disparate impact analysis encompasses several steps. The single fact 
that a policy or practice creates a disparity on a prohibited basis is 
not alone proof of a violation. Where the policy or practice is 
justified by ``business necessity'' and there is no less discriminatory 
alternative, a violation of the FH Act or the ECOA will not exist.
    The existence of a disparate impact may be established through 
review of how a particular practice, policy or standard operates with 
respect to those who are affected by it. The existence of disparate 
impact is not established by a mere assertion or general perception 
that a policy or practice disproportionately excludes or injures people 
on a prohibited basis. The existence of a disparate impact must be 
established by facts. Frequently this is done through a quantitative or 
statistical analysis. Sometimes the operation of the practice is 
reviewed by analyzing its effect on an applicant pool; sometimes it 
consists of an analysis of the practice's effect on possible 
applicants, or on the population in general. Not every member of the 
group must be adversely affected for the practice to have a disparate 
impact. Evidence of discriminatory intent is not necessary to establish 
that a policy or practice adopted or implemented by a lender that has a 
disparate impact is in violation of the FH Act or ECOA.
    Identifying the existence of a disparate impact is only the first 
step in proving lending discrimination under this method of proof. When 
an Agency finds that a lender's policy or practice has a disparate 
impact, the next step is to seek to determine whether the policy or 
practice is justified by ``business necessity.'' The justification must 
be manifest and may not be hypothetical or speculative. Factors that 
may be relevant to the justification could include cost and 
profitability.
    Even if a policy or practice that has a disparate impact on a 
prohibited basis can be justified by business necessity, it still may 
be found to be discriminatory if an alternative policy or practice 
could serve the same purpose with less discriminatory effect.

    Example: A lender's policy is not to extend loans for single 
family residences for less than $60,000.00. This policy has been in 
effect for ten years. This minimum loan amount policy is shown to 
disproportionately exclude potential minority applicants from 
consideration because of their income levels or the value of the 
houses in the areas in which they live. The lender will be required 
to justify the ``business necessity'' for the policy.
    Example: In the past, lenders primarily considered net income in 
making underwriting decisions. In recent years, the trend has been 
to consider gross income. A lender decided to switch its practices 
to consider gross income rather than net income. However, in 
calculating gross income, the lender did not distinguish between 
taxable and nontaxable income even though nontaxable income is of 
more value than the equivalent amount of taxable income. The 
lender's policy may have a disparate impact on individuals with 
disabilities and the elderly, both of whom are more likely than the 
general applicant pool to receive substantial nontaxable income. The 
lender's policy is likely to be proven discriminatory. First, the 
lender is unlikely to be able to show that the policy is compelled 
by business necessity. Second, even if the lender could show 
business necessity, the lender could achieve the same purpose with 
less discriminatory effect by ``grossing up'' nontaxable income 
(i.e., making it equivalent to gross taxable income by using 
formulas related to the applicant's tax bracket).

    Lenders will not have to justify every requirement and practice 
every time that they face a compliance examination. The Agencies 
recognize the relevance to credit decisions of factors related to the 
adequacy of the borrower's income to carry the loan, the likely 
continuation of that income, the adequacy of the collateral to secure 
the loan, the borrower's past performance in paying obligations, the 
availability of funds to close, and the existence of adequate reserves. 
While lenders should think critically about whether widespread, 
familiar requirements and practices have an unjustifiable disparate 
impact, they should look especially carefully at requirements that are 
more stringent than customary. Lenders should also stay informed of 
developments in underwriting and portfolio performance evaluation so 
that they are well positioned to consider all options by which their 
business objectives can be achieved.

C. Answers to Questions Often Asked by Financial Institutions and 
the Public

    Lending institutions and others often ask the Agencies questions 
about various aspects of lending discrimination. The Agencies have 
compiled this list of common questions, with answers, in order to 
provide further guidance.
    Q1: Are disparities in application, approval, or denial rates 
revealed by HMDA data sufficient to establish lending discrimination?
    A: HMDA data alone do not prove lending discrimination. The data do 
not contain enough information on major credit-related factors, such as 
employment and credit histories, to prove discrimination. Despite these 
limitations, the data can provide ``red flags'' that there may be 
problems at particular institutions. Therefore, regulatory and 
enforcement agencies may use HMDA data, along with other factors, to 
identify institutions whose lending practices warrant more scrutiny. 
Furthermore, HMDA data can be relevant, in conjunction with other data 
and information, to the determination whether a lender has 
discriminated.
    Q2: Does a lending institution that submits inaccurate HMDA data 
violate lending discrimination laws?
    A: An inaccurate HMDA data submission constitutes a violation of 
the HMDA, the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation C, and other 
applicable laws, and may subject the lending institution to an 
enforcement action, which could include civil money penalties, and, if 
the lender is a HUD-approved mortgagee, the sanctions of the HUD 
Mortgagee Review Board. An inaccurate HMDA data submission, however, is 
not in itself a violation of the ECOA or the FH Act. However, a person 
who intentionally submits incorrect or incomplete HMDA data in order to 
cover up a violation of the FH Act may be subject, under the FH Act and 
federal criminal statutes, to a fine or prison term or both. In 
addition, a failure to ensure accurate HMDA data may be considered as a 
relevant fact during a FH Act investigation or an examination of the 
institution's lending activities.
    Q3: Does a second review program only for loan applicants who are 
members of a protected class violate laws prohibiting discrimination in 
lending?
    A: Such programs are permissible if they do no more than ensure 
that lending standards are applied fairly and uniformly to all 
applicants. For example, it is permissible to review the proposed 
denial of applicants who are members of a protected class by comparing 
their applications to the approved applications of similarly qualified 
individuals who are not members of a protected class to determine if 
the applications were evaluated consistently. It is impermissible, 
however, to review the applications of members of a protected class in 
order to apply standards to those applications different from the 
standards used to evaluate other applications for the same credit 
program or to apply the same standards in a different manner, unless 
such actions are otherwise permitted by law, as described in Question 
4.
    Other types of second review programs are also permissible. For 
example, lenders could review the proposed denial of all applicants 
within a certain income range. Lenders also could review a sampling of 
all applications proposed for denial, or even review all such 
applications.
    Q4: May a lender apply different lending standards to applicants 
who are members of a protected class in order to increase lending to 
that sector of its community?
    A: Generally, a lender that applies different lending standards or 
offers different levels of assistance on a prohibited basis, regardless 
of its motivation, would be violating both the FH Act and the ECOA. 
There are exceptions to the general rule; thus, applying different 
lending standards or offering different levels of assistance to 
applicants who are members of a protected class is permissible in some 
circumstances. For example, the FH Act requires lenders to provide 
reasonable accommodation to people with disabilities. In addition, 
providing different treatment to applicants to address past 
discrimination would be permissible if done in response to a court 
order or otherwise in accord with applicable legal precedent. However, 
the law in this area is complex and developing. Before implementing 
programs of this sort, a lender should seek legal advice.
    Of course, affirmative advertising and marketing efforts that do 
not involve application of different lending standards are permissible 
under both the ECOA and the FH Act. For example, special outreach to a 
minority community would be permissible.
    Q5: Should a lender engage in self-testing?
    A: Principles of sound lending dictate that adequate policies and 
procedures be in place to ensure safe and sound lending practices and 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and that a lender 
adopt appropriate audit and control systems to determine whether the 
institution's policies and procedures are functioning adequately. This 
is as true in the area of fair lending as in other operations. Lenders 
should employ reliable measures for auditing fair lending compliance. A 
well-designed and implemented program of self-testing could be a 
valuable part of this process. Lenders should be aware, however, that 
data documenting lending discrimination discovered in a self-test 
generally will not be shielded from disclosure.
    Corrective actions should always be taken by any lender that 
discovers discrimination. Self-testing and corrective actions do not 
expunge or extinguish legal liability for the violations of law, 
insulate a lender from private suits, or eliminate the primary 
regulatory agency's obligation to make the referrals required by law. 
However, they will be considered as a substantial mitigating factor by 
the primary regulatory agencies when contemplating possible enforcement 
actions. In addition, HUD and DOJ will consider as a substantial 
mitigating factor an institution's self-identification and self-
correction when determining whether they will seek additional penalties 
or other relief under the FH Act and the ECOA. The Agencies strongly 
encourage self-testing and will consider further steps that might be 
taken to provide greater incentives for institutions to undertake self-
assessment and self-correction.
    Q6: What should a lender do if self-testing evidences lending 
discrimination?
    A: If a lender discovers discriminatory practices, it should make 
all reasonable efforts to determine the full extent of the 
discrimination and its cause, e.g., determine whether the practices 
were grounded in defective policies, poor implementation or control of 
those policies, or isolated to a particular area of the lender's 
operations. The lender should take all appropriate corrective actions 
to address the discrimination, including, but not limited to:
     Identifying customers whose applications may have been 
inappropriately processed, offering to extend credit if they were 
improperly denied; compensating them for any damages, both out-of-
pocket and compensatory; and notifying them of their legal rights;
     Correcting any institutional policies or procedures that 
may have contributed to the discrimination;
     Identifying, and then training and/or disciplining, the 
employees involved;
     Considering the need for community outreach programs and/
or changes in marketing strategy or loan products to better serve 
minority segments of the lender's market; and
     Improving audit and oversight systems in order to ensure 
there is no recurrence of the discrimination.
    An institution is not required to report to the Agencies a lending 
discrimination problem it has discovered. However, a lender that 
reports its discovery can ensure that the corrective actions it 
develops are appropriate and complete and thereby minimize the damages 
to which it will be subject.
    Q7: Will a lender be held responsible for discriminatory lending 
engaged in by a single loan officer where the lending institution has 
good policies and procedures in place, is otherwise in full compliance 
with all applicable laws and regulations and neither knows nor 
reasonably could have known that the officer was engaged in illegal 
discriminatory conduct?
    A: Fair lending violations can occur even in the most well-run 
lending institutions that have good policies in place to ensure 
compliance with fair lending laws and regulations. Of course, the 
chances that such violations will occur can be greatly reduced by 
backing up those policies with proper employee training and supervision 
and subjecting the lending process to proven systems of oversight and 
review. Self-testing can further reduce the likelihood that violations 
may occur. Notwithstanding these efforts, a single loan officer might 
still improperly apply policies or, worse yet, deliberately circumvent 
them and manage to conceal or disguise the true nature of his or her 
practices for a time. It may be particularly difficult to discover this 
type of behavior when it occurs in the pre-application process.
    In any case where discriminatory lending by a lending institution 
is identified, the lender will be expected to identify and fairly 
compensate victims of discriminatory conduct just as it would be 
expected to compensate a customer if an employee's conduct resulted in 
physical injury to the customer. In addition, such a violation might 
constitute a ``pattern or practice'' that must be referred to DOJ or a 
violation that must be referred to HUD.
    As in other cases of discriminatory behavior, where a lender takes 
self-initiated corrective actions, such actions will be considered as a 
substantial mitigating factor by the Agencies in determining the nature 
of any enforcement action and what penalties or other relief would be 
appropriate.
    Q8: If a federal financial institutions regulatory agency has 
``reason to believe'' that a lender has engaged in a pattern or 
practice of discrimination in violation of the ECOA, the ECOA requires 
the agency to refer the matter to DOJ. What constitutes a ``reason to 
believe''?
    A: A federal financial institutions regulatory agency has reason to 
believe that an ECOA violation has occurred when a reasonable person 
would conclude from an examination of all credible information 
available that discrimination has occurred. This determination requires 
weighing the available evidence and applicable law and determining 
whether an apparent violation has occurred. Information supporting a 
reason to believe finding may include loan files and other documents, 
credible observations by persons with direct knowledge, statistical 
analysis, and the financial institution's response to the preliminary 
examination findings.
    Reason to believe is more than an unfounded suspicion. While the 
evidence of discrimination need not be definitive and need not include 
evidence of overt discrimination, it should be developed to the point 
that a reasonable person would conclude that a violation exists.
    Q9: If a federal financial institutions regulatory agency has 
reason to believe that a lender has engaged in a ``pattern or 
practice'' of discrimination in violation of the ECOA, the agency will 
refer the matter to DOJ. What constitutes a ``pattern or practice'' of 
lending discrimination?
    A: Determinations by federal financial institutions regulatory 
agencies regarding a pattern or practice of lending discrimination must 
be based on an analysis of the facts in a given case. Isolated, 
unrelated or accidental occurrences will not constitute a pattern or 
practice. However, repeated, intentional, regular, usual, deliberate, 
or institutionalized practices will almost always constitute a pattern 
or practice. The totality of the circumstances must be considered when 
assessing whether a pattern or practice is present. Considerations 
include, but are not limited to:
     Whether the conduct appears to be grounded in a written or 
unwritten policy or established practice that is discriminatory in 
purpose or effect;
     Whether there is evidence of similar conduct by a 
financial institution toward more than one applicant. Note, however, 
that this is not a mathematical process, e.g., ``more than one'' does 
not necessarily constitute a pattern or practice;
     Whether the conduct has some common source or cause within 
the financial institution's control;
     The relationship of the instances of conduct to one 
another (e.g., whether they all occurred in the same area of the 
financial institution's operations); and
     The relationship of the number of instances of conduct to 
the financial institution's total lending activity. Note, however, 
that, depending on the circumstances, violations that involve only a 
small percentage of an institution's total lending activity could 
constitute a pattern or practice.
    Depending on the egregiousness of the facts and circumstances 
involved, singly or in combination, these factors could provide 
evidence of a pattern or practice.
    Q10: How does the employment of few minorities and individuals from 
other protected classes in lending positions--e.g., Account Executive, 
Underwriter, Loan Counselor, Loan Processor, Staff Appraiser, Assistant 
Branch Manager and Branch Manager--affect compliance with lending 
discrimination laws?
    A: The employment of few minorities and others in protected 
classes, in itself, is not a violation of the FH Act or the ECOA. 
However, employment of few members of protected classes in lending 
positions can contribute to a climate in which lending discrimination 
could occur by affecting the delivery of services.
    Therefore, lenders might consider the following steps, as 
appropriate to their institutions:
     Advertising lending job openings in local minority-
oriented publications;
     Notifying predominantly minority organizations of such 
openings;
     Seeking employment referrals from current minority 
employees, minority real estate boards and local historically minority 
colleges and other institutions that serve minority groups in the 
community; and
     Seeking qualified independent fee appraisers from local 
minority appraisal organizations.
    Similar outreach steps could be considered to recruit women, 
persons with disabilities, and other persons protected by the FH Act 
and the ECOA.
    Q11: What is the role of the guidelines of secondary market 
purchasers and private and governmental loan insurers in determining 
whether primary lenders practice lending discrimination?
    A: Many lenders make mortgage loans only when they can be sold on 
the secondary market, or they may place some loans in their own 
portfolios and sell others on the secondary market. The principal 
secondary market purchasers, Federal National Mortgage Association 
(``Fannie Mae'') and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (``Freddie 
Mac''), publish underwriting guidelines to inform primary lenders of 
the conditions under which they will buy loans. For example, ability to 
repay the loan is measured by suggested ratios of monthly housing 
expense to income (28%) and total obligations to income (36%). However, 
these guidelines allow considerable discretion on the part of the 
primary lender. In addition, the secondary market guidelines have in 
some cases been made more flexible, for example, with respect to 
factors such as stability of income (rather than stability of 
employment) and use of nontraditional ways of establishing good credit 
and ability to pay (e.g., use of past rent and utility payment 
records). Lenders should ensure that their loan processors and 
underwriters are aware of the provisions of the secondary market 
guidelines that provide various alternative and flexible means by which 
applicants may demonstrate their ability and willingness to repay their 
loans. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac not infrequently purchase mortgages 
exceeding the suggested ratios, and their guidelines contain detailed 
discussions of the compensating factors that can justify higher ratios 
(and which must be documented by the primary lender).
    A lender who rejects an application from an applicant who is a 
member of a protected class and who has ratios above those of the 
guidelines and approves an application from another applicant with 
similar ratios should be prepared to show that the reason for the 
rejection was based on factors that are applied consistently without 
regard to any of the prohibited factors.
    These same principles apply equally to the guidelines of private 
and governmental loan insurers.
    Q12: What criteria will be employed in taking enforcement actions 
or seeking remedial measures when lending discrimination is discovered?
    A: Enforcement sanctions and remedial measures for lending 
discrimination violations vary depending on whether such sanctions are 
sought by the appropriate federal financial institutions regulatory 
agencies, DOJ, HUD or other federal agencies charged with enforcing 
either the ECOA or the FH Act. The following discussion sets out the 
criteria typically employed by the federal banking agencies (i.e., OCC, 
OTS, the Board and FDIC), NCUA, DOJ, HUD, OFHEO, FHFB and FTC in 
determining the nature and severity of sanctions that may be used to 
address discriminatory lending practices. As discussed in Questions 8 
and 9, above, in certain situations, the primary regulatory agencies 
will also refer enforcement matters to HUD or DOJ.
    The federal banking agencies:
    The federal banking agencies are authorized to use the full range 
of their enforcement authority under 12 U.S.C. 1818 to address 
discriminatory lending practices. This includes the authority to seek:
     Enforcement actions that may require both prospective and 
retrospective relief; and
     Civil money penalties (``CMPs'') in varying amounts 
against the financial institution or any institution-affiliated party 
(``IAP'') within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. 1813(u), depending, among 
other things, on the nature of the violation and the degree of 
culpability.
    In addition to the above actions, the federal banking agencies may 
also take removal and prohibition actions against any IAP where the 
statutory requirements for such actions are met.
    The federal banking agencies will make determinations as to the 
appropriateness of any potential enforcement action after giving full 
consideration to a variety of factors. In making these determinations, 
the banking agencies will take into account:
     The number and duration of violations identified;
     The nature of the evidence of discrimination (i.e., overt 
discrimination, disparate treatment or disparate impact);
     Whether the discrimination was limited to a particular 
office or unit of the financial institution or was more pervasive in 
nature;
     The presence and effectiveness of any anti-discrimination 
policies;
     Any history of discriminatory conduct; and
     Any corrective measures implemented or proposed by the 
financial institution.
    The severity of the federal banking agencies' enforcement response 
will depend on the egregiousness of the financial institution's 
conduct. Voluntary identification and correction of violations 
disclosed through a self-testing program will be a substantial 
mitigating factor in considering whether to initiate an enforcement 
action.
    In addition, the federal banking agencies may consider whether an 
institution has provided victims of discrimination with all the relief 
available to them under applicable civil rights laws.
    The federal banking agencies may seek both prospective and 
retrospective relief for fair lending violations.
    Prospective relief may include requiring the financial institution 
to:
     Adopt corrective policies and procedures and correct any 
financial institution policies or procedures that may have contributed 
to the discrimination;
     Train financial institution employees involved;
     Establish community outreach programs and change marketing 
strategy or loan products to better serve all sectors of the financial 
institution's service area;
     Improve internal audit controls and oversight systems in 
order to ensure there is no recurrence of discrimination; or
     Monitor compliance and provide periodic reports to the 
primary federal regulator.
    Retrospective relief may include:
     Identifying customers who may have been subject to 
discrimination and offering to extend credit if the customers were 
improperly denied;
     Requiring the financial institution to make payments to 
injured parties:
     Restitution: This may include any out-of-pocket expenses 
incurred as a result of the violation to make the victim of 
discrimination whole, such as: fees or expenses in connection with the 
application; the difference between any greater fees or expenses of 
another loan granted elsewhere after denial by the discriminating 
lender; and, when loans were granted on disparate terms, appropriate 
modification of those terms and refunds of any greater amounts paid.
     Other Affirmative Action As Appropriate to Correct 
Conditions Resulting From Discrimination: The federal banking agencies 
also have the authority to require a financial institution to take 
affirmative action to correct or remedy any conditions resulting from 
any violation or practice. The banking agencies will determine whether 
such affirmative action is appropriate in a given case and, if such 
action is appropriate, the type of remedy to order.
     Requiring the financial institution to pay CMPs:
    The banking agencies have the authority to assess CMPs against 
financial institutions or individuals for violating fair lending laws 
or regulations. Each agency has the authority to assess CMPs of up to 
$5,000 per day for any violation of law, rule or regulation. Penalties 
of up to $25,000 per day are also permitted, but only if the violations 
represent a pattern of misconduct, cause more than minimal loss to the 
financial institution, or result in gain or benefit to the party 
involved. CMPs are paid to the U.S. Treasury and therefore do not 
compensate victims of discrimination.
National Credit Union Administration
    For federal credit unions, NCUA will employ criteria comparable to 
those of the federal banking agencies, pursuant to its authority under 
12 U.S.C. 1786.
The Department of Justice
    The Department of Justice is authorized to use the full range of 
its enforcement authority under the FH Act and the ECOA. DOJ has 
authority to commence pattern or practice investigations of possible 
lending discrimination on its own initiative or through referrals from 
the federal financial institutions regulatory agencies, and to file 
lawsuits in federal court where there is reasonable cause to believe 
that such violations have occurred. DOJ is also authorized under the FH 
Act to bring suit based on individual complaints filed with HUD where 
one of the parties to the complaint elects to have the case heard in 
federal court.
    The relief sought by DOJ in lending discrimination lawsuits may 
include:
     An injunction which may require both prospective and 
retrospective relief; and,
     In enforcement actions under the FH Act, CMPs not to 
exceed $50,000 per defendant for a first violation and $100,000 for any 
subsequent violation.
    Prospective injunctive relief may include:
     A permanent injunction to insure against a recurrence of 
the unlawful practices;
     Affirmative measures to correct past discriminatory 
policies, procedures, or practices, so long as consistent with safety 
and soundness, such as:
     Expansion of the lender's service areas to include 
previously excluded minority neighborhoods;
     Opening branches or other credit facilities in under-
served minority neighborhoods;
     Targeted sales calls on real estate agents and builders 
active in minority neighborhoods;
     Advertising through minority-oriented media;
     Self-testing;
     Employee training;
     Changes to commission structures which tend to discourage 
lending in minority and low-income neighborhoods; and
     Changes in loan processing and underwriting procedures 
(including second reviews of denied applications) to ensure equal 
treatment without regard to prohibited factors; and
     Record keeping and reporting requirements to monitor 
compliance with remedial obligations.
    Retrospective injunctive relief may include relief for victims of 
past discrimination, actual and punitive damages, and offers or 
adjustments of credit or other forms of loan commitments.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development
    The Department of Housing and Urban Development is fully authorized 
to investigate complaints alleging discrimination in lending in 
violation of the FH Act and has the authority to initiate complaints 
and investigations even when an individual complaint has not been 
received. HUD issues determinations on whether or not reasonable cause 
exists to believe that the FH Act has been violated. HUD also may 
authorize actions for temporary and preliminary injunctions to be 
brought by DOJ and has authority to issue enforceable subpoenas for 
information related to investigations.
    Following issuance of a determination of reasonable cause under the 
FH Act, HUD enforces the FH Act administratively unless one of the 
parties elects to have the case heard in federal court in a case 
brought by DOJ.
    Relief under the FH Act that may be awarded by an administrative 
law judge (``ALJ'') after a hearing, or by the Secretary on review of a 
decision by an ALJ, includes:
     Injunctive or other appropriate relief, including a 
variety of actions designed to correct discriminatory practices, such 
as changes in loan processes or procedures, modifications of loan 
service areas or branching actions, approval of previously denied loans 
to aggrieved persons, additional record-keeping and reporting on future 
activities or other affirmative relief;
     Actual damages suffered by persons who are aggrieved by 
any violation of the FH Act, including damages for mental distress and 
out-of-pocket losses attributable to a violation; and
     Civil penalties of up to $10,000 for each initial 
violation and up to $25,000 and $50,000 for successive violations 
within specific time frames.
    HUD also is authorized to direct Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 
undertake various remedial actions, including suspension, probation, 
reprimand, or settlement, against lenders found to have engaged in 
discriminatory lending practices in violation of the FH Act or the 
ECOA.
The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
    The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight is authorized to 
use its enforcement authority under 12 U.S.C. 4631 and 4636, including 
cease and desist orders and CMPs for violations by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac of the fair housing regulations promulgated by the 
Secretary of HUD pursuant to 12 U.S.C. Sec. 4545.
The Federal Housing Finance Board
    While the Federal Housing Finance Board does not have enforcement 
authority under the ECOA or the FH Act, in reviewing the members of the 
Federal Home Loan Bank System for community support, it may restrict 
access to long-term System advances to any member that, within two 
years prior to the due date of submission of a Community Support 
Statement, had a final administrative or judicial ruling against it 
based on violations of those statutes (or any similar state or local 
law prohibiting discrimination in lending). System members in this 
situation are asked to submit to the Finance Board an explanation of 
steps taken to remedy the violation or prevent a recurrence. See 12 
U.S.C. 1430(g); 12 CFR 936.3 (b)(5).
The Federal Trade Commission
    The Federal Trade Commission enforces the requirements of the ECOA 
and Regulation B for all lenders subject to the ECOA, except where 
enforcement is specifically committed to another agency. The FTC may 
exercise all of its functions and powers under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (``FTC Act'') to enforce the ECOA, and a violation of 
any requirement under the ECOA is deemed to be a violation of a 
requirement under the FTC Act. The FTC has the power to enforce 
Regulation B in the same manner as if a violation of Regulation B were 
a violation of an FTC trade regulation rule.
    This means that the FTC has the power to investigate lenders 
suspected of lending discrimination and to use compulsory process in 
doing so. The Commission, through DOJ or on its own behalf where the 
Justice Department declines to act, may file suit in federal court 
against suspected violators and seek relief including:
     Injunctions against the violative practice;
     Civil penalties of up to $10,000 for each violation; and
     Redress to affected consumers.
    In addition, the Commission routinely imposes recordkeeping and 
reporting requirements to monitor compliance.
    Q13: Will a financial institution be subjected to multiple actions 
by DOJ or HUD and its primary regulator if discriminatory practices are 
discovered?
    A: In all cases where referrals to other agencies are made, the 
appropriate federal financial institutions regulatory agency will 
engage in ongoing consultations with DOJ or HUD regarding coordination 
of each agency's actions. The Agencies will coordinate their 
enforcement actions and make every effort to eliminate unnecessarily 
duplicative actions. Where both a federal financial institutions 
regulatory agency and either DOJ or HUD are contemplating taking 
actions under their own respective authorities, the Agencies will seek 
to coordinate their actions to ensure that each agency's action is 
consistent and complementary. The financial institutions regulatory 
agencies also will discuss referrals on a case-by-case basis with DOJ 
or HUD to determine whether multiple actions are necessary and 
appropriate.

    Dated: April 6, 1994.
Henry G. Cisneros,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Aida Alvarez,
Director, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight.
Janet Reno,
Attorney General, Department of Justice.
Eugene A. Ludwig,
Comptroller of the Currency.
Jonathan L. Fiechter
Acting Director, Office of Thrift Supervision.
Alan Greenspan,
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Andrew C. Hove, Jr.,
Acting Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Nicolas P. Retsinas,
HUD--Secretary, Designee to the Board, Federal Housing Finance Board.
Donald S. Clark,
Secretary, Federal Trade Commission.
Norman E. D'Amours,
Chairman, National Credit Union Administration.
Norman E. D'Amours,
Chairman, National Credit Union Administration.
Norman E. D'Amours,
Chairman, National Credit Union Administration.
[FR Doc. 94-9214 Filed 4-14-93; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODES 4210-32-P; 4210-01-P; 15-01-0004-P; 4810-33-P; 6720-01-P; 
6210-01-P; 6714-01-P; 6725-01-P; 6750-01-P; and 753-501-P