[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 20 (Monday, January 31, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-1300]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: January 31, 1994]


_______________________________________________________________________

Part II





Department of Labor





_______________________________________________________________________



Occupational Safety and Health Administration



_______________________________________________________________________



29 CFR Part 1910




Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution; Electrical 
Protective Equipment; Final Rule
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

29 CFR Part 1910

[Docket No. S-015]

 
Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution; 
Electrical Protective Equipment

AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 
Department of Labor.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: OSHA is issuing a new standard addressing the work practices 
to be used during the operation and maintenance of electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution facilities. The standard 
includes requirements relating to enclosed spaces, hazardous energy 
control, working near energized parts, grounding for employee 
protection, work on underground and overhead installations, line-
clearance tree trimming, work in substations and generating plants, and 
other special conditions and equipment unique to the generation, 
transmission, and distribution of electric energy. Compliance with 
these requirements will prevent injuries to employees working on 
electric power systems.
    OSHA is also revising the electrical protective equipment 
requirements contained in the General Industry Standards. The current 
standards for the design of electrical protective equipment adopt 
several national consensus standards by reference. The revision 
replaces the incorporation of these out-of-date consensus standards 
with a set of performance-oriented requirements that are consistent 
with the latest revisions of these consensus standards. Additionally, 
OSHA is issuing new requirements for the safe use and care of 
electrical protective equipment to complement the equipment design 
provisions. These revisions will update the existing OSHA standards and 
will prevent accidents caused by inadequate electrical protective 
equipment.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The Final Rule, except for Sec. 1910.269(a)(2), is 
effective on May 31, 1994. Paragraph (a)(2) of Sec. 1910.269 is 
effective on January 31, 1995.

ADDRESSES: In compliance with 28 U.S.C. 2112(a), the Agency designates 
for receipt of petitions for review of the standard the Associate 
Solicitor of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, Office of the 
Solicitor, room S4004, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Ave., 
NW., Washington, DC 20210.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. James F. Foster, U.S. Department 
of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, room N3647, 
200 Constitution Ave., NW., Washington, DC 20210 (202-523-8148).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

A. Need for Regulation

    Employees performing operation or maintenance work on electric 
power generation, transmission, or distribution installations are not 
adequately protected by current OSHA standards, though these employees 
face far greater electrical hazards than those faced by other workers. 
The voltages involved are generally much higher than voltages 
encountered in other types of work, and a large part of electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution work exposes employees to 
energized parts of the power system.
    The existing electrical regulations contained in subpart S of the 
General Industry Standards address electric utilization systems--
installations of electric conductors and equipment which use electric 
energy for mechanical, chemical, heating, lighting, or similar 
purposes. Subpart S protects most employees from the hazards associated 
with electric utilization equipment and with the premises wiring that 
supplies this equipment. However, subpart S does not contain 
requirements protecting employees from the hazards arising out of the 
operation or maintenance of electric power generation, transmission, or 
distribution installations.1
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    \1\Electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
installations under the exclusive control of an electric utility 
(Sec. 1910.302(a)(2)(v)) are specifically not covered by the 
electrical installation requirements contained in Subpart S 
Secs. 1910.303 through 1910.308. Industrial generation, 
transmission, and distribution installations, even though they are 
not included in the language of Sec. 1910.302(a)(2)(v), are also not 
covered under the Subpart S utilization requirements if they are the 
same type as those of electric utilities (46 FR 4039). Additionally, 
the safety-related work practice requirements of Subpart S exempt 
work performed by qualified persons on or directly associated with 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
installations regardless of who owns or controls them 
(Sec. 1910.331(c)(1)).
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    In contrast, telecommunications workers, who face similar hazards, 
are covered under a specific telecommunications standard in 
Sec. 1910.268. This regulation protects employees performing 
communications work from the two major hazards of falling and electric 
shock. These are the same two hazards accounting for most of the 
accidental deaths in electric power transmission and distribution work.
    Employees engaged in the construction of electric power 
transmission or distribution systems are protected by the provisions of 
subpart V of the Construction Standards (Part 1926). However, this 
standard does not address operation or maintenance work, nor does it 
cover work in electric power generating plants.
    Electric utility industry trade associations requested several 
times that OSHA adopt a set of rules on the operation and maintenance 
of power generation, transmission, and distribution systems. Toward 
this end, representatives of Edison Electric Institute (an association 
of investor-owned electric utilities) and of the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (a union representing electric 
utility workers) developed a draft standard, submitted it to OSHA, and 
suggested that it be used as a proposed rule. The Agency accepted the 
draft standard and used it to begin the development of a proposal on 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution.

B. Accident Patterns

    To establish a basis for the development of safety standards, 
accident data must be collected and analyzed. OSHA has looked to 
several sources for information on accidents in the electric utility 
industry. Besides OSHA's own accident investigation files, statistics 
on injuries are compiled by the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) and by 
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW). 
Additionally, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) publishes such 
accident data as incidence rates for total cases, lost workday cases, 
and lost workdays. Analyses of accident data for electric utility 
workers can be found in the following documents, which (like all 
exhibits and hearing transcripts) are available for inspection and 
copying in Docket S-015 in the Docket Office:

    (1) ``Preparation of an Economic Impact Study for the Proposed 
OSHA Regulation Covering Electric Power Generation, Transmission, 
and Distribution'', June 1986, Eastern Research Group, Section 4 
(Ex.2 4).
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    \2\Exhibit.
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    (2) ``Assessment of the Benefits of the Proposed Standard on 
Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution--Coding 
Results and Analysis'', October 5, 1990, Eastern Research Group (Ex. 
6-24).

    Overall accident incidence rates for the electric services industry 
(that is, the electric utility industry, SIC 491) are slightly lower 
than corresponding rates for the private sector as a whole. 
Furthermore, these rates are much lower than the traditionally more 
hazardous manufacturing, construction, and mining industries. However, 
although accident incidence rates can be used to compare relative risk 
between industries, they are not specific enough to be used to 
determine the types of hazards that need to be addressed by an 
occupational safety standard.
    OSHA realized during the development of the standard that, except 
for electrical and fall hazards, electric utility employees face 
hazards that are similar in nature and degree to those encountered in 
many other industries. At the same time, OSHA recognized that the risk 
faced by some employees during certain electric-utility-type operations 
is greater than the risk faced by other general industry employees. For 
example, the risk of electric shock to an electric power line worker or 
cable repairer performing his or her routine duties is far greater than 
that faced by any other occupational group.\3\ It is the uniquely 
hazardous operations that are being addressed by OSHA's standard.
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    \3\JACA Corp., ``Regulatory Assessment of the Impact of the 
Proposed Electrical Safety-Related Work Practices Standard, Final 
Report,'' October 1983, pp. 4-8 to 4-10 (Ex. 2-6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    BLS's Supplementary Data System (SDS) provides some detail on the 
characteristics of accidents in the electric service industry. SDS 
files indicate that the three major sources of injury within SIC 491 
are falls, overexertion, and being struck by or against an object. 
Information on the nature of injuries also can be obtained from SDS. 
For example, from these data, sprains/strains, cuts/lacerations, and 
contusions/bruises are the most frequent injuries encountered in the 
electric services industry. Similar data can be found throughout 
general industry. It is noteworthy that electric shock cases do not 
constitute a major injury category and are grouped under ``all other 
classifiable.'' Although these data do indicate hazards that must be 
addressed by a standard, they provide little guidance with respect to 
the content of the standard.
    More specific information on fatal and other serious accidents was 
gathered from IBEW, EEI, and OSHA files. Contrasting with the SDS data, 
these files indicate that electrical accidents are the most frequent 
type of fatal and other serious injuries, accounting for approximately 
one half of these. According to EEI and IBEW data, other accident types 
that occur frequently include motor vehicle accidents, falls, and 
``struck by/crushed.''
    OSHA also collected information on accidents in non-utility 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution installations 
(Ex. 6-25). These data indicate that accidents involving such 
installations are similar in nature and degree to those in the electric 
utility industry.

C. Significant Risk

    OSHA must show that the hazards the Agency addresses in a safety 
regulation present significant risks to employees. As part of the 
regulatory analyses for this standard, OSHA has determined the 
population at risk, the occupations presenting major risks, and the 
incidence and severity of injuries attributable to the failure to 
follow established standards. In keeping with the purpose of safety 
standards to prevent accidental injury and death, OSHA has estimated 
the number of accidents that would be prevented by the new regulation.
    Although nearly all workers in the electric utility industry are 
exposed to various hazards common to the industry, some are at much 
greater risk than others. Eastern Research Group, Inc. (ERG), in their 
``Preparation of an Economic Impact Study for the Proposed OSHA 
Regulation Covering Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and 
Distribution'', June 1986 (Ex. 4), characterized the frequency with 
which accidents occur in the industry and tabulated the relative risk 
among electric utility occupations. According to the ERG report, 
``there were more accidents associated with transmission and 
distribution [lines] than with substations or power generation 
[installations].'' Within the first category, more fatal and serious 
lost-time accidents occurred among line workers, apprentice line 
workers, and working line foremen. Within the latter two categories, 
substation electricians and general utility mechanics experienced the 
most accidents. (See p. 4-23 of the ERG report.)
    The hazards that are directly covered by the standard are those of 
an electrical nature, causing electrocution and injuries due to 
electric shock. In addition, the standard directly addresses fatalities 
and injuries associated with four other types of accidents: (1) Struck 
by or struck against; (2) fall; (3) caught in or between; and (4) 
contact with temperature extremes. (A few requirements of the standard 
address some hazards common to general industry work. These provisions 
deal with hazards that are not currently addressed in the General 
Industry Standards but that are causing injuries in electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution work.)
    OSHA has estimated that an average of 12,976 lost-workday injuries 
to and 86 fatalities of electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution employees occur annually. (See Section V of this 
preamble.) Using these figures, OSHA has also estimated the number of 
injuries which could be prevented by the new regulations. Taking into 
account such factors as existing regulation and the differences in 
training levels among utilities, OSHA estimated that 1,634 lost-workday 
injuries and 61 deaths could be prevented each year through compliance 
with the provisions contained in or referenced by the standard. (A 
detailed analysis of the benefits of the standard and a description of 
the methodology used can be found in the Final Regulatory Impact 
Analysis of the Electric Power Generation, Transmission and 
Distribution and the Electrical Protective Equipment Final Rules (RIA) 
for the standard, which is available for inspection and copying in the 
Docket Office.) Based on this analysis, OSHA has made a determination 
that hazards of work on electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution installations pose a significant risk to employees and 
that the standard is reasonably necessary and appropriate to deal with 
that risk.

II. Development of Standard

A. Present Standards

    OSHA adopted regulations applying to the construction of power 
transmission and distribution lines and equipment in 1972 (Subpart V of 
part 1926). The term ``construction'' is broadly defined in 
Sec. 1926.950(a)(1) to include alteration, conversion, and improvement, 
as well as the original installation of the lines and equipment. 
However, subpart V does not apply to the operation or maintenance of 
transmission or distribution installations.
    OSHA found, in reviewing the construction regulations, that the 
provisions of Subpart V of part 1926 were suitable for use as a base in 
the development of rules for operation and maintenance work. Important 
safety considerations for electric utility employees are currently 
addressed in Subpart V including tools and protective equipment, 
mechanical equipment, grounding for employee protection, and overhead 
and underground installations. These are topics that also need to be 
addressed in a comprehensive standard for the operation and maintenance 
of electric power transmission and distribution installations.
    However, the construction rules do have some disadvantages. During 
the 15 years subpart V has been in effect, areas of ambiguity have 
developed, making parts of the standard difficult for employees and 
employers to understand and for OSHA compliance officers to enforce. 
Additionally, some subpart V requirements are specifically related to 
the initial construction of lines and equipment and are not readily 
adaptable to maintenance operations. Lastly, subpart V contains no 
provisions specifically addressing power generation work.
    The National Electrical Safety Code (American National Standards 
Institute Standard ANSI C2;\4\ also known as the NESC) must also be 
taken into consideration in the development of rules for the operation 
and maintenance of electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution systems. This national consensus standard contains 
requirements specifically addressing this type of work. The latest 
version of ANSI C2 is much more up-to-date than subpart V of the 
Construction Standards. However, ANSI C2 is primarily directed to the 
prevention of electric shock, although it does contain a few 
requirements for the prevention of falls. Other hazards common to the 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution work are not 
discussed.
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    \4\The 1984 and 1987 editions (ANSI C2-1984 and ANSI C2-1987) 
were entered into the rulemaking record as Ex. 2-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another related OSHA standard is Sec. 1910.268, pertaining to 
telecommunications work. Much of the field work covered in this 
regulation is similar in nature to the type of field work performed by 
electric utility employees, and the hazards faced in the performance of 
this type of work are frequently the same in both industries. In any 
situation in which the hazards are the same and in which there is no 
clear coverage in the other existing standards, the provisions in the 
telecommunications standard have been used as a basis for developing 
requirements to protect employees performing electric-utility-type 
work.

B. Industry-Union Draft Standard

    As previously noted, representatives of EEI and IBEW developed a 
draft standard, submitted it to OSHA, and represented it as being a 
negotiated standard that could be used in a rulemaking activity. (EEI 
and IBEW submitted separate versions of the draft standard. These 
documents are available for inspection and copying in the Docket Office 
as Ex. 2-3 and 2-4.) This draft standard was essentially a continuation 
of the existing requirements of Subpart V of Part 1926 in which the 
hazards addressed are those found in transmission and distribution 
installations after the construction phase is completed and the 
electrical system becomes operational. Additionally, based on existing 
industry practice, EEI and IBEW added provisions addressing generating 
plants, substations, confined spaces, and hazardous energy control to 
supplement the rules on transmission and distribution work.
    In the development of this proposal, OSHA evaluated the drafts 
submitted by EEI and IBEW to determine their suitability as a base 
document. In areas which overlapped existing OSHA standards, the drafts 
were reviewed to see if equivalent safety was provided. For example, 
provisions in the draft standard dealing with ladders were compared to 
the regulations in Subpart D of part 1910. OSHA also reviewed the 
drafts to determine if their requirements were as effective as the 
requirements of national consensus standards addressing the same 
hazards and to determine if definitions of terms common to several 
other OSHA standards were identical. For example, the draft provisions 
on line-clearance tree trimming were checked against the equivalent 
ANSI standard, ANSI Z133.1-1982 (Ex. 2-29), to be sure that OSHA's 
regulations would better effectuate safety than the national consensus 
standard.
    The EEI and IBEW draft standards included a section on electrical 
protective equipment. This equipment is an integral part of electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution work, and its use (or 
lack of use) directly affects the safety of employees performing this 
type of work. In fact, many of the accidents mentioned earlier were 
related to electrical protective equipment. Because Sec. 1910.137 
already addresses electrical protective equipment, OSHA believes it is 
appropriate to revise that section rather than include separate 
protective equipment requirements in Sec. 1910.269.
    After thoroughly analyzing the EEI/IBEW drafts, OSHA determined 
that, together with ANSI C2 and Subpart V of part 1926, they could 
provide a basis from which a proposal could be developed. OSHA met with 
representatives of EEI and IBEW several times to obtain their advice. 
OSHA then clarified some of the language involved, revised 
unenforceable wording, and resolved conflicts with other OSHA 
regulations and with national consensus standards.

History of the Regulation

    On January 31, 1989, OSHA published the proposed standard on 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution work and on 
electrical protective equipment (54 FR 4974). This proposal was 
intended to supplement the existing electric power transmission and 
distribution requirements for construction contained in 29 CFR part 
1926, subpart V, and to update the provisions of Sec. 1910.137 on 
electrical protective equipment. The proposed rules were based, in 
part, on the provisions of the EEI/IBEW draft standard, on subpart V, 
and on the NESC.
    Interested parties were originally given until May 1, 1989, to 
submit written comments on the proposal, to file objections, and to 
request a hearing. In response to requests from the public, the 
deadline for receipt of comments was subsequently extended to June 1, 
1989 (54 FR 18546).
    OSHA received 83 comments on the proposal by June 1, 1989, and one 
request for a hearing by the earlier May 1 deadline. Five late requests 
for a hearing were also received. In response to the hearing requests 
and in accordance with section 6(b)(3) of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act, OSHA published a notice announcing an informal public 
hearing and listing the issues to be discussed at the hearing (54 FR 
30401, corrected at 54 FR 31970).
    The hearing began on November 28, 1989, in Washington, DC. It was 
adjourned on December 5, 1989, and was reconvened on December 12, 1989, 
in Los Angeles, CA. The hearing concluded on December 14, 1989.
    At the close of the public hearing, Administrative Law Judge Robert 
Feldman set the deadlines for the submission of additional information 
and for the filing of briefs by the participants to be March 14 and 
April 13, 1990, respectively. At the request of some of the hearing 
participants, Judge Feldman subsequently extended the deadlines to July 
1 and August 1, 1990 (Ex. 50).
    Section 1910.269 was proposed to apply only to installations under 
the exclusive control of electric utilities. One of the issues listed 
in the notice of hearing was whether the scope of the standard should 
be extended to include work on all electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution installations regardless of who owned or 
operated the installations.
    The original regulatory impact analysis for the proposal did not 
consider the impact of the standard beyond electric utilities and their 
contractors. Based on its review of the record, the Agency decided to 
evaluate the economic impact of applying the rule to employers other 
than electric utilities. Therefore, OSHA contracted for a study 
(performed by Eastern Research Group, Inc.) of the regulatory impact of 
applying Sec. 1910.269 to companies which generate or distribute their 
own electric power. This study was placed in the rulemaking record on 
the proposal (Ex. 6-25), and OSHA published a notice in the Federal 
Register reopening the record on the proposal for a period of 60 days 
(November 9, 1990, 55 FR 47074). At the request of several interested 
parties, the deadline was extended until February 8, 1991 (January 10, 
1991, 56 FR 976).
    Two of the hearing participants had additional information to be 
entered into the record and requested a reopening of the hearing 
record. This information represented the outcome of a relevant 
consensus standards committee action. During the hearing, the 
participants had promised to provide these data at the request of the 
Agency. In response to this request, Administrative Law Judge Robert 
Feldman reopened the record until March 1, 1991 (Ex. 63).
    Judge Feldman issued an order receiving the post-hearing comments 
and closing the record on July 23, 1992. At that time, he certified the 
record to the Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA.
    The comments received in response to the notices of proposed 
rulemaking, of public hearing, and of the reopening of the record, the 
written transcript of the hearing, and the exhibits submitted at the 
hearing and during the post-hearing period allowed for such submissions 
constitute the rulemaking record for this proceeding. The entire record 
was carefully considered in the preparation of this final rule.

III. Summary and Explanation of The Final Rule

    This section discusses the important elements of the final 
standard, explains the purpose of the individual requirements, and 
explains any differences between the final rule and existing standards. 
This section also discusses and resolves issues that were raised at the 
public hearing, significant comments received as part of the rulemaking 
record, and substantive changes from the language of the proposed rule. 
References in parentheses are to exhibits and transcript pages5 in 
the rulemaking record.
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    \5\DC--Transcript of the hearing held in Washington, DC.
    LA--Transcript of the hearing held in Los Angeles, CA.
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A. Section 1910.137

    Electrical protective equipment is in constant use during electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution work; and, 
appropriately, the EEI/IBEW draft standard contained provisions related 
to this equipment. Because the existing OSHA standards for electrical 
protective equipment are contained in Sec. 1910.137, the Agency 
determined that relevant requirements based on the portion of the EEI/
IBEW draft relating to such equipment should be incorporated into the 
format of the existing OSHA personal protective equipment standards 
rather than in new Sec. 1910.269. Further, OSHA believes that these 
updated personal protective equipment provisions should apply 
throughout industry, wherever such equipment is necessary for employee 
safety, and that improvements in the electrical protective equipment 
provisions should not be limited to the use of this equipment in 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution work. 
Therefore, OSHA is revising Sec. 1910.137, which formerly incorporated 
by reference the following six American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI) standards: 

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Item                            ANSI standard      
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rubber insulating gloves......................  J6.6-1967               
Rubber matting for use around electric          J6.7-1935 (R1962)       
 apparatus.                                                             
Rubber insulating blankets....................  J6.4-1970               
Rubber insulating hoods.......................  J6.2-1950 (R1962)       
Rubber insulating line hose...................  J6.1-1950 (R1962)       
Rubber insulating sleeves.....................  J6.5-1962               
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These ANSI standards were originally developed and adopted as 
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) standards. (In fact, 
the latest revisions of these standards use the ASTM designations, 
rather than using separate designations for both standards-writing 
organizations.) As is typical of national consensus standards, the ASTM 
standards are filled with detailed specifications for the manufacture, 
testing, and design of electrical protective equipment. Additionally, 
these standards are revised frequently, making former Sec. 1910.137 up 
to a quarter century out of date. For example, the most recent ANSI 
standard listed in the former OSHA requirement is dated 1970. The most 
recent ASTM version available is a 1990 edition of specifications on 
rubber insulating gloves. The complete list of current ASTM standards 
corresponding to the ANSI standards is as follows:

ASTM D120-87, Specification for Rubber Insulating Gloves.
ASTM D178-88, Specification for Rubber Insulating Matting.
ASTM D1048-88, Specification for Rubber Insulating Blankets.
ASTM D1049-88, Specification for Rubber Insulating Covers.
ASTM D1050-90, Specification for Rubber Insulating Line Hose.
ASTM D1051-87, Specification for Rubber Insulating Sleeves.

     Additionally, ASTM has adopted standards on the in-service care of 
insulating line hose and covers (ASTM F478-92), insulating blankets 
(ASTM F479-88a), and insulating gloves and sleeves (ASTM F496-91), 
which have no current counterparts in the existing OSHA electrical 
protective equipment standard.6
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    \6\The relevant ASTM standards are contained in the record as 
Exhibits 2-9 through 2-17. In several cases, the version of the 
consensus standard in the record is older than the version listed in 
the preamble. However, final Sec. 1910.137 is based only on the ASTM 
documents and other data in the record. The preamble lists editions 
of the consensus standards not in the record because they have been 
evaluated for consistency with OSHA's final rule. It has been 
determined that these later ASTM standards do indeed conform to the 
requirements of final Sec. 1910.137. See the discussion of the notes 
following paragraphs (a)(3)(ii)(B) and (b)(2)(ix) for the 
significance of this determination.
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    In an attempt to retain the quality of protection afforded by the 
ASTM standards, OSHA has developed a revision of Sec. 1910.137 which 
has been derived from the ASTM documents but which has been written in 
performance terms. OSHA recognizes the importance of the ASTM standards 
in defining basic requirements for the safe design and manufacture of 
electrical protective equipment for employees. The revision of 
Sec. 1910.137 maintains the protection presently afforded to employees 
by the referenced ANSI/ASTM standards. While carrying forward ASTM 
provisions which are considered necessary for employee safety, OSHA is 
providing greater flexibility for compliance with these provisions to 
the extent that worker safety warrants. OSHA has determined, therefore, 
that the requirements contained in this revision of Sec. 1910.137 are 
reasonably necessary to protect employees from electrical hazards 
posing significant risks in the workplace.
    There are several reasons why adopting the ASTM standards in toto 
would be inappropriate in this rulemaking. First, ASTM has revised each 
of the currently referenced standards several times since they were 
adopted in the former OSHA regulation. Because of the continual process 
by which ASTM periodically revises its standards, any specific editions 
that OSHA might adopt would likely be outdated within a few years. 
Additionally, since the rulemaking process is lengthy, a complete 
revision of OSHA's electrical protective equipment requirements every 
three years or so to keep pace with the changes in the consensus 
standards is not practical. (In fact, some of the ASTM standards were 
revised again during the rulemaking period.) To remedy this problem, 
OSHA has adopted a revision of Sec. 1910.137 to make the standards 
flexible enough to accommodate changes in technology, obviating the 
need for constant revision. Where possible, the new standard has been 
written in performance terms in order to allow alternative methods of 
compliance if they provide comparable safety to the employee.
    Another difficulty with incorporation of the ASTM standards by 
reference is that they contain details which go beyond the purposes of 
the OSHA standard or which are not directly related to employee safety. 
In the revision of Sec. 1910.137, OSHA has tried to carry forward only 
provisions which are relevant to employee safety in the workplace. 
Furthermore, OSHA has attempted to simplify those provisions to make 
the requirements easier for employers and employees to use and 
understand. Because the revision places all relevant requirements in 
the text of the regulations, employers would no longer have to refer to 
the ASTM documents to determine their obligations under OSHA.
    In striving for this degree of simplification, the Agency has tried 
to use an approach that will accept new methods of protection which may 
appear in future editions of the ASTM standards. OSHA recognizes that 
such future editions of these standards might contain technological 
advances providing significant improvement in employee safety, which 
might not be permitted under the revised Sec. 1910.137. However, due to 
the performance-oriented nature of the OSHA standard as compared to the 
ASTM standards, conflicts between the two standards in areas affecting 
employee safety are expected to be infrequent.
    An employer who follows future versions of ASTM standards will be 
covered by OSHA's de minimis policy as set forth in OSHA Instruction 
CPL 2.45A (Field Operations Manual). Under that policy, a de minimis 
condition7 exists (1) where an employer's workplace has been 
updated in accordance with new technology or equipment as a result of 
revisions to the latest consensus publications from which OSHA 
standards were derived, (2) where the updated versions result in a 
``state of the art'' workplace, technically advanced beyond the 
requirements of the applicable OSHA standard, and (3) where equal or 
greater safety and health protection is provided.
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    \7\OSHA considers a de minimis condition to be a technical 
violation of a standard only. However, because the employer is 
considered to be in substantial compliance with the standard, the 
Agency issues no citations or penalties, nor is the employer 
required to bring his or her workplace into compliance with the 
older standard.
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    Several commenters objected to OSHA's adoption of requirements on 
the design of electrical protective equipment (Ex. 3-33, 3-44, 3-54, 3-
58, 3-71). These comments suggested leaving former Sec. 1910.137 as it 
was, because ``[d]esign requirements are a manufacturer's specification 
standard, not an employer/employee standard [Ex 3-71].''
    Others, however, supported OSHA's performance-oriented proposal 
(Ex. 3-34, 3-50, 3-51, 3-64). ASTM, itself, stated, ``Concerning 
[Sec. 1910.137] and with the exception of the few items with which we 
disagree or feel can be improved, we feel OSHA has adequately 
accomplished its goal of protecting workers in performance-oriented 
language [Ex. 3-51].'' At the hearing, Mr. Arthur Lewis, OSHA's expert 
witness, testified, ``I feel OSHA has done an excellent job in 
accomplishing its goal of protecting workers through performance 
oriented language in the proposed standard [DC Tr. 352].''
    In the development of this performance language, OSHA attempted to 
avoid conflicts between the Agency's requirements and the ASTM 
standards, and the notice of proposed rulemaking requested comments on 
whether or not the Agency had achieved this objective. The 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, who expressed support 
for the proposal, agreed that the proposed standard was written in 
performance-oriented language (Ex. 3-107). As noted earlier, ASTM 
itself supported the OSHA proposal and suggested ways in which the 
final rule could be made more consistent with their standards. OSHA's 
expert witness, Mr. Arthur Lewis (who is a long-term member of the ASTM 
F-18 Committee), stated, ``I find the proposed revision of 1910.137 to 
reflect the requirements of the relevant ASTM standards accurately with 
the exception of the few items of the proposal with which I disagree or 
which I feel can be improved [DC Tr. 352].'' Because of the Agency's 
desire to maintain consistency with the consensus standards (which was 
not opposed by any party in this rulemaking) OSHA has relied heavily on 
Mr. Lewis's and ASTM's suggestions for improving the proposal. The 
Agency believes the final rule does achieve the goal of protecting 
employees through the use of performance language that is consistent 
with and retains the intent of the ASTM standards from which the rule 
was derived.
    In view of the limitations imposed by the continued incorporation 
by reference of the outdated ASTM standards, OSHA has determined that 
relevant requirements for electrical protective equipment for workers 
should be placed within the body of Sec. 1910.137 and that these 
provisions should be updated and clarified to facilitate their 
application to workplaces. The Agency believes the rulemaking record 
supports this action and has made some revisions to the language 
contained in the proposal, as suggested by the comments and as 
summarized later in this section of the preamble.
    There currently exist several relatively new ASTM standards on 
other types of electrical protective equipment. For example, ASTM has 
adopted specifications for fiberglass-reinforced plastic rod and tube 
used in live-line tools. However, the standards writing organization 
has not developed corresponding requirements on the use and care of 
this equipment. Similarly, ASTM Standards F712 and F968 set forth test 
methods and design specifications, respectively, for electrically 
insulating plastic guard equipment for the protection of workers, but 
this standard does not contain provisions on the use or care of the 
guards. ASTM is currently working on standards for the use and care of 
some of this equipment and on additional specifications for still other 
types of equipment.
    Most electrical protective equipment presently being manufactured 
meets existing ASTM standards. Because of this, OSHA's adoption of 
these newer ASTM design and test specifications would have little 
impact on employee safety without the adoption of corresponding 
requirements on the use and care of the equipment. Therefore, to 
maximize efficient use of the Agency's available resources, this 
revision does not include ASTM requirements for these other types of 
electrical protective equipment, but such provisions are being 
considered for future rulemaking. In this way, all of the newer types 
of equipment can be dealt with at one time, and provisions on care and 
use can be included.
    Paragraph (a). Paragraph (a) of the revision to Sec. 1910.137 
addresses the design and manufacture of insulating blankets, matting, 
covers, line hose, gloves, and sleeves made of rubber (either natural 
or synthetic). For the reasons noted earlier, other types of equipment 
are not covered. However, the standard does not preclude their use.
    Under paragraph (a)(1)(i), blankets, gloves, and sleeves have to be 
manufactured without seams. This method of making the protective 
equipment minimizes the chances of separation of the material. Because 
they are used to permit workers to handle energized lines, gloves and 
sleeves are the only defense an employee has against electric shock. 
Additionally, blankets, gloves, and sleeves need to be seamless because 
of the stresses placed on the equipment by the flexing of the rubber 
during normal use. The other three types of electrical protective 
equipment (covers, line hose, and matting) generally provide a more 
indirect form of protection--they insulate the live parts from 
accidental, rather than intended, contact--and they are not usually 
subject to similar amounts or types of flexing.
    Two commenters were concerned that existing sleeves were not 
manufactured by a seamless process (Ex 3-42, 3-112). They recommended 
exempting existing stocks of these items or eliminating the application 
of this requirement to sleeves. However, Mr. Arthur Lewis noted that 
all equipment addressed in proposed paragraph (a)(1)(i) has been ``made 
utilizing a seamless process [DC Tr. 354].'' He further stated:


    Items made in a mold process frequently have a raised portion 
along the juncture of the two halves of the mold. This is not a 
seam. Examination of a cross-section of the material at that point 
will show it to be homogeneous. To the best of my knowledge, there 
is no equipment used in industry today * * * that would be in 
violation of the proposed 1910.137 standard or the relevant ASTM 
standards [DC Tr. 354].


    On the basis of Mr. Lewis's testimony, OSHA believes that there is 
no reason to exempt existing sleeves from the requirement that they be 
manufactured by a seamless process. Therefore, no change has been made 
to the language contained in Sec. 1910.137(a)(1)(i).
    Paragraph (a)(1)(ii) requires electrical protective equipment to be 
marked to indicate its class and type. The class marking gives an 
indication of the voltage with which the equipment can be used; the 
type marking indicates whether or not the equipment is ozone resistant. 
This will enable employees to know the uses and voltages for which the 
equipment is suited. Paragraph (a)(1)(ii) also permits equipment to 
contain other relevant markings.
    Paragraph (a)(1)(iii) requires all markings to be nonconductive and 
to be applied so that the properties of the equipment are not impaired. 
This will ensure that no marking interferes with the protection to be 
provided by the equipment.
    Paragraph (a)(1)(iv) requires markings on gloves to be provided 
only in the cuff area. Markings in other areas could possibly be worn 
off. Moreover, having the markings in one place will allow the employee 
to determine the class and type of glove quickly. Paragraph (b)(1)(vii) 
of Sec. 1910.137 normally requires rubber gloves to be worn under 
protector gloves. Because a protector glove is almost always shorter 
than the corresponding rubber glove with which it is worn and because 
the cuff of the protector glove can easily be pulled back without 
removal, it is easy to see markings on the cuff portion of the rubber 
glove beneath. Any marking provided on the rubber glove in an area 
outside of the cuff could not be seen with the protector glove in 
place.
    Under the national consensus standards (both the formerly 
referenced and the newer versions), electrical protective equipment 
must be capable of passing certain electrical tests. In 
Sec. 1910.137(a)(2), OSHA is continuing these requirements. The tests 
specified in the ASTM standards are very detailed. This is not the case 
in the OSHA standard. Through the use of performance language, the 
final rule establishes the same level of protection without a lengthy 
discussion of test procedures.
    Paragraph (a)(2)(i) requires electrical protective equipment to be 
capable of withstanding the a-c proof-test voltages in Table I-2 or the 
d-c proof-test voltages in Table I-3 (depending, of course, on whether 
an a-c proof test or an equivalent d-c proof test is performed). The 
proof-test voltages listed in these tables have been taken from the 
current ASTM standards, which also contain details of the test 
procedures used to determine whether electrical protective equipment is 
capable of withstanding these voltages. These details have not been 
included in the final rule. Paragraph (a)(2)(i)(A) replaces them with a 
performance-oriented requirement that whatever test is used must 
reliably indicate that the equipment can withstand the proof-test 
voltage involved. (This provision was contained in the text of proposed 
paragraph (a)(2)(i).) To meet the requirements of the OSHA performance 
standard, employers would have to get the assurance of the manufacturer 
that the equipment is capable of withstanding the appropriate proof-
test voltage. The manufacturer, in turn, would normally look to the 
ASTM standards for guidance in determining the testing procedure.
    Paragraph (a)(2)(i)(B) requires the proof-test voltage to be 
applied for 1 minute for insulating matting and for 3 minutes for other 
insulating equipment. (This provision was also part of the text of 
proposed paragraph (a)(2)(i).) These times are based on the proof-test 
times given in the ASTM design standards and are appropriate for 
testing the design capabilities of electrical protective equipment.
    Some commenters suggested adding a requirement for gloves to be 
able to withstand the proof-test voltage after a 16-hour water soak 
(Ex. 3-50, 3-57). Siebe North, Inc., tested rubber insulating gloves of 
some manufacturers and found them to absorb water, causing a reduction 
in insulating properties (Ex. 3-50). They claimed that water absorption 
is a critical property because exposure to perspiration or rain is 
quite common while lineman's gloves are in use. These commenters also 
noted that provisions for a proof test after a water soak are included 
in ASTM D120-87. OSHA's expert witness also supported the inclusion of 
a moisture absorption/proof test in the final standard (Ex. 17; DC Tr. 
357).
    The reduction of insulation that may be caused by absorption of 
moisture is a legitimate concern, one that is addressed in ASTM D120 
but was not covered in the OSHA proposal. Although a requirement for a 
soak test was not included in the proposal, the inclusion of such a 
rule in the final standard is a natural outgrowth of the requirement 
proposed in paragraph (a)(2)(i) that electrical protective equipment be 
tested and that the proof test reliably indicate that the equipment can 
withstand the voltage involved. Electrical work is sometimes performed 
in the rain, and an employee's perspiration is often present while the 
gloves are in use (Ex. 3-50). The soak test is needed to ensure that 
electrical protective equipment can withstand the voltage involved 
under these conditions. Therefore, the Agency has accepted the 
suggestion that rubber gloves also be capable of passing the proof test 
after a 16-hour water soak (consistent with the ASTM standard) and has 
added such a requirement as paragraph (a)(2)(i)(C) in the final rule.
    When an a-c proof test is used on gloves, the resulting proof-test 
current gives an indication of the validity of the glove make-up, the 
dielectric constant of the type of material used, its thickness, and 
the total area under test. Paragraph (a)(2)(ii) prohibits the a-c 
proof-test current from exceeding the current allowed in Table I-2. 
Again, the currents listed in the table have been taken from ASTM D120-
87.
    Under paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(A), the maximum current for a-c voltages 
at frequencies other than 60 hertz would be computed from the direct 
ratio of the frequencies. This provision was contained in the text of 
paragraph (a)(2)(ii) in the proposal.
    Gloves are filled with and immersed in water during the a-c proof 
test, and the water inside and outside the glove forms the electrodes. 
Several commenters noted that the a-c proof-test current was dependent 
on the length of the portion of the glove that was out of water (Ex. 3-
50, 3-57, 3-112). Mr. Arthur Lewis, OSHA's expert witness stated:

    Additionally, the proof-test limits specified in Table I-2 
depend upon specific immersion depths specified in the ASTM 
standard. Less immersion results in lower leakage current. Unless 
the OSHA regulation controls clearance above the water line, gloves 
which would fail ASTM D-120 or F-496 could pass the OSHA 
requirement, resulting in substantially lower level of protection. 
[DC Tr. 358-359]

    Mr. Lewis and two of the commenters, Siebe North, Inc. (Ex. 3-50), 
and W. H. Salisbury and Co. (Ex. 3-57), suggested adding a table for 
water immersion depths derived from ASTM D120. OSHA has accepted this 
suggestion. The Agency agrees that, because the proof-test current is a 
function of immersion depth, it is important to specify the depth in 
the regulation. Otherwise, employee safety could be compromised. 
Therefore, paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B) in the final standard specifies that 
gloves to be tested must be filled with and immersed in water to the 
depth given in Table I-4. This table was taken directly from ASTM D120-
87 and is valid for the proof-test currents listed in Table I-2.
    The allowable proof-test current must be increased for proof-tests 
on gloves after a 16-hour water soak. ASTM D120-87 allows an increase 
in the proof-test current of 2 milliamperes. OSHA has adopted this 
provision, recommended by Mr. Lewis (Ex. 17, DC Tr. 359), as paragraph 
(a)(2)(ii)(C).
    Since the relatively high voltages used in testing electrical 
protective equipment for minimum breakdown voltage can actually damage 
the insulating material under test (even if it passes), paragraph 
(a)(2)(iii) prohibits protective equipment that has been subjected to 
such a test from being used to protect employees from electrical 
hazards. Some comments suggested defining the term ``minimum breakdown 
voltage test'' (Ex. 3-21, 3-50, 3-112, 3-120). Most of these comments 
agreed that the standard should refer to the ASTM specifications for 
this test.
    OSHA agrees that the intent of the standard is to prohibit the use 
of equipment that has been tested under conditions equivalent to those 
in the ASTM standards for minimum breakdown voltage tests. However, the 
standard already references the ASTM standards as a reference in a note 
following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B). Rather than reference these 
standards every place a different test is mentioned in the OSHA 
regulation, the Agency has decided to clarify the note to indicate that 
all the tests given in Sec. 1910.137(a) are described in the consensus 
documents. Towards this end, the following paragraph has been added to 
the note:

    These [ASTM] standards contain specifications for conducting the 
various tests required in paragraph (a) of this section. For 
example, the a-c and d-c proof tests, the breakdown test, the water 
soak procedure, and the ozone test mentioned in this paragraph are 
described in detail in the ASTM standards.

    This does not mean that OSHA is adopting the ASTM standards by 
reference. In enforcing Sec. 1910.137, the Agency will accept any test 
that meets the requirements of the OSHA standard. However, the final 
rule states explicitly that the ASTM tests listed in the note are 
acceptable; and, if the ASTM specifications are met, an employer has 
assurance that he or she is complying with Sec. 1910.137. If an 
employer uses other test methods, the Agency will determine, on a case-
by-case basis, whether or not they meet the Federal standard.
    Around high voltage lines and equipment, a luminous discharge, 
called electric corona, can occur due to ionization of the surrounding 
air caused by a voltage gradient which exceeds a certain critical 
value. The blue corona discharge is accompanied by a hissing noise and 
by ozone, which can cause damage to certain types of rubber insulating 
materials. Therefore, when there is a chance that ozone may be produced 
at a work location, electrical protective equipment made of ozone-
resistant material is frequently used. To ensure that ozone-resistant 
material will, in fact, be resistant to the damaging effects of the 
gas, paragraph (a)(2)(iv) requires this type of material to be capable 
of withstanding an ozone test.
    Two commenters were concerned that the ozone test was not specified 
or defined in proposed Sec. 1910.137(a)(2)(iv) (Ex. 3-50, 3-57). To 
address this concern, OSHA has included, in paragraph (a)(2)(iv) of 
final Sec. 1910.137, a requirement that the ozone test reliably 
indicate that the material will resist ozone exposure in actual use. As 
noted earlier, standardized ozone tests are given in the ASTM 
specifications. The final rule also lists signs of failure of the test, 
such as checking, cracking, breaks, and pitting.
    Paragraph (a)(3) applies to the workmanship and finish of 
electrical protective equipment. Because physical irregularities can 
interfere with the insulating properties of the equipment, paragraph 
(a)(3)(i) prohibits the presence of harmful defects that can be 
detected by the tests or inspections required under Sec. 1910.137. 
However, some minor irregularities are nearly unavoidable in the 
manufacture of rubber goods, and these imperfections may be present in 
the insulating materials without significantly affecting the 
insulation. Paragraph (a)(3)(ii) lists the types of imperfections that 
are permitted. Even with these imperfections, electrical protective 
equipment is still required to be capable of passing the electrical 
tests specified in paragraph (a)(2).
    Proposed paragraph (a)(3)(i) referred to ``harmful physical 
irregularities which can be detected by thorough test or inspection.'' 
OSHA has revised this phrase to read ``harmful physical irregularities 
that can be detected by the tests or inspections required under this 
section.'' The Agency intended ``thorough test or inspection'' to be 
those required under Sec. 1910.137, but this was not explicit in the 
proposed text. The language contained in the final rule clearly 
reflects the intent of this provision.
    Two commenters objected to proposed paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(C) (Ex.   
3-50, 3-57). They claimed that this provision dealt only with the 
cosmetics of the gloves and not with their safety. These commenters 
were joined by OSHA's expert witness, Mr. Arthur Lewis (Ex. 17), in 
citing the ASTM D120-87 requirement that was the basis for this 
paragraph, which states:

    (Section 11.2) The working area of the glove on both the inner 
and outer surfaces shall also be free of nonharmful physical 
irregularities * * * [Ex. 2-9]

    This language, they noted, prohibited ``nonharmful'' irregularities 
only. They argued that omitting the provision would have no effect on 
employee safety, because harmful abnormalities would be prohibited 
under proposed paragraph (a)(3)(ii) generally. For example, a color 
splash on the surface of the glove may not interfere with the 
insulating capabilities or the mechanical characteristics of the glove. 
The two commenters and OSHA's expert witness believed that, although 
such an irregularity would affect the appearance of the glove, the 
imperfection would not adversely impact employee safety. OSHA has 
accepted this reasoning and proposed paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(C) is not 
contained in the final rule.
    Since paragraph (a) of Sec. 1910.137 is written in performance-
oriented language, OSHA believes that it is important for employees, 
employers, and manufacturers to have some guidance in terms of what is 
acceptable under the final standard. OSHA also realizes that the 
current ASTM specifications on electrical protective equipment are 
accepted by industry as providing safety to employees and that existing 
electrical protective equipment is normally made to these 
specifications. Furthermore, the final rule is based on the provisions 
of these national consensus standards, although the requirements are 
stated in performance terms. OSHA has therefore included a footnote at 
the end of paragraph (a) stating that rubber insulating equipment 
meeting the requirements of the listed ASTM standards for this 
equipment are considered as conforming to the requirements contained in 
Sec. 1910.137. The lists of ASTM standards in the final rule (in the 
notes following paragraphs (a)(3)(ii)(B) and (b)(2)(ix)) contain the 
latest revisions of the standards listed in the proposal. The Agency 
has reviewed these documents and has found them to provide suitable 
guidance for compliance with the OSHA standard.
    Paragraph (b). Although former Sec. 1910.137 does not contain 
provisions for the care and use of insulating equipment, OSHA believes 
provisions of this type can contribute greatly to employee safety. 
Electrical protective equipment is, in large part, manufactured in 
accordance with the latest ASTM standards. This would probably be the 
case even in the absence of OSHA regulation. However, improper use and 
care of this equipment can easily reduce, or even eliminate, the 
protection afforded by this equipment. Therefore, OSHA is adding new 
requirements on the in-service care and use of electrical protective 
equipment to the design standards already contained in former 
Sec. 1910.137. These new provisions will help ensure that these safety 
products retain their insulating properties.
    Paragraph (b)(1) requires electrical protective equipment to be 
maintained in a safe and reliable condition. This general, performance-
oriented requirement, which applies to all equipment addressed by 
revised Sec. 1910.137, helps ensure that employees are fully protected 
from electric shock.
    Detailed criteria for the use and care of specific types of 
electrical protective equipment are contained in the following ASTM 
standards:

ASTM F 478-92, Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating Line 
Hose and Covers.
ASTM F 479-88a, Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating 
Blankets.
ASTM F 496-91, Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating 
Gloves and Sleeves.

    Paragraph (b) (2), which has been derived from these ASTM 
standards, applies only to rubber insulating blankets, covers, line 
hose, gloves, and sleeves. These are the only types of electrical 
protective equipment addressed by consensus standards on the care and 
use of such equipment. Rubber insulating matting, which is addressed by 
the material design specifications in paragraph (a), is not covered by 
any ASTM standard on its in-service care or by Sec. 1910.137(b)(2). 
This type of equipment is generally permanently installed to provide 
supplementary protection against electric shock. Employees stand on the 
matting, and they are insulated from ground, which protects them from 
phase-to-ground electric shock. However, because this type of equipment 
is normally left in place after it is installed and because it is not 
relied on for primary protection from electric shock (the primary 
protection is provided by other insulating equipment or by insulating 
tools), it is not tested on a periodic basis and is not subject to the 
careful inspection before use that other insulating equipment is 
required to receive. It should be noted, however, that rubber 
insulating matting is required to be maintained in a safe, reliable 
condition under paragraph (b)(1).
    Although the rubber insulating equipment addressed in 
Sec. 1910.137(a) is currently designed to be capable of withstanding 
voltages of up to 40 kilovolts, such equipment is actually intended to 
be used at lower voltages (Ex. 2-10 through 2-17). The use of 
insulating equipment at voltages less than its actual breakdown voltage 
provides a margin of safety for the employee. In paragraph (b)(2)(i) 
and Table I-5, the final rule has adopted the margins of safety 
recognized in the ASTM standards, restricting the use of insulating 
equipment to voltages lower than the proof-test voltages given in Table 
I-2 and Table I-3. (Table I-5 in the final rule was originally proposed 
as Table I-4.)
    Several comments addressed Note 1 to proposed Table I-4 (Ex. 3-23, 
3-51, 3-64, 3-112). The proposed note read as follows:

    The maximum use voltage is the a-c voltage (rms) classification 
of the protective equipment that designates the maximum nominal 
design voltage of the energized system that may be safely worked. 
The nominal design voltage is equal to the phase-to-phase voltage on 
multiphase circuits. If there is no multiphase exposure in a system 
area and if the voltage exposure is limited to the phase-to-ground 
potential, the phase-to-ground potential is considered to be the 
nominal design voltage.

    This language was taken from comparable provisions in the ASTM 
standards on the in-service use and care of electrical protective 
equipment (for example, ASTM F496-85, section 4.15). However, the ASTM 
standards had an additional provision for recognizing the phase-to-
ground voltage as the nominal design voltage. Typically, this provision 
read as follows:

    If electrical equipment and devices are insulated, or isolated, 
or both, such that the multiphase exposure on a grounded wye circuit 
is removed, then the nominal design voltage may be considered as the 
phase-to-ground voltage on that circuit. [ASTM F496-85, section 
4.15.2; Ex. 2-17]

    In proposing the original note, OSHA interpreted the language as 
already recognizing the elimination of multiphase exposure through the 
use of insulation or other means. In other words, assuming that the 
multiphase exposure was eliminated before an employee had to rely on 
the insulation provided by the electrical protective equipment, OSHA 
was permitting the phase-to-ground voltage to be considered as the 
maximum use voltage. For example, a three-phase, Y-connected overhead 
distribution system could be run as three phase conductors with a 
neutral or as three single phase circuits with one phase conductor and 
a neutral each. If only one phase conductor is present on a pole, there 
is no multiphase exposure. If all three phase conductors are present, 
the multiphase exposure can be removed by insulating two of the phases 
or by isolating8 two of the phases. After the insulation is in 
place or while the employee is isolated from the other two phase 
conductors, there is no multiphase exposure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\Depending on the configuration of the system, an employee 
could be isolated from two of the phases on the pole by approaching 
one of the outside phase conductors and working on it from a 
position where there is no possibility of coming too close to the 
other two phase conductors. Isolation of the employee may be 
impossible for some line configurations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The commenters universally interpreted the proposal differently and 
mistakenly believed that OSHA was eliminating the option of removing an 
existing multiphase exposure. They argued that the consensus wording 
should be included to differentiate the case in which there is no 
multiphase exposure initially present from the case in which the 
exposure has been removed. ASTM, itself, suggested adding this language 
to provide for consistency with the referenced standard and accepted 
industry practice (Ex. 3-51).
    OSHA has modified the language of Note 1 to Table I-5 in order to 
recognize explicitly the removal of multiphase exposure as a means of 
reducing the nominal design voltage. Although the proposed language 
meant the same thing as the final regulatory text, OSHA has included 
the ASTM language for consistency with the consensus standards. The 
Agency believes that this will make the final standard easier to use by 
those who are familiar with the ASTM standards and will minimize the 
confusion that might otherwise result. (It should be noted that, until 
the multiphase exposure has actually been removed, the phase-to-phase 
voltage remains the maximum use voltage.)
    Paragraph (b)(2)(ii) requires insulating equipment to be visually 
inspected before use each day and immediately after any incident which 
might be suspected of causing damage. In this way, obvious defects can 
be detected before an accident occurs. Possible damage-causing 
incidents would include exposure to corona and exposure to possible 
direct physical damage. Additionally, rubber gloves must be subjected 
to an air test along with the inspection. In the field, this test 
usually consists of rolling the cuff towards the palm so that air is 
entrapped within the glove. In a testing facility, a mechanical 
inflater may be used. In either case, punctures and cuts can easily be 
detected.
    During use, electrical protective equipment may become damaged and 
lose some of its insulating value. Paragraph (b)(2)(iii) lists types of 
damage which would cause the insulating value to drop. The equipment 
may not be used if any of these defects are present.
    Defects other than those listed in paragraph (b)(2)(iii) may 
develop during use of the equipment and could also affect the 
insulating and mechanical properties of the equipment. If such defects 
are found, paragraph (b)(2)(iv) requires the equipment to be removed 
from service and tested in accordance with other requirements in 
paragraph (b)(2). The results of the tests determine if it is safe to 
return the items to service.
    Foreign substances on the surface of rubber insulating equipment 
can degrade the material and lead to damage to the insulation. 
Paragraph (b)(2)(v) requires the equipment to be cleaned as needed to 
remove any foreign substances.
    Over time, certain environmental conditions can also cause 
deterioration of rubber insulating equipment. Paragraph (b)(2)(vi) 
requires insulating equipment to be stored so that it is protected from 
injurious conditions and substances, such as light, temperature 
extremes, excessive humidity, and ozone. This requirement helps the 
equipment retain its insulating properties as it ages.
    Several electric utility representatives objected to this provision 
(Ex. 3-11, 3-33, 3-44, 3-58, 3-123). They claimed that rubber 
protective equipment was stored on trucks and that it was impossible, 
in many parts of the country, to protect it from temperature extremes 
and excess humidity. However, this is the method utilities use to 
transport the equipment to the worksite; OSHA does not consider 
carrying the equipment on trucks for the use of employees during the 
course of work to be storage. Furthermore, the Agency does not believe 
that it is safe to store the equipment on trucks for extended periods 
between use if such storage would expose the equipment to extremes of 
temperature or humidity. It may be necessary, under some circumstances, 
to store equipment indoors during prolonged periods when employees 
would not be using it. Workers are dependent upon electrical protective 
equipment for their safety, and all reasonable means of protecting it 
from unnecessary damage must be employed. Therefore, OSHA has retained 
this requirement as proposed.
    Rubber insulating gloves are particularly sensitive to physical 
damage during use. Through handling conductors and other electrical 
equipment, an employee can damage the gloves and lose the protection 
they provide. For example, a sharp point on the end of a conductor 
could puncture the rubber. To protect against damage, protector gloves 
(made of leather) are worn over the rubber gloves. Paragraph 
(b)(2)(vii) recognizes the extra protection afforded by leather gloves 
and requires their use over rubber gloves, except under limited 
conditions.
    Protector gloves would not be required with Class 0 gloves if high 
finger dexterity is needed for small parts manipulation. The maximum 
voltage on which Class 0 gloves can be used is 1000 volts. An employee 
is protected against electric shock at this voltage as long as a live 
part does not puncture the rubber and contact the employee's hand. The 
type of small parts encountered in work on energized circuits, such as 
small nuts and washers, are not likely to do this. While the exception 
is necessary to allow work to be performed on small energized parts, 
extra care is needed in the visual examination of the glove and in the 
avoidance of handling sharp objects (Ex. 17). (A note to this effect 
has been added in the final rule.)
    The other exception to the requirement for protector gloves is 
granted if the employer can demonstrate that the possibility for damage 
is low and if gloves at least one class higher than required for the 
voltage are used. For example, if a Class 2 glove is used at 7500 volts 
or less (the maximum use voltage for Class 1 equipment), if high 
dexterity is needed, and if the possibility of damage is low, then 
protector gloves need not be used. In this case, the additional 
thickness of insulation provides a measure of additional physical 
protection. This exception does not apply when the possibility of 
damage is significant, such as when an employee is using a knife to 
trim insulation from a conductor or when an employee has to handle 
moving parts, such as conductors being pulled into place. To ensure 
that no loss of insulation has occurred, the standard requires any 
gloves used under this exception to be tested before being used at a 
voltage higher than that permitted for the lower class of insulating 
equipment.
    Paragraph (b)(2)(viii), Table I-5, and Table I-6 (proposed Tables 
I-4 and I-5) require insulating equipment to be tested periodically so 
that electrical protective equipment retains its insulating properties 
over time. Table I-5 lists the retest voltages that are required for 
the various classes of protective equipment, and Table I-6 presents the 
testing intervals for the different types of equipment. These test 
voltages and intervals were taken from the relevant ASTM standards.
    Proposed Table I-4 contained a note allowing for the reduction in 
test voltages for equipment used at voltages lower than the maximum use 
voltages given in the table. A formula for determining the appropriate 
test voltage was given in proposed Note 2.
    Three commenters expressed concern with this proposed note (Ex. 3-
51, 3-64, 3-107). ASTM recommended the removal of this note from the 
standard, stating:

    Note 2 under Table [I-4] provides for proof-test voltages less 
than those listed in the relevant ASTM standards, if nominal 
voltages are less than the maximum use voltages. This provision and 
formula was provided in the ASTM standards during an interim 
transition period while users' equipment changed from the old 
voltage classes to the new voltage classes. For instance, Class 2 
gloves made to the J-6 set of standards were thinner and rated at 
15,000 volts. If repeatedly tested to the current proof-test voltage 
of Class 2 material of 20,000 volts there would have been the 
possibility of above normal loss of protective equipment during 
tests. The same was true of equipment made to the two higher voltage 
classes. Such equipment has now been almost completely removed from 
use and equipment manufactured since about 1975 has been 
manufactured to withstand the proof-test voltages of the new voltage 
classes without excessive failure rates. This note either has been 
or is in the process of being removed from all the relevant ASTM 
standards. [Ex. 3-51]

    The other two commenters and OSHA's expert witness, Mr. Arthur 
Lewis, supported the elimination of this note (Tr. DC-357). OSHA 
accepts the reasoning in these comments, and the proposed note does not 
appear in the final rule.
    The proposal did not address the amount of time the test voltage 
was to be applied to the protective equipment. Applying the voltage for 
too short a period of time might allow marginal goods to pass the test, 
while longer test times would cause good equipment to fail at a higher 
than normal rate. Several commenters alluded to this problem (3-51, 3-
64, 3-65, 3-107, 3-123, 17). A test interval of from 1 to 3 minutes was 
suggested for consistency with the ASTM in-service standards. OSHA has 
accepted this suggestion and has included it as a note to Table I-5.
    Paragraph (b)(2)(ix) sets forth a performance-oriented requirement 
that the method used for the periodic tests give a reliable indication 
of whether or not the electrical protective equipment can withstand the 
voltages involved. In a performance-oriented standard, it would not be 
appropriate to spell out detailed procedures for the required tests, 
which vary depending on the type of equipment being tested. On the 
other hand, OSHA believes that it is important for employees, 
employers, and testing laboratories to have some guidance in terms of 
what is acceptable under the proposed standard. Therefore, under 
paragraph (b)(2)(ix), OSHA has included a note stating that electrical 
test methods given in the various ASTM standards on rubber insulating 
equipment meet the performance requirement. As noted earlier, this does 
not mean that OSHA is adopting the ASTM standards by reference. In 
enforcing Sec. 1910.137(b)(2), the Agency will accept any test that 
meets the requirements of the OSHA standard. However, the final rule 
states explicitly that the listed ASTM tests are acceptable; and, if 
the ASTM specifications are met, an employer has assurance that he or 
she is complying with Sec. 1910.137. If an employer uses other test 
methods, the Agency will determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether or 
not they meet the Federal standard.
    In the notice of proposed rulemaking, OSHA requested comments on 
whether the listed ASTM standards were appropriate and on whether there 
were other acceptable test methods that should also have been listed. 
The comments were nearly universal in support of the consensus 
standards (Ex. 3-50, 3-51, 3-57, 3-64, 3-107). Countering these 
comments, the Edison Electric Institute claimed that there were other 
acceptable test methods not recognized by ASTM and suggested that OSHA 
remove the list of their standards from the regulation (3-112). 
However, EEI did not submit any other test methods into the record for 
evaluation by the Agency. Therefore, OSHA is not listing any references 
in addition to those given in the proposal. As noted earlier, OSHA will 
accept other test methods meeting the performance requirements set out 
in Sec. 1910.137. Also, the Agency believes that referencing acceptable 
test methods within the standard will benefit employees, employers, and 
testing laboratories in their efforts to comply with the standard. The 
mere existence of other acceptable methods of testing electrical 
protective equipment does not justify removing the list of methods that 
OSHA does recognize.
    Once the equipment has been tested, it is important to ensure that 
any failed equipment is not returned to service. Paragraph (b)(2)(x) 
prohibits electrical protective equipment that failed the required 
tests from being used by employees, unless the defects can be safely 
eliminated.
    For electrical protective equipment that fails the test, paragraph 
(b)(2)(x) also lists acceptable means of rendering the equipment fit 
for use. Sometimes defective portions of rubber line hose and blankets 
can be removed. The result would be a smaller blanket or a shorter 
length of line hose. Obviously, gloves and sleeves cannot be repaired 
in this manner; however, there are methods of patching them if the 
defects are minor. Rubber blankets can also be patched. The patched 
area must have electrical and physical properties equal to those of the 
material being repaired. To minimize the possibility that a patch will 
loosen or fail, the standard does not permit repairs to gloves outside 
the gauntlet area. In response to requests for a definition of the term 
``gauntlet area'' (Ex. 3-44, 3-58, 3-65, 3-112), OSHA has replaced that 
term from paragraph (b)(2)(x)(D) of the proposal with the expression 
``the area between the wrist and the reinforced edge of the opening''. 
This language was taken directly from ASTM F496-85 (Ex. 2-17).
    Several commenters objected to allowing patches to rubber 
protective equipment (3-50, 3-57, 3-66, 3-69). However, they provided 
no evidence that patched gloves have failed. Additionally, the ASTM 
standards recognize such repairs, and the standard requires repaired 
equipment to pass a retest before being placed back into service. For 
these reasons, OSHA has retained the provision allowing patches to 
rubber protective equipment in the final rule.
    Once the insulating equipment has been repaired, it must be 
retested to ensure that any patches are effective and that there are no 
other defects present. Such retests are required under paragraph 
(b)(2)(xi).
    Employers, employees, and OSHA compliance staff must have a method 
of determining whether or not the tests required under paragraphs 
(b)(2)(viii) and (b)(2)(xi) have been performed. Paragraph (b)(2)(xii) 
requires this to be accomplished by means of certification by the 
employer that equipment has been tested in accordance with the 
standard. The certification is required to identify the equipment that 
passed the test and the date it was tested. Typical means of meeting 
this requirement include logs and stamping test dates on the equipment.
    Many commenters suggested that OSHA clarify this requirement (Ex. 
3-11, 3-33, 3-39, 3-44, 3-45, 3-58, 3-69). In general, they objected to 
the use of the words ``certify'' and ``certification'' in the rule and 
recommended the words ``document'' and ``documentation'' in their 
stead. In support of these comments, Mr. Arthur Lewis stated:

    Many employers have independent testing facilities and these 
facilities do certify their test results. The employer can only 
maintain the documentation of those testing programs and the records 
of the results. Since employers do not perform the actual tests, 
even in their own companies, I recommend that a note be added after 
this requirement to read as follows:

    Note: This certification may be in the form of logs or test 
records commonly found in industry. Such logs or other records shall 
identify the equipment that passed the test and the date it was 
tested. [Ex. 17]

    OSHA believes that the intent of the proposed standard may not have 
been clear with respect to what forms of documentation are acceptable 
means of ``certification''. Therefore, the Agency has decided to add a 
explanatory note to paragraph (b)(2)(xii) in the final rule. The note, 
which is patterned after the first sentence in Mr. Lewis's 
recommendation, reads as follows:

    Note: Marking of equipment and entering the results of the tests 
and the dates of testing onto logs are two acceptable means of 
meeting this requirement.

B. Section 1910.269

    OSHA is adding a new section to the General Industry Standards. 
This new section is being added to Subpart R, Special Industries, and 
is designated Sec. 1910.269. New Sec. 1910.269 contains requirements 
for the prevention of injuries to employees performing operation or 
maintenance work on electric power generation, transmission, or 
distribution installations.
    Two issues listed in the hearing notice affect the entire standard. 
Additionally, two other issues raised at the hearing and in the 
comments are general in nature. These four issues are as follows:
    (1) Whether or not a provision should be included to 
``grandfather'' all existing equipment and installations from the 
specifications in the standard;
    (2) Whether or not the standard should be more performance 
oriented;
    (3) Whether OSHA should more closely follow the EEI/IBEW draft 
standard; and
    (4) Whether or not health issues, such as exposure to 
electromagnetic radiation or asbestos, should be addressed in this 
standard.
    These four issues will be discussed first. Individual provisions 
contained in the new standard and related issues are discussed 
immediately afterwards.
    Grandfathering. Many commenters, representing affected employers, 
requested some general form of exemption for existing power generation, 
transmission, and distribution installations from Sec. 1910.269 (Ex. 3-
26, 3-42, 3-62, 3-80, 3-110, 3-112, 3-123, 56; DC Tr. 718, 831-838, 
1144-1146; LA Tr. 409). Such an exemption is commonly referred to as 
``grandfathering''. The objections listed proposed paragraph (h)(4) on 
step bolts and manhole steps, paragraphs (u)(1) and (v)(3) on access 
and working space about electric equipment, and paragraphs (u)(4) and 
(v)(4) on guarding of live parts as requirements that would force 
extensive modification of existing installations. The commenters were 
also concerned that OSHA's economic analysis did not fully account for 
the cost of ``retroactively'' applying the requirements of the standard 
to existing installations.
    The American Public Power Association (APPA), whose arguments were 
cited by several other commenters, presented the best evidence 
supporting a general grandfather provision, as follows:

    Certain provisions of the proposed rule could be interpreted to 
require extensive modification of existing utility work practices, 
and installations and equipment which, when originally constructed, 
complied with applicable regulatory requirements. The retroactive 
application of the requirements in the proposed rule to these 
facilities is unfair and will impose a tremendous financial burden 
upon the electric utility industry. The Agency has not adequately 
considered, much less justified, this aspect of the proposed rule. 
The Agency has made no effort to demonstrate that the safety 
benefits, if any, of retrofitting existing installations and 
equipment justify the substantial costs involved in such efforts.
* * * * *
    APPA therefore recommends that existing installations and 
equipment should be exempted (i.e., ``grandfathered'') from the 
requirements of the rule. [Ex. 3-80]

    EEI supported the adoption of the language contained in the 
``grandfather'' provision of the EEI/IBEW draft standard, which read as 
follows:

    Existing facilities are not required to be modified to conform 
to the requirements of applicable standards in this section, 
provided the maintenance and operation are performed in accordance 
with the work rules and regulations of this section to the extent 
existing physical facilities permit. Where existing facilities do 
not permit compliance with this standard, the employer shall so far 
as possible provide employment and places of employment which are as 
safe and healthful as those which would prevail if the employer 
complied with this standard. [Ex. 2-3]

    EEI argued that they did not intend for the grandfathering concept 
to deprive electric utility employees of the protection that would 
otherwise be provided by the standard (Ex. 56). They claimed that this 
EEI/IBEW draft provision, which was taken in part from the general duty 
clause of the OSH Act,9 would require employers ``to provide 
employees with a level of protection equivalent to that which the 
standard would require in those instances in which a utility does not 
want to modify existing facilities to comply with the final standard 
[Ex. 56].''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Section 5(a)(1) of the OSH Act, known as the General duty 
clause, reads as follows: [Each employer] shall furnish to each of 
his employees employment and a place of employment which are free 
from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause 
death or serious harm to his employees . . .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter opposed the adoption of an omnibus exemption for 
existing installations (Ex. 3-122). He maintained that 
``grandfathering'' would result in additional deaths with no 
responsibility on the part of industry.
    OSHA has concluded that applying final Sec. 1910.269 without a 
general exemption is reasonably necessary and appropriate for employee 
safety. This does not mean, however, that OSHA is not providing any 
relief for employers with existing installations that do not meet the 
design criteria proposed in specific provisions of Sec. 1910.269. The 
Agency is ``grandfathering'' these installations wherever the record 
supports an exemption from the specific requirement involved.
    The standard consists largely of work practice requirements that 
are necessary for employee safety. The Agency believes that it is 
important to apply these work practices in full to existing 
installations, as well as to conductors and equipment that are 
installed in the future. Some of the rules apply to equipment or 
installations; however, they are few in number.
    Additionally, the standard typically provides alternative means of 
compliance for many requirements. If the lines or equipment being 
worked do not permit a specific compliance method to be used, another 
approach is normally available. For example, final Sec. 1910.269(l)(2) 
sets forth minimum approach distances to be maintained from exposed 
energized parts. If the installation does not provide sufficient 
clearance for this distance to be maintained during certain operations 
(as is sometimes the case), alternative means of protecting employees, 
such as insulation, are spelled out in the rule.
    With respect to work practices, OSHA believes that it is important 
for the rule to accept all currently recognized work methods that 
provide an adequate degree of protection, regardless of the age of the 
installation involved. The exemption suggested by the commenters 
implies that other equally effective protective measures are available, 
but are not recognized in the standard. This should not be the case.
    Equipment design and installation presents different problems. Once 
equipment has been installed, it can be very costly to modify. For 
example, switchboards and control panels that were installed 20 years 
ago may not provide as much clearance around energized parts as those 
installed under current consensus standards. Any requirement that 
imposed clearances equalling those of the newer equipment would force 
the older equipment to be modified or replaced. In some cases, an 
entire installation would have to be completely redone. Such 
retrofitting can result in large capital outlays with limited benefits.
    On the other hand, some older equipment may pose such hazards to 
employees that the benefits of retrofitting or rebuilding the 
installation outweigh the costs involved. For example, some 
switchboards that could not be taken out of service (that is, 
deenergized) may have such small clearances around energized parts that 
it would be hazardous to perform any maintenance on the switchboard. 
Safety considerations may indeed dictate modification of the equipment.
    Therefore, while the argument that older equipment needs special 
treatment has merit, a complete exemption of existing equipment from 
all the requirements contained in Sec. 1910.269 is not in the best 
interest of employee safety. In fact, OSHA rarely provides a complete 
exemption from its standards for older equipment or installations; 
rather, a more limited form of ``grandfathering'' is usually provided. 
In some cases, employers are granted delays of several years to allow 
existing equipment to be modified in accordance with the relevant 
requirements.10 Other standards apply to existing equipment only 
in part.11
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\0 See, for example, Sec. 1910.67(b)(1) on aerial lifts and 
Sec. 1926.1000(c) on roll-over protective structures.
    \1\1 See, for example, Sec. 1910.302(b)(1), which specifies 
which requirements of Subpart S apply to all installations 
regardless of their age.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As there are relatively few equipment and installation design 
requirements in Sec. 1910.269, the Agency has decided to provide 
exemptions for existing equipment and installations on a case-by-case 
basis, based on the record. For example, final paragraph (v)(11)(x) 
allows coal conveying systems installed before the effective date of 
the standard to use other protective measures instead of audible 
devices to warn employees of startup of the system. This ``exemption'' 
is based on the record with respect to the proposed requirement for 
audible warning devices. (See the discussion of this requirement later 
in this preamble.) Each provision in the proposed standard that would 
have resulted in substantial capital outlays has been reevaluated in 
light of the record. The Agency's determination in each case is given 
in the preamble discussion of the relevant provision of the final rule.
    OSHA has also decided not to adopt the alternative ``exemption'' 
suggested by EEI. As noted earlier, the Agency believes that all 
generally acceptable alternatives included in the rulemaking record 
should be provided for in the standard. Unique safety techniques 
adopted by a given employer should be handled under OSHA's variance 
procedures. In this manner, all interested parties have an opportunity 
to provide relevant information, and employee safety can be assured. 
Additionally, this approach minimizes enforcement difficulties.
    Performance-oriented requirements. One of the hearing requests 
objected to the lack of performance language in some of the proposed 
regulations (Ex. 3-80). In the hearing notice, public comment was 
invited on the issue of whether any of the proposal's requirements were 
too specification oriented.
    The APPA was concerned about the lack of performance-oriented 
language in certain parts of the proposed rule (Ex. 3-80, 3-119). They 
believed that these parts of the standard could be written to allow 
alternative ways of achieving the same safety-related goals.
    The Agency believes that the proposed rule was written largely in 
performance-oriented terms. The proposal also frequently allowed 
several alternative methods of providing protection from specific 
hazards. For example, proposed Sec. 1910.269(i)(2)(ii) provided three 
alternative methods of protecting employees from ground-fault hazards 
posed by cord- and plug-connected equipment.
    On the other hand, the proposal was not written in vague, general 
language, which can be difficult to enforce. Words such as 
``adequate'', ``appropriate'', and ``suitable'', which appeared in 
several of the source documents (that is, the EEI/IBEW draft,12 
Subpart V, and consensus standards), were not used in the proposed 
standard. Rather, specific performance goals were stated in enforceable 
terms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\2 The IBEW removed much of this type of language from their 
version of the draft (Ex. 2-4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA has reviewed the record on the proposal and has modified the 
language of the proposed rules as appropriate. The discussion of 
individual requirements indicates when the provisions have been 
rewritten in a more performance-oriented manner or have been revised to 
allow additional alternatives.
    EEI/IBEW draft standard. Some commenters and hearing participants 
supported the EEI/IBEW draft standard on electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution work, and many of them recommended that 
OSHA adopt it, either in part or in its entirety (Ex. 3-26, 3-42, 3-66, 
3-80, 3-112, 3-120, 3-123, 56; DC Tr. 786-792, 818, 831-832, 980; LA 
Tr. 216). EEI argued that the EEI/IBEW draft should be used by the 
Agency in drafting the final rule (Ex. 3-112, 56). Their reasoning was 
stated in their prehearing comments as follows:

    As explained more fully below, EEI strongly believes that the 
EEI/IBEW draft, prepared by experienced industry and union experts, 
is superior to the OSHA proposal because it provides more 
appropriate protection for electric utility workers, explains the 
principles and requirements involved in more understandable 
language, and would provide everyone affected by the standard with a 
comprehensive document. Indeed, because the draft was prepared by 
those who know the most about safety in electric utilities--those 
who operate and work in the industry each day--EEI submits that OSHA 
should give considerable deference to the EEI/IBEW draft. This is 
especially so given that the other representatives of electric 
utility employers--the American Public Power Association and the 
National Rural Electric Cooperatives Association--supported the EEI/
IBEW draft. [Ex. 3-112]

    The other major union representing electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution workers, the Utility Workers Union of 
America (UWUA), which represents approximately one third of the 
unionized electric utility work force (DC Tr. 457), did not endorse the 
EEI/IBEW draft standard (DC Tr. 498). Additionally, a significant 
contingent of affected employers, industrial establishments that 
generate, transmit, or distribute their own electric power, did not 
participate in the development of the EEI/IBEW draft.
    EEI represented their draft standard as minimum safety rules that 
were being met under current industry practices (DC Tr. 782, 793, 1109-
1110). They argued that electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work poses a significant risk of serious injury, but that 
electric utility workers do not face a significant risk under current 
industry practice as reflected in their proposal (LA Tr. 316-317).
    The Agency believes that the record clearly demonstrates that the 
EEI/IBEW draft standard represents current practices in the electric 
utility industry, at least to the extent that nearly all electric 
utility employers comply with the rules in that draft. OSHA does not, 
however, agree that electric utility employees are protected from 
significant risk under current industry practices. The final regulatory 
analysis has found 61 fatalities occurring each year in the industry 
under these practices. Many of these deaths are preventable.
    In the case of Sec. 1910.269, the Agency has determined that 
employees are presently facing significant risk. The risk that an 
electric utility employee will be seriously injured or die from a fall 
or an electric shock is significant. OSHA has determined that that risk 
can be reduced by adopting a standard that requires the industry to 
change existing protective measures in certain cases. The areas for 
which this holds true are explained in the discussion of individual 
provisions.
    There are many accident descriptions in the record. The Agency has 
relied heavily on analyses of these accidents in determining the 
content of the final rule. These analyses were used by OSHA to make 
necessary modifications to the EEI/IBEW draft, which was based 
primarily on current industry practice and anecdotal evidence (Ex. 3-
123, 56; DC Tr. 1108-1110). OSHA believes that, because the standard is 
an attempt to reduce the number of injuries and fatalities, thorough 
study of relevant accidents is a necessary part of the standards 
development process.
    Additionally, the OSH Act requires the Agency to look to consensus 
standards for guidance in setting occupational safety standards. 
Section 6(b)(8) of the OSH Act states:

    Whenever a rule promulgated by the Secretary differs 
substantially from an existing national consensus standard, the 
Secretary shall, at the same time, publish in the Federal Register a 
statement of the reasons why the rule as adopted will better 
effectuate the purposes of this Act than the national consensus 
standard.

    Thus, OSHA relies heavily on consensus standards in developing 
requirements for employee safety and health.
    Several consensus standards generally apply to the work covered 
under final Sec. 1910.269: ANSI C2, the ``National Electrical Safety 
Code;'' ANSI Z244.1, ``American National Standard for Personnel 
Protection--Lockout/Tagout of Energy Sources--Minimum Safety 
Requirements;'' and ANSI Z133.1, ``American National Standard for Tree 
Care Operations--Pruning, Trimming, Repairing, Maintaining, and 
Removing Trees, and Cutting Brush--Safety Requirements.'' (The preamble 
discussion of the individual paragraphs indicates where other consensus 
documents have been used.) Under the OSH Act, the Agency must 
demonstrate that any deviations from these standards will better 
protect employees. Therefore, in developing the proposal, OSHA deferred 
to the national consensus standards whenever such standards appeared to 
be more protective than provisions of the EEI/IBEW draft.
    Existing OSHA standards also apply to much of the work addressed by 
Sec. 1910.269. For example, Subpart D of Part 1910 provides 
requirements for walking and working surfaces, including fixed ladders. 
Proposed Sec. 1910.269(h) also contained provisions on ladders. The 
final rule includes only requirements that the record demonstrates 
provide better protection for electric power generation, transmission, 
and distribution workers than those set forth in current Subpart D. 
Also, Subpart V of Part 1926 covers the construction of electric 
transmission and distribution lines. Similarly, final Sec. 1910.269 is 
no less protective than subpart V where identical hazards are addressed 
in the two standards.
    OSHA believes that new standards must build on existing 
requirements. Provisions in the EEI/IBEW draft that were less 
protective than current regulations have not been adopted in the final 
rule.
    For these reasons, OSHA has not simply adopted the EEI/IBEW draft 
standard verbatim. However, the Agency has used the document as a 
foundation for the development of final Sec. 1910.269, modifying it as 
necessary to best protect employees and to meet the requirements of the 
OSH Act. The final rule, based on the record considered as a whole, 
provides reasonably necessary and appropriate protection from 
significant risks faced by electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution workers. Substantial issues raised in the record as a 
result of the difference between the EEI/IBEW draft and the proposal 
are discussed in the explanation of the individual provisions.
    Health considerations. Several persons claimed that the proposal 
did not adequately address issues affecting the health of electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution workers (Ex. 3-21; DC 
Tr. 420-421, 429-431, 475-476). They referred to hazardous exposures to 
lead, asbestos, and electromagnetic radiation as matters that were not 
covered at all. Mr. Eugene Briody of the UWUA noted:

work on electrical transmission involves a lot more than electrical 
[shock] related hazards * * *. I must stress that over the last 
several years that the overwhelming majority of safety complaints 
and occupational related disabilities reported by our members 
working in electrical transmission relate to asbestos, PCBs and lead 
rather than shock, explosions or burns. We must also begin to pay 
attention to the growing evidence concerning the occupational 
hazards of electromagnetic radiation [DC Tr. 420-421].

    OSHA realizes that there are hazards faced by electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution workers that are not 
addressed by Sec. 1910.269. However, the health hazards discussed by 
Mr. Briody, which are found throughout general industry, are more 
appropriately regulated under Subpart Z of part 1910 (for asbestos, 
polychlorinated biphenyls, and lead) and under Sec. 1910.97 (for non-
ionizing radiation) rather than in a standard specific to a particular 
industry sector. Indeed, asbestos and lead have been subjects of 
extensive rulemaking throughout OSHA's history.
    Further, Sec. 1910.269 was proposed as a safety standard, and the 
notices of proposed rulemaking and of public hearing portrayed it this 
way. Most of the commenters were not aware that issues relating to 
health effects of exposures to harmful chemicals or physical agents 
would be raised at the hearing, and most of the hearing participants 
(including the Agency, itself) were not prepared to respond to these 
issues at the hearing. Additionally, the record contains very little 
information on levels of exposure or rates of illness for any toxic 
chemical or harmful physical agent to which electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution workers are exposed. Accordingly, at 
this time, the Agency has no basis on which to expand the scope of 
Sec. 1910.269 to cover health hazards that may be unique to utility 
work. Should such data become available, OSHA will consider whether 
further action is warranted.
    Paragraph (a). Paragraph (a)(1) of Sec. 1910.269 sets forth the 
scope of the standard. Under the terms of paragraph (a)(1)(i), the 
provisions of Sec. 1910.269 apply to the operation and maintenance of 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution systems, to 
electrical testing of such systems, and to line-clearance tree 
trimming. Although the regulation does not define ``operation'' or 
``maintenance'', OSHA intends that the standard cover activity, other 
than construction work covered by Part 1926, associated with electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution installations. The 
standard primarily covers the following types of work operations:
    (1) Inspection,
    (2) Switching (connection and disconnection of facilities),
    (3) Maintenance of lines and equipment,
    (4) Line-clearance tree trimming,
    (5) Testing and fault locating,
    (6) Streetlight relamping,
    (7) Chemical cleaning of boilers, and
    (8) Other operation and maintenance activities.
    According to proposed Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(B), OSHA would only 
have applied the regulation to installations for the generation, 
transmission, or distribution of electric energy that are owned or 
operated by electric utilities and to work performed on such 
installations owned by a utility. The scope of the draft proposal 
submitted by EEI and IBEW was limited to utilities only, and OSHA 
decided to propose that the standard be applied in the same manner. 
However, the notice of proposed rulemaking noted that consideration was 
being given to expanding the scope of the standard. In the preamble to 
the proposal, in the hearing notice, and in the notice reopening the 
record, OSHA solicited comments on the appropriateness of extending 
coverage of the standard to all power generation, transmission, and 
distribution systems. OSHA also requested data on the costs and 
benefits of expanding the scope in this manner.
    Many industrial generation, transmission, and distribution systems 
are essentially the same as those of a utility, and the work performed 
on these systems is nearly identical to that performed on electric 
utility installations. One might assume that electric utility systems 
are of larger capacity than those operated by industrial plants. In 
general this is true, but not always. For example, one generating 
facility for a large steel plant in Sparrows Point, Maryland, has a 
generating capacity of 140 megawatts with a generating voltage of 13 
kilovolts and with distribution voltages of 34.5 and 69 kilovolts. This 
system is larger than those of many rural electric cooperatives that 
would have been covered by the proposal. Additionally, the existing 
OSHA and national consensus standards, Subpart V of part 1926 and ANSI 
C2, respectively, do extend their coverage to anyone doing electric-
utility-type work.
    OSHA received many comments on this issue, from utilities, from 
electrical contractors, from other industries, and from unions. In 
general, the utilities supported extending coverage to all generation, 
transmission, and distribution installations (Ex. 3-27, 3-40, 3-59, 3-
82, 3-102, 3-112). For example, the New York State Electric and Gas 
Corporation stated that their personnel perform work on transmission 
and distribution interconnect facilities as well as inspect, oversee, 
and approve protection system design, installation, testing, and 
maintenance on non-utility protection systems (Ex. 3-40). Their 
employees also provide assistance to industrial customers under 
emergency conditions.
    Unions also supported extending the scope of Sec. 1910.269 (Ex. 3-
9, 3-76, 3-107). The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
stated that the hazards, training, and work practices are the same for 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution facilities 
regardless of who owns or operates them (Ex. 3-107). Therefore, they 
argued, the safety and health requirements should be the same.
    The National Electrical Contractors Association (NECA) represents 
the contractors who perform work on utility and on industrial power 
generation, transmission, and distribution installations. NECA agreed 
with IBEW that these installations were the same, no matter who owned 
or operated them, and that the accident prevention measures should be 
the same (Ex. 3-60). The contractors' association also believed that 
the scope should be expanded.
    Countering these comments, many large industrial companies and 
trade associations argued that the standard should apply only to 
utilities (Ex. 3-34, 3-45, 3-88, 3-131, 62-2). These commenters 
generally argued that portions of Sec. 1910.269 overlapped other OSHA 
standards. Union Carbide Corp. noted that the proposal contained 
provisions relating to boilers and railroad equipment (Ex. 3-34). They 
were concerned that these requirements could be read to apply to 
equipment and operations that are unrelated to a power generation 
installation. The Amoco Corp. made similar comments about the proposed 
regulations on hazardous energy control and on enclosed spaces (Ex. 3-
73).
    S. C. Johnson and Son, Inc., argued that the ``hazards posed by 
electric utilization systems at industrial facilities do not warrant 
two separate work practice standards [Sec. 1910.269 and Sec. 1910.331 
et seq., Ex. 3-4]''. Monsanto Company noted that, while a few 
industrial plants have large electric power generation, transmission, 
and distribution systems resembling a small utility company, most 
industrial power systems are on a much smaller scale than any utility 
system (Ex. 3-34). They compared a 50-kilowatt cogeneration unit that 
is part of an industrial facility's steam plant to a 1000-megawatt 
utility generating station. Monsanto reasoned that there was a 
significant difference in the hazards posed by the two installations.
    Union Carbide Corp. presented the following four reasons for not 
extending the application of the final standard to industrial power 
generation, transmission, and distribution:

    (a) Utility electrical systems are normally operated at much 
higher voltage than are industrial electrical systems. They also 
differ drastically from industrial systems with respect to 
grounding, physical size, aerial conductors, and lightning 
protection. The hazards of the two kinds of systems and the best 
methods of controlling these hazards differ.
    (b) The proposed rule addresses a number of hazards which are 
peculiar to utility systems but not to industrial systems. These 
include tree trimming and access to the system by the unauthorized, 
untrained general public. Fortunately, industrial electrical systems 
seldom have those problems. It would be inappropriate to impose on 
industrial systems requirements which address those hazards.
    (c) Traditionally, industrial electrical systems have been based 
upon the National Electrical Code (``NEC'') in their design and 
operation. Utility electrical systems, on the other hand, have 
always been based upon the National Electrical Safety Code 
(``NESC'') in their design and operation. While the NEC and NESC use 
many of the same concepts, they are entirely different documents. 
The proposed rule is based upon the NESC (see 54 Fed. Reg. at 4975-
76). Accordingly, applying the proposed rule to industrial 
electrical systems could create many compliance problems not related 
to safety.
    (d) Application of the proposed rule to industrial electrical 
systems would establish the need to comply with two separate sets of 
requirements at a single facility, creating a training nightmare. 
For example, a piece of switchgear feeding a production unit may be 
adjacent to a piece of switchgear serving a generating facility. The 
regulations in 29 C.F.R. Part 1910, Subpart S would apply to the 
production unit switchgear, while the proposed rule would apply to 
the generator switchgear. This would create great practical 
difficulties for operating personnel in trying to decide which set 
of rules to apply. [Ex. 3-45]

    The installation safety requirements in Subpart S of Part 1910 
(Secs. 1910.302 through 1910.308) do not cover ``installations under 
the exclusive control of electric utilities * * * for the generation, 
control, transformation, transmission, and distribution of electric 
energy'' (Sec. 1910.302(a)(2)(v)). Additionally, OSHA has interpreted 
the Subpart S installation requirements to exempt industrial power 
generation and distribution systems that are similar to electric 
utility installations.13 This exclusion reflects the unique 
hazards and work practices involved in generation, transmission, and 
distribution of electric energy. The work practice requirements in 
Subpart S of Part 1910 (Secs. 1910.332 through 1910.335) are designed 
to complement the installation safety provisions in Subpart S and do 
not cover work practices for qualified persons who work on or near 
electric generation, transmission, or distribution installations. Also, 
because electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
installations involve similar hazards and work practices whether or not 
they are controlled by electric utilities, the Subpart S work practices 
standard does not apply to qualified persons who work on or near any 
such installation, regardless of who owns or controls the installation.
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    \1\3The preamble to the final rule revising the Subpart S 
electrical standards stated:
    In the situations where the industrial operation may be the same 
as that of an electric utility, there would not be an overlap [of 
electrical standards] since ANSI C-2 contains the provisions which 
would apply and neither the NEC nor OSHA's Subpart S contain 
provisions which would be applicable. [46 FR 4039, January 16, 1981]
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    OSHA believes that there are hazards related to electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution work that are not adequately 
addressed elsewhere in the General Industry Standards. The hazards 
related to transmission systems are the same whether the system is 
owned by a steel plant, a chemical plant, or an electric utility. There 
are currently no OSHA standards governing the design or installation of 
these systems, and the electrical standards in Subpart S of Part 1910 
do not apply.
    Coverage of electric power generation and distribution systems is 
slightly different from the coverage of transmission systems. Utility-
type generation and distribution installations are not covered by the 
provisions of Secs. 1910.303 through 1910.308 or (if the work is 
performed by a qualified employee) by Secs. 1910.332 through 1910.335. 
Commercial-type systems,14 however, are covered by the Subpart S 
requirements. Additionally, some employers voluntarily comply with 
OSHA's electrical standards in Subpart S for their large-scale 
generation and distribution installations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\4OSHA is using the terms ``utility-type'' and ``commercial-
type'' to distinguish between covered and excluded generation and 
distribution systems. As noted earlier, industrial generation and 
distribution installations that are similar to those of an electric 
utility are not covered under the Subpart S installation 
requirements. These systems have voltages and generating capacity 
equivalent to those of an electric utility. Additionally, the 
operators of these installations typically sell excess power to an 
electric utility. OSHA is referring to these systems and those of 
electric utilities as ``utility-type'' electric power generation and 
distribution systems.
    On the other hand, industrial generation and distribution 
``systems'' that are not like an electric utility system are covered 
under Subpart S. These installations, which are considered to be 
part of the electric utilization system, have more limited capacity, 
and their generating capability is limited to an emergency or backup 
role. OSHA is referring to these systems as ``commercial-type'' 
electric power generation and distribution systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    From an electrical viewpoint, the hazards faced by employees 
working on an installation that conforms to the design requirements of 
Secs. 1910.303 through 1910.308 are different from those faced by 
employees working on an installation that was designed to conform to 
the National Electrical Safety Code. OSHA believes that whether an 
employer should comply with the subpart S work practice requirements or 
with the provisions of Sec. 1910.269 depends on the hazards faced by an 
employee. The hazards posed by an installation are related to the type 
of installation involved and to whether or not it conforms to the 
design standards in subpart S. The risk faced by an employee working on 
the installation depends on what the hazards are and on whether or not 
the employee is trained to recognize and avoid the hazards. Therefore, 
the Agency has made application of most of the electrical requirements 
in the new standard dependent on whether or not the installation 
conforms to Secs. 1910.303 through 1910.308 and on whether or not the 
employee is qualified to perform the work, not on whether or not the 
work is performed by an employee of an electric utility.
    OSHA has determined which provisions of final Sec. 1910.269 address 
electrical hazards that are already addressed in Secs. 1910.332 through 
1910.335 of subpart S for electrical installations that meet the design 
requirements in Secs. 1910.302 through 1910.308 of subpart S. In short, 
when qualified employees work on such installations, the Agency will 
consider these installations and work practices conforming to 
Secs. 1910.332 through 1910.335 to be in compliance with the provisions 
of Sec. 1910.269 that are identified in Table 1 of Appendix A-2.
    OSHA has also identified requirements in Sec. 1910.269 that are not 
adequately addressed in subpart S, and these requirements must be 
followed at all times. These provisions are listed in Table 1 of 
Appendix A-2 as well. It should be noted that, if unqualified employees 
are working on, near, or with electric power generation, transmission, 
and distribution installations, Secs. 1910.332 through 1910.335 apply 
in any event. Appendices A-1 and A-2 illustrate the application of 
Sec. 1910.269 and Subpart S to the various types of electrical 
installations.
    The non-electrical provisions in Sec. 1910.269 (for example, 
paragraph (g)(2) on fall protection and paragraph (p)(1) on mechanical 
equipment) address only unique aspects of electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution work. As noted in paragraph (a)(1)(iii), 
the requirements of Sec. 1910.269 supplement those elsewhere in part 
1910, unless an exception is specifically mentioned. The non-electrical 
requirements in this section have been handled individually throughout 
the standard to allow alternative methods of compliance already 
recognized in the General Industry Standards. For example, the lockout 
and tagging provisions of paragraph (d) recognize compliance with the 
generic standard on control of hazardous energy sources in 
Sec. 1910.147. (See the discussion of this paragraph later in this 
preamble.) Each of these cases is discussed in detail in the portion of 
this preamble relating to the requirement in question.
    Paragraph (a)(1)(i)(A) sets forth the scope of Sec. 1910.269 as it 
relates to industrial and utility power generation, transmission, and 
distribution. This paragraph reads as follows:
    * * * These provisions apply to:

    (A) Power generation, transmission, and distribution 
installations, including related equipment for the purpose of 
communication or metering, which are accessible only to qualified 
employees;
    Note: The types of installations covered by this paragraph 
include the generation, transmission, and distribution installations 
of electric utilities, as well as equivalent installations of 
industrial establishments. Supplementary electric generating 
equipment that is used to supply a workplace for emergency, standby, 
or similar purposes only is covered under Subpart S of this part. 
(See paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(B) of this section.)

    OSHA believes that this language will effectively extend the scope 
of the standard to the types of installations that the standard is 
intended to cover, namely, electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution systems of electric utilities and equivalent industrial 
systems. It also makes it clear that supplementary generating 
equipment, such as emergency and standby generators used to provide 
temporary power at a workplace, is not covered. These installations are 
considered to be part of the utilization system rather than separate 
generation installations and are addressed by the existing Subpart S 
regulations. Additional clarification as to the application of the 
electrical safety requirements of Sec. 1910.269 is contained in 
paragraph (a)(i)(ii)(B), as discussed later in this preamble.
    Section 1910.269 applies to the parts of a facility that are 
directly involved with the generation, transmission, or distribution of 
electric power. Installations not used for one of these purposes are 
not covered by the standard. For example, office buildings, warehouses, 
machine shops, and other installations which are not integral parts of 
generating plants, substations, or control centers are not covered by 
final Sec. 1910.269. Work performed on these installations is not of a 
type addressed by the standard. However, paragraph (a)(1)(i)(B) lists 
installations that are not integral to the generation of electric 
power, but that are covered nonetheless. Such installations include the 
fuel handling operations and water and steam spaces.
    Edison Electric Institute objected to the proposed restriction in 
scope to installations within a generating plant that are for the 
purpose of electric power generation (DC Tr. 803-805). Speaking on 
EEI's behalf, Mr. J. Frederick Doering stated, ``We continue to believe 
that all power plant work for operation and maintenance should be 
covered by this standard.'' (DC Tr. 804) Mr. John Bachofer displayed 
many slides showing that widely varied and dispersed portions of an 
electric generating plant were all maintained and operated by a single 
resident crew (DC Tr. 806-813). These slides showed that similar 
equipment is involved both in installations used specifically for power 
generation and in installations used for other purposes within the same 
plant. These witnesses argued that it would be safer to have a single 
set of standards applying to employees at these plants than to have 
multiple standards regulate utility work.
    OSHA agrees that it is generally beneficial for employees to be 
using one set of rules for the work they do. However, this does not 
mean that it is always best to have a single standard governing all 
safety considerations in every industry. This would not be practical 
given the Agency's limited resources and the diversity of industries in 
the United States. In explaining OSHA's position, Mr. Thomas Seymour 
stated, ``We would not want to see ourselves getting into a posture 
where we have to do a specific standard for each and every industry 
because we would then have thousands and thousands of books for each 
industry, repeating the same materials over and over and over again.'' 
(DC Tr. 177)
    While OSHA believes that it may be important to cover the unique 
safety aspects of an industry in an industry-specific standard, it 
would be wasteful for the Agency to duplicate other general industry 
regulations already addressing common safe working conditions. For 
example, the existing generic lockout and tagging standard, 
Sec. 1910.147, presently applies to the control of hazardous energy 
sources of an installation that is not for the purpose of electric 
power generation, transmission, or distribution. Additionally, OSHA's 
electrical standards in subpart S also apply to such installations 
within an electric utility's generating plant. OSHA is not able to 
address all working conditions in a single rulemaking, especially where 
there is adequate coverage in the existing General Industry Standards. 
The utility industry must show that unique considerations within the 
industry necessitate different requirements from those that apply 
generally. Where there is adequate coverage, there is simply no need to 
open up the record on rules with respect to which there is nothing 
unique in the electric utility industry.
    Furthermore, the Agency is expanding the scope of the rule so that 
non-utility electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
are covered. Including general safety provisions within this standard 
would create problems for industries that generate power as a by-
product of the manufacturing process. These companies would have two 
full sets of standards applying in one workplace, instead of one set of 
general rules and one set that applied to the unique aspects of 
electric power generation.
    For these reasons, OSHA has decided that Sec. 1910.269 should cover 
only those aspects of electric power generation plants that pose unique 
hazards to employees or that are not covered adequately in other 
General Industry Standards. Thus, for example, this section includes 
requirements on boiler maintenance safety, conveyors, and water and 
steam installations that are not contained in any other subpart of Part 
1910. Other provisions that seemingly duplicate other general industry 
requirements are contained in Sec. 1910.269 either because the hazards 
are not within the scope of the general regulations, or because unique 
circumstances of electric power generation, transmission, or 
distribution work necessitate different or additional rules. OSHA 
believes that this approach will maximize employee safety, as well as 
the effective use of Agency resources.
    Two comments discussed the application of Sec. 1910.269 to coal 
handling activities. These comments noted that the Mine Safety and 
Health Administration (MSHA) was asserting jurisdiction in some areas 
involving coal crushing and conveying (Ex. 3-109, 56). They argued that 
it was more appropriate for OSHA to regulate these installations than 
for them to be subject to MSHA's authority. Edison Electric Institute 
stated, ``to exclude those facilities from this final standard, and 
thereby to impose inconsistent regulatory requirements, would 
compromise employee safety [Ex. 56].'' They urged OSHA to incorporate 
provisions on coal handling, as proposed. Messrs. Nicholas Reynolds, 
Scott DuBoff, and Allen Flowers, representing a number of electric 
utilities, recommended appropriate interagency coordination and 
corresponding adjustments to the agencies' respective regulations (Ex. 
3-109).
    While OSHA proposed requirements dealing with coal handling 
facilities within a power plant, the Agency has no desire (indeed, not 
even the legal authority) to regulate working conditions that are being 
regulated by other Federal agencies. Section 4(b)(1) of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 states:

    Nothing in this Act shall apply to working conditions of 
employees with respect to which other Federal agencies * * * 
exercise statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or 
regulations affecting occupational safety or health.

    Therefore, to the extent that MSHA asserts jurisdiction over areas 
at an electric power plant, MSHA's exercise of that authority preempts 
OSHA's. For example, the Mine Safety and Health Act (30 U.S.C. 801, et 
seq.) provides that ``structures, facilities, equipment, machines, 
tools or other property * * * used in, or to be used in, or resulting 
from the work of preparing coal'' are within the definition of ``coal 
or other mine'' and are thereby subject to MSHA jurisdiction. In 
section 802(i) of the Mine Safety and Health Act, the ``work of 
preparing coal'' is defined as ``breaking, crushing, sizing, cleaning, 
washing, drying, mixing, storing, and loading of bituminous coal, 
lignite or anthracite, and such other work of preparing such coal as is 
usually done by the operator of the coal mine.'' In Pennsylvania 
Electric Company v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, 
969 F.2d 1501 (3d Cir. 1992), the Court of Appeals found that conveyor 
head drives of conveyor belts used to transport coal from mine head 
scales to a processing station constitute the work of preparing coal 
and that MSHA had promulgated rules preempting OSHA.
    The requirements in this final rule are only intended to apply to 
conditions and installations for which MSHA does not in fact ``exercise 
statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations.'' 
Because the mine safety agency assumes enforcement responsibility for 
the coal handling operations noted earlier, OSHA and MSHA will work 
together, coordinating their standards and inspection activities, in a 
manner consistent with their respective rulemaking and enforcement 
authorities, to assure the safety of affected employees.
    Paragraph (a)(1)(i)(C) of final Sec. 1910.269 states that this 
section applies to testing associated with electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution systems. This paragraph is the same as 
the corresponding provision in the proposal, except that the reference 
to electric utilities has been removed. This change was made for 
consistency with OSHA's decision to expand the scope of the standard to 
cover non-utilities.
    In the proposal, the first three paragraphs under 
Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(i) referred only to installations. However, the 
introductory statement prefacing these paragraphs stated that the 
section also covered work practices associated with electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution lines and equipment. To 
clarify the scope of the final rule, OSHA has added paragraph 
(a)(1)(i)(D) to extend the application of Sec. 1910.269 explicitly to 
work practices on or directly associated with the installations listed 
in the first three paragraphs. It should be noted that work performed 
near one of these installations is not covered simply because of its 
proximity to the installation; the work must be directly associated 
with the covered installation as well.
    Paragraph (a)(1)(i)(E) of Sec. 1910.269 explains the application of 
the standard to tree-trimming operations. The entire section, except 
paragraph (r)(1), applies to tree-trimming operations performed by 
qualified employees (that is, employees who are knowledgeable in the 
operation of electric power generation, transmission, or distribution 
equipment and the hazards involved). These employees typically perform 
tree-trimming duties as an incidental part of their normal work 
activities. However, only paragraphs (a)(2), (b), (c), (g), (k), (p), 
and (r) apply to line-clearance tree-trimming work performed by other 
employees (line-clearance tree trimmers).
    Most tree-trimming operations, which are often performed by 
employees of outside contractors, do not involve routine line-
maintenance activities. Although these tree-trimming employees work 
near the power lines, they do not work directly on them. For activities 
other than the actual tree-trimming work, these employees are not 
``qualified employees'' for the purposes of this standard. Therefore, 
many of the requirements set forth in Sec. 1910.269 are not relevant to 
their work. Since these employees are not trained as qualified linemen, 
OSHA feels that the application of rules written expressly for electric 
utility-type work could expose these other types of workers to hazards 
that they are not adequately trained to face. For example, paragraph 
(1) allows qualified employees to come closer than 2 feet to a 7600-
volt overhead distribution line if the employee is wearing electrical 
protective equipment (such as rubber insulating gloves and sleeves). By 
contrast, paragraph (r)(1) requires line-clearance tree trimmers to 
maintain a minimum approach distance from energized overhead power 
lines regardless of any other protective techniques that might be 
employed. Line-clearance tree-trimming work does not require these 
employees to come closer to power lines, nor does their training15 
typically encompass all the information and skill needed to work on or 
closer than 2 feet to the line, regardless of whether electrical 
protective equipment is used. For these reasons, OSHA has adopted 
special electrical safety-related work practice provisions for line-
clearance tree trimmers that are more stringent than those that apply 
to ``qualified employees''. These provisions are contained in paragraph 
(r)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\5 Of course, if these employees do receive the appropriate 
training, then they become ``qualified employees''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the other hand, if employees performing line-clearance tree-
trimming work are also ``qualified employees'', with the necessary 
training and experience in dealing with power lines, all of final 
Sec. 1910.269, except paragraph (r)(1), applies to their work.
    Paragraphs (a)(2), (b), (c), (g), (k), and (p), are general 
requirements addressing training, medical services and first aid, job 
briefing, personal protective equipment, material handling, and 
mechanical equipment, respectively. OSHA has determined that the 
requirements in these areas are necessary and appropriate for line-
clearance tree-trimming work performed by other than qualified 
employees. The remaining provisions of final Sec. 1910.269 are not 
necessary for the safety of these employees and are not related to the 
type of work they perform.
    The proposal would also have applied entire paragraph (a) (covering 
the scope of the standard, training, and the determination of existing 
conditions) to line-clearance tree trimming operations. Mr. Robert 
Felix, Executive Vice President of the National Arborist Association, 
argued that proposed paragraph (a)(3) was not appropriate for line-
clearance tree trimming work (Ex. 3-113). This paragraph would have 
required the inspection of existing conditions before work is started 
and set forth a list of items that would have to be checked. These 
items (switching transients, induced voltages, integrity of grounds, 
etc.) relate to maintenance of electric power generation, transmission, 
and distribution lines and equipment. Mr. Felix asserted that these 
conditions were not applicable to tree trimming work and that a 
provision covering conditions directly related to tree trimming would 
be more appropriately located in paragraph (r)(1), where the proposal 
addressed the electrical hazards of line-clearance tree trimming. OSHA 
has adopted this suggestion and is applying only paragraph (a)(2), 
which covers training, rather than entire paragraph (a) to tree 
trimming operations. Because paragraph (a)(1) is the scope of the 
standard, the relevant portion of paragraph (a)(3) has been placed in 
paragraph (r)(1).
    Standards on the construction of transmission and distribution 
lines and equipment are contained in 29 CFR part 1926, subpart V. So as 
not to overlap these regulations in the Construction Standards, final 
Sec. 1910.269 published today does not apply to operations involving 
construction work. This ``exemption'' is set forth in 
Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(A). ``Construction work'' is defined in 
Sec. 1910.12(b) as ``work for construction, alteration, and/or repair, 
including painting and decorating.'' In Sec. 1910.12(d), the term is 
further defined as including ``the erection of new electric 
transmission and distribution lines and equipment, and the alteration, 
conversion, and improvement of existing transmission and distribution 
lines and equipment.'' None of the types of work covered by these two 
definitions are covered by Sec. 1910.269.
    Several commenters and witnesses at the hearing were concerned with 
having to comply with two separate standards (that is, Sec. 1910.269 
and 29 CFR part 1926, subpart V) governing essentially the same work 
(Ex. 3-60, 3-85, 3-102, 3-112, 56; DC Tr. 717-718, 794-800). These 
persons gave examples of work operations that could be covered under 
either standard depending on slightly different circumstances. Mr. 
Eugene Trombley of Consumers Power Company gave the most detailed 
accounting of such situations, presenting a video tape of an employee 
performing distribution work (DC Tr. 794-800). In one case, the 
employee was replacing an insulator of the same type (Sec. 1910.269 
applies); in the other he was installing an upgraded insulator (Subpart 
V applies). Similar examples were given of lightning arrester and 
transformer replacement. In each case, the hazards involved were 
identical, but the standard that applied was different--sometimes it 
was Sec. 1910.269, sometimes subpart V.
    Mr. Trombley, testifying on behalf of EEI, stated his concerns and 
his suggested solution as follows:

    In view of what we have seen here, I believe that it is safe to 
say that the work practices and procedures that we have used to work 
on existing equipment are identical, whether OSHA calls the job 
construction or maintenance.
    Because the label dictates the OSHA standard that will apply, 
however, I am concerned about the problems that will be created if 
conflicting standards are applied to the same work.
    I am concerned that this is going to complicate my company's 
safety rules which we work hard to keep simple and direct. This in 
turn is going to make it more difficult for me as a trainer to give 
clear direction to my linemen as to what they are to do in specific 
circumstances.
    This is going to place them at greater risk, and I am sure that 
linemen trainers throughout the industry would feel the same.
    I would recommend strongly that the distinction between 
construction and maintenance for electric utilities be eliminated 
completely, as it affects work on existing equipment. So that 
alterations, conversions and improvements of existing equipment 
required for operation of the system will be considered, as it 
should be, maintenance work. [DC Tr. 799-800]

    OSHA has not accepted this suggestion. The scope of subpart V 
cannot be altered without first submitting the revision to the Advisory 
Committee for Construction Safety and Health and subsequently 
publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking. EEI claimed that 
consultation with the Advisory Committee would be unnecessary if the 
scope of Sec. 1910.269 was simply extended to alterations, conversions, 
and improvements of existing equipment required for operation of the 
system. However, under the present definitions of construction work, 
all alterations, improvements, and conversions of electric transmission 
and distribution lines and equipment are considered to be construction 
work and, therefore, covered under subpart V. The Agency cannot adopt 
their suggestion without revising the definition of construction in 
Sec. 1910.12 and the scope of subpart V in Sec. 1926.950(a)(1) to 
eliminate this double coverage. This type of action would require 
further rulemaking.
    Others suggested that OSHA make the standards for equivalent 
hazards the same. Mr. Charles J. Hart of the National Electrical 
Contractors Association stated, ``we believe that all of the 
requirements that apply to electrical power generation, transmission 
and distribution, whether it be construction or maintenance and 
operation, be included in one document and that the rules pertaining to 
similar situations be identical [Ex. 3-60].'' Mr. Joseph Van Name, 
testifying for the ANSI C2 Subcommittee 8 on Work Rules, supported this 
view and stated, ``to the extent possible, consistency with subpart V 
is essential; to have different clearance tables and paragraphs seems 
inappropriate [DC Tr. 717].''
    OSHA believes that it is important for employees to use consistent 
work practices for jobs posing equivalent hazards. It may, indeed, 
introduce dangers if an employee has to vary the work practices used 
for a job depending on slightly different circumstances unrelated to 
safety. The Agency attempts to make its standards consistent across 
industries for similar situations, but it is not always possible to 
make them identical. The employer should ensure that the work rules are 
the same for similar jobs even though different regulations may apply.
    Subpart V is about 20 years old, and it is based on technology and 
practices that reflect its age. If OSHA were to promulgate a standard 
identical to subpart V, it would not be possible for the Agency to 
incorporate new technology or to correct deficiencies without first 
revising the older standard. Therefore, in some cases, Sec. 1910.269 
applies different requirements to the same work than subpart V. The 
Agency believes it is more important to extend coverage of an electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution standard to areas 
where employees are not now protected than it is to revise an existing 
standard that is already protecting employees to a great degree. This 
alternative provides greater protection to employees.
    OSHA plans to develop a proposal that would revise subpart V to 
incorporate the improvements promulgated here and to provide for 
consistency between the two standards. Meanwhile, however, employers 
will have to comply with two different standards on electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution work. OSHA expects that 
employers will choose to comply with new Sec. 1910.269, as it provides 
greater protection to employees than subpart V, and will generally 
accept such compliance for all work involving electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution installations, whether it be 
general industry or construction work. However, where subpart V 
provides requirements that relate specifically to construction and 
where Sec. 1910.269 contains no corresponding provisions, the subpart V 
requirements will continue to apply. For example, Sec. 1926.955(b) 
contains provisions relating to metal tower construction. Final 
Sec. 1910.269 contains no corresponding requirements. Therefore, 
Sec. 1926.955(b) will continue to apply in toto. The Agency will 
provide compliance directives to its compliance staff incorporating 
this concept.
    Proposed Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(B) would have excluded electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution installations of non-
utilities from coverage under Sec. 1910.269. As noted earlier, OSHA has 
decided to provide coverage for these installations. Therefore, this 
proposed paragraph was not carried forward into the final rule.
    Existing regulations contained in Subpart S of Part 1910 apply to 
the design and installation of electric utilization systems. Although 
Sec. 1910.302(a)(2)(v) states that electric utility ``installations * * 
* for the purpose of communication or metering; or for the generation, 
control, transformation, transmission, and distribution of electric 
energy'' are not covered by subpart S, electric utility installations 
used for other purposes (that is, those for the electric utilization 
systems) are covered by subpart S. Generation includes the conductors 
and equipment that are used for generation, such as the generator 
itself, the boiler feedwater pumps, and control circuits for the 
generator. On the other hand, utilization includes premises wiring 
leading to lighting, convenience outlets, and heating, ventilating, and 
air conditioning equipment. Where it is difficult to distinguish 
between generation and utilization within an electric power generating 
installation, utilization begins at the point where circuits become 
independent of generating circuits. This distinction, which was 
thoroughly explained in the preamble to the electrical safety-related 
work practices standard (55 FR 31993-31997), is consistent with the 
National Fire Protection Association's (NFPA) National Electrical Code 
(NFPA 70) and Electrical Safety Requirements for Employee Workplaces 
(NFPA 70E), OSHA enforcement policy, and the installation safety 
requirements in Subpart S. Moreover, the Court of Appeals, by upholding 
OSHA's interpretation of the electrical installation requirements of 
Part 1926, Subpart K, upheld OSHA's interpretation of utilization and 
generation within an electric power generation facility. (See Edison 
Electric Institute v. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
849 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1988).) This current differentiation in 
coverage between electric utilization installations, which are covered 
by subpart S, and generation, transmission, and distribution 
installations, which are not covered by subpart S, is carried forward 
in Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(B), which states that Sec. 1910.269 does not 
apply to electrical installations, safety-related work practices, or 
maintenance considerations covered by subpart S.
    Many utility industry representatives restated the arguments made 
in the electrical safety-related work practices rulemaking opposing any 
application of subpart S to their industry and any language in 
Sec. 1910.269 referencing subpart S (Ex. 3-26, 3-42, 3-80, 3-82, 3-102, 
3-112). Most of these comments cited their desire to follow one 
standard rather than two. Charles T. Autry of Oglethorpe Power Company 
specifically recommended including work covered under subpart S as 
being covered by Sec. 1910.269 (Ex. 3-102). Others also argued that the 
requirements of Subpart S were inappropriate and that the work was 
performed by the same highly qualified employees, whether or not 
generating equipment was involved (Ex. 3-80, 3-82). EEI claimed that, 
within electric utility power plants, there was no distinction between 
installations used as opposed to those not used for the generation of 
power (Ex. 3-112).
    The distinction between generation and utilization in a power 
generation facility was thoroughly considered in the electrical safety-
related work practices rulemaking, which resulted in a standard for 
work practices for general industry (55 FR 31984, August 6, 1990). 
While the electrical safety-related work practices standard itself 
dealt only with work practices, comments to that rulemaking and OSHA's 
rationale in applying the final standard to work on utilization systems 
in electric power generation facilities addressed the application of 
OSHA's electrical installation requirements of subpart S as well.
    The Agency carefully considered all comments related to applying 
the electrical safety-related work practices standard to electric 
utility generating plants. Every argument made with respect to the 
issue of applying all Subpart S requirements, whether related to 
installation or work practices, was discussed in detail in the preamble 
to the Final Rule. (For a full discussion of OSHA's decision in this 
matter, see the full text of the Federal Register notice at 55 FR 
31990-31997.) Briefly, the Agency's rationale was:
    (1) The distinction, made under the scope of Part I of subpart S, 
between installations used and those not used for the generation of 
electric power at utility plants is one that can be readily determined. 
OSHA realizes that all circuits for utilization equipment installed in 
generating stations must originate in the same area as the circuits for 
the generating installation. However, at some point, circuits that are 
not an integral part of the generating installation must become 
independent of the generating circuits, except to the extent that they 
may share common cable trays or perhaps raceways. Otherwise, it would 
be impossible to control the lighting, for example, independently of 
the generator itself. With respect to the existing requirements of Part 
I of subpart S, OSHA considers the ``covered'' installation to begin 
where it becomes electrically independent of conductors and equipment 
used for the generation of electric power. In most cases, it is a 
simple matter of tracing the wiring back from the utilization equipment 
itself until a point is reached where generation circuits are also 
supplied. Generally, branch circuits supplying utilization equipment 
(other than that used for the generation process) are covered; feeders 
supplying only ``utilization'' branch circuits are covered; feeders 
supplying ``generation'' circuits, alone or in combination with 
``utilization'' circuits are not covered by subpart S.
    (2) Although installations not used for power generation are 
covered by subpart S, installations of conductors and equipment used 
for power generation have not been regulated to date by OSHA standards. 
Because of the installation requirements of subpart S, the conductors 
and equipment covered by subpart S can be expected to present a minimum 
level of safety, under normal operating conditions. The subpart S 
installation requirements are sufficiently comprehensive that only a 
few basic safety-related work practices are necessary to supplement 
them (basically, those contained in Sec. 1910.334). For example, under 
subpart S, live parts of electric circuits are not generally exposed to 
contact by employees (especially unqualified employees), so that 
employees can perform their jobs without consideration of touching an 
energized part. Also, metal frames of electric equipment are grounded 
if employees would likely be in contact with a grounded surface when 
touching the equipment. In this way, employees are protected from 
ground faults. To protect employees from fire and ground-fault hazards, 
conductors and equipment are provided with overcurrent protection. 
Thus, the installation safety requirements contained in Subpart S 
protect employees to a great degree already (and this is the preferred 
method of protection given the inevitability of human error if work 
practices are used as the primary means of protection). The safe work 
practices to be used when work is performed on, near, or with electric 
circuits and equipment are dependent upon the design of the electrical 
installation and the standards it must meet.
    On the other hand, installations used for power generation, which 
are not covered by the design requirements of Subpart S, have not been 
subject to any comparable OSHA standards for equipment or installation 
design. Equipment grounding, guarding of live parts, and overcurrent 
protection are not required for power generation equipment under OSHA 
standards, and the Agency has no assurance that these safety features 
have been provided. Even if electric utilities ``generally'' comply 
with the National Electrical Safety Code (ANSI C2), their generation 
installations do not necessarily provide the same safety features as 
the NEC and Subpart S require for utilization equipment. For example, 
ANSI C2-1984, Section 124.A, requires the guarding of circuit parts 
operating at more than 150 volts to ground. (This provision has been 
carried into this final rule as Sec. 1910.269(v)(5)(i).) By contrast, 
existing OSHA Sec. 1910.303 requires guarding of circuit parts 
operating at 50 volts or more. In a generating station, electric 
utilities must currently follow the Subpart S rule for conductors and 
equipment that are not used for generation, but not for the generation 
system conductors and equipment. Clearly, safe work practices for the 
two types of installations would vary, even with similar 120-volt 
motors, for example, if one has live parts guarded and the other does 
not. (Of course, if the two types of installations are commingled, the 
work practices used should be appropriate for whatever poses the 
greater hazards. Normally, the hazards posed by the electric power 
generation installation would be greater than those posed by the 
utilization installation.)
    (3) In the electrical safety-related work practices rulemaking, 
OSHA found that electric utility employees face a significant risk of 
injury due to hazards posed by installations that are not used for 
electric power generation. After reviewing all the evidence in the 
record of that rulemaking, the Agency determined that the risk of 
electrocution caused by a hazard covered by Subpart S is about the same 
as or slightly higher in the electric utility industry in comparison to 
the risk faced by general industry employees as a whole.
    (4) OSHA considered whether the hazards to which employees working 
in electric utility plants are comparable to those faced by employees 
working in other general industry workplaces covered by subpart S. In 
general, the hazards faced by electric utility employees working on or 
near electric utilization installations in generating plants are not 
unique. With respect to installations in electric power generation 
plants that are covered by Subpart S, OSHA concluded in the electrical 
safety-related work practices rulemaking that the hazards from those 
installations faced by electric utility employees are identical to 
those faced by other general industry employees. There is nothing 
special about a lighting installation, for example, in a generating 
plant that would make the hazards there any different from those in 
other workplaces.
    (5) Electric utilization circuits in generating plants do pose 
unique hazards if the circuits are commingled with installations of 
power generation equipment or circuits and if the commingled generation 
equipment or circuits present greater electrical hazards than those 
posed by the utilization equipment or circuits alone (such as exposure 
to higher voltages or lack of overcurrent protection). Under this 
condition, the work practices to be used would have to conform to 
Sec. 1910.269 rather than Secs. 1910.332 through 1910.335, and the 
Subpart S work practices standard does not apply. (See the notes to 
Sec. 1910.331(c)(1).)
    No new evidence on this issue was introduced in the present 
rulemaking. The scope of the Subpart S installation and work practice 
requirements was the subject of two previous rulemakings (46 FR 4034 
and 55 FR 31984).16 In those rulemakings, EEI and other electric 
utility representatives raised the issue of whether or not electric 
utility utilization installations at electric power generation 
facilities should be covered by Subpart S. OSHA concluded that these 
installations would be covered under Subpart S. The Agency is not 
reconsidering this issue in the present rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\6 The issue of whether electric utilities are covered by 
OSHA's electrical installation requirements was also addressed in 
the rulemaking on the electrical standards for construction (Subpart 
K of Part 1926, 51 FR 25294).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA is deciding in this rulemaking (1) whether compliance with 
Sec. 1910.269 can be considered as protecting employees to a degree 
equivalent to compliance with subpart S with respect to work practices 
and installation covered by subpart S and (2) whether the requirements 
of subpart S should be incorporated into Sec. 1910.269.
    With respect to whether Sec. 1910.269 can be considered as 
protective as subpart S, OSHA notes that final Sec. 1910.269 contains 
very few requirements relating to the design of electrical 
installations. (Whether or not final Sec. 1910.269 should include 
additional electrical installation requirements is addressed later in 
this section of the preamble.) The only such requirements are contained 
in paragraphs (u) and (v) and relate to the guarding of live parts and 
to access to and workspace around electric equipment. These 
requirements, although similar in nature to corresponding provisions in 
subpart S (Sec. 1910.303 (g) and (h)), are not as protective as their 
Subpart S counterparts. For example, Sec. 1910.269(u)(5)(i) and 
(v)(5)(i) require live parts operating at more than 150 volts to be 
guarded. By contrast, Sec. 1910.303(g)(2)(i) requires guarding of live 
parts operating at 50 volts or more. Clearly, the Subpart S provision 
is more protective. Therefore, OSHA will continue to apply the 
electrical installation safety requirements contained in Secs. 1910.302 
through 1910.308 for utilization systems in electric generating 
facilities.
    On the other hand, OSHA has concluded that the electrical work 
practices required by Sec. 1910.269 can protect employees as well as 
certain provisions contained in the electrical safety-related work 
practices standard (Secs. 1910.332 through 1910.335). Installations not 
meeting the Subpart S design standard demand, in general, more 
restrictive safety precautions by employees working on or near them. 
Most of the requirements contained in final Sec. 1910.269 are more 
stringent than comparable provisions of Secs. 1910.331 through 
1910.335. For example, paragraph (l)(9) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires 
non-current carrying metal parts of equipment to be treated as 
energized unless the parts have been determined to be grounded. This 
type of requirement is not contained in subpart S because such metal 
parts are required to be grounded when they pose a hazard to employees. 
For this reason, OSHA can consider compliance with these more stringent 
provisions as compliance with the subpart S work practice requirements. 
However, subpart S contains work practices that are beyond the scope of 
Sec. 1910.269 and are thus not covered here. For example, requirements 
pertaining to unqualified employees working near exposed live parts and 
to the use of electric utilization equipment are simply not addressed 
in final Sec. 1910.269. For this reason, OSHA cannot simply accept 
compliance with Sec. 1910.269 as being compliance with all of 
Secs. 1910.331 through 1910.335 for all employees, whether qualified or 
unqualified.
    OSHA has reviewed the two standards to determine which provisions 
of subpart S could be considered as being met by an employer complying 
with final Sec. 1910.269. Based on this review, the Agency has 
concluded that the hazards addressed by Sec. 1910.333(c) and 
Sec. 1910.335 (covering work on or near exposed energized parts and 
safeguards for personnel protection, respectively), with respect to 
qualified employees only, are adequately covered by final 
Sec. 1910.269. The other provisions of the subpart S work practices 
standard either relate extensively to the protection of unqualified 
employees or relate to equipment generally not covered under 
Sec. 1910.269. Paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(B) of final Sec. 1910.269 contains 
a note incorporating these concepts and reading as follows:

    Note 2: Work practices performed by qualified persons and 
conforming to Sec. 1910.269 of this part are considered as complying 
with Sec. 1910.333(c) and Sec. 1910.335 of this part.

    For consistency, OSHA is adding similar language to a new note 
under Sec. 1910.331(c)(1).
    With respect to the issue of whether the requirements of subpart S 
should be incorporated into Sec. 1910.269, Edison Electric Institute 
submitted an alternative standard that should be applied, they 
suggested, to all electrical safety within a generating station in lieu 
of subpart S (Ex. 3-112, 28, 62-33; DC Tr. 940-979). Representing EEI, 
Mr. J. Frederick Doering explained the rationale behind their suggested 
paragraph:

    EEI reviewed the proposal's lack of coverage addressed to 
electrical work in power generation. There were only four items in 
the proposed section (v) covering electrical items.

    The EEI proposal had 26 items--the EEI/IBEW proposal.

    While nine of the proposed 1910.269 paragraphs (a), (d), (i), 
(j), (l), (o), (s), (t), and (w) have rules that provide some 
guidance to power plant electrical work, there's very little on 
design or electrical work practices in power generation facilities.
* * * * *
    We have no dispute that electrical safety in power plants needs 
to be regulated. In fact, as we say, we think proposed subpart R is 
inadequate to the extent it would not have addressed these issues. 
But we want to try to find a way to get all of the regulation of 
power plant electrical safety in one place--this standard. That's 
one of the reasons why we have written proposed section (vv).
    Another reason, of course, is that subpart S, Parts I and 
proposed Part II, contain many provisions which are inappropriate 
for power plants, largely due to the fact that these sections were 
drawn from the National Electrical Code. We cannot overemphasize 
that the electrical systems in power plants are engineered in great 
detail by experienced engineering staffs, making use of a large 
number of consensus standards and other sources, covering the 
material, the equipment, system design, and so forth.
* * * * *
    We are concerned that one reason OSHA did not include a detailed 
section on electrical safety in power plants in this proposed 
standard is that it is considering regulating some portion of power 
plant work under subpart S. We are also concerned that OSHA believes 
there are certain hazards in power plants which are properly 
addressed in subpart S.
    We have attempted to make our proposed section (vv) as 
comprehensive as possible, to address the issues of electrical 
safety which we know exist in power plants. Therefore, to help the 
agency understand how our proposal was constructed, and to assure 
the agency that relevant safety issues are addressed in the 
standard, we want to show you the sources from which we drew in 
putting this proposed section (vv) together.
    Our hope is that from review, the agency will see that we have 
covered all of the pertinent electrical safety issues in power 
plants in our draft, and that it is included in the final standard--
and that if it is included in the final standard, there will be no 
need for OSHA to refer to any other standard to regulate electrical 
safety in utility plants. [DC Tr. 940-944]

    OSHA does not believe that the proposal contained too few 
provisions related to electrical safety in power plants.17 All of 
the general electrical safety requirements in Sec. 1910.269 apply, 
including paragraphs (d) and (m) on deenergizing electric circuits, 
paragraph (i) on portable tools, paragraph (l) on work on or near live 
parts, and paragraph (n) on grounding. Additionally, Subpart S of Part 
1910 contains many requirements that are applicable to electrical 
safety in electric utility power generating stations. OSHA believes 
that the electrical safety-related work practices contained in final 
Sec. 1910.269 and in Secs. 1910.332 through 1910.335 sufficiently 
protect employees from electrical hazards caused by poor work practices 
associated with electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution installations. Only in the area of electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution installation design is there 
any deficiency in employee protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\7 The only significant area that is addressed only to a minor 
degree is the design and installation of electric power generation 
circuits and equipment. Paragraphs (v)(3) and (v)(5) contain rules 
on access to working space around electric equipment and on guarding 
of live parts, respectively. These provisions do apply to the design 
of generation circuits and equipment, but there are no others.
    As noted earlier, OSHA relied heavily on the EEI/IBEW draft 
standard in the development of proposed Sec. 1910.269. Their draft 
contained few requirements on electrical design, for either the 
generating station or the transmission and distribution system. 
Therefore, OSHA also proposed few provisions in this area, even 
though much of the National Electrical Safety Code relates to 
electrical design safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency has reviewed the new EEI material on electrical safety 
in generating plants in order to determine if it should be incorporated 
into the final rule. The Agency compared the submission to requirements 
in subpart S that are currently being applied to generating plants to 
ascertain whether or not the EEI provisions would be as protective as 
the existing OSHA standards.
    By their own accounting, EEI indicated that member companies apply 
less than 50 percent of the electrical installation requirements of 
Subpart S for utilization systems at their power plants (DC Tr. 946-
948). No justification (other than that the provision was not 
applicable in power plants) was given for the omission of such 
important requirements as: Illumination of working space 
(Sec. 1910.303(g)(1)(v)); guarding of live parts operating between 50 
and 150 volts to ground (Sec. 1910.303(g)(2)); outlet devices 
(Sec. 1910.304(b)(2)); grounding connections (Sec. 1910.304(f)(3)); 
grounding of hand-held, motor-operated tools, cord- and plug-connected 
appliances used in damp or wet locations, and portable hand lamps 
(Sec. 1910.305(f)(5)(v)(c)); grounding of systems and circuits over 
1000 volts (Sec. 1910.305(f)(7)); switches (Sec. 1910.305(c)); 
appliances (Sec. 1910.305(j)(3)); storage batteries 
(Sec. 1910.305(j)(7)); and systems over 600 volts (Sec. 1910.308(a)). 
OSHA cannot simply ignore these important safety considerations without 
good cause, especially since these rules currently apply to utilization 
installations within generating stations. Similar omissions were made 
in the safety-related work practices section of the new EEI draft.
    Additionally, many of the provisions proposed by EEI were not as 
protective as the existing subpart S counterparts. The rationale for 
these changes was frequently inadequate for OSHA to justify relaxing 
its requirements.
    The EEI-suggested provisions that were adequately justified could 
not be incorporated into Sec. 1910.269 alone. OSHA believes that, 
except for guarding and workspace provisions (which are necessary for 
the work practices required by Sec. 1910.269), installation design 
requirements must be proposed and adopted as a complete set. The 
installation design standards in subpart S (Sec. 1910.302 through 
1910.308) contain an interrelated set of requirements to protect 
employees from electrical hazards posed by utilization systems. 
Requirements for overcurrent protection are based on such factors as 
conductor size and load current ratings of equipment. Equipment 
grounding considerations are dependent on system grounding design. 
Standards for the design of an electrical installation must be adopted 
as a complete set to be protective. The few EEI-suggested provisions 
that are justified cannot stand alone--they must be integrated into an 
interdependent collection of requirements to be protective.
    Lastly, many applicable requirements of the National Electrical 
Safety Code were not incorporated. Such rules would have to be a part 
of any OSHA standard in this area.
    The Agency realizes that Subpart S does not apply to electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution installations. The EEI 
proposal would extend protection to generation installations, but it 
would relax the protection already afforded for other electrical 
installations within the plant. Additionally, the EEI proposal does not 
address hazards posed by transmission or distribution installation 
design. To remedy these problems, OSHA intends to explore this issue 
more completely in the future and will consider developing a standard 
that can be proposed at the same time as the proposed revision of 
Subpart V of part 1926 (discussed earlier in this section of the 
preamble). OSHA intends to integrate applicable requirements from 
Subpart S and from the NESC and to propose a rule that will best 
protect employees from hazards arising from the design of electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution installations.
    Paragraph (a)(1)(iii) of final Sec. 1910.269 explains the 
application of the section with respect to the rest of part 1910. All 
other General Industry Standards continue to apply to installations 
covered by this new standard unless an exception is given in 
Sec. 1910.269. For example, Sec. 1910.269(p)(1)(i) requires the 
critical components of mechanical elevating and rotating equipment to 
be inspected before each shift. This provision does not supersede 
existing Sec. 1910.180(d), which details specific requirements for the 
inspection of cranes. References in Sec. 1910.269 to other sections of 
part 1910 are provided only for emphasis.
    Paragraph (a)(2) of Sec. 1910.269 addresses training for employees. 
Since it is widely recognized that electric-utility-type work requires 
special knowledge and skills, paragraph (a)(2)(i) requires employees to 
be trained in the safety-related work practices, safety procedures, and 
other personnel safety requirements in the standard that pertain to 
their respective job assignments. Employees are also required to be 
trained in and familiar with any other safety practices necessary for 
their safety, including applicable emergency procedures.
    Mr. George Weedin of the Electrical Division of the Panama Canal 
Commission suggested that tower, pole, and manhole rescue procedures be 
specifically mentioned as part of the required training (Ex. 3-43). 
Some witnesses at the hearing, including NIOSH, the UWUA, and the IBEW, 
also expressed concern about rescue procedures (DC Tr. 45, 431, 434, 
436-437, 640-641). OSHA believes that training in rescue procedures is 
important. Proposed Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(i) had a requirement for 
training in emergency procedures for this very reason. To further 
explain the importance of this training, the Agency has added pole and 
manhole rescue as examples of emergency procedures in which employees 
would have to be trained.
    Many comments, including one of the hearing requests, claimed that 
proposed Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(i) was overly broad and vague (3-11, 3-20, 
3-33, 3-42, 3-44, 3-58, 3-109, 3-112, 3-113, 3-119, 3-123, 3-125, 3-
128, 58). Most were concerned about the proposal's requirement, in this 
paragraph, that employees be trained in ``any other safety practices . 
. . which are not addressed by this section but which are necessary for 
their safety'' (Ex. 3-20, 3-80, 3-109, 3-112, 3-113, 3-119, 3-123, 3-
125, 3-128, 58). They suggested replacing the word ``other'' with 
``applicable'' or ``related'', claiming that this would clarify the 
intent of the provision.
    In response to these comments, OSHA raised this issue in the notice 
of public hearing. OSHA representatives at the public hearing explained 
that the proposed rule would require employees to be trained in work 
techniques that related to his or her job (DC Tr. 87-88). Additionally, 
if more than one set of work practices could be used to accomplish a 
task safely, the employee would need to be trained in only those work 
methods he or she is to use (DC Tr. 87-88). For example, an insulator 
on a power line could be replaced through the use of live-line tools, 
through the use of rubber insulating equipment, or by deenergizing the 
line. The employee would only have to be trained in the method actually 
used to replace that insulator. In keeping with these interpretations, 
the Agency has decided to revise the language of the last sentence of 
Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(i) to read as follows:

    Employees shall also be trained in and familiar with any other 
safety practices, including applicable emergency procedures (such as 
pole top and manhole rescue), that are not addressed by this section 
but that are related to their work and are necessary for their 
safety.

    The standard cannot specify requirements for every hazard the 
employee faces in performing electric power generation, transmission, 
or distribution work. Employers must fill in this gap by training their 
employees in hazards that are anticipated during the course of jobs 
they are expected to perform. The revised language of final 
Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(i) clearly imparts OSHA's intent that safety 
training be provided in areas that are not covered by the standard but 
that are related to the employee's job.
    Paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of final Sec. 1910.269 contains additional 
requirements for the training of qualified employees. Because qualified 
employees are allowed to work very close to electric power lines and 
equipment and because they face a high risk of electrocution, it is 
important that they be specially trained. Towards this end, the 
proposal would have required that these employees be trained in 
distinguishing live parts from other parts of electric equipment, in 
determining nominal voltages of lines and equipment, in the minimum 
approach distances set forth in the proposal, and in the techniques 
involved in working on or near live parts.
    The Association of Illinois Electric Cooperatives stated that this 
paragraph, as proposed, would impose a substantial cost burden upon its 
members (Ex 3-69). They claim that this provision would require very 
extensive training of workers to become ``qualified''.
    OSHA believes that qualified employees need to be extensively 
trained in order for them to perform their work safely. The IBEW 
agreed, stating that their apprenticeship program took between 3 and 5 
years (DC Tr. 619-620) However, the Agency also believes that this 
training is already being provided by the vast majority of utility 
employers. EEI stated that electric utility workers were highly trained 
under its membership's current programs (Ex. 3-112). The National 
Electrical Contractors Association stated that their joint 
apprenticeship training program is the finest program in the country 
for journeyman linemen (Ex. 3-60; LA Tr. 191). No one argued that 
employees who work on electric power generation, transmission, or 
distribution installations (that is, those who must be ``qualified'' 
under Sec. 1910.269) would be able to perform this work safely without 
the training proposed under paragraph (a)(2)(ii). Therefore, OSHA has 
retained this paragraph without modification in the final rule.
    Under paragraph (a)(2)(v), the final rule permits classroom or on-
the-job training or a combination of both. This allows employers to 
continue the types of training programs that are currently in 
existence. Additionally, if an employee has already been trained 
(through previous job assignments, for example), the employer does not 
have to duplicate previous instruction.
    Several commenters suggested adding language permitting an employer 
to demonstrate that employees have been previously trained (Ex. 3-20, 
3-80, 3-112, 3-123). It was claimed that this would eliminate 
unnecessary and redundant training of existing employees.
    Paragraphs (a)(2)(i) and (a)(2)(ii) require employees to be 
trained. They do not specifically require employers to provide this 
training themselves or to repeat training already provided. Clearly, 
the plain language of the standard allows employees to be trained by 
other parties or to have been trained previously by their own 
employers. OSHA does not believe it is necessary to modify the language 
of the standard to recognize this explicitly.
    The employer is required, by paragraph (a)(2)(vii), to certify that 
each employee has been trained. This certification should not 
necessitate the employer's completing forms or creating new records; 
existing personnel records would normally suffice, or the employer 
could simply make out a certification for each employee upon completion 
of training. Employers relying on training provided by previous 
employers are expected to take steps to verify that the employee has 
indeed received it.
    Many commenters objected to the requirement for ``certification'' 
(Ex. 3-11, 3-22, 3-33, 3-34, 3-39, 3-44, 3-45, 3-58, 3-60, 3-69, 3-71, 
3-80, 3-82, 3-83, 3-86, 3-112, 3-113, 3-123). Mr. Robert Felix of the 
National Arborist Association (NAA) summarized these comments, stating:


    NAA fully supports the training requirement. We, however, oppose 
the certification requirement as an unworkable administrative 
nightmare which will serve only to generate OSHA citations but not 
improve employee safety. [Ex. 3-113]


    OSHA representatives at the hearing reiterated the explanation in 
the preamble to the proposal that employment records would normally be 
a sufficient means of compliance with the certification requirement. 
NAA suggested that the final rule clarify this in the standard itself 
(Ex. 58). Although the Agency did not take the exact approach mentioned 
by this hearing participant, OSHA has added a note to paragraph 
(a)(2)(vii) clarifying this point. The new note reads as follows:


    Note: Employment records that indicate that an employee has 
received the required training are an acceptable means of meeting 
this requirement.


    OSHA believes that this explanation will satisfy most of the 
commenters with objections to the requirement for certification of 
training.
    The proposal did not include a requirement for follow-up training 
for employees. However, in the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested 
information on the need for such training.
    A few expressed opposition to an OSHA requirement for follow-up 
training (Ex. 3-112, 3-125, 3-128). Edison Electric Institute voiced 
the concern of those opposed to this type of requirement as follows:


    In response to OSHA's request for comment, EEI believes that it 
would not be necessary or useful for the standard to specify follow-
up training. Electric utility training programs are well established 
and include follow-up training when needed. The flexibility needed 
to address perceived training needs when they arise can be lost when 
subject matter and training cycle are fixed by regulation. Moreover, 
the difficulty of forecasting when opportunities for on-the-job 
training will arise would complicate compliance with a follow-up 
requirement, particularly as to unusual or esoteric skills which are 
best taught when the need arises to use them on the job. [Ex. 3-112]


    Even though EEI argued that it would not be appropriate for the 
standard to specify follow-up training, they nonetheless admitted that 
existing programs do include follow-up on an as-needed basis (Ex. 3-
112). EEI witnesses also admitted that the initial schooling provided 
for their employees was being supplemented in various ways (DC Tr. 
1096-1099).
    Others, including NIOSH, IBEW, and UWUA, supported a new 
requirement (Ex. 3-21, 3-57, 3-76, 3-82, 3-103, 3-107). They argued 
that the introduction of new technology in the industry demands 
retraining employees (Ex. 3-21, 3-76, 3-103, 3-107), that long periods 
of time may elapse before an employee uses certain procedures (Ex. 3-
76; DC Tr. 411-412, 472), and that periodic training reinforces correct 
work practices (3-21). Mr. Marshall Hicks, National Secretary-Treasurer 
of the Utility Workers Union of America, stated:


    I would like to expand and explain our position on the training 
requirements which are proposed in paragraph (a)(2)(ii). We are not 
confident that the provisions allowing the employers to continue 
present training practices currently in existence and also the 
failure of the provision to require follow-up training is 
sufficient.
    Our experience with the current practices and the lack of 
follow-up training indicates that it is inadequate for maintaining 
safety and job performance. In many instances, the mere fact that 
workers may have labored in lower rated classifications and the same 
promotional ladder is the only job training provided.
    And in some cases, an individual worker because of shift 
assignment, crew assignment or other limited assignment practices 
may not have experienced more than one or two phases of the work 
activity as he performs in the lower rated classification.
    In recent years, employers have merged classifications to the 
extent that a number of work disciplines are included in one 
classification. We have an instance where one employer with workers 
holding a title of general maintenance journeyman are required to be 
skilled in two specific trades and semi-skilled in two additional 
trades.
    And the work assignments to those workers are made generally on 
the basis of where they have been best trained. If an individual is 
best trained as a welder, most of his assignments are welder, but he 
may at some time once every two or three months or so be assigned to 
do electrical repair work without any additional training or 
experience.
    So we find that the on the job training received is not 
adequate. We suggest that follow-up training be required for those 
purposes. And we also have the experience circumstances where on 
shift rotation that an individual who might be working on an off-
shift where there is not an awful lot of maintenance work being done 
may go for a number of months before he is required to perform 
certain types of work, and he generally forgets what all of the 
safety practices are between various assignments.
    And on the follow-up training, we think that it should be 
carried out on a routine regular basis for those reasons and for the 
reasons that the technological changes in the jobs and the work that 
is required now days is continuing changing and the training is a 
necessity to keep employees up-to-date on the latest technology. [DC 
Tr. 410-412]


    Mr. Robert Macdonald of the International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers noted that some of the accidents in the IBEW submission were 
caused by the lack of training (Ex. 12-12; DC Tr. 532-534). They argued 
that this supported the need for further training and retraining.
    OSHA has determined that there is a need for employees to be 
trained on a continuing basis. Initial instruction in safe techniques 
for performing specific job tasks is not sufficient to ensure that 
employees will use safe work practices all the time. With regard to the 
effect of training on accidents, Dr. Heinz Ahlers of NIOSH stated:


    * * * I think in a majority of those instances, the fatality 
involved the worker who had been appropriately trained for the 
exposure that he subsequently came in contact with and just was not 
following what the training and the company policy had involved. [DC 
Tr. 47-48]


    Continual reinforcement of this initial guidance must be provided 
to ensure that the employee actually uses the procedures he or she has 
been taught. This reinforcement can take the form of supervision (DC 
Tr. 1097), safety meetings (LA Tr. 134-135), pre-job briefings or 
conferences (DC Tr. 1096), and retraining (DC Tr. 1098-1099). 
Typically, adequate supervision can detect unsafe work practices with 
respect to tasks that are routine and are performed on a daily or 
regular basis. However, if an employee has to use a technique that is 
applied infrequently or that is based on new technology, some follow-up 
is needed to ensure that the employee is actually aware of the correct 
procedure for accomplishing the task (Ex. 3-21; DC Tr. 410-412, 1098-
1099). A detailed job briefing, as required under Sec. 1910.269(c)(2), 
may be adequate if the employee has previously received some 
instruction, but training would be necessary if the employee has never 
been schooled in the techniques to be used.
    For these reasons, OSHA has supplemented the training requirements 
proposed in Sec. 1910.269(a)(2) with two new requirements: (1) a 
requirement for regular supervision and an annual inspection by the 
employer to determine whether or not each employee is complying with 
the safety-related work practices required by Sec. 1910.269 and (2) a 
requirement for additional training whenever an employee must use work 
practices that he or she does not implement regularly or that involve 
new technology and whenever an employee is found not in compliance with 
the work practices required by Sec. 1910.269. The new provisions are 
contained in paragraphs (a)(2)(iii) and (a)(2)(iv), which read as 
follows:

    (iii) The employer shall determine, through regular supervision 
and through inspections conducted on at least an annual basis, that 
each employee is complying with the safety-related work practices 
required by this section.
    (iv) An employee shall receive additional training (or 
retraining) under any of the following conditions:
    (A) If the supervision and annual inspections required by 
paragraph (a)(2)(iii) of this section indicate that the employee is 
not complying with the safety-related work practices required by 
this section, or
    (B) If new technology, new types of equipment, or changes in 
procedures necessitate the use of safety-related work practices that 
are different from those which the employee would normally use, or
    (C) If he or she must employ safety-related work practices that 
are not normally used during his or her regular job duties.

    Note: OSHA would consider tasks that are performed less often 
than once per year to necessitate retraining before the performance 
of the work practices involved.

    The note indicates that the Agency considers tasks performed less 
often than once per year to require retraining before the task is 
actually performed. OSHA will accept instruction provided in pre-job 
briefings if it is detailed enough to fully inform the employee of the 
procedures involved in the job and to ensure that he or she can 
accomplish them in a safe manner. OSHA believes that this requirement 
will significantly improve safety for electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution workers.
    The Utility Workers Union of America was concerned that, if the 
final training requirements were the same as those in the proposal, the 
standard would not fully protect electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution workers (DC Tr. 410). Several utility 
employees testified that the training they were given was inadequate 
and that their employer falsely documented training that was never 
received (LA Tr. 61, 69, 78, 80, 82-83, 102). They also submitted 
documentary evidence, including citations issued by California's 
Division of Occupational Safety and Health, supporting their assertions 
(Ex. 66). One of the documents submitted was a ``QA [Quality Assurance] 
Surveillance Report'' from the Southern California Edison Company (the 
employer of the employees involved), which stated, ``Based on the 
numerous procedural deficiencies and observations, as documented in 
this surveillance, it appears that the root cause for these problems 
stems from the lack of adequate training for Operations personnel in 
Work Authorizations.''
    EEI submitted documents detailing the extensive training manuals 
used to train Southern California Edison employees (Ex. 46). They 
argued that utility training programs result in a highly qualified work 
force (Ex. 3-112). As noted previously, other commenters, including 
NIOSH, stated that training given to utility employees is 
comprehensive.
    While there is substantial evidence in the record that electric 
utility employees are highly skilled and well trained, OSHA is 
concerned, based on the evidence submitted by the UWUA, that a few 
employers may inaccurately ``certify'' the training of some employees 
who have not demonstrated proficiency in the work practices required by 
the standard. An example will help to illustrate the need for the 
standard to address the overall goals of the training program. At the 
public hearing, Mr. John Bachofer, testifying on behalf of the Edison 
Electric Institute, described a complex tagging program and extensive 
training for that program, which he characterized as typical for the 
electric utility industry as a whole (LA Tr. 222-226). With respect to 
training in tagging procedures, Mr. Bachofer stated:

    These detailed procedures, together with the safety manual, 
serve a dual purpose. They establish the specific requirements and 
provide the explicit direction for protection of employees from 
hazardous energy and they comprise the text material which is the 
basis for employee training in protection from hazardous energy. The 
training process is rigorous, including classroom presentation by 
qualified instructors, as well as self-study and it does include 
testing. Employees must demonstrate knowledge and skill in the 
application of hazardous energy control, consistent with established 
acceptance criteria, before they are qualified to either request 
that equipment be removed from service and tagged out, or to execute 
switching, valving and tagging. [LA Tr. 224]

    An employee who has attended a single training class on a procedure 
that is as complex as the lockout and tagging procedure used in an 
electric generating plant has generally not been fully trained in that 
procedure. Unless a training program establishes an employee's 
proficiency in safe work practices and unless that employee then 
demonstrates his or her ability to perform those work practices, there 
will be no assurance that safe work practices will result, and overall 
employee safety will not benefit nearly as much as it could. To address 
this problem, the Agency is adding one provision and changing the 
language of the proposed certification provision. Paragraph (a)(2)(vi) 
of the final rule, which has no counterpart in proposed Sec. 1910.269, 
reads as follows:

    The training shall establish employee proficiency in the work 
practices required by this section and shall introduce the 
procedures necessary for compliance with this section.

    Additionally, as noted earlier, the employer is required, under 
paragraph (a)(2)(vii), to certify that an employee has received the 
training required by paragraph (a)(2). Under the proposed rule 
(proposed paragraph (a)(2)(iv)), this certification would have been 
required ``when the employee successfully completes the training''. 
OSHA has changed this phrase to ``when the employee demonstrates 
proficiency in the work practices involved''.
    The addition of paragraph (a)(2)(vi) and the revised language 
contained in paragraph (a)(2)(vii) of the final rule will ensure that 
employers do not try to comply with Sec. 1910.269 by simply handing 
training manuals to their employees. These provisions will require 
employers to take steps to assure that employees comprehend what they 
have been taught and that they are capable of performing the work 
practices mandated by the standard. OSHA believes that these two 
paragraphs will maximize the benefits of the training required under 
the standard.
    OSHA believes that the training requirements contained in the final 
standard are sufficient to protect employees performing electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution work. However, in every 
industry, there will be some employers who are not as faithful in 
following safety and health standards as others. The Agency intends to 
vigorously enforce the training requirements of the final rule, because 
much of the worker's safety depends on knowledge of and skills in 
proper working procedures. The combination of rigorous training 
provisions with strict enforcement of these rules will result in 
increased safety to employees.
    Frequently, the conditions present at a jobsite can expose 
employees to unexpected hazards. For example, the grounding system 
available at an outdoor site could have been damaged by the weather or 
by vehicular traffic, or communications cables in the vicinity could 
reduce the approach distance to an unacceptable level. To protect 
employees from such adverse situations, the conditions present in the 
work area should be known so that appropriate action can be taken. 
Paragraph (a)(3) of Sec. 1910.269 addresses this problem by requiring 
conditions existing in the work area to be determined before work is 
started. The language for this paragraph was taken from 
Sec. 1926.950(b)(1). A similar requirement can be found in ANSI C2-1987 
(the NESC), Section 420D (Ex. 2-8).
    EEI contended that this paragraph belongs with provisions related 
to overhead lines (Ex. 3-112). They claimed that the provision was 
taken from a Subpart V requirement dealing with overhead lines and that 
making it a general rule distorted its meaning. Mr. Klaus Broscheit of 
the New England Power Service argued that this provision related to 
electrical hazards only (Ex. 3-62). He suggested that this be stated in 
the opening sentence of the requirement.
    As noted earlier, Sec. 1910.269(a)(3) was taken from 
Sec. 1926.950(b)(1), a provision in Subpart V having general 
applicability. It relates to hazards common to all types of electrical 
work performed under that standard,18 not just overhead line work. 
For example, the condition of the equipment grounding conductor that 
may be provided on a motor that is part of a generating installation 
affects the safety of anyone working on that motor. However, OSHA 
agrees with Mr. Broscheit that the conditions listed in the proposed 
rule related solely to safety in performing electrical work. Therefore, 
the Agency is limiting the application of this paragraph in the final 
rule to work ``on or near electric lines or equipment''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\8Although Subpart V applies only to the construction of 
electric transmission and distribution lines and equipment, the 
definition of ``construction work'' as it applies to Subpart V is 
very broad. In fact, EEI pointed out that much of the work that will 
be performed under Sec. 1910.269 is nearly the same as work covered 
under Subpart V (Ex. 3-112).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other commenters argued that determinations of switching 
transients, induced voltages, and integrity of grounds was not 
necessary for employee safety (Ex. 3-20, 3-23, 3-80, 3-82, 3-101, 3-
112). Summarizing their objections, Mr. G. F. Stone of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority stated:

    Paragraph 3 appears to require an accurate determination be made 
as to the amount of induced voltage present in a given circuit 
before work begins. While it is important to recognize and control 
hazards associated with induced voltages and switching transients, 
this can be done and is routinely done in the utility industry 
without ever having to know the amount of induced voltage or 
switching transients present. The hazards associated with induced 
voltages are controlled by properly applying protective grounds 
before work begins. Application of protective grounds is covered in 
paragraph (n) of this standard. The hazards associated with 
switching transients are controlled by applying protective grounds, 
suspending switching operations on adjacent lines, and disabling 
automatic reclosing schemes.
    Unless paragraph (a)(3) is changed to reflect the [commenter's] 
proposed text, the utility industry will be required to measure for 
the amount of induced voltage. This step would be costly but would 
not offer any additional protection for the worker. [Ex. 3-82]

    It is not OSHA's intent routinely to require employers to take 
measurements in order to make the determinations required by 
Sec. 1910.269(a)(3). Knowledge of the maximum transient voltage level 
is necessary to perform many routine transmission and distribution line 
jobs safely; however, no measurement is necessary in the determination 
of what the maximum level is. It can be determined by an analysis of 
the electric circuit, or the employer can assume the default maximum 
transient overvoltages as discussed under Sec. 1910.269(1)(2). 
Similarly, employers can make determinations of the presence of 
hazardous induced voltages and of the presence and condition of grounds 
without taking measurements.19 To clarify the standard, OSHA has 
reworded the language of paragraph to read as follows:

    \1\9It may be necessary for measurements to be made if there is 
doubt as to the condition of a ground or the level of induced or 
transient voltage and if the employer is relying on one of these 
conditions to meet other requirements in the standard. For example, 
an engineering analysis of a particular installation might reveal 
that voltage induced on a deenergized line is considerable, but 
should not be dangerous. A measurement of the voltage is warranted 
if the employer is using this analysis as a basis for claiming that 
the provisions of Sec. 1910.269(q)(2)(iv) on hazardous induced 
voltage do not apply. In another case, further investigation would 
be warranted if an equipment ground is found to be of questionable 
reliability, unless the equipment is treated as energized under 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 1910.269(1)(9).

    Existing conditions related to the safety of the work to be 
performed shall be determined before work on or near electric lines 
or equipment is started. Such conditions include, but are not 
limited to, the nominal voltages of lines and equipment, the maximum 
switching transient voltages, the presence of hazardous induced 
voltages, the presence and condition of protective grounds and 
equipment grounding conductors, the condition of poles, 
environmental conditions relative to safety, and the locations of 
circuits and equipment, including power and communication lines and 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
fire protective signaling circuits.

    The conditions found as a result of compliance with this paragraph 
will affect the application of various requirements contained within 
Sec. 1910.269. For example, the voltage on equipment will determine the 
minimum approach distances required under Sec. 1910.269(1)(2). 
Similarly, the presence or absence of an equipment grounding conductor 
will affect the work practices required under Sec. 1910.269(1)(9). If 
conditions to which no specific Sec. 1910.269 provision applies are 
found, then the employee would be trained, as required by paragraph 
(a)(2)(i), to use appropriate safe work practices.
    Paragraph (b). Paragraph (b) of Sec. 1910.269 sets forth 
requirements for medical services and first aid. In accordance with 
Sec. 1910.269(b), the introductory text of paragraph (a)(1)(iii) 
emphasizes that the requirements of Sec. 1910.151 apply. That existing 
section includes provisions for available medical personnel, first aid 
training and supplies, and facilities for drenching or flushing of the 
eyes and body in the event of exposure to corrosive materials.
    Because of the hazard of electric shock when employees are 
performing work on or with energized lines and equipment, electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution workers suffer 
electrocution on the job. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) is 
necessary in the event of electric shock so that injured employees can 
be revived. CPR must be started within 4 minutes to be effective in 
reviving an employee whose heart has gone into fibrillation.
    OSHA proposed requiring CPR training for field crews of two or more 
employees (a minimum of two trained employees) and for fixed worksites 
(enough trained employees to provide assistance within 4 minutes). The 
proposal requested comments on whether the requirement was reasonable 
and, if changes were suggested, on what the costs and benefits of the 
suggested changes would be.
    Many commenters, including NIOSH, IBEW, UWUA, and EEI, supported 
requiring CPR training for electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution workers, though some disagreed with the language contained 
in the proposed rule (Ex. 3-21, 3-46, 3-76, 3-82, 3-103, 3-107, 3-112). 
However, the National Arborist Association argued that line-clearance 
tree trimmers did not face a significant risk of electric shock (Ex. 3-
113, 58; LA Tr. 338-340). This objection was also raised by tree 
trimming companies and electric utility companies (Ex. 3-48, 3-63, 3-
67, 3-75, 3-90, 3-91, 3-92, 3-98, 3-99, 3-104). Robert Felix, Executive 
Vice President of the National Arborist Association, claimed that a 
survey of 55 of their member companies, who perform 90 percent of the 
line-clearance tree-trimming work in the nation, accounted for 10 
fatalities over a 3-year period (Ex. 58). None of the fatalities was 
caused by contact with an electric power line. He also asserted that 
OSHA's own fatality data did not demonstrate a risk of electrocution 
for line-clearance tree trimmers because the data did not distinguish 
between line-clearance and non-line-clearance tree trimming.20
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\0NAA also noted that Eastern Research Group, Inc. (ERG), in 
its ``Preparation of an Economic Impact Study for the Proposed OSHA 
Regulation Covering Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and 
Distribution'' (Ex. 4), estimated a much lower incidence of 
fatalities to line-clearance tree-trimming crews--between zero and 
four per year. However, the ERG estimate was based on two sources: 
IBEW accident reports and the National Arborist Association data. As 
the IBEW does not represent many line-clearance tree trimmers, it 
cannot be expected to be in receipt of many reports by its members 
on line-clearance tree-trimming accidents. The NAA survey included 
no electrocutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Exhibit 9-6 contains all accident-related inspections for the 
period April 1984 to September 1989. In this exhibit, there are 19 
fatalities for companies in Standard Industrial Code (SIC) 0783 that 
the data indicate involve line-clearance tree-trimming work. Although 
SIC 0783 includes companies that do not perform line-clearance tree 
trimming work as well as those that do, other information in the 
printout can be used to determine the type of work being performed. The 
abstract usually indicates that this was the type of work being 
performed, but sometimes this information can be gleaned from other 
data in the report, such as the voltage involved (transmission line 
voltages, 69 kV and higher, are assumed to involve line clearance as 
such lines are not typically present during residential tree work) or 
the establishment inspected (that is, an electric utility). Of these 19 
fatalities, 12 (63 percent) were due to electric shock.
    Exhibit 9-1 contains descriptions of accidents related to trimming 
trees near overhead power lines. It covers a period from approximately 
April 1984 to December 1986 and describes 15 accidents involving 14 
fatalities and 3 injuries. Five of these accidents (five deaths) 
appeared to involve line-clearance tree trimming activities--two so 
state in the abstract; one involved a ``trained employee'' trimming 
along a 161-kV right of way (Ex. 9-6, same accident); one involved 
contact with a 69-kilovolt power line; and one involved an inspection 
of an electric cooperative (Ex. 9-6, same accident). Only four of the 
reports (5 deaths) apparently dealt with residential tree trimming. One 
of the reports concerned a line-clearance tree trimmer who received 
burns only (no fatality). The other abstracts related to accidents 
which could have related to either line-clearance or non-line-clearance 
work. This exhibit alone shows that a minimum of 5 electrocutions 
involving line-clearance tree-trimming activities occurred during this 
2.75-year period, and the true number is likely to be even higher.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\For various reasons, the OSHA fatality reports in Exhibits 
9-1 and 9-6 did not record all occupational electrocutions occurring 
in this period. For example, despite reporting requirements, some 
fatalities are simply never reported to the Agency. Additionally, 
the OSHA data base does not include reports from all states with 
their own approved occupational safety and health programs. Further, 
with respect to Exhibit 9-1, some accident reports submitted for the 
period covered by this exhibit were not reviewed in time to be 
entered into the database.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is not clear why the NAA survey failed to include any 
electrocutions;22 however, the OSHA data amply demonstrate the 
risk faced by these tree-trimming employees. An estimated 8 line-
clearance tree-trimming employees are electrocuted each year out of a 
population of approximately 36,000 full-time positions for a fatality 
rate of 0.00022, or a risk of electrocution of 1 in 100 over a 45-year 
working lifetime (Ex. 5). OSHA also estimates that about 40 workers 
among 137,800 electric utility employees at high risk under the 
proposal were electrocuted each year for a fatality rate of 0.00029, or 
a risk of electrocution of 1.3 in 100 over a 45-year working lifetime 
(Ex. 5). On this basis, OSHA has determined that the risk of 
electrocution for line-clearance employees is about 75 percent of the 
risk of those who face the highest probability of death from electric 
shock. Additionally, employees are also exposed to injury from electric 
shock; and, while the OSHA data do not accurately reflect injury rates, 
the Agency has found that injuries from electric shock normally occur 
at a much greater frequency than electrocutions (54 FR 5005-5006; Ex. 
5). Therefore, the Agency concludes that employees involved in line-
clearance tree-trimming work are exposed to a significant risk of 
electric shock.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\2 The OSHA data were submitted after the NPRM was published, 
but before the public hearing. Equivalent data were also submitted 
by OSHA to the Subpart S work practices rulemaking and were 
available even before Sec. 1910.269 was proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Robert Felix of the National Arborist Association further 
argued that CPR was of dubious value with respect to injuries caused by 
electric shock. In NAA's post-hearing brief, he stated:

a study of the precise issue by medical experts (Cardiologist F. 
Gravino, M.D., F.A.C.C., et al.) commissioned by NAA and submitted 
to the Record as part of NAA's post-hearing evidence submission to 
the Docket, along with other related Record evidence, demonstrates 
the following medical assessment:

    1. * * * There is no demonstrated value of CPR in the electric 
injury context.
* * * * *
    2. * * * CPR is of no value to a person exposed to high voltage 
shock because of attendant ``irreversible damage of either the 
autonomic nervous system or the cardiac tissue itself.'' (Gravino, 
et al., supra)
* * * * *
    3. * * * Lower voltage contacts from indirect contacts do ``not 
respond to CPR''--see National Safety Council Newsletter of July/
August 1990, at p. 1, submitted to the Docket by NAA as part of its 
post-hearing evidence submission.
    Moreover, such lower voltage contacts may induce respiratory 
block, rather than cardiac block, as to which artificial 
respiration, which is taught to line clearance tree trimmers as part 
of first-aid training, provides appropriate assistance, for which 
CPR would provide no additional benefit--a point conceded by NIOSH 
(D.C. Tr. 35, 67).
    4. * * * Even if otherwise appropriate in an electrical 
context--a fact not supported by the evidence--CPR is of value only 
if followed by defibrillation within 8 minutes of the onset of 
ventricular fibrillation.
    The likelihood of getting an 8 minute ambulance response time to 
a line clearance job site is remote (notwithstanding the isolated 
anecdotal evidence to the contrary arising in a non line clearance 
context in Seattle, Washington and West Va.).
    * * * the dubious value of CPR further is attenuated by the 
remote likelihood of obtaining the required defibrillation within 8 
minutes. [Ex. 58]

    Others asserted that CPR was useful and necessary for the 
protection of workers exposed to electric shock (Ex. 3-21, 3-76, 3-
107). Dr. Richard Niemeier of NIOSH stated that current medical 
guidelines recommend CPR treatment, as follows:

    The revised ``Standards and Guidelines for Cardiopulmonary 
Resuscitation (CPR) and Emergency Cardiac Care (ECC)'' recommend the 
same treatment for cardiopulmonary arrest, whether spontaneous or 
associated with electrical shock [JAMA 1986]. The guidelines noted 
that the complications of electric shock that might require CPR 
include tetany of the muscles used for breathing during contact with 
the electrical current, prolonged paralysis of breathing muscles for 
a period following the electric contact, and cardiac arrest. This 
discussion considers two categories: (1) respiratory arrest (with 
pulse) and (2) cardiac arrest. [Ex. 15]

    NIOSH reviewed studies on the effectiveness of CPR in resuscitating 
electric shock victims. Regarding this review of the available 
evidence, Mr. Niemeier stated:

    The question posed by OSHA, at this time, however, is whether 
sufficient evidence exists to support the recommendation that 
utility linemen work in pairs and be trained in CPR. Medical ethics 
and common sense prohibit a prospective study with random allocation 
of electrical shock or other cardiac arrest victims to ``CPR'' and 
``non-CPR'' groups. This question must be answered, therefore, by 
clinical epidemiologic studies that are less than perfect. Cummins 
and Eisenberg [1985] reviewed the evidence regarding the 
relationship of early CPR and survival following cardiac arrest. The 
authors found nine studies that they considered credible (before 
1985); all nine studies reported that early CPR had a beneficial 
effect. Cummins and Eisenberg [1985] concluded that the evidence 
clearly supported the concept that early CPR (begun on the scene by 
lay persons) leads to better survival rates than CPR delayed until 
emergency medical personnel arrive. These studies generally exclude 
trauma victims from analysis; this fact does not preclude the 
extrapolation of these results to patients with cardiac rhythm 
disturbances secondary to contact with electrical energy. [Ex. 15]

    The IBEW strongly urged OSHA to require CPR training for those 
exposed to the hazards of electric shock, stating:

    The IBEW urges OSHA to adopt language which would require every 
employer covered by the standard, where employees can be expected by 
the nature of the work to be exposed to hazardous electrical 
contact, to train employees in cardio-pulmonary resuscitation. Line-
Clearance tree-trimming personnel must also be trained in CPR. 
Numerous reports of accidents and life saving incidents submitted by 
IBEW Local Unions to the IBEW International Office, some of which 
have been submitted to OSHA during this rulemaking, argue forcibly 
for this provision in the standard. Therefore, the IBEW fully 
supports the OSHA proposed Rule 1910.269(b)(1)(i).
    During the public hearing(s) testimony was given regarding the 
effectiveness of administering CPR to electrocution victims where 
the heart is in a state of fibrillation. The Electric Power Research 
Institute did a complete study of this issue with regard to methods 
of pole top rescue. [Ex. 61]

    The EPRI study did recognize CPR as part of their recommended 
treatment for victims of electric shock (Ex. 57).
    While the Gravino, et al., report cited in the NAA post-hearing 
comments did indeed point out several factors limiting the usefulness 
of CPR in the treatment of electric shock injuries,\23\ OSHA is not 
persuaded that CPR cannot revive some victims of electric shock. In 
fact, the IBEW testified that their members have used CPR to save 
lives, and their accident records report the use of cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation techniques on employees injured by electric shock (Ex 12-
12; DC Tr. 559-561, 564-565). The NIOSH testimony clearly indicates 
that accepted treatment of unconscious electric shock victims includes 
the application of CPR. As they stated, ``The limited data available 
regarding survival after contact with electrical energy and other 
relevant data on factors associated with survival after cardiopulmonary 
arrest support the NIOSH recommendations [DC Tr. 34].''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\The NAA comments misrepresent the study in one important 
area. Their comments stated, ``CPR is of no value to a person 
exposed to high voltage shock because of attendant `irreversible 
damage of either the autonomic nervous system or the cardiac tissue 
itself.'''. The actual statement in the study was ``Exposure to 
extremely high voltage (with attendant high amperage) energized 
electric power lines . . . might well lead to irreversible damage of 
either the autonomic nervous system or the cardiac tissue itself. . 
. . CPR would be of no value in the resuscitation of a person so 
exposed [emphasis added].'' Additional examples are given of 
circumstances that minimize the usefulness of CPR. However, no 
statement in the study indicates that CPR is of no value generally 
in electric shock cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA has not accepted the argument that lack of fully equipped 
ambulances and slow response times negate any benefit that CPR training 
would provide. Though it is true that ACLS is needed to revive the 
heart after it goes into fibrillation, Mr. Heinz Ahlers of NIOSH stated 
that defibrillation is not necessary for cases of complete heart 
stoppage (that is, the heart stops beating completely rather than 
fibrillates) as occurs in response to some electric shocks (LA Tr. 358-
360). Additionally, in cases of fibrillation of the heart muscle, 
emergency response times are quick enough (within 8 minutes 50 percent 
of the time in occupational sites in West Virginia--DC Tr. 66-68) and 
the presence of defibrillating equipment is present in sufficient and 
increasing quantities (presently in 25 percent of all licensed 
ambulances--Ex. 58; increasing over time--DC Tr. 67-68) for CPR 
provided on the scene by crew members to have an impact on employee 
safety on a country-wide basis.
    For the foregoing reasons, OSHA has determined that a requirement 
for the training of employees in cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
techniques is necessary and appropriate. Therefore, Sec. 1910.269(b)(1) 
retains the proposal's requirement that persons with training in first 
aid, including CPR, be available where employees are exposed to 
electric shock hazards.
    Some commenters did suggest that OSHA clarify the standard to state 
that CPR was required only for employees exposed to the hazards of 
electric shock (Ex. 3-34, 3-80, 3-82, 3-88, 3-109, 3-123). Messrs. 
Nicholas Reynolds, Scott DuBoff, and Allen Flowers, commenting on 
behalf of several electric utilities, suggested ``[i]ncorporation of a 
voltage level threshold'' in the final standard by way of clarification 
(Ex. 3-109). The American Public Power Association and the Tennessee 
Valley Authority recommended adding the word ``exposed'' before 
``energized'' to bring forth the intended meaning of the requirement 
(Ex. 3-80, 3-82).
    OSHA agrees with these comments and has clarified the rule so that 
it applies to employees ``performing work on or associated with exposed 
lines or equipment energized at 50 volts or more''. This will clarify 
that the rule does not apply to employees working near insulated 
electric equipment, as the exposure to electric shock hazards is 
minimal. It also establishes a 50-volt threshold that has previously 
been recognized in the Agency's electrical standards as a general 
electric shock hazard limit. (See Secs. 1910.303(g)(2)(i), 
1910.304(f)(1), and 1910.333(a)(1) for examples.)
    Proposed Sec. 1910.269(b)(1)(i)(A) would have required two CPR-
trained persons for field work that involved two or more employees. The 
National Arborist Association argued that requiring a minimum of two 
trained persons was not feasible for line-clearance tree trimming 
contractors (Ex. 3-113, 58; LA Tr. 375-377). Others also noted the 
difficulty of manning crews with two trained employees at all times, 
due to the extensive use of two-person crews and the 80-percent 
turnover rate in the industry (Ex. 3-60, 3-63, 3-67, 3-77, 3-87, 3-90, 
3-91, 3-98, 3-100, 3-118). NAA made this statement in their post-
hearing comment (Ex. 58):

    Finally, CPR is not feasible for implementation in the line 
clearance tree trimming industry because the industry's employee 
turnover rate is 81% per year! Thus, as currently proposed by OSHA, 
a line clearance contractor could not field a typical two man line 
clearance crew until at least one member was trained in CPR, and no 
sooner than the new employee is trained, statistically, the odds are 
he will quit! See NAA survey of members' employee turnover for line 
clearance crews, submitted to the Record as part of NAA's post-
hearing evidence submission. This survey shows that fully one third 
of new hires are gone within 30 days, almost half are gone in 60 
days, 59% are gone in 90 days, 70% are gone in 6 months, 78% are 
gone in 9 months, and 81% are gone in a year. Thus, because having 
to train all of these imminent quits is an extraordinarily expensive 
outlay [FOOTNOTE: ``$8,280,000--almost four times OSHA's estimate--
see our pre-hearing Comment''] of dubious use in any event, we 
respectfully submit that this proposal exceeds OSHA's proper 
exercise of its legitimate authority.

    NAA did acknowledge, however, that the ``logistical infeasibility'' 
of the CPR training requirement could be minimized by allowing 
employers to phase in training of new employees after they have been 
hired (Ex. 58; LA Tr. 376-377). In their post-hearing comment, they 
suggested a phase-in period of 6 months for newly hired employees (Ex. 
58).
    The Agency has accepted the need for flexibility in applying the 
rule to employers who experience a high turnover of employees or who, 
for other reasons, are faced with the problem of manning two-person 
crews with many new employees. The final rule does require the presence 
of two persons trained in first aid, including CPR, for field crews 
consisting of two or more employees. However, an exception is made to 
allow an employer to provide only one CPR-trained person if all new 
employees are trained in first aid, including cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation, within 3 months of their hiring dates. OSHA believes 
that the 3-month delay in the training of new employees will minimize 
the economic impact on line-clearance tree-trimming contractors (as 
well as any other employers who experience a high rate of turnover with 
new employees). As NAA testified, most of the turnover occurs within 
the first 3 months of an employee's tenure. Line-clearance tree 
trimmers that remain beyond 3 months are required to be trained; and, 
if they then quit and are hired by another firm after that, the 
training they have already received can be used by their new employer 
for compliance with paragraph (b)(1). Additionally, the 3-month delay 
in training new employees provides a built-in exception for students 
hired during the summer break.
    OSHA believes that this rule gives line-clearance tree-trimming 
contractors and other small employers flexibility by permitting new 
employees to be trained within 3 months of being hired. It also 
maximizes safety for exposed employees by requiring all employees to be 
trained in CPR.
    Paragraph (b)(1)(i)(B) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 would have 
required the presence of enough CPR-trained individuals to enable 
emergency treatment to begin within 4 minutes of an accident. Many 
commenters objected to the imposition of a time limit on the response 
to an accident (Ex. 3-20, 3-39, 3-42, 3-80, 3-112, 3-123, 3-131). Most 
claimed that a stricken employee may not be discovered for a while, 
making it impossible for employers to meet the standard. Some 
commenters suggested modifying the rule to apply the 4-minute limit 
starting with discovery of the accident (Ex. 3-39, 3-73, 3-83). Others 
recommended more general language, such as ``as soon as practical'', 
``as soon as possible'', or simply ``trained persons shall be 
available'' (Ex. 3-20, 3-80, 3-123, 56).
    OSHA intended proposed paragraph (b)(1)(i)(B) to provide guidance 
in the determination of the number of trained people necessary for 
prompt application of first aid or CPR in the event of an accident. The 
4-minute time given in the proposal was not intended as an absolute 
time limit on responding to an accident and did not account for delays 
in discovering an accident. In fact, at the public hearing, Agency 
representatives stated that the proposal was written in performance 
language and that the standard would be enforced by determining the 
time it would take for a CPR-trained individual to get to an injured 
employee (DC Tr. 201-203). If the provision were worded so that the 
number of trained employees was based on the total time after discovery 
of the accident, travel time between the nearest trained person and the 
exposed employee would not always be counted. OSHA believes that it is 
important for cardiopulmonary resuscitation to begin within 4 minutes 
of an electric shock injury. The record indicates that once that time 
has passed CPR is of limited usefulness. The Agency also believes that 
it is important for the final rule to incorporate this objective. OSHA 
has reworded this requirement, however, to state its intent that 
exposed employees be no more than 4 minutes from a CPR-trained person.
    Some commenters were also concerned that remote work stations with 
limited staffs could not meet the requirement proposed for fixed work 
locations (Ex. 3-42, 3-102, 3-112). To respond to these comments, OSHA 
has added the following exception:

    However, where the existing number of employees is insufficient 
to meet this requirement (at a remote substation, for example), all 
employees at the work location shall be trained.

    Proposed Sec. 1910.269(b)(1)(ii) would have required first aid 
training to be equivalent to the training provided by the American Red 
Cross. This provision was proposed to define the quality of first aid 
training required. In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested 
comments on whether there were additional training programs that 
provide equivalent training and that should also have been listed in 
the regulation.
    Several commenters listed organizations that provide first aid or 
CPR training equivalent to that given by the American Red Cross (Ex. 3-
21, 3-24, 3-42, 3-59, 3-60, 3-69, 3-123). In the past, OSHA recognized 
many other organizations as having acceptable first aid training 
programs under Sec. 1910.151(b), through the use of interpretations and 
formal compliance documents (CPL instructions).
    While the American Red Cross first aid training program is 
nationally recognized, OSHA believes that accrediting this organization 
in the text of the standard would give it greater visibility than 
others who provide equally protective programs. OSHA also believes that 
listing all currently recognized first aid courses is not practical, 
especially since the Agency no longer formally acknowledges such 
programs. Instead of recognizing individual programs, OSHA has adopted 
guidelines for the evaluation of first aid training by competent 
professionals as well as by compliance staff in the context of 
workplace inspections (OSHA instruction CPL 2-2.53). Because these 
guidelines are already in place, there is no need to address this issue 
in Sec. 1910.269. Additionally, generic requirements on first aid 
training belong in Sec. 1910.151, where they would apply generally, 
rather than in Sec. 1910.269, where they would apply only to electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution work. Therefore, OSHA 
has decided not to carry proposed paragraph (b)(1)(ii) forward into the 
final rule. The Agency will continue to use the guidelines in CPL 2-
2.53 to determine the adequacy of first aid training courses provided 
to employees.
    In Sec. 1910.269(b)(2), OSHA proposed that first aid supplies 
recommended by a physician be placed in weatherproof containers, unless 
stored indoors, and that these containers be readily accessible. This 
was to ensure that proper first aid supplies are available and are in 
good condition when needed.
    Several comments objected to the language ``[f]irst aid supplies 
recommended by a physician'' (Ex. 3-21, 3-69, 3-86, 3-102, 3-109, 3-
123). They expressed the concern that this term was too ambiguous and 
would rule out commercially available first aid kits.
    This language was taken from existing Sec. 1910.151(b). It was the 
intent of the proposal that the first aid supplies required by this 
current regulation be stored in weatherproof containers. It was not 
intended that the existing provision be modified by the new standard to 
require different types or amounts of first aid supplies. To express 
this intent more clearly, the final rule replaces ``recommended by a 
physician'' with ``required by Sec. 1910.151(b)''.
    Two commenters suggested that the regulation not require first aid 
supplies stored in vehicles to be kept in a weatherproof container (Ex. 
3-20, 3-80). They argued that storing the supplies inside a vehicle 
would protect them from the weather.
    OSHA has decided to require first aid supplies that may be exposed 
to the weather to be kept in weatherproof containers. This performance-
oriented language would thus require the supplies to be protected from 
the elements only if it is necessary. (It should be noted that 
Sec. 1926.50(d)(2) requires first aid supplies to be kept in 
weatherproof containers. Thus, first aid kits used in construction 
would have to be weatherproof in any event.)
    Paragraph (b)(3) of Sec. 1910.269 proposed that first aid kits be 
maintained ready for use and be inspected at least annually in 
accordance with an established schedule. OSHA proposed this provision 
to ensure that first aid kits are maintained with all of the proper 
equipment.
    The Utility Workers Union of America questioned the adequacy of the 
requirement for annual inspections (Ex. 3-76; DC Tr. 413). Mr. Marshall 
Hicks of the UWUA stated:

    In dealing with paragraph (b)(3), the requirement for an annual 
inspection of first-aid kits we also feel is totally inadequate. And 
again speaking from personal experience, in the system where I was 
employed, the first-aid kits, ladders and fire extinguishers were 
inspected on a monthly basis.
    And even on a monthly basis, we found that substantial amounts 
of supplies from the first-aid kits were missing or previously used 
and had to be restocked. On an annual basis, I am afraid that in 
less than six months that the first-aid kits would be totally empty 
if they were not inspected and replenished on a routine basis. We 
would therefore request or suggest that OSHA reconsider this 
proposal and require a monthly inspection of first-aid kits.

    OSHA is also concerned that supplies might not be adequate if 
inspections are made on an annual basis. However, there is no evidence 
that monthly checks are necessary or adequate. Therefore, the final 
rule carries forward the proposed requirement for an annual inspection 
and also requires first aid kits to be examined often enough to ensure 
that expended supplies are replaced on a timely basis.
    Paragraph (c). In paragraph (c) of Sec. 1910.269, OSHA requires a 
job briefing to be conducted before each job. Most of the work 
performed under the standard requires planning in order to ensure 
employee safety (as well as to protect equipment and the general 
public). Typically, electric power transmission and distribution work 
exposes employees to the hazards of exposed conductors energized at 
thousands of volts. Power generation work frequently involves 
electrical hazards, as well as the hazards of air pressures in the 
range of 15 to 500 pounds per square inch, of water pressures of 35 to 
4000 pounds per square inch, of chemical injection systems of 250 to 
4000 pounds per square inch, of steam pressures of 15 to 4000 pounds 
per square inch at temperatures of up to 1000 degrees Fahrenheit, and 
of hazardous substances (LA Tr. 50). If the work is not thoroughly 
planned ahead of time, the possibility of human error is increased 
greatly. To avoid problems, the task sequence is prescribed before work 
is started. For example, before climbing a pole, the employee must 
determine if the pole is capable of remaining in place and if minimum 
approach distances are sufficient, and he or she must determine what 
tools will be needed and what procedure should be used for performing 
the job. Without job planning, the worker may ignore the minimum 
approach distance requirements or may have to reclimb the pole to 
retrieve a forgotten tool or perform an overlooked task, resulting in 
increased exposure to the hazards of falling and contact with energized 
lines.
    When more than one employee is involved, the job plan must be 
communicated to all the affected employees. If the job is planned but 
the plan is not discussed with the workers, one employee may perform 
his or her duties out of order or may otherwise not coordinate 
activities with the rest of the crew, endangering the entire crew. 
Therefore, OSHA is requiring a job briefing before work is started. The 
briefing would cover: hazards and work procedures involved, special 
precautions, energy source controls, and requirements for personal 
protective equipment.
    OSHA received numerous comments about the practicality of enforcing 
the requirement for job briefings (Ex. 3-9, 3-13, 3-69, 3-71, 3-123, 3-
125, 3-128, 62-16, 62-18, 62-22, 62-38). Expressing the concerns of 
many of these commenters, the Nashville Electric Service stated:

    NES believes job briefing is important, and it has been its 
experience that such job briefings are already in place. The 
mandating of such a technical requirement imposes a burden which is 
very difficult to enforce and would negate the primary object of job 
briefings; that is, to ensure that crew members are aware of all 
work-related hazards. [Ex. 62-22]

    Additionally, several commenters objected to the additional 
paperwork burden that would be imposed by the requirement (Ex. 3-20, 3-
53, 3-80, 3-109, 3-123).
    Others supported OSHA's requirement for job briefings (Ex. 3-9, 3-
46, 3-59, 3-107, 3-115; LA Tr. 50-53). Even those who disagreed with 
the language in proposed Sec. 1910.269(c) accepted the importance of 
planning the work and discussion of the job plan among employees 
involved in the work. As the Nashville Electric Service noted, job 
briefings are already being done.
    OSHA has carried the requirement for these briefings forward into 
the final rule. The concern of those who objected to the paperwork 
burden is unfounded. The final rule, like the proposal before it, does 
not contain a provision for making or keeping records of these 
briefings.
    The introductory text in proposed Sec. 1910.269(c)(1) was worded as 
follows:

    Before starting each job, the employer shall ensure that the 
employee in charge shall conduct a job briefing with the employees 
involved. The briefing shall cover such subjects as: hazards 
associated with the job, work procedures involved, special 
precautions, energy source controls, and personal protective 
equipment requirements.

    Some comments objected to the phrase ``the employer shall ensure 
that'' (Ex. 3-20, 3-44, 3-58, 3-69, 3-71, 3-80, 3-112, 3-123). These 
commenters offered suggested substitutions, such as ``the employer 
shall require'' and ``the employee in charge shall conduct''. For 
example, Mr. Carl Behnke of EEI stated:

while a utility may require that supervisors, foremen and other 
employees assigned the responsibility for directing work activities 
perform certain tasks such as conducting a job briefing, the utility 
cannot ``ensure'' or ``guarantee'' that such a briefing will in fact 
be conducted each and every time it would be necessary and 
appropriate to do so. This is an effort to impose strict liability 
which is beyond OSHA's statutory authority, and thus is 
inappropriate regulatory language. [Footnote omitted.] An employer 
can be required under OSHA only to establish and communicate a 
policy requiring that a job briefing be conducted, and implement 
appropriate disciplinary action against those who are assigned the 
responsibility but fail to carry it out.
    In the EEI/IBEW draft, the responsibility for conducting the job 
briefing would be delegated by the employer to the ``employee in 
charge.'' This might include a supervisor or senior employee at the 
location who is familiar with the work to be performed. The 
performance-oriented wording contained in the EEI/IBEW submittal 
represents a more reasonable and rational approach to the issue of 
job briefing and should be substituted for OSHA's proposed language. 
[Ex. 3-112]

    OSHA has rejected these arguments. All the suggested alternatives 
to the proposed language attempt to absolve employers of duties that 
must be imposed to protect employees to the fullest. As noted by Mr. 
Behnke, the EEI/IBEW draft language places the responsibility for 
compliance on the employee in charge. The standard properly places the 
responsibility on the employer to see that job briefings are conducted. 
Mr. Behnke also noted that an employer can be required to establish and 
communicate a policy requiring that job briefings be conducted and to 
implement appropriate disciplinary action against those who are 
assigned the task but fail to carry it out (Ex. 3-112). The Agency 
feels that the EEI/IBEW draft language does not convey the full weight 
of these duties to employers. Likewise, terms such as ``the employer 
shall require'' impose only a small part of the responsibility for 
compliance on employers.
    The current General Industry Standards and Construction Standards 
contain many examples of the phrase ``the employer shall 
ensure''.24 This language does not make the employer an absolute 
guarantor of an employee's compliance. In fact, the Agency recognizes 
unpreventable employee misconduct as an affirmative defense to a 
citation, and OSHA's policy is not to issue a citation where the 
employer has fulfilled his or her responsibilities to inform the 
employee of an adequate work rule and to enforce that rule 
uniformly.25
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    \2\4See, for example, Secs. 1910.95, 1910.147, 1910.151, 
1910.183, 1910.184, 1910.217, 1910.268, 1910.1001, 1910.1028, 
1910.1030, 1910.1047, 1910.1048, 1910.1200, 1910.1450, 1926.24, 
1926.50, 1926.58, 1926.59, 1926.403, 1926.431, 1926.605, 1926.800, 
and 1926.1053. The individual paragraph numbers have been omitted 
because they are too numerous. Similar language, such as ``the 
employer shall insure'' and ``the employer shall assure'', also 
occurs throughout the OSHA standards.
    \2\5Occupational Safety and Health Administration Field 
Operations Manual, Chapter 5, Section E.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For these reasons, OSHA has carried forward the language of the 
proposed provision without substantive change.
    Under paragraph , at least one briefing is required to be conducted 
before the start of each shift. Only one briefing in a shift is needed 
if all the jobs are similar in nature. Additional planning discussions 
must take place for work involving significant changes in routine. For 
example, if the first two jobs of the day involve working on a 
deenergized line and the third job involves working on energized lines 
with live-line tools, separate briefings must be conducted for each 
type of job.
    Under paragraph (c)(2), the required briefing would normally 
consist of a concise discussion outlining the tasks to be performed. 
However, if the work is particularly hazardous or if the employees may 
not be able to recognize the hazards involved, then a more thorough 
discussion must take place. With this provision, OSHA recognizes that 
employees are familiar with the tasks and hazards involved with routine 
work. However, it is important to take the time to carefully discuss 
unusual work situations that may pose additional or different hazards 
to workers. (See also the preamble discussion of 
Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(iv).) OSHA has included a note following this 
paragraph in the final rule to clarify that, regardless of how short 
the discussion is, the briefing must still touch on all the topics 
listed in the introductory text of paragraph (c).
    Proposed Sec. 1910.269(c)(3) would have exempted employees working 
alone from the requirements for job briefings. Though it would still be 
important for the employee to plan the work, OSHA felt that work 
procedure discussions would not have relevance for a single worker 
inasmuch as there would be no one else available for discussion. 
However, in the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested comments on 
the need for and desirability of a requirement for job planning for 
these workers.
    OSHA received several comments supporting the proposed exemption of 
employees working alone from the requirement for job briefings (Ex. 3-
20, 3-42, 3-107, 3-112). The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 
argued that it would be superfluous to require job planning for an 
employee who reports alone at the job location (Ex. 3-20). Union 
Electric Company was concerned about the practicality of such a 
requirement (Ex. 3-42).
    NIOSH and the National Electrical Manufacturers Association 
supported a provision requiring job planning for employees working 
alone (Ex. 3-21, 3-81). NIOSH reported that several of their reports of 
fatalities among utility workers indicate that a thorough job briefing 
may have prevented a fatality (Ex. 3-21). They argued that the 
acknowledged hazards of overhead line work should require prior 
planning with a supervisor for each day's task and each new location. 
The UWUA also supported a requirement that applied to employees working 
alone (DC Tr. 424; LA Tr. 44).
    Even in the preamble to the proposal, OSHA recognized the 
importance of job planning for all employees. The Agency does not 
believe that an employee who labors alone needs to plan his or her 
tasks any less than one who is assisting others. Several fatalities in 
the record involved a lone employee who could have benefitted from 
better job planning or perhaps a briefing with the supervisor before 
the job started (Ex. 3-21, 9-2, 12-12). Therefore, OSHA has included a 
requirement for job planning for these employees. The language in 
Sec. 1910.269(c)(3) of the final rule reads as follows:

    An employee working alone need not conduct a job briefing. 
However, the employer shall ensure that the tasks to be performed 
are planned as if a briefing were required.

    OSHA believes that this provision will encourage additional 
planning of the job.
    Paragraph (d). Paragraph (d) of Sec. 1910.269 contains hazardous 
energy control (lockout/tagout) requirements. The provisions of this 
paragraph in the proposal were patterned after the national consensus 
standard of the American National Standards Institute, ANSI Z244.1-
1982, ``American National Standard for Personal Protection--Lockout/
Tagout of Energy Sources--Minimum Safety Requirements'' (Ex. 2-21). In 
addition, the provisions of the proposed paragraph were consistent and 
compatible with the generic procedures originally contained in OSHA's 
proposed general industry standard for control of hazardous energy 
sources (lockout/tagout), which was published on April 29, 1988 (53 FR 
15496).
    After the electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
standard was proposed, a final general industry standard on the control 
of hazardous energy sources was issued (September 1, 1989, 54 FR 
36644). In order to ensure that issues raised in that rulemaking were 
also considered in this one, OSHA incorporated the entire lockout/
tagout record into the record on Sec. 1910.269 (54 FR 4982).26 The 
Agency stated in the preamble to proposed Sec. 1910.269 that, if it was 
determined that final Sec. 1910.269 would contain lockout and tagging 
provisions, these requirements would be the same as those in the final 
generic lockout/tagout standard, except as necessary to provide for 
unique situations in electric power generation work. OSHA used this 
guideline in developing paragraph (d) of the final electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\6 UWUA, Local 246, also requested that OSHA incorporate this 
evidence into the electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution rulemaking (LA Tr. 45).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA received numerous comments on this issue. Utility 
representatives generally argued that utility tagging systems are 
unique and provide a high degree of safety to their employees (Ex. 3-
20, 3-32, 3-42, 3-82, 3-112, 3-123; LA Tr. 215-239). Others supported 
the use of the generic standard (at least as proposed) for lockout and 
tagging of electric power generation systems, which recognized systems 
using locks or tags (Ex. 3-13, 3-34, 3-39, 3-45, 3-68, 3-73, 3-83, 3-
88). NIOSH and the UWUA argued, as they did in the generic standard 
rulemaking record, that locks should be required and that each employee 
should be protected by personal locks (Ex. 3-21, 3-76; DC Tr. 30, 414-
415; LA Tr. 45-49, 54-59, 68-70).
    Mr. John Bachofer, Vice President of Metropolitan Edison Company, 
representing Edison Electric Institute addressed the issue of control 
of hazardous energy sources at the public hearing in Los Angeles, CA. 
He explained the case that tagging systems in use in the utility 
industry are unique and fully protect employees as follows:

    As OSHA is well aware, one of the most important aspects of this 
proposal is OSHA's recognition that in the electric utility industry 
tagging systems provide excellent protection for utility workers 
when it is necessary to control hazardous energy sources. OSHA 
specifically recognized this point in the preamble to the generic 
lockout/tagout standard and we appreciate it. Nonetheless, there are 
some who are participating in this rulemaking who have asked the 
agency to reconsider its position on this point.
* * * * *
    [W]e want to show why this standard should be the only one 
regulating control of all types of hazardous energy sources in the 
operation and maintenance of electric utility facilities. There are 
six basic concepts that we'd like to emphasize. First, the control 
of energy in several of its various forms; electrical, chemical, 
thermal, mechanical, internal (such as pressure of liquid or gas) is 
fundamental to electric utility work. It's a large part of what we 
do.
    Second, because it is central to our operations, control of 
hazardous energy is absolutely critical to employee safety and all 
of us in the industry from the CEO to the entry level ground helper, 
mechanic or operator, take it very, very seriously. Everyone of our 
employees is trained to recognize that the forms of energy we deal 
with are very unforgiving. As Mr. Lawson of PEPCO said in the 
lockout/tagout hearing, ``Compliance with tagging procedures in this 
industry is akin to an orthodox religion.''
    Third, because we recognize what we are dealing with, the 
methods we use to control hazardous energy involve a comprehensive 
and documented process. In the electric utility industry devices 
that can effect the operation of a system are operated only on 
specific or standard orders issued from authorized personnel.
    Fourth, employees who may be exposed to hazardous energy are 
trained in the application of hazardous energy control procedures 
and are required to comply rigorously with those procedures, 
including the formality and documentation which provides constant 
audit and reinforcement of the integrity of these procedures. 
Employees successfully complete training before they're considered 
qualified to request that tagging procedures be initiated and before 
they are assigned switching and tagging work as part of their normal 
job duties. Employees who violate these procedures are subject to 
serious discipline.
    Fifth, the methods for controlling energy, while perhaps varying 
slightly due to local design differences or practices, are 
essentially consistent throughout the electric utility industry. We, 
of course, speak only for the investor-owned portion of the 
industry, but we think that you'll find that the public power and 
rural cooperative representatives agree.
    Sixth, just as OSHA has concluded, and as IBEW has agreed, this 
industry's hazardous energy control procedures work and they work 
very, very well. Not to say that as in any human endeavor there is 
no chance for human error or for malfeasance. Unfortunately, it 
happens. Albeit infrequently. Undoubtedly, you have heard in the 
course of this proceeding of isolated instances in which the system 
has alleged to have failed, but we wish to point out that there are 
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of successful examples. In 
fact, in the time it takes to make this presentation there will 
probably be hundreds of successful tagging operations performed in 
utilities around the country and you won't hear about one of them, 
which is great because it means that no one will have gotten hurt. 
[LA Tr. 215-219]

    EEI also displayed a videotape of a typical tagging procedure used 
by one of their member companies (Ex. 12-6). They argued that the 
tagging system used by electric utilities is characterized by formality 
and redundant controls (Ex. 56).
    OSHA has not accepted the argument that the elements of hazardous 
energy control in electric utility operations are so unique that they 
warrant a completely different set of lockout and tagging requirements. 
EEI's six basic concepts do not demonstrate unique conditions in 
electric utility workplaces. Rather, they encompass conditions common 
to many large industrial worksites, as follows:
    1. ``First, the control of energy in several of its various forms; 
electrical, chemical, thermal, mechanical, internal (such as pressure 
of liquid or gas) is fundamental to electric utility work.'' Not only 
do many non-utility employers find it necessary to control many 
different forms of hazardous energy, companies that generate electric 
power as a by-product of their normal production activities would often 
have even more sources of energy to control (Ex. 3-39, 3-45, 3-68, 3-
83).
    2. ``Second, because it is central to our operations, control of 
hazardous energy is absolutely critical to employee safety and all of 
us in the industry from the CEO to the entry level ground helper, 
mechanic or operator, take it very, very seriously.'' Several employers 
commenting on the generic lockout standard made the same argument (54 
FR 36654; Ex. 3-45, 3-68).
    3. ``Third, because we recognize what we are dealing with, the 
methods we use to control hazardous energy involve a comprehensive and 
documented process.'' In the generic hazardous energy control 
rulemaking, OSHA found that companies with successful tagging programs 
``implemented detailed energy control procedures'' (54 FR 36655).
    4. ``Fourth, employees who may be exposed to hazardous energy are 
trained in the application of hazardous energy control procedures and 
are required to comply rigorously with those procedures, including the 
formality and documentation which provides constant audit and 
reinforcement of the integrity of these procedures.'' Likewise, OSHA 
determined that successful tagging programs throughout industry include 
``extensive training programs'', including the reinforcement of this 
training and discipline for those who violate the tagging procedures 
(54 FR 36655).
    5. ``Fifth, the methods for controlling energy, while perhaps 
varying slightly due to local design differences or practices, are 
essentially consistent throughout the electric utility industry.'' 
While this might be true,27 OSHA does not believe that consistency 
alone in energy control across an industry has a great impact on 
employee safety. For example, if company A and company B have identical 
lockout procedures, employees might be protected to equal degrees in 
both companies. However, just the simple fact that both lockout 
procedures are the same has little impact on employee safety.28 It 
is the procedures themselves that directly impact employee safety. In 
fact, better procedures could lead to even greater safety. Furthermore, 
different companies with identical procedures could have differing 
follow-up systems, such as supervision, retraining, and incident 
investigation. Follow-up techniques themselves can vastly improve 
lockout procedures. Moreover, new entrants in the utility industry may 
not choose to apply hazardous energy control procedures in the same 
manner as existing electric utility companies, and the final electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution standard applies to 
other industries as well. Besides, the generic lockout rule allows for 
a wide variation in specific procedures. Thus, OSHA has evaluated the 
lockout and tagging procedures of the electric utility industry, as 
identified in the electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution rulemaking record, to determine whether they protect 
employees to an acceptable degree. The content of Sec. 1910.269(d) is 
based on this evaluation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\7 Some evidence in the record indicates that there are 
differences in the lockout and tagging procedures used by different 
utilities and even by the same utility in different plants (Ex. 3-
31, 3-80; DC Tr. 414; LA Tr. 49). The rulemaking record does 
demonstrate, however, that the use of tags rather than locks is 
common practice in the utility industry and that many of the 
procedures used to ensure the integrity of the ``tagout'' system are 
similar.
    \2\8 If both companies share accident information, this might 
lead to better lockout procedures for both companies. However, it is 
the lockout procedures, not the consistency between the programs, 
that lead to better safety for employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    6. ``Sixth, just as OSHA has concluded, and as IBEW has agreed, 
this industry's hazardous energy control procedures work and they work 
very, very well.'' This also does not make the industry's procedures 
unique. The preamble to the generic lockout standard relates the 
experience of many companies with successful lockout or tagging 
programs (54 FR 36654-36655).
    Representatives of the Utility Workers Union of America pointed out 
the weaknesses of some utilities' tagging method of hazardous energy 
control (LA Tr. 45-49, 54-59, 68-70). Messrs. Carl Wood, Scott Treon, 
and Willard Kelly testified that tags had come off and had fallen to 
the floor (LA Tr. 55, 62, 67). Messrs. Bernardo Garcia, Marshall Hicks, 
and Allen Wilson maintained that work authorizations under these 
tagging systems had been released under pressure from supervisory 
personnel or without the knowledge of the employee who held the 
authorization (LA Tr. 46; DC Tr. 414, 444). UWUA representatives also 
stated that testing work had been permitted on circuits that were 
deenergized and tagged (LA Tr. 46, 57, 59-60), that tags had been 
incorrectly attached (LA Tr. 55), and that some tags were improper (LA 
Tr. 67-68). They were also concerned that training in the employers' 
tagging system was inadequate (LA Tr. 46, 61-63, 69). The UWUA 
supported their allegations with documentary evidence, such as 
grievances on work authorizations (hazardous energy control) and 
related training, union safety committee reports of problems with work 
authorizations, company audit reports and memoranda of such problems, 
and State and Federal agency notices of deficiencies in the work 
authorization system (Ex. 66).
    In the preamble to the final generic standard on the control of 
hazardous energy sources, OSHA stated that ``various electric utilities 
* * * report that they have used tagout in lieu of lockout successfully 
for many years'' (54 FR 36655). However, in the preamble to the final 
electrical safety-related work practices standard, the Agency further 
found that ``as documented in two of the computer printouts in Exhibit 
8, the electric utility industry had [at least] 14 fatalities and 17 
injuries recorded in OSHA files that were directly caused by a failure 
of the lockout/tagout procedure in use'', during the period of July 1, 
1972, to June 30, 1988 (55 FR 32003). It appears from this evidence 
that, although some electric utility companies have had excellent 
success with their tagging systems, other companies have had problems.
    OSHA found this same dichotomy in the rulemaking record on 
Sec. 1910.147. The Agency believes that there is no reason to reach a 
different conclusion here, because the evidence in the electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution rulemaking is basically no 
different from that in the lockout and tagging record. Therefore, OSHA 
has reached the same final determination and rationale with respect to 
the issue of whether the Agency should require the use of locks, locks 
and tags, or tags alone to control potentially hazardous energy, as 
follows:

    Much of the testimony and comment received in this rulemaking 
has focused on whether the standard should require lockout as 
opposed to the proposed approach of allowing lockout or tagout. In a 
sense, it was unfortunate that attention was focused more on a 
single aspect of the standard, though it is certainly an important 
one, than on the standard taken as a whole. The proposed standard 
was intended to specify that the employer provide a comprehensive 
set of procedures for addressing the hazards of unexpected 
reenergization of equipment, and the use of locks and/or tags was 
intended to be only a single element of the total program. In order 
to provide adequate protection to employees, the Final Rule requires 
employers to develop and utilize a comprehensive energy control 
program consisting of: procedures for shutting down and isolating 
machines and equipment and locking or tagging out the energy 
isolating devices; employee training; and periodic inspections of 
the energy control procedure to maintain its effectiveness. The 
procedures must consist of steps for deenergization of equipment, 
isolation of the equipment from energy sources, and verification of 
deenergization before servicing and maintenance is performed on 
equipment, and the employees who either perform the servicing or 
maintenance or are affected by those operations must be properly 
trained in the energy control procedures which apply to their work.
    It should be noted that locks and tags by themselves do not 
control hazardous energy. It is the isolation of the equipment from 
the energy source and the following of the established procedures 
for deenergization and reenergization of the equipment that actually 
controls the energy. Locks and/or tags are attached to the 
disconnects and other energy isolating devices after the machine or 
equipment has, in fact, been isolated, in order to prevent them from 
being reenergized before the work has been completed. If the 
equipment has not been properly deenergized, and if proper 
procedures have not been followed, neither a lock nor a tag will 
provide protection.
    The treatment of lockout vs. tagout presents OSHA with a 
difficult regulatory dilemma. On the one hand, if the issue were 
simply whether a lock or a tag will be better able to prevent 
equipment from being reactivated, there is no question that a lock 
would be the preferred method. Locks are positive restraints which 
cannot be removed (except through extraordinary means such as by the 
use of bolt-cutters) without the use of a key or other unlocking 
mechanism. By contrast, the limitations of tags used alone are self-
evident: They do not serve as positive restraints on energy 
isolating devices, but are only warnings to employees that the 
equipment is not to be reenergized. Tags not fastened with a strong 
material can become detached from the energy isolating device by 
wind or other environmental conditions, and the legend on some tags 
can be rendered illegible if the tag becomes wet. Tags may not 
provide protection if there are affected employees who do not read 
English or who have not been properly trained in the tagging system 
and its implementation.
    However, the issue in this rulemaking is not merely on the use 
of lockout vs. tagout, but rather the use of locks and/or tags in a 
comprehensive program of energy control. As was noted in the 
preamble of the proposed rule (53 FR 15496, April 29, 1988), OSHA is 
aware of workplaces in which tagout systems are used with great 
effectiveness. In particular, various electric utilities and 
chemical plants report that they have used tagout in lieu of lockout 
successfully for many years (Tr. pg. H194-214; W2-3 to 2-39). In 
evaluating these industries, OSHA has determined that there are 
several factors which have contributed to their successful use of 
tagout programs: first, these companies have implemented detailed 
energy control procedures which are quite similar to those set forth 
in both the proposed and final lockout/tagout standard; second, they 
have established and utilized extensive training programs to teach 
their employees about their energy control procedures, including the 
use of tags and the importance of obeying them; third, these 
companies reinforce their training periodically. However, it is the 
fourth common element, discipline, which appears to be the most 
critical to the success of these programs; the companies with 
effective tagout programs apply disciplinary action to both 
supervisors and employees who violate the tagout procedures.
    OSHA believes that an effective tagout system needs all four of 
these elements to be successful. However, it is the fourth element, 
discipline, which is the most difficult to incorporate into a 
regulatory approach in the Final Rule. Not surprisingly, it also 
reflects the most serious limitation of tagout which does not arise 
with lockout. Because a tagout program does not involve positive 
restraints on energy control devices, it requires constant vigilance 
to assure that tags are properly applied; that they remain affixed 
throughout the servicing and maintenance of equipment; and that no 
employee violates the tag by reenergizing the equipment, either 
intentionally or inadvertently, before the tag is removed. By 
contrast, a lockout device, once applied, cannot inadvertently be 
removed, and cannot be removed intentionally by an unauthorized 
person except by the use of force.
    In the Final Rule, OSHA has determined that lockout is a surer 
means of assuring deenergization of equipment than tagout, and that it 
should be the preferred method used by employees. However, the Agency 
also recognizes that tagout will nonetheless need to be used instead of 
lockout where the energy control device cannot accept a locking device. 
Where an energy control device has been designed to be lockable, the 
standard requires that lockout be used unless tagout can be shown to 
provide ``full employee protection,'' that is, protection equivalent to 
lockout. [54 FR 36655, corrected at 55 FR 38677, 38684]

    OSHA has decided to take the same approach in this standard and has 
taken two steps to realize this objective. First, the final rule 
includes a note indicating that the Agency will accept compliance with 
Sec. 1910.147 as compliance with Sec. 1910.269(d). The lockout and 
tagging provisions of Sec. 1910.269 are based on the requirements in 
the generic standard; therefore, it is appropriate to recognize this 
formally in the final rule. This will allay the concerns of the many 
commenters who were concerned that employers would be faced with having 
to comply with two different standards for the control of hazardous 
energy sources.29 It will also ease the burden of compliance for 
employers (including electric utilities) who have taken steps to comply 
with Sec. 1910.147, which has been in effect for over 2 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\9EEI also noted the possibility of an employer's having to 
comply with four different general industry standards on lockout and 
tagging: Secs. 1910.147, proposed 1910.269(d) and (m), and 
1910.333(b) (Ex. 3-112). However, the OSHA electrical lockout and 
tagging requirements also recognize compliance with Sec. 1910.147, 
with two exceptions. Further, Sec. 1910.269(m) has limited 
application in generating plants (substations and transmission lines 
only). As discussed later, the differences between paragraphs (d) 
and (m) are based on differences in hazards posed by the types of 
installations involved. Therefore, if an employer wanted to follow a 
single standard on the control of hazardous energy sources for 
generation and utilization installations within an electric power 
generating plant, he or she could comply with Sec. 1910.147, with 
only two additional provisions to follow for work on electric 
utilization installations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the requirements in paragraph (d) of final Sec. 1910.269 
have been patterned after those in final Sec. 1910.147. Issues decided 
in that rulemaking are being dealt with in the same manner in this one. 
(References to the preamble discussion of these issues are noted in 
parentheses, or in brackets if the material is quoted.) The Agency has 
incorporated different rules in Sec. 1910.269(d) only to the extent 
that they are warranted based on unique conditions presented by 
electric power generation installations, as noted in the rulemaking 
record. Absent such unique conditions, the two standards contain the 
same requirements, though the language is not always identical.
    OSHA believes that this approach will maximize employee safety, 
while minimizing compliance burdens. This approach also effectively 
eliminates any safety and cost concerns that might be raised with 
regard to substantive inconsistencies between the two lockout and 
tagging standards.
    Paragraph (d)(1) of final Sec. 1910.269 limits the application of 
the provisions of paragraph (d) to the control of energy sources in 
installations for the purpose of electric power generation, including 
related equipment for communication or metering. The scope of this 
paragraph is intended to coincide with the exemption from the generic 
lockout standard contained in Sec. 1910.147(a)(1)(ii)(B). The 
provisions of Sec. 1910.269 cover installations exempted by this 
paragraph in the generic standard. Installations in electric generating 
plants that are not addressed in Sec. 1910.269(d) are covered under 
Sec. 1910.147; for such installations, there should be no overlaps or 
gaps in coverage under the two standards.
    EEI also argued that Sec. 1910.269 should be the only standard that 
applies to the control of hazardous energy within an electric power 
generation plant and that Sec. 1910.147 should not apply (Ex. 3-112). 
OSHA decided this issue in the rulemaking on the generic lockout 
standard as follows:

    If such equipment is either an integral part of, or inextricably 
commingled with, power generation processes or equipment, OSHA 
agrees that the power generation standard will apply instead of the 
generic lockout/tagout standard. [54 FR 36660]

    The first note following paragraph (d)(1) has been modified from 
the proposal to incorporate this concept. As mentioned earlier in this 
preamble, a second note has been added to the final version of this 
paragraph explaining OSHA's enforcement policy regarding the interface 
between Sec. 1910.269 and Sec. 1910.147. Employers who use procedures 
developed under and conforming to Sec. 1910.147 for the control of 
hazardous energy sources related to the generation of electric power 
will be considered as being in compliance with Sec. 1910.269(d).
    Procedures for the control of electric energy used for purposes of 
transmission and distribution are addressed in Sec. 1910.269(m). These 
systems are installed outdoors and are connected to the ultimate 
consumer of the electric power. The considerations involved in the 
control of hazardous energy sources related to transmission and 
distribution systems are truly unique compared to other industrial 
energy systems. Transmission and distribution lines are exposed to 
contact with energized conductors that are part of unrelated circuits; 
voltage backfeed from unknown power sources can energize 
``deenergized'' lines; and induced voltage from nearby power lines can 
present hazards to employees working on ``deenergized'' lines. 
Therefore, separate requirements apply to the control of hazardous 
energy involving these systems, as noted in final Sec. 1910.269(d)(1). 
This separation of energy control procedures was not opposed by any 
interested party and, in fact, was specifically supported by two 
commenters (Ex. 3-39, 3-83).
    Paragraph (d)(2) lists general requirements. Paragraph (d)(2)(i) of 
proposed Sec. 1910.269 would have required employers to ensure that all 
potentially hazardous energy was isolated, locked out or tagged out, 
and otherwise disabled in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 
(d), before an employee could perform any activity during which 
energizing, start-up, or release of stored energy could occur and cause 
injury.
    Several utilities objected to the language contained in this 
proposed paragraph (Ex. 3-20, 3-23, 3-40, 3-62, 3-80, 3-112, 3-120). 
Most suggested that OSHA replace the phrase ``and otherwise disabled'' 
to ``or otherwise disabled''.
    As an Agency representative explained at the hearing, the proposal 
was intended to require that equipment be deenergized in accordance 
with the provisions of the standard (DC Tr. 208-209). The provision was 
not intended to require employers to take steps to disable equipment in 
addition to those in the standard. In order to clarify the requirement 
in the final rule, OSHA has adopted language taken from 
Sec. 1910.147(c)(1), which reads as follows:

    The employer shall establish a program consisting of energy 
control procedures, employee training, and periodic inspections to 
ensure that, before any employee performs any servicing or 
maintenance on a machine or equipment where the unexpected 
energizing, start up, or release of stored energy could occur and 
cause injury, the machine or equipment is isolated from the energy 
source and rendered inoperative.

    As noted previously, OSHA is adopting the generic lockout 
standard's approach to the issue of whether or not to require locks on 
disconnects rather than tags alone. Briefly, Sec. 1910.147 requires the 
use of locks on disconnects that are capable of being locked out, 
unless the employer demonstrates that the use of a tagging system will 
provide full employee protection (that is, a level of protection 
equivalent to that provided by a lockout program).
    Paragraph (d)(2)(ii) of final Sec. 1910.269 adopts these 
requirements, based on Sec. 1910.147(c)(2). These provisions read as 
follows:

    (ii) The employer's energy control program under paragraph 
(d)(2) of this section shall meet the following requirements:
    (A) If an energy isolating device is not capable of being locked 
out, the employer's program shall use a tagout system.
    (B) If an energy isolating device is capable of being locked 
out, the employer's program shall use lockout, unless the employer 
can demonstrate that the use of a tagout system will provide full 
employee protection as follows:
    (1) When a tagout device is used on an energy isolating device 
which is capable of being locked out, the tagout device shall be 
attached at the same location that the lockout device would have 
been attached, and the employer shall demonstrate that the tagout 
program will provide a level of safety equivalent to that obtained 
by the use of a lockout program.
    (2) In demonstrating that a level of safety is achieved in the 
tagout program equivalent to the level of safety obtained by the use 
of a lockout program, the employer shall demonstrate full compliance 
with all tagout-related provisions of this standard together with 
such additional elements as are necessary to provide the equivalent 
safety available from the use of a lockout device. Additional means 
to be considered as part of the demonstration of full employee 
protection shall include the implementation of additional safety 
measures such as the removal of an isolating circuit element, 
blocking of a controlling switch, opening of an extra disconnecting 
device, or the removal of a valve handle to reduce the likelihood of 
inadvertent energizing.
    (C) After [insert date 120 days after publication], whenever 
replacement or major repair, renovation, or modification of a 
machine or equipment is performed, and whenever new machines or 
equipment are installed, energy isolating devices for such machines 
or equipment shall be designed to accept a lockout device.

    OSHA believes that electric utilities generally meet these 
requirements. Although lockout is rarely used, the industry's tagging 
systems generally provide protection equivalent to that obtained by the 
use of a lockout program.30 The final standard requires this of 
all affected employers, thus ensuring the safety of all electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution workers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\0 The number of fatalities related to failure of electric 
utilities' tagging systems indicates that some individual systems 
may not provide safety at this level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An employer who uses a tagging system must demonstrate that it will 
provide full employee protection, as explained in paragraph 
(d)(2)(ii)(B). The employer must obviously demonstrate that the tagging 
program meets all tagging-related requirements in the standard, such as 
proper materials and construction of the tagout device, the durability 
of the tag, and the capability of the attachment means to prevent the 
unauthorized or accidental removal of the tagout device (see paragraph 
(d)(3)(ii)). However, as noted earlier, OSHA does not believe that a 
tagout program that simply meets the requirements of the standard would 
be as protective as a lockout program, even though the tagging 
requirements have been strengthened considerably from the proposal. For 
the employer to demonstrate that a tagging program is as protective as 
lockout for a lockable piece of equipment, that employer will need to 
show additional elements that bridge the gap between lockout and 
tagging. The employer must consider additional measures that will 
further enhance the safety of the tagging program, such as the removal 
of isolating circuit elements, the locking of a controlling switch, or 
the opening of an additional disconnecting device. By requiring that 
the employer make a showing of the effectiveness of tagging in 
situations that are otherwise amenable to lockout, the standard that 
each type of control (lock or tag) will provide an acceptable level of 
safety for employees who must perform the servicing or maintenance on 
the machine or equipment. Based upon the range of variations that are 
possible in different situations, OSHA believes that the comparative 
effectiveness of any particular energy control program can be made only 
after examination and evaluation of the factors present at each point 
of application.
    Paragraph (d)(2)(iii) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires a procedure 
to be developed, documented, and used for the control of potentially 
hazardous energy. The language of this provision has been modified 
slightly from proposed Sec. 1910.269(d)(2)(ii) for clarification.
    Paragraph (d)(2)(iv) specifies elements to be included in the 
procedure, including the purpose for the procedure and the rules and 
techniques to apply. One comment on the corresponding paragraph in the 
proposal, Sec. 1910.269(d)(2)(iii), was concerned that an entire system 
would have to be deenergized to allow work to be performed on only a 
portion of the system (Ex. 3-20). To clarify this in the final rule, 
OSHA has replaced the word ``system'' with the term ``machine or 
equipment''. This is the language used in Sec. 1910.147.
    Paragraphs (d)(2) (iv) through (vi) of proposed Sec. 1910.269, 
dealing with periodic inspections of the hazardous energy control 
procedures in use at a workplace, have been combined in the final 
standard into Sec. 1910.269(d)(2)(v). Paragraph (d)(2)(v) of final 
Sec. 1910.269 requires periodic inspections to ensure that the 
provisions of the standard are followed.
    In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested comments on whether 
or not a minimum frequency for such inspections should be specified in 
the standard. Utility representatives responding to this issue 
generally suggested either that no minimum frequency be specified or 
that the requirement be deleted entirely (Ex. 3-13, 3-20, 3-42, 3-44, 
3-53, 3-58, 3-80, 3-82, 3-112). EEI's comment exemplified these 
recommendations, as follows:

    As proposed, these sections [proposed Sec. 1910.269(d)(2) (iv) 
and (v)] properly state a performance requirement for periodic 
inspections. In response to OSHA's request for comment on whether a 
minimum frequency for periodic inspections should be required, EEI 
reiterates the testimony of Robert L. Lawson of PEPCO on cross-
examination at the hearing on OSHA's proposal for a generic lockout/
tagout standard. Mr. Lawson explained to OSHA that:
    ``We see little value of an annual certification of a tagging 
system. A tagging system, as we use in our industry, has to be 
constantly watched by management to ensure that it's working. It's 
watched, number one, from a discipline standpoint. If you have an 
isolated employee that ignores it or refuses to comply with 
something because it's for his convenience, you have to be able to 
catch those infractions to issue discipline.
    ``In my company here, PEPCO in Washington, D.C., we're 
constantly looking at the procedure, to update things. If we have 
new systems going in, we evaluate that to see whether it is 
compatible with the existing tagging procedures . . . and we're 
constantly looking at things like that to ensure that the tagging 
procedure is adequate to protect employees. So that's why we 
recommend that it's got to be an ongoing, constant survey of that 
procedure or system.'' [Footnote omitted.]
    Accordingly, because the record shows that evaluation of tagging 
systems is an ongoing process in the utility industry, EEI submits 
that there is no record basis for specifying minimum frequency. [Ex. 
3-112]

    Others suggested a minimum frequency of from once every two hours 
to once per year (Ex. 3-11, 3-107; DC Tr. 425). For example, the New 
Hampshire Electric Cooperative stated:

    Some minimum should be stated as to what ``periodic'' is. Once 
every 100 years is periodic once the inspection has been repeated. 
We suggest yearly.

    The IBEW also supported specifying a minimum frequency, as follows:

    The term periodic inspections could lead to misunderstanding 
regarding the time duration between inspections. The IBEW would 
propose that the minimum frequency for the periodic inspections be 
two times per year for each work location.

    OSHA has decided to require the inspections to be performed at 
least once a year. OSHA agrees with the IBEW that the standard needs to 
specify the frequency of the required inspections; otherwise, 
enforcement difficulties would be likely. The periodic inspection is 
intended to assure that the energy control procedures continue to be 
implemented properly, that the employees involved are familiar with 
their responsibilities under those procedures, and that employees 
follow and maintain proficiency in the energy control procedure. The 
evidence indicates that electric utilities are performing audits of 
their lockout programs on a constant and routine basis (Ex. 3-112; LA 
Tr. 217, 264-266, 423-425). An annual inspection, as suggested by the 
New England Electric Cooperative, is specified in 
Sec. 1910.147(c)(6)(i), and employers must comply with this requirement 
for their non-electric power generation installations. The inspections 
conducted as a result of Sec. 1910.269 can easily be integrated into 
the ones employers are already conducting under Sec. 1910.147.
    Paragraphs (d)(2)(v)(A) through (d)(2)(v)(E) detail requirements 
that the periodic inspection must meet. These provisions require that 
the inspections be performed by authorized employees, be designed to 
correct identified deviations or inadequacies, include reviews between 
the inspector and authorized and affected employees of the employees' 
responsibilities, and be certified by the employer. The proposed rule 
did not contain all the requirements of the final version. The 
rationale for the inclusion of the new provisions was stated in the 
preamble discussion of Sec. 1910.147(c)(6), as follows:

    Due to the severity of the risks associated with a lapse in the 
implementation of the energy control procedure, paragraph (c)(6) 
requires that periodic inspections be performed at least annually in 
order to verify and to ensure that the energy control procedure is 
being properly utilized. One method for meeting the performance 
requirements in this paragraph would be to use random audits and 
planned visual observations to determine the extent of employee 
compliance. Another would include modifying and adopting ordinary 
plant safety tours to suit this purpose.
    The periodic inspection is intended to assure that the energy 
control procedures continue to be implemented properly, and that the 
employees involved are familiar with their responsibilities under 
those procedures. A significant change in this requirement from the 
proposal involves the activities of the person performing the 
inspections. The inspector, who is required to be an authorized 
person not involved in the energy control procedure being inspected, 
must be able to determine three things: first, whether the steps in 
the energy control procedure are being followed; second, whether the 
employees involved know their responsibilities under the procedure; 
and third, whether the procedure is adequate to provide the 
necessary protection, and what changes, if any, are needed. The 
inspector will need to observe and talk with the employees in order 
to make these determinations. The Final Rule provides some 
additional guidance as to the inspector's duties in performing 
periodic inspections, to assure that he or she obtains the necessary 
information about the energy control procedure and its 
effectiveness. Where lockout is used, the inspector must review each 
authorized employee's responsibilities under the procedure with that 
employee. This does not necessarily require separate one-on-one 
meetings, but can involve the inspector meeting with the whole 
servicing crew at one time. Indeed, group meetings can be the most 
effective way of dealing with this situation, because they reinforce 
the employees' knowledge of the procedures and how they are to be 
utilized, and to be able to recognize any problems with the energy 
control program. Where tagout is used, the inspector's review of 
responsibilities extends to affected employees as well, because of 
the increased importance of their role in avoiding accidental or 
inadvertent activation of the equipment or machinery being serviced. 
OSHA believes that these reviews, which will need to be performed on 
at least an annual basis during the periodic inspections, will 
assure that employees follow and maintain proficiency in the energy 
control procedure, and that the inspector will be better able to 
determine whether changes are needed.
    A related change from the proposal is found in the certification 
provision in paragraph (c)(6)(ii) of the Final Rule. In addition to 
the operation, date of inspection, and name of inspector, the Final 
Rule also requires identification of the employees included in the 
inspection. This change provides for the inspector to indicate which 
employees were involved with the servicing operation being 
inspected, in order to assure that these employees have had the 
opportunity to review their responsibilities and demonstrate their 
performance under the procedure.
    Inspections must be made by an authorized employee other than 
one implementing the energy control procedure being inspected. This 
is done to ensure that the employee performing the inspections knows 
the procedures and how they are to be utilized, and to be able to 
recognize any problems with the energy control program. The 
inspections must be designed and conducted to correct any deviations 
uncovered. In addition, the employer must certify that they have 
been performed. These inspections are intended to provide for 
immediate feedback and action by the employer to correct any 
inadequacies observed.
    These inspections are intended to ensure that the energy control 
procedure has been properly implemented and to provide an essential 
check on the continued utilization of the procedure. [54 FR 36672-
36673, corrected at 55 FR 38681, 38685]

    OSHA believes that this rationale applies equally to the electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution standard. As 
previously noted, the evidence presented by UWUA members demonstrated 
that not all electric utility tagging systems work as well as those 
presented by the EEI witnesses. Additionally, the emergence of new 
types of companies31 into the electric utility industry and 
extending the scope of the standard to other industries will expand 
coverage of Sec. 1910.269 to employers that might not have the tagging 
systems that provide the level of safety EEI has testified is common 
among their member companies. To ensure that this does not occur, the 
Agency has adopted these provisions from Sec. 1910.147.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\1As a result of legislative action and changes in the 
electric utility industry during the past decade, the number of 
independent power producers has grown tremendously (Ex. 6-25). (The 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission defines an independent power 
production facility as a generator that is less than 80 megawatts 
capacity and that uses biomass, waste, renewable resources, 
geothermal resources, or a combination of these as the primary 
energy source.) According to ERG, independent power production 
capacity grew by an estimated 700 percent (Ex. 6-25). Regulated 
electric utilities purchase electric power at special rates from 
these independent power producers under the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (16 U.S.C. 2101 et seq.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In paragraphs (d)(2)(vi), (d)(2)(vii) and (d)(2)(viii) of final 
Sec. 1910.269, OSHA specifies that the employer provide effective 
initial training, as well as retraining as required by changing 
conditions in the workplace, or when an inspection conducted in 
accordance with paragraph (d)(2)(v) reveals the need for retraining. 
Additionally, paragraph (d)(2)(ix) requires certification of such 
training of employees. OSHA considers these requirements to be of 
critical importance in helping to ensure that the applicable 
provisions, restrictions, and prohibitions of the energy control 
program are known, understood, and strictly adhered to by employees.
    As is the case with the other provisions of this rule, OSHA 
believes that the training requirements under this standard need to be 
performance oriented so as to deal with the wide range of workplaces 
covered by the standard. However, in order to provide adequate 
information, any training program under this standard will need to 
cover at least four areas: The employer's energy control program, the 
elements of the energy control procedures that are relevant to the 
employee's duties, the restrictions of the program applicable to each 
employee, and the requirements of this final rule. The details will 
necessarily vary from workplace to workplace, and even from employee to 
employee within a single workplace, depending upon the complexity of 
the equipment and the procedure, the employees' job duties and their 
responsibilities under the energy control program, and other factors. 
Paragraph (d)(2)(vi) of final Sec. 1910.269 establishes the amount of 
training that is required for the three groups of employees: 
``Authorized'' employees, ``affected'' employees, and all ``other'' 
employees.32 The relative degree of knowledge required by these 
three employee groups is in descending order, with the requirements for 
authorized employees demanding the most effort in training. Because 
authorized employees must use the energy control procedures, it is 
important that they receive training in recognizing and understanding 
all potentially hazardous energy that they might be exposed to during 
their work assignments. It is also necessary that they be trained in 
the use of adequate methods and means for the control of such energy. 
The authorized employees are the ones who must use the energy control 
procedure to provide for their protection when they are performing the 
servicing or maintenance of the machines or equipment. Therefore, they 
need extensive training in aspects of the procedure and its proper use, 
together with all relevant information about the equipment being 
serviced.
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    \3\2 The terms ``authorized employee'' and ``affected employee'' 
are defined in proposed Sec. 1910.269(x). An authorized employee is 
one who locks out or tags out machines or equipment in order to 
perform servicing or maintenance on that machine or equipment. An 
affected employee is one whose job requires him or her to operate or 
use a machine or equipment on which servicing or maintenance is 
being performed under lockout or tagout, or whose job requires him 
or her to work in an area in which such servicing or maintenance is 
being performed. An affected employee becomes an authorized employee 
when that employee's duties include performing servicing or 
maintenance covered under this section.
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    The training OSHA requires for ``affected employees'' is less 
stringent than that for ``authorized employees'', simply because 
affected employees do not perform servicing or maintenance operations 
which are performed under an energy control procedure. Affected 
employees are important to the overall protection provided in the 
energy control program, however, because such employees work in areas 
where the program is being utilized by authorized employees. It is 
vital to the safety of the authorized employees that the affected 
employees recognize lockout or tagout devices immediately, that they 
know about the purpose of those devices, and, most importantly, that 
they know not to disturb the lockout or tagout devices or the equipment 
to which the devices are affixed. Therefore, the standard requires that 
affected employees be instructed in these matters. The instruction 
needs to be sufficient to enable the employees to determine if a 
control measure is in use. The instruction also needs to make affected 
employees aware that disregarding or violating the prohibitions imposed 
by the energy control program could endanger their own lives or the 
lives of co-workers.
    OSHA requires, in paragraph (d)(2)(vi)(C), that all other employees 
be instructed about the restrictions imposed upon all employees by the 
energy control program. This instruction on the employer's energy 
control program can be conveyed during new employee orientations, by 
the use of employee handbooks, or through regularly scheduled safety 
meetings. The training of employees other than authorized and affected 
employees is considered by OSHA to be essential since other employees 
working in the plant or facility have been known to have turned on the 
power to a machine or equipment on which another employee is performing 
a servicing or maintenance activity. Inadvertent and intentional 
activation of machines or equipment by employees other than those 
working on the machine or equipment is not limited to affected 
employees. The training requirements for these other employees are 
minimal, essentially requiring only that these employees know what the 
energy control program does and that they are not to touch any locks, 
tags, or equipment covered by this program.
    The training requirements for the different classes or types of 
employees as they are defined in this final standard are performance 
oriented, thereby providing the employer with considerable flexibility 
in how the training should be conducted. The employer is permitted to 
use whatever method will best accomplish the objective of the training. 
Considerable latitude is given to employers in the development and 
conduct of the required training for authorized, affected, and other 
employees.
    In paragraph (d)(2)(vii), OSHA is establishing a requirement for 
additional training for all employees in plants or facilities where 
tagout is the preferred method of energy control. The need for this 
additional or supplemental training for employees in those facilities 
is based upon the fact that the use of tagout relies upon the knowledge 
of the employees and their adherence to the limitations imposed by the 
use of tags. It is also consistent with current practice. Several 
commenters who use tagout programs stated in their comments and 
testimony that tagout is effective in the electric utility industry 
because, among other things, the program provides for extensive 
training and reinforcement of the elements of the tagout procedures 
(Ex. 3-112; DC Tr. 615; LA Tr. 217-218, 224). The requirements of this 
paragraph have been taken from Sec. 1910.147(c)(7)(ii).
    Paragraph (d)(2)(viii) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 would have 
required annual retraining for all authorized and affected employees, 
either by regular on-the-job work assignments or by specific training. 
Several commenters objected to the requirement that this training be 
provided on an annual basis (Ex. 3-20, 3-80, 3-82, 3-86). They argued 
that retraining should only be required on a performance basis, that 
is, when it is needed.
    OSHA has accepted these arguments and has incorporated the 
provisions of Sec. 1910.147(c)(7)(iii) on this subject into 
Sec. 1910.269(d)(2)(viii) of the final rule. This performance-oriented 
approach would require formal retraining only when it is necessary for 
employee safety, such as when the periodic inspection required under 
paragraph (d)(2)(v) identifies deficiencies or when control procedures 
that the employee uses change. It should be noted that paragraph 
(d)(2)(v) requires the periodic inspection of the energy control 
procedure to be conducted on an annual basis. This inspection includes 
a review between the inspector and each authorized employee, and the 
inspection must be designed to detect such deficiencies as the need for 
additional training.
    Paragraph (d)(2)(ix) requires the employer to certify that the 
employee training has been accomplished and has been kept up to date. 
Many commenters objected to the use of the word ``certify'' and 
suggested alternatives, such as ``determine'' and ``verify'' (Ex. 3-20, 
3-33, 3-39, 3-44, 3-45, 3-58, 3-82, 3-83, 3-86). To clarify this 
requirement in the final rule, OSHA has included a provision stating 
that the certification need consist only of the employee's name and the 
date he or she was trained.
    OSHA believes that a written certification serves the same purpose 
as a written record of the training, while minimizing the paperwork 
burden on employers. It should be noted that the certification is not 
intended as a means of evaluating the completeness or efficacy of the 
training; it only provides an indication that training has been 
performed. The quality and content of the training are not evaluated 
through the certification of performance. As noted earlier, the 
standard sets forth the elements which must be included in the training 
for employees. In evaluating whether an employee has been adequately 
trained, OSHA will examine the employee's responsibilities under the 
energy control program in relation to the elements of the standard.
    In paragraph (d)(3) of final Sec. 1910.269, OSHA requires the 
employer to provide the necessary protective materials and hardware, 
such as locks, tags, chains, and adapter pins, for attachment to the 
energy isolating devices. This paragraph in the standard also requires 
that the devices be unique to the particular use (the only ones 
authorized for the purpose); that they be durable, standardized, and 
substantial; and that they identify the user.
    The standard utilizes performance language in imposing these 
requirements. OSHA believes that the obligations imposed by paragraph 
(d)(3) are not overly restrictive or complicated. To meet the 
requirement in paragraph (d)(3)(i) to supply protective equipment and 
hardware, an employer either can issue devices to each employee 
responsible for implementing energy control measures or can exercise 
the option of simply having a sufficient quantity of the devices on 
hand at any given time and assign or distribute them to employees as 
the need arises. All authorized employees will need to have these 
devices available to attach to energy isolating devices whenever they 
perform servicing or maintenance using the energy control procedure.
    The proposed standard specified that lockout or tagout devices be 
singularly identified, be the only devices used for controlling 
hazardous energy, and be durable, standardized, substantial, and 
identifiable. These requirements remain substantially unchanged in the 
final rule (paragraph (d)(3)(ii)). A restriction on the use of these 
devices (for hazardous energy control only) is being adopted, based on 
the record on the generic lockout/tagout standard, to ensure that the 
sight of a distinctive lock or tag will provide a constant message of 
the use to which the device is being put and the restrictions which 
this device is intended to convey (54 FR 36671). If lockout or tagout 
devices are used for other purposes, they can lose their significance 
in the workplace. For the energy control procedure to be effective, 
these devices must have a single meaning to employees: Do not energize 
or attempt to start or operate a machine or equipment when such a 
device is affixed to an energy isolating device that controls the 
energy to that machine or equipment.
    In Sec. 1910.269(d)(3)(iii), OSHA proposed that lockout or tagout 
devices be durable. There was concern by some of the witnesses at the 
hearing that existing tags were of inadequate construction (LA Tr. 121-
123). In order to overcome some of these concerns, OSHA is adding in 
the final rule a requirement that tagout devices be constructed and 
printed so that exposure to weather or other environmental conditions 
which exist in the workplace will not cause the tag to become 
unserviceable or the message on the tag to become illegible (paragraph 
(d)(3)(ii)A)). For any sign, tag, or other message-bearing item, the 
message must remain legible for the employees to be able to ascertain 
the meaning and intent of the message.
    In paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(B), OSHA requires lockout and tagout 
devices to be standardized in one of the following criteria: color, 
shape, size, print, or format, in order that they be readily 
identifiable and distinguished from other similar devices found in the 
workplace. In addition, the final rule clarifies that the use of a 
standardized print and format is for tagout devices. This is done to 
ensure that tagout devices, which rely exclusively on employee 
recognition for their effectiveness, will be so unique as to minimize 
the chances of their being misidentified or their message 
misinterpreted.
    In paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(C), OSHA requires that lockout devices be 
substantial enough to prevent their removal without the use of 
excessive force or unusual techniques. Tagout devices and their means 
of attachment are similarly required by paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(D) to be 
constructed so that the potential for inadvertent or accidental removal 
is minimized. Tag attachment means are further required to be 
attachable by hand, and to be of strength equivalent to a one-piece 
non-releasable, self-locking cable tie. These additional requirements 
are being imposed to ensure that tags do not become disconnected or 
lost during use, thereby negating their effectiveness. Such provisions 
were supported at the hearing by some of the witnesses (LA Tr. 121-
123).
    In paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(E), OSHA requires that lockout or tagout 
devices identify the employee who applies the device or devices. This 
requirement is similar to the provision proposed in 
Sec. 1910.269(d)(3)(v). Identification of the user provides an 
additional degree of accountability to the overall program. It enables 
the employer to inspect the application of the energy control procedure 
and determine which employees are properly implementing its 
requirements. If locks or tags are not being properly attached by an 
employee, identification on the locks and tags will enable the employer 
to locate that employee and correct the problem promptly, including 
additional training, as necessary. This requirement will enable 
employers and other employees to determine at a glance which authorized 
employees are performing a given servicing operation. It puts them on 
notice that if questions arise about the servicing or the energy 
control procedure, the persons listed on the lockout and tagout devices 
are the appropriate persons to ask. The authorized employee has the 
additional assurance that other employees know of his or her 
involvement in the servicing operation and that only he or she is 
allowed to remove the device.
    OSHA believes that knowing who applied a lockout device to a 
machine or equipment can save time and lives. If an employee, upon 
completing a job, forgets to remove a lockout device, the identity of 
the employee can be immediately determined and the employee made 
available to complete the procedure. If that employee cannot be 
located, it is possible that he or she is still working on the 
equipment. It would then be possible to check out the area and assure 
that the employee and others are out of the danger area before the 
device is removed. Marking a lockout or tagout device is a simple way 
of identifying the person who applies it and can prevent the 
inadvertent reenergizing or reactivation of equipment before that 
employee has been located and has moved clear of the equipment. Thus, 
marking the identity of the employee who uses a lockout or tagout 
device is an appropriate safeguard.
    Marking of the lockout or tagout devices can also promote a sense 
of security in employees, in that each device is the individual 
employee's device, used only for his or her protection. This sense of 
identity also can be used to encourage willing utilization of the 
energy control procedure. When an employee can identify with a part of 
the program he or she controls for his or her own protection, that 
employee will likely be an active participant in making the program 
work.
    In paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(F), OSHA states that the legend (major 
message) on tagout devices must warn against hazardous conditions if 
the equipment is energized. Five examples of major messages are 
provided in paragraph (c)(5)(iii): Do Not Start, Do Not Open, Do Not 
Close, Do Not Energize, and Do Not Operate. OSHA recognizes, however, 
that these messages may not be sufficient to cover all conditions 
involving hazardous energy control. For that reason, these legends are 
only examples of what must be stated. Graphics, pictographs, and other 
symbols that convey the message that the tag represents serve the same 
purpose as a written message and therefore would be acceptable to OSHA. 
Additionally, the use of danger tags must meet the requirements of 
Sec. 1910.145.
    OSHA proposed, in Sec. 1910.269(d)(4)(i), that energy isolating 
devices used for the control of potentially hazardous energy sources, 
including valves, be marked or labeled to identify the equipment 
supplied and the energy type and magnitude. If they were positioned and 
arranged so that these elements were evident, however, the marking 
requirement would not have applied. Paragraph (d)(4)(ii) proposed that 
these devices be operated only by authorized employees. OSHA reasoned 
that employees working with energy control procedures need adequate 
information about the hazards of the equipment that they are servicing 
and that they must be certain that the equipment they are working on is 
the same equipment that was intended to be disabled. They should feel 
confident that they have secured the correct energy control devices and 
are protected from the hazards of inadvertently working on energized 
equipment.
    The proposed identification requirement of paragraph (d)(4)(i) 
would have applied to all energy isolating devices, including devices 
which control hydraulic, pneumatic, steam, and similar energy sources 
by the use of valves or similar devices. The proposed generic lockout 
standard included an identical provision. The comments received in the 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution rulemaking 
record echoed the arguments of those who commented on the generic 
standard. As there was no new evidence introduced here, OSHA has simply 
adopted the outcome and rationale relating to final 
Sec. 1910.147(c)(6), as follows:

    OSHA has determined that the marking or labeling of energy 
isolating devices is not reasonably necessary for the effectiveness 
of the energy control program. Authorized employees are required at 
(c)(7)(i)(A) [Sec. 1910.269(d)(2)(vi(A)] to receive training in and 
to know that information relating to hazardous energy. Authorized 
employees, in order to perform their servicing or maintenance duties 
under the energy control procedure, are required to know the type 
and magnitude of the energy sources which must be controlled. The 
marking or labeling of the sources themselves will not provide the 
authorized employees with any additional information. Second, as far 
as affected or other employees are concerned, their role in the 
energy control program is essentially to understand what the program 
is designed to accomplish, and to recognize that when they see an 
energy isolating device with a tag and/or lock on it, they are not 
to touch the equipment, regardless of what the type and magnitude of 
the energy might be. OSHA believes that marking the equipment with 
this information would not enhance the protection of these 
employees, because their compliance with the energy control 
procedure does not depend upon knowledge of these details.
    Accordingly, OSHA has eliminated the proposed requirement for 
marking or labeling energy isolating devices. In its place, OSHA is 
incorporating a specific requirement in paragraph (c)(7)(i)(A) 
[Sec. 1910.269(d)(2)(vi(A)] that authorized employees be trained in 
the recognition of applicable hazardous energy sources, the type and 
magnitude of the energy available in the workplace, and in the 
methods and means necessary for energy isolation and control. OSHA 
further requires in paragraph (d)(1) [Sec. 1910.269(d)(6)(i)] that 
authorized employees must know the type and magnitude of the energy, 
the hazards of the energy to be controlled and the method or means 
to control the energy even before the machine or equipment is turned 
off. OSHA believes that employee knowledge of this information is 
essential to ensure that the correct energy control devices are used 
on the proper energy isolating devices and in the proper manner. 
This provision requires the employee to have that specific 
information prior to deenergizing the equipment, in order to control 
the energy and render the machine or equipment safe to work on. OSHA 
does recognize that the physical shutdown of the machine or 
equipment can be accomplished by either the authorized or affected 
employee.
    The new paragraph (c)(8) [Sec. 1910.269(d)(4)] requires that 
lockout or tagout be performed only by the authorized employees who 
are performing the maintenance or servicing. These are the only 
employees who are required to be trained to know in detail about the 
types of energy available in the workplace and how to control the 
hazards of that energy. Only properly trained and qualified 
employees can be relied on to deenergize and to properly control 
lockout or tagout machines or equipment which are being serviced or 
maintained, in order to ensure that the work will be accomplished 
safely. [54 FR 36675-36676, corrected at 55 FR 38682, 38685]

    In paragraph (d)(5), OSHA requires that whenever servicing or 
maintenance might affect other employees' work activities, the employer 
or the authorized employee must tell those employees before applying 
lockout or tagout devices and after they are removed that servicing or 
maintenance is going to be done or has been completed on a machine or 
equipment.
    Several commenters were concerned that the standard would require 
notification of employees who were not at the workplace of the lockout 
or tagout of machines or equipment (Ex. 3-20, 3-80, 3-42, 3-62, 3-112, 
3-120; LA Tr. 226-227). They argued that the equipment was frequently 
locked out or tagged out over weekends or at night when many employees 
were away from work. As the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 
noted: ``The actual intent probably is to ensure that employees 
currently working with or near equipment be notified prior to 
application of lockout/tagout controls if such controls would directly 
affect them.'' (Ex. 3-20)
    Indeed, the Agency does intend, when controls are to be applied to 
equipment, for employers to inform employees currently working with or 
near such equipment, not employees at home. An affected employee is one 
whose job requires him or her to operate or use a machine or equipment 
on which servicing or maintenance is being performed under lockout or 
tagout, or whose job requires him or her to work in an area in which 
such servicing or maintenance is being performed. OSHA does not 
interpret this definition as including a person who is not at the 
workplace. Employees who are not at the workplace need not be notified 
of the placement of lockout or tagout controls while they are away from 
work. However, these employees must be notified of the application of 
lockout or tagging as soon as they return to work.
    OSHA believes that the requirement contained in paragraph (d)(5) is 
an essential component of the total energy control program. 
Notification of affected employees when lockout or tagout is going to 
be applied provides an opportunity for the employer or authorized 
employee who notifies them of the impending interruption of the normal 
production operation to remind them and reinforce the importance of the 
restrictions imposed upon them by the energy control program.
    OSHA believes that these measures are important to ensure that 
employees who operate or use machines or equipment do not unknowingly 
attempt to reenergize those machines or equipment that have been taken 
out of service and deenergized for the performance of activities 
covered by this standard. The lack of information regarding the status 
of the equipment could endanger both the servicing employees and the 
employees working near the equipment, who might attempt to reenergize 
or operate the equipment. Such notification is also needed after 
servicing is completed to assure that employees know when the control 
measures have been removed. Without such information, employees might 
mistakenly believe that a system is still deenergized and that it is 
safe to continue working on or around it.
    Paragraph (d)(6) of final Sec. 1910.269 provides that six separate 
and distinct steps be followed in stopping, deenergizing, and locking 
out or tagging machines or equipment and that the actions be taken in 
the sequence presented. Paragraph (d)(6)(i) requires that in 
preparation for the shutdown of machinery or equipment, the authorized 
employee must know about the type and magnitude of the energy, the 
hazards involved, and the means of controlling them. (As mentioned 
previously, this provision was incorporated in the final rule in order 
to address the hazards that would have been covered by proposed 
paragraph (d)(4)(i) on marking energy isolating devices, which is not 
included in final Sec. 1910.269.) Paragraph (d)(6)(ii) then requires 
that the machine or equipment be turned off or shut down according to 
the procedure normally employed for stopping the machine or equipment. 
This will be done by the authorized employee or the affected employee 
(the machine or equipment operator or user). This is the starting point 
for all subsequent actions necessary to put the machine or equipment in 
a state that will permit employees to work on it safely.
    In many operations, activation of an electrical push-button control 
or the movement of a simple throw switch (electrical, hydraulic, or 
pneumatic) to the ``stop'' or ``off'' mode is sufficient to meet this 
provision. In other cases, however, there are many control devices that 
must be closed, shut down, or stopped in a particular sequence. In 
these instances, a series of predetermined steps may be necessary to 
achieve a shutdown of the machine or equipment. Paragraph (d)(6)(ii) of 
final Sec. 1910.269 requires an orderly shutdown of the equipment to 
ensure that the necessary steps are taken in the proper sequence.
    Following shutdown of the machine or equipment, paragraph 
(d)(6)(iii), as the next step in the procedure, provides that energy 
isolation devices be physically located and operated in such a manner 
as to isolate the machine or equipment from energy sources. For 
example, once an electrical push-button control has been utilized to 
stop the movement of machine or equipment parts as the first step of 
the shutdown procedure, isolation can then be accomplished by ensuring 
that the push-button circuitry cannot be supplied with additional 
electrical energy. For such equipment, the isolation requirement can be 
accomplished by the employee's actions in tracing the path from the 
control toward the energy source until he or she locates the energy 
isolating device and by his or her moving the energy isolating device 
control lever to the ``safe'', ``off'', or ``open'' position. 
Performing these actions will prevent the reintroduction of energy to 
the push-button circuitry and will isolate the operating control and 
the machine or equipment from the energy source.
    As the fourth step in the procedure, paragraph (d)(6)(iv) provides 
that action be taken to secure the energy isolating devices in a 
``safe'' or ``off'' position. This paragraph requires that lockout or 
tagout devices be affixed to each energy isolating device by the 
authorized employee and that they be attached so as to prevent 
unintended reactivation of the machine or equipment.
    Paragraph (d)(6)(iv) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires the hazardous 
energy control device to be attached in a manner that will minimize the 
chance that the energy isolating device will be moved into an unsafe 
position. For energy isolating devices that are capable of being locked 
out, this provision requires the lock or tag to be attached so as to 
hold the isolating device in a safe position. Otherwise, a tag would 
have to be placed as close as safely possible to the isolating device 
in a position that will be immediately obvious to anyone attempting to 
operate the device. OSHA believes this will clarify this provision of 
the standard, as requested by two commenters (Ex. 3-11, 3-42).
    Paragraph (d)(6)(v) provides that the next step taken in the energy 
control procedure is to relieve, disconnect, and restrain all 
potentially hazardous stored or residual energy in the machine or 
equipment. Up to this point, the purpose of following all the steps of 
the procedure has been to enable the employee to isolate and block the 
source of energy feeding the machine or equipment to be worked on at a 
point beyond which it cannot be bypassed. However, energy can very 
easily be trapped in a system downstream from an energy isolating 
device or can be present in the form of potential energy from gravity 
or from spring action. Stored or residual energy of this sort cannot be 
turned on or off; it must be dissipated or controlled (that is, 
relieved or restrained).
    When energy may still be present in a system that has been isolated 
from the energy source, this paragraph requires such energy to be 
controlled before an employee attempts to perform any work covered by 
the scope of the standard. Compliance with this provision might 
require, for example, the use of blocks or other physical restraints to 
immobilize the machine, machine components, or equipment for control of 
the hazard. In the case of electric circuits, grounding might be 
necessary to discharge hazardous energy. Hydraulic or pneumatic systems 
might necessitate the use of bleed valves to relieve the pressure.
    The final rule addresses the hazards of stored or residual energy 
in a performance manner. Rather than trying to determine all of the 
potential manners in which this energy can be stored or retained in 
machines, equipment, and materials being used in the production 
process, OSHA requires (in paragraph (d)(6)(i)) that the authorized 
employee must have knowledge of the energy (including stored or 
residual energy), its hazards, and how to control it. Paragraph 
(d)(6)(v) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires the stored or residual energy 
to be relieved, disconnected, restrained, or otherwise rendered safe as 
part of the energy control procedure. Under paragraph (d)(6)(vi), 
verification of isolation must be continued until the servicing or 
maintenance is completed or until the possibility of reaccumulation of 
energy no longer exists.
    Under paragraph (d)(6)(vii), as the sixth step in the energy 
control procedure, the authorized employee must ensure that the 
previous steps of the procedure have been taken to isolate the machine 
or equipment effectively. This must be done prior to starting the 
servicing or maintenance work. The authorized employee needs to verify 
that the machine or equipment was turned off or shut down properly as 
required by paragraph (d)(6)(ii) of final Sec. 1910.269; that all 
energy isolating devices were identified, located, and operated as 
required by paragraph (d)(6)(iii); that the lockout or tagout devices 
have been attached to energy isolating devices as required by paragraph 
(d)(6)(iv); and that stored energy has been rendered safe as required 
by paragraph (d)(6)(v).
    This step of the procedure is intended to assure the employee that 
the machine or equipment is isolated from the energy, that residual or 
stored energy has been dissipated or blocked, and that injury could not 
result from the inadvertent activation of the operating controls. This 
action may involve a deliberate attempt to start the equipment that has 
been isolated from the energy. Another means of verifying is testing 
the machine or equipment with appropriate test instruments. This method 
would be appropriate, and is in fact required, for use in cases 
exposing employees to possible electric shock. Verification of 
isolation could be accomplished for electric circuits by the use of a 
voltmeter to determine that there is no electrical energy present. 
Similar test equipment can be utilized to check for the presence of 
other energy types and sources.
    Edison Electric Institute pointed out that the proposal would have 
required a test only for work involving contact with normally energized 
parts (Ex.     3-112). They noted that this did not account for the 
possibility of inadvertent contact with such parts. OSHA agrees with 
this comment and has modified the language in final 
Sec. 1910.269(d)(6)(vii) to require testing of energized parts which an 
employee could contact during the servicing or maintenance.
    OSHA also considers the use of visual inspection procedures to be 
of critical importance throughout the lockout or tagging procedures. 
Visual inspection can confirm that switches, valves, and breakers have 
been properly moved to and secured in the ``off'' or ``safe'' position. 
Observing the position of the main electric power disconnect switch 
can, for example, confirm that the switch is either in the ``off'' 
(open) or ``on'' (closed) position. Visual inspection can also verify 
whether or not locks and other protective devices have been applied to 
the control points in a manner that would prevent the unsafe movement 
of the switches or valves. Finally, a visual inspection can be used to 
verify that isolation has taken place by determining that all motion 
has stopped and that all coasting parts, such as flywheels, grinding 
wheels, and saw blades, have come to rest.
    OSHA emphasizes that, in order to verify that hazardous energy has 
been isolated, the authorized employee may need to use a combination of 
these methods. The appropriate combination will depend upon the type of 
machinery or equipment involved, the complexity of the system, and 
other factors.
    Because it was redundant with respect to final 
Sec. 1910.269(d)(6)(vii), proposed paragraph (d)(6)(viii) has not been 
carried forward into the final rule. The language from the proposed 
paragraph, which would have required that the steps taken ensure the 
effectiveness of the hazardous energy control method, was similar to 
that in proposed paragraph (d)(6)(vii), which is contained in the final 
rule.
    Paragraph (d)(7) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires certain actions to 
be taken by authorized employees before lockout or tagout devices are 
removed from energy isolating devices. These actions are intended to 
ensure that: (1) the machine or equipment has been returned to a safe 
operating condition; (2) any employees who might be exposed to injury 
due to the starting of the machine or equipment know that the machine 
or equipment is being energized; and (3) employees who applied the 
energy control devices are available to remove those devices.
    Because each servicing employee will have his or her own lockout or 
tagout device attached to the energy isolating device during the 
servicing operation, the person in charge of the servicing operation 
will first determine whether all lockout and tagout devices have been 
removed by the servicing employees. When a tagging system is used, the 
employer must have a procedure for ensuring that the tagout device was 
removed by the employee who placed it. Without such a procedure, the 
tagging system would not be considered as protective as a lockout 
system, which by its nature ensures that the employee who applied the 
lockout device is the one who removed it.
    Verifying that all lockout and tagout devices have been removed is 
an essential step in the procedure, and paragraph (d)(7) requires that 
a final verification be performed to ensure that it is safe to 
reenergize the equipment after servicing is completed. Further, a check 
on the satisfactory completion of the work can also ensure that the 
machine or equipment will not be damaged by its start up. Although the 
purpose of the final check is to protect employees, it can also prevent 
needless downtime of the machine or equipment because the servicing or 
maintenance was not done correctly or completely the first time.
    When servicing or maintenance is done on a large machine or complex 
system of equipment by a large number of employees as is the case in 
many electric power generation plants, the machine or equipment would 
probably be operationally intact before the work begins. When the work 
is completed, but before the equipment is reenergized, paragraph 
(d)(7)(i) requires that the employees who did the servicing or 
maintenance work complete the job by replacing guards and other 
machinery components and by cleaning up after themselves. Paragraph 
(d)(7)(ii) then requires a check to ensure that employees are safely 
positioned and have been notified that the machine or equipment is to 
be reenergized. A simple procedure to follow to verify that the work 
area and the machinery is ready to be used for its production function 
is for a foreman, supervisor, or leadman (whoever is in charge) to ask 
the workmen if they are done and then to spot check to ensure that all 
appears ready to resume normal operations.
    Paragraph (d)(7)(i) requires that the workplace area around the 
machine or equipment be inspected to ensure that nonessential items 
have been removed and that equipment components are operationally 
intact. This step ensures that tools, machine parts, and materials have 
been removed and that mechanical restraints, guards, and other machine 
parts have been replaced before the machine or equipment is returned to 
its operational mode. Depending on the size or complexity of the 
machinery and the type and degree of the servicing performed, visual 
inspection alone might be sufficient to meet this requirement; however, 
additional measures, such as check lists and other administrative 
procedures, might have to be used for large, complex machines or 
equipment.
    In paragraph (d)(7)(ii), OSHA requires the work area to be checked 
to be sure that employees are clear of the machine or equipment before 
energy is restored to it. This determination usually can be 
accomplished by a visual inspection. Paragraph (d)(7)(iii) of final 
Sec. 1910.269 repeats the requirement (in Sec. 1910.269(d)(5)) that 
affected employees be notified of lockout or tagout device removal and 
ensures that the notification be made before the machine or equipment 
is reenergized. Depending on the size or complexity of the equipment 
and the scope of the operation, the notification may consist of 
informing affected employees individually, or it may necessitate the 
use of warning devices, such as horns, bells, or buzzers.
    It cannot be overemphasized that employees performing tasks on 
deenergized equipment may be exposed to hazards involving serious 
injury or death if the status of the lockout or tagout control can be 
changed without their knowledge. Lockout or tagout is personal 
protection. For this reason, OSHA requires (in paragraph (d)(7)(iv)) 
that lockout or tagout devices be removed by the employees who applied 
them except in limited situations. In the proposed standard, OSHA 
considered whether an exception should be provided whenever two 
conditions exist which would necessitate the removal of a lockout or 
tagout device by an authorized employee other than the employee who 
applied the device. Paragraph (d)(7)(iii)(A), as proposed, would have 
permitted other authorized employees to remove a lockout or tagout 
device when the employee who applied the lockout or tagout device was 
not available to remove it. This provision was intended to cover 
situations such as those that might arise from the sudden sickness or 
injury of an employee or other emergency conditions. Proposed paragraph 
(d)(7)(iii)(B) would have permitted use of the exception for unique 
operating activities involving complex systems, if the employer could 
demonstrate that it was not feasible to have the device removed by the 
employee applying it. This was intended to provide flexibility in 
operations involving the removal of a lockout or tagout device at a 
remote location.
    EEI argued that the person removing a lockout or tagout device need 
not be the same as the person who placed it (Ex. 3-112; LA Tr. 227-
229). They contended that the unique nature of utility tagging programs 
is such that any qualified employee can participate in it and that when 
and if tags are removed and equipment returned to service is a matter 
of operations, not safety.
    OSHA does not agree that the removal of a tagout device by a person 
other than the one who under its protection is not related to safety. 
In paragraph (d)(7)(iv) of final Sec. 1910.269, OSHA is requiring that, 
as a general rule, the authorized employee who affixes a lockout or 
tagout device is the only one allowed to remove it. OSHA believes that 
each employee must have the assurance that the device is in his or her 
control, and that it will not be removed by anyone else except in an 
emergency situation. This will prevent the removal of tagout devices by 
supervisory personnel without the knowledge of the employee who is 
performing the work, which the UWUA alleged was occurring under 
existing industry practices (Ex. 66; LA Tr. 46, 57-58). The entire 
energy control program in this standard depends upon each employee 
recognizing and respecting another employee's lockout or tagout device. 
The servicing employee relies upon the fact that he or she applied the 
device and assumes that it will remain on the equipment while he or she 
is exposed to the hazards of the servicing operation. OSHA believes 
that the only way to ensure that the employee is aware of whether or 
not the lockout or tagout device is in place is to permit only that 
employee to remove the device himself or herself.
    OSHA can envision very few instances which would justify one 
employee's removal of another's lockout or tagout device. In a true 
emergency, and not merely because the employee is not available, the 
employer may be able to demonstrate a need to remove an employee's 
lockout or tagout device. An exception to paragraph (d)(7)(iv) of the 
final rule is being provided to allow for such situations. OSHA 
emphasizes that removal of a personal lockout or tagout device by 
another person may not be based on convenience or the simple 
unavailability of the employee. If a lockout or tagout device is 
attached, it is assumed that the employee who attached that device is 
engaged in servicing the equipment for which the device is in use and 
that that person is exposed to the hazards of reenergizing of energy 
sources. Therefore, as a general matter, the protection of that 
employee requires that he or she have complete control over his or her 
lockout or tagout device. Some modification of the general rule is 
warranted in the case of transfer of authority between shifts, as 
discussed under Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(iii), and to a limited extent in 
group lockout or tagout, as discussed under Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(ii), 
both of which involve coordination of activities between servicing 
employees. Additionally, under conditions of central control of energy 
isolating devices, as is the case in many electric utility situations, 
further modification of the general rule may be warranted, as discussed 
under Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(v) later in this preamble.
    Under the exception to paragraph (d)(7)(iv), the employer may 
direct the removal of a lockout or tagout device by another employee 
only if the energy control program incorporates specific procedures and 
training for that purpose and only where the employer can demonstrate 
that the alternative procedure will provide equivalent safety to having 
the employee remove his or her own device. The procedure must include, 
at a minimum, the following items: first, verification that the 
authorized employee is not at the facility; second, making all 
reasonable efforts to contact that employee to inform him or her that 
his or her device has been removed; and third, ensuring that employee 
knows of that device removal before he or she resumes work at the 
facility. These steps are necessary to ensure that the employee who is 
protected by the device is not exposed to energy hazards either at the 
time of its removal or afterwards.
    Paragraph (d)(8)(i) requires the employer to develop and use a 
procedure that establishes a sequence of actions to be taken when 
energy isolating devices are locked out or tagged out and there is a 
need for testing or positioning of the machine or equipment or 
components thereof. These actions are necessary in order to maintain 
the integrity of any lockout or tagout protection for the servicing 
employees. It is also necessary in order to provide optimum safety 
coverage for employees when they have to go from a deenergized 
condition to an energized one and then return the system to lockout or 
tagout control. It is during these transition periods that employee 
exposure to hazards is high and a sequence of steps to accomplish these 
tasks safely is needed.
    Paragraph (d)(8)(i) prescribes a logical sequence of steps to be 
followed when energy isolating devices are locked out or tagged out and 
there is a need to test or position the machine, equipment, or 
components thereof. These steps offer necessary protection to employees 
when they are involved in this activity. The procedure is clear-cut and 
should require little or no explanation other than the contents of the 
standard itself.
    It should be noted that OSHA is allowing the removal of the lockout 
or tagout devices and the reenergizing of the machine or equipment only 
during the limited time necessary for the testing or positioning of the 
machine, equipment, or component. This paragraph does not allow the 
employer or employee to disregard the requirement for locking out or 
tagging out during the other portions of the servicing or maintenance 
operation. This exception provides for a temporary measure to be used 
only to accomplish a particular task for which reenergizing is 
essential.
    One commenter expressed the concern that all lockout or tagout 
devices would have to be removed from all energy isolating devices (Ex. 
3-20). He suggested that the standard permit locks and tags to remain 
attached to controls that were not to be operated. However, this change 
is not necessary. The standard does not require all lockout or tagout 
devices to be removed, only those attached to energy isolating devices 
that are to be changed from the ``safe'' or ``off'' position to the 
``on'' position.
    Group lockout involves the performance of servicing or maintenance 
activities by more than one employee. The group of employees is 
protected by group lockout or tagout devices, representing the group as 
a whole, with one authorized employee directly responsible for the 
performance of the servicing. The proposed requirement for group 
lockout would have required that the procedure provide the same degree 
of safety as personal locks or tags. It did not specify the use of 
individual locks or tags by the individual employees of the group. The 
proposal would have allowed this system, with the authorized employee 
being responsible for the safety of all the employees in the group, if 
that program provided the same degree of safety as personal lockout or 
tagout.
    The issue of group lockout was a concern of the UWUA (Ex. 66; LA 
Tr. 45-49, 69). As this issue was decided in the generic hazardous 
energy control standard and no new evidence was submitted under this 
rulemaking, the Agency has decided to adopt the outcome and rationale 
with respect to final Sec. 1910.147(f)(3), as follows:

    Based on the record (Ex. 2-27, 2-29, 2-32, 2-44, 2-63, 2-99, 2-
106, 51, 56, 60, Tr. pg. W 1-142), OSHA has reexamined the issue of 
group lockout and has concluded that an additional element is 
necessary for the safety of the servicing employees: each employee 
in the group needs to be able to affix his/her personal lockout or 
tagout system device as part of the group lockout. This is necessary 
for several reasons: first, the placement of a personal lockout or 
tagout device enables that employee to control his/her own 
protection, rather than having to depend upon another person; 
second, the use of a personal lockout or tagout device will enable 
each servicing employee to verify that the equipment has been 
properly deenergized in accordance with the energy control 
procedure, and to affix his/her device to indicate that 
verification; third, the presence of an employee's lockout or tagout 
device will inform all other persons that the employee is working on 
the equipment; fourth, as long as that device remains attached, all 
employees know that the job is not completed and that it is not safe 
to reenergize the equipment; and fifth, the servicing employee will 
continue to be protected by the presence of his/her device until he/
she removes it. The authorized employee in charge of the group 
lockout or tagout cannot reenergize the equipment until each 
employee in the group has removed his/her personal device, 
indicating that he/she is no longer exposed to the hazards from 
reenergization of the machine or equipment. OSHA is convinced that 
the use of individual lockout or tagout devices as part of the group 
lockout provides the greatest assurance of protection for servicing 
employees.
    The proposed rule contained several general elements for group 
lockout, including provision[s] on primary responsibility and 
coordination of work forces. These elements are carried forward in 
the Final Rule. The requirement for the use of personal lockout or 
tagout devices will only enhance the overall effectiveness of these 
provisions, because the authorized employee in charge of the group 
lockout will be better able to evaluate the status of the servicing 
operation, as well as to determine which, if any, of the servicing 
employees are working on the equipment at a particular time.
    OSHA requires in paragraph (f)(3) [Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(ii)] that 
when a crew, craft, department or other group lockout or tagout 
device is used, it must provide the authorized and affected 
employees with a degree of protection that is equivalent to the use 
of personal lockout or tagout procedures. As in the case of personal 
lockout or tagout, the employer who uses group lockout or tagout 
must develop a procedure which encompasses the elements set forth in 
paragraph (c)(4) [Sec. 1910.269(d)(2)(iii) and (d)(2)(iv)].
    Paragraph (f)(3) [Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(ii)] contains several key 
provisions which must be included in all group lockout or tagout 
procedures. If a single lockout device or set of lockout devices 
(often referred to as ``operations locks'') are utilized to isolate 
the machine or equipment from the energy sources, each authorized 
employee is afforded a means to utilize his/her personal lockout or 
tagout devices so that no single employee has control of the means 
to remove the group lockout or tagout devices while employees are 
still servicing or maintaining the machine or equipment. This can be 
accomplished by the use of a lockbox or other similar appliance. 
Once the machine or equipment is locked out, the key is placed into 
the lockbox and each authorized employee places his/her lockout or 
tagout device on the box. When each individual completes his/her 
portion of the work, that person removes his/her lockout or tagout 
device from the lockbox. Once all personal lockout or tagout devices 
have been removed, the key for the group lockout devices for the 
machine or equipment can be used to remove that group lockout 
device. This method provides individual protection for all employees 
working under the protection of a particular lockout or tagout 
device. When more than one group is involved, another authorized 
person might need to maintain responsibility for coordination of the 
various lockout control groups in order to ensure continuity of 
protection and to coordinate workforces.
    In addition to designating and assigning responsibility to 
authorized employees, paragraph (f)(3) [Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(ii)] 
requires the employer to develop and implement procedures for 
determining the exposure status of individual crew members and for 
taking appropriate measures to control or limit that exposure. These 
provisions are seen by OSHA as requiring at least the following 
steps:
    1. Verification of shutdown and isolation of the equipment or 
process before allowing a crew member to place a personal lockout or 
tagout device on an energy isolating device, or on a lockout box, 
board, or cabinet;
    2. Ensuring that all employees in the crew have completed their 
assignments, removed their lockout and/or tagout devices from the 
energy isolating device, the box lid or other device used, and are 
in the clear before turning the equipment or process over to the 
operating personnel or simply turning the machine or equipment on;
    3. Providing the necessary coordinating procedures for ensuring 
the safe transfer of lockout or tagout control devices between other 
groups and work shifts.
    The special coverage of paragraph (f)(3) 
[Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(ii)] recognizes the importance of group lockout 
and/or tagout devices used under conditions in which the safety of 
all employees working in the group is dependent on how those devices 
are used. For that reason, it involves a closer examination of the 
conditions, methods and procedures needed for effective individual 
employee protection.
    OSHA also believes that by requiring each servicing employee to 
attach his/her own device in group servicing operations, it becomes 
possible to extend coverage of group servicing activities under 
paragraph (f)(3) [Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(ii)] beyond lockout, as 
envisioned by the proposal, to cover tagout, as well. This would 
primarily involve equipment which has not been designed to accept a 
lockout device. OSHA believes that when a group lockout or tagout 
procedure is properly implemented, it adds an additional element of 
protection to servicing employees: the authorized employee in charge 
of the group servicing operation applies a group lockout or tagout 
device to the equipment being serviced, and each servicing employee 
attaches a personal lockout or tagout device to the group device. 
These individual devices are removed by the employees who applied 
them, leaving the group device attached. These employees, by 
clearing the equipment and removing their own devices, indicate that 
they are no longer exposed to the hazards of the servicing 
operation. The authorized employee in charge of the group servicing 
operation then verifies that all elements of the group servicing 
have, in fact, been completed, and that it is safe to reenergize the 
system, before he/she removes the group device. Thus, the additional 
step provides further assurance that reenergizing the equipment will 
not endanger employees. Expanding group procedures to encompass 
tagout as well as lockout will extend the additional protection to 
operations which would otherwise be permitted under this standard to 
use tagout devices instead of lockout.
    One of the most difficult problems to be dealt with by this 
standard involves the servicing and maintenance of complex 
equipment, particularly when the work extends across several 
workshifts. Under the basic approach taken by this standard, each 
servicing employee is responsible for the application and removal of 
his/her own lockout or tagout device. However, the record indicates 
that the servicing of some complex equipment may take days or weeks, 
and that in some cases, hundreds of lockout or tagout devices may be 
necessary. EEI (Ex. 56) noted that in some major maintenance 
operations, it can take a day or more just to apply lockout/tagout 
devices to all energy isolating devices. CMA (Ex. 56) explained that 
in a chemical plant, certain ``turn-around'' jobs may require the 
locking or tagging of a hundred or more energy isolation devices and 
require 25 or more employees to perform the servicing. When complex 
equipment is being serviced, OSHA recognizes the need to provide 
employers with the option of utilizing an alternative procedure to 
each employee locking or tagging out each energy isolating device. 
When an alternative procedure is used, it must provide equivalent 
protection for the authorized employees. [54 FR 36681-36682, 
corrected at 55 FR 38683-38685]

    OSHA has adopted language for final Sec. 1910.269 (d)(8)(ii) from 
Sec. 1910.147(f)(3). The Agency believes that the final standard will 
best protect employees servicing or maintaining electric power 
generation equipment.
    After the generic lockout/tagout standard was promulgated, OSHA 
received many questions regarding the necessary elements of a group 
lockout procedure. The Agency answered many of these questions in the 
form of an OSHA Instruction, STD 1-7.3, which set guidelines for the 
enforcement of Sec. 1910.147 when group lockout or tagging was 
involved. In order to clarify final Sec. 1910.269(d), the Agency is 
summarizing these guidelines with respect to the manner in which they 
would apply to Sec. 1910.269(d), as follows:
    (1) Group lockout/tagout procedures must be tailored to the 
specific operation involved. Irrespective of the situation, the 
requirements of the final rule specify that each employee performing 
maintenance or servicing activities be in control of hazardous energy 
during his or her period of exposure.
    (2) The procedures must ensure that each authorized employee is 
protected from the unexpected release of hazardous energy by personal 
lockout or tagout devices. No employee may affix the personal lockout 
or tagout device of another employee.
    (3) The use of such devices as master locks and tags are permitted 
and can serve to simplify group lockout/tagout procedures. For example, 
a single lock may used on each energy isolating device, together with 
the use of a lockbox for retention of the keys and to which each 
authorized employee affixes his or her lock or tag. In a tagging 
system, a master tag may be used, as long as each employee personally 
signs on and signs off on it and as long as the tag clearly identifies 
each authorized employee who is being protected by it.
    (4) All other provisions of paragraph continue to apply.
    Paragraph (d)(8)(iii) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires that specific 
procedures be used to ensure continuation of lockout or tagout 
protection for employees during shift or personnel changes in order to 
provide for an orderly transfer of control measures and in order to be 
certain that the machine or equipment is continuously maintained in a 
safe condition. As with group lockout or tagout, the method of 
accomplishing this task must be part of the procedures that are defined 
in performance language in Sec. 1910.269 (d)(2)(iii) and (d)(2)(iv). 
Paragraph (d)(8)(iii) requires specific procedures whenever transfer of 
control measures is necessary. The underlying rationale for these 
provisions, whereby hazardous energy control responsibility is 
transferred, is for the maintenance of uninterrupted protection for the 
employees involved. It is therefore considered essential that lockout 
or tagout devices be maintained on energy isolating devices throughout 
the transition period.
    Basically, the transfer of responsibility can be accomplished by 
the on-coming shift employees accepting control of the system involved 
prior to the release of control by the off-going employees. Also, the 
procedures, whether they necessitate the use of simple control measures 
or the more detailed use of logs and check lists to accomplish an 
orderly transfer, are to be followed by an assurance that the system is 
indeed safe for employees to continue working. This assurance may 
involve action by the authorized supervisory employee responsible for 
the transfer to verify the continued isolation of the machine or 
equipment from the energy source.
    Perhaps the most critical element of assuring continuity of 
protection is providing the individual employee with an opportunity to 
verify that the equipment has been deenergized. Even more than in the 
case with individual lockout or tagout, the on-coming employee should 
not have to depend on the actions of another employee or supervisor, 
particularly one who has left the workplace for the day, for assurance 
that it is safe to work on the machine or equipment. The group lockout 
provisions in paragraph (d)(8)(ii) of final Sec. 1910.269 contain what 
OSHA believes to be the necessary safeguards for these situations. To 
the extent that the procedures provide for individual verification that 
the equipment has been properly deenergized and to the extent that the 
procedures allow for the servicing employee to attest to that 
verification in accordance with the standard, OSHA believes that such 
procedures would comply with the final rule. In the case of the type of 
complex servicing operation described by EEI involving large numbers of 
energy isolating devices, large numbers of servicing employees, and 
multiple shifts (Ex. 3-112; LA Tr. 215-239), OSHA acknowledges that the 
removal and replacement of the lockout or tagout devices each shift 
could be overly burdensome. When the complexity of the servicing 
operation necessitates an alternative to such frequent attachment and 
removal of lockout or tagout devices, the use of the work permit or 
comparable means, with each employee signing in and out as he or she 
begins or stops working on the equipment, combined with the servicing 
employees' verifying that the equipment is deenergized prior to 
beginning work, would be an acceptable approach to compliance with 
group lockout or tagout and shift change provisions of the standard.
    Because the person applying the lockout or tagout device is 
generally the one being protected by that device, it is essential that 
the device not be removed by anyone else except in emergencies. When an 
employee transfers servicing duties to an employee on the next shift 
and the equipment is to remain deenergized throughout the shift change, 
it should not be an undue burden to establish a procedure under 
paragraph (d)(8)(iii) for the off-going employee to transfer his or her 
authority to the on-coming employee. In situations in which the off-
going employee removes his or her lockout or tagout device before the 
on-coming employee arrives, the procedure could allow for the off-going 
employee to apply a tagout device at the time he or she removes his or 
her device, indicating that the lock had been removed, but that the 
machine or equipment had not been reenergized. The on-coming employee 
would verify that the system was still deenergized and would remove the 
interim tag and substitute his or her lockout device. This would assure 
that the continuous protection is maintained from one shift to another. 
When tagout devices are used, it would be possible to use a tag with 
spaces for the off-going employee to sign off, giving the date and 
time, and for the on-coming employee to sign on, also giving the date 
and time. Each employee would verify the deenergizing and energy 
isolation for his or her own protection before signing onto the tag.
    In paragraph (d)(8)(iv), the final standard requires that whenever 
outside servicing personnel (that is, employees of contractors) are 
engaged to perform any of the activities covered by this standard, each 
employer must inform the other employer of their respective lockout or 
tagout procedures. Each employer shall also ensure that his or her own 
employees understand and comply with the restrictions and prohibitions 
of the energy control program in use.
    These requirements are necessary when outside personnel work on 
machines or equipment because their activities have the same or greater 
potential for exposing employees to servicing hazards as would exist if 
the employer's own employees were performing the work. These hazards 
can pose a threat to both the outside service personnel and the 
employees in the plant or facility.
    The outside servicing personnel would certainly be expected to know 
about the specific equipment being serviced, but they might not be 
familiar with the energy control procedures being used in the 
particular workplace. Similarly, the employees at the worksite might be 
familiar with the procedures being used by their fellow employees, but 
they might not know what to do if the contractor has a procedure which 
differs from their own. If such procedures were not coordinated, each 
group of employees might be endangered by the actions of the other, 
even if each one followed its own procedures.
    This standard is intended to ensure that both the employer and the 
outside service personnel are aware that their interaction can be a 
possible source of injury to employees and that the close coordination 
of their activities is needed in order to reduce the likelihood of such 
injury. OSHA sees the proper use of these provisions, when they are 
understood and adhered to, as a way to prevent misunderstandings by 
either plant employees or outside service personnel regarding: (1) the 
use of lockout or tagout procedures in general, (2) the use of specific 
lockout or tagout devices that are selected for a particular 
application, and (3) the restrictions and prohibitions imposed upon 
each group of employees by the other employer's energy control program.
    OSHA proposed to require outside contractors to use the same 
procedures as used in the plant or facility where the work is being 
done, and a similar requirement was considered under the rulemaking on 
Sec. 1910.147. In the generic standard rulemaking, the Agency 
determined that it might adversely affect the safety of employees if 
the standard were to require them to comply in all cases with a 
procedure which was unfamiliar to them and differed from their usual 
practices under their own employer's energy control program (54 FR 
36680-36681, corrected at 55 FR 38683, 38685). Further, by allowing 
each employee to use the procedure that he or she is familiar with, 
Sec. 1910.147(f)(2) provides greater assurance that the employees will 
willingly use the procedure. OSHA has decided to use the same approach 
here.
    Paragraph (d)(8)(iv) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires that each 
employer inform the other employer of the procedures used by his or her 
employees and that each employer's employees understand and comply with 
the restrictions and prohibitions of the energy control program in use. 
For example, if there are elements of the contractor's procedures which 
need to be explained to the facility employees, or if there are other 
steps needed to assure the safety of the contractor's employees, the 
facility employer must provide his or her employees with the 
information to provide the necessary protection.
    The requirement for coordination between the contractor and the on-
site employer is intended to deal with the potential for either one's 
employees to create or compound the hazards to which the other's 
employees are exposed. This is true even if the on-site employer 
includes as a term of the contract that the contractor follow the on-
site employer's lockout or tagging procedures. Regardless of the degree 
of coordination required by paragraph (d)(8)(iv), each covered 
employer, whether contractor or on-site employer, has an independent 
obligation under the OSH Act to provide the protection under the 
standard for his or her own employees.
    The facility owner will need to look at various aspects of the 
contractor's energy control program to assure that his or her employees 
are not placed at an increased risk. For example, is the contractor's 
means of notifying the affected employees of the pending lockout or 
tagout as thorough as the facility employer's? Is the procedure for 
identifying the energy isolating devices as exhaustive or complete as 
the facility employer's? Is the method of lockout or tagout used by the 
contractor recognized and respected by the facility's employees? Does 
the contractor's procedure take into account the possibility of 
reaccumulation of stored energy (if that is a potential problem)? Does 
the contractor's procedure for removal of lockout or tagout devices and 
reenergizing and startup of the machine or equipment provide for 
employee notification and ensuring the equipment is safe before 
startup? If any of the steps in the contractor's procedures fail to 
cover significant or essential conditions of the workplace which could 
adversely affect the safety of the facility employees, action must be 
taken by the facility employer to minimize the potential for injury to 
his or her employees.
    Edison Electric Institute argued that the tagging systems used by 
electric utilities across the country are unique and work well to 
protect their employees (Ex. 3-112; LA Tr. 215-239).33 They argued 
that OSHA should adopt provisions from the EEI/IBEW draft relating to 
lockout and tagging. Because OSHA has already adopted a standard on the 
control of hazardous energy sources, the Agency believes that the 
industry must show that unique circumstances, such as the hazards 
presented or the methods of controlling them, warrant separate and 
distinct treatment. Mr. John Bachofer, Vice President of Metropolitan 
Edison Company, representing Edison Electric Institute emphasized six 
basic concepts of hazardous energy control at electric utilities:
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    \3\3EEI also argued that electric utility employees are not at 
significant risk of injury under existing industry lockout and 
tagging procedures (Ex. 62-33). In both the Subpart S work practices 
rulemaking and the generic hazardous energy control rulemaking, OSHA 
found existing electric utility lockout and tagging procedures to 
expose employees to a significant risk of injury (55 FR 32003, 54 FR 
36651-36654, 36684). In a review of IBEW fatality reports, Eastern 
Research Group, Ind., found 4 of 159 fatalities (2.5%) could have 
been prevented by compliance with proposed Sec. 1910.269(d) (Ex. 6-
24). These fatalities occurred among approximately 50,000 electric 
utility employees at high risk (Ex. 4: Table 3-22 with the 
population limited to generating plant workers at high risk) at the 
rate of nearly 2 per year (2.5% of the estimated 70 deaths per year; 
Ex. 5). The Agency believes that these employees are exposed to a 
significant risk of injury under existing industry practices. 
Otherwise, no lockout and tagging standard would have been proposed. 
OSHA evaluates significant risk based on the hazards that exist 
under the current state of regulation.
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    (1) The control of energy is fundamental to electric utility work.
    (2) Control of hazardous energy is critical to employee safety in 
the industry.
    (3) The methods used to control hazardous energy involve a 
comprehensive and documented process.
    (4) Employees are trained in and required to comply with the 
hazardous energy control procedures.
    (5) Methods for controlling energy are essentially consistent 
throughout the electric utility industry.
    (6) The electric utility industry's hazardous energy control 
procedures work very well (LA Tr. 216-218).
    As noted earlier, these concepts are in use in other industries as 
well and do not make the utility industry's tagging system unique. OSHA 
believes that the only concept employed by electric utilities that is 
unique to their industry is the use of central control facilities. Mr. 
Bachofer described the utilities' use of a system operator who 
initiates and controls switching and tagging procedures, and presented 
a videotape of a typical tagout procedure in action in a generating 
plant (Ex. 12-6; LA Tr. 225-232). This evidence indicates that typical 
utility company tagout procedures are unique. However, as discussed 
extensively earlier, the evidence presented by the Utility Workers 
Union of America and the accident data submitted into the record 
demonstrate that, even under these procedures, employees can be exposed 
to hazards (Ex. 9-2, 66; DC Tr. 414, 444; LA Tr. 45-49, 54-63, 67-
70).34 Therefore, rather than adopt the EEI/IBEW draft provisions 
on the control of hazardous energy sources, OSHA is incorporating 
additional provisions under Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(v) to allow for the 
placement and removal of lockout or tagout devices by the system 
operator. This provides employers with the flexibility to protect 
employees by central control of energy isolating devices, but provides 
employees with protection equivalent to that provided by personal 
lockout or tagout devices. The new paragraph is worded as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\4OSHA came to the same conclusion in the electrical safety-
related work practices rulemaking, 55 FR 32003.

    (v) If energy isolating devices are installed in a central 
location under the exclusive control of a system operator, the 
following requirements apply:
    (A) The employer shall use a procedure that affords employees a 
level of protection equivalent to that provided by the 
implementation of a personal lockout or tagout device.
    (B) The system operator shall place and remove lockout and 
tagout devices in place of the authorized employee under paragraphs 
(d)(4), (d)(6)(iv), and (d)(7)(iv) of this section.
    (C) Provisions shall be made to identify the authorized employee 
who is responsible for (that is, being protected by) the lockout or 
tagout device, to transfer responsibility for lockout and tagout 
devices, and to ensure that an authorized employee requesting 
removal or transfer of a lockout or tagout device is the one 
responsible for it before the device is removed or transferred.

    These requirements recognize lockout and tagout practices that are 
common in the electric utility industry and that have been successful 
in protecting employees from hazards associated with the control of 
hazardous energy sources. Under paragraph (d)(8)(v), the system 
operator has complete control over hazardous energy sources that 
endanger employees maintaining or servicing machinery or equipment 
associated with an electric power generation installation. Other 
employees do not even have access to the energy control devices and 
cannot operate them to reenergize machinery or equipment being 
serviced. This central control of hazardous energy sources, in 
combination with the lockout and tagging procedures and other 
safeguards required by paragraph (d), minimizes the accidental 
reenergizing of machinery and equipment.
    Paragraph (d)(8)(v)(A) requires the procedure used to provide 
protection equal to the use of a personal lockout or tagout device. The 
procedure used must strictly regulate the operation of energy control 
devices. For example, it could prohibit the operation of these devices, 
except under written orders. Additionally, logs of switching orders 
provide a history of the energy control device operation that can help 
employers determine the efficacy of their procedures. At a minimum, the 
procedure must ensure that no lock or tag is removed without the 
permission of the authorized employee it is protecting and that locked 
out or tagged out energy control devices are not operated to reenergize 
hazardous energy sources.
    Paragraph (d)(8)(v)(B) requires the system operator to place and 
remove lockout and tagout devices in place of the authorized employee 
under paragraphs (d)(4), (d)(6)(iv), and (d)(7)(iv). The system 
operator is the only person with the authority to operate energy 
control devices under his or her jurisdiction and to place locks and 
tags on these devices. An authorized employee will not be able to place 
or remove his or her own tags; therefore, the system operator is 
required to perform this function. Allowing other employees to place 
and remove tags would increase the chances that locks or tags could be 
removed with the knowledge of the employee they are protecting.
    Paragraph (d)(8)(v)(C) requires the employer to make provisions to 
identify the authorized employee being protected by the lockout or 
tagout device, to transfer responsibility for lockout and tagout 
devices, and to ensure that an employee requesting the removal or 
transfer of a lockout or tagout device is the authorized employee 
responsible for it. It is important for any lockout or tagging system 
to protect every employee servicing or maintaining machinery or 
equipment. To achieve this goal, the lockout or tagging procedures must 
ensure that no lock or tag protecting an employee is removed without 
the knowledge and participation of the employee it is protecting. Even 
though the energy control devices are under the exclusive control of 
the system operator, the locked out or tagged out devices must not be 
operated until the employee they are protecting personally authorizes 
it. When a lockout or tagout device is to be removed or when 
responsibility for the device is to be transferred to another employee, 
the lockout or tagout procedures must take steps to identify the 
employee requesting removal or transfer. Signed orders, for example, 
could be used, and the signatures on the orders could be checked 
against the original lockout or tagout request. Password systems, 
master lock systems, and receipt systems could also be used to identify 
the authorized employee responsible for the lockout or tagout device. 
The procedures must also make provision for transferring lockout or 
tagout from one employee to another, such as may be needed during shift 
changes. The procedures must also ensure that the system operator does 
not remove any lockout or tagout device without the specific 
authorization of the employee it is protecting (except as permitted in 
paragraph (d)(7)(iv) for emergencies). Paragraph (d)(8)(v)(C) prohibits 
supervisors (or other employees) from releasing lockout or tagout 
devices while they are protecting authorized employees, and it 
recognizes only central control systems that provide protection 
equivalent to that provided by personal lockout or tagout devices. The 
use of signed orders, passwords, master locks or tags, or receipts can 
facilitate compliance with this provision.
    Paragraph (e). Paragraph (e) of final Sec. 1910.269 contains 
requirements for entry into and work in enclosed spaces. An ``enclosed 
space'' is defined to be a space that has a limited means of entry or 
egress, that is designed for periodic entry by employees under normal 
operating conditions, and that is not expected to contain a hazardous 
atmosphere, but may contain one under unusual conditions. In this 
paragraph, OSHA intends to cover only the types of enclosed spaces that 
are routinely entered by employees engaged in electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution work and are unique to 
underground utility work. Work in these spaces is part of the day-to-
day activities performed by employees protected by this standard. 
Enclosed spaces include manholes and vaults that provide employees 
access to electric generation, transmission, and distribution 
equipment. This paragraph does not address other types of confined 
spaces, such as boilers, tanks, and coal bunkers, that are common to 
other industries as well. These locations are addressed in OSHA's 
generic permit-required confined space standard, Sec. 1910.146, which 
applies to all of general industry, including industries engaged in 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution work.
    Section 1910.146 contains requirements that address hazards 
associated with entry into ``permit-required confined spaces'' (permit 
spaces). Section 1910.146 defines ``confined space'' and ``permit-
required confined space'' as follows:
     Confined space means a space that:
    (1) Is large enough and so configured that an employee can bodily 
enter and perform assigned work; and
    (2) Has limited or restricted means for entry or exit (for example, 
tanks, vessels, silos, storage bins, hoppers, vaults, and pits are 
spaces that may have limited means of entry.); and
    (3) Is not designed for continuous employee occupancy.
    Permit-required confined space (permit space) means a confined 
space that has one or more of the following characteristics:
    (1) Contains or has a potential to contain a hazardous 
atmosphere;35
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\5The definition of ``hazardous atmosphere'' in final 
Sec. 1910.269(x) is identical to that contained in the final generic 
permit-required confined spaces standard, Sec. 1910.146(b). OSHA 
believes that the criteria for determining whether an atmosphere is 
hazardous is independent of the injury or type of work being 
performed. For this reason, the definition proposed in Sec. 1910.269 
was the same as the one proposed in Sec. 1910.146. The differences 
between the proposed definition and the one contained in final 
Sec. 1910.146 were described and explained in the preamble to the 
generic permit-required confined spaces standard (58 FR 4473-4474).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (2) Contains a material that has the potential for engulfing an 
entrant;
    (3) Has an internal configuration such that an entrant could be 
trapped or asphyxiated by inwardly converging walls or by a floor which 
slopes downward and tapers to a smaller cross-section; or
    (4) Contains any other recognized serious safety or health hazard.
    The permit-required confined spaces standard requires employers to 
implement a comprehensive confined space entry program. This standard 
covers the wide range of permit-required confined spaces encountered 
throughout general industry. Because the hazards posed by these spaces 
vary so greatly, Sec. 1910.146 requires employers to implement a permit 
system for entry into them. The permit system must spell out the steps 
to be taken to make the space safe for entry and must include 
provisions for attendants stationed outside the spaces and for rescue 
of entrants, who could be disabled inside the space. However, an 
employer need not follow the permit-entry requirements of Sec. 1910.146 
for spaces where the hazards have been completely eliminated or for 
spaces where an alternative set of procedures are observed. The 
alternative procedures apply only where the space can be made safe for 
entry through the use of continuous forced air ventilation alone. The 
procedures, which are set forth in Sec. 1910.146(c)(5)(ii), ensure that 
conditions within the permit space do not endanger an entrant's life or 
ability to rescue himself or herself.
    Paragraph (e) of 1910.269 applies to ``enclosed spaces''. By 
definition, an enclosed space would be a permit-required confined space 
in the absence of Sec. 1910.269. An enclosed space meets the definition 
of a confined space--it is large enough for an employee to enter; it 
has a limited means of access or egress; it is designed for periodic, 
rather than continuous, employee occupancy36 under normal 
operating conditions. An enclosed space also meets the definition of a 
permit space--although it is not expected to contain a hazardous 
atmosphere, it has the potential to contain one. The Agency notes that, 
if hazardous conditions which cannot be controlled through the 
precautions set out in paragraphs (e) and (t) of final Sec. 1910.269 
are present, the enclosed space must be treated as a permit space under 
Sec. 1910.146.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\6``One of the characteristics of a confined space is that it 
is not designed for humans to enter and work for prolonged periods 
without any additional consideration for safety and health. With 
respect to manholes and unvented vaults, the Agency notes that 
atmospheric testing and portable mechanical ventilation are among 
the recognized procedures that must be undertaken . . . before 
employees can safely enter these spaces. [Preamble to the generic 
permit space standard, 58 FR 4478]''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the preamble to the permit-required confined spaces standard, 
OSHA acknowledged that ``the practices necessary to make confined 
spaces that merely have the potential to contain hazardous atmospheres 
(as opposed to one that contains a hazardous atmosphere under normal 
operating conditions) safe are widely recognized and used throughout 
various industries [58 FR 4486].'' The Agency recognized the electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution industry as one of 
those industries (58 FR 4489). In fact, proposed Sec. 1910.269(e) was 
used as the basis of many of the requirements adopted under the 
alternative procedures adopted in Sec. 1910.146(c)(5)(ii).
    OSHA has carried forward proposed paragraph (e) into the final 
rule, setting requirements for electric power generation, transmission, 
and distribution work in enclosed spaces. Because these spaces are 
still permit spaces when work not falling under Sec. 1910.269 is 
performed, all employers must include these spaces in their permit-
space programs and must comply with the general permit-space 
requirements contained in Sec. 1910.146(c). For example, in accordance 
with Sec. 1910.146, enclosed spaces must be identified under paragraph 
(c)(1); employees must be informed of the existence, location, and 
hazardous nature of enclosed spaces under paragraph (c)(2); the 
employer must develop a written program covering entry into permit 
spaces under paragraph (c)(4); the employer must reevaluate permit 
spaces and reclassify them on the basis of changes in their use or 
configuration under paragraph (c)(6); and the host employer and 
contractor must coordinate entry activities under paragraphs (c)(8) and 
(c)(9).
    Edison Electric Institute strongly urged OSHA to include all 
electric utility confined spaces under the provisions of Sec. 1910.269 
(Ex. 3-112, 56; DC Tr. 814-828). Summing up the evidence EEI presented 
on this issue, Messrs. Carl D. Behnke and Charles Kelly stated:

    Another important issue is whether this standard will regulate 
all enclosed spaces in electric utility facilities, or only those 
which OSHA perceives as ``unique'' to utility operations. As 
written, the proposal would cover underground systems, such as 
manholes and vaults. Nothing in the record would support a contrary 
conclusion. Moreover, as EEI made clear in the rulemaking on OSHA's 
proposed generic standard on permit-entry enclosed spaces, it makes 
no sense for the generic standard to regulate work in power plant 
boilers, or other spaces, such as fuel oil tanks, which are found in 
electric utility facilities.
 * * * * *
    First, the records in this proceeding and the permit-entry 
matter show that only in electric power generating plants does one 
find the type of massive boilers which EEI described and depicted in 
its comments, testimony, and exhibits. (See Lawson presentations). 
Moreover, under typical procedures applicable in the industry, once 
those boilers have been shut down and opened, and slag removed, they 
present none of the ``enclosed space'' hazards which the generic 
standard apparently is intended to regulate.
    Second, while equipment such as tanks found in power plants may 
be similar to those found in other industrial settings, a compelling 
difference remains. Thus, the employees who will enter power plant 
spaces regulated under this standard will be the same ones who enter 
the spaces which OSHA apparently intends to regulate under the 
generic standard. To the extent the two final standards are as 
significantly different as the respective proposals, the result will 
be that power plant workers will be subject to inconsistent 
standards when performing identical or similar work. This simply 
makes no sense and for no apparent reason would defeat the value of 
having a comprehensive standard for power generation in the first 
place.
    Nothing in the record shows that entering spaces in power plants 
which are like other industrial spaces presents unusual or 
particular hazards which merit the application of the proposed 
generic rule. Also, the superior training which investor-owned 
utilities give their workers would be applicable to all enclosed 
space entries. [Ex. 56]

    OSHA has determined that Sec. 1910.146 is the proper place to 
regulate permit-required confined spaces other than enclosed spaces. 
The enclosed space requirements of the final rule are intended to 
regulate a portion of electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work that is routine and presents limited hazards to the 
qualified employees covered by Sec. 1910.269 who are performing that 
work. Electric utility companies have an estimated 14,350 employees 
engaged in underground transmission and distribution work (where most 
of the work covered by paragraph (e) occurs).37 Underground repair 
crews, in which these employees work, can typically expect to enter a 
manhole once or twice a day.38 The enclosed space entry procedure 
addressed by Sec. 1910.269(e) is a day-to-day part of the routine of 
these workers. This type of work is unique to underground utilities 
(such as electric, telephone, and water utilities), and the hazards 
presented by these spaces are widely recognized by these industries and 
their workers. Indeed, underground telecommunications work is currently 
regulated under Sec. 1910.268, which contains procedures basically 
equivalent to final Sec. 1910.269. In contrast, other permit spaces in 
electric power generating plants are entered on a far less frequent 
basis by employees working in the plants, typically, three such entries 
per week for an entire generating plant.39 A boiler at a 
generating plant, for example, is only entered by employees at the 
plant on a very infrequent basis--the electric generator would have to 
be shut down for a few days at a minimum, and this is not a routine 
occurrence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\7ERG, ``Preparation of an Economic Impact Study for the 
Proposed OSHA Regulation Covering Electric Power Generation, 
Transmission, and Distribution'', p. 8-8.
    \3\8Ibid, p. 8-21.
    \3\9Ibid, p. 8-25 to 8-26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, the hazards posed by the enclosed spaces covered in 
Sec. 1910.269(e) are generally much more limited than the hazards posed 
by permit spaces addressed in Sec. 1910.146.40 By definition, 
``enclosed spaces'' are designed for employee occupancy during normal 
operating conditions. Electrical and other energy systems would not 
have to be shut down, nor would the space have to be drained of liquids 
for the employee to enter the space safely. On the other hand, other 
``permit-required confined spaces'' at electric generating plants, such 
as boilers, fuel tanks, and transformer and circuit breaker cases, are 
not designed for employee occupancy and require energy sources to be 
isolated and fluids to be drained from the space before an employee can 
safely enter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\0Permit spaces covered by the alternative procedures in 
Sec. 1910.146(c)(5)(ii) pose hazards similar in nature to those 
found in enclosed spaces. However, the requirements for these spaces 
are similar to those in paragraph (e) of final Sec. 1910.269.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The hazards posed by enclosed spaces consist of (1) limited access 
and egress, (2) possible lack of oxygen, (3) possible presence of 
flammable gases,41 and (4) possible presence of limited amounts of 
toxic chemicals. The potential atmospheric hazards are caused by an 
enclosed space's lack of adequate ventilation and can normally be 
controlled through the use of continuous forced air ventilation alone. 
Practices to control these hazards are widely recognized and are 
currently in use in electric, telecommunications, and other underground 
utility industries. Such practices include testing for the presence of 
flammable gases and vapors, testing for oxygen deficiency, ventilation 
of the enclosed space, controls on the use of open flames, and the use 
of an attendant outside the space. Existing Sec. 1910.268(o) sets forth 
regulations addressing these areas in the telecommunications industry, 
which exposes its employees to the same non-electrical hazards as the 
electric utility industry. Section 1910.146, itself, recognizes permit 
spaces that are equivalent to enclosed spaces and sets separate 
provisions, similar to those contained in Sec. 1910.269(e), for those 
spaces.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\1Airborne combustible dust can also create a hazardous 
atmosphere. However, if combustible dust is present in sufficient 
amounts to create a hazardous atmosphere, it will almost surely be 
present in layers inside the space. The fire hazard associated with 
layers of combustible dust are not addressed in Sec. 1910.269(e), 
which deals only with the atmospheric hazards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The hazards posed by permit-required confined spaces vary widely 
between different types of spaces. Some tanks contain flammable 
liquids, which must be removed before an employee can enter. A boiler 
must have its fuel system shut down and then must be cooled before an 
employee can work inside. Each space has its own unique set of entry 
procedures covering all the hazards associated with it. This is the 
type of space that Sec. 1910.146 covers. The provisions of that 
standard are intended to protect employees from all the hazards that 
may be present in a vast array of different confined spaces.
    The EEI/IBEW draft standard recognized the difference between the 
two types of spaces (Ex. 2-3, 2-4). Paragraph (e)(3) of their draft 
contained provisions on ``enclosed spaces'', including requirements 
related to air contaminants, combustible atmospheres, oxygen 
deficiency, and access and egress. Paragraph (e)(4) of the EEI/IBEW 
document contained additional considerations for ``permit-entry 
spaces'', which incorporated provisions for the employer to identify 
the hazards associated with each space, to develop a permit system to 
control entry into these spaces, and to protect employees from hazards 
that could be anticipated within the space. These provisions recognize 
the wide variety of hazards and methods of control associated with 
permit spaces, as opposed to the basic hazards common to such enclosed 
spaces as manholes and vaults.
    OSHA has also adopted a two-pronged approach to regulating enclosed 
and permit-required confined space entry. However, rather than develop 
a new rule on permit-required confined spaces to be placed in 
Sec. 1910.269, the Agency has determined that permit spaces in electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution should be governed by 
the generic standard, Sec. 1910.146. OSHA has not found such spaces in 
electric utility work to be sufficiently unique with respect to the 
hazards they present to warrant separate regulation, except for 
enclosed spaces that are entered on a routine, daily basis and that are 
designed to be entered under normal operating conditions. Therefore, 
consistent with this determination, OSHA has set forth separate 
requirements in this standard (Sec. 1910.269(e)) for employee entry 
into enclosed spaces that are unique to the performance of electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution work.42 Other 
types of permit spaces (such as boilers and tanks) are not addressed in 
this Sec. 1910.269, but are addressed in the generic confined spaces 
standard, Sec. 1910.146.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\2These spaces are also found in other underground utility 
work as well. For example, the telecommunications industry performs 
work in some of the same manholes and underground vaults that 
electric utility workers enter. However, the hazards posed by these 
enclosed spaces are unique to the extent that they should be covered 
by a standard separate from the generic confined spaces standard. As 
noted earlier, entry into enclosed spaces is a routine part of 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution work, and 
the practices necessary for safe entry into these spaces are in 
widespread use throughout the electric utility industry. 
Additionally, manhole and vault entry is already covered by 
Sec. 1926.956 of subpart V for the construction of electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution installations and by 
Sec. 1910.268(o) for telecommunications work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the non-electrical hazards found in manholes, underground 
vaults, and similar enclosed spaces are the same in both 
telecommunications work and electric power generation, transmission, 
and distribution work, requirements relating to these hazards should be 
similar. (In joint-use manholes, where both telecommunications and 
electric distribution equipment are present, telecommunications 
employees and electric utility employees have to work in the same 
manholes--though not necessarily at the same time.) Therefore, the 
provisions contained in Sec. 1910.269(e) are based, in large part, on 
the requirements of existing Sec. 1910.268(o) relating to 
telecommunications work on underground installations. In carrying them 
over to Sec. 1910.269, OSHA has modified and has added to the existing 
telecommunications regulations as described in the summary and 
explanation of individual provisions within paragraph (e). The Agency 
has also drawn from provisions in ANSI C2 and the EEI/IBEW draft that 
relate to enclosed space hazards.
    The introduction to paragraph (e) sets forth the scope of the 
enclosed space provisions. As previously noted, enclosed spaces are 
defined as spaces that have limited means of entry or egress, that are 
designed for periodic entry by employees under normal operating 
conditions, and that are not expected to contain hazardous atmospheres 
but may contain them under unusual conditions. These spaces include 
manholes and unvented vaults. The introduction also notes (1) that 
paragraph (e) of Sec. 1910.269 applies to routine entry into enclosed 
spaces in lieu of the permit-space entry requirements of Sec. 1910.146, 
and (2) that the generic permit-required confined spaces standard, 
Sec. 1910.146, applies to entries into enclosed spaces where the 
precautions taken under paragraphs (e) and (t) of Sec. 1910.269 do not 
protect entrants.
    The ventilation in vented vaults prevents a hazardous atmosphere 
from accumulating, so vented vaults were proposed to be excluded from 
coverage. However, NIOSH pointed out that the intake or exhaust of a 
vented vault could be clogged, limiting the flow of air through the 
vaults (Ex. 3-21; DC Tr. 74). The employee in such cases would be 
exposed to the same hazards as those presented by non-vented vaults. 
Additionally, the mechanical ventilation for a vault may fail to 
operate. To ensure that the employee is protected from the hazards 
posed by lack of proper ventilation, the final rule exempts vented 
vaults only if a determination is made that the ventilation is in full 
operating condition. The determination must ensure that ventilation 
openings are clear and that any permanently installed mechanical 
ventilating equipment is in proper working order.
    Employers have been required to comply with Sec. 1910.146 for all 
permit spaces since April 15, 1992. Since that time, entry into 
enclosed spaces has been covered by that standard. Some employers may 
want to continue complying with Sec. 1910.146 for entry into enclosed 
spaces falling under Sec. 1910.269. Because the provisions of 
Sec. 1910.146 protect employees entering enclosed space to the same 
degree as Sec. 1910.269(e), OSHA will accept compliance with 
Sec. 1910.146 as meeting the enclosed space entry requirements of 
Sec. 1910.269(e). A note to this effect has been included immediately 
following the introduction to paragraph (e).
    Paragraph (e)(1) sets forth the general requirement that employers 
ensure the use of safe work practices by their employees. These safe 
work practices must include procedures for complying with the specific 
regulations contained in paragraphs (e)(4) through (e)(14) and must 
include safe rescue procedures. The requirement that the safe work 
practices used provide for rescue of employees was added because of the 
concern of several interested parties that this issue had been 
overlooked in the proposal. (See the following discussion of this issue 
for specific comments.)
    NIOSH suggested adding a specific requirement for training 
employees in the hazards of and procedures for enclosed spaces and in 
rescue procedures (Ex. 3-21; DC Tr. 45). Dr. Richard Niemeier stated, 
``Ill-conceived rescue attempts have [led] to multiple fatalities in 
confined spaces [DC Tr. 45].'' EEI and IBEW also endorsed a training 
requirement for employees working in enclosed spaces, as did the UWUA 
(Ex. 56, 61; DC Tr. 436).
    OSHA has accepted these recommendations. Paragraph (e)(2) of final 
Sec. 1910.269 requires employees who work in or who are attendants 
outside of enclosed spaces to be trained in the hazards of and 
procedures for enclosed space entry and in enclosed space rescue 
procedures.
    The Utility Workers Union of America expressed concern with the 
lack of adequate coverage of employee rescue and noted the absence of 
any discussion of the means of rescuing employees from enclosed spaces 
(DC Tr. 431, 436-437). EEI and IBEW supported a requirement compelling 
the employer to provide appropriate rescue equipment (Ex. 56, 61; DC 
Tr. 640-641).
    OSHA agrees that there is a need for rescue equipment to be 
available in the event that an injured employee must be retrieved from 
the enclosed space. However, there was no agreement on the record as to 
what constitutes adequate rescue equipment. The EEI and IBEW 
recommended language referred to ``the required rescue equipment'' 
without defining it further. The Agency has decided to adopt a 
performance approach here and to require, in final Sec. 1910.269(e)(3), 
the employer to provide equipment that will assure the prompt and safe 
rescue of injured employees. The equipment must enable a rescuer to 
remove an injured employee from the enclosed space quickly and without 
injury to the rescuer or further harm to the fallen employee. A 
harness, a lifeline, and a self-supporting winch can normally be used 
in this manner.
    Some conditions within an enclosed space, such as high temperature 
and high pressure, make it hazardous to remove any cover from the 
space. For example, if high pressure is present within the space, the 
cover could be blown off in the process of removing it. To protect 
employees from such hazards, paragraph (e)(4) requires a determination 
of whether or not it is safe to remove the cover. This determination 
may take the form of a quick check of the conditions expected to be in 
the enclosed space. For example, the cover could be checked to see if 
it is hot and, if it is fastened in place, could be loosened gradually 
to release any residual pressure. An evaluation must also be made of 
whether conditions at the site could cause a hazardous atmosphere to 
accumulate in the space. Any conditions making it unsafe for employees 
to remove the cover are required to be eliminated (that is, reduced to 
the extent that it is no longer unsafe).
    Several persons commented on the language used in this provision in 
the proposal (proposed Sec. 1910.269(e)(2)). They generally claimed 
that some existing manhole covers do not accept a test probe and that 
these covers would have to have holes drilled in them in order to 
perform the evaluations called for by the proposed language (Ex. 3-38, 
3-42, 3-62, 3-112). Mr. Klaus Broscheit of the New England Power 
Service argued that the standard should allow older manhole covers to 
be cracked open to test for oxygen and combustibles (Ex. 3-62). Edison 
Electric Institute suggested requiring the determination to be made 
before the space is entered rather than before the cover to the space 
is removed (Ex. 3-112).
    OSHA believes that the proposed rule did not require manholes to 
accommodate a probe. The requirement, as proposed, allowed for covers 
to be cracked open for any necessary tests. Also, as an Agency 
representative testified at the public hearing, the provision was 
simply intended to require a check of whether the cover was hot, a 
determination of whether there were conditions in the area conducive to 
the formation of a hazardous atmosphere within the enclosed space, and 
a check (typically by means of loosening the cover slightly) of whether 
there was a hazardous pressure differential between the two sides of 
the cover (DC Tr. 219-221). To make this clear in the final rule, OSHA 
is revising the language of the requirement to reflect its intent more 
accurately. Additionally, a note has been added for clarification. This 
note reads as follows:

    Note: The evaluation called for in this paragraph may take the 
form of a check of the conditions expected to be in the enclosed 
space. For example, the cover could be checked to see if it is hot 
and, if it is fastened in place, could be loosened gradually to 
release any residual pressure. A determination must also be made of 
whether conditions at the site could cause a hazardous atmosphere, 
such as an oxygen deficient or flammable atmosphere, to develop 
within the space.

    Paragraph (e)(5) requires that openings to enclosed spaces be 
guarded to protect employees from falling into the space and to protect 
employees in the enclosed space from being injured by objects entering 
the space. The guard could be in the form of a railing, a temporary 
cover, or any other temporary barrier that provides the required 
protection. This provision was taken from existing 
Sec. 1910.268(o)(1)(i), which sets forth the equivalent requirement for 
underground telecommunications work.
    Paragraph (e)(6) prohibits employees from entering enclosed spaces 
that contain a hazardous atmosphere. Once the hazardous atmosphere is 
removed (for example, by ventilating the enclosed space), employees 
would be allowed to enter. If an entry is to be made while a hazardous 
atmosphere is present, the entry is required to conform to the generic 
permit-required confined spaces standard, Sec. 1910.146. The use of the 
term ``entry'' in this paragraph of Sec. 1910.269 is consistent with 
the use of that term in Sec. 1910.146, and the definition of ``entry'' 
in Sec. 1910.146(b) applies. (A note to this effect is included 
following paragraph (e)(6) in final Sec. 1910.269.)
    The corresponding provision in the proposal, Sec. 1910.269(e)(4), 
would have permitted an employee to enter an enclosed space containing 
a hazardous atmosphere if the employee was ``protected from the hazards 
that exist or may develop within the space.'' As OSHA has noted earlier 
in this preamble, paragraph (e) is intended to apply only to routine 
entry into enclosed spaces, where compliance with the procedures set 
out in paragraphs (e) and (t) adequately protect employees. If a 
hazardous atmosphere exists in an enclosed space after the testing and 
ventilation requirements in paragraphs (e)(9) through (e)(13) of final 
Sec. 1910.269 have been met, additional measures must be taken to 
protect employees. When this is the case, the generic permit-spaces 
standard in Sec. 1910.146 contains the relevant requirements necessary 
to protect entrants. Paragraph (e)(6) of final Sec. 1910.269 makes this 
clear. (It should be noted that Subpart Z of Part 1910 continues to 
apply to the exposure of employees to toxic substances.)
    Paragraph (e)(7) addresses the use of an attendant outside the 
enclosed space to provide assistance in an emergency. An attendant is 
required if there is reason to believe that a hazard43 exists 
within the space or if a hazard exists because of traffic patterns near 
the opening. For example, a manhole containing energized electric 
equipment that is in danger of failing catastrophically requires an 
attendant under this paragraph. The purpose of the attendant would be 
to provide assistance in an emergency; however, he or she would not be 
precluded from performing other duties outside the enclosed space, as 
long as those duties do not interfere with the person's function as an 
attendant. The attendant must have the first aid training required 
under paragraph (b) of final Sec. 1910.269. The provisions of paragraph 
(e)(7) are based on existing Sec. 1910.268(o)(1)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\3 The type of hazard to which this paragraph refers is one 
that threatens the life of an entrant or that interferes with escape 
from the enclosed space.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenting on the corresponding provision of the proposal (proposed 
Sec. 1910.269(e)(5)), Mr. Charles Hart of the National Electrical 
Contractors Association stated that it was not clear whether or not the 
attendant should be stationed outside the space (Ex. 3-60). Two 
commenters stated that the provision should explicitly permit the 
attendant to enter the manhole (Ex. 3-42, 3-112). The Utility Workers 
Union of America expressed support for the proposed provision requiring 
the attendant to be outside the space (DC Tr. 426, 436-437). Mr. Eugene 
Briody, representing UWUA, Local 1-2, stated: ``Our local union 
strongly believes that a second man should be located outside an 
enclosed space at all times because of the speed with which hazardous 
conditions can develop in a manhole, and the difficulty an injured 
employee may have in leaving a manhole [DC Tr. 426].''
    The intent of this paragraph is to require the presence of a person 
with first aid training outside the enclosed space if hazards exist 
within the space or if a hazard exists due to traffic patterns outside 
the space. If this person were to enter the enclosed space, he or she 
might be unable to assist the employee already within the space. For 
example, if traffic hazards are present in the area of the opening to 
the enclosed space and if the attendant entered the space, then both 
the attendant and the workers he or she is intended to protect would be 
vulnerable upon leaving. No one would be present to minimize or control 
the traffic hazards. If flooding hazards are present, a person outside 
the space may be able to assist in a rescue attempt; an attendant 
inside the space would likely be another victim. Therefore, the final 
rule explicitly states that the attendant is required to remain outside 
the enclosed space.
    On the other hand, if there is no reason to believe that a hazard 
exists inside the enclosed space and if no traffic hazards are present, 
an attendant would still be required under Sec. 1910.269(t)(3) while 
work is being performed in a manhole containing energized conductors. 
The major, though not the only, hazard in this case is that of electric 
shock. Assistance can be provided to a victim of electric shock by 
another person in the manhole. Therefore, the provisions of paragraph 
(t)(3) permit the attendant required under that paragraph to enter the 
manhole for brief periods of time. However, it should be noted that 
Sec. 1910.269(e)(7) requires the attendant to be ``immediately 
available outside the space''. Thus, an attendant required by paragraph 
(e)(7) (rather than by paragraph (t)(3)) is required to remain outside 
the space.
    A few commenters suggested prohibiting the attendants from 
performing ``other duties'' outside the space, because he or she could 
be distracted from the primary goal of protecting employees within the 
enclosed space (Ex. 3-59, 3-82). Michael Kenny of the UWUA stated that 
the practice of periodic testing of air quality in the enclosed space 
is among the duties to be performed (Ex. 3-76). OSHA agrees with these 
comments, in part, and has adopted language that would permit the 
attendant to perform duties only if they did not distract him or her 
from monitoring the employees in the enclosed space.
    Paragraph (e)(8) requires test instruments used to monitor 
atmospheres in enclosed spaces to be kept in calibration. This will 
ensure that test measurements are accurate so that hazardous conditions 
will be detected when they arise.
    In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested public comment on 
whether a specific level of accuracy (for example, plus or minus 10 
percent) should be required in this provision. Five commenters 
suggested referring to the instrument manufacturer's recommendations 
for guidelines on accuracy (Ex. 3-21, 3-22, 3-59, 3-80, 3-82). James 
McKnight of the Southwestern Power Administration argued that 
plus-minuss>5 percent should be the minimum accuracy, as a 10 
percent error in oxygen reading might result in insufficient oxygen for 
strenuous work (Ex. 3-53). Edison Electric Institute supported a 
plus-minuss>10 percent guideline as reflecting conditions that are 
common in daily operations (Ex. 3-112).
    While the Agency expects employers to follow instrument 
manufacturers' advice for calibrating these devices, OSHA believes that 
a standard that relies on ``manufacturer's specifications'' without 
setting a minimum acceptable standard will be difficult to enforce or 
could lead to inaccurate readings. The manufacturer's recommendation 
might not be available during an inspection, and a manufacturer's 
recommendation to calibrate the instrument to plus-minuss>30 
percent of the full scale reading is possible (though it would be 
unsafe to rely on an instrument that was so calibrated). Therefore, the 
final rule adopts a requirement that the instrument be calibrated to 
within plus-minuss>10 percent. Because the Agency considers EEI's 
comment as reflecting common industry practice, OSHA considers 
plus-minuss>10 percent to be the minimum accuracy needed. 
Paragraph (e)(8) does require the test instrument to be kept in 
calibration, so a higher accuracy is required if specified by the 
manufacturer.
    As noted earlier, because of the lack of adequate ventilation, 
enclosed spaces can accumulate hazardous concentrations of flammable 
gases and vapors, or an oxygen deficient atmosphere could develop. It 
is important to keep concentrations of oxygen and flammable gases and 
vapors at safe levels; otherwise, an explosion could occur while 
employees are in the space, or an oxygen deficiency could lead to the 
suffocation of an employee. Toward these ends, paragraphs (e)(9), 
(e)(10), (e)(11), (e)(12), (e)(13), and (e)(14) address the testing of 
the atmosphere in the space and ventilation of the space.
    Paragraph (e)(9) requires the atmosphere in an enclosed space to be 
tested for oxygen. However, continuous forced air ventilation is 
permitted as an alternative to testing. Such ventilation would ensure 
that there is sufficient oxygen\44\ in the manhole. (See also paragraph 
(e)(12) for requirements relating to the length of time ventilation 
must be provided before employees are allowed to enter the manhole.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\The definition of ``hazardous atmosphere'' determines what 
concentrations of oxygen are considered hazardous. (See the 
discussion of this term under the summary and explanation of 
paragraph (x) of final Sec. 1910.269 later in this preamble.) 
Paragraph (e)(6) prohibits entry into an enclosed space while a 
hazardous atmosphere is present.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenting on the corresponding provision of the proposal (proposed 
Sec. 1910.269(e)(8)), NIOSH argued that oxygen monitoring was 
appropriate and necessary (Ex. 3-21; DC Tr. 44-45). Testifying at the 
public hearing, Dr. Richard Niemeier expressed their concerns that 
oxygen deficiency is a deadly atmospheric condition with no warning 
properties and that the first symptoms of hypoxia are frequently poor 
judgment and lack of coordination (DC Tr. 44-45). He also stated that 
oxygen deficiency may cause erroneous readings on explosivity monitors 
and that the use of forced-air ventilation in an enclosed space with an 
atmosphere above the upper explosive limit may result in an explosion 
(DC Tr. 45).
    OSHA is also concerned that the improper use of ventilation may 
itself cause hazards for employees. However, the proper use of 
ventilation and testing for flammable gases, along with other 
precautions, will protect employees from the relevant hazards without 
the need for an oxygen test. For example, to prevent employees from 
exposure to oxygen deficiency within the enclosed space, the forced-air 
ventilation must be properly positioned and run for an adequate length 
of time before entry to place sufficient oxygen in the working zone. To 
address the concerns raised by NIOSH, the Agency has adopted language 
in final Sec. 1910.269 (e)(9) requiring that the procedures used when 
no oxygen monitoring is performed protect employees from the hazards 
associated with oxygen deficiency. Furthermore, OSHA has reordered the 
paragraphs so that the requirement for oxygen testing (or ventilation) 
appears before the requirement for testing for the presence of 
flammable gases and vapors. This reordering will stress the importance 
of ensuring that there is sufficient oxygen to provide an accurate 
flammability reading. Additionally, a provision has been included in 
paragraph (e)(10) to require an oxygen concentration in a range that 
ensures the accuracy of the flammability test.
    Paragraph (e)(10) requires the internal atmosphere of the enclosed 
space to be tested for flammable gases and vapors. The results of the 
test must indicate that the atmosphere is safe before employees can 
enter. So that the results are accurate and are relevant to the 
atmosphere in the space at the time of employee entry, testing is 
required to be performed with a direct reading meter or similar 
instrument. Test equipment that samples the atmosphere so that the 
samples can be forwarded to a laboratory for analysis does not meet the 
requirements of paragraph (e)(10). The flammability test must be 
undertaken after the steps taken under paragraph (e)(9) ensure that the 
enclosed space has sufficient oxygen for accurate results.
    One commenter objected to the proposed requirement (proposed 
Sec. 1910.269(e)(7)) to test for the presence of flammable gases and 
vapors and suggested that forced ventilation be permitted in place of 
the testing (Ex. 3-27). OSHA does not agree with this commenter. An 
employee could not be certain that the atmosphere within an enclosed 
space was safe without testing, even if ventilation is provided.
    If flammable gases or vapors are detected or if an oxygen 
deficiency is found, paragraph (e)(11) requires the employer to provide 
forced air ventilation to assure safe levels of oxygen and to prevent a 
hazardous concentration of flammable gases or vapors from accumulating. 
As an alternative, an employer could use a continuous monitoring system 
that ensures that no hazardous atmosphere develops and no increase in 
flammable gas or vapor concentration occurs. The definition of 
hazardous atmosphere contains guidelines for the determination of 
whether or not the concentration of a substance is at a hazardous 
level. OSHA has included a note to this effect after paragraph (e)(11) 
of final Sec. 1910.269. An identical note has been included after 
paragraph (e)(14).
    The provisions of paragraphs (e)(9), (e)(10), and (e)(11) have been 
taken from requirements contained in existing Sec. 1910.268(o)(2) and 
in ANSI C2-1987, Section 426B, with changes, as noted earlier, based on 
the rulemaking record.
    Paragraph (e)(12) sets forth specific requirements for the 
ventilation of enclosed spaces. When forced air ventilation is used, it 
is required to be maintained before entry for a period of time long 
enough to purge the atmosphere within the space of hazardous amounts of 
flammable gases and vapors and long enough to supply an adequate 
concentration of oxygen. After the ventilation has been maintained for 
this amount of time, employees can then safely enter the space.
    In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested public comment on 
whether the Agency should specify what number of air changes of the 
atmosphere within the enclosed space should be required before 
employees are allowed to enter. Several commenters opposed specifying 
an exact number of air changes in the standard (Ex. 3-20, 3-21, 3-32, 
3-80, 3-82, 3-112). In general, they argued that no number of air 
changes can be specified to cover all situations and that a performance 
approach was appropriate. Many stated that testing should be used to 
indicate the presence of a safe atmosphere.
    Based on these comments, OSHA has decided not to specify a minimum 
number of air changes before employee entry into the enclosed space. 
Instead, the Agency will strictly interpret Sec. 1910.269(e)(12) to 
require either testing to determine the safety of the atmosphere in the 
space or a thorough evaluation of the air flow required to make the 
atmosphere safe. As noted by Mr. Eugene Briody of UWUA Local 1-2, the 
safety of employees working in enclosed spaces should not rely on the 
``potentially faulty judgment of a supervisor or of an employee'' (DC 
Tr. 427).
    Paragraph (e)(12) also requires the air provided by the ventilating 
equipment to be directed at the area within the enclosed space where 
employees are at work. The forced air ventilation is required to be 
maintained the entire time the employees are present within the space. 
These provisions ensure that a hazardous atmosphere does not reoccur 
where employees are working.
    In order to ensure that the air supplied by the ventilating 
equipment will provide a safe atmosphere, paragraph (e)(13) requires 
the air supply to be from a clean source and prohibits it from 
increasing the hazards in the enclosed space. For example, positioning 
the air intake for the ventilating equipment near the exhaust from a 
gasoline or diesel engine would contaminate the atmosphere in the 
enclosed space. This practice would not be allowed under the standard.
    The use of open flames in enclosed spaces is safe only when 
flammable gases or vapors are not present in hazardous quantities. For 
this reason, paragraph (e)(14) requires additional testing for 
flammable gases and vapors if open flames are to be used in enclosed 
spaces. The tests must be performed immediately before the open flame 
device is used and at least once per hour while the device is in use. 
This requirement is based on existing Sec. 1910.268(o)(5)(i).
    In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested comments on whether 
the frequency of testing is appropriate or whether the frequency should 
be increased or decreased. Several utility representatives stated that 
the periodic testing not be required if continuous ventilation is 
provided (Ex. 3-27, 3-32, 3-59, 3-112, 3-120). NIOSH, IBEW, and UWUA 
supported the proposed requirement for periodic testing (Ex. 3-21, 3-
107; DC Tr. 427). In fact, NIOSH and UWUA argued that once per hour is 
not frequent enough.
    OSHA believes that the use of open flames in enclosed spaces poses 
a substantial risk of severe injury should hazardous quantities of 
flammable gases or vapors accumulate within the space. If the 
ventilation is not positioned properly, areas within the enclosed space 
can develop hazardous atmospheres. In such cases, an explosion would 
likely result from the use of open flames within the space. OSHA agrees 
with NIOSH and UWUA that hourly testing is not always sufficient. 
Therefore, the final rule sets a minimum testing frequency of once per 
hour (as did the proposal), but more frequent testing would be required 
if conditions indicate the need for it. Examples of such conditions 
include the presence of volatile flammable liquids in the enclosed 
space and a history of hazardous quantities of flammable vapors or 
gases in a given space.
    Paragraph (f). Paragraph (f) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses 
excavating operations. This paragraph simply references the appropriate 
existing regulations in the Construction Standards (Part 1926) 
pertaining to excavations, which are contained in 29 CFR Part 1926, 
Subpart P. The hazards involved are common to all types of excavating 
operations, such as trenching. Since excavating work is normally 
considered a construction operation and since construction regulations 
dealing with the hazards involved already exist, OSHA considers it 
appropriate to refer to the construction requirements directly. This 
ensures that the regulations are the same whether or not the work is 
``construction work'' as defined in Sec. 1910.12. Employers covered by 
this standard should already be familiar with these requirements 
because they frequently perform the type of work covered under Subpart 
V of Part 1926 (which contains a similar reference in 
Sec. 1926.956(c)(2)).
    EEI, IBEW, and UWUA supported OSHA's adoption of the excavation 
standards for construction (Ex. 3-76, 3-107, 3-112). EEI also 
recommended that the Agency adopt provisions from the EEI/IBEW draft 
standard that they claimed were omitted from the OSHA proposal. The 
hazards addressed by the draft requirements are, however, already 
covered by rules in Subpart P of Part 1926. Therefore, OSHA has not 
adopted the EEI recommendation.
    It should be noted that OSHA has promulgated, in a separate 
rulemaking project, a revision of the regulations contained in Subpart 
P of Part 1926. This revision was published on October 31, 1989 (54 FR 
45894). In proposed Sec. 1910.269(f), OSHA referred to the individual 
sections contained in Subpart P of Part 1926 but noted that operations 
covered by Sec. 1910.269 would be required to follow whatever is 
promulgated as a final standard under the Construction Standards 
rulemaking. Because the revised excavation standard contains different 
section numbers than those proposed in Sec. 1910.269(f), OSHA has 
decided to refer to Subpart P as a whole in final Sec. 1910.269. 
Additionally, the proposal's reference to trenching has been dropped 
for consistency in terminology between the two standards--trenching is 
simply one type of excavating work and is covered without being 
specifically mentioned.
    Paragraph (g). Paragraph (g) of final Sec. 1910.269 sets forth 
requirements for personal protective equipment (PPE), which includes 
eye and face protection, respiratory protection, head protection, foot 
protection, protective clothing, electrical protective equipment, and 
personal fall protection equipment. In accordance with 
Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(iii), paragraph (g)(1) emphasizes that the 
requirements of Subpart I of Part 1910 apply. It should be realized 
that OSHA considers PPE which meets the requirements of current (as of 
today) editions of the American National Standards referenced in 
Subpart I to be in compliance with the current requirements of this 
subpart.45 For example, Subpart I of Part 1910 references American 
National Standard for Industrial Head Protection (Z89.1-1969), although 
other later editions have been published for head protection (for 
example, ANSI Z89.1-1986). OSHA considers equipment meeting these newer 
standards to be acceptable. Subpart I of Part 1910 was proposed for 
revision on August 16, 1989 (54 FR 33832), and the updating of the PPE 
requirements with the latest American National Standards will be 
accomplished when that revision becomes a final rule. The clarifying 
statement in proposed Sec. 1910.269(g)(1) noting that equipment meeting 
American National Standard for Industrial Protective Helmets for 
Electrical Workers (ANSI Z89.2-1971) is acceptable head protection has 
not been carried forward into the final rule. This ANSI standard is out 
of date (this equipment is now covered under ANSI Z89.1), and the 
reference to it will be unnecessary when the revision of Subpart I is 
published. In the interim, OSHA's existing policy of accepting head 
protection meeting ANSI Z89.1-1986 will continue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\5 OSHA's de minimis policy with respect to later editions of 
consensus standards incorporated by reference in OSHA's standards is 
described earlier in this preamble under the summary and explanation 
of final Sec. 1910.137. The Agency has evaluated the current ANSI 
PPE standards and has found them to be acceptable under that policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (g)(2) of final Sec. 1910.269 sets forth requirements for 
personal fall protection systems including fall arrest equipment (body 
belts and life lines) and work positioning equipment (body belts and 
safety straps).
    In paragraphs (g)(2)(i) and (g)(2)(ii), OSHA is requiring that body 
belts, lifelines, and lanyards for fall arrest, and body belts and 
safety straps for work positioning, meet the requirements of Subpart E 
of Part 1926 and Sec. 1926.959 of this chapter, respectively. Although 
these regulations are contained in the Construction Standards, OSHA 
believes that they apply equally as well to personal fall protection 
systems and to work positioning equipment used in overhead electric 
line work. Additionally, body belts, lifelines, lanyards, and safety 
straps used in overhead line work are currently required to comply with 
pertinent regulations of Part 1926, including Secs. 1926.104 and 
1926.959, during the construction of transmission and distribution 
lines and equipment. Since the same personal fall arrest systems and 
work positioning equipment are used during all phases of overhead 
electric line work (maintenance work and construction work alike), the 
standard's reference to existing construction standards is appropriate.
    OSHA has proposed, in a separate rulemaking project, Safety 
Standards for Fall Protection in the Construction Industry (November 
25, 1986, 51 FR 42718), to revise and simplify most of the existing 
fall protection regulations for construction, which are currently 
scattered throughout 29 CFR Part 1926, and to consolidate them in 
Subpart M of that Part. Requirements corresponding to Sec. 1926.104 
were proposed to be placed in Sec. 1926.502(d). Proposed 
Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(i) referred to Sec. 1926.104, which is contained in 
Subpart E of the Construction Standards, for requirements on body 
belts, lifelines, and lanyards used for fall arrest. So that this 
reference can easily be corrected when the final revision of this 
construction standard is issued, final Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(i) 
incorporates by reference the personal fall arrest requirements of 
Subpart E of Part 1926.
    OSHA has also proposed a general industry standard for fall 
protection, contained in Secs. 1910.128 through 1910.131 (April 10, 
1990, 55 FR 13423). The Agency has made every effort to make these two 
proposed standards (for general industry and for construction) 
compatible. It is the Agency's belief that, once the two standards are 
published as final rules, fall protection systems meeting the relevant 
portions of either of them would be acceptable.46
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\6 Whether or not body belts are an acceptable component of a 
fall arrest system was an issue in the two fall protection 
rulemakings. The outcome of this issue in these rulemakings will 
affect whether or not body belts will be acceptable under paragraph 
, which now references Subpart E of the Construction Standards in 
Part 1926.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Dr. Nigel Ellis urged OSHA to adopt the provisions of Appendix C of 
Sec. 1910.66 as the standard that fall protection systems for electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution work must meet. This 
appendix contains provisions that the Agency feels are appropriate for 
fall protection systems in general; and, in fact, proposed 
Secs. 1910.128 through 1910.131 were largely based on the material in 
Sec. 1910.66. However, because existing construction standards already 
apply to fall protection equipment in use in the electric utility 
industry, the Agency is continuing to use them as the basis for 
Sec. 1910.269 fall protection equipment standards. As noted earlier, 
the construction standards have been proposed for revision, and the 
construction and general industry requirements for this equipment will 
be compatible when the two other proposals are finalized. Therefore, in 
the future, OSHA may combine the fall protection requirements in 
Sec. 1910.269(g)(2) with those in Secs. 1910.128 through 1910.131 so 
that there is one consistent set of standards for fall protection 
systems.
    Paragraph (g)(2)(iii) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires body belts, 
safety straps, lanyards, lifelines, and body harnesses to be inspected 
before use each day to determine if the equipment is in safe working 
condition. This provision also prohibits the use of defective 
equipment. This requirement helps ensure that the protective equipment 
in use will, in fact, be able to protect employees when called upon to 
do so.
    Paragraph (g)(2)(iv) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires lifelines to 
be protected against being cut or abraded. Cuts and abrasions 
significantly reduce the strength of lifelines and could cause them to 
fail during use.
    In Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(v), OSHA proposed requirements covering the 
use of fall arrest, work positioning, and travel restricting equipment. 
The Agency proposed that, unless another type of fall protection was 
provided, one of these systems be used by employees when they were 
working at heights more than 4 feet (1.2 m) above the ground on poles, 
towers, trees, or structures or when they were working from vehicle-
mounted elevating and rotating work platforms (aerial lifts). The 
proposal further stated that the use of fall protection equipment would 
not have been required when a qualified employee was climbing or 
changing location on poles, towers, or similar structures which had 
steps or step bolts. The step bolts or ladders would have had to meet 
the design requirements proposed in Sec. 1910.269, as well as the 
applicable requirements in subpart D for fixed ladders. However, OSHA 
did propose that fall protection equipment (safety straps) be used by 
employees climbing wood poles not containing step bolts except when 
they were climbing around obstructions, such as crossarms, pins, or 
braces. This paragraph was proposed to clarify when the use of personal 
fall protection would be required and when exceptions to its use would 
have been permitted.
    This provision received much attention from the commenters and from 
the witnesses at the hearing. Most argued that (1) fall protection 
should not be required when poles are being climbed (Ex. 3-9, 3-11, 3-
18, 3-23, 3-32, 3-38, 3-51, 3-53; DC Tr. 367-369, 537-538) or (2) the 
minimum height such protection should be required is 10 feet (Ex. 3-15, 
3-22, 3-26, 3-27, 3-39, 3-42, 3-45, 3-66, 3-82, 3-83, 3-102, 3-109, 3-
125, 3-128), or (3) advanced both arguments (Ex. 3-20, 3-62, 3-69, 3-
80, 3-101, 3-107, 3-112, 3-123, 56; DC Tr. 845-853). Expressing both 
arguments, Mr. Larry Hobart, Executive Director of APPA, stated:


    The four foot arrest requirement to protect against unexpected 
falls which is established by this section is too restrictive, and 
impractical. (Footnote omitted.) APPA recommends that OSHA establish 
a fifteen foot requirement. A requirement of this sort is by no 
means extreme. The State of California, for example, has established 
a fifteen foot height for fall protection requirements. (Footnote 
omitted.)
    In addition, utilities have for many years used the practice of 
ascending and descending poles without fall protection, which is 
referred to as ``free climbing.'' Free climbing is a safe, well 
established, widely accepted and proven practice. Employees who 
climb and perform other tasks on poles are qualified employees who 
have climbing duties as one of their routine work activities.
    If fall protection were required (belting-off around the pole), 
it would equal or exceed the hazards of not wearing fall protection 
equipment. For example, an employee using a waist belt when 
ascending or descending a pole would have to reposition the belt 
every few steps. This would fatigue the employee more than free 
climbing. Positioning and maneuvering to adjust the belt to the 
changing diameter of the pole creates additional exposure to fall 
and injury, as the body must be brought close to the pole and the 
length adjustment buckle is placed in a position where operation is 
impractical while maintaining balance.
    In addition, large transmission poles are often so large at 4 
feet above the ground that a safety belt of ten or twelve feet in 
length would be required under the rule in order to secure the 
employee and still permit climbing to occur. As the employee gained 
height and the pole tapered, the safety belt would have to be 
shortened (adjusted) frequently and when fully adjusted, would prove 
too long for safe work at the top of the pole. (Ex. 3-80)


    Mr. Gene Trombley, representing EEI, testified at the hearing that 
using a safety strap while climbing was unnecessary and sometimes even 
unsafe. He stated:


    Electric utility workers who climb poles and towers for a living 
are trained to approach each job on the basis of existing 
conditions, evaluating any hazards that may be faced in ascending 
and descending poles and towers.
    Workers are trained to climb using a variety of techniques and 
the decision on which technique to use is based on a number of 
factors including weather, the condition of the pole, and the kind 
of attachments on the structure like guy wires, telephone cables and 
cross arms.
    Also, where unusual conditions or obstacles do not dictate the 
kinds of methods to use, line workers have favorite methods of 
climbing poles with which they are comfortable and therefore the 
safest.
    Any one of these methods is acceptable and has proven safe over 
the years. I feel very strongly about these statements based upon my 
own personal experiences. I worked in an area where we shared our 
poles with another electric utility. We not only had to contend with 
the usual Bell and Cable TV attachments, we also had to deal with 
all of the facilities of a fair sized municipal power company.
* * * * *
You need to understand that when a lineman has to climb from ground 
level to the top of a pole or tower that has numerous attachments, 
such as telephone cables, Cable TV, guy wires and various other 
obstructions, your proposal would require him to attach and detach 
his safety strap each time an obstruction is encountered. This does 
not protect him; it increases the risk of a fall.
    Some of the poles I mentioned earlier could require belting as 
many as 25 or 30 times from the bottom up and down again.
* * * * *
    Climbing a pole with a safety strap results in other problems 
that can create a risk to the worker. For example, the climbing 
motion can result in a considerable amount of movement at the top of 
the pole and can cause energized lines to swing together resulting 
in a fault that could burn the lines down.
    For a lineman to eliminate this motion when climbing belted in, 
he must first develop a rhythm. This is [best] done by learning to 
climb hand over hand. This develops the proper hand to foot 
relationship that is necessary to ascend and descend poles smoothly.
* * * * *
    We have been successfully using the same climbing methods and 
equipment for decades and there has never been any indication 
whatsoever that they place the line workers at risk.
    Our methods have been developed over the years through actual 
experience. They are also backed up with training.
    Climbing is fundamental to the electric utility line worker. 
Line workers are given extensive training and possess a great deal 
of confidence in their ability. To suddenly try to require them to 
change years and years of training and experience would, I feel, 
cause a serious reduction in that high level of confidence and 
ability. (DC Tr. 848-853)

    These witnesses and commenters agreed that existing practices in 
electric utilities were safe and that the OSHA standard should simply 
adopt these practices (Ex. 3-23, 3-80; DC Tr. 852). They argued that 
the line worker was in the best position to determine the proper 
technique to be used in climbing the pole or tower and that the 
regulation should not interfere with his or her judgment (DC Tr. 581-
582, 850-851). Furthermore, witnesses at the hearing, including OSHA's 
expert witness, Mr. Arthur Lewis, maintained that the use of a pole 
strap by an employee climbing a pole would be more hazardous under most 
conditions than climbing without the strap (DC Tr. 367, 849-850).
    Others addressed the need for and existing technology of fall 
protection systems and supported requirements for fall protection for 
workers climbing poles, towers, and similar structures (Ex. 3-13, 3-16, 
3-43, 3-52, 54; DC Tr. 73, 648-659, 686-689). NIOSH supported OSHA's 
proposed requirement for employees to have fall protection at the work 
locations on poles, towers, and similar structures and while climbing 
unstepped wooden poles (DC Tr. 73). Mr. George R. Weedin, Safety 
Officer for the Electrical Division of the Panama Canal Commission, 
stated that their employees are tied off at all times while climbing or 
working on elevated structures and suggested that OSHA adopt a 
requirement patterned after their practices (Ex. 3-43).
    Dr. J. Nigel Ellis of the Research and Trading Corporation and Mr. 
Andrew Sulowski of Ontario Hydro (representing the U.S. Technical 
Advisory Group to ANSI on the International Standards Organization's 
ISO/TC94/SC4, discussed fall protection options available to electric 
utility workers (DC Tr. 647-659, 683-689). The evidence presented by 
these witnesses demonstrates that there is a range of options available 
for protecting electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution workers from falls. Dr. Ellis recommended that equipment 
used for fall protection should meet the requirements of Appendix C of 
Sec. 1910.66, which was published as a final OSHA standard on July 28, 
1989 (54 FR 31408).47 Mr. Sulowski highlighted the success that 
Ontario Hydro experienced in totally eliminating their fatalities from 
falling to none through the use of a ground-to-ground system of fall 
protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\7Appendix C of Sec. 1910.66 covers fall protection systems 
used with powered platforms for building maintenance. OSHA's 
proposed Sec. 1910.128 through 1910.131 noted earlier contain 
comparable requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NIOSH stated that risks associated with climbing poles are a major 
cause of injuries and fatalities in the electric utility industry (DC 
Tr. 44) and submitted a Canadian study48 that listed falls as 
accounting for 21.9 percent of all accidents (Ex. 15). ``Climbing up or 
down a pole, tower, basket, truck'' accounted for 14.8 percent of all 
accidents in this study. The ``IBEW Utility Department Survey of Fatal 
and Serious Occupational Accidents'' for the years 1984, 1986, and 1988 
report 13 fatalities from slips and falls during the period represented 
by these surveys49 (Ex. 12-12).50 The total number of deaths 
was 121, and the total non-electrical accidents was 37. In this data 
base, falls represented about 12 percent of all fatalities and 35 
percent of non-electrical deaths. Injuries due to falls from elevations 
(as coded on the forms) were involved in 10 percent (61 of 637) of the 
fatality/catastrophe investigations recorded in Exhibits 9-3 and 9-4. 
These investigations included only electric utilities (SIC 4911).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\8Kedl E., Laflamme L., et al. [1986]. ``Typical Accidents 
Involving Linemen in the Construction Sector''. Montreal, Quebec, 
Canada: Canadian Center for Occupational Health and Safety.
    \4\9These surveys cover IBEW local unions that represent the 
employees in investor-owned utilities, rural electric cooperatives, 
and municipal and governmental utilities.
    \5\0These IBEW surveys represented reports received by the 
International Office of the IBEW as follows:
    1984--July 15, 1981, to October 1, 1983.
    1986--October 1, 1983, to December 31, 1985.
    1988--January 1, 1986, to December 31, 1987.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All of these exhibits demonstrate that electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution workers face a significant risk of 
serious injury due to falls under current industry practices. To 
determine the extent to which they face hazards addressed by proposed 
Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(v), OSHA analyzed fall accidents included in 
various exhibits contained in the rulemaking record. The results of 
this analysis are presented in Table 1. As can be seen from the table, 
employees do fall while climbing poles, towers, or similar structures--
26 percent of the falling accidents related to Sec. 1910.269 occurred 
in this manner. The evidence in the record indicates that climbing a 
pole, tower, or similar structure is not as safe, under current 
industry practices, as some of the hearing witnesses testified. 
Therefore, the Agency has decided that the final standard must provide 
additional protection beyond that provided by the existing industry 
practices noted in the record and stated in the EEI/IBEW draft 
standard.
    Most of the witnesses agreed that it was not always safe to ``free 
climb'' a pole (that is, climb it without the use of a pole strap). Mr. 
Arthur Lewis, OSHA's expert witness, testified that a pole strap would 
be needed where the diameter of the pole was too great for an employee 
to grip it comfortably, if ice was present on the pole, or if there 
were impediments to the use of climbers (strap-on gaffs) on the pole 
(DC Tr. 369, 376-377). Mr. Andrew Sulowski of Ontario Hydro noted that 
some wooden poles were treated with a chemical that made them so hard 
that they were unsafe to climb without fall protection (DC Tr. 673). 
Additionally, he mentioned other conditions making it unsafe to climb a 
pole, tower, or similar structure, such as static electricity on a 
metal structure, direct contact with energized lines, and falling 
objects striking an employee from above (DC Tr. 649). Mr. Robert 
Macdonald of the IBEW and Mr. Gene Trombley representing EEI also 
stated that some conditions would make it unsafe to climb a pole 
without the use of a pole strap (DC Tr. 537-538, 1117-1118).
    OSHA has accepted the position that it is not always necessary for 
a qualified employee to use a pole strap when climbing an unstepped 
wooden pole. On the other hand, the Agency has determined that, under 
certain circumstances, climbing poles, towers, and similar structures 
poses a significant risk of serious injury to electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution workers. Even EEI recognized 
that the level of competence of the climber, the condition of the pole, 
the configuration of attachments on the pole, the weather, and other 
factors affect the determination of which method of climbing is safe 
and appropriate to use (Ex. 3-112). Therefore, the final rule adopts a 
requirement for employees to use a pole strap or other fall protection 
equipment when they are climbing a pole, tower, or similar structure 
that is not safe to climb without such protection. The language used in 
final Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(v) reads as follows:

    The use of fall protection equipment is not required to be used 
by a qualified employee climbing or changing location on poles, 
towers, or similar structures, unless conditions, such as, but not 
limited to, ice, high winds, the design of the structure (for 
example, no provision for holding on with hands), or the presence of 
contaminants on the structure, could cause the employee to lose his 
or her grip or footing.

                   Table 1.--Falls by Type of Accident                  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Number of 
                       Type of fall                         accidents\1\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fall from Pole or Tower                                                 
    Climbing or descending................................            10
    Changing location.....................................             1
    At work location......................................             7
    Other (not stated)....................................             3
Fall from tree............................................             6
Failure of structure......................................            12
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Each accident involves the death or serious injury of one or more    
  employees.                                                            
Source: Ex. 3-21, 9-1, 9-6, 9-7, 12-12, 53. Duplicate entries were not  
  counted. The time period covered by these exhibits varied, but        
  included accidents in the years 1981 to 1989. It does not represent   
  all fall accidents involving death or serious injury during this 9    
  year period, however. For example, the years 1981 to 1984 are         
  represented only by IBEW data, which includes only accidents that were
  reported by IBEW local unions during that period.                     

    The term ``high winds'' is also used in paragraph (q)(4)(iv) of 
final Sec. 1910.269. OSHA believes that this term is somewhat vague and 
that further clarification is needed. Therefore, a definition of ``high 
winds'' has been incorporated in Sec. 1910.269(x). Winds are considered 
to be ``high'' if they are of such velocity (1) that employees would be 
exposed to being blown from elevated locations, or (2) that an employee 
or material handling equipment could lose control of material being 
handled, or (3) that the winds would expose employees to other hazards 
not controlled by the provisions of the standard involved (for example, 
winds strong enough to move energized conductors far enough to reduce 
the minimum approach distance to less than that required under 
paragraph 1). Additionally, the Agency has included a compliance 
guideline of 40 miles per hour (30 miles per hour if material handling 
is involved). Winds beyond this speed are normally considered as being 
hazardous unless additional precautions are taken to protect employees. 
At this point, the danger that a worker will be blown off a structure 
or that workers will lose control of parts of a structure being 
assembled presents a significant risk to employees. The Agency has used 
this guideline in enforcing similar standards in the past. (See, for 
example, 55 FR 13397.) It should be noted that if wind is present in 
combination with other conditions such as snow or ice, it could be 
hazardous to climb the pole or structure even if the guideline is not 
exceeded. The standard requires fall protection to be used in such 
cases.
    It should be noted that the conditions listed in the rule are not 
the only ones warranting the use of fall protection. Other factors 
mentioned in the record as affecting the risk of an employee's falling 
include the level of competence of the employee, the condition of a 
pole or structure, the configuration of attachments on a pole (Ex. 3-
112), and the need to have both hands free for climbing (Ex. 3-18). In 
fact, OSHA believes that climbing without the use of fall protection is 
only safe if the employee is using his or her hands to hold onto the 
structure while he or she is climbing. If the employee is not holding 
onto the structure (for example, because the employee is carrying tools 
or equipment in his or her hands), fall protection is required under 
the final rule. The video tapes entered into the record by EEI (Ex. 12-
6), which they claimed represented typical, safe climbing practices in 
the utility industry, demonstrate employees using their hands to 
provide extra support and balance. Climbing in this manner will enable 
an employee to continue to hold onto the structure in case his or her 
foot slips. If the employee is not using his or her hands for 
additional support, he or she would be much more likely to fall as a 
result of a slip.
    The note also indicates that fall protection is required for 
unqualified employees and for employees undergoing training any time 
they are at heights greater than 4 feet (1.2 m). These employees would 
not be able to judge for themselves whether or not a safety strap 
should be used (and, in some cases, may not even be qualified in its 
use). Additionally, the record indicates that training and experience 
is one of the reasons a line worker can climb a pole or structure 
safely without fall protection (Ex. 3-80, 3-112; DC Tr. 848-849, 852-
853) and that employees in training are at increased risk of injury due 
to falling (Ex. 12-12, 54; DC Tr. 689).
    Many commenters were also concerned that the standard would apply 
to ladders, loading docks, and other elevated areas (Ex. 3-26, 3-80, 3-
82, 3-86, 3-112, 3-123). Others objected to the use of fall protection 
for employees climbing trees, although such a requirement was not 
proposed (Ex. 3-48, 3-63, 3-67, 3-75, 3-77, 3-87, 3-90, 3-91, 3-92, 3-
93, 3-98, 3-99, 3-100, 3-113). These commenters requested clarification 
of the rule in the final standard. OSHA spokespersons testified at the 
hearing that the standard applied only to structures that were similar 
to poles and towers used in overhead electric power installations, not 
to ladders or loading docks (DC Tr. 234). General fall protection 
requirements for working conditions that are not unique to electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution work (such as working 
on loading docks, ladders, or equipment) are addressed in Subpart D 
(walking and working surfaces) of OSHA's General Industry Standards. 
Agency spokespersons also stated that it was not requiring fall 
protection to be used by employees while they were climbing trees (DC 
Tr. 100-103).
    Because of the widespread confusion of the application of proposed 
Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(v), OSHA has modified the language from the 
proposal. First, the requirement for the use of fall protection for 
tree trimming work has been moved to Sec. 1910.269(r)(8). A fall 
protection requirement is included in the ANSI tree trimming standard 
(ANSI Z133.1 discussed later in this preamble), and the Agency feels 
that this subject is more appropriately covered with the other tree 
trimming provisions.
    Second, the word ``similar'' has been added before the word 
``structures'' wherever it appears in paragraph (g)(2)(v) of final 
Sec. 1910.269. This will reflect the meaning of the rule more 
accurately. Types of structures covered under this provision include 
substation structures and other conductor support structures. It does 
not include loading docks, electric equipment such as transformers or 
circuit breakers, or fixed or portable ladders used or installed on 
chimneys, stacks, or buildings. Requirements for these installations, 
which are not unique to electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work, are addressed in other parts of the OSHA standards, 
such as Subpart D of the General Industry Standards. A note to this 
effect also appears in the final rule.
    Lastly, the Agency has not included in final Sec. 1910.269 the 
proposed requirement for the use of fall protection in aerial lifts. 
Paragraph (c)(2)(v) of existing Sec. 1910.67 requires employees working 
from an aerial lift to use a body belt with a lanyard attached to the 
boom or basket. In light of all the injuries and fatalities associated 
with falls from aerial lifts, however, a reference to Sec. 1910.67 is 
included in the first note to Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(v).
    These changes clarify the rule so that employees and employers will 
know that it applies to poles, towers, and similar structures and not 
to trees, buildings, or aerial lifts.
    The current OSHA telecommunications standard, in 
Sec. 1910.268(g)(1), requires the use of personal fall protection 
equipment when work is performed at heights more than 4 feet (1.2 m) 
above the ground. The existing standards in Subpart D of Part 1910 also 
require fall protection (usually in the form of guard rails) for 
situations where employees are exposed to falls of more than 4 feet 
(1.2 m). Additionally, in Subpart V of the Construction Standards, OSHA 
requires fall protection to be used by ``employees working at elevated 
locations'' without specifying the height at which such protection 
would be necessary (Sec. 1926.951(b)(1)). The Agency proposed to retain 
the construction requirement, but clarify it as requiring protection to 
be initiated at 4 feet (1.2 m) to be consistent with the other OSHA 
general industry standards dealing with the same hazard.
    The EEI/IBEW draft standard applied fall protection requirements 
beginning at 10 feet (3.05 m). Many commenters objected to the proposed 
4-foot (1.2-m) distance and strongly urged OSHA to adopt the EEI/IBEW 
distance (Ex. 3-15, 3-22, 3-26, 3-39, 3-42, 3-45, 3-62, 3-66, 3-69, 3-
80, 3-82, 3-83, 3-101, 3-107, 3-109, 3-112, 3-123, 3-125, 3-128; DC Tr. 
846-847). These commenters argued that protection at levels below 10 
feet (3.05 m) was inconsistent with industry practice and cited loading 
docks and ladders as two areas where the proposed requirement would be 
inappropriate. However, the rule would not apply in these areas.
    The other reason cited by these commenters for increasing the 
distance was that a 6-foot (1.8-m) lanyard would not arrest a fall of 
less than 6 feet (1.8 m). To address this concern, OSHA is adding a 
requirement to Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(vi) for fall arrest systems to be 
rigged so that the employee can neither fall more than 6 feet (1.8 m) 
nor contact any lower level. In other words, if the ground is only 5 
feet (1.5 m) below the employee, the fall arrest system is required to 
arrest the fall in less than 5 feet (1.5 m). Fall arrest systems 
installed in accordance with final Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(vi) will thus 
arrest a fall before an employee strikes a lower level. This new 
provision is consistent with Sec. 1910.129(c)(3) in the previously 
mentioned general industry fall protection proposal. In fact, the 
language for this requirement was taken from proposed Sec. 1910.129. 
(Work positioning systems used for fall protection assist the employee 
in maintaining a work position, so that no fall is likely. The new 
provision does not need to apply to this equipment.)
    Paragraph (g)(2)(vi) of Sec. 1910.269 proposed that, when stopping 
or preventing a fall, fall arrest systems not produce an arresting 
force on an employee of more than ten times the employee's weight or 
1800 pounds (8 kN), whichever was lower. Based on section 3.3.5 of ANSI 
A10.14-1975 (Ex. 2-24), and a National Bureau of Standards report, A 
Study of Personal Fall-Safety Equipment, (NBS IR 76-1146; Ex. 2-25), as 
well as other literature on fall arrest forces, this proposed 
requirement was intended to minimize injury to an employee in the event 
of a fall.
    One commenter argued that the portion of the requirement based on 
the employee's weight was redundant and should be removed (Ex. 3-20). 
Another (Ex. 3-16) urged OSHA to adopt separate limits for systems 
using body belts (900 pounds or 4 kN) and for those using body 
harnesses (1800 pounds or 8 kN). This is the approach taken in Appendix 
C to existing Sec. 1910.66 and in proposed Sec. 1910.129(b)(1). To be 
consistent with these other OSHA general industry standards, the Agency 
has accepted these arguments and has adopted language from proposed 
Sec. 1910.129(b)(1)(i) and (b)(1)(ii) in final 
Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(vi)(A) and (g)(2)(vi)(B). (A full discussion of the 
rationale of setting separate limits for body belts and body harness is 
presented in the preambles to final Sec. 1910.66 and proposed 
Sec. 1910.129(b)(1), 54 FR 31449-31450 and 55 FR 13429, respectively. 
Briefly, the reason for the difference in separate limits for body 
belts and body harnesses is because the force distribution on the body 
when a fall is arrested differ between the two systems, with the body 
belt being more likely to result in injury at a given arresting force.) 
Additionally, as noted previously, paragraph (g)(2)(vi)(C) adds a 
requirement that protects employees from falling too far.
    Paragraph (g)(2)(vii) of final Sec. 1910.269 prohibits more than 
one employee from being attached to any one lifeline when vertical 
lifelines or droplines are used. This limitation recognizes that it is 
inherently unsafe to use a single vertical lifeline to tie off two or 
more employees performing separate tasks. Movement by one employee 
could cause the lifeline to be pulled to one side. This could, in turn, 
cause the other employee to lose balance. Therefore, if one employee 
did fall, movement of the lifeline during the arrest of the fall would 
very likely cause other employees connected to the lifeline to fall.
    In paragraphs (g)(2)(viii) and (g)(2)(ix), OSHA is requiring that 
snaphooks not be connected to loops in webbing-type lanyards or to each 
other. These provisions prohibit two methods of attachment that are 
considered unsafe due to the potential for accidental disengagement of 
the snaphooks during use.
    Paragraph (h). Paragraph (h) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses 
ladders, platforms, step bolts, and manhole steps. Paragraph (h)(1) 
emphasizes that the requirements for ladders in Subpart D of Part 1910 
continue to apply.
    Paragraph (h)(2) contains requirements for special ladders and 
platforms used for electrical work. Because of the nature of overhead 
line work and the limitations of structures available for ladder 
support, OSHA exempts portable hook ladders and other special ladders 
used on structures or on overhead lines from the general provisions of 
Secs. 1910.25(d)(2)(i), 1910.25(d)(2)(iii), and 1910.26(c)(3)(iii), 
which deal with ladder support and placement. To provide employees with 
protection which approximates that afforded by the ``exempted'' Subpart 
D provisions, paragraphs (h)(2)(i) through (h)(2)(iv) apply to these 
special types of ladders. These same paragraphs also apply to platforms 
designed for and used in this type of work. The requirements provide 
that these special ladders and special platforms be secured, specify 
the acceptable loads and proper strength of this equipment, and provide 
that they be used only for the particular types of application for 
which they are designed. (The ratings and design of this equipment are 
specified by the manufacturer and can usually also be found in standard 
references.) OSHA has concluded that these alternative criteria provide 
for the safe use of this special equipment.
    The revision of Subpart D mentioned earlier proposed to modify the 
requirements dealing with ladders so as to make the exceptions listed 
in Sec. 1910.269(h)(2) unnecessary. The language exempting special 
ladders will be removed or revised as necessary upon promulgation of 
the Subpart D revision as a final rule.
    Most of the comments received regarding proposed paragraph (h)(2) 
concerned the requirement in paragraph (h)(2)(iv) that this equipment 
be capable of supporting without failure at least four times its 
maximum intended load. Three commenters and two hearing witnesses 
argued that the four-to-one safety factor was not appropriate for these 
devices (Ex. 3-51, 3-112, 3-120; DC Tr. 360-362, 722-724). These 
commenters stated that equipment presently in use can achieve a 2.5-to-
1 safety factor with a load rating of 500 pounds. Mr. Joseph Van Name, 
testifying on behalf of the National Electrical Safety Code Committee, 
Working Group 8, and the Line Maintenance Group of the Pennsylvania-New 
Jersey-Maryland Interconnection, said: ``Since 1961, continued research 
on this material indicates that adequate mechanical performance is 
achieved with a factor of safety of 2 to 2\1/2\ for a `failure' [DC Tr. 
723].'' Mr. Arthur Lewis, one of OSHA's expert witnesses, stated that 
ASTM is developing a standard for platforms covered by proposed 
paragraph (h)(2) and presented the reasoning behind adopting a 
requirement with a 2.5-to-1 safety factor. He explained as follows:

    I am specifically commenting on the lineman's insulating work 
platform, a device that is temporarily attached at one end to a pole 
and which provides a cantilevered work platform for the worker.
    The purpose is two-fold in that it insulates the worker from the 
pole, which normally has to be considered as a ground conductor, 
while at the same time it provides a work platform for the worker to 
reach line construction. Such a platform is usually used in 
locations where an aerial lift vehicle cannot be utilized.
    The platform has to be raised from the ground to the work 
position by hand or by the use of a portable capstan winch. This 
necessitates that the platform be constructed of lightweight 
materials. ASTM is currently developing a standard for such 
platforms. Industry experience with this equipment is extensive and 
is useful in setting parameters for design standards.
    In adopting ratings and safety factor, the committee considered 
the maximum loading that the platform board could reasonably be 
expected to carry during use, the need for lightweight construction 
to prevent injury during installation, the nature of materials of 
which the platform and supporting members are constructed, and 
industry experience with platforms presently available in the 
country.
    Material choice today is an aluminum alloy for the metal 
attachment to the pole and a platform of fiberglass reinforced 
plastic. Design and manufacture of FRP is at an advanced stage with 
long term performance of the material being very predictable.
    A working load rating of 500 pounds is considered adequate to 
allow a lineman weighing 250 pounds with tools and materials of an 
additional 50 pounds to [lift] a heavy conductor or other piece of 
equipment and not exceed the rating of the platform. Tests on 
existing platforms on the market and in use throughout industry show 
that with the 500 pound working load rating a 2.5 to one safety 
factor is achievable and relatively standard.51
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\1 According to this testimony, a platform rated at 500 pounds 
will withstand 1250 pounds of force before failure. Using the 
proposed 4 to 1 safety factor, the working load rating on such a 
platform would have to be reduced to 312 pounds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Industry experience with platforms in use today has been 
excellent. [DC Tr. 360-362, corrected at Ex. 6-26]


    OSHA agrees that there is a need for these special ladders and 
platforms to be as light as possible. They are handled by employees 
working on poles and towers at various heights above the ground. If the 
ladder or platform is heavier than necessary, injury could result from 
maneuvering the device in an awkward position or from dropping the 
device on an employee below. OSHA believes that this risk exceeds the 
risk that the ladder or platform will fail under load. Additionally, 
there is no evidence in the record to indicate that existing equipment 
is posing a significant risk to employees. In fact, OSHA's own expert 
witness stated that experience with these platforms has been excellent 
(DC Tr. 362). Therefore, the Agency has accepted the 2.5-to-1 safety 
factor recommended by the comments and testimony. Paragraph (h)(2)(iv) 
of final Sec. 1910.269 reflects this lower safety factor.
    In Sec. 1910.269(h)(3), OSHA is prohibiting the use of portable 
metal and other portable conductive ladders near exposed energized 
lines or equipment. This paragraph addresses the hazard to employees of 
contacting energized lines and equipment with conductive ladders. 
However, in specialized high-voltage work, the use of nonconductive 
ladders could present a greater hazard to employees than the use of 
conductive ladders. In such situations, the clearances between live 
parts operating at differing voltages and between the live parts and 
grounded surfaces are large enough that it is relatively easy to 
maintain the minimum approach distances required by paragraph (l). 
Voltage is induced on objects in the vicinity of these high-voltage 
lines. Using a conductive ladder can minimize the voltage differences 
between objects52 within an employee's reach, reducing the hazard 
to the employee. Therefore, the standard allows a conductive ladder to 
be used where an employer can demonstrate that the use of a 
nonconductive ladder would present a greater hazard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\2 These induced voltages do not normally pose an 
electrocution hazard. However, the involuntary muscular reactions 
from contacting objects at different voltages can lead to falls.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (h)(4) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 addressed step bolts and 
manhole steps. The existing OSHA standards do not specifically address 
step bolts or manhole steps; rather, they address fixed ladders which 
are not normally used in manholes or on poles. OSHA proposed that step 
bolts and manhole steps for general use meet paragraphs (h)(4)(i) 
through (h)(4)(xiv) and the requirements of Sec. 1910.27 for ladder 
safety devices. However, as noted previously, after the publication of 
proposed Sec. 1910.269, OSHA proposed to revise subpart D of part 1910. 
The latter proposal included provisions on step bolts and manhole steps 
in Sec. 1910.24 that were almost identical to those proposed in 
Sec. 1910.269(h)(4). In the subpart D revision, OSHA proposed to remove 
the step bolt and manhole step provisions in Sec. 1910.268 
(telecommunications) as they would no longer be necessary. Such 
requirements are unnecessary here as well. Therefore, OSHA has not 
carried the provisions of proposed Sec. 1910.269(h)(4) forward into the 
final rule. All the comments received in response to this rulemaking 
dealing with step bolts or manhole step will be considered in the 
promulgation of Sec. 1910.24.
    Similarly, the provisions of proposed paragraph (h)(5) dealt with a 
subject that was addressed in the subpart D proposal--the exemption of 
ladders or step bolts on triangulation, telecommunication, electrical 
power, and similar towers, and ladders on poles and other structures 
(including stacks and chimneys) from the current requirements in 
subpart D of this part for ladder safety devices and cages if only 
qualified employees use these ladders. The generic exemption of ladders 
and step bolts used by qualified climbers from the general industry 
requirements for ladder safety devices would eliminate the need to 
exempt ladders and step bolts under Sec. 1910.269. OSHA has decided 
against adopting a specific exemption for electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution work at this time. If the Agency 
determines that a ``qualified climber'' exemption is appropriate for 
all of general industry, OSHA will take the comments in the 
Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking record into consideration in the adoption of 
the revision of subpart D as a final rule. If the Agency decides 
against the adoption of a general exemption, OSHA will revisit this 
issue as it relates to electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work in the future and will adopt an appropriate revision 
of final Sec. 1910.269 based on this rulemaking record.53
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\3At this time, the Agency is not making a determination as to 
the appropriateness of exempting ladders and step bolts used in 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution work from 
the subpart D requirements for ladder safety devices. OSHA is simply 
postponing the determination of this issue until the same issue in 
the subpart D rulemaking, upon which proposed Sec. 1910.269(h)(5) 
depends, is resolved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (i). Paragraph (i) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses hand 
and portable power tools. Portable and vehicle-mounted generators 
supplying cord- and plug-connected equipment are also covered by 
paragraph (i).
    Electric tools connected by cord and plug are required to meet 
paragraph (i)(2). If the equipment is supplied by the wiring of a 
building or other premises, existing Subpart S of Part 1910 continues 
to apply as it does now. If premises wiring is not involved (in which 
case Subpart S does not currently apply), paragraph (i)(2)(ii) requires 
that the tool frame be grounded or that the tool be double insulated or 
that the tool be supplied by an isolating transformer with ungrounded 
secondary. Any of these three methods can protect employees from 
electric shock, which could directly injure the employee or which could 
cause an involuntary reaction leading to a secondary injury.
    OSHA received several comments suggesting that ground-fault circuit 
interrupter (GFCI) protection be allowed as an additional alternative 
(Ex. 3-80, 3-81, 3-112). However, although a GFCI can prevent 
electrocution, the device cannot by itself prevent an initial electric 
shock to an employee before it interrupts the circuit. This initial 
shock could lead to injury from involuntary reaction. This is of 
particular concern if the employee is in an elevated position, exposing 
him or her to a fall in the event of electric shock. For this reason, 
existing electrical standards (for example, Sec. 1910.306(j)(2) and 
Sec. 1926.404(b)(1)) require GFCI protection in addition to, not in 
place of, equipment grounding and double insulation. Therefore, in 
final Sec. 1910.269(i)(2)(ii), OSHA is not allowing the use of a GFCI 
alone to protect employees using cord- and plug-connected equipment.
    Two others suggested that the standard require GFCI protection in 
addition to that provided by the three alternative protective methods 
listed in the proposal (Ex. 3-21, 3-76; DC Tr. 415-416, 503). The UWUA 
was particularly concerned that tools may be dropped and lose whatever 
protection was afforded by double insulation (DC Tr. 503). OSHA's 
electrical standards for general industry and for construction 
recognize double insulation as an appropriate method of protection 
against electric shock. The Agency has no evidence under these 
standards that double-insulated tools lose their protective abilities 
once they are dropped or that electric power generation, transmission, 
and distribution maintenance work exposes tools and cords to the same 
degree of mishandling and abuse found on construction sites, where 
GFCIs are required in addition to double insulation or grounding. 
Therefore, the final rule adopts the approach presented in paragraph 
(i)(2) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 (that is, tools must be protected by 
grounding, double insulation, or an isolating transformer).
    Paragraph (i)(3) of final Sec. 1910.269 essentially extends the 
requirements of existing Sec. 1926.404(f)(3) to electric transmission 
and distribution field operations. The standard basically requires that 
portable and vehicle-mounted generators provide a means for grounding 
cord- and plug-connected equipment and allows the frame of the 
generator to serve as the grounding electrode (reference ground).
    Paragraph (i)(4) of final Sec. 1910.269 applies to pneumatic and 
hydraulic tools. Safe operating pressures are required to be maintained 
by paragraph (i)(4)(i). This protects employees from the harmful 
effects of tool failure. Of course, if hazardous defects are present, 
no operating pressure would be safe, and the tools could not be used. 
In the absence of defects, the maximum rated operating pressure (as 
specified by the manufacturer or by standard references) is the maximum 
safe pressure. A note to this effect has been included in the final 
rule.
    If a pneumatic or hydraulic tool is used where it may contact 
exposed energized parts, the tool is required to be designed and 
maintained for such use (paragraph (i)(4)(ii)). Hydraulic systems for 
tools used near live parts would need to provide protection against the 
formation of a partial vacuum in the hydraulic line (paragraph 
(i)(4)(iii)). A pneumatic tool would have to provide protection against 
the accumulation of moisture in the air supply (paragraph (i)(4)(iv)). 
These three requirements protect employees from electric shock by 
restricting current flow through hoses.
    Proposed Sec. 1910.269(i)(4)(ii) would have simply required hoses 
used with hydraulic and pneumatic tools to be nonconductive. The 
National Electrical Manufacturers Association was concerned that other 
considerations were also involved in making these tools safe around 
energized lines (Ex. 3-81). They mentioned the type of oil used, 
contamination, and the voltage involved as factors that could also 
affect safety. OSHA agrees with these concerns and has worded paragraph 
(i)(4)(ii) in the final rule to require that the equipment be designed 
and maintained for use near energized parts.
    Several commenters were concerned about the lack of a requirement 
in the proposal to prevent the loss of insulating value in hydraulic 
tools from the creation of a partial vacuum in the hydraulic line (Ex. 
3-80, 3-81, 3-107, 3-112; DC Tr. 612-613). If such tools are used so 
that the highest point on the system is more than about 35 feet (10.7 
m) above the oil reservoir, a partial vacuum can form inside the line. 
This can lead to loss of insulating value in tools used on high voltage 
lines and to the failure of the system while the employee is working on 
the power line. The IBEW reported that two accidents resulted from such 
an occurrence and suggested that OSHA adopt language requiring 
protection for these systems (DC Tr. 613). The Agency agrees with these 
comments and has added such a requirement to the final rule in 
Sec. 1910.269(i)(4)(iii).
    OSHA has reworded proposed Sec. 1910.269(i)(4)(iii), which 
specified the use of accumulators for pneumatic tools used near 
energized parts in order to accommodate the concerns of EEI that 
certain pneumatic systems do not need accumulators (Ex. 3-112). The 
final version of this provision (Sec. 1910.269)(i)(4)(iv)) states the 
requirement in performance language--the system must protect against 
the accumulation of moisture in the air supply--rather than specify the 
means by which this is accomplished.
    Paragraphs (i)(4)(v) and (i)(4)(vi) set forth work-practice 
requirements to protect employees from the accidental release of 
pressure and from injection of hydraulic oil into the body. The first 
of these two provisions requires the release of pressure before 
connections in the lines are broken, unless the quick-acting, self-
closing connectors commonly found on tools are used. The other 
prohibits employees from attempting to use their bodies in order to 
locate or stop a hydraulic leak.
    Paragraph (j). Paragraph (j) of final Sec. 1910.269 contains 
requirements for live-line tools, some of which are commonly called 
``hot sticks.'' This type of tool is used by qualified employees to 
handle energized conductors. The tool insulates the employee from the 
energized line, allowing the employee to safely perform the task at 
hand. For example, a wire tong, a slender insulated pole with a clamp 
on one end, is used to hold a conductor at a distance while work is 
being performed. Common types of live-line tools include wire tongs, 
wire tong supports, tension links, and tie sticks.
    Paragraph (j)(1) requires live-line tools to be designed and 
constructed to be able to withstand 100,000 V/ft if made of fiberglass, 
75,000 V/ft if made of wood, or other equivalent tests. (The voltage 
per unit length varies with material because the two different 
insulating materials are capable of withstanding different voltages 
over equal lengths. A higher design standard for wood would cause most 
wood to fail to meet the specification. A lower design specification 
would allow substandard products into service. Paragraph (j)(1), which 
contains the design criteria for materials used in live-line tools, is 
based on the capabilities of the materials in question.) Since the 
withstand voltages are consistent with those in existing 
Sec. 1926.951(d) and with ASTM F 711-83, Standard Specification for 
Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Rod and Tube Used in Live-Line 
Tools (Ex. 2-27), tools complying with standards currently in use in 
the industry continue to be acceptable. A note to this effect and 
language clarifying that the rule applies to rods and tubes as well as 
``poles'' has been added as suggested by EEI (Ex. 3-112). Together with 
the minimum approach distances in Sec. 1910.269(l), paragraph (j)(1) 
protects employees from electric shock during use of these tools.
    Paragraph (j)(2)(i) requires the daily visual inspection of live-
line tools before they are used. Several commenters suggested that this 
provision include a requirement for wiping the tool as well, because 
contamination can frequently be removed at this time (Ex. 3-40, 3-71, 
3-112). OSHA has accepted this suggestion.
    If any contamination or defect that could lower the insulating 
value of the live-line tool is present after the tool is wiped, it 
could be discovered during this inspection, and the tool would have to 
be removed from service, as required by paragraph (j)(2)(ii). This 
paragraph protects employees from the failure of live-line tools during 
use.
    EEI and IBEW recommended adding language to this requirement 
prohibiting defects that could affect the mechanical integrity of the 
tool as well (Ex. 56, 61). Because mechanical defects can also lead to 
failure of the tool in use, OSHA has adopted this recommendation. 
Additionally, to clarify Sec. 1910.269(j)(2)(ii), as requested by 
several commenters (Ex. 3-40, 3-80, 3-82, 3-102, 3-112), OSHA has added 
language to indicate that the tool must be removed from service if the 
defect is present after wiping. Also, the tool must be examined and 
tested as described under new paragraph (j)(2)(iii) before further use.
    The performance criteria given in paragraph (j)(1) are intended to 
be ``design standards'' and are to be met at the time of manufacture. 
The test voltages and length of time that they are applied are not 
appropriate for periodic retesting of the hot sticks because the live-
line tools could sustain damage during the test. In the notice of 
proposed rulemaking and in the notice of public hearing, OSHA requested 
information on whether retesting should be required, what values of 
voltage and time should be used for retests, and what period of time 
should be allowed between retests.
    OSHA received many comments on this issue. Some supported requiring 
periodic testing of live-line tools (Ex. 3-30, 3-46, 3-57, 3-69, 3-82, 
3-123, 61; DC Tr. 362-363). Others opposed mandatory routine testing of 
these tools (Ex. 3-42, 3-65, 3-94, 3-112, 3-119, 3-120, 56; DC Tr. 762-
767, 1152-1153).
    Supporters of periodic live-line tool testing expressed concern 
that the tool needed to be checked periodically in order to verify the 
tool's ability to protect the worker. In expressing this view, Mr. 
Arthur Lewis, one of OSHA's expert witnesses, noted that current 
practices of most firms in the country conform to a 1- to 2-year 
testing interval (DC Tr. 373-374). Others also endorsed intervals of 2 
years or less (Ex. 3-46, 3-57, 61).
    Those opposed to a requirement for regular testing argued that 
inspection of the tool was sufficient to detect defects which could 
cause failure and that no fatalities have been caused by the failure of 
a live-line tool. They asserted that testing was necessary only when an 
inspection found defects in the tool. Several pointed to the Institute 
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Guide for In-Service 
Maintenance and Electrical Testing of Live-Line Tools, IEEE Std. 978-
1984, which states ``Insulating tools should be shop maintained and 
tested at an interval dependent on their exposure, manner of use, care 
they receive, individual company policy, and as field inspection 
dictates (Ex. 60). In response to questions by EEI and OSHA attorneys, 
Mr. Joseph Van Name made the case for thorough examination of hot 
sticks as follows:

    Mr. Yohay: Are you familiar with the study on live-line tool 
testing performed by the Georgia Power Company which was mentioned 
in the hearing last week?
    Mr. Van Name: Yes, I am.
    Mr. Yohay: Would you please comment on it briefly for the 
benefit of the OSHA Panel?
    Mr. Van Name: * * * The study that they did came out of an 
incident on their transmission system on [a] 115 kV line. The 
essential parts of it were published in Electric, Light and Power in 
August of 1978.
    And the reason for this study was that when the workers were 
performing a job on a 115 kV transmission structure, it started to 
rain, a very severe storm. And when it started to rain, they had 
arcing across the sticks on the structure * * *.
    [The study stated:] ``As the crew prepared to leave the rainy 
site, they observed arcing over the surface of the sticks. When 
tak[en] out of service for examination, all the sticks on that 
structure showed signs of tracking.''
    Now the reason the study was done then was to evaluate the 
condition of the surface * * *.
    * * * they found out quite early in their review that the dry 
testing procedures that had been followed would not discriminate as 
well as a wet test * * * where you actually applied water to the 
stick in your testing procedures. That enables you in a laboratory 
environment to evaluate the surface condi[ti]on.
    Now what that means is if the sticks are not inspected visually 
and any stick that is inspected visually, except a hollow one, you 
can determine this without having to go through an electrical test. 
A visual inspection is much more important in this case and for this 
condition than an electrical test. [DC Tr. 748-750]
* * * * *
    Mr. Van Name: * * * my personal opinion is that the requirement 
should be that hot sticks should be periodically inspected visually. 
And a period of one to two years is very important.
    But just automatically testing them for electrical performance 
is not going to insure a good performing hot stick. In other words, 
the periodicity should be related to the inspection, not the 
electrical test.
    If you inspect it and you find it is defective in any way or has 
to be maintained or recoated, as part of that process you do an 
electrical test before you send it back to the crew.
    Ms. Thurber: Are there any flaws that visual inspection would 
not reveal?
    Mr. Van Name: Not that I know of. I was going to make one more 
comment.
    Ms. Thurber: Certainly.
    Mr. Van Name: And that is, [that my comment applies to] hot 
sticks which are not wood * * * and the hot sticks that are not 
hollow. And there are very few, if any, [wood] sticks in the 
industry.
* * * * *
    So that I would say that hollow sticks require some additional 
care which could be electrical testing.
    Electrical testing also with hollow sticks does not guarantee 
that there is nothing defective inside a hollow stick--nothing wrong 
inside a hollow stick. [DC Tr. 763-764]

    Although no injuries related to the failure of a hot stick could be 
found in the record, evidence does indicate that these tools have 
failed in use (without injury to employees) and that employees do 
depend on their insulating value in using them to handle energized 
conductors (Ex. 60, 61; DC Tr. 371, 376, 380-381, 748-749, 765). The 
fact that live-line tools are not typically used to provide protection 
for employees in the rain (when work is normally suspended) probably 
accounts for the lack of injuries in the record. Regardless, live-line 
tools might be used under wet conditions, in which case it is important 
to ensure that these tools will retain their insulating qualities when 
they are wet. Therefore, OSHA has determined that additional regulation 
of the condition of live-line tools is necessary and appropriate.
    Also, although Mr. Van Name's testimony shows that inspection can 
detect the presence of hazardous defects and contamination, the Agency 
is concerned about whether the daily inspections required in the OSHA 
standard will, indeed, detect these problems. In fact, referring to the 
live-line tools that had failed in use, the Georgia Power Company study 
that he cited in his testimony stated: ``Under visual inspection all 
the sticks appeared to be relatively clean with no apparent surface 
irregularities [Ex. 60].'' (These tools also passed a ``dry'' voltage 
test, but failed a ``wet'' test.) While the study further noted that 
the surface luster on the sticks had been reduced, apparently the 
visual inspection alone was not able to detect such defects as the ones 
that caused these tools to fail.
    To address these concerns, OSHA is adopting additional requirements 
for the thorough examination, cleaning, repair, and testing of live-
line tools on a periodic basis. The tools would undergo this process on 
a 2-year cycle and any time tools are returned on the basis of the 
daily inspection required by Sec. 1910.269(j)(2)(ii). The final rule 
first requires a complete examination of the hot stick (paragraph 
(j)(2)(iii)(A)). After the examination, the tool must be cleaned and 
waxed, or it must be repaired and refinished if necessary (paragraph 
(j)(2)(iii)(B)). According to Sec. 1910.269(j)(2)(iii)(C), a test would 
also be required: (1) After the tool has been repaired or refinished 
regardless of its composition; (2) After the examination if the tool is 
made of wood or hollow FRP; or (3) After the examination if the tool is 
solid FRP rod or foam-filled FRP tube, unless the employer can 
demonstrate that the examination has revealed all defects that could 
cause the tool to fail during use. The test method used must be 
designed to verify the tool's integrity along its full length and, if 
made of FRP, its integrity under wet conditions (paragraph 
(j)(2)(iii)(D)). The test voltages are 75 kV/ft for FRP and 50 kV/ft 
for wood, and the voltage must be applied for a minimum of 1 minute 
(paragraph (j)(2)(iii)(E)). Other equivalent tests are permitted. The 
final rule also includes a note referring to IEEE Std. 978-1984 (Ex. 
60), which is an excellent guide to the inspection, care, and testing 
of live-line tools. This document recommends the practices that are 
required by the OSHA standard.
    Paragraph (k). Paragraph (k) sets forth requirements for material 
handling and storage. Paragraph (k)(1) simply provides that Subpart N 
of Part 1910 continues to apply. The phrase ``except as modified in 
this paragraph'' from the proposal has not been carried into the final 
rule because paragraph (k) supplements rather than modifies Subpart N.
    Paragraph (k)(2) addresses the handling and storage of materials in 
the vicinity of energized lines and exposed parts of energized 
equipment. In general, as is the case through most of the General 
Industry Standards, material is not allowed to be taken or stored 
within 10 feet of the lines or exposed parts of equipment. This 
clearance distance must be increased by 4 inches for every 10 kilovolts 
over 50 kilovolts. For materials storage, the distance must also be 
increased to account for the maximum sag and side swing of any 
conductor and to account for the use of material handling equipment. 
Maintaining these clearances protects unqualified employees, who are 
not trained in the recognition and avoidance of the hazards involved, 
from contacting the energized lines or equipment with materials being 
handled. However, the work practices these unqualified workers would 
employ in handling material stored near energized lines are addressed 
by Subpart S. The general approach taken in new Sec. 1910.269 is to 
provide safety-related work practices for qualified employees to follow 
when they are performing electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work. Safe work practices for unqualified employees are 
not addressed in final Sec. 1910.269, because these practices are 
already spelled out in Subpart S of OSHA's General Industry Standards 
(see in particular Sec. 1910.333(c)(3)(i) for work performed by 
unqualified employees near overhead power lines). In fact, 
Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(B) specifically excludes these practices from 
coverage under Sec. 1910.269. Therefore, proposed Sec. 1910.269(k)(2) 
relating to work practices used by unqualified employees has not been 
carried forward into the final rule.
    Paragraph (k)(2)(i) only regulates the storage of materials where 
exposure is not restricted to qualified employees. If the materials are 
stored where only qualified workers have access to them, the materials 
may be safely stored closer to the energized parts than 10 feet, 
providing these employees have sufficient room to perform their work. 
To ensure that enough room is available, paragraph (k)(2)(ii) prohibits 
material from being stored in the working space around energized lines 
or equipment. (See the discussion of paragraphs (u)(1) and (v)(3) of 
final Sec. 1910.269 for an explanation of the requirements for access 
and working space.)
    Two commenters suggested specifying the minimum approach distances 
proposed in paragraph (l) in place of the reference to ``working 
space'' (Ex. 3-80, 3-112).
    The working space about electric equipment is the clear space to be 
provided around the equipment to enable qualified employees to work on 
the equipment. An employee enters this space to service or maintain the 
electric equipment. The minimum working space specifies the minimum 
distance an obstruction can be from the equipment. For example, if a 
switchboard is installed in a cabinet into which an employee will 
enter, the inside walls of the cabinet must provide a minimum working 
space to enable the employee to work safely within the cabinet.
    The minimum approach distance to be maintained from a live part is 
the limit of the space about the equipment that a qualified employee is 
not permitted to enter. The minimum approach distance a qualified 
employee must maintain from an energized part (covered in final 
Sec. 1910.269(l)) are smaller than the working space that is required 
to be provided around the part. The employee must ``enter'' the working 
space and still maintain the minimum approach distance. Storing 
materials in this space would tempt employees to work on energized 
equipment in cramped quarters if access were necessary in an emergency. 
Alternatively, if materials stored in the working space had to be moved 
so that adequate room could be provided, accidents could result from 
the movement of the material. Therefore, OSHA has not accepted the 
suggestion to replace ``working space'' with ``clearance distance''.
    Paragraph (l). Paragraph (l) of final Sec. 1910.269 covers the 
hazards of working on or near exposed parts of energized lines or 
equipment.
    Paragraph (l)(1) requires employees working on or in areas 
containing exposed live parts of electric lines or equipment to be 
qualified. Without proper training in the construction and operation of 
the lines and equipment and in the electrical hazards involved, workers 
would likely be electrocuted attempting to perform this type of work 
and would also expose others to injury as well. In areas containing 
unguarded live parts energized at more than 50 volts, untrained 
employees would not be familiar with the practices that are necessary 
to recognize and avoid contact with these parts.
    However, employees in training, under the direct supervision of a 
qualified employee, are permitted to perform work on live parts and in 
areas containing unguarded live parts. OSHA believes that the close 
supervision of trainees will reveal errors ``in the act'', before they 
cause accidents. Allowing these workers the experience of performing 
tasks under actual conditions may also better prepare the employees to 
work safely.
    In the proposal, OSHA included this concept in the text of 
paragraph (l)(1) itself. In the final rule, the Agency has added a note 
to the definition of ``qualified employee'' to indicate that employees 
who are undergoing on-the-job training are considered to be qualified 
if they have demonstrated an ability to perform duties safely and if 
they are under the immediate supervision of qualified employees. 
Therefore, paragraph (l)(1) of final Sec. 1910.269 no longer refers to 
employees in training. (See the discussion of the definition of this 
term under the summary and explanation of Sec. 1910.269(x).) These 
changes will allay the concerns of those who argued that the language 
in the proposal would have required fully trained qualified employees 
to work under the direct supervision of another qualified employee (Ex. 
3-20, 3-26, 3-42, 3-80, 3-101, 3-112).
    In response to the notice of proposed rulemaking, many employer and 
employee groups commented on the issue of whether or not a minimum of 
two employees should be required for work involving energized electric 
equipment. OSHA did not propose such a rule, but the Agency listed this 
as an issue in the notice announcing the public hearing. At that time, 
OSHA stated that it would consider evidence supporting or opposing this 
type of rule and invited the public to comment on the issue of what 
conditions necessitate the presence of at least two employees.
    NIOSH and the UWUA supported a rule prohibiting a single employee 
from performing work on energized lines or equipment (Ex. 3-76; DC Tr. 
33-34, 42, 412-413). NIOSH maintained that a second employee is needed 
to provide emergency care to an employee who contacts live parts. (Much 
of their testimony and evidence relates to the usefulness of CPR 
training, which was discussed earlier in this preamble.) UWUA witnesses 
stated their concern that an employee who was injured would not get 
prompt assistance in case of an accident and testified about two 
accidents in which employees working alone were involved (DC Tr. 468-
470).54
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\4In their post-hearing comments, EEI argued that one of the 
accidents actually involved a worker who was not alone (Ex. 56). It 
is not clear whether or not the two parties were discussing the same 
accident; however, the Agency is not relying on the UWUA testimony 
alone in resolving this issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many commenters claimed that certain types of electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution work could be performed 
safely by a single employee (Ex. 3-2, 3-12, 3-17, 3-47, 3-80, 3-112, 3-
119, 3-125, 3-128). Witnesses and commenters described the following 
tasks as not necessitating the presence of a second employee under 
current industry practices: installing and removing meters; low voltage 
(generally below 600 volts) work; opening and closing switches, circuit 
breakers, sectionalizing devices, and other disconnects; and replacing 
fuses (Ex. 3-2, 3-31, 3-47, 3-80, 3-112, 3-119, 3-125, 3-128, 47; DC 
Tr. 536, 599-600, 1143, 1157). Additionally, one person noted that high 
voltage work by a lone employee was only permitted if live-line tools 
were used (DC Tr. 992-993). In fact, the types of high-voltage work 
mentioned by the witnesses as safe to perform alone are normally 
associated with hot stick work.
    EEI also argued that the presence of an additional employee is not 
necessary because most accidents are a result of a worker's disregard 
for training and well established procedures put in place for his or 
her protection (Ex. 56). However, if this argument is relevant at all, 
OSHA believes that it is justification for having an extra employee 
simply because workers should be able to point out poor work practices 
to their fellow employees. This alone could prevent many accidents.
    In any event, OSHA believes that the most relevant consideration in 
determining whether or not to require the presence of at least two 
employees is whether the hazards of the work would be significantly 
reduced by the presence of an additional worker. Therefore, OSHA 
believes it is important to determine what types of work frequently 
result in electric shock, regardless of the number of employees 
present. Electric shock accidents, in particular, necessitate the 
immediate availability of a person trained in CPR.
    To ascertain this information, the Agency reviewed the accident 
data in Exhibit 9-2. The results of this analysis are presented in 
Table 2, which tabulates the number of accidents involving different 
categories of work. Accidents unrelated to work by qualified employees 
on energized parts are not included in this table.55 Data in the 
other categories demonstrate that working directly on energized lines 
causes most of the accidents and is presumably the most hazardous job 
performed by line workers. Even some of the jobs claimed by utilities 
to be safe for a single employee to perform were involved in a few of 
the accidents, namely, replacing fuses, opening disconnects with live-
line tools, and ``low voltage'' (600 volts or less) work. In 
particular, lines operating at 600 volts or less accounted for 13 
percent (11 of 86) of the relevant accidents, as shown in Table 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\5Of 117 accidents in Exhibit 9-2, 31 are not relevant to the 
issue of whether or not qualified employees should be able to work 
alone near exposed live parts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As a result of this analysis, OSHA has determined that there is a 
need for some regulation of what types of work can be performed safely 
by a solitary employee. For the most part, the types of jobs witnesses 
and commenters maintained were safe generally involved few injuries or 
fatalities. Specifically, OSHA has concluded that the following work 
can be performed with minimal hazard to qualified employees working by 
themselves:
    (1) Substation work not involving direct contact with live parts or 
climbing on structures, and
    (2) Opening disconnects with live-line tools, if the employee is 
well away from the live parts.
    Other types of work, such as line installation and removal, use of 
mechanical apparatus to lift or position material or persons, and 
electric station work on energized parts, are much more hazardous. 
These operations are the types of jobs that the witnesses and 
commenters generally described as being performed by two or more 
employees. This was also evident from the accident abstracts. However, 
the Agency is concerned that some employers may force their employees 
to do this work alone, whether or not it is common industry practice to 
provide additional workers. One IBEW witness stated that he heard 
reports of such an occurrence (DC Tr. 600-601), and EEI also admitted 
that consideration is being given to reduction of crew size in the 
future (Ex. 56). Therefore, OSHA is adopting a rule requiring the 
presence of at least two employees under conditions closely following 
those in which two or more workers would be present under current 
industry practices. 

              Table 2.--Number of Accidents by Type of Work             
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               No. of   
                       Type of work                         accidents\1\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moving or repairing lines.................................          18  
Line stringing............................................          10  
Replacing or repairing equipment..........................          10  
Rubber glove (or bare hand) work, other...................          17  
Hot stick work, other.....................................           5  
                                                           -------------
  Subtotal................................................          60  
Mechanical equipment used to lift or position.............          10  
Setting poles.............................................           4  
                                                           -------------
  Subtotal................................................          14  
Station work, work on energized parts.....................           9  
Station work, misc........................................           3  
                                                           -------------
  Subtotal................................................          12  
                                                           =============
    Total.................................................          86  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Accidents involving one or more employees injured due to contact with
  energized parts.                                                      
Source: Exhibit 9-2.                                                    


                Table 3.--Number of Accidents by Voltage                
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 No. of 
                        Voltage range                          accidents
------------------------------------------------------------------------
120/240......................................................        10 
440..........................................................         1 
2.4kV........................................................         1 
7.2-14.4 kV\1\...............................................        53 
69kV.........................................................         1 
115kV........................................................         2 
Unspecified..................................................        18 
                                                              ----------
  Total......................................................        86 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\The voltage specified was in this range; however, it was not always  
  clear whether the voltage was phase-to-phase or phase-to-ground.      
Source: Exhibit 9-2.                                                    

    EEI was also concerned that a prohibition on working alone would 
hinder restoration efforts, as follows:

    There are a number of crucial operating functions within the 
electric utility industry that are performed by one qualified 
worker, alone, and on energized equipment, at all voltage ranges. A 
classic example is the expert troubleman who works alone on 
energized lines in emergencies to restore power, such as during 
storms. These functions are performed safely literally thousand of 
times daily. [Ex. 3-112]

    OSHA believes that the loss of power can create public safety 
concerns that outweigh the safety concerns of individual employees. In 
such cases, action must be taken to restore power so that public safety 
is assured. To address this concern in the final rule, OSHA is also 
permitting an employee to work alone to effect emergency repairs to the 
extent necessary to safeguard the general public.
    Paragraph (l)(1)(i) of final Sec. 1910.269 applies to the following 
types of work involving exposed parts energized at more than 600 volts:
    (1) Installation, removal, or repair of lines that are energized,
    (2) Installation, removal, or repair of deenergized lines if an 
employee is exposed to contact with other energized parts,
    (3) Installation, removal, or repair of equipment, such as 
transformers, capacitors, and regulators, if an employee is exposed to 
contact with energized parts,
    (4) Work involving the use of mechanical equipment, other than 
insulated aerial lifts, near energized parts, and
    (5) Other work that exposes an employee to electrical hazards 
greater than or equal to those posed by operations that are 
specifically listed in the standard.
    The first four work operations are those that the record 
demonstrates expose employees to the greatest risk of electric shock. 
OSHA has included the fifth category to cover types of work that, while 
not specifically identified in the record, pose equal or greater 
hazards.
    As the record demonstrates, however, some work can be performed 
safely by a single employee or must be performed as quickly as possible 
for reasons of public safety. The standard, in Sec. 1910.269 
(l)(1)(ii), recognizes this type of work by granting exceptions for the 
following operations:
    (1) Routine switching of circuits, if the employer can demonstrate 
that conditions at the site allow this work to be performed 
safely,56
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\6 This provision corresponds to the common types of 
substation work identified earlier in this preamble as being safe to 
perform. OSHA has written this provision in performance language to 
recognize types of work with similar characteristics. It is the 
hazards associated with the work that is the determining factor 
rather than the specific task.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (2) Work performed with live-line tools if the employee is 
positioned so that he or she is not exposed to contact with energized 
parts,57 and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\7 This provision corresponds to work involving the use of 
live-line tools to operate disconnects. Any similar work performed 
with a hot stick at a safe distance is also safe to perform by a 
qualified employee working alone. Here, too, OSHA has written this 
provision in performance language.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (3) Emergency repairs to the minimum extent necessary to safeguard 
the general public.
    OSHA has placed restrictions on the use of these exceptions in view 
of the accidents that occurred even under these limited conditions. 
Accidents involving hot stick work have typically occurred only when 
the employee was using a live-line tool but was close enough to 
energized parts to be injured--sometimes through direct contact, other 
times by contact through conductors being handled. Employees have been 
injured during switching operations when unusual conditions, such as 
poor lighting, bad weather, and hazardous configuration or state of 
repair of the switching equipment, were present. Because such 
conditions make the work unsafe, paragraph (l)(1)(ii)(A) would not 
permit switching operations to be performed by an employee working 
alone.
    The requirement for at least two employees to be present during 
certain operations does not apply if the voltage of the energized parts 
involved is 600 volts or less. The record contains conflicting data 
regarding the safety of performing work at these voltages. Many 
witnesses and commenters said that it was safe to perform such work, 
but the data in Table 3 strongly suggests that this is not true.
    Unfortunately, the types of work involving voltages of 600 volts or 
less are not clearly defined in the rulemaking record, at least with 
respect to the degree of risk they present. For example, electric meter 
work, which typically involves these lower voltages, is one type of 
work commonly performed by electric utility workers. However, there are 
very few accidents involving this type of work. It appears that many of 
the lower voltage accidents in the record involved qualified employees 
working on service drops, but there may be conditions making even this 
type of work safe.
    There is insufficient evidence in the record as to whether or not 
it is safe for qualified employees to work alone on live parts 
energized at these lower voltages. Therefore, the final rule does not 
address this situation. OSHA intends to address this issue when Subpart 
V of Part 1926 is proposed for revision. (The absence of a requirement 
in the final standard addressing this hazard should not be regarded as 
a determination that this type of work is always safe under existing 
industry practices.)
    Paragraph (l)(2) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires employees to 
maintain minimum approach distances from exposed energized parts. The 
minimum approach distances are specified in Table R-6 through Table R-
10.
    Paragraph (l)(2) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 set forth the minimum 
approach distance requirements for work near exposed energized parts. 
The language of the proposed paragraph was taken from existing 
Sec. 1926.950(c)(1). Basically, the proposal would have required 
employees to maintain the minimum approach distances listed in the 
standard, unless the employee was insulated from the live part or the 
part was insulated from the employee or the employee was insulated from 
all other conductive objects.
    The proposed rule used the term ``clearance'' in the heading and in 
the distance tables to describe the distance an employee must stay away 
from energized parts. The term clearance was also used in proposed 
paragraphs (m), (u), and (v). In proposed paragraph (m), ``clearance'' 
meant authorization to perform work. In proposed paragraphs (u) and 
(v), the term meant the clear distance between two objects. OSHA is 
concerned that this term as used in paragraph (l)(2) might be confused 
with the same term used in paragraphs (m), (u)(5), and (v)(5) of final 
Sec. 1910.269. The term ``minimum approach distance'' has been adopted 
in the final rule to refer to distances to be maintained from energized 
parts, and the term ``clearance'' in the final rule relates only to 
authorization to perform work or to the clear distance between objects. 
To make this change clear in final Sec. 1910.269, OSHA has defined the 
term ``minimum approach distance'' in paragraph (x), Definitions. This 
new definition reads as follows:


    Minimum approach distance. The closest distance an employee is 
permitted to approach an energized or a grounded object.


    The Agency has carried forward the proposal's definition of 
``clearance (for work)'' into paragraph (x) of final Sec. 1910.269. 
OSHA has also adopted a definition of ``clearance (between objects)'' 
in paragraph (x) of final Sec. 1910.269, as follows:


    Clearance (between objects). The clear distance between two 
objects measured surface to surface.


    This definition has been taken from the 1987 NESC (Ex. 2-8).
    The minimum approach distances proposed in Table R-6 were for AC 
voltages up to 765 kilovolts, nominal. Taken in large part from 
existing Table V-1 in Part 1926, each of these distances was intended 
to provide a sufficient gap between the worker and the line so that 
current could not arc to the employee under the most adverse transient 
voltage that could be imposed on the line, plus an extra amount for 
inadvertent movement on the part of the employee. To make it clear that 
direct contact with live parts was not permitted, OSHA also proposed to 
add to the distances given in the existing standard an ``avoid 
contact'' entry under the lowest voltage. Additionally, to make the 
proposal more consistent with ANSI C2, OSHA proposed to adopt a minimum 
approach distance of 2 feet for voltages between 1.1 and 15 kilovolts. 
(Table V-1 gives no minimum approach distances below 2.1 kilovolts.)
    Proposed table R-7 applied to DC voltages between 250 and 750 
kilovolts, nominal. These distances were taken directly from Table 422-
3 of ANSI C2-1984. Since systems of DC voltages other than those listed 
are rare, no distances were presented for them in the table.
    For the highest voltages, the two proposed tables contained notes 
permitting minimum approach distances smaller than those listed. The 
smaller minimum approach distance would have been at least the length 
of the line insulator, and the smaller distance would have had to be 
necessary to perform the work. In the existing Construction Standards, 
subpart V uses a similar note, except that the distance may be reduced 
to the shortest distance between the energized part and a grounded 
surface. The proposed note differed from the note in subpart V because 
the subpart V version allowed an employee to be exposed to a risk of 
arc-over equal to that at the point in the energized system where the 
probability of arc-over is greatest. The Agency believed that the risk 
to the employee had to be reduced to a safer level. Taking a different 
approach, ANSI C2-1984 had separate tables for AC voltages of 345 to 
765 kilovolts, nominal, and for all DC voltages of systems with a known 
transient overvoltage factor. The ANSI C-2 tables used minimum approach 
distances which increased with increasing surge factors and provided 
for greater minimum approach distances, in many cases, than the 
footnotes in OSHA's proposed tables. In the notice of proposed 
rulemaking, OSHA requested comments on whether it would be more 
appropriate to use the ANSI C-2 minimum approach distances for the 
affected voltages and whether the ANSI tables provided better 
protection for employees than the OSHA proposal.
    The comments presented various views on this issue. Two supported 
the proposal (Ex. 3-13, 3-20), while others suggested that the Agency 
adopt the ANSI C-2 requirements (Ex. 3-35, 3-57, 3-65, 3-80, 3-82, 3-
107). In its pre-hearing comments, Edison Electric Institute also 
supported the ANSI minimum approach distance tables, but they expressed 
concern that neither ANSI nor OSHA recognized reductions in minimum 
approach distances for certain maintenance operations, such as painting 
and adjusting hardware (Ex. 3-112).
    EEI witnesses at the hearing testified about situations that 
presented problems if they had to meet the proposed minimum approach 
distances. They were especially concerned about the differences between 
the footnotes in the proposal and those in subpart V (DC Tr. 856-885). 
At the hearing, they presented new minimum approach distance tables for 
use in Sec. 1910.269(1), and one of their witnesses gave testimony 
providing technical support for the new tables (DC Tr. 872-905). Mr. 
Nestor Kolcio of the American Electric Power Services Corporation 
stated that the distances in EEI's tables were based on two formulas 
(Ex. 31; DC Tr. 899-901):
    Equation (1)--For voltages of 1.1 kV to 72.5 kV:

TR31JA94.000

Where:

D=Distance in air in feet
Vmax=Maximum rated line-to-ground rms58 voltage in kV
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\8Root mean square.
    Source: AIEE Standard No. 4, 1943.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

pu=Maximum switching surge factor in per unit
    Equation (2)--For voltages of 72.6 kV to 800 kV:

TR31JA94.001

Where:

D=Insulation distance in feet
C1=0.01 or 1 percent of line-to-ground kV, based on 60-Hz rod-gap 
withstand spacing
C2=1.1, composed of 1.06 for live-line tool-to-air withstand 
distance ratio plus intangibles
a=saturation factor for system voltages of 345 kV and more
S=Maximum anticipated per unit switching surge
kV=System rms line-to-ground kV, actual

    Source: ANSI/IEEE Standard No. 516, 1987.

    The distances resulting from these formulas were the basis for 
calculating the electrical component of the minimum approach distance 
to energized parts (that is, the distance at which the probability of 
arc-over or flashover becomes extremely low). Although these formulas 
were taken from consensus standards, Mr. Kolcio reduced the resultant 
electrical component of the minimum approach distance by 25 percent at 
voltages over 72.5 kV, which has the effect of increasing the 
probability of arc-over at these voltages (Ex. 31; DC Tr. 901). He 
acknowledged that this reduction was based on ``new data'' and that no 
national consensus standard recognized such a reduction as valid (DC 
Tr. 1134).\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\The NESC subcommittee working on new minimum approach 
distance tables (see discussion of their work later in this 
preamble), which reviewed all the latest technical data, did not 
accept a similar reduction of the electrical component of the 
minimum approach distance (Ex. 64, 65).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another witness, Mr. Joseph Van Name, representing the National 
Electrical Safety Code Committee, Working Group 8, and the Line 
Maintenance Group of the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland 
Interconnection, testified about the technical basis upon which minimum 
approach distances rely (LA Tr. 471-510). He explained that the 
technical basis for determining the distance needed to protect against 
sparkover and flashover (types of disruptive discharge\60\) is 
contained in the IEEE Guide for Maintenance Methods on Energized Power-
Lines, ANSI/IEEE Std. 516-1987 (Ex. 60; LA Tr. 491). He described the 
procedure as follows:

    \60\``Disruptive discharge'' means the phenomena associated with 
the failure of insulation, under electric stress, that include a 
collapse of voltage and the passage of current; the term applies to 
electrical breakdown in solid, liquid, and gaseous dielectrics and 
combinations of these. Terms relating to various types of disruptive 
discharge include ``sparkover'', ``flashover'', and ``puncture''. 
``Sparkover'' is the term used for a disruptive discharge occurring 
in a gaseous or liquid dielectric. ``Flashover'' is the term used 
for a discharge occurring over the surface of a solid dielectric in 
a gaseous or liquid medium. ``Puncture'' is the term used for the 
discharge occurring through a solid dielectric. (These definitions 
were taken from Ex. 8-2. These terms were also explained by Mr. Van 
Name at LA Tr. 486.) The term ``sparkover'' generally applies to a 
breakdown that occurs when an employee is using air as an insulating 
medium; ``flashover'' usually applies when he or she is using a 
live-line tool and a breakdown occurs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The guideline that is fundamental to our work is if the 
electrical withstand capability of the insulation exceeds not only 
the operating voltage but any transient or temporary over voltage 
that might appear during the work process. And I for one, who works 
on the lines, [feel] that that is kind of important.
    Let's go through the process, the major item in this process of 
determining the safe working clearances. You determine the maximum 
electrical stress that can appear at the work site from whatever 
source. The stress then determines the withstand requirement, that's 
the three sigma requirements. Then, you get a clearance at the work 
site to preclude flashover, then you assure that if a flashover 
happens, it will not cause injury.
    I'll go back. If I am at the work site and I effectively am the 
same electrical gap as the physical gap there, I don't want it to 
flashover to me. So, to make sure it doesn't come to me, I have to 
add some more sigmas, not three, but I add the other two to make 
sure it goes over a known gap, and not to the worker. So, that's 
what we're trying to do in this whole determination. That's the 
fundamental thing. [LA Tr. 492-493]

    Mr. Van Name also described the factors that influence the length 
of the safe gap, for the purpose of determining minimum approach 
distances: temporary overvoltages caused by faults, switching, or 
lightning; the wave shape of the overvoltage; polarity of the 
overvoltage; insulating medium; gap geometry; and atmospheric 
conditions (LA Tr. 493-496). He defined the critical flashover (CFO) 
voltage as that voltage that would flashover 50 percent of time for a 
given gap (LA Tr. 496-497). The withstand voltage is three standard 
deviations (that is, ``three sigmas'') above that voltage (or 1.15 
times the CFO) for a probability of flashover of about 0.1 percent (LA 
Tr. 496). Mr. Van Name also illustrated the technique of reducing the 
minimum safe approach distance by installing a gap in the system and 
specified the technique used for determining the sizes of gaps and 
minimum approach distances (LA Tr. 508-509).
    In concluding his testimony, Mr. Van Name suggested that the 
standard adopt a ``user-friendly'' approach consisting of various 
tables supplying the distances to be maintained from different voltages 
(LA Tr. 509-510). The numbers in the tables presented at the hearing 
needed additional refinement, which he promised in the post-hearing 
comment period. He also suggested that OSHA include the National 
Electrical Safety Code action on this issue in the record and rely on 
it as being the best and latest technical information available (LA Tr. 
515-516, 534-537, 550-551, 567-569).
    From Mr. Kolcio's and Mr. Van Name's presentations, it is clear 
that OSHA must first determine the size of the air gap that must be 
present so that an arc does not occur during the most severe 
overvoltage on a system. This has been referred to as the electrical 
component of the minimum approach distance. To determine the minimum 
safe approach distance, OSHA must then add an extra distance to account 
for ergonomic considerations, or human error.
    The electrical component depends on five factors (Ex. 60):
    (1) The maximum voltage,
    (2) The wave shape of this voltage,
    (3) The configuration of the ``electrodes'' forming the end points 
of the gap,61
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\1Typical configurations include rod-rod, rod-plane, and 
conductor-plane. The terminology refers to the configuration of the 
two electrodes. For example, in a rod-plane configuration, one of 
the electrodes is a rod perpendicular to an electrode in the shape 
of a plane.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (4) The insulating medium in the gap, and
    (5) The atmospheric conditions present.
    ANSI/IEEE Std. 516-1987 listed values for the electrical component 
of the minimum approach distance, both for air alone as an insulating 
medium and for live-line tool sticks in air, that were accepted as 
being accurate when the standard was adopted (by IEEE) in 1987 (Ex. 
60). Using information regarding the wave shape of typical switching 
surges, Mr. Kolcio argued that these distances could be reduced by 25 
percent (DC Tr. 900-901, 1133-1134). On the other hand, OSHA's expert 
witness, Dr. Robert J. Harrington, testified that the Agency's proposed 
minimum approach distances were correct. He also noted that OSHA's 
proposed minimum approach distances were by no means the most 
conservative in the world (DC Tr. 305-308, 318-319). An IEEE paper 
presented at the IEEE Power Engineering Society's 1988 Summer Meeting 
asserted that more conservative distances might be warranted based on 
gap configurations that more closely reflect actual exposure than the 
rod-to-rod gap on which IEEE Std. 516-1987 is based and on wave shapes 
that are close to the critical wave shape62 (Ex. 60).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\2This refers to the graph of the voltage as a function of 
time. The ``critical wave shape'' flashes over at the lowest voltage 
if all other factors remain constant. If the transient overvoltage 
on the line presents this critical wave shape it may flash over at a 
voltage lower than that anticipated by Equation (2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The NESC subcommittee having responsibility for the ANSI C-2 
minimum approach distance tables completed their review of the latest 
technical information related to this issue and adopted a change 
proposal for the 1993 edition of the National Electrical Safety Code 
(Ex. 64, 65). The basic electrical components of the minimum approach 
distances in the subcommittee's proposed tables were based on Equation 
(1) and Equation (2).
    OSHA has accepted this approach to establishing the basic 
electrical component of minimum approach distance. None of the evidence 
in the record supporting either a smaller or a larger electrical 
component is substantial enough to outweigh the consensus of expert 
opinion (that is, ANSI and IEEE) on this matter. However, this distance 
is only a portion of the minimum approach distance needed for the 
safety of the employee. Other factors also bear on the total safe 
distance for employees to maintain from energized parts; the electrical 
component of the minimum approach distance does not take into account 
human errors in judging and maintaining the required minimum approach 
distance.
    The NESC subcommittee accepted a set of seven principles to be used 
in the development of the proposed minimum approach distance tables. 
These principles were listed as follows:
    (1) The following principles shall guide the development of a 
change proposal for the revision of minimum approach distances under 
Rule 441.
    (2) ANSI/IEEE Standard 516 is to be the electrical basis of the 
NESC Rules for approach distances: Table 4 (Alternating Current) and 
Table 5 (Direct Current) for voltages * * * above 72.5 KV. Lower 
voltages are to be based on ANSI/IEEE Standard 4. The application of 
ANSI/IEEE Standard 516 shall be inclusive of the formula used by that 
standard to derive electrical clearance distances.
    (3) Altitude correction factors shall be in accordance with ANSI/
IEEE Standard 516, Table 1.
    (4) The maximum design transient overvoltage data to be used in the 
development of the basic approach distance tables shall be: 3.0 per 
unit for voltage[s] 362 KV and less, 2.4 per unit for 500 to 550 KV, 
2.0 per unit [for] 765 to 800 KV.
    (5) All phase to phase values shall be calculated from the EPRI 
Transmission Line Reference Book for 115 to 138 KV. ([S]ee EPRI book 
figure 5.2)
    (6) An inadvertent movement factor shall be added to all basic 
electrical approach distances for all voltage ranges. A distance of one 
foot shall be added to all voltage ranges. An additional distance of 
one additional foot shall be added to voltage ranges below 72.6 KV.
    (7) The voltage reduction allowance for controlled maximum 
transient overvoltage shall be such that the minimum allowable approach 
distance is not less than the given approach distance specified for the 
highest voltage of the given range. The reason for this is that 
controlled transient overvoltage factors cannot be applied due to 
consideration that power frequency dictates the minimum approach 
distance for the voltage involved.
    (8) The transient overvoltage tables will be applied only at 
voltage ranges inclusive of 72.6 KV to 800 KV. All tables shall be 
established using the higher voltage of each separate voltage range. 
[Ex. 64, 65]
    OSHA has also accepted these principles in forming the minimum 
approach distance tables in the final rule. Each of the factors listed 
by the subcommittee is supported by substantial evidence in the record 
(Ex. 60, 64, 65). The technical aspects of most of these considerations 
are such that the Agency must rely heavily on the judgment of these 
experts. Nevertheless, OSHA has reviewed the technical information 
supporting the subcommittee's action and has found that the data do 
justify the NESC criteria. Therefore, the Agency has accepted the NESC 
method of computing the minimum approach distances.63
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\3The minimum approach distance tables in the original NESC 
change proposal contained several errors in calculation. OSHA, while 
accepting the NESC method of computing the distances, has calculated 
the actual distances and has carried the correct distances into 
final Sec. 1910.269.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The only other factor to cause any debate was the ergonomic 
distance to be added to the basic electrical component of minimum 
approach distance to account for human errors in judging and 
maintaining the required minimum approach distance. Electric utilities 
commonly add an ergonomic distance of 1 to 3 feet to the electrical 
component of minimum approach distance to determine allowable approach 
distances (Ex. 60). The distances set forth in subpart V Tables V-1 and 
V-2 provide the ergonomic distances shown in Table 4.
    The ergonomic data in the record are limited. Relevant data from 
the record include a typical arm's reach of about 2 feet and a reaction 
time to a stimulus of 0.2 to more than 1.0 second (Ex. 8-19). To 
prevent an employee from breaching the air gap required for the 
electrical component, the ergonomic distance must be sufficient for the 
employee to be able to recognize a hazardous approach to an energized 
line and withdraw to a safe position. Thus, the distance should equal 
the response time multiplied by the average speed of an employee's 
movement plus ``braking'' distance. (This is comparable to the 
calculation of total braking distance for a motor vehicle. This 
distance equals the initial speed of the vehicle times the driver's 
reaction time plus the braking distance for the vehicle itself after 
the brakes have been applied.) The maximum reach (or range of movement) 
may place an upper bound on the ergonomic component, however.
    For system voltages up to 72.5 kV, phase-to-phase, much of the work 
is performed using rubber gloves, and the employee is working within 
arm's reach of energized parts (Ex. 64, 65). The ergonomic component of 
the minimum approach distance must account for this since the employee 
may not have time to react and position himself or herself out of 
danger. A distance of 2 feet appears to meet this criterion and was, in 
fact, adopted by the NESC subcommittee. OSHA also accepts this value. 
Therefore, for voltages of 72.5 kV and less, the minimum approach 
distances set forth in the final rule adopt the electrical component of 
minimum approach distance given by equation (1) plus an ergonomic 
component of 2 feet.

       Table 4.--Ergonomic Distances Based on Subpart V, Table V-1      
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Distance (ft)       
                                             ---------------------------
                                                      IEEE 4            
     Voltage range (kV) phase to phase                 IEEE             
                                               V-1    516\1\  Differ.\2\
                                                                        
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.1 to 15...................................    2.00    0.08        1.92
15.1 to 35..................................    2.33    0.33        2.00
35.1 to 46..................................    2.50    0.50        2.00
46.1 to 72.5................................    3.00    1.00        2.00
72.6 to 121.................................    3.33    2.08        1.25
138 to 145..................................    3.50    2.58        0.92
161 to 169..................................    3.67    3.00        0.67
230 to 242..................................    5.00    4.17        0.83
345 to 362..................................    7.00    7.42       -0.42
500 to 552..................................   11.00   10.25        0.75
700 to 765..................................   15.00   13.83        1.17
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\This column represents the electrical component of the minimum       
  approach distance as given in the following standards:                
2.1 to 7.5 kV: AIEE Standard 4-1943, High Voltage Testing Techniques.   
7.6 kV and above: ANSI/IEEE Standard 516-1987, IEEE Guide for           
  Maintenance Methods on Energized Power Lines.                         
\2\This equals the ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance 
  based on Subpart V, Table V-1.                                        

    For operations involving lines energized at voltages over 72.5 kV, 
the applicable work practices change. Generally, live-line tools are 
employed to perform the work while equipment is energized (Ex. 64, 65). 
When hot sticks are not used, employees use work methods that more 
tightly control their movements than when they perform rubber glove 
work. Additionally, exposure to conductors at a potential different 
from the one on which work is being performed is limited or 
nonexistent. Therefore, a smaller ergonomic component is appropriate 
for the higher voltages.64 The NESC subcommittee has accepted a 
value of 1 foot for this component. OSHA has adopted this distance as 
well. Therefore, for voltages over 72.5 kV, the minimum approach 
distances set forth in the final rule adopt the electrical component of 
the minimum approach distance given by Equation (2) plus an ergonomic 
component of 1 foot.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\4It can also be argued that a large part of the electrical 
component of the minimum approach distance at the higher voltages 
results from the unlikely, though possible, imposition of a surge on 
the energized equipment. This line of reasoning implies that it is 
safe to approach an energized part closer than the electrical 
component, as long as such approach takes a minimal amount of time. 
OSHA does not, however, believe that it is safe to enter this zone 
at any time. At the electrical component distance the probability of 
flashover is 1 in 1000 if it occurs at the same moment as the 
maximum transient overvoltage. The record has little information 
regarding what the probability is that a given overvoltage would be 
at a maximum. However, it is clear that, given sufficient exposure, 
a sparkover will eventually occur at distances less than the 
electrical component of the minimum approach distance. Because 
OSHA's standard allows for the reduction of minimum approach 
distances for systems with known transient overvoltages, it is 
logical to assume that the maximum possible transient overvoltage is 
reasonably likely to occur. This would place an employee at 
significant risk of serious injury due to sparkover if the 
electrical component of the minimum approach distance is violated. 
It should be noted that one of the sources of temporary overvoltage 
is faults, which could be caused by the work operation being 
performed. (For example, a conductor being handled could drop onto a 
tower. The resultant ground fault could cause a temporary 
overvoltage on the unfaulted phase conductors.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It should be noted that the ergonomic component of the minimum 
approach distance is only considered a safety factor that protects 
employees in case of errors in judging and maintaining the full minimum 
approach distance. The actual working position selected must account 
for the range of movements that could normally be anticipated while an 
employee is working. Otherwise, the employee would violate the minimum 
approach distance while he or she is working.
    As noted earlier, the proposal permitted work to be performed at 
distances less than those given in proposed Tables R-6 and R-7 at 
voltages of 345 kV or more if the work was performed at a distance that 
was at least as long as the insulator string. Several commenters and 
witnesses urged OSHA to recognize methods of working on or near 
energized parts that would permit an employee to approach the parts 
closer than permitted by proposed Sec. 1910.269(1)(2) and Tables R-6 
and R-7 (Ex. 3-35, 3-65, 3-72, 3-80, 3-82, 3-112, 56; DC Tr. 856-868; 
LA Tr. 280-281, 471-511). They noted that Subpart V allows approach as 
close as the shortest distance between an energized part and a grounded 
surface. EEI suggested that Sec. 1910.269 contain a similar footnote 
and that the note be extended to lower voltages as well (Ex. 3-112; DC 
Tr. 856-858).
    As OSHA explained at the hearing, the language in subpart V permits 
employees to work at a distance from energized parts that may expose 
them to a flashover (DC Tr. 254-255). Under questioning, Mr. Joseph Van 
Name agreed that it was not proper to use this distance as the minimum 
approach distance:

    Mr. Wallis: * * * you really shouldn't take the shortest 
distance anywhere on the system, no matter how far away it is?
    Mr. Van Name: As a general term, the answer is positively no. I 
think I tried to make that rather clear. [LA Tr. 542]

    The language in subpart V exposes employees to a probability of 
flashover that is equal to the worst case probability anywhere on the 
system. No leeway for inadvertent movement is included in this 
distance. Additionally, it is possible (though perhaps not likely) that 
the shortest distance between a live part and a grounded surface is 
less than the withstand distance for the voltage involved. Clearly, 
this is neither safe nor acceptable.
    Some commenters and witnesses proposed that the standard recognize 
limiting surge factors65 as one method of reducing the minimum 
approach distance (Ex. 3-35, 3-65, 3-72, 3-80, 3-82; DC Tr. 881-882; LA 
Tr. 280-281, 471-511). They argued that, if the maximum transient 
overvoltage that could occur on a line was lower than the worst case 
estimates used to compile proposed Tables R-6 and R-7, the minimum 
approach distance between an employee and an energized part could be 
safely reduced. These commenters and witnesses listed various methods 
of controlling the maximum surge factor on a line including:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\5Surge factor is the ratio of the maximum overvoltage due to 
switching or faults to the normal system voltage. This value is 
expressed in ``per unit''; the maximum transient overvoltage is 
typically expressed in kilovolts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (1) Modifying the operation of a circuit breaker or other switching 
device, including blocking the reclosing feature of a circuit,
    (2) Installing surge arresters or temporary protective gaps, and
    (3) Changing the operation of the system to restrict the effect of 
switching operations (Ex. 64, 65).
    Mr. Van Name explained the method of using protective gaps to 
reduce the surge factor in great detail (LA Tr. 478-482, 509). He also 
explained the technical considerations involved in protecting the 
employee when such a gap is used. He indicated that the minimum 
approach distances that would be supplied in the post-hearing comment 
period would incorporate this concept (LA Tr. 534-537, 550-551, 567-
569). In fact, the NESC subcommittee, as mentioned previously, did 
incorporate this concept into their proposed change for the 1993 
National Electrical Safety Code (Ex. 64, 65).
    The Agency has adopted the approach of the NESC subcommittee in the 
final rule. Final Sec. 1910.269 recognizes the use of gaps and other 
means of decreasing the surge factor on energized lines as acceptable 
methods of reducing the required minimum approach distance. Table R-6 
through Table R-10 list minimum approach distances for various surge 
factors and phase-to-phase voltages.
    In response to questions by EEI, Mr. Van Name acknowledged that 
explanatory material would be necessary to enable employers and 
employees to use a standard adopting this approach (LA Tr. 516-517). 
OSHA has accepted this suggestion as well. The final rule incorporates 
an appendix (Appendix B) presenting information necessary to the proper 
use of Sec. 1910.269(1)(2). Much of this information is based on 
material provided by the NESC subcommittee on work rules (Ex. 64, 65).
    There is one difference between the OSHA tables of minimum approach 
distances and the proposed ANSI tables. The lowest voltage given in the 
ANSI subcommittee's tables is 300 volts, for which the appropriate 
minimum approach distance is ``avoid contact.'' The final rule extends 
this ``minimum approach distance'' down to 50 volts.
    OSHA proposed that employees ``avoid contact'' with all voltages at 
1000 volts or less. In response to the proposal, EEI argued that 
electrical protective equipment was unnecessary below 300 volts (Ex. 
56). They claimed that ``the record evidence does not show that linemen 
have been placed at significant risk * * *''
    The Agency strongly disagrees with EEI on this point. As Table 3 
shows, 15 percent of the accidents to qualified employees working on or 
near live parts were at voltages below 300 volts (Ex. 9-2).66 OSHA 
believes that there is a hazard for employees exposed to any voltage 
higher than 50 volts. Requirements in Subpart S for guarding of live 
parts start at 50 volts (see, for example, Sec. 1910.303(g)(2)), and 
even qualified electric utility workers have been electrocuted at 
voltages as low as 120 volts to ground (Ex. 9-2). Therefore, a level of 
50 volts rather than 300 volts has been adopted in the final rule as 
the low voltage cutoff for taking measures to prevent employee contact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\6The percentage does not include accidents in which the 
voltage level was not given.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One last method of reducing minimum approach distances was 
addressed at the hearing. Three witnesses discussed limiting the reach 
of employees by means such as barriers as a method of reducing the 
ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance (DC Tr. 873-885, 
903-905; LA Tr. 509-510). They argued that, if the employee's movements 
were restricted, a smaller ergonomic component would be warranted. This 
concept was also suggested to the NESC subcommittee on work rules for 
inclusion in the change proposal for the 1993 National Electrical 
Safety Code (Ex. L62-44, 64, 65). At the hearing, EEI suggested an 
ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance of 1 foot for 
employees protected by means of position or warning barriers (DC Tr. 
878). A similar suggestion to the NESC subcommittee included an 
ergonomic distance of 0.5 feet (Ex. L62-44). This concept was not 
accepted by the NESC subcommittee, however (Ex. 64, 65).
    OSHA has not accepted a reduction in the ergonomic component of the 
minimum approach distance by means of warning barriers or employee 
positioning for a number of reasons. First, no amount of reduction in 
the ergonomic distance is supported by any evidence in the record. 
EEI's original suggestion of a 1-foot distance for this component under 
limited conditions has been incorporated into the final minimum 
approach distances without restriction for voltages above 72.5 kV. The 
later recommendation for a 0.5-foot add-on appears to be justified 
solely on the basis of what the absolute minimum approach distance is 
on an industry-wide basis under current practices rather than on the 
basis of what is technologically justified and safe for employees.
    Second, for voltages over 72.5 kV, the ergonomic component of the 
minimum approach distance is only 1 foot. This relatively short 
distance gives the employee very little room to err in judging and 
maintaining the minimum approach distance involved. While a warning 
barrier may aid the employee in judging the distance, the 0.5-foot 
ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance is simply too 
small to protect the employee if he or she inadvertently moves too 
close to the energized part.
    For voltages of 72.5 kV and less, the minimum approach distance is 
between 2 and 3 feet. The minimum approach distance recommended by the 
rejected change proposal for these voltages would be only 0.5 to 1.5 
feet. Clearly, any tools or equipment being held by an employee would 
expose him or her to inadvertent contact with the lines, regardless of 
the electrical component of the minimum approach distance. The 
accidents in the record amply demonstrate that this is a common 
occurrence.
    If anything, the accidents in the record indicate that the 
ergonomic component should be increased, not decreased. The ergonomic 
component of the minimum approach distance is a cushion against an 
employee's coming too close to an energized part. Unfortunately, it 
cannot be reasonably sized to ensure that no employee will ever get 
close enough to be injured or killed. The Agency must choose a distance 
that will be sufficient under typical working conditions to provide 
adequate safety to electrical line workers. Given existing industry 
practices and the other provisions included in this final rule, OSHA 
believes that the 1- and 2-foot ergonomic components of the minimum 
approach distance provided in Table R-6 through Table R-8 will afford 
this protection.
    As noted earlier, EEI argued that minimum approach distances 
smaller than those required by Subpart V were sometimes necessary to 
perform work on energized systems. Although the minimum approach 
distances set forth in final Sec. 1910.269(1)(2) are basically no less 
than those in the construction standard, the rule does recognize 
procedures that permit closer approaches.
    The standard provides smaller minimum approach distances for 
systems with surge factors that are limited by means such as system 
design, switching controls, and temporary protective gaps. Frequently, 
built-in or temporary limits on the surge factor on a system can result 
in a minimum approach distance that is small enough to permit work to 
be performed without additional protective measures. Because the line 
worker cannot determine surge factors at the jobsite, surge factor 
reduction is permitted only when the employer can demonstrate, through 
engineering analysis, that the possible surges on the line will be held 
to values no more than permitted under Table R-7 and Table R-8. Methods 
of controlling and determining the surge factor for a system are given 
in appendix B.
    Other means of allowing closer approach are also permitted. 
Proposed Sec. 1910.269(l)(2) provided three exceptions to the use of 
the minimum approach distances in Tables R-6 and R-7. The first 
exception was that the employee be insulated from the energized part. 
The second exception was for the live part to be insulated from the 
employee. The last exception was for the employee to be insulated from 
energized parts at a voltage different from that on which work was 
being performed. Similar exceptions are provided in the final rule as 
well.
    Existing Sec. 1926.950(c)(1)(i), from which proposed 
Sec. 1910.269(l)(2)(i) was taken, also specifically permits the 
employee to be guarded or isolated from the live parts. This language 
was omitted from the proposal. EEI strongly objected to the omission 
and urged that the final rule adopt the language of the requirement in 
the Construction Standards (Ex. 3-112; DC Tr. 868-870). However, it 
should be noted that the introductory language in final 
Sec. 1910.269(l)(2) requires minimum approach distances to be 
maintained from ``exposed'' energized parts. Guarded live parts, 
whether they are guarded by enclosures or barriers or are guarded by 
position (isolated), are not addressed by this rule.\67\ Including 
language exempting live parts that are ``guarded'' or ``isolated'' 
would be redundant and could lead to misinterpretation of the rule. 
Therefore, EEI's suggestion has not been adopted. Additionally, similar 
redundancies in paragraphs (c)(1)(ii) and (iii) of Sec. 1926.950 have 
not been carried forward into paragraphs (l)(2)(ii) and (l)(2)(iii) of 
final Sec. 1910.269. To clarify the rule, however, a note has been 
included following paragraph (l)(2) to indicate that parts of electric 
circuits meeting paragraphs (u)(5)(i) and (v)(5)(i) are not considered 
as ``exposed'' unless a guard is removed or an employee enters the 
space intended to provide isolation from the live parts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\Paragraphs (u)(5)(i) and (v)(5)(i) contain requirements for 
the guarding of live parts. Parts of electric circuits that meet 
these two provisions are not considered as ``exposed'' unless a 
guard is removed or an employee enters the space intended to provide 
isolation from the live parts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Final Sec. 1910.269(l)(2)(i) contains the first exception--
insulating the employee from the energized part. This insulation can 
take the form of rubber insulating gloves and rubber insulating 
sleeves. This equipment protects the employee from electric shock as he 
or she works on the line or equipment. Even though uninsulated parts of 
the employee's body may come closer to the live part than would 
otherwise be permitted by Table R-6 through Table R-10, the employee's 
hand and arm would be insulated from the live part, and the working 
distances involved would be sufficient protection against arc-over. As 
noted earlier the tables include a component for inadvertent movement, 
which is unnecessary for employees using rubber insulating equipment. 
In the worst case situation, an employee would be working on a line 
requiring a 3-foot minimum approach distance.\68\ The electrical 
component of this minimum approach distance is 1 foot. Because the 
distance from the hand to the elbow is about 1 foot and because it 
would be uncomfortable to work closer than this distance to a line 
being held in the hand, the worst case minimum approach distance would 
exceed the electrical component of the minimum approach distance, and 
the employee would be protected from sparkover. In any event, the 
accident data in the record show that the overriding hazard to 
employees is posed by other energized conductors in the work area, to 
which the minimum approach distances still apply. The rubber gloves, of 
course, provide protection only for the line on which work is being 
performed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\The maximum use voltage for Class IV rubber gloves is 36 
kilovolts. If only single-phase exposure is involved, the maximum 
phase-to-phase voltage would be in the 46.1 to 72.5 kilovolt range 
Table R-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Of course, the insulation used would have to be designed for the 
voltage. (The revision of Sec. 1910.137 gives use voltages for 
electrical protective equipment.) As a clarification, paragraph 
(l)(2)(i) notes that the insulation is considered as protection only 
against parts upon which work is being performed; the required minimum 
approach distances would have to be maintained from other exposed 
energized parts.
    As a second option to maintaining the minimum approach distances, 
paragraph (l)(2)(ii) of final Sec. 1910.269 allows the energized part 
to be insulated from the employee. Such insulation could be in the form 
of insulating blankets or line hose or other suitable insulating 
equipment. Again, the insulation would have to be adequate for the 
voltage.
    Paragraphs (l)(2)(i) and (l)(2)(ii) recognize the protection 
afforded to the employee by an insulating barrier between the employee 
and the energized part. As long as the insulation is appropriate and is 
in good condition, current will not flow through the worker, and he or 
she is protected.
    The third option (paragraph (l)(2)(iii)) to the maintenance of the 
minimum approach distances is to insulate the employee from exposed 
conductive objects other than the live part upon which work is to be 
performed. Much of the work performed under this option is called 
``live-line bare-hand'' work. (For specific practices for this type of 
work, see the discussion of final Sec. 1910.269 (q)(3).) In this type 
of work, the employee is in contact with the energized line, like a 
bird on a wire, but is not contacting another conductive object at a 
different potential. Because there is no complete circuit, current 
cannot flow through the worker, and he or she is protected.
    In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested public comment on 
whether rubber insulating sleeves should be required when gloves are 
used on lines or equipment. The Agency received a significant amount of 
comment on this issue.
    Several commenters supported a requirement for employees to wear 
rubber insulating sleeves when working on or near exposed energized 
parts (Ex. 3-13, 3-46, 3-57, 3-107, 64; DC Tr. 558-561, 610-612). They 
stressed the extra safety that sleeves would provide. Mr. James Ozzello 
of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers summarized the 
IBEW accident data relating to the lack of rubber insulating sleeves by 
electric line workers, as follows:

    Mr. Ozzello: Regarding the rubber sleeves, I only included those 
accidents where the electric contact was in the area that would be 
covered by the rubber sleeves. I did not include those accidents 
where the electric contact was in the area of rubber sleeves and the 
victim was not wearing rubber gloves or where the victim was using a 
live line tool, a hot stick.
    If the employee was not wearing rubber gloves, chances are he 
would not be wearing the rubber sleeves. Also, many companies do not 
require the use of rubber protective equipment when live line tools 
are used.
* * * * *
    To summarize the three surveys on fatal and serious accidents, 
there were a total of 171 fatal accidents and 271 serious accidents.
* * * * *
    Rubber sleeves might have prevented nine of the fatalities and 
[sixteen] of the serious accidents. [DC Tr. 558-561]

    Others opposed a requirement for employees to wear sleeves as well 
as gloves (Ex. 3-23, 3-32, 3-42, 3-60, 3-82, 3-112, 46, 47, 56, L62-33, 
L62-43, L62-44; DC Tr. 925-926). EEI pointed to the experience of four 
electric utilities that have had no electrical contact accidents that 
the use of rubber insulating sleeves would have prevented (Ex. 46). The 
experience of these companies was summarized by Mr. Tony E. Brannan of 
Georgia Power Company, representing EEI, who stated:

    Mr. Brannan: I would like to make, if I may, just one comment, 
one side comment here.
    Please note that rubber glove. Now our fine faithful colleague 
friends from up north have been showing you some slides where 
employees use sleeves. That is those things that go around the 
shoulder and come down the arm.
    Well, that is all well and good and I am not trying to criticize 
their work practices. But I am trying to show you here that there 
are other ways of protecting employees other than using sleeves.

(Viewgraph displayed)
    Mr. Brannan: Now look at this glove. That glove goes up over the 
elbow of that individual. That gloves [sic] has what is called an 
18-inch cuff, which means that it goes up, way up onto the forearm.
    Now what I am suggesting and requesting, respectfully 
requesting, is that if you in this case follow the language in 
Subpart V where gloves ``or'' sleeves and gloves shall be used. In 
other words, please continue and let the use of rubber sleeves be 
optional.
    Some companies use them and some companies don't. In our company 
we have a tremendous cover-up program and we cover-up even the paths 
to ground up on the pole.
    So therefore we do not use sleeves. They are hot in the south in 
the summertime. They don't breathe. And we look at them as a 
nuisance. I can tell you that we in our company have never had an 
accident that rubber sleeves would have prevented. [DC Tr. 925-926]

    EEI also pointed to the cost and inadequate supply of rubber 
insulating sleeves as factors the Agency should consider as factors 
supporting their view (Ex. 56). They submitted many petitions urging 
OSHA not to adopt a requirement for the use of sleeves (Ex. 46) and 
stated that ``[t]his spontaneous expression of concern by employers and 
employees alike surely cannot be ignored by the Agency'' (Ex. 56).
    OSHA's primary concern is for the safety of employees. The injuries 
and fatalities to which Mr. Ozzello referred constitute 5.9 and 5.3 
percent of the totals, respectively. This is a significant portion of 
the total number of serious accidents occurring among electric line 
workers. The Agency believes that these injuries and fatalities are 
clearly preventable.
    The use of rubber insulating sleeves would certainly have prevented 
most of these accidents. However, as demonstrated by the commendable 
safety record of the companies cited by EEI, the extensive use of 
insulating equipment to cover energized parts in the employee's work 
area would also appear to prevent employees' upper arms and shoulders 
from contacting live parts. In fact, if every energized part within 
reach of an employee were insulated, electrical contacts involving 
other parts of the body, such as an employee's head or back, would be 
averted as well. The NESC subcommittee on work rules also recognized 
this method as providing protection to employees (Ex. 64, 65).
    The proposal and existing subpart V do not require any protection 
for employees working on or near exposed live parts beyond the use of 
rubber insulating gloves, and it appears from the descriptions of the 
accidents cited by the IBEW that some companies do not go beyond the 
existing OSHA regulations. To prevent such accidents from occurring in 
the future, the Agency has decided to require protection in addition to 
that required by subpart V.
    The final rule adopts a provision, Sec. 1910.269(l)(3), requiring 
the use of rubber insulating sleeves (in addition to rubber insulating 
gloves), unless live parts that are exposed to contact with an 
employee's upper arm or shoulder are insulated. Employees can work 
without sleeves by installing rubber line hose, rubber blankets, and 
plastic guard equipment on energized equipment. However, an employee 
installing such protective equipment on energized lines must wear 
rubber sleeves unless his or her upper arms and shoulders are not 
exposed to contact with other live parts during this operation.
    OSHA believes that paragraph (l)(3) incorporates the most effective 
approach to preventing accidents involving work on or near exposed live 
parts. Companies that rely on extensive insulation of live parts in the 
work area can generally continue to use this method to protect 
employees. Companies that use gloves alone to protect their employees 
may have to purchase additional supplies of rubber insulating 
equipment.
    Evidence in the record indicates that supplies of rubber insulating 
sleeves at the time the rulemaking record closed were not sufficient to 
enable employers to acquire them in quantities adequate to ensure 
compliance with the standard (Ex. 46, 56). In its post-hearing brief 
(Ex. 56), EEI stated: ``Any requirement for additional rubber 
protective sleeves could only be phased in over a period of three years 
at a minimum.'' That statement was made in August of 1990, over 3 years 
ago. As EEI noted in their brief, demand for additional supplies of 
rubber insulating sleeves was anticipated by the manufacturers as early 
as 1990. Furthermore, the NESC requirement on the use of sleeves was 
adopted in July of 1992, well over 1 year ago. Thus, employers and 
manufacturers have had over 1 year's lead time based on compliance with 
the NESC. Lastly, the standard recognizes alternative approaches for 
protecting employees. Because of this, some employers may not need to 
purchase rubber sleeves to comply with the final rule. Taking this 
information into consideration, OSHA has determined that no additional 
delay in effective date, beyond the 120 days given for the final rule 
as a whole, is needed to enable employers to obtain sufficient supplies 
of rubber insulating equipment.
    Paragraph (l)(3) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 would have required 
employees to position themselves so that a shock or slip would not 
cause the worker's body to move towards exposed parts at a potential 
different from that of the employee. Since slips, and even electric 
shocks, are not entirely preventable, it is important for the employee 
to take a working position so that such an event will not increase the 
severity of any incurred injury. This proposed requirement was taken 
from ANSI C2-1984, Section 422F.
    Several commenters objected to this provision (Ex. 3-20, 3-22, 3-
42, 3-60, 3-80, 3-82, 3-101, 3-112). They noted that the ANSI 
requirement was not written in mandatory language and that it was not 
always possible to work from below an energized part. Most suggested 
alternative language, such as replacing ``employees may not work'' to 
``employees shall avoid, where practical'' (Ex. 3-20) and replacing 
``may'' with ``should'' (Ex. 3-42). Some gave examples demonstrating 
the impracticality of such a rule (Ex. 3-20, 3-42, 3-101; DC Tr. 991-
992).
     OSHA agrees that it is not always possible to comply with the rule 
as proposed. However, the Agency believes that it is important for an 
employee to work from a position where a slip or a shock will not bring 
him or her into contact with an energized part unless other conditions, 
such as the configuration of the lines involved or fatigue of the 
employee, would make another working position safer. The position taken 
must be the safest available to accomplish the task, but may not be the 
most efficient one. Even electric utility representatives stated that 
it is common practice to teach employees to work from below energized 
parts, where a slip would take the employee away from the parts (Ex. 3-
82, 3-112; DC Tr. 989-991). Unfortunately, most of the suggested 
alternatives would render the provision largely unenforceable. To 
provide employees with the safest work position feasible, OSHA has 
adopted the following language in paragraph (l)(4) of final 
Sec. 1910.269:

     The employer shall ensure that each employee, to the extent 
that other safety-related conditions at the worksite permit, works 
in a position from which a slip or shock will not bring the 
employee's body into contact with exposed, uninsulated parts 
energized at a potential different from the employee.

     The revised language recognizes situations that preclude working 
from a position from which a slip would bring the employee into contact 
with a live part but remains enforceable in the Agency's view. The 
language contained in this provision also allows such options as 
guarding or insulating the live part as alternative means of 
compliance.
    Paragraph (l)(5) addresses the practices of connecting and 
disconnecting lines and equipment. Common industry practice, as 
reflected in ANSI C2-1984, Section 422G, is to make a connection so 
that the source is connected as the last item in sequence and to break 
a connection so that the source is removed as the first item in 
sequence. In this way, conducting wires and devices used to make and 
break the connection are deenergized during almost the entire 
procedure. Since these wires and devices must be handled during the 
procedure, the requirement reduces the chance for an electrical 
accident. Also, to prevent the disconnected conductors from being 
energized, loose conductors must be kept away from live parts. These 
requirements have been broken into separate paragraphs in the final 
rule.
    Taken from ANSI C2-1984, Section 420I2, Sec. 1910.269(l)(6)(i) 
prohibits the wearing of conductive articles by employees working 
within reach of exposed live parts of equipment if these articles would 
increase the hazards associated with accidental contact with the live 
parts. If an employee wants to wear metal jewelry, he or she can cover 
the jewelry so as to eliminate the contact hazard. This requirement is 
not intended to preclude workers from wearing metal rings or watch 
bands if the work being performed already exposes them to electric 
shock hazards and if the wearing of metal would not increase the 
hazards. (For example, for work performed on an overhead line, the 
wearing of a ring does not increase the likelihood that an employee 
would contact the line, nor would it increase the severity of the 
injury should contact occur.) However, this requirement would protect 
employees working on energized circuits with small clearances and high 
current capacities (such as some battery-supplied circuits) from severe 
burn hazards to which they would otherwise be exposed. The rule also 
protects workers who are only minimally exposed to shock hazards from 
being injured as a result of a dangling chain's making contact with an 
energized part. OSHA has accepted the suggestion of two commenters that 
the proposed term ``in the vicinity of'' be replaced with ``within 
reaching distance'' to help clarify the requirement (Ex. 3-20, 3-80).
    OSHA mentioned in the preamble to the proposal that certain 
clothing fabrics were easily ignited and could pose severe burn 
hazards. The Agency noted that, since qualified employees are commonly 
exposed to electric arcs, it had been suggested that clothing made of 
these materials be prohibited for exposed employees. The preamble also 
stated that American Society for Testing and Materials Committee F-18 
on Electrical Protective Equipment for Workers was exploring possible 
standards for application to clothing. However, since no standards 
existed, OSHA requested public comment on the desirability of adopting 
requirements in this area and on the costs and benefits of any 
suggested provisions. The notice of public hearing informed interested 
parties that the Agency was considering a prohibition of any clothing 
that would substantially increase the severity of any injury received 
from arcing electric equipment.
    OSHA received many comments on this issue. In its original 
submission, EEI maintained that electric utility employees are rarely 
exposed to electric arcs because of the quality of their training and 
the extent of the safeguards provided (Ex. 3-112). If this were true, 
the Agency would not need to regulate the type of clothing these 
workers wear. However, this statement was strongly rebutted by the 
testimony of Mr. James Ozzello of the IBEW, who stated:

    When examining the accident reports for these accidents where 
burns might have been the cause of a death or contributing factor to 
the death of a victim, or a factor in the seriousness of the 
accident, I did not include flash burns or burns that could have 
been solely electrical burns.
    I only included the type of burns that the wearing of either 
flame resistant clothing or a natural fiber clothing might have 
prevented or lessened the degree of injury.
    I also did not include burns that were caused by either escaping 
steam or hot water.
* * * * *
    To summarize the three surveys on fatal and serious accidents, 
there were a total of 171 fatal accidents and 271 serious accidents 
[overall].
* * * * *
    If 65 of the employees who were involved in serious accidents 
had been wearing natural fiber clothing or flame retardant clothing, 
their accidents might not have been classified as serious accidents. 
[DC Tr. 559-562]

    OSHA has determined, therefore, that electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution workers do face a significant risk of 
injury from burns due to electric arcs.
    The evidence was nearly universal that certain fabrics increase the 
extent of injuries to employees caught in an electric arc or otherwise 
exposed to flames (Ex. 3-9, 3-10, 3-13, 3-20, 3-22, 3-51, 3-57, 3-80, 
3-82, 3-88, 3-95, 3-107, 12-12, 47, 56; DC Tr. 363-364). Nonetheless, 
the commenters disagreed on the approach that OSHA should take in 
regulating the type of clothing worn by employees. Several claimed that 
requirements dealing with this subject would be difficult to enforce 
and suggested that OSHA adopt either no regulation or a simple 
provision requiring workers to be trained in the relevant hazards (Ex. 
3-10, 3-42, 3-69, 3-123, 56). Most, however, took a position similar to 
that of OSHA's expert witness Mr. Arthur Lewis, who recommended 
adopting a rule that would prohibit employees from wearing clothing 
made of fabrics that could increase the extent of their injuries in the 
event of exposure to electric arc (Ex. 3-9, 3-13, 3-20, 3-57, 3-82, 3-
107, 47; DC Tr. 363-364).69
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\9Some of these supported a requirement for natural fibers, 
such as cotton; others supported a prohibition against synthetic 
materials, such as polyester.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several interested parties submitted evidence regarding the 
flammability of various materials and the degree of injuries that would 
occur under certain conditions. The IBEW introduced a videotape, 
produced by the Duke Power Company, demonstrating the effects of 
different types of clothing upon exposure to electric arcs (Ex. 12-12). 
This tape provides clear evidence of the hazards of wearing clothing 
made from certain untreated synthetic fabrics, such as polyester, 
acetate, nylon, and rayon. Representatives from E. I. du Pont de 
Nemours and Company and from Hoechst Celanese Corporation submitted 
test data on various fabrics (Ex. 44, 3-95). The du Pont data, contrary 
to other evidence in the record, indicated that untreated cotton 
resulted in a higher predicted percentage of second and third degree 
burns than an untreated polyester/cotton blend. However, these results 
were obtained with a 4-second gas heat flux of 2 calories/cm\2\-sec--
not a normal electric arc exposure, which is of high energy density but 
short duration.
     OSHA believes the data from the Duke Power Company study are more 
directly related to electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work, at least at present. In the future, the results of 
the ASTM Committee work should improve the data available to the Agency 
and should provide a basis upon which a detailed standard could be 
based. In the meantime, OSHA has decided that a performance-oriented 
approach to the problem is warranted. The risk to employees is too 
great for the Agency simply to ignore the problem, and the quickest 
immediate solution is for employees to avoid wearing fabrics that might 
worsen any injuries they experience from an electric arc. Therefore, 
for exposed employees, paragraph of final Sec. 1910.269 adopts a 
requirement that these employees be trained in the hazards related to 
the clothing that they wear, and paragraph sets forth a prohibition of 
apparel that could increase the extent of injuries received by a worker 
who is exposed to an electric arc. OSHA has also included a note 
following paragraph to indicate the types of clothing fabrics that the 
record demonstrates are hazardous to wear by employees exposed to 
electric arcs.
    The requirement is intended to prohibit the types of fabrics shown 
in the Duke Power Company videotape to be expected to cause more severe 
injuries than would otherwise be anticipated. These include such 
untreated materials as polyester and rayon, unless the employee is 
otherwise protected from the effects of their burning. Natural fabrics, 
such as 100 percent cotton or wool, and synthetic materials that are 
flame resistant or flame retardant are acceptable under the final rule. 
(If and when a national consensus standard on clothing for electrical 
workers becomes available, OSHA will examine whether or not to revise 
the rule to require materials conforming to such a standard.) The 
Agency realizes that employers may have difficulties enforcing company 
rules on the types of clothing that their employees may wear. OSHA will 
adopt flexible enforcement policies in this area for employers making 
good faith efforts to comply with the standard. Additionally, the 
Agency intends to support such outreach activities as training, 
speeches, and informational pamphlets to educate employers and 
employees about the hazards associated with flammable clothing.
    To protect employees from contacting energized parts, paragraph 
(l)(6) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 would have required fuses for circuits 
over 300 volts to be installed and removed using insulated tools or 
gloves. Additionally, employees installing expulsion-type fuses would 
have been required to wear eye protection and would have had to stand 
clear of the fuse's exhaust path. This requirement was taken from ANSI 
C2-1984, Section 420O.
    Two commenters argued that, at higher voltages, the proposal was 
not adequate to protect employees (Ex. 3-69, 3-123). They also 
suggested that some protection be required for voltages below 300 
volts.
    OSHA agrees that there is a hazard for employees exposed to any 
voltage higher than 50 volts. Requirements in Subpart S for guarding of 
live parts start at 50 volts (see, for example, Sec. 1910.303(g)(2)), 
and even qualified electric utility employees have been electrocuted at 
voltages as low as 120 volts to ground (Ex. 9-2). Therefore, the final 
standard also requires protection for the installation or removal of 
fuses with exposed parts energized at more than 50 volts.
    The installation and removal of fuses on circuits energized at 
voltages much higher than 300 volts can also lead to hazards not 
completely addressed by proposed Sec. 1910.269(l)(6) if expulsion-type 
fuses are involved. When an expulsion fuse operates on a fault or 
overload, the arc from the fault current erodes the tube of the fuse 
holder (Ex. 8-5). This produces a gas that blasts the arc out through 
the fuse tube vent or vents, and with it any loose material in the way. 
Employees could be injured by the arc blast or by particles blown, by 
the blast, in their eyes. (For this reason, OSHA has not accepted the 
argument of three commenters, Ex. 3-38, 3-125, 3-128, that no 
protection is needed by employees handling the fuses with 30-foot hot 
sticks.) Employees should never install or remove such fuses using 
gloves alone. Therefore, in final Sec. 1910.269(l)(7), the Agency is 
requiring them to use eye protection and tools rated for the voltage.
    Paragraph (l)(8) explains that covered conductors are treated under 
the standard as uninsulated. (See the definition of ``covered 
conductor'' in Sec. 1910.269(x).) The covering on this type of wire 
protects the conductor from the weather but does not provide adequate 
insulating value.
    Since ungrounded metal frames of equipment can become energized, 
paragraph (l)(8) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 would have required the 
testing of these metal parts for voltage before they could be treated 
as deenergized. Two commenters questioned the wisdom of this provision 
(Ex. 3-69, 3-123). They noted that a test is only good at the specific 
time the test is done.
    OSHA has accepted this recommendation. Paragraph (l)(9) in the 
final rule restates the requirement so that noncurrent-carrying metal 
parts of equipment or devices must be treated as energized unless the 
installation is inspected and these parts are determined to be 
grounded. Grounding these parts, whether by permanent grounds or by the 
installation of temporary grounds, would provide protection the entire 
time work is being performed.
    Paragraph (l)(10) requires devices used to open circuits under load 
conditions to be designed to interrupt the current involved.
    This provision was not included in proposed Sec. 1910.269. The 
National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) urged OSHA to add 
a requirement for opening circuits under load only with devices 
intended to interrupt current (Ex. 3-81). Edison Electric Institute 
recommended adoption of a similar requirement (Ex. 28). The Agency 
agrees with EEI and NEMA that it is hazardous to open a circuit with a 
device that is not designed to interrupt current if that circuit is 
carrying current. Non-load-break switches used to open a circuit while 
it is carrying load current could fail catastrophically, severely 
injuring or killing any nearby employee. Therefore, OSHA has adopted a 
requirement that devices used to open circuits under load conditions be 
designed to interrupt the current involved as paragraph (l)(10) of 
final Sec. 1910.269.
    Paragraph (m). Paragraph (m) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses the 
deenergizing of electric transmission and distribution lines and 
equipment for the protection of employees. Transmission and 
distribution systems are different from other energy systems found in 
general industry or even in the electric utility industry itself. The 
hazardous energy control methods for these systems are necessarily 
different from those covered under Sec. 1910.269(d). Transmission and 
distribution lines and equipment are installed outdoors and are subject 
to being reenergized by means other than the normal energy sources. For 
example, lightning can strike a line and energize an otherwise 
deenergized conductor, or a line could be energized by unknown 
cogeneration sources not under the control of the employer. 
Additionally, some deenergized transmission and distribution lines are 
subject to being reenergized by induced voltage from nearby energized 
conductors or by contact with other energized sources of electrical 
energy. Another difference is that energy control devices are often 
very remote from the worksite and are frequently under the centralized 
control of a system operator.
    For these reasons, OSHA proposed to cover the control of hazardous 
energy sources related to transmission and distribution systems 
separately. Because paragraph (m) covers this area, the general 
requirements for hazardous energy control in paragraph (d) of final 
Sec. 1910.269 do not apply to the disconnection of transmission and 
distribution lines and equipment from sources of electrical energy. 
There was no significant objection to this approach in the record, and 
OSHA has carried it forward into the final rule.
    In addition to setting forth the application of Sec. 1910.269(m), 
paragraph (m)(1) explains that conductors and equipment that have not 
been deenergized under the procedures of either paragraph (d) or (m) of 
Sec. 1910.269 have to be treated as energized. Therefore, there are no 
gaps in the coverage of these two paragraphs.
    Several commenters objected to the application of the requirements 
of proposed Sec. 1910.269(m) to distribution lines of 600 volts or less 
(Ex. 3-20, 3-42, 3-80, 3-112). These commenters stated that their 
procedures for the lower voltages did not conform to OSHA's proposal 
and that they had experienced no accidents as a result of using them. 
EEI specified how utilities' approach differs for lines and equipment 
operating at 600 volts or less. They stated:

     OSHA has not proposed to use the triggering level of 600 volts 
contained in subpart V, [Sec. ]1926.950(d) and proposed by EEI/IBEW 
as the threshold for application of these requirements. Accordingly, 
formal clearance70 procedures would be used to work voltages 
lower than 600 volts without personal protective equipment. To 
initiate these procedures for voltages less than 600 volts would 
result in substantial work delays that are completely unnecessary. 
Once again, we do not understand why OSHA proposes to depart from 
subpart V for a hazard which is truly identical whether performing 
maintenance or construction. Stated simply, 600 volts is 600 volts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\0The word ``clearance'', as used in the discussion of this 
paragraph, means the procedure used to deenergize lines and 
equipment (and hold them ``clear'') for the protection of employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA has also omitted the phrase ``visibly open'' contained in 
the EEI/IBEW draft. This could mean that formal clearance procedures 
would be required even on small jobs where the crew working on the 
facility can clearly see that the disconnect switches are open or 
locked out or tagged out. Subpart V, section 1926.950(d)(1) provides 
that its requirements do not apply if the disconnecting means is 
``visibly open or visibly locked out.'' Again, the reason for 
departing from subpart V for identical hazards is not explained or 
justified.
    The ``visibly open'' provision is utilized on some high voltage 
work, involving one or two spans of conductor, removing transformers 
from the line, and some substation work. The ``visibly open'' 
provision and the ``600 volt'' threshold are also used on most 
secondary and service work. Consistent with OSHA's existing 
standards, most utilities presently allow personnel to work on 
deenergized equipment normally energized below 600 volts without 
rubber protective equipment if the means of disconnecting is visibly 
open or visibly tagged or locked open. There are other precautions, 
such as testing for voltage, removal of customer meters, 
disconnecting service taps or shunting the transformer secondary 
leads, that are used to protect workers. Most utilities do not 
require personal protective grounds below 600 volts.
    With no voltage threshold for application of this [paragraph], 
prohibitive costs will be incurred for utilities that presently 
comply with subpart V and use the 600 volt threshold for both 
construction and maintenance work. These added costs will flow from 
instituting centralized control for these low voltage operations, 
purchasing additional grounds and implementing procedures on a daily 
basis. [Ex. 3-112]

    OSHA firmly believes that certain procedures must be followed for 
deenergizing live parts at any voltage over 50 volts71 if 
employees will be in contact with the parts during the course of work. 
Contact with electric circuit parts energized at 600 volts or less can 
be as fatal as contact with higher voltages. The basic steps necessary 
for deenergizing electric circuits are the same regardless of voltage--
first, the disconnecting means for the circuit must be opened; second, 
a method of securing the disconnecting means from accidental closure 
must be used; third, the circuit must be tested to ensure that it is in 
fact deenergized; and, fourth, measures (such as grounding) must be 
used to ensure that no hazardous voltage can be impressed on the 
circuit while employees are working. These are the steps that were 
proposed in Sec. 1910.269(m) and that have been carried into the final 
rule. These are the same steps that are set forth, without a voltage 
limitation, in 1987 NESC Section 423, on which the proposal was based 
(Ex. 2-8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\1This is also the voltage limit for the application of the 
requirement for deenergizing live parts in OSHA's electrical safety-
related work practices standard, Sec. 1910.333(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to the comments, OSHA has modified the details of the 
individual steps (that is, paragraphs in the final rule), as explained 
later in this section of the preamble (see, for example, the summary 
and explanation of paragraphs (m)(2)(ii) and (m)(3)(i)). These 
modifications have been based, not on voltage, but on the circumstances 
involved with different types of installations. For example, one of 
these circumstances is whether or not central control of the electric 
circuit is exerted. Central control of transmission and distribution 
circuits is not required by the standard (as implied by EEI) but, if 
present, necessitates modifications of the details of the basic steps 
to be taken. This is true regardless of the voltage involved.
    For these reasons, OSHA has not limited the application of 
paragraph (m) of final Sec. 1910.269 to circuit parts operating at more 
than 600 volts.
    Proposed Sec. 1910.269(m)(2) outlined how the individual provisions 
in paragraph (m)(3) would have applied under various conditions. The 
entire paragraph (m)(3) would have applied to situations in which the 
employee depended on others for deenergizing the circuits or in which 
the employee obtained authorization to perform the task himself or 
herself. All of paragraph (m)(3) would also have applied if a single 
employee, other than the system operator, was in complete control of 
the lines or equipment and of their means of disconnection. In this 
case, the employee in charge would have been required to take the place 
of the system operator, as necessary, to open and tag switches and 
other devices controlling electrical energy to the lines or equipment 
involved. (The system operator is a qualified person, commonly located 
in a control room, who operates the system or its parts.)
    If an employee was working alone and if the means of disconnection 
were visible to the employee, the only requirements of paragraph (m)(3) 
which would have applied were those directly pertaining to the 
deenergizing and reenergizing of lines and equipment. Provisions for 
tagging and for communication with others would not have applied.
    EEI suggested that this last condition be extended to apply to a 
crew of employees, as well as employees working alone (Ex. 3-112; LA 
Tr. 240-241). They argued that tags were not necessary if a single 
group of employees was working on a deenergized circuit and if the 
disconnecting means for that circuit was visibly open.
    OSHA has accepted this recommendation. The Agency agrees that, 
under certain conditions, tagging a disconnecting means that is open 
and visible to a crew as they are performing their work would not 
increase the safety of the employees. As noted by the commenters, some 
systems are under the direction of a central system operator who 
controls all switching operations. Other systems (mostly distribution 
installations) are not under any centralized control. These systems are 
energized and deenergized in the field without the direct intervention 
of a system operator. To incorporate EEI's suggestion into the final 
rule and to reflect more clearly this bifurcated approach to 
deenergizing transmission and distribution lines and equipment, OSHA 
has reorganized and revised paragraph (m)(2).
    Paragraph (m)(2)(i) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 has been carried 
forward into the final rule. The language of this provision, however, 
has been modified to make it clear that all of the requirements of 
paragraph (m)(3) apply only if a system operator is in charge of the 
lines and equipment and of their means of disconnection.
    Paragraph (m)(2)(ii) defines the general application of the rule to 
crews working on lines that are not under the control of a system 
operator. In the usual case, one employee is designated to be in charge 
of the clearance. All the requirements in paragraph (m)(3) apply, with 
the employee in charge of the clearance taking the place of the system 
operator. In this manner, the final rule provides protection against 
the unintended energizing of transmission and distribution lines 
without requiring all lines to be under the control of one employee. 
One employee in a crew will be in charge of the clearance for the crew; 
procedures will be followed to ensure that the lines are truly 
deenergized; tags will be placed on the lines; and procedures will be 
followed to remove the tags and reenergize the lines.
    However, in some cases, certain requirements contained in paragraph 
(m)(3) are not necessary for the safety of employees. If only one crew 
will be working on transmission or distribution lines and if the means 
of deenergizing the lines is accessible and visible to and under the 
sole control of the employee in charge of the clearance, the provisions 
requiring tags on the disconnecting means are unnecessary. The proposed 
rule would have applied the appropriate provisions for this situation, 
but only for employees working alone. As EEI noted in their comments, 
the hazards are basically the same whether an employee is working alone 
or as part of a crew, as long as the disconnecting means are accessible 
and visible to the employees and are under the sole control of a single 
employee.
    Therefore, paragraph (m)(2)(iii) exempts a portion of the 
requirements of paragraph (m)(3) from applying to work that is 
performed by a single crew of employees,72 if the means of 
disconnection of the lines and equipment are accessible and visible to 
and under the sole control of the employee in charge of the clearance. 
The provisions of paragraph (m)(3) that would not apply are those 
relating to (1) requesting the system operator to deenergize the lines, 
(2) automatic and remote control of the lines, (3) the wording on tags, 
(4) two crews working on the same line, and (5) tag removal. It is not 
necessary to request the system operator to deenergize the lines 
because he or she would not be in control of the disconnecting means 
for the lines. Only one person would be in charge of the clearance for 
the crew, and the means of disconnection for the lines would be 
accessible and visible to and under the control of that person.73 
Thus, tags would not be needed for the protection of the crew, and 
remote and automatic switching of the lines would not be recognized 
under paragraph (m)(2)(iii). Additionally, this paragraph does not 
apply to work performed by two crews working on lines or equipment 
controlled by the same disconnecting means. (A group of employees made 
up of several ``crews'' of employees who are under the direction of a 
single employee and who are working in a coordinated manner to 
accomplish a task on the same lines or equipment are considered to be a 
single crew, rather than as multiple independent crews, for the 
purposes of paragraph (m)(2)(iii).) If the crews are independent, each 
crew would need an employee-in-charge of its clearance. Therefore, no 
one could be considered as having sole control over the disconnecting 
means protecting the crews, and the exceptions listed in paragraph 
(m)(2)(iii) would not apply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\2An employee working alone is considered to be a ``crew'' of 
one.
    \7\3The means of disconnection is under the sole control of the 
employee in charge of the clearance, and it need only be accessible 
and visible to that employee. Other employees in the crew have no 
control whatsoever over the disconnecting means.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under any of the preceding scenarios, disconnecting means that are 
accessible to people not under the employer's control must be rendered 
inoperable. For example, a switch handle mounted at the bottom of a 
utility pole that is not on the employer's premises must be locked in 
the open position while the overhead line is deenergized. This 
requirement, which is contained in paragraph (m)(2)(iv) prevents a 
member of the general public or an employee (of a contractor, for 
example) who is not under the employer's control from closing the 
switch and energizing the line.
    Paragraph (m)(3) of final Sec. 1910.269 sets forth the exact 
procedure for deenergizing transmission and distribution lines and 
equipment. The procedure must be followed in the order presented in the 
rule. Except as noted, the rules are consistent with existing 
Sec. 1926.950(d)(1), although the language originally contained in the 
proposal was taken in large part from ANSI C2-1987, section 423. The 
Agency has attempted to simplify the language of the consensus standard 
and to write the requirements in performance-oriented terms whenever 
possible. In the final rule, OSHA has incorporated changes that are 
justified on the basis of the record considered as a whole, as noted in 
the following discussion of the individual paragraphs.
    Paragraph (m)(3)(i) requires an employee to request the system 
operator to deenergize a particular section of line or equipment. So 
that control is vested in one authority, a single designated employee 
would be assigned this task. This designated employee thus becomes the 
employee in charge of and responsible for the clearance for work.
    One commenter was concerned that this provision would require the 
presence of a foreman on the worksite (Ex. 3-2). Others thought that 
the provision would prohibit prearranged switching requests performed 
by someone who would not be performing the actual work (Ex. 3-20, 112; 
LA Tr. 241-242).
    These concerns are unfounded. The designated employee who requests 
the clearance need not be in charge of other aspects of the work; the 
regulation intends for this designated employee to be in charge of the 
clearance. He or she is responsible for requesting the clearance, for 
informing the system operator of changes in the clearance (such as 
transfer of responsibility), and for insuring that it is safe for the 
circuit to be reenergized before the clearance is released. If someone 
other than an employee at the worksite requests the clearance and if 
that clearance is in place before the employee arrives at the site, 
then clearance must be transferred under Sec. 1910.269(m)(3)(ix). The 
Agency believes that the person requesting the clearance, once the 
lines are indeed deenergized, must be the one to contact in case 
alterations in the clearance are necessary. The employees who will be 
performing the actual work at some time in the future would not 
necessarily be aware that a clearance has been requested and would not 
be in position to answer questions about the clearance.
    OSHA believes that this intent is clear from the wording of the 
last sentence of paragraph (m)(3)(i), which reads as follows: ``The 
designated employee becomes the employee in charge (as this term is 
used in paragraph of this section) and is responsible for the clearance 
[emphasis added].'' Therefore, no changes have been made to the 
language of this provision.
    The second step (paragraph (m)(3)(ii)) is to open all switches 
through which electrical energy could flow to the section of line or 
equipment. The disconnecting means must then be made inoperable if the 
design of the device permits. For example, the removable handle of a 
switch could be detached. Also, the switches must be tagged to indicate 
that employees are at work. This paragraph ensures that the lines are 
disconnected from their sources of supply and protects against the 
accidental reclosing of the switches.
    Several commenters noticed that the phrase ``lines and equipment to 
be energized'' in this paragraph in the proposal referred to lines and 
equipment that actually were to be deenergized (Ex. 3-32, 3-40, 3-42, 
3-82, 3-107, 3-112). This was an inadvertent error in the proposal, and 
it has been corrected in the final rule.
    Some commenters also expressed the concern that this provision 
would require the disconnection of hundreds of transformers, in certain 
cases, in order to eliminate possible unexpected sources of electric 
energy (Ex. 3-101, 3-123). This rule is intended to require the 
disconnection of known sources of electric energy, and the language in 
the final rule makes this clear. Hazards related to the presence of 
unexpected energy sources are controlled by testing for voltage and by 
grounding the circuit, as required by paragraphs (m)(3)(v) and 
(m)(3)(vi), respectively.
    Paragraph (m)(3)(iii) requires the tagging of automatically and 
remotely controlled switches. An automatically or remotely controlled 
switch must also be rendered inoperable if the design of the switch 
allows for it to be made inoperable. This provision would also protect 
employees from being injured as a result of the automatic operation of 
such switches.
    In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested public comment on 
whether it is appropriate to require all new and replacement switches 
that are to be automatically or remotely controlled to be designed so 
that they could be rendered inoperable and on whether it is feasible 
for such switches to be so designed.
    Some commenters supported such a requirement (Ex. 3-76, 3-107; DC 
Tr. 416-417). The UWUA argued that all disconnecting means should be 
locked out and under the control of the employee performing the work 
(DC Tr. 416-417). Mr. G. F. Stone of the Tennessee Valley Authority 
claimed that it would be feasible to require new switches to be 
designed so that they could be rendered inoperable only if the rule 
applied to automatically or remotely controlled switches (Ex. 3-82).
    Three commenters opposed such a requirement (Ex. 3-59, 3-81, 3-
112). Mr. James W. Broome of the Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, 
Inc., expressed the view that the procedures already in place 
adequately protect employees and that any requirement for changes in 
the design of automatic and remotely controlled switches would increase 
the cost of these devices (Ex. 3-59). EEI believed that there were too 
many different types of switches in use and that most of them currently 
have the capability of disabling the automatic or remote control 
feature (Ex. 3-112). Agreeing with EEI, the National Electrical 
Manufacturers Association, which represents manufacturers of such 
devices, also opposed regulations requiring a change in the design of 
these devices (Ex. 3-81).
    There is insufficient evidence on the record to determine whether 
or not it is feasible to require automatically and remotely controlled 
switches to be capable of having the automatic or remote control 
feature disabled. In any event, the procedures required by the standard 
will protect employees from the hazards involved. Paragraph (m)(3)(iii) 
requires automatically and remotely controlled switches to be tagged at 
the point of control. This alerts the person who would initiate action 
to reenergize the circuit that the line or equipment is deenergized for 
the protection of employees. The only way the line or equipment could 
be reenergized is for someone to override the tag, and the requirements 
of paragraph (m) are intended to prevent that. Therefore, the Agency is 
not adopting a requirement that new automatically and remotely 
controlled switches be designed so that they could be rendered 
inoperable.
    Paragraph (m)(3)(iv) requires tags to prohibit operation of the 
switches to which they are attached. They are also required to state 
that employees are at work.
    After the previous four requirements have been met and after the 
employee in charge of the work has been given a clearance by the system 
operator, paragraph (m)(3)(v) requires the lines or equipment to be 
tested. This test ensures that the lines have in fact been deenergized 
and is intended to prevent accidents resulting from someone's opening 
the wrong disconnect. It also protects employees from hazards 
associated with unknown sources of electric energy.
    The proposal would have required the testing to be performed by the 
employee in charge. Mr. Carl D. Behnke of EEI and Mr. G. F. Stone of 
the Tennessee Valley Authority suggested allowing other employees to 
perform the testing (Ex. 3-82).
    OSHA believes that it is not necessary for the employee in charge 
to perform the actual testing. Therefore, Mr. Behnke's and Mr. Stone's 
suggestions have been accepted, and the final rule does not specify who 
is to execute the tests.
    Edison Electric Institute and Oglethorpe Power Company recommended 
allowing visual determination of whether a line was deenergized (Ex. 3-
102, 3-112).
    Existing Sec. 1926.950(d)(1)(iii) permits visual inspection in lieu 
of tests. However, especially because of the increasing amount of 
cogeneration (electric generation of power by customers of the 
utility), which can unknowingly supply lines with electricity, a visual 
determination of the state of energization is not always accurate. The 
IBEW supported this view, stating:

    The IBEW supports OSHA in the requirement that a test of the 
lines or equipment be made after clearance has been given by the 
system operator. A visual inspection cannot reliably determine if a 
line is deenergized. The IBEW has had reports from its local unions 
where the failure to test lines or equipment for the absence of 
voltage was a critical factor in an accident. [Ex. 3-107]

    OSHA has concluded that it is important that lines and equipment on 
which work is to be performed always be tested for an energized 
condition, so that employees will not falsely believe that the line or 
equipment is deenergized. As the IBEW comment indicates and as the 
accident descriptions in the record demonstrate (Ex. 9-2, 12-12), the 
failure to test for voltage has been a cause of accidents. Therefore, 
the final rule does not allow visual inspection in lieu of testing the 
lines or equipment.
    Paragraph (m)(3)(vi) requires the installation of any protective 
grounds required by Sec. 1910.269(n) at this point in the sequence of 
events. Since the lines or equipment have been deenergized and tested 
in accordance with the previous provisions, it is now safe to install a 
protective ground.
    After the six previous rules have been followed, paragraph 
(m)(3)(vii) permits the lines or equipment to be treated as 
deenergized.
    Paragraph (m)(3)(viii) requires each independent crew to follow the 
steps outlined in Sec. 1910.269(m)(3) separately, to ensure that a 
group of workers does not make faulty assumptions about what steps have 
been or will be taken by another group to deenergize lines or 
equipment.
    Three commenters stated that some utilities use one tag for all 
crews involved, maintaining a log to identify each crew separately (Ex. 
3-20, 3-27, 3-112). They recommended that the standard allow this 
practice to continue.
    Paragraph (m)(3) of final Sec. 1910.269 does not require a separate 
tag for each crew (nor did paragraph (m)(3) in the proposal); it does 
require, however, separate clearances for each crew. There must be one 
employee in charge of the clearance for each crew, and the clearance 
for a crew is held by this employee. In complying with paragraph 
(m)(3)(viii), the employer must ensure that no tag is removed unless 
its associated clearances are released (paragraph (m)(3)(xii)) and that 
no action is taken at a given point of disconnection until all 
protective grounds have been removed, until all crews have released 
their clearances, until all employees are clear of the lines or 
equipment, and until all tags have been removed at that point of 
disconnection (paragraph (m)(3)(xiii)).
     In some cases, as when an employee in charge has to leave the job 
because of illness, it may be necessary to transfer a clearance. Under 
such conditions, paragraph (m)(3)(ix) requires that the employee in 
charge inform the system operator and that the employees in the crew be 
informed of the transfer. If the employee holding the clearance is 
forced to leave the worksite due to illness or other emergency, the 
employee's supervisor could inform the system operator of the transfer 
in clearance. (The proposed rule used the term ``forced absence''. As a 
clarification, the final rule replaces this term with language stating 
specifically that the absence is ``forced'' due to illness or other 
emergency.)
    After the clearance is transferred, the new employee in charge is 
then responsible for the clearance. It is important that only one 
employee at a time be responsible for any clearance; otherwise, 
independent action by any worker could endanger the entire crew.
    Once work is completed, the clearance will have to be released so 
that the lines or equipment can be reenergized. Paragraph (m)(3)(x) 
covers this procedure. To ensure that it is safe to release the 
clearance, the employee in charge must: (1) Notify workers in the crew 
of the release, (2) determine that they are clear of the lines and 
equipment, (3) determine that grounds have been removed, and (4) notify 
the system operator that the clearance is to be released.
    Paragraph (m)(3)(xii) in the proposal would have required that the 
employee requesting tag removal be the one who requested its placement. 
The intent of this proposed rule was to ensure that any one clearance 
is always under the control of a single employee.
    Several commenters pointed out that the description of this 
provision in the preamble depicted the actual procedure for releasing a 
clearance but the rule itself did not (Ex. 3-20, 3-27, 3-112; LA Tr. 
243-244). The preamble text stated: ``Paragraph (m)(3)(xii) proposes 
that the employee releasing the clearance be the one who was 
responsible for requesting it.'' Mr. Howard D. Wilcox of Consumers 
Power Company, representing EEI, pointed out that the person normally 
requesting tag placement is literally the system operator (LA Tr. 243-
244). He stated that when a request is actually made to remove the tag 
the person requesting its removal could quite possibly be someone else 
acting in that capacity. All these commenters agreed that the person 
releasing the clearance would be the same one who requested it.
    OSHA has accepted these suggestions. The language of this provision 
in the final rule, which has been moved to paragraph (m)(3)(xi) to 
reflect its true position in the procedure, now conforms to the 
description of the proposed rule. The person who is releasing the 
clearance must be the one who requested it, unless responsibility has 
been transferred. However, because the persons who place and remove the 
tags may not be the same, it is important for the regulation to 
prohibit removing a tag without the release of the clearance by the 
employee who is responsible for it. Therefore, OSHA has added a 
requirement adopting this prohibition as paragraph (m)(3)(xii) of final 
Sec. 1910.269. It should be noted that the person requesting a 
clearance is the employee in charge of the clearance under paragraph 
(m)(3)(i). If the supervisor or the system operator is the person who 
originally requested the clearance, the clearance must be transferred 
to another employee under paragraph (m)(3)(ix) before that employee can 
become responsible for the clearance.
    According to paragraph (m)(3)(xiii), action may be taken to 
reenergize the lines or equipment only after grounds and tags have been 
removed, after all clearances have been released, and after all 
employees are in the clear. This protects employees from the 
possibility that the line or equipment could be reenergized while 
employees are still at work.
    Several commenters objected to the language of this provision as 
proposed in paragraph (m)(3)(xi) (Ex. 3-20, 3-42, 3-62, 3-112; LA Tr. 
229-230, 242-243). They were concerned that this requirement would 
force employees to remove all tags from all disconnecting means, then 
retrace their steps to reclose the switches, even if they were miles 
apart. For example, a 5-mile section of line could be deenergized by 
opening and tagging switches at each end of the line. These commenters 
were concerned that the standard would require them to remove the tags 
from one end, and then travel 5 miles to the other end to remove the 
tags there before any switch could be closed.
    The Agency did not intend for this provision to require the removal 
of all tags from all disconnecting means before any of them could be 
reclosed. It was intended to require that all tags for any particular 
switch be removed before that switch was closed. It is very important 
in a tagging system that no energy isolating device be returned to a 
position allowing energy flow if there are any tags on it that are 
protecting employees. OSHA has reworded the language of proposed 
Sec. 1910.269(m)(3)(xi) to reflect its meaning more accurately. In the 
case of the 5-mile section of line used in the earlier example, after 
all the tags were removed from any one switch that one switch could 
then be closed. The Agency believes that paragraph (m)(3)(xiii) of 
final Sec. 1910.269 will eliminate the objections raised by the 
commenters.
    Paragraph (n). Sometimes, normally energized lines and equipment 
which have been deenergized to permit employees to work become 
accidentally energized. This can happen in several ways, for example, 
by contact with another energized circuit, by voltage backfeed from a 
customer's cogeneration installation, by lightning contact, or by 
failure of the clearance system outlined in Sec. 1910.269(m).
    Transmission and distribution lines and equipment are normally 
installed outdoors where they are exposed to damage from the weather 
and from actions taken by members of the general public. Many utility 
poles are installed alongside roadways where they may be struck by 
motor vehicles. Distribution lines have been damaged by falling trees, 
and transmission line insulators have been used for target practice. 
Additionally, customers fed by a utility company's distribution line 
may have cogeneration or backup generation capability, sometimes 
without the utility company's knowledge. All these factors can 
reenergize a deenergized transmission or distribution line or 
equipment. Energized lines can be knocked down onto deenergized lines. 
A backup generator or a cogenerator can cause voltage backfeed on the 
deenergized power line. Lastly, lightning, even miles from the 
worksite, can reenergize a line. All of these problems pose hazards to 
employees working on deenergized transmission and distribution lines 
and equipment. In fact, these problems have been a factor in 14 of the 
accidents in Exhibit 9-2.
    Grounding the lines and equipment is used to protect employees from 
injury should such reenergizing occur. Grounding also provides 
protection against induced voltages and static charges on a line. 
(These induced and static voltages can be high enough to endanger 
employees, either directly from electric shock or indirectly from 
involuntary reaction.)
    Grounding, as a temporary protective measure, involves connecting 
the deenergized lines and equipment to earth through conductors. As 
long as the conductors remain deenergized, this maintains the lines and 
equipment at the same potential as the earth. However, if voltage is 
impressed on a line, the voltage on the grounded line rises to a value 
dependent upon the impressed voltage, the impedance between its source 
and the grounding point, and the impedance of the grounding conductor.
    Various techniques are used to limit the voltage to which an 
employee working on a grounded line would be exposed. Bonding is one of 
these techniques. Conductive objects within the reach of the employee 
are bonded together to create an equipotential work area for the 
employee. Within this area of equal potentials, voltage differences are 
limited to a safe value.
    Paragraph (n) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses protective grounding 
and bonding.\74\ As noted in paragraph (n)(1), entire paragraph (n) 
applies to the grounding of deenergized transmission and distribution 
lines and equipment for the purpose of protecting employees. 
Additionally, paragraph (n)(1) indicates that paragraph (n)(4) applies 
to the protective grounding of nonelectrical equipment, such as aerial 
lift trucks, as well. Under normal conditions, such equipment would not 
be connected to a source of electric energy. However, to protect 
employees in case of accidental contact of the equipment with live 
parts, protective grounding is required elsewhere in the standard (in 
Sec. 1910.269(q)(3)(xi), for example); and, to ensure the adequacy of 
this grounding, the provisions of paragraph (n)(4) must be followed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\As used throughout the rest of this discussion and within 
paragraph (n) of final Sec. 1910.269, the term ``grounding'' 
includes bonding. Technically, grounding refers to the connection of 
a conductive part to ground, whereas bonding refers to connecting 
conductive parts to each other. However, for convenience, OSHA is 
using the term ``grounding'' to refer to both techniques of 
minimizing voltages to which an employee will be exposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Three commenters objected to the inclusion of systems of 600 volts 
and less within the scope of paragraph (n) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 
(Ex. 3-20, 3-80, 3-120). They argued that the cramped spaces involved 
made working with grounds more hazardous than working without them.
    OSHA has not accepted these changes. Neither existing Sec. 1926.954 
nor the NESC limit the application of grounding requirements to 
voltages over 600 volts. In fact, even the EEI/IBEW draft standard 
contained no such limitation. Additionally, the commenters did not 
provide any information indicating that work on ungrounded deenergized 
equipment normally operating at 600 volts or less is safe. The Agency 
is particularly concerned that undetected voltage from a customer's 
generating system may backfeed the low voltage circuit and energize the 
line while the employee is working. Several of the accidents in the 
record occurred in this manner (Ex. 9-2). Although the employee usually 
happened to be working on the high voltage side of a transformer in 
these cases, a similar result would have occurred had the worker been 
contacting the low voltage side. For these reasons, no voltage 
limitation has been included in paragraph (n)(1) of final 
Sec. 1910.269.
    The general requirement contained in paragraph (n)(2) states the 
conditions under which lines and equipment must be grounded. Basically, 
in order for lines or equipment to be treated as deenergized, they must 
be deenergized under paragraph (m) of final Sec. 1910.269 and grounded. 
Grounding may be omitted only if the installation of a ground is 
impracticable (such as during the initial stages of work on underground 
cables, when the conductor is not exposed for grounding) or if the 
conditions resulting from the installation of a ground would introduce 
more serious hazards than work without grounds. It is expected that 
conditions warranting the absence of protective grounds will be 
relatively rare.
    In the preamble to the notice of proposed rulemaking, OSHA invited 
public comment on what conditions were appropriate for this exception 
and on whether the standard should list the specific types of 
conditions for which grounding would not be required. Several 
commenters provided examples of situations where grounding would not be 
required under the proposed requirement (Ex. 3-13, 3-20, 3-42, 3-45, 3-
112). However, no definitive guidelines were presented. Therefore, the 
language of paragraph (n)(2) of final Sec. 1910.269 has not been 
changed from that in the proposal.
    If grounds are not installed and the lines and equipment are to be 
treated as deenergized, however, precautions have to be observed, and 
certain conditions must be met. Obviously, the lines and equipment 
still must be deenergized by the procedures of Sec. 1910.269(m). Also, 
there may be no possibility of contact with another source of voltage, 
and the hazard of induced voltage may not be present. Since these 
precautions and conditions do not protect against the possible 
reenergizing of the lines or equipment under all conditions, the 
omission of grounding is permitted only in very limited circumstances.
    Paragraph (n)(3) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 would have required 
protective grounds to be installed at the work location. However, if it 
was not feasible to provide a ground where the employee is working, 
grounds would have been required on both sides of the work location. 
This was to provide for situations such as those that could arise when 
an employee worked from an aerial lift between two structures 
supporting a transmission or distribution line.
    Several commenters objected to the language in the proposal and 
suggested that OSHA use the wording similar to that contained in the 
EEI/IBEW draft standard or in Sec. 1926.954(f) (Ex. 3-2, 3-42, 3-112, 
3-123, 56; DC Tr. 929-931). They argued that grounding on both sides of 
the work location is a common and accepted method of protecting 
employees from the hazards associated with deenergized lines. Two other 
commenters stated that placement of grounds on each side of the work 
location does not necessarily protect the employee (Ex. 3-44, 3-58). 
They argued that such grounds are intended to operate the protective 
equipment for the circuit.
    EEI pointed to the IEEE proposed Guide for Protective Grounding of 
Power Lines, IEEE P1048-1989, as evidence supporting their position 
that employers should be given the choice as to what method of 
grounding should be used (Ex. 3-112). On behalf of EEI, Mr. Carl D. 
Behnke stated:

    The specification of the placement of protective grounds cannot 
be treated with a simple, one paragraph regulation. For example, on 
page 8 of IEEE's recently published ``Guide for Protective Grounding 
on Power Lines'', prepared by Work Group 15.07.06, Safety and 
Regulations, Engineering in the Safety, Maintenance, and Operation 
of Line[s] Subcommittee, Transmission and Distribution Committee 
(ESMOL), IEEE Power Engineering Society, the Work Group states:

The decision to use work site grounds (single point) or bracketed 
(adjacent structure grounds) involves evaluation of the electrical 
risk to all members of the crew and requires analysis of line design 
and permanent structure grounding practices of the industry.
* * * * *
    The IEEE guide referred to above illustrates on pages 11-12 the 
varying practices of selected companies, and the varying practices 
used in transmission as opposed to distribution work. Since some 
companies use single point grounding, OSHA might conclude that 
single point is ``feasible,'' in that ``it is capable of being 
done.'' But this does not mean it can be required for all utilities 
under section 3(8) in a safety standard. The IEEE guide demonstrates 
that various grounding methods provide safety, and that one method 
is not necessarily superior to the other.
* * * * *
    The question of grounding for the protection of employees has 
long been, and still remains, a subject for debate among those 
knowledgeable and experienced in the electric utility industry and 
engineering fields. OSHA's concern should be whether grounds are 
provided in such a manner so as to provide protection for workers, 
and not the specific location of the grounds.
    In developing safe work practices and procedures for the 
construction and maintenance of overhead power lines, many factors 
must be considered. Grounding strategies which will afford maximum 
protection for workers can be accomplished in a variety of ways 
which do not necessarily include placing grounds at the very 
location where workers are positioned.

    Others supported OSHA's preference for single point grounds 
wherever possible (Ex. 3-29, 3-53, 3-55, 3-107). At the hearing and in 
the post-hearing comment period, the IBEW went further to suggest that 
the standard provide an equipotential work area for the exposed 
employees (Ex. 64; DC Tr. 543-545). Mr. James L. Dushaw, Director of 
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers' Safety and Health 
Department testified in support of this position as follows:

    Reasonable and technically sound provisions for protective 
grounding of lines and equipment is fundamental to the safety of 
line workers. It is remarkable that the well-recognized concept of 
creating [an] equipotential work zone is not better accepted and 
established.
* * * * *
    The fundamental purpose of the equipotential work zone is to 
minimize electric current flow across the worker's body. It is very 
simple and should be easily understood.
    The proposed rule requires temporary protective grounds as 
required be placed at the work location or, in the alternative, on 
each side of the work location as close to it as possible.
    Given the stated knowledge about performance of protective 
grounds for line workers working from or close to poles or other 
supporting structures that are at ground potential or a percentage 
of ground potential, the OSHA proposal does not provide adequate 
protection for workers where conductors may become energized as 
discussed in OSHA's summary and explanation of the proposed 
standard.
    It has become clear that, standing alone, grounds installed on 
either side of the work location or bracketed grounds do not prevent 
potentially lethal current from reaching and flowing through the 
worker.
    I think there is a conception here that with electrical power 
that in bracketed grounds somehow those bracketed grounds are going 
to stop the electric current from flowing through the worker and it 
simply doesn't happen. The current takes every path.
* * * * *
    Similarly, grounds installed at the work location without 
bonding or connection directly to the pole or structure at a point 
close or-below the work area does not diminish the current flow 
through the worker who is in contact with the line and the structure 
simultaneously.
* * * * *
    Our Union recommends that OSHA revise 1910.269 paragraph 
((n)(3)) to performance based language as follows. * * * temporary 
protective grounds shall be placed at locations in such a manner as 
to prevent worker exposure to hazardous differences in electrical 
potentials. (DC Tr. 543-545)

    A similar performance-oriented approach was also supported by the 
American Public Power Association and by the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(Ex. 3-80, 3-82). At the public hearing, EEI also lent limited support 
to the IBEW approach, as follows:

    The proposed language that you have seen (that was contained in 
the EEl/IBEW draft) is a reflection of our industry safety rules and 
safe work practices that are in place because they work and we urge 
you to allow these safe practices to continue.
    In the alternative, the performance-oriented language that was 
submitted the other day by the IBEW through Mr. Dushaw's testimony 
appears to be an acceptable option that would provide the level of 
flexibility that we need. (DC Tr. 930)

     OSHA reviewed the accidents in Ex. 9-2 and Ex. 9-2A for those 
involving improper protective grounding. There were nine accidents in 
these two exhibits related to protective grounding. In three cases, 
inadequate grounds were present. Based on the fact that grounding is a 
backup measure, intended to provide protection only when all other 
safety-related work practices fail, OSHA believes that this is a 
significant incidence of faulty grounding. Grounding practices that do 
not provide an equipotential zone in which an employee is safeguarded 
from voltage differences do not provide complete protection. In case 
the line is accidentally reenergized, voltages to which an employee 
would be exposed due to inadequate grounding would be lethal, as can be 
seen by some of the exhibits in the record (Ex. 6-27, 57). The employee 
would be protected only if he or she is not in contact with the line 
until the energy source is cleared by circuit protective 
devices.75
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\5Facilitating the opening of circuit protective devices is 
another function of protective grounding. However, on the basis of 
the record, OSHA believes this is secondary to providing a safe area 
in which employees can work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For these reasons, OSHA has accepted the IBEW approach to the 
problem. Final Sec. 1910.269 (n)(3) requires protective grounds to be 
so located and arranged that employees are not exposed to hazardous 
differences in potential. The final rule thus allows employers and 
employees to use whatever grounding method they prefer as long as 
employees are protected. For employees working at elevated positions on 
poles and towers, single point grounding may be necessary, together 
with grounding straps to provide an equipotential zone for the worker. 
Employees in insulated aerial lifts working at midspan between two 
conductor supporting structures may be protected by grounding at 
convenient points on both sides of the work area. Bonding the aerial 
lift to the grounded conductor will ensure that the employee remains at 
the potential of the conductor in case of a fault. Other methods may be 
necessary to protect workers on the ground, including grounding mats 
and insulating platforms. The Agency believes that this performance-
oriented approach will provide the flexibility needed by employers, but 
will afford the best protection to employees.
    Paragraph (n)(4) contains requirements that grounding equipment 
must meet. So that the protective grounding equipment does not fail, it 
is required to have an ampacity high enough so that the fault current 
would be carried for the amount of time necessary to allow protective 
devices to interrupt the circuit. This provision is contained in 
paragraph (n)(4)(i) of final Sec. 1910.269. One commenter noted that 
the fault current is not always single-phase to ground as implied by 
the proposal, but can also be phase to phase or three-phase to ground 
(Ex. 3-45). The language in the final rule requires the protective 
grounding equipment to be able to carry the maximum fault current, 
regardless of the type of fault. Also, as suggested by another 
commenter (Ex. 3-120), OSHA has added a note referencing the ASTM 
standard on protective grounding equipment (ASTM F855-83).
    Under paragraph (n)(4)(ii), the impedance of the grounding 
equipment is required to be low enough to ensure the quick operation of 
the protective devices. As recommended by a commenter (Ex. 3-40), the 
phrase ``impedance to ground'' contained in the proposal has been 
changed to ``impedance'' in the final rule. This change recognizes that 
the relevant impedance is sometimes between phases rather than between 
phase and ground, and the revision is consistent with the modification 
of the preceding paragraph.
    Paragraphs (n)(4)(i) and (n)(4)(ii) help ensure the prompt clearing 
of the circuit supplying voltage to the point where the employee is 
working. Thus, the grounding equipment limits the duration and reduce 
the severity of any electric shock, though it does not itself prevent 
shock from occurring.
    Paragraph (n)(5) of Sec. 1910.269 requires lines and equipment that 
are to be grounded to be tested for voltage before a ground is 
installed. If a previously installed ground is evident, no test need be 
conducted. This requirement prevents energized equipment from being 
grounded, which could result in injury to the employee installing the 
ground.
    The proposed version of this paragraph would have required the test 
to determine that the line or equipment was ``absent of voltage''. Many 
commenters suggested that the standard require only that the line or 
equipment be free of nominal voltage (Ex. 3-20, 3-33, 3-42, 3-44, 3-58, 
3-69, 3-80, 3-82, 3-102, 3-112, 3-123; DC Tr. 719). They argued that 
lines which are deenergized frequently have voltage induced on them 
from other nearby energized lines and that it was safe to install 
grounds as long as the nominal line voltage was absent. OSHA has 
accepted this argument. Final Sec. 1910.269(n)(5) requires that the 
line or equipment be free of nominal voltage.76
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\6``Nominal voltage'' is discussed in the definition of 
``voltage'' as follows:
    The nominal voltage of a system or circuit is the value assigned 
to a system or circuit of a given voltage class for the purpose of 
convenient designation. The operating voltage of the system may vary 
above or below this value.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraphs (n)(6) and (n)(7) set forth the procedure for installing 
and removing grounds. To protect employees in the event that the 
``deenergized'' equipment to be grounded is or becomes energized, the 
standard requires the ``equipment end'' of the grounding device to be 
applied last and removed first and that a live-line tool be used for 
both procedures in order to protect workers.
    The proposal would have required the use of a live-line tool or 
``other insulated device''. Several commenters were concerned that this 
language implied that rubber insulating gloves could be used to install 
and remove grounds (Ex. 3-11, 3-44, 3-58, 3-69, 3-71, 3-123). They 
noted that it was unsafe for an employee to be too close when 
connecting or disconnecting a ground and urged OSHA to eliminate the 
phrase ``or other insulated device'' from the rule.
    The Agency agrees with these commenters and has adopted their 
suggestion in the final rule. OSHA will consider any device that is 
insulated for the voltage and that allows an employee to apply or 
remove the ground from a safe position to be a live-line tool for the 
purposes of Sec. 1910.269 (n)(6) and (n)(7). It should be noted that, 
during the periods before the ground is installed and after it is 
removed, the line or equipment involved must be considered as energized 
(under paragraph (l)(1)). As a result, the minimum approach distances 
specified in paragraph (l)(2) apply when grounds are installed or 
removed.
    With certain underground cable installations, a fault at one 
location along the cable can create a substantial potential difference 
between the earth at that location and the earth at other locations. 
Under normal conditions, this is not a hazard. However, if an employee 
is in contact with a remote ground (by being in contact with a 
conductor that is grounded at a remote station), he or she can be 
exposed to the difference in potential (because he or she is also in 
contact with the local ground). To protect employees in such 
situations, paragraph (n)(8) prohibits grounding cables at remote 
locations if a hazardous potential transfer could occur under fault 
conditions.
    Paragraph (n)(9) addresses the removal of grounds for test 
purposes. Under the proposal, the previously grounded lines and 
equipment would have had to be treated as energized while they remain 
ungrounded.
    Several commenters objected to this proposed provision (Ex. 3-20, 
3-42, 3-80, 3-101, 3-112). They were concerned that the tests could not 
be performed if the equipment was considered energized. To correct this 
problem, some of these commenters suggested the following language from 
the EEI/IBEW draft standard:

    Grounds may be temporarily removed only when necessary for test 
purposes and caution shall be exercised during the test procedures. 
(Ex. 2-3)

    OSHA acknowledges the problems that the proposed rule would have 
caused. However, the Agency does not believe that the language proposed 
in the EEI/IBEW draft contains any safeguards for employees. Certainly, 
such a requirement would be difficult to enforce. To resolve this 
issue, OSHA has adopted the following language in final 
Sec. 1910.269(n)(9):

    Grounds may be removed temporarily during tests. During the test 
procedure, the employer shall ensure that each employee uses 
insulating equipment and is isolated from any hazards involved, and 
the employer shall institute any additional measures as may be 
necessary to protect each exposed employee in case the previously 
grounded lines and equipment become energized.

    The examples of precautions that should be taken are based on 
suggestions of New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, Inc., Federated 
Rural Electric Insurance Company, National Utility Training and Safety 
Education Association, and Oglethorpe Power Company (Ex. 3-11, 3-44, 3-
58, 3-102). OSHA believes that this approach will address the concerns 
of the commenters objecting to the proposal but will still protect 
employees.
    Paragraph (o). Paragraph (o) of final Sec. 1910.269 sets forth 
safety work practices covering electrical hazards arising out of the 
special testing of lines and equipment (namely, in-service and out-of-
service, as well as new, lines and equipment) to determine maintenance 
needs and fitness for service. Generally, the need to conduct tests on 
new and idle lines and equipment as part of normal checkout procedures, 
in addition to maintenance evaluation, is specified in the National 
Electrical Safety Code (ANSI C2). Basically, as stated in paragraph 
(o)(1), the rules apply only to testing involving interim measurements 
utilizing high voltage, high power, or combinations of both, as opposed 
to testing involving continuous measurements as in routine metering, 
relaying and normal line work.
    For the purposes of these requirements, high-voltage testing is 
assumed to involve voltage sources having sufficient energy to cause 
injury and having magnitudes generally in excess of 1000 volts, 
nominal. High-power testing involves sources where fault currents, load 
currents, magnetizing currents, or line dropping currents are used for 
testing, either at the rated voltage of the equipment under test or at 
lower voltages. Paragraph (o) covers such testing in laboratories, in 
shops and substations, and in the field and on transmission and 
distribution lines.
    Examples of typical special tests in which either high-voltage 
sources or high-power sources are used as part of operation and 
maintenance of electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution systems include cable-fault locating, large capacitive 
load tests, high current fault-closure tests, insulation resistance and 
leakage tests, direct-current proof tests, and other tests requiring 
direct connection to power lines.
    Excluded from the scope of paragraph (o) are routine inspection and 
maintenance measurements made by qualified employees in accordance with 
established work practice rules where the hazards associated with the 
use of intrinsic high-voltage or high-power sources require only those 
normal precautions peculiar to such periodic work. Obviously, the work 
practices for these routine tests must comply with the rest of final 
Sec. 1910.269. Because this type of testing poses hazards that are 
identical to other types of routine electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution work, OSHA has determined that the 
requirements of Sec. 1910.269 excluding paragraph (o) adequately 
protect employees performing these tests. Two typical examples of such 
excluded test work procedures would be ``phasing-out'' testing and 
testing for a ``no voltage'' condition. To clarify the scope of this 
paragraph in the final rule, as suggested by two commenters (Ex. 3-20, 
3-80), a note to this effect has been added after paragraph (o)(1). 
Additionally, because the scope of final Sec. 1910.269 has been 
extended to cover non-utilities, proposed language limiting the 
application of paragraph (o) to electric utilities has been removed. 
(See the discussion of final Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(i).)
    Paragraph (o)(2)(i) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires employers to 
establish work practices governing employees engaged in certain testing 
activities. These work practices are intended to delineate precautions 
that employees must observe for protection from the hazards of high-
voltage or high-power testing. For example, if high-voltage sources are 
used in the testing, employees are required to follow the safety 
practices established under paragraph (o)(2)(i) to protect against such 
typical hazards as inadvertent arcing or voltage overstress 
destruction, as well as accidental contact with objects which have 
become residually charged by induced voltage from electric field 
exposure. If high-power sources are used in the testing, employees are 
required to follow established safety practices to protect against such 
typical hazards as ground voltage rise as well as exposure to excessive 
electromagnetically-caused physical forces associated with the passage 
of heavy current.
    These practices apply to work performed at both permanent and 
temporary test areas (that is, areas permanently located in the 
controlled environment of a laboratory or shop and in areas temporarily 
located in a non-controlled field environment). At a minimum, the 
safety work practices are required to cover the following types of 
test-associated activities:
    (1) Guarding the test area to prevent inadvertent contact with 
energized parts,
    (2) Safe grounding practices to be observed,
    (3) Precautions to be taken in the use of control and measuring 
circuits, and
    (4) Periodic checks of field test areas.
    Paragraph (o)(2)(ii) complements the general rule on the use of 
safe work practices in test areas with a requirement that all employees 
involved in this type of work be trained in these safety test 
practices. This paragraph further requires a periodic review of these 
practices to be conducted from time to time as a means of providing 
reemphasis and updating.
    Although specific work practices used in test areas are generally 
unique to the particular test being conducted, three basic elements 
affecting safety are commonly found to some degree at all test sites: 
Guarding, grounding, and the safe utilization of control and measuring 
circuits. By considering safe work practices in these three categories, 
OSHA has attempted to achieve a performance-oriented standard 
applicable to high-voltage and high-power testing and test facilities.
    OSHA believes that guarding can best be achieved when it is 
provided both around and within test areas. By controlling access to 
all parts that are likely to become energized by either direct or 
inductive coupling, the standard will prevent accidental contact by 
employees. Paragraph (o)(3)(i) requires permanent test areas to be 
guarded by having them completely enclosed by walls or some other type 
of physical barrier. In the case of field testing, paragraph (o)(3)(ii) 
attempts to achieve a level of safety for temporary test sites 
comparable to that achieved in laboratory test areas. For these areas, 
a barricade of tapes and cones or observation by an attendant are 
acceptable methods of guarding.
    Three commenters objected to the specification of safety tape with 
signs as the only acceptable type of barricade or barrier (Ex. 3-69, 3-
82, 3-112). They suggested a performance-oriented approach that would 
accept other types of barriers or barricades. OSHA has accepted this 
suggestion. Final Sec. 1910.269(o)(3)(ii)(B) accepts any barrier or 
barricade that provides a means of limiting access to the test area 
physically and visually equivalent to safety tape with signs.
    Since the effectiveness of the temporary guarding means can be 
severely compromised by failing to remove it when it is not required, 
frequent safety checks must be made to monitor its use. For example, 
leaving barriers in place for a week at a time when testing is 
performed only an hour or two per day is likely to result in disregard 
for the barriers. For this reason, paragraph (o)(3)(iii) requires the 
temporary barriers to be removed when they are no longer needed.
    Within test areas, whether temporary or permanent, additional 
safety can be achieved by observing the guarding practices that control 
access to test areas. Paragraph (o)(3)(iv) therefore requires that such 
guarding be provided if the test equipment or apparatus under test may 
become energized as part of the testing by either direct or inductive 
coupling. A combination of guards and barriers, preferably interlocked, 
is intended to provide protection to all employees in the vicinity.
    Suitable grounding is another important work practice that can be 
employed for the protection of personnel from the hazards of high-
voltage or high-power testing. If high currents are intentionally 
employed in the testing, an isolated ground-return conductor, adequate 
for the service, is required so that no intentional passage of heavy 
current, with its attendant voltage rise, will occur in the ground grid 
or in the earth. Another safety consideration involving grounding is 
that all conductive parts accessible to the test operator during the 
time that the equipment is operating at high voltage be maintained at 
ground potential, except portions of the equipment that are isolated 
from the test operator by suitable guarding. Paragraph (o)(4) of final 
Sec. 1910.269 contains requirements for proper grounding at test sites.
    Paragraph (o)(4)(i) requires that grounding practices be 
established and implemented for test facilities and that the basic 
grounding practice be to treat as energized all ungrounded terminals of 
test equipment or apparatus under test until reliably determined 
otherwise. Paragraph (o)(4)(ii) requires visible grounds to be properly 
applied before work is performed on the circuit or item or apparatus 
under test.
    Paragraph (o)(4)(iii) addresses hazards resulting from the use of 
inadequate ground-returns in which a voltage rise in the ground grid or 
in the earth can result whenever high currents are employed in the 
testing. Test personnel who may be exposed to such potentials are 
required to be protected from the hazards involved.
    Proposed Sec. 1910.269(o)(4)(iii) would have required the employer 
to establish an essentially equipotential safe area through the use of 
an isolated ground-return system. Three commenters objected to this 
requirement (Ex. 3-20, 3-35, 3-80). Exemplifying their objections, Mr. 
Eldon A. Cotton of the Department of Water and Power of the City of Los 
Angeles submitted the following comment:


    To insure the validity of test results, occasionally power 
systems must be tested under actual operating conditions. These 
tests can require high ground currents (e.g., system fault tests). 
To fully test control and protective relay system response or power 
system recovery characteristics during a major disturbance, testing 
must be as realistic as possible. This is not accomplished by 
requiring an isolated ground current return system from a fault 
staged miles from the power system facility.
    Before performing such operational tests, qualified electrical 
engineers study system conditions and develop appropriate test 
plans. The primary responsibility of individuals writing these test 
plans is to assure the safety of personnel and equipment under 
expected and unexpected conditions. Utilities have a long history of 
safety when staging tests requiring large ground currents. [Ex. 3-
20]

    OSHA agrees that, under such conditions, it is not reasonable to 
require an isolated ground-return conductor system. Therefore, 
paragraph (o)(4)(iii) of final Sec. 1910.269 provides an exception to 
the requirement for such a system. The exception applies if the 
isolated ground-return cannot be provided because of the distance 
involved and if employees are protected from hazardous step and touch 
potentials that may develop. Consideration must always be given to the 
possibility of voltage gradients developing in the earth during 
impulse, short-circuit, inrush, or oscillatory conditions. Such 
voltages may appear between the feet of an observer, or between his or 
her body and a grounded object, and are usually referred to as ``step'' 
and ``touch'' potentials. Examples of acceptable protection from step 
and touch potentials include suitable electrical protective equipment 
and the removal of employees from areas that may expose them to 
hazardous potentials.
    Another grounding situation is recognized by paragraph (o)(4)(iv) 
in which grounding through the power cord of test equipment may be 
inadequate and actually increase the hazard to test operators. 
Normally, an equipment grounding conductor is required in the power 
cord of test equipment to connect it to a grounding connection in the 
power receptacle. However, in some circumstances, this practice can 
prevent satisfactory measurements, or current induced in the grounding 
conductor can cause a hazard to personnel. If these conditions exist, 
the use of the equipment grounding conductor within the cord is not 
mandatory, and paragraph (o)(4)(iv) requires that an equivalent safety 
ground be provided.
    Paragraph (o)(4)(v) further requires that a ground be placed on the 
high-voltage terminal and any other exposed terminals when the test 
area is entered after equipment is deenergized. In the case of high 
capacitance equipment or apparatus, before a direct ground can be 
applied, the initial grounding discharge must be accomplished through a 
resistor having an adequate energy rating.
    Paragraph (o)(4)(vi) recognizes the hazards associated with field 
testing in which test trailers or test vehicles are used. In addition 
to requiring the chassis of such vehicles to be grounded, paragraph 
(o)(4)(vi) provides for a performance-oriented approach by requiring 
that protection be provided against hazardous touch potentials by 
bonding, by insulation, or by isolation. The protection provided by 
each of these methods is described in the following examples:
    (1) Protection by bonding can be effected by providing, around the 
vehicle, an area covered by a metallic mat or mesh of substantial 
cross-section and low impedance which is bonded to the vehicle at 
several points and is also bonded to an adequate number of driven 
ground rods or, where available, to an adequate number of accessible 
points on the station ground grid. All bonding conductors must be of 
sufficient electrical size to keep the voltage developed during maximum 
anticipated current tests at a safe value. The mat must be of a size 
which precludes simultaneous contact with the vehicle and with the 
earth or with metallic structures not adequately bonded to the mat.
    (2) Protection by insulation can be accomplished, for example, by 
providing around the vehicle an area of dry wooden planks covered with 
rubber insulating blankets. The physical extent of the insulated area 
must be sufficient to prevent simultaneous contact with the vehicle, or 
the ground lead of the vehicle, and with the earth or with metallic 
structures in the vicinity.
    (3) Protection by isolation can be implemented by providing an 
effective means to exclude personnel from any area where simultaneous 
contact could be made with the vehicle (or conductive parts 
electrically connected to the vehicle) and with other conductive 
materials. A combination of barriers together with effective, 
interlocked restraints may be employed to prevent the inadvertent exit 
from the vehicle during the testing.
    Finally, a third category of safe work practices applicable to 
employees performing testing work, which complements the first two 
safety work practices of guarding and grounding, involves work 
practices associated with the installation of control and measurement 
circuits utilized at test facilities. Practices necessary for the 
protection of personnel and equipment from the hazards of high-voltage 
or high-power testing must be observed for every test where special 
signal-gathering equipment is used (that is, meters, oscilloscopes, and 
other special instruments). In addition, special settings of protective 
relays and the re-examination of backup schemes may be necessary to 
ensure an adequate level of safety during the tests or to minimize the 
effects of the testing on other parts of the system under test. As a 
consequence, paragraphs (o)(5)(i) through (o)(5)(iii) address the 
principal safe work practices involving control and measuring circuit 
utilization within the test area.
    Generally control and measuring circuit wiring should remain within 
the test area. If this is not possible, however, paragraph (o)(5)(i) 
covers requirements to minimize hazards should it become necessary to 
have the test wiring routed outside the test area. Cables and other 
wiring must be contained within a grounded metallic sheath and 
terminated in a grounded metal enclosure, or other precautions must be 
taken to provide equivalent safety.
    Paragraph (o)(5)(ii) covers the avoidance of possible hazards 
arising from inadvertent contact with energized accessible terminals or 
parts of meters and other test instruments. Meters with such terminals 
or parts must be isolated from test personnel.
    Work practices involving the proper routing and connection of 
temporary wiring to protect against damage are covered in paragraph 
(o)(5)(iii). This paragraph also requires the various functional wiring 
used for the test set-up to be kept separate, to the maximum extent 
possible, in order to minimize the coupling of hazardous voltages into 
the control and measuring circuits.
    A final safety work practice requirement related to control 
circuits is addressed by paragraph (o)(5)(iv). This paragraph requires, 
if employees are present within the guarded test area during the test, 
a test observer who can, in cases of emergency, immediately deenergize 
all test circuits for safety purposes.
    Since the environment in which field tests are conducted differs in 
important respects from that of laboratory tests, extra care must be 
taken to ensure appropriate levels of safety. Permanent fences and 
gates for isolating the field test area are not usually provided, nor 
is there a permanent conduit for the instrumentation and control 
wiring. As a further hazard, there may be other sources of high-voltage 
electric energy in the vicinity in addition to the source of test 
voltage.
    It is not always possible in the field to prevent ingress of 
persons into a test area physically, as is accomplished by the fences 
and interlocked gates of the laboratory environment. Consequently, 
readily recognizable means are required to discourage such ingress; 
and, before test potential or current is applied to a test area, the 
test operator in charge must ensure that all necessary barriers are in 
place.
    As a consequence of these safety considerations, paragraph 
(o)(6)(i) calls for a safety check to be made at temporary or field 
test areas at the beginning of each group of continuous tests (that is, 
a series of tests conducted one immediately after another). Paragraph 
(o)(6)(ii) requires that, as a minimum for the safety check, the person 
responsible for the testing verify, before the initiation of a 
continuous period of testing, the status of a general group of safety 
conditions. These conditions include the state of guards and status 
signals, the marking of disconnects, the provision of ground 
connections and personal protective equipment, and the separation of 
circuits.
    Paragraph (p). Requirements for mechanical equipment are contained 
in Sec. 1910.269. (Subpart N of Part 1910 contains additional 
requirements related to specific types of lifting equipment.)
    Paragraph (p)(1) sets forth general requirements for mechanical 
equipment used in the generation, transmission, or distribution of 
electric power. Paragraph (p)(1)(i) requires the critical safety 
components77 of mechanical elevating and rotating equipment to be 
inspected before use on each shift. Some commenters were concerned that 
this provision, as proposed, would require the disassembly of 
components of mechanical equipment each time it was used (Ex. 3-20, 3-
22, 3-62). This was not the intent of this paragraph. OSHA has worded 
the provision in the final rule to make it clear that a thorough visual 
inspection is required. It is not necessary to disassemble equipment to 
perform a visual inspection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\7The critical safety components of aerial lifts are 
identified in Sec. 1910.67(c)(4) as being components whose failure 
would result in a free fall or free rotation of the boom. A note has 
been included following paragraph (p)(1)(i) of final Sec. 1910.269 
similarly defining these components in the electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (p)(1)(ii) requires a reverse signal alarm or a 
designated employee78 to signal when it is safe to back up the 
vehicle for vehicles operated under certain conditions exposing an 
employee to hazards. (It is not intended for this provision to require 
the presence of a second employee. If the driver of the equipment is 
the only employee present and if no employees would be exposed to the 
hazards of vehicle backup, the standard would not apply.) This 
provision is based on existing Secs. 1926.601(b)(4) and 
1926.602(a)(9)(ii), which apply to construction. Because the same 
equipment is used for electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work during maintenance, as well as construction, and 
because the type of work being performed is similar in both situations, 
OSHA believes it is appropriate to make the requirements applying to 
this equipment the same whether maintenance or construction work is 
being performed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\8A designated employee is someone who is designated by the 
employer to perform specific duties under the terms of the standard 
and who is knowledgeable in the construction and operation of the 
equipment and the hazards involved. (See Sec. 1910.269(x), 
Definitions.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (p)(1)(iii) prohibits the operator of an electric line 
truck from leaving his or her position at the controls while a load is 
suspended, unless the employer can demonstrate that no employee, 
including the operator, might be endangered. This ensures that the 
operator will be at the controls if an emergency arises that 
necessitates moving the suspended load. For example, due to wind or 
unstable soil, the equipment might start to tip over. Having the 
operator at the controls ensures that corrective action can be taken 
quickly enough to prevent an accident. Equivalent requirements for 
truck cranes and derricks are contained in Secs. 1910.180(h)(4)(i) and 
1910.181(i)(4)(i), respectively, which also apply to those types of 
equipment.
    Paragraph (p)(1)(iv) requires roll-over protective structures to be 
provided on certain types of mechanical equipment. The equipment listed 
in this paragraph is frequently used for electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution work during construction, and Subpart W 
of Part 1926, which contains the same list, already requires this 
equipment to have such protection. The final rule extends the 
protection afforded by the construction standards to operations that do 
not involve construction work. The roll-over protective structures must 
conform to subpart W of part 1926.
    Paragraph (p)(2) sets forth requirements for outriggers. Paragraph 
(p)(2)(i) requires vehicular equipment provided with outriggers to be 
operated with the outriggers extended and firmly set as necessary for 
the stability of the equipment in the particular configuration 
involved. The stability of the equipment in various configurations is 
normally provided by the manufacturer, but it can also be derived 
through engineering analysis. This paragraph also prohibits the 
outriggers from being extended or retracted outside the clear view of 
the operator unless all employees are outside the range of possible 
equipment motion. Paragraph (p)(2)(ii) applies where the work area or 
terrain precludes the use of outriggers and limits the operation of the 
equipment only within the maximum load ratings as specified by the 
manufacturer for the particular configuration without outriggers. These 
two paragraphs help ensure the stability of the equipment while loads 
are being handled and prevent injuries caused by extending outriggers 
into employees. (Additional requirements for the use of outriggers on 
truck cranes are contained in Sec. 1910.180(h)(3)(ix).)
    A few of the accident descriptions submitted into the record by 
OSHA indicated that fatalities are occurring because of the use of 
aerial lift buckets to move overhead power lines (Ex. 9-1, 9-2). The 
employees in the aerial lift were killed when the unrestrained line 
slid up the bucket and contacted the employee (in two cases) or when 
current passed through a leakage hole in the bottom of the bucket (in 
the other case). In order to prevent such accidents, the Agency 
requested public comment on a possible prohibition against moving or 
contacting overhead power lines with the bucket of an aerial lift (54 
FR 30404).
    The following discussion with the IBEW witnesses represents the 
most detailed and useful information in the record on this issue:


    Ms. Thurber: I would like to ask your comments on [this issue].
    Mr. Dushaw: Given the proper equipment, I see no reason to 
prohibit moving of aerial conductors with aerial lift equipment and 
bucket trucks. Pieces of equipment are designed to do just exactly 
that.
    And it certainly in many cases puts a man in a safer 
configuration than [if] he [were] to do it by some other means.
    The cases talked about there, with the hole in the bottom of the 
bucket truck, I don't know what you can do to prevent that. If 
somebody doesn't like the water in the bottom of the bucket truck 
and decides to take a drill and drill a hole to let the water out, 
he has bridged the insulating quality of the bucket truck and put 
himself in a bad position, which should be prevented under any 
circumstances.
    Ms. Thurber: What about those instances where the cable will 
knock a person out, slide over and knock a person out of a bucket? 
Is there a way to prevent that?
    Mr. Dushaw: Well, I don't know. That can happen.
    Ms. Thurber: Electrocute him and knock him out.
    Mr. Dushaw: If you have lost control of the job site to that 
extent, this could happen whether a person is in a bucket truck, on 
a pole or flying. It doesn't make any difference.
    Obviously he has lost control of something there that is not the 
fault of the equipment itself but the planning of the job.
    Ms. Thurber: Can you tell me if bucket trucks are designed to 
move cables? We are talking about when a bucket truck is designed to 
move a cable, not when one is standing on a bucket working on a 
cable or something.
    Mr. MacDonald: Yes, they are. It depends on their load-lifting 
capacity.
    Mr. Ozzello: They make a [device] that is attached to the aerial 
unit and on that [device] you can attach the electric wires. Then 
you can lift those wires up off the cross-arm. You can replace the 
cross-arm or lower that [device] down and reattach those wires to 
the cross-arm. That is a normal procedure. The [device] is made out 
of fiberglas[s] and is theoretically tested on a periodic basis.
    Ms. Thurber: Let me let David follow up on that just briefly.
    Mr. Wallis: The two cases in the record were not using the 
equipment you mentioned. The bucket itself was used to push the 
conductors out of the way.
    Mr. Ozzello: That was a misuse of the equipment.
    Mr. Wallis: So should that practice be prohibited?
    Mr. Ozzello: Yes it should be. That is misuse of the equipment. 
The equipment was not designed to be used in that manner.
    Mr. Wallis: Okay. Thank you.
    Mr. Dushaw: I would say that with that a consideration here is 
what the load is you are lifting.
    Mr. Ozzello: There are devices that will measure that load to 
keep you from exceeding the load limit of the vehicle. [DC Tr. 604-
606]

    Proposed Sec. 1910.269(p)(3) addressed loads applied to lifting 
equipment. As proposed, this provision would have limited the maximum 
load to be lifted. Based on the testimony of the IBEW witnesses and on 
the accident descriptions in the record, OSHA believes that this 
provision should be broadened to extend to all types of loads applied 
to mechanical equipment. It is important for mechanical equipment to be 
used within its design limitations so that the lifting equipment does 
not fail during use and so that employees are not otherwise endangered. 
Therefore, OSHA has adopted the following language in paragraph (p)(3) 
of final Sec. 1910.269:

    Mechanical equipment used to lift or move lines or other 
material shall be used within its maximum load rating and other 
design limitations for the conditions under which the work is being 
performed.

    This provision will better protect employees than the comparable 
provision in the proposal.
    Even in electric-utility operations, contact with live parts 
through mechanical equipment causes many fatalities each year. A sample 
of typical accidents involving the operation of mechanical equipment 
near overhead lines is given in Table 5. Industry practice and existing 
rules in subpart V of the Construction Standards require aerial lifts 
and truck-mounted booms to be kept away from exposed energized lines 
and equipment at distances greater than or approximately equal to those 
set forth in Table R-6. However, some contact with the energized parts 
does occur during the hundreds of thousands of operations carried out 
near overhead power lines each year. If the equipment operator is 
distracted briefly or if the distances involved or the speed of the 
equipment towards the line is misjudged, contact with the lines is the 
expected result, rather than simple coincidence, especially when the 
minimum approach distances are relatively small. Mr. James L. Dushaw of 
the IBEW agreed stating, ``It is impractical and dangerous to believe 
that electrical contact with uninsulated vehicular equipment or 
suspended loads such as occurs in [pole-]setting or any other 
operations can simply be avoided [DC Tr. 547].'' Because these types of 
contacts cannot be totally avoided, OSHA believes that additional 
requirements are necessary for operating mechanical devices near 
exposed energized lines. Paragraph (p)(4) of final Sec. 1910.269 
addresses this problem.
    Proposed paragraph (p)(4)(i) would have required the minimum 
approach distances in Table R-6 to be maintained between the equipment 
and the live parts while equipment was being operated near exposed 
energized lines or equipment, without exception. Edison Electric 
Institute and Tennessee Valley Authority suggested that this provision 
provide an exception for insulated equipment (Ex. 3-82, 3-112; DC Tr. 
906-912). They argued that it was safe for this equipment to be brought 
close to energized lines. Mr. Gene Trombley, representing EEI, stated 
that not only was it safe to operate this equipment very close to the 
lines, it would be unsafe to operate it farther away (DC Tr. 906-912). 
He stated that employees would be forced to lean out of the bucket to 
reach the conductors to perform work on them, possibly causing back 
injuries and other muscle strains. He said, ``These trucks are designed 
to put you in the work area, not to be on the outside looking in [DC 
Tr. 907].''

             Table 5.--Accidents Involving the Operation of Mechanical Equipment Near Overhead Lines            
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          Number of fatalities                                                  
                                    --------------------------------                                            
         Type of equipment                          Grounded                       Type of accident             
                                      Total ------------------------                                            
                                               Yes     No       ?                                               
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boom Truck/Derrick Truck...........       7       1  ......       6  Boom contact with energized line.          
                                          2       1  ......       1  Pole contact with energized line.          
Aerial lift........................       1  ......  ......       1  Boom contact with energized line.          
                                          3  ......       1       2  Lower boom contact with energized line.    
                                          3  ......  ......       3  Employee working on deenergized line when  
                                                                      upper boom contacted energized line.      
                                          1  ......  ......       1  Winch on lift used on energized line arced 
                                                                      to nearby ground.                         
Vehicle............................       1  ......       1  ......  Line fell on vehicle.                      
                                          1  ......  ......       1  Unknown type of vehicle and type of        
                                                                      accident.                                 
                                    --------------------------------                                            
    Total..........................      19       2       2      15                                             
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Exhibits 9-2 and 9-2A.                                                                                  

    OSHA has accepted this recommendation. Aerial lifts are designed to 
enable an employee to position himself or herself at elevated locations 
with a high degree of accuracy. The aerial lift operator is in the 
bucket next to the energized lines and can easily judge the approach 
distance. This minimizes the chance that the equipment will contact an 
energized line and that the energized line will be struck down should 
contact actually occur. The employee operating the lift in the bucket 
is protected from the hazards of contacting the live parts under the 
provisions of paragraph (1). As the device is insulated, employees on 
the ground are protected from electric shock in the case of contact 
with the lines. Lastly, paragraph (p)(3) prevents the aerial lift from 
striking down the power line. Therefore, final Sec. 1910.269 (p)(4)(i) 
provides an exception to the requirement to maintain specific minimum 
approach distances for the insulated portion of an aerial lift operated 
by an employee in the lift. (It should be noted that this exception 
relates only to the conductor on which the employee is working. 
Paragraph (1)(2) still requires the employee to maintain the required 
distance from conductors at potentials different from that on which he 
or she is working.)
    Determining the distance between objects that are themselves 
relatively far away from the observer can sometimes be difficult. For 
example, different perspectives can lead to different estimates of the 
distance, and lack of a suitable reference can result in errors (Ex. 8-
19). If the minimum approach distance cannot be accurately determined 
by the operator, an extra person is required, by paragraph (p)(4)(ii), 
to observe the operation and give warnings when the specified minimum 
approach distance is approached.
    EEI recommended that the phrase ``[i]f it is difficult for the 
operator to determine the distance between the equipment and the 
energized parts'' to ``where it is difficult for the operator to 
maintain the desired clearance by visual means'' (Ex. 3-112). They 
claimed that whether the minimum approach distance was sufficient was 
the determining factor, not whether the distance itself could be 
judged.
    The purpose of proposed Sec. 1910.269(p)(4)(ii) was to ensure that 
an observer was used if the approach distance between the equipment and 
a live part could not be maintained due to difficulty in judging the 
minimum approach distance by the operator. OSHA agrees with EEI that 
the determining factor is whether the minimum approach distance can be 
maintained. The Agency also realizes that the proposed rule may not 
have made this clear and has modified the language of this provision in 
the final rule to read as follows:

    A designated employee other than the equipment operator shall 
observe the approach distance to exposed lines and equipment and 
give timely warnings before the minimum approach distance required 
by paragraph (p)(4)(i) is reached, unless the employer can 
demonstrate that the operator can accurately determine that the 
minimum approach distance is being maintained.

    This language clarifies that an observer is needed unless the 
employer can demonstrate that the operator can accurately determine 
that the minimum approach distance can be maintained.
    Proposed paragraph (p)(4)(iii) would have required one of two 
alternative protective measures to be taken if it was possible during 
operation for the equipment to come closer to the live parts than the 
required minimum approach distance. The first alternative was for the 
mechanical equipment and any attached load to be treated as live parts. 
The second alternative was for the equipment to be insulated for the 
voltage involved. Under this alternative, the mechanical equipment 
would have had to be positioned so that uninsulated portions of the 
equipment could not have come within the specified minimum approach 
distance of the line. The proposal was intended to protect employees 
from electric shock in case contact was made.
    In the development of proposed paragraph (p)(4), OSHA considered 
other methods of protecting employees from accidental contact with 
exposed energized lines. For example, OSHA considered allowing the 
mechanical equipment to be grounded as an additional option to the two 
alternatives proposed in paragraph (p)(4)(iii). However, grounding 
alone does not provide sufficient protection for employees, because if 
contact is made with a line of common distribution voltage, the 
equipment will still rise to a hazardous voltage with respect to earth 
only a few feet from the grounding point. OSHA requested comments and 
suggestions on the proposed rule and solicited information on 
additional methods of protecting employees.
    Many commenters provided their views on protecting workers from the 
hazards of contacting overhead power lines through mechanical 
equipment. Most of the individual comments on this paragraph related to 
its application to line-clearance tree-trimming work (Ex. 3-48, 3-63, 
3-67, 3-75, 3-77, 3-78, 3-89, 3-90, 3-92, 3-98, 3-99, 3-100, 3-104, 3-
113, 3-118). Except for a few who supported the proposal (Ex. 3-92, 3-
98, 3-118), the commenters argued that the proposed rule would prohibit 
tree workers on the ground from contacting a chipper hooked to an 
aerial lift that was used to position an employees trimming trees near 
power lines. Because the aerial lifts are insulated, they contended, 
employees on the ground could safely feed the chipper. A description of 
the method of performing this work was summarized by Mr. Robert Felix, 
Executive Vice President of the National Arborist Association, as 
follows:

    The normal equipment configuration of many line clearance tree 
trimming crews is a fully insulated aerial lift truck with a chipper 
in tow. While one employee is in an elevated insulated bucket, 
typically another is on the ground feeding the cut brush into the 
chipper. In that fashion, the brush is effectively cut, and removed, 
in integrated fashion. This time-proven method is safe. NAA's 1989 
survey of its members performing line clearance work using properly 
fully insulated aerial lift trucks with attached chipper indicates 
that in the past 3 years, covering approximately 192 million man/
hours [sic] of work, no personnel were injured by electric shock 
incident to operating a chipper while a fully insulated aerial lift 
device was elevated. [Ex. 3-113]

    The OSHA proposal clearly presented two alternatives if equipment 
could come too close to exposed energized power lines: (1) The 
equipment and attached load could be treated as energized or (2) the 
equipment could be insulated for the voltage. Equipment operated under 
the second alternative would have had to be positioned so that 
uninsulated portions could not violate the minimum approach distance 
requirements. The Agency believes that the language contained in the 
proposal clearly recognized the safe use of insulated aerial lifts 
outlined by Mr. Felix.
    Under the proposal, the only time an employee feeding a chipper 
would have had to consider the equipment energized was when the aerial 
lift was positioned so that the uninsulated portion (normally, the 
lower part of the boom) could have come too close to a power line. If 
the uninsulated portion contacted the line, any employee in contact 
with the chipper would probably have been electrocuted. In fact, this 
happened to tree-trimming crews in the past. Two of the accidents, 
resulting in two deaths and one hospitalized injury, described in 
Exhibit 9-6 involved employees contacting chippers energized when the 
boom of an aerial lift struck a power line. Three additional accidents, 
resulting in three fatalities, occurred to employees in contact with 
the aerial lift truck itself. One of the commenters supporting the 
proposed rule included a memorandum describing one of these accidents 
as a reason why the proposal was correct (Ex. 3-92).
    OSHA has therefore carried forward the option of using equipment 
insulated for the voltage, without change, as 
Sec. 1910.269(p)(4)(iii)(B).
    Many of the commenters suggested allowing additional options to the 
two presented for operations of mechanical equipment near exposed 
energized power lines (Ex. 3-13, 3-23, 3-40, 3-60, 3-62, 3-112). Two of 
them urged OSHA to include the installation of insulating protective 
equipment on the lines as an acceptable option (Ex. 3-23, 3-62). They 
argued that this would also protect employees.
    The proposal limited its application to ``exposed energized lines 
or equipment''. Insulating barriers used on the lines would render them 
unexposed. Thus, under the proposed rule, insulating barriers were an 
acceptable alternative. Rubber insulation is not, however, normally 
considered to be a ``barrier''79 and would not have been an 
acceptable option under most conditions. For certain types of 
operations, rubber insulating line hose and blankets would not provide 
sufficient protection. For example, using a crane to lift and position 
metal tower sections exposes the insulation to damage upon inadvertent 
contact. Other operations, such as the use of an aerial lift operated 
by an employee in the lift, would be much less likely to damage the 
insulation. Therefore, OSHA has decided to accept insulating the 
energized lines or equipment as an option if the insulating material 
used will withstand the type of contact likely to result during 
operation. Paragraph (p)(4)(iii)(A) of final Sec. 1910.269 sets forth 
this option.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\9``Exposed'' means not isolated or guarded. ``Guarded'' means 
covered, fenced, enclosed, or otherwise protected, by means of 
suitable covers or casings, barrier rails or screens, mats, or 
platforms, designed to minimize the possibility, under normal 
conditions, of dangerous approach or accidental contact by persons 
or objects. A note under the definition of ``guarded'' states that 
wires that are insulated, but not otherwise protected, are not 
considered as guarded. Examples of barriers that are acceptable 
included electrically insulating plastic guard equipment (see ASTM 
F968-90) and ``goalpost-type'' guards installed to limit the 
movement of mechanical equipment. Whatever barrier is used must be 
capable of withstanding any impact that is likely to be imposed and 
must be installed so as to prevent the mechanical equipment from 
approaching too close to the energized lines or equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another method supported by these commenters was grounding the 
mechanical equipment (Ex. 3-13, 3-23, 3-40, 3-60, 3-62, 3-112, 56; DC 
Tr. 918-920; LA Tr. 195-196). Most argued that, although grounding does 
not provide complete protection, it facilitates rapid opening of the 
circuit protective devices, which deenergizes the lines. They stressed 
that it is important for the line to be deenergized quickly. In its 
prehearing comment, EEI made the strongest argument for accepting 
vehicle grounding, as follows:

    Similarly, in 1926.950(c) and 1926.952(c)(2)(ii), OSHA 
recognizes grounding as a satisfactory means of protecting 
employees. In the preamble, however, OSHA asserts that ``grounding 
does not provide sufficient protection for employees.'' 54 Fed. Reg. 
4994. No accident or engineering data is cited, however, to support 
this assertion.
    A decision not to permit equipment grounding as a method of 
providing protection and compliance would be a mistake. As OSHA 
knows, it is a common industry practice to use grounding as a method 
of providing protection to employees working on the ground. The 
industry is well aware of the possibilities of hazardous touch and 
step potentials. However, after considering all safety elements 
involved in various work practices requiring the use of mechanical 
equipment, grounding continues to be one of the viable methods of 
protecting employees.
    Grounding may not prevent injury if the employee happens to be 
in contact with the truck when it becomes energized, but the 
seriousness of the accident is generally limited. Similarly, it 
becomes obvious that when barricading rules are broken (and they are 
hard to enforce), and the truck becomes energized, a serious 
accident may occur. However, the option of using grounding should 
not be eliminated, particularly when it can be used in combination 
with other methods to enhance worker protection.
    The requirements of the proposed standard appear to be driven by 
a concern for step potentials. However, the phenomena associated 
with both touch and step potentials have been well known for years. 
For example, we submit as Attachment J the Harrington and Martin 
AIEE article in the August 1954 Transactions which describes the 
concept of step potentials.
    Considering that this phenomenon has been known for years, it is 
worth asking why, over the years, both OSHA and national consensus 
standards have permitted grounding as a means of protecting 
employees on the ground. Among the consensus standards which permit 
grounding for this purpose are the 1987 National Electrical Safety 
Code, for lifting equipment, and IEEE Standard 516, 6.6 for lifting 
equipment and aerial lifts. (See attachments K and L).
    An advantage of having a vehicle grounded is that if contact is 
made, protective fusing or relaying is instantaneously activated to 
deenergize a faulted line. Because grounding is intended to trigger 
rapid deenergizing of the overhead line, it substantially decreases 
the likelihood that the person will sustain a severe electrical 
shock.
    An ungrounded vehicle could become a booby trap should the 
vehicle or equipment remain in contact with the energized conductor 
and not be noticed. In this instance, a path to ground could be 
completed if a worker gets on or off the truck or reaches into a 
tool bin. This situation is more likely at 4,160 volts or below. But 
if the vehicle is grounded, this risk to the unsuspecting worker 
would not be present. Also, when equipment is located under 
transmission lines, induced voltage, if present, will be shorted 
out, eliminating this startling but generally not harmful current 
flow.
    Also, at phase-to-neutral voltage of 7,200 volts and above, the 
ungrounded vehicle in contact with an energized conductor presents 
another potential hazard--fire. The voltage stresses across the 
surface of the outrigger and resultant creepage will cause tires to 
burn or possibly start grass fires, a very serious threat to the 
workers in the vehicle or up in the air. [Ex. 3-112]

    OSHA does not dispute the fact that grounding can facilitate the 
deenergizing of energized conductors. The proposal did not prohibit the 
use of vehicle grounding; it simply did not recognize it alone as being 
capable of completely protecting employees working around the vehicles. 
While vehicle grounding can also limit the voltage impressed on a 
vehicle in contact with an energized line, however, it does not 
normally reduce the voltage to a safe level. Evidence in the record, 
including descriptions of two fatal accidents, supports this assertion 
(Ex. 3-57, 6-10, 6-27, 9-2; DC Tr. 309-310, 349-350, 548). Dr. Robert 
J. Harrington, one of OSHA's expert witnesses, explained why this 
occurs:

    Dr. Harrington: While at first sight it would appear that 
grounding of the equipment is advisable, there are implications with 
respect to any equipotentials appearing on the surface of the ground 
close to the actual grounding point. Even if the grounding is solid, 
the current penetration will probably be insufficient to prevent the 
presence of equipotentials due to fault current. [DC Tr. 309-310]
* * * * *
    Ms. Thurber: Does voltage appear on grounded mechanical 
equipment when that equipment contacts an energized line?
    Dr. Harrington: Oh, yes, certainly.
    Ms. Thurber: Can you explain for those of us who do not 
understand this very well how that happens?
    Dr. Harrington: Well, even if you have got solid ground up there 
for the vehicle itself, what essentially happens once we get 
connection to the energized part * * * the vehicle itself is 
probably fairly close to it as a zero potential, but along the 
ground there is a pattern of equal potentials which may be quite 
considerable in terms of voltage. If I had a diagram or something, I 
could explain it more precisely.
    But essentially the grounding point at which the vehicle is 
supposed to be grounded and the actual ground of the system may be 
considerably far apart, and it probably will be. And in between that 
point of the so-called ground of the vehicle and the actual 
grounding of the system there will be these equal potentials 
appearing on the surface of the earth, the surface of the ground.
    Now that is partly due to the fact that the current penetration 
around the actual grounding point is not perfect * * * So 
essentially therefore one gets on the surface of the earth fairly 
close to the vehicle quite considerable voltage equal potentials.
    And therefore there is a considerable risk and hazard to those 
in the region of the vehicle at this time. [DC Tr. 349-350]

    The IBEW was also concerned about equipotentials, but was even more 
concerned that the OSHA standard might encourage employers not to 
ground mechanical equipment when operated near overhead lines (Ex. 64; 
DC Tr. 545-550). On their behalf, Mr. James Dushaw cited the continued 
presence of step potentials and fires as hazards that would be caused 
by the lack of grounding (DC Tr. 547-548).
    On the basis of the record considered as a whole, OSHA believes 
that vehicle grounding alone cannot always be depended upon to provide 
sufficient protection against the hazards of mechanical equipment 
contact with energized power lines. On the other hand, the Agency 
recognizes the usefulness of grounding as a protective measure that can 
be used in combination with other techniques to protect employees from 
electric shock. Such supplemental techniques include:
    (1) Using the best available ground to minimize the time the lines 
remain energized,
    (2) Bonding equipment together to minimize potential differences,
    (3) Providing ground mats to extend areas of equipotential, and
    (4) Using insulating protective equipment or barricades to guard 
against any remaining hazardous potential differences.
    The final rule recognizes all these techniques. Paragraph 
(p)(4)(iii)(C) of final Sec. 1910.269 sets forth the performance-
oriented requirement that assures that employees on the ground will be 
protected from the hazards that could arise if the equipment contacts 
the energized parts. The protective measures used must ensure that 
employees are not exposed to hazardous differences in potential. 
Information in appendix C to the standard provides guidelines for 
employers and employees that explain the various measures and how they 
can be used. A note referencing this appendix has been included in the 
final rule.
    The last issue related to paragraph (p)(4)(iii) of proposed 
Sec. 1910.269 concerned when the rule should apply. The proposed 
paragraph used the phrase ``[i]f it is possible for the mechanical 
equipment or any attached load to be taken closer to exposed energized 
lines or equipment than the clearance specified''. This language was 
chosen because of the difficulty OSHA experienced in enforcing 
comparable provisions in subpart V of the Construction 
Standards.80
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\0The relevant subpart V regulations are:
    Sec. 1926.952(c)(2)  ``mechanical equipment shall not be 
operated closer to any energized line or equipment than the 
clearances set forth in Sec. 1926.950(c) unless . . . [emphasis 
added]''
    Sec. 1926.955(a)(6)(i)  ``equipment or machinery working 
adjacent to energized lines or equipment. [emphasis added]''
    Sec. 1926.955(a)(6)(ii)  ``Lifting equipment shall be . . . when 
utilized near energized equipment or lines. [emphasis added]''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EEI noted that the wording of these provisions had caused 
enforcement-related problems (Ex. 3-112, 56). They pointed to two 
federal Court of Appeals decisions which reached the conclusion that 
these requirements are unclear and need substantial revision 
(Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. v. OSHRC, 737 F.2d 350; and Wisconsin 
Electric Power Co. v. OSHRC, 567 F.2d 735, 738).
    Many commenters objected to this approach (Ex. 3-26, 3-63, 3-89, 3-
112, 3-113, 3-120, 56, 58; DC Tr. 914-928; LA Tr. 343). They were 
concerned that the provision would apply whenever there was a 
possibility of close approach even if the chance of the equipment's 
getting too close to the power line was remote. EEI argued that ``the 
pointless cost and loss of productivity resulting from such a 
requirement would be enormous, especially if one considers how many 
times per day electric utilities around the country operate mechanical 
equipment in locations where extension of a boom to reach an overhead 
power line is at least physically possible [Ex. 3-112].'' Mr. Tony E. 
Brannan of Georgia Power Co., representing EEI, described several 
example situations that would unnecessarily require precautions to be 
taken under the proposal, as follows:
    (1) Work on one side of a street where energized power lines are on 
the opposite side and where the boom of a line truck could reach the 
energized lines,
    (2) Work, such as lifting material, that is unrelated to energized 
lines but that is close enough to power lines to present the 
possibility of contact,
    (3) Work performed with the boom lowered, such as entry into and 
exit from the truck upon arrival or departure, and
    (4) Work on the vehicle while it is parked near energized lines (DC 
Tr. 920-928).
    Several commenters suggested that OSHA use the phrase ``when it is 
intended'' or ``where it can be reasonably anticipated'' in the final 
rule in place of the proposed phrase ``if it is possible'' (Ex. 3-26, 
3-112, 56, 64). EEI urged OSHA to use a reasonable triggering point and 
to rely on job planning to determine when the triggering point was 
reached (Ex. 56). The National Arborist Association simply suggested 
removing the offensive phrase from the requirement (Ex. 3-113, 56).
    OSHA believes that these commenters have a valid point. While some 
of the examples presented by Mr. Brannan would not be covered under 
Sec. 1910.269 (for example, vehicle servicing) or would still pose a 
substantial risk to employees (for example, work unrelated to energized 
lines), others demonstrated that the risk of contact with an energized 
line may not be significant even though there is a possibility of 
contact. In particular, the Agency can envision a line crew working on 
deenergized equipment across the street from an energized line. If the 
mechanical equipment is positioned so that it is barely possible to 
contact the energized lines and if the crew performs all the work on 
the deenergized side of the street the likelihood of contact is remote. 
However, many situations covered under the standard do require the 
employees to be exposed to a substantial risk of having the mechanical 
equipment contact an energized line. The nature of electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution work naturally brings 
employees and the equipment they use near energized lines.
    The question then becomes what language can be used to describe the 
triggering point. Eliminating the phrase ``if it is possible'' as NAA 
suggests would require precautions to be taken only when the minimum 
approach distance is violated, an act prohibited by paragraph of final 
Sec. 1910.269.
    EEI's and IBEW's suggested phrase, ``when it is intended'', is 
better. However, it cannot always be foreseen before work starts 
whether the mechanical equipment will be taken too close to energized 
lines. Some of the accident descriptions contained in the record depict 
situations involving changes in approach directions not envisioned in 
the job plan (Ex. 9-2). For example, a different approach than 
originally planned may be necessary for an articulating device to be 
able to reach a desired position. In such cases, the employee operating 
the equipment has his or her mind on the task of positioning the 
device, and whether or not it was originally intended to get too close 
to the lines is irrelevant. In one of the cases cited by EEI, an 
accident occurred when the job plan was allegedly violated by the 
operator himself (Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. v. OSHRC, 737 F.2d 
350; Ex. 46).
    Additionally, OSHA believes it is important to initiate protective 
measures before the boom (or an equivalent part) of the equipment is 
moved. Once the boom has been started in motion to perform work near 
the power lines, the employee will be concentrating on maneuvering it 
into position and may not remember to or be convinced of the need to 
stop to take these measures.
    For these reasons, the Agency is taking a different, more 
performance-oriented approach than anything suggested by the 
commenters. OSHA has decided to require that the necessary protective 
steps be taken if the employer knows or reasonably could have known 
that the hazard of the mechanical equipment's becoming energized exists 
during operation. Such a hazard could exist because of the likelihood 
of direct contact with the line, of current arcing to the equipment, or 
of hazardous induced voltage. This concept is set forth in the 
introductory text of Sec. 1910.269, which reads as follows:

    If, during operation of the mechanical equipment, the equipment 
could become energized, the operation shall also comply with at 
least one of paragraphs (p)(4)(iii)(A) through (p)(4)(iii)(C) of 
this section.

    The Agency believes that the final rule addresses the problem 
directly, by applying only to hazardous operations, rather than 
indirectly as the proposal did. Under paragraph (p)(4)(iii) of final 
Sec. 1910.269, only operations exposing employees to the hazard of 
dangerous voltage being impressed or induced on mechanical equipment 
require measures to be taken to minimize the risk of injury from 
electric shock.
    Paragraph (q). Paragraph (q) of final Sec. 1910.269 applies to work 
involving overhead lines or equipment. The types of work performed on 
overhead lines and addressed by this paragraph include the installation 
and removal of overhead lines, live-line bare-hand work, and work on 
towers and structures. While performing this type of work, employees 
are typically exposed to the hazards of falls and electric shock.
    Paragraph (q)(1)(i) requires the employer to determine that 
elevated structures such as poles and towers are of adequate strength 
to withstand the stresses which will be imposed by the work to be 
performed. For example, if the work involves removing and reinstalling 
an existing line on a utility pole, the pole will be subjected to the 
weight of the employee (a vertical force) and to the release and 
replacement of the force imposed by the overhead line (a vertical and 
possibly a horizontal force). The additional stress involved may cause 
the pole to break, particularly if the pole has rotted at its base. If 
the pole or structure cannot withstand the loads to be imposed, it must 
be reinforced so that failure does not occur. This rule protects 
employees from falling to the ground upon failure of the pole or other 
elevated structure.
    As the last step in ascertaining whether a wood pole is safe to 
climb, as required under paragraph (q)(1)(i), checking the actual 
condition of the pole is important because of the possibility of decay 
and other conditions adversely affecting the strength of the pole. 
Appendix D of final Sec. 1910.269 contains methods of inspecting and 
testing the condition of wood structures before they are climbed. These 
methods, which can be used in ascertaining whether a wood pole is 
capable of sustaining the forces imposed by an employee climbing it, 
have been taken from Sec. 1910.268, the telecommunications standard. It 
should be noted that the employer must also ascertain whether the pole 
is capable of sustaining any additional forces that will be imposed 
during the work.
    Several commenters argued that the standard should be changed to 
require this determination to be performed by a qualified employee (Ex. 
3-22, 3-32, 3-40, 3-42, 3-69, 3-112, 3-116, 3-123, 3-125, 3-128). They 
argued that employees climbing the poles and structures are qualified 
to inspect poles and structures and determine whether they are safe to 
climb. In their view, it is the worker, not the employer, who is the 
most appropriate one to perform this function.
    OSHA realizes that the employee at the worksite will be the one to 
inspect the structure for deterioration and will also determine whether 
it is safe to climb. However, under the OSH Act, it is the employer's 
responsibility to ensure that this is accomplished, regardless of who 
performs the work. (See the discussion of this issue under the summary 
and explanation of the introductory text of paragraph (c), earlier in 
the preamble.) Additionally, some work involves changing the loading on 
the structure. For example, replacement transformers may be heavier, 
and the equipment needed to perform the work will impose extra stress 
on the pole. The employee in the field is not necessarily skilled in 
structural engineering, and a determination as to whether or not the 
pole could withstand the stresses involved would need to be performed 
by the employer's engineering staff. (Typically, this task is performed 
in the initial design of the system or when changes are made.) For this 
reason, OSHA believes it is necessary to specify in the standard the 
employer's responsibility in this regard. Therefore, the wording of 
this provision has not been changed in the final rule. However, the 
Agency expects the determination of the condition of the pole or 
structure to be made at the worksite by an employee who is capable of 
making this determination. The employer fulfills the obligation imposed 
by the standard by training his or her employees and by enforcing 
company rules that adhere to the standard.
    When poles are handled near overhead lines, it is necessary to 
protect the pole from contact with the lines. Paragraph (q)(1)(ii) 
prohibits letting the pole come into direct contact with the overhead 
lines. Measures commonly used to prevent such contact include 
installation of insulating guards on the pole and pulling conductors 
away from the area where the pole will go.
    Paragraph (q)(1)(iii) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires employees 
handling the poles to be insulated from the pole. This provision was 
proposed as part of Sec. 1910.269(q)(1)(ii). However, for clarity, the 
two requirements contained in the proposed paragraph have been 
separated into two distinct paragraphs ((q)(1)(ii) and (q)(1)(iii)) in 
the final rule. These requirements protect employees from hazards 
caused by falling power lines and by contact of the pole with the line. 
They are in addition to the requirements in paragraph (p)(4) for 
operations involving mechanical equipment.
    Several commenters suggested limiting the application of these two 
provisions to lines of more than 600 volts (Ex. 3-20, 3-42, 3-80, 3-
112). They noted that the EEI/IBEW draft contained such a limitation. 
Additionally, EEI claimed that providing protection at the lower 
voltage levels would be impractical and would add nothing to the safety 
of employees handling poles (Ex. 3-112).
    Two existing OSHA requirements apply to setting, moving, and 
removing poles near overhead lines: Sec. 1910.268(n)(11), in the 
telecommunications standard, and Sec. 1926.955(a), in Subpart V. Both 
contain requirements comparable to proposed Sec. 1910.269(q)(1)(ii), 
and neither contains a lower voltage limitation. Furthermore, poles are 
often conductive. They can be made of metal or concrete, which OSHA 
considers to be conductive, as well as wood. Even wood poles pose an 
electric shock hazard when being moved near electric power lines. Wet 
poles and poles with ground wires running along their length are both 
highly conductive. Some of the accidents described in the record 
involve wood poles with installed ground wires being placed between 
energized conductors (Ex. 9-2). Even though the voltage was greater 
than 600 volts or was unspecified, these accidents show the dangers, 
regardless of the voltage involved. (Any voltage greater than 50 volts 
is normally considered lethal.) Therefore, OSHA has not accepted the 
suggested 600-volt limitation.
    To protect employees from falling into holes into which poles are 
to be placed, paragraph (q)(1)(iv) requires the holes to be guarded by 
barriers or attended by employees. For clarification, the language in 
this provision has been changed slightly from the wording in the 
proposal. The final version is similar to that suggested by the 
American Public Power Association (Ex. 3-80).
    Paragraph (q)(2) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses the installation 
and removal of overhead lines. The provisions contained in final 
Sec. 1910.269 (q)(2) have been taken, in large part, from existing 
Sec. 1926.955(c), on stringing and removing lines, and 
Sec. 1926.955(d), on stringing adjacent to energized lines. However, 
the final rule combines these provisions into a single paragraph 
(q)(2).
    EEI objected to the merging of these two paragraphs into one (Ex. 
3-112, 56). They noted that the EEI/IBEW draft followed the Subpart V 
format and that it was widely understood in the industry.
    OSHA believes that paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 1926.955 are 
confusing. Paragraph (c) in the construction standard is entitled 
``Stringing or removing deenergized conductors'', while paragraph (d) 
is ``Stringing adjacent to energized lines''. However, whereas both of 
these paragraphs relate to the installation of deenergized conductors, 
paragraph (c) also contains provisions related to stringing lines 
adjacent to live conductors. Additionally, some of the requirements are 
redundant\81\ or inconsistent,\82\ even though paragraph (d) 
incorporates the requirement of paragraph (c) by reference. Therefore, 
OSHA has retained the proposed approach of combining these two 
paragraphs from the Construction Standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\For example, both Sec. 1926.955(c)(5) and (d)(2) require the 
use of the tension stringing method or other means of preventing the 
line being installed from contacting an energized conductor.
    \82\For example, Sec. 1926.955(c)(10), (d)(5), and (d)(8)(iii) 
relate to the removal of grounds and imply that it is permissible to 
remove them at different times during the operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (q)(2)(i) requires precautions to be taken to prevent the 
line being installed or removed from contacting existing energized 
power lines. Common methods of accomplishing this include the use of 
the following techniques: Stringing conductors by means of the tension 
stringing method (which keeps the conductors off the ground and clear 
of energized circuits) and the use of rope nets and guards (which 
physically prevent one line from contacting another). These 
precautions, or equivalent measures, are necessary to protect employees 
against electric shock and against the effects of equipment damage 
resulting from accidental contact of the line being installed with 
energized parts.
    Even though the precautions taken under paragraph (q)(2)(i) 
minimize the possibility of accidental contact, there is still a 
significant risk that the line being installed or removed could make 
contact with energized lines. Paragraph (q)(2)(i)(A) of proposed 
Sec. 1910.269 would have required the line being installed, plus any 
connected equipment, to be treated as energized if any of several 
listed accident situations could energize the line. This was intended 
to ensure that, in the event of contact with other energized lines, 
these workers would be handling the equipment (which would now be 
energized as a result) only through insulating devices.
    Several commenters argued that OSHA should recognize the widely 
used practice of grounding the installed cable to protect employees 
(Ex. 3-62, 3-112, 3-120, 3-123). They offered reasons similar to those 
used on the issue of whether to recognize vehicle grounding for 
mechanical equipment used near exposed electric power lines. (See the 
previous discussion of this issue.)
    OSHA believes that this issue is equivalent to the one on vehicle 
grounding. In fact, the hazards are identical: employees are exposed to 
hazardous differences in potential if the conductor being installed or 
equipment being used makes contact with an energized line. The methods 
of protection that can be applied are also the same in both cases. 
Therefore, the Agency has determined that the approach used for the 
hazard of contact between mechanical equipment and overhead lines 
should also be used for the hazard of contact between a line being 
installed or removed and an existing energized conductor. To accomplish 
this, paragraph (q)(2)(ii) of final Sec. 1910.269 simply adopts the 
requirements of paragraph (p)(4)(iii) by reference. Basically, the 
employer is required to institute measures to protect employees from 
hazardous differences in potential at the work location. (See the 
discussion of final Sec. 1910.269(p)(4)(iii) and Appendix C to 
Sec. 1910.269 for acceptable methods of compliance.)
    Paragraph (q)(2)(i)(B) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 would have allowed 
employees working aloft to be protected by grounding the line being 
installed. Because paragraph (q)(2)(ii) of final Sec. 1910.269 takes a 
performance-oriented approach to the protection of employees from 
hazardous differences in potential, this proposed paragraph is no 
longer necessary and is not being carried forward into the final rule.
    Paragraph (q)(2)(iii) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires the disabling 
of the automatic-reclosing feature of the devices protecting any 
circuit that operates at more than 600 volts and that passes under 
conductors being installed. If it is not made inoperative, this feature 
would cause the circuit protective devices to reenergize the circuit 
after they had tripped, exposing the employees to additional or more 
severe injury.
    Many commenters argued that, because older circuit reclosing 
devices did not permit the disabling of the automatic circuit reclosing 
feature, the rule should permit alternative protective measures, such 
as guarding the energized lines and grounding the lines being installed 
(Ex. 3-2, 3-42, 3-44, 3-58, 3-62, 3-69, 3-71, 3-80, 3-112).
    Paragraph (q)(2)(i) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires the use of 
techniques that minimize the possibility of contact between the 
existing and new conductors. Paragraph (q)(2)(ii) of final 
Sec. 1910.269 requires the use of measures that protect employees from 
hazardous differences in potential. These two paragraphs encompass all 
the suggested alternatives and provide the primary protection to 
employees installing conductors. Paragraph (q)(2)(iii) is secondary 
protection; it provides an additional measure of safety in case the 
first two provisions are violated. Therefore, in the final rule, OSHA 
is applying this paragraph only to circuit reclosing devices that are 
designed to permit the disabling of the automatic reclosing feature. 
(The issue of whether or not OSHA should require new automatic 
switching devices to be made so as to allow disabling of the automatic 
switching feature was discussed under the summary and explanation of 
paragraph (m)(3)(iii), earlier in this preamble.) The Agency believes 
that the combination of these three paragraphs in final Sec. 1910.269 
will provide better protection than the comparable provisions in the 
proposal.
    Paragraph (q)(2)(iv) sets forth rules protecting workers from the 
hazard of voltage induced on lines being installed near (and usually 
parallel to) other energized lines. These rules, which provide 
supplemental provisions on grounding, would be in addition to those 
elsewhere in the standard. In general, when employees may be exposed to 
the hazard of induced voltage on overhead lines, the lines being 
installed must be grounded to minimize the voltage and to protect 
employees handling the lines from electric shock.
    Several commenters (Ex. 3-13, 3-20, 3-40, 3-62, 3-80, 3-82, 3-112) 
objected to the limited options available under this provision in the 
proposal (proposed Sec. 1910.269(q)(2)(iii)). Some argued that it was 
not always possible to determine the exact voltage that would be 
induced on a line (Ex. 3-13, 3-20, 3-82, 3-101, 3-107, 3-112). Others 
suggested that a determination of voltage was unnecessary if the line 
was assumed to carry a hazardous voltage (Ex. 3-20, 3-40, 3-82, 3-101, 
3-107, 3-112). Still others suggested allowing work to be performed as 
if the conductors were energized (Ex. 3-20, 3-40, 3-62, 3-80, 3-112).
    OSHA has accepted all of these recommendations. Paragraph 
(q)(2)(iv) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires a determination of the 
``approximate'' voltage, unless the line being installed is assumed to 
carry a hazardous induced voltage. Additionally, workers may treat the 
line as energized rather than comply with the additional grounding 
requirements contained in this paragraph.
    The standard does not provide guidelines for determining whether or 
not a hazard exists due to induced voltage. The hazard depends not only 
on the voltage of the existing line, but also on the length of the line 
being installed and the distance between the existing line and the new 
one. Electric shock from induced voltage poses two different hazards. 
First, the electric shock could cause an involuntary reaction, which 
could cause a fall or other injury. Second, the electric shock itself 
could cause respiratory or cardiac arrest. If no precautions are taken 
to protect employees from hazards associated with involuntary reactions 
from electric shock, a hazard is presumed to exist if the induced 
voltage is sufficient to pass a current of 1 milliampere through a 500 
ohm resistor. (The 500 ohm resistor represents the resistance of an 
employee. The 1 milliampere current is the threshold of perception.) If 
employees are protected from injury due to involuntary reactions from 
electric shock, a hazard is presumed to exist if the resultant current 
would be more than 6 milliamperes (the let-go threshold for women). It 
is up to the employer to ensure that employees are protected against 
serious injury from any voltages induced on lines being installed and 
to determine whether the voltages are high enough to warrant the 
adoption of the additional provisions on grounding spelled out in 
paragraphs (q)(2)(iv)(A) through (q)(2)(iv)(E) of final Sec. 1910.269. 
These rules set forth the following requirements:
    (1) Grounds must be installed in increments of no more than 2 miles 
(paragraph (q)(2)(iv)(A));
    (2) Grounds must remain in place until the installation is 
completed between dead ends (paragraph (q)(2)(iv)(B) );
    (3) Grounds must be removed as the last phase of aerial cleanup 
(paragraph (q)(2)(iv)(C));
    (4) Grounds must be installed at each work location and at all open 
dead-end or catch-off points or the next adjacent structure (paragraph 
(q)(2)(iv)(D)); and
    (5) Bare conductors being spliced must be bonded and grounded 
(paragraph (q)(2)(iv)(E)).
    Proposed paragraphs (q)(2)(iii)(F) and (q)(2)(iii)(G), which 
related to the connection and removal of grounds, respectively, have 
not been carried forward into the final rule. As noted by EEI (Ex. 3-
112), these two paragraphs simply repeated the provisions of 
Sec. 1910.269 (n)(6) and (n)(7) and were therefore unnecessary.
    Paragraph (q)(2)(v) requires reel handling equipment to be in safe 
operating condition and to be leveled and aligned. Proper alignment of 
the stringing machines will help prevent failure of the equipment, 
conductors, and supporting structures, which could result in injury to 
workers.
     Prevention of the failure of the line pulling equipment and 
accessories is also the purpose of paragraphs (q)(2)(vi), (q)(2)(vii), 
and (q)(2)(viii). These provisions respectively require the operation 
to be performed within the load limits of the equipment, require the 
repair or replacement of defective apparatus, and prohibit the use of 
conductor grips not specifically designed for use in pulling 
operations. Equipment that has been damaged beyond manufacturing 
specifications or that has been damaged to the extent that its load 
ratings would be reduced are considered to be defective. Load limits 
and design specifications are normally provided by the manufacturer, 
but they can also be found in engineering and materials handbooks (see, 
for example, The Lineman's and Cableman's Handbook, Ex. 8-5).
    When the tension stringing method is used, the pulling rig (which 
takes up the pulling rope and thereby pulls the conductors into place) 
is separated from the reel stands and tensioner (which pay out the 
conductors and apply tension to them) by one or more spans (the 
distance between the structures supporting the conductors). In an 
emergency, the pulling equipment operator may have to shut down the 
operation. Paragraph (q)(2)(ix) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires 
communication to be maintained between the reel tender and the pulling 
rig operator, so that in case of emergency at the conductor supply end, 
the pulling rig operator can shut the equipment down before injury-
causing damage occurs. The proposed version of this rule, paragraph 
(q)(2)(viii), would have required simply that ``reliable 
communications'' be maintained. The language contained in paragraph 
(q)(2)(ix) of final Sec. 1910.269 clarifies that two-way radios or 
other equivalent means constitute ``reliable communication''.
    Paragraph (q)(2)(x) prohibits the operation of the pulling rig 
under unsafe conditions. This provision was proposed as part of 
Sec. 1910.269(q)(2)(viii). It has been designated as a separate 
paragraph in the final rule. OSHA has included a note following 
paragraph (q)(2)(x) of the final rule. The explanatory note, which was 
not contained in the proposal, provides examples of unsafe conditions.
    Paragraph (q)(2)(xi) prohibits employees from unnecessarily working 
directly beneath overhead operations or on the cross arm. This 
provision minimizes exposure of employees to injury resulting from the 
failure of equipment, conductors, or supporting structures during 
pulling operations.
    Under certain conditions, work must be performed on transmission 
and distribution lines while they remain energized. Sometimes, this 
work is accomplished using rubber insulating equipment or live-line 
tools. However, this equipment has voltage and other limitations which 
make it impossible to insulate the employee performing work on live 
lines under all conditions. In such cases, usually on medium- and high-
voltage transmission lines, the work is performed using the live-line 
bare-hand technique. If work is to be performed ``bare handed'', the 
employee works from an insulated aerial platform and is electrically 
bonded to the energized line. Since there is essentially no potential 
difference across the worker's body, he or she is protected from 
electric shock. Paragraph (q)(3) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses the 
live-line bare-hand technique.
    Paragraph (q)(3)(i) requires employees using or supervising the use 
of the live-line bare-hand method on energized lines to be trained in 
the use of the technique. Periodic retraining must be provided as 
required under paragraph (a)(2) of final Sec. 1910.269. Without this 
training, employees would not be able to perform the highly specialized 
work safely.
    Before work can be started, the voltage of the lines on which work 
is to be performed must be known. This voltage determines the minimum 
approach distances and the types of equipment which can be used. If the 
voltage is higher than expected, the minimum approach distance will be 
too small and the equipment may not be safe for use. Therefore, 
paragraph (q)(3)(ii) requires a determination to be made of the voltage 
of the circuit, of the minimum approach distances involved, and of the 
voltage limitations of equipment to be used.
    Paragraph (q)(3)(iii) requires insulated tools and equipment to be 
designed, tested, and intended for live-line bare-hand work and that 
they be kept clean and dry. This requirement is important to ensure 
that equipment does not fail under constant contact with high voltage 
sources. The final version of this rule explains that it applies to 
insulated tools, insulated equipment, and aerial devices and platforms 
used in live-line work. This clarification was made in response to the 
request of three commenters (Ex. 3-65, 3-81, 3-112). The Agency 
considers insulated equipment that is rated for the voltage on which it 
is used (such as a live-line tool) to meet this requirement.
    Paragraph (q)(3)(iv) requires the automatic-reclosing feature of 
circuit protective devices to be made inoperative. In case of a fault 
at the worksite, it is important for the circuit to be deenergized as 
quickly as possible and for it to remain deenergized once the 
protective devices have opened the circuit. This prevents any possible 
injuries from becoming more severe. Additionally, this measure helps 
limit the possible switching surge voltage, which provides an extra 
measure of safety. (The issue of whether or not OSHA should require new 
automatic switching devices to be made so as to allow disabling of the 
automatic switching feature was discussed under the summary and 
explanation of paragraph (m)(3)(iii), earlier in this preamble.)
    Sometimes the weather makes live-line bare-hand work unsafe. For 
example, lightning strikes on lines being worked can create severe 
transient voltages, against which the minimum approach distances 
required by final Sec. 1910.269 may not provide complete protection. 
Additionally, the wind can reduce the minimum approach distance below 
acceptable values. To provide protection against environmental 
conditions which can increase the hazards by an unacceptable degree, 
paragraph (q)(3)(v) prohibits live-line bare-hand work in the midst of 
a thunderstorm or under any other conditions that make the work 
unusually hazardous (that is, hazardous in spite of the precautions 
taken under the final rule). Also, work may not be performed under any 
conditions that reduce the minimum approach distances below required 
values. If insulating guards are provided to prevent hazardous approach 
to other energized parts and to ground, then work may be performed 
under conditions reducing the minimum approach distances.
    Paragraph (q)(3)(vi) requires the use of a conductive device, 
usually in the form of a conductive bucket liner, which creates an area 
of equipotential in which the employee can work safely. The employee 
must be bonded to this device by means of conductive shoes or leg clips 
or by another effective method. Additionally, if necessary to protect 
employees further, electrostatic shielding would be required.
    To avoid receiving a shock caused by charging current, the employee 
must bond the conductive bucket liner (or other conductive device) to 
the energized conductor before he or she touches the conductor. 
Typically, a hot stick is used to bring a bonding jumper (already 
connected to the conductive bucket liner) into contact with the live 
line. This connection brings the equipotential area surrounding the 
employee to the same voltage as that of the line. Paragraph (q)(3)(vii) 
requires the conductive device to be bonded to the energized conductor 
before any employee contacts the energized conductor and requires this 
connection to be maintained until work is completed.
    Paragraph (q)(3)(viii) requires aerial lifts used for live-line 
bare-hand work to be equipped with upper controls that are within reach 
of any employee in the bucket and with lower controls that permit 
override operation at base of the boom. Upper controls are necessary so 
that employees in the bucket can precisely control the lift's direction 
and speed of approach to the live line. Control by workers on the 
ground responding to directions from those in the bucket could lead to 
contact by an employee in the lift with the energized conductor before 
the bonding jumper is in place. Controls are needed at ground level, 
however, so that employees in the lift who might be disabled as a 
result of an accident or illness could be promptly lowered and 
assisted. For this reason, paragraph (q)(3)(ix) prohibits operation of 
the ground level controls except in case of emergency.
    In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested comments on whether 
there were operations involving live-line bare-hand work that require 
the use of the lower controls in lieu of the ones in the lift. In 
response to this request, the IBEW supported the proposed language (Ex. 
3-107). EEI suggested that the standard allow the lower controls to be 
operated with the permission of the employee in the lift because in 
some situations it would be necessary or safer (Ex. 3-112). However, 
EEI did not specify what type of procedure would necessitate such 
operation or explain how this could be done safely. Because OSHA does 
not believe it would be either safer or necessary for an employee on 
the ground to operate the lift in other than emergency conditions, the 
final rule adopts the provision as proposed.
    Paragraph (q)(3)(x) requires aerial lift controls to be checked to 
ensure that they are in proper working order before any employee is 
lifted into the working position.
    To protect employees on the ground from the electric shock that 
would be received upon touching the truck supporting the aerial lift, 
paragraph (q)(3)(xi) requires the truck to be grounded or treated as 
energized. In this case the insulation of the lift limits the voltage 
on the body of the truck to a safe level if the truck itself is 
grounded.
    Aerial lifts that are used in live-line bare-hand work are exposed 
to the full line-to-ground voltage of the circuit for the duration of 
the job. To ensure that the insulating value of the lift being used is 
high enough to protect employees, paragraph (q)(3)(xii) requires a 
boom-current test to be made before work is started each day. The test 
is also required when a higher voltage is encountered and when 
conditions change to a degree that warrants retesting the equipment.
    Under the standard, the test consists of placing the bucket in 
contact with a source of voltage equal to that being encountered during 
the job and keeping it there for at least 3 minutes. This is normally 
accomplished at the worksite by placing the bucket in contact with the 
energized line on which work is to be performed (without anyone in it, 
of course).
    Several smaller electric utility companies and one oil company 
objected to the requirement to test aerial lifts on a day-to-day basis 
(Ex. 3-2, 3-12, 3-17, 3-26, 3-124). These commenters argued that the 
insulating value of this type of equipment does not change 
significantly from day to day and that this type of test was very 
expensive.
    OSHA believes that, if live-line bare-hand work is to be performed, 
a test must be conducted before work starts each day. The aerial lift 
is deliberately placed into contact with the energized line, and any 
damage to the insulation could quickly lead to the death of an 
employee. The insulation on these devices must be constantly monitored 
for adequacy.
    The test proposed in Sec. 1910.269(q)(3)(xii) is already required 
under Sec. 1926.955(e)(11) for similar work performed under the 
Construction Standards. Additionally, all aerial lifts insulated for 
voltages over 69 kV are required by Sec. 1910.6783 (through ANSI 
A92.2-1969) to be equipped with electrodes for conducting these tests. 
Final Sec. 1910.269 does not require these devices to be sent to a test 
facility for testing (in fact, this would be counterproductive), nor 
does it require these tests to be performed on all aerial lifts used in 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution work. This 
provision applies only to lifts used in live-line bare-hand work and 
only when they are so used. For these reasons, OSHA has carried this 
requirement forward into the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\3Paragraph (b)(1) of Sec. 1910.67 requires all vehicle-
mounted elevating and rotating work platforms (aerial lifts) to 
conform to the provisions of ANSI A92.2-1969, Vehicle Mounted 
Elevating and Rotating Work Platforms. Section 4.11 of that standard 
contains the requirement for platforms insulated for more than 69 kV 
to be equipped with test electrodes. These electrodes can be used 
for field testing as noted in the Appendix to that standard and in 
Section 6.3.1.3 of the 1979 version of that standard (ANSI A92.2-
1979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To provide employees with a level of protection equivalent to that 
provided by American National Standard for Vehicle-Mounted Elevating 
and Rotating Aerial Devices (ANSI A92.2-1979; Ex. 2-28), 
Sec. 1910.269(q)(3)(xii) proposed to permit a leakage current of up to 
1 microampere per kilovolt of nominal phase-to-ground voltage. In 
contrast, the corresponding provisions in Subpart V of Part 1926 
(Sec. 1926.955(e)(11)) and in the EEI/IBEW draft allow up to 1 
microampere of current for every kilovolt of phase-to-phase voltage. 
(For a three-phase, Y-connected system, the phase-to-phase voltage 
equals 1.73 times the phase-to-ground voltage.) Because of the 
inconsistency between the proposal and OSHA's existing standard, the 
Agency requested comments on the appropriateness of the leakage current 
level permitted by the proposal.
    Four commenters responded to this request (Ex. 3-41, 3-82, 3-107, 
3-112). EEI and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) supported the 
Subpart V level of 1 microampere per kilovolt of phase-to-phase voltage 
(Ex. 3-82, 3-112). They argued that this level was more appropriate for 
field testing and was consistent with the existing OSHA standard.
    IBEW and the Manufacturers of Aerial Devices & Digger Derricks 
Council supported the lower level proposed in Sec. 1910.269(q)(3)(xii) 
(Ex. 3-41, 3-107). They noted that this is the level adopted in the 
consensus standard. Also, the latest version of the ANSI standard 
includes a provision for field testing of insulated aerial devices at a 
level of 1 microampere per kilovolt of phase-to-ground voltage (Ex. 2-
28, 60).
    The manufacturers of insulated aerial lifts and the national 
consensus standard support the leakage level contained in the proposal. 
Neither EEI nor TVA explained how a higher leakage current level would 
better protect employees than the level set in the national consensus 
standard. Therefore, OSHA is adopting the maximum leakage current of 1 
microampere per kilovolt of phase-to-ground voltage from ANSI A92.2-
1979.
    Paragraph (q)(3)(xii) requires the suspension of related work 
activity any time (not only during tests) a malfunction of the 
equipment is evident. This requirement is intended to prevent the 
failure of insulated aerial devices during use. As requested by a 
commenter (Ex. 3-62), this provision in the final rule has been 
clarified so that only work from the aerial lift is affected. Work not 
involving the aerial lift could be continued. Halting work from the 
lift will protect employees in the lift, as well as those on the 
ground, from the electrical hazards involved.
    Paragraphs (q)(3)(xiii), (q)(3)(xiv), and (q)(3)(xv) of final 
Sec. 1910.269 require the minimum approach distances specified in Table 
R-6 through Table R-10 to be maintained from grounded objects and from 
objects at a potential different from that at which the bucket is 
energized. (The proposal contained a separate table for live-line bare-
hand work. The final rule has consolidated all the minimum approach 
distance tables in one place, under Sec. 1910.269(1).) Paragraph 
(q)(3)(xiii) applies to minimum approach distances in general; 
paragraph (q)(3)(xiv) covers minimum approach distances to be used as 
the employee approaches or leaves the energized conductor; and 
paragraph (q)(3)(xv) relates to the distance between the bucket and the 
end of a bushing or insulator string. The phrase ``or any other 
grounded surface'' has been added after ``insulator string'' to 
indicate that the bucket must maintain this minimum approach distance 
from any grounded surface, as recommended by Mr. Joseph Van Name (DC 
Tr. 732).
    The tables referenced in paragraphs (q)(3)(xiii), (q)(3)(xiv), and 
(q)(3)(xv) are those set forth in paragraph (1)(2) of final 
Sec. 1910.269. The rationale behind the adoption of those tables and 
the discussion of issues related to minimum approach distances is 
presented under the preamble summary of that paragraph. The principles 
behind the two sets of tables are the same. (In fact, EEI proposed 
placing all these requirements under paragraph (l). OSHA has not 
adopted this approach at this time because of concerns of sufficient 
notice to interested parties. However, consolidation of the live-line 
bare-hand requirements and the other regulations relating to work on 
energized lines will be considered in future rulemaking efforts.)
    Paragraph (q)(3)(xvi) prohibits the use of hand lines between the 
bucket and boom and between the bucket and ground. Such use of lines 
could set up a potential difference between the employee in the bucket 
and the power line when the employee contacts the hand line. If the 
hand line is supported by the energized conductor, as permitted by the 
paragraph, no potential difference is generated at the bucket. Unless 
the rope is insulated for the voltage, employees on the ground must 
treat it as energized.
    For similar reasons, paragraph (q)(3)(xvii) prohibits passing 
uninsulated equipment or materials to an employee bonded to an 
energized part.
    Paragraph (q)(3)(xviii) requires a durable chart reflecting the 
minimum approach distances prescribed by Table R-6 through Table R-10 
to be mounted so that it is visible to the operator of the boom. Of 
course, a table prescribing minimum approach distances greater than 
those required would also be acceptable. Paragraph (q)(3)(xix) requires 
a non-conductive measuring device to be available to the employee in 
the lift. Compliance with these two provisions in the final standard 
will assist the employee in determining the minimum approach distances 
required by the standard.
    Paragraph (q)(4) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses hazards 
associated with towers and other structures supporting overhead lines.
    To protect employees on the ground from hazards presented by 
falling objects, paragraph (q)(4)(i) prohibits workers from standing 
under a tower or other structure, unless their presence is necessary to 
assist employees working above.
    Paragraph (q)(4)(ii) relates to operations which involve lifting 
and positioning tower sections. This provision normally requires tag 
lines or other similar devices to be used to control tower sections 
being positioned. The use of tag lines protects employees from being 
struck by tower sections that are in motion.
    Paragraph (q)(4)(iii) requires loadlines to remain in place until 
the load is secured so that it cannot topple and injure an employee.
    Some weather conditions can make work from towers and other 
overhead structures more hazardous than usual. For example, icy 
conditions may make slips and falls much more likely, in fact even 
unavoidable. Under such conditions, work from towers and other 
structures would generally be prohibited by Sec. 1910.269(q)(4)(iv). 
However, when emergency restoration work is involved, the additional 
risk may be necessary for public safety, and the standard permits such 
work to be performed even in bad weather.
    The final rule allows work to continue under any type of emergency 
restoration,84 whether or not power is available. This change was 
requested by two commenters that noted that emergency conditions 
sometimes develop with actual loss of power and that it would be better 
to allow restoration work to avoid this situation (Ex. 3-69, 3-123).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\4Emergency restoration work is considered to be that work 
necessary to restore an electric power generation, transmission, or 
distribution installation to an operating condition to the extent 
necessary to safeguard the general public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (r). Paragraph (r) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses 
safety considerations related to line-clearance tree trimming. As can 
be seen from the definition in Sec. 1910.269(x), line-clearance tree 
trimming is the trimming of any tree or brush that is within 10 feet 
(305 cm) of an electric power line. Since Sec. 1910.269 addresses 
hazards unique to electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work, general tree trimming is not covered by this 
paragraph. For example, tree trimming contractors performing work at a 
residence where there are no overhead power lines within 10 feet of any 
trees or brush are not required to follow Sec. 1910.269(r).
    The requirements for this paragraph have been taken, in large part, 
from ANSI Z133.1-1982, American National Standard Safety Requirements 
for Pruning, Trimming, Repairing, Maintaining, and Removing Trees, and 
for Cutting Brush (Ex. 2-29).
    Paragraph (r)(1) covers the electrical hazards associated with 
line-clearance tree trimming. This paragraph does not apply to 
qualified employees. These employees are highly trained and are 
adequately protected by other provisions in the standard, including the 
requirements for personal protective equipment in paragraph (g) and for 
working on or near exposed energized parts in paragraph (l). Line-
clearance tree trimmers, on the other hand, do not have such extensive 
training, and more stringent requirements dealing with electrical 
hazards are necessary and appropriate for their protection. Paragraph 
(r)(1) of final Sec. 1910.269 sets forth such requirements.
    The distinction between the ``qualified employee'' and ``line-
clearance tree trimmer'' is discussed in summary and explanation of 
final Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(i)(E), earlier in this preamble, and final 
Sec. 1910.269(x), later in this preamble. As noted in those 
discussions, a ``qualified employee'' under Sec. 1910.269 is an 
employee who has been trained to work on energized electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution installations. Line-
clearance tree trimmers are not considered to be ``qualified 
employees'' under Sec. 1910.269. As explained earlier, they do not have 
the necessary training to use the protective equipment that would be 
necessary to work on energized electric power generation, transmission, 
and distribution installations. They do, however, have the training 
necessary to perform tree-trimming work very close to energized 
transmission and distribution lines, and the work they perform is 
directly associated with electric power transmission and distribution 
installations. Therefore, work practices necessary for their safety are 
included in Sec. 1910.269.
    Subpart S of the General Industry Standards also contains safety-
related work practice requirements for work, such as tree trimming, 
that is performed near overhead power transmission and distribution 
lines. However, the Subpart S safety-related work practices do not 
apply to work performed by ``qualified persons on or directly 
associated with'' electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution installations. Because line-clearance tree trimmers do 
have training necessary to enable them to work very close to energized 
electric power transmission and distribution lines and because the work 
practices necessary for their safety have been included in 
Sec. 1910.269, they are considered to be ``qualified persons'' for the 
purpose of Sec. 1910.331(c)(1).85
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\5This paragraph reads as follows:
    (c) Excluded work by qualified persons. The provisions of 
Secs. 1910.331 through 1910.333 do not apply to work performed by 
qualified persons on or directly associated with the following 
installations:
    (1) Generation, transmission, and distribution installations. 
Installations for the generation, control, transformation, 
transmission, and distribution of electric energy (including 
communication and metering) located in buildings used for such 
purposes or located outdoors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other tree workers do not have the training necessary for them to 
be either ``qualified employees'' or ``line-clearance tree 
trimmers'',86 as defined under Sec. 1910.269(x). These employees 
are not covered under Sec. 1910.269 at all. The work practices these 
employees must use are contained in Subpart S of Part 1910. Under 
Subpart S, tree workers must maintain a 10-foot minimum approach 
distance from overhead lines. (In fact, trimming any branch that is 
within 10 feet of an overhead power line is prohibited by Subpart S.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\6For the purposes of paragraph (r), trainees working under 
the supervision of a qualified line-clearance tree trimmer are 
considered to be qualified line-clearance tree trimmers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Sec. 1910.269(r)(1)(i) would have required an inspection 
to be made of the tree on which work is to be performed to see if an 
electric conductor passes within 10 feet of the tree. This inspection 
was intended to give an indication of whether an electrical hazard 
exists.
    The preamble discussion of final Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(i)(E) noted 
that OSHA had decided to move the requirement for the determination of 
voltage levels, as it relates to line-clearance tree trimming, to 
paragraph (r)(1)(i). Under this paragraph, the employer must make a 
determination of the voltages to which employees are exposed, so that 
employees would be able to maintain the proper minimum approach 
distances. However, if employees treat all conductors as energized at 
the maximum voltage to be encountered, only the maximum voltage need be 
determined. Because Sec. 1910.269 applies only to line-clearance tree 
trimming activities, the proposed general requirement for an inspection 
of the tree for the presence of electric power lines, which must be 
present for the standard to apply, has been eliminated.
    Paragraphs (r)(1)(ii) and (r)(1)(iii) of the proposal would have 
required a 10-foot (305-cm) minimum approach distance for non-line-
clearance tree trimmers and would have prohibited these tree trimmers 
from trimming trees that were within 10 feet of an electric power line. 
The National Arborist Association noted that the Electrical Safety-
Related Work Practices Standard87 (which was also a proposal at 
the time of their comments) covered work performed by unqualified 
employees near overhead power lines (Ex. 3-113, 58; LA Tr. 347-350). 
They were concerned that the two standards contained conflicting 
provisions aimed at protecting non-line-clearance tree workers. These 
concerns were expressed by Mr. Richard Proudfoot of Pruett Tree Service 
as follows:

    \8\7This standard is set forth in Secs. 1910.331 through 
1910.335 of Subpart S, which was promulgated as a final rule on 
August 6, 1990 (55 FR 31984).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    I'm Dick Proudfoot. I'm General Manager of Pruett Tree Service 
in Lake Oswego, Oregon. We do not perform line clearance tree 
trimming work. For that reason alone, I should not be here today in 
behalf of residential and commercial tree trimmers because this 
proposed standard supposedly is directed only to line clearance tree 
trimming work.
    The rub is twofold. First, this proposed standard actually 
regulates us even though it pretends not to, and second, OSHA 
already has dealt with residential and commercial tree trimmers in 
the pending OSHA section 1910.331, electrical related safe work 
practice standard, but contradicts that regulation in today's 
standard.
    Specifically, the pending .331, electric related safe work 
practice standard, covers tree care workers, such as those employed 
by my company, who do not perform line clearance work and excludes 
line clearance workers with the intention they be covered by today's 
line clearance standard. Thus, the pending electrical related work 
practice standard requires residential/commercial trimmers who work 
in a non-line clearance context to maintain ten feet between the 
tree trimmer and the overhead conductor. That approach is entirely 
correct.
    However, OSHA contradicts in today's standard the correct 
approach it has taken in the pending .331 standard, because in 
today's line clearance standard OSHA says that a non-line clearance 
tree trimmer may not trim a tree if any part of the tree is within 
ten feet of a conductor, even though under the pending .331 standard 
we could trim the tree, so long as we stayed ten feet away from the 
wire. Thus, the standard that is intended to apply to us properly 
measures the distance of the employee to the wire, while this 
standard would measure for the same employee the distance of the 
tree to the wire.
    To begin with, if we are subject to the .331 standard, as OSHA 
tells us we are, the agency has no business to regulate the same 
conduct of non-line clearance trimmers in this standard. Safety 
compliance requires non-contradictory standards. Contradictory 
signals from OSHA breeds non-compliance and unsafe conditions.
    OSHA should, therefore, delete from today's standards its 
attempt in section (r)(1)(iii) to regulate non-line clearance 
trimmers and leave that to OSHA's sound resolution of that issue in 
the pending .331 standard. Section (r)(1)(iii) should, therefore, be 
deleted from today's line clearance standard altogether. [LA Tr. 
347-349]

    Proposed Sec. 1910.269 did, in fact, overlap the provisions of the 
Electrical Safety-Related Work Practices Standard in Subpart S. The 
Subpart S requirements currently apply to tree workers who are not 
line-clearance tree trimmers regardless of the type of work being 
performed--commercial, residential, or line-clearance tree trimming. 
The presence of proposed paragraphs (r)(1)(ii) and (r)(1)(iii) in final 
Sec. 1910.269 would only confuse employers. In fact, under 
Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(B), work practices covered by Subpart S (that 
is, work by unqualified employees near electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution installations) are not regulated under 
the electric power generation, transmission, and distribution standard. 
Therefore, Proposed paragraphs (r)(1)(ii) and (r)(1)(iii) are beyond 
the scope of Sec. 1910.269, and the Agency has not carried them forward 
into the final rule.
    Paragraph (r)(1)(ii) of final Sec. 1910.269 lists the conditions 
under which a second qualified line-clearance tree trimmer is required 
to be present. The listed conditions are: (1) if the employee is to 
come closer than 10 feet (305 cm) to electric circuit parts energized 
at more than 750 volts; (2) if a branch or limb is closer to such parts 
than the distances listed in Table R-6, Table R-9, and Table R-10; or 
(3) if roping must be used to remove branches or limbs from such parts. 
Under these conditions, a line-clearance tree trimmer is placed in a 
more hazardous environment than is usual, and errors are more likely to 
lead to an electrical accident. The second employee would be able to 
assist an employee in trouble or would be able to summon help readily.
    Some electric utility representatives argued that this requirement 
(proposed as paragraph (r)(1)(iv)) would be burdensome (Ex. 3-69, 3-
112, 3-120, 3-123). They claimed that it would unnecessarily restrict 
crews clearing lines and restoring service.
    The hazards posed by working close to electric power lines are 
widely recognized. The need for a second employee is acknowledged in 
section 4.2.3 of the ANSI Z133.1 standard and is amply demonstrated by 
the accident descriptions of tree trimmers electrocuted while trimming 
trees (Ex. 9-5 and 9-6). Therefore, OSHA has retained this provision as 
proposed. However, it should be noted that, if qualified employees are 
involved, Sec. 1910.269(l)(1)(i), and not paragraph (r)(1)(ii), 
addresses the need for the presence of a second employee.
    In general, line-clearance tree trimmers do not have the experience 
or training for work on overhead electric power lines. However, they do 
have the training and skills necessary to be able to perform work 
safely near these lines. By using special techniques and equipment, 
these workers trim trees that are close to the overhead lines without 
bringing their bodies or other conductive objects within the danger 
zone. Therefore, paragraph (r)(1)(iii) requires the same minimum 
approach distances (listed in Table R-6, Table R-9, and Table R-10) for 
line-clearance work as those for regular line work, but the standard 
does not permit line-clearance tree trimmers to come closer than the 
minimum approach distances in the tables even when using protective 
equipment.
    Employees could receive an electric shock through the branches of 
the trees they are trimming if the branch, once it is cut or breaks 
free, contacts an energized conductor. To prevent electric shock to an 
employee if this should occur, paragraph (r)(1)(iv) requires branches 
that are closer to the lines than permitted under Table R-6, Table R-9, 
and Table R-10 to be removed by the use of insulating equipment. This 
can be accomplished through the use of pruners with insulating handles.
    The proposal's preamble discussion of this paragraph (proposed 
Sec. 1910.269(r)(1)(vi)) implied that the insulating equipment would 
also have to be in strict conformance to proposed Sec. 1910.269(j) on 
live-line tools. Some commenters objected to this (Ex. 3-112, 3-113, 
58; LA Tr. 343-345). They stated that the testing requirements in 
paragraph (j) were unnecessary for the type of equipment tree trimmers 
use and that no injuries have resulted from the use of a wood-handled 
tree pruner.
    As OSHA representatives noted at the hearing, the reference to the 
provisions on live-line tools was meant to clarify what type of 
equipment would be considered as ``insulating'' under the proposed 
tree-trimming rule and that individual tool poles would not have to be 
tested (DC Tr. 115-119). The Agency believes that some guidance is 
necessary with respect to what types of tools will meet the requirement 
that ``insulating equipment'' be used. Wood pruner poles that meet the 
test criteria given in final Sec. 1910.269(j)(1), which gives design 
criteria for live-line tools, and that are not wet88 or 
contaminated meet Sec. 1910.269(r)(1)(iv). Individual tool poles need 
not be tested. The Agency will accept evidence indicating that tools of 
a given construction generically meet the test criteria. A note to this 
effect has been included following paragraph (r)(1)(iv) of final 
Sec. 1910.269.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\8It should be noted that untreated wood absorbs moisture, 
even if it is not exposed to rain. It is important to keep wood 
poles dry and to maintain their finish so that they do not become 
conductive.
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    Paragraph (r)(1)(v) prohibits ladders, platforms, and aerial 
devices from coming closer to energized lines than the distances listed 
in Table R-6, Table R-9, and Table R-10. This provision is intended to 
prevent electric shock to line-clearance tree trimmers, who are not 
familiar with the practices necessary to contact the lines safely.
    Proposed paragraph (r)(1)(viii) would have prohibited line-
clearance tree-trimming operations during storms and under emergency 
conditions. This provision received most of the objections raised to 
the proposal. Electric utilities, unions, and tree trimming contractors 
alike overwhelmingly opposed this provision (Ex. 3-9, 3-11, 3-20, 3-23, 
3-27, 3-29, 3-32, 3-38, 3-40, 3-42, 3-48, 3-55, 3-62, 3-63, 3-66, 3-67, 
3-69, 3-75, 3-77, 3-78, 3-82, 3-87, 3-89, 3-90, 3-91, 3-92, 3-93, 3-94, 
3-97, 3-98, 3-99, 3-100, 3-104, 3-107, 3-112, 3-113, 3-118, 3-119, 3-
120, 3-123, 3-125, 3-128, 47, 58; DC Tr. 931-934, 1141-1142; LA Tr. 
345-346). They all argued that tree-trimming contractors have assisted 
electric utilities in restoring power after storms and during other 
emergencies. They claimed that the work was performed safely and with 
few accidents. The testimony of Mr. Robert Felix, Executive Vice 
President of the National Arborist Association, represented these 
objections as follows:

    The section (r)(1)(viii), storm work prohibition, is utterly 
unacceptable to us. It's unacceptable to the utilities and to the 
IBEW, as well. It must be discarded in its entirety. Obviously, line 
clearance work is never done during a storm. After a storm is over, 
however, line clearance crews' work are vital to the effort to clear 
debris so that the utilities can have their linemen efficiently 
restore power. To require, as is proposed, linemen to perform the 
debris clearance work would be doubly dysfunctional. One, linemen 
are not trained in tree and branch removal proximate to energized 
conductors. Two, if linemen had to do such work to the exclusion of 
line clearance tree trimmers, the task of restoring power to 
hospitals, homes, offices and school would be indefinitely delayed. 
This provision is ill conceived, it's intolerable and it must go.
    We would support instead the ANSI Z133 requirement, or a similar 
proposal, that requires storm emergency work to be performed only by 
qualified line clearance tree trimmers and qualified line clearance 
tree trimmer trainees, who are trained in recognition of the hazards 
involved and work practices appropriate to those hazards. [LA Tr. 
345-346]

    The commenters gave many examples of successful tree trimming 
operations performed in the aftermath of severe storms. The testimony 
of Mr. William R. Powell, representing the American Public Power 
Association, gave a typical example:

    Consider for example the proposed rules, limitations on line 
clearance tree trimming. The proposed rule would prohibit line 
clearance tree trimming operations conducted by other than qualified 
employees during quote, ``storms or under emergency conditions,'' 
close quote.
    The impact of Hurricane Hugo, one of the major natural disasters 
to recently hit our country provides ample illustration that the 
proposed prohibition is unworkable for large and small utilities 
alike.
    The South Carolina Public Service Authority, [SCPSA], which 
employs over 1600 people reports that it could have taken several 
months rather than several weeks to restore power to its customers 
if it had not been able to use the service of line clearance tree 
trimmers in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo.
    As it was, it took [SCPSA] almost two solid weeks of 16- to 18-
hour days working over 13, or over 300 independent line clearance 
tree trimmers in addition to a substantial complement [of] qualified 
linemen to restore power to its service community.
    None of the participating line clearance tree trimmers suffered 
significant injuries during this restoration effort.
    If in the emergency situation, the utility the size of [SCPSA] 
which has access to substantial internal * * * manpower resources, 
could not have restored electric service to its community in a 
timely fashion without the help of line clearance tree trimmers, a 
smaller utility having as few as four employees would even be more 
hard pressed to restore service to its customers without outside 
assistance.
    For this reason, the Agency's [proposed] rule needs to be 
modified to allow the use of line clearance tree trimmers during 
emergencies or other similar situations.
    In this regard, the APPA strongly supports the Agency's 
suggestion that the proposed restriction be * * * replaced by 
performance-oriented language designed to insure that those clearing 
lines are aware of the dangers involved at all times and under all 
circumstances. [DC Tr. 1141-1142]

    Mr. Felix noted, however, that restoration work is limited to work 
performed in the aftermath of a storm, testifying as follows:

    Obviously, line clearance work is never done during a storm. 
After a storm is over, however, line clearance crews' work [is] 
vital to the effort to clear debris so that the utilities can have 
their linemen efficiently restore power. [LA Tr. 345]

    OSHA recognizes the need for power to be restored quickly after 
storms. Public safety considerations demand that electric service not 
be interrupted any longer than necessary.
    The Agency's concern in proposing the prohibition on storm and 
emergency work by line-clearance tree trimmers was that these employees 
were not trained sufficiently for this type of work. In fact, several 
accident descriptions submitted to the record tend to support this 
concern (Ex. 9-6, 53). The widespread objection to this prohibition, 
however, seems to indicate that line-clearance tree trimmers are 
trained in emergency restoration work (at least insofar as it involves 
clearing trees from electric power lines). This training is limited, 
however, to emergency restoration work performed after, rather than 
during, a storm.
    OSHA is acquiescing to the nearly unanimous opposition to proposed 
Sec. 1910.269(r)(1)(viii), and the final rule does not include a 
prohibition of line-clearance work for the restoration of power in the 
aftermath of a storm. However, the final rule does prohibit line-
clearance tree trimming when adverse weather conditions make the work 
hazardous in spite of the work practices required by Sec. 1910.269 and 
includes a note explaining what these weather conditions are. 
Additionally, to ensure that employees who perform line-clearance work 
in the aftermath of storms or who work under other emergency conditions 
are properly trained, the Agency is adopting a requirement for specific 
training in the hazards posed by this type of work. This requirement is 
contained in final Sec. 1910.269(r)(1)(vi).
    In Sec. 1910.269(r)(2), OSHA is adopting requirements for brush 
chippers. These requirements specify that chippers be equipped with a 
locking ignition system, that access panels be in place during 
operation, that the inlet feed hopper be of sufficient length to 
prevent workers from contacting the blades during operation, that 
trailer chippers be chocked or secured when not attached to a vehicle, 
and that employees wear proper protective equipment in the area of 
operation. (It should be noted that the existing general machine 
guarding requirements of Sec. 1910.212 continue to apply to brush 
chippers.) These requirements are derived from Section 5.3 of ANSI 
Z133.1-1982 and are intended to prevent injury to employees operating 
or maintaining brush chippers.
    The only provision in this proposed paragraph that received comment 
was the requirement in Sec. 1910.269(r)(2) that brush chipper operators 
wear eye and face protection. A similar requirement was also proposed 
for stump cutter operators under paragraph (r)(4)(ii). Many commenters 
argued that operators of brush chippers and stump cutters did not need 
full face protection (Ex. 3-38, 3-48, 3-63, 3-69, 3-112, 3-113, 3-118, 
3-123, 3-125, 3-128, 58; LA Tr. 346). In fact, Mr. Robert Felix argued 
that face protection was actually harmful because ``those masks fog up, 
obscure vision and hinder employee communication'' (LA Tr. 346).
    OSHA is concerned that employees using eye protection alone will 
not be fully protected from the hazards of flying debris from brush 
chippers and stump cutters. However, there is insufficient evidence in 
the record for the final rule to require full face protection on an 
industry-wide basis. Therefore, the Agency has modified the language of 
paragraphs (r)(2)(v) and (r)(4)(ii) in final Sec. 1910.269 so that 
employees must wear personal protective equipment as required by 
Subpart I. Using such information as the chipper manufacturer's 
recommendations and the hazards noted during the inspection, OSHA will 
determine on a case-by-case basis whether or not the hazards at the 
jobsite warrant full face protection. This is the policy currently in 
use for tree-trimming operations.
    In Sec. 1910.269(r)(3), OSHA is adopting requirements for sprayers 
and associated equipment. These provisions require walking and working 
surfaces to be slip-resistant. If the slippery conditions cannot be 
removed, slip-resistant footwear or handrails meeting the requirements 
of Subpart D of Part 1910 are required to be used to prevent employees 
from slipping. In addition, if the spraying operation takes place with 
the vehicle in motion, the area from which the operator works must be 
provided with guardrails to protect him or her from falling from the 
vehicle. These requirements are based on Section 5.4 of ANSI Z133.1-
1982.
    Paragraph (r)(4) contains requirements for stump cutters. These 
provisions specify that cutters be equipped with enclosures or guards 
to protect employees from the blades and debris and that employees wear 
personal protective equipment in the immediate area of stump grinding 
operations. These requirements are essentially the same as those 
contained in Section 5.5 of ANSI Z133.1-1982. Paragraph (r)(4)(ii) of 
final Sec. 1910.269 has been changed from the proposal as noted 
earlier.
    Paragraph (r)(5) sets forth requirements intended to protect 
employees from the hazards presented by power saws. Paragraph (r)(5) 
adopts the requirements of Sec. 1910.266(c)(5)89 (dealing with 
instructions for power saw operations). In addition, paragraph (r)(5) 
of final Sec. 1910.269 contains requirements for starting saws, saw 
design relative to chain movement and idling speed, saw operation, 
refueling, cleaning, and other saw maintenance. These requirements are 
based on Section 6.2 of ANSI Z133.1-1982 and on requirements contained 
in the draft standard recommended by EEI and IBEW.
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    \8\9OSHA has proposed to revise the logging standard, 
Sec. 1910.266. The reference in final Sec. 1910.269(r)(5) to the 
relevant power saw requirements in the logging standard, which were 
contained in Sec. 1910.266(e)(5) of that proposal, will be revised 
when the logging standard is promulgated as a final rule.
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    Several commenters suggested revising the wording of proposed 
paragraph (r)(5)(iv) (Ex. 3-11, 3-44, 3-58, 3-69, 3-102). The proposal 
would have required employees to have ``secure footing'' when starting 
a saw. They noted that an employee working in a tree would not have 
``secure footing'' and recommended that the standard require the 
employee to be in a secure working position instead. OSHA has revised 
the language of this provision in the final rule to accommodate this 
concern. The language contained in final paragraph (r)(5)(iv) agrees 
with the comparable provision proposed in the logging standard, 
Sec. 1910.266(e)(5)(v), which makes it clear that it is the saw that is 
to be firmly supported when it is started. (It should be noted that 
paragraph (r)(5)(vi) prohibits employees from carrying a running saw 
into a tree.)
    In Sec. 1910.269(r)(6), OSHA is adopting requirements for backpack 
power units. To protect employees operating or maintaining this 
equipment and other employees in the area, the requirements of the 
final rule specify that no one other than the operator be within 10 
feet (305 cm) of the cutting head of the brush saw, that the unit be 
equipped with a quick shutoff switch, and that power unit engines be 
stopped for all cleaning, refueling, adjustments, and repairs. These 
requirements are based on Section 6.3 of ANSI Z133.1-1982.
    Paragraph (r)(7) contains requirements for climbing rope. To 
protect employees from hazards posed by rope breakage, these provisions 
require that ropes have a specified minimum strength (taken from 
section 7.9 of the ANSI standard), that defective or damaged rope not 
be used, that rope contact with chemicals be avoided, that climbing 
rope not be spliced to effect repair, that rope ends be secured to 
prevent unraveling, and that ropes be stored properly. In accordance 
with the recommendations of NIOSH, OSHA has added, to paragraph 
(r)(7)(ii), a requirement for inspection of rope before use. The 
inspection will enable an employee to detect damage and defects.
    Proposed Sec. 1910.269(r)(7)(vii) would have required that ropes 
that could be taken closer to exposed energized lines than the 
specified minimum approach distances be treated as energized by 
employees on the ground or in contact with ground unless electrical 
protective equipment was used.
    Several commenters objected to this provision (Ex. 3-20, 3-48, 3-
63, 3-80, 3-112, 3-113, 58; LA Tr. 346-347). They argued that it would 
render the ropes unusable in many situations, including rescue of an 
injured employee. The NAA offered this explanation, along with an 
alternative:

    We complained in our pre-hearing Comment that OSHA's proposed 
Sec. (r)(7)(vii) requirement that all rope brought within the Table 
R-6 and R-7 minimum separation distances be treated as energized, 
was unacceptable because it (1) would defeat the long standing safe 
work practice of line clearance tree trimmers to pull branches back 
from conductors to permit safe cutting of those branches; (2) would 
prohibit the use of ropes in effecting tree rescues of employees; 
and (3) would conflict with the proposed Sec. (r)(1)(iv)(C) practice 
permitting the roping of branches in line clearance work.
    While the proposed requirement to treat as energized all rope 
brought within the separation distances is so over broad as to wipe 
out all of the proper uses of rope proximate to overhead conductors, 
OSHA indicated at the public hearing that its concern was of a far 
more limited order: namely, to prevent the use of ``wet or 
contaminated'' ropes proximate to wires (D.C. Tr. 127-130). OSHA 
asked us to submit an alternative more closely tailored to OSHA's 
legitimate concerns (id). We therefore propose the following 
substitute language to replace proposed (r)(7)(vii) [footnote 
omitted]:
    ``(vii) Ropes which are (A) wet, or (B) so contaminated so as 
reasonably to impair their dielectric capacity, or (C) are not 
considered to be dielectric for the voltage of the wires they are 
used proximate to, may not be taken closer to exposed energized 
lines than the clearance distance specified in Table R-6 or R-7.'' 
[Ex. 58]

    OSHA has accepted the NAA approach. Paragraph (r)(7)(vii) of final 
Sec. 1910.269 prohibits rope that is wet, contaminated, or otherwise 
not insulated for the voltage from being used near overhead power 
lines.
    A paragraph providing for fall protection for line-clearance tree-
trimming work has been added as Sec. 1910.269(r)(8). This requirement 
was originally proposed under paragraph (g)(2)(v). A detailed 
explanation of this provision and of why it was moved is presented in 
the preamble discussion of final Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(v).
    Paragraph (s). Final Sec. 1910.269(s) addresses communication 
facilities associated with electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution systems. Typical communications installations include 
those for microwave signaling and power line carriers.
    Microwave signaling systems are addressed by paragraph (s)(1). To 
protect employees' eyes from being injured by microwave radiation, 
paragraph (s)(1)(i) prohibits employees from looking into an open 
waveguide or antenna which is connected to an energized source of 
microwave radiation.
    Existing Sec. 1910.97, which covers non-ionizing radiation, 
prescribes a warning sign with a special symbol indicating non-ionizing 
radiation hazards. Paragraph (s)(1)(ii) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires 
areas which contain radiation in excess of the radiation protection 
guide set forth in Sec. 1910.97 to be posted with the warning sign. 
Also, the standard requires the lower half of that sign to be labeled 
as follows:

    Radiation in this area may exceed hazard limitations and special 
precautions are required. Obtain specific instruction before 
entering.

    The sign is intended to warn employees about the hazards present in 
the area and to inform them that special instructions are necessary to 
enter the area.
    In Sec. 1910.97, the radiation protection guide is advisory only. 
Paragraph (s)(1)(iii) of final Sec. 1910.269 makes the guide mandatory 
for electric utilities by requiring the employer to institute measures 
that prevent any employee's exposure from being greater than that set 
forth in the guide. These measures may be of an administrative nature 
(such as limitations on the duration of exposure) or of an engineering 
nature (such as a design of the system that limits the emitted 
radiation to that permitted by the guide) or may involve the use of 
personal protective equipment.
    Power line carrier systems use the power line itself to carry 
signals between equipment at different points on the line. Because of 
this, OSHA is requiring, in paragraph (s)(2), that work associated with 
power line carrier installations be performed according to the 
requirements for work on energized lines.
    Paragraph (t). In many electric distribution systems, electric 
equipment is installed in enclosures, such as manholes and vaults, set 
beneath the earth. Paragraph (t) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses 
safety for these underground electrical installations. The requirements 
set forth in this paragraph are in addition to requirements contained 
elsewhere in the standard (and elsewhere in Part 1910) because 
paragraph (t) only contains considerations unique to underground 
facilities. For example, paragraph (e), relating to enclosed spaces, 
also applies to underground operations involving entry into an enclosed 
space.
    Paragraph (t)(1) requires the use of ladders or other climbing 
devices for entrance into and exit from manholes and subsurface vaults 
that are more than 4 feet (122 cm) deep. Because employees can easily 
be injured in the course of jumping into subsurface enclosures or in 
climbing on the cables and hangers which have been installed in these 
enclosures, the standard requires the use of appropriate devices for 
employees entering and exiting manholes and vaults. The practice of 
climbing on equipment such as cables and cable hangers is specifically 
prohibited by paragraph (t)(1).
    In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested public comment on 
the appropriateness of requiring ladders or other climbing devices for 
subsurface enclosures more than 4 feet (122 cm) deep, as opposed to 
requiring them for shallower enclosures or for deeper enclosures. Three 
commenters addressed this issue. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and 
EEI supported the 4-foot (122-cm) depth as being appropriate (Ex. 3-22, 
3-112). Only Tennessee Valley Authority suggested a different depth, 6 
feet (183 cm), but did not provide a reason (Ex. 3-82).
    Because the 4-foot (122-cm) depth is consistent with requirements 
in Sec. 1910.23 (contained in Subpart D of Part 1910) and in paragraph 
(g)(2)(v) of final Sec. 1910.269 to provide fall protection starting at 
this height (and in light of the lack of significant opposition), OSHA 
has carried the proposed provision forward into the final rule without 
change.
    Paragraph (t)(2) requires equipment used to lower materials and 
tools into manholes or vaults to be capable of supporting the weight 
and requires this equipment to be checked for defects before use. 
Paragraph (t)(2) also requires employees to be in the clear when tools 
or materials are lowered into the enclosure. This provision protects 
employees against being injured by falling tools and material.
    The proposed rule would not have required employees to be clear of 
tools or material other than hot compounds being lowered into the 
manhole. Two commenters noted the possibility of injury due to falling 
objects and suggested that OSHA extend application of this requirement 
to any tools or material being lowered (Ex. 3-46, 3-107).
    The probability that an object will fall while being lowered is not 
related to whether or not it is a hot compound. Additionally, the 
likelihood and degree of injury is relatively constant whether or not a 
hot compound is involved. Therefore, OSHA has decided to extend the 
application of this provision as suggested. It should be noted that, 
because work addressed by paragraph (t) of final Sec. 1910.269 exposes 
employees to the danger of head injury, Sec. 1910.132(a) requires 
employees to wear head protection when they are working in underground 
electrical installations.
    Paragraph (t)(3) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 would have required 
attendants for manholes. During the time work was being performed in a 
manhole which contained energized electric equipment, an employee would 
have been required to be available in the immediate vicinity (but not 
normally in the manhole) to render emergency assistance. However, the 
attendant would have been allowed to enter the manhole, for brief 
periods, to provide other than emergency assistance to those inside. 
Also, an employee working alone would have been permitted to enter a 
manhole briefly for the purpose of inspection, housekeeping, taking 
readings, or other similar work, if this work could be performed 
safely.
    The provisions in paragraph (t)(3) were proposed so that emergency 
assistance could be provided to employees working in manholes, where 
the employees work unobserved and where undetected injury could occur. 
Taken from existing Sec. 1926.956(b)(1), these proposed requirements 
were intended to protect employees within the manhole without exposing 
the attendants outside to a risk of injury greater than that faced by 
those inside. The existing and proposed standard applied to manholes 
containing equipment energized at any voltage. However, the EEI/IBEW 
draft standard suggested that OSHA require attendants only if the 
voltage exceeded 250 volts. Although it might seem safe to allow 
employees to work alone in manholes containing equipment energized at 
250 volts or less, employees could be seriously injured at these lower 
voltages under certain conditions. In the preamble to the proposal, 
OSHA requested public comment on whether an attendant was necessary for 
entry into manholes or vaults containing electric equipment energized 
at 250 volts or less. OSHA also requested comments on whether employees 
should ever be allowed to enter manholes alone and, if so, under what 
conditions and for what length of time.
    Several commenters urged OSHA to require an attendant for all 
underground operations, regardless of the voltage of electric equipment 
(Ex. 3-21, 3-46, 3-76). The UWUA noted that there have been fatalities 
encountered at voltages much less than 250 volts (Ex. 3-76). EEI argued 
that an attendant was not necessary unless the voltage level presented 
a hazard (Ex. 3-112). They went on to suggest 250 volts as an 
appropriate limit.
    OSHA believes that the current subpart V regulation is correct in 
not providing a lower limit on the voltage of energized equipment 
requiring the presence of an attendant. The National Electrical Safety 
Code (ANSI C2-1987, Section 426C) also requires an attendant regardless 
of the voltage of energized equipment (Ex. 2-8). Additionally, at least 
one of the accidents described in the record involves an employee 
electrocuted by a voltage lower than 250 volts (Ex. 53). Therefore, the 
final rule requires an attendant for work involving energized electric 
equipment regardless of voltage.
    Most of the comments received on paragraph (t)(3) supported 
allowing an employee to work alone, as proposed, when he or she is 
performing inspections, housekeeping, or similar work (Ex. 3-22, 3-32, 
3-103, 3-107, 3-112). They contended that this work could be performed 
alone safely. Additionally, EEI noted that the NESC permits this type 
of work to be performed by employees working alone (Ex. 3-112). The 
UWUA supported allowing this only if it has been clearly established 
that no work hazards exist, if the manhole is continually ventilated, 
if there is sufficient clearance from live parts, and if the work does 
not require contact with or close approach to the live parts (Ex. 3-76; 
DC Tr. 417). Opposing these views, NIOSH and IBEW Local 17 supported 
requiring an attendant under all conditions because of the presence of 
other hazards in enclosed spaces (Ex. 3-21, 3-66).
    OSHA has retained the language of proposed paragraphs (t)(3)(ii) 
and (t)(3)(iii) in the final rule. On balance, the record supports the 
proposed conditions for permitting work by an employee in a manhole 
without an attendant. If other hazards in the space warrant the 
presence of an additional employee, final Sec. 1910.269(e)(7) already 
requires it. The electrical hazards addressed by the UWUA are covered 
in final Sec. 1910.269(1). Because the hazards addressed by paragraph 
(t)(3) are primarily related to electric shock, allowing the attendant 
to enter the manhole briefly\90\ has no significant effect on the 
safety of the employee he or she is protecting. In case of electric 
shock, the attendant would still be able to provide assistance. The 
final rule requires the attendant to be trained in first aid and in CPR 
as required by final Sec. 1910.269(b)(1) to ensure that CPR and other 
first aid treatment will be available if needed.
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    \90\The attendant is permitted to remain within the manhole only 
for the short period of time necessary to assist the employee inside 
the manhole with a task that one employee cannot perform alone. For 
example, if a second employee is needed to help lift a piece of 
equipment into place, the attendant could enter only for the amount 
of time that is needed to accomplish this task. However, if 
significant portions of the job require the assistance of a second 
worker in the manhole, the attendant would not be permitted to 
remain in the manhole for the length of time that would be 
necessary, and a third employee would be required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, if other hazards are believed to endanger the employee in 
the manhole, paragraph (e)(7) of final Sec. 1910.269 also applies.\91\ 
Paragraph (e)(7) requires attendants for work in an enclosed space (for 
example, a manhole) if there is reason to believe that a hazard may 
exist within the space or if a hazard exists because of traffic 
patterns in the area of the opening to the enclosed space. For example, 
if the ventilation of the manhole required by paragraph (e)(11) reduces 
the concentration of flammable vapors to an acceptable level and if 
failure of the ventilation system could allow the concentration 
flammable vapors to become hazardous again, an attendant would be 
required. An attendant is also required when traffic patterns in the 
area around the manhole opening endanger an entrant exiting the 
manhole. In such situations, the employee on the surface would be 
exposed to the same hazards against which he or she is trying to 
protect the original entrant. Therefore, the final rule does not permit 
attendants required under paragraph (e)(7) to enter the manhole. To 
clarify the application of the two different attendant requirements, a 
note has been added to paragraph (t)(3)(ii) in the final rule. The note 
indicates that if an attendant is also required under paragraph (e)(7), 
one person may serve to satisfy both requirements, but is not permitted 
to enter the manhole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\Additionally, as noted in the discussion of paragraph (e), 
earlier in this preamble, the entry would have to be conducted in 
accordance with Sec. 1910.146, the generic permit-required confined 
spaces standard, if paragraphs (e) and (t) of final Sec. 1910.269 do 
not adequately protect the entrants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA has included a second note following paragraph (t)(3)(ii) in 
the final rule. The note serves as a reminder that paragraph (l)(1) 
prohibits unqualified employees from working in areas containing 
unguarded, uninsulated energized lines or parts of equipment.
    Under paragraph (t)(3)(iv) reliable communications are required to 
be maintained among all employees involved in the job, including any 
attendants, the employees in the manhole, and employees in separate 
manholes working on the same job. The language of this provision has 
been modified slightly from that in the proposal for consistency with 
final Sec. 1910.269(q)(2)(ix), which contains a similar requirement.
    Several hearing participants addressed the issue of manhole rescue. 
The UWUA and Mr. J. Nigel Ellis, President of the Research and Trading 
Corporation, suggested that OSHA adopt provisions relating to the 
availability of manhole rescue equipment (Ex. 54; DC Tr. 434, 436-437, 
483-488). EEI and IBEW recommended language also addressing this 
concern (Ex. 56, 64).
    OSHA has decided to address rescue under the requirements 
pertaining to enclosed spaces. The hazards related to rescuing 
employees working in spaces with restricted means of access are common 
to all enclosed spaces and are more appropriately covered under 
provisions dealing with such spaces. The discussion and resolution of 
this issue can be found in the summary and explanation of final 
Sec. 1910.269(e)(3).
    To install cables into the underground ducts, or conduits, that 
will contain them, employees use a series of short jointed rods or a 
long flexible rod inserted into the ducts. The insertion of these rods 
into the ducts is known as ``rodding.'' The rods are used to thread the 
cable-pulling rope through the conduit. After the rods have been 
withdrawn and the cable-pulling ropes have been inserted, the cables 
can then be pulled through by mechanical means.
    Paragraph (t)(4) of Sec. 1910.269 requires the duct rods to be 
inserted in the direction presenting the least hazard to employees. To 
make sure that the rod does not contact live parts in the far manhole 
or vault, the final rule also requires an employee to be stationed at 
the remote end of the rodding operation.
    To prevent accidents resulting from working on the wrong cable, one 
that may be energized, paragraph (t)(5) requires the identification of 
the proper cable when multiple cables are present in a work area. The 
identification must be made by electrical means, unless the proper 
cable is obvious because of appearance, location, or other means of 
readily identifying the proper cable.
    This provision in the proposal would have allowed distinctive 
appearance or location to be the only alternative means of identifying 
the proper cable. Several commenters requested a more performance-
oriented approach that would allow for other means of identifying the 
cable, such as cable tags (Ex. 3-42, 3-62, 3-120, 3-125, 3-128), OSHA 
has added language in the final rule recognizing any means of readily 
identifying the correct cable. Additionally, this paragraph was 
originally proposed as Sec. 1910.269(t)(6), but was switched with 
proposed paragraph (t)(5) in the final rule.
    If any energized cables are to be moved during underground 
operations, paragraph (t)(6) requires them to be inspected for possible 
defects that could lead to a fault. (If a defect is found, paragraph 
(t)(7) applies.) These provisions protect employees against possibly 
defective cables, which could fault upon being moved, leading to 
serious injury.
    This paragraph, which was proposed as Sec. 1910.269(t)(5), also 
would have required the cable to be moved under the direct supervision 
of a qualified employee. Because final Sec. 1910.269(l)(1) already 
requires such work to be performed by a qualified employee, this 
additional portion of proposed paragraph (t)(5) is unnecessary. 
Additionally, at least one commenter misinterpreted the proposal to 
forbid the employee supervising the work from actually performing it 
(Ex. 3-62). Therefore, this language has not been carried forward into 
the final rule.
    Since defective energized cables may fail with an enormous release 
of energy, precautions must be taken to minimize the possibility of 
such an occurrence while an employee is working in a manhole. 
Therefore, paragraph (t)(7) proposed to prohibit employees from working 
in a manhole which contains an energized cable with a defect that could 
lead to a fault. The proposal listed typical abnormalities that could 
expose employees to injury as: oil or compound leaking from a cable or 
joint (splice), a broken cable sheath or joint sleeve, hot localized 
surface temperatures on a cable or joint, or a joint that is swollen so 
much that its circumference exceeds 3.5 times the standard sleeve 
diameter. OSHA invited comments on whether there were additional 
defects that should be listed. OSHA also invited data on whether any of 
the listed defects could not possibly lead to a fault in the cable 
system.
    Three commenters contended that it is not unusual to have small 
amounts of oil or compound leaking from a cable or joint (Ex. 3-20, 3-
42, 3-80). They claimed that this would not indicate the presence of an 
impending fault but would suggest the need for closer inspection and 
evaluation.
    On the other hand, Edison Electric Institute agreed that all the 
conditions listed in the proposal could be indicators of impending 
faults, except for the presence of swelling in a joint (Ex. 3-112). 
They cited surveys of two electric utilities that had disassembled over 
100 joints apiece. In both cases, they noted, no evidence was found 
that a swollen or collapsed lead casing on a cable joint was more 
susceptible of failure than a joint with no change to its exterior 
geometry. They argued that there is no basis for OSHA to select a 
particular circumference formula or measurement as an indication in all 
instances that a fault is impending.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\EEI also cited an Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission decision that they felt supported their claim (Ex. 56). 
In fact, the Administrative Law Judge cited proposed 
Sec. 1910.269(t)(7) in his decision as validating the respondent's 
measures to protect employees, which he found did not expose 
employees to unreasonable hazards and conformed to the OSHA proposal 
(Secretary of Labor v. Consolidated Edison Company of New York, 
Inc., OSHRC Docket Nos. 88-004, 88-461).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By contrast, the UWUA testified that joints swollen to any degree 
posed a threat of failure (Ex. 3-76; DC Tr. 417-418, 427-429, 515-521). 
Mr. George Hollman, on behalf of the UWUA, stated their position as 
follows:

    It has been my experience as a troubleshooter in the emergency 
department that most of the cable failures that I see have been in 
fact swollen joints. That we have seen a great number of them that 
have already exploded and nobody realizes whether in fact it was a 
swollen joint.
    We had on our [``D'' fault] procedure which is a procedure 
utilized by the Edison Company they have the chart for what the 
circumference of a sleeve should be. The integrity of that joint is 
compromised considerably when you get the joint swollen beyond the 
engineering specification.
    So our position would be if that if it is a 5.5 inch sleeve, 
that that is the engineering specification for the sleeve. For them 
to go beyond that to say that it is okay, the integrity is severely 
compromised. So we have seen in many instances that upon opening it 
that water came right out of the bottom, and water and oil do not 
mix.
    So that would tell you immediately that any cable joint that has 
water in it other than a sleeve which might be from a polyethylene 
type cable or EPR cable would be in danger of failures. Any type of 
immersible cable that has water in it is in danger of failure. I 
think that both sides agree on that.
    And it has been my experience that many times when we open up a 
swollen joint that we find water in it. So we feel that it is 
definitely assumed to fail, at what point where the sleeve ruptures 
and starts emitting fluid out of it. I think that when you take a 
chart and you say well at this point in the chart it is not going to 
kill you and go one-eighth of an inch more and now it will, I think 
is ludicrous.
    So that has been the argument all along, of where you got the 
chart from, where did you get the numbers, and where did you say 
that that is the stress point. What type lead sleeve from one lead 
sleeve to another manufacturer, which is stronger, how many 
manufacturers are you utilizing, and who came up with it. And 
usually we do not get any answers. Somebody just hands you a piece 
of paper with that sleeve.
    And I think that when you take the OSHA standard that you put 
forward of 3.5, 3.5 of a circumference or a diameter, right away 
they are going to get bulldozed on that job, and they are going to 
be confused on what 3.5 is. Because I think that I was a little bit 
confused on it myself until I really got into it. [DC Tr. 519-521]

    Mr. David J. Mahoney of the Los Angeles Department of Water and 
Power testified that joints on their system were corrected before 
swelling to the extent cited in the proposal (LA Tr. 457-458).
    OSHA considers the conditions listed in the proposal as indications 
that a cable or joint is not normal and may be in danger of failing. If 
a cable is leaking, it is certainly capable of allowing the entrance of 
moisture (which is an undisputed cause of faults). In certain cases, an 
employer may be able to demonstrate that a particular condition is not 
related to a possible fault-producing state. There is some evidence in 
the record, for example, that a joint that is swollen is not in danger 
of failing unless other conditions, such as the presence of higher than 
normal temperatures or leaks, also exist (Ex. 46). Unfortunately, the 
record does not contain good evidence of what symptoms a joint or cable 
displays before failing. (Since the fault destroys most of the 
available evidence, this is not surprising.) However, the record does 
demonstrate what the likely consequences of employee exposure to a 
fault on an underground power line--severe burns, possibly resulting in 
death (Ex. 6-16). Additionally, the conditions listed in the proposal 
are considered abnormal, requiring the use of protective measures.
    OSHA has concluded that employees may work in a manhole that 
contains a cable with abnormalities only when service load conditions 
and feasible alternatives prevent deenergizing the cable and only when 
the employees are protected from a failure. Rather than specify the 
precise conditions requiring protective measures, paragraph (t)(7) of 
final Sec. 1910.269 presumes that certain conditions are indicative of 
a problem, as follows:

    Where a cable in a manhole has one or more abnormalities that 
could lead to or be an indication of an impending fault, the 
defective cable shall be deenergized before any employee may work in 
the manhole, except when service load conditions and a lack of 
feasible alternatives require that the cable remain energized. In 
that case, employees may enter the manhole provided they are 
protected from the possible effects of a failure by shields or other 
devices that are capable of containing the adverse effects of a 
fault in the joint.

     Note: Abnormalities such as oil or compound leaking from cable 
or joints, broken cable sheaths or joint sleeves, hot localized 
surface temperatures of cables or joints, or joints that are swollen 
beyond normal tolerance are presumed to lead to or be an indication 
of an impending fault.

    The abnormalities listed in proposed paragraph (t)(7) have been 
moved to a note following this provision in the final rule. The 
criterion for determining the amount of acceptable swelling has also 
been revised to indicate that joints ``that are swollen beyond normal 
tolerance'' are presumed to be an abnormality. The note states that the 
listed conditions are presumed to lead to or be an indication of a 
possible impending fault. An employer could demonstrate that any one of 
these conditions, in a particular case, is not indicative of an 
impending fault, in which case Sec. 1910.269(t)(7) would not require 
protective measures to be taken.
    Under some service load conditions, it may not be feasible for the 
electric utility to deenergize the cable with the defect at the same 
time that another line is deenergized for maintenance work. In such 
cases, paragraph (t)(7) of final Sec. 1910.269 allows the defective 
cable or splice to remain energized as long as the employees in the 
manhole are protected against the possible effects of a failure. For 
example, a ballistic blanket wrapped around a defective splice can 
protect against injury from the effects of a fault in the splice.
    Some commenters noted that handling a conductor to wrap a 
protective blanket around it may itself induce the impending fault to 
occur (Ex. 3-20, 3-80). The UWUA was concerned that a ballistic blanket 
might not provide complete protection (Ex. 3-76; DC Tr. 519).
    Paragraph (t)(7) requires employees to be protected by shields 
capable of containing the adverse effects of a failure. The energy that 
could be released in case of a fault is known, and the energy absorbing 
capability of a shield can be obtained from the manufacturer or can be 
calculated. As long as the energy absorbing capability of the shield 
exceeds the available fault energy, the shield will protect employees. 
Employees are required to be protected, regardless of the type of 
shielding device used and of how it is applied. Additionally, the 
standard permits this option to be used only ``if the defective cable 
or splice cannot be deenergized due to service load conditions''. 
Employers are required to use alternatives such as those mentioned by 
Mr. Eugene Briody (for example, the use of shunts or other means of 
supplying areas with power [DC Tr. 518-519]) whenever feasible before 
allowing access.
    Paragraph (t)(8) requires metallic sheath continuity to be 
maintained while work is performed on underground cables. Bonding 
across an opening in a cable's sheath protects employees against shock 
from a difference in potential between the two sides of the opening.
    Several commenters objected to this requirement (Ex. 3-32, 3-42, 3-
45, 3-62, 3-112, 3-123). They generally argued that it was not always 
possible to provide a bonding jumper across the opening in the sheath. 
Some cited the problems of jacketed cables (Ex. 3-32, 3-112), one cited 
corrosion problems (Ex. 3-123), and others simply suggested allowing 
alternatives (Ex. 3-42, 3-45, 3-62).
    The Lineman's and Cableman's Handbook describes the purpose behind 
bonding cable sheaths as follows:

    Cable Bonding and Grounding. The purpose of bonding and 
grounding the cable sheaths is to maintain them at or near ground 
potential. A No. 2 AWG copper wire is generally used. It must be 
attached to the sheaths with a special bond clip which is soldered 
to the wire and sheath and connected to a low-resistance ground.
    Bonding and grounding reduce the likelihood of arcing between 
the sheath of a faulted cable and other nearby sheaths. It thus 
reduces the danger to cablemen who may be in a manhole when a cable 
fault occurs. It also minimizes the harmful effects of corrosive 
action due to stray currents.93 [Ex. 8-5]

    \9\3Kurtz, Edwin B., and Shoemaker, Thomas M., The Lineman's and 
Cableman's Handbook, Sixth Edition, 1981, McGraw-Hill Book Co., p. 
33-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While this description relates to the permanent installation of 
grounds and bonding jumpers on cable installations, it nonetheless 
holds true for temporary bonding across the opening in a sheath. Under 
fault conditions, the voltage difference between the two sides of the 
opening can reach lethal levels if proper bonding is not in place. This 
hazard is currently recognized in Sec. 1926.956(c)(7), which contains a 
requirement equivalent to the one being adopted in final 
Sec. 1910.269(t)(8). The final rule is performance oriented, accepting 
any method of ensuring continuity that limits potential differences to 
safe levels (per Sec. 1910.269(n)(3)). However, as noted by Union 
Carbide Corporation, there are certain periods, such as during the 
cable stripping process, when cable sheath continuity cannot be 
maintained (Ex. 3-45). They recommended that the standard allow the use 
of electrical protective equipment during these periods. OSHA agrees 
with Union Carbide, and paragraph (t)(8) of final Sec. 1910.269 allows 
the cable sheath to be treated as energized in lieu of bonding. (The 
voltage to which the sheath is to be considered energized is equal to 
the maximum voltage that could be seen across the sheath under fault 
conditions.) This is consistent with other parts of the final rule, 
such as paragraph (l)(9), which recognize treating objects as energized 
as an alternative to grounding.
    Paragraph (u). Paragraph (u) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses work 
performed in substations. As is the case elsewhere in the standard, the 
provisions of this paragraph are intended to supplement (rather than 
modify) the more general requirements contained in other portions of 
Sec. 1910.269, such as paragraph (1) on minimum approach distances.
    Paragraph (u)(1) requires enough space to be provided around 
electric equipment to allow ready and safe access to and operation and 
maintenance of the equipment. This rule prevents employees from 
contacting exposed live parts as a result of insufficient maneuvering 
room. A note has been included to recognize, as constituting 
compliance, the provisions of ANSI C2-1987 for the design of workspace 
for electric equipment.
     Some commenters objected to the application of this provision to 
installations made before the standard's effective date (Ex. 3-20, 3-
22, 3-80, 3-82, 3-101, 3-112; DC Tr. 833-836). Arguing that this 
pointed out the need for an omnibus grandfather clause, they claimed 
that older substations do not meet the access and working distances 
specified in the latest ANSI standards. They noted that these 
facilities were built under standards in effect at the time of 
installation. Mr. Howard D. Wilcox, representing EEI, testified on this 
subject as follows:

    One of the best examples of the need for a grandfather clause is 
electric substations. A substation is a facility that transforms 
electricity from one voltage to another.
    In certain types of substations, there are buildings that house 
control switches, relays and associated circuitry. The purpose of 
this equipment is to control circuit breakers that are located in 
the substation yard. Photo No. 1 shows the front of one of these 
panels. You can see that it has been around for a while.
    The reverse side of these panels must be periodically accessed 
by relay technicians, substation mechanics and other qualified 
personnel to perform inspections and tests.
    As you can see in Photo NO. 2, the clearances between panels in 
these older stations is less than 30 inches and in this station is 
about 23 inches from the back of both of those panels.
    Paragraph (u) of the proposal as written calls for sufficient 
access and working space to be provided in accordance with the 
National Electric [sic] Safety Code, ANSI C2-1987, which would 
require a 30-inch clearance between the panels.
    A significant number of older indoor substations do not comply 
with ANSI C2-1987 because they were built prior to the 30-inch 
requirement. However, ANSI C2 contains a grandfather provision which 
exempts existing facilities from its design requirements.
    The preamble to this proposed rule recognizes that ``older 
installations may not meet the exact dimensions set forth in the 
latest version'' of the National Electric Safety Code, and notes 
that the agency believes the language of the standard to be 
sufficiently performance-oriented to exempt these older 
installations.
    The actual language of the proposed standard, however, merely 
requires sufficient access and working space and references the 1987 
version of the National Electric Safety Code.
    We are concerned, therefore, that the standard could be 
interpreted as requiring strict compliance with the National 
Electric Safety Code clearance requirements even though the NESC 
itself ``grandfathers'' the existing equipment.
    If so, compliance with the standard would require massive 
retrofitting of numerous older substations, which, although they 
provide adequate access and working space, do not provide the full 
clearances required by ANSI C2-1987.
    In order to perform the retrofit, the substation control houses 
would have to be completely rebuilt. Present cost for a complete 138 
kV/46 kV substation control house is in the order of $350,000 for 
material, labor, engineering and overheads on the Consumers Power 
Company system.
    Rebuild of the substation control house shown in Photos Nos. 1 
and 2, which has a significantly larger number of outgoing circuits, 
would be in the $900,000 range on the Consumers Power Company 
system.
    I cannot begin to estimate what the capital cost to the entire 
industry would be, and what the impact on the nation's electric 
system and customers would be, if we had to systematically shut down 
older substations and completely rebuild their control houses to 
provide for this extra clearance.
    The number of accidents experienced in this environment on the 
Consumers Power Company System in the time I have been with the 
company is zero.
    We, as all other utilities, provide safe work practices and 
equipment to allow working in this environment, such as insulated 
tools, rubber gloves, and protective cover-up. (DC Tr. 833-836)

    As noted in the preamble to the proposal, OSHA realizes that older 
installations may not meet the dimensions set forth in the latest 
version of the national consensus standard. The Agency continues to 
believe that the language of proposed Sec. 1910.269(u)(1) is 
sufficiently performance oriented that older installations built to 
specifications in the standards that were in effect at the time they 
were constructed would meet the requirement for sufficient workspace 
provided that the installation and work practices used enable employees 
to perform work safely within the space and to maintain the minimum 
approach distances specified in paragraph (1)(2). The note for this 
provision clearly states that the NESC specifications are guidelines. 
The ANSI standard is specifically not being incorporated by reference 
here. To clarify the guidelines in the final rule, OSHA has included 
the following language in the note to paragraph (u)(1):

    Note: Guidelines for the dimensions of access and workspace 
about electric equipment in substations are contained in American 
National Standard-National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI C2-1987. 
Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply with paragraph 
(u)(1) of this section. An installation that does not conform to 
this ANSI standard will, nonetheless, be considered as complying 
with paragraph (u)(1) of this section if the employer can 
demonstrate that the installation provides ready and safe access 
based on the following evidence:

    (1) That the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2 
that was in effect at the time the installation was made,
    (2) That the configuration of the installation enables employees 
to maintain the minimum approach distances required by paragraph 
(1)(2) of this section while they working on exposed, energized 
parts, and
    (3) That the precautions taken when work is performed on the 
installation provide protection equivalent to the protection that 
would be provide by access and working space meeting ANSI C2-1987.

    This language accomplishes three goals. First, it explains that an 
installation need not be in conformance with ANSI C2-1987 in order to 
be considered as complying with final Sec. 1910.269(u)(1). Second, it 
informs employers whose installations do not conform to the latest ANSI 
standard of how they can demonstrate compliance with the OSHA standard. 
Third, it ensures that, however old an installation is, it provides 
sufficient space to enable employees to work within the space without 
significant risk of injury.
    The Agency has not adopted Mr. Wilcox's suggested complete 
exemption of older installations from final paragraph (u)(1). The basic 
rule is for the equipment to provide adequate access and working space. 
Even Mr. Wilcox believes that his company's older installations meet 
this. If a facility does not provide sufficient space, it poses a 
hazard to employees and should be modified. Based on the record, 
however, OSHA believes that the vast majority of installations were 
made in accordance with standards in effect at the time they were 
built. In such cases, the working and access space involved should 
normally be sufficient, and the note in the final rule ensures that it 
is.
    Paragraph (u)(2) requires draw-out-type circuit breakers to be 
inserted and removed while the breaker is in the open position. (A 
draw-out-type circuit breaker is one in which the removable portion may 
be withdrawn from the stationary portion without the necessity of 
unbolting connections or mounting supports.) Additionally, if the 
design of the control devices permits, the control circuit for the 
circuit breaker would have to be rendered inoperative. (Some circuit 
breaker and control device designs do not incorporate a feature 
allowing the control circuit for the breaker to be rendered 
inoperative.) These provisions are intended to prevent arcing which 
could injure employees.
    Because voltages can be impressed or induced on large metal objects 
near substation equipment, paragraph (u)(3) requires conductive fences 
around substations to be grounded. Continuity across openings is also 
required in order to eliminate voltage differences between adjacent 
parts of the fence.
    Paragraph (u)(3)(ii) proposed the locking of unattended 
substations. Two commenters suggested limiting the application of this 
rule to substations containing exposed live parts (Ex. 3-34, 3-45). One 
of them made a similar comment regarding proposed paragraph (u)(4)(i), 
which contains the same requirement (Ex. 3-34).
    OSHA has decided to omit proposed paragraph (u)(3)(ii) from the 
final rule. The hazard it addressed is covered in the same manner in 
final Sec. 1910.269(u)(4), discussed next.
    Paragraph (u)(4) addresses the guarding of energized parts. In the 
proposal, all rooms and spaces containing electric supply lines or 
equipment would have been required to be enclosed within fences, 
screens, partitions, or walls to prevent unqualified persons from 
entering. The entrances to such rooms and spaces would have been 
required to be locked or attended, and warning signs would have been 
required. These provisions, which were proposed in paragraph (u)(4)(i), 
were intended to prevent unqualified persons from gaining access to 
high voltage equipment and from contacting exposed live parts.
    Several other commenters suggested changing the phrase 
``unqualified persons'' to ``unauthorized employees'' (Ex. 3-11, 3-44, 
3-58, 3-69, 3-102, 3-112, 3-123). Two of them maintained that the rule 
would preclude apprentices from entering the area containing energized 
electric supply equipment (Ex. 3-44, 3-58, 3-102). Others argued that 
the word ``qualified'' was too restrictive and that it would prevent 
activities such as meter reading, inspection, and engineering from 
these areas (Ex. 3-11, 3-69, 3-112, 3-123). Two additional commenters 
urged OSHA to limit the application of the rule to areas accessible to 
the public (Ex. 3-20, 3-80).
    OSHA does not agree that the requirement is too restrictive with 
respect to which persons are denied access to hazardous areas. The term 
``authorized employee'' is not appropriate for use in this rule. The 
definition of this term restricts its use to requirements dealing with 
the control of hazardous energy sources.94 Even assuming that the 
commenters intended the EEI/IBEW draft definition of ``authorized 
employee'' to apply, the Agency believes that the definition in their 
draft standard would result in a requirement that is no less 
restrictive than the OSHA rule. Their definition reads as follows:

    \9\4Authorized employee--``An employee who locks out or tags out 
machines or equipment in order to perform servicing or maintenance 
on that machine or equipment. An affected employee becomes an 
authorized employee when that employee's duties include performing 
servicing or maintenance covered under this section.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A qualified employee to whom the authority and responsibility to 
perform a specific assignment has been given by the employer. (Ex. 
2-3, emphasis supplied in the original document)

    Thus, under the EEI/IBEW draft standard, a person would still have 
to be ``qualified'' to be an ``authorized employee''. (The issue of 
whether OSHA's definition of ``qualified employee'' is too restrictive 
is discussed under the summary and explanation of Sec. 1910.269(x).)
    OSHA believes that it is important to prohibit unqualified persons 
from areas containing energized electric supply equipment regardless of 
the work they would be performing. Employees working in these areas 
must be trained in the hazards involved and in the appropriate work 
practices, as required by paragraph (a)(2)(ii). Otherwise, they would 
not be able to distinguish hazardous circuit parts from non-hazardous 
equipment and would not be familiar with the appropriate work 
practices, regardless of the jobs they are performing. There are 
accidents described in the record that involve contact of unqualified 
persons with energized parts in such areas. Accidents of this type 
responsible for the deaths of three employees were described in Exhibit 
9-2.
    For these reasons, the Agency has retained the term ``unqualified 
persons'' in final Sec. 1910.269(u)(4).
    As noted earlier, two commenters suggested revising the 
restrictions on access by unqualified persons to apply only to areas 
containing exposed live parts, at least with respect to industrial 
installations (Ex. 3-34, 3-45).
    OSHA agrees with these commenters, at least in part. Section 
1910.269 is intended to apply to electrical installations that are 
largely unregulated. The Subpart S installation standards typically do 
not apply, and the electric equipment may pose hazards in addition to 
those of exposed live parts. For example, equipment enclosures may be 
ungrounded. If the requirements of Subpart S are not being met, then it 
is important to prevent unqualified persons from gaining access to 
areas containing electric supply equipment.
    If, on the other hand, the installation conforms to Subpart S, at 
least with respect to the guarding of live parts and to the grounding 
of enclosures for these parts, the provisions of proposed paragraph 
(u)(4)(i) are unnecessary. In Subpart S, suitable protection is 
provided in a similar, though not identical, requirement contained in 
Sec. 1910.303(h)(2). This requirement in Subpart S, along with 
Secs. 1910.303(g)(2) and 1910.304(f)(5), provides safety to employees 
equivalent to that provided by proposed Sec. 1910.269(u)(4)(i). These 
provisions prohibit unqualified persons from accessing areas containing 
exposed live parts operating at 50 volts through 600 volts and located 
less than 8 feet above the floor or other working surface. Unqualified 
persons are also prohibited from areas containing live parts operating 
at more than 600 volts, unless the live parts are completely enclosed 
in metal enclosures or are installed at an elevation of at least 8 
feet, 6 inches. The metal enclosures must be grounded, and the minimum 
height increases with increasing voltage.
    In the final rule, OSHA is adopting requirements that follow the 
Subpart S approach to excluding unqualified persons from access to 
unsafe areas. Final Sec. 1910.269(u)(4) sets forth criteria for access 
by unqualified persons to spaces containing electric supply lines or 
equipment that are equivalent to those contained in Subpart S, with one 
exception. Paragraph (u)(5)(i) of final Sec. 1910.269 does not permit 
the installation of unguarded live parts operating at more than 150 
volts, although it does recognize ``guarding by location''. Following 
these guidelines, paragraph (u)(4)(i) divides areas containing electric 
supply equipment into three categories, rather than two, as follows:
    (1) areas where exposed live parts operating at 50 to 150 volts to 
ground are located within 8 feet of the ground or other working 
surface,
    (2) areas where live parts operating at between 150 and 601 volts 
and located within 8 feet of the ground or other working surface are 
guarded only by location, as permitted under paragraph (u)(5)(i), and
    (3) areas where live parts operating at more than 600 volts are 
located, unless:
    (a) the live parts are enclosed within grounded, metal-enclosed 
equipment whose only openings are designed so that foreign objects 
inserted in these openings will be deflected from energized parts, or
    (b) the live parts are installed at a height above ground and any 
other working surface that provides protection at least equivalent to 
an 8-foot height at 50 volts.
    Paragraphs (u)(4)(ii) through (u)(4)(v) contain the requirements 
that apply to these areas. The areas have to be so enclosed as to 
minimize the possibility that unqualified persons will enter; warning 
signs have to be displayed; and entrances not under the observation of 
an attendant have to be kept locked. Additionally, unqualified persons 
are not permitted to enter these areas while the electric supply lines 
or equipment are energized.
    With these changes, OSHA has codified the provisions in the final 
rule that are equivalent to proposed paragraph (u)(4)(i) as entire 
paragraph (u)(4). The remaining requirements of proposed paragraph 
(u)(4) (proposed as Sec. 1910.269(u)(4)(ii) through (u)(4)(iv)) have 
been placed under paragraph (u)(5) in final Sec. 1910.269.
    Paragraph (u)(5)(i) requires live parts operating at more than 150 
volts to be guarded (by physical guards or by location) or insulated. 
This provision protects qualified employees from accidentally 
contacting energized parts. Guidance for clearance distances 
appropriate for guarding by location can be found in ANSI C2. 
Installations meeting ANSI C2-1987 are considered to meet paragraph 
(u)(5)(i), which is based on Section 124A.1 of that standard.
    Several interested parties made comments to this paragraph 
(proposed Sec. 1910.269(u)(4)(ii)) that were similar to the comments on 
paragraph (u)(1), discussed earlier (Ex. 3-62, 3-65, 3-80, 3-82, 3-
112). Namely, they claimed that older installations did not meet 
current ANSI standards. OSHA has used the same approach in the final 
version of this provision as the Agency used under the earlier 
requirement. In this case, OSHA will consider installations that do not 
meet ANSI C2-1987 as meeting paragraph (u)(5)(i) provided the employer 
can demonstrate that the installation provides sufficient clearance 
based on the following evidence:
    (1) That the installation meets the requirements of the edition of 
ANSI C2 that was in effect at the time the installation was made,
    (2) That each employee is isolated from live parts at the point of 
closest approach, and95
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    \9\5 An employee is isolated from an energized part if the 
installation prevents the employee from coming within the withstand 
distance for the voltage involved. Appendix ------ contains 
information on determining withstand distances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (3) That the precautions taken protect employees to the same degree 
as the clearances specified in ANSI C2-1987.
    This approach affords employers flexibility in complying with the 
standard and affords employees protection from injury due to sparkover 
from live circuit parts.
    Paragraph (u)(5)(ii) provides that the guarding of live parts 
within a compartment be maintained during operation and maintenance 
functions. This guarding is intended to prevent accidental contact with 
energized parts and to prevent objects from being dropped on energized 
parts. However, since access must be gained to energized equipment by 
qualified employees, an exception to this proposed requirement allows 
the removal of guards for this purpose. In such cases, paragraph 
(u)(5)(iii) protects other employees working nearby by requiring the 
installation of protective barriers around the work area.
    So that employees can receive pertinent information on conditions 
that affect safety at the substation, paragraph (u)(6)(i) requires 
employees who do not regularly work at the station to report their 
presence to the employee in charge. Typical conditions affecting safety 
in substations include the location of energized equipment in the area 
and the limits of any deenergized work area. Paragraph (u)(6)(ii) 
requires this specific information to be communicated to employees 
during the job briefing required by paragraph (c) of final 
Sec. 1910.269.
    Paragraph (v). Paragraph (v) of final Sec. 1910.269 contains 
requirements pertaining to electric power generating plants and to work 
practices used in these plants. As is the case elsewhere in the 
standard, the provisions of paragraph (v) are intended to supplement 
(rather than modify) the other more general requirements of 
Sec. 1910.269.
    Paragraph (v)(1)(i) requires the employer to maintain interlocks 
and other safety devices (such as relief valves) in a safe and operable 
condition. This requirement ensures that these devices perform their 
intended function of protecting workers when called upon to do so. To 
ensure further that these devices remain operable, paragraph (v)(1)(ii) 
prohibits them from being modified to defeat their function, except as 
necessary for the test, repair, or adjustment of the device.
    Three commenters suggested allowing safety devices to be modified 
when necessary to permit operations to continue (Ex. 3-20, 3-80, 3-
112).
    No evidence was presented to demonstrate why defeating a safety 
device would be necessary nor was any evidence given as to how this 
could be accomplished without endangering employees. These devices are 
required by safety codes (such as the NESC) and are installed to 
protect persons from hazards posed by different types of equipment. For 
example, pressure vessels are commonly equipped with safety relief 
valves so that the safe operating pressure of the vessel is not 
exceeded. Defeating this valve would expose employees to possible 
explosion, a widely recognized hazard. OSHA does not believe that these 
devices could be defeated without exposing employees to hazards, so 
paragraph (v)(1)(ii) has been adopted as proposed.
    Sometimes the brushes on a generator or exciter must be replaced 
while the machine is in operation. This work is unusually hazardous, 
and extreme caution must be observed by employees performing the job. 
To protect these workers, paragraph (v)(2) contains requirements for 
replacing brushes while the generator is in service. Since field 
windings and exciters are operated in an ungrounded condition, there is 
no voltage with respect to ground on the brushes as long as there is no 
ground fault in the circuit. So that no voltage to ground is present 
while employees are changing the brushes, paragraph (v)(2) requires the 
exciter-field circuit to be checked to ensure that a ground condition 
does not exist.
    Paragraph (v)(2) in the proposal also contained the following 
requirement:

    If the equipment has ground protecting devices, the protective 
devices shall be disconnected and tagged before brushes are changed.

    Several commenters objected to this requirement (Ex. 3-42, 3-61, 3-
82, 3-112, 3-123). They maintained that this provision was unnecessary. 
EEI stated that ``[c]ontinuation in service of ground detection/
protection devices is advantageous to reliability of service'' (Ex. 3-
112). They recommended substitution of the following EEI/IBEW provision 
(from which the OSHA proposal was taken):

    Where such equipment has ground protecting devices, such devices 
shall be disconnected and tagged before changing brushes.

     The proposed OSHA paragraph simply corrected grammatical errors in 
the EEI/IBEW version. Accepting EEI's suggested language would not 
overcome the objections to this provision.
    Mr. G.F. Stone of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) aptly 
described the purpose of disconnecting ground protecting devices and 
the reasons for their opposition to this requirement as follows:

    The ground protecting devices are disconnected before the 
brushes are changed for operational reasons and not for employee 
protection.
    The ground protecting device serves to trip the generator when a 
ground condition is detected on the generator field, but only for 
equipment protection. The ground protecting devices are disconnected 
only to ensure the generator does not trip off line while the 
brushes are being changed and not for protecting employees from 
electrical hazards. While employees are changing brushes they are 
exposed to a maximum of 375 volts dc from the positive brush to the 
negative brush regardless of whether or not the ground protecting 
devices are disconnected.
    Employee protection is provided by an insulative barrier of 
fiber board between the positive and negative brushes, following 
safe operating and maintenance procedures, and training employees in 
safe methods to change brushes. However, disconnecting the ground 
protecting devices does not provide employee protection.
    This requirement would require unnecessary costs due to tagging 
equipment without increasing the level of protection provided the 
employee. [Ex. 3-82]

    The Agency has accepted TVA's recommendation and has not carried 
the proposed requirement forward into final Sec. 1910.269(v)(2).
    Paragraph (v)(3) requires enough space to be provided around 
electric equipment to allow ready and safe access to and operation and 
maintenance of the equipment. This rule prevents employees from 
contacting exposed live parts as a result of insufficient maneuvering 
room. A note has been included to recognize, as constituting 
compliance, the provisions of ANSI C2-1987 for the design of workspace 
for electric equipment.
    Several interested parties made comments to this paragraph that 
were similar to the comments on paragraph (u)(1), discussed earlier 
(Ex. 3-20, 3-22, 3-80, 3-82, 3-102). Namely, they claimed that older 
installations did not meet current ANSI standards. OSHA has used the 
same approach in the final version of this provision as the Agency used 
under the earlier requirement. The language in the note following 
paragraph (v)(3) includes a statement regarding older installations. 
This language is identical to that contained in the note following 
paragraph (u)(1), except that the paragraph references are different. 
(See the summary and explanation of paragraph (u)(1), earlier in this 
preamble for a discussion of this language.)
    Paragraphs (v)(4) and (v)(5) contain requirements on the guarding 
of energized parts. Comments on these provisions were similar to the 
ones on proposed Sec. 1910.269(u)(4), which has been split in the final 
rule into paragraphs (u)(4) and (u)(5). These two sets of provisions 
contain equivalent requirements for guarding live parts, with 
paragraphs (u)(4) and (u)(5) of final Sec. 1910.269 applying to 
substations and paragraphs (v)(4) and (v)(5) applying to generating 
plants. OSHA has adopted the same changes, based on the record, in both 
places in the final rule. For discussion of the rationale behind these 
changes and the comments upon which they were based (as well as 
suggestions that were not accepted), see the summary and explanation of 
paragraphs (u)(4) and (u)(5) earlier in this preamble.
    Paragraph (v)(4)(i) divides areas containing electric supply 
equipment into three categories, rather than two, as follows:
    (1) areas where exposed live parts operating at 50 to 150 volts to 
ground are located within 8 feet of the ground or other working 
surface,
    (2) areas where live parts operating at between 150 and 601 volts 
and located within 8 feet of the ground or other working surface are 
guarded only by location, as permitted under paragraph (v)(5)(i), and
    (3) areas where live parts operating at more than 600 volts are 
located, unless:
    (a) the live parts are enclosed within grounded, metal-enclosed 
equipment whose only openings are designed so that foreign objects 
inserted in these openings will be deflected from energized parts, or
    (b) the live parts are installed at a height above ground and any 
other working surface that provides protection at least equivalent to 
an 8-foot height at 50 volts.
    Paragraphs (v)(4)(ii) through (v)(4)(v) contain the requirements 
that apply to these areas. The areas have to be so enclosed to minimize 
the possibility that unqualified persons will enter; warning signs have 
to be displayed; and entrances not under the observation of an 
attendant have to be kept locked. Additionally, unqualified persons are 
not permitted to enter these locations while the electric supply lines 
or equipment are energized.
    Paragraph (v)(5)(i) requires live parts operating at more than 150 
volts to be guarded (by physical guards or by location) or insulated. 
This provision protects qualified employees from accidentally 
contacting energized parts. Guidance for clearance distances 
appropriate for guarding by location can be found in ANSI C2. 
Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply with paragraph 
(v)(5)(i). Installations meeting ANSI C2-1987 are considered to meet 
paragraph (v)(5)(i), which is based on Section 124A.1 of that standard.
    Several interested parties made comments to this paragraph that 
were similar to the comments on paragraph (u)(5)(i), discussed earlier 
(Ex. 3-80, 3-82, 3-112, 3-120). Namely, they claimed that older 
installations did not meet current ANSI standards. OSHA has used the 
same approach in the final version of this provision as the Agency used 
under the earlier requirement. The language in the note following 
paragraph (v)(3) includes a statement regarding older installations. 
This language is identical to that contained in the note following 
paragraph (u)(5)(i), except that the paragraph references are 
different. (See the summary and explanation of paragraph (u)(5)(i), 
earlier in this preamble for a discussion of this language.)
    Paragraph (v)(5)(ii) provides that the guarding of live parts 
within a compartment be maintained during operation and maintenance 
functions. This guarding is intended to prevent accidental contact with 
energized parts and to prevent objects from being dropped on energized 
parts. However, since access must be gained to energized equipment by 
qualified employees, an exception to this proposed requirement allows 
the removal of guards for this purpose. In such cases, paragraph 
(v)(5)(iii) protects other employees working nearby by requiring the 
installation of protective barriers around the work area.
    Paragraph (v)(5) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 addressed the breaking 
of pressure connections. Paragraph (v)(5)(i) would have required lines 
which exposed employees to hazardous pressures or temperatures to be 
isolated, drained, and locked out or tagged in accordance with proposed 
Sec. 1910.269(d) before a valve bonnet or stuffing box gland was moved 
or removed and before a flanged joint or other pressure connection was 
broken. Paragraph (v)(5)(ii) would have required that the bolts, nuts, 
or other fasteners be loosened after locking out or tagging the line.
    Several commenters were concerned that proposed paragraph (v)(5) 
would not permit adjusting or repacking valves while they were in 
service (Ex. 3-42, 3-112, 3-120, 56; DC Tr. 828-829). EEI argued that 
this provision would require locking or tagging out of equipment that 
could be safely worked while it was in service. They illustrated their 
problem with examples, as follows:

    Examples are re-packing valves which are backseated, adjusting 
pump packing glands, retorquing pressure boundary bolts per 
manufacturers' instructions (such as feedwater heater heads, boiler 
feed pump casings, turbine shell bolts) after heating, effecting 
temporary leak repairs by applying clamp-on covers, connecting/
disconnecting instrumentation, etc. [Ex. 3-112]

    These rulemaking participants urged OSHA to adopt provisions 
specifically permitting this type of work under procedures established 
by the employer and performed by employees trained in this operation. 
Additionally, Mr. Stephen R. Marsh of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 
urged OSHA to provide an alternative to loosening bolts, nuts, and 
other fasteners to recognize the fact that these devices sometimes 
freeze in place and have to be broken off (Ex. 3-22).
    OSHA does not believe the incorporation of these suggestions is 
necessary. The proposed paragraph was intended to provide requirements 
that would supplement the lockout and tagging requirements of paragraph 
(d). The proposed requirements provided specific procedures on how 
lines were to be relieved of hazardous temperatures and pressures. It 
was not intended to require the deenergizing of equipment that would 
not otherwise be required to be locked out or tagged out under 
paragraph (d). However, the comments received on proposed paragraph 
(v)(5) indicate that this was not clear. OSHA believes that employees 
are fully protected from the hazards associated with the control of 
hazardous energy sources under final Sec. 1910.269(d) and that the 
provisions proposed in paragraph (v)(5) are unnecessary. The employer's 
lockout and tagging procedures required under paragraph (d) will state 
exactly how employees are to be protected from the hazards related to 
the control of hazardous temperatures and pressures in lines.
    Boilers are an essential part of steam-driven electric generating 
plants. Water is heated and converted to steam, which in turn drives 
the steam turbine generating equipment. Boilers, whether of the water 
tube or fire tube type, contain water and steam spaces that must be 
entered periodically for maintenance. Paragraph (v)(6) of final 
Sec. 1910.269 contains two provisions relating to some of the hazards 
involved. (An introductory sentence has been added to this paragraph in 
the final rule to clarify that it applies to work in water and steam 
spaces associated with boilers.)
    Paragraph (v)(6)(i) requires an inspection to be undertaken by a 
designated person to ensure that work can be initiated safely. To 
protect employees who may have to reenter the work area from hazards 
arising from incomplete work or other problems that may have occurred 
during the course of work, this paragraph also requires a similar 
inspection to be performed after work is completed. As a further 
precaution, this paragraph requires employees to wear eye or face 
protection during cleaning operations.
    Proposed paragraph (v)(6) only specified eye protection. However, 
as noted previously, the provisions of Sec. 1910.269 are intended to 
supplement the other requirements of OSHA's General Industry Standards 
in Part 1910. Section 1910.132(a) already requires employees to wear 
full face protection any time it is necessary for their protection. So 
that it is clear that final Sec. 1910.269 does not reduce the 
protection afforded by Sec. 1910.132, paragraph (v)(6)(i) of final 
Sec. 1910.269 requires full face protection if it is necessary.
    Paragraph (v)(6)(ii) requires provisions to be made to shield 
employees working near the end of water or steam tubes during cleaning 
operations.
    In Sec. 1910.269(v)(7), OSHA is promulgating requirements for the 
chemical cleaning of boilers and pressure vessels. These requirements 
specify that areas be cordoned off to restrict access during cleaning 
and that the number of workers in the area be limited to those needed 
to do the operation. Because of the flammability of chemicals used in 
cleaning and the possibility of flammable gases in the boiler or 
pressure vessel, the standard prohibits smoking, welding, and other 
ignition sources during cleaning operations. In addition, requirements 
are set forth for the use of protective clothing, goggles, boots, and 
gloves and for the availability of water or showers in the general area 
of work. (A note has been included after paragraph (v)(7)(iii) in final 
Sec. 1910.269 to indicate that Sec. 1910.141 contains requirements 
related to water supply and to washing facilities.) These provisions 
recognize the safety hazards of chemical cleaning and are intended to 
minimize risks to employees during these operations.
    Mr. Robert L. Barham of the Carolina Power and Light Company 
suggested restricting the application of provisions addressing the 
hazards of flammable materials to cleaning operations that used such 
materials (Ex. 3-23). OSHA has accepted his recommendation and has 
revised the final rule accordingly.
    Paragraph (v)(8) of final Sec. 1910.269 contains requirements for 
chlorine system safety. (These requirements, of course, are in addition 
to other provisions in Part 1910 addressing the hazards of exposure to 
chlorine, such as those in Subparts I and Z. These subparts also have 
application to some of the other hazards addressed by paragraph (v), 
such as paragraph (v)(8) on chlorine systems.) OSHA is requiring 
gaseous chlorine system enclosures to be posted with signs restricting 
entry and warning of the hazards. Entry into the restricted area is 
permitted only for designated employees equipped with personal 
protective equipment and is limited to the number required to perform 
the task. In addition, OSHA requires repair kits (for the emergency 
repair of chlorine leaks) to be available. Chlorine tanks, pipes, and 
equipment must also be purged and isolated from other sources of 
chlorine before repair operations begin. Lastly, OSHA requires the 
employer to take precautions to prevent the accidental mixing of 
chlorine with reactive materials that could produce a hazardous 
situation.
    Paragraph (v)(9) of final Sec. 1910.269 contains requirements for 
boiler repair work. These requirements specify that boiler furnaces and 
ash hoppers be inspected for possible falling objects, such as failed 
liners, before repair work is begun. If this hazard exists, overhead 
protection is required to be provided. An employer could instead choose 
to remove objects that could fall and injure employees. Obviously, 
after the hazard is removed, no overhead protection would be required. 
Additionally, OSHA requires employees to stand clear of the opening of 
an operating boiler when opening the door to prevent injury which may 
be caused by hot gases escaping from the open door.
    Paragraph (v)(10) of final Sec. 1910.269 contains requirements for 
turbine-generator systems. Turbine generators are typically cooled by 
air or hydrogen circulated by fans mounted on the generator rotor. The 
requirements of paragraph (v)(10) address the fire and explosion 
hazards of hydrogen in turbine generators and are based on requirements 
in the draft standard recommended by EEI and IBEW. These requirements 
prohibit smoking or other ignition sources near hydrogen or hydrogen 
sealing systems and require the posting of signs warning of the 
explosion hazard (paragraph (v)(10)(i)). In addition, conditions of 
excessive hydrogen makeup or abnormal pressure loss are considered to 
be an emergency situation requiring correction (paragraph (v)(10)(ii)), 
and a quantity of inert gas suitable for purging hydrogen from 
generators is required to be available (paragraph (v)(10)(iii)).
    Two commenters recommended that paragraph (v)(10)(ii) in the 
proposal be amended to require an inspection upon evidence of excessive 
hydrogen makeup or abnormal pressure loss (Ex. 3-20, 3-80). They 
maintained that these conditions do not always constitute an emergency.
    OSHA has not adopted this suggestion. Excessive hydrogen makeup and 
abnormal loss of pressure are indications that hydrogen may be leaking 
from the system, and the escaping hydrogen poses serous explosion 
hazards. Even if these symptoms are not caused by leaks, it would be 
much more difficult to detect a leak that occurred while the symptoms 
were being ignored. Thus, it is important to correct the problems 
causing the excessive hydrogen makeup or abnormal loss of pressure as 
soon as possible.
    Paragraph (v)(11) contains requirements for the handling of coal 
and ash and includes provisions on the use of railroad equipment and 
conveyors for this purpose. Several provisions within this paragraph 
relate to the hazards of coal or coal handling. It should be noted that 
MSHA has jurisdiction over the handling of coal until it is fully 
processed. (For a complete discussion of the extent of OSHA's authority 
over coal-related hazards, see the summary and explanation of 
Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(i)(B), earlier in this preamble.)
    Paragraph (v)(11)(i) permits only designated persons to operate 
railroad equipment. Designated persons are persons who are 
knowledgeable of the construction and operation of the equipment (in 
this instance, railroad equipment) and hazards involved and who are 
assigned by the employer to perform this task.
    Restricting the running of railroad equipment to persons who are 
knowledgeable of the way to operate the equipment and of the accepted 
rules, such as right-of-way and signalling, will prevent accidents by 
assuring that the equipment operator is competent.
    Paragraph (v)(11)(ii) requires a warning to be given before a 
locomotive or locomotive crane is moved. This warning will allow 
employees the opportunity to stand clear of the train and track before 
the equipment moves.
    The standard requires, in paragraphs (v)(11)(iii) and (v)(11)(iv), 
that drawheads not be aligned by employees kicking the drawheads (to 
prevent injury to or loss of the employees' feet) and that drawheads 
and knuckles not be shifted while railroad equipment is in motion (to 
prevent runaway rail cars). (A drawhead is the body of the automatic 
coupler, and the knuckle is the movable arm which connects with the 
drawhead to form the coupling on cars and locomotives.)
    Paragraph (v)(11)(v) proposed that railroad cars, when stopped for 
unloading, be blocked to prevent the cars from moving. Several 
commenters objected to this provision (Ex. 3-20, 3-23, 3-26, 3-42, 3-
59, 3-80, 3-82, 3-112). They argued that other means were available to 
secure railroad cars from movement during unloading operations. For 
example, the unloading equipment itself may serve to hold the car in 
place.
    The Agency agrees with these comments. Therefore, the final rule 
states the provision in terms of the performance desired, that is, that 
railroad cars be secured from displacement so that they cannot move 
during the unloading operation.
    In paragraph (v)(11)(vi), the standard requires an emergency means 
of stopping railcar dumping during this operation. In the event an 
incident occurs, this safeguard will allow interruption of the dumping 
operation to prevent or minimize injury to employees.
    Paragraph (v)(11)(vii) requires employees to be trained and 
knowledgeable in coal- and ash-handling conveyors operations if they 
work in conveyor areas. For example, their training and knowledge 
should be thorough in the subjects of: (1) operation of the conveyor 
system, (2) hazards associated with conveyors, (3) how to minimize 
these hazards, and (4) requirements of this standard that pertain to 
conveyor operation.
    The standard prohibits, in paragraph (v)(11)(viii), employees from 
riding on coal- or ash-handling conveyors. Belt conveyors are not 
designed to carry persons and riding the conveying medium can be very 
hazardous. This paragraph further provides that employees be allowed to 
cross over a belt conveyor only at walkways, unless the conveyor is 
locked out or tagged in accordance with Sec. 1910.269(d).
    Paragraph (v)(11)(ix) addresses the hazard of unexpected startup of 
conveyors. If a conveyor could cause injury when it is started, 
paragraph (v)(11)(ix) requires personnel in the area to be alerted by a 
signal or by a designated employee that the conveyor is about to start. 
For automatically and remotely controlled conveyors, an audible warning 
device that could be heard and recognized by employees at all points 
along the conveyor where personnel could be present is required. 
However, a visual warning is permitted if it would be more effective in 
alerting employees. The requirements for warning devices are contained 
in paragraph (v)(11)(x).
    Exceptions to the requirement for warning devices are given in 
paragraph (v)(11)(x) for systems whose function would be seriously 
hindered by the required time delay. In such cases, warning signs are 
required to be provided at locations along the conveyor where it is not 
guarded by position or location. These exceptions protect employees at 
conveyor installations that cannot have warning devices installed for 
design reasons.
    The provisions of paragraph (v)(11)(ix) are intended to protect 
employees from getting caught in and injured by a conveyor that is 
started unexpectedly. This paragraph is based on provisions in the 
Safety Standard for Conveyors and Related Equipment, ASME/ANSI B20.1-
1987 (Ex. 2-30).
    Three commenters maintained that the cost of this requirement was 
not justified by the benefits (Ex. 3-23, 3-26, 3-112). They argued that 
precautions, such as covering the conveyors, installing emergency stop 
devices, and avoiding unsafe positions unless the equipment was locked 
or tagged out, are effective measures to prevent injury. They submitted 
cost estimates ranging from $9,000 to $50,000 per station for 
retrofitting existing systems.
    Mr. James W. Broome of the Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. 
believed that all conveyors should be provided with alarms and warning 
signs to alert employees of automatic starting (Ex. 3-59).
    OSHA's final rule does recognize guarding as an alternative to 
warning systems. Conveyor systems that do not expose employees to 
hazards do not require warning alarms. Of course, if the guards are 
removed, the conveyor system would have to be locked out or tagged in 
accordance with Sec. 1910.147.
    For conveyor systems that are not completed guarded, OSHA has 
decided to provide an exception to the requirement for warning devices 
for conveyor systems installed before [insert date 1 year after date of 
publication] until their control systems are rebuilt. Conveyors that 
are currently in place and those that are in the final stages of 
installation would require substantial costs to retrofit warning 
devices. OSHA does believe that warning signs and training can provide 
adequate protection for older conveyors, although warning devices are 
considered more effective for the long run.96 Therefore, paragraph 
(v)(11)(x) of final Sec. 1910.269 exempts existing conveyor 
installations from the requirement for warning alarms until their 
control systems are rebuilt. Incorporating warning devices into a 
conveyor in its initial design stage or when its controls system is 
rebuilt is a much more cost-effective approach, one that OSHA has taken 
in the final rule. Before the conveyor system is installed it is a 
relatively simple matter to incorporate warning devices as a part of 
the control system. Similarly, when the control system is rebuilt 
(rewired), installing a warning system and connecting it to the control 
system can be a cost-effective technique of preventing injuries 
associated with unexpected conveyor movement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\6 There is at least one accident described in the record that 
could have been prevented by warning devices (Ex. 6-23, 6-24).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In adopting final paragraph (v)(11)(x), OSHA has also clarified the 
language from the corresponding provision of the proposed rule 
(paragraph (v)(12)(ix)(A)) to indicate that the alarm must be 
recognized by employees as a warning that the conveyor will be started. 
Obviously, an alarm that could not be identified by employees would not 
be an effective warning, and the final rule requires employers to 
ensure (through such means as training and the design of the alarm 
system) that the alarm is recognized. Additionally, because the alarm 
will be understood by employees, OSHA has not carried forward the 
provision in the proposal exempting conveyor systems from the alarm 
requirements if the intent of the alarm could be misinterpreted.
    Paragraph (v)(11)(xi) addresses hazards associated with emergency 
situations involving automatically and remotely controlled conveyors. 
These conveyors are required to have emergency stop devices so that the 
equipment could be deenergized in case an employee becomes endangered 
by its operation. However, if the design, function, and operation of a 
conveyor is not hazardous to personnel, an emergency stop is not 
required. For example, a conveyor system that operates at low speed and 
that does not contain exposed nip or pinch points is considered as not 
posing a hazard to employees.
    The emergency stop devices have to be easily identifiable and have 
to be placed anywhere the conveyor is not guarded. They are also 
required to act directly on the control of the conveyor (not dependent 
on the stopping of other intermediate equipment) and to be installed so 
that they cannot be overridden.
    The requirements contained in paragraph (v)(11)(xi) are also based 
on ASME/ANSI B20.1-1987.
    Paragraph (v)(11)(xii) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires that, where 
a combustible atmosphere may be produced in coal-handling operations, 
sources of ignition be eliminated or controlled to prevent the ignition 
of combustible gases. This requirement mitigates the hazard of fire and 
explosion in coal-handling operations. It also indicates that a 
combustible atmosphere may occur in these operations. An area in which 
this may occur must be considered a Class II location as far as 
ignition sources are concerned, and a note to this effect is included 
in the final rule. (See subpart S of part 1910 for requirements 
pertaining to the control of electrical ignition sources in Class II 
locations--locations that are hazardous because of the presence of 
combustible dust, such as coal dust.)
    In paragraph (v)(11)(xiii), OSHA is prohibiting employees from 
working on or beneath overhanging coal. Based on requirements contained 
in the draft standard recommended by EEI and IBEW, this requirement 
addresses the hazards of an employee's being struck or crushed by 
falling coal or suffocating by being buried in coal.
    Mr. Charles T. Autry of the Oglethorpe Power Company urged OSHA to 
allow utilities to provide protection so that employees could work, if 
necessary, in areas with overhanging coal (Ex. 3-102).
    OSHA has accepted his recommendation. Paragraph (v)(11)(xiii) 
permits employees to work in these areas if they are protected from all 
hazards associated with shifting coal. For example, support structures 
could be provided to protect employees from the falling coal or to 
prevent the coal from falling.
    Paragraph (v)(11)(xiv) requires employees entering a bunker or silo 
to wear a safety harness with lifeline attached to a fixed support 
outside the bunker attended at all times by a standby employee. Also 
based on requirements contained in the draft standard recommended by 
EEI and IBEW, this requirement further addresses the hazard of an 
employee's suffocating by being buried in coal or ash.
    Proposed Sec. 1910.269(v)(12) contained requirements for walking 
and working surfaces. Proposed paragraph (v)(12)(i) emphasized that the 
requirements of Subpart D of Part 1910 would continue to apply. 
Paragraph (v)(12)(ii) would have provided an exception to the Subpart D 
requirements whereby a floor hole, through which passes machinery, 
piping, or other equipment that may expand or contract in the hole, 
would have been permitted to be guarded by a toeboard if the opening 
around the machinery or pipe was 12 inches (30.5 cm) or less. This 
provision recognized the need to provide for expansion and contraction 
of equipment. OSHA believed that a toeboard would normally prevent an 
employee's foot from entering the opening as well as prevent tools from 
falling through the hole.
    Ms. Nancy Weinberg of the American Textile Manufacturers Institute 
was concerned about consistency of proposed paragraph (v)(12) with 
Subpart D (Ex. 3-54).
    OSHA proposed equivalent provisions in its revision of Subpart D 
(paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(4) of proposed Sec. 1910.27, 55 FR 13401). 
In order to ensure consistency with Subpart D, as requested by Ms. 
Weinberg, and because the proposed provision addressed a condition 
common to many industries, the Agency is not carrying proposed 
Sec. 1910.269(v)(12) forward into this final rule. The subject will be 
addressed in the forthcoming revision of Subpart D.
    Paragraph (v)(12) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires employees working 
near gates, valves, intakes, or flumes of a hydroplant to be warned 
before changes are made in water flow rates, if such a change would 
pose a hazard to employees. As a clarification of the intent of this 
paragraph, the Agency has added the phrase ``and shall vacate dangerous 
areas'' to the wording contained in the proposal. Thus, the final 
provision reads as follows:

    Employees working on or close to water gates, valves, intakes, 
forebays, flumes, or other locations where increased or decreased 
water flow or levels may pose a significant hazard shall be warned 
and shall vacate such dangerous areas before water flow changes are 
made. [Emphasis added.]

    OSHA believes that this will point out the purpose of the rule and 
will ensure that employees are not injured as a result of water flow 
changes.
    Paragraph (w). Paragraph contains requirements for special 
conditions that are encountered during electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution work.
    Since capacitors store electric charge and can release electrical 
energy even when disconnected from their sources of supply, some 
precautions may be necessary, in addition to those contained in 
Sec. 1910.269(m) (deenergizing lines and equipment) and 
Sec. 1910.269(n) (grounding), when work is performed on capacitors or 
on lines which are connected to capacitors. Paragraph (w)(1) sets forth 
precautions which will enable this equipment to be considered as 
deenergized. Under paragraph (w)(1)(i), capacitors on which work is to 
be performed must be disconnected from their sources of supply and 
short-circuited. This not only removes the sources of electric current 
but relieves the capacitors of their charge as well.
    Two commenters suggested adding a requirement for a 5-minute wait, 
after disconnection, before the short circuit is applied (Ex. 3-80, 3-
82). They pointed out that ANSI/IEEE Standard No. 18 requires all 
capacitors to have an internal resistor across its terminals to reduce 
the voltage to 50 volts or less within 5 minutes after the capacitor is 
disconnected from an energized source. OSHA is not applying this 
requirement to lines to which capacitors are connected. The employees 
who would be short-circuiting and grounding these lines would 
frequently not be the same as the employees who would be deenergizing 
them. Thus, the time between deenergizing the lines and short-
circuiting them cannot be controlled in such cases. In any event, lines 
are normally deenergized at a different point from where they are 
short-circuited and grounded, and a delay of more than 5 minutes is 
effectively built into this process.
    OSHA has accepted the suggested delay before short circuiting is 
applied. Paragraph (w)(1)(i) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires capacitors 
to be deenergized and, after a 5-minute wait, short circuited.
    For work on individual capacitors in a series-parallel capacitor 
bank, each unit must be short-circuited between its terminals and the 
capacitor tank or rack; otherwise, individual capacitors could retain a 
charge. This consideration is set forth in paragraph (w)(1)(ii). 
Lastly, paragraph (w)(1)(iii) also requires lines to which capacitors 
are connected to be short-circuited before the lines can be considered 
deenergized.
    Several commenters suggested adding requirements for capacitor 
circuits to be grounded, as well, before they could be considered 
deenergized (Ex. 3-44, 3-58, 3-66, 3-80, 3-82, 3-102, 3-112).
    Rather than add a specific requirement for grounding, the Agency 
has decided to add a note referring to the requirements for 
deenergizing electric transmission and distribution lines and 
equipment, paragraph (m), and for grounding, paragraph (n). OSHA 
believes that this will alert readers to the appropriate requirements 
for deenergizing and grounding without adding redundant, and perhaps 
inconsistent, provisions.
    Although the magnetic flux density in the core of a current 
transformer is usually very low, resulting in a low secondary voltage, 
it will rise to saturation if the secondary circuit is opened while the 
transformer primary is energized. If this occurs, the magnetic flux 
will induce a voltage in the secondary winding high enough to be 
hazardous to the insulation in the secondary circuit and to personnel. 
Because of this hazard to workers, paragraph (w)(2) prohibits the 
opening of the secondary circuit of a current transformer while the 
primary is energized. If the primary cannot be deenergized for work to 
be performed on the secondary, then the secondary circuit must be 
bridged so that an open-circuit condition does not result.
    In a series streetlighting circuit, the lamps are connected in 
series, and the same current flows in each lamp. This current is 
supplied by a constant-current transformer, which provides a constant 
current at a variable voltage from a source of constant voltage and 
variable current. Like the current transformer, the constant current 
source attempts to supply current even when the secondary circuit is 
open. The resultant open-circuit voltage can be very high and hazardous 
to employees. For this reason, paragraph (w)(3) sets forth a 
requirement, similar to that in paragraph (w)(2), that either the 
streetlighting transformer be deenergized or the circuit be bridged to 
avoid an open-circuit condition.
    Frequently, electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution employees must work at night or in enclosed places, such 
as manholes, that are not illuminated by the sun. Since inadvertent 
contact with live parts can be fatal, good lighting is important to the 
safety of these workers. Therefore, paragraph (w)(4) requires 
sufficient illumination to be provided so that work can be performed 
safely.
    The proposal did not provide specific guidance with respect to 
levels of illumination that are necessary for safety under various 
conditions. In the notice of proposed rulemaking, OSHA requested 
comments and supporting data on this issue. Unfortunately, the comments 
on this paragraph did not include any recommended specifications. 
Therefore, the final rule sets forth the requirement as proposed. In 
enforcing this provision, the Agency will use, as guidelines, other 
OSHA and national consensus standards that apply to this subject (for 
example, Sec. 1926.56, which applies to work performed during the 
construction of electric power transmission and distribution 
installations).
    To protect employees working in areas that expose them to the 
hazards of drowning, paragraph (w)(5) requires the provision and use of 
personal flotation devices. Additionally, to ensure that these devices 
will provide the necessary protection upon demand, they must be 
approved by the U.S. Coast Guard, be maintained in safe condition, and 
be regularly inspected for defects that render them unsuitable for use. 
Lastly, employees would not be permitted to cross streams unless a safe 
means of passage is provided.
    Three commenters were concerned that the language in proposed 
Sec. 1910.269(w)(5)(i) could be interpreted to require floatation 
devices where the danger of drowning is minimal, such as near 
decorative fountains and swimming pools (Ex. 3-20, 3-80, 3-112).
    OSHA does not believe the language proposed in this paragraph and 
carried forward into the final rule normally requires personal 
floatation devices when work is performed over a fountain or swimming 
pool. However, there may be times when the size and depth of a fountain 
or pool and the type of work being performed would expose the employee 
to the hazard of drowning. In enforcing paragraph (w)(5)(i) of final 
Sec. 1910.269, the Agency will consider the extent of the hazard faced 
by the worker.
    Employees working in areas with pedestrian or vehicular traffic are 
exposed to additional hazards compared to employees working on an 
employer's premises, where public access is restricted. One serious 
additional hazard faced by workers exposed to the public is that of 
being struck by a vehicle (or even by a person). To protect employees 
against being injured as a result of traffic mishaps, paragraph (w)(6) 
requires the placement of warning signs or flags or other warning 
devices to channel approaching traffic away from the work area if the 
conditions in the area pose a hazard to employees. If warning signs are 
not sufficient protection or if employees are working in an area in 
which there are excavations, barricades must be erected. Additionally, 
warning lights are required for night work.
    Edison Electric Institute suggested incorporating the requirements 
of Sec. 1926.200(g)(2), which covers traffic control devices (Ex. 3-
112). This provision in OSHA's Construction Standards incorporates ANSI 
D6.1-1971, Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and 
Highways, by reference. OSHA has accepted this recommendation and has 
added the reference to the construction standard in paragraph 
(w)(6)(i).
    Paragraph (w)(7) addresses the hazards of voltage backfeed due to 
sources of cogeneration or due to the configuration of the circuit 
involved. Under conditions of voltage backfeed, the lines upon which 
work is to be performed remain energized after the main source of power 
has been disconnected. As noted by this provision, the lines have to be 
worked as energized, under Sec. 1910.269(l), or could be worked as 
deenergized, following paragraphs (m) and (n) of final Sec. 1910.269. 
The referenced paragraphs contain the appropriate controls and work 
practices to be taken in case of voltage backfeed.
    Sometimes, electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work involves the use of lasers. Appropriate requirements 
for the installation, operation, and adjustment of lasers are contained 
in existing Sec. 1926.54 of the Construction Standards. Rather than 
develop different requirements for electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution work, OSHA has adopted the construction 
regulation by reference in paragraph (w)(8) of final Sec. 1910.269.
    To ensure that hydraulic equipment retains its insulating value, 
paragraph (w)(9) requires the hydraulic fluid used in insulated 
sections of such equipment to be of the insulating type.
    Paragraph (x). Final Sec. 1910.269(x) contains definitions of terms 
used in the standard.\97\ Since these definitions have been taken, in 
large part, from consensus standards and existing OSHA regulations and 
since the definitions included are generally self-explanatory, OSHA 
expects these terms to be well understood, and no explanation is given 
here beyond that needed to discuss issues raised during the rulemaking 
period. However, for terms whose meaning may not be readily apparent, 
the Agency has provided an explanation in the discussion of the 
provision in which the term first appears.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\Paragraph (x) only defines terms that are used in 
Sec. 1910.269. However, many of the documents listed in Appendix 
contain definitions of terms generally associated with electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution work. In 
particular, IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronic 
Terms (IEEE Std. 100-1988), IEEE Guide to the Installation of 
Overhead Transmission Line Conductors (IEEE Std. 524-1992), and IEEE 
Guide on Terminology for Tools and Equipment to Be Used in Live Line 
Working (IEEE Std. 935-1989) set out definitions of commonly used 
terms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA received several comments relating to the definitions of 
authorized, designated, and qualified employees (Ex. 3-20, 3-31, 3-40, 
3-42, 3-44, 3-66, 3-69, 3-73, 3-80, 3-82, 3-102, 3-112, 3-123). The 
definitions in the proposal were based on the relevant national 
consensus standards (for example, American National Standard C2, the 
National Electrical Safety Code). However, the commenters believed that 
the proposed language was inappropriate.
    Most of the commenters objected to the definition of ``qualified 
employee'' (Ex. 3-20, 3-40, 3-42, 3-44, 3-58, 3-69, 3-80, 3-82, 3-102, 
3-112, 3-123). They were concerned that the wording in the proposal was 
too broad and that it would require an employee to be trained in all 
aspects of electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
equipment. The comments of Ms. Meredith McCoy on behalf of the National 
Rural Electric Cooperative Association were typical:

    The proposed standards require that only a ``qualified 
employee'' or ``qualified person'' perform certain functions, and 
define these terms to mean ``[o]ne knowledgeable in the construction 
and operation of electric power generation, transmission and 
distribution equipment and the hazards involved.'' * * *
    Thus, the proposed standards appear to require that workers know 
all aspects of both the construction and operation of electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution, even though many of 
these aspects have no relevance to their jobs or job safety. For 
example, the safety of employees at distribution co-ops does not 
require that they be trained in problems related to generation. As 
another example, the proposed standards could be interpreted to 
require that line clearance tree trimmers be knowledgeable in power 
plant ash handling. NRECA does not believe that OSHA intended such a 
requirement, which would be impracticable in terms of the cost and 
time of the training which would be necessary, and which would bear 
little, if any, relationship to worker safety. Consequently, the 
proposed standards should be clarified to provide that employees 
need only be ``qualified'' in regard to those aspects of the 
construction and operation of electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution which directly relate to their job 
safety. [Ex. 3-123]

    Ms. McCoy is correct. OSHA did not intend to require employees to 
be knowledgeable in all aspects of electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution equipment in order to be considered as 
``qualified''. The proposed definition of ``qualified employee'' read 
as follows:

    Qualified employee (qualified person). One knowledgeable in the 
construction and operation of electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution equipment and the hazards involved. 
[Emphasis added.]

    The Agency intended the word ``involved'' to modify ``equipment'', 
as well as ``hazards''. From the comments on this definition, OSHA can 
see that this interpretation is not apparent from the proposed 
language. Therefore, the Agency has revised the wording slightly in the 
final rule. The definition of ``qualified employee'' in the final rule 
reads as follows:

    Qualified employee (qualified person). One knowledgeable in the 
construction and operation of electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution equipment involved, along with the 
associated hazards.

    OSHA believes that this language will convey the Agency's true 
intent and will allay the concerns of the commenters. It should be 
noted that the final rule uses the term ``qualified employee'' to refer 
only to employees who have the training to work on energized electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution installations. 
Paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of final Sec. 1910.269 sets out the training an 
employee must have to be considered a qualified employee. A note to 
this effect has been included following the definition of this term.
    EEI also commented on the related definitions of ``authorized 
employee'' and ``designated employee'' (Ex. 3-112). They argued that no 
employee should be authorized or designated without first being 
qualified.
    OSHA notes that the term ``authorized employee'' is used in the 
standard only in Sec. 1910.269(d) with regard to the control of 
hazardous energy sources. Therefore, the definition of that term is 
necessarily restricted to applications involving lockout and tagging. 
Since the Agency relied heavily on the language of final Sec. 1910.147 
in promulgating paragraph (d) of final Sec. 1910.269, OSHA has decided 
to use the definition from the generic standard on hazardous energy 
control in that context. Similarly, the definition of ``affected 
employee'' in this final rule has also been taken from Sec. 1910.147.
    The term ``qualified employee'', as used in final Sec. 1910.269, 
relates only to employees who perform work on energized electric 
equipment. The term ``designated employee'' is used in a more general 
way to refer to employees who are competent to perform a task and who 
are assigned that task by their employers, and it was defined in this 
manner in the proposal. For example, Sec. 1910.269(v)(11)(i) requires 
railroad equipment to be operated by designated employees. These 
employees are not necessarily ``qualified'' electrical workers. 
Therefore, OSHA has retained the proposed definition of ``designated 
employee'' in the final rule.
    Other commenters were concerned that the proposal did not refer to 
line-clearance tree trimmers as ``qualified'' (Ex. 3-20, 3-80, 3-113, 
58; DC Tr. 85-87). Mr. Robert Felix, Executive Vice President of the 
National Arborist Association, stated these concerns as follows:

    * * * NAA fully supports the wisdom of the Agency's decision to 
treat differently persons who work on conductors from those, such as 
line clearance tree trimmers, who are trained to work proximate to, 
but not on, conductors. This appropriate distinction is based on the 
Agency's proper recognition that the very foundation of safety in 
the line clearance tree trimming industry is training in using 
special techniques to work safely proximate to energized conductors 
but never to touch conductors. These special techniques serve the 
public interest by enabling trees growing in the vicinity of power 
lines to be trimmed without de-energizing lines, consistent with 
maintaining employee safety by forbidding them to ever touch 
conductors. Thus, the proposed standard is entirely correct in 
recognizing the fundamentally different regulatory concerns in 
dealing with those who work on conductors, as compared to those 
trained to work near, but not on, conductors.
    Our problem is purely semantic and not substantive: because line 
clearance tree trimmers are uniquely qualified to trim trees 
proximate to conductors, it is misleading and utterly confusing to 
term them ``not qualified'' for the purpose of applying only 
portions of the subject proposed standard to them; for line 
clearance tree trimmers are, indeed, uniquely qualified to perform 
this highly specialized service.
    In fact, this confusion is compounded when the subject standard 
is viewed, as it must, in conjunction with ANSI Z-133 and the 
pending proposed Sec. 1910.331 electric safe work practice standard 
for general industry. OSHA's intent under that standard, it will be 
recalled, is to exempt ``qualified line clearance tree trimmers''--
the very same personnel who would be covered under this standard as 
``not qualified''! This anomalous terminology is untenable.

    To disarm this needless incongruity, we suggest that in order to 
achieve consistency between 1910.331 and .269, the same terminology 
used in 1910.331 be employed by OSHA in the subject standard--that the 
term ``qualified line clearance tree trimmer'' [footnote omitted] be 
used in both standards to indicate their exemption from 1910.331 and 
their partial coverage under the subject standard, because of their 
qualification to work proximate to conductors. To distinguish these 
employees who are partially covered by the subject standard, from 
utility employees who work on conductors and therefore are subject to 
the entire standard, we suggest that the latter be referred to as 
``qualified utility employees''. [Ex. 3-113]

    The Agency understands the tree trimming contractors' concerns. 
Under Sec. 1910.331(c)(1), line-clearance tree trimming is exempt from 
the Subpart S work practices standard only if performed by ``qualified 
employees'' as defined in Sec. 1910.399. This definition is quite 
similar to that contained in Sec. 1910.269(x). Thus, Subpart S could be 
misinterpreted as applying to line-clearance tree trimmers, even though 
that is not the Agency's intent. OSHA has decided to provide a note 
under the definition of ``line-clearance tree trimmer'' to indicate 
that these employees, though not considered to be ``qualified 
employees'' under Sec. 1910.269, are still considered to be ``qualified 
employees'' under Sec. 1910.331. The Agency believes that this note 
will clarify the rule and will prevent enforcement difficulties.
    However, OSHA has not adopted the National Arborist Association's 
suggestion. As noted previously, the only employees considered 
``qualified'' under final Sec. 1910.269 are those trained to work on 
energized conductors. Additionally, paragraph (a)(2)(ii) imposes 
training requirements for qualified employees that line-clearance tree 
trimmers do not normally, by NAA's own admission, meet. Therefore, to 
state that line-clearance tree trimmers are also considered as 
``qualified employees'' under Sec. 1910.269 would lead to confusion and 
possible misinterpretation of the standard.
    Appendices. OSHA is including five appendices to final 
Sec. 1910.269.
    Appendix A (A-1 through A-5) contains flow charts depicting the 
interface between Sec. 1910.269 and the following standards: 
Sec. 1910.146, Permit-required confined spaces; Sec. 1910.147, The 
control of hazardous energy (lockout/tagout); and Part 1910, Subpart S, 
Electrical. This appendix will assist employers in determining which of 
these standards applies in different situations.
    Appendix B provides information relating to the determination of 
appropriate minimum approach distances as required by 
Sec. 1910.269(l)(2) and (q)(3).
    Appendix C provides information relating to the protection of 
employees from hazardous step and touch potentials as addressed in 
Sec. 1910.269(o)(4)(iii), (p)(4)(iii)(C), and (q)(2)(ii).
    Appendix D contains information on the inspection and testing of 
wood poles addressed in Sec. 1910.269(q)(1)(i).
    Appendix E contains references to additional sources of information 
that may be used to supplement the requirements of final Sec. 1910.269. 
The national consensus standards referenced in this appendix contain 
detailed specifications that employers may follow in complying with the 
more performance-oriented requirements of OSHA's final rule. Except as 
specifically noted in Sec. 1910.269, however, compliance with the 
national consensus standards is not a substitute for compliance with 
the provisions of the OSHA standard.

C. Subpart S

    The notice of proposed rulemaking did not contain any changes to 
Subpart S of Part 1910. The provisions of Subpart S most directly 
affected by new Sec. 1910.269 are contained in Part II of that subpart, 
electrical safety-related work practices. These provisions are 
contained in Secs. 1910.331 through 1910.335 of this chapter and, at 
the time Sec. 1910.269 was proposed, were only in the proposed rule 
stage themselves.
    Because the two standards are related, however, the Agency believes 
that it will be helpful to revise two of the existing notes to 
requirements in Subpart S and, as mentioned previously, to add one 
additional note. This will clarify the interface between the two 
standards. Only the informational notes are being amended; the 
requirements of Subpart S are not affected by these changes.
    As discussed under the explanation of final 
Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(B), OSHA is adding the following new note after 
Sec. 1910.331(c)(1):

    For work on or directly associated with utilization 
installations, an employer who complies with the work practices of 
Sec. 1910.269 (electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution) will be deemed to be in compliance with 
Sec. 1910.333(c) and Sec. 1910.335. However, the requirements of 
Sec. 1910.332, Sec. 1910.333(a), Sec. 1910.333(b), and Sec. 1910.334 
apply to all work on or directly associated with utilization 
installations, regardless of whether the work is performed by 
qualified or unqualified persons.

    The first note following this paragraph in Subpart S describes the 
types of installations covered by the electrical safety-related work 
practices standard. The new note should give employers and employees 
guidance as to what standard to follow when both standards address the 
same hazards.
    OSHA is adding the following paragraph at the end of the second 
note after Sec. 1910.331(c)(1):
    Such [electric power generation, transmission, and distribution] 
work is covered by Sec. 1910.269 of this part.
    Additionally, the Agency is revising the first sentence in the note 
after the introductory text in Sec. 1910.333(c)(3):

    The work practices used by qualified persons installing 
insulating devices on overhead power transmission or distribution 
lines are covered by Sec. 1910.269 of this part, not by 
Secs. 1910.332 through 1910.335 of this part.

    These two amendments will refer interested parties to Sec. 1910.269 
for requirements that apply to electric power generation, transmission, 
and distribution work.

IV. Statutory Considerations

A. Introduction.

    OSHA has described the hazards in the generation, transmission, and 
distribution of electric power and the measures required to protect 
affected employees from those hazards in section I, Background, and in 
section III, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this 
preamble. The Agency is providing the following discussion of the 
statutory mandate for OSHA rulemaking activity to explain the legal 
basis for its determination that the Electric Power Generation, 
Transmission, and Distribution standard and the revised Electrical 
Protective Equipment standard, as promulgated, are reasonably necessary 
to protect affected employees from significant risks of injury and 
death.
    Section 2(b)(3) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
authorizes ``the Secretary of Labor to set mandatory occupational 
safety and health standards applicable to businesses affecting 
interstate commerce'', and section 5(a)(2) provides that ``[e]ach 
employer shall comply with occupational safety and health standards 
promulgated under this Act'' (emphasis added). Section 3(8) of the OSH 
Act (29 U.S.C. Sec. 652(8)) provides that ``the term `occupational 
safety and health standard' means a standard which requires conditions, 
or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, 
operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to 
provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment.''
    In two recent cases, reviewing courts have expressed concern that 
OSHA's interpretation of these provisions of the OSH Act, particularly 
of section 3(8) as it pertains to safety rulemaking, could lead to 
overly costly or under-protective safety standards. In International 
Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the District of 
Columbia Circuit rejected substantive challenges to OSHA's lockout/
tagout standard and denied a request that enforcement of that standard 
be stayed, but it also expressed concern that OSHA's interpretation of 
the OSH Act could lead to safety standards that are very costly and 
only minimally protective. In National Grain & Feed Ass'n v. OSHA, 866 
F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1989), the Fifth Circuit concluded that Congress 
gave OSHA considerable discretion in structuring the costs and benefits 
of safety standards but, concerned that the grain dust standard might 
be under-protective, directed OSHA to consider adding a provision that 
might further reduce significant risk of fire and explosion.
    OSHA rulemakings involve a significant degree of agency expertise 
and policy-making discretion to which reviewing courts must defer. (See 
for example, Building & Constr. Trades Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Brock, 838 
F.2d 1258, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. 
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 655 n. 62 (1980).) At the same 
time, the agency's technical expertise and policy-making authority must 
be exercised within discernable parameters. The lockout/tagout and 
grain handling standard decisions sought clarification of the agency's 
view of the scope of its expertise and authority. In light of those 
decisions, the preamble to this safety standard states OSHA's views 
regarding the limits of its safety rulemaking authority and explains 
why the Agency is confident that its interpretive views have in the 
past avoided regulatory extremes and continue to do so in this rule.
    Stated briefly, the OSH Act requires that, before promulgating any 
occupational safety standard, OSHA demonstrate based on substantial 
evidence in the record as a whole that: (1) the proposed standard will 
substantially reduce a significant risk of material harm; (2) 
compliance is technologically feasible in the sense that the protective 
measures being required already exist, can be brought into existence 
with available technology, or can be created with technology that can 
reasonably be developed; (3) compliance is economically feasible in the 
sense that industry can absorb or pass on the costs without major 
dislocation or threat of instability; and (4) the standard is cost 
effective in that it employs the least expensive protective measures 
capable of reducing or eliminating significant risk. Additionally, 
proposed safety standards must be compatible with prior agency action, 
must be responsive to significant comment in the record, and, to the 
extent allowed by statute, must be consistent with applicable Executive 
Orders. These elements limit OSHA's regulatory discretion for safety 
rulemaking and provide a decision-making framework for developing a 
rule.

B. Congress Concluded That OSHA Regulations are Necessary to Protect 
Workers From Occupational Hazards and That Employers Should be Required 
to Reduce or Eliminate Significant Workplace Health and Safety Threats

    At section 2(a) of the OSH Act (29 U.S.C. Sec. 651(a)), Congress 
announced its determination that occupational injury and illness should 
be eliminated as much as possible: ``The Congress finds that 
occupational injury and illness arising out of work situations impose a 
substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance to, interstate commerce in 
terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability 
compensation payments.'' Congress therefore declared ``it to be its 
purpose and policy * * * to assure so far as possible every working man 
and woman in the Nation safe * * * working conditions [29 U.S.C. 
Sec. 651(b)].''
    To that end, Congress instructed the Secretary of Labor to adopt 
existing federal and consensus standards during the first two years 
after the OSH Act became effective and, in the event of conflict among 
any such standards, to ``promulgate the standard which assures the 
greatest protection of the safety or health of the affected employees 
[29 U.S.C. Sec. 655(a)].'' Congress also directed the Secretary to set 
mandatory occupational safety standards (29 U.S.C. Sec. 651(b)(3)), 
based on a rulemaking record and substantial evidence (29 U.S.C. 
Sec. 655(b)(2)), that are ``reasonably necessary or appropriate to 
provide safe * * * employment and places of employment.'' When 
promulgating permanent safety or health standards that differ from 
existing national consensus standards, the Secretary must explain ``why 
the rule as adopted will better effectuate the purposes of this Act 
than the national consensus standard [29 U.S.C. Sec. 655(b)(8)].'' 
Correspondingly, every employer must comply with OSHA standards and, in 
addition, ``furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of 
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or 
are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees [29 
U.S.C. Sec. 654(a)].''
    ``Congress understood that the Act would create substantial costs 
for employers, yet intended to impose such costs when necessary to 
create a safe and healthful working environment. Congress viewed the 
costs of health and safety as a cost of doing business * * * Indeed, 
Congress thought that the financial costs of health and safety problems 
in the workplace were as large as or larger than the financial costs of 
eliminating these problems [American Textile Mfrs. Inst. Inc. v. 
Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 519-522 (1981) (ATMI); emphasis was supplied in 
original].'' ``[T]he fundamental objective of the Act [is] to prevent 
occupational deaths and serious injuries [Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 
445 U.S. 1, 11 (1980)].'' ``We know the costs would be put into 
consumer goods but that is the price we should pay for the 80 million 
workers in America [S. Rep. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); 
H.R. Rep. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Legislative History of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, (Committee Print 1971) 
(``Leg. Hist.'') at 444 (Senator Yarborough)].'' ``Of course, it will 
cost a little more per item to produce a washing machine. Those of us 
who use washing machines will pay for the increased cost, but it is 
worth it, to stop the terrible death and injury rate in this country 
[Id. at 324; see also 510-511, 517].''

    [T]he vitality of the Nation's economy will be enhanced by the 
greater productivity realized through saved lives and useful years 
of labor.
    When one man is injured or disabled by an industrial accident or 
disease, it is he and his family who suffer the most immediate and 
personal loss. However, that tragic loss also affects each of us. As 
a result of occupational accidents and disease, over $1.5 billion in 
wages is lost each year [1970 dollars], and the annual loss to the 
gross national product is estimated to be over $8 billion. Vast 
resources that could be available for productive use are siphoned 
off to pay workmen's compensation and medical expenses * * *
    Only through a comprehensive approach can we hope to effect a 
significant reduction in these job death and casualty figures. [Id. 
at 518-19 (Senator Cranston)]

    Congress considered uniform enforcement crucial because it would 
reduce or eliminate the disadvantage that a conscientious employer 
might experience where inter-industry or intra-industry competition is 
present. Moreover, ``many employers--particularly smaller ones--simply 
cannot make the necessary investment in health and safety, and survive 
competitively, unless all are compelled to do so [Leg. Hist. at 144, 
854, 1188, 1201].''
    Thus, the statutory text and legislative history make clear that 
Congress conclusively determined that OSHA regulation is necessary to 
protect workers from occupational hazards and that employers should be 
required to reduce or eliminate significant workplace health and safety 
threats.

As Construed by the Courts and by OSHA, the OSH Act Sets Clear and 
Reasonable Limits for Agency Rulemaking Action

    OSHA has long followed the teaching that section 3(8) of the OSH 
Act requires that, before it promulgates ``any permanent health or 
safety standard, [it must] make a threshold finding that a place of 
employment is unsafe--in the sense that significant risks are present 
and can be eliminated or lessened by a change in practices [Industrial 
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 642 
(1980) (plurality) (Benzene); emphasis was supplied in original].'' 
Thus, the national consensus and existing federal standards that 
Congress instructed OSHA to adopt summarily within two years of the OSH 
Act's inception provide reference points concerning the least an OSHA 
standard should achieve (29 U.S.C. Secs. 655(a)). As a result, OSHA is 
precluded from regulating insignificant safety risks or from issuing 
safety standards that do not at least lessen risk in a significant way.
    The OSH Act also limits OSHA's discretion to issue overly 
burdensome rules, as the agency also has long recognized that ``any 
standard that was not economically or technologically feasible would a 
fortiori not be `reasonably necessary or appropriate' under the Act. 
See Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, [499 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir. 
1974)] (`Congress does not appear to have intended to protect employees 
by putting their employers out of business.') [American Textile Mfrs. 
Inst. Inc., 452 U.S. at 513 n. 31 (a standard is economically feasible 
even if it portends `disaster for some marginal firms,' but it is 
economically infeasible if it `threaten[s] massive dislocation to, or 
imperil[s] the existence of,' the industry)].''
    By stating the test in terms of ``threat'' and ``peril,'' the 
Supreme Court made clear in ATMI that economic infeasibility begins 
short of industry-wide bankruptcy. OSHA itself has placed the line 
considerably below this level. (See for example, ATMI, 452 U.S. at 527 
n. 50; 43 FR 27360 (June 23, 1978). Proposed 200 g/m3 PEL for 
cotton dust did not raise serious possibility of industry-wide 
bankruptcy, but impact on weaving sector would be severe, possibly 
requiring reconstruction of 90 percent of all weave rooms. OSHA 
concluded that the 200 g/m3 level was not feasible for weaving 
and that 750 g/m3 was all that could reasonably be required. 
See also 54 FR 29245-29246 (July 11, 1989); American Iron & Steel 
Institute, 939 F.2d at 1003. OSHA raised engineering control level for 
lead in small nonferrous foundries to avoid the possibility of 
bankruptcy for about half of small foundries even though the industry 
as a whole could have survived the loss of small firms.)
    All OSHA standards must also be cost-effective in the sense that 
the protective measures being required must be the least expensive 
measures capable of achieving the desired end (ATMI, at 514 n. 32; 
Building and Constr. Trades Dep't AFL-CIO v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1269 
(D.C. Cir. 1988)). OSHA gives additional consideration to financial 
impact in setting the period of time that should be allowed for 
compliance, allowing as much as 10 years for compliance phase-in. (See 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).) Additionally, OSHA's 
enforcement policy takes account of financial hardship on an 
individualized basis. OSHA's Field Operations Manual provides that, 
based on an employer's economic situation, OSHA may extend the period 
within which a violation must be corrected after issuance of a citation 
(CPL 2.45B, chapter III, paragraph E6d(3)(a), Dec. 31, 1990).
    To reach the necessary findings and conclusions, OSHA conducts 
rulemaking in accordance with the requirements of section 6 of the OSH 
Act. The rulemaking process enables the Agency to determine the 
qualitative and, if possible, the quantitative nature of the risk with 
(and without) regulation, the technological feasibility of compliance, 
the availability of capital to the industry and the extent to which 
that capital is required for other purposes, the industry's profit 
history, the industry's ability to absorb costs or pass them on to the 
consumer, the impact of higher costs on demand, and the impact on 
competition with substitutes and imports. (See ATMI at 2501-2503; 
American Iron & Steel Institute generally.) Section 6(f) of the OSH Act 
further provides that, if the validity of a standard is challenged, 
OSHA must support its conclusions with ``substantial evidence in the 
record considered as a whole,'' a standard that courts have determined 
requires fairly close scrutiny of agency action and the explanation of 
that action. (See Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1206-1207.)
    OSHA's powers are further circumscribed by the independent 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, which provides a 
neutral forum for employer contests of citations issued by OSHA for 
noncompliance with health and safety standards (29 U.S.C. Secs. 659-
661; noted as an additional constraint in Benzene at 652 n. 59). OSHA 
must also respond rationally to similarities and differences among 
industries or industry sectors. (See Building and Constr. Trades Dep't, 
AFL-CIO v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1272-73 (D.C. Cir. 1988).)
    OSHA rulemaking is thus constrained first by the need to 
demonstrate that the standard will substantially reduce a significant 
risk of material harm, and then by the requirement that compliance is 
technologically capable of being done and not so expensive as to 
threaten economic instability or dislocation for the industry. Within 
these bounds, further constraints such as the need to find cost-
effective measures and to respond rationally to all meaningful comment 
militate against regulatory extremes.

D. The Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution 
Standard and the Electrical Protective Equipment Standard Comply With 
the Statutory Criteria Described Above and Are Not Subject to the 
Additional Constraints Applicable to Section 6(b)(5) Standards

    Standards which regulate hazards that are frequently undetectable 
because they are subtle or develop slowly or after long latency 
periods, are frequently referred to as ``health'' standards. Standards 
that regulate hazards, like explosions or electrocution, that cause 
immediately noticeable physical harm, are called ``safety'' standards. 
(See National Grain & Feed Ass'n v. OSHA (NGFA II), 866 F.2d 717, 731, 
733 (5th Cir. 1989). As noted above, section 3(8) provides that all 
OSHA standards must be ``reasonably necessary or appropriate.'' In 
addition, section 6(b)(5) requires that OSHA set health standards which 
limit significant risk ``to the extent feasible.'' OSHA has determined 
that the Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution 
standard and the revised Electrical Protective Equipment standard are 
safety standards, because these two standards address hazards, such as 
high voltage electricity and falls from elevations, that are 
immediately dangerous to life or health, not the longer term, less 
obvious hazards subject to section 6(b)(5).
    The OSH Act and its legislative history clearly indicate that 
Congress intended for OSHA to distinguish between safety standards and 
health standards. For example in section 2(b)(6) of the OSH Act, 
Congress declared that the goal of assuring safe and healthful working 
conditions and preserving human resources would be achieved, in part:

    * * * by exploring ways to discover latent diseases, 
establishing causal connections between diseases and work in 
environmental conditions, and conducting other research relating to 
health problems, in recognition of the fact that occupational health 
standards present problems often different from those involved in 
occupational safety.

    The legislative history makes this distinction even clearer:


    [The Secretary] should take into account that anyone working in 
toxic agents and physical agents which might be harmful may be 
subjected to such conditions for the rest of his working life, so 
that we can get at something which might not be toxic now, if he 
works in it a short time, but if he works in it the rest of his life 
might be very dangerous; and we want to make sure that such things 
are taken into consideration in establishing standards. [Leg. Hist. 
at 502-503 (Sen. Dominick), quoted in Benzene at 648-49]


    Additionally, Representative Daniels distinguished between 
``insidious 'silent killers' such as toxic fumes, bases, acids, and 
chemicals'' and ``violent physical injury causing immediate visible 
physical harm'' (Leg. Hist. at 1003), and Representative Udall 
contrasted insidious hazards like carcinogens with ``the more 
visible and well-known question of industrial accidents and on-the-
job injury'' (Leg. Hist. at 1004). (See also, for example, S. Rep. 
No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess 2-3 (1970), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 
News 1970, pp. 5177, 5179, reprinted in Leg. Hist. at 142-143, 
discussing 1967 Surgeon General study that found that 65 percent of 
employees in industrial plants ``were potentially exposed to harmful 
physical agents, such as severe noise or vibration, or to toxic 
materials''; Leg.Hist at 412; id. at 446; id. at 516; id. at 845; 
International Union, UAW at 1315.)
    In reviewing OSHA rulemaking activity, the Supreme Court has held 
that section 6(b)(5) requires OSHA to set ``the most protective 
standard consistent with feasibility'' (Benzene at 643 n. 48). As 
Justice Stevens observed:


    The reason that Congress drafted a special section for these 
substances * * * was because Congress recognized that there were 
special problems in regulating health risks as opposed to safety 
risks. In the latter case, the risks are generally immediate and 
obvious, while in the former, the risks may not be evident until a 
worker has been exposed for long periods of time to particular 
substances. [Benzene, at 649 n. 54.]


    Challenges to the grain dust and lockout/tagout standards included 
assertions that grain dust in explosive quantities and uncontrolled 
energy releases that could expose employees to crushing, cutting, 
burning or explosion hazards were harmful physical agents so that OSHA 
was required to apply the criteria of section 6(b)(5) when determining 
how to protect employees from those hazards. Reviewing courts have 
uniformly rejected such assertions. For example, the Court in 
International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
rejected the view that section 6(b)(5) provided the statutory criteria 
for regulation of uncontrolled energy, holding that such a ``reading 
would obliterate a distinction that Congress drew between 'health' and 
'safety' risks.'' The Court also noted that the language of the OSH Act 
and the legislative history supported the OSHA position (International 
Union, UAW at 1314). Additionally, the Court stated: ``We accord 
considerable weight to an agency's construction of a statutory scheme 
it is entrusted to administer, rejecting it only if unreasonable'' 
(International Union, UAW at 1313, citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
    The Court reviewing the grain dust standard also deferred to OSHA's 
reasonable view that the Agency was not subject to the feasibility 
mandate of section 6(b)(5) in regulating explosive quantities of grain 
dust (National Grain & Feed Association v. OSHA (NGFA II), 866 F.2d 
717, 733 (5th Cir. 1989)). It therefore applied the criteria of section 
3(8), requiring the Agency to establish that the standard is 
``reasonably necessary or appropriate'' to protect employees.
    As explained in section I, Background, and section III, Summary and 
Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble, and in section 
V, Regulatory Impact Assessment, later in this preamble, OSHA has 
determined that the generation, transmission, and distribution of 
electric power and the non-use or misuse of appropriate electrical 
protective equipment poses significant risks to employees (86 
fatalities and 12,977 injuries annually) and that the provisions of the 
final rule are reasonably necessary to protect affected employees from 
those risks. The Agency estimates that compliance with the Electric 
Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution standard and the 
revised Electrical Protective Equipment standard will cost $40.9 
million in the first year and $21.7 million annually thereafter and 
will reduce the risk of the identified hazards (preventing 61 
fatalities and 1634 injuries annually). This constitutes a substantial 
reduction of significant risk of material harm for the exposed 
population of approximately 382,073 employees in electric utilities and 
in general industries. The Agency believes that compliance is 
technologically feasible because the rulemaking record indicates that 
the engineering controls, work practices, and personal protective 
equipment required by the standard are already in general use 
throughout the industries covered by the standard. Additionally, OSHA 
believes that compliance is economically feasible, because, as 
documented in the Regulatory Impact Analysis, all regulated sectors can 
readily absorb or pass on compliance costs.
    As detailed in section V, Regulatory Impact Assessment, later in 
this preamble, and in Table 6, the standard's costs, benefits, and 
compliance requirements are consistent with those of other OSHA safety 
standards, such as the Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency 
Response (HAZWOPER) standard.
    OSHA assessed employee risk by evaluating exposure to the hazards 
associated with electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work in a large range of industries. Section V, Regulatory 
Impact Assessment, later in this preamble, presents OSHA's estimate of 
the costs and benefits of the Electric Power Generation, Transmission, 
and Distribution standard and the revised Electrical Protective 
Equipment standard in terms of the Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) codes for the industries regulated.
    The Agency acknowledges that some industries covered by the 
Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution standard and 
by the revised Electrical Protective Equipment standard have more 
documented injuries or fatalities associated with electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution work than do others. OSHA 
does not believe that the risk associated with exposure to electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution hazards varies 
according to the number of incidents documented for a particular SIC 
code. OSHA has set the scope of the Electric Power Generation, 
Transmission, and Distribution standard and the revised Electrical 
Protective Equipment standard to address situations in which employees 
are exposed to these hazards, regardless of the relative frequency of 
incidents. The Agency believes, based on analysis of the elements of 
the hazards identified, that there is sufficient information for OSHA 
to determine that employees in the covered sectors face significant 
risks related to electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work and to the non-use or misuse of electrical protective 
equipment. Therefore, the Agency has determined that all employees 
within the scope of the Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and 
Distribution standard and the revised Electrical Protective Equipment 
standard face a significant risk of material harm and that compliance 
with these standards is reasonably necessary to protect affected 
employees from that risk, regardless of the number of injuries or 
fatalities reported for the SIC code to which the employer has been 
assigned. 

                     Table 6.--Summary of Benefits and Costs of Recent OSHA Safety Standards                    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                              Annual            
                                                                        No. of     No. of      cost      Annual 
             Standard (CFR cite)                 Final rule date (FR    deaths    injuries    first    cost next
                                                       cite)          prevented  prevented   five yrs   five yrs
                                                                      annually   annually    (mill)      (mill) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grain handling (Sec. 1910.272)................  12-31-87 (52 FR              18        394   5.9-33.4   5.9-33.4
                                                 049622)                                                        
HAZWOPER (Sec. 1910.120)......................  3-6-89 (54 FR 9311)          32     18,700        153        153
Excavations (subpart P).......................  10-31-89 (54 FR              74        800        306        306
                                                 45,954                                                         
Process safety mgmt (Sec. 1910.119)...........  2-24-92 (57 FR 6356)        330      1,917      880.7      470.8
Permit-required confined spaces (Sec.           1-14-93 (58 FR 4462)         54      5,041      202.4      202.4
 1910.146).                                                                                                     
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA has considered and responded to all substantive comments 
regarding the proposed Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and 
Distribution and Electrical Protective Equipment standards on their 
merits in section III, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, 
earlier in this preamble. In particular, OSHA evaluated all suggested 
changes to the proposed rule in terms of their impact on worker safety, 
their feasibility, their cost effectiveness, and their consonance with 
the OSH Act.

V. Regulatory Impact Assessment

A. Introduction

    The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has 
determined that there is a significant risk to the health and safety of 
workers who are exposed to the hazards of electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution. To protect workers from the unique 
hazards encountered in these work environments, OSHA is issuing this 
final standard on electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution and the revised general industry standard on electrical 
protective equipment (29 CFR Sec. 1910.269 and 29 CFR Sec. 1910.137).
    The final standard in Sec. 1910.269 addresses work practices to be 
used during the operation and maintenance of electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution installations. Additionally, 
Sec. 1910.137 incorporates revisions made to the general industry 
standard on electrical protective equipment. These revisions primarily 
consist of performance-oriented requirements that are consistent with 
the latest national consensus standards.
    Executive Order 12886 requires that a regulatory analysis be 
conducted for any rule having major economic consequences on the 
national economy, individual industries, geographical regions, or 
levels of government. In addition, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 
1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires federal agencies to determine 
whether a regulation will have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.
    Consistent with these requirements, OSHA has prepared this 
Regulatory Impact and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis for the standards 
on electric power generation, transmission, and distribution and on 
electrical protective equipment. This analysis includes an estimate of 
affected industries and employees, estimated benefits, the 
technological feasibility of the standards, estimated compliance costs, 
nonregulatory alternatives, and a discussion of the economic and 
environmental impacts of these final standards.

B. Industries and Employees Affected by the Standard

    The final standard in Sec. 1910.137 consists of revisions made to 
the general industry standard on electrical protective equipment. Those 
industries which utilize equipment necessary for electrical protective 
measures are affected by the scope of this rule. However, OSHA 
anticipates that these revisions will primarily impact industries 
involved in electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
and industries in the non-utility sector involved with the cogeneration 
of electric power. This final standard is, therefore, considered to 
have a de minimis effect on all other industries.
    Thus, on the basis of OSHA's analysis, these final standards will 
cover the electric utility industry (SIC 491 and part of SIC 493), 
contract power line workers, contract line-clearance tree trimmers, 
independent power producers, industrial generators of electric power, 
and establishments that perform high-voltage electrical work (including 
contractors). As Table 7 shows, there are 12,074 affected 
establishments within the scope of these final standards, and 382,073 
employees who are considered exposed.
    Within the three phases of electric power operations (that is, 
generation, transmission, and distribution), employees encounter a 
variety of occupational hazards. Although many of these hazards are 
specific to a particular phase, electricity is the most common source 
of occupational fatalities and serious injuries throughout. The 
consequences of inadvertent contact with high-voltage electricity are 
often death or serious injuries such as second-degree and third-degree 
burns, amputation of limbs, damage to internal organs, and neurological 
damage.
    Electric power generation, transmission, and distribution employees 
also face occupational hazards other than electrocution. For example, 
high-pressure steam might be released inadvertently during maintenance 
work on multi-story boilers, machinery might accidentally be activated 
during maintenance work, or employees might fall from ladders, 
scaffolds, poles, or other elevations.

C. Benefits

    The final standards mandate a comprehensive approach for the 
control of the hazards discussed earlier. Included in the standards are 
provisions for electrical protective equipment, initial training 
requirements, CPR training, lockout/tagout, equipment inspections, and 
live-line maintenance, among others. The majority of benefits are 
expected to be achieved in electric utilities, which account for 
approximately 80 percent of fatalities to be prevented and nearly two-
thirds of the lost-workday injuries to be prevented.
    The final rules are expected to significantly reduce the number of 
fatalities and injuries involving electrical contact, flash burns, and 
thermal burns, as well as other accidents involving uncontrolled 
exposure to occupational hazards. The rules are expected to prevent at 
least 59 fatalities and 323 lost-workday injuries per year. Several 
provisions within Sec. 1910.269 reference existing OSHA standards. By 
increased recognition of these referenced standards, through employee 
training and administrative emphasis on hazard recognition (through job 
briefings, for example), OSHA estimates that an additional 2 fatalities 
and 1,310 lost-workday injuries will be prevented annually. Table 8 
shows the summary of total benefits expected to be achieved through 
promulgation of the final rules.

D. Technological Feasibility

    In assessing the technological feasibility of these final rules, 
OSHA reviewed existing electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution practices and electrical protective equipment practices 
among the affected industries. Based on this review, OSHA considers the 
implementation of the final rules to be technologically feasible.
    The final rule in Sec. 1910.269 has included several new provisions 
or requirements that differ from the proposed rule. These new 
modifications primarily involve personnel time to develop programs and 
procedures and to train employees. Any equipment required to comply is 
either currently in use or readily available. OSHA has determined, 
based on its review, that all of the work practices and specifications 
required by the final standard are consistent with equipment 
procurement, installation, and work practices widely accepted in these 
industries.

E. Costs of Compliance

    The cost of compliance with the final standards were estimated 
using the baseline of current electric utility practices. Electric 
utilities have had to comply with other parts of OSHA standards since 
1970, and have been subject to various national consensus standards 
such as the National Electrical Safety Code and those of the American 
Society for Testing and Materials. Since many costs have already been 
incurred to comply with these standards, this analysis covers 
incremental costs that will need to be incurred to comply with new 
requirements imposed by Secs. 1910.137 and 1910.269.
    Compliance costs of the standards were based on industry profile 
information, current compliance rates, unit costs for required 
equipment, and hourly compensation of labor. For each provision of the 
standard, OSHA estimated initial costs and annual recurring costs. 
Initial costs represent up-front expenditures for program development 
and equipment. Any equipment that will need to be purchased was then 
annualized over the expected life of the resource in order to show 
these costs on an annual basis. Other ongoing expenditures incurred 
annually include refresher training, equipment maintenance, and 
inspections. OSHA summed the annualized capital costs and ongoing costs 
to estimate total annual costs.
    OSHA estimates that the first year cost of compliance with the 
final rule will be $40.9 million and that the annual cost of compliance 
thereafter will be $21.7 million. Table 9 outlines the first year costs 
and annual costs by each sector affected by the final rule.

F. Nonregulatory Alternatives

    The primary objective of OSHA's standards for electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution work and for electrical 
protective equipment is to reduce the number of employee fatalities and 
injuries associated with the hazards involved in this work. OSHA 
believes these standards will eliminate to a considerable degree the 
worker risk experienced within the scope of the rules.
    The Agency examined the nonregulatory approaches for promoting 
safety practices within industries that generate, transmit, and 
distribute electric power, including: (1) economic forces generated by 
the private market system, (2) incentives created by workers' 
compensation programs or the threat of private suits, and (3) related 
activities of private agencies. Following this review, OSHA determined 
that the need for government regulation arises from the significant 
risk of job-related injury or death caused by inadequate safety 
practices for electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
work. Private markets fail to provide enough safety and health 
resources due to the lack of information on risk, immobility of labor, 
and externalization of part of the social costs of worker injuries and 
deaths. Workers' Compensation systems do not offer an adequate remedy 
because premiums do not reflect specific workplace risk and liability 
claims are restricted by statutes preventing employees from suing their 
employers. While certain voluntary industry standards exist, their 
scope and approach fail to provide adequate protection for all workers. 
Thus, OSHA has determined that a federal standard is necessary.

G. Economic Impacts

    OSHA assessed the potential economic impact of the final standards 
on the affected industry sectors and has determined that impacts on 
prices, profits, and sales will be modest for most industries. In order 
to determine the economic feasibility of the standards, OSHA compared 
first-year compliance costs and recurring annual costs with revenue per 
firm (to produce price impact estimates) and before-tax profits per 
firm (to produce profit impact estimates) by Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) Code. Revenue and profit data were derived from 
Dun & Bradstreet databases.
    Affected industries included SIC 0783, Shrub and Tree Services 
(line-clearance tree trimmers); SIC 1731, Electrical Work (high-voltage 
contractors); SIC 491, Electric Services (electric utilities and 
independent power producers); and SIC 493, Combination Electric and 
Gas, and Other Utility Services (electric utilities and independent 
power producers). Industrial generators and high-voltage customers were 
identified in SIC 13, Oil and Gas Production; SICs 20-39, 
Manufacturing; SICs 42-48, Transportation and Communications; SICs 50-
57, Wholesale and Retail Trade; SICs 60-65, Finance, Insurance, and 
Real Estate; and SICs 70-87, Services.
    Impacts were separately identified for large firms (20 or more 
employees) and small firms (1 to 19 employees). Among large firms in 
the electric utility industry, first-year price impacts were estimated 
to be less than 0.1 percent, assuming full cost pass through of 
contract power line workers' compliance costs. Estimated maximum profit 
impacts for large electric utilities in the first year were not 
expected to exceed 0.5 percent of pre-tax profits, also assuming full 
cost pass through of contract power line workers' compliance costs. For 
large line-clearance tree-trimming contractors, first-year price 
impacts were estimated to be 1.1 percent with maximum profit impacts of 
13.1 percent. However, OSHA believes that large line-clearance tree-
trimming firms will be able to pass the compliance costs through to 
their customers and therefore will not experience the decreased profits 
associated with the maximum profit impact scenario.
    Large firms in the non-utility industry were identified among the 
independent power producers, industrial generators, high-voltage 
customers, and high-voltage contractors. First-year price and profit 
impacts for independent power producers are not expected to exceed 0.1 
percent and 0.7 percent, respectively. Among industrial generators, 
first-year price impacts across all affected industries did not exceed 
0.11 percent. First-year profit impacts in the industrial generating 
sector were generally less than 1.0 percent, with the highest impact 
(2.0 percent) occurring in SIC 82, Education Services. In industries 
with high-voltage customers, the first-year price impacts across all 
affected industries did not exceed 0.1 percent. First-year profit 
impacts for high-voltage customers were less than 1.0 percent in most 
industries, with the highest impact (1.2 percent) occurring in SIC 82, 
Education Services. Among high-voltage contractors, first-year price 
and profit impacts were not expected to be greater than 0.1 percent and 
0.4 percent, respectively. OSHA concluded that these low levels of 
impact make the standards economically feasible for impacted large 
firms in all affected industries.
    Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et 
seq.), OSHA assessed the impact of the final standards on small 
businesses. Within the electric utility industry, small businesses are 
not expected to experience price or profit impacts in excess of 0.2 
percent even assuming full cost pass-through of contract power line 
workers' compliance costs. Estimated price impacts for small line-
clearance tree trimmers were less than 0.6 percent, while the maximum 
estimated pre-tax profit impact was 8.2 percent. However, OSHA believes 
that small line-clearance tree-trimming firms will be able to pass the 
compliance costs through to their customers and therefore will not 
experience the decreased profits estimated under the maximum profit 
impact scenario. In the non-utility industries, only the independent 
power producer sector was identified as having affected small 
businesses. Small independent power producers are not expected to 
experience price impacts in excess of 0.1 percent or profit impacts in 
excess of 1.0 percent. Therefore, consistent with the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act, OSHA has concluded that the standards are economically 
feasible and will have no significant impact for small firms.
    Thus, OSHA concludes that the economic impacts on affected industry 
groups will be small. It is not anticipated that small businesses will 
be disproportionately affected by the standards. OSHA also examined 
international trade and environmental issues and concludes that the 
standards will have no major negative impacts in those areas.

           Table 7.--Profile of Establishments and Employees in the Utility and Non-utility industries          
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Number of       Number of       Number of               
                                                        affected     affected large  affected small   Number of 
                 Industry Group\1\                   establishments  establishments  establishments    exposed  
                                                                                                      employees 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electric Utilities:                                                                                             
    Total Utilities Including:.....................          2,134           1,693             441       242,164
      Investor-Owned, Cooperatively-Owned, Publicly                                                             
       Owned,\2\ Federally Owned, and Contract                                                                  
       Power Line Workers..........................  ..............  ..............  ..............       16,500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                
Total: Electric Utilities..........................          2,134           1,693             441       258,664
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                
Contract Line-Clearance Tree Trimmers:                                                                          
    National Arborist Association..................             55              55               0        26,932
    Others.........................................          1,750               0           1,750        10,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                
Total: Contract Tree Trimmers......................          1,805              55           1,750        36,932
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                
Independent Power Producers and Industrial                                                                      
 Generators:                                                                                                    
  Independent Power Producers......................          2,160              85           2,075         7,647
  Industrial Generators............................          1,682           1,682               0        20,400
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                
Total: IPP's and Generators........................          3,842           1,767           2,075        28,047
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                
High-Voltage Contractors:                                                                                       
  Union Contractors................................            200             200               0         9,750
  Non-Union Contractors............................            200             200               0         9,750
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                
Total: High-Voltage Contractors....................            400             400               0        19,500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                
High-Voltage Utility Customers:                                                                                 
    Firms Performing In-House Work.................          3,893           3,893               0        38,930
================================================================================================================
                                                                                                                
      Total........................................         12,074           7,808           4,266       382,073
================================================================================================================
                                                                                                                
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Refer to the Industry Profile (Chapter II) of the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis of the Electric Power     
  Generation, Transmission and Distribution and the Electrical Protective Equipment Final Rules for a detailed  
  explanation of establishments and employees covered in the final standards.                                   
\2\The number of publicly owned utilities and employees included among Affected Establishments and Exposed      
  Employees excludes publicly owned utilities in non-state-plan states.                                         
Source: OSHA, Office of Regulatory Analysis; Eastern Research Group, 1993.                                      


    Table 8.--Summary of Benefits Associated With the Final Electric Power Generation Standard and the Final    
                                    Electrical Protective Equipment Standard                                    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                               Accident cases   
                                                                                           ---------------------
                                 Type of accident/sector                                               Prevented
                                                                                            Baseline    by final
                                                                                                       standards
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fatalities:                                                                                                     
    Electric utilities\1\.................................................................       60.7       42.6
    Utility contractors                                                                                         
      Electrical contractors..............................................................        9.4        6.6
      Line-clearance tree trimmers........................................................        8.6        5.8
    Non-utility establishments............................................................        6.8        5.6
                                                                                           ---------------------
        Total.............................................................................       85.5       60.6
Lost-Workday Injuries:                                                                                          
    Electric utilities\1\.................................................................    7,773.0      917.2
    Utility Contractors                                                                                         
      Electrical contractors..............................................................      529.0       62.4
      Line-clearance tree trimmers........................................................    1,920.5      226.6
    Non-utility establishments                                                                                  
      Power line workers..................................................................    1,856.0      259.8
      Power plant employees...............................................................      898.0      167.0
                                                                                           ---------------------
        Total.............................................................................   12,976.5    1,633.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Excludes totals for utility contractors.                                                                     
Source: Eastern Research Group.                                                                                 


                                                 Table 9.--Total Costs of Compliance for the Final Rules                                                
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            First year      First year      Total costs      Recurring      Annualized     Annual costs 
                                                               costs          capital       first year         costs          capital       (Year 2--)  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Small Utilities.....................................        $132,630          $7,905        $140,535        $108,894          $7,905        $116,799
    Large Utilities.....................................      12,906,120         696,719      13,602,840       9,645,738         696,719      10,342,458
Total: Utilities........................................      13,038,750         704,624      13,743,374       9,754,633         704,624      10,459,257
Contract Power Line Workers.............................       1,623,738               0       1,623,738       1,623,738               0       1,623,738
    Line-Clearance Tree Trimmers--Small.................       1,204,789               0       1,204,789         498,851               0         498,851
    Line-Clearance Tree Trimmers--Large.................       3,244,737               0       3,244,737       1,343,506               0       1,343,506
Total: Line-Clearance Tree Trimmers.....................       4,449,525               0       4,449,525       1,842,357               0       1,842,357
    Independent Power Producers--Small..................       2,915,395         386,503       3,301,898         978,182         386,503       1,364,686
    Independent Power Producers--Large..................       1,067,586          15,833       1,083,419         208,910          15,833         224,742
Total: Independent Power Producers......................       3,982,981         402,336       4,385,317       1,187,092         402,336       1,589,428
Industrial Cogenerators.................................       6,716,043          18,535       6,734,578       2,775,258          18,535       2,793,794
High-Voltage Customers..................................       9,335,958          15,572       9,351,530       2,735,590          15,572       2,751,162
High-Voltage Contractors................................         648,504               0         648,504         648,504               0         648,504
      Total.............................................      39,795,499       1,141,068      40,936,567      20,567,171       1,141,068      21,708,238
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, OSHA, Office of Regulatory Analysis, 1993.                                                                            

VI. International Trade

    Increases in the prices of domestically manufactured goods in 
general result in an increase in the demand for imports and a decrease 
in the demand for exports. The magnitude of this impact depends on the 
relevant demand elasticities and the magnitude of the price changes. 
While the final standard may result in slightly higher prices of 
manufactured goods, the estimated magnitude of this increase is so 
small that the Agency has concluded that any resultant impact on 
foreign trade will be negligible.

VII. Effective Date

    In developing the Final Rule, OSHA has considered whether a delayed 
effective date is necessary for any of the provisions of the standard. 
Employers will need adequate time to integrate their procedures for 
complying with the lockout and tagging provisions in this standard into 
the procedures used under the generic lockout standard, Sec. 1910.147, 
published on September 1, 1989 (54 FR 36644), and under the lockout 
requirements of the electrical safety-related work practices standard, 
published on August 6, 1990 (55 FR 31984). The work practices developed 
under final Sec. 1910.269 will also have to be blended into the work 
practices required by the Subpart S standard. A period of 120 days 
should be adequate for this purpose, since most of the requirements in 
the Final Rule do not require extensive retrofitting or major 
modifications of existing equipment. The recently published electrical 
safety-related work practices and generic lockout standards, which are 
similar types of standards, also gave employers 120 days delay in 
effective date. Lastly, this amount of time should be adequate for 
employers to ensure that their work practices conform to the 
requirements of the new standard.
    However, OSHA received evidence during the Subpart S rulemaking 
that it could take some electric utility employers a year or more to 
incorporate the training required by that standard into their existing 
training programs. The preamble to the final electrical safety-related 
work practices standard cited the testimony of Mr. Lamont Turner, who 
stated, on behalf of Edison Electric Institute, that it took his 
company 15 months to restructure their training program in order to 
meet regulations on hazardous waste (55 FR 32013-32014). This standard 
provided a 1-year's delay in effective date for its training 
requirements, and OSHA found this delay to be appropriate. Therefore, 
OSHA is similarly making the requirements on training contained in 
Sec. 1910.269(a)(2) effective one year from the date of publication of 
the standard.

VIII. Federalism

    This Final Rule has been reviewed in accordance with Executive 
Order 12612 (52 FR 41685, October 30, 1987), regarding Federalism. This 
Order requires that agencies, to the extent possible, refrain from 
limiting state policy options, consult with states before taking any 
actions which would restrict state policy options, and take such 
actions only if there is clear constitutional authority and the 
presence of a problem of national scope. The Order provides for 
preemption of state law only if there is a clear Congressional intent 
for the Agency to do so. Any such preemption is to be limited to the 
extent possible.
    Section 18 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) 
expresses Congress' clear intent to preempt state laws relating to 
issues on which Federal OSHA has promulgated occupational safety and 
health standards. Under the OSH Act, a state can avoid preemption only 
if it submits, and obtains Federal approval of, a plan for the 
development of such standards and their enforcement. Occupational 
safety and health standards developed by such Plan-States must, among 
other things, be at least as effective in providing safe and healthful 
employment and places of employment as the Federal standards. Where 
such standards are applicable to products distributed or used in 
interstate commerce, they may not unduly burden commerce and must be 
justified by compelling local conditions. (See section 18(c)(2) of the 
OSH Act).
    The Federal standards on the operation and maintenance of electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution systems and on 
electrical protective equipment address hazards which are not unique to 
any one state or region of the country. Nonetheless, states with 
occupational safety and health plans approved under Section 18 of the 
OSH Act will be able to develop their own state standards to deal with 
any special problems which might be encountered in a particular state. 
Moreover, because these standards are written in general, performance-
oriented terms, there is considerable flexibility for state plans to 
require, and for affected employers to use, methods of compliance which 
are appropriate to the working conditions covered by the standard.
    In brief, this Final Rule addresses a clear national problem 
related to occupational safety and health in general industry. States 
which have elected to participate under section 18 of the OSH Act are 
not preempted by this standard and will be able to address any special 
conditions within the framework of the Federal Act, while ensuring that 
the state standards are at least as effective as this standard.

IX. State Plan Standards

    The 23 states and 2 territories with their own OSHA-approved 
occupational safety and health plans must adopt a comparable standard 
within 6 months of the publication date of the final standard. These 
states and territories are: Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Connecticut,98 Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, New York,99 North 
Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, 
Vermont, Virginia, Virgin Islands, Washington, and Wyoming. Until such 
time as a state standard is promulgated, Federal OSHA will provide 
interim enforcement assistance, as appropriate, in these states.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\8Plan covers only State and local government employees.
    \9\9Plan covers only State and local government employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

X. Index Terms and Authority

Authority

    This document was prepared under the direction of Joseph A. Dear, 
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. 
Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 
20210.

List of Subjects in 29 CFR Part 1910

    Electric power; fire prevention; flammable materials; occupational 
safety and health; Occupational Safety and Health Administration; 
safety; signs and symbols; and tools.

    Accordingly, pursuant to sections 4, 6, and 8 of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657), Secretary of 
Labor's Order No. 1-90 (55 FR 9033), and 29 CFR part 1911, 29 CFR part 
1910 is amended as set forth below.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 13th day of January, 1994.
Joseph A. Dear,
Assistant Secretary of Labor.
    Part 1910 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended 
as follows:

PART 1910--[AMENDED]

Subpart I--Personal Protective Equipment

    1. The authority citation for subpart I of part 1910 is revised to 
read as follows:

    Authority: Secs. 4, 6, 8, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 (29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657); Secretary of Labor's Order No. 12-71 
(36 FR 8754), 8-76 (41 FR 25059), 9-83 (48 FR 35736), or 1-90 (55 FR 
9033) as applicable. Sections 1910.134 and 1910.137 also issued 
under 29 CFR part 1911.

    2. Section 1910.137 is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 1910.137  Electrical protective equipment.

    (a) Design requirements. Insulating blankets, matting, covers, line 
hose, gloves, and sleeves made of rubber shall meet the following 
requirements:
    (1) Manufacture and marking. (i) Blankets, gloves, and sleeves 
shall be produced by a seamless process.
    (ii) Each item shall be clearly marked as follows:
    (A) Class 0 equipment shall be marked Class 0.
    (B) Class 1 equipment shall be marked Class 1.
    (C) Class 2 equipment shall be marked Class 2.
    (D) Class 3 equipment shall be marked Class 3.
    (E) Class 4 equipment shall be marked Class 4.
    (F) Non-ozone-resistant equipment other than matting shall be 
marked Type I.
    (G) Ozone-resistant equipment other than matting shall be marked 
Type II.
    (H) Other relevant markings, such as the manufacturer's 
identification and the size of the equipment, may also be provided.
    (iii) Markings shall be nonconducting and shall be applied in such 
a manner as not to impair the insulating qualities of the equipment.
    (iv) Markings on gloves shall be confined to the cuff portion of 
the glove.
    (2) Electrical requirements. (i) Equipment shall be capable of 
withstanding the a-c proof-test voltage specified in Table I-2 or the 
d-c proof-test voltage specified in Table I-3.
    (A) The proof test shall reliably indicate that the equipment can 
withstand the voltage involved.
    (B) The test voltage shall be applied continuously for 3 minutes 
for equipment other than matting and shall be applied continuously for 
1 minute for matting.
    (C) Gloves shall also be capable of withstanding the a-c proof-test 
voltage specified in Table I-2 after a 16-hour water soak. (See the 
note following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B) of this section.)
    (ii) When the a-c proof test is used on gloves, the 60-hertz proof-
test current may not exceed the values specified in Table I-2 at any 
time during the test period.
    (A) If the a-c proof test is made at a frequency other than 60 
hertz, the permissible proof-test current shall be computed from the 
direct ratio of the frequencies.
    (B) For the test, gloves (right side out) shall be filled with tap 
water and immersed in water to a depth that is in accordance with Table 
I-4. Water shall be added to or removed from the glove, as necessary, 
so that the water level is the same inside and outside the glove.
    (C) After the 16-hour water soak specified in paragraph 
(a)(2)(i)(C) of this section, the 60-hertz proof-test current may 
exceed the values given in Table I-2 by not more than 2 milliamperes.
    (iii) Equipment that has been subjected to a minimum breakdown 
voltage test may not be used for electrical protection. (See the note 
following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B) of this section.)
    (iv) Material used for Type II insulating equipment shall be 
capable of withstanding an ozone test, with no visible effects. The 
ozone test shall reliably indicate that the material will resist ozone 
exposure in actual use. Any visible signs of ozone deterioration of the 
material, such as checking, cracking, breaks, or pitting, is evidence 
of failure to meet the requirements for ozone-resistant material. (See 
the note following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B) of this section.)
    (3) Workmanship and finish. (i) Equipment shall be free of harmful 
physical irregularities that can be detected by the tests or 
inspections required under this section.
    (ii) Surface irregularities that may be present on all rubber goods 
because of imperfections on forms or molds or because of inherent 
difficulties in the manufacturing process and that may appear as 
indentations, protuberances, or imbedded foreign material are 
acceptable under the following conditions:
    (A) The indentation or protuberance blends into a smooth slope when 
the material is stretched.
    (B) Foreign material remains in place when the insulating material 
is folded and stretches with the insulating material surrounding it.

    Note: Rubber insulating equipment meeting the following national 
consensus standards is deemed to be in compliance with paragraph (a) 
of this section:

    American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) D 120-87, 
Specification for Rubber Insulating Gloves.
    ASTM D 178-88, Specification for Rubber Insulating Matting.
    ASTM D 1048-88a, Specification for Rubber Insulating Blankets.
    ASTM D 1049-88, Specification for Rubber Insulating Covers.
    ASTM D 1050-90, Specification for Rubber Insulating Line Hose.
    ASTM D 1051-87, Specification for Rubber Insulating Sleeves.
    These standards contain specifications for conducting the 
various tests required in paragraph (a) of this section. For 
example, the a-c and d-c proof tests, the breakdown test, the water 
soak procedure, and the ozone test mentioned in this paragraph are 
described in detail in the ASTM standards.

    (b) In-service care and use. (1) Electrical protective equipment 
shall be maintained in a safe, reliable condition.
    (2) The following specific requirements apply to insulating 
blankets, covers, line hose, gloves, and sleeves made of rubber:
    (i) Maximum use voltages shall conform to those listed in Table I-
5.
    (ii) Insulating equipment shall be inspected for damage before each 
day's use and immediately following any incident that can reasonably be 
suspected of having caused damage. Insulating gloves shall be given an 
air test, along with the inspection.
    (iii) Insulating equipment with any of the following defects may 
not be used:
    (A) A hole, tear, puncture, or cut;
    (B) Ozone cutting or ozone checking (the cutting action produced by 
ozone on rubber under mechanical stress into a series of interlacing 
cracks);
    (C) An embedded foreign object;
    (D) Any of the following texture changes: swelling, softening, 
hardening, or becoming sticky or inelastic.
    (E) Any other defect that damages the insulating properties.
    (iv) Insulating equipment found to have other defects that might 
affect its insulating properties shall be removed from service and 
returned for testing under paragraphs (b)(2)(viii) and (b)(2)(ix) of 
this section.
    (v) Insulating equipment shall be cleaned as needed to remove 
foreign substances.
    (vi) Insulating equipment shall be stored in such a location and in 
such a manner as to protect it from light, temperature extremes, 
excessive humidity, ozone, and other injurious substances and 
conditions.
    (vii) Protector gloves shall be worn over insulating gloves, except 
as follows:
    (A) Protector gloves need not be used with Class 0 gloves, under 
limited-use conditions, where small equipment and parts manipulation 
necessitate unusually high finger dexterity.

    Note: Extra care is needed in the visual examination of the 
glove and in the avoidance of handling sharp objects.

    (B) Any other class of glove may be used for similar work without 
protector gloves if the employer can demonstrate that the possibility 
of physical damage to the gloves is small and if the class of glove is 
one class higher than that required for the voltage involved. 
Insulating gloves that have been used without protector gloves may not 
be used at a higher voltage until they have been tested under the 
provisions of paragraphs (b) (2) (viii) and (b) (2) (xi) of this 
section.
    (viii) Electrical protective equipment shall be subjected to 
periodic electrical tests. Test voltages and the maximum intervals 
between tests shall be in accordance with Table I-5 and Table I-6.
    (ix) The test method used under paragraphs (b)(2)(viii) and 
(b)(2)(xi) of this section shall reliably indicate whether the 
insulating equipment can withstand the voltages involved.

    Note: Standard electrical test methods considered as meeting 
this requirement are given in the following national consensus 
standards:
    American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) D 120-87, 
Specification for Rubber Insulating Gloves.
    ASTM D 1048-88a, Specification for Rubber Insulating Blankets.
    ASTM D 1049-88, Specification for Rubber Insulating Covers.
    ASTM D 1050-90, Specification for Rubber Insulating Line Hose.
    ASTM D 1051-87, Specification for Rubber Insulating Sleeves.
    ASTM F 478-92, Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating 
Line Hose and Covers.
    ASTM F 479-88a, Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating 
Blankets.
    ASTM F 496-91, Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating 
Gloves and Sleeves.

    (x) Insulating equipment failing to pass inspections or electrical 
tests may not be used by employees, except as follows:
    (A) Rubber insulating line hose may be used in shorter lengths with 
the defective portion cut off.
    (B) Rubber insulating blankets may be repaired using a compatible 
patch that results in physical and electrical properties equal to those 
of the blanket.
    (C) Rubber insulating blankets may be salvaged by severing the 
defective area from the undamaged portion of the blanket. The resulting 
undamaged area may not be smaller than 22 inches by 22 inches (560 mm 
by 560 mm) for Class 1, 2, 3, and 4 blankets.
    (D) Rubber insulating gloves and sleeves with minor physical 
defects, such as small cuts, tears, or punctures, may be repaired by 
the application of a compatible patch. Also, rubber insulating gloves 
and sleeves with minor surface blemishes may be repaired with a 
compatible liquid compound. The patched area shall have electrical and 
physical properties equal to those of the surrounding material. Repairs 
to gloves are permitted only in the area between the wrist and the 
reinforced edge of the opening.
    (xi) Repaired insulating equipment shall be retested before it may 
be used by employees.
    (xii) The employer shall certify that equipment has been tested in 
accordance with the requirements of paragraphs (b)(2)(viii), 
(b)(2)(ix), and (b)(2)(xi) of this section. The certification shall 
identify the equipment that passed the test and the date it was tested.

    Note: Marking of equipment and entering the results of the tests 
and the dates of testing onto logs are two acceptable means of 
meeting this requirement.

                                     Table I-2.--A-C Proof-Test Requirements                                    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   Maximum proof-test current, mA (gloves only) 
                                                      Proof-test -----------------------------------------------
                 Class of equipment                     voltage     267-mm                                      
                                                         rms V     (10.5-in)  356-mm (14- 406-mm (16- 457-mm (18-
                                                                     glove     in) glove   in) glove   in) glove
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0...................................................       5,000           8          12          14          16
1...................................................      10,000  ..........          14          16          18
2...................................................      20,000  ..........          16          18          20
3...................................................      30,000  ..........          18          20          22
4...................................................      40,000  ..........  ..........          22          24
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                 Table I-3.--D-C Proof-Test Requirements                
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Proof-test
                     Class of equipment                        voltage  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0..........................................................       20,000
1..........................................................       40,000
2..........................................................       50,000
3..........................................................       60,000
4..........................................................       70,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Note: The d-c voltages listed in this table are not appropriate 
for proof testing rubber insulating line hose or covers. For this 
equipment, d-c proof tests shall use a voltage high enough to 
indicate that the equipment can be safely used at the voltages 
listed in Table I-4. See ASTM D 1050-90 and ASTM D 1049-88 for 
further information on proof tests for rubber insulating line hose 
and covers.

                 Table I-4.--Glove Tests--Water Level1 2                
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                           AC proof test   DC proof test
             Class of glove              -------------------------------
                                            mm.     in.     mm.     in. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.......................................      38     1.5      38     1.5
1.......................................      38     1.5      51     2.0
2.......................................      64     2.5      76     3.0
3.......................................      89     3.5     102     4.0
4.......................................     127     5.0     153     6.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\The water level is given as the clearance from the cuff of the glove 
  to the water line, with a tolerance of 13 mm. (0.5 in.).                                                       
\2\If atmospheric conditions make the specified clearances impractical, 
  the clearances may be increased by a maximum of 25 mm. (1 in.).       


      Table I-5.--Rubber Insulating Equipment Voltage Requirements      
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            Maximum use       Retest          Retest    
   Class of equipment      voltage\1\ a-   voltage\2\ a-   voltage\2\ d-
                              c--rms          c--rms          c--avg    
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.......................           1,000           5,000          20,000
1.......................           7,500          10,000          40,000
2.......................          17,000          20,000          50,000
3.......................          26,500          30,000          60,000
4.......................          36,000          40,000          70,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\The maximum use voltage is the a-c voltage (rms) classification of   
  the protective equipment that designates the maximum nominal design   
  voltage of the energized system that may be safely worked. The nominal
  design voltage is equal to the phase-to-phase voltage on multiphase   
  circuits. However, the phase-to-ground potential is considered to be  
  the nominal design voltage:                                           
(1) If there is no multiphase exposure in a system area and if the      
  voltage exposure is limited to the phase-to-ground potential, or      
(2) If the electrical equipment and devices are insulated or isolated or
  both so that the multiphase exposure on a grounded wye circuit is     
  removed.                                                              
\2\The proof-test voltage shall be applied continuously for at least 1  
  minute, but no more than 3 minutes.                                   


         Table I-6.--Rubber Insulating Equipment Test Intervals         
------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Type of equipment                       When to test           
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rubber insulating line hose........  Upon indication that insulating    
                                      value is suspect.                 
Rubber insulating covers...........  Upon indication that insulating    
                                      value is suspect.                 
Rubber insulating blankets.........  Before first issue and every 12    
                                      months thereafter.\1\             
Rubber insulating gloves...........  Before first issue and every 6     
                                      months thereafter.\1\             
Rubber insulating sleeves..........  Before first issue and every 12    
                                      months thereafter.\1\             
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\If the insulating equipment has been electrically tested but not     
  issued for service, it may not be placed into service unless it has   
  been electrically tested within the previous 12 months.               

Subpart R--Special Industries

    3. The authority citation for subpart R of part 1910 is revised to 
read as follows:

    Authority: Secs. 4, 6, 8, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 (29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657); Secretary of Labor's Order No. 12-71 
(36 FR 8754), 8-76 (41 FR 25059), 9-83 (48 FR 35736), or 1-90 (55 FR 
9033) as applicable.
    Sections 1910.261, 1910.262, 1910.265, 1910.266, 1910.267, 
1910.268, 1910.269, 1910.274, and 1910.275 also issued under 29 CFR 
Part 1911.

    4. A new Sec. 1910.269 is added to Subpart R to read as follows:


Sec. 1910.269  Electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution.

    (a) General. (1) Application. (i) This section covers the operation 
and maintenance of electric power generation, control, transformation, 
transmission, and distribution lines and equipment. These provisions 
apply to:
    (A) Power generation, transmission, and distribution installations, 
including related equipment for the purpose of communication or 
metering, which are accessible only to qualified employees;

    Note: The types of installations covered by this paragraph 
include the generation, transmission, and distribution installations 
of electric utilities, as well as equivalent installations of 
industrial establishments. Supplementary electric generating 
equipment that is used to supply a workplace for emergency, standby, 
or similar purposes only is covered under Subpart S of this Part. 
(See paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(B) of this section.)

    (B) Other installations at an electric power generating station, as 
follows:
    (1) Fuel and ash handling and processing installations, such as 
coal conveyors,
    (2) Water and steam installations, such as penstocks, pipelines, 
and tanks, providing a source of energy for electric generators, and
    (3) Chlorine and hydrogen systems.
    (C) Test sites where electrical testing involving temporary 
measurements associated with electric power generation, transmission, 
and distribution is performed in laboratories, in the field, in 
substations, and on lines, as opposed to metering, relaying, and 
routine line work; and
    (D) Work on or directly associated with the installations covered 
in paragraphs (a)(1)(i)(A) through (a)(1)(i)(C) of this section.
    (E) Line-clearance tree-trimming operations, as follows:
    (1) Entire Sec. 1910.269 of this Part, except paragraph (r)(1) of 
this section, applies to line-clearance tree-trimming operations 
performed by qualified employees (those who are knowledgeable in the 
construction and operation of electric power generation, transmission, 
or distribution equipment involved, along with the associated hazards).
    (2) Paragraphs (a)(2), (b), (c), (g), (k), (p), and (r) of this 
section apply to line-clearance tree-trimming operations performed by 
line-clearance tree trimmers who are not qualified employees.
    (ii) Notwithstanding paragraph (A)(1)(I) of this section, 
Sec. 1910.269 of this Part does not apply:
    (A) To construction work, as defined in Sec. 1910.12 of this Part; 
or
    (B) To electrical installations, electrical safety-related work 
practices, or electrical maintenance considerations covered by Subpart 
S of this Part.

    Note 1: Work practices conforming to Secs. 1910.332 through 
1910.335 of this Part are considered as complying with the 
electrical safety-related work practice requirements of this section 
identified in Table 1 of Appendix A-2 to this section, provided the 
work is being performed on a generation or distribution installation 
meeting Secs. 1910.303 through 1910.308 of this Part. This table 
also identifies provisions in this section that apply to work by 
qualified persons directly on or associated with installations of 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution lines or 
equipment, regardless of compliance with Secs. 1910.332 through 
1910.335 of this Part.
    Note 2: Work practices performed by qualified persons and 
conforming to Sec. 1910.269 of this Part are considered as complying 
with Sec. 1910.333(c) and Sec. 1910.335 of this Part.

    (iii) This section applies in addition to all other applicable 
standards contained in this Part 1910. Specific references in this 
section to other sections of Part 1910 are provided for emphasis only.
    (2) Training. Employees shall be trained in and familiar with the 
safety-related work practices, safety procedures, and other safety 
requirements in this section that pertain to their respective job 
assignments. Employees shall also be trained in and familiar with any 
other safety practices, including applicable emergency procedures (such 
as pole top and manhole rescue), that are not specifically addressed by 
this section but that are related to their work and are necessary for 
their safety.
    (ii) Qualified employees shall also be trained and competent in:
    (A) The skills and techniques necessary to distinguish exposed live 
parts from other parts of electric equipment,
    (B) The skills and techniques necessary to determine the nominal 
voltage of exposed live parts,
    (C) The minimum approach distances specified in this section 
corresponding to the voltages to which the qualified employee will be 
exposed, and
    (D) The proper use of the special precautionary techniques, 
personal protective equipment, insulating and shielding materials, and 
insulated tools for working on or near exposed energized parts of 
electric equipment.

    Note: For the purposes of this section, a person must have this 
training in order to be considered a qualified person.

    (iii) The employer shall determine, through regular supervision and 
through inspections conducted on at least an annual basis, that each 
employee is complying with the safety-related work practices required 
by this section.
    (iv) An employee shall receive additional training (or retraining) 
under any of the following conditions:
    (A) If the supervision and annual inspections required by paragraph 
(a)(2)(iii) of this section indicate that the employee is not complying 
with the safety-related work practices required by this section, or
    (B) If new technology, new types of equipment, or changes in 
procedures necessitate the use of safety-related work practices that 
are different from those which the employee would normally use, or
    (C) If he or she must employ safety-related work practices that are 
not normally used during his or her regular job duties.

    Note: OSHA would consider tasks that are performed less often 
than once per year to necessitate retraining before the performance 
of the work practices involved.

    (v) The training required by paragraph (a)(2) of this section shall 
be of the classroom or on-the-job type.
    (vi) The training shall establish employee proficiency in the work 
practices required by this section and shall introduce the procedures 
necessary for compliance with this section.
    (vii) The employer shall certify that each employee has received 
the training required by paragraph (a)(2) of this section. This 
certification shall be made when the employee demonstrates proficiency 
in the work practices involved and shall be maintained for the duration 
of the employee's employment.

    Note: Employment records that indicate that an employee has 
received the required training are an acceptable means of meeting 
this requirement.

    (3) Existing conditions. Existing conditions related to the safety 
of the work to be performed shall be determined before work on or near 
electric lines or equipment is started. Such conditions include, but 
are not limited to, the nominal voltages of lines and equipment, the 
maximum switching transient voltages, the presence of hazardous induced 
voltages, the presence and condition of protective grounds and 
equipment grounding conductors, the condition of poles, environmental 
conditions relative to safety, and the locations of circuits and 
equipment, including power and communication lines and fire protective 
signaling circuits.
    (b) Medical services and first aid. The employer shall provide 
medical services and first aid as required in Sec. 1910.151 of this 
Part. In addition to the requirements of Sec. 1910.151 of this Part, 
the following requirements also apply:
    (1) Cardiopulmonary resuscitation and first aid training. When 
employees are performing work on or associated with exposed lines or 
equipment energized at 50 volts or more, persons trained in first aid 
including cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) shall be available as 
follows:
    (i) For field work involving two or more employees at a work 
location, at least two trained persons shall be available. However, 
only one trained person need be available if all new employees are 
trained in first aid, including CPR, within 3 months of their hiring 
dates.
    (ii) For fixed work locations such as generating stations, the 
number of trained persons available shall be sufficient to ensure that 
each employee exposed to electric shock can be reached within 4 minutes 
by a trained person. However, where the existing number of employees is 
insufficient to meet this requirement (at a remote substation, for 
example), all employees at the work location shall be trained.
    (2) First aid supplies. First aid supplies required by 
Sec. 1910.151(b) of this Part shall be placed in weatherproof 
containers if the supplies could be exposed to the weather.
    (3) First aid kits. Each first aid kit shall be maintained, shall 
be readily available for use, and shall be inspected frequently enough 
to ensure that expended items are replaced but at least once per year.
    (c) Job briefing. The employer shall ensure that the employee in 
charge conducts a job briefing with the employees involved before they 
start each job. The briefing shall cover at least the following 
subjects: hazards associated with the job, work procedures involved, 
special precautions, energy source controls, and personal protective 
equipment requirements.
    (1) Number of briefings. If the work or operations to be performed 
during the work day or shift are repetitive and similar, at least one 
job briefing shall be conducted before the start of the first job of 
each day or shift. Additional job briefings shall be held if 
significant changes, which might affect the safety of the employees, 
occur during the course of the work.
    (2) Extent of briefing. A brief discussion is satisfactory if the 
work involved is routine and if the employee, by virtue of training and 
experience, can reasonably be expected to recognize and avoid the 
hazards involved in the job. A more extensive discussion shall be 
conducted:
    (i) If the work is complicated or particularly hazardous, or
    (ii) If the employee cannot be expected to recognize and avoid the 
hazards involved in the job.

    Note: The briefing is always required to touch on all the 
subjects listed in the introductory text to paragraph (c) of this 
section.

    (3) Working alone. An employee working alone need not conduct a job 
briefing. However, the employer shall ensure that the tasks to be 
performed are planned as if a briefing were required.
    (d) Hazardous energy control (lockout/tagout) procedures. (1) 
Application. The provisions of paragraph (d) of this section apply to 
the use of lockout/tagout procedures for the control of energy sources 
in installations for the purpose of electric power generation, 
including related equipment for communication or metering. Locking and 
tagging procedures for the deenergizing of electric energy sources 
which are used exclusively for purposes of transmission and 
distribution are addressed by paragraph (m) of this section.

    Note 1: Installations in electric power generation facilities 
that are not an integral part of, or inextricably commingled with, 
power generation processes or equipment are covered under 
Sec. 1910.147 and Subpart S of this Part.
    Note 2: Lockout and tagging procedures that comply with 
paragraphs (c) through (f) of Sec. 1910.147 of this Part will also 
be deemed to comply with paragraph of this section if the procedures 
address the hazards covered by paragraph (d) of this section.

    (2) General. (i) The employer shall establish a program consisting 
of energy control procedures, employee training, and periodic 
inspections to ensure that, before any employee performs any servicing 
or maintenance on a machine or equipment where the unexpected 
energizing, start up, or release of stored energy could occur and cause 
injury, the machine or equipment is isolated from the energy source and 
rendered inoperative.
    (ii) The employer's energy control program under paragraph (d)(2) 
of this section shall meet the following requirements:
    (A) If an energy isolating device is not capable of being locked 
out, the employer's program shall use a tagout system.
    (B) If an energy isolating device is capable of being locked out, 
the employer's program shall use lockout, unless the employer can 
demonstrate that the use of a tagout system will provide full employee 
protection as follows:
    (1) When a tagout device is used on an energy isolating device 
which is capable of being locked out, the tagout device shall be 
attached at the same location that the lockout device would have been 
attached, and the employer shall demonstrate that the tagout program 
will provide a level of safety equivalent to that obtained by the use 
of a lockout program.
    (2) In demonstrating that a level of safety is achieved in the 
tagout program equivalent to the level of safety obtained by the use of 
a lockout program, the employer shall demonstrate full compliance with 
all tagout-related provisions of this standard together with such 
additional elements as are necessary to provide the equivalent safety 
available from the use of a lockout device. Additional means to be 
considered as part of the demonstration of full employee protection 
shall include the implementation of additional safety measures such as 
the removal of an isolating circuit element, blocking of a controlling 
switch, opening of an extra disconnecting device, or the removal of a 
valve handle to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent energizing.
    (C) After [insert date 120 days after publication], whenever 
replacement or major repair, renovation, or modification of a machine 
or equipment is performed, and whenever new machines or equipment are 
installed, energy isolating devices for such machines or equipment 
shall be designed to accept a lockout device.
    (iii) Procedures shall be developed, documented, and used for the 
control of potentially hazardous energy covered by paragraph (d) of 
this section.
    (iv) The procedure shall clearly and specifically outline the 
scope, purpose, responsibility, authorization, rules, and techniques to 
be applied to the control of hazardous energy, and the measures to 
enforce compliance including, but not limited to, the following:
    (A) A specific statement of the intended use of this procedure;
    (B) Specific procedural steps for shutting down, isolating, 
blocking and securing machines or equipment to control hazardous 
energy;
    (C) Specific procedural steps for the placement, removal, and 
transfer of lockout devices or tagout devices and the responsibility 
for them; and
    (D) Specific requirements for testing a machine or equipment to 
determine and verify the effectiveness of lockout devices, tagout 
devices, and other energy control measures.
    (v) The employer shall conduct a periodic inspection of the energy 
control procedure at least annually to ensure that the procedure and 
the provisions of paragraph (d) of this section are being followed.
    (A) The periodic inspection shall be performed by an authorized 
employee who is not using the energy control procedure being inspected.
    (B) The periodic inspection shall be designed to identify and 
correct any deviations or inadequacies.
    (C) If lockout is used for energy control, the periodic inspection 
shall include a review, between the inspector and each authorized 
employee, of that employee's responsibilities under the energy control 
procedure being inspected.
    (D) Where tagout is used for energy control, the periodic 
inspection shall include a review, between the inspector and each 
authorized and affected employee, of that employee's responsibilities 
under the energy control procedure being inspected, and the elements 
set forth in paragraph (d)(2)(vii) of this section.
    (E) The employer shall certify that the inspections required by 
paragraph (d)(2)(v) of this section have been accomplished. The 
certification shall identify the machine or equipment on which the 
energy control procedure was being used, the date of the inspection, 
the employees included in the inspection, and the person performing the 
inspection.

    Note: If normal work schedule and operation records demonstrate 
adequate inspection activity and contain the required information, 
no additional certification is required.

    (vi) The employer shall provide training to ensure that the purpose 
and function of the energy control program are understood by employees 
and that the knowledge and skills required for the safe application, 
usage, and removal of energy controls are acquired by employees. The 
training shall include the following:
    (A) Each authorized employee shall receive training in the 
recognition of applicable hazardous energy sources, the type and 
magnitude of energy available in the workplace, and in the methods and 
means necessary for energy isolation and control.
    (B) Each affected employee shall be instructed in the purpose and 
use of the energy control procedure.
    (C) All other employees whose work operations are or may be in an 
area where energy control procedures may be used shall be instructed 
about the procedures and about the prohibition relating to attempts to 
restart or reenergize machines or equipment that are locked out or 
tagged out.
    (vii) When tagout systems are used, employees shall also be trained 
in the following limitations of tags:
    (A) Tags are essentially warning devices affixed to energy 
isolating devices and do not provide the physical restraint on those 
devices that is provided by a lock.
    (B) When a tag is attached to an energy isolating means, it is not 
to be removed without authorization of the authorized person 
responsible for it, and it is never to be bypassed, ignored, or 
otherwise defeated.
    (C) Tags must be legible and understandable by all authorized 
employees, affected employees, and all other employees whose work 
operations are or may be in the area, in order to be effective.
    (D) Tags and their means of attachment must be made of materials 
which will withstand the environmental conditions encountered in the 
workplace.
    (E) Tags may evoke a false sense of security, and their meaning 
needs to be understood as part of the overall energy control program.
    (F) Tags must be securely attached to energy isolating devices so 
that they cannot be inadvertently or accidentally detached during use.
    (viii) Retraining shall be provided by the employer as follows:
    (A) Retraining shall be provided for all authorized and affected 
employees whenever there is a change in their job assignments, a change 
in machines, equipment, or processes that present a new hazard or 
whenever there is a change in the energy control procedures.
    (B) Retraining shall also be conducted whenever a periodic 
inspection under paragraph (d)(2)(v) of this section reveals, or 
whenever the employer has reason to believe, that there are deviations 
from or inadequacies in an employee's knowledge or use of the energy 
control procedures.
    (C) The retraining shall reestablish employee proficiency and shall 
introduce new or revised control methods and procedures, as necessary.
    (ix) The employer shall certify that employee training has been 
accomplished and is being kept up to date. The certification shall 
contain each employee's name and dates of training.
    (3) Protective materials and hardware. (i) Locks, tags, chains, 
wedges, key blocks, adapter pins, self-locking fasteners, or other 
hardware shall be provided by the employer for isolating, securing, or 
blocking of machines or equipment from energy sources.
    (ii) Lockout devices and tagout devices shall be singularly 
identified; shall be the only devices used for controlling energy; may 
not be used for other purposes; and shall meet the following 
requirements:
    (A) Lockout devices and tagout devices shall be capable of 
withstanding the environment to which they are exposed for the maximum 
period of time that exposure is expected.
    (1) Tagout devices shall be constructed and printed so that 
exposure to weather conditions or wet and damp locations will not cause 
the tag to deteriorate or the message on the tag to become illegible.
    (2) Tagout devices shall be so constructed as not to deteriorate 
when used in corrosive environments.
    (B) Lockout devices and tagout devices shall be standardized within 
the facility in at least one of the following criteria: color, shape, 
size. Additionally, in the case of tagout devices, print and format 
shall be standardized.
    (C) Lockout devices shall be substantial enough to prevent removal 
without the use of excessive force or unusual techniques, such as with 
the use of bolt cutters or metal cutting tools.
    (D) Tagout devices, including their means of attachment, shall be 
substantial enough to prevent inadvertent or accidental removal. Tagout 
device attachment means shall be of a non-reusable type, attachable by 
hand, self-locking, and non-releasable with a minimum unlocking 
strength of no less than 50 pounds and shall have the general design 
and basic characteristics of being at least equivalent to a one-piece, 
all-environment-tolerant nylon cable tie.
    (E) Each lockout device or tagout device shall include provisions 
for the identification of the employee applying the device.
    (F) Tagout devices shall warn against hazardous conditions if the 
machine or equipment is energized and shall include a legend such as 
the following: Do Not Start, Do Not Open, Do Not Close, Do Not 
Energize, Do Not Operate.


    Note: For specific provisions covering accident prevention tags, 
see Sec. 1910.145 of this Part.


    (4) Energy isolation. Lockout and tagout device application and 
removal may only be performed by the authorized employees who are 
performing the servicing or maintenance.
    (5) Notification. Affected employees shall be notified by the 
employer or authorized employee of the application and removal of 
lockout or tagout devices. Notification shall be given before the 
controls are applied and after they are removed from the machine or 
equipment.


    Note: See also paragraph (d)(7) of this section, which requires 
that the second notification take place before the machine or 
equipment is reenergized.


    (6) Lockout/tagout application. The established procedures for the 
application of energy control (the lockout or tagout procedures) shall 
include the following elements and actions, and these procedures shall 
be performed in the following sequence:
    (i) Before an authorized or affected employee turns off a machine 
or equipment, the authorized employee shall have knowledge of the type 
and magnitude of the energy, the hazards of the energy to be 
controlled, and the method or means to control the energy.
    (ii) The machine or equipment shall be turned off or shut down 
using the procedures established for the machine or equipment. An 
orderly shutdown shall be used to avoid any additional or increased 
hazards to employees as a result of the equipment stoppage.
    (iii) All energy isolating devices that are needed to control the 
energy to the machine or equipment shall be physically located and 
operated in such a manner as to isolate the machine or equipment from 
energy sources.
    (iv) Lockout or tagout devices shall be affixed to each energy 
isolating device by authorized employees.
    (A) Lockout devices shall be attached in a manner that will hold 
the energy isolating devices in a ``safe'' or ``off'' position.
    (B) Tagout devices shall be affixed in such a manner as will 
clearly indicate that the operation or movement of energy isolating 
devices from the ``safe'' or ``off'' position is prohibited.
    (1) Where tagout devices are used with energy isolating devices 
designed with the capability of being locked out, the tag attachment 
shall be fastened at the same point at which the lock would have been 
attached.
    (2) Where a tag cannot be affixed directly to the energy isolating 
device, the tag shall be located as close as safely possible to the 
device, in a position that will be immediately obvious to anyone 
attempting to operate the device.
    (v) Following the application of lockout or tagout devices to 
energy isolating devices, all potentially hazardous stored or residual 
energy shall be relieved, disconnected, restrained, or otherwise 
rendered safe.
    (vi) If there is a possibility of reaccumulation of stored energy 
to a hazardous level, verification of isolation shall be continued 
until the servicing or maintenance is completed or until the 
possibility of such accumulation no longer exists.
    (vii) Before starting work on machines or equipment that have been 
locked out or tagged out, the authorized employee shall verify that 
isolation and deenergizing of the machine or equipment have been 
accomplished. If normally energized parts will be exposed to contact by 
an employee while the machine or equipment is deenergized, a test shall 
be performed to ensure that these parts are deenergized.
    (7) Release from lockout/tagout. Before lockout or tagout devices 
are removed and energy is restored to the machine or equipment, 
procedures shall be followed and actions taken by the authorized 
employees to ensure the following:
    (i) The work area shall be inspected to ensure that nonessential 
items have been removed and that machine or equipment components are 
operationally intact.
    (ii) The work area shall be checked to ensure that all employees 
have been safely positioned or removed.
    (iii) After lockout or tagout devices have been removed and before 
a machine or equipment is started, affected employees shall be notified 
that the lockout or tagout devices have been removed.
    (iv) Each lockout or tagout device shall be removed from each 
energy isolating device by the authorized employee who applied the 
lockout or tagout device. However, if that employee is not available to 
remove it, the device may be removed under the direction of the 
employer, provided that specific procedures and training for such 
removal have been developed, documented, and incorporated into the 
employer's energy control program. The employer shall demonstrate that 
the specific procedure provides a degree of safety equivalent to that 
provided by the removal of the device by the authorized employee who 
applied it. The specific procedure shall include at least the following 
elements:
    (A) Verification by the employer that the authorized employee who 
applied the device is not at the facility;
    (B) Making all reasonable efforts to contact the authorized 
employee to inform him or her that his or her lockout or tagout device 
has been removed; and
    (C) Ensuring that the authorized employee has this knowledge before 
he or she resumes work at that facility.
    (8) Additional requirements. (i) If the lockout or tagout devices 
must be temporarily removed from energy isolating devices and the 
machine or equipment must be energized to test or position the machine, 
equipment, or component thereof, the following sequence of actions 
shall be followed:
    (A) Clear the machine or equipment of tools and materials in 
accordance with paragraph (d)(7)(i) of this section;
    (B) Remove employees from the machine or equipment area in 
accordance with paragraphs (d)(7)(ii) and (d)(7)(iii) of this section;
    (C) Remove the lockout or tagout devices as specified in paragraph 
(d)(7)(iv) of this section;
    (D) Energize and proceed with the testing or positioning; and
    (E) Deenergize all systems and reapply energy control measures in 
accordance with paragraph (d)(6) of this section to continue the 
servicing or maintenance.
    (ii) When servicing or maintenance is performed by a crew, craft, 
department, or other group, they shall use a procedure which affords 
the employees a level of protection equivalent to that provided by the 
implementation of a personal lockout or tagout device. Group lockout or 
tagout devices shall be used in accordance with the procedures required 
by paragraphs (d)(2)(iii) and(d)(2)(iv) of this section including, but 
not limited to, the following specific requirements:
    (A) Primary responsibility shall be vested in an authorized 
employee for a set number of employees working under the protection of 
a group lockout or tagout device (such as an operations lock);
    (B) Provision shall be made for the authorized employee to 
ascertain the exposure status of all individual group members with 
regard to the lockout or tagout of the machine or equipment;
    (C) When more than one crew, craft, department, or other group is 
involved, assignment of overall job-associated lockout or tagout 
control responsibility shall be given to an authorized employee 
designated to coordinate affected work forces and ensure continuity of 
protection; and
    (D) Each authorized employee shall affix a personal lockout or 
tagout device to the group lockout device, group lockbox, or comparable 
mechanism when he or she begins work and shall remove those devices 
when he or she stops working on the machine or equipment being serviced 
or maintained.
    (iii) Procedures shall be used during shift or personnel changes to 
ensure the continuity of lockout or tagout protection, including 
provision for the orderly transfer of lockout or tagout device 
protection between off-going and on-coming employees, to minimize their 
exposure to hazards from the unexpected energizing or start-up of the 
machine or equipment or from the release of stored energy.
    (iv) Whenever outside servicing personnel are to be engaged in 
activities covered by paragraph (d) of this section, the on-site 
employer and the outside employer shall inform each other of their 
respective lockout or tagout procedures, and each employer shall ensure 
that his or her personnel understand and comply with restrictions and 
prohibitions of the energy control procedures being used.
    (v) If energy isolating devices are installed in a central location 
under the exclusive control of a system operator, the following 
requirements apply:
    (A) The employer shall use a procedure that affords employees a 
level of protection equivalent to that provided by the implementation 
of a personal lockout or tagout device.
    (B) The system operator shall place and remove lockout and tagout 
devices in place of the authorized employee under paragraphs (d)(4), 
(d)(6)(iv) and (d)(7)(iv) of this section.
    (C) Provisions shall be made to identify the authorized employee 
who is responsible for (that is, being protected by) the lockout or 
tagout device, to transfer responsibility for lockout and tagout 
devices, and to ensure that an authorized employee requesting removal 
or transfer of a lockout or tagout device is the one responsible for it 
before the device is removed or transferred.
    (e) Enclosed spaces. This paragraph covers enclosed spaces that may 
be entered by employees. It does not apply to vented vaults if a 
determination is made that the ventilation system is operating to 
protect employees before they enter the space. This paragraph applies 
to routine entry into enclosed spaces in lieu of the permit-space entry 
requirements contained in paragraphs (d) through (k) of Sec. 1910.146 
of this Part. If, after the precautions given in paragraphs (e) and (t) 
of this section are taken, the hazards remaining in the enclosed space 
endanger the life of an entrant or could interfere with escape from the 
space, then entry into the enclosed space shall meet the permit-space 
entry requirements of paragraphs (d) through (k) of Sec. 1910.146 of 
this Part.

    Note: Entries into enclosed spaces conducted in accordance with 
the permit-space entry requirements of paragraphs (d) through (k) of 
Sec. 1910.146 of this Part are considered as complying with 
paragraph (e) of this section.

    (1) Safe work practices. The employer shall ensure the use of safe 
work practices for entry into and work in enclosed spaces and for 
rescue of employees from such spaces.
    (2) Training. Employees who enter enclosed spaces or who serve as 
attendants shall be trained in the hazards of enclosed space entry, in 
enclosed space entry procedures, and in enclosed space rescue 
procedures.
    (3) Rescue equipment. Employers shall provide equipment to ensure 
the prompt and safe rescue of employees from the enclosed space.
    (4) Evaluation of potential hazards. Before any entrance cover to 
an enclosed space is removed, the employer shall determine whether it 
is safe to do so by checking for the presence of any atmospheric 
pressure or temperature differences and by evaluating whether there 
might be a hazardous atmosphere in the space. Any conditions making it 
unsafe to remove the cover shall be eliminated before the cover is 
removed.

    Note: The evaluation called for in this paragraph may take the 
form of a check of the conditions expected to be in the enclosed 
space. For example, the cover could be checked to see if it is hot 
and, if it is fastened in place, could be loosened gradually to 
release any residual pressure. A determination must also be made of 
whether conditions at the site could cause a hazardous atmosphere, 
such as an oxygen deficient or flammable atmosphere, to develop 
within the space.

    (5) Removal of covers. When covers are removed from enclosed 
spaces, the opening shall be promptly guarded by a railing, temporary 
cover, or other barrier intended to prevent an accidental fall through 
the opening and to protect employees working in the space from objects 
entering the space.
    (6) Hazardous atmosphere. Employees may not enter any enclosed 
space while it contains a hazardous atmosphere, unless the entry 
conforms to the generic permit-required confined spaces standard in 
Sec. 1910.146 of this Part.

    Note: The term ``entry'' is defined in Sec. 1910.146(b) of this 
Part.

    (7) Attendants. While work is being performed in the enclosed 
space, a person with first aid training meeting paragraph (b) of this 
section shall be immediately available outside the enclosed space to 
render emergency assistance if there is reason to believe that a hazard 
may exist in the space or if a hazard exists because of traffic 
patterns in the area of the opening used for entry. That person is not 
precluded from performing other duties outside the enclosed space if 
these duties do not distract the attendant from monitoring employees 
within the space.

    Note: See paragraph of this section for additional requirements 
on attendants for work in manholes.

    (8) Calibration of test instruments. Test instruments used to 
monitor atmospheres in enclosed spaces shall be kept in calibration, 
with a minimum accuracy of 10 percent.
    (9) Testing for oxygen deficiency. Before an employee enters an 
enclosed space, the internal atmosphere shall be tested for oxygen 
deficiency with a direct-reading meter or similar instrument, capable 
of collection and immediate analysis of data samples without the need 
for off-site evaluation. If continuous forced air ventilation is 
provided, testing is not required provided that the procedures used 
ensure that employees are not exposed to the hazards posed by oxygen 
deficiency.
    (10) Testing for flammable gases and vapors. Before an employee 
enters an enclosed space, the internal atmosphere shall be tested for 
flammable gases and vapors with a direct-reading meter or similar 
instrument capable of collection and immediate analysis of data samples 
without the need for off-site evaluation. This test shall be performed 
after the oxygen testing and ventilation required by paragraph (e)(9) 
of this section demonstrate that there is sufficient oxygen to ensure 
the accuracy of the test for flammability.
    (11) Ventilation and monitoring. If flammable gases or vapors are 
detected or if an oxygen deficiency is found, forced air ventilation 
shall be used to maintain oxygen at a safe level and to prevent a 
hazardous concentration of flammable gases and vapors from 
accumulating. A continuous monitoring program to ensure that no 
increase in flammable gas or vapor concentration occurs may be followed 
in lieu of ventilation, if flammable gases or vapors are detected at 
safe levels.

    Note: See the definition of hazardous atmosphere for guidance in 
determining whether or not a given concentration of a substances is 
considered to be hazardous.

    (12) Specific ventilation requirements. If continuous forced air 
ventilation is used, it shall begin before entry is made and shall be 
maintained long enough to ensure that a safe atmosphere exists before 
employees are allowed to enter the work area. The forced air 
ventilation shall be so directed as to ventilate the immediate area 
where employees are present within the enclosed space and shall 
continue until all employees leave the enclosed space.
    (13) Air supply. The air supply for the continuous forced air 
ventilation shall be from a clean source and may not increase the 
hazards in the enclosed space.
    (14) Open flames. If open flames are used in enclosed spaces, a 
test for flammable gases and vapors shall be made immediately before 
the open flame device is used and at least once per hour while the 
device is used in the space. Testing shall be conducted more frequently 
if conditions present in the enclosed space indicate that once per hour 
is insufficient to detect hazardous accumulations of flammable gases or 
vapors.

    Note: See the definition of hazardous atmosphere for guidance in 
determining whether or not a given concentration of a substances is 
considered to be hazardous.

    (f) Excavations. Excavation operations shall comply with Subpart P 
of Part 1926 of this chapter.
    (g) Personal protective equipment. (1) General. Personal protective 
equipment shall meet the requirements of Subpart I of this Part.
    (2) Fall protection. (i) Personal fall arrest equipment shall meet 
the requirements of Subpart E of Part 1926 of this Chapter.
    (ii) Body belts and safety straps for work positioning shall meet 
the requirements of Sec. 1926.959 of this Chapter.
    (iii) Body belts, safety straps, lanyards, lifelines, and body 
harnesses shall be inspected before use each day to determine that the 
equipment is in safe working condition. Defective equipment may not be 
used.
    (iv) Lifelines shall be protected against being cut or abraded.
    (v) Fall arrest equipment, work positioning equipment, or travel 
restricting equipment shall be used by employees working at elevated 
locations more than 4 feet (1.2 m) above the ground on poles, towers, 
or similar structures if other fall protection has not been provided. 
The use of fall protection equipment is not required to be used by a 
qualified employee climbing or changing location on poles, towers, or 
similar structures, unless conditions, such as, but not limited to, 
ice, high winds, the design of the structure (for example, no provision 
for holding on with hands), or the presence of contaminants on the 
structure, could cause the employee to lose his or her grip or footing.

    Note 1: This paragraph applies to structures that support 
overhead electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
lines and equipment. It does not apply to portions of buildings, 
such as loading docks, to electric equipment, such as transformers 
and capacitors, nor to aerial lifts. Requirements for fall 
protection associated with walking and working surfaces are 
contained in Subpart D of this Part; requirements for fall 
protection associated with aerial lifts are contained in 
Sec. 1910.67 of this Part.
    Note 2: Employees undergoing training are not considered 
``qualified employees'' for the purposes of this provision. 
Unqualified employees (including trainees) are required to use fall 
protection any time they are more than 4 feet (1.2 m) above the 
ground.

    (vi) The following requirements apply to personal fall arrest 
systems:
    (A) When stopping or arresting a fall, personal fall arrest systems 
shall limit the maximum arresting force on an employee to 900 pounds (4 
kN) if used with a body belt.
    (B) When stopping or arresting a fall, personal fall arrest systems 
shall limit the maximum arresting force on an employee to 1800 pounds 
(8 kN) if used with a body harness.
    (C) Personal fall arrest systems shall be rigged such that an 
employee can neither free fall more than 6 feet (1.8 m) nor contact any 
lower level.
    (vii) If vertical lifelines or droplines are used, not more than 
one employee may be attached to any one lifeline.
    (viii) Snaphooks may not be connected to loops made in webbing-type 
lanyards.
    (ix) Snaphooks may not be connected to each other.
    (h) Ladders, platforms, step bolts, and manhole steps. (1) General. 
Requirements for ladders contained in Subpart D of this Part apply, 
except as specifically noted in paragraph (h)(2) of this section.
    (2) Special ladders and platforms. Portable ladders and platforms 
used on structures or conductors in conjunction with overhead line work 
need not meet paragraphs (d)(2)(i) and (d)(2)(iii) of Sec. 1910.25 of 
this Part or paragraph (c)(3)(iii) of Sec. 1910.26 of this Part. 
However, these ladders and platforms shall meet the following 
requirements:
    (i) Ladders and platforms shall be secured to prevent their 
becoming accidentally dislodged.
    (ii) Ladders and platforms may not be loaded in excess of the 
working loads for which they are designed.
    (iii) Ladders and platforms may be used only in applications for 
which they were designed.
    (iv) In the configurations in which they are used, ladders and 
platforms shall be capable of supporting without failure at least 2.5 
times the maximum intended load.
    (3) Conductive ladders. Portable metal ladders and other portable 
conductive ladders may not be used near exposed energized lines or 
equipment. However, in specialized high-voltage work, conductive 
ladders shall be used where the employer can demonstrate that 
nonconductive ladders would present a greater hazard than conductive 
ladders.
    (i) Hand and portable power tools. (1) General. Paragraph (i)(2) of 
this section applies to electric equipment connected by cord and plug. 
Paragraph (i)(3) of this section applies to portable and vehicle-
mounted generators used to supply cord-and plug-connected equipment. 
Paragraph (i)(4) of this section applies to hydraulic and pneumatic 
tools.
    (2) Cord- and plug-connected equipment. (1) Cord-and plug-connected 
equipment supplied by premises wiring is covered by Subpart S of this 
Part.
    (ii) Any cord- and plug-connected equipment supplied by other than 
premises wiring shall comply with one of the following in lieu of 
Sec. 1910.243(a)(5) of this Part:
    (A) It shall be equipped with a cord containing an equipment 
grounding conductor connected to the tool frame and to a means for 
grounding the other end (however, this option may not be used where the 
introduction of the ground into the work environment increases the 
hazard to an employee); or
    (B) It shall be of the double-insulated type conforming to Subpart 
S of this Part; or
    (C) It shall be connected to the power supply through an isolating 
transformer with an ungrounded secondary.
    (3) Portable and vehicle-mounted generators. Portable and vehicle-
mounted generators used to supply cord- and plug-connected equipment 
shall meet the following requirements:
    (i) The generator may only supply equipment located on the 
generator or the vehicle and cord- and plug-connected equipment through 
receptacles mounted on the generator or the vehicle.
    (ii) The non-current-carrying metal parts of equipment and the 
equipment grounding conductor terminals of the receptacles shall be 
bonded to the generator frame.
    (iii) In the case of vehicle-mounted generators, the frame of the 
generator shall be bonded to the vehicle frame.
    (iv) Any neutral conductor shall be bonded to the generator frame.
    (4) Hydraulic and pneumatic tools. (i) Safe operating pressures for 
hydraulic and pneumatic tools, hoses, valves, pipes, filters, and 
fittings may not be exceeded.

    Note: If any hazardous defects are present, no operating 
pressure would be safe, and the hydraulic or pneumatic equipment 
involved may not be used. In the absence of defects, the maximum 
rated operating pressure is the maximum safe pressure.

    (ii) A hydraulic or pneumatic tool used where it may contact 
exposed live parts shall be designed and maintained for such use.
    (iii) The hydraulic system supplying a hydraulic tool used where it 
may contact exposed live parts shall provide protection against loss of 
insulating value for the voltage involved due to the formation of a 
partial vacuum in the hydraulic line.

    Note: Hydraulic lines without check valves having a separation 
of more than 35 feet (10.7 m) between the oil reservoir and the 
upper end of the hydraulic system promote the formation of a partial 
vacuum.

    (iv) A pneumatic tool used on energized electrical lines or 
equipment or used where it may contact exposed live parts shall provide 
protection against the accumulation of moisture in the air supply.
    (v) Pressure shall be released before connections are broken, 
unless quick acting, self-closing connectors are used. Hoses may not be 
kinked.
    (vi) Employees may not use any part of their bodies to locate or 
attempt to stop a hydraulic leak.
    (j) Live-line tools. (1) Design of tools. Live-line tool rods, 
tubes, and poles shall be designed and constructed to withstand the 
following minimum tests:
    (i) 100,000 volts per foot (3281 volts per centimeter) of length 
for 5 minutes if the tool is made of fiberglass-reinforced plastic 
(FRP), or
    (ii) 75,000 volts per foot (2461 volts per centimeter) of length 
for 3 minutes if the tool is made of wood, or
    (iii) Other tests that the employer can demonstrate are equivalent.

    Note: Live-line tools using rod and tube that meet ASTM F711-89, 
Standard Specification for Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Rod 
and Tube Used in Live-Line Tools, conform to paragraph (j)(1)(i) of 
this section.

    (2) Condition of tools. (i) Each live-line tool shall be wiped 
clean and visually inspected for defects before use each day.
    (ii) If any defect or contamination that could adversely affect the 
insulating qualities or mechanical integrity of the live-line tool is 
present after wiping, the tool shall be removed from service and 
examined and tested according to paragraph (j)(2)(iii) of this section 
before being returned to service.
    (iii) Live-line tools used for primary employee protection shall be 
removed from service every 2 years and whenever required under 
paragraph (j)(2)(ii) of this section for examination, cleaning, repair, 
and testing as follows:
    (A) Each tool shall be thoroughly examined for defects.
    (B) If a defect or contamination that could adversely affect the 
insulating qualities or mechanical integrity of the live-line tool is 
found, the tool shall be repaired and refinished or shall be 
permanently removed from service. If no such defect or contamination is 
found, the tool shall be cleaned and waxed.
    (C) The tool shall be tested in accordance with paragraphs 
(j)(2)(iii)(D) and (j)(2)(iii)(E) of this section under the following 
conditions:
    (1) After the tool has been repaired or refinished; and
    (2) After the examination if repair or refinishing is not 
performed, unless the tool is made of FRP rod or foam-filled FRP tube 
and the employer can demonstrate that the tool has no defects that 
could cause it to fail in use.
    (D) The test method used shall be designed to verify the tool's 
integrity along its entire working length and, if the tool is made of 
fiberglass-reinforced plastic, its integrity under wet conditions.
    (E) The voltage applied during the tests shall be as follows:
    (1) 75,000 volts per foot (2461 volts per centimeter) of length for 
1 minute if the tool is made of fiberglass, or
    (2) 50,000 volts per foot (1640 volts per centimeter) of length for 
1 minute if the tool is made of wood, or
    (3) Other tests that the employer can demonstrate are equivalent.

    Note: Guidelines for the examination, cleaning, repairing, and 
in-service testing of live-line tools are contained in the Institute 
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Guide for In-Service 
Maintenance and Electrical Testing of Live-Line Tools, IEEE Std. 
978-1984.

    (k) Materials handling and storage. (1) General. Material handling 
and storage shall conform to the requirements of Subpart N of this 
Part.
    (2) Materials storage near energized lines or equipment. (i) In 
areas not restricted to qualified persons only, materials or equipment 
may not be stored closer to energized lines or exposed energized parts 
of equipment than the following distances plus an amount providing for 
the maximum sag and side swing of all conductors and providing for the 
height and movement of material handling equipment:
    (A) For lines and equipment energized at 50 kV or less, the 
distance is 10 feet (305 cm).
    (B) For lines and equipment energized at more than 50 kV, the 
distance is 10 feet (305 cm) plus 4 inches (10 cm) for every 10 kV over 
50 kV.
    (ii) In areas restricted to qualified employees, material may not 
be stored within the working space about energized lines or equipment.

    Note: Requirements for the size of the working space are 
contained in paragraphs (u)(1) and (v)(3) of this section.

    (1) Working on or near exposed energized parts. This paragraph 
applies to work on exposed live parts, or near enough to them, to 
expose the employee to any hazard they present.
    (1) General. Only qualified employees may work on or with exposed 
energized lines or parts of equipment. Only qualified employees may 
work in areas containing unguarded, uninsulated energized lines or 
parts of equipment operating at 50 volts or more. Electric lines and 
equipment shall be considered and treated as energized unless the 
provisions of paragraph (d) or paragraph (m) of this section have been 
followed.
    (i) Except as provided in paragraph (l)(1)(ii) of this section, at 
least two employees shall be present while the following types of work 
are being performed:
    (A) Installation, removal, or repair of lines that are energized at 
more than 600 volts,
    (B) Installation, removal, or repair of deenergized lines if an 
employee is exposed to contact with other parts energized at more than 
600 volts,
    (C) Installation, removal, or repair of equipment, such as 
transformers, capacitors, and regulators, if an employee is exposed to 
contact with parts energized at more than 600 volts,
    (D) Work involving the use of mechanical equipment, other than 
insulated aerial lifts, near parts energized at more than 600 volts, 
and
    (E) Other work that exposes an employee to electrical hazards 
greater than or equal to those posed by operations that are 
specifically listed in paragraphs (l)(1)(i)(A) through (l)(1)(i)(D) of 
this section.
    (ii) Paragraph (l)(1)(i) of this section does not apply to the 
following operations:
    (A) Routine switching of circuits, if the employer can demonstrate 
that conditions at the site allow this work to be performed safely,
    (B) Work performed with live-line tools if the employee is 
positioned so that he or she is neither within reach of nor otherwise 
exposed to contact with energized parts, and
    (C) Emergency repairs to the extent necessary to safeguard the 
general public.
    (2) Minimum approach distances. The employer shall ensure that no 
employee approaches or takes any conductive object closer to exposed 
energized parts than set forth in Table R-6 through Table R-10, unless:
    (i) The employee is insulated from the energized part (insulating 
gloves or insulating gloves and sleeves worn in accordance with 
paragraph (l)(3) of this section are considered insulation of the 
employee only with regard to the energized part upon which work is 
being performed), or
    (ii) The energized part is insulated from the employee and from any 
other conductive object at a different potential, or
    (iii) The employee is insulated from any other exposed conductive 
object, as during live-line bare-hand work.

    Note: Paragraphs (v)(5)(i) and of this section contain 
requirements for the guarding and isolation of live parts. Parts of 
electric circuits that meet these two provisions are not considered 
as ``exposed'' unless a guard is removed or an employee enters the 
space intended to provide isolation from the live parts.

    (3) Type of insulation. If the employee is to be insulated from 
energized parts by the use of insulating gloves (under paragraph 
(l)(2)(i) of this section), insulating sleeves shall also be used. 
However, insulating sleeves need not be used under the following 
conditions:
    (i) If exposed energized parts on which work is not being performed 
are insulated from the employee and
    (ii) If such insulation is placed from a position not exposing the 
employee's upper arm to contact with other energized parts.
    (4) Working position. The employer shall ensure that each employee, 
to the extent that other safety-related conditions at the worksite 
permit, works in a position from which a slip or shock will not bring 
the employee's body into contact with exposed, uninsulated parts 
energized at a potential different from the employee.
    (5) Making connections. The employer shall ensure that connections 
are made as follows:
    (i) In connecting deenergized equipment or lines to an energized 
circuit by means of a conducting wire or device, an employee shall 
first attach the wire to the deenergized part;
    (ii) When disconnecting equipment or lines from an energized 
circuit by means of a conducting wire or device, an employee shall 
remove the source end first; and
    (iii) When lines or equipment are connected to or disconnected from 
energized circuits, loose conductors shall be kept away from exposed 
energized parts.
    (6) Apparel. (i) When work is performed within reaching distance of 
exposed energized parts of equipment, the employer shall ensure that 
each employee removes or renders nonconductive all exposed conductive 
articles, such as key or watch chains, rings, or wrist watches or 
bands, unless such articles do not increase the hazards associated with 
contact with the energized parts.
    (ii) The employer shall train each employee who is exposed to the 
hazards of flames or electric arcs in the hazards involved.
    (iii) The employer shall ensure that each employee who is exposed 
to the hazards of flames or electric arcs does not wear clothing that, 
when exposed to flames or electric arcs, could increase the extent of 
injury that would be sustained by the employee.

    Note: Clothing made from the following types of fabrics, either 
alone or in blends, is prohibited by this paragraph, unless the 
employer can demonstrate that the fabric has been treated to 
withstand the conditions that may be encountered or that the 
clothing is worn in such a manner as to eliminate the hazard 
involved: acetate, nylon, polyester, rayon.

    (7) Fuse handling. When fuses must be installed or removed with one 
or both terminals energized at more than 300 volts or with exposed 
parts energized at more than 50 volts, the employer shall ensure that 
tools or gloves rated for the voltage are used. When expulsion-type 
fuses are installed with one or both terminals energized at more than 
300 volts, the employer shall ensure that each employee wears eye 
protection meeting the requirements of Subpart I of this Part, uses a 
tool rated for the voltage, and is clear of the exhaust path of the 
fuse barrel.
    (8) Covered (noninsulated) conductors. The requirements of this 
section which pertain to the hazards of exposed live parts also apply 
when work is performed in the proximity of covered (noninsulated) 
wires.
    (9) Noncurrent-carrying metal parts. Noncurrent-carrying metal 
parts of equipment or devices, such as transformer cases and circuit 
breaker housings, shall be treated as energized at the highest voltage 
to which they are exposed, unless the employer inspects the 
installation and determines that these parts are grounded before work 
is performed.
    (10) Opening circuits under load. Devices used to open circuits 
under load conditions shall be designed to interrupt the current 
involved.

         Table R-6.--AC Live-Line Work Minimum Approach Distance        
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Distance           
                                         -------------------------------
                                             Phase to     Phase to phase
  Nominal voltage in kilovolts phase to       ground         exposure   
                 phase                       exposure    ---------------
                                         ----------------               
                                           (ft-            (ft-     (m) 
                                           in)     (m)     in)          
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.05 to 1.0.............................   (\4\)   (\4\)   (\4\)   (\4\)
1.1 to 15.0.............................     2-1    0.64     2-2    0.66
15.1 to 36.0............................     2-4    0.72     2-7    0.77
36.1 to 46.0............................     2-7    0.77    2-10    0.85
46.1 to 72.5............................     3-0    0.90     3-6    1.05
72.6 to 121.............................     3-2    0.95     4-3    1.29
138 to 145..............................     3-7    1.09    4-11    1.50
161 to 169..............................     4-0    1.22     5-8    1.71
230 to 242..............................     5-3    1.59     7-6    2.27
345 to 362..............................     8-6    2.59    12-6    3.80
500 to 550..............................    11-3    3.42    18-1    5.50
765 to 800..............................   14-11    4.53    26-0    7.91
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: These distances take into consideration the highest switching   
  surge an employee will be exposed to on any system with air as the    
  insulating medium and the maximum voltages shown.                     
Note 2: The clear live-line tool distance shall equal or exceed the     
  values for the indicated voltage ranges.                              
Note 3: See Appendix B of this part for information on how the minimum  
  approach distances listed in the tables were derived.                 
\4\Avoid contact.                                                       


    Table R-7.--AC Live-Line Work Minimum Approach Distance With Overvoltage Factor Phase-to-Ground Exposure    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Maximum                                          Distance in feet-inches                                     
 anticipated  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   per-unit                               Maximum phase-to-phase voltage in kilovolts                           
  transient   --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 overvoltage        121            145           169           242           362           552           800    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5..........  .............  ............  ............  ............  ............           6-0           9-8
1.6..........  .............  ............  ............  ............  ............           6-6          10-8
1.7..........  .............  ............  ............  ............  ............           7-0          11-8
1.8..........  .............  ............  ............  ............  ............           7-7          12-8
1.9..........  .............  ............  ............  ............  ............           8-1          13-9
2.0..........           2-5            2-9           3-0          3-10           5-3           8-9         14-11
2.1..........           2-6           2-10           3-2           4-0           5-5           9-4  ............
2.2..........           2-7           2-11           3-3           4-1           5-9          9-11  ............
2.3..........           2-8            3-0           3-4           4-3           6-1          10-6  ............
2.4..........           2-9            3-1           3-5           4-5           6-4          11-3  ............
2.5..........           2-9            3-2           3-6           4-6           6-8  ............  ............
2.6..........          2-10            3-3           3-8           4-8           7-1  ............  ............
2.7..........          2-11            3-4           3-9          4-10           7-5  ............  ............
2.8..........           3-0            3-5          3-10          4-11           7-9  ............  ............
2.9..........           3-1            3-6          3-11           5-1           8-2  ............  ............
3.0..........           3-2            3-7           4-0           5-3           8-6  ............  ............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: The distance specified in this table may be applied only where the maximum anticipated per-unit         
  transient overvoltage has been determined by engineering analysis and has been supplied by the employer. Table
  R-6 applies otherwise.                                                                                        
Note 2: The distances specified in this table are the air, bare-hand, and live-line tool distances.             
Note 3: See Appendix B of this part for information on how the minimum approach distances listed in the tables  
  were derived and on how to calculate revised minimum approach distances based on the control of transient     
  overvoltages.                                                                                                 


     Table R-8.--AC Live-Line Work Minimum Approach Distance With Overvoltage Factor Phase-to-Phase Exposure    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Maximum                                          Distance in feet-inches                                     
 anticipated  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   per-unit                               Maximum phase-to-phase voltage in kilovolts                           
  transient   --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 overvoltage        121           145           169           242           362           552           800     
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5..........  .............  ............  ............  ............  ............           7-4          12-1
1.6..........  .............  ............  ............  ............  ............           8-9          14-6
1.7..........  .............  ............  ............  ............  ............          10-2          17-2
1.8..........  .............  ............  ............  ............  ............          11-7         19-11
1.9..........  .............  ............  ............  ............  ............          13-2         22-11
2.0..........           3-7            4-1           4-8           6-1           8-7         14-10          26-0
2.1..........           3-7            4-2           4-9           6-3          8-10          15-7  ............
2.2..........           3-8            4-3          4-10           6-4           9-2          16-4  ............
2.3..........           3-9            4-4          4-11           6-6           9-6          17-2  ............
2.4..........          3-10            4-5           5-0           6-7          9-11          18-1  ............
2.5..........          3-11            4-6           5-2           6-9          10-4  ............  ............
2.6..........           4-0            4-7           5-3          6-11          10-9  ............  ............
2.7..........           4-1            4-8           5-4           7-0          11-2  ............  ............
2.8..........           4-1            4-9           5-5           7-2          11-7  ............  ............
2.9..........           4-2           4-10           5-6           7-4          12-1  ............  ............
3.0..........           4-3           4-11           5-8           7-6          12-6  ............  ............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: The distance specified in this table may be applied only where the maximum anticipated per-unit         
  transient overvoltage has been determined by engineering analysis and has been supplied by the employer. Table
  R-6 applies otherwise.                                                                                        
Note 2: The distances specified in this table are the air, bare-hand, and live-line tool distances.             
Note 3: See Appendix B of this part for information on how the minimum approach distances listed in the tables  
  were derived and on how to calculate revised minimum approach distances based on the control of transient     
  overvoltages.                                                                                                 


                 Table R-9.--DC Live-Line Work Minimum Approach Distance With Overvoltage Factor                
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Distance in feet-inches                       
                                           ---------------------------------------------------------------------
  Maximum anticipated per-unit transient                Maximum line-to-ground voltage in kilovolts             
               overvoltage                 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                250           400           500           600            750    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5 or lower..............................           3-8           5-3           6-9           8-7         11-10
1.6.......................................          3-10           5-7           7-4           9-5          13-1
1.7.......................................           4-1           6-0          7-11          10-3          14-4
1.8.......................................           4-3           6-5           8-7          11-2          15-9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: The distances specified in this table may be applied only where the maximum anticipated per-unit        
  transient overvoltage has been determined by engineering analysis and has been supplied by the employer.      
  However, if the transient overvoltage factor is not known, a factor of 1.8 shall be assumed.                  
Note 2: The distances specified in this table are the air, bare-hand, and live-line tool distances.             


                 Table R-10.--Altitude Correction Factor                
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Altitude                                            
-------------------------------------------------    Correction factor  
           ft                       m                                   
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3000...................               900                    1.00       
4000...................              1200                    1.02       
5000...................              1500                    1.05       
6000...................              1800                    1.08       
7000...................              2100                    1.11       
8000...................              2400                    1.14       
9000...................              2700                    1.17       
10000..................              3000                    1.20       
12000..................              3600                    1.25       
14000..................              4200                    1.30       
16000..................              4800                    1.35       
18000..................              5400                    1.39       
20000..................              6000                    1.44       
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: If the work is performed at elevations greater than 3000 ft (900  
  m) above mean sea level, the minimum approach distance shall be       
  determined by multiplying the distances in Table R-6 through Table R-9
  by the correction factor corresponding to the altitude at which work  
  is performed.                                                         

    (m) Deenergizing lines and equipment for employee protection. (1) 
Application. Paragraph (m) of this section applies to the deenergizing 
of transmission and distribution lines and equipment for the purpose of 
protecting employees. Control of hazardous energy sources used in the 
generation of electric energy is covered in paragraph (d) of this 
section. Conductors and parts of electric equipment that have been 
deenergized under procedures other than those required by paragraphs 
(d) or (m) of this section, as applicable, shall be treated as 
energized.
    (2) General. (i) If a system operator is in charge of the lines or 
equipment and their means of disconnection, all of the requirements of 
paragraph (m)(3) of this section shall be observed, in the order given, 
before work is begun.
    (ii) If no system operator is in charge of the lines or equipment 
and their means of disconnection, one employee in the crew shall be 
designated as being in charge of the clearance. All of the requirements 
of paragraph (m)(3) of this section apply, in the order given, except 
as provided in paragraph (m)(2)(iii) of this section. The employee in 
charge of the clearance shall take the place of the system operator, as 
necessary.
    (iii) If only one crew will be working on the lines or equipment 
and if the means of disconnection is accessible and visible to and 
under the sole control of the employee in charge of the clearance, 
paragraphs (m)(3)(i), (m)(3)(iii), (m)(3)(iv), (m)(3)(viii) and 
(m)(3)(xii) of this section do not apply. Additionally, tags required 
by the remaining provisions of paragraph (m)(3) of this section need 
not be used.
    (iv) Any disconnecting means that are accessible to persons outside 
the employer's control (for example, the general public) shall be 
rendered inoperable while they are open for the purpose of protecting 
employees.
    (3) Deenergizing lines and equipment. (i) A designated employee 
shall make a request of the system operator to have the particular 
section of line or equipment deenergized. The designated employee 
becomes the employee in charge (as this term is used in paragraph 
(m)(3) of this section) and is responsible for the clearance.
    (ii) All switches, disconnectors, jumpers, taps, and other means 
through which known sources of electric energy may be supplied to the 
particular lines and equipment to be deenergized shall be opened. Such 
means shall be rendered inoperable, unless its design does not so 
permit, and tagged to indicate that employees are at work.
    (iii) Automatically and remotely controlled switches that could 
cause the opened disconnecting means to close shall also be tagged at 
the point of control. The automatic or remote control feature shall be 
rendered inoperable, unless its design does not so permit.
    (iv) Tags shall prohibit operation of the disconnecting means and 
shall indicate that employees are at work.
    (v) After the applicable requirements in paragraphs (m)(3)(i) 
through (m)(3)(iv) of this section have been followed and the employee 
in charge of the work has been given a clearance by the system 
operator, the lines and equipment to be worked shall be tested to 
ensure that they are deenergized.
    (vi) Protective grounds shall be installed as required by paragraph 
(n) of this section.
    (vii) After the applicable requirements of paragraphs (m)(3)(i) 
through (m)(3)(vi) of this section have been followed, the lines and 
equipment involved may be worked as deenergized.
    (viii) If two or more independent crews will be working on the same 
lines or equipment, each crew shall independently comply with the 
requirements in paragraph (m)(3) of this section.
    (ix) To transfer the clearance, the employee in charge (or, if the 
employee in charge is forced to leave the worksite due to illness or 
other emergency, the employee's supervisor) shall inform the system 
operator; employees in the crew shall be informed of the transfer; and 
the new employee in charge shall be responsible for the clearance.
    (x) To release a clearance, the employee in charge shall:
    (A) Notify employees under his or her direction that the clearance 
is to be released;
    (B) Determine that all employees in the crew are clear of the lines 
and equipment;
    (C) Determine that all protective grounds installed by the crew 
have been removed; and
    (D) Report this information to the system operator and release the 
clearance.
    (xi) The person releasing a clearance shall be the same person that 
requested the clearance, unless responsibility has been transferred 
under paragraph (m)(3)(ix) of this section.
    (xii) Tags may not be removed unless the associated clearance has 
been released under paragraph (m)(3)(x) of this section.
    (xiii) Only after all protective grounds have been removed, after 
all crews working on the lines or equipment have released their 
clearances, after all employees are clear of the lines and equipment, 
and after all protective tags have been removed from a given point of 
disconnection, may action be initiated to reenergize the lines or 
equipment at that point of disconnection.
    (n) Grounding for the protection of employees. (1) Application. 
Paragraph (n) of this section applies to the grounding of transmission 
and distribution lines and equipment for the purpose of protecting 
employees. Paragraph (n)(4) of this section also applies to the 
protective grounding of other equipment as required elsewhere in this 
section.
    (2) General. For the employee to work lines or equipment as 
deenergized, the lines or equipment shall be deenergized under the 
provisions of paragraph (m) of this section and shall be grounded as 
specified in paragraphs (n)(3) through (n)(9) of this section. However, 
if the employer can demonstrate that installation of a ground is 
impracticable or that the conditions resulting from the installation of 
a ground would present greater hazards than working without grounds, 
the lines and equipment may be treated as deenergized provided all of 
the following conditions are met:
    (i) The lines and equipment have been deenergized under the 
provisions of paragraph (m) of this section.
    (ii) There is no possibility of contact with another energized 
source.
    (iii) The hazard of induced voltage is not present.
    (3) Equipotential zone.  Temporary protective grounds shall be 
placed at such locations and arranged in such a manner as to prevent 
each employee from being exposed to hazardous differences in electrical 
potential.
    (4) Protective grounding equipment. (i) Protective grounding 
equipment shall be capable of conducting the maximum fault current that 
could flow at the point of grounding for the time necessary to clear 
the fault. This equipment shall have an ampacity greater than or equal 
to that of No. 2 AWG copper.

    Note: Guidelines for protective grounding equipment are 
contained in American Society for Testing and Materials Standard 
Specifications for Temporary Grounding Systems to be Used on De-
Energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment, ASTM F855-1990.

    (ii) Protective grounds shall have an impedance low enough to cause 
immediate operation of protective devices in case of accidental 
energizing of the lines or equipment.
    (5) Testing. Before any ground is installed, lines and equipment 
shall be tested and found absent of nominal voltage, unless a 
previously installed ground is present.
    (6) Order of connection. When a ground is to be attached to a line 
or to equipment, the ground-end connection shall be attached first, and 
then the other end shall be attached by means of a live-line tool.
    (7) Order of removal. When a ground is to be removed, the grounding 
device shall be removed from the line or equipment using a live-line 
tool before the ground-end connection is removed.
    (8) Additional precautions. When work is performed on a cable at a 
location remote from the cable terminal, the cable may not be grounded 
at the cable terminal if there is a possibility of hazardous transfer 
of potential should a fault occur.
    (9) Removal of grounds for test. Grounds may be removed temporarily 
during tests. During the test procedure, the employer shall ensure that 
each employee uses insulating equipment and is isolated from any 
hazards involved, and the employer shall institute any additional 
measures as may be necessary to protect each exposed employee in case 
the previously grounded lines and equipment become energized.
    (o) Testing and test facilities. (1) Application. Paragraph (o) of 
this section provides for safe work practices for high-voltage and 
high-power testing performed in laboratories, shops, and substations, 
and in the field and on electric transmission and distribution lines 
and equipment. It applies only to testing involving interim 
measurements utilizing high voltage, high power, or combinations of 
both, and not to testing involving continuous measurements as in 
routine metering, relaying, and normal line work.

    Note: Routine inspection and maintenance measurements made by 
qualified employees are considered to be routine line work and are 
not included in the scope of paragraph (o) of this section, as long 
as the hazards related to the use of intrinsic high-voltage or high-
power sources require only the normal precautions associated with 
routine operation and maintenance work required in the other 
paragraphs of this section. Two typical examples of such excluded 
test work procedures are ``phasing-out'' testing and testing for a 
``no-voltage'' condition.

    (2) General requirements. (i) The employer shall establish and 
enforce work practices for the protection of each worker from the 
hazards of high-voltage or high-power testing at all test areas, 
temporary and permanent. Such work practices shall include, as a 
minimum, test area guarding, grounding, and the safe use of measuring 
and control circuits. A means providing for periodic safety checks of 
field test areas shall also be included. (See paragraph (o)(6) of this 
section.)
    (ii) Employees shall be trained in safe work practices upon their 
initial assignment to the test area, with periodic reviews and updates 
provided as required by paragraph (a)(2) of this section.
    (3) Guarding of test areas. (i) Permanent test areas shall be 
guarded by walls, fences, or barriers designed to keep employees out of 
the test areas.
    (ii) In field testing, or at a temporary test site where permanent 
fences and gates are not provided, one of the following means shall be 
used to prevent unauthorized employees from entering:
    (A) The test area shall be guarded by the use of distinctively 
colored safety tape that is supported approximately waist high and to 
which safety signs are attached,
    (B) The test area shall be guarded by a barrier or barricade that 
limits access to the test area to a degree equivalent, physically and 
visually, to the barricade specified in paragraph (o)(3)(ii)(A) of this 
section, or
    (C) The test area shall be guarded by one or more test observers 
stationed so that the entire area can be monitored.
    (iii) The barriers required by paragraph (o)(3)(ii) of this section 
shall be removed when the protection they provide is no longer needed.
    (iv) Guarding shall be provided within test areas to control access 
to test equipment or to apparatus under test that may become energized 
as part of the testing by either direct or inductive coupling, in order 
to prevent accidental employee contact with energized parts.
    (4) Grounding practices. (i) The employer shall establish and 
implement safe grounding practices for the test facility.
    (A) All conductive parts accessible to the test operator during the 
time the equipment is operating at high voltage shall be maintained at 
ground potential except for portions of the equipment that are isolated 
from the test operator by guarding.
    (B) Wherever ungrounded terminals of test equipment or apparatus 
under test may be present, they shall be treated as energized until 
determined by tests to be deenergized.
    (ii) Visible grounds shall be applied, either automatically or 
manually with properly insulated tools, to the high-voltage circuits 
after they are deenergized and before work is performed on the circuit 
or item or apparatus under test. Common ground connections shall be 
solidly connected to the test equipment and the apparatus under test.
    (iii) In high-power testing, an isolated ground-return conductor 
system shall be provided so that no intentional passage of current, 
with its attendant voltage rise, can occur in the ground grid or in the 
earth. However, an isolated ground-return conductor need not be 
provided if the employer can demonstrate that both the following 
conditions are met:
    (A) An isolated ground-return conductor cannot be provided due to 
the distance of the test site from the electric energy source, and
    (B) Employees are protected from any hazardous step and touch 
potentials that may develop during the test.

    Note: See Appendix C of this part for information on measures 
that can be taken to protect employees from hazardous step and touch 
potentials.

    (iv) In tests in which grounding of test equipment by means of the 
equipment grounding conductor located in the equipment power cord 
cannot be used due to increased hazards to test personnel or the 
prevention of satisfactory measurements, a ground that the employer can 
demonstrate affords equivalent safety shall be provided, and the safety 
ground shall be clearly indicated in the test set-up.
    (v) When the test area is entered after equipment is deenergized, a 
ground shall be placed on the high-voltage terminal and any other 
exposed terminals.
    (A) High capacitance equipment or apparatus shall be discharged 
through a resistor rated for the available energy.
    (B) A direct ground shall be applied to the exposed terminals when 
the stored energy drops to a level at which it is safe to do so.
    (vi) If a test trailer or test vehicle is used in field testing, 
its chassis shall be grounded. Protection against hazardous touch 
potentials with respect to the vehicle, instrument panels, and other 
conductive parts accessible to employees shall be provided by bonding, 
insulation, or isolation.
    (5) Control and measuring circuits. (i) Control wiring, meter 
connections, test leads and cables may not be run from a test area 
unless they are contained in a grounded metallic sheath and terminated 
in a grounded metallic enclosure or unless other precautions are taken 
that the employer can demonstrate as ensuring equivalent safety.
    (ii) Meters and other instruments with accessible terminals or 
parts shall be isolated from test personnel to protect against hazards 
arising from such terminals and parts becoming energized during 
testing. If this isolation is provided by locating test equipment in 
metal compartments with viewing windows, interlocks shall be provided 
to interrupt the power supply if the compartment cover is opened.
    (iii) The routing and connections of temporary wiring shall be made 
secure against damage, accidental interruptions and other hazards. To 
the maximum extent possible, signal, control, ground, and power cables 
shall be kept separate.
    (iv) If employees will be present in the test area during testing, 
a test observer shall be present. The test observer shall be capable of 
implementing the immediate deenergizing of test circuits for safety 
purposes.
    (6) Safety check. (i) Safety practices governing employee work at 
temporary or field test areas shall provide for a routine check of such 
test areas for safety at the beginning of each series of tests.
    (ii) The test operator in charge shall conduct these routine safety 
checks before each series of tests and shall verify at least the 
following conditions:
    (A) That barriers and guards are in workable condition and are 
properly placed to isolate hazardous areas;
    (B) That system test status signals, if used, are in operable 
condition;
    (C) That test power disconnects are clearly marked and readily 
available in an emergency;
    (D) That ground connections are clearly identifiable;
    (E) That personal protective equipment is provided and used as 
required by Subpart I of this Part and by this section; and
    (F) That signal, ground, and power cables are properly separated.
    (p) Mechanical equipment. (1) General requirements. (i) The 
critical safety components of mechanical elevating and rotating 
equipment shall receive a thorough visual inspection before use on each 
shift.

    Note: Critical safety components of mechanical elevating and 
rotating equipment are components whose failure would result in a 
free fall or free rotation of the boom.

    (ii) No vehicular equipment having an obstructed view to the rear 
may be operated on off-highway jobsites where any employee is exposed 
to the hazards created by the moving vehicle, unless:
    (A) The vehicle has a reverse signal alarm audible above the 
surrounding noise level, or
    (B) The vehicle is backed up only when a designated employee 
signals that it is safe to do so.
    (iii) The operator of an electric line truck may not leave his or 
her position at the controls while a load is suspended, unless the 
employer can demonstrate that no employee (including the operator) 
might be endangered.
    (iv) Rubber-tired, self-propelled scrapers, rubber-tired front-end 
loaders, rubber-tired dozers, wheel-type agricultural and industrial 
tractors, crawler-type tractors, crawler-type loaders, and motor 
graders, with or without attachments, shall have roll-over protective 
structures that meet the requirements of Subpart W of Part 1926 of this 
chapter.
    (2) Outriggers. (i) Vehicular equipment, if provided with 
outriggers, shall be operated with the outriggers extended and firmly 
set as necessary for the stability of the specific configuration of the 
equipment. Outriggers may not be extended or retracted outside of clear 
view of the operator unless all employees are outside the range of 
possible equipment motion.
    (ii) If the work area or the terrain precludes the use of 
outriggers, the equipment may be operated only within its maximum load 
ratings for the particular configuration of the equipment without 
outriggers.
    (3) Applied loads. Mechanical equipment used to lift or move lines 
or other material shall be used within its maximum load rating and 
other design limitations for the conditions under which the work is 
being performed.
    (4) Operations near energized lines or equipment. (i) Mechanical 
equipment shall be operated so that the minimum approach distances of 
Table R-6 through Table R-10 are maintained from exposed energized 
lines and equipment. However, the insulated portion of an aerial lift 
operated by a qualified employee in the lift is exempt from this 
requirement.
    (ii) A designated employee other than the equipment operator shall 
observe the approach distance to exposed lines and equipment and give 
timely warnings before the minimum approach distance required by 
paragraph (p)(4)(i) is reached, unless the employer can demonstrate 
that the operator can accurately determine that the minimum approach 
distance is being maintained.
    (iii) If, during operation of the mechanical equipment, the 
equipment could become energized, the operation shall also comply with 
at least one of paragraphs (p)(4)(iii)(A) through (p)(4)(iii)(C) of 
this section.
    (A) The energized lines exposed to contact shall be covered with 
insulating protective material that will withstand the type of contact 
that might be made during the operation.
    (B) The equipment shall be insulated for the voltage involved. The 
equipment shall be positioned so that its uninsulated portions cannot 
approach the lines or equipment any closer than the minimum approach 
distances specified in Table R-6 through Table R-10.
    (C) Each employee shall be protected from hazards that might arise 
from equipment contact with the energized lines. The measures used 
shall ensure that employees will not be exposed to hazardous 
differences in potential. Unless the employer can demonstrate that the 
methods in use protect each employee from the hazards that might arise 
if the equipment contacts the energized line, the measures used shall 
include all of the following techniques:
    (1) Using the best available ground to minimize the time the lines 
remain energized,
    (2) Bonding equipment together to minimize potential differences,
    (3) Providing ground mats to extend areas of equipotential, and
    (4) Employing insulating protective equipment or barricades to 
guard against any remaining hazardous potential differences.

    Note: Appendix C of this part contains information on hazardous 
step and touch potentials and on methods of protecting employees 
from hazards resulting from such potentials.

    (q) Overhead lines. This paragraph provides additional requirements 
for work performed on or near overhead lines and equipment.
    (1) General. (i) Before elevated structures, such as poles or 
towers, are subjected to such stresses as climbing or the installation 
or removal of equipment may impose, the employer shall ascertain that 
the structures are capable of sustaining the additional or unbalanced 
stresses. If the pole or other structure cannot withstand the loads 
which will be imposed, it shall be braced or otherwise supported so as 
to prevent failure.

    Note: Appendix D of this part contains test methods that can be 
used in ascertaining whether a wood pole is capable of sustaining 
the forces that would be imposed by an employee climbing the pole. 
This paragraph also requires the employer to ascertain that the pole 
can sustain all other forces that will be imposed by the work to be 
performed.

    (ii) When poles are set, moved, or removed near exposed energized 
overhead conductors, the pole may not contact the conductors.
    (iii) When a pole is set, moved, or removed near an exposed 
energized overhead conductor, the employer shall ensure that each 
employee wears electrical protective equipment or uses insulated 
devices when handling the pole and that no employee contacts the pole 
with uninsulated parts of his or her body.
    (iv) To protect employees from falling into holes into which poles 
are to be placed, the holes shall be attended by employees or 
physically guarded whenever anyone is working nearby.
    (2) Installing and removing overhead lines. The following 
provisions apply to the installation and removal of overhead conductors 
or cable.
    (i) The employer shall use the tension stringing method, barriers, 
or other equivalent measures to minimize the possibility that 
conductors and cables being installed or removed will contact energized 
power lines or equipment.
    (ii) The protective measures required by paragraph (p)(4)(iii) of 
this section for mechanical equipment shall also be provided for 
conductors, cables, and pulling and tensioning equipment when the 
conductor or cable is being installed or removed close enough to 
energized conductors that any of the following failures could energize 
the pulling or tensioning equipment or the wire or cable being 
installed or removed:
    (A) Failure of the pulling or tensioning equipment,
    (B) Failure of the wire or cable being pulled, or
    (C) Failure of the previously installed lines or equipment.
    (iii) If the conductors being installed or removed cross over 
energized conductors in excess of 600 volts and if the design of the 
circuit-interrupting devices protecting the lines so permits, the 
automatic-reclosing feature of these devices shall be made inoperative.
    (iv) Before lines are installed parallel to existing energized 
lines, the employer shall make a determination of the approximate 
voltage to be induced in the new lines, or work shall proceed on the 
assumption that the induced voltage is hazardous. Unless the employer 
can demonstrate that the lines being installed are not subject to the 
induction of a hazardous voltage or unless the lines are treated as 
energized, the following requirements also apply:
    (A) Each bare conductor shall be grounded in increments so that no 
point along the conductor is more than 2 miles (3.22 km) from a ground.
    (B) The grounds required in paragraph (q)(2)(iv)(A) of this section 
shall be left in place until the conductor installation is completed 
between dead ends.
    (C) The grounds required in paragraph (q)(2)(iv)(A) of this section 
shall be removed as the last phase of aerial cleanup.
    (D) If employees are working on bare conductors, grounds shall also 
be installed at each location where these employees are working, and 
grounds shall be installed at all open dead-end or catch-off points or 
the next adjacent structure.
    (E) If two bare conductors are to be spliced, the conductors shall 
be bonded and grounded before being spliced.
    (v) Reel handling equipment, including pulling and tensioning 
devices, shall be in safe operating condition and shall be leveled and 
aligned.
    (vi) Load ratings of stringing lines, pulling lines, conductor 
grips, load-bearing hardware and accessories, rigging, and hoists may 
not be exceeded.
    (vii) Pulling lines and accessories shall be repaired or replaced 
when defective.
    (viii) Conductor grips may not be used on wire rope, unless the 
grip is specifically designed for this application.
    (ix) Reliable communications, through two-way radios or other 
equivalent means, shall be maintained between the reel tender and the 
pulling rig operator.
    (x) The pulling rig may only be operated when it is safe to do so.

    Note: Examples of unsafe conditions include employees in 
locations prohibited by paragraph (q)(2)(xi) of this section, 
conductor and pulling line hang-ups, and slipping of the conductor 
grip.

    (xi) While the conductor or pulling line is being pulled (in 
motion) with a power-driven device, employees are not permitted 
directly under overhead operations or on the cross arm, except as 
necessary to guide the stringing sock or board over or through the 
stringing sheave.
    (3) Live-line bare-hand work. In addition to other applicable 
provisions contained in this section, the following requirements apply 
to live-line bare-hand work:
    (i) Before using or supervising the use of the live-line bare-hand 
technique on energized circuits, employees shall be trained in the 
technique and in the safety requirements of paragraph (q)(3) of this 
section. Employees shall receive refresher training as required by 
paragraph (a)(2).
    (ii) Before any employee uses the live-line bare-hand technique on 
energized high-voltage conductors or parts, the following information 
shall be ascertained:
    (A) The nominal voltage rating of the circuit on which the work is 
to be performed,
    (B) The minimum approach distances to ground of lines and other 
energized parts on which work is to be performed, and
    (C) The voltage limitations of equipment to be used.
    (iii) The insulated equipment, insulated tools, and aerial devices 
and platforms used shall be designed, tested, and intended for live-
line bare-hand work. Tools and equipment shall be kept clean and dry 
while they are in use.
    (iv) The automatic-reclosing feature of circuit-interrupting 
devices protecting the lines shall be made inoperative, if the design 
of the devices permits.
    (v) Work may not be performed when adverse weather conditions would 
make the work hazardous even after the work practices required by this 
section are employed. Additionally, work may not be performed when 
winds reduce the phase-to-phase or phase-to-ground minimum approach 
distances at the work location below that specified in paragraph 
(q)(3)(xiii) of this section, unless the grounded objects and other 
lines and equipment are covered by insulating guards.


    Note: Thunderstorms in the immediate vicinity, high winds, snow 
storms, and ice storms are examples of adverse weather conditions 
that are presumed to make live-line bare-hand work too hazardous to 
perform safely.


    (vi) A conductive bucket liner or other conductive device shall be 
provided for bonding the insulated aerial device to the energized line 
or equipment.
    (A) The employee shall be connected to the bucket liner or other 
conductive device by the use of conductive shoes, leg clips, or other 
means.
    (B) Where differences in potentials at the worksite pose a hazard 
to employees, electrostatic shielding designed for the voltage being 
worked shall be provided.
    (vii) Before the employee contacts the energized part, the 
conductive bucket liner or other conductive device shall be bonded to 
the energized conductor by means of a positive connection. This 
connection shall remain attached to the energized conductor until the 
work on the energized circuit is completed.
    (viii) Aerial lifts to be used for live-line bare-hand work shall 
have dual controls (lower and upper) as follows:
    (A) The upper controls shall be within easy reach of the employee 
in the basket. On a two-basket-type lift, access to the controls shall 
be within easy reach from either basket.
    (B) The lower set of controls shall be located near the base of the 
boom, and they shall be so designed that they can override operation of 
the equipment at any time.
    (ix) Lower (ground-level) lift controls may not be operated with an 
employee in the lift, except in case of emergency.
    (x) Before employees are elevated into the work position, all 
controls (ground level and bucket) shall be checked to determine that 
they are in proper working condition.
    (xi) Before the boom of an aerial lift is elevated, the body of the 
truck shall be grounded, or the body of the truck shall be barricaded 
and treated as energized.
    (xii) A boom-current test shall be made before work is started each 
day, each time during the day when higher voltage is encountered, and 
when changed conditions indicate a need for an additional test. This 
test shall consist of placing the bucket in contact with an energized 
source equal to the voltage to be encountered for a minimum of 3 
minutes. The leakage current may not exceed 1 microampere per kilovolt 
of nominal phase-to-ground voltage. Work from the aerial lift shall be 
immediately suspended upon indication of a malfunction in the 
equipment.
    (xiii) The minimum approach distances specified in Table R-6 
through Table R-10 shall be maintained from all grounded objects and 
from lines and equipment at a potential different from that to which 
the live-line bare-hand equipment is bonded, unless such grounded 
objects and other lines and equipment are covered by insulating guards.
    (xiv) While an employee is approaching, leaving, or bonding to an 
energized circuit, the minimum distances in Table R-6 through Table R-
10 shall be maintained between the employee and any grounded parts, 
including the lower boom and portions of the truck.
    (xv) While the bucket is positioned alongside an energized bushing 
or insulator string, the phase-to-ground minimum approach distances of 
Table R-6 through Table R-10 shall be maintained between all parts of 
the bucket and the grounded end of the bushing or insulator string or 
any other grounded surface.
    (xvi) Hand lines may not be used between the bucket and the boom or 
between the bucket and the ground. However, non-conductive-type hand 
lines may be used from conductor to ground if not supported from the 
bucket. Ropes used for live-line bare-hand work may not be used for 
other purposes.
    (xvii) Uninsulated equipment or material may not be passed between 
a pole or structure and an aerial lift while an employee working from 
the bucket is bonded to an energized part.
    (xviii) A minimum approach distance table reflecting the minimum 
approach distances listed in Table R-6 through Table R-10 shall be 
printed on a plate of durable non-conductive material. This table shall 
be mounted so as to be visible to the operator of the boom.
    (xix) A non-conductive measuring device shall be readily accessible 
to assist employees in maintaining the required minimum approach 
distance.
    (4) Towers and structures. The following requirements apply to work 
performed on towers or other structures which support overhead lines.
    (i) The employer shall ensure that no employee is under a tower or 
structure while work is in progress, except where the employer can 
demonstrate that such a working position is necessary to assist 
employees working above.
    (ii) Tag lines or other similar devices shall be used to maintain 
control of tower sections being raised or positioned, unless the 
employer can demonstrate that the use of such devices would create a 
greater hazard.
    (iii) The loadline may not be detached from a member or section 
until the load is safely secured.
    (iv) Except during emergency restoration procedures, work shall be 
discontinued when adverse weather conditions make the work hazardous in 
spite of the work practices required by this section.

    Note: Thunderstorms in the immediate vicinity, high winds, snow 
storms, and ice storms are examples of adverse weather conditions 
that are presumed to make this work too hazardous to perform, except 
under emergency conditions.

    (r) Line-clearance tree trimming operations. This paragraph 
provides additional requirements for line-clearance tree-trimming 
operations and for equipment used in these operations.
    (1) Electrical hazards. This paragraph does not apply to qualified 
employees.
    (i) Before an employee climbs, enters, or works around any tree, a 
determination shall be made of the nominal voltage of electric power 
lines posing a hazard to employees. However, a determination of the 
maximum nominal voltage to which an employee will be exposed may be 
made instead, if all lines are considered as energized at this maximum 
voltage.
    (ii) There shall be a second line-clearance tree trimmer within 
normal (that is, unassisted) voice communication under any of the 
following conditions:
    (A) If a line-clearance tree trimmer is to approach more closely 
than 10 feet (305 cm) any conductor or electrical apparatus energized 
at more than 750 volts or
    (B) If branches or limbs being removed are closer to lines 
energized at more than 750 volts than the distances listed in Table R-
6, Table R-9, and Table R-10 or
    (C) If roping is necessary to remove branches or limbs from such 
conductors or apparatus.
    (iii) Line-clearance tree trimmers shall maintain the minimum 
approach distances from energized conductors given in Table R-6, Table 
R-9, and Table R-10.
    (iv) Branches that are contacting exposed energized conductors or 
equipment or that are within the distances specified in Table R-6, 
Table R-9, and Table R-10 may be removed only through the use of 
insulating equipment.

    Note: A tool constructed of a material that the employer can 
demonstrate has insulating qualities meeting paragraph (j)(1) of 
this section are considered as insulated under this paragraph if the 
tool is clean and dry.

    (v) Ladders, platforms, and aerial devices may not be brought 
closer to an energized part than the distances listed in Table R-6, 
Table R-9, and Table R-10.
    (vi) Line-clearance tree-trimming work may not be performed when 
adverse weather conditions make the work hazardous in spite of the work 
practices required by this section. Each employee performing line-
clearance tree trimming work in the aftermath of a storm or under 
similar emergency conditions shall be trained in the special hazards 
related to this type of work.

    Note: Thunderstorms in the immediate vicinity, high winds, snow 
storms, and ice storms are examples of adverse weather conditions 
that are presumed to make line-clearance tree trimming work too 
hazardous to perform safely.

    (2) Brush chippers. (i) Brush chippers shall be equipped with a 
locking device in the ignition system.
    (ii) Access panels for maintenance and adjustment of the chipper 
blades and associated drive train shall be in place and secure during 
operation of the equipment.
    (iii) Brush chippers not equipped with a mechanical infeed system 
shall be equipped with an infeed hopper of length sufficient to prevent 
employees from contacting the blades or knives of the machine during 
operation.
    (iv) Trailer chippers detached from trucks shall be chocked or 
otherwise secured.
    (v) Each employee in the immediate area of an operating chipper 
feed table shall wear personal protective equipment as required by 
Subpart I of this Part.
    (3) Sprayers and related equipment. (i) Walking and working 
surfaces of sprayers and related equipment shall be covered with slip-
resistant material. If slipping hazards cannot be eliminated, slip-
resistant footwear or handrails and stair rails meeting the 
requirements of Subpart D may be used instead of slip-resistant 
material.
    (ii) Equipment on which employees stand to spray while the vehicle 
is in motion shall be equipped with guardrails around the working area. 
The guardrail shall be constructed in accordance with Subpart D of this 
Part.
    (4) Stump cutters. (i) Stump cutters shall be equipped with 
enclosures or guards to protect employees.
    (ii) Each employee in the immediate area of stump grinding 
operations (including the stump cutter operator) shall wear personal 
protective equipment as required by Subpart I of this Part.
    (5) Gasoline-engine power saws. Gasoline-engine power saw 
operations shall meet the requirements of Sec. 1910.266(c)(5) of this 
Part and the following:
    (i) Each power saw weighing more than 15 pounds (6.8 kilograms, 
service weight) that is used in trees shall be supported by a separate 
line, except when work is performed from an aerial lift and except 
during topping or removing operations where no supporting limb will be 
available.
    (ii) Each power saw shall be equipped with a control that will 
return the saw to idling speed when released.
    (iii) Each power saw shall be equipped with a clutch and shall be 
so adjusted that the clutch will not engage the chain drive at idling 
speed.
    (iv) A power saw shall be started on the ground or where it is 
otherwise firmly supported. Drop starting of saws over 15 pounds (6.8 
kg) is permitted outside of the bucket of an aerial lift only if the 
area below the lift is clear of personnel.
    (v) A power saw engine may be started and operated only when all 
employees other than the operator are clear of the saw.
    (vi) A power saw may not be running when the saw is being carried 
up into a tree by an employee.
    (vii) Power saw engines shall be stopped for all cleaning, 
refueling, adjustments, and repairs to the saw or motor, except as the 
manufacturer's servicing procedures require otherwise.
    (6) Backpack power units for use in pruning and clearing. (i) While 
a backpack power unit is running, no one other than the operator may be 
within 10 feet (305 cm) of the cutting head of a brush saw.
    (ii) A backpack power unit shall be equipped with a quick shutoff 
switch readily accessible to the operator.
    (iii) Backpack power unit engines shall be stopped for all 
cleaning, refueling, adjustments, and repairs to the saw or motor, 
except as the manufacturer's servicing procedures require otherwise.
    (7) Rope. (i) Climbing ropes shall be used by employees working 
aloft in trees. These ropes shall have a minimum diameter of 0.5 inch 
(1.2 cm) with a minimum breaking strength of 2300 pounds (10.2 kN). 
Synthetic rope shall have elasticity of not more than 7 percent.
    (ii) Rope shall be inspected before each use and, if unsafe (for 
example, because of damage or defect), may not be used.
    (iii) Rope shall be stored away from cutting edges and sharp tools. 
Rope contact with corrosive chemicals, gas, and oil shall be avoided.
    (iv) When stored, rope shall be coiled and piled, or shall be 
suspended, so that air can circulate through the coils.
    (v) Rope ends shall be secured to prevent their unraveling.
    (vi) Climbing rope may not be spliced to effect repair.
    (vii) A rope that is wet, that is contaminated to the extent that 
its insulating capacity is impaired, or that is otherwise not 
considered to be insulated for the voltage involved may not be used 
near exposed energized lines.
    (8) Fall protection. Each employee shall be tied in with a climbing 
rope and safety saddle when the employee is working above the ground in 
a tree, unless he or she is ascending into the tree.
    (s) Communication facilities. (1) Microwave transmission. (i) The 
employer shall ensure that no employee looks into an open waveguide or 
antenna that is connected to an energized microwave source.
    (ii) If the electromagnetic radiation level within an accessible 
area associated with microwave communications systems exceeds the 
radiation protection guide given in Sec. 1910.97(a)(2) of this Part, 
the area shall be posted with the warning symbol described in 
Sec. 1910.97(a)(3) of this Part. The lower half of the warning symbol 
shall include the following statements or ones that the employer can 
demonstrate are equivalent:

    Radiation in this area may exceed hazard limitations and special 
precautions are required. Obtain specific instruction before 
entering.

    (iii) When an employee works in an area where the electromagnetic 
radiation could exceed the radiation protection guide, the employer 
shall institute measures that ensure that the employee's exposure is 
not greater than that permitted by that guide. Such measures may 
include administrative and engineering controls and personal protective 
equipment.
    (2) Power line carrier. Power line carrier work, including work on 
equipment used for coupling carrier current to power line conductors, 
shall be performed in accordance with the requirements of this section 
pertaining to work on energized lines.
    (t) Underground electrical installations. This paragraph provides 
additional requirements for work on underground electrical 
installations.
    (1) Access. A ladder or other climbing device shall be used to 
enter and exit a manhole or subsurface vault exceeding 4 feet (122 cm) 
in depth. No employee may climb into or out of a manhole or vault by 
stepping on cables or hangers.
    (2) Lowering equipment into manholes. Equipment used to lower 
materials and tools into manholes or vaults shall be capable of 
supporting the weight to be lowered and shall be checked for defects 
before use. Before tools or material are lowered into the opening for a 
manhole or vault, each employee working in the manhole or vault shall 
be clear of the area directly under the opening.
    (3) Attendants for manholes. (i) While work is being performed in a 
manhole containing energized electric equipment, an employee with first 
aid and CPR training meeting paragraph (b)(1) of this section shall be 
available on the surface in the immediate vicinity to render emergency 
assistance.
    (ii) Occasionally, the employee on the surface may briefly enter a 
manhole to provide assistance, other than emergency.

    Note 1: An attendant may also be required under paragraph (e)(7) 
of this section. One person may serve to fulfill both requirements. 
However, attendants required under paragraph (e)(7) of this section 
are not permitted to enter the manhole.

    Note 2: Employees entering manholes containing unguarded, 
uninsulated energized lines or parts of electric equipment operating 
at 50 volts or more are required to be qualified under paragraph 
(l)(1) of this section.

    (iii) For the purpose of inspection, housekeeping, taking readings, 
or similar work, an employee working alone may enter, for brief periods 
of time, a manhole where energized cables or equipment are in service, 
if the employer can demonstrate that the employee will be protected 
from all electrical hazards.
    (iv) Reliable communications, through two-way radios or other 
equivalent means, shall be maintained among all employees involved in 
the job.
    (4) Duct rods. If duct rods are used, they shall be installed in 
the direction presenting the least hazard to employees. An employee 
shall be stationed at the far end of the duct line being rodded to 
ensure that the required minimum approach distances are maintained.
    (5) Multiple cables. When multiple cables are present in a work 
area, the cable to be worked shall be identified by electrical means, 
unless its identity is obvious by reason of distinctive appearance or 
location or by other readily apparent means of identification. Cables 
other than the one being worked shall be protected from damage.
    (6) Moving cables. Energized cables that are to be moved shall be 
inspected for defects.
    (7) Defective cables. Where a cable in a manhole has one or more 
abnormalities that could lead to or be an indication of an impending 
fault, the defective cable shall be deenergized before any employee may 
work in the manhole, except when service load conditions and a lack of 
feasible alternatives require that the cable remain energized. In that 
case, employees may enter the manhole provided they are protected from 
the possible effects of a failure by shields or other devices that are 
capable of containing the adverse effects of a fault in the joint.

    Note: Abnormalities such as oil or compound leaking from cable 
or joints, broken cable sheaths or joint sleeves, hot localized 
surface temperatures of cables or joints, or joints that are swollen 
beyond normal tolerance are presumed to lead to or be an indication 
of an impending fault.

    (8) Sheath continuity. When work is performed on buried cable or on 
cable in manholes, metallic sheath continuity shall be maintained or 
the cable sheath shall be treated as energized.
    (u) Substations. This paragraph provides additional requirements 
for substations and for work performed in them.
    (1) Access and working space. Sufficient access and working space 
shall be provided and maintained about electric equipment to permit 
ready and safe operation and maintenance of such equipment.

    Note: Guidelines for the dimensions of access and workspace 
about electric equipment in substations are contained in American 
National Standard--National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI C2-1987. 
Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply with paragraph 
(u)(1) of this section. An installation that does not conform to 
this ANSI standard will, nonetheless, be considered as complying 
with paragraph (u)(1) of this section if the employer can 
demonstrate that the installation provides ready and safe access 
based on the following evidence:
    (1) That the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2 
that was in effect at the time the installation was made,
    (2) That the configuration of the installation enables employees 
to maintain the minimum approach distances required by paragraph 
(l)(2) of this section while they are working on exposed, energized 
parts, and
    (3) That the precautions taken when work is performed on the 
installation provide protection equivalent to the protection that 
would be provided by access and working space meeting ANSI C2-1987.

    (2) Draw-out-type circuit breakers. When draw-out-type circuit 
breakers are removed or inserted, the breaker shall be in the open 
position. The control circuit shall also be rendered inoperative, if 
the design of the equipment permits.
    (3) Substation fences. Conductive fences around substations shall 
be grounded. When a substation fence is expanded or a section is 
removed, fence grounding continuity shall be maintained, and bonding 
shall be used to prevent electrical discontinuity.
    (4) Guarding of rooms containing electric supply equipment. (i) 
Rooms and spaces in which electric supply lines or equipment are 
installed shall meet the requirements of paragraphs (u)(4)(ii) through 
(u)(4)(v) of this section under the following conditions:
    (A) If exposed live parts operating at 50 to 150 volts to ground 
are located within 8 feet of the ground or other working surface inside 
the room or space,
    (B) If live parts operating at 151 to 600 volts and located within 
8 feet of the ground or other working surface inside the room or space 
are guarded only by location, as permitted under paragraph (u)(5)(i) of 
this section, or
    (C) If live parts operating at more than 600 volts are located 
within the room or space, unless:
    (1) The live parts are enclosed within grounded, metal-enclosed 
equipment whose only openings are designed so that foreign objects 
inserted in these openings will be deflected from energized parts, or
    (2) The live parts are installed at a height above ground and any 
other working surface that provides protection at the voltage to which 
they are energized corresponding to the protection provided by an 8-
foot height at 50 volts.
    (ii) The rooms and spaces shall be so enclosed within fences, 
screens, partitions, or walls as to minimize the possibility that 
unqualified persons will enter.
    (iii) Signs warning unqualified persons to keep out shall be 
displayed at entrances to the rooms and spaces.
    (iv) Entrances to rooms and spaces that are not under the 
observation of an attendant shall be kept locked.
    (v) Unqualified persons may not enter the rooms or spaces while the 
electric supply lines or equipment are energized.
    (5) Guarding of energized parts. (i) Guards shall be provided 
around all live parts operating at more than 150 volts to ground 
without an insulating covering, unless the location of the live parts 
gives sufficient horizontal or vertical or a combination of these 
clearances to minimize the possibility of accidental employee contact.

    Note: Guidelines for the dimensions of clearance distances about 
electric equipment in substations are contained in American National 
Standard--National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI C2-1987. 
Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply with paragraph 
(u)(5)(i) of this section. An installation that does not conform to 
this ANSI standard will, nonetheless, be considered as complying 
with paragraph (u)(5)(i) of this section if the employer can 
demonstrate that the installation provides sufficient clearance 
based on the following evidence:
    (1) That the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2 
that was in effect at the time the installation was made,
    (2) That each employee is isolated from energized parts at the 
point of closest approach, and
    (3) That the precautions taken when work is performed on the 
installation provide protection equivalent to the protection that 
would be provided by horizontal and vertical clearances meeting ANSI 
C2-1987.

    (ii) Except for fuse replacement and other necessary access by 
qualified persons, the guarding of energized parts within a compartment 
shall be maintained during operation and maintenance functions to 
prevent accidental contact with energized parts and to prevent tools or 
other equipment from being dropped on energized parts.
    (iii) When guards are removed from energized equipment, barriers 
shall be installed around the work area to prevent employees who are 
not working on the equipment, but who are in the area, from contacting 
the exposed live parts.
    (6) Substation entry. (i) Upon entering an attended substation, 
each employee other than those regularly working in the station shall 
report his or her presence to the employee in charge in order to 
receive information on special system conditions affecting employee 
safety.
    (ii) The job briefing required by paragraph (c) of this section 
shall cover such additional subjects as the location of energized 
equipment in or adjacent to the work area and the limits of any 
deenergized work area.
    (v) Power generation. This paragraph provides additional 
requirements and related work practices for power generating plants.
    (1) Interlocks and other safety devices. (i) Interlocks and other 
safety devices shall be maintained in a safe, operable condition.
    (ii) No interlock or other safety device may be modified to defeat 
its function, except for test, repair, or adjustment of the device.
    (2) Changing brushes. Before exciter or generator brushes are 
changed while the generator is in service, the exciter or generator 
field shall be checked to determine whether a ground condition exists. 
The brushes may not be changed while the generator is energized if a 
ground condition exists.
    (3) Access and working space. Sufficient access and working space 
shall be provided and maintained about electric equipment to permit 
ready and safe operation and maintenance of such equipment.

    Note: Guidelines for the dimensions of access and workspace 
about electric equipment in generating stations are contained in 
American National Standard--National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI 
C2-1987. Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply with 
paragraph (v)(3) of this section. An installation that does not 
conform to this ANSI standard will, nonetheless, be considered as 
complying with paragraph (v)(3) of this section if the employer can 
demonstrate that the installation provides ready and safe access 
based on the following evidence:
    (1) That the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2 
that was in effect at the time the installation was made,
    (2) That the configuration of the installation enables employees 
to maintain the minimum approach distances required by paragraph 
(l)(2) of this section while they work on exposed, energized parts, 
and
    (3) That the precautions taken when work is performed on the 
installation provide protection equivalent to the protection that 
would be provided by access and working space meeting ANSI C2-1987.

    (4) Guarding of rooms containing electric supply equipment. (i) 
Rooms and spaces in which electric supply lines or equipment are 
installed shall meet the requirements of paragraphs (v)(4)(ii) through 
(v)(4)(v) of this section under the following conditions:
    (A) If exposed live parts operating at 50 to 150 volts to ground 
are located within 8 feet of the ground or other working surface inside 
the room or space,
    (B) If live parts operating at 151 to 600 volts and located within 
8 feet of the ground or other working surface inside the room or space 
are guarded only by location, as permitted under paragraph (v)(5)(i) of 
this section, or
    (C) If live parts operating at more than 600 volts are located 
within the room or space, unless:
    (1) The live parts are enclosed within grounded, metal-enclosed 
equipment whose only openings are designed so that foreign objects 
inserted in these openings will be deflected from energized parts, or
    (2) The live parts are installed at a height above ground and any 
other working surface that provides protection at the voltage to which 
they are energized corresponding to the protection provided by an 8-
foot height at 50 volts.
    (ii) The rooms and spaces shall be so enclosed within fences, 
screens, partitions, or walls as to minimize the possibility that 
unqualified persons will enter.
    (iii) Signs warning unqualified persons to keep out shall be 
displayed at entrances to the rooms and spaces.
    (iv) Entrances to rooms and spaces that are not under the 
observation of an attendant shall be kept locked.
    (v) Unqualified persons may not enter the rooms or spaces while the 
electric supply lines or equipment are energized.
    (5) Guarding of energized parts. (i) Guards shall be provided 
around all live parts operating at more than 150 volts to ground 
without an insulating covering, unless the location of the live parts 
gives sufficient horizontal or vertical or a combination of these 
clearances to minimize the possibility of accidental employee contact.

    Note: Guidelines for the dimensions of clearance distances about 
electric equipment in generating stations are contained in American 
National Standard--National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI C2-1987. 
Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply with paragraph 
(v)(5)(i) of this section. An installation that does not conform to 
this ANSI standard will, nonetheless, be considered as complying 
with paragraph (v)(5)(i) of this section if the employer can 
demonstrate that the installation provides sufficient clearance 
based on the following evidence:
    (1) That the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2 
that was in effect at the time the installation was made,
    (2) That each employee is isolated from energized parts at the 
point of closest approach, and
    (3) That the precautions taken when work is performed on the 
installation provide protection equivalent to the protection that 
would be provided by horizontal and vertical clearances meeting ANSI 
C2-1987.

    (ii) Except for fuse replacement or other necessary access by 
qualified persons, the guarding of energized parts within a compartment 
shall be maintained during operation and maintenance functions to 
prevent accidental contact with energized parts and to prevent tools or 
other equipment from being dropped on energized parts.
    (iii) When guards are removed from energized equipment, barriers 
shall be installed around the work area to prevent employees who are 
not working on the equipment, but who are in the area, from contacting 
the exposed live parts.
    (6) Water or steam spaces. The following requirements apply to work 
in water and steam spaces associated with boilers:
    (i) A designated employee shall inspect conditions before work is 
permitted and after its completion. Eye protection, or full face 
protection if necessary, shall be worn at all times when condenser, 
heater, or boiler tubes are being cleaned.
    (ii) Where it is necessary for employees to work near tube ends 
during cleaning, shielding shall be installed at the tube ends.
    (7) Chemical cleaning of boilers and pressure vessels. The 
following requirements apply to chemical cleaning of boilers and 
pressure vessels:
    (i) Areas where chemical cleaning is in progress shall be cordoned 
off to restrict access during cleaning. If flammable liquids, gases, or 
vapors or combustible materials will be used or might be produced 
during the cleaning process, the following requirements also apply:
    (A) The area shall be posted with signs restricting entry and 
warning of the hazards of fire and explosion; and
    (B) Smoking, welding, and other possible ignition sources are 
prohibited in these restricted areas.
    (ii) The number of personnel in the restricted area shall be 
limited to those necessary to accomplish the task safely.
    (iii) There shall be ready access to water or showers for emergency 
use.

    Note: See Sec. 1910.141 of this Part for requirements that apply 
to the water supply and to washing facilities.

    (iv) Employees in restricted areas shall wear protective equipment 
meeting the requirements of Subpart I of this Part and including, but 
not limited to, protective clothing, boots, goggles, and gloves.
    (8) Chlorine systems. (i) Chlorine system enclosures shall be 
posted with signs restricting entry and warning of the hazard to health 
and the hazards of fire and explosion.

    Note: See Subpart Z of this Part for requirements necessary to 
protect the health of employees from the effects of chlorine.

    (ii) Only designated employees may enter the restricted area. 
Additionally, the number of personnel shall be limited to those 
necessary to accomplish the task safely.
    (iii) Emergency repair kits shall be available near the shelter or 
enclosure to allow for the prompt repair of leaks in chlorine lines, 
equipment, or containers.
    (iv) Before repair procedures are started, chlorine tanks, pipes, 
and equipment shall be purged with dry air and isolated from other 
sources of chlorine.
    (v) The employer shall ensure that chlorine is not mixed with 
materials that would react with the chlorine in a dangerously 
exothermic or other hazardous manner.
    (9) Boilers. (i) Before internal furnace or ash hopper repair work 
is started, overhead areas shall be inspected for possible falling 
objects. If the hazard of falling objects exists, overhead protection 
such as planking or nets shall be provided.
    (ii) When opening an operating boiler door, employees shall stand 
clear of the opening of the door to avoid the heat blast and gases 
which may escape from the boiler.
    (10) Turbine generators. (i) Smoking and other ignition sources are 
prohibited near hydrogen or hydrogen sealing systems, and signs warning 
of the danger of explosion and fire shall be posted.
    (ii) Excessive hydrogen makeup or abnormal loss of pressure shall 
be considered as an emergency and shall be corrected immediately.
    (iii) A sufficient quantity of inert gas shall be available to 
purge the hydrogen from the largest generator.
    (11) Coal and ash handling. (i) Only designated persons may operate 
railroad equipment.
    (ii) Before a locomotive or locomotive crane is moved, a warning 
shall be given to employees in the area.
    (iii) Employees engaged in switching or dumping cars may not use 
their feet to line up drawheads.
    (iv) Drawheads and knuckles may not be shifted while locomotives or 
cars are in motion.
    (v) When a railroad car is stopped for unloading, the car shall be 
secured from displacement that could endanger employees.
    (vi) An emergency means of stopping dump operations shall be 
provided at railcar dumps.
    (vii) The employer shall ensure that employees who work in coal- or 
ash-handling conveyor areas are trained and knowledgeable in conveyor 
operation and in the requirements of paragraphs (v)(11)(viii) through 
(v)(11)(xii) of this section.
    (viii) Employees may not ride a coal- or ash-handling conveyor belt 
at any time. Employees may not cross over the conveyor belt, except at 
walkways, unless the conveyor's energy source has been deenergized and 
has been locked out or tagged in accordance with paragraph (d) of this 
section.
    (ix) A conveyor that could cause injury when started may not be 
started until personnel in the area are alerted by a signal or by a 
designated person that the conveyor is about to start.
    (x) If a conveyor that could cause injury when started is 
automatically controlled or is controlled from a remote location, an 
audible device shall be provided that sounds an alarm that will be 
recognized by each employee as a warning that the conveyor will start 
and that can be clearly heard at all points along the conveyor where 
personnel may be present. The warning device shall be actuated by the 
device starting the conveyor and shall continue for a period of time 
before the conveyor starts that is long enough to allow employees to 
move clear of the conveyor system. A visual warning may be used in 
place of the audible device if the employer can demonstrate that it 
will provide an equally effective warning in the particular 
circumstances involved.

    Note: Exception: If the employer can demonstrate that the 
system's function would be seriously hindered by the required time 
delay, warning signs may be provided in place of the audible warning 
device. If the system was installed before [insert date 1 year after 
publication date], warning signs may be provided in place of the 
audible warning device until such time as the conveyor or its 
control system is rebuilt or rewired. These warning signs shall be 
clear, concise, and legible and shall indicate that conveyors and 
allied equipment may be started at any time, that danger exists, and 
that personnel must keep clear. These warning signs shall be 
provided along the conveyor at areas not guarded by position or 
location.

    (xi) Remotely and automatically controlled conveyors, and conveyors 
that have operating stations which are not manned or which are beyond 
voice and visual contact from drive areas, loading areas, transfer 
points, and other locations on the conveyor path not guarded by 
location, position, or guards shall be furnished with emergency stop 
buttons, pull cords, limit switches, or similar emergency stop devices. 
However, if the employer can demonstrate that the design, function, and 
operation of the conveyor do not expose an employee to hazards, an 
emergency stop device is not required.
    (A) Emergency stop devices shall be easily identifiable in the 
immediate vicinity of such locations.
    (B) An emergency stop device shall act directly on the control of 
the conveyor involved and may not depend on the stopping of any other 
equipment.
    (C) Emergency stop devices shall be installed so that they cannot 
be overridden from other locations.
    (xii) Where coal-handling operations may produce a combustible 
atmosphere from fuel sources or from flammable gases or dust, sources 
of ignition shall be eliminated or safely controlled to prevent 
ignition of the combustible atmosphere.

    Note: Locations that are hazardous because of the presence of 
combustible dust are classified as Class II hazardous locations. See 
Sec. 1910.307 of this Part.

    (xiii) An employee may not work on or beneath overhanging coal in 
coal bunkers, coal silos, or coal storage areas, unless the employee is 
protected from all hazards posed by shifting coal.
    (xiv) An employee entering a bunker or silo to dislodge the 
contents shall wear a body harness with lifeline attached. The lifeline 
shall be secured to a fixed support outside the bunker and shall be 
attended at all times by an employee located outside the bunker or 
facility.
    (12) Hydroplants and equipment. Employees working on or close to 
water gates, valves, intakes, forebays, flumes, or other locations 
where increased or decreased water flow or levels may pose a 
significant hazard shall be warned and shall vacate such dangerous 
areas before water flow changes are made.
    (w) Special conditions. (1) Capacitors. The following additional 
requirements apply to work on capacitors and on lines connected to 
capacitors.

    Note: See paragraphs (m) and (n) of this section for 
requirements pertaining to the deenergizing and grounding of 
capacitor installations.

    (i) Before employees work on capacitors, the capacitors shall be 
disconnected from energized sources and, after a wait of at least 5 
minutes from the time of disconnection, short-circuited.
    (ii) Before the units are handled, each unit in series-parallel 
capacitor banks shall be short-circuited between all terminals and the 
capacitor case or its rack. If the cases of capacitors are on 
ungrounded substation racks, the racks shall be bonded to ground.
    (iii) Any line to which capacitors are connected shall be short-
circuited before it is considered deenergized.
    (2) Current transformer secondaries. The secondary of a current 
transformer may not be opened while the transformer is energized. If 
the primary of the current transformer cannot be deenergized before 
work is performed on an instrument, a relay, or other section of a 
current transformer secondary circuit, the circuit shall be bridged so 
that the current transformer secondary will not be opened.
    (3) Series streetlighting. If the open-circuit voltage exceeds 600 
volts, the series streetlighting circuit shall be worked in accordance 
with paragraph (q) or (t) of this section, as appropriate. A series 
loop may only be opened after the streetlighting transformer has been 
deenergized and isolated from the source of supply or after the loop is 
bridged to avoid an open-circuit condition.
    (4) Illumination. Sufficient illumination shall be provided to 
enable the employee to perform the work safely.
    (5) Protection against drowning. (i) Whenever an employee may be 
pulled or pushed or may fall into water where the danger of drowning 
exists, the employee shall be provided with and shall use U.S. Coast 
Guard approved personal flotation devices.
    (ii) Each personal flotation device shall be maintained in safe 
condition and shall be inspected frequently enough to ensure that it 
does not have rot, mildew, water saturation, and or any other condition 
that could render the device unsuitable for use.
    (iii) An employee may cross streams or other bodies of water only 
if a safe means of passage, such as a bridge, is provided.
    (6) Employee protection in public work areas.
    (i) Traffic control signs and traffic control devices used for the 
protection of employees shall meet the requirements of 
Sec. 1926.200(g)(2) of this Chapter.
    (ii) Before work is begun in the vicinity of vehicular or 
pedestrian traffic that may endanger employees, warning signs or flags 
and other traffic control devices shall be placed in conspicuous 
locations to alert and channel approaching traffic.
    (iii) Where additional employee protection is necessary, barricades 
shall be used.
    (iv) Excavated areas shall be protected with barricades.
    (v) At night, warning lights shall be prominently displayed.
    (7) Backfeed. If there is a possibility of voltage backfeed from 
sources of cogeneration or from the secondary system (for example, 
backfeed from more than one energized phase feeding a common load), the 
requirements of paragraph (1) of this section apply if the lines or 
equipment are to be worked as energized, and the requirements of 
paragraphs (m) and (n) of this section apply if the lines or equipment 
are to be worked as deenergized.
    (8) Lasers. Laser equipment shall be installed, adjusted, and 
operated in accordance with Sec. 1926.54 of this Chapter.
    (9) Hydraulic fluids. Hydraulic fluids used for the insulated 
sections of equipment shall provide insulation for the voltage 
involved.
    (x) Definitions.
    Affected employee. An employee whose job requires him or her to 
operate or use a machine or equipment on which servicing or maintenance 
is being performed under lockout or tagout, or whose job requires him 
or her to work in an area in which such servicing or maintenance is 
being performed.
    Attendant. An employee assigned to remain immediately outside the 
entrance to an enclosed or other space to render assistance as needed 
to employees inside the space.
    Authorized employee. An employee who locks out or tags out machines 
or equipment in order to perform servicing or maintenance on that 
machine or equipment. An affected employee becomes an authorized 
employee when that employee's duties include performing servicing or 
maintenance covered under this section.
    Automatic circuit recloser. A self-controlled device for 
interrupting and reclosing an alternating current circuit with a 
predetermined sequence of opening and reclosing followed by resetting, 
hold-closed, or lockout operation.
    Barricade. A physical obstruction such as tapes, cones, or A-frame 
type wood or metal structures intended to provide a warning about and 
to limit access to a hazardous area.
    Barrier. A physical obstruction which is intended to prevent 
contact with energized lines or equipment or to prevent unauthorized 
access to a work area.
    Bond. The electrical interconnection of conductive parts designed 
to maintain a common electrical potential.
    Bus. A conductor or a group of conductors that serve as a common 
connection for two or more circuits.
    Bushing. An insulating structure, including a through conductor or 
providing a passageway for such a conductor, with provision for 
mounting on a barrier, conducting or otherwise, for the purposes of 
insulating the conductor from the barrier and conducting current from 
one side of the barrier to the other.
    Cable. A conductor with insulation, or a stranded conductor with or 
without insulation and other coverings (single-conductor cable), or a 
combination of conductors insulated from one another (multiple-
conductor cable).
    Cable sheath. A conductive protective covering applied to cables.

    Note: A cable sheath may consist of multiple layers of which one 
or more is conductive.

    Circuit. A conductor or system of conductors through which an 
electric current is intended to flow.
    Clearance (between objects). The clear distance between two objects 
measured surface to surface.
    Clearance (for work). Authorization to perform specified work or 
permission to enter a restricted area.
    Communication lines. (See Lines, communication.)
    Conductor. A material, usually in the form of a wire, cable, or bus 
bar, used for carrying an electric current.
    Covered conductor. A conductor covered with a dielectric having no 
rated insulating strength or having a rated insulating strength less 
than the voltage of the circuit in which the conductor is used.
    Current-carrying part. A conducting part intended to be connected 
in an electric circuit to a source of voltage. Non-current-carrying 
parts are those not intended to be so connected.
    Deenergized. Free from any electrical connection to a source of 
potential difference and from electric charge; not having a potential 
different from that of the earth.

    Note: The term is used only with reference to current-carrying 
parts, which are sometimes energized (alive).

    Designated employee (designated person). An employee (or person) 
who is designated by the employer to perform specific duties under the 
terms of this section and who is knowledgeable in the construction and 
operation of the equipment and the hazards involved.
    Electric line truck. A truck used to transport personnel, tools, 
and material for electric supply line work.
    Electric supply equipment. Equipment that produces, modifies, 
regulates, controls, or safeguards a supply of electric energy.
    Electric supply lines. (See Lines, electric supply.)
    Electric utility. An organization responsible for the installation, 
operation, or maintenance of an electric supply system.
    Enclosed space. A working space, such as a manhole, vault, tunnel, 
or shaft, that has a limited means of egress or entry, that is designed 
for periodic employee entry under normal operating conditions, and that 
under normal conditions does not contain a hazardous atmosphere, but 
that may contain a hazardous atmosphere under abnormal conditions.

    Note: Spaces that are enclosed but not designed for employee 
entry under normal operating conditions are not considered to be 
enclosed spaces for the purposes of this section. Similarly, spaces 
that are enclosed and that are expected to contain a hazardous 
atmosphere are not considered to be enclosed spaces for the purposes 
of this section. Such spaces meet the definition of permit spaces in 
Sec. 1910.146 of this Part, and entry into them must be performed in 
accordance with that standard.

    Energized (alive, live). Electrically connected to a source of 
potential difference, or electrically charged so as to have a potential 
significantly different from that of earth in the vicinity.
    Energy isolating device. A physical device that prevents the 
transmission or release of energy, including, but not limited to, the 
following: a manually operated electric circuit breaker, a disconnect 
switch, a manually operated switch, a slide gate, a slip blind, a line 
valve, blocks, and any similar device with a visible indication of the 
position of the device. (Push buttons, selector switches, and other 
control-circuit-type devices are not energy isolating devices.)
    Energy source. Any electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, 
chemical, nuclear, thermal, or other energy source that could cause 
injury to personnel.
    Equipment (electric). A general term including material, fittings, 
devices, appliances, fixtures, apparatus, and the like used as part of 
or in connection with an electrical installation.
    Exposed. Not isolated or guarded.
    Ground. A conducting connection, whether intentional or accidental, 
between an electric circuit or equipment and the earth, or to some 
conducting body that serves in place of the earth.
    Grounded. Connected to earth or to some conducting body that serves 
in place of the earth.
    Guarded. Covered, fenced, enclosed, or otherwise protected, by 
means of suitable covers or casings, barrier rails or screens, mats, or 
platforms, designed to minimize the possibility, under normal 
conditions, of dangerous approach or accidental contact by persons or 
objects.

    Note: Wires which are insulated, but not otherwise protected, 
are not considered as guarded.

    Hazardous atmosphere means an atmosphere that may expose employees 
to the risk of death, incapacitation, impairment of ability to self-
rescue (that is, escape unaided from an enclosed space), injury, or 
acute illness from one or more of the following causes:
    (1) Flammable gas, vapor, or mist in excess of 10 percent of its 
lower flammable limit (LFL);
    (2) Airborne combustible dust at a concentration that meets or 
exceeds its LFL;

    Note: This concentration may be approximated as a condition in 
which the dust obscures vision at a distance of 5 feet (1.52 m) or 
less.

    (3) Atmospheric oxygen concentration below 19.5 percent or above 
23.5 percent;
    (4) Atmospheric concentration of any substance for which a dose or 
a permissible exposure limit is published in Subpart G, Occupational 
Health and Environmental Control, or in Subpart Z, Toxic and Hazardous 
Substances, of this Part and which could result in employee exposure in 
excess of its dose or permissible exposure limit;

    Note: An atmospheric concentration of any substance that is not 
capable of causing death, incapacitation, impairment of ability to 
self-rescue, injury, or acute illness due to its health effects is 
not covered by this provision.

    (5) Any other atmospheric condition that is immediately dangerous 
to life or health.

    Note: For air contaminants for which OSHA has not determined a 
dose or permissible exposure limit, other sources of information, 
such as Material Safety Data Sheets that comply with the Hazard 
Communication Standard, Sec. 1910.1200 of this Part, published 
information, and internal documents can provide guidance in 
establishing acceptable atmospheric conditions.

    High-power tests. Tests in which fault currents, load currents, 
magnetizing currents, and line-dropping currents are used to test 
equipment, either at the equipment's rated voltage or at lower 
voltages.
    High-voltage tests. Tests in which voltages of approximately 1000 
volts are used as a practical minimum and in which the voltage source 
has sufficient energy to cause injury.
    High wind. A wind of such velocity that the following hazards would 
be present:
    (1) An employee would be exposed to being blown from elevated 
locations, or
    (2) An employee or material handling equipment could lose control 
of material being handled, or
    (3) An employee would be exposed to other hazards not controlled by 
the standard involved.

    Note: Winds exceeding 40 miles per hour (64.4 kilometers per 
hour), or 30 miles per hour (48.3 kilometers per hour) if material 
handling is involved, are normally considered as meeting this 
criteria unless precautions are taken to protect employees from the 
hazardous effects of the wind.

    Immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH) means any condition 
that poses an immediate or delayed threat to life or that would cause 
irreversible adverse health effects or that would interfere with an 
individual's ability to escape unaided from a permit space.

    Note: Some materials--hydrogen fluoride gas and cadmium vapor, 
for example--may produce immediate transient effects that, even if 
severe, may pass without medical attention, but are followed by 
sudden, possibly fatal collapse 12-72 hours after exposure. The 
victim ``feels normal'' from recovery from transient effects until 
collapse. Such materials in hazardous quantities are considered to 
be ``immediately'' dangerous to life or health.

    Insulated. Separated from other conducting surfaces by a dielectric 
(including air space) offering a high resistance to the passage of 
current.

    Note: When any object is said to be insulated, it is understood 
to be insulated for the conditions to which it is normally 
subjected. Otherwise, it is, within the purpose of this section, 
uninsulated.

    Insulation (cable). That which is relied upon to insulate the 
conductor from other conductors or conducting parts or from ground.
    Line-clearance tree trimm. An employee who, through related 
training or on-the-job experience or both, is familiar with the special 
techniques and hazards involved in line-clearance tree trimming.

    Note 1: An employee who is regularly assigned to a line-
clearance tree-trimming crew and who is undergoing on-the-job 
training and who, in the course of such training, has demonstrated 
an ability to perform duties safely at his or her level of training 
and who is under the direct supervision of a line-clearance tree 
trimmer is considered to be a line-clearance tree trimmer.
    Note 2: A line-clearance tree trimmer is not considered to be a 
``qualified employee'' under this section unless he or she has the 
training required for a qualified employee under paragraph 
(a)(2)(ii) of this section. However, under the electrical safety-
related work practices standard, a line-clearance tree trimmer is 
considered to be a ``qualified employee''. Tree trimming performed 
by such ``qualified employees'' is not subject to the electrical 
safety-related work practice requirements contained in 
Secs. 1910.331 through 1910.335 of this Part. (See also the note 
following Sec. 1910.332(b)(3) of this Part for information regarding 
the training an employee must have to be considered a qualified 
employee under Secs. 1910.331 through 1910.335 of this part.)

    Line-clearance tree trimming. The pruning, trimming, repairing, 
maintaining, removing, or clearing of trees or the cutting of brush 
that is within 10 feet (305 cm) of electric supply lines and equipment.
    Lines. (1) Communication lines. The conductors and their supporting 
or containing structures which are used for public or private signal or 
communication service, and which operate at potentials not exceeding 
400 volts to ground or 750 volts between any two points of the circuit, 
and the transmitted power of which does not exceed 150 watts. If the 
lines are operating at less than 150 volts, no limit is placed on the 
transmitted power of the system. Under certain conditions, 
communication cables may include communication circuits exceeding these 
limitations where such circuits are also used to supply power solely to 
communication equipment.

    Note: Telephone, telegraph, railroad signal, data, clock, fire, 
police alarm, cable television, and other systems conforming with 
this definition are included. Lines used for signaling purposes, but 
not included under this definition, are considered as electric 
supply lines of the same voltage.

    (2) Electric supply lines. Conductors used to transmit electric 
energy and their necessary supporting or containing structures. Signal 
lines of more than 400 volts are always supply lines within this 
section, and those of less than 400 volts are considered as supply 
lines, if so run and operated throughout.
    Manhole. A subsurface enclosure which personnel may enter and which 
is used for the purpose of installing, operating, and maintaining 
submersible equipment or cable.
    Manhole steps. A series of steps individually attached to or set 
into the walls of a manhole structure.
    Minimum approach distance. The closest distance an employee is 
permitted to approach an energized or a grounded object.
    Qualified employee (qualified person). One knowledgeable in the 
construction and operation of the electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution equipment involved, along with the 
associated hazards.

    Note 1: An employee must have the training required by paragraph 
(a)(2)(ii) of this section in order to be considered a qualified 
employee.
    Note 2: Except under paragraph (g)(2)(v) of this section, an 
employee who is undergoing on-the-job training and who, in the 
course of such training, has demonstrated an ability to perform 
duties safely at his or her level of training and who is under the 
direct supervision of a qualified person is considered to be a 
qualified person for the performance of those duties.

    Step bolt. A bolt or rung attached at intervals along a structural 
member and used for foot placement during climbing or standing.
    Switch. A device for opening and closing or for changing the 
connection of a circuit. In this section, a switch is understood to be 
manually operable, unless otherwise stated.
    System operator. A qualified person designated to operate the 
system or its parts.
    Vault. An enclosure, above or below ground, which personnel may 
enter and which is used for the purpose of installing, operating, or 
maintaining equipment or cable.
    Vented vault. A vault that has provision for air changes using 
exhaust flue stacks and low level air intakes operating on 
differentials of pressure and temperature providing for airflow which 
precludes a hazardous atmosphere from developing.
    Voltage. The effective (rms) potential difference between any two 
conductors or between a conductor and ground. Voltages are expressed in 
nominal values unless otherwise indicated. The nominal voltage of a 
system or circuit is the value assigned to a system or circuit of a 
given voltage class for the purpose of convenient designation. The 
operating voltage of the system may vary above or below this value.

Appendix A to Sec. 1910.269 Flow Charts

    This appendix presents information, in the form of flow charts, 
that illustrates the scope and application of Sec. 1910.269. This 
appendix addresses the interface between Sec. 1910.269 and Subpart S of 
this Part (Electrical), between Sec. 1910.269 and Sec. 1910.146 of this 
Part (Permit-required confined spaces), and between Sec. 1910.269 and 
Sec. 1910.147 of this Part (The control of hazardous energy (lockout/
tagout)). These flow charts provide guidance for employers trying to 
implement the requirements of Sec. 1910.269 in combination with other 
General Industry Standards contained in Part 1910.
    Appendix A-1 to Section 1910.269--Application of Section 1910.269 
and Subpart S of this Part to Electrical Installations.

TR31JA94.002

    Appendix A-2 to Section 1910.269--Application of Section 1910.269 
and Subpart S of this Part to Electrical Safety-Related Work Practices.

TR31JA94.003


 Table 1.--Electrical Safety-Related Work Practices in Section 1910.269 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Compliance with subpart S is                                        
 considered as compliance with Sec.  Paragraphs that apply regardless of
            1910.269\1\                   compliance with subpart S     
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(d), electric shock hazards only...  (a)(2)\2\ and (a)(3)\2\.           
(h)(3).............................  (b)\2\.                            
(i)(2).............................  (c)\2\.                            
(k)................................  (d), other than electric shock     
                                      hazards.                          
(l)(1) through (l)(4), (l)(6)(i),    (e).                               
 and (l)(8) through (l)(10).                                            
(m)................................  (f).                               
(p)(4).............................  (g).                               
(s)(2).............................  (h)(1) and (h)(2).                 
(u)(1) and (u)(3) through (u)(5)...  (i)(3)\2\ and (i)(4)\2\.           
(v)(3) through (v)(5)..............  (j)\2\.                            
(w)(1) and (w)(7)..................  (l)(5)\2\, (l)(6)(iii)\2\,         
                                      (l)(6)(iii)\2\, and (l)(7)\2\.    
                                     (n)\2\.                            
                                     (o)\2\.                            
                                     (p)(1) through (p)(3).             
                                     (q)\2\.                            
                                     (r).                               
                                     (s)(1).                            
                                     (t)\2\.                            
                                     (u)(2)\2\ and (u)(6)\2\.           
                                     (v)(1), (v)(2)\2\, and (v)(6)      
                                      through (v)(12).                  
                                     (w)(2) through (w)(6)\2\, (w)(8),  
                                      and (w)(9)\2\.                    
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\If the electrical installation meets the requirements of Secs.       
  1910.332 through 1910.308 of this Part, then the electrical           
  installation and any associated electrical safety-related work        
  practices conforming to Secs. 1910.332 through 1910.335 of this Part  
  are considered to comply with these provisions of Sec. 1910.269 of    
  this Part.                                                            
\2\These provisions include electrical safety requirements that must be 
  met regardless of compliance with Subpart S of this Part.             

    Appendix A-3 to Section 1910.269--Application of Section 1910.269 
and Subpart S of This Part to Tree-Trimming Operations.

TR31JA94.004

    Appendix A-4 to Section 1910.269--Application of Section 1910.147, 
Section 1910.269 and Section 1910.333 to Hazardous Energy Control 
Procedures (Lockout/Tagout).

TR31JA94.005

    \1\If the installation conforms to Secs. 1910.303 through 1910.308 
of this part, the lockout and tagging procedures of Sec. 1910.333(b) of 
this part may be followed for electric shock hazards.
    \2\Commingled to the extent that the electric power generation, 
transmission, or distribution installation poses the greater hazard.
    \3\Section 1910.333(b)(2)(iii)(D) and (b)(2)(iv)(B) of this part 
still apply.
    Appendix A-5 to Section 1910.269--Application of Section 1910.146 
and Section 1910.269 to Permit-Required Confined Spaces.

TR31JA94.006

Appendix B to Section 1910.269--Working on Exposed Energized Parts

I. Introduction

    Electric transmission and distribution line installations have 
been designed to meet National Electrical Safety Code (NESC), ANSI 
C2, requirements and to provide the level of line outage performance 
required by system reliability criteria. Transmission and 
distribution lines are also designed to withstand the maximum 
overvoltages expected to be impressed on the system. Such 
overvoltages can be caused by such conditions as switching surges, 
faults, or lightning. Insulator design and lengths and the 
clearances to structural parts (which, for low voltage through 
extra-high voltage, or EHV, facilities, are generally based on the 
performance of the line as a result of contamination of the 
insulation or during storms) have, over the years, come closer to 
the minimum approach distances used by workers (which are generally 
based on non-storm conditions). Thus, as minimum approach (working) 
distances and structural distances (clearances) converge, it is 
increasingly important that basic considerations for establishing 
safe approach distances for performing work be understood by the 
designers and the operating and maintenance personnel involved.
    The information in this Appendix will assist employers in 
complying with the minimum approach distance requirements contained 
in paragraphs (l)(2) and (q)(3) of this section. The technical 
criteria and methodology presented herein is mandatory for employers 
using reduced minimum approach distances as permitted in Table R-7 
and Table R-8. This Appendix is intended to provide essential 
background information and technical criteria for the development or 
modification, if possible, of the safe minimum approach distances 
for electric transmission and distribution live-line work. The 
development of these safe distances must be undertaken by persons 
knowledgeable in the techniques discussed in this appendix and 
competent in the field of electric transmission and distribution 
system design.

II. General

A. Definitions

    The following definitions from Sec. 1910.269(x) relate to work 
on or near transmission and distribution lines and equipment and the 
electrical hazards they present.
    Exposed. Not isolated or guarded.
    Guarded. Covered, fenced, enclosed, or otherwise protected, by 
means of suitable covers or casings, barrier rails or screens, mats, 
or platforms, designed to minimize the possibility, under normal 
conditions, of dangerous approach or accidental contact by persons 
or objects.

    Note: Wires which are insulated, but not otherwise protected, 
are not considered as guarded.

    Insulated. Separated from other conducting surfaces by a 
dielectric (including air space) offering a high resistance to the 
passage of current.

    Note: When any object is said to be insulated, it is understood 
to be insulated for the conditions to which it is normally 
subjected. Otherwise, it is, within the purpose of this section, 
uninsulated.

B. Installations Energized at 50 to 300 Volts

    The hazards posed by installations energized at 50 to 300 volts 
are the same as those found in many other workplaces. That is not to 
say that there is no hazard, but the complexity of electrical 
protection required does not compare to that required for high 
voltage systems. The employee must avoid contact with the exposed 
parts, and the protective equipment used (such as rubber insulating 
gloves) must provide insulation for the voltages involved.

C. Exposed Energized Parts Over 300 Volts AC

    Table R-6, Table R-7, and Table R-8 of Sec. 1910.269 provide 
safe approach and working distances in the vicinity of energized 
electrical apparatus so that work can be done safely without risk of 
electrical flashover.
    The working distances must withstand the maximum transient 
overvoltage that can reach the work site under the working 
conditions and practices in use. Normal system design may provide or 
include a means to control transient overvoltages, or temporary 
devices may be employed to achieve the same result. The use of 
technically correct practices or procedures to control overvoltages 
(for example, portable gaps or preventing the automatic control from 
initiating breaker reclosing) enables line design and operation to 
be based on reduced transient overvoltage values. Technical 
information for U.S. electrical systems indicates that current 
design provides for the following maximum transient overvoltage 
values (usually produced by switching surges): 362 kV and less--3.0 
per unit; 552 kV--2.4 per unit; 800 kV--2.0 per unit.
    Additional discussion of maximum transient overvoltages can be 
found in paragraph IV.A.2, later in this Appendix.

III. Determination of the Electrical Component of Minimum Approach 
Distances

A. Voltages of 1.1 kV to 72.5 kV

    For voltages of 1.1 kV to 72.5 kV, the electrical component of 
minimum approach distances is based on American National Standards 
Institute (ANSI)/American Institute of Electrical Engineers (AIEE) 
Standard No.4, March 1943, Tables III and IV. (AIEE is the 
predecessor technical society to the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronic Engineers (IEEE).) These distances are calculated by the 
following formula:

Equation (1)--For voltages of 1.1 kV to 72.5 kV

TR31JA94.010

Where:

D=Electrical component of the minimum approach distance in air in feet
Vmax=Maximum rated line-to-ground rms voltage in kV
pu=Maximum transient overvoltage factor in per unit

    Source: AIEE Standard No. 4, 1943.

    This formula has been used to generate Table 1. 

Table 1.--AC Energized Line-Work Phase-to-Ground Electrical Component of
              the Minimum Approach Distance--1.1 to 72.5 kV             
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Maximum anticipated                Phase to phase voltage              
 per-unit transient  ---------------------------------------------------
     overvoltage         15,000       36,000       46,000       72,500  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3.0.................         0.08         0.33         0.49         1.03
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Note: The distances given (in feet) are for air as the 
insulating medium and provide no additional clearance for 
inadvertent movement.

B. Voltages of 72.6 kV to 800 kV

    For voltages of 72.6 kV to 800 kV, the electrical component of 
minimum approach distances is based on ANSI/IEEE Standard 516-1987, 
``IEEE Guide for Maintenance Methods on Energized Power Lines.'' 
This standard gives the electrical component of the minimum approach 
distance based on power frequency rod-gap data, supplemented with 
transient overvoltage information and a saturation factor for high 
voltages. The distances listed in ANSI/IEEE Standard 516 have been 
calculated according to the following formula:

Equation (2)--For voltages of 72.6 kV to 800 kV

TR31JA94.011

Where:

D=Electrical component of the minimum approach distance in air in feet
C=0.01 to take care of correction factors associated with the variation 
of gap sparkover with voltage
a=A factor relating to the saturation of air at voltages of 345 kV or 
higher
pu=Maximum anticipated transient overvoltage, in per unit (p.u.)
Vmax=Maximum rms system line-to-ground voltage in kilovolts--it 
should be the ``actual'' maximum, or the normal highest voltage for the 
range (for example, 10 percent above the nominal voltage)

    Source: Formula developed from ANSI/IEEE Standard No. 516, 1987.

    This formula is used to calculate the electrical component of 
the minimum approach distances in air and is used in the development 
of Table 2 and Table 3.

Table 2.--AC Energized Line-Work Phase-to-Ground Electrical Component of
               the Minimum Approach Distance--121to 242 kV              
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Maximum anticipated                Phase to phase voltage              
 per-unit transient  ---------------------------------------------------
     overvoltage        121,000      145,000      169,000      242,000  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.0.................         1.40         1.70         2.00         2.80
2.1.................         1.47         1.79         2.10         2.94
2.2.................         1.54         1.87         2.20         3.08
2.3.................         1.61         1.96         2.30         3.22
2.4.................         1.68         2.04         2.40         3.35
2.5.................         1.75         2.13         2.50         3.50
2.6.................         1.82         2.21         2.60         3.64
2.7.................         1.89         2.30         2.70         3.76
2.8.................         1.96         2.38         2.80         3.92
2.9.................         2.03         2.47         2.90         4.05
3.0.................         2.10         2.55         3.00         4.29
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Note: The distances given (in feet) are for air as the 
insulating medium and provide no additional clearance for 
inadvertent movement.

Table 3.--AC Energized Line-Work Phase-to-Ground Electrical Component of
              the Minimum Approach Distance--362 to 800 kv              
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum anticipated per-              Phase to phase voltage            
     unit transient      -----------------------------------------------
      overvoltage            362,000         552,000          800,000   
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5.....................  ..............            4.97            8.66
1.6.....................  ..............            5.46            9.60
1.7.....................  ..............            5.98           10.60
1.8.....................  ..............            6.51           11.64
1.9.....................  ..............            7.08           12.73
2.0.....................            4.20            7.68           13.86
2.1.....................            4.41            8.27  ..............
2.2.....................            4.70            8.87  ..............
2.3.....................            5.01            9.49  ..............
2.4.....................            5.34           10.21  ..............
2.5.....................            5.67  ..............  ..............
2.6.....................            6.01  ..............  ..............
2.7.....................            6.36  ..............  ..............
2.8.....................            6.73  ..............  ..............
2.9.....................            7.10  ..............  ..............
3.0.....................            7.48  ..............  ..............
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Note: The distances given (in feet) are for air as the 
insulating medium and provide no additional clearance for 
inadvertent movement.

C. Provisions for Inadvertent Movement

    The minimum approach distances (working distances) must include 
an ``adder'' to compensate for the inadvertent movement of the 
worker relative to an energized part or the movement of the part 
relative to the worker. A certain allowance must be made to account 
for this possible inadvertent movement and to provide the worker 
with a comfortable and safe zone in which to work. A distance for 
inadvertent movement (called the ``ergonomic component of the 
minimum approach distance'') must be added to the electrical 
component to determine the total safe minimum approach distances 
used in live-line work.
    One approach that can be used to estimate the ergonomic 
component of the minimum approach distance is response time-distance 
analysis. When this technique is used, the total response time to a 
hazardous incident is estimated and converted to distance travelled. 
For example, the driver of a car takes a given amount of time to 
respond to a ``stimulus'' and stop the vehicle. The elapsed time 
involved results in a distance being travelled before the car comes 
to a complete stop. This distance is dependent on the speed of the 
car at the time the stimulus appears.
    In the case of live-line work, the employee must first perceive 
that he or she is approaching the danger zone. Then, the worker 
responds to the danger and must decelerate and stop all motion 
toward the energized part. During the time it takes to stop, a 
distance will have been traversed. It is this distance that must be 
added to the electrical component of the minimum approach distance 
to obtain the total safe minimum approach distance.
    At voltages below 72.5 kV, the electrical component of the 
minimum approach distance is smaller than the ergonomic component. 
At 72.5 kV the electrical component is only a little more than 1 
foot. An ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance is 
needed that will provide for all the worker's expected movements. 
The usual live-line work method for these voltages is the use of 
rubber insulating equipment, frequently rubber gloves. The energized 
object needs to be far enough away to provide the worker's face with 
a safe approach distance, as his or her hands and arms are 
insulated. In this case, 2 feet has been accepted as a sufficient 
and practical value.
    For voltages between 72.6 and 800 kV, there is a change in the 
work practices employed during energized line work. Generally, live-
line tools (hot sticks) are employed to perform work while equipment 
is energized. These tools, by design, keep the energized part at a 
constant distance from the employee and thus maintain the 
appropriate minimum approach distance automatically.
    The length of the ergonomic component of the minimum approach 
distance is also influenced by the location of the worker and by the 
nature of the work. In these higher voltage ranges, the employees 
use work methods that more tightly control their movements than when 
the workers perform rubber glove work. The worker is farther from 
energized line or equipment and needs to be more precise in his or 
her movements just to perform the work.
    For these reasons, a smaller ergonomic component of the minimum 
approach distance is needed, and a distance of 1 foot has been 
selected for voltages between 72.6 and 800 kV.
    Table 4 summarizes the ergonomic component of the minimum 
approach distance for the two voltage ranges. 

       Table 4.--Ergonomic Component of Minimum Approach Distance       
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Distance
                     Voltage range (kV)                         (feet)  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.1 to 72.5..................................................        2.0
72.6 to 800..................................................       1.0 
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Note: This distance must be added to the electrical component of 
the minimum approach distance to obtain the full minimum approach 
distance.

D. Bare-Hand Live-Line Minimum Approach Distances

    Calculating the strength of phase-to-phase transient 
overvoltages is complicated by the varying time displacement between 
overvoltages on parallel conductors (electrodes) and by the varying 
ratio between the positive and negative voltages on the two 
electrodes. The time displacement causes the maximum voltage between 
phases to be less than the sum of the phase-to-ground voltages. The 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Technical Committee 
28, Working Group 2, has developed the following formula for 
determining the phase-to-phase maximum transient overvoltage, based 
on the per unit (p.u.) of the system nominal voltage phase-to-ground 
crest:

pup=pug+1.6.

Where:

pug=p.u. phase-to-ground maximum transient overvoltage
pup=p.u. phase-to-phase maximum transient overvoltage

    This value of maximum anticipated transient overvoltage must be 
used in Equation (2) to calculate the phase-to-phase minimum 
approach distances for live-line bare-hand work.

E. Compiling the Minimum Approach Distance Tables

    For each voltage involved, the distance in table 4 in this 
appendix has been added to the distance in Table 1, Table 2 or Table 
3 in this appendix to determine the resulting minimum approach 
distances in Table R-6, Table R-7, and in Table R-8 in 
Sec. 1910.269.

F. Miscellaneous Correction Factors

    The strength of an air gap is influenced by the changes in the 
air medium that forms the insulation. A brief discussion of each 
factor follows, with a summary at the end.
    1. Dielectric strength of air. The dielectric strength of air in 
a uniform electric field at standard atmospheric conditions is 
approximately 31 kV (crest) per cm at 60 Hz. The disruptive gradient 
is affected by the air pressure, temperature, and humidity, by the 
shape, dimensions, and separation of the electrodes, and by the 
characteristics of the applied voltage (wave shape).
    2. Atmospheric effect. Flashover for a given air gap is 
inhibited by an increase in the density (humidity) of the air. The 
empirically determined electrical strength of a given gap is 
normally applicable at standard atmospheric conditions (20 deg.C, 
101.3 kPa, 11 g/cm3 humidity).
    The combination of temperature and air pressure that gives the 
lowest gap flashover voltage is high temperature and low pressure. 
These are conditions not likely to occur simultaneously. Low air 
pressure is generally associated with high humidity, and this causes 
increased electrical strength. An average air pressure is more 
likely to be associated with low humidity. Hot and dry working 
conditions are thus normally associated with reduced electrical 
strength.
    The electrical component of the minimum approach distances in 
Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3 and has been calculated using the 
maximum transient overvoltages to determine withstand voltages at 
standard atmospheric conditions.
    3. Altitude. The electrical strength of an air gap is reduced at 
high altitude, due principally to the reduced air pressure. An 
increase of 3% in the minimum approach distance for altitudes above 
1000 meters is required. Table R-10 of Sec. 1910.269 presents this 
information in tabular form.
    Summary. After taking all these correction factors into account 
and after considering their interrelationships relative to the air 
gap insulation strength and the conditions under which live work is 
performed, one finds that only a correction for altitude need be 
made. An elevation of 1000 meters is established as the base 
elevation, and the values of the electrical component of the minimum 
approach distances has been derived with this correction factor in 
mind. Thus, the values used for elevations below 1000 meters are 
conservative without any change; corrections have to be made only 
above this base elevation.

IV. Determination of Reduced Minimum Approach Distances

A. Factors Affecting Voltage Stress at the Work Site

    1. System voltage (nominal). The nominal system voltage range 
sets the absolute lower limit for the minimum approach distance. The 
highest value within the range, as given in the relevant table, is 
selected and used as a reference for per unit calculations.
    2. Transient overvoltages. Transient overvoltages may be 
generated on an electrical system by the operation of switches or 
breakers, by the occurrence of a fault on the line or circuit being 
worked or on an adjacent circuit, and by similar activities. Most of 
the overvoltages are caused by switching, and the term ``switching 
surge'' is often used to refer generically to all types of 
overvoltages. However, each overvoltage has an associated transient 
voltage wave shape. The wave shape arriving at the site and its 
magnitude vary considerably.
    The information used in the development of the minimum approach 
distances takes into consideration the most common wave shapes; 
thus, the required minimum approach distances are appropriate for 
any transient overvoltage level usually found on electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution systems. The values of 
the per unit (p.u.) voltage relative to the nominal maximum voltage 
are used in the calculation of these distances.
    3. Typical magnitude of overvoltages. The magnitude of typical 
transient overvoltages is given in Table 5.
    4. Standard deviation--air-gap withstand. For each air gap 
length, and under the same atmospheric conditions, there is a 
statistical variation in the breakdown voltage. The probability of 
the breakdown voltage is assumed to have a normal (Gaussian) 
distribution. The standard deviation of this distribution varies 
with the wave shape, gap geometry, and the atmospheric conditions. 
The withstand voltage of the air gap used in calculating the 
electrical component of the minimum approach distance has been set 
at three standard deviations (3\1\) below the critical 
flashover voltage. (The critical flashover voltage is the crest 
value of the impulse wave that, under specified conditions, causes 
flashover on 50 percent of the applications. An impulse wave of 
three standard deviations below this value, that is, the withstand 
voltage, has a probability of flashover of approximately 1 in 1000.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\Sigma  is the symbol for standard deviation.

          Table 5.--Magnitude of Typical Transient Overvoltages         
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               Magnitude
                            Cause                                 (per  
                                                                 unit)  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Energized 200 mile line without closing resistors............        3.5
Energized 200 mile line with one step closing resistor.......        2.1
Energized 200 mile line with multi-step resistor.............        2.5
Reclosed with trapped charge one step resistor...............        2.2
Opening surge with single restrike...........................        3.0
Fault initiation unfaulted phase.............................        2.1
Fault initiation adjacent circuit............................        2.5
Fault clearing...............................................   1.7-1.9 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: ANSI/IEEE Standard No. 516, 1987.                               

    5. Broken Insulators. Tests have shown that the insulation 
strength of an insulator string with broken skirts is reduced. 
Broken units may have lost up to 70% of their withstand capacity. 
Because the insulating capability of a broken unit cannot be 
determined without testing it, damaged units in an insulator are 
usually considered to have no insulating value. Additionally, the 
overall insulating strength of a string with broken units may be 
further reduced in the presence of a live-line tool alongside. The 
number of good units that must be present in a string is based on 
the maximum overvoltage possible at the worksite.

B. Minimum Approach Distances Based on Known Maximum Anticipated Per-
Unit Transient Overvoltages

    1. Reduction of the minimum approach distance for AC systems. 
When the transient overvoltage values are known and supplied by the 
employer, Table R-7 and Table R-8 of Sec. 1910.269 allow the minimum 
approach distances from energized parts to be reduced. In order to 
determine what this maximum overvoltage is, the employer must 
undertake an engineering analysis of the system. As a result of this 
engineering study, the employer must provide new live work 
procedures, reflecting the new minimum approach distances, the 
conditions and limitations of application of the new minimum 
approach distances, and the specific practices to be used when these 
procedures are implemented.
    2. Calculation of reduced approach distance values. The 
following method of calculating reduced minimum approach distances 
is based on ANSI/IEEE Standard 516:
    Step 1. Determine the maximum voltage (with respect to a given 
nominal voltage range) for the energized part.
    Step 2. Determine the maximum transient overvoltage (normally a 
switching surge) that can be present at the work site during work 
operation.
    Step 3. Determine the technique to be used to control the 
maximum transient overvoltage. (See paragraphs IV.C and IV.D of this 
appendix.) Determine the maximum voltage that can exist at the work 
site with that form of control in place and with a confidence level 
of 3. This voltage is considered to be the withstand 
voltage for the purpose of calculating the appropriate minimum 
approach distance.
    Step 4. Specify in detail the control technique to be used, and 
direct its implementation during the course of the work.
    Step 5. Using the new value of transient overvoltage in per unit 
(p.u.), determine the required phase-to-ground minimum approach 
distance from Table R-7 or Table R-8 of Sec. 1910.269.

Methods of Controlling Possible Transient Overvoltage Stress Found on a 
System

    1. Introduction. There are several means of controlling 
overvoltages that occur on transmission systems. First, the 
operation of circuit breakers or other switching devices may be 
modified to reduce switching transient overvoltages. Second, the 
overvoltage itself may be forcibly held to an acceptable level by 
means of installation of surge arresters at the specific location to 
be protected. Third, the transmission system may be changed to 
minimize the effect of switching operations.
    2. Operation of circuit breakers.2 The maximum transient 
overvoltage that can reach the work site is often due to switching 
on the line on which work is being performed. If the automatic-
reclosing is removed during energized line work so that the line 
will not be re-energized after being opened for any reason, the 
maximum switching surge overvoltage is then limited to the larger of 
the opening surge or the greatest possible fault-generated surge, 
provided that the devices (for example, insertion resistors) are 
operable and will function to limit the transient overvoltage. It is 
essential that the operating ability of such devices be assured when 
they are employed to limit the overvoltage level. If it is prudent 
not to remove the reclosing feature (because of system operating 
conditions), other methods of controlling the switching surge level 
may be necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ The detailed design of a circuit interrupter, such as the 
design of the contacts, of resistor insertion, and of breaker timing 
control, are beyond the scope of this appendix. These features are 
routinely provided as part of the design for the system. Only 
features that can limit the maximum switching transient overvoltage 
on a system are discussed in this appendix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Transient surges on an adjacent line, particularly for double 
circuit construction, may cause a significant overvoltage on the 
line on which work is being performed. The coupling to adjacent 
lines must be accounted for when minimum approach distances are 
calculated based on the maximum transient overvoltage.
    3. Surge arresters. The use of modern surge arresters has 
permitted a reduction in the basic impulse-insulation levels of much 
transmission system equipment. The primary function of early 
arresters was to protect the system insulation from the effects of 
lightning. Modern arresters not only dissipate lightning-caused 
transients, but may also control many other system transients that 
may be caused by switching or faults.
    It is possible to use properly designed arresters to control 
transient overvoltages along a transmission line and thereby reduce 
the requisite length of the insulator string. On the other hand, if 
the installation of arresters has not been used to reduce the length 
of the insulator string, it may be used to reduce the minimum 
approach distance instead.3
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ Surge arrestor application is beyond the scope of this 
appendix. However, if the arrester is installed near the work site, 
the application would be similar to protective gaps as discussed in 
paragraph IV.D. of this appendix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. Switching Restrictions. Another form of overvoltage control 
is the establishment of switching restrictions, under which breakers 
are not permitted to be operated until certain system conditions are 
satisfied. Restriction of switching is achieved by the use of a 
tagging system, similar to that used for a ``permit'', except that 
the common term used for this activity is a ``hold-off'' or 
``restriction''. These terms are used to indicate that operation is 
not prevented, but only modified during the live-work activity.

D. Minimum Approach Distance Based on Control of Voltage Stress 
(Overvoltages) at the Work Site.

    Reduced minimum approach distances can be calculated as follows:
    1. First Method--Determining the reduced minimum approach 
distance from a given withstand voltage.4
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ Since a given rod gap of a given configuration corresponds 
to a certain withstand voltage, this method can also be used to 
determine the minimum approach distance for a known gap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Step 1. Select the appropriate withstand voltage for the 
protective gap based on system requirements and an acceptable 
probability of actual gap flashover.
    Step 2. Determine a gap distance that provides a withstand 
voltage5 greater than or equal to the one selected in the first 
step.6
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ The withstand voltage for the gap is equal to 85 percent of 
its critical flashover voltage.
    \6\ Switch steps 1 and 2 if the length of the protective gap is 
known. The withstand voltage must then be checked to ensure that it 
provides an acceptable probability of gap flashover. In general, it 
should be at least 1.25 times the maximum crest operating voltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Step 3. Using 110 percent of the gap's critical flashover 
voltage, determine the electrical component of the minimum approach 
distance from Equation (2) or Table 6, which is a tabulation of 
distance vs. withstand voltage based on Equation (2).
    Step 4. Add the 1-foot ergonomic component to obtain the total 
minimum approach distance to be maintained by the employee.
    2. Second Method--Determining the necessary protective gap 
length from a desired (reduced) minimum approach distance.
    Step 1. Determine the desired minimum approach distance for the 
employee. Subtract the 1-foot ergonomic component of the minimum 
approach distance.
    Step 2. Using this distance, calculate the air gap withstand 
voltage from Equation (2). Alternatively, find the voltage 
corresponding to the distance in Table 6.7
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ Since the value of the saturation factor, a, in is dependent 
on the maximum voltage, several iterative computations may be 
necessary to determine the correct withstand voltage using the 
equation. A graph of withstand voltage vs. distance is given in 
ANSI/IEEE Std. 516, 1987. This graph could also be used to determine 
the appropriate withstand voltage for the minimum approach distance 
involved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Step 3. Select a protective gap distance corresponding to a 
critical flashover voltage that, when multiplied by 110 percent, is 
less than or equal to the withstand voltage from Step 2.
    Step 4. Calculate the withstand voltage of the protective gap 
(85 percent of the critical flashover voltage) to ensure that it 
provides an acceptable risk of flashover during the time the gap is 
installed.

        Table 6.--Withstand Distances for Transient Overvoltages        
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               Withstand
                                                               distance 
                     Crest voltage (kV)                        (in feet)
                                                                air gap 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
100.........................................................        0.71
150.........................................................        1.06
200.........................................................        1.41
250.........................................................        1.77
300.........................................................        2.12
350.........................................................        2.47
400.........................................................        2.83
450.........................................................        3.18
500.........................................................        3.54
550.........................................................        3.89
600.........................................................        4.24
650.........................................................        4.60
700.........................................................        5.17
750.........................................................        5.73
800.........................................................        6.31
850.........................................................        6.91
900.........................................................        7.57
950.........................................................        8.23
1000........................................................        8.94
1050........................................................        9.65
1100........................................................       10.42
1150........................................................       11.18
1200........................................................       12.05
1250........................................................       12.90
1300........................................................       13.79
1350........................................................       14.70
1400........................................................       15.64
1450........................................................       16.61
1500........................................................       17.61
1550........................................................       18.63
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Calculations are based on Equation (2).                         
                                                                        
Note: The air gap is based on the 60-Hz rod-gap withstand distance.     

    3. Sample protective gap calculations.
    Problem 1: Work is to be performed on a 500-kV transmission line 
that is subject to transient overvoltages of 2.4 p.u. The maximum 
operating voltage of the line is 552 kV. Determine the length of the 
protective gap that will provide the minimum practical safe approach 
distance. Also, determine what that minimum approach distance is.
    Step 1. Calculate the smallest practical maximum transient 
overvoltage (1.25 times the crest line-to-ground voltage):\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\To eliminate unwanted flashovers due to minor system 
disturbances, it is desirable to have the crest withstand voltage no 
lower than 1.25 p.u.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      

TR31JA94.012

This will be the withstand voltage of the protective gap.
    Step 2. Using test data for a particular protective gap, select 
a gap that has a critical flashover voltage greater than or equal 
to:


TR31JA94.013

For example, if a protective gap with a 4.0-foot spacing tested to a 
critical flashover voltage of 665 kV, crest, select this gap 
spacing.
    Step 3. This protective gap corresponds to a 110 percent of 
critical flashover voltage value of:


TR31JA94.014

    This corresponds to the withstand voltage of the electrical 
component of the minimum approach distance.
    Step 4. Using this voltage in Equation (2) results in an 
electrical component of the minimum approach distance of:


TR31JA94.015

    Step 5. Add 1 foot to the distance calculated in step 4, 
resulting in a total minimum approach distance of 6.5 feet.
    Problem 2: For a line operating at a maximum voltage of 552 kV 
subject to a maximum transient overvoltage of 2.4 p.u., find a 
protective gap distance that will permit the use of a 9.0-foot 
minimum approach distance. (A minimum approach distance of 11 feet, 
3 inches is normally required.)
    Step 1. The electrical component of the minimum approach 
distance is 8.0 feet (9.0-1.0).
    Step 2. From Table 6, select the withstand voltage corresponding 
to a distance of 8.0 feet. By interpolation:


TR31JA94.016

    Step 3. The voltage calculated in Step 2 corresponds to 110 
percent of the critical flashover voltage of the gap that should be 
employed. Using test data for a particular protective gap, select a 
gap that has a critical flashover voltage less than or equal to:


TR31JA94.017

For example, if a protective gap with a 5.8-foot spacing tested to a 
critical flashover voltage of 820 kV, crest, select this gap 
spacing.
    Step 4. The withstand voltage of this protective gap would be:


TR31JA94.018

The maximum operating crest voltage would be:


TR31JA94.019

and the maximum per unit transient overvoltage during the time the 
protective gap is installed would be:


TR31JA94.020

    If this is acceptable, the protective gap could be installed 
with a 5.8-foot spacing, and the minimum approach distance could 
then be reduced to 9.0 feet.
    4. Comments and variations. The 1-foot ergonomic component of 
the minimum approach distance must be added to the electrical 
component of the minimum approach distance calculated under 
paragraph IV.D of this appendix. The calculations may be varied by 
starting with the protective gap distance or by starting with the 
minimum approach distance.

E. Location of Protective Gaps

    1. Installation of the protective gap on a structure adjacent to 
the work site is an acceptable practice, as this does not 
significantly reduce the protection afforded by the gap.
    2. Gaps installed at terminal stations of lines or circuits 
provide a given level of protection. The level may not, however, 
extend throughout the length of the line to the worksite. The use of 
gaps at terminal stations must be studied in depth. The use of 
substation terminal gaps raises the possibility that separate surges 
could enter the line at opposite ends, each with low enough 
magnitude to pass the terminal gaps without flashover. When voltage 
surges are initiated simultaneously at each end of a line and travel 
toward each other, the total voltage on the line at the point where 
they meet is the arithmetic sum of the two surges. A gap that is 
installed within 0.5 mile of the work site will protect against such 
intersecting waves. Engineering studies of a particular line or 
system may indicate that adequate protection can be provided by even 
more distant gaps.
    3. If protective gaps are used at the work site, the work site 
impulse insulation strength is established by the gap setting. 
Lightning strikes as much as 6 miles away from the worksite may 
cause a voltage surge greater than the insulation withstand voltage, 
and a gap flashover may occur. The flashover will not occur between 
the employee and the line, but across the protective gap instead.
    4. There are two reasons to disable the automatic-reclosing 
feature of circuit-interrupting devices while employees are 
performing live-line maintenance:
     To prevent the reenergizing of a circuit faulted by 
actions of a worker, which could possibly create a hazard or 
compound injuries or damage produced by the original fault;
     To prevent any transient overvoltage caused by the 
switching surge that would occur if the circuit were reenergized.
    However, due to system stability considerations, it may not 
always be feasible to disable the automatic-reclosing feature.

Appendix C to Section 1910.269--Protection from Step and Touch 
Potentials

I. Introduction

    When a ground fault occurs on a power line, voltage is impressed 
on the ``grounded'' object faulting the line. The voltage to which 
this object rises depends largely on the voltage on the line, on the 
impedance of the faulted conductor, and on the impedance to 
``true,'' or ``absolute,'' ground represented by the object. If the 
object causing the fault represents a relatively large impedance, 
the voltage impressed on it is essentially the phase-to-ground 
system voltage. However, even faults to well grounded transmission 
towers or substation structures can result in hazardous 
voltages.1 The degree of the hazard depends upon the magnitude 
of the fault current and the time of exposure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ This appendix provides information primarily with respect to 
employee protection from contact between equipment being used and an 
energized power line. The information presented is also relevant to 
ground faults to transmission towers and substation structures; 
however, grounding systems for these structures should be designed 
to minimize the step and touch potentials involved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Voltage-Gradient Distribution

A. Voltage-Gradient Distribution Curve

    The dissipation of voltage from a grounding electrode (or from 
the grounded end of an energized grounded object) is called the 
ground potential gradient. Voltage drops associated with this 
dissipation of voltage are called ground potentials. Figure 1 is a 
typical voltage-gradient distribution curve (assuming a uniform soil 
texture). This graph shows that voltage decreases rapidly with 
increasing distance from the grounding electrode.

B. Step and Touch Potentials

    ``Step potential'' is the voltage between the feet of a person 
standing near an energized grounded object. It is equal to the 
difference in voltage, given by the voltage distribution curve, 
between two points at different distances from the ``electrode''. A 
person could be at risk of injury during a fault simply by standing 
near the grounding point.
    ``Touch potential'' is the voltage between the energized object 
and the feet of a person in contact with the object. It is equal to 
the difference in voltage between the object (which is at a distance 
of 0 feet) and a point some distance away. It should be noted that 
the touch potential could be nearly the full voltage across the 
grounded object if that object is grounded at a point remote from 
the place where the person is in contact with it. For example, a 
crane that was grounded to the system neutral and that contacted an 
energized line would expose any person in contact with the crane or 
its uninsulated load line to a touch potential nearly equal to the 
full fault voltage.
    Step and touch potentials are illustrated in Figure 2.

BILLING CODE 4510-26-P

TR31JA94.007


TR31JA94.008

C. Protection From the Hazards of Ground-Potential Gradients. An 
engineering analysis of the power system under fault conditions can be 
used to determine whether or not hazardous step and touch voltages will 
develop. The result of this analysis can ascertain the need for 
protective measures and can guide the selection of appropriate 
precautions.

    Several methods may be used to protect employees from hazardous 
ground-potential gradients, including equipotential zones, 
insulating equipment, and restricted work areas.
    1. The creation of an equipotential zone will protect a worker 
standing within it from hazardous step and touch potentials. (See 
Figure 3.) Such a zone can be produced through the use of a metal 
mat connected to the grounded object. In some cases, a grounding 
grid can be used to equalize the voltage within the grid. 
Equipotential zones will not, however, protect employees who are 
either wholly or partially outside the protected area. Bonding 
conductive objects in the immediate work area can also be used to 
minimize the potential between the objects and between each object 
and ground. (Bonding an object outside the work area can increase 
the touch potential to that object in some cases, however.)
    2. The use of insulating equipment, such as rubber gloves, can 
protect employees handling grounded equipment and conductors from 
hazardous touch potentials. The insulating equipment must be rated 
for the highest voltage that can be impressed on the grounded 
objects under fault conditions (rather than for the full system 
voltage).
    3. Restricting employees from areas where hazardous step or 
touch potentials could arise can protect employees not directly 
involved in the operation being performed. Employees on the ground 
in the vicinity of transmission structures should be kept at a 
distance where step voltages would be insufficient to cause injury. 
Employees should not handle grounded conductors or equipment likely 
to become energized to hazardous voltages unless the employees are 
within an equipotential zone or are protected by insulating 
equipment.

BILLING CODE 4510-26-P

TR31JA94.009

Appendix D to Section 1910.269--Methods of Inspecting and Testing 
Wood Poles

I. Introduction

    When work is to be performed on a wood pole, it is important to 
determine the condition of the pole before it is climbed. The weight 
of the employee, the weight of equipment being installed, and other 
working stresses (such as the removal or retensioning of conductors) 
can lead to the failure of a defective pole or one that is not 
designed to handle the additional stresses.\1\ For these reasons, it 
is essential that an inspection and test of the condition of a wood 
pole be performed before it is climbed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\A properly guyed pole in good condition should, at a minimum, 
be able to handle the weight of an employee climbing it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If the pole is found to be unsafe to climb or to work from, it 
must be secured so that it does not fail while an employee is on it. 
The pole can be secured by a line truck boom, by ropes or guys, or 
by lashing a new pole alongside it. If a new one is lashed alongside 
the defective pole, work should be performed from the new one.

II. Inspection of Wood Poles

    Wood poles should be inspected by a qualified employee for the 
following conditions:\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\The presence of any of these conditions is an indication that 
the pole may not be safe to climb or to work from. The employee 
performing the inspection must be qualified to make a determination 
as to whether or not it is safe to perform the work without taking 
additional precautions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. General Condition

    The pole should be inspected for buckling at the ground line and 
for an unusual angle with respect to the ground. Buckling and odd 
angles may indicate that the pole has rotted or is broken.

B. Cracks

    The pole should be inspected for cracks. Horizontal cracks 
perpendicular to the grain of the wood may weaken the pole. Vertical 
ones, although not considered to be a sign of a defective pole, can 
pose a hazard to the climber, and the employee should keep his or 
her gaffs away from them while climbing.

C. Holes

    Hollow spots and woodpecker holes can reduce the strength of a 
wood pole.

D. Shell Rot and Decay.

    Rotting and decay is a cutout hazard and a possible indication 
of the age and internal condition of the pole.

Knots

    E. Knots
    One large knot or several smaller ones at the same height on the 
pole may be evidence of a weak point on the pole.

F. Depth of Setting

    Evidence of the existence of a former ground line substantially 
above the existing ground level may be an indication that the pole 
is no longer buried to a sufficient extent.

G. Soil Conditions

    Soft, wet, or loose soil may not support any changes of stress 
on the pole.

H. Burn Marks

    Burning from transformer failures or conductor faults could 
damage the pole so that it cannot withstand mechanical stress 
changes.

III. Testing of Wood Poles

    The following tests, which have been taken from 
Sec. 1910.268(n)(3), are recognized as acceptable methods of testing 
wood poles:

A. Hammer Test

    Rap the pole sharply with a hammer weighing about 3 pounds, 
starting near the ground line and continuing upwards 
circumferentially around the pole to a height of approximately 6 
feet. The hammer will produce a clear sound and rebound sharply when 
striking sound wood. Decay pockets will be indicated by a dull sound 
or a less pronounced hammer rebound. Also, prod the pole as near the 
ground line as possible using a pole prod or a screwdriver with a 
blade at least 5 inches long. If substantial decay is encountered, 
the pole is considered unsafe.

B. Rocking Test

    Apply a horizontal force to the pole and attempt to rock it back 
and forth in a direction perpendicular to the line. Caution must be 
exercised to avoid causing power lines to swing together. The force 
may be applied either by pushing with a pike pole or pulling with a 
rope. If the pole cracks during the test, it shall be considered 
unsafe.

Appendix E to Section 1910.269--Reference Documents

    The references contained in this appendix provide information 
that can be helpful in understanding and complying with the 
requirements contained in Sec. 1910.269. The national consensus 
standards referenced in this appendix contain detailed 
specifications that employers may follow in complying with the more 
performance-oriented requirements of OSHA's final rule. Except as 
specifically noted in Sec. 1910.269, however, compliance with the 
national consensus standards is not a substitute for compliance with 
the provisions of the OSHA standard.

    ANSI A92.2-1979, American National Standard for Vehicle-Mounted 
Elevating and Rotating Aerial Devices.
    ANSI C2-1993, National Electrical Safety Code.
    ANSI Z133.1-1988, American National Standard Safety Requirements 
for Pruning, Trimming, Repairing, Maintaining, and Removing Trees, 
and for Cutting Brush.
    ANSI/ASME B20.1-1990, Safety Standard for Conveyors and Related 
Equipment.
    ANSI/IEEE Std. 4-1978 (Fifth Printing), IEEE Standard Techniques 
for High-Voltage Testing.
    ANSI/IEEE Std. 100-1988, IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical 
and Electronic Terms.
    ANSI/IEEE Std. 516-1987, IEEE Guide for Maintenance Methods on 
Energized Power-Lines.
    ANSI/IEEE Std. 935-1989, IEEE Guide on Terminology for Tools and 
Equipment to Be Used in Live Line Working.
    ANSI/IEEE Std. 957-1987, IEEE Guide for Cleaning Insulators.
    ANSI/IEEE Std. 978-1984 (R1991), IEEE Guide for In-Service 
Maintenance and Electrical Testing of Live-Line Tools.
    ASTM D 120-87, Specification for Rubber Insulating Gloves.
    ASTM D 149-92, Test Method for Dielectric Breakdown Voltage and 
Dielectric Strength of Solid Electrical Insulating Materials at 
Commercial Power Frequencies.
    ASTM D 178-88, Specification for Rubber Insulating Matting.
    ASTM D 1048-88a, Specification for Rubber Insulating Blankets.
    ASTM D 1049-88, Specification for Rubber Insulating Covers.
    ASTM D 1050-90, Specification for Rubber Insulating Line Hose.
    ASTM D 1051-87, Specification for Rubber Insulating Sleeves.
    ASTM F 478-92, Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating 
Line Hose and Covers.
    ASTM F 479-88a, Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating 
Blankets.
    ASTM F 496-91, Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating 
Gloves and Sleeves.
    ASTM F 711-89, Specification for Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic 
(FRP) Rod and Tube Used in Live Line Tools.
    ASTM F 712-88, Test Methods for Electrically Insulating Plastic 
Guard Equipment for Protection of Workers.
    ASTM F 819-83a (1988), Definitions of Terms Relating to 
Electrical Protective Equipment for Workers.
    ASTM F 855-90, Specifications for Temporary Grounding Systems to 
Be Used on De-Energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment.
    ASTM F 887-91a, Specifications for Personal Climbing Equipment.
    ASTM F 914-91, Test Method for Acoustic Emission for Insulated 
Aerial Personnel Devices.
    ASTM F 968-93, Specification for Electrically Insulating Plastic 
Guard Equipment for Protection of Workers.
    ASTM F 1116-88, Test Method for Determining Dielectric Strength 
of Overshoe Footwear.
    ASTM F 1117-87, Specification for Dielectric Overshoe Footwear.
    ASTM F 1236-89, Guide for Visual Inspection of Electrical 
Protective Rubber Products.
    IEEE Std. 62-1978, IEEE Guide for Field Testing Power Apparatus 
Insulation.
    IEEE Std. 524-1992, IEEE Guide to the Installation of Overhead 
Transmission Line Conductors.
    IEEE Std. 1048-1990, IEEE Guide for Protective Grounding of 
Power Lines.
    IEEE Std. 1067-1990, IEEE Guide for the In-Service Use, Care, 
Maintenance, and Testing of Conductive Clothing for Use on Voltages 
up to 765 kV AC.

Subpart S--Electrical

    5. The authority citation for subpart S of part 1910 continues to 
read as follows:

    Authority: Secs. 4, 6, 8, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 (29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657); Secretary of Labor's Order No. 8-76 
(41 FR 25059) or 1-90 (55 FR 9033), as applicable; 29 CFR Part 1911.

    6. Note 2 following paragraph (c)(1) of Sec. 1910.331 is 
redesignated as Note 3.
    7. A new Note 2 is added, and existing Note 3 is revised, to read 
as follows:


Sec. 1910.331  Scope.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (1) * * *

    Note 2: For work on or directly associated with utilization 
installations, an employer who complies with the work practices of 
Sec. 1910.269 (electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution) will be deemed to be in compliance with 
Sec. 1910.333(c) and Sec. 1910.335. However, the requirements of 
Sec. 1910.332, Sec. 1910.333(a), Sec. 1910.333(b), and Sec. 1910.334 
apply to all work on or directly associated with utilization 
installations, regardless of whether the work is performed by 
qualified or unqualified persons.
    Note 3: Work on or directly associated with generation, 
transmission, or distribution installations includes:
    (1) Work performed directly on such installations, such as 
repairing overhead or underground distribution lines or repairing a 
feed-water pump for the boiler in a generating plant.
    (2) Work directly associated with such installations, such as 
line-clearance tree trimming and replacing utility poles.
    (3) Work on electric utilization circuits in a generating plant 
provided that:
    (A) Such circuits are commingled with installations of power 
generation equipment or circuits, and
    (B) The generation equipment or circuits present greater 
electrical hazards than those posed by the utilization equipment or 
circuits (such as exposure to higher voltages or lack of overcurrent 
protection).

    This work is covered by Sec. 1910.269 of this Part.
* * * * *
    8. The first sentence of the note after the introductory text in 
Sec. 1910.333(c)(3) is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 1910.333  Selection and use of work practices.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (3) * * *

    Note: The work practices used by qualified persons installing 
insulating devices on overhead power transmission or distribution 
lines are covered by Sec. 1910.269 of this Part, not by 
Sec. Sec. 1910.332 through 1910.335 of this Part. * * *
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 94-1300 Filed 1-28-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P