[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 51 (Wednesday, March 16, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-6075]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: March 16, 1994]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-333]

 

Power Authority of the State of New York; James A. Fitzpatrick 
Nuclear Power Plant; Environmental Assessment and Finding of No 
Significant Impact

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an exemption from certain requirements of 10 
CFR part 50, appendix J, to the Power Authority of the State of New 
York (the licensee) for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, 
located at the licensee's site in Oswego County, New York.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of Proposed Action

    By letter dated January 11, 1994, the licensee requested a 
schedular exemption pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a) from the requirements 
of 10 CFR part 50, appendix J, section III.D.3. Specifically, the 
licensee requested one-time relief from the requirement to perform Type 
C tests (local leak-rate tests (LLRT)) at intervals of no greater than 
2 years for the shutdown cooling isolation valves (10MOV-17 and 10MOV-
18). This one-time only delay, until the next refueling outage 
currently scheduled to begin in November 1994, was requested for the 
performance of these leakage tests. The licensee's request was 
necessitated by the extended 1991-1993 refueling outage and the length 
of the current operating cycle.

The Need for the Proposed Action

    The schedular exemption is required to permit the licensee to 
operate the plant until the next refueling outage (Reload 11/Cycle 12), 
currently scheduled to begin in November 1994.
    The shutdown cooling valves were previously tested during the last 
refueling outage (Reload 10/Cycle 11). This was an extended outage that 
began in November 1991 and ended in January 1993. The Type C tests on 
the subject valves were performed on May 30, 1992, for the outboard 
isolation valve (10MOV-17), and June 5, 1992, for the inboard isolation 
valve (10MOV-18). Subsequent delays in the outage resulted in these 
tests being performed significantly in advance of the start of the 
operating cycle (more than 7 months prior to the end of the outage). As 
a result, the 2 year test interval will be reached for these valves 
(May 30, 1994/June 5, 1994) 6 to 7 months prior to the next scheduled 
refueling outage. The exemption would permit a deferral in the 
performance of Type C testing of the shutdown cooling isolation valves 
beyond the 2-year limiting interval until the next refueling outage.
    The most effective means of removing reactor core decay heat is 
with the shutdown cooling mode of the residual heat removal (RHR) 
system. This requires both of the stated isolation valves to be in the 
open position. The shutdown cooling mode of the RHR system must be 
removed from service for approximately 24 hours to perform an LLRT 
(Type C) of its isolation valves. This is the time required to tag-out 
the system, drain the line, perform the test, refill the line, and 
return the system to service. To avoid overheating the reactor coolant 
system with the shutdown cooling mode inoperable, one of the following 
two conditions must exist:
    1. The reactor needs to be shutdown for several months to permit 
sufficient reduction in decay heat levels for use of an alternate 
shutdown cooling method. The alternate cooling method with the highest 
heat removal capacity is the Reactor Water Cleanup system in the 
blowdown mode. However, the reactor must be shutdown for more than 3 
months before this method can handle the decay heat load.
    2. The plant needs to be in the refueling condition; i.e., reactor 
head removed, reactor cavity flooded up and connected to the spent fuel 
pool. This permits the removal of the normal shutdown cooling system 
from operation and testing of these valves.
    A 3-week surveillance/maintenance outage is planned for spring 
1994. However, the decay heat levels present during any outage less 
than several months precludes the use of the alternate cooling method 
without placing the plant in the refueling configuration. The exemption 
would preclude the need to place the plant in the refueling 
configuration prior to the next scheduled refueling outage. Without the 
exemption, the licensee would be required to remove the drywell and 
reactor heads and connect the reactor cavity to the spent fuel pool 
solely for the purpose of testing the shutdown cooling isolation 
valves. Placing the plant in the refueling configuration would 
significantly lengthen the spring 1994 outage and would require 
significant resources. Furthermore, placing the plant in the refueling 
configuration to accommodate testing of the isolation valves would 
increase occupational radiation exposures. For these reasons, the 
licensee has determined that compliance with the regulation would 
result in undue hardship and costs.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

    The proposed schedular exemption would allow the licensee to 
continue to operate the plant from May 30, 1994, until the next 
refueling outage which is scheduled for November 1994. During that 
refueling outage, the Type C test on shutdown cooling system valves 
10MOV-17 and 10MOV-18 would be performed in accordance with the 
requirements of 10 CFR part 50, appendix J. The remaining Type B 
penetrations and Type C tested valves have been or will be leak rate 
tested such that they will not exceed the 24-month frequency prior to 
the November 1994 refueling outage.
    The operating configuration of the shutdown cooling isolation 
valves and the RHR system when the reactor coolant system is 
pressurized (greater than 75 psig) substantially minimizes the 
possibility of gross leakage through these valves. A high reactor 
pressure interlock, as well as plant operating procedures, assures that 
these isolation valves are closed whenever reactor pressure is above 75 
psig. This protects the low pressure RHR system from 
overpressurization. The RHR system suction piping is designed for 450 
psig. Gross leakage while the reactor is pressurized would be detected 
by high pressure on the RHR suction piping or an increase in 
suppression pool inventory. Consequently, the maintenance of normal 
operating status of the RHR system assures the absence of gross leakage 
through these valves.
    These valves also receive an isolation signal in the event of a 
plant accident (reactor vessel low water level or high drywell 
pressure). This assures isolation of a potential leakage path from the 
reactor coolant system to the reactor building. For this path to exist, 
leakage through both isolation valves, and a breach of the RHR system 
piping would need to occur simultaneously. Since the isolation valves 
are maintained closed with the reactor pressurized, it is improbable 
the leakage through the valves will increase while the plant is 
operating. The redundant isolation valves provide two leakage barriers 
which limit the pathway leakage rate to that experienced by the valve 
with smallest leakage rate. For these reasons, the potential for 
significant leakage to the reactor building by way of the shutdown 
cooling line is minimal.
    The penetration included in the licensee's schedular exemption 
request represents only 6.4 percent of the total ``as left'' leakage at 
the beginning of the current operating cycle. The total ``as left'' 
minimum path leakage for all penetrations was only 0.073 La and the 
total ``as left'' minimum path leakage for the penetration addressed in 
the proposed exemption was only 0.0046 La. The replacement of both 
isolation valves with valves of improved design provides added 
confidence that excessive leakage will not be experienced. The inboard 
valve 10MOV-18 was replaced during the 1985 refueling outage and has 
successfully passed three out of four Type C tests performed during 
refueling outages since its replacement. The outboard isolation valve 
10MOV-17 was replaced with a similarly designed new valve during the 
last refueling outage (1992). The limited number of valve strokes these 
valves are subject to over any one operating cycle minimizes valve 
degradation due to wear. This provides reasonable assurance that the 
requested surveillance interval expansion will not result in the Type B 
and C leakage rate total exceeding the 0.6 La limit of 10 CFR part 50, 
appendix J. Therefore, the Commission concludes that there are no 
significant radiological environmental impacts associated with the 
proposed schedular exemption.
    With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed 
schedular exemption only involves LLRT on containment isolation valves. 
The exemption does not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has 
no other environmental impact. Therefore, the Commission concludes that 
there are no significant nonradiological impacts associated with the 
proposed schedular exemption.

Altenatives to the Proposed Action

    Since the Commission has concluded that there are no significant 
environmental effects that would result from the proposed schedular 
exemption, any alternatives with equal or greater environmental impacts 
need not be evaluated. The principal alternative would be to deny the 
licensee's request. Such action would not reduce environmental impacts 
of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant and would result in 
undue hardship on the licensee possibly including an unwarranted 
shutdown of the plant.

Alternative Use of Resources

    The actions associated with the granting of the proposed schedular 
exemption as detailed above do not involve the use of resources not 
previously considered in connection with the ``Final Environmental 
Statement for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant,'' dated 
March 1973.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

    The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's submittal that supports the 
proposed schedular exemption discussed above. The NRC staff contacted 
the State of New York Energy Office regarding the environmental impact 
of this proposed action.

Finding of No Significant Impact

    The Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental 
impact statement for the proposed schedular exemption.
    Based upon the foregoing environmental assessment, the Commission 
concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect 
on the quality of the human environment.
    For further details with respect to this action, see the licensee's 
application for the schedular exemption dated January 11, 1994. This 
document is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public 
Document Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 
20555, and at the local public document room located at the Penfield 
Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New York 13126.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 9th day of March 1994.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Robert A. Capra,
Director, Project Directorate I-1, Division of Reactor Projects--I/II, 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 94-6075 Filed 3-15-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M