[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 49 (Monday, March 14, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-5826]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: March 14, 1994]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-286]

 

Power Authority of the State of New York; Environmental 
Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 
part 50, Appendix R, ``Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power 
Facilities Operating Prior To January 1, 1979,'' section III.G.2, to 
the Power Authority of the State of New York the (licensee) for the 
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3), located at the 
licensee's site in Westchester County, New York.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of Proposed Action

    Section III.G.2 of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, specifies measures 
to be taken to ensure that one train of redundant equipment necessary 
to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions remains free of fire 
damage.
    During a programmatic review of IP3's Fire Protection Program and 
Appendix R compliance strategy, the licensee identified that safe 
shutdown instrument sensing lines inside containment do not meet the 
separation requirements of section III.G.2 of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix 
R. Specifically, in some areas the wide-range steam generator (SG) 
water level and pressurizer level sensing lines are not separated by a 
horizontal distance of 20 feet, nor are they separated by a radiant 
energy shield. In addition, fire detection and suppression in the area 
is limited. The licensee has, therefore, requested exemption from the 
requirements of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, section III.G.2, for the 
wide-range SG water level and pressurizer level sensing lines within 
the IP3 containment structure.

Need for the Proposed Action

    The proposed exemption is needed to permit the licensee to operate 
the plant without being in violation of the Commission's regulations 
and to obviate the need for extensive modifications. Physical 
modification of the plant to achieve literal compliance with 10 CFR 
part 50, Appendix R, section III.G.2, would require many design 
changes, for example: rerouting portions of the sensing lines, 
installing additional barriers, and the installation of additional fire 
suppression and detection. Given the location of the sensing lines, the 
implementation of these changes would entail extensive scaffolding, as 
well as engineering and financial resources. In addition, since these 
modifications were not anticipated in the current outage scope, the 
detailed development and implementation of such design changes could 
significantly delay restart from the current outage, resulting in lost 
revenue.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

    Section III.G.2 of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, requires that where 
redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot 
shutdown conditions are located within the same fire area inside 
containment, fire protection must be provided by separation of cables 
and equipment by a horizontal distance of 20 feet, noncombustible 
radiant energy shields, or by installation of fire detectors and an 
automatic fire suppression system in the fire area. The licensee has 
determined that certain sections of the wide-range SG water level and 
pressurizer level sensing lines within containment do not meet these 
requirements. Therefore, the licensee has requested an exemption from 
the requirement of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, section III.G.2, for 
these sensing lines within the containment.
    The likely result of a fire affecting the sensing lines would be 
erroneous signals. The erroneous signals would not initiate until the 
fluid inside the lines is heated by the fire and would terminate after 
the fire was extinguished. The lines themselves would not experience 
fire damage.
    The capability to safely shutdown the unit would not be jeopardized 
in the event that a fire results in erroneous wide-range SG water level 
or pressurizer level indications. Specifically, a fire inside 
containment would not necessitate control room evacuation (i.e., 
alternate shutdown), so operations personnel would have access to 
numerous and diverse plant status indications. In addition, plant 
operating procedures advise personnel that a fire may cause anomalous 
equipment behavior. Erroneous wide-range SG water level or pressurizer 
level indications resulting from a fire would be of short duration due 
to low combustion loadings inside containment. The fixed combustible 
loading in containment is very small and the locations of the redundant 
sensing lines are remote from fixed combustibles. The largest fixed 
combustible load, reactor coolant pump oil, is contained in a 
collection system in accordance with 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, 
section III.O, and automatic smoke detectors are installed above each 
reactor coolant pump. Personnel access to the containment is restricted 
during power operation. As such, the potential for transient 
combustible materials to accumulate in the containment is very low. The 
containment is inspected by operations personnel prior to plant 
startup.
    Based on the considerations discussed above, the Commission 
concludes that granting the proposed exemption will not increase the 
probability of an accident and will not result in any post-accident 
radiological releases significantly in excess of those previously 
determined for IP3. The proposed exemption would not otherwise affect 
radiological plant effluents, nor result in any significant 
occupational exposure. In addition, the exemption does not affect 
nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact.
    Therefore, the Commission concludes that there are no significant 
radiological or nonradiological environmental impacts associated with 
the proposed exemption.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

    As an alternative to the proposed action, the Commission considered 
denial of the proposed action. Denial of the application would result 
in no change in current environmental impacts. The environmental 
impacts of the proposed action and the alternative action are similar. 
The alternative would also result in unwarranted expenditures of 
engineering and financial resources, and could significantly delay 
restart from the current outage.

Alternate Use of Resources

    This action does not involve the use of any resources not 
previously considered in the ``Final Environmental Statement for the 
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station Unit No. 3,'' dated February 
1975.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

    The Commission consulted with the State of New York regarding the 
environmental impact of the proposed action.

Finding of No Significant Impact

    The Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental 
impact statement for the proposed license amendment.
    Based upon the foregoing environmental assessment, the Commission 
concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect 
on the quality of the human environment.
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for exemption dated November 30, 1993. This document is 
available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document 
Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street NW., Washington, DC 20555, and 
at the White Plains Public Library, 100 Martine Avenue, White Plains, 
New York.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of March 1994.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Robert A. Capra,
Director, Project Directorate I-1, Division of Reactor Projects I/II, 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 94-5826 Filed 3-11-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M