[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 43 (Friday, March 4, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-5026]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: March 4, 1994]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311]

 

Public Service Electric and Gas Co.; Consideration of Issuance of 
Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. 
DPR-70 and DPR-75 issued to the Public Service Electric and Gas Company 
(the licensee) for operation of the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, 
Units 1 and 2, located in Salem County, New Jersey.
    The proposed amendment would increase the storage capacity of the 
spent fuel pool (SFP) from its current 1170 storage cells to 1632 
storage cells. This would be accomplished by replacing 9 out of twelve 
of the existing high density fuel racks with 9 maximum density rack 
modules constructed of stainless steel and a neutron absorber material 
(boron carbide and aluminum-composite sandwich, product name 
``boral''). The proposed change would extend the date when full core 
discharge capacity is no longer available for Salem 1 from 1998 to 
2008, and for Salem 2 from 2002 to 2012.
    In addition, the proposed amendment would extend the decay time for 
refueling operations from 100 hours to 168 hours.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below:

    1. Do not involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    [Public Service Electric and Gas Company] PSE&G has evaluated 
the following postulated accident scenarios:
    1. A spent fuel assembly drop in the SFP.
    2. Loss of SFP cooling.
    3. A seismic event.
    4. An installation accident during reracking.
    The Salem SFP has been analyzed considering fuel handling 
equipment, operating procedures, SFP cooling system, and seismic 
events. Reracking involves replacing 9 out of the 12 existing high 
density racks with 9 new maximum density racks. It does not require 
any system modifications or modifications to the cask handling 
crane, which by its physical location and design is prevented from 
moving over the SFP. Results confirm that the proposed modification 
does not increase the probability of the first three postulated 
accident scenarios.
    NUREG-0612, ``Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants,'' 
sections 5.1.1, 5.1.2, and 5.1.6, provide guidance for heavy load 
handling operations during spent fuel storage rack replacement. 
Section 5.1.2 lists (4) alternatives for assuring safe heavy load 
handling during a fuel storage rack replacement. Alternative (1) 
satisfies the control of heavy loads guidelines through the 
implementation of defense-in-depth measures. These measures ensure 
that the potential for a heavy load drop is extremely small. PSE&G 
intends to utilize the defense-in-depth concept during reracking 
activities.
    NUREG-0554, ``Single Failure Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power 
Plants,'' provides guidance for the design, fabrication, 
installation, and testing of highly reliable new cranes. NUREG-0612, 
Appendix C, ``Modification of Existing Cranes,'' provides guidance 
for the implementation of NUREG-0554 at operating plants. We have 
evaluated anticipated fuel handling crane movements for compliance 
with the guidelines specified in alternative (1) of Appendix C, and 
determined that alternative (1) was satisfied based on the extremely 
small probability of a storage rack drop. The maximum weight of any 
storage rack and its associated handling tool is 17 tons. The fuel 
handling crane will be upgraded to a 20 ton lifting capacity and a 
design safety factor, with respect to ultimate strength, of five 
times the lifting capacity (i.e., 100 tons). The uprated fuel 
handling crane has ample safety factor margin for storage rack 
movement. This applies to non-redundant load-bearing components. 
Special redundant lifting devices, which have a rated capacity 
sufficient to maintain safety factors, will be utilized for storage 
rack movements. Per NUREG-0612, Appendix B, the substantial safety 
factor margin ensures that the probability of a load drop is 
extremely low. Additionally, a load drop analysis was performed to 
ensure the integrity of the pool structure. The analysis results 
were acceptable.
    Based on the actions discussed above, the proposed modification 
does not increase the probability of an installation accident.
    PSE&G evaluated the consequences of a spent fuel assembly drop 
in the SFP and determined that the criticality acceptance criterion, 
Keff less than or equal to 0.95, was not exceeded. The radiological 
consequences of a fuel assembly drop did not change significantly 
from those previously analyzed. The calculated doses are well within 
10 CFR 100 requirements. A spent fuel assembly dropped on the racks, 
will not cause rack distortion that would prevent the performance of 
their safety function. Thus, the consequences of this postulated 
accident are not significantly changed from those previously 
evaluated.
    The consequences of a loss of SFP cooling were evaluated. The 
evaluation concluded that sufficient time is available to establish 
an alternate means of cooling following a complete failure of the 
normal SFP cooling system. Calculations show that under a normal 
discharge scenario, if all indirect forced cooling paths (i.e., heat 
removal by heat exchangers) are lost at the instant the pool water 
reaches its maximum value, the pool will not begin bulk boiling for 
at least 4.61 hours. This time interval is sufficient to allow plant 
personnel to establish alternate heat removal methods. A piped 
cross-connection exists between Unit 1 and Unit 2's SFP heat 
exchangers. This allows for use of the opposite Unit's heat 
exchanger during emergencies, or when a given Unit's Service Water 
header or Component Cooling System are out-of-service. Thus, the 
consequences of this postulated accident are not significantly 
changed from those previously evaluated.
    The new racks are designed and fabricated to meet applicable NRC 
requirements and industry standards. Seismic analyses were performed 
on the new racks and the existing racks using 3-D single rack 
(opposed phase motion) and Whole Pool Multi-Rack (WPMR) models. 
Kinematic and shear analyses conclude the existence of large margins 
of safety. The kinematic margin against rack-to-rack or rack-to-wall 
impact is at least 1.5 for all SFP racks. Maximum rack primary 
stresses, under [Safe Shutdown Earthquake] SSE conditions, are less 
than 50% of the allowable ASME Code value. Maximum supporting pool 
structure bending moments and thru-thickness shear, under factored 
load conditions, are less than 80% of the allowables. All racks (new 
and existing) are designed as free-standing racks, to ensure that 
rack and pool structure integrity is maintained during and after a 
seismic event. Thus, the consequences of a postulated seismic event 
are not increased from previously evaluated events.
    The consequences of an installation accident were considered. 
All fuel in the SFP will have decayed for a minimum of (3) months 
prior to any heavy load movement in the SFP area. This allows 
sufficient time for decay of gaseous radionuclides in the fuel (gap 
activity). A postulated accidental gaseous release from all stored 
fuel assemblies would result in a potential offsite dose less than 
10% of 10CFR100 limit. No equipment essential to safe reactor 
shutdown or employed to mitigate the consequences of an accident is 
located beneath, adjacent to, or within the area of influence of any 
load handling to support the SFP modification. Thus, the 
consequences of a postulated installation accident are not 
significantly increased from those previously evaluated.
    The only postulated accident affected by decay time is a Loss of 
SFP cooling. The proposed increase in decay time prior to refueling 
operations is conservative and decreases the decay heat removal 
requirements. All thermal-hydraulic calculations used 168 hours as 
the assumed decay time and concluded that adequate heat removal 
capability existed. Thus, the probability and consequences of a loss 
of SFP cooling accident are not significantly increased from those 
previously evaluated.
    Therefore, it may be concluded that the proposed changes do not 
increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any previously evaluated.
    The proposed modification has been reviewed and analyzed for 
possible accidents. The criteria used in the analyses, design, and 
installation of the new spent fuel racks account for anticipated 
loadings and postulated conditions that may be imposed upon the 
structure during its lifetime, and is in conformance with 
established codes, standards, and specifications acceptable to the 
NRC.
    Factors that could affect the SFP neutron multiplication factor 
have been addressed conservatively. PSE&G concluded that the maximum 
SFP neutron multiplication, with the addition of the maximum density 
racks, will not exceed the subcritically limit of Keff less than or 
equal to 0.95.
    The increase in decay time prior to refueling operations reduces 
the initial heat load and SFP cooling equipments. The addition of 
new racks and associated spent fuel will produce an incremental heat 
load in the SFP. However, analysis has shown that the existing SFP 
cooling system is sufficient to absorb this incremental heat load. 
The peak bulk pool temperature will be maintained below the 
threshold value to preclude bulk boiling. The incremental heat load 
does not alter SFP cooling safety considerations from those 
previously reviewed and found acceptable.
    Rack impact analysis was performed to investigate possible 
impact during seismic events (i.e., rack-to-rack and rack-to-wall 
impacts). The analysis concluded that the proposed SFP modification 
does not result in rack-to-rack impact in the cellular region or 
rack-to-wall impact during postulated seismic events.
    The basic SFP reracking technology has been reviewed and 
approved by the NRC in numerous applications for spent fuel capacity 
increases. The safety function and operation of the SFP cooling 
system, makeup, and structural systems are unchanged by the 
modification. No new failure modes are created.
    Therefore, it may be concluded that the proposed changes do not 
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from 
any previously evaluated.
    3. Do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    The safety function of the SFP and the racks is to preclude 
inadvertent criticality in a safe, specifically designed, underwater 
storage location for spent fuel assemblies that require shielding 
and cooling during storage and handling. The NRC Staff has 
established that the issue of margin of safety, when applied to 
reracking modifications, should address the following areas:
    1. Nuclear criticality considerations.
    2. Thermal-hydraulic considerations.
    3. Mechanical, material, and structural considerations.
    Assessment in these areas assures that the SFP and racks will 
withstand specified design conditions, without impairment of the 
structural integrity or performance of required safety functions.
    The criticality analysis confirms that the new and existing rack 
designs meet the NRC acceptance criterion of Keff less than or equal 
to 0.95 under all conditions. The criticality analysis methods 
conform to applicable industry codes, standards, specifications and 
NRC guidance.
    Keff calculations include uncertainties at a 95%/95% probability 
confidence level. Thus, the proposed amendment does not involve a 
significant reduction in the nuclear criticality margin of safety.
    Conservative methods and assumptions were used to calculate the 
maximum fuel temperature and the increase in SFP water temperature. 
The thermal-hydraulic evaluation employed methods previously used to 
evaluate existing spent fuel racks. The results demonstrate that the 
temperature margins of safety are maintained. The proposed 
modification, with the fuel inventory, will increase the heat load 
in the SFP. However, the decay time prior to refueling operations 
was increased from 100 to 168 hours to reduce the initial SFP 
cooling requirements. Evaluation results indicate that the existing 
SFP cooling system can maintain the bulk pool water temperature at 
or below 149 F under normal discharge scenarios. The maximum 
allowable temperature for bulk boiling is not exceeded for the 
calculated increase in pool heat load. Maximum local water 
temperatures, along the hottest fuel assembly, remain below the 
nucleate boiling condition. While no nucleate boiling is indicated 
for the standard storage condition, an assumption of 50% cell 
blockage results in a possible highly localized two-phase condition 
near the top of the fuel. Fuel clad thermal stresses remain less 
than 7000 psi, which is considerably lower than the endurance limit 
of the clad material. Thus, there is no significant reduction in the 
margin of safety for thermal-hydraulic or SFP cooling.
    Maintaining the spent fuel assemblies in a safe configuration 
during normal and abnormal loadings is the primary safety function 
of the SFP and racks. Abnormal loading associated with an 
earthquake, a spent fuel assembly drop, or the drop of any other 
heavy object were considered. The mechanical, material, and 
structural design of the new spent fuel racks complies with 
applicable portions of the NRC OT Position Paper. Rack materials are 
compatible with the spent fuel pool environment and the spent fuel 
assemblies. The structural assessment of the new racks concluded 
that tilting and deflection or movement will not result in impact in 
the active fuel region during postulated seismic events. In 
addition, the spent fuel assemblies remain intact with no 
criticality concerns. Thus, there is no significant reduction in the 
margin of safety for mechanical, material and structural 
considerations.
    Therefore, it may be concluded that the proposed changes do not 
involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing 
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this 
action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Rules Review and 
Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications 
Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555, and should cite the publication date and page 
number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be 
delivered to room P-223, Phillips Building, 7920 Norfolk Avenue, 
Bethesda, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. 
Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 
20555.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By April 4, 1994, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility 
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR part 2. Interested 
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is 
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555 and at the local 
public document room located at the Salem Free Public Library, 112 West 
Broadway, Salem, New Jersey 08079. If a request for a hearing or 
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the 
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the 
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or 
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of 
hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Services 
Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, 
the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555, by the 
above date. Where petitions are filed during the last 10 days of the 
notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform 
the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 1-
(800) 248-5100 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union 
operator should be given Datagram Identification Number N1023 and the 
following message addressed to Charles L. Miller: petitioner's name and 
telephone number, date petition was mailed, plant name, and publication 
date and page number of this Federal Register notice. A copy of the 
petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to Mark J. 
Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston and Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW., 
Washington, DC 20005-3502, attorney for the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d)
    The Commission hereby provides notice that this is a proceeding on 
an application for a license amendment falling within the scope of 
section 134 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), 42 U.S.C. 
10154. Under section 134 of the NWPA, the Commission, at the request of 
any party to the proceeding, must use hybrid hearing procedures with 
respect to ``any matter which the Commission determines to be in 
controversy among the parties.'' The hybrid procedures in section 134 
provide for oral argument on matters in controversy, preceded by 
discovery under the Commission's rules, and the designation, following 
argument, of only those factual issues that involve a genuine and 
substantial dispute, together with any remaining questions of law, to 
be resolved in an adjudicatory hearing. Actual adjudicatory hearings 
are to be held on only those issues found to meet the criteria of 
section 134 and set for hearing after oral argument.
    The Commission's rules implementing section 134 of the NWPA are 
found in 10 CFR part 2, subpart K, ``Hybrid Hearing Procedures for 
Expansion of Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Capacity at Civilian Nuclear 
Power Reactors'' (published at 50 FR 41662, October 15, 1985) to 10 CFR 
2.1101 et seq. Under those rules, any party to the proceeding may 
invoke the hybrid hearing procedures by filing with the presiding 
officer a written request for oral argument under 10 CFR 2.1109. To be 
timely, the request must be filed within 10 days of an order granting a 
request for hearing or petition to intervene. (As outlined above, the 
Commission's rules in 10 CFR part 2, subpart G, and 2.714 in 
particular, continue to govern the filing of requests for a hearing or 
petitions to intervene, as well as the admission of contentions.) The 
presiding officer shall grant a timely request for oral argument. The 
presiding officer shall grant an untimely request for oral argument 
only upon showing of good cause by the requesting party for the failure 
to file on time and after providing the other parties an opportunity to 
respond to the untimely request. If the presiding officer grants a 
request for oral argument, any hearing held on the application shall be 
conducted in accordance with hybrid hearing procedures. In essence, 
those procedures limit the time available for discovery and require 
that an oral argument be held to determine whether any contentions must 
be resolved in adjudicatory hearing. If no party to the proceedings 
requests oral argument, or if all untimely requests for oral argument 
are denied, then the usual procedures in 10 CFR part 2, subpart G, 
apply.
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated April 28, 1993, and revisions to this 
submittal dated August 12, 1993, November 17, 1993 and February 2, 
1994, which are available for public inspection at the Commission's 
Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street NW., 
Washington, DC 20555 and at the local public document room located at 
the Salem Free Public Library, 112 West Broadway, Salem, New Jersey 
08079.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day of February 1994.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
James C. Stone,
Project Manager, Project Directorate I-2, Division of Reactor 
Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 94-5026 Filed 3-3-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M