[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 20 (Monday, January 31, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-1300]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: January 31, 1994]
_______________________________________________________________________
Part II
Department of Labor
_______________________________________________________________________
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
_______________________________________________________________________
29 CFR Part 1910
Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution; Electrical
Protective Equipment; Final Rule
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
29 CFR Part 1910
[Docket No. S-015]
Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution;
Electrical Protective Equipment
AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
Department of Labor.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: OSHA is issuing a new standard addressing the work practices
to be used during the operation and maintenance of electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution facilities. The standard
includes requirements relating to enclosed spaces, hazardous energy
control, working near energized parts, grounding for employee
protection, work on underground and overhead installations, line-
clearance tree trimming, work in substations and generating plants, and
other special conditions and equipment unique to the generation,
transmission, and distribution of electric energy. Compliance with
these requirements will prevent injuries to employees working on
electric power systems.
OSHA is also revising the electrical protective equipment
requirements contained in the General Industry Standards. The current
standards for the design of electrical protective equipment adopt
several national consensus standards by reference. The revision
replaces the incorporation of these out-of-date consensus standards
with a set of performance-oriented requirements that are consistent
with the latest revisions of these consensus standards. Additionally,
OSHA is issuing new requirements for the safe use and care of
electrical protective equipment to complement the equipment design
provisions. These revisions will update the existing OSHA standards and
will prevent accidents caused by inadequate electrical protective
equipment.
EFFECTIVE DATE: The Final Rule, except for Sec. 1910.269(a)(2), is
effective on May 31, 1994. Paragraph (a)(2) of Sec. 1910.269 is
effective on January 31, 1995.
ADDRESSES: In compliance with 28 U.S.C. 2112(a), the Agency designates
for receipt of petitions for review of the standard the Associate
Solicitor of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, Office of the
Solicitor, room S4004, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Ave.,
NW., Washington, DC 20210.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. James F. Foster, U.S. Department
of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, room N3647,
200 Constitution Ave., NW., Washington, DC 20210 (202-523-8148).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
A. Need for Regulation
Employees performing operation or maintenance work on electric
power generation, transmission, or distribution installations are not
adequately protected by current OSHA standards, though these employees
face far greater electrical hazards than those faced by other workers.
The voltages involved are generally much higher than voltages
encountered in other types of work, and a large part of electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution work exposes employees to
energized parts of the power system.
The existing electrical regulations contained in subpart S of the
General Industry Standards address electric utilization systems--
installations of electric conductors and equipment which use electric
energy for mechanical, chemical, heating, lighting, or similar
purposes. Subpart S protects most employees from the hazards associated
with electric utilization equipment and with the premises wiring that
supplies this equipment. However, subpart S does not contain
requirements protecting employees from the hazards arising out of the
operation or maintenance of electric power generation, transmission, or
distribution installations.1
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\1\Electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
installations under the exclusive control of an electric utility
(Sec. 1910.302(a)(2)(v)) are specifically not covered by the
electrical installation requirements contained in Subpart S
Secs. 1910.303 through 1910.308. Industrial generation,
transmission, and distribution installations, even though they are
not included in the language of Sec. 1910.302(a)(2)(v), are also not
covered under the Subpart S utilization requirements if they are the
same type as those of electric utilities (46 FR 4039). Additionally,
the safety-related work practice requirements of Subpart S exempt
work performed by qualified persons on or directly associated with
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
installations regardless of who owns or controls them
(Sec. 1910.331(c)(1)).
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In contrast, telecommunications workers, who face similar hazards,
are covered under a specific telecommunications standard in
Sec. 1910.268. This regulation protects employees performing
communications work from the two major hazards of falling and electric
shock. These are the same two hazards accounting for most of the
accidental deaths in electric power transmission and distribution work.
Employees engaged in the construction of electric power
transmission or distribution systems are protected by the provisions of
subpart V of the Construction Standards (Part 1926). However, this
standard does not address operation or maintenance work, nor does it
cover work in electric power generating plants.
Electric utility industry trade associations requested several
times that OSHA adopt a set of rules on the operation and maintenance
of power generation, transmission, and distribution systems. Toward
this end, representatives of Edison Electric Institute (an association
of investor-owned electric utilities) and of the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (a union representing electric
utility workers) developed a draft standard, submitted it to OSHA, and
suggested that it be used as a proposed rule. The Agency accepted the
draft standard and used it to begin the development of a proposal on
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution.
B. Accident Patterns
To establish a basis for the development of safety standards,
accident data must be collected and analyzed. OSHA has looked to
several sources for information on accidents in the electric utility
industry. Besides OSHA's own accident investigation files, statistics
on injuries are compiled by the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) and by
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW).
Additionally, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) publishes such
accident data as incidence rates for total cases, lost workday cases,
and lost workdays. Analyses of accident data for electric utility
workers can be found in the following documents, which (like all
exhibits and hearing transcripts) are available for inspection and
copying in Docket S-015 in the Docket Office:
(1) ``Preparation of an Economic Impact Study for the Proposed
OSHA Regulation Covering Electric Power Generation, Transmission,
and Distribution'', June 1986, Eastern Research Group, Section 4
(Ex.2 4).
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\2\Exhibit.
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(2) ``Assessment of the Benefits of the Proposed Standard on
Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution--Coding
Results and Analysis'', October 5, 1990, Eastern Research Group (Ex.
6-24).
Overall accident incidence rates for the electric services industry
(that is, the electric utility industry, SIC 491) are slightly lower
than corresponding rates for the private sector as a whole.
Furthermore, these rates are much lower than the traditionally more
hazardous manufacturing, construction, and mining industries. However,
although accident incidence rates can be used to compare relative risk
between industries, they are not specific enough to be used to
determine the types of hazards that need to be addressed by an
occupational safety standard.
OSHA realized during the development of the standard that, except
for electrical and fall hazards, electric utility employees face
hazards that are similar in nature and degree to those encountered in
many other industries. At the same time, OSHA recognized that the risk
faced by some employees during certain electric-utility-type operations
is greater than the risk faced by other general industry employees. For
example, the risk of electric shock to an electric power line worker or
cable repairer performing his or her routine duties is far greater than
that faced by any other occupational group.\3\ It is the uniquely
hazardous operations that are being addressed by OSHA's standard.
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\3\JACA Corp., ``Regulatory Assessment of the Impact of the
Proposed Electrical Safety-Related Work Practices Standard, Final
Report,'' October 1983, pp. 4-8 to 4-10 (Ex. 2-6).
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BLS's Supplementary Data System (SDS) provides some detail on the
characteristics of accidents in the electric service industry. SDS
files indicate that the three major sources of injury within SIC 491
are falls, overexertion, and being struck by or against an object.
Information on the nature of injuries also can be obtained from SDS.
For example, from these data, sprains/strains, cuts/lacerations, and
contusions/bruises are the most frequent injuries encountered in the
electric services industry. Similar data can be found throughout
general industry. It is noteworthy that electric shock cases do not
constitute a major injury category and are grouped under ``all other
classifiable.'' Although these data do indicate hazards that must be
addressed by a standard, they provide little guidance with respect to
the content of the standard.
More specific information on fatal and other serious accidents was
gathered from IBEW, EEI, and OSHA files. Contrasting with the SDS data,
these files indicate that electrical accidents are the most frequent
type of fatal and other serious injuries, accounting for approximately
one half of these. According to EEI and IBEW data, other accident types
that occur frequently include motor vehicle accidents, falls, and
``struck by/crushed.''
OSHA also collected information on accidents in non-utility
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution installations
(Ex. 6-25). These data indicate that accidents involving such
installations are similar in nature and degree to those in the electric
utility industry.
C. Significant Risk
OSHA must show that the hazards the Agency addresses in a safety
regulation present significant risks to employees. As part of the
regulatory analyses for this standard, OSHA has determined the
population at risk, the occupations presenting major risks, and the
incidence and severity of injuries attributable to the failure to
follow established standards. In keeping with the purpose of safety
standards to prevent accidental injury and death, OSHA has estimated
the number of accidents that would be prevented by the new regulation.
Although nearly all workers in the electric utility industry are
exposed to various hazards common to the industry, some are at much
greater risk than others. Eastern Research Group, Inc. (ERG), in their
``Preparation of an Economic Impact Study for the Proposed OSHA
Regulation Covering Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and
Distribution'', June 1986 (Ex. 4), characterized the frequency with
which accidents occur in the industry and tabulated the relative risk
among electric utility occupations. According to the ERG report,
``there were more accidents associated with transmission and
distribution [lines] than with substations or power generation
[installations].'' Within the first category, more fatal and serious
lost-time accidents occurred among line workers, apprentice line
workers, and working line foremen. Within the latter two categories,
substation electricians and general utility mechanics experienced the
most accidents. (See p. 4-23 of the ERG report.)
The hazards that are directly covered by the standard are those of
an electrical nature, causing electrocution and injuries due to
electric shock. In addition, the standard directly addresses fatalities
and injuries associated with four other types of accidents: (1) Struck
by or struck against; (2) fall; (3) caught in or between; and (4)
contact with temperature extremes. (A few requirements of the standard
address some hazards common to general industry work. These provisions
deal with hazards that are not currently addressed in the General
Industry Standards but that are causing injuries in electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution work.)
OSHA has estimated that an average of 12,976 lost-workday injuries
to and 86 fatalities of electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution employees occur annually. (See Section V of this
preamble.) Using these figures, OSHA has also estimated the number of
injuries which could be prevented by the new regulations. Taking into
account such factors as existing regulation and the differences in
training levels among utilities, OSHA estimated that 1,634 lost-workday
injuries and 61 deaths could be prevented each year through compliance
with the provisions contained in or referenced by the standard. (A
detailed analysis of the benefits of the standard and a description of
the methodology used can be found in the Final Regulatory Impact
Analysis of the Electric Power Generation, Transmission and
Distribution and the Electrical Protective Equipment Final Rules (RIA)
for the standard, which is available for inspection and copying in the
Docket Office.) Based on this analysis, OSHA has made a determination
that hazards of work on electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution installations pose a significant risk to employees and
that the standard is reasonably necessary and appropriate to deal with
that risk.
II. Development of Standard
A. Present Standards
OSHA adopted regulations applying to the construction of power
transmission and distribution lines and equipment in 1972 (Subpart V of
part 1926). The term ``construction'' is broadly defined in
Sec. 1926.950(a)(1) to include alteration, conversion, and improvement,
as well as the original installation of the lines and equipment.
However, subpart V does not apply to the operation or maintenance of
transmission or distribution installations.
OSHA found, in reviewing the construction regulations, that the
provisions of Subpart V of part 1926 were suitable for use as a base in
the development of rules for operation and maintenance work. Important
safety considerations for electric utility employees are currently
addressed in Subpart V including tools and protective equipment,
mechanical equipment, grounding for employee protection, and overhead
and underground installations. These are topics that also need to be
addressed in a comprehensive standard for the operation and maintenance
of electric power transmission and distribution installations.
However, the construction rules do have some disadvantages. During
the 15 years subpart V has been in effect, areas of ambiguity have
developed, making parts of the standard difficult for employees and
employers to understand and for OSHA compliance officers to enforce.
Additionally, some subpart V requirements are specifically related to
the initial construction of lines and equipment and are not readily
adaptable to maintenance operations. Lastly, subpart V contains no
provisions specifically addressing power generation work.
The National Electrical Safety Code (American National Standards
Institute Standard ANSI C2;\4\ also known as the NESC) must also be
taken into consideration in the development of rules for the operation
and maintenance of electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution systems. This national consensus standard contains
requirements specifically addressing this type of work. The latest
version of ANSI C2 is much more up-to-date than subpart V of the
Construction Standards. However, ANSI C2 is primarily directed to the
prevention of electric shock, although it does contain a few
requirements for the prevention of falls. Other hazards common to the
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution work are not
discussed.
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\4\The 1984 and 1987 editions (ANSI C2-1984 and ANSI C2-1987)
were entered into the rulemaking record as Ex. 2-8.
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Another related OSHA standard is Sec. 1910.268, pertaining to
telecommunications work. Much of the field work covered in this
regulation is similar in nature to the type of field work performed by
electric utility employees, and the hazards faced in the performance of
this type of work are frequently the same in both industries. In any
situation in which the hazards are the same and in which there is no
clear coverage in the other existing standards, the provisions in the
telecommunications standard have been used as a basis for developing
requirements to protect employees performing electric-utility-type
work.
B. Industry-Union Draft Standard
As previously noted, representatives of EEI and IBEW developed a
draft standard, submitted it to OSHA, and represented it as being a
negotiated standard that could be used in a rulemaking activity. (EEI
and IBEW submitted separate versions of the draft standard. These
documents are available for inspection and copying in the Docket Office
as Ex. 2-3 and 2-4.) This draft standard was essentially a continuation
of the existing requirements of Subpart V of Part 1926 in which the
hazards addressed are those found in transmission and distribution
installations after the construction phase is completed and the
electrical system becomes operational. Additionally, based on existing
industry practice, EEI and IBEW added provisions addressing generating
plants, substations, confined spaces, and hazardous energy control to
supplement the rules on transmission and distribution work.
In the development of this proposal, OSHA evaluated the drafts
submitted by EEI and IBEW to determine their suitability as a base
document. In areas which overlapped existing OSHA standards, the drafts
were reviewed to see if equivalent safety was provided. For example,
provisions in the draft standard dealing with ladders were compared to
the regulations in Subpart D of part 1910. OSHA also reviewed the
drafts to determine if their requirements were as effective as the
requirements of national consensus standards addressing the same
hazards and to determine if definitions of terms common to several
other OSHA standards were identical. For example, the draft provisions
on line-clearance tree trimming were checked against the equivalent
ANSI standard, ANSI Z133.1-1982 (Ex. 2-29), to be sure that OSHA's
regulations would better effectuate safety than the national consensus
standard.
The EEI and IBEW draft standards included a section on electrical
protective equipment. This equipment is an integral part of electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution work, and its use (or
lack of use) directly affects the safety of employees performing this
type of work. In fact, many of the accidents mentioned earlier were
related to electrical protective equipment. Because Sec. 1910.137
already addresses electrical protective equipment, OSHA believes it is
appropriate to revise that section rather than include separate
protective equipment requirements in Sec. 1910.269.
After thoroughly analyzing the EEI/IBEW drafts, OSHA determined
that, together with ANSI C2 and Subpart V of part 1926, they could
provide a basis from which a proposal could be developed. OSHA met with
representatives of EEI and IBEW several times to obtain their advice.
OSHA then clarified some of the language involved, revised
unenforceable wording, and resolved conflicts with other OSHA
regulations and with national consensus standards.
History of the Regulation
On January 31, 1989, OSHA published the proposed standard on
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution work and on
electrical protective equipment (54 FR 4974). This proposal was
intended to supplement the existing electric power transmission and
distribution requirements for construction contained in 29 CFR part
1926, subpart V, and to update the provisions of Sec. 1910.137 on
electrical protective equipment. The proposed rules were based, in
part, on the provisions of the EEI/IBEW draft standard, on subpart V,
and on the NESC.
Interested parties were originally given until May 1, 1989, to
submit written comments on the proposal, to file objections, and to
request a hearing. In response to requests from the public, the
deadline for receipt of comments was subsequently extended to June 1,
1989 (54 FR 18546).
OSHA received 83 comments on the proposal by June 1, 1989, and one
request for a hearing by the earlier May 1 deadline. Five late requests
for a hearing were also received. In response to the hearing requests
and in accordance with section 6(b)(3) of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, OSHA published a notice announcing an informal public
hearing and listing the issues to be discussed at the hearing (54 FR
30401, corrected at 54 FR 31970).
The hearing began on November 28, 1989, in Washington, DC. It was
adjourned on December 5, 1989, and was reconvened on December 12, 1989,
in Los Angeles, CA. The hearing concluded on December 14, 1989.
At the close of the public hearing, Administrative Law Judge Robert
Feldman set the deadlines for the submission of additional information
and for the filing of briefs by the participants to be March 14 and
April 13, 1990, respectively. At the request of some of the hearing
participants, Judge Feldman subsequently extended the deadlines to July
1 and August 1, 1990 (Ex. 50).
Section 1910.269 was proposed to apply only to installations under
the exclusive control of electric utilities. One of the issues listed
in the notice of hearing was whether the scope of the standard should
be extended to include work on all electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution installations regardless of who owned or
operated the installations.
The original regulatory impact analysis for the proposal did not
consider the impact of the standard beyond electric utilities and their
contractors. Based on its review of the record, the Agency decided to
evaluate the economic impact of applying the rule to employers other
than electric utilities. Therefore, OSHA contracted for a study
(performed by Eastern Research Group, Inc.) of the regulatory impact of
applying Sec. 1910.269 to companies which generate or distribute their
own electric power. This study was placed in the rulemaking record on
the proposal (Ex. 6-25), and OSHA published a notice in the Federal
Register reopening the record on the proposal for a period of 60 days
(November 9, 1990, 55 FR 47074). At the request of several interested
parties, the deadline was extended until February 8, 1991 (January 10,
1991, 56 FR 976).
Two of the hearing participants had additional information to be
entered into the record and requested a reopening of the hearing
record. This information represented the outcome of a relevant
consensus standards committee action. During the hearing, the
participants had promised to provide these data at the request of the
Agency. In response to this request, Administrative Law Judge Robert
Feldman reopened the record until March 1, 1991 (Ex. 63).
Judge Feldman issued an order receiving the post-hearing comments
and closing the record on July 23, 1992. At that time, he certified the
record to the Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA.
The comments received in response to the notices of proposed
rulemaking, of public hearing, and of the reopening of the record, the
written transcript of the hearing, and the exhibits submitted at the
hearing and during the post-hearing period allowed for such submissions
constitute the rulemaking record for this proceeding. The entire record
was carefully considered in the preparation of this final rule.
III. Summary and Explanation of The Final Rule
This section discusses the important elements of the final
standard, explains the purpose of the individual requirements, and
explains any differences between the final rule and existing standards.
This section also discusses and resolves issues that were raised at the
public hearing, significant comments received as part of the rulemaking
record, and substantive changes from the language of the proposed rule.
References in parentheses are to exhibits and transcript pages5 in
the rulemaking record.
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\5\DC--Transcript of the hearing held in Washington, DC.
LA--Transcript of the hearing held in Los Angeles, CA.
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A. Section 1910.137
Electrical protective equipment is in constant use during electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution work; and,
appropriately, the EEI/IBEW draft standard contained provisions related
to this equipment. Because the existing OSHA standards for electrical
protective equipment are contained in Sec. 1910.137, the Agency
determined that relevant requirements based on the portion of the EEI/
IBEW draft relating to such equipment should be incorporated into the
format of the existing OSHA personal protective equipment standards
rather than in new Sec. 1910.269. Further, OSHA believes that these
updated personal protective equipment provisions should apply
throughout industry, wherever such equipment is necessary for employee
safety, and that improvements in the electrical protective equipment
provisions should not be limited to the use of this equipment in
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution work.
Therefore, OSHA is revising Sec. 1910.137, which formerly incorporated
by reference the following six American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) standards:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Item ANSI standard
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rubber insulating gloves...................... J6.6-1967
Rubber matting for use around electric J6.7-1935 (R1962)
apparatus.
Rubber insulating blankets.................... J6.4-1970
Rubber insulating hoods....................... J6.2-1950 (R1962)
Rubber insulating line hose................... J6.1-1950 (R1962)
Rubber insulating sleeves..................... J6.5-1962
------------------------------------------------------------------------
These ANSI standards were originally developed and adopted as
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) standards. (In fact,
the latest revisions of these standards use the ASTM designations,
rather than using separate designations for both standards-writing
organizations.) As is typical of national consensus standards, the ASTM
standards are filled with detailed specifications for the manufacture,
testing, and design of electrical protective equipment. Additionally,
these standards are revised frequently, making former Sec. 1910.137 up
to a quarter century out of date. For example, the most recent ANSI
standard listed in the former OSHA requirement is dated 1970. The most
recent ASTM version available is a 1990 edition of specifications on
rubber insulating gloves. The complete list of current ASTM standards
corresponding to the ANSI standards is as follows:
ASTM D120-87, Specification for Rubber Insulating Gloves.
ASTM D178-88, Specification for Rubber Insulating Matting.
ASTM D1048-88, Specification for Rubber Insulating Blankets.
ASTM D1049-88, Specification for Rubber Insulating Covers.
ASTM D1050-90, Specification for Rubber Insulating Line Hose.
ASTM D1051-87, Specification for Rubber Insulating Sleeves.
Additionally, ASTM has adopted standards on the in-service care of
insulating line hose and covers (ASTM F478-92), insulating blankets
(ASTM F479-88a), and insulating gloves and sleeves (ASTM F496-91),
which have no current counterparts in the existing OSHA electrical
protective equipment standard.6
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\6\The relevant ASTM standards are contained in the record as
Exhibits 2-9 through 2-17. In several cases, the version of the
consensus standard in the record is older than the version listed in
the preamble. However, final Sec. 1910.137 is based only on the ASTM
documents and other data in the record. The preamble lists editions
of the consensus standards not in the record because they have been
evaluated for consistency with OSHA's final rule. It has been
determined that these later ASTM standards do indeed conform to the
requirements of final Sec. 1910.137. See the discussion of the notes
following paragraphs (a)(3)(ii)(B) and (b)(2)(ix) for the
significance of this determination.
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In an attempt to retain the quality of protection afforded by the
ASTM standards, OSHA has developed a revision of Sec. 1910.137 which
has been derived from the ASTM documents but which has been written in
performance terms. OSHA recognizes the importance of the ASTM standards
in defining basic requirements for the safe design and manufacture of
electrical protective equipment for employees. The revision of
Sec. 1910.137 maintains the protection presently afforded to employees
by the referenced ANSI/ASTM standards. While carrying forward ASTM
provisions which are considered necessary for employee safety, OSHA is
providing greater flexibility for compliance with these provisions to
the extent that worker safety warrants. OSHA has determined, therefore,
that the requirements contained in this revision of Sec. 1910.137 are
reasonably necessary to protect employees from electrical hazards
posing significant risks in the workplace.
There are several reasons why adopting the ASTM standards in toto
would be inappropriate in this rulemaking. First, ASTM has revised each
of the currently referenced standards several times since they were
adopted in the former OSHA regulation. Because of the continual process
by which ASTM periodically revises its standards, any specific editions
that OSHA might adopt would likely be outdated within a few years.
Additionally, since the rulemaking process is lengthy, a complete
revision of OSHA's electrical protective equipment requirements every
three years or so to keep pace with the changes in the consensus
standards is not practical. (In fact, some of the ASTM standards were
revised again during the rulemaking period.) To remedy this problem,
OSHA has adopted a revision of Sec. 1910.137 to make the standards
flexible enough to accommodate changes in technology, obviating the
need for constant revision. Where possible, the new standard has been
written in performance terms in order to allow alternative methods of
compliance if they provide comparable safety to the employee.
Another difficulty with incorporation of the ASTM standards by
reference is that they contain details which go beyond the purposes of
the OSHA standard or which are not directly related to employee safety.
In the revision of Sec. 1910.137, OSHA has tried to carry forward only
provisions which are relevant to employee safety in the workplace.
Furthermore, OSHA has attempted to simplify those provisions to make
the requirements easier for employers and employees to use and
understand. Because the revision places all relevant requirements in
the text of the regulations, employers would no longer have to refer to
the ASTM documents to determine their obligations under OSHA.
In striving for this degree of simplification, the Agency has tried
to use an approach that will accept new methods of protection which may
appear in future editions of the ASTM standards. OSHA recognizes that
such future editions of these standards might contain technological
advances providing significant improvement in employee safety, which
might not be permitted under the revised Sec. 1910.137. However, due to
the performance-oriented nature of the OSHA standard as compared to the
ASTM standards, conflicts between the two standards in areas affecting
employee safety are expected to be infrequent.
An employer who follows future versions of ASTM standards will be
covered by OSHA's de minimis policy as set forth in OSHA Instruction
CPL 2.45A (Field Operations Manual). Under that policy, a de minimis
condition7 exists (1) where an employer's workplace has been
updated in accordance with new technology or equipment as a result of
revisions to the latest consensus publications from which OSHA
standards were derived, (2) where the updated versions result in a
``state of the art'' workplace, technically advanced beyond the
requirements of the applicable OSHA standard, and (3) where equal or
greater safety and health protection is provided.
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\7\OSHA considers a de minimis condition to be a technical
violation of a standard only. However, because the employer is
considered to be in substantial compliance with the standard, the
Agency issues no citations or penalties, nor is the employer
required to bring his or her workplace into compliance with the
older standard.
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Several commenters objected to OSHA's adoption of requirements on
the design of electrical protective equipment (Ex. 3-33, 3-44, 3-54, 3-
58, 3-71). These comments suggested leaving former Sec. 1910.137 as it
was, because ``[d]esign requirements are a manufacturer's specification
standard, not an employer/employee standard [Ex 3-71].''
Others, however, supported OSHA's performance-oriented proposal
(Ex. 3-34, 3-50, 3-51, 3-64). ASTM, itself, stated, ``Concerning
[Sec. 1910.137] and with the exception of the few items with which we
disagree or feel can be improved, we feel OSHA has adequately
accomplished its goal of protecting workers in performance-oriented
language [Ex. 3-51].'' At the hearing, Mr. Arthur Lewis, OSHA's expert
witness, testified, ``I feel OSHA has done an excellent job in
accomplishing its goal of protecting workers through performance
oriented language in the proposed standard [DC Tr. 352].''
In the development of this performance language, OSHA attempted to
avoid conflicts between the Agency's requirements and the ASTM
standards, and the notice of proposed rulemaking requested comments on
whether or not the Agency had achieved this objective. The
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, who expressed support
for the proposal, agreed that the proposed standard was written in
performance-oriented language (Ex. 3-107). As noted earlier, ASTM
itself supported the OSHA proposal and suggested ways in which the
final rule could be made more consistent with their standards. OSHA's
expert witness, Mr. Arthur Lewis (who is a long-term member of the ASTM
F-18 Committee), stated, ``I find the proposed revision of 1910.137 to
reflect the requirements of the relevant ASTM standards accurately with
the exception of the few items of the proposal with which I disagree or
which I feel can be improved [DC Tr. 352].'' Because of the Agency's
desire to maintain consistency with the consensus standards (which was
not opposed by any party in this rulemaking) OSHA has relied heavily on
Mr. Lewis's and ASTM's suggestions for improving the proposal. The
Agency believes the final rule does achieve the goal of protecting
employees through the use of performance language that is consistent
with and retains the intent of the ASTM standards from which the rule
was derived.
In view of the limitations imposed by the continued incorporation
by reference of the outdated ASTM standards, OSHA has determined that
relevant requirements for electrical protective equipment for workers
should be placed within the body of Sec. 1910.137 and that these
provisions should be updated and clarified to facilitate their
application to workplaces. The Agency believes the rulemaking record
supports this action and has made some revisions to the language
contained in the proposal, as suggested by the comments and as
summarized later in this section of the preamble.
There currently exist several relatively new ASTM standards on
other types of electrical protective equipment. For example, ASTM has
adopted specifications for fiberglass-reinforced plastic rod and tube
used in live-line tools. However, the standards writing organization
has not developed corresponding requirements on the use and care of
this equipment. Similarly, ASTM Standards F712 and F968 set forth test
methods and design specifications, respectively, for electrically
insulating plastic guard equipment for the protection of workers, but
this standard does not contain provisions on the use or care of the
guards. ASTM is currently working on standards for the use and care of
some of this equipment and on additional specifications for still other
types of equipment.
Most electrical protective equipment presently being manufactured
meets existing ASTM standards. Because of this, OSHA's adoption of
these newer ASTM design and test specifications would have little
impact on employee safety without the adoption of corresponding
requirements on the use and care of the equipment. Therefore, to
maximize efficient use of the Agency's available resources, this
revision does not include ASTM requirements for these other types of
electrical protective equipment, but such provisions are being
considered for future rulemaking. In this way, all of the newer types
of equipment can be dealt with at one time, and provisions on care and
use can be included.
Paragraph (a). Paragraph (a) of the revision to Sec. 1910.137
addresses the design and manufacture of insulating blankets, matting,
covers, line hose, gloves, and sleeves made of rubber (either natural
or synthetic). For the reasons noted earlier, other types of equipment
are not covered. However, the standard does not preclude their use.
Under paragraph (a)(1)(i), blankets, gloves, and sleeves have to be
manufactured without seams. This method of making the protective
equipment minimizes the chances of separation of the material. Because
they are used to permit workers to handle energized lines, gloves and
sleeves are the only defense an employee has against electric shock.
Additionally, blankets, gloves, and sleeves need to be seamless because
of the stresses placed on the equipment by the flexing of the rubber
during normal use. The other three types of electrical protective
equipment (covers, line hose, and matting) generally provide a more
indirect form of protection--they insulate the live parts from
accidental, rather than intended, contact--and they are not usually
subject to similar amounts or types of flexing.
Two commenters were concerned that existing sleeves were not
manufactured by a seamless process (Ex 3-42, 3-112). They recommended
exempting existing stocks of these items or eliminating the application
of this requirement to sleeves. However, Mr. Arthur Lewis noted that
all equipment addressed in proposed paragraph (a)(1)(i) has been ``made
utilizing a seamless process [DC Tr. 354].'' He further stated:
Items made in a mold process frequently have a raised portion
along the juncture of the two halves of the mold. This is not a
seam. Examination of a cross-section of the material at that point
will show it to be homogeneous. To the best of my knowledge, there
is no equipment used in industry today * * * that would be in
violation of the proposed 1910.137 standard or the relevant ASTM
standards [DC Tr. 354].
On the basis of Mr. Lewis's testimony, OSHA believes that there is
no reason to exempt existing sleeves from the requirement that they be
manufactured by a seamless process. Therefore, no change has been made
to the language contained in Sec. 1910.137(a)(1)(i).
Paragraph (a)(1)(ii) requires electrical protective equipment to be
marked to indicate its class and type. The class marking gives an
indication of the voltage with which the equipment can be used; the
type marking indicates whether or not the equipment is ozone resistant.
This will enable employees to know the uses and voltages for which the
equipment is suited. Paragraph (a)(1)(ii) also permits equipment to
contain other relevant markings.
Paragraph (a)(1)(iii) requires all markings to be nonconductive and
to be applied so that the properties of the equipment are not impaired.
This will ensure that no marking interferes with the protection to be
provided by the equipment.
Paragraph (a)(1)(iv) requires markings on gloves to be provided
only in the cuff area. Markings in other areas could possibly be worn
off. Moreover, having the markings in one place will allow the employee
to determine the class and type of glove quickly. Paragraph (b)(1)(vii)
of Sec. 1910.137 normally requires rubber gloves to be worn under
protector gloves. Because a protector glove is almost always shorter
than the corresponding rubber glove with which it is worn and because
the cuff of the protector glove can easily be pulled back without
removal, it is easy to see markings on the cuff portion of the rubber
glove beneath. Any marking provided on the rubber glove in an area
outside of the cuff could not be seen with the protector glove in
place.
Under the national consensus standards (both the formerly
referenced and the newer versions), electrical protective equipment
must be capable of passing certain electrical tests. In
Sec. 1910.137(a)(2), OSHA is continuing these requirements. The tests
specified in the ASTM standards are very detailed. This is not the case
in the OSHA standard. Through the use of performance language, the
final rule establishes the same level of protection without a lengthy
discussion of test procedures.
Paragraph (a)(2)(i) requires electrical protective equipment to be
capable of withstanding the a-c proof-test voltages in Table I-2 or the
d-c proof-test voltages in Table I-3 (depending, of course, on whether
an a-c proof test or an equivalent d-c proof test is performed). The
proof-test voltages listed in these tables have been taken from the
current ASTM standards, which also contain details of the test
procedures used to determine whether electrical protective equipment is
capable of withstanding these voltages. These details have not been
included in the final rule. Paragraph (a)(2)(i)(A) replaces them with a
performance-oriented requirement that whatever test is used must
reliably indicate that the equipment can withstand the proof-test
voltage involved. (This provision was contained in the text of proposed
paragraph (a)(2)(i).) To meet the requirements of the OSHA performance
standard, employers would have to get the assurance of the manufacturer
that the equipment is capable of withstanding the appropriate proof-
test voltage. The manufacturer, in turn, would normally look to the
ASTM standards for guidance in determining the testing procedure.
Paragraph (a)(2)(i)(B) requires the proof-test voltage to be
applied for 1 minute for insulating matting and for 3 minutes for other
insulating equipment. (This provision was also part of the text of
proposed paragraph (a)(2)(i).) These times are based on the proof-test
times given in the ASTM design standards and are appropriate for
testing the design capabilities of electrical protective equipment.
Some commenters suggested adding a requirement for gloves to be
able to withstand the proof-test voltage after a 16-hour water soak
(Ex. 3-50, 3-57). Siebe North, Inc., tested rubber insulating gloves of
some manufacturers and found them to absorb water, causing a reduction
in insulating properties (Ex. 3-50). They claimed that water absorption
is a critical property because exposure to perspiration or rain is
quite common while lineman's gloves are in use. These commenters also
noted that provisions for a proof test after a water soak are included
in ASTM D120-87. OSHA's expert witness also supported the inclusion of
a moisture absorption/proof test in the final standard (Ex. 17; DC Tr.
357).
The reduction of insulation that may be caused by absorption of
moisture is a legitimate concern, one that is addressed in ASTM D120
but was not covered in the OSHA proposal. Although a requirement for a
soak test was not included in the proposal, the inclusion of such a
rule in the final standard is a natural outgrowth of the requirement
proposed in paragraph (a)(2)(i) that electrical protective equipment be
tested and that the proof test reliably indicate that the equipment can
withstand the voltage involved. Electrical work is sometimes performed
in the rain, and an employee's perspiration is often present while the
gloves are in use (Ex. 3-50). The soak test is needed to ensure that
electrical protective equipment can withstand the voltage involved
under these conditions. Therefore, the Agency has accepted the
suggestion that rubber gloves also be capable of passing the proof test
after a 16-hour water soak (consistent with the ASTM standard) and has
added such a requirement as paragraph (a)(2)(i)(C) in the final rule.
When an a-c proof test is used on gloves, the resulting proof-test
current gives an indication of the validity of the glove make-up, the
dielectric constant of the type of material used, its thickness, and
the total area under test. Paragraph (a)(2)(ii) prohibits the a-c
proof-test current from exceeding the current allowed in Table I-2.
Again, the currents listed in the table have been taken from ASTM D120-
87.
Under paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(A), the maximum current for a-c voltages
at frequencies other than 60 hertz would be computed from the direct
ratio of the frequencies. This provision was contained in the text of
paragraph (a)(2)(ii) in the proposal.
Gloves are filled with and immersed in water during the a-c proof
test, and the water inside and outside the glove forms the electrodes.
Several commenters noted that the a-c proof-test current was dependent
on the length of the portion of the glove that was out of water (Ex. 3-
50, 3-57, 3-112). Mr. Arthur Lewis, OSHA's expert witness stated:
Additionally, the proof-test limits specified in Table I-2
depend upon specific immersion depths specified in the ASTM
standard. Less immersion results in lower leakage current. Unless
the OSHA regulation controls clearance above the water line, gloves
which would fail ASTM D-120 or F-496 could pass the OSHA
requirement, resulting in substantially lower level of protection.
[DC Tr. 358-359]
Mr. Lewis and two of the commenters, Siebe North, Inc. (Ex. 3-50),
and W. H. Salisbury and Co. (Ex. 3-57), suggested adding a table for
water immersion depths derived from ASTM D120. OSHA has accepted this
suggestion. The Agency agrees that, because the proof-test current is a
function of immersion depth, it is important to specify the depth in
the regulation. Otherwise, employee safety could be compromised.
Therefore, paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B) in the final standard specifies that
gloves to be tested must be filled with and immersed in water to the
depth given in Table I-4. This table was taken directly from ASTM D120-
87 and is valid for the proof-test currents listed in Table I-2.
The allowable proof-test current must be increased for proof-tests
on gloves after a 16-hour water soak. ASTM D120-87 allows an increase
in the proof-test current of 2 milliamperes. OSHA has adopted this
provision, recommended by Mr. Lewis (Ex. 17, DC Tr. 359), as paragraph
(a)(2)(ii)(C).
Since the relatively high voltages used in testing electrical
protective equipment for minimum breakdown voltage can actually damage
the insulating material under test (even if it passes), paragraph
(a)(2)(iii) prohibits protective equipment that has been subjected to
such a test from being used to protect employees from electrical
hazards. Some comments suggested defining the term ``minimum breakdown
voltage test'' (Ex. 3-21, 3-50, 3-112, 3-120). Most of these comments
agreed that the standard should refer to the ASTM specifications for
this test.
OSHA agrees that the intent of the standard is to prohibit the use
of equipment that has been tested under conditions equivalent to those
in the ASTM standards for minimum breakdown voltage tests. However, the
standard already references the ASTM standards as a reference in a note
following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B). Rather than reference these
standards every place a different test is mentioned in the OSHA
regulation, the Agency has decided to clarify the note to indicate that
all the tests given in Sec. 1910.137(a) are described in the consensus
documents. Towards this end, the following paragraph has been added to
the note:
These [ASTM] standards contain specifications for conducting the
various tests required in paragraph (a) of this section. For
example, the a-c and d-c proof tests, the breakdown test, the water
soak procedure, and the ozone test mentioned in this paragraph are
described in detail in the ASTM standards.
This does not mean that OSHA is adopting the ASTM standards by
reference. In enforcing Sec. 1910.137, the Agency will accept any test
that meets the requirements of the OSHA standard. However, the final
rule states explicitly that the ASTM tests listed in the note are
acceptable; and, if the ASTM specifications are met, an employer has
assurance that he or she is complying with Sec. 1910.137. If an
employer uses other test methods, the Agency will determine, on a case-
by-case basis, whether or not they meet the Federal standard.
Around high voltage lines and equipment, a luminous discharge,
called electric corona, can occur due to ionization of the surrounding
air caused by a voltage gradient which exceeds a certain critical
value. The blue corona discharge is accompanied by a hissing noise and
by ozone, which can cause damage to certain types of rubber insulating
materials. Therefore, when there is a chance that ozone may be produced
at a work location, electrical protective equipment made of ozone-
resistant material is frequently used. To ensure that ozone-resistant
material will, in fact, be resistant to the damaging effects of the
gas, paragraph (a)(2)(iv) requires this type of material to be capable
of withstanding an ozone test.
Two commenters were concerned that the ozone test was not specified
or defined in proposed Sec. 1910.137(a)(2)(iv) (Ex. 3-50, 3-57). To
address this concern, OSHA has included, in paragraph (a)(2)(iv) of
final Sec. 1910.137, a requirement that the ozone test reliably
indicate that the material will resist ozone exposure in actual use. As
noted earlier, standardized ozone tests are given in the ASTM
specifications. The final rule also lists signs of failure of the test,
such as checking, cracking, breaks, and pitting.
Paragraph (a)(3) applies to the workmanship and finish of
electrical protective equipment. Because physical irregularities can
interfere with the insulating properties of the equipment, paragraph
(a)(3)(i) prohibits the presence of harmful defects that can be
detected by the tests or inspections required under Sec. 1910.137.
However, some minor irregularities are nearly unavoidable in the
manufacture of rubber goods, and these imperfections may be present in
the insulating materials without significantly affecting the
insulation. Paragraph (a)(3)(ii) lists the types of imperfections that
are permitted. Even with these imperfections, electrical protective
equipment is still required to be capable of passing the electrical
tests specified in paragraph (a)(2).
Proposed paragraph (a)(3)(i) referred to ``harmful physical
irregularities which can be detected by thorough test or inspection.''
OSHA has revised this phrase to read ``harmful physical irregularities
that can be detected by the tests or inspections required under this
section.'' The Agency intended ``thorough test or inspection'' to be
those required under Sec. 1910.137, but this was not explicit in the
proposed text. The language contained in the final rule clearly
reflects the intent of this provision.
Two commenters objected to proposed paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(C) (Ex.
3-50, 3-57). They claimed that this provision dealt only with the
cosmetics of the gloves and not with their safety. These commenters
were joined by OSHA's expert witness, Mr. Arthur Lewis (Ex. 17), in
citing the ASTM D120-87 requirement that was the basis for this
paragraph, which states:
(Section 11.2) The working area of the glove on both the inner
and outer surfaces shall also be free of nonharmful physical
irregularities * * * [Ex. 2-9]
This language, they noted, prohibited ``nonharmful'' irregularities
only. They argued that omitting the provision would have no effect on
employee safety, because harmful abnormalities would be prohibited
under proposed paragraph (a)(3)(ii) generally. For example, a color
splash on the surface of the glove may not interfere with the
insulating capabilities or the mechanical characteristics of the glove.
The two commenters and OSHA's expert witness believed that, although
such an irregularity would affect the appearance of the glove, the
imperfection would not adversely impact employee safety. OSHA has
accepted this reasoning and proposed paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(C) is not
contained in the final rule.
Since paragraph (a) of Sec. 1910.137 is written in performance-
oriented language, OSHA believes that it is important for employees,
employers, and manufacturers to have some guidance in terms of what is
acceptable under the final standard. OSHA also realizes that the
current ASTM specifications on electrical protective equipment are
accepted by industry as providing safety to employees and that existing
electrical protective equipment is normally made to these
specifications. Furthermore, the final rule is based on the provisions
of these national consensus standards, although the requirements are
stated in performance terms. OSHA has therefore included a footnote at
the end of paragraph (a) stating that rubber insulating equipment
meeting the requirements of the listed ASTM standards for this
equipment are considered as conforming to the requirements contained in
Sec. 1910.137. The lists of ASTM standards in the final rule (in the
notes following paragraphs (a)(3)(ii)(B) and (b)(2)(ix)) contain the
latest revisions of the standards listed in the proposal. The Agency
has reviewed these documents and has found them to provide suitable
guidance for compliance with the OSHA standard.
Paragraph (b). Although former Sec. 1910.137 does not contain
provisions for the care and use of insulating equipment, OSHA believes
provisions of this type can contribute greatly to employee safety.
Electrical protective equipment is, in large part, manufactured in
accordance with the latest ASTM standards. This would probably be the
case even in the absence of OSHA regulation. However, improper use and
care of this equipment can easily reduce, or even eliminate, the
protection afforded by this equipment. Therefore, OSHA is adding new
requirements on the in-service care and use of electrical protective
equipment to the design standards already contained in former
Sec. 1910.137. These new provisions will help ensure that these safety
products retain their insulating properties.
Paragraph (b)(1) requires electrical protective equipment to be
maintained in a safe and reliable condition. This general, performance-
oriented requirement, which applies to all equipment addressed by
revised Sec. 1910.137, helps ensure that employees are fully protected
from electric shock.
Detailed criteria for the use and care of specific types of
electrical protective equipment are contained in the following ASTM
standards:
ASTM F 478-92, Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating Line
Hose and Covers.
ASTM F 479-88a, Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating
Blankets.
ASTM F 496-91, Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating
Gloves and Sleeves.
Paragraph (b) (2), which has been derived from these ASTM
standards, applies only to rubber insulating blankets, covers, line
hose, gloves, and sleeves. These are the only types of electrical
protective equipment addressed by consensus standards on the care and
use of such equipment. Rubber insulating matting, which is addressed by
the material design specifications in paragraph (a), is not covered by
any ASTM standard on its in-service care or by Sec. 1910.137(b)(2).
This type of equipment is generally permanently installed to provide
supplementary protection against electric shock. Employees stand on the
matting, and they are insulated from ground, which protects them from
phase-to-ground electric shock. However, because this type of equipment
is normally left in place after it is installed and because it is not
relied on for primary protection from electric shock (the primary
protection is provided by other insulating equipment or by insulating
tools), it is not tested on a periodic basis and is not subject to the
careful inspection before use that other insulating equipment is
required to receive. It should be noted, however, that rubber
insulating matting is required to be maintained in a safe, reliable
condition under paragraph (b)(1).
Although the rubber insulating equipment addressed in
Sec. 1910.137(a) is currently designed to be capable of withstanding
voltages of up to 40 kilovolts, such equipment is actually intended to
be used at lower voltages (Ex. 2-10 through 2-17). The use of
insulating equipment at voltages less than its actual breakdown voltage
provides a margin of safety for the employee. In paragraph (b)(2)(i)
and Table I-5, the final rule has adopted the margins of safety
recognized in the ASTM standards, restricting the use of insulating
equipment to voltages lower than the proof-test voltages given in Table
I-2 and Table I-3. (Table I-5 in the final rule was originally proposed
as Table I-4.)
Several comments addressed Note 1 to proposed Table I-4 (Ex. 3-23,
3-51, 3-64, 3-112). The proposed note read as follows:
The maximum use voltage is the a-c voltage (rms) classification
of the protective equipment that designates the maximum nominal
design voltage of the energized system that may be safely worked.
The nominal design voltage is equal to the phase-to-phase voltage on
multiphase circuits. If there is no multiphase exposure in a system
area and if the voltage exposure is limited to the phase-to-ground
potential, the phase-to-ground potential is considered to be the
nominal design voltage.
This language was taken from comparable provisions in the ASTM
standards on the in-service use and care of electrical protective
equipment (for example, ASTM F496-85, section 4.15). However, the ASTM
standards had an additional provision for recognizing the phase-to-
ground voltage as the nominal design voltage. Typically, this provision
read as follows:
If electrical equipment and devices are insulated, or isolated,
or both, such that the multiphase exposure on a grounded wye circuit
is removed, then the nominal design voltage may be considered as the
phase-to-ground voltage on that circuit. [ASTM F496-85, section
4.15.2; Ex. 2-17]
In proposing the original note, OSHA interpreted the language as
already recognizing the elimination of multiphase exposure through the
use of insulation or other means. In other words, assuming that the
multiphase exposure was eliminated before an employee had to rely on
the insulation provided by the electrical protective equipment, OSHA
was permitting the phase-to-ground voltage to be considered as the
maximum use voltage. For example, a three-phase, Y-connected overhead
distribution system could be run as three phase conductors with a
neutral or as three single phase circuits with one phase conductor and
a neutral each. If only one phase conductor is present on a pole, there
is no multiphase exposure. If all three phase conductors are present,
the multiphase exposure can be removed by insulating two of the phases
or by isolating8 two of the phases. After the insulation is in
place or while the employee is isolated from the other two phase
conductors, there is no multiphase exposure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\Depending on the configuration of the system, an employee
could be isolated from two of the phases on the pole by approaching
one of the outside phase conductors and working on it from a
position where there is no possibility of coming too close to the
other two phase conductors. Isolation of the employee may be
impossible for some line configurations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The commenters universally interpreted the proposal differently and
mistakenly believed that OSHA was eliminating the option of removing an
existing multiphase exposure. They argued that the consensus wording
should be included to differentiate the case in which there is no
multiphase exposure initially present from the case in which the
exposure has been removed. ASTM, itself, suggested adding this language
to provide for consistency with the referenced standard and accepted
industry practice (Ex. 3-51).
OSHA has modified the language of Note 1 to Table I-5 in order to
recognize explicitly the removal of multiphase exposure as a means of
reducing the nominal design voltage. Although the proposed language
meant the same thing as the final regulatory text, OSHA has included
the ASTM language for consistency with the consensus standards. The
Agency believes that this will make the final standard easier to use by
those who are familiar with the ASTM standards and will minimize the
confusion that might otherwise result. (It should be noted that, until
the multiphase exposure has actually been removed, the phase-to-phase
voltage remains the maximum use voltage.)
Paragraph (b)(2)(ii) requires insulating equipment to be visually
inspected before use each day and immediately after any incident which
might be suspected of causing damage. In this way, obvious defects can
be detected before an accident occurs. Possible damage-causing
incidents would include exposure to corona and exposure to possible
direct physical damage. Additionally, rubber gloves must be subjected
to an air test along with the inspection. In the field, this test
usually consists of rolling the cuff towards the palm so that air is
entrapped within the glove. In a testing facility, a mechanical
inflater may be used. In either case, punctures and cuts can easily be
detected.
During use, electrical protective equipment may become damaged and
lose some of its insulating value. Paragraph (b)(2)(iii) lists types of
damage which would cause the insulating value to drop. The equipment
may not be used if any of these defects are present.
Defects other than those listed in paragraph (b)(2)(iii) may
develop during use of the equipment and could also affect the
insulating and mechanical properties of the equipment. If such defects
are found, paragraph (b)(2)(iv) requires the equipment to be removed
from service and tested in accordance with other requirements in
paragraph (b)(2). The results of the tests determine if it is safe to
return the items to service.
Foreign substances on the surface of rubber insulating equipment
can degrade the material and lead to damage to the insulation.
Paragraph (b)(2)(v) requires the equipment to be cleaned as needed to
remove any foreign substances.
Over time, certain environmental conditions can also cause
deterioration of rubber insulating equipment. Paragraph (b)(2)(vi)
requires insulating equipment to be stored so that it is protected from
injurious conditions and substances, such as light, temperature
extremes, excessive humidity, and ozone. This requirement helps the
equipment retain its insulating properties as it ages.
Several electric utility representatives objected to this provision
(Ex. 3-11, 3-33, 3-44, 3-58, 3-123). They claimed that rubber
protective equipment was stored on trucks and that it was impossible,
in many parts of the country, to protect it from temperature extremes
and excess humidity. However, this is the method utilities use to
transport the equipment to the worksite; OSHA does not consider
carrying the equipment on trucks for the use of employees during the
course of work to be storage. Furthermore, the Agency does not believe
that it is safe to store the equipment on trucks for extended periods
between use if such storage would expose the equipment to extremes of
temperature or humidity. It may be necessary, under some circumstances,
to store equipment indoors during prolonged periods when employees
would not be using it. Workers are dependent upon electrical protective
equipment for their safety, and all reasonable means of protecting it
from unnecessary damage must be employed. Therefore, OSHA has retained
this requirement as proposed.
Rubber insulating gloves are particularly sensitive to physical
damage during use. Through handling conductors and other electrical
equipment, an employee can damage the gloves and lose the protection
they provide. For example, a sharp point on the end of a conductor
could puncture the rubber. To protect against damage, protector gloves
(made of leather) are worn over the rubber gloves. Paragraph
(b)(2)(vii) recognizes the extra protection afforded by leather gloves
and requires their use over rubber gloves, except under limited
conditions.
Protector gloves would not be required with Class 0 gloves if high
finger dexterity is needed for small parts manipulation. The maximum
voltage on which Class 0 gloves can be used is 1000 volts. An employee
is protected against electric shock at this voltage as long as a live
part does not puncture the rubber and contact the employee's hand. The
type of small parts encountered in work on energized circuits, such as
small nuts and washers, are not likely to do this. While the exception
is necessary to allow work to be performed on small energized parts,
extra care is needed in the visual examination of the glove and in the
avoidance of handling sharp objects (Ex. 17). (A note to this effect
has been added in the final rule.)
The other exception to the requirement for protector gloves is
granted if the employer can demonstrate that the possibility for damage
is low and if gloves at least one class higher than required for the
voltage are used. For example, if a Class 2 glove is used at 7500 volts
or less (the maximum use voltage for Class 1 equipment), if high
dexterity is needed, and if the possibility of damage is low, then
protector gloves need not be used. In this case, the additional
thickness of insulation provides a measure of additional physical
protection. This exception does not apply when the possibility of
damage is significant, such as when an employee is using a knife to
trim insulation from a conductor or when an employee has to handle
moving parts, such as conductors being pulled into place. To ensure
that no loss of insulation has occurred, the standard requires any
gloves used under this exception to be tested before being used at a
voltage higher than that permitted for the lower class of insulating
equipment.
Paragraph (b)(2)(viii), Table I-5, and Table I-6 (proposed Tables
I-4 and I-5) require insulating equipment to be tested periodically so
that electrical protective equipment retains its insulating properties
over time. Table I-5 lists the retest voltages that are required for
the various classes of protective equipment, and Table I-6 presents the
testing intervals for the different types of equipment. These test
voltages and intervals were taken from the relevant ASTM standards.
Proposed Table I-4 contained a note allowing for the reduction in
test voltages for equipment used at voltages lower than the maximum use
voltages given in the table. A formula for determining the appropriate
test voltage was given in proposed Note 2.
Three commenters expressed concern with this proposed note (Ex. 3-
51, 3-64, 3-107). ASTM recommended the removal of this note from the
standard, stating:
Note 2 under Table [I-4] provides for proof-test voltages less
than those listed in the relevant ASTM standards, if nominal
voltages are less than the maximum use voltages. This provision and
formula was provided in the ASTM standards during an interim
transition period while users' equipment changed from the old
voltage classes to the new voltage classes. For instance, Class 2
gloves made to the J-6 set of standards were thinner and rated at
15,000 volts. If repeatedly tested to the current proof-test voltage
of Class 2 material of 20,000 volts there would have been the
possibility of above normal loss of protective equipment during
tests. The same was true of equipment made to the two higher voltage
classes. Such equipment has now been almost completely removed from
use and equipment manufactured since about 1975 has been
manufactured to withstand the proof-test voltages of the new voltage
classes without excessive failure rates. This note either has been
or is in the process of being removed from all the relevant ASTM
standards. [Ex. 3-51]
The other two commenters and OSHA's expert witness, Mr. Arthur
Lewis, supported the elimination of this note (Tr. DC-357). OSHA
accepts the reasoning in these comments, and the proposed note does not
appear in the final rule.
The proposal did not address the amount of time the test voltage
was to be applied to the protective equipment. Applying the voltage for
too short a period of time might allow marginal goods to pass the test,
while longer test times would cause good equipment to fail at a higher
than normal rate. Several commenters alluded to this problem (3-51, 3-
64, 3-65, 3-107, 3-123, 17). A test interval of from 1 to 3 minutes was
suggested for consistency with the ASTM in-service standards. OSHA has
accepted this suggestion and has included it as a note to Table I-5.
Paragraph (b)(2)(ix) sets forth a performance-oriented requirement
that the method used for the periodic tests give a reliable indication
of whether or not the electrical protective equipment can withstand the
voltages involved. In a performance-oriented standard, it would not be
appropriate to spell out detailed procedures for the required tests,
which vary depending on the type of equipment being tested. On the
other hand, OSHA believes that it is important for employees,
employers, and testing laboratories to have some guidance in terms of
what is acceptable under the proposed standard. Therefore, under
paragraph (b)(2)(ix), OSHA has included a note stating that electrical
test methods given in the various ASTM standards on rubber insulating
equipment meet the performance requirement. As noted earlier, this does
not mean that OSHA is adopting the ASTM standards by reference. In
enforcing Sec. 1910.137(b)(2), the Agency will accept any test that
meets the requirements of the OSHA standard. However, the final rule
states explicitly that the listed ASTM tests are acceptable; and, if
the ASTM specifications are met, an employer has assurance that he or
she is complying with Sec. 1910.137. If an employer uses other test
methods, the Agency will determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether or
not they meet the Federal standard.
In the notice of proposed rulemaking, OSHA requested comments on
whether the listed ASTM standards were appropriate and on whether there
were other acceptable test methods that should also have been listed.
The comments were nearly universal in support of the consensus
standards (Ex. 3-50, 3-51, 3-57, 3-64, 3-107). Countering these
comments, the Edison Electric Institute claimed that there were other
acceptable test methods not recognized by ASTM and suggested that OSHA
remove the list of their standards from the regulation (3-112).
However, EEI did not submit any other test methods into the record for
evaluation by the Agency. Therefore, OSHA is not listing any references
in addition to those given in the proposal. As noted earlier, OSHA will
accept other test methods meeting the performance requirements set out
in Sec. 1910.137. Also, the Agency believes that referencing acceptable
test methods within the standard will benefit employees, employers, and
testing laboratories in their efforts to comply with the standard. The
mere existence of other acceptable methods of testing electrical
protective equipment does not justify removing the list of methods that
OSHA does recognize.
Once the equipment has been tested, it is important to ensure that
any failed equipment is not returned to service. Paragraph (b)(2)(x)
prohibits electrical protective equipment that failed the required
tests from being used by employees, unless the defects can be safely
eliminated.
For electrical protective equipment that fails the test, paragraph
(b)(2)(x) also lists acceptable means of rendering the equipment fit
for use. Sometimes defective portions of rubber line hose and blankets
can be removed. The result would be a smaller blanket or a shorter
length of line hose. Obviously, gloves and sleeves cannot be repaired
in this manner; however, there are methods of patching them if the
defects are minor. Rubber blankets can also be patched. The patched
area must have electrical and physical properties equal to those of the
material being repaired. To minimize the possibility that a patch will
loosen or fail, the standard does not permit repairs to gloves outside
the gauntlet area. In response to requests for a definition of the term
``gauntlet area'' (Ex. 3-44, 3-58, 3-65, 3-112), OSHA has replaced that
term from paragraph (b)(2)(x)(D) of the proposal with the expression
``the area between the wrist and the reinforced edge of the opening''.
This language was taken directly from ASTM F496-85 (Ex. 2-17).
Several commenters objected to allowing patches to rubber
protective equipment (3-50, 3-57, 3-66, 3-69). However, they provided
no evidence that patched gloves have failed. Additionally, the ASTM
standards recognize such repairs, and the standard requires repaired
equipment to pass a retest before being placed back into service. For
these reasons, OSHA has retained the provision allowing patches to
rubber protective equipment in the final rule.
Once the insulating equipment has been repaired, it must be
retested to ensure that any patches are effective and that there are no
other defects present. Such retests are required under paragraph
(b)(2)(xi).
Employers, employees, and OSHA compliance staff must have a method
of determining whether or not the tests required under paragraphs
(b)(2)(viii) and (b)(2)(xi) have been performed. Paragraph (b)(2)(xii)
requires this to be accomplished by means of certification by the
employer that equipment has been tested in accordance with the
standard. The certification is required to identify the equipment that
passed the test and the date it was tested. Typical means of meeting
this requirement include logs and stamping test dates on the equipment.
Many commenters suggested that OSHA clarify this requirement (Ex.
3-11, 3-33, 3-39, 3-44, 3-45, 3-58, 3-69). In general, they objected to
the use of the words ``certify'' and ``certification'' in the rule and
recommended the words ``document'' and ``documentation'' in their
stead. In support of these comments, Mr. Arthur Lewis stated:
Many employers have independent testing facilities and these
facilities do certify their test results. The employer can only
maintain the documentation of those testing programs and the records
of the results. Since employers do not perform the actual tests,
even in their own companies, I recommend that a note be added after
this requirement to read as follows:
Note: This certification may be in the form of logs or test
records commonly found in industry. Such logs or other records shall
identify the equipment that passed the test and the date it was
tested. [Ex. 17]
OSHA believes that the intent of the proposed standard may not have
been clear with respect to what forms of documentation are acceptable
means of ``certification''. Therefore, the Agency has decided to add a
explanatory note to paragraph (b)(2)(xii) in the final rule. The note,
which is patterned after the first sentence in Mr. Lewis's
recommendation, reads as follows:
Note: Marking of equipment and entering the results of the tests
and the dates of testing onto logs are two acceptable means of
meeting this requirement.
B. Section 1910.269
OSHA is adding a new section to the General Industry Standards.
This new section is being added to Subpart R, Special Industries, and
is designated Sec. 1910.269. New Sec. 1910.269 contains requirements
for the prevention of injuries to employees performing operation or
maintenance work on electric power generation, transmission, or
distribution installations.
Two issues listed in the hearing notice affect the entire standard.
Additionally, two other issues raised at the hearing and in the
comments are general in nature. These four issues are as follows:
(1) Whether or not a provision should be included to
``grandfather'' all existing equipment and installations from the
specifications in the standard;
(2) Whether or not the standard should be more performance
oriented;
(3) Whether OSHA should more closely follow the EEI/IBEW draft
standard; and
(4) Whether or not health issues, such as exposure to
electromagnetic radiation or asbestos, should be addressed in this
standard.
These four issues will be discussed first. Individual provisions
contained in the new standard and related issues are discussed
immediately afterwards.
Grandfathering. Many commenters, representing affected employers,
requested some general form of exemption for existing power generation,
transmission, and distribution installations from Sec. 1910.269 (Ex. 3-
26, 3-42, 3-62, 3-80, 3-110, 3-112, 3-123, 56; DC Tr. 718, 831-838,
1144-1146; LA Tr. 409). Such an exemption is commonly referred to as
``grandfathering''. The objections listed proposed paragraph (h)(4) on
step bolts and manhole steps, paragraphs (u)(1) and (v)(3) on access
and working space about electric equipment, and paragraphs (u)(4) and
(v)(4) on guarding of live parts as requirements that would force
extensive modification of existing installations. The commenters were
also concerned that OSHA's economic analysis did not fully account for
the cost of ``retroactively'' applying the requirements of the standard
to existing installations.
The American Public Power Association (APPA), whose arguments were
cited by several other commenters, presented the best evidence
supporting a general grandfather provision, as follows:
Certain provisions of the proposed rule could be interpreted to
require extensive modification of existing utility work practices,
and installations and equipment which, when originally constructed,
complied with applicable regulatory requirements. The retroactive
application of the requirements in the proposed rule to these
facilities is unfair and will impose a tremendous financial burden
upon the electric utility industry. The Agency has not adequately
considered, much less justified, this aspect of the proposed rule.
The Agency has made no effort to demonstrate that the safety
benefits, if any, of retrofitting existing installations and
equipment justify the substantial costs involved in such efforts.
* * * * *
APPA therefore recommends that existing installations and
equipment should be exempted (i.e., ``grandfathered'') from the
requirements of the rule. [Ex. 3-80]
EEI supported the adoption of the language contained in the
``grandfather'' provision of the EEI/IBEW draft standard, which read as
follows:
Existing facilities are not required to be modified to conform
to the requirements of applicable standards in this section,
provided the maintenance and operation are performed in accordance
with the work rules and regulations of this section to the extent
existing physical facilities permit. Where existing facilities do
not permit compliance with this standard, the employer shall so far
as possible provide employment and places of employment which are as
safe and healthful as those which would prevail if the employer
complied with this standard. [Ex. 2-3]
EEI argued that they did not intend for the grandfathering concept
to deprive electric utility employees of the protection that would
otherwise be provided by the standard (Ex. 56). They claimed that this
EEI/IBEW draft provision, which was taken in part from the general duty
clause of the OSH Act,9 would require employers ``to provide
employees with a level of protection equivalent to that which the
standard would require in those instances in which a utility does not
want to modify existing facilities to comply with the final standard
[Ex. 56].''
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\9\ Section 5(a)(1) of the OSH Act, known as the General duty
clause, reads as follows: [Each employer] shall furnish to each of
his employees employment and a place of employment which are free
from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause
death or serious harm to his employees . . .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One commenter opposed the adoption of an omnibus exemption for
existing installations (Ex. 3-122). He maintained that
``grandfathering'' would result in additional deaths with no
responsibility on the part of industry.
OSHA has concluded that applying final Sec. 1910.269 without a
general exemption is reasonably necessary and appropriate for employee
safety. This does not mean, however, that OSHA is not providing any
relief for employers with existing installations that do not meet the
design criteria proposed in specific provisions of Sec. 1910.269. The
Agency is ``grandfathering'' these installations wherever the record
supports an exemption from the specific requirement involved.
The standard consists largely of work practice requirements that
are necessary for employee safety. The Agency believes that it is
important to apply these work practices in full to existing
installations, as well as to conductors and equipment that are
installed in the future. Some of the rules apply to equipment or
installations; however, they are few in number.
Additionally, the standard typically provides alternative means of
compliance for many requirements. If the lines or equipment being
worked do not permit a specific compliance method to be used, another
approach is normally available. For example, final Sec. 1910.269(l)(2)
sets forth minimum approach distances to be maintained from exposed
energized parts. If the installation does not provide sufficient
clearance for this distance to be maintained during certain operations
(as is sometimes the case), alternative means of protecting employees,
such as insulation, are spelled out in the rule.
With respect to work practices, OSHA believes that it is important
for the rule to accept all currently recognized work methods that
provide an adequate degree of protection, regardless of the age of the
installation involved. The exemption suggested by the commenters
implies that other equally effective protective measures are available,
but are not recognized in the standard. This should not be the case.
Equipment design and installation presents different problems. Once
equipment has been installed, it can be very costly to modify. For
example, switchboards and control panels that were installed 20 years
ago may not provide as much clearance around energized parts as those
installed under current consensus standards. Any requirement that
imposed clearances equalling those of the newer equipment would force
the older equipment to be modified or replaced. In some cases, an
entire installation would have to be completely redone. Such
retrofitting can result in large capital outlays with limited benefits.
On the other hand, some older equipment may pose such hazards to
employees that the benefits of retrofitting or rebuilding the
installation outweigh the costs involved. For example, some
switchboards that could not be taken out of service (that is,
deenergized) may have such small clearances around energized parts that
it would be hazardous to perform any maintenance on the switchboard.
Safety considerations may indeed dictate modification of the equipment.
Therefore, while the argument that older equipment needs special
treatment has merit, a complete exemption of existing equipment from
all the requirements contained in Sec. 1910.269 is not in the best
interest of employee safety. In fact, OSHA rarely provides a complete
exemption from its standards for older equipment or installations;
rather, a more limited form of ``grandfathering'' is usually provided.
In some cases, employers are granted delays of several years to allow
existing equipment to be modified in accordance with the relevant
requirements.10 Other standards apply to existing equipment only
in part.11
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\1\0 See, for example, Sec. 1910.67(b)(1) on aerial lifts and
Sec. 1926.1000(c) on roll-over protective structures.
\1\1 See, for example, Sec. 1910.302(b)(1), which specifies
which requirements of Subpart S apply to all installations
regardless of their age.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As there are relatively few equipment and installation design
requirements in Sec. 1910.269, the Agency has decided to provide
exemptions for existing equipment and installations on a case-by-case
basis, based on the record. For example, final paragraph (v)(11)(x)
allows coal conveying systems installed before the effective date of
the standard to use other protective measures instead of audible
devices to warn employees of startup of the system. This ``exemption''
is based on the record with respect to the proposed requirement for
audible warning devices. (See the discussion of this requirement later
in this preamble.) Each provision in the proposed standard that would
have resulted in substantial capital outlays has been reevaluated in
light of the record. The Agency's determination in each case is given
in the preamble discussion of the relevant provision of the final rule.
OSHA has also decided not to adopt the alternative ``exemption''
suggested by EEI. As noted earlier, the Agency believes that all
generally acceptable alternatives included in the rulemaking record
should be provided for in the standard. Unique safety techniques
adopted by a given employer should be handled under OSHA's variance
procedures. In this manner, all interested parties have an opportunity
to provide relevant information, and employee safety can be assured.
Additionally, this approach minimizes enforcement difficulties.
Performance-oriented requirements. One of the hearing requests
objected to the lack of performance language in some of the proposed
regulations (Ex. 3-80). In the hearing notice, public comment was
invited on the issue of whether any of the proposal's requirements were
too specification oriented.
The APPA was concerned about the lack of performance-oriented
language in certain parts of the proposed rule (Ex. 3-80, 3-119). They
believed that these parts of the standard could be written to allow
alternative ways of achieving the same safety-related goals.
The Agency believes that the proposed rule was written largely in
performance-oriented terms. The proposal also frequently allowed
several alternative methods of providing protection from specific
hazards. For example, proposed Sec. 1910.269(i)(2)(ii) provided three
alternative methods of protecting employees from ground-fault hazards
posed by cord- and plug-connected equipment.
On the other hand, the proposal was not written in vague, general
language, which can be difficult to enforce. Words such as
``adequate'', ``appropriate'', and ``suitable'', which appeared in
several of the source documents (that is, the EEI/IBEW draft,12
Subpart V, and consensus standards), were not used in the proposed
standard. Rather, specific performance goals were stated in enforceable
terms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\2 The IBEW removed much of this type of language from their
version of the draft (Ex. 2-4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA has reviewed the record on the proposal and has modified the
language of the proposed rules as appropriate. The discussion of
individual requirements indicates when the provisions have been
rewritten in a more performance-oriented manner or have been revised to
allow additional alternatives.
EEI/IBEW draft standard. Some commenters and hearing participants
supported the EEI/IBEW draft standard on electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work, and many of them recommended that
OSHA adopt it, either in part or in its entirety (Ex. 3-26, 3-42, 3-66,
3-80, 3-112, 3-120, 3-123, 56; DC Tr. 786-792, 818, 831-832, 980; LA
Tr. 216). EEI argued that the EEI/IBEW draft should be used by the
Agency in drafting the final rule (Ex. 3-112, 56). Their reasoning was
stated in their prehearing comments as follows:
As explained more fully below, EEI strongly believes that the
EEI/IBEW draft, prepared by experienced industry and union experts,
is superior to the OSHA proposal because it provides more
appropriate protection for electric utility workers, explains the
principles and requirements involved in more understandable
language, and would provide everyone affected by the standard with a
comprehensive document. Indeed, because the draft was prepared by
those who know the most about safety in electric utilities--those
who operate and work in the industry each day--EEI submits that OSHA
should give considerable deference to the EEI/IBEW draft. This is
especially so given that the other representatives of electric
utility employers--the American Public Power Association and the
National Rural Electric Cooperatives Association--supported the EEI/
IBEW draft. [Ex. 3-112]
The other major union representing electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution workers, the Utility Workers Union of
America (UWUA), which represents approximately one third of the
unionized electric utility work force (DC Tr. 457), did not endorse the
EEI/IBEW draft standard (DC Tr. 498). Additionally, a significant
contingent of affected employers, industrial establishments that
generate, transmit, or distribute their own electric power, did not
participate in the development of the EEI/IBEW draft.
EEI represented their draft standard as minimum safety rules that
were being met under current industry practices (DC Tr. 782, 793, 1109-
1110). They argued that electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work poses a significant risk of serious injury, but that
electric utility workers do not face a significant risk under current
industry practice as reflected in their proposal (LA Tr. 316-317).
The Agency believes that the record clearly demonstrates that the
EEI/IBEW draft standard represents current practices in the electric
utility industry, at least to the extent that nearly all electric
utility employers comply with the rules in that draft. OSHA does not,
however, agree that electric utility employees are protected from
significant risk under current industry practices. The final regulatory
analysis has found 61 fatalities occurring each year in the industry
under these practices. Many of these deaths are preventable.
In the case of Sec. 1910.269, the Agency has determined that
employees are presently facing significant risk. The risk that an
electric utility employee will be seriously injured or die from a fall
or an electric shock is significant. OSHA has determined that that risk
can be reduced by adopting a standard that requires the industry to
change existing protective measures in certain cases. The areas for
which this holds true are explained in the discussion of individual
provisions.
There are many accident descriptions in the record. The Agency has
relied heavily on analyses of these accidents in determining the
content of the final rule. These analyses were used by OSHA to make
necessary modifications to the EEI/IBEW draft, which was based
primarily on current industry practice and anecdotal evidence (Ex. 3-
123, 56; DC Tr. 1108-1110). OSHA believes that, because the standard is
an attempt to reduce the number of injuries and fatalities, thorough
study of relevant accidents is a necessary part of the standards
development process.
Additionally, the OSH Act requires the Agency to look to consensus
standards for guidance in setting occupational safety standards.
Section 6(b)(8) of the OSH Act states:
Whenever a rule promulgated by the Secretary differs
substantially from an existing national consensus standard, the
Secretary shall, at the same time, publish in the Federal Register a
statement of the reasons why the rule as adopted will better
effectuate the purposes of this Act than the national consensus
standard.
Thus, OSHA relies heavily on consensus standards in developing
requirements for employee safety and health.
Several consensus standards generally apply to the work covered
under final Sec. 1910.269: ANSI C2, the ``National Electrical Safety
Code;'' ANSI Z244.1, ``American National Standard for Personnel
Protection--Lockout/Tagout of Energy Sources--Minimum Safety
Requirements;'' and ANSI Z133.1, ``American National Standard for Tree
Care Operations--Pruning, Trimming, Repairing, Maintaining, and
Removing Trees, and Cutting Brush--Safety Requirements.'' (The preamble
discussion of the individual paragraphs indicates where other consensus
documents have been used.) Under the OSH Act, the Agency must
demonstrate that any deviations from these standards will better
protect employees. Therefore, in developing the proposal, OSHA deferred
to the national consensus standards whenever such standards appeared to
be more protective than provisions of the EEI/IBEW draft.
Existing OSHA standards also apply to much of the work addressed by
Sec. 1910.269. For example, Subpart D of Part 1910 provides
requirements for walking and working surfaces, including fixed ladders.
Proposed Sec. 1910.269(h) also contained provisions on ladders. The
final rule includes only requirements that the record demonstrates
provide better protection for electric power generation, transmission,
and distribution workers than those set forth in current Subpart D.
Also, Subpart V of Part 1926 covers the construction of electric
transmission and distribution lines. Similarly, final Sec. 1910.269 is
no less protective than subpart V where identical hazards are addressed
in the two standards.
OSHA believes that new standards must build on existing
requirements. Provisions in the EEI/IBEW draft that were less
protective than current regulations have not been adopted in the final
rule.
For these reasons, OSHA has not simply adopted the EEI/IBEW draft
standard verbatim. However, the Agency has used the document as a
foundation for the development of final Sec. 1910.269, modifying it as
necessary to best protect employees and to meet the requirements of the
OSH Act. The final rule, based on the record considered as a whole,
provides reasonably necessary and appropriate protection from
significant risks faced by electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution workers. Substantial issues raised in the record as a
result of the difference between the EEI/IBEW draft and the proposal
are discussed in the explanation of the individual provisions.
Health considerations. Several persons claimed that the proposal
did not adequately address issues affecting the health of electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution workers (Ex. 3-21; DC
Tr. 420-421, 429-431, 475-476). They referred to hazardous exposures to
lead, asbestos, and electromagnetic radiation as matters that were not
covered at all. Mr. Eugene Briody of the UWUA noted:
work on electrical transmission involves a lot more than electrical
[shock] related hazards * * *. I must stress that over the last
several years that the overwhelming majority of safety complaints
and occupational related disabilities reported by our members
working in electrical transmission relate to asbestos, PCBs and lead
rather than shock, explosions or burns. We must also begin to pay
attention to the growing evidence concerning the occupational
hazards of electromagnetic radiation [DC Tr. 420-421].
OSHA realizes that there are hazards faced by electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution workers that are not
addressed by Sec. 1910.269. However, the health hazards discussed by
Mr. Briody, which are found throughout general industry, are more
appropriately regulated under Subpart Z of part 1910 (for asbestos,
polychlorinated biphenyls, and lead) and under Sec. 1910.97 (for non-
ionizing radiation) rather than in a standard specific to a particular
industry sector. Indeed, asbestos and lead have been subjects of
extensive rulemaking throughout OSHA's history.
Further, Sec. 1910.269 was proposed as a safety standard, and the
notices of proposed rulemaking and of public hearing portrayed it this
way. Most of the commenters were not aware that issues relating to
health effects of exposures to harmful chemicals or physical agents
would be raised at the hearing, and most of the hearing participants
(including the Agency, itself) were not prepared to respond to these
issues at the hearing. Additionally, the record contains very little
information on levels of exposure or rates of illness for any toxic
chemical or harmful physical agent to which electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution workers are exposed. Accordingly, at
this time, the Agency has no basis on which to expand the scope of
Sec. 1910.269 to cover health hazards that may be unique to utility
work. Should such data become available, OSHA will consider whether
further action is warranted.
Paragraph (a). Paragraph (a)(1) of Sec. 1910.269 sets forth the
scope of the standard. Under the terms of paragraph (a)(1)(i), the
provisions of Sec. 1910.269 apply to the operation and maintenance of
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution systems, to
electrical testing of such systems, and to line-clearance tree
trimming. Although the regulation does not define ``operation'' or
``maintenance'', OSHA intends that the standard cover activity, other
than construction work covered by Part 1926, associated with electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution installations. The
standard primarily covers the following types of work operations:
(1) Inspection,
(2) Switching (connection and disconnection of facilities),
(3) Maintenance of lines and equipment,
(4) Line-clearance tree trimming,
(5) Testing and fault locating,
(6) Streetlight relamping,
(7) Chemical cleaning of boilers, and
(8) Other operation and maintenance activities.
According to proposed Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(B), OSHA would only
have applied the regulation to installations for the generation,
transmission, or distribution of electric energy that are owned or
operated by electric utilities and to work performed on such
installations owned by a utility. The scope of the draft proposal
submitted by EEI and IBEW was limited to utilities only, and OSHA
decided to propose that the standard be applied in the same manner.
However, the notice of proposed rulemaking noted that consideration was
being given to expanding the scope of the standard. In the preamble to
the proposal, in the hearing notice, and in the notice reopening the
record, OSHA solicited comments on the appropriateness of extending
coverage of the standard to all power generation, transmission, and
distribution systems. OSHA also requested data on the costs and
benefits of expanding the scope in this manner.
Many industrial generation, transmission, and distribution systems
are essentially the same as those of a utility, and the work performed
on these systems is nearly identical to that performed on electric
utility installations. One might assume that electric utility systems
are of larger capacity than those operated by industrial plants. In
general this is true, but not always. For example, one generating
facility for a large steel plant in Sparrows Point, Maryland, has a
generating capacity of 140 megawatts with a generating voltage of 13
kilovolts and with distribution voltages of 34.5 and 69 kilovolts. This
system is larger than those of many rural electric cooperatives that
would have been covered by the proposal. Additionally, the existing
OSHA and national consensus standards, Subpart V of part 1926 and ANSI
C2, respectively, do extend their coverage to anyone doing electric-
utility-type work.
OSHA received many comments on this issue, from utilities, from
electrical contractors, from other industries, and from unions. In
general, the utilities supported extending coverage to all generation,
transmission, and distribution installations (Ex. 3-27, 3-40, 3-59, 3-
82, 3-102, 3-112). For example, the New York State Electric and Gas
Corporation stated that their personnel perform work on transmission
and distribution interconnect facilities as well as inspect, oversee,
and approve protection system design, installation, testing, and
maintenance on non-utility protection systems (Ex. 3-40). Their
employees also provide assistance to industrial customers under
emergency conditions.
Unions also supported extending the scope of Sec. 1910.269 (Ex. 3-
9, 3-76, 3-107). The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
stated that the hazards, training, and work practices are the same for
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution facilities
regardless of who owns or operates them (Ex. 3-107). Therefore, they
argued, the safety and health requirements should be the same.
The National Electrical Contractors Association (NECA) represents
the contractors who perform work on utility and on industrial power
generation, transmission, and distribution installations. NECA agreed
with IBEW that these installations were the same, no matter who owned
or operated them, and that the accident prevention measures should be
the same (Ex. 3-60). The contractors' association also believed that
the scope should be expanded.
Countering these comments, many large industrial companies and
trade associations argued that the standard should apply only to
utilities (Ex. 3-34, 3-45, 3-88, 3-131, 62-2). These commenters
generally argued that portions of Sec. 1910.269 overlapped other OSHA
standards. Union Carbide Corp. noted that the proposal contained
provisions relating to boilers and railroad equipment (Ex. 3-34). They
were concerned that these requirements could be read to apply to
equipment and operations that are unrelated to a power generation
installation. The Amoco Corp. made similar comments about the proposed
regulations on hazardous energy control and on enclosed spaces (Ex. 3-
73).
S. C. Johnson and Son, Inc., argued that the ``hazards posed by
electric utilization systems at industrial facilities do not warrant
two separate work practice standards [Sec. 1910.269 and Sec. 1910.331
et seq., Ex. 3-4]''. Monsanto Company noted that, while a few
industrial plants have large electric power generation, transmission,
and distribution systems resembling a small utility company, most
industrial power systems are on a much smaller scale than any utility
system (Ex. 3-34). They compared a 50-kilowatt cogeneration unit that
is part of an industrial facility's steam plant to a 1000-megawatt
utility generating station. Monsanto reasoned that there was a
significant difference in the hazards posed by the two installations.
Union Carbide Corp. presented the following four reasons for not
extending the application of the final standard to industrial power
generation, transmission, and distribution:
(a) Utility electrical systems are normally operated at much
higher voltage than are industrial electrical systems. They also
differ drastically from industrial systems with respect to
grounding, physical size, aerial conductors, and lightning
protection. The hazards of the two kinds of systems and the best
methods of controlling these hazards differ.
(b) The proposed rule addresses a number of hazards which are
peculiar to utility systems but not to industrial systems. These
include tree trimming and access to the system by the unauthorized,
untrained general public. Fortunately, industrial electrical systems
seldom have those problems. It would be inappropriate to impose on
industrial systems requirements which address those hazards.
(c) Traditionally, industrial electrical systems have been based
upon the National Electrical Code (``NEC'') in their design and
operation. Utility electrical systems, on the other hand, have
always been based upon the National Electrical Safety Code
(``NESC'') in their design and operation. While the NEC and NESC use
many of the same concepts, they are entirely different documents.
The proposed rule is based upon the NESC (see 54 Fed. Reg. at 4975-
76). Accordingly, applying the proposed rule to industrial
electrical systems could create many compliance problems not related
to safety.
(d) Application of the proposed rule to industrial electrical
systems would establish the need to comply with two separate sets of
requirements at a single facility, creating a training nightmare.
For example, a piece of switchgear feeding a production unit may be
adjacent to a piece of switchgear serving a generating facility. The
regulations in 29 C.F.R. Part 1910, Subpart S would apply to the
production unit switchgear, while the proposed rule would apply to
the generator switchgear. This would create great practical
difficulties for operating personnel in trying to decide which set
of rules to apply. [Ex. 3-45]
The installation safety requirements in Subpart S of Part 1910
(Secs. 1910.302 through 1910.308) do not cover ``installations under
the exclusive control of electric utilities * * * for the generation,
control, transformation, transmission, and distribution of electric
energy'' (Sec. 1910.302(a)(2)(v)). Additionally, OSHA has interpreted
the Subpart S installation requirements to exempt industrial power
generation and distribution systems that are similar to electric
utility installations.13 This exclusion reflects the unique
hazards and work practices involved in generation, transmission, and
distribution of electric energy. The work practice requirements in
Subpart S of Part 1910 (Secs. 1910.332 through 1910.335) are designed
to complement the installation safety provisions in Subpart S and do
not cover work practices for qualified persons who work on or near
electric generation, transmission, or distribution installations. Also,
because electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
installations involve similar hazards and work practices whether or not
they are controlled by electric utilities, the Subpart S work practices
standard does not apply to qualified persons who work on or near any
such installation, regardless of who owns or controls the installation.
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\1\3The preamble to the final rule revising the Subpart S
electrical standards stated:
In the situations where the industrial operation may be the same
as that of an electric utility, there would not be an overlap [of
electrical standards] since ANSI C-2 contains the provisions which
would apply and neither the NEC nor OSHA's Subpart S contain
provisions which would be applicable. [46 FR 4039, January 16, 1981]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA believes that there are hazards related to electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution work that are not adequately
addressed elsewhere in the General Industry Standards. The hazards
related to transmission systems are the same whether the system is
owned by a steel plant, a chemical plant, or an electric utility. There
are currently no OSHA standards governing the design or installation of
these systems, and the electrical standards in Subpart S of Part 1910
do not apply.
Coverage of electric power generation and distribution systems is
slightly different from the coverage of transmission systems. Utility-
type generation and distribution installations are not covered by the
provisions of Secs. 1910.303 through 1910.308 or (if the work is
performed by a qualified employee) by Secs. 1910.332 through 1910.335.
Commercial-type systems,14 however, are covered by the Subpart S
requirements. Additionally, some employers voluntarily comply with
OSHA's electrical standards in Subpart S for their large-scale
generation and distribution installations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\4OSHA is using the terms ``utility-type'' and ``commercial-
type'' to distinguish between covered and excluded generation and
distribution systems. As noted earlier, industrial generation and
distribution installations that are similar to those of an electric
utility are not covered under the Subpart S installation
requirements. These systems have voltages and generating capacity
equivalent to those of an electric utility. Additionally, the
operators of these installations typically sell excess power to an
electric utility. OSHA is referring to these systems and those of
electric utilities as ``utility-type'' electric power generation and
distribution systems.
On the other hand, industrial generation and distribution
``systems'' that are not like an electric utility system are covered
under Subpart S. These installations, which are considered to be
part of the electric utilization system, have more limited capacity,
and their generating capability is limited to an emergency or backup
role. OSHA is referring to these systems as ``commercial-type''
electric power generation and distribution systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
From an electrical viewpoint, the hazards faced by employees
working on an installation that conforms to the design requirements of
Secs. 1910.303 through 1910.308 are different from those faced by
employees working on an installation that was designed to conform to
the National Electrical Safety Code. OSHA believes that whether an
employer should comply with the subpart S work practice requirements or
with the provisions of Sec. 1910.269 depends on the hazards faced by an
employee. The hazards posed by an installation are related to the type
of installation involved and to whether or not it conforms to the
design standards in subpart S. The risk faced by an employee working on
the installation depends on what the hazards are and on whether or not
the employee is trained to recognize and avoid the hazards. Therefore,
the Agency has made application of most of the electrical requirements
in the new standard dependent on whether or not the installation
conforms to Secs. 1910.303 through 1910.308 and on whether or not the
employee is qualified to perform the work, not on whether or not the
work is performed by an employee of an electric utility.
OSHA has determined which provisions of final Sec. 1910.269 address
electrical hazards that are already addressed in Secs. 1910.332 through
1910.335 of subpart S for electrical installations that meet the design
requirements in Secs. 1910.302 through 1910.308 of subpart S. In short,
when qualified employees work on such installations, the Agency will
consider these installations and work practices conforming to
Secs. 1910.332 through 1910.335 to be in compliance with the provisions
of Sec. 1910.269 that are identified in Table 1 of Appendix A-2.
OSHA has also identified requirements in Sec. 1910.269 that are not
adequately addressed in subpart S, and these requirements must be
followed at all times. These provisions are listed in Table 1 of
Appendix A-2 as well. It should be noted that, if unqualified employees
are working on, near, or with electric power generation, transmission,
and distribution installations, Secs. 1910.332 through 1910.335 apply
in any event. Appendices A-1 and A-2 illustrate the application of
Sec. 1910.269 and Subpart S to the various types of electrical
installations.
The non-electrical provisions in Sec. 1910.269 (for example,
paragraph (g)(2) on fall protection and paragraph (p)(1) on mechanical
equipment) address only unique aspects of electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work. As noted in paragraph (a)(1)(iii),
the requirements of Sec. 1910.269 supplement those elsewhere in part
1910, unless an exception is specifically mentioned. The non-electrical
requirements in this section have been handled individually throughout
the standard to allow alternative methods of compliance already
recognized in the General Industry Standards. For example, the lockout
and tagging provisions of paragraph (d) recognize compliance with the
generic standard on control of hazardous energy sources in
Sec. 1910.147. (See the discussion of this paragraph later in this
preamble.) Each of these cases is discussed in detail in the portion of
this preamble relating to the requirement in question.
Paragraph (a)(1)(i)(A) sets forth the scope of Sec. 1910.269 as it
relates to industrial and utility power generation, transmission, and
distribution. This paragraph reads as follows:
* * * These provisions apply to:
(A) Power generation, transmission, and distribution
installations, including related equipment for the purpose of
communication or metering, which are accessible only to qualified
employees;
Note: The types of installations covered by this paragraph
include the generation, transmission, and distribution installations
of electric utilities, as well as equivalent installations of
industrial establishments. Supplementary electric generating
equipment that is used to supply a workplace for emergency, standby,
or similar purposes only is covered under Subpart S of this part.
(See paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(B) of this section.)
OSHA believes that this language will effectively extend the scope
of the standard to the types of installations that the standard is
intended to cover, namely, electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution systems of electric utilities and equivalent industrial
systems. It also makes it clear that supplementary generating
equipment, such as emergency and standby generators used to provide
temporary power at a workplace, is not covered. These installations are
considered to be part of the utilization system rather than separate
generation installations and are addressed by the existing Subpart S
regulations. Additional clarification as to the application of the
electrical safety requirements of Sec. 1910.269 is contained in
paragraph (a)(i)(ii)(B), as discussed later in this preamble.
Section 1910.269 applies to the parts of a facility that are
directly involved with the generation, transmission, or distribution of
electric power. Installations not used for one of these purposes are
not covered by the standard. For example, office buildings, warehouses,
machine shops, and other installations which are not integral parts of
generating plants, substations, or control centers are not covered by
final Sec. 1910.269. Work performed on these installations is not of a
type addressed by the standard. However, paragraph (a)(1)(i)(B) lists
installations that are not integral to the generation of electric
power, but that are covered nonetheless. Such installations include the
fuel handling operations and water and steam spaces.
Edison Electric Institute objected to the proposed restriction in
scope to installations within a generating plant that are for the
purpose of electric power generation (DC Tr. 803-805). Speaking on
EEI's behalf, Mr. J. Frederick Doering stated, ``We continue to believe
that all power plant work for operation and maintenance should be
covered by this standard.'' (DC Tr. 804) Mr. John Bachofer displayed
many slides showing that widely varied and dispersed portions of an
electric generating plant were all maintained and operated by a single
resident crew (DC Tr. 806-813). These slides showed that similar
equipment is involved both in installations used specifically for power
generation and in installations used for other purposes within the same
plant. These witnesses argued that it would be safer to have a single
set of standards applying to employees at these plants than to have
multiple standards regulate utility work.
OSHA agrees that it is generally beneficial for employees to be
using one set of rules for the work they do. However, this does not
mean that it is always best to have a single standard governing all
safety considerations in every industry. This would not be practical
given the Agency's limited resources and the diversity of industries in
the United States. In explaining OSHA's position, Mr. Thomas Seymour
stated, ``We would not want to see ourselves getting into a posture
where we have to do a specific standard for each and every industry
because we would then have thousands and thousands of books for each
industry, repeating the same materials over and over and over again.''
(DC Tr. 177)
While OSHA believes that it may be important to cover the unique
safety aspects of an industry in an industry-specific standard, it
would be wasteful for the Agency to duplicate other general industry
regulations already addressing common safe working conditions. For
example, the existing generic lockout and tagging standard,
Sec. 1910.147, presently applies to the control of hazardous energy
sources of an installation that is not for the purpose of electric
power generation, transmission, or distribution. Additionally, OSHA's
electrical standards in subpart S also apply to such installations
within an electric utility's generating plant. OSHA is not able to
address all working conditions in a single rulemaking, especially where
there is adequate coverage in the existing General Industry Standards.
The utility industry must show that unique considerations within the
industry necessitate different requirements from those that apply
generally. Where there is adequate coverage, there is simply no need to
open up the record on rules with respect to which there is nothing
unique in the electric utility industry.
Furthermore, the Agency is expanding the scope of the rule so that
non-utility electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
are covered. Including general safety provisions within this standard
would create problems for industries that generate power as a by-
product of the manufacturing process. These companies would have two
full sets of standards applying in one workplace, instead of one set of
general rules and one set that applied to the unique aspects of
electric power generation.
For these reasons, OSHA has decided that Sec. 1910.269 should cover
only those aspects of electric power generation plants that pose unique
hazards to employees or that are not covered adequately in other
General Industry Standards. Thus, for example, this section includes
requirements on boiler maintenance safety, conveyors, and water and
steam installations that are not contained in any other subpart of Part
1910. Other provisions that seemingly duplicate other general industry
requirements are contained in Sec. 1910.269 either because the hazards
are not within the scope of the general regulations, or because unique
circumstances of electric power generation, transmission, or
distribution work necessitate different or additional rules. OSHA
believes that this approach will maximize employee safety, as well as
the effective use of Agency resources.
Two comments discussed the application of Sec. 1910.269 to coal
handling activities. These comments noted that the Mine Safety and
Health Administration (MSHA) was asserting jurisdiction in some areas
involving coal crushing and conveying (Ex. 3-109, 56). They argued that
it was more appropriate for OSHA to regulate these installations than
for them to be subject to MSHA's authority. Edison Electric Institute
stated, ``to exclude those facilities from this final standard, and
thereby to impose inconsistent regulatory requirements, would
compromise employee safety [Ex. 56].'' They urged OSHA to incorporate
provisions on coal handling, as proposed. Messrs. Nicholas Reynolds,
Scott DuBoff, and Allen Flowers, representing a number of electric
utilities, recommended appropriate interagency coordination and
corresponding adjustments to the agencies' respective regulations (Ex.
3-109).
While OSHA proposed requirements dealing with coal handling
facilities within a power plant, the Agency has no desire (indeed, not
even the legal authority) to regulate working conditions that are being
regulated by other Federal agencies. Section 4(b)(1) of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 states:
Nothing in this Act shall apply to working conditions of
employees with respect to which other Federal agencies * * *
exercise statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or
regulations affecting occupational safety or health.
Therefore, to the extent that MSHA asserts jurisdiction over areas
at an electric power plant, MSHA's exercise of that authority preempts
OSHA's. For example, the Mine Safety and Health Act (30 U.S.C. 801, et
seq.) provides that ``structures, facilities, equipment, machines,
tools or other property * * * used in, or to be used in, or resulting
from the work of preparing coal'' are within the definition of ``coal
or other mine'' and are thereby subject to MSHA jurisdiction. In
section 802(i) of the Mine Safety and Health Act, the ``work of
preparing coal'' is defined as ``breaking, crushing, sizing, cleaning,
washing, drying, mixing, storing, and loading of bituminous coal,
lignite or anthracite, and such other work of preparing such coal as is
usually done by the operator of the coal mine.'' In Pennsylvania
Electric Company v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission,
969 F.2d 1501 (3d Cir. 1992), the Court of Appeals found that conveyor
head drives of conveyor belts used to transport coal from mine head
scales to a processing station constitute the work of preparing coal
and that MSHA had promulgated rules preempting OSHA.
The requirements in this final rule are only intended to apply to
conditions and installations for which MSHA does not in fact ``exercise
statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations.''
Because the mine safety agency assumes enforcement responsibility for
the coal handling operations noted earlier, OSHA and MSHA will work
together, coordinating their standards and inspection activities, in a
manner consistent with their respective rulemaking and enforcement
authorities, to assure the safety of affected employees.
Paragraph (a)(1)(i)(C) of final Sec. 1910.269 states that this
section applies to testing associated with electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution systems. This paragraph is the same as
the corresponding provision in the proposal, except that the reference
to electric utilities has been removed. This change was made for
consistency with OSHA's decision to expand the scope of the standard to
cover non-utilities.
In the proposal, the first three paragraphs under
Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(i) referred only to installations. However, the
introductory statement prefacing these paragraphs stated that the
section also covered work practices associated with electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution lines and equipment. To
clarify the scope of the final rule, OSHA has added paragraph
(a)(1)(i)(D) to extend the application of Sec. 1910.269 explicitly to
work practices on or directly associated with the installations listed
in the first three paragraphs. It should be noted that work performed
near one of these installations is not covered simply because of its
proximity to the installation; the work must be directly associated
with the covered installation as well.
Paragraph (a)(1)(i)(E) of Sec. 1910.269 explains the application of
the standard to tree-trimming operations. The entire section, except
paragraph (r)(1), applies to tree-trimming operations performed by
qualified employees (that is, employees who are knowledgeable in the
operation of electric power generation, transmission, or distribution
equipment and the hazards involved). These employees typically perform
tree-trimming duties as an incidental part of their normal work
activities. However, only paragraphs (a)(2), (b), (c), (g), (k), (p),
and (r) apply to line-clearance tree-trimming work performed by other
employees (line-clearance tree trimmers).
Most tree-trimming operations, which are often performed by
employees of outside contractors, do not involve routine line-
maintenance activities. Although these tree-trimming employees work
near the power lines, they do not work directly on them. For activities
other than the actual tree-trimming work, these employees are not
``qualified employees'' for the purposes of this standard. Therefore,
many of the requirements set forth in Sec. 1910.269 are not relevant to
their work. Since these employees are not trained as qualified linemen,
OSHA feels that the application of rules written expressly for electric
utility-type work could expose these other types of workers to hazards
that they are not adequately trained to face. For example, paragraph
(1) allows qualified employees to come closer than 2 feet to a 7600-
volt overhead distribution line if the employee is wearing electrical
protective equipment (such as rubber insulating gloves and sleeves). By
contrast, paragraph (r)(1) requires line-clearance tree trimmers to
maintain a minimum approach distance from energized overhead power
lines regardless of any other protective techniques that might be
employed. Line-clearance tree-trimming work does not require these
employees to come closer to power lines, nor does their training15
typically encompass all the information and skill needed to work on or
closer than 2 feet to the line, regardless of whether electrical
protective equipment is used. For these reasons, OSHA has adopted
special electrical safety-related work practice provisions for line-
clearance tree trimmers that are more stringent than those that apply
to ``qualified employees''. These provisions are contained in paragraph
(r)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\5 Of course, if these employees do receive the appropriate
training, then they become ``qualified employees''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the other hand, if employees performing line-clearance tree-
trimming work are also ``qualified employees'', with the necessary
training and experience in dealing with power lines, all of final
Sec. 1910.269, except paragraph (r)(1), applies to their work.
Paragraphs (a)(2), (b), (c), (g), (k), and (p), are general
requirements addressing training, medical services and first aid, job
briefing, personal protective equipment, material handling, and
mechanical equipment, respectively. OSHA has determined that the
requirements in these areas are necessary and appropriate for line-
clearance tree-trimming work performed by other than qualified
employees. The remaining provisions of final Sec. 1910.269 are not
necessary for the safety of these employees and are not related to the
type of work they perform.
The proposal would also have applied entire paragraph (a) (covering
the scope of the standard, training, and the determination of existing
conditions) to line-clearance tree trimming operations. Mr. Robert
Felix, Executive Vice President of the National Arborist Association,
argued that proposed paragraph (a)(3) was not appropriate for line-
clearance tree trimming work (Ex. 3-113). This paragraph would have
required the inspection of existing conditions before work is started
and set forth a list of items that would have to be checked. These
items (switching transients, induced voltages, integrity of grounds,
etc.) relate to maintenance of electric power generation, transmission,
and distribution lines and equipment. Mr. Felix asserted that these
conditions were not applicable to tree trimming work and that a
provision covering conditions directly related to tree trimming would
be more appropriately located in paragraph (r)(1), where the proposal
addressed the electrical hazards of line-clearance tree trimming. OSHA
has adopted this suggestion and is applying only paragraph (a)(2),
which covers training, rather than entire paragraph (a) to tree
trimming operations. Because paragraph (a)(1) is the scope of the
standard, the relevant portion of paragraph (a)(3) has been placed in
paragraph (r)(1).
Standards on the construction of transmission and distribution
lines and equipment are contained in 29 CFR part 1926, subpart V. So as
not to overlap these regulations in the Construction Standards, final
Sec. 1910.269 published today does not apply to operations involving
construction work. This ``exemption'' is set forth in
Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(A). ``Construction work'' is defined in
Sec. 1910.12(b) as ``work for construction, alteration, and/or repair,
including painting and decorating.'' In Sec. 1910.12(d), the term is
further defined as including ``the erection of new electric
transmission and distribution lines and equipment, and the alteration,
conversion, and improvement of existing transmission and distribution
lines and equipment.'' None of the types of work covered by these two
definitions are covered by Sec. 1910.269.
Several commenters and witnesses at the hearing were concerned with
having to comply with two separate standards (that is, Sec. 1910.269
and 29 CFR part 1926, subpart V) governing essentially the same work
(Ex. 3-60, 3-85, 3-102, 3-112, 56; DC Tr. 717-718, 794-800). These
persons gave examples of work operations that could be covered under
either standard depending on slightly different circumstances. Mr.
Eugene Trombley of Consumers Power Company gave the most detailed
accounting of such situations, presenting a video tape of an employee
performing distribution work (DC Tr. 794-800). In one case, the
employee was replacing an insulator of the same type (Sec. 1910.269
applies); in the other he was installing an upgraded insulator (Subpart
V applies). Similar examples were given of lightning arrester and
transformer replacement. In each case, the hazards involved were
identical, but the standard that applied was different--sometimes it
was Sec. 1910.269, sometimes subpart V.
Mr. Trombley, testifying on behalf of EEI, stated his concerns and
his suggested solution as follows:
In view of what we have seen here, I believe that it is safe to
say that the work practices and procedures that we have used to work
on existing equipment are identical, whether OSHA calls the job
construction or maintenance.
Because the label dictates the OSHA standard that will apply,
however, I am concerned about the problems that will be created if
conflicting standards are applied to the same work.
I am concerned that this is going to complicate my company's
safety rules which we work hard to keep simple and direct. This in
turn is going to make it more difficult for me as a trainer to give
clear direction to my linemen as to what they are to do in specific
circumstances.
This is going to place them at greater risk, and I am sure that
linemen trainers throughout the industry would feel the same.
I would recommend strongly that the distinction between
construction and maintenance for electric utilities be eliminated
completely, as it affects work on existing equipment. So that
alterations, conversions and improvements of existing equipment
required for operation of the system will be considered, as it
should be, maintenance work. [DC Tr. 799-800]
OSHA has not accepted this suggestion. The scope of subpart V
cannot be altered without first submitting the revision to the Advisory
Committee for Construction Safety and Health and subsequently
publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking. EEI claimed that
consultation with the Advisory Committee would be unnecessary if the
scope of Sec. 1910.269 was simply extended to alterations, conversions,
and improvements of existing equipment required for operation of the
system. However, under the present definitions of construction work,
all alterations, improvements, and conversions of electric transmission
and distribution lines and equipment are considered to be construction
work and, therefore, covered under subpart V. The Agency cannot adopt
their suggestion without revising the definition of construction in
Sec. 1910.12 and the scope of subpart V in Sec. 1926.950(a)(1) to
eliminate this double coverage. This type of action would require
further rulemaking.
Others suggested that OSHA make the standards for equivalent
hazards the same. Mr. Charles J. Hart of the National Electrical
Contractors Association stated, ``we believe that all of the
requirements that apply to electrical power generation, transmission
and distribution, whether it be construction or maintenance and
operation, be included in one document and that the rules pertaining to
similar situations be identical [Ex. 3-60].'' Mr. Joseph Van Name,
testifying for the ANSI C2 Subcommittee 8 on Work Rules, supported this
view and stated, ``to the extent possible, consistency with subpart V
is essential; to have different clearance tables and paragraphs seems
inappropriate [DC Tr. 717].''
OSHA believes that it is important for employees to use consistent
work practices for jobs posing equivalent hazards. It may, indeed,
introduce dangers if an employee has to vary the work practices used
for a job depending on slightly different circumstances unrelated to
safety. The Agency attempts to make its standards consistent across
industries for similar situations, but it is not always possible to
make them identical. The employer should ensure that the work rules are
the same for similar jobs even though different regulations may apply.
Subpart V is about 20 years old, and it is based on technology and
practices that reflect its age. If OSHA were to promulgate a standard
identical to subpart V, it would not be possible for the Agency to
incorporate new technology or to correct deficiencies without first
revising the older standard. Therefore, in some cases, Sec. 1910.269
applies different requirements to the same work than subpart V. The
Agency believes it is more important to extend coverage of an electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution standard to areas
where employees are not now protected than it is to revise an existing
standard that is already protecting employees to a great degree. This
alternative provides greater protection to employees.
OSHA plans to develop a proposal that would revise subpart V to
incorporate the improvements promulgated here and to provide for
consistency between the two standards. Meanwhile, however, employers
will have to comply with two different standards on electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution work. OSHA expects that
employers will choose to comply with new Sec. 1910.269, as it provides
greater protection to employees than subpart V, and will generally
accept such compliance for all work involving electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution installations, whether it be
general industry or construction work. However, where subpart V
provides requirements that relate specifically to construction and
where Sec. 1910.269 contains no corresponding provisions, the subpart V
requirements will continue to apply. For example, Sec. 1926.955(b)
contains provisions relating to metal tower construction. Final
Sec. 1910.269 contains no corresponding requirements. Therefore,
Sec. 1926.955(b) will continue to apply in toto. The Agency will
provide compliance directives to its compliance staff incorporating
this concept.
Proposed Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(B) would have excluded electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution installations of non-
utilities from coverage under Sec. 1910.269. As noted earlier, OSHA has
decided to provide coverage for these installations. Therefore, this
proposed paragraph was not carried forward into the final rule.
Existing regulations contained in Subpart S of Part 1910 apply to
the design and installation of electric utilization systems. Although
Sec. 1910.302(a)(2)(v) states that electric utility ``installations * *
* for the purpose of communication or metering; or for the generation,
control, transformation, transmission, and distribution of electric
energy'' are not covered by subpart S, electric utility installations
used for other purposes (that is, those for the electric utilization
systems) are covered by subpart S. Generation includes the conductors
and equipment that are used for generation, such as the generator
itself, the boiler feedwater pumps, and control circuits for the
generator. On the other hand, utilization includes premises wiring
leading to lighting, convenience outlets, and heating, ventilating, and
air conditioning equipment. Where it is difficult to distinguish
between generation and utilization within an electric power generating
installation, utilization begins at the point where circuits become
independent of generating circuits. This distinction, which was
thoroughly explained in the preamble to the electrical safety-related
work practices standard (55 FR 31993-31997), is consistent with the
National Fire Protection Association's (NFPA) National Electrical Code
(NFPA 70) and Electrical Safety Requirements for Employee Workplaces
(NFPA 70E), OSHA enforcement policy, and the installation safety
requirements in Subpart S. Moreover, the Court of Appeals, by upholding
OSHA's interpretation of the electrical installation requirements of
Part 1926, Subpart K, upheld OSHA's interpretation of utilization and
generation within an electric power generation facility. (See Edison
Electric Institute v. Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
849 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1988).) This current differentiation in
coverage between electric utilization installations, which are covered
by subpart S, and generation, transmission, and distribution
installations, which are not covered by subpart S, is carried forward
in Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(B), which states that Sec. 1910.269 does not
apply to electrical installations, safety-related work practices, or
maintenance considerations covered by subpart S.
Many utility industry representatives restated the arguments made
in the electrical safety-related work practices rulemaking opposing any
application of subpart S to their industry and any language in
Sec. 1910.269 referencing subpart S (Ex. 3-26, 3-42, 3-80, 3-82, 3-102,
3-112). Most of these comments cited their desire to follow one
standard rather than two. Charles T. Autry of Oglethorpe Power Company
specifically recommended including work covered under subpart S as
being covered by Sec. 1910.269 (Ex. 3-102). Others also argued that the
requirements of Subpart S were inappropriate and that the work was
performed by the same highly qualified employees, whether or not
generating equipment was involved (Ex. 3-80, 3-82). EEI claimed that,
within electric utility power plants, there was no distinction between
installations used as opposed to those not used for the generation of
power (Ex. 3-112).
The distinction between generation and utilization in a power
generation facility was thoroughly considered in the electrical safety-
related work practices rulemaking, which resulted in a standard for
work practices for general industry (55 FR 31984, August 6, 1990).
While the electrical safety-related work practices standard itself
dealt only with work practices, comments to that rulemaking and OSHA's
rationale in applying the final standard to work on utilization systems
in electric power generation facilities addressed the application of
OSHA's electrical installation requirements of subpart S as well.
The Agency carefully considered all comments related to applying
the electrical safety-related work practices standard to electric
utility generating plants. Every argument made with respect to the
issue of applying all Subpart S requirements, whether related to
installation or work practices, was discussed in detail in the preamble
to the Final Rule. (For a full discussion of OSHA's decision in this
matter, see the full text of the Federal Register notice at 55 FR
31990-31997.) Briefly, the Agency's rationale was:
(1) The distinction, made under the scope of Part I of subpart S,
between installations used and those not used for the generation of
electric power at utility plants is one that can be readily determined.
OSHA realizes that all circuits for utilization equipment installed in
generating stations must originate in the same area as the circuits for
the generating installation. However, at some point, circuits that are
not an integral part of the generating installation must become
independent of the generating circuits, except to the extent that they
may share common cable trays or perhaps raceways. Otherwise, it would
be impossible to control the lighting, for example, independently of
the generator itself. With respect to the existing requirements of Part
I of subpart S, OSHA considers the ``covered'' installation to begin
where it becomes electrically independent of conductors and equipment
used for the generation of electric power. In most cases, it is a
simple matter of tracing the wiring back from the utilization equipment
itself until a point is reached where generation circuits are also
supplied. Generally, branch circuits supplying utilization equipment
(other than that used for the generation process) are covered; feeders
supplying only ``utilization'' branch circuits are covered; feeders
supplying ``generation'' circuits, alone or in combination with
``utilization'' circuits are not covered by subpart S.
(2) Although installations not used for power generation are
covered by subpart S, installations of conductors and equipment used
for power generation have not been regulated to date by OSHA standards.
Because of the installation requirements of subpart S, the conductors
and equipment covered by subpart S can be expected to present a minimum
level of safety, under normal operating conditions. The subpart S
installation requirements are sufficiently comprehensive that only a
few basic safety-related work practices are necessary to supplement
them (basically, those contained in Sec. 1910.334). For example, under
subpart S, live parts of electric circuits are not generally exposed to
contact by employees (especially unqualified employees), so that
employees can perform their jobs without consideration of touching an
energized part. Also, metal frames of electric equipment are grounded
if employees would likely be in contact with a grounded surface when
touching the equipment. In this way, employees are protected from
ground faults. To protect employees from fire and ground-fault hazards,
conductors and equipment are provided with overcurrent protection.
Thus, the installation safety requirements contained in Subpart S
protect employees to a great degree already (and this is the preferred
method of protection given the inevitability of human error if work
practices are used as the primary means of protection). The safe work
practices to be used when work is performed on, near, or with electric
circuits and equipment are dependent upon the design of the electrical
installation and the standards it must meet.
On the other hand, installations used for power generation, which
are not covered by the design requirements of Subpart S, have not been
subject to any comparable OSHA standards for equipment or installation
design. Equipment grounding, guarding of live parts, and overcurrent
protection are not required for power generation equipment under OSHA
standards, and the Agency has no assurance that these safety features
have been provided. Even if electric utilities ``generally'' comply
with the National Electrical Safety Code (ANSI C2), their generation
installations do not necessarily provide the same safety features as
the NEC and Subpart S require for utilization equipment. For example,
ANSI C2-1984, Section 124.A, requires the guarding of circuit parts
operating at more than 150 volts to ground. (This provision has been
carried into this final rule as Sec. 1910.269(v)(5)(i).) By contrast,
existing OSHA Sec. 1910.303 requires guarding of circuit parts
operating at 50 volts or more. In a generating station, electric
utilities must currently follow the Subpart S rule for conductors and
equipment that are not used for generation, but not for the generation
system conductors and equipment. Clearly, safe work practices for the
two types of installations would vary, even with similar 120-volt
motors, for example, if one has live parts guarded and the other does
not. (Of course, if the two types of installations are commingled, the
work practices used should be appropriate for whatever poses the
greater hazards. Normally, the hazards posed by the electric power
generation installation would be greater than those posed by the
utilization installation.)
(3) In the electrical safety-related work practices rulemaking,
OSHA found that electric utility employees face a significant risk of
injury due to hazards posed by installations that are not used for
electric power generation. After reviewing all the evidence in the
record of that rulemaking, the Agency determined that the risk of
electrocution caused by a hazard covered by Subpart S is about the same
as or slightly higher in the electric utility industry in comparison to
the risk faced by general industry employees as a whole.
(4) OSHA considered whether the hazards to which employees working
in electric utility plants are comparable to those faced by employees
working in other general industry workplaces covered by subpart S. In
general, the hazards faced by electric utility employees working on or
near electric utilization installations in generating plants are not
unique. With respect to installations in electric power generation
plants that are covered by Subpart S, OSHA concluded in the electrical
safety-related work practices rulemaking that the hazards from those
installations faced by electric utility employees are identical to
those faced by other general industry employees. There is nothing
special about a lighting installation, for example, in a generating
plant that would make the hazards there any different from those in
other workplaces.
(5) Electric utilization circuits in generating plants do pose
unique hazards if the circuits are commingled with installations of
power generation equipment or circuits and if the commingled generation
equipment or circuits present greater electrical hazards than those
posed by the utilization equipment or circuits alone (such as exposure
to higher voltages or lack of overcurrent protection). Under this
condition, the work practices to be used would have to conform to
Sec. 1910.269 rather than Secs. 1910.332 through 1910.335, and the
Subpart S work practices standard does not apply. (See the notes to
Sec. 1910.331(c)(1).)
No new evidence on this issue was introduced in the present
rulemaking. The scope of the Subpart S installation and work practice
requirements was the subject of two previous rulemakings (46 FR 4034
and 55 FR 31984).16 In those rulemakings, EEI and other electric
utility representatives raised the issue of whether or not electric
utility utilization installations at electric power generation
facilities should be covered by Subpart S. OSHA concluded that these
installations would be covered under Subpart S. The Agency is not
reconsidering this issue in the present rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\6 The issue of whether electric utilities are covered by
OSHA's electrical installation requirements was also addressed in
the rulemaking on the electrical standards for construction (Subpart
K of Part 1926, 51 FR 25294).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA is deciding in this rulemaking (1) whether compliance with
Sec. 1910.269 can be considered as protecting employees to a degree
equivalent to compliance with subpart S with respect to work practices
and installation covered by subpart S and (2) whether the requirements
of subpart S should be incorporated into Sec. 1910.269.
With respect to whether Sec. 1910.269 can be considered as
protective as subpart S, OSHA notes that final Sec. 1910.269 contains
very few requirements relating to the design of electrical
installations. (Whether or not final Sec. 1910.269 should include
additional electrical installation requirements is addressed later in
this section of the preamble.) The only such requirements are contained
in paragraphs (u) and (v) and relate to the guarding of live parts and
to access to and workspace around electric equipment. These
requirements, although similar in nature to corresponding provisions in
subpart S (Sec. 1910.303 (g) and (h)), are not as protective as their
Subpart S counterparts. For example, Sec. 1910.269(u)(5)(i) and
(v)(5)(i) require live parts operating at more than 150 volts to be
guarded. By contrast, Sec. 1910.303(g)(2)(i) requires guarding of live
parts operating at 50 volts or more. Clearly, the Subpart S provision
is more protective. Therefore, OSHA will continue to apply the
electrical installation safety requirements contained in Secs. 1910.302
through 1910.308 for utilization systems in electric generating
facilities.
On the other hand, OSHA has concluded that the electrical work
practices required by Sec. 1910.269 can protect employees as well as
certain provisions contained in the electrical safety-related work
practices standard (Secs. 1910.332 through 1910.335). Installations not
meeting the Subpart S design standard demand, in general, more
restrictive safety precautions by employees working on or near them.
Most of the requirements contained in final Sec. 1910.269 are more
stringent than comparable provisions of Secs. 1910.331 through
1910.335. For example, paragraph (l)(9) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires
non-current carrying metal parts of equipment to be treated as
energized unless the parts have been determined to be grounded. This
type of requirement is not contained in subpart S because such metal
parts are required to be grounded when they pose a hazard to employees.
For this reason, OSHA can consider compliance with these more stringent
provisions as compliance with the subpart S work practice requirements.
However, subpart S contains work practices that are beyond the scope of
Sec. 1910.269 and are thus not covered here. For example, requirements
pertaining to unqualified employees working near exposed live parts and
to the use of electric utilization equipment are simply not addressed
in final Sec. 1910.269. For this reason, OSHA cannot simply accept
compliance with Sec. 1910.269 as being compliance with all of
Secs. 1910.331 through 1910.335 for all employees, whether qualified or
unqualified.
OSHA has reviewed the two standards to determine which provisions
of subpart S could be considered as being met by an employer complying
with final Sec. 1910.269. Based on this review, the Agency has
concluded that the hazards addressed by Sec. 1910.333(c) and
Sec. 1910.335 (covering work on or near exposed energized parts and
safeguards for personnel protection, respectively), with respect to
qualified employees only, are adequately covered by final
Sec. 1910.269. The other provisions of the subpart S work practices
standard either relate extensively to the protection of unqualified
employees or relate to equipment generally not covered under
Sec. 1910.269. Paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(B) of final Sec. 1910.269 contains
a note incorporating these concepts and reading as follows:
Note 2: Work practices performed by qualified persons and
conforming to Sec. 1910.269 of this part are considered as complying
with Sec. 1910.333(c) and Sec. 1910.335 of this part.
For consistency, OSHA is adding similar language to a new note
under Sec. 1910.331(c)(1).
With respect to the issue of whether the requirements of subpart S
should be incorporated into Sec. 1910.269, Edison Electric Institute
submitted an alternative standard that should be applied, they
suggested, to all electrical safety within a generating station in lieu
of subpart S (Ex. 3-112, 28, 62-33; DC Tr. 940-979). Representing EEI,
Mr. J. Frederick Doering explained the rationale behind their suggested
paragraph:
EEI reviewed the proposal's lack of coverage addressed to
electrical work in power generation. There were only four items in
the proposed section (v) covering electrical items.
The EEI proposal had 26 items--the EEI/IBEW proposal.
While nine of the proposed 1910.269 paragraphs (a), (d), (i),
(j), (l), (o), (s), (t), and (w) have rules that provide some
guidance to power plant electrical work, there's very little on
design or electrical work practices in power generation facilities.
* * * * *
We have no dispute that electrical safety in power plants needs
to be regulated. In fact, as we say, we think proposed subpart R is
inadequate to the extent it would not have addressed these issues.
But we want to try to find a way to get all of the regulation of
power plant electrical safety in one place--this standard. That's
one of the reasons why we have written proposed section (vv).
Another reason, of course, is that subpart S, Parts I and
proposed Part II, contain many provisions which are inappropriate
for power plants, largely due to the fact that these sections were
drawn from the National Electrical Code. We cannot overemphasize
that the electrical systems in power plants are engineered in great
detail by experienced engineering staffs, making use of a large
number of consensus standards and other sources, covering the
material, the equipment, system design, and so forth.
* * * * *
We are concerned that one reason OSHA did not include a detailed
section on electrical safety in power plants in this proposed
standard is that it is considering regulating some portion of power
plant work under subpart S. We are also concerned that OSHA believes
there are certain hazards in power plants which are properly
addressed in subpart S.
We have attempted to make our proposed section (vv) as
comprehensive as possible, to address the issues of electrical
safety which we know exist in power plants. Therefore, to help the
agency understand how our proposal was constructed, and to assure
the agency that relevant safety issues are addressed in the
standard, we want to show you the sources from which we drew in
putting this proposed section (vv) together.
Our hope is that from review, the agency will see that we have
covered all of the pertinent electrical safety issues in power
plants in our draft, and that it is included in the final standard--
and that if it is included in the final standard, there will be no
need for OSHA to refer to any other standard to regulate electrical
safety in utility plants. [DC Tr. 940-944]
OSHA does not believe that the proposal contained too few
provisions related to electrical safety in power plants.17 All of
the general electrical safety requirements in Sec. 1910.269 apply,
including paragraphs (d) and (m) on deenergizing electric circuits,
paragraph (i) on portable tools, paragraph (l) on work on or near live
parts, and paragraph (n) on grounding. Additionally, Subpart S of Part
1910 contains many requirements that are applicable to electrical
safety in electric utility power generating stations. OSHA believes
that the electrical safety-related work practices contained in final
Sec. 1910.269 and in Secs. 1910.332 through 1910.335 sufficiently
protect employees from electrical hazards caused by poor work practices
associated with electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution installations. Only in the area of electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution installation design is there
any deficiency in employee protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\7 The only significant area that is addressed only to a minor
degree is the design and installation of electric power generation
circuits and equipment. Paragraphs (v)(3) and (v)(5) contain rules
on access to working space around electric equipment and on guarding
of live parts, respectively. These provisions do apply to the design
of generation circuits and equipment, but there are no others.
As noted earlier, OSHA relied heavily on the EEI/IBEW draft
standard in the development of proposed Sec. 1910.269. Their draft
contained few requirements on electrical design, for either the
generating station or the transmission and distribution system.
Therefore, OSHA also proposed few provisions in this area, even
though much of the National Electrical Safety Code relates to
electrical design safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency has reviewed the new EEI material on electrical safety
in generating plants in order to determine if it should be incorporated
into the final rule. The Agency compared the submission to requirements
in subpart S that are currently being applied to generating plants to
ascertain whether or not the EEI provisions would be as protective as
the existing OSHA standards.
By their own accounting, EEI indicated that member companies apply
less than 50 percent of the electrical installation requirements of
Subpart S for utilization systems at their power plants (DC Tr. 946-
948). No justification (other than that the provision was not
applicable in power plants) was given for the omission of such
important requirements as: Illumination of working space
(Sec. 1910.303(g)(1)(v)); guarding of live parts operating between 50
and 150 volts to ground (Sec. 1910.303(g)(2)); outlet devices
(Sec. 1910.304(b)(2)); grounding connections (Sec. 1910.304(f)(3));
grounding of hand-held, motor-operated tools, cord- and plug-connected
appliances used in damp or wet locations, and portable hand lamps
(Sec. 1910.305(f)(5)(v)(c)); grounding of systems and circuits over
1000 volts (Sec. 1910.305(f)(7)); switches (Sec. 1910.305(c));
appliances (Sec. 1910.305(j)(3)); storage batteries
(Sec. 1910.305(j)(7)); and systems over 600 volts (Sec. 1910.308(a)).
OSHA cannot simply ignore these important safety considerations without
good cause, especially since these rules currently apply to utilization
installations within generating stations. Similar omissions were made
in the safety-related work practices section of the new EEI draft.
Additionally, many of the provisions proposed by EEI were not as
protective as the existing subpart S counterparts. The rationale for
these changes was frequently inadequate for OSHA to justify relaxing
its requirements.
The EEI-suggested provisions that were adequately justified could
not be incorporated into Sec. 1910.269 alone. OSHA believes that,
except for guarding and workspace provisions (which are necessary for
the work practices required by Sec. 1910.269), installation design
requirements must be proposed and adopted as a complete set. The
installation design standards in subpart S (Sec. 1910.302 through
1910.308) contain an interrelated set of requirements to protect
employees from electrical hazards posed by utilization systems.
Requirements for overcurrent protection are based on such factors as
conductor size and load current ratings of equipment. Equipment
grounding considerations are dependent on system grounding design.
Standards for the design of an electrical installation must be adopted
as a complete set to be protective. The few EEI-suggested provisions
that are justified cannot stand alone--they must be integrated into an
interdependent collection of requirements to be protective.
Lastly, many applicable requirements of the National Electrical
Safety Code were not incorporated. Such rules would have to be a part
of any OSHA standard in this area.
The Agency realizes that Subpart S does not apply to electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution installations. The EEI
proposal would extend protection to generation installations, but it
would relax the protection already afforded for other electrical
installations within the plant. Additionally, the EEI proposal does not
address hazards posed by transmission or distribution installation
design. To remedy these problems, OSHA intends to explore this issue
more completely in the future and will consider developing a standard
that can be proposed at the same time as the proposed revision of
Subpart V of part 1926 (discussed earlier in this section of the
preamble). OSHA intends to integrate applicable requirements from
Subpart S and from the NESC and to propose a rule that will best
protect employees from hazards arising from the design of electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution installations.
Paragraph (a)(1)(iii) of final Sec. 1910.269 explains the
application of the section with respect to the rest of part 1910. All
other General Industry Standards continue to apply to installations
covered by this new standard unless an exception is given in
Sec. 1910.269. For example, Sec. 1910.269(p)(1)(i) requires the
critical components of mechanical elevating and rotating equipment to
be inspected before each shift. This provision does not supersede
existing Sec. 1910.180(d), which details specific requirements for the
inspection of cranes. References in Sec. 1910.269 to other sections of
part 1910 are provided only for emphasis.
Paragraph (a)(2) of Sec. 1910.269 addresses training for employees.
Since it is widely recognized that electric-utility-type work requires
special knowledge and skills, paragraph (a)(2)(i) requires employees to
be trained in the safety-related work practices, safety procedures, and
other personnel safety requirements in the standard that pertain to
their respective job assignments. Employees are also required to be
trained in and familiar with any other safety practices necessary for
their safety, including applicable emergency procedures.
Mr. George Weedin of the Electrical Division of the Panama Canal
Commission suggested that tower, pole, and manhole rescue procedures be
specifically mentioned as part of the required training (Ex. 3-43).
Some witnesses at the hearing, including NIOSH, the UWUA, and the IBEW,
also expressed concern about rescue procedures (DC Tr. 45, 431, 434,
436-437, 640-641). OSHA believes that training in rescue procedures is
important. Proposed Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(i) had a requirement for
training in emergency procedures for this very reason. To further
explain the importance of this training, the Agency has added pole and
manhole rescue as examples of emergency procedures in which employees
would have to be trained.
Many comments, including one of the hearing requests, claimed that
proposed Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(i) was overly broad and vague (3-11, 3-20,
3-33, 3-42, 3-44, 3-58, 3-109, 3-112, 3-113, 3-119, 3-123, 3-125, 3-
128, 58). Most were concerned about the proposal's requirement, in this
paragraph, that employees be trained in ``any other safety practices .
. . which are not addressed by this section but which are necessary for
their safety'' (Ex. 3-20, 3-80, 3-109, 3-112, 3-113, 3-119, 3-123, 3-
125, 3-128, 58). They suggested replacing the word ``other'' with
``applicable'' or ``related'', claiming that this would clarify the
intent of the provision.
In response to these comments, OSHA raised this issue in the notice
of public hearing. OSHA representatives at the public hearing explained
that the proposed rule would require employees to be trained in work
techniques that related to his or her job (DC Tr. 87-88). Additionally,
if more than one set of work practices could be used to accomplish a
task safely, the employee would need to be trained in only those work
methods he or she is to use (DC Tr. 87-88). For example, an insulator
on a power line could be replaced through the use of live-line tools,
through the use of rubber insulating equipment, or by deenergizing the
line. The employee would only have to be trained in the method actually
used to replace that insulator. In keeping with these interpretations,
the Agency has decided to revise the language of the last sentence of
Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(i) to read as follows:
Employees shall also be trained in and familiar with any other
safety practices, including applicable emergency procedures (such as
pole top and manhole rescue), that are not addressed by this section
but that are related to their work and are necessary for their
safety.
The standard cannot specify requirements for every hazard the
employee faces in performing electric power generation, transmission,
or distribution work. Employers must fill in this gap by training their
employees in hazards that are anticipated during the course of jobs
they are expected to perform. The revised language of final
Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(i) clearly imparts OSHA's intent that safety
training be provided in areas that are not covered by the standard but
that are related to the employee's job.
Paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of final Sec. 1910.269 contains additional
requirements for the training of qualified employees. Because qualified
employees are allowed to work very close to electric power lines and
equipment and because they face a high risk of electrocution, it is
important that they be specially trained. Towards this end, the
proposal would have required that these employees be trained in
distinguishing live parts from other parts of electric equipment, in
determining nominal voltages of lines and equipment, in the minimum
approach distances set forth in the proposal, and in the techniques
involved in working on or near live parts.
The Association of Illinois Electric Cooperatives stated that this
paragraph, as proposed, would impose a substantial cost burden upon its
members (Ex 3-69). They claim that this provision would require very
extensive training of workers to become ``qualified''.
OSHA believes that qualified employees need to be extensively
trained in order for them to perform their work safely. The IBEW
agreed, stating that their apprenticeship program took between 3 and 5
years (DC Tr. 619-620) However, the Agency also believes that this
training is already being provided by the vast majority of utility
employers. EEI stated that electric utility workers were highly trained
under its membership's current programs (Ex. 3-112). The National
Electrical Contractors Association stated that their joint
apprenticeship training program is the finest program in the country
for journeyman linemen (Ex. 3-60; LA Tr. 191). No one argued that
employees who work on electric power generation, transmission, or
distribution installations (that is, those who must be ``qualified''
under Sec. 1910.269) would be able to perform this work safely without
the training proposed under paragraph (a)(2)(ii). Therefore, OSHA has
retained this paragraph without modification in the final rule.
Under paragraph (a)(2)(v), the final rule permits classroom or on-
the-job training or a combination of both. This allows employers to
continue the types of training programs that are currently in
existence. Additionally, if an employee has already been trained
(through previous job assignments, for example), the employer does not
have to duplicate previous instruction.
Several commenters suggested adding language permitting an employer
to demonstrate that employees have been previously trained (Ex. 3-20,
3-80, 3-112, 3-123). It was claimed that this would eliminate
unnecessary and redundant training of existing employees.
Paragraphs (a)(2)(i) and (a)(2)(ii) require employees to be
trained. They do not specifically require employers to provide this
training themselves or to repeat training already provided. Clearly,
the plain language of the standard allows employees to be trained by
other parties or to have been trained previously by their own
employers. OSHA does not believe it is necessary to modify the language
of the standard to recognize this explicitly.
The employer is required, by paragraph (a)(2)(vii), to certify that
each employee has been trained. This certification should not
necessitate the employer's completing forms or creating new records;
existing personnel records would normally suffice, or the employer
could simply make out a certification for each employee upon completion
of training. Employers relying on training provided by previous
employers are expected to take steps to verify that the employee has
indeed received it.
Many commenters objected to the requirement for ``certification''
(Ex. 3-11, 3-22, 3-33, 3-34, 3-39, 3-44, 3-45, 3-58, 3-60, 3-69, 3-71,
3-80, 3-82, 3-83, 3-86, 3-112, 3-113, 3-123). Mr. Robert Felix of the
National Arborist Association (NAA) summarized these comments, stating:
NAA fully supports the training requirement. We, however, oppose
the certification requirement as an unworkable administrative
nightmare which will serve only to generate OSHA citations but not
improve employee safety. [Ex. 3-113]
OSHA representatives at the hearing reiterated the explanation in
the preamble to the proposal that employment records would normally be
a sufficient means of compliance with the certification requirement.
NAA suggested that the final rule clarify this in the standard itself
(Ex. 58). Although the Agency did not take the exact approach mentioned
by this hearing participant, OSHA has added a note to paragraph
(a)(2)(vii) clarifying this point. The new note reads as follows:
Note: Employment records that indicate that an employee has
received the required training are an acceptable means of meeting
this requirement.
OSHA believes that this explanation will satisfy most of the
commenters with objections to the requirement for certification of
training.
The proposal did not include a requirement for follow-up training
for employees. However, in the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested
information on the need for such training.
A few expressed opposition to an OSHA requirement for follow-up
training (Ex. 3-112, 3-125, 3-128). Edison Electric Institute voiced
the concern of those opposed to this type of requirement as follows:
In response to OSHA's request for comment, EEI believes that it
would not be necessary or useful for the standard to specify follow-
up training. Electric utility training programs are well established
and include follow-up training when needed. The flexibility needed
to address perceived training needs when they arise can be lost when
subject matter and training cycle are fixed by regulation. Moreover,
the difficulty of forecasting when opportunities for on-the-job
training will arise would complicate compliance with a follow-up
requirement, particularly as to unusual or esoteric skills which are
best taught when the need arises to use them on the job. [Ex. 3-112]
Even though EEI argued that it would not be appropriate for the
standard to specify follow-up training, they nonetheless admitted that
existing programs do include follow-up on an as-needed basis (Ex. 3-
112). EEI witnesses also admitted that the initial schooling provided
for their employees was being supplemented in various ways (DC Tr.
1096-1099).
Others, including NIOSH, IBEW, and UWUA, supported a new
requirement (Ex. 3-21, 3-57, 3-76, 3-82, 3-103, 3-107). They argued
that the introduction of new technology in the industry demands
retraining employees (Ex. 3-21, 3-76, 3-103, 3-107), that long periods
of time may elapse before an employee uses certain procedures (Ex. 3-
76; DC Tr. 411-412, 472), and that periodic training reinforces correct
work practices (3-21). Mr. Marshall Hicks, National Secretary-Treasurer
of the Utility Workers Union of America, stated:
I would like to expand and explain our position on the training
requirements which are proposed in paragraph (a)(2)(ii). We are not
confident that the provisions allowing the employers to continue
present training practices currently in existence and also the
failure of the provision to require follow-up training is
sufficient.
Our experience with the current practices and the lack of
follow-up training indicates that it is inadequate for maintaining
safety and job performance. In many instances, the mere fact that
workers may have labored in lower rated classifications and the same
promotional ladder is the only job training provided.
And in some cases, an individual worker because of shift
assignment, crew assignment or other limited assignment practices
may not have experienced more than one or two phases of the work
activity as he performs in the lower rated classification.
In recent years, employers have merged classifications to the
extent that a number of work disciplines are included in one
classification. We have an instance where one employer with workers
holding a title of general maintenance journeyman are required to be
skilled in two specific trades and semi-skilled in two additional
trades.
And the work assignments to those workers are made generally on
the basis of where they have been best trained. If an individual is
best trained as a welder, most of his assignments are welder, but he
may at some time once every two or three months or so be assigned to
do electrical repair work without any additional training or
experience.
So we find that the on the job training received is not
adequate. We suggest that follow-up training be required for those
purposes. And we also have the experience circumstances where on
shift rotation that an individual who might be working on an off-
shift where there is not an awful lot of maintenance work being done
may go for a number of months before he is required to perform
certain types of work, and he generally forgets what all of the
safety practices are between various assignments.
And on the follow-up training, we think that it should be
carried out on a routine regular basis for those reasons and for the
reasons that the technological changes in the jobs and the work that
is required now days is continuing changing and the training is a
necessity to keep employees up-to-date on the latest technology. [DC
Tr. 410-412]
Mr. Robert Macdonald of the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers noted that some of the accidents in the IBEW submission were
caused by the lack of training (Ex. 12-12; DC Tr. 532-534). They argued
that this supported the need for further training and retraining.
OSHA has determined that there is a need for employees to be
trained on a continuing basis. Initial instruction in safe techniques
for performing specific job tasks is not sufficient to ensure that
employees will use safe work practices all the time. With regard to the
effect of training on accidents, Dr. Heinz Ahlers of NIOSH stated:
* * * I think in a majority of those instances, the fatality
involved the worker who had been appropriately trained for the
exposure that he subsequently came in contact with and just was not
following what the training and the company policy had involved. [DC
Tr. 47-48]
Continual reinforcement of this initial guidance must be provided
to ensure that the employee actually uses the procedures he or she has
been taught. This reinforcement can take the form of supervision (DC
Tr. 1097), safety meetings (LA Tr. 134-135), pre-job briefings or
conferences (DC Tr. 1096), and retraining (DC Tr. 1098-1099).
Typically, adequate supervision can detect unsafe work practices with
respect to tasks that are routine and are performed on a daily or
regular basis. However, if an employee has to use a technique that is
applied infrequently or that is based on new technology, some follow-up
is needed to ensure that the employee is actually aware of the correct
procedure for accomplishing the task (Ex. 3-21; DC Tr. 410-412, 1098-
1099). A detailed job briefing, as required under Sec. 1910.269(c)(2),
may be adequate if the employee has previously received some
instruction, but training would be necessary if the employee has never
been schooled in the techniques to be used.
For these reasons, OSHA has supplemented the training requirements
proposed in Sec. 1910.269(a)(2) with two new requirements: (1) a
requirement for regular supervision and an annual inspection by the
employer to determine whether or not each employee is complying with
the safety-related work practices required by Sec. 1910.269 and (2) a
requirement for additional training whenever an employee must use work
practices that he or she does not implement regularly or that involve
new technology and whenever an employee is found not in compliance with
the work practices required by Sec. 1910.269. The new provisions are
contained in paragraphs (a)(2)(iii) and (a)(2)(iv), which read as
follows:
(iii) The employer shall determine, through regular supervision
and through inspections conducted on at least an annual basis, that
each employee is complying with the safety-related work practices
required by this section.
(iv) An employee shall receive additional training (or
retraining) under any of the following conditions:
(A) If the supervision and annual inspections required by
paragraph (a)(2)(iii) of this section indicate that the employee is
not complying with the safety-related work practices required by
this section, or
(B) If new technology, new types of equipment, or changes in
procedures necessitate the use of safety-related work practices that
are different from those which the employee would normally use, or
(C) If he or she must employ safety-related work practices that
are not normally used during his or her regular job duties.
Note: OSHA would consider tasks that are performed less often
than once per year to necessitate retraining before the performance
of the work practices involved.
The note indicates that the Agency considers tasks performed less
often than once per year to require retraining before the task is
actually performed. OSHA will accept instruction provided in pre-job
briefings if it is detailed enough to fully inform the employee of the
procedures involved in the job and to ensure that he or she can
accomplish them in a safe manner. OSHA believes that this requirement
will significantly improve safety for electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution workers.
The Utility Workers Union of America was concerned that, if the
final training requirements were the same as those in the proposal, the
standard would not fully protect electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution workers (DC Tr. 410). Several utility
employees testified that the training they were given was inadequate
and that their employer falsely documented training that was never
received (LA Tr. 61, 69, 78, 80, 82-83, 102). They also submitted
documentary evidence, including citations issued by California's
Division of Occupational Safety and Health, supporting their assertions
(Ex. 66). One of the documents submitted was a ``QA [Quality Assurance]
Surveillance Report'' from the Southern California Edison Company (the
employer of the employees involved), which stated, ``Based on the
numerous procedural deficiencies and observations, as documented in
this surveillance, it appears that the root cause for these problems
stems from the lack of adequate training for Operations personnel in
Work Authorizations.''
EEI submitted documents detailing the extensive training manuals
used to train Southern California Edison employees (Ex. 46). They
argued that utility training programs result in a highly qualified work
force (Ex. 3-112). As noted previously, other commenters, including
NIOSH, stated that training given to utility employees is
comprehensive.
While there is substantial evidence in the record that electric
utility employees are highly skilled and well trained, OSHA is
concerned, based on the evidence submitted by the UWUA, that a few
employers may inaccurately ``certify'' the training of some employees
who have not demonstrated proficiency in the work practices required by
the standard. An example will help to illustrate the need for the
standard to address the overall goals of the training program. At the
public hearing, Mr. John Bachofer, testifying on behalf of the Edison
Electric Institute, described a complex tagging program and extensive
training for that program, which he characterized as typical for the
electric utility industry as a whole (LA Tr. 222-226). With respect to
training in tagging procedures, Mr. Bachofer stated:
These detailed procedures, together with the safety manual,
serve a dual purpose. They establish the specific requirements and
provide the explicit direction for protection of employees from
hazardous energy and they comprise the text material which is the
basis for employee training in protection from hazardous energy. The
training process is rigorous, including classroom presentation by
qualified instructors, as well as self-study and it does include
testing. Employees must demonstrate knowledge and skill in the
application of hazardous energy control, consistent with established
acceptance criteria, before they are qualified to either request
that equipment be removed from service and tagged out, or to execute
switching, valving and tagging. [LA Tr. 224]
An employee who has attended a single training class on a procedure
that is as complex as the lockout and tagging procedure used in an
electric generating plant has generally not been fully trained in that
procedure. Unless a training program establishes an employee's
proficiency in safe work practices and unless that employee then
demonstrates his or her ability to perform those work practices, there
will be no assurance that safe work practices will result, and overall
employee safety will not benefit nearly as much as it could. To address
this problem, the Agency is adding one provision and changing the
language of the proposed certification provision. Paragraph (a)(2)(vi)
of the final rule, which has no counterpart in proposed Sec. 1910.269,
reads as follows:
The training shall establish employee proficiency in the work
practices required by this section and shall introduce the
procedures necessary for compliance with this section.
Additionally, as noted earlier, the employer is required, under
paragraph (a)(2)(vii), to certify that an employee has received the
training required by paragraph (a)(2). Under the proposed rule
(proposed paragraph (a)(2)(iv)), this certification would have been
required ``when the employee successfully completes the training''.
OSHA has changed this phrase to ``when the employee demonstrates
proficiency in the work practices involved''.
The addition of paragraph (a)(2)(vi) and the revised language
contained in paragraph (a)(2)(vii) of the final rule will ensure that
employers do not try to comply with Sec. 1910.269 by simply handing
training manuals to their employees. These provisions will require
employers to take steps to assure that employees comprehend what they
have been taught and that they are capable of performing the work
practices mandated by the standard. OSHA believes that these two
paragraphs will maximize the benefits of the training required under
the standard.
OSHA believes that the training requirements contained in the final
standard are sufficient to protect employees performing electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution work. However, in every
industry, there will be some employers who are not as faithful in
following safety and health standards as others. The Agency intends to
vigorously enforce the training requirements of the final rule, because
much of the worker's safety depends on knowledge of and skills in
proper working procedures. The combination of rigorous training
provisions with strict enforcement of these rules will result in
increased safety to employees.
Frequently, the conditions present at a jobsite can expose
employees to unexpected hazards. For example, the grounding system
available at an outdoor site could have been damaged by the weather or
by vehicular traffic, or communications cables in the vicinity could
reduce the approach distance to an unacceptable level. To protect
employees from such adverse situations, the conditions present in the
work area should be known so that appropriate action can be taken.
Paragraph (a)(3) of Sec. 1910.269 addresses this problem by requiring
conditions existing in the work area to be determined before work is
started. The language for this paragraph was taken from
Sec. 1926.950(b)(1). A similar requirement can be found in ANSI C2-1987
(the NESC), Section 420D (Ex. 2-8).
EEI contended that this paragraph belongs with provisions related
to overhead lines (Ex. 3-112). They claimed that the provision was
taken from a Subpart V requirement dealing with overhead lines and that
making it a general rule distorted its meaning. Mr. Klaus Broscheit of
the New England Power Service argued that this provision related to
electrical hazards only (Ex. 3-62). He suggested that this be stated in
the opening sentence of the requirement.
As noted earlier, Sec. 1910.269(a)(3) was taken from
Sec. 1926.950(b)(1), a provision in Subpart V having general
applicability. It relates to hazards common to all types of electrical
work performed under that standard,18 not just overhead line work.
For example, the condition of the equipment grounding conductor that
may be provided on a motor that is part of a generating installation
affects the safety of anyone working on that motor. However, OSHA
agrees with Mr. Broscheit that the conditions listed in the proposed
rule related solely to safety in performing electrical work. Therefore,
the Agency is limiting the application of this paragraph in the final
rule to work ``on or near electric lines or equipment''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\8Although Subpart V applies only to the construction of
electric transmission and distribution lines and equipment, the
definition of ``construction work'' as it applies to Subpart V is
very broad. In fact, EEI pointed out that much of the work that will
be performed under Sec. 1910.269 is nearly the same as work covered
under Subpart V (Ex. 3-112).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other commenters argued that determinations of switching
transients, induced voltages, and integrity of grounds was not
necessary for employee safety (Ex. 3-20, 3-23, 3-80, 3-82, 3-101, 3-
112). Summarizing their objections, Mr. G. F. Stone of the Tennessee
Valley Authority stated:
Paragraph 3 appears to require an accurate determination be made
as to the amount of induced voltage present in a given circuit
before work begins. While it is important to recognize and control
hazards associated with induced voltages and switching transients,
this can be done and is routinely done in the utility industry
without ever having to know the amount of induced voltage or
switching transients present. The hazards associated with induced
voltages are controlled by properly applying protective grounds
before work begins. Application of protective grounds is covered in
paragraph (n) of this standard. The hazards associated with
switching transients are controlled by applying protective grounds,
suspending switching operations on adjacent lines, and disabling
automatic reclosing schemes.
Unless paragraph (a)(3) is changed to reflect the [commenter's]
proposed text, the utility industry will be required to measure for
the amount of induced voltage. This step would be costly but would
not offer any additional protection for the worker. [Ex. 3-82]
It is not OSHA's intent routinely to require employers to take
measurements in order to make the determinations required by
Sec. 1910.269(a)(3). Knowledge of the maximum transient voltage level
is necessary to perform many routine transmission and distribution line
jobs safely; however, no measurement is necessary in the determination
of what the maximum level is. It can be determined by an analysis of
the electric circuit, or the employer can assume the default maximum
transient overvoltages as discussed under Sec. 1910.269(1)(2).
Similarly, employers can make determinations of the presence of
hazardous induced voltages and of the presence and condition of grounds
without taking measurements.19 To clarify the standard, OSHA has
reworded the language of paragraph to read as follows:
\1\9It may be necessary for measurements to be made if there is
doubt as to the condition of a ground or the level of induced or
transient voltage and if the employer is relying on one of these
conditions to meet other requirements in the standard. For example,
an engineering analysis of a particular installation might reveal
that voltage induced on a deenergized line is considerable, but
should not be dangerous. A measurement of the voltage is warranted
if the employer is using this analysis as a basis for claiming that
the provisions of Sec. 1910.269(q)(2)(iv) on hazardous induced
voltage do not apply. In another case, further investigation would
be warranted if an equipment ground is found to be of questionable
reliability, unless the equipment is treated as energized under
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 1910.269(1)(9).
Existing conditions related to the safety of the work to be
performed shall be determined before work on or near electric lines
or equipment is started. Such conditions include, but are not
limited to, the nominal voltages of lines and equipment, the maximum
switching transient voltages, the presence of hazardous induced
voltages, the presence and condition of protective grounds and
equipment grounding conductors, the condition of poles,
environmental conditions relative to safety, and the locations of
circuits and equipment, including power and communication lines and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
fire protective signaling circuits.
The conditions found as a result of compliance with this paragraph
will affect the application of various requirements contained within
Sec. 1910.269. For example, the voltage on equipment will determine the
minimum approach distances required under Sec. 1910.269(1)(2).
Similarly, the presence or absence of an equipment grounding conductor
will affect the work practices required under Sec. 1910.269(1)(9). If
conditions to which no specific Sec. 1910.269 provision applies are
found, then the employee would be trained, as required by paragraph
(a)(2)(i), to use appropriate safe work practices.
Paragraph (b). Paragraph (b) of Sec. 1910.269 sets forth
requirements for medical services and first aid. In accordance with
Sec. 1910.269(b), the introductory text of paragraph (a)(1)(iii)
emphasizes that the requirements of Sec. 1910.151 apply. That existing
section includes provisions for available medical personnel, first aid
training and supplies, and facilities for drenching or flushing of the
eyes and body in the event of exposure to corrosive materials.
Because of the hazard of electric shock when employees are
performing work on or with energized lines and equipment, electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution workers suffer
electrocution on the job. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) is
necessary in the event of electric shock so that injured employees can
be revived. CPR must be started within 4 minutes to be effective in
reviving an employee whose heart has gone into fibrillation.
OSHA proposed requiring CPR training for field crews of two or more
employees (a minimum of two trained employees) and for fixed worksites
(enough trained employees to provide assistance within 4 minutes). The
proposal requested comments on whether the requirement was reasonable
and, if changes were suggested, on what the costs and benefits of the
suggested changes would be.
Many commenters, including NIOSH, IBEW, UWUA, and EEI, supported
requiring CPR training for electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution workers, though some disagreed with the language contained
in the proposed rule (Ex. 3-21, 3-46, 3-76, 3-82, 3-103, 3-107, 3-112).
However, the National Arborist Association argued that line-clearance
tree trimmers did not face a significant risk of electric shock (Ex. 3-
113, 58; LA Tr. 338-340). This objection was also raised by tree
trimming companies and electric utility companies (Ex. 3-48, 3-63, 3-
67, 3-75, 3-90, 3-91, 3-92, 3-98, 3-99, 3-104). Robert Felix, Executive
Vice President of the National Arborist Association, claimed that a
survey of 55 of their member companies, who perform 90 percent of the
line-clearance tree-trimming work in the nation, accounted for 10
fatalities over a 3-year period (Ex. 58). None of the fatalities was
caused by contact with an electric power line. He also asserted that
OSHA's own fatality data did not demonstrate a risk of electrocution
for line-clearance tree trimmers because the data did not distinguish
between line-clearance and non-line-clearance tree trimming.20
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\0NAA also noted that Eastern Research Group, Inc. (ERG), in
its ``Preparation of an Economic Impact Study for the Proposed OSHA
Regulation Covering Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and
Distribution'' (Ex. 4), estimated a much lower incidence of
fatalities to line-clearance tree-trimming crews--between zero and
four per year. However, the ERG estimate was based on two sources:
IBEW accident reports and the National Arborist Association data. As
the IBEW does not represent many line-clearance tree trimmers, it
cannot be expected to be in receipt of many reports by its members
on line-clearance tree-trimming accidents. The NAA survey included
no electrocutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exhibit 9-6 contains all accident-related inspections for the
period April 1984 to September 1989. In this exhibit, there are 19
fatalities for companies in Standard Industrial Code (SIC) 0783 that
the data indicate involve line-clearance tree-trimming work. Although
SIC 0783 includes companies that do not perform line-clearance tree
trimming work as well as those that do, other information in the
printout can be used to determine the type of work being performed. The
abstract usually indicates that this was the type of work being
performed, but sometimes this information can be gleaned from other
data in the report, such as the voltage involved (transmission line
voltages, 69 kV and higher, are assumed to involve line clearance as
such lines are not typically present during residential tree work) or
the establishment inspected (that is, an electric utility). Of these 19
fatalities, 12 (63 percent) were due to electric shock.
Exhibit 9-1 contains descriptions of accidents related to trimming
trees near overhead power lines. It covers a period from approximately
April 1984 to December 1986 and describes 15 accidents involving 14
fatalities and 3 injuries. Five of these accidents (five deaths)
appeared to involve line-clearance tree trimming activities--two so
state in the abstract; one involved a ``trained employee'' trimming
along a 161-kV right of way (Ex. 9-6, same accident); one involved
contact with a 69-kilovolt power line; and one involved an inspection
of an electric cooperative (Ex. 9-6, same accident). Only four of the
reports (5 deaths) apparently dealt with residential tree trimming. One
of the reports concerned a line-clearance tree trimmer who received
burns only (no fatality). The other abstracts related to accidents
which could have related to either line-clearance or non-line-clearance
work. This exhibit alone shows that a minimum of 5 electrocutions
involving line-clearance tree-trimming activities occurred during this
2.75-year period, and the true number is likely to be even higher.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\For various reasons, the OSHA fatality reports in Exhibits
9-1 and 9-6 did not record all occupational electrocutions occurring
in this period. For example, despite reporting requirements, some
fatalities are simply never reported to the Agency. Additionally,
the OSHA data base does not include reports from all states with
their own approved occupational safety and health programs. Further,
with respect to Exhibit 9-1, some accident reports submitted for the
period covered by this exhibit were not reviewed in time to be
entered into the database.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is not clear why the NAA survey failed to include any
electrocutions;22 however, the OSHA data amply demonstrate the
risk faced by these tree-trimming employees. An estimated 8 line-
clearance tree-trimming employees are electrocuted each year out of a
population of approximately 36,000 full-time positions for a fatality
rate of 0.00022, or a risk of electrocution of 1 in 100 over a 45-year
working lifetime (Ex. 5). OSHA also estimates that about 40 workers
among 137,800 electric utility employees at high risk under the
proposal were electrocuted each year for a fatality rate of 0.00029, or
a risk of electrocution of 1.3 in 100 over a 45-year working lifetime
(Ex. 5). On this basis, OSHA has determined that the risk of
electrocution for line-clearance employees is about 75 percent of the
risk of those who face the highest probability of death from electric
shock. Additionally, employees are also exposed to injury from electric
shock; and, while the OSHA data do not accurately reflect injury rates,
the Agency has found that injuries from electric shock normally occur
at a much greater frequency than electrocutions (54 FR 5005-5006; Ex.
5). Therefore, the Agency concludes that employees involved in line-
clearance tree-trimming work are exposed to a significant risk of
electric shock.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\2 The OSHA data were submitted after the NPRM was published,
but before the public hearing. Equivalent data were also submitted
by OSHA to the Subpart S work practices rulemaking and were
available even before Sec. 1910.269 was proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Robert Felix of the National Arborist Association further
argued that CPR was of dubious value with respect to injuries caused by
electric shock. In NAA's post-hearing brief, he stated:
a study of the precise issue by medical experts (Cardiologist F.
Gravino, M.D., F.A.C.C., et al.) commissioned by NAA and submitted
to the Record as part of NAA's post-hearing evidence submission to
the Docket, along with other related Record evidence, demonstrates
the following medical assessment:
1. * * * There is no demonstrated value of CPR in the electric
injury context.
* * * * *
2. * * * CPR is of no value to a person exposed to high voltage
shock because of attendant ``irreversible damage of either the
autonomic nervous system or the cardiac tissue itself.'' (Gravino,
et al., supra)
* * * * *
3. * * * Lower voltage contacts from indirect contacts do ``not
respond to CPR''--see National Safety Council Newsletter of July/
August 1990, at p. 1, submitted to the Docket by NAA as part of its
post-hearing evidence submission.
Moreover, such lower voltage contacts may induce respiratory
block, rather than cardiac block, as to which artificial
respiration, which is taught to line clearance tree trimmers as part
of first-aid training, provides appropriate assistance, for which
CPR would provide no additional benefit--a point conceded by NIOSH
(D.C. Tr. 35, 67).
4. * * * Even if otherwise appropriate in an electrical
context--a fact not supported by the evidence--CPR is of value only
if followed by defibrillation within 8 minutes of the onset of
ventricular fibrillation.
The likelihood of getting an 8 minute ambulance response time to
a line clearance job site is remote (notwithstanding the isolated
anecdotal evidence to the contrary arising in a non line clearance
context in Seattle, Washington and West Va.).
* * * the dubious value of CPR further is attenuated by the
remote likelihood of obtaining the required defibrillation within 8
minutes. [Ex. 58]
Others asserted that CPR was useful and necessary for the
protection of workers exposed to electric shock (Ex. 3-21, 3-76, 3-
107). Dr. Richard Niemeier of NIOSH stated that current medical
guidelines recommend CPR treatment, as follows:
The revised ``Standards and Guidelines for Cardiopulmonary
Resuscitation (CPR) and Emergency Cardiac Care (ECC)'' recommend the
same treatment for cardiopulmonary arrest, whether spontaneous or
associated with electrical shock [JAMA 1986]. The guidelines noted
that the complications of electric shock that might require CPR
include tetany of the muscles used for breathing during contact with
the electrical current, prolonged paralysis of breathing muscles for
a period following the electric contact, and cardiac arrest. This
discussion considers two categories: (1) respiratory arrest (with
pulse) and (2) cardiac arrest. [Ex. 15]
NIOSH reviewed studies on the effectiveness of CPR in resuscitating
electric shock victims. Regarding this review of the available
evidence, Mr. Niemeier stated:
The question posed by OSHA, at this time, however, is whether
sufficient evidence exists to support the recommendation that
utility linemen work in pairs and be trained in CPR. Medical ethics
and common sense prohibit a prospective study with random allocation
of electrical shock or other cardiac arrest victims to ``CPR'' and
``non-CPR'' groups. This question must be answered, therefore, by
clinical epidemiologic studies that are less than perfect. Cummins
and Eisenberg [1985] reviewed the evidence regarding the
relationship of early CPR and survival following cardiac arrest. The
authors found nine studies that they considered credible (before
1985); all nine studies reported that early CPR had a beneficial
effect. Cummins and Eisenberg [1985] concluded that the evidence
clearly supported the concept that early CPR (begun on the scene by
lay persons) leads to better survival rates than CPR delayed until
emergency medical personnel arrive. These studies generally exclude
trauma victims from analysis; this fact does not preclude the
extrapolation of these results to patients with cardiac rhythm
disturbances secondary to contact with electrical energy. [Ex. 15]
The IBEW strongly urged OSHA to require CPR training for those
exposed to the hazards of electric shock, stating:
The IBEW urges OSHA to adopt language which would require every
employer covered by the standard, where employees can be expected by
the nature of the work to be exposed to hazardous electrical
contact, to train employees in cardio-pulmonary resuscitation. Line-
Clearance tree-trimming personnel must also be trained in CPR.
Numerous reports of accidents and life saving incidents submitted by
IBEW Local Unions to the IBEW International Office, some of which
have been submitted to OSHA during this rulemaking, argue forcibly
for this provision in the standard. Therefore, the IBEW fully
supports the OSHA proposed Rule 1910.269(b)(1)(i).
During the public hearing(s) testimony was given regarding the
effectiveness of administering CPR to electrocution victims where
the heart is in a state of fibrillation. The Electric Power Research
Institute did a complete study of this issue with regard to methods
of pole top rescue. [Ex. 61]
The EPRI study did recognize CPR as part of their recommended
treatment for victims of electric shock (Ex. 57).
While the Gravino, et al., report cited in the NAA post-hearing
comments did indeed point out several factors limiting the usefulness
of CPR in the treatment of electric shock injuries,\23\ OSHA is not
persuaded that CPR cannot revive some victims of electric shock. In
fact, the IBEW testified that their members have used CPR to save
lives, and their accident records report the use of cardiopulmonary
resuscitation techniques on employees injured by electric shock (Ex 12-
12; DC Tr. 559-561, 564-565). The NIOSH testimony clearly indicates
that accepted treatment of unconscious electric shock victims includes
the application of CPR. As they stated, ``The limited data available
regarding survival after contact with electrical energy and other
relevant data on factors associated with survival after cardiopulmonary
arrest support the NIOSH recommendations [DC Tr. 34].''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\The NAA comments misrepresent the study in one important
area. Their comments stated, ``CPR is of no value to a person
exposed to high voltage shock because of attendant `irreversible
damage of either the autonomic nervous system or the cardiac tissue
itself.'''. The actual statement in the study was ``Exposure to
extremely high voltage (with attendant high amperage) energized
electric power lines . . . might well lead to irreversible damage of
either the autonomic nervous system or the cardiac tissue itself. .
. . CPR would be of no value in the resuscitation of a person so
exposed [emphasis added].'' Additional examples are given of
circumstances that minimize the usefulness of CPR. However, no
statement in the study indicates that CPR is of no value generally
in electric shock cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA has not accepted the argument that lack of fully equipped
ambulances and slow response times negate any benefit that CPR training
would provide. Though it is true that ACLS is needed to revive the
heart after it goes into fibrillation, Mr. Heinz Ahlers of NIOSH stated
that defibrillation is not necessary for cases of complete heart
stoppage (that is, the heart stops beating completely rather than
fibrillates) as occurs in response to some electric shocks (LA Tr. 358-
360). Additionally, in cases of fibrillation of the heart muscle,
emergency response times are quick enough (within 8 minutes 50 percent
of the time in occupational sites in West Virginia--DC Tr. 66-68) and
the presence of defibrillating equipment is present in sufficient and
increasing quantities (presently in 25 percent of all licensed
ambulances--Ex. 58; increasing over time--DC Tr. 67-68) for CPR
provided on the scene by crew members to have an impact on employee
safety on a country-wide basis.
For the foregoing reasons, OSHA has determined that a requirement
for the training of employees in cardiopulmonary resuscitation
techniques is necessary and appropriate. Therefore, Sec. 1910.269(b)(1)
retains the proposal's requirement that persons with training in first
aid, including CPR, be available where employees are exposed to
electric shock hazards.
Some commenters did suggest that OSHA clarify the standard to state
that CPR was required only for employees exposed to the hazards of
electric shock (Ex. 3-34, 3-80, 3-82, 3-88, 3-109, 3-123). Messrs.
Nicholas Reynolds, Scott DuBoff, and Allen Flowers, commenting on
behalf of several electric utilities, suggested ``[i]ncorporation of a
voltage level threshold'' in the final standard by way of clarification
(Ex. 3-109). The American Public Power Association and the Tennessee
Valley Authority recommended adding the word ``exposed'' before
``energized'' to bring forth the intended meaning of the requirement
(Ex. 3-80, 3-82).
OSHA agrees with these comments and has clarified the rule so that
it applies to employees ``performing work on or associated with exposed
lines or equipment energized at 50 volts or more''. This will clarify
that the rule does not apply to employees working near insulated
electric equipment, as the exposure to electric shock hazards is
minimal. It also establishes a 50-volt threshold that has previously
been recognized in the Agency's electrical standards as a general
electric shock hazard limit. (See Secs. 1910.303(g)(2)(i),
1910.304(f)(1), and 1910.333(a)(1) for examples.)
Proposed Sec. 1910.269(b)(1)(i)(A) would have required two CPR-
trained persons for field work that involved two or more employees. The
National Arborist Association argued that requiring a minimum of two
trained persons was not feasible for line-clearance tree trimming
contractors (Ex. 3-113, 58; LA Tr. 375-377). Others also noted the
difficulty of manning crews with two trained employees at all times,
due to the extensive use of two-person crews and the 80-percent
turnover rate in the industry (Ex. 3-60, 3-63, 3-67, 3-77, 3-87, 3-90,
3-91, 3-98, 3-100, 3-118). NAA made this statement in their post-
hearing comment (Ex. 58):
Finally, CPR is not feasible for implementation in the line
clearance tree trimming industry because the industry's employee
turnover rate is 81% per year! Thus, as currently proposed by OSHA,
a line clearance contractor could not field a typical two man line
clearance crew until at least one member was trained in CPR, and no
sooner than the new employee is trained, statistically, the odds are
he will quit! See NAA survey of members' employee turnover for line
clearance crews, submitted to the Record as part of NAA's post-
hearing evidence submission. This survey shows that fully one third
of new hires are gone within 30 days, almost half are gone in 60
days, 59% are gone in 90 days, 70% are gone in 6 months, 78% are
gone in 9 months, and 81% are gone in a year. Thus, because having
to train all of these imminent quits is an extraordinarily expensive
outlay [FOOTNOTE: ``$8,280,000--almost four times OSHA's estimate--
see our pre-hearing Comment''] of dubious use in any event, we
respectfully submit that this proposal exceeds OSHA's proper
exercise of its legitimate authority.
NAA did acknowledge, however, that the ``logistical infeasibility''
of the CPR training requirement could be minimized by allowing
employers to phase in training of new employees after they have been
hired (Ex. 58; LA Tr. 376-377). In their post-hearing comment, they
suggested a phase-in period of 6 months for newly hired employees (Ex.
58).
The Agency has accepted the need for flexibility in applying the
rule to employers who experience a high turnover of employees or who,
for other reasons, are faced with the problem of manning two-person
crews with many new employees. The final rule does require the presence
of two persons trained in first aid, including CPR, for field crews
consisting of two or more employees. However, an exception is made to
allow an employer to provide only one CPR-trained person if all new
employees are trained in first aid, including cardiopulmonary
resuscitation, within 3 months of their hiring dates. OSHA believes
that the 3-month delay in the training of new employees will minimize
the economic impact on line-clearance tree-trimming contractors (as
well as any other employers who experience a high rate of turnover with
new employees). As NAA testified, most of the turnover occurs within
the first 3 months of an employee's tenure. Line-clearance tree
trimmers that remain beyond 3 months are required to be trained; and,
if they then quit and are hired by another firm after that, the
training they have already received can be used by their new employer
for compliance with paragraph (b)(1). Additionally, the 3-month delay
in training new employees provides a built-in exception for students
hired during the summer break.
OSHA believes that this rule gives line-clearance tree-trimming
contractors and other small employers flexibility by permitting new
employees to be trained within 3 months of being hired. It also
maximizes safety for exposed employees by requiring all employees to be
trained in CPR.
Paragraph (b)(1)(i)(B) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 would have
required the presence of enough CPR-trained individuals to enable
emergency treatment to begin within 4 minutes of an accident. Many
commenters objected to the imposition of a time limit on the response
to an accident (Ex. 3-20, 3-39, 3-42, 3-80, 3-112, 3-123, 3-131). Most
claimed that a stricken employee may not be discovered for a while,
making it impossible for employers to meet the standard. Some
commenters suggested modifying the rule to apply the 4-minute limit
starting with discovery of the accident (Ex. 3-39, 3-73, 3-83). Others
recommended more general language, such as ``as soon as practical'',
``as soon as possible'', or simply ``trained persons shall be
available'' (Ex. 3-20, 3-80, 3-123, 56).
OSHA intended proposed paragraph (b)(1)(i)(B) to provide guidance
in the determination of the number of trained people necessary for
prompt application of first aid or CPR in the event of an accident. The
4-minute time given in the proposal was not intended as an absolute
time limit on responding to an accident and did not account for delays
in discovering an accident. In fact, at the public hearing, Agency
representatives stated that the proposal was written in performance
language and that the standard would be enforced by determining the
time it would take for a CPR-trained individual to get to an injured
employee (DC Tr. 201-203). If the provision were worded so that the
number of trained employees was based on the total time after discovery
of the accident, travel time between the nearest trained person and the
exposed employee would not always be counted. OSHA believes that it is
important for cardiopulmonary resuscitation to begin within 4 minutes
of an electric shock injury. The record indicates that once that time
has passed CPR is of limited usefulness. The Agency also believes that
it is important for the final rule to incorporate this objective. OSHA
has reworded this requirement, however, to state its intent that
exposed employees be no more than 4 minutes from a CPR-trained person.
Some commenters were also concerned that remote work stations with
limited staffs could not meet the requirement proposed for fixed work
locations (Ex. 3-42, 3-102, 3-112). To respond to these comments, OSHA
has added the following exception:
However, where the existing number of employees is insufficient
to meet this requirement (at a remote substation, for example), all
employees at the work location shall be trained.
Proposed Sec. 1910.269(b)(1)(ii) would have required first aid
training to be equivalent to the training provided by the American Red
Cross. This provision was proposed to define the quality of first aid
training required. In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested
comments on whether there were additional training programs that
provide equivalent training and that should also have been listed in
the regulation.
Several commenters listed organizations that provide first aid or
CPR training equivalent to that given by the American Red Cross (Ex. 3-
21, 3-24, 3-42, 3-59, 3-60, 3-69, 3-123). In the past, OSHA recognized
many other organizations as having acceptable first aid training
programs under Sec. 1910.151(b), through the use of interpretations and
formal compliance documents (CPL instructions).
While the American Red Cross first aid training program is
nationally recognized, OSHA believes that accrediting this organization
in the text of the standard would give it greater visibility than
others who provide equally protective programs. OSHA also believes that
listing all currently recognized first aid courses is not practical,
especially since the Agency no longer formally acknowledges such
programs. Instead of recognizing individual programs, OSHA has adopted
guidelines for the evaluation of first aid training by competent
professionals as well as by compliance staff in the context of
workplace inspections (OSHA instruction CPL 2-2.53). Because these
guidelines are already in place, there is no need to address this issue
in Sec. 1910.269. Additionally, generic requirements on first aid
training belong in Sec. 1910.151, where they would apply generally,
rather than in Sec. 1910.269, where they would apply only to electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution work. Therefore, OSHA
has decided not to carry proposed paragraph (b)(1)(ii) forward into the
final rule. The Agency will continue to use the guidelines in CPL 2-
2.53 to determine the adequacy of first aid training courses provided
to employees.
In Sec. 1910.269(b)(2), OSHA proposed that first aid supplies
recommended by a physician be placed in weatherproof containers, unless
stored indoors, and that these containers be readily accessible. This
was to ensure that proper first aid supplies are available and are in
good condition when needed.
Several comments objected to the language ``[f]irst aid supplies
recommended by a physician'' (Ex. 3-21, 3-69, 3-86, 3-102, 3-109, 3-
123). They expressed the concern that this term was too ambiguous and
would rule out commercially available first aid kits.
This language was taken from existing Sec. 1910.151(b). It was the
intent of the proposal that the first aid supplies required by this
current regulation be stored in weatherproof containers. It was not
intended that the existing provision be modified by the new standard to
require different types or amounts of first aid supplies. To express
this intent more clearly, the final rule replaces ``recommended by a
physician'' with ``required by Sec. 1910.151(b)''.
Two commenters suggested that the regulation not require first aid
supplies stored in vehicles to be kept in a weatherproof container (Ex.
3-20, 3-80). They argued that storing the supplies inside a vehicle
would protect them from the weather.
OSHA has decided to require first aid supplies that may be exposed
to the weather to be kept in weatherproof containers. This performance-
oriented language would thus require the supplies to be protected from
the elements only if it is necessary. (It should be noted that
Sec. 1926.50(d)(2) requires first aid supplies to be kept in
weatherproof containers. Thus, first aid kits used in construction
would have to be weatherproof in any event.)
Paragraph (b)(3) of Sec. 1910.269 proposed that first aid kits be
maintained ready for use and be inspected at least annually in
accordance with an established schedule. OSHA proposed this provision
to ensure that first aid kits are maintained with all of the proper
equipment.
The Utility Workers Union of America questioned the adequacy of the
requirement for annual inspections (Ex. 3-76; DC Tr. 413). Mr. Marshall
Hicks of the UWUA stated:
In dealing with paragraph (b)(3), the requirement for an annual
inspection of first-aid kits we also feel is totally inadequate. And
again speaking from personal experience, in the system where I was
employed, the first-aid kits, ladders and fire extinguishers were
inspected on a monthly basis.
And even on a monthly basis, we found that substantial amounts
of supplies from the first-aid kits were missing or previously used
and had to be restocked. On an annual basis, I am afraid that in
less than six months that the first-aid kits would be totally empty
if they were not inspected and replenished on a routine basis. We
would therefore request or suggest that OSHA reconsider this
proposal and require a monthly inspection of first-aid kits.
OSHA is also concerned that supplies might not be adequate if
inspections are made on an annual basis. However, there is no evidence
that monthly checks are necessary or adequate. Therefore, the final
rule carries forward the proposed requirement for an annual inspection
and also requires first aid kits to be examined often enough to ensure
that expended supplies are replaced on a timely basis.
Paragraph (c). In paragraph (c) of Sec. 1910.269, OSHA requires a
job briefing to be conducted before each job. Most of the work
performed under the standard requires planning in order to ensure
employee safety (as well as to protect equipment and the general
public). Typically, electric power transmission and distribution work
exposes employees to the hazards of exposed conductors energized at
thousands of volts. Power generation work frequently involves
electrical hazards, as well as the hazards of air pressures in the
range of 15 to 500 pounds per square inch, of water pressures of 35 to
4000 pounds per square inch, of chemical injection systems of 250 to
4000 pounds per square inch, of steam pressures of 15 to 4000 pounds
per square inch at temperatures of up to 1000 degrees Fahrenheit, and
of hazardous substances (LA Tr. 50). If the work is not thoroughly
planned ahead of time, the possibility of human error is increased
greatly. To avoid problems, the task sequence is prescribed before work
is started. For example, before climbing a pole, the employee must
determine if the pole is capable of remaining in place and if minimum
approach distances are sufficient, and he or she must determine what
tools will be needed and what procedure should be used for performing
the job. Without job planning, the worker may ignore the minimum
approach distance requirements or may have to reclimb the pole to
retrieve a forgotten tool or perform an overlooked task, resulting in
increased exposure to the hazards of falling and contact with energized
lines.
When more than one employee is involved, the job plan must be
communicated to all the affected employees. If the job is planned but
the plan is not discussed with the workers, one employee may perform
his or her duties out of order or may otherwise not coordinate
activities with the rest of the crew, endangering the entire crew.
Therefore, OSHA is requiring a job briefing before work is started. The
briefing would cover: hazards and work procedures involved, special
precautions, energy source controls, and requirements for personal
protective equipment.
OSHA received numerous comments about the practicality of enforcing
the requirement for job briefings (Ex. 3-9, 3-13, 3-69, 3-71, 3-123, 3-
125, 3-128, 62-16, 62-18, 62-22, 62-38). Expressing the concerns of
many of these commenters, the Nashville Electric Service stated:
NES believes job briefing is important, and it has been its
experience that such job briefings are already in place. The
mandating of such a technical requirement imposes a burden which is
very difficult to enforce and would negate the primary object of job
briefings; that is, to ensure that crew members are aware of all
work-related hazards. [Ex. 62-22]
Additionally, several commenters objected to the additional
paperwork burden that would be imposed by the requirement (Ex. 3-20, 3-
53, 3-80, 3-109, 3-123).
Others supported OSHA's requirement for job briefings (Ex. 3-9, 3-
46, 3-59, 3-107, 3-115; LA Tr. 50-53). Even those who disagreed with
the language in proposed Sec. 1910.269(c) accepted the importance of
planning the work and discussion of the job plan among employees
involved in the work. As the Nashville Electric Service noted, job
briefings are already being done.
OSHA has carried the requirement for these briefings forward into
the final rule. The concern of those who objected to the paperwork
burden is unfounded. The final rule, like the proposal before it, does
not contain a provision for making or keeping records of these
briefings.
The introductory text in proposed Sec. 1910.269(c)(1) was worded as
follows:
Before starting each job, the employer shall ensure that the
employee in charge shall conduct a job briefing with the employees
involved. The briefing shall cover such subjects as: hazards
associated with the job, work procedures involved, special
precautions, energy source controls, and personal protective
equipment requirements.
Some comments objected to the phrase ``the employer shall ensure
that'' (Ex. 3-20, 3-44, 3-58, 3-69, 3-71, 3-80, 3-112, 3-123). These
commenters offered suggested substitutions, such as ``the employer
shall require'' and ``the employee in charge shall conduct''. For
example, Mr. Carl Behnke of EEI stated:
while a utility may require that supervisors, foremen and other
employees assigned the responsibility for directing work activities
perform certain tasks such as conducting a job briefing, the utility
cannot ``ensure'' or ``guarantee'' that such a briefing will in fact
be conducted each and every time it would be necessary and
appropriate to do so. This is an effort to impose strict liability
which is beyond OSHA's statutory authority, and thus is
inappropriate regulatory language. [Footnote omitted.] An employer
can be required under OSHA only to establish and communicate a
policy requiring that a job briefing be conducted, and implement
appropriate disciplinary action against those who are assigned the
responsibility but fail to carry it out.
In the EEI/IBEW draft, the responsibility for conducting the job
briefing would be delegated by the employer to the ``employee in
charge.'' This might include a supervisor or senior employee at the
location who is familiar with the work to be performed. The
performance-oriented wording contained in the EEI/IBEW submittal
represents a more reasonable and rational approach to the issue of
job briefing and should be substituted for OSHA's proposed language.
[Ex. 3-112]
OSHA has rejected these arguments. All the suggested alternatives
to the proposed language attempt to absolve employers of duties that
must be imposed to protect employees to the fullest. As noted by Mr.
Behnke, the EEI/IBEW draft language places the responsibility for
compliance on the employee in charge. The standard properly places the
responsibility on the employer to see that job briefings are conducted.
Mr. Behnke also noted that an employer can be required to establish and
communicate a policy requiring that job briefings be conducted and to
implement appropriate disciplinary action against those who are
assigned the task but fail to carry it out (Ex. 3-112). The Agency
feels that the EEI/IBEW draft language does not convey the full weight
of these duties to employers. Likewise, terms such as ``the employer
shall require'' impose only a small part of the responsibility for
compliance on employers.
The current General Industry Standards and Construction Standards
contain many examples of the phrase ``the employer shall
ensure''.24 This language does not make the employer an absolute
guarantor of an employee's compliance. In fact, the Agency recognizes
unpreventable employee misconduct as an affirmative defense to a
citation, and OSHA's policy is not to issue a citation where the
employer has fulfilled his or her responsibilities to inform the
employee of an adequate work rule and to enforce that rule
uniformly.25
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\2\4See, for example, Secs. 1910.95, 1910.147, 1910.151,
1910.183, 1910.184, 1910.217, 1910.268, 1910.1001, 1910.1028,
1910.1030, 1910.1047, 1910.1048, 1910.1200, 1910.1450, 1926.24,
1926.50, 1926.58, 1926.59, 1926.403, 1926.431, 1926.605, 1926.800,
and 1926.1053. The individual paragraph numbers have been omitted
because they are too numerous. Similar language, such as ``the
employer shall insure'' and ``the employer shall assure'', also
occurs throughout the OSHA standards.
\2\5Occupational Safety and Health Administration Field
Operations Manual, Chapter 5, Section E.
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For these reasons, OSHA has carried forward the language of the
proposed provision without substantive change.
Under paragraph , at least one briefing is required to be conducted
before the start of each shift. Only one briefing in a shift is needed
if all the jobs are similar in nature. Additional planning discussions
must take place for work involving significant changes in routine. For
example, if the first two jobs of the day involve working on a
deenergized line and the third job involves working on energized lines
with live-line tools, separate briefings must be conducted for each
type of job.
Under paragraph (c)(2), the required briefing would normally
consist of a concise discussion outlining the tasks to be performed.
However, if the work is particularly hazardous or if the employees may
not be able to recognize the hazards involved, then a more thorough
discussion must take place. With this provision, OSHA recognizes that
employees are familiar with the tasks and hazards involved with routine
work. However, it is important to take the time to carefully discuss
unusual work situations that may pose additional or different hazards
to workers. (See also the preamble discussion of
Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(iv).) OSHA has included a note following this
paragraph in the final rule to clarify that, regardless of how short
the discussion is, the briefing must still touch on all the topics
listed in the introductory text of paragraph (c).
Proposed Sec. 1910.269(c)(3) would have exempted employees working
alone from the requirements for job briefings. Though it would still be
important for the employee to plan the work, OSHA felt that work
procedure discussions would not have relevance for a single worker
inasmuch as there would be no one else available for discussion.
However, in the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested comments on
the need for and desirability of a requirement for job planning for
these workers.
OSHA received several comments supporting the proposed exemption of
employees working alone from the requirement for job briefings (Ex. 3-
20, 3-42, 3-107, 3-112). The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
argued that it would be superfluous to require job planning for an
employee who reports alone at the job location (Ex. 3-20). Union
Electric Company was concerned about the practicality of such a
requirement (Ex. 3-42).
NIOSH and the National Electrical Manufacturers Association
supported a provision requiring job planning for employees working
alone (Ex. 3-21, 3-81). NIOSH reported that several of their reports of
fatalities among utility workers indicate that a thorough job briefing
may have prevented a fatality (Ex. 3-21). They argued that the
acknowledged hazards of overhead line work should require prior
planning with a supervisor for each day's task and each new location.
The UWUA also supported a requirement that applied to employees working
alone (DC Tr. 424; LA Tr. 44).
Even in the preamble to the proposal, OSHA recognized the
importance of job planning for all employees. The Agency does not
believe that an employee who labors alone needs to plan his or her
tasks any less than one who is assisting others. Several fatalities in
the record involved a lone employee who could have benefitted from
better job planning or perhaps a briefing with the supervisor before
the job started (Ex. 3-21, 9-2, 12-12). Therefore, OSHA has included a
requirement for job planning for these employees. The language in
Sec. 1910.269(c)(3) of the final rule reads as follows:
An employee working alone need not conduct a job briefing.
However, the employer shall ensure that the tasks to be performed
are planned as if a briefing were required.
OSHA believes that this provision will encourage additional
planning of the job.
Paragraph (d). Paragraph (d) of Sec. 1910.269 contains hazardous
energy control (lockout/tagout) requirements. The provisions of this
paragraph in the proposal were patterned after the national consensus
standard of the American National Standards Institute, ANSI Z244.1-
1982, ``American National Standard for Personal Protection--Lockout/
Tagout of Energy Sources--Minimum Safety Requirements'' (Ex. 2-21). In
addition, the provisions of the proposed paragraph were consistent and
compatible with the generic procedures originally contained in OSHA's
proposed general industry standard for control of hazardous energy
sources (lockout/tagout), which was published on April 29, 1988 (53 FR
15496).
After the electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
standard was proposed, a final general industry standard on the control
of hazardous energy sources was issued (September 1, 1989, 54 FR
36644). In order to ensure that issues raised in that rulemaking were
also considered in this one, OSHA incorporated the entire lockout/
tagout record into the record on Sec. 1910.269 (54 FR 4982).26 The
Agency stated in the preamble to proposed Sec. 1910.269 that, if it was
determined that final Sec. 1910.269 would contain lockout and tagging
provisions, these requirements would be the same as those in the final
generic lockout/tagout standard, except as necessary to provide for
unique situations in electric power generation work. OSHA used this
guideline in developing paragraph (d) of the final electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\6 UWUA, Local 246, also requested that OSHA incorporate this
evidence into the electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution rulemaking (LA Tr. 45).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA received numerous comments on this issue. Utility
representatives generally argued that utility tagging systems are
unique and provide a high degree of safety to their employees (Ex. 3-
20, 3-32, 3-42, 3-82, 3-112, 3-123; LA Tr. 215-239). Others supported
the use of the generic standard (at least as proposed) for lockout and
tagging of electric power generation systems, which recognized systems
using locks or tags (Ex. 3-13, 3-34, 3-39, 3-45, 3-68, 3-73, 3-83, 3-
88). NIOSH and the UWUA argued, as they did in the generic standard
rulemaking record, that locks should be required and that each employee
should be protected by personal locks (Ex. 3-21, 3-76; DC Tr. 30, 414-
415; LA Tr. 45-49, 54-59, 68-70).
Mr. John Bachofer, Vice President of Metropolitan Edison Company,
representing Edison Electric Institute addressed the issue of control
of hazardous energy sources at the public hearing in Los Angeles, CA.
He explained the case that tagging systems in use in the utility
industry are unique and fully protect employees as follows:
As OSHA is well aware, one of the most important aspects of this
proposal is OSHA's recognition that in the electric utility industry
tagging systems provide excellent protection for utility workers
when it is necessary to control hazardous energy sources. OSHA
specifically recognized this point in the preamble to the generic
lockout/tagout standard and we appreciate it. Nonetheless, there are
some who are participating in this rulemaking who have asked the
agency to reconsider its position on this point.
* * * * *
[W]e want to show why this standard should be the only one
regulating control of all types of hazardous energy sources in the
operation and maintenance of electric utility facilities. There are
six basic concepts that we'd like to emphasize. First, the control
of energy in several of its various forms; electrical, chemical,
thermal, mechanical, internal (such as pressure of liquid or gas) is
fundamental to electric utility work. It's a large part of what we
do.
Second, because it is central to our operations, control of
hazardous energy is absolutely critical to employee safety and all
of us in the industry from the CEO to the entry level ground helper,
mechanic or operator, take it very, very seriously. Everyone of our
employees is trained to recognize that the forms of energy we deal
with are very unforgiving. As Mr. Lawson of PEPCO said in the
lockout/tagout hearing, ``Compliance with tagging procedures in this
industry is akin to an orthodox religion.''
Third, because we recognize what we are dealing with, the
methods we use to control hazardous energy involve a comprehensive
and documented process. In the electric utility industry devices
that can effect the operation of a system are operated only on
specific or standard orders issued from authorized personnel.
Fourth, employees who may be exposed to hazardous energy are
trained in the application of hazardous energy control procedures
and are required to comply rigorously with those procedures,
including the formality and documentation which provides constant
audit and reinforcement of the integrity of these procedures.
Employees successfully complete training before they're considered
qualified to request that tagging procedures be initiated and before
they are assigned switching and tagging work as part of their normal
job duties. Employees who violate these procedures are subject to
serious discipline.
Fifth, the methods for controlling energy, while perhaps varying
slightly due to local design differences or practices, are
essentially consistent throughout the electric utility industry. We,
of course, speak only for the investor-owned portion of the
industry, but we think that you'll find that the public power and
rural cooperative representatives agree.
Sixth, just as OSHA has concluded, and as IBEW has agreed, this
industry's hazardous energy control procedures work and they work
very, very well. Not to say that as in any human endeavor there is
no chance for human error or for malfeasance. Unfortunately, it
happens. Albeit infrequently. Undoubtedly, you have heard in the
course of this proceeding of isolated instances in which the system
has alleged to have failed, but we wish to point out that there are
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of successful examples. In
fact, in the time it takes to make this presentation there will
probably be hundreds of successful tagging operations performed in
utilities around the country and you won't hear about one of them,
which is great because it means that no one will have gotten hurt.
[LA Tr. 215-219]
EEI also displayed a videotape of a typical tagging procedure used
by one of their member companies (Ex. 12-6). They argued that the
tagging system used by electric utilities is characterized by formality
and redundant controls (Ex. 56).
OSHA has not accepted the argument that the elements of hazardous
energy control in electric utility operations are so unique that they
warrant a completely different set of lockout and tagging requirements.
EEI's six basic concepts do not demonstrate unique conditions in
electric utility workplaces. Rather, they encompass conditions common
to many large industrial worksites, as follows:
1. ``First, the control of energy in several of its various forms;
electrical, chemical, thermal, mechanical, internal (such as pressure
of liquid or gas) is fundamental to electric utility work.'' Not only
do many non-utility employers find it necessary to control many
different forms of hazardous energy, companies that generate electric
power as a by-product of their normal production activities would often
have even more sources of energy to control (Ex. 3-39, 3-45, 3-68, 3-
83).
2. ``Second, because it is central to our operations, control of
hazardous energy is absolutely critical to employee safety and all of
us in the industry from the CEO to the entry level ground helper,
mechanic or operator, take it very, very seriously.'' Several employers
commenting on the generic lockout standard made the same argument (54
FR 36654; Ex. 3-45, 3-68).
3. ``Third, because we recognize what we are dealing with, the
methods we use to control hazardous energy involve a comprehensive and
documented process.'' In the generic hazardous energy control
rulemaking, OSHA found that companies with successful tagging programs
``implemented detailed energy control procedures'' (54 FR 36655).
4. ``Fourth, employees who may be exposed to hazardous energy are
trained in the application of hazardous energy control procedures and
are required to comply rigorously with those procedures, including the
formality and documentation which provides constant audit and
reinforcement of the integrity of these procedures.'' Likewise, OSHA
determined that successful tagging programs throughout industry include
``extensive training programs'', including the reinforcement of this
training and discipline for those who violate the tagging procedures
(54 FR 36655).
5. ``Fifth, the methods for controlling energy, while perhaps
varying slightly due to local design differences or practices, are
essentially consistent throughout the electric utility industry.''
While this might be true,27 OSHA does not believe that consistency
alone in energy control across an industry has a great impact on
employee safety. For example, if company A and company B have identical
lockout procedures, employees might be protected to equal degrees in
both companies. However, just the simple fact that both lockout
procedures are the same has little impact on employee safety.28 It
is the procedures themselves that directly impact employee safety. In
fact, better procedures could lead to even greater safety. Furthermore,
different companies with identical procedures could have differing
follow-up systems, such as supervision, retraining, and incident
investigation. Follow-up techniques themselves can vastly improve
lockout procedures. Moreover, new entrants in the utility industry may
not choose to apply hazardous energy control procedures in the same
manner as existing electric utility companies, and the final electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution standard applies to
other industries as well. Besides, the generic lockout rule allows for
a wide variation in specific procedures. Thus, OSHA has evaluated the
lockout and tagging procedures of the electric utility industry, as
identified in the electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution rulemaking record, to determine whether they protect
employees to an acceptable degree. The content of Sec. 1910.269(d) is
based on this evaluation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\7 Some evidence in the record indicates that there are
differences in the lockout and tagging procedures used by different
utilities and even by the same utility in different plants (Ex. 3-
31, 3-80; DC Tr. 414; LA Tr. 49). The rulemaking record does
demonstrate, however, that the use of tags rather than locks is
common practice in the utility industry and that many of the
procedures used to ensure the integrity of the ``tagout'' system are
similar.
\2\8 If both companies share accident information, this might
lead to better lockout procedures for both companies. However, it is
the lockout procedures, not the consistency between the programs,
that lead to better safety for employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. ``Sixth, just as OSHA has concluded, and as IBEW has agreed,
this industry's hazardous energy control procedures work and they work
very, very well.'' This also does not make the industry's procedures
unique. The preamble to the generic lockout standard relates the
experience of many companies with successful lockout or tagging
programs (54 FR 36654-36655).
Representatives of the Utility Workers Union of America pointed out
the weaknesses of some utilities' tagging method of hazardous energy
control (LA Tr. 45-49, 54-59, 68-70). Messrs. Carl Wood, Scott Treon,
and Willard Kelly testified that tags had come off and had fallen to
the floor (LA Tr. 55, 62, 67). Messrs. Bernardo Garcia, Marshall Hicks,
and Allen Wilson maintained that work authorizations under these
tagging systems had been released under pressure from supervisory
personnel or without the knowledge of the employee who held the
authorization (LA Tr. 46; DC Tr. 414, 444). UWUA representatives also
stated that testing work had been permitted on circuits that were
deenergized and tagged (LA Tr. 46, 57, 59-60), that tags had been
incorrectly attached (LA Tr. 55), and that some tags were improper (LA
Tr. 67-68). They were also concerned that training in the employers'
tagging system was inadequate (LA Tr. 46, 61-63, 69). The UWUA
supported their allegations with documentary evidence, such as
grievances on work authorizations (hazardous energy control) and
related training, union safety committee reports of problems with work
authorizations, company audit reports and memoranda of such problems,
and State and Federal agency notices of deficiencies in the work
authorization system (Ex. 66).
In the preamble to the final generic standard on the control of
hazardous energy sources, OSHA stated that ``various electric utilities
* * * report that they have used tagout in lieu of lockout successfully
for many years'' (54 FR 36655). However, in the preamble to the final
electrical safety-related work practices standard, the Agency further
found that ``as documented in two of the computer printouts in Exhibit
8, the electric utility industry had [at least] 14 fatalities and 17
injuries recorded in OSHA files that were directly caused by a failure
of the lockout/tagout procedure in use'', during the period of July 1,
1972, to June 30, 1988 (55 FR 32003). It appears from this evidence
that, although some electric utility companies have had excellent
success with their tagging systems, other companies have had problems.
OSHA found this same dichotomy in the rulemaking record on
Sec. 1910.147. The Agency believes that there is no reason to reach a
different conclusion here, because the evidence in the electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution rulemaking is basically no
different from that in the lockout and tagging record. Therefore, OSHA
has reached the same final determination and rationale with respect to
the issue of whether the Agency should require the use of locks, locks
and tags, or tags alone to control potentially hazardous energy, as
follows:
Much of the testimony and comment received in this rulemaking
has focused on whether the standard should require lockout as
opposed to the proposed approach of allowing lockout or tagout. In a
sense, it was unfortunate that attention was focused more on a
single aspect of the standard, though it is certainly an important
one, than on the standard taken as a whole. The proposed standard
was intended to specify that the employer provide a comprehensive
set of procedures for addressing the hazards of unexpected
reenergization of equipment, and the use of locks and/or tags was
intended to be only a single element of the total program. In order
to provide adequate protection to employees, the Final Rule requires
employers to develop and utilize a comprehensive energy control
program consisting of: procedures for shutting down and isolating
machines and equipment and locking or tagging out the energy
isolating devices; employee training; and periodic inspections of
the energy control procedure to maintain its effectiveness. The
procedures must consist of steps for deenergization of equipment,
isolation of the equipment from energy sources, and verification of
deenergization before servicing and maintenance is performed on
equipment, and the employees who either perform the servicing or
maintenance or are affected by those operations must be properly
trained in the energy control procedures which apply to their work.
It should be noted that locks and tags by themselves do not
control hazardous energy. It is the isolation of the equipment from
the energy source and the following of the established procedures
for deenergization and reenergization of the equipment that actually
controls the energy. Locks and/or tags are attached to the
disconnects and other energy isolating devices after the machine or
equipment has, in fact, been isolated, in order to prevent them from
being reenergized before the work has been completed. If the
equipment has not been properly deenergized, and if proper
procedures have not been followed, neither a lock nor a tag will
provide protection.
The treatment of lockout vs. tagout presents OSHA with a
difficult regulatory dilemma. On the one hand, if the issue were
simply whether a lock or a tag will be better able to prevent
equipment from being reactivated, there is no question that a lock
would be the preferred method. Locks are positive restraints which
cannot be removed (except through extraordinary means such as by the
use of bolt-cutters) without the use of a key or other unlocking
mechanism. By contrast, the limitations of tags used alone are self-
evident: They do not serve as positive restraints on energy
isolating devices, but are only warnings to employees that the
equipment is not to be reenergized. Tags not fastened with a strong
material can become detached from the energy isolating device by
wind or other environmental conditions, and the legend on some tags
can be rendered illegible if the tag becomes wet. Tags may not
provide protection if there are affected employees who do not read
English or who have not been properly trained in the tagging system
and its implementation.
However, the issue in this rulemaking is not merely on the use
of lockout vs. tagout, but rather the use of locks and/or tags in a
comprehensive program of energy control. As was noted in the
preamble of the proposed rule (53 FR 15496, April 29, 1988), OSHA is
aware of workplaces in which tagout systems are used with great
effectiveness. In particular, various electric utilities and
chemical plants report that they have used tagout in lieu of lockout
successfully for many years (Tr. pg. H194-214; W2-3 to 2-39). In
evaluating these industries, OSHA has determined that there are
several factors which have contributed to their successful use of
tagout programs: first, these companies have implemented detailed
energy control procedures which are quite similar to those set forth
in both the proposed and final lockout/tagout standard; second, they
have established and utilized extensive training programs to teach
their employees about their energy control procedures, including the
use of tags and the importance of obeying them; third, these
companies reinforce their training periodically. However, it is the
fourth common element, discipline, which appears to be the most
critical to the success of these programs; the companies with
effective tagout programs apply disciplinary action to both
supervisors and employees who violate the tagout procedures.
OSHA believes that an effective tagout system needs all four of
these elements to be successful. However, it is the fourth element,
discipline, which is the most difficult to incorporate into a
regulatory approach in the Final Rule. Not surprisingly, it also
reflects the most serious limitation of tagout which does not arise
with lockout. Because a tagout program does not involve positive
restraints on energy control devices, it requires constant vigilance
to assure that tags are properly applied; that they remain affixed
throughout the servicing and maintenance of equipment; and that no
employee violates the tag by reenergizing the equipment, either
intentionally or inadvertently, before the tag is removed. By
contrast, a lockout device, once applied, cannot inadvertently be
removed, and cannot be removed intentionally by an unauthorized
person except by the use of force.
In the Final Rule, OSHA has determined that lockout is a surer
means of assuring deenergization of equipment than tagout, and that it
should be the preferred method used by employees. However, the Agency
also recognizes that tagout will nonetheless need to be used instead of
lockout where the energy control device cannot accept a locking device.
Where an energy control device has been designed to be lockable, the
standard requires that lockout be used unless tagout can be shown to
provide ``full employee protection,'' that is, protection equivalent to
lockout. [54 FR 36655, corrected at 55 FR 38677, 38684]
OSHA has decided to take the same approach in this standard and has
taken two steps to realize this objective. First, the final rule
includes a note indicating that the Agency will accept compliance with
Sec. 1910.147 as compliance with Sec. 1910.269(d). The lockout and
tagging provisions of Sec. 1910.269 are based on the requirements in
the generic standard; therefore, it is appropriate to recognize this
formally in the final rule. This will allay the concerns of the many
commenters who were concerned that employers would be faced with having
to comply with two different standards for the control of hazardous
energy sources.29 It will also ease the burden of compliance for
employers (including electric utilities) who have taken steps to comply
with Sec. 1910.147, which has been in effect for over 2 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\9EEI also noted the possibility of an employer's having to
comply with four different general industry standards on lockout and
tagging: Secs. 1910.147, proposed 1910.269(d) and (m), and
1910.333(b) (Ex. 3-112). However, the OSHA electrical lockout and
tagging requirements also recognize compliance with Sec. 1910.147,
with two exceptions. Further, Sec. 1910.269(m) has limited
application in generating plants (substations and transmission lines
only). As discussed later, the differences between paragraphs (d)
and (m) are based on differences in hazards posed by the types of
installations involved. Therefore, if an employer wanted to follow a
single standard on the control of hazardous energy sources for
generation and utilization installations within an electric power
generating plant, he or she could comply with Sec. 1910.147, with
only two additional provisions to follow for work on electric
utilization installations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the requirements in paragraph (d) of final Sec. 1910.269
have been patterned after those in final Sec. 1910.147. Issues decided
in that rulemaking are being dealt with in the same manner in this one.
(References to the preamble discussion of these issues are noted in
parentheses, or in brackets if the material is quoted.) The Agency has
incorporated different rules in Sec. 1910.269(d) only to the extent
that they are warranted based on unique conditions presented by
electric power generation installations, as noted in the rulemaking
record. Absent such unique conditions, the two standards contain the
same requirements, though the language is not always identical.
OSHA believes that this approach will maximize employee safety,
while minimizing compliance burdens. This approach also effectively
eliminates any safety and cost concerns that might be raised with
regard to substantive inconsistencies between the two lockout and
tagging standards.
Paragraph (d)(1) of final Sec. 1910.269 limits the application of
the provisions of paragraph (d) to the control of energy sources in
installations for the purpose of electric power generation, including
related equipment for communication or metering. The scope of this
paragraph is intended to coincide with the exemption from the generic
lockout standard contained in Sec. 1910.147(a)(1)(ii)(B). The
provisions of Sec. 1910.269 cover installations exempted by this
paragraph in the generic standard. Installations in electric generating
plants that are not addressed in Sec. 1910.269(d) are covered under
Sec. 1910.147; for such installations, there should be no overlaps or
gaps in coverage under the two standards.
EEI also argued that Sec. 1910.269 should be the only standard that
applies to the control of hazardous energy within an electric power
generation plant and that Sec. 1910.147 should not apply (Ex. 3-112).
OSHA decided this issue in the rulemaking on the generic lockout
standard as follows:
If such equipment is either an integral part of, or inextricably
commingled with, power generation processes or equipment, OSHA
agrees that the power generation standard will apply instead of the
generic lockout/tagout standard. [54 FR 36660]
The first note following paragraph (d)(1) has been modified from
the proposal to incorporate this concept. As mentioned earlier in this
preamble, a second note has been added to the final version of this
paragraph explaining OSHA's enforcement policy regarding the interface
between Sec. 1910.269 and Sec. 1910.147. Employers who use procedures
developed under and conforming to Sec. 1910.147 for the control of
hazardous energy sources related to the generation of electric power
will be considered as being in compliance with Sec. 1910.269(d).
Procedures for the control of electric energy used for purposes of
transmission and distribution are addressed in Sec. 1910.269(m). These
systems are installed outdoors and are connected to the ultimate
consumer of the electric power. The considerations involved in the
control of hazardous energy sources related to transmission and
distribution systems are truly unique compared to other industrial
energy systems. Transmission and distribution lines are exposed to
contact with energized conductors that are part of unrelated circuits;
voltage backfeed from unknown power sources can energize
``deenergized'' lines; and induced voltage from nearby power lines can
present hazards to employees working on ``deenergized'' lines.
Therefore, separate requirements apply to the control of hazardous
energy involving these systems, as noted in final Sec. 1910.269(d)(1).
This separation of energy control procedures was not opposed by any
interested party and, in fact, was specifically supported by two
commenters (Ex. 3-39, 3-83).
Paragraph (d)(2) lists general requirements. Paragraph (d)(2)(i) of
proposed Sec. 1910.269 would have required employers to ensure that all
potentially hazardous energy was isolated, locked out or tagged out,
and otherwise disabled in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
(d), before an employee could perform any activity during which
energizing, start-up, or release of stored energy could occur and cause
injury.
Several utilities objected to the language contained in this
proposed paragraph (Ex. 3-20, 3-23, 3-40, 3-62, 3-80, 3-112, 3-120).
Most suggested that OSHA replace the phrase ``and otherwise disabled''
to ``or otherwise disabled''.
As an Agency representative explained at the hearing, the proposal
was intended to require that equipment be deenergized in accordance
with the provisions of the standard (DC Tr. 208-209). The provision was
not intended to require employers to take steps to disable equipment in
addition to those in the standard. In order to clarify the requirement
in the final rule, OSHA has adopted language taken from
Sec. 1910.147(c)(1), which reads as follows:
The employer shall establish a program consisting of energy
control procedures, employee training, and periodic inspections to
ensure that, before any employee performs any servicing or
maintenance on a machine or equipment where the unexpected
energizing, start up, or release of stored energy could occur and
cause injury, the machine or equipment is isolated from the energy
source and rendered inoperative.
As noted previously, OSHA is adopting the generic lockout
standard's approach to the issue of whether or not to require locks on
disconnects rather than tags alone. Briefly, Sec. 1910.147 requires the
use of locks on disconnects that are capable of being locked out,
unless the employer demonstrates that the use of a tagging system will
provide full employee protection (that is, a level of protection
equivalent to that provided by a lockout program).
Paragraph (d)(2)(ii) of final Sec. 1910.269 adopts these
requirements, based on Sec. 1910.147(c)(2). These provisions read as
follows:
(ii) The employer's energy control program under paragraph
(d)(2) of this section shall meet the following requirements:
(A) If an energy isolating device is not capable of being locked
out, the employer's program shall use a tagout system.
(B) If an energy isolating device is capable of being locked
out, the employer's program shall use lockout, unless the employer
can demonstrate that the use of a tagout system will provide full
employee protection as follows:
(1) When a tagout device is used on an energy isolating device
which is capable of being locked out, the tagout device shall be
attached at the same location that the lockout device would have
been attached, and the employer shall demonstrate that the tagout
program will provide a level of safety equivalent to that obtained
by the use of a lockout program.
(2) In demonstrating that a level of safety is achieved in the
tagout program equivalent to the level of safety obtained by the use
of a lockout program, the employer shall demonstrate full compliance
with all tagout-related provisions of this standard together with
such additional elements as are necessary to provide the equivalent
safety available from the use of a lockout device. Additional means
to be considered as part of the demonstration of full employee
protection shall include the implementation of additional safety
measures such as the removal of an isolating circuit element,
blocking of a controlling switch, opening of an extra disconnecting
device, or the removal of a valve handle to reduce the likelihood of
inadvertent energizing.
(C) After [insert date 120 days after publication], whenever
replacement or major repair, renovation, or modification of a
machine or equipment is performed, and whenever new machines or
equipment are installed, energy isolating devices for such machines
or equipment shall be designed to accept a lockout device.
OSHA believes that electric utilities generally meet these
requirements. Although lockout is rarely used, the industry's tagging
systems generally provide protection equivalent to that obtained by the
use of a lockout program.30 The final standard requires this of
all affected employers, thus ensuring the safety of all electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution workers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\0 The number of fatalities related to failure of electric
utilities' tagging systems indicates that some individual systems
may not provide safety at this level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An employer who uses a tagging system must demonstrate that it will
provide full employee protection, as explained in paragraph
(d)(2)(ii)(B). The employer must obviously demonstrate that the tagging
program meets all tagging-related requirements in the standard, such as
proper materials and construction of the tagout device, the durability
of the tag, and the capability of the attachment means to prevent the
unauthorized or accidental removal of the tagout device (see paragraph
(d)(3)(ii)). However, as noted earlier, OSHA does not believe that a
tagout program that simply meets the requirements of the standard would
be as protective as a lockout program, even though the tagging
requirements have been strengthened considerably from the proposal. For
the employer to demonstrate that a tagging program is as protective as
lockout for a lockable piece of equipment, that employer will need to
show additional elements that bridge the gap between lockout and
tagging. The employer must consider additional measures that will
further enhance the safety of the tagging program, such as the removal
of isolating circuit elements, the locking of a controlling switch, or
the opening of an additional disconnecting device. By requiring that
the employer make a showing of the effectiveness of tagging in
situations that are otherwise amenable to lockout, the standard that
each type of control (lock or tag) will provide an acceptable level of
safety for employees who must perform the servicing or maintenance on
the machine or equipment. Based upon the range of variations that are
possible in different situations, OSHA believes that the comparative
effectiveness of any particular energy control program can be made only
after examination and evaluation of the factors present at each point
of application.
Paragraph (d)(2)(iii) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires a procedure
to be developed, documented, and used for the control of potentially
hazardous energy. The language of this provision has been modified
slightly from proposed Sec. 1910.269(d)(2)(ii) for clarification.
Paragraph (d)(2)(iv) specifies elements to be included in the
procedure, including the purpose for the procedure and the rules and
techniques to apply. One comment on the corresponding paragraph in the
proposal, Sec. 1910.269(d)(2)(iii), was concerned that an entire system
would have to be deenergized to allow work to be performed on only a
portion of the system (Ex. 3-20). To clarify this in the final rule,
OSHA has replaced the word ``system'' with the term ``machine or
equipment''. This is the language used in Sec. 1910.147.
Paragraphs (d)(2) (iv) through (vi) of proposed Sec. 1910.269,
dealing with periodic inspections of the hazardous energy control
procedures in use at a workplace, have been combined in the final
standard into Sec. 1910.269(d)(2)(v). Paragraph (d)(2)(v) of final
Sec. 1910.269 requires periodic inspections to ensure that the
provisions of the standard are followed.
In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested comments on whether
or not a minimum frequency for such inspections should be specified in
the standard. Utility representatives responding to this issue
generally suggested either that no minimum frequency be specified or
that the requirement be deleted entirely (Ex. 3-13, 3-20, 3-42, 3-44,
3-53, 3-58, 3-80, 3-82, 3-112). EEI's comment exemplified these
recommendations, as follows:
As proposed, these sections [proposed Sec. 1910.269(d)(2) (iv)
and (v)] properly state a performance requirement for periodic
inspections. In response to OSHA's request for comment on whether a
minimum frequency for periodic inspections should be required, EEI
reiterates the testimony of Robert L. Lawson of PEPCO on cross-
examination at the hearing on OSHA's proposal for a generic lockout/
tagout standard. Mr. Lawson explained to OSHA that:
``We see little value of an annual certification of a tagging
system. A tagging system, as we use in our industry, has to be
constantly watched by management to ensure that it's working. It's
watched, number one, from a discipline standpoint. If you have an
isolated employee that ignores it or refuses to comply with
something because it's for his convenience, you have to be able to
catch those infractions to issue discipline.
``In my company here, PEPCO in Washington, D.C., we're
constantly looking at the procedure, to update things. If we have
new systems going in, we evaluate that to see whether it is
compatible with the existing tagging procedures . . . and we're
constantly looking at things like that to ensure that the tagging
procedure is adequate to protect employees. So that's why we
recommend that it's got to be an ongoing, constant survey of that
procedure or system.'' [Footnote omitted.]
Accordingly, because the record shows that evaluation of tagging
systems is an ongoing process in the utility industry, EEI submits
that there is no record basis for specifying minimum frequency. [Ex.
3-112]
Others suggested a minimum frequency of from once every two hours
to once per year (Ex. 3-11, 3-107; DC Tr. 425). For example, the New
Hampshire Electric Cooperative stated:
Some minimum should be stated as to what ``periodic'' is. Once
every 100 years is periodic once the inspection has been repeated.
We suggest yearly.
The IBEW also supported specifying a minimum frequency, as follows:
The term periodic inspections could lead to misunderstanding
regarding the time duration between inspections. The IBEW would
propose that the minimum frequency for the periodic inspections be
two times per year for each work location.
OSHA has decided to require the inspections to be performed at
least once a year. OSHA agrees with the IBEW that the standard needs to
specify the frequency of the required inspections; otherwise,
enforcement difficulties would be likely. The periodic inspection is
intended to assure that the energy control procedures continue to be
implemented properly, that the employees involved are familiar with
their responsibilities under those procedures, and that employees
follow and maintain proficiency in the energy control procedure. The
evidence indicates that electric utilities are performing audits of
their lockout programs on a constant and routine basis (Ex. 3-112; LA
Tr. 217, 264-266, 423-425). An annual inspection, as suggested by the
New England Electric Cooperative, is specified in
Sec. 1910.147(c)(6)(i), and employers must comply with this requirement
for their non-electric power generation installations. The inspections
conducted as a result of Sec. 1910.269 can easily be integrated into
the ones employers are already conducting under Sec. 1910.147.
Paragraphs (d)(2)(v)(A) through (d)(2)(v)(E) detail requirements
that the periodic inspection must meet. These provisions require that
the inspections be performed by authorized employees, be designed to
correct identified deviations or inadequacies, include reviews between
the inspector and authorized and affected employees of the employees'
responsibilities, and be certified by the employer. The proposed rule
did not contain all the requirements of the final version. The
rationale for the inclusion of the new provisions was stated in the
preamble discussion of Sec. 1910.147(c)(6), as follows:
Due to the severity of the risks associated with a lapse in the
implementation of the energy control procedure, paragraph (c)(6)
requires that periodic inspections be performed at least annually in
order to verify and to ensure that the energy control procedure is
being properly utilized. One method for meeting the performance
requirements in this paragraph would be to use random audits and
planned visual observations to determine the extent of employee
compliance. Another would include modifying and adopting ordinary
plant safety tours to suit this purpose.
The periodic inspection is intended to assure that the energy
control procedures continue to be implemented properly, and that the
employees involved are familiar with their responsibilities under
those procedures. A significant change in this requirement from the
proposal involves the activities of the person performing the
inspections. The inspector, who is required to be an authorized
person not involved in the energy control procedure being inspected,
must be able to determine three things: first, whether the steps in
the energy control procedure are being followed; second, whether the
employees involved know their responsibilities under the procedure;
and third, whether the procedure is adequate to provide the
necessary protection, and what changes, if any, are needed. The
inspector will need to observe and talk with the employees in order
to make these determinations. The Final Rule provides some
additional guidance as to the inspector's duties in performing
periodic inspections, to assure that he or she obtains the necessary
information about the energy control procedure and its
effectiveness. Where lockout is used, the inspector must review each
authorized employee's responsibilities under the procedure with that
employee. This does not necessarily require separate one-on-one
meetings, but can involve the inspector meeting with the whole
servicing crew at one time. Indeed, group meetings can be the most
effective way of dealing with this situation, because they reinforce
the employees' knowledge of the procedures and how they are to be
utilized, and to be able to recognize any problems with the energy
control program. Where tagout is used, the inspector's review of
responsibilities extends to affected employees as well, because of
the increased importance of their role in avoiding accidental or
inadvertent activation of the equipment or machinery being serviced.
OSHA believes that these reviews, which will need to be performed on
at least an annual basis during the periodic inspections, will
assure that employees follow and maintain proficiency in the energy
control procedure, and that the inspector will be better able to
determine whether changes are needed.
A related change from the proposal is found in the certification
provision in paragraph (c)(6)(ii) of the Final Rule. In addition to
the operation, date of inspection, and name of inspector, the Final
Rule also requires identification of the employees included in the
inspection. This change provides for the inspector to indicate which
employees were involved with the servicing operation being
inspected, in order to assure that these employees have had the
opportunity to review their responsibilities and demonstrate their
performance under the procedure.
Inspections must be made by an authorized employee other than
one implementing the energy control procedure being inspected. This
is done to ensure that the employee performing the inspections knows
the procedures and how they are to be utilized, and to be able to
recognize any problems with the energy control program. The
inspections must be designed and conducted to correct any deviations
uncovered. In addition, the employer must certify that they have
been performed. These inspections are intended to provide for
immediate feedback and action by the employer to correct any
inadequacies observed.
These inspections are intended to ensure that the energy control
procedure has been properly implemented and to provide an essential
check on the continued utilization of the procedure. [54 FR 36672-
36673, corrected at 55 FR 38681, 38685]
OSHA believes that this rationale applies equally to the electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution standard. As
previously noted, the evidence presented by UWUA members demonstrated
that not all electric utility tagging systems work as well as those
presented by the EEI witnesses. Additionally, the emergence of new
types of companies31 into the electric utility industry and
extending the scope of the standard to other industries will expand
coverage of Sec. 1910.269 to employers that might not have the tagging
systems that provide the level of safety EEI has testified is common
among their member companies. To ensure that this does not occur, the
Agency has adopted these provisions from Sec. 1910.147.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\1As a result of legislative action and changes in the
electric utility industry during the past decade, the number of
independent power producers has grown tremendously (Ex. 6-25). (The
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission defines an independent power
production facility as a generator that is less than 80 megawatts
capacity and that uses biomass, waste, renewable resources,
geothermal resources, or a combination of these as the primary
energy source.) According to ERG, independent power production
capacity grew by an estimated 700 percent (Ex. 6-25). Regulated
electric utilities purchase electric power at special rates from
these independent power producers under the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (16 U.S.C. 2101 et seq.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In paragraphs (d)(2)(vi), (d)(2)(vii) and (d)(2)(viii) of final
Sec. 1910.269, OSHA specifies that the employer provide effective
initial training, as well as retraining as required by changing
conditions in the workplace, or when an inspection conducted in
accordance with paragraph (d)(2)(v) reveals the need for retraining.
Additionally, paragraph (d)(2)(ix) requires certification of such
training of employees. OSHA considers these requirements to be of
critical importance in helping to ensure that the applicable
provisions, restrictions, and prohibitions of the energy control
program are known, understood, and strictly adhered to by employees.
As is the case with the other provisions of this rule, OSHA
believes that the training requirements under this standard need to be
performance oriented so as to deal with the wide range of workplaces
covered by the standard. However, in order to provide adequate
information, any training program under this standard will need to
cover at least four areas: The employer's energy control program, the
elements of the energy control procedures that are relevant to the
employee's duties, the restrictions of the program applicable to each
employee, and the requirements of this final rule. The details will
necessarily vary from workplace to workplace, and even from employee to
employee within a single workplace, depending upon the complexity of
the equipment and the procedure, the employees' job duties and their
responsibilities under the energy control program, and other factors.
Paragraph (d)(2)(vi) of final Sec. 1910.269 establishes the amount of
training that is required for the three groups of employees:
``Authorized'' employees, ``affected'' employees, and all ``other''
employees.32 The relative degree of knowledge required by these
three employee groups is in descending order, with the requirements for
authorized employees demanding the most effort in training. Because
authorized employees must use the energy control procedures, it is
important that they receive training in recognizing and understanding
all potentially hazardous energy that they might be exposed to during
their work assignments. It is also necessary that they be trained in
the use of adequate methods and means for the control of such energy.
The authorized employees are the ones who must use the energy control
procedure to provide for their protection when they are performing the
servicing or maintenance of the machines or equipment. Therefore, they
need extensive training in aspects of the procedure and its proper use,
together with all relevant information about the equipment being
serviced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\2 The terms ``authorized employee'' and ``affected employee''
are defined in proposed Sec. 1910.269(x). An authorized employee is
one who locks out or tags out machines or equipment in order to
perform servicing or maintenance on that machine or equipment. An
affected employee is one whose job requires him or her to operate or
use a machine or equipment on which servicing or maintenance is
being performed under lockout or tagout, or whose job requires him
or her to work in an area in which such servicing or maintenance is
being performed. An affected employee becomes an authorized employee
when that employee's duties include performing servicing or
maintenance covered under this section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The training OSHA requires for ``affected employees'' is less
stringent than that for ``authorized employees'', simply because
affected employees do not perform servicing or maintenance operations
which are performed under an energy control procedure. Affected
employees are important to the overall protection provided in the
energy control program, however, because such employees work in areas
where the program is being utilized by authorized employees. It is
vital to the safety of the authorized employees that the affected
employees recognize lockout or tagout devices immediately, that they
know about the purpose of those devices, and, most importantly, that
they know not to disturb the lockout or tagout devices or the equipment
to which the devices are affixed. Therefore, the standard requires that
affected employees be instructed in these matters. The instruction
needs to be sufficient to enable the employees to determine if a
control measure is in use. The instruction also needs to make affected
employees aware that disregarding or violating the prohibitions imposed
by the energy control program could endanger their own lives or the
lives of co-workers.
OSHA requires, in paragraph (d)(2)(vi)(C), that all other employees
be instructed about the restrictions imposed upon all employees by the
energy control program. This instruction on the employer's energy
control program can be conveyed during new employee orientations, by
the use of employee handbooks, or through regularly scheduled safety
meetings. The training of employees other than authorized and affected
employees is considered by OSHA to be essential since other employees
working in the plant or facility have been known to have turned on the
power to a machine or equipment on which another employee is performing
a servicing or maintenance activity. Inadvertent and intentional
activation of machines or equipment by employees other than those
working on the machine or equipment is not limited to affected
employees. The training requirements for these other employees are
minimal, essentially requiring only that these employees know what the
energy control program does and that they are not to touch any locks,
tags, or equipment covered by this program.
The training requirements for the different classes or types of
employees as they are defined in this final standard are performance
oriented, thereby providing the employer with considerable flexibility
in how the training should be conducted. The employer is permitted to
use whatever method will best accomplish the objective of the training.
Considerable latitude is given to employers in the development and
conduct of the required training for authorized, affected, and other
employees.
In paragraph (d)(2)(vii), OSHA is establishing a requirement for
additional training for all employees in plants or facilities where
tagout is the preferred method of energy control. The need for this
additional or supplemental training for employees in those facilities
is based upon the fact that the use of tagout relies upon the knowledge
of the employees and their adherence to the limitations imposed by the
use of tags. It is also consistent with current practice. Several
commenters who use tagout programs stated in their comments and
testimony that tagout is effective in the electric utility industry
because, among other things, the program provides for extensive
training and reinforcement of the elements of the tagout procedures
(Ex. 3-112; DC Tr. 615; LA Tr. 217-218, 224). The requirements of this
paragraph have been taken from Sec. 1910.147(c)(7)(ii).
Paragraph (d)(2)(viii) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 would have
required annual retraining for all authorized and affected employees,
either by regular on-the-job work assignments or by specific training.
Several commenters objected to the requirement that this training be
provided on an annual basis (Ex. 3-20, 3-80, 3-82, 3-86). They argued
that retraining should only be required on a performance basis, that
is, when it is needed.
OSHA has accepted these arguments and has incorporated the
provisions of Sec. 1910.147(c)(7)(iii) on this subject into
Sec. 1910.269(d)(2)(viii) of the final rule. This performance-oriented
approach would require formal retraining only when it is necessary for
employee safety, such as when the periodic inspection required under
paragraph (d)(2)(v) identifies deficiencies or when control procedures
that the employee uses change. It should be noted that paragraph
(d)(2)(v) requires the periodic inspection of the energy control
procedure to be conducted on an annual basis. This inspection includes
a review between the inspector and each authorized employee, and the
inspection must be designed to detect such deficiencies as the need for
additional training.
Paragraph (d)(2)(ix) requires the employer to certify that the
employee training has been accomplished and has been kept up to date.
Many commenters objected to the use of the word ``certify'' and
suggested alternatives, such as ``determine'' and ``verify'' (Ex. 3-20,
3-33, 3-39, 3-44, 3-45, 3-58, 3-82, 3-83, 3-86). To clarify this
requirement in the final rule, OSHA has included a provision stating
that the certification need consist only of the employee's name and the
date he or she was trained.
OSHA believes that a written certification serves the same purpose
as a written record of the training, while minimizing the paperwork
burden on employers. It should be noted that the certification is not
intended as a means of evaluating the completeness or efficacy of the
training; it only provides an indication that training has been
performed. The quality and content of the training are not evaluated
through the certification of performance. As noted earlier, the
standard sets forth the elements which must be included in the training
for employees. In evaluating whether an employee has been adequately
trained, OSHA will examine the employee's responsibilities under the
energy control program in relation to the elements of the standard.
In paragraph (d)(3) of final Sec. 1910.269, OSHA requires the
employer to provide the necessary protective materials and hardware,
such as locks, tags, chains, and adapter pins, for attachment to the
energy isolating devices. This paragraph in the standard also requires
that the devices be unique to the particular use (the only ones
authorized for the purpose); that they be durable, standardized, and
substantial; and that they identify the user.
The standard utilizes performance language in imposing these
requirements. OSHA believes that the obligations imposed by paragraph
(d)(3) are not overly restrictive or complicated. To meet the
requirement in paragraph (d)(3)(i) to supply protective equipment and
hardware, an employer either can issue devices to each employee
responsible for implementing energy control measures or can exercise
the option of simply having a sufficient quantity of the devices on
hand at any given time and assign or distribute them to employees as
the need arises. All authorized employees will need to have these
devices available to attach to energy isolating devices whenever they
perform servicing or maintenance using the energy control procedure.
The proposed standard specified that lockout or tagout devices be
singularly identified, be the only devices used for controlling
hazardous energy, and be durable, standardized, substantial, and
identifiable. These requirements remain substantially unchanged in the
final rule (paragraph (d)(3)(ii)). A restriction on the use of these
devices (for hazardous energy control only) is being adopted, based on
the record on the generic lockout/tagout standard, to ensure that the
sight of a distinctive lock or tag will provide a constant message of
the use to which the device is being put and the restrictions which
this device is intended to convey (54 FR 36671). If lockout or tagout
devices are used for other purposes, they can lose their significance
in the workplace. For the energy control procedure to be effective,
these devices must have a single meaning to employees: Do not energize
or attempt to start or operate a machine or equipment when such a
device is affixed to an energy isolating device that controls the
energy to that machine or equipment.
In Sec. 1910.269(d)(3)(iii), OSHA proposed that lockout or tagout
devices be durable. There was concern by some of the witnesses at the
hearing that existing tags were of inadequate construction (LA Tr. 121-
123). In order to overcome some of these concerns, OSHA is adding in
the final rule a requirement that tagout devices be constructed and
printed so that exposure to weather or other environmental conditions
which exist in the workplace will not cause the tag to become
unserviceable or the message on the tag to become illegible (paragraph
(d)(3)(ii)A)). For any sign, tag, or other message-bearing item, the
message must remain legible for the employees to be able to ascertain
the meaning and intent of the message.
In paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(B), OSHA requires lockout and tagout
devices to be standardized in one of the following criteria: color,
shape, size, print, or format, in order that they be readily
identifiable and distinguished from other similar devices found in the
workplace. In addition, the final rule clarifies that the use of a
standardized print and format is for tagout devices. This is done to
ensure that tagout devices, which rely exclusively on employee
recognition for their effectiveness, will be so unique as to minimize
the chances of their being misidentified or their message
misinterpreted.
In paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(C), OSHA requires that lockout devices be
substantial enough to prevent their removal without the use of
excessive force or unusual techniques. Tagout devices and their means
of attachment are similarly required by paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(D) to be
constructed so that the potential for inadvertent or accidental removal
is minimized. Tag attachment means are further required to be
attachable by hand, and to be of strength equivalent to a one-piece
non-releasable, self-locking cable tie. These additional requirements
are being imposed to ensure that tags do not become disconnected or
lost during use, thereby negating their effectiveness. Such provisions
were supported at the hearing by some of the witnesses (LA Tr. 121-
123).
In paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(E), OSHA requires that lockout or tagout
devices identify the employee who applies the device or devices. This
requirement is similar to the provision proposed in
Sec. 1910.269(d)(3)(v). Identification of the user provides an
additional degree of accountability to the overall program. It enables
the employer to inspect the application of the energy control procedure
and determine which employees are properly implementing its
requirements. If locks or tags are not being properly attached by an
employee, identification on the locks and tags will enable the employer
to locate that employee and correct the problem promptly, including
additional training, as necessary. This requirement will enable
employers and other employees to determine at a glance which authorized
employees are performing a given servicing operation. It puts them on
notice that if questions arise about the servicing or the energy
control procedure, the persons listed on the lockout and tagout devices
are the appropriate persons to ask. The authorized employee has the
additional assurance that other employees know of his or her
involvement in the servicing operation and that only he or she is
allowed to remove the device.
OSHA believes that knowing who applied a lockout device to a
machine or equipment can save time and lives. If an employee, upon
completing a job, forgets to remove a lockout device, the identity of
the employee can be immediately determined and the employee made
available to complete the procedure. If that employee cannot be
located, it is possible that he or she is still working on the
equipment. It would then be possible to check out the area and assure
that the employee and others are out of the danger area before the
device is removed. Marking a lockout or tagout device is a simple way
of identifying the person who applies it and can prevent the
inadvertent reenergizing or reactivation of equipment before that
employee has been located and has moved clear of the equipment. Thus,
marking the identity of the employee who uses a lockout or tagout
device is an appropriate safeguard.
Marking of the lockout or tagout devices can also promote a sense
of security in employees, in that each device is the individual
employee's device, used only for his or her protection. This sense of
identity also can be used to encourage willing utilization of the
energy control procedure. When an employee can identify with a part of
the program he or she controls for his or her own protection, that
employee will likely be an active participant in making the program
work.
In paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(F), OSHA states that the legend (major
message) on tagout devices must warn against hazardous conditions if
the equipment is energized. Five examples of major messages are
provided in paragraph (c)(5)(iii): Do Not Start, Do Not Open, Do Not
Close, Do Not Energize, and Do Not Operate. OSHA recognizes, however,
that these messages may not be sufficient to cover all conditions
involving hazardous energy control. For that reason, these legends are
only examples of what must be stated. Graphics, pictographs, and other
symbols that convey the message that the tag represents serve the same
purpose as a written message and therefore would be acceptable to OSHA.
Additionally, the use of danger tags must meet the requirements of
Sec. 1910.145.
OSHA proposed, in Sec. 1910.269(d)(4)(i), that energy isolating
devices used for the control of potentially hazardous energy sources,
including valves, be marked or labeled to identify the equipment
supplied and the energy type and magnitude. If they were positioned and
arranged so that these elements were evident, however, the marking
requirement would not have applied. Paragraph (d)(4)(ii) proposed that
these devices be operated only by authorized employees. OSHA reasoned
that employees working with energy control procedures need adequate
information about the hazards of the equipment that they are servicing
and that they must be certain that the equipment they are working on is
the same equipment that was intended to be disabled. They should feel
confident that they have secured the correct energy control devices and
are protected from the hazards of inadvertently working on energized
equipment.
The proposed identification requirement of paragraph (d)(4)(i)
would have applied to all energy isolating devices, including devices
which control hydraulic, pneumatic, steam, and similar energy sources
by the use of valves or similar devices. The proposed generic lockout
standard included an identical provision. The comments received in the
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution rulemaking
record echoed the arguments of those who commented on the generic
standard. As there was no new evidence introduced here, OSHA has simply
adopted the outcome and rationale relating to final
Sec. 1910.147(c)(6), as follows:
OSHA has determined that the marking or labeling of energy
isolating devices is not reasonably necessary for the effectiveness
of the energy control program. Authorized employees are required at
(c)(7)(i)(A) [Sec. 1910.269(d)(2)(vi(A)] to receive training in and
to know that information relating to hazardous energy. Authorized
employees, in order to perform their servicing or maintenance duties
under the energy control procedure, are required to know the type
and magnitude of the energy sources which must be controlled. The
marking or labeling of the sources themselves will not provide the
authorized employees with any additional information. Second, as far
as affected or other employees are concerned, their role in the
energy control program is essentially to understand what the program
is designed to accomplish, and to recognize that when they see an
energy isolating device with a tag and/or lock on it, they are not
to touch the equipment, regardless of what the type and magnitude of
the energy might be. OSHA believes that marking the equipment with
this information would not enhance the protection of these
employees, because their compliance with the energy control
procedure does not depend upon knowledge of these details.
Accordingly, OSHA has eliminated the proposed requirement for
marking or labeling energy isolating devices. In its place, OSHA is
incorporating a specific requirement in paragraph (c)(7)(i)(A)
[Sec. 1910.269(d)(2)(vi(A)] that authorized employees be trained in
the recognition of applicable hazardous energy sources, the type and
magnitude of the energy available in the workplace, and in the
methods and means necessary for energy isolation and control. OSHA
further requires in paragraph (d)(1) [Sec. 1910.269(d)(6)(i)] that
authorized employees must know the type and magnitude of the energy,
the hazards of the energy to be controlled and the method or means
to control the energy even before the machine or equipment is turned
off. OSHA believes that employee knowledge of this information is
essential to ensure that the correct energy control devices are used
on the proper energy isolating devices and in the proper manner.
This provision requires the employee to have that specific
information prior to deenergizing the equipment, in order to control
the energy and render the machine or equipment safe to work on. OSHA
does recognize that the physical shutdown of the machine or
equipment can be accomplished by either the authorized or affected
employee.
The new paragraph (c)(8) [Sec. 1910.269(d)(4)] requires that
lockout or tagout be performed only by the authorized employees who
are performing the maintenance or servicing. These are the only
employees who are required to be trained to know in detail about the
types of energy available in the workplace and how to control the
hazards of that energy. Only properly trained and qualified
employees can be relied on to deenergize and to properly control
lockout or tagout machines or equipment which are being serviced or
maintained, in order to ensure that the work will be accomplished
safely. [54 FR 36675-36676, corrected at 55 FR 38682, 38685]
In paragraph (d)(5), OSHA requires that whenever servicing or
maintenance might affect other employees' work activities, the employer
or the authorized employee must tell those employees before applying
lockout or tagout devices and after they are removed that servicing or
maintenance is going to be done or has been completed on a machine or
equipment.
Several commenters were concerned that the standard would require
notification of employees who were not at the workplace of the lockout
or tagout of machines or equipment (Ex. 3-20, 3-80, 3-42, 3-62, 3-112,
3-120; LA Tr. 226-227). They argued that the equipment was frequently
locked out or tagged out over weekends or at night when many employees
were away from work. As the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
noted: ``The actual intent probably is to ensure that employees
currently working with or near equipment be notified prior to
application of lockout/tagout controls if such controls would directly
affect them.'' (Ex. 3-20)
Indeed, the Agency does intend, when controls are to be applied to
equipment, for employers to inform employees currently working with or
near such equipment, not employees at home. An affected employee is one
whose job requires him or her to operate or use a machine or equipment
on which servicing or maintenance is being performed under lockout or
tagout, or whose job requires him or her to work in an area in which
such servicing or maintenance is being performed. OSHA does not
interpret this definition as including a person who is not at the
workplace. Employees who are not at the workplace need not be notified
of the placement of lockout or tagout controls while they are away from
work. However, these employees must be notified of the application of
lockout or tagging as soon as they return to work.
OSHA believes that the requirement contained in paragraph (d)(5) is
an essential component of the total energy control program.
Notification of affected employees when lockout or tagout is going to
be applied provides an opportunity for the employer or authorized
employee who notifies them of the impending interruption of the normal
production operation to remind them and reinforce the importance of the
restrictions imposed upon them by the energy control program.
OSHA believes that these measures are important to ensure that
employees who operate or use machines or equipment do not unknowingly
attempt to reenergize those machines or equipment that have been taken
out of service and deenergized for the performance of activities
covered by this standard. The lack of information regarding the status
of the equipment could endanger both the servicing employees and the
employees working near the equipment, who might attempt to reenergize
or operate the equipment. Such notification is also needed after
servicing is completed to assure that employees know when the control
measures have been removed. Without such information, employees might
mistakenly believe that a system is still deenergized and that it is
safe to continue working on or around it.
Paragraph (d)(6) of final Sec. 1910.269 provides that six separate
and distinct steps be followed in stopping, deenergizing, and locking
out or tagging machines or equipment and that the actions be taken in
the sequence presented. Paragraph (d)(6)(i) requires that in
preparation for the shutdown of machinery or equipment, the authorized
employee must know about the type and magnitude of the energy, the
hazards involved, and the means of controlling them. (As mentioned
previously, this provision was incorporated in the final rule in order
to address the hazards that would have been covered by proposed
paragraph (d)(4)(i) on marking energy isolating devices, which is not
included in final Sec. 1910.269.) Paragraph (d)(6)(ii) then requires
that the machine or equipment be turned off or shut down according to
the procedure normally employed for stopping the machine or equipment.
This will be done by the authorized employee or the affected employee
(the machine or equipment operator or user). This is the starting point
for all subsequent actions necessary to put the machine or equipment in
a state that will permit employees to work on it safely.
In many operations, activation of an electrical push-button control
or the movement of a simple throw switch (electrical, hydraulic, or
pneumatic) to the ``stop'' or ``off'' mode is sufficient to meet this
provision. In other cases, however, there are many control devices that
must be closed, shut down, or stopped in a particular sequence. In
these instances, a series of predetermined steps may be necessary to
achieve a shutdown of the machine or equipment. Paragraph (d)(6)(ii) of
final Sec. 1910.269 requires an orderly shutdown of the equipment to
ensure that the necessary steps are taken in the proper sequence.
Following shutdown of the machine or equipment, paragraph
(d)(6)(iii), as the next step in the procedure, provides that energy
isolation devices be physically located and operated in such a manner
as to isolate the machine or equipment from energy sources. For
example, once an electrical push-button control has been utilized to
stop the movement of machine or equipment parts as the first step of
the shutdown procedure, isolation can then be accomplished by ensuring
that the push-button circuitry cannot be supplied with additional
electrical energy. For such equipment, the isolation requirement can be
accomplished by the employee's actions in tracing the path from the
control toward the energy source until he or she locates the energy
isolating device and by his or her moving the energy isolating device
control lever to the ``safe'', ``off'', or ``open'' position.
Performing these actions will prevent the reintroduction of energy to
the push-button circuitry and will isolate the operating control and
the machine or equipment from the energy source.
As the fourth step in the procedure, paragraph (d)(6)(iv) provides
that action be taken to secure the energy isolating devices in a
``safe'' or ``off'' position. This paragraph requires that lockout or
tagout devices be affixed to each energy isolating device by the
authorized employee and that they be attached so as to prevent
unintended reactivation of the machine or equipment.
Paragraph (d)(6)(iv) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires the hazardous
energy control device to be attached in a manner that will minimize the
chance that the energy isolating device will be moved into an unsafe
position. For energy isolating devices that are capable of being locked
out, this provision requires the lock or tag to be attached so as to
hold the isolating device in a safe position. Otherwise, a tag would
have to be placed as close as safely possible to the isolating device
in a position that will be immediately obvious to anyone attempting to
operate the device. OSHA believes this will clarify this provision of
the standard, as requested by two commenters (Ex. 3-11, 3-42).
Paragraph (d)(6)(v) provides that the next step taken in the energy
control procedure is to relieve, disconnect, and restrain all
potentially hazardous stored or residual energy in the machine or
equipment. Up to this point, the purpose of following all the steps of
the procedure has been to enable the employee to isolate and block the
source of energy feeding the machine or equipment to be worked on at a
point beyond which it cannot be bypassed. However, energy can very
easily be trapped in a system downstream from an energy isolating
device or can be present in the form of potential energy from gravity
or from spring action. Stored or residual energy of this sort cannot be
turned on or off; it must be dissipated or controlled (that is,
relieved or restrained).
When energy may still be present in a system that has been isolated
from the energy source, this paragraph requires such energy to be
controlled before an employee attempts to perform any work covered by
the scope of the standard. Compliance with this provision might
require, for example, the use of blocks or other physical restraints to
immobilize the machine, machine components, or equipment for control of
the hazard. In the case of electric circuits, grounding might be
necessary to discharge hazardous energy. Hydraulic or pneumatic systems
might necessitate the use of bleed valves to relieve the pressure.
The final rule addresses the hazards of stored or residual energy
in a performance manner. Rather than trying to determine all of the
potential manners in which this energy can be stored or retained in
machines, equipment, and materials being used in the production
process, OSHA requires (in paragraph (d)(6)(i)) that the authorized
employee must have knowledge of the energy (including stored or
residual energy), its hazards, and how to control it. Paragraph
(d)(6)(v) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires the stored or residual energy
to be relieved, disconnected, restrained, or otherwise rendered safe as
part of the energy control procedure. Under paragraph (d)(6)(vi),
verification of isolation must be continued until the servicing or
maintenance is completed or until the possibility of reaccumulation of
energy no longer exists.
Under paragraph (d)(6)(vii), as the sixth step in the energy
control procedure, the authorized employee must ensure that the
previous steps of the procedure have been taken to isolate the machine
or equipment effectively. This must be done prior to starting the
servicing or maintenance work. The authorized employee needs to verify
that the machine or equipment was turned off or shut down properly as
required by paragraph (d)(6)(ii) of final Sec. 1910.269; that all
energy isolating devices were identified, located, and operated as
required by paragraph (d)(6)(iii); that the lockout or tagout devices
have been attached to energy isolating devices as required by paragraph
(d)(6)(iv); and that stored energy has been rendered safe as required
by paragraph (d)(6)(v).
This step of the procedure is intended to assure the employee that
the machine or equipment is isolated from the energy, that residual or
stored energy has been dissipated or blocked, and that injury could not
result from the inadvertent activation of the operating controls. This
action may involve a deliberate attempt to start the equipment that has
been isolated from the energy. Another means of verifying is testing
the machine or equipment with appropriate test instruments. This method
would be appropriate, and is in fact required, for use in cases
exposing employees to possible electric shock. Verification of
isolation could be accomplished for electric circuits by the use of a
voltmeter to determine that there is no electrical energy present.
Similar test equipment can be utilized to check for the presence of
other energy types and sources.
Edison Electric Institute pointed out that the proposal would have
required a test only for work involving contact with normally energized
parts (Ex. 3-112). They noted that this did not account for the
possibility of inadvertent contact with such parts. OSHA agrees with
this comment and has modified the language in final
Sec. 1910.269(d)(6)(vii) to require testing of energized parts which an
employee could contact during the servicing or maintenance.
OSHA also considers the use of visual inspection procedures to be
of critical importance throughout the lockout or tagging procedures.
Visual inspection can confirm that switches, valves, and breakers have
been properly moved to and secured in the ``off'' or ``safe'' position.
Observing the position of the main electric power disconnect switch
can, for example, confirm that the switch is either in the ``off''
(open) or ``on'' (closed) position. Visual inspection can also verify
whether or not locks and other protective devices have been applied to
the control points in a manner that would prevent the unsafe movement
of the switches or valves. Finally, a visual inspection can be used to
verify that isolation has taken place by determining that all motion
has stopped and that all coasting parts, such as flywheels, grinding
wheels, and saw blades, have come to rest.
OSHA emphasizes that, in order to verify that hazardous energy has
been isolated, the authorized employee may need to use a combination of
these methods. The appropriate combination will depend upon the type of
machinery or equipment involved, the complexity of the system, and
other factors.
Because it was redundant with respect to final
Sec. 1910.269(d)(6)(vii), proposed paragraph (d)(6)(viii) has not been
carried forward into the final rule. The language from the proposed
paragraph, which would have required that the steps taken ensure the
effectiveness of the hazardous energy control method, was similar to
that in proposed paragraph (d)(6)(vii), which is contained in the final
rule.
Paragraph (d)(7) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires certain actions to
be taken by authorized employees before lockout or tagout devices are
removed from energy isolating devices. These actions are intended to
ensure that: (1) the machine or equipment has been returned to a safe
operating condition; (2) any employees who might be exposed to injury
due to the starting of the machine or equipment know that the machine
or equipment is being energized; and (3) employees who applied the
energy control devices are available to remove those devices.
Because each servicing employee will have his or her own lockout or
tagout device attached to the energy isolating device during the
servicing operation, the person in charge of the servicing operation
will first determine whether all lockout and tagout devices have been
removed by the servicing employees. When a tagging system is used, the
employer must have a procedure for ensuring that the tagout device was
removed by the employee who placed it. Without such a procedure, the
tagging system would not be considered as protective as a lockout
system, which by its nature ensures that the employee who applied the
lockout device is the one who removed it.
Verifying that all lockout and tagout devices have been removed is
an essential step in the procedure, and paragraph (d)(7) requires that
a final verification be performed to ensure that it is safe to
reenergize the equipment after servicing is completed. Further, a check
on the satisfactory completion of the work can also ensure that the
machine or equipment will not be damaged by its start up. Although the
purpose of the final check is to protect employees, it can also prevent
needless downtime of the machine or equipment because the servicing or
maintenance was not done correctly or completely the first time.
When servicing or maintenance is done on a large machine or complex
system of equipment by a large number of employees as is the case in
many electric power generation plants, the machine or equipment would
probably be operationally intact before the work begins. When the work
is completed, but before the equipment is reenergized, paragraph
(d)(7)(i) requires that the employees who did the servicing or
maintenance work complete the job by replacing guards and other
machinery components and by cleaning up after themselves. Paragraph
(d)(7)(ii) then requires a check to ensure that employees are safely
positioned and have been notified that the machine or equipment is to
be reenergized. A simple procedure to follow to verify that the work
area and the machinery is ready to be used for its production function
is for a foreman, supervisor, or leadman (whoever is in charge) to ask
the workmen if they are done and then to spot check to ensure that all
appears ready to resume normal operations.
Paragraph (d)(7)(i) requires that the workplace area around the
machine or equipment be inspected to ensure that nonessential items
have been removed and that equipment components are operationally
intact. This step ensures that tools, machine parts, and materials have
been removed and that mechanical restraints, guards, and other machine
parts have been replaced before the machine or equipment is returned to
its operational mode. Depending on the size or complexity of the
machinery and the type and degree of the servicing performed, visual
inspection alone might be sufficient to meet this requirement; however,
additional measures, such as check lists and other administrative
procedures, might have to be used for large, complex machines or
equipment.
In paragraph (d)(7)(ii), OSHA requires the work area to be checked
to be sure that employees are clear of the machine or equipment before
energy is restored to it. This determination usually can be
accomplished by a visual inspection. Paragraph (d)(7)(iii) of final
Sec. 1910.269 repeats the requirement (in Sec. 1910.269(d)(5)) that
affected employees be notified of lockout or tagout device removal and
ensures that the notification be made before the machine or equipment
is reenergized. Depending on the size or complexity of the equipment
and the scope of the operation, the notification may consist of
informing affected employees individually, or it may necessitate the
use of warning devices, such as horns, bells, or buzzers.
It cannot be overemphasized that employees performing tasks on
deenergized equipment may be exposed to hazards involving serious
injury or death if the status of the lockout or tagout control can be
changed without their knowledge. Lockout or tagout is personal
protection. For this reason, OSHA requires (in paragraph (d)(7)(iv))
that lockout or tagout devices be removed by the employees who applied
them except in limited situations. In the proposed standard, OSHA
considered whether an exception should be provided whenever two
conditions exist which would necessitate the removal of a lockout or
tagout device by an authorized employee other than the employee who
applied the device. Paragraph (d)(7)(iii)(A), as proposed, would have
permitted other authorized employees to remove a lockout or tagout
device when the employee who applied the lockout or tagout device was
not available to remove it. This provision was intended to cover
situations such as those that might arise from the sudden sickness or
injury of an employee or other emergency conditions. Proposed paragraph
(d)(7)(iii)(B) would have permitted use of the exception for unique
operating activities involving complex systems, if the employer could
demonstrate that it was not feasible to have the device removed by the
employee applying it. This was intended to provide flexibility in
operations involving the removal of a lockout or tagout device at a
remote location.
EEI argued that the person removing a lockout or tagout device need
not be the same as the person who placed it (Ex. 3-112; LA Tr. 227-
229). They contended that the unique nature of utility tagging programs
is such that any qualified employee can participate in it and that when
and if tags are removed and equipment returned to service is a matter
of operations, not safety.
OSHA does not agree that the removal of a tagout device by a person
other than the one who under its protection is not related to safety.
In paragraph (d)(7)(iv) of final Sec. 1910.269, OSHA is requiring that,
as a general rule, the authorized employee who affixes a lockout or
tagout device is the only one allowed to remove it. OSHA believes that
each employee must have the assurance that the device is in his or her
control, and that it will not be removed by anyone else except in an
emergency situation. This will prevent the removal of tagout devices by
supervisory personnel without the knowledge of the employee who is
performing the work, which the UWUA alleged was occurring under
existing industry practices (Ex. 66; LA Tr. 46, 57-58). The entire
energy control program in this standard depends upon each employee
recognizing and respecting another employee's lockout or tagout device.
The servicing employee relies upon the fact that he or she applied the
device and assumes that it will remain on the equipment while he or she
is exposed to the hazards of the servicing operation. OSHA believes
that the only way to ensure that the employee is aware of whether or
not the lockout or tagout device is in place is to permit only that
employee to remove the device himself or herself.
OSHA can envision very few instances which would justify one
employee's removal of another's lockout or tagout device. In a true
emergency, and not merely because the employee is not available, the
employer may be able to demonstrate a need to remove an employee's
lockout or tagout device. An exception to paragraph (d)(7)(iv) of the
final rule is being provided to allow for such situations. OSHA
emphasizes that removal of a personal lockout or tagout device by
another person may not be based on convenience or the simple
unavailability of the employee. If a lockout or tagout device is
attached, it is assumed that the employee who attached that device is
engaged in servicing the equipment for which the device is in use and
that that person is exposed to the hazards of reenergizing of energy
sources. Therefore, as a general matter, the protection of that
employee requires that he or she have complete control over his or her
lockout or tagout device. Some modification of the general rule is
warranted in the case of transfer of authority between shifts, as
discussed under Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(iii), and to a limited extent in
group lockout or tagout, as discussed under Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(ii),
both of which involve coordination of activities between servicing
employees. Additionally, under conditions of central control of energy
isolating devices, as is the case in many electric utility situations,
further modification of the general rule may be warranted, as discussed
under Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(v) later in this preamble.
Under the exception to paragraph (d)(7)(iv), the employer may
direct the removal of a lockout or tagout device by another employee
only if the energy control program incorporates specific procedures and
training for that purpose and only where the employer can demonstrate
that the alternative procedure will provide equivalent safety to having
the employee remove his or her own device. The procedure must include,
at a minimum, the following items: first, verification that the
authorized employee is not at the facility; second, making all
reasonable efforts to contact that employee to inform him or her that
his or her device has been removed; and third, ensuring that employee
knows of that device removal before he or she resumes work at the
facility. These steps are necessary to ensure that the employee who is
protected by the device is not exposed to energy hazards either at the
time of its removal or afterwards.
Paragraph (d)(8)(i) requires the employer to develop and use a
procedure that establishes a sequence of actions to be taken when
energy isolating devices are locked out or tagged out and there is a
need for testing or positioning of the machine or equipment or
components thereof. These actions are necessary in order to maintain
the integrity of any lockout or tagout protection for the servicing
employees. It is also necessary in order to provide optimum safety
coverage for employees when they have to go from a deenergized
condition to an energized one and then return the system to lockout or
tagout control. It is during these transition periods that employee
exposure to hazards is high and a sequence of steps to accomplish these
tasks safely is needed.
Paragraph (d)(8)(i) prescribes a logical sequence of steps to be
followed when energy isolating devices are locked out or tagged out and
there is a need to test or position the machine, equipment, or
components thereof. These steps offer necessary protection to employees
when they are involved in this activity. The procedure is clear-cut and
should require little or no explanation other than the contents of the
standard itself.
It should be noted that OSHA is allowing the removal of the lockout
or tagout devices and the reenergizing of the machine or equipment only
during the limited time necessary for the testing or positioning of the
machine, equipment, or component. This paragraph does not allow the
employer or employee to disregard the requirement for locking out or
tagging out during the other portions of the servicing or maintenance
operation. This exception provides for a temporary measure to be used
only to accomplish a particular task for which reenergizing is
essential.
One commenter expressed the concern that all lockout or tagout
devices would have to be removed from all energy isolating devices (Ex.
3-20). He suggested that the standard permit locks and tags to remain
attached to controls that were not to be operated. However, this change
is not necessary. The standard does not require all lockout or tagout
devices to be removed, only those attached to energy isolating devices
that are to be changed from the ``safe'' or ``off'' position to the
``on'' position.
Group lockout involves the performance of servicing or maintenance
activities by more than one employee. The group of employees is
protected by group lockout or tagout devices, representing the group as
a whole, with one authorized employee directly responsible for the
performance of the servicing. The proposed requirement for group
lockout would have required that the procedure provide the same degree
of safety as personal locks or tags. It did not specify the use of
individual locks or tags by the individual employees of the group. The
proposal would have allowed this system, with the authorized employee
being responsible for the safety of all the employees in the group, if
that program provided the same degree of safety as personal lockout or
tagout.
The issue of group lockout was a concern of the UWUA (Ex. 66; LA
Tr. 45-49, 69). As this issue was decided in the generic hazardous
energy control standard and no new evidence was submitted under this
rulemaking, the Agency has decided to adopt the outcome and rationale
with respect to final Sec. 1910.147(f)(3), as follows:
Based on the record (Ex. 2-27, 2-29, 2-32, 2-44, 2-63, 2-99, 2-
106, 51, 56, 60, Tr. pg. W 1-142), OSHA has reexamined the issue of
group lockout and has concluded that an additional element is
necessary for the safety of the servicing employees: each employee
in the group needs to be able to affix his/her personal lockout or
tagout system device as part of the group lockout. This is necessary
for several reasons: first, the placement of a personal lockout or
tagout device enables that employee to control his/her own
protection, rather than having to depend upon another person;
second, the use of a personal lockout or tagout device will enable
each servicing employee to verify that the equipment has been
properly deenergized in accordance with the energy control
procedure, and to affix his/her device to indicate that
verification; third, the presence of an employee's lockout or tagout
device will inform all other persons that the employee is working on
the equipment; fourth, as long as that device remains attached, all
employees know that the job is not completed and that it is not safe
to reenergize the equipment; and fifth, the servicing employee will
continue to be protected by the presence of his/her device until he/
she removes it. The authorized employee in charge of the group
lockout or tagout cannot reenergize the equipment until each
employee in the group has removed his/her personal device,
indicating that he/she is no longer exposed to the hazards from
reenergization of the machine or equipment. OSHA is convinced that
the use of individual lockout or tagout devices as part of the group
lockout provides the greatest assurance of protection for servicing
employees.
The proposed rule contained several general elements for group
lockout, including provision[s] on primary responsibility and
coordination of work forces. These elements are carried forward in
the Final Rule. The requirement for the use of personal lockout or
tagout devices will only enhance the overall effectiveness of these
provisions, because the authorized employee in charge of the group
lockout will be better able to evaluate the status of the servicing
operation, as well as to determine which, if any, of the servicing
employees are working on the equipment at a particular time.
OSHA requires in paragraph (f)(3) [Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(ii)] that
when a crew, craft, department or other group lockout or tagout
device is used, it must provide the authorized and affected
employees with a degree of protection that is equivalent to the use
of personal lockout or tagout procedures. As in the case of personal
lockout or tagout, the employer who uses group lockout or tagout
must develop a procedure which encompasses the elements set forth in
paragraph (c)(4) [Sec. 1910.269(d)(2)(iii) and (d)(2)(iv)].
Paragraph (f)(3) [Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(ii)] contains several key
provisions which must be included in all group lockout or tagout
procedures. If a single lockout device or set of lockout devices
(often referred to as ``operations locks'') are utilized to isolate
the machine or equipment from the energy sources, each authorized
employee is afforded a means to utilize his/her personal lockout or
tagout devices so that no single employee has control of the means
to remove the group lockout or tagout devices while employees are
still servicing or maintaining the machine or equipment. This can be
accomplished by the use of a lockbox or other similar appliance.
Once the machine or equipment is locked out, the key is placed into
the lockbox and each authorized employee places his/her lockout or
tagout device on the box. When each individual completes his/her
portion of the work, that person removes his/her lockout or tagout
device from the lockbox. Once all personal lockout or tagout devices
have been removed, the key for the group lockout devices for the
machine or equipment can be used to remove that group lockout
device. This method provides individual protection for all employees
working under the protection of a particular lockout or tagout
device. When more than one group is involved, another authorized
person might need to maintain responsibility for coordination of the
various lockout control groups in order to ensure continuity of
protection and to coordinate workforces.
In addition to designating and assigning responsibility to
authorized employees, paragraph (f)(3) [Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(ii)]
requires the employer to develop and implement procedures for
determining the exposure status of individual crew members and for
taking appropriate measures to control or limit that exposure. These
provisions are seen by OSHA as requiring at least the following
steps:
1. Verification of shutdown and isolation of the equipment or
process before allowing a crew member to place a personal lockout or
tagout device on an energy isolating device, or on a lockout box,
board, or cabinet;
2. Ensuring that all employees in the crew have completed their
assignments, removed their lockout and/or tagout devices from the
energy isolating device, the box lid or other device used, and are
in the clear before turning the equipment or process over to the
operating personnel or simply turning the machine or equipment on;
3. Providing the necessary coordinating procedures for ensuring
the safe transfer of lockout or tagout control devices between other
groups and work shifts.
The special coverage of paragraph (f)(3)
[Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(ii)] recognizes the importance of group lockout
and/or tagout devices used under conditions in which the safety of
all employees working in the group is dependent on how those devices
are used. For that reason, it involves a closer examination of the
conditions, methods and procedures needed for effective individual
employee protection.
OSHA also believes that by requiring each servicing employee to
attach his/her own device in group servicing operations, it becomes
possible to extend coverage of group servicing activities under
paragraph (f)(3) [Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(ii)] beyond lockout, as
envisioned by the proposal, to cover tagout, as well. This would
primarily involve equipment which has not been designed to accept a
lockout device. OSHA believes that when a group lockout or tagout
procedure is properly implemented, it adds an additional element of
protection to servicing employees: the authorized employee in charge
of the group servicing operation applies a group lockout or tagout
device to the equipment being serviced, and each servicing employee
attaches a personal lockout or tagout device to the group device.
These individual devices are removed by the employees who applied
them, leaving the group device attached. These employees, by
clearing the equipment and removing their own devices, indicate that
they are no longer exposed to the hazards of the servicing
operation. The authorized employee in charge of the group servicing
operation then verifies that all elements of the group servicing
have, in fact, been completed, and that it is safe to reenergize the
system, before he/she removes the group device. Thus, the additional
step provides further assurance that reenergizing the equipment will
not endanger employees. Expanding group procedures to encompass
tagout as well as lockout will extend the additional protection to
operations which would otherwise be permitted under this standard to
use tagout devices instead of lockout.
One of the most difficult problems to be dealt with by this
standard involves the servicing and maintenance of complex
equipment, particularly when the work extends across several
workshifts. Under the basic approach taken by this standard, each
servicing employee is responsible for the application and removal of
his/her own lockout or tagout device. However, the record indicates
that the servicing of some complex equipment may take days or weeks,
and that in some cases, hundreds of lockout or tagout devices may be
necessary. EEI (Ex. 56) noted that in some major maintenance
operations, it can take a day or more just to apply lockout/tagout
devices to all energy isolating devices. CMA (Ex. 56) explained that
in a chemical plant, certain ``turn-around'' jobs may require the
locking or tagging of a hundred or more energy isolation devices and
require 25 or more employees to perform the servicing. When complex
equipment is being serviced, OSHA recognizes the need to provide
employers with the option of utilizing an alternative procedure to
each employee locking or tagging out each energy isolating device.
When an alternative procedure is used, it must provide equivalent
protection for the authorized employees. [54 FR 36681-36682,
corrected at 55 FR 38683-38685]
OSHA has adopted language for final Sec. 1910.269 (d)(8)(ii) from
Sec. 1910.147(f)(3). The Agency believes that the final standard will
best protect employees servicing or maintaining electric power
generation equipment.
After the generic lockout/tagout standard was promulgated, OSHA
received many questions regarding the necessary elements of a group
lockout procedure. The Agency answered many of these questions in the
form of an OSHA Instruction, STD 1-7.3, which set guidelines for the
enforcement of Sec. 1910.147 when group lockout or tagging was
involved. In order to clarify final Sec. 1910.269(d), the Agency is
summarizing these guidelines with respect to the manner in which they
would apply to Sec. 1910.269(d), as follows:
(1) Group lockout/tagout procedures must be tailored to the
specific operation involved. Irrespective of the situation, the
requirements of the final rule specify that each employee performing
maintenance or servicing activities be in control of hazardous energy
during his or her period of exposure.
(2) The procedures must ensure that each authorized employee is
protected from the unexpected release of hazardous energy by personal
lockout or tagout devices. No employee may affix the personal lockout
or tagout device of another employee.
(3) The use of such devices as master locks and tags are permitted
and can serve to simplify group lockout/tagout procedures. For example,
a single lock may used on each energy isolating device, together with
the use of a lockbox for retention of the keys and to which each
authorized employee affixes his or her lock or tag. In a tagging
system, a master tag may be used, as long as each employee personally
signs on and signs off on it and as long as the tag clearly identifies
each authorized employee who is being protected by it.
(4) All other provisions of paragraph continue to apply.
Paragraph (d)(8)(iii) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires that specific
procedures be used to ensure continuation of lockout or tagout
protection for employees during shift or personnel changes in order to
provide for an orderly transfer of control measures and in order to be
certain that the machine or equipment is continuously maintained in a
safe condition. As with group lockout or tagout, the method of
accomplishing this task must be part of the procedures that are defined
in performance language in Sec. 1910.269 (d)(2)(iii) and (d)(2)(iv).
Paragraph (d)(8)(iii) requires specific procedures whenever transfer of
control measures is necessary. The underlying rationale for these
provisions, whereby hazardous energy control responsibility is
transferred, is for the maintenance of uninterrupted protection for the
employees involved. It is therefore considered essential that lockout
or tagout devices be maintained on energy isolating devices throughout
the transition period.
Basically, the transfer of responsibility can be accomplished by
the on-coming shift employees accepting control of the system involved
prior to the release of control by the off-going employees. Also, the
procedures, whether they necessitate the use of simple control measures
or the more detailed use of logs and check lists to accomplish an
orderly transfer, are to be followed by an assurance that the system is
indeed safe for employees to continue working. This assurance may
involve action by the authorized supervisory employee responsible for
the transfer to verify the continued isolation of the machine or
equipment from the energy source.
Perhaps the most critical element of assuring continuity of
protection is providing the individual employee with an opportunity to
verify that the equipment has been deenergized. Even more than in the
case with individual lockout or tagout, the on-coming employee should
not have to depend on the actions of another employee or supervisor,
particularly one who has left the workplace for the day, for assurance
that it is safe to work on the machine or equipment. The group lockout
provisions in paragraph (d)(8)(ii) of final Sec. 1910.269 contain what
OSHA believes to be the necessary safeguards for these situations. To
the extent that the procedures provide for individual verification that
the equipment has been properly deenergized and to the extent that the
procedures allow for the servicing employee to attest to that
verification in accordance with the standard, OSHA believes that such
procedures would comply with the final rule. In the case of the type of
complex servicing operation described by EEI involving large numbers of
energy isolating devices, large numbers of servicing employees, and
multiple shifts (Ex. 3-112; LA Tr. 215-239), OSHA acknowledges that the
removal and replacement of the lockout or tagout devices each shift
could be overly burdensome. When the complexity of the servicing
operation necessitates an alternative to such frequent attachment and
removal of lockout or tagout devices, the use of the work permit or
comparable means, with each employee signing in and out as he or she
begins or stops working on the equipment, combined with the servicing
employees' verifying that the equipment is deenergized prior to
beginning work, would be an acceptable approach to compliance with
group lockout or tagout and shift change provisions of the standard.
Because the person applying the lockout or tagout device is
generally the one being protected by that device, it is essential that
the device not be removed by anyone else except in emergencies. When an
employee transfers servicing duties to an employee on the next shift
and the equipment is to remain deenergized throughout the shift change,
it should not be an undue burden to establish a procedure under
paragraph (d)(8)(iii) for the off-going employee to transfer his or her
authority to the on-coming employee. In situations in which the off-
going employee removes his or her lockout or tagout device before the
on-coming employee arrives, the procedure could allow for the off-going
employee to apply a tagout device at the time he or she removes his or
her device, indicating that the lock had been removed, but that the
machine or equipment had not been reenergized. The on-coming employee
would verify that the system was still deenergized and would remove the
interim tag and substitute his or her lockout device. This would assure
that the continuous protection is maintained from one shift to another.
When tagout devices are used, it would be possible to use a tag with
spaces for the off-going employee to sign off, giving the date and
time, and for the on-coming employee to sign on, also giving the date
and time. Each employee would verify the deenergizing and energy
isolation for his or her own protection before signing onto the tag.
In paragraph (d)(8)(iv), the final standard requires that whenever
outside servicing personnel (that is, employees of contractors) are
engaged to perform any of the activities covered by this standard, each
employer must inform the other employer of their respective lockout or
tagout procedures. Each employer shall also ensure that his or her own
employees understand and comply with the restrictions and prohibitions
of the energy control program in use.
These requirements are necessary when outside personnel work on
machines or equipment because their activities have the same or greater
potential for exposing employees to servicing hazards as would exist if
the employer's own employees were performing the work. These hazards
can pose a threat to both the outside service personnel and the
employees in the plant or facility.
The outside servicing personnel would certainly be expected to know
about the specific equipment being serviced, but they might not be
familiar with the energy control procedures being used in the
particular workplace. Similarly, the employees at the worksite might be
familiar with the procedures being used by their fellow employees, but
they might not know what to do if the contractor has a procedure which
differs from their own. If such procedures were not coordinated, each
group of employees might be endangered by the actions of the other,
even if each one followed its own procedures.
This standard is intended to ensure that both the employer and the
outside service personnel are aware that their interaction can be a
possible source of injury to employees and that the close coordination
of their activities is needed in order to reduce the likelihood of such
injury. OSHA sees the proper use of these provisions, when they are
understood and adhered to, as a way to prevent misunderstandings by
either plant employees or outside service personnel regarding: (1) the
use of lockout or tagout procedures in general, (2) the use of specific
lockout or tagout devices that are selected for a particular
application, and (3) the restrictions and prohibitions imposed upon
each group of employees by the other employer's energy control program.
OSHA proposed to require outside contractors to use the same
procedures as used in the plant or facility where the work is being
done, and a similar requirement was considered under the rulemaking on
Sec. 1910.147. In the generic standard rulemaking, the Agency
determined that it might adversely affect the safety of employees if
the standard were to require them to comply in all cases with a
procedure which was unfamiliar to them and differed from their usual
practices under their own employer's energy control program (54 FR
36680-36681, corrected at 55 FR 38683, 38685). Further, by allowing
each employee to use the procedure that he or she is familiar with,
Sec. 1910.147(f)(2) provides greater assurance that the employees will
willingly use the procedure. OSHA has decided to use the same approach
here.
Paragraph (d)(8)(iv) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires that each
employer inform the other employer of the procedures used by his or her
employees and that each employer's employees understand and comply with
the restrictions and prohibitions of the energy control program in use.
For example, if there are elements of the contractor's procedures which
need to be explained to the facility employees, or if there are other
steps needed to assure the safety of the contractor's employees, the
facility employer must provide his or her employees with the
information to provide the necessary protection.
The requirement for coordination between the contractor and the on-
site employer is intended to deal with the potential for either one's
employees to create or compound the hazards to which the other's
employees are exposed. This is true even if the on-site employer
includes as a term of the contract that the contractor follow the on-
site employer's lockout or tagging procedures. Regardless of the degree
of coordination required by paragraph (d)(8)(iv), each covered
employer, whether contractor or on-site employer, has an independent
obligation under the OSH Act to provide the protection under the
standard for his or her own employees.
The facility owner will need to look at various aspects of the
contractor's energy control program to assure that his or her employees
are not placed at an increased risk. For example, is the contractor's
means of notifying the affected employees of the pending lockout or
tagout as thorough as the facility employer's? Is the procedure for
identifying the energy isolating devices as exhaustive or complete as
the facility employer's? Is the method of lockout or tagout used by the
contractor recognized and respected by the facility's employees? Does
the contractor's procedure take into account the possibility of
reaccumulation of stored energy (if that is a potential problem)? Does
the contractor's procedure for removal of lockout or tagout devices and
reenergizing and startup of the machine or equipment provide for
employee notification and ensuring the equipment is safe before
startup? If any of the steps in the contractor's procedures fail to
cover significant or essential conditions of the workplace which could
adversely affect the safety of the facility employees, action must be
taken by the facility employer to minimize the potential for injury to
his or her employees.
Edison Electric Institute argued that the tagging systems used by
electric utilities across the country are unique and work well to
protect their employees (Ex. 3-112; LA Tr. 215-239).33 They argued
that OSHA should adopt provisions from the EEI/IBEW draft relating to
lockout and tagging. Because OSHA has already adopted a standard on the
control of hazardous energy sources, the Agency believes that the
industry must show that unique circumstances, such as the hazards
presented or the methods of controlling them, warrant separate and
distinct treatment. Mr. John Bachofer, Vice President of Metropolitan
Edison Company, representing Edison Electric Institute emphasized six
basic concepts of hazardous energy control at electric utilities:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\3EEI also argued that electric utility employees are not at
significant risk of injury under existing industry lockout and
tagging procedures (Ex. 62-33). In both the Subpart S work practices
rulemaking and the generic hazardous energy control rulemaking, OSHA
found existing electric utility lockout and tagging procedures to
expose employees to a significant risk of injury (55 FR 32003, 54 FR
36651-36654, 36684). In a review of IBEW fatality reports, Eastern
Research Group, Ind., found 4 of 159 fatalities (2.5%) could have
been prevented by compliance with proposed Sec. 1910.269(d) (Ex. 6-
24). These fatalities occurred among approximately 50,000 electric
utility employees at high risk (Ex. 4: Table 3-22 with the
population limited to generating plant workers at high risk) at the
rate of nearly 2 per year (2.5% of the estimated 70 deaths per year;
Ex. 5). The Agency believes that these employees are exposed to a
significant risk of injury under existing industry practices.
Otherwise, no lockout and tagging standard would have been proposed.
OSHA evaluates significant risk based on the hazards that exist
under the current state of regulation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) The control of energy is fundamental to electric utility work.
(2) Control of hazardous energy is critical to employee safety in
the industry.
(3) The methods used to control hazardous energy involve a
comprehensive and documented process.
(4) Employees are trained in and required to comply with the
hazardous energy control procedures.
(5) Methods for controlling energy are essentially consistent
throughout the electric utility industry.
(6) The electric utility industry's hazardous energy control
procedures work very well (LA Tr. 216-218).
As noted earlier, these concepts are in use in other industries as
well and do not make the utility industry's tagging system unique. OSHA
believes that the only concept employed by electric utilities that is
unique to their industry is the use of central control facilities. Mr.
Bachofer described the utilities' use of a system operator who
initiates and controls switching and tagging procedures, and presented
a videotape of a typical tagout procedure in action in a generating
plant (Ex. 12-6; LA Tr. 225-232). This evidence indicates that typical
utility company tagout procedures are unique. However, as discussed
extensively earlier, the evidence presented by the Utility Workers
Union of America and the accident data submitted into the record
demonstrate that, even under these procedures, employees can be exposed
to hazards (Ex. 9-2, 66; DC Tr. 414, 444; LA Tr. 45-49, 54-63, 67-
70).34 Therefore, rather than adopt the EEI/IBEW draft provisions
on the control of hazardous energy sources, OSHA is incorporating
additional provisions under Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(v) to allow for the
placement and removal of lockout or tagout devices by the system
operator. This provides employers with the flexibility to protect
employees by central control of energy isolating devices, but provides
employees with protection equivalent to that provided by personal
lockout or tagout devices. The new paragraph is worded as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\4OSHA came to the same conclusion in the electrical safety-
related work practices rulemaking, 55 FR 32003.
(v) If energy isolating devices are installed in a central
location under the exclusive control of a system operator, the
following requirements apply:
(A) The employer shall use a procedure that affords employees a
level of protection equivalent to that provided by the
implementation of a personal lockout or tagout device.
(B) The system operator shall place and remove lockout and
tagout devices in place of the authorized employee under paragraphs
(d)(4), (d)(6)(iv), and (d)(7)(iv) of this section.
(C) Provisions shall be made to identify the authorized employee
who is responsible for (that is, being protected by) the lockout or
tagout device, to transfer responsibility for lockout and tagout
devices, and to ensure that an authorized employee requesting
removal or transfer of a lockout or tagout device is the one
responsible for it before the device is removed or transferred.
These requirements recognize lockout and tagout practices that are
common in the electric utility industry and that have been successful
in protecting employees from hazards associated with the control of
hazardous energy sources. Under paragraph (d)(8)(v), the system
operator has complete control over hazardous energy sources that
endanger employees maintaining or servicing machinery or equipment
associated with an electric power generation installation. Other
employees do not even have access to the energy control devices and
cannot operate them to reenergize machinery or equipment being
serviced. This central control of hazardous energy sources, in
combination with the lockout and tagging procedures and other
safeguards required by paragraph (d), minimizes the accidental
reenergizing of machinery and equipment.
Paragraph (d)(8)(v)(A) requires the procedure used to provide
protection equal to the use of a personal lockout or tagout device. The
procedure used must strictly regulate the operation of energy control
devices. For example, it could prohibit the operation of these devices,
except under written orders. Additionally, logs of switching orders
provide a history of the energy control device operation that can help
employers determine the efficacy of their procedures. At a minimum, the
procedure must ensure that no lock or tag is removed without the
permission of the authorized employee it is protecting and that locked
out or tagged out energy control devices are not operated to reenergize
hazardous energy sources.
Paragraph (d)(8)(v)(B) requires the system operator to place and
remove lockout and tagout devices in place of the authorized employee
under paragraphs (d)(4), (d)(6)(iv), and (d)(7)(iv). The system
operator is the only person with the authority to operate energy
control devices under his or her jurisdiction and to place locks and
tags on these devices. An authorized employee will not be able to place
or remove his or her own tags; therefore, the system operator is
required to perform this function. Allowing other employees to place
and remove tags would increase the chances that locks or tags could be
removed with the knowledge of the employee they are protecting.
Paragraph (d)(8)(v)(C) requires the employer to make provisions to
identify the authorized employee being protected by the lockout or
tagout device, to transfer responsibility for lockout and tagout
devices, and to ensure that an employee requesting the removal or
transfer of a lockout or tagout device is the authorized employee
responsible for it. It is important for any lockout or tagging system
to protect every employee servicing or maintaining machinery or
equipment. To achieve this goal, the lockout or tagging procedures must
ensure that no lock or tag protecting an employee is removed without
the knowledge and participation of the employee it is protecting. Even
though the energy control devices are under the exclusive control of
the system operator, the locked out or tagged out devices must not be
operated until the employee they are protecting personally authorizes
it. When a lockout or tagout device is to be removed or when
responsibility for the device is to be transferred to another employee,
the lockout or tagout procedures must take steps to identify the
employee requesting removal or transfer. Signed orders, for example,
could be used, and the signatures on the orders could be checked
against the original lockout or tagout request. Password systems,
master lock systems, and receipt systems could also be used to identify
the authorized employee responsible for the lockout or tagout device.
The procedures must also make provision for transferring lockout or
tagout from one employee to another, such as may be needed during shift
changes. The procedures must also ensure that the system operator does
not remove any lockout or tagout device without the specific
authorization of the employee it is protecting (except as permitted in
paragraph (d)(7)(iv) for emergencies). Paragraph (d)(8)(v)(C) prohibits
supervisors (or other employees) from releasing lockout or tagout
devices while they are protecting authorized employees, and it
recognizes only central control systems that provide protection
equivalent to that provided by personal lockout or tagout devices. The
use of signed orders, passwords, master locks or tags, or receipts can
facilitate compliance with this provision.
Paragraph (e). Paragraph (e) of final Sec. 1910.269 contains
requirements for entry into and work in enclosed spaces. An ``enclosed
space'' is defined to be a space that has a limited means of entry or
egress, that is designed for periodic entry by employees under normal
operating conditions, and that is not expected to contain a hazardous
atmosphere, but may contain one under unusual conditions. In this
paragraph, OSHA intends to cover only the types of enclosed spaces that
are routinely entered by employees engaged in electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution work and are unique to
underground utility work. Work in these spaces is part of the day-to-
day activities performed by employees protected by this standard.
Enclosed spaces include manholes and vaults that provide employees
access to electric generation, transmission, and distribution
equipment. This paragraph does not address other types of confined
spaces, such as boilers, tanks, and coal bunkers, that are common to
other industries as well. These locations are addressed in OSHA's
generic permit-required confined space standard, Sec. 1910.146, which
applies to all of general industry, including industries engaged in
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution work.
Section 1910.146 contains requirements that address hazards
associated with entry into ``permit-required confined spaces'' (permit
spaces). Section 1910.146 defines ``confined space'' and ``permit-
required confined space'' as follows:
Confined space means a space that:
(1) Is large enough and so configured that an employee can bodily
enter and perform assigned work; and
(2) Has limited or restricted means for entry or exit (for example,
tanks, vessels, silos, storage bins, hoppers, vaults, and pits are
spaces that may have limited means of entry.); and
(3) Is not designed for continuous employee occupancy.
Permit-required confined space (permit space) means a confined
space that has one or more of the following characteristics:
(1) Contains or has a potential to contain a hazardous
atmosphere;35
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\5The definition of ``hazardous atmosphere'' in final
Sec. 1910.269(x) is identical to that contained in the final generic
permit-required confined spaces standard, Sec. 1910.146(b). OSHA
believes that the criteria for determining whether an atmosphere is
hazardous is independent of the injury or type of work being
performed. For this reason, the definition proposed in Sec. 1910.269
was the same as the one proposed in Sec. 1910.146. The differences
between the proposed definition and the one contained in final
Sec. 1910.146 were described and explained in the preamble to the
generic permit-required confined spaces standard (58 FR 4473-4474).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Contains a material that has the potential for engulfing an
entrant;
(3) Has an internal configuration such that an entrant could be
trapped or asphyxiated by inwardly converging walls or by a floor which
slopes downward and tapers to a smaller cross-section; or
(4) Contains any other recognized serious safety or health hazard.
The permit-required confined spaces standard requires employers to
implement a comprehensive confined space entry program. This standard
covers the wide range of permit-required confined spaces encountered
throughout general industry. Because the hazards posed by these spaces
vary so greatly, Sec. 1910.146 requires employers to implement a permit
system for entry into them. The permit system must spell out the steps
to be taken to make the space safe for entry and must include
provisions for attendants stationed outside the spaces and for rescue
of entrants, who could be disabled inside the space. However, an
employer need not follow the permit-entry requirements of Sec. 1910.146
for spaces where the hazards have been completely eliminated or for
spaces where an alternative set of procedures are observed. The
alternative procedures apply only where the space can be made safe for
entry through the use of continuous forced air ventilation alone. The
procedures, which are set forth in Sec. 1910.146(c)(5)(ii), ensure that
conditions within the permit space do not endanger an entrant's life or
ability to rescue himself or herself.
Paragraph (e) of 1910.269 applies to ``enclosed spaces''. By
definition, an enclosed space would be a permit-required confined space
in the absence of Sec. 1910.269. An enclosed space meets the definition
of a confined space--it is large enough for an employee to enter; it
has a limited means of access or egress; it is designed for periodic,
rather than continuous, employee occupancy36 under normal
operating conditions. An enclosed space also meets the definition of a
permit space--although it is not expected to contain a hazardous
atmosphere, it has the potential to contain one. The Agency notes that,
if hazardous conditions which cannot be controlled through the
precautions set out in paragraphs (e) and (t) of final Sec. 1910.269
are present, the enclosed space must be treated as a permit space under
Sec. 1910.146.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\6``One of the characteristics of a confined space is that it
is not designed for humans to enter and work for prolonged periods
without any additional consideration for safety and health. With
respect to manholes and unvented vaults, the Agency notes that
atmospheric testing and portable mechanical ventilation are among
the recognized procedures that must be undertaken . . . before
employees can safely enter these spaces. [Preamble to the generic
permit space standard, 58 FR 4478]''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the preamble to the permit-required confined spaces standard,
OSHA acknowledged that ``the practices necessary to make confined
spaces that merely have the potential to contain hazardous atmospheres
(as opposed to one that contains a hazardous atmosphere under normal
operating conditions) safe are widely recognized and used throughout
various industries [58 FR 4486].'' The Agency recognized the electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution industry as one of
those industries (58 FR 4489). In fact, proposed Sec. 1910.269(e) was
used as the basis of many of the requirements adopted under the
alternative procedures adopted in Sec. 1910.146(c)(5)(ii).
OSHA has carried forward proposed paragraph (e) into the final
rule, setting requirements for electric power generation, transmission,
and distribution work in enclosed spaces. Because these spaces are
still permit spaces when work not falling under Sec. 1910.269 is
performed, all employers must include these spaces in their permit-
space programs and must comply with the general permit-space
requirements contained in Sec. 1910.146(c). For example, in accordance
with Sec. 1910.146, enclosed spaces must be identified under paragraph
(c)(1); employees must be informed of the existence, location, and
hazardous nature of enclosed spaces under paragraph (c)(2); the
employer must develop a written program covering entry into permit
spaces under paragraph (c)(4); the employer must reevaluate permit
spaces and reclassify them on the basis of changes in their use or
configuration under paragraph (c)(6); and the host employer and
contractor must coordinate entry activities under paragraphs (c)(8) and
(c)(9).
Edison Electric Institute strongly urged OSHA to include all
electric utility confined spaces under the provisions of Sec. 1910.269
(Ex. 3-112, 56; DC Tr. 814-828). Summing up the evidence EEI presented
on this issue, Messrs. Carl D. Behnke and Charles Kelly stated:
Another important issue is whether this standard will regulate
all enclosed spaces in electric utility facilities, or only those
which OSHA perceives as ``unique'' to utility operations. As
written, the proposal would cover underground systems, such as
manholes and vaults. Nothing in the record would support a contrary
conclusion. Moreover, as EEI made clear in the rulemaking on OSHA's
proposed generic standard on permit-entry enclosed spaces, it makes
no sense for the generic standard to regulate work in power plant
boilers, or other spaces, such as fuel oil tanks, which are found in
electric utility facilities.
* * * * *
First, the records in this proceeding and the permit-entry
matter show that only in electric power generating plants does one
find the type of massive boilers which EEI described and depicted in
its comments, testimony, and exhibits. (See Lawson presentations).
Moreover, under typical procedures applicable in the industry, once
those boilers have been shut down and opened, and slag removed, they
present none of the ``enclosed space'' hazards which the generic
standard apparently is intended to regulate.
Second, while equipment such as tanks found in power plants may
be similar to those found in other industrial settings, a compelling
difference remains. Thus, the employees who will enter power plant
spaces regulated under this standard will be the same ones who enter
the spaces which OSHA apparently intends to regulate under the
generic standard. To the extent the two final standards are as
significantly different as the respective proposals, the result will
be that power plant workers will be subject to inconsistent
standards when performing identical or similar work. This simply
makes no sense and for no apparent reason would defeat the value of
having a comprehensive standard for power generation in the first
place.
Nothing in the record shows that entering spaces in power plants
which are like other industrial spaces presents unusual or
particular hazards which merit the application of the proposed
generic rule. Also, the superior training which investor-owned
utilities give their workers would be applicable to all enclosed
space entries. [Ex. 56]
OSHA has determined that Sec. 1910.146 is the proper place to
regulate permit-required confined spaces other than enclosed spaces.
The enclosed space requirements of the final rule are intended to
regulate a portion of electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work that is routine and presents limited hazards to the
qualified employees covered by Sec. 1910.269 who are performing that
work. Electric utility companies have an estimated 14,350 employees
engaged in underground transmission and distribution work (where most
of the work covered by paragraph (e) occurs).37 Underground repair
crews, in which these employees work, can typically expect to enter a
manhole once or twice a day.38 The enclosed space entry procedure
addressed by Sec. 1910.269(e) is a day-to-day part of the routine of
these workers. This type of work is unique to underground utilities
(such as electric, telephone, and water utilities), and the hazards
presented by these spaces are widely recognized by these industries and
their workers. Indeed, underground telecommunications work is currently
regulated under Sec. 1910.268, which contains procedures basically
equivalent to final Sec. 1910.269. In contrast, other permit spaces in
electric power generating plants are entered on a far less frequent
basis by employees working in the plants, typically, three such entries
per week for an entire generating plant.39 A boiler at a
generating plant, for example, is only entered by employees at the
plant on a very infrequent basis--the electric generator would have to
be shut down for a few days at a minimum, and this is not a routine
occurrence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\7ERG, ``Preparation of an Economic Impact Study for the
Proposed OSHA Regulation Covering Electric Power Generation,
Transmission, and Distribution'', p. 8-8.
\3\8Ibid, p. 8-21.
\3\9Ibid, p. 8-25 to 8-26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, the hazards posed by the enclosed spaces covered in
Sec. 1910.269(e) are generally much more limited than the hazards posed
by permit spaces addressed in Sec. 1910.146.40 By definition,
``enclosed spaces'' are designed for employee occupancy during normal
operating conditions. Electrical and other energy systems would not
have to be shut down, nor would the space have to be drained of liquids
for the employee to enter the space safely. On the other hand, other
``permit-required confined spaces'' at electric generating plants, such
as boilers, fuel tanks, and transformer and circuit breaker cases, are
not designed for employee occupancy and require energy sources to be
isolated and fluids to be drained from the space before an employee can
safely enter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\0Permit spaces covered by the alternative procedures in
Sec. 1910.146(c)(5)(ii) pose hazards similar in nature to those
found in enclosed spaces. However, the requirements for these spaces
are similar to those in paragraph (e) of final Sec. 1910.269.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The hazards posed by enclosed spaces consist of (1) limited access
and egress, (2) possible lack of oxygen, (3) possible presence of
flammable gases,41 and (4) possible presence of limited amounts of
toxic chemicals. The potential atmospheric hazards are caused by an
enclosed space's lack of adequate ventilation and can normally be
controlled through the use of continuous forced air ventilation alone.
Practices to control these hazards are widely recognized and are
currently in use in electric, telecommunications, and other underground
utility industries. Such practices include testing for the presence of
flammable gases and vapors, testing for oxygen deficiency, ventilation
of the enclosed space, controls on the use of open flames, and the use
of an attendant outside the space. Existing Sec. 1910.268(o) sets forth
regulations addressing these areas in the telecommunications industry,
which exposes its employees to the same non-electrical hazards as the
electric utility industry. Section 1910.146, itself, recognizes permit
spaces that are equivalent to enclosed spaces and sets separate
provisions, similar to those contained in Sec. 1910.269(e), for those
spaces.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\1Airborne combustible dust can also create a hazardous
atmosphere. However, if combustible dust is present in sufficient
amounts to create a hazardous atmosphere, it will almost surely be
present in layers inside the space. The fire hazard associated with
layers of combustible dust are not addressed in Sec. 1910.269(e),
which deals only with the atmospheric hazards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The hazards posed by permit-required confined spaces vary widely
between different types of spaces. Some tanks contain flammable
liquids, which must be removed before an employee can enter. A boiler
must have its fuel system shut down and then must be cooled before an
employee can work inside. Each space has its own unique set of entry
procedures covering all the hazards associated with it. This is the
type of space that Sec. 1910.146 covers. The provisions of that
standard are intended to protect employees from all the hazards that
may be present in a vast array of different confined spaces.
The EEI/IBEW draft standard recognized the difference between the
two types of spaces (Ex. 2-3, 2-4). Paragraph (e)(3) of their draft
contained provisions on ``enclosed spaces'', including requirements
related to air contaminants, combustible atmospheres, oxygen
deficiency, and access and egress. Paragraph (e)(4) of the EEI/IBEW
document contained additional considerations for ``permit-entry
spaces'', which incorporated provisions for the employer to identify
the hazards associated with each space, to develop a permit system to
control entry into these spaces, and to protect employees from hazards
that could be anticipated within the space. These provisions recognize
the wide variety of hazards and methods of control associated with
permit spaces, as opposed to the basic hazards common to such enclosed
spaces as manholes and vaults.
OSHA has also adopted a two-pronged approach to regulating enclosed
and permit-required confined space entry. However, rather than develop
a new rule on permit-required confined spaces to be placed in
Sec. 1910.269, the Agency has determined that permit spaces in electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution should be governed by
the generic standard, Sec. 1910.146. OSHA has not found such spaces in
electric utility work to be sufficiently unique with respect to the
hazards they present to warrant separate regulation, except for
enclosed spaces that are entered on a routine, daily basis and that are
designed to be entered under normal operating conditions. Therefore,
consistent with this determination, OSHA has set forth separate
requirements in this standard (Sec. 1910.269(e)) for employee entry
into enclosed spaces that are unique to the performance of electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution work.42 Other
types of permit spaces (such as boilers and tanks) are not addressed in
this Sec. 1910.269, but are addressed in the generic confined spaces
standard, Sec. 1910.146.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\2These spaces are also found in other underground utility
work as well. For example, the telecommunications industry performs
work in some of the same manholes and underground vaults that
electric utility workers enter. However, the hazards posed by these
enclosed spaces are unique to the extent that they should be covered
by a standard separate from the generic confined spaces standard. As
noted earlier, entry into enclosed spaces is a routine part of
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution work, and
the practices necessary for safe entry into these spaces are in
widespread use throughout the electric utility industry.
Additionally, manhole and vault entry is already covered by
Sec. 1926.956 of subpart V for the construction of electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution installations and by
Sec. 1910.268(o) for telecommunications work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the non-electrical hazards found in manholes, underground
vaults, and similar enclosed spaces are the same in both
telecommunications work and electric power generation, transmission,
and distribution work, requirements relating to these hazards should be
similar. (In joint-use manholes, where both telecommunications and
electric distribution equipment are present, telecommunications
employees and electric utility employees have to work in the same
manholes--though not necessarily at the same time.) Therefore, the
provisions contained in Sec. 1910.269(e) are based, in large part, on
the requirements of existing Sec. 1910.268(o) relating to
telecommunications work on underground installations. In carrying them
over to Sec. 1910.269, OSHA has modified and has added to the existing
telecommunications regulations as described in the summary and
explanation of individual provisions within paragraph (e). The Agency
has also drawn from provisions in ANSI C2 and the EEI/IBEW draft that
relate to enclosed space hazards.
The introduction to paragraph (e) sets forth the scope of the
enclosed space provisions. As previously noted, enclosed spaces are
defined as spaces that have limited means of entry or egress, that are
designed for periodic entry by employees under normal operating
conditions, and that are not expected to contain hazardous atmospheres
but may contain them under unusual conditions. These spaces include
manholes and unvented vaults. The introduction also notes (1) that
paragraph (e) of Sec. 1910.269 applies to routine entry into enclosed
spaces in lieu of the permit-space entry requirements of Sec. 1910.146,
and (2) that the generic permit-required confined spaces standard,
Sec. 1910.146, applies to entries into enclosed spaces where the
precautions taken under paragraphs (e) and (t) of Sec. 1910.269 do not
protect entrants.
The ventilation in vented vaults prevents a hazardous atmosphere
from accumulating, so vented vaults were proposed to be excluded from
coverage. However, NIOSH pointed out that the intake or exhaust of a
vented vault could be clogged, limiting the flow of air through the
vaults (Ex. 3-21; DC Tr. 74). The employee in such cases would be
exposed to the same hazards as those presented by non-vented vaults.
Additionally, the mechanical ventilation for a vault may fail to
operate. To ensure that the employee is protected from the hazards
posed by lack of proper ventilation, the final rule exempts vented
vaults only if a determination is made that the ventilation is in full
operating condition. The determination must ensure that ventilation
openings are clear and that any permanently installed mechanical
ventilating equipment is in proper working order.
Employers have been required to comply with Sec. 1910.146 for all
permit spaces since April 15, 1992. Since that time, entry into
enclosed spaces has been covered by that standard. Some employers may
want to continue complying with Sec. 1910.146 for entry into enclosed
spaces falling under Sec. 1910.269. Because the provisions of
Sec. 1910.146 protect employees entering enclosed space to the same
degree as Sec. 1910.269(e), OSHA will accept compliance with
Sec. 1910.146 as meeting the enclosed space entry requirements of
Sec. 1910.269(e). A note to this effect has been included immediately
following the introduction to paragraph (e).
Paragraph (e)(1) sets forth the general requirement that employers
ensure the use of safe work practices by their employees. These safe
work practices must include procedures for complying with the specific
regulations contained in paragraphs (e)(4) through (e)(14) and must
include safe rescue procedures. The requirement that the safe work
practices used provide for rescue of employees was added because of the
concern of several interested parties that this issue had been
overlooked in the proposal. (See the following discussion of this issue
for specific comments.)
NIOSH suggested adding a specific requirement for training
employees in the hazards of and procedures for enclosed spaces and in
rescue procedures (Ex. 3-21; DC Tr. 45). Dr. Richard Niemeier stated,
``Ill-conceived rescue attempts have [led] to multiple fatalities in
confined spaces [DC Tr. 45].'' EEI and IBEW also endorsed a training
requirement for employees working in enclosed spaces, as did the UWUA
(Ex. 56, 61; DC Tr. 436).
OSHA has accepted these recommendations. Paragraph (e)(2) of final
Sec. 1910.269 requires employees who work in or who are attendants
outside of enclosed spaces to be trained in the hazards of and
procedures for enclosed space entry and in enclosed space rescue
procedures.
The Utility Workers Union of America expressed concern with the
lack of adequate coverage of employee rescue and noted the absence of
any discussion of the means of rescuing employees from enclosed spaces
(DC Tr. 431, 436-437). EEI and IBEW supported a requirement compelling
the employer to provide appropriate rescue equipment (Ex. 56, 61; DC
Tr. 640-641).
OSHA agrees that there is a need for rescue equipment to be
available in the event that an injured employee must be retrieved from
the enclosed space. However, there was no agreement on the record as to
what constitutes adequate rescue equipment. The EEI and IBEW
recommended language referred to ``the required rescue equipment''
without defining it further. The Agency has decided to adopt a
performance approach here and to require, in final Sec. 1910.269(e)(3),
the employer to provide equipment that will assure the prompt and safe
rescue of injured employees. The equipment must enable a rescuer to
remove an injured employee from the enclosed space quickly and without
injury to the rescuer or further harm to the fallen employee. A
harness, a lifeline, and a self-supporting winch can normally be used
in this manner.
Some conditions within an enclosed space, such as high temperature
and high pressure, make it hazardous to remove any cover from the
space. For example, if high pressure is present within the space, the
cover could be blown off in the process of removing it. To protect
employees from such hazards, paragraph (e)(4) requires a determination
of whether or not it is safe to remove the cover. This determination
may take the form of a quick check of the conditions expected to be in
the enclosed space. For example, the cover could be checked to see if
it is hot and, if it is fastened in place, could be loosened gradually
to release any residual pressure. An evaluation must also be made of
whether conditions at the site could cause a hazardous atmosphere to
accumulate in the space. Any conditions making it unsafe for employees
to remove the cover are required to be eliminated (that is, reduced to
the extent that it is no longer unsafe).
Several persons commented on the language used in this provision in
the proposal (proposed Sec. 1910.269(e)(2)). They generally claimed
that some existing manhole covers do not accept a test probe and that
these covers would have to have holes drilled in them in order to
perform the evaluations called for by the proposed language (Ex. 3-38,
3-42, 3-62, 3-112). Mr. Klaus Broscheit of the New England Power
Service argued that the standard should allow older manhole covers to
be cracked open to test for oxygen and combustibles (Ex. 3-62). Edison
Electric Institute suggested requiring the determination to be made
before the space is entered rather than before the cover to the space
is removed (Ex. 3-112).
OSHA believes that the proposed rule did not require manholes to
accommodate a probe. The requirement, as proposed, allowed for covers
to be cracked open for any necessary tests. Also, as an Agency
representative testified at the public hearing, the provision was
simply intended to require a check of whether the cover was hot, a
determination of whether there were conditions in the area conducive to
the formation of a hazardous atmosphere within the enclosed space, and
a check (typically by means of loosening the cover slightly) of whether
there was a hazardous pressure differential between the two sides of
the cover (DC Tr. 219-221). To make this clear in the final rule, OSHA
is revising the language of the requirement to reflect its intent more
accurately. Additionally, a note has been added for clarification. This
note reads as follows:
Note: The evaluation called for in this paragraph may take the
form of a check of the conditions expected to be in the enclosed
space. For example, the cover could be checked to see if it is hot
and, if it is fastened in place, could be loosened gradually to
release any residual pressure. A determination must also be made of
whether conditions at the site could cause a hazardous atmosphere,
such as an oxygen deficient or flammable atmosphere, to develop
within the space.
Paragraph (e)(5) requires that openings to enclosed spaces be
guarded to protect employees from falling into the space and to protect
employees in the enclosed space from being injured by objects entering
the space. The guard could be in the form of a railing, a temporary
cover, or any other temporary barrier that provides the required
protection. This provision was taken from existing
Sec. 1910.268(o)(1)(i), which sets forth the equivalent requirement for
underground telecommunications work.
Paragraph (e)(6) prohibits employees from entering enclosed spaces
that contain a hazardous atmosphere. Once the hazardous atmosphere is
removed (for example, by ventilating the enclosed space), employees
would be allowed to enter. If an entry is to be made while a hazardous
atmosphere is present, the entry is required to conform to the generic
permit-required confined spaces standard, Sec. 1910.146. The use of the
term ``entry'' in this paragraph of Sec. 1910.269 is consistent with
the use of that term in Sec. 1910.146, and the definition of ``entry''
in Sec. 1910.146(b) applies. (A note to this effect is included
following paragraph (e)(6) in final Sec. 1910.269.)
The corresponding provision in the proposal, Sec. 1910.269(e)(4),
would have permitted an employee to enter an enclosed space containing
a hazardous atmosphere if the employee was ``protected from the hazards
that exist or may develop within the space.'' As OSHA has noted earlier
in this preamble, paragraph (e) is intended to apply only to routine
entry into enclosed spaces, where compliance with the procedures set
out in paragraphs (e) and (t) adequately protect employees. If a
hazardous atmosphere exists in an enclosed space after the testing and
ventilation requirements in paragraphs (e)(9) through (e)(13) of final
Sec. 1910.269 have been met, additional measures must be taken to
protect employees. When this is the case, the generic permit-spaces
standard in Sec. 1910.146 contains the relevant requirements necessary
to protect entrants. Paragraph (e)(6) of final Sec. 1910.269 makes this
clear. (It should be noted that Subpart Z of Part 1910 continues to
apply to the exposure of employees to toxic substances.)
Paragraph (e)(7) addresses the use of an attendant outside the
enclosed space to provide assistance in an emergency. An attendant is
required if there is reason to believe that a hazard43 exists
within the space or if a hazard exists because of traffic patterns near
the opening. For example, a manhole containing energized electric
equipment that is in danger of failing catastrophically requires an
attendant under this paragraph. The purpose of the attendant would be
to provide assistance in an emergency; however, he or she would not be
precluded from performing other duties outside the enclosed space, as
long as those duties do not interfere with the person's function as an
attendant. The attendant must have the first aid training required
under paragraph (b) of final Sec. 1910.269. The provisions of paragraph
(e)(7) are based on existing Sec. 1910.268(o)(1)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\3 The type of hazard to which this paragraph refers is one
that threatens the life of an entrant or that interferes with escape
from the enclosed space.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenting on the corresponding provision of the proposal (proposed
Sec. 1910.269(e)(5)), Mr. Charles Hart of the National Electrical
Contractors Association stated that it was not clear whether or not the
attendant should be stationed outside the space (Ex. 3-60). Two
commenters stated that the provision should explicitly permit the
attendant to enter the manhole (Ex. 3-42, 3-112). The Utility Workers
Union of America expressed support for the proposed provision requiring
the attendant to be outside the space (DC Tr. 426, 436-437). Mr. Eugene
Briody, representing UWUA, Local 1-2, stated: ``Our local union
strongly believes that a second man should be located outside an
enclosed space at all times because of the speed with which hazardous
conditions can develop in a manhole, and the difficulty an injured
employee may have in leaving a manhole [DC Tr. 426].''
The intent of this paragraph is to require the presence of a person
with first aid training outside the enclosed space if hazards exist
within the space or if a hazard exists due to traffic patterns outside
the space. If this person were to enter the enclosed space, he or she
might be unable to assist the employee already within the space. For
example, if traffic hazards are present in the area of the opening to
the enclosed space and if the attendant entered the space, then both
the attendant and the workers he or she is intended to protect would be
vulnerable upon leaving. No one would be present to minimize or control
the traffic hazards. If flooding hazards are present, a person outside
the space may be able to assist in a rescue attempt; an attendant
inside the space would likely be another victim. Therefore, the final
rule explicitly states that the attendant is required to remain outside
the enclosed space.
On the other hand, if there is no reason to believe that a hazard
exists inside the enclosed space and if no traffic hazards are present,
an attendant would still be required under Sec. 1910.269(t)(3) while
work is being performed in a manhole containing energized conductors.
The major, though not the only, hazard in this case is that of electric
shock. Assistance can be provided to a victim of electric shock by
another person in the manhole. Therefore, the provisions of paragraph
(t)(3) permit the attendant required under that paragraph to enter the
manhole for brief periods of time. However, it should be noted that
Sec. 1910.269(e)(7) requires the attendant to be ``immediately
available outside the space''. Thus, an attendant required by paragraph
(e)(7) (rather than by paragraph (t)(3)) is required to remain outside
the space.
A few commenters suggested prohibiting the attendants from
performing ``other duties'' outside the space, because he or she could
be distracted from the primary goal of protecting employees within the
enclosed space (Ex. 3-59, 3-82). Michael Kenny of the UWUA stated that
the practice of periodic testing of air quality in the enclosed space
is among the duties to be performed (Ex. 3-76). OSHA agrees with these
comments, in part, and has adopted language that would permit the
attendant to perform duties only if they did not distract him or her
from monitoring the employees in the enclosed space.
Paragraph (e)(8) requires test instruments used to monitor
atmospheres in enclosed spaces to be kept in calibration. This will
ensure that test measurements are accurate so that hazardous conditions
will be detected when they arise.
In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested public comment on
whether a specific level of accuracy (for example, plus or minus 10
percent) should be required in this provision. Five commenters
suggested referring to the instrument manufacturer's recommendations
for guidelines on accuracy (Ex. 3-21, 3-22, 3-59, 3-80, 3-82). James
McKnight of the Southwestern Power Administration argued that
plus-minuss>5 percent should be the minimum accuracy, as a 10
percent error in oxygen reading might result in insufficient oxygen for
strenuous work (Ex. 3-53). Edison Electric Institute supported a
plus-minuss>10 percent guideline as reflecting conditions that are
common in daily operations (Ex. 3-112).
While the Agency expects employers to follow instrument
manufacturers' advice for calibrating these devices, OSHA believes that
a standard that relies on ``manufacturer's specifications'' without
setting a minimum acceptable standard will be difficult to enforce or
could lead to inaccurate readings. The manufacturer's recommendation
might not be available during an inspection, and a manufacturer's
recommendation to calibrate the instrument to plus-minuss>30
percent of the full scale reading is possible (though it would be
unsafe to rely on an instrument that was so calibrated). Therefore, the
final rule adopts a requirement that the instrument be calibrated to
within plus-minuss>10 percent. Because the Agency considers EEI's
comment as reflecting common industry practice, OSHA considers
plus-minuss>10 percent to be the minimum accuracy needed.
Paragraph (e)(8) does require the test instrument to be kept in
calibration, so a higher accuracy is required if specified by the
manufacturer.
As noted earlier, because of the lack of adequate ventilation,
enclosed spaces can accumulate hazardous concentrations of flammable
gases and vapors, or an oxygen deficient atmosphere could develop. It
is important to keep concentrations of oxygen and flammable gases and
vapors at safe levels; otherwise, an explosion could occur while
employees are in the space, or an oxygen deficiency could lead to the
suffocation of an employee. Toward these ends, paragraphs (e)(9),
(e)(10), (e)(11), (e)(12), (e)(13), and (e)(14) address the testing of
the atmosphere in the space and ventilation of the space.
Paragraph (e)(9) requires the atmosphere in an enclosed space to be
tested for oxygen. However, continuous forced air ventilation is
permitted as an alternative to testing. Such ventilation would ensure
that there is sufficient oxygen\44\ in the manhole. (See also paragraph
(e)(12) for requirements relating to the length of time ventilation
must be provided before employees are allowed to enter the manhole.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\The definition of ``hazardous atmosphere'' determines what
concentrations of oxygen are considered hazardous. (See the
discussion of this term under the summary and explanation of
paragraph (x) of final Sec. 1910.269 later in this preamble.)
Paragraph (e)(6) prohibits entry into an enclosed space while a
hazardous atmosphere is present.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenting on the corresponding provision of the proposal (proposed
Sec. 1910.269(e)(8)), NIOSH argued that oxygen monitoring was
appropriate and necessary (Ex. 3-21; DC Tr. 44-45). Testifying at the
public hearing, Dr. Richard Niemeier expressed their concerns that
oxygen deficiency is a deadly atmospheric condition with no warning
properties and that the first symptoms of hypoxia are frequently poor
judgment and lack of coordination (DC Tr. 44-45). He also stated that
oxygen deficiency may cause erroneous readings on explosivity monitors
and that the use of forced-air ventilation in an enclosed space with an
atmosphere above the upper explosive limit may result in an explosion
(DC Tr. 45).
OSHA is also concerned that the improper use of ventilation may
itself cause hazards for employees. However, the proper use of
ventilation and testing for flammable gases, along with other
precautions, will protect employees from the relevant hazards without
the need for an oxygen test. For example, to prevent employees from
exposure to oxygen deficiency within the enclosed space, the forced-air
ventilation must be properly positioned and run for an adequate length
of time before entry to place sufficient oxygen in the working zone. To
address the concerns raised by NIOSH, the Agency has adopted language
in final Sec. 1910.269 (e)(9) requiring that the procedures used when
no oxygen monitoring is performed protect employees from the hazards
associated with oxygen deficiency. Furthermore, OSHA has reordered the
paragraphs so that the requirement for oxygen testing (or ventilation)
appears before the requirement for testing for the presence of
flammable gases and vapors. This reordering will stress the importance
of ensuring that there is sufficient oxygen to provide an accurate
flammability reading. Additionally, a provision has been included in
paragraph (e)(10) to require an oxygen concentration in a range that
ensures the accuracy of the flammability test.
Paragraph (e)(10) requires the internal atmosphere of the enclosed
space to be tested for flammable gases and vapors. The results of the
test must indicate that the atmosphere is safe before employees can
enter. So that the results are accurate and are relevant to the
atmosphere in the space at the time of employee entry, testing is
required to be performed with a direct reading meter or similar
instrument. Test equipment that samples the atmosphere so that the
samples can be forwarded to a laboratory for analysis does not meet the
requirements of paragraph (e)(10). The flammability test must be
undertaken after the steps taken under paragraph (e)(9) ensure that the
enclosed space has sufficient oxygen for accurate results.
One commenter objected to the proposed requirement (proposed
Sec. 1910.269(e)(7)) to test for the presence of flammable gases and
vapors and suggested that forced ventilation be permitted in place of
the testing (Ex. 3-27). OSHA does not agree with this commenter. An
employee could not be certain that the atmosphere within an enclosed
space was safe without testing, even if ventilation is provided.
If flammable gases or vapors are detected or if an oxygen
deficiency is found, paragraph (e)(11) requires the employer to provide
forced air ventilation to assure safe levels of oxygen and to prevent a
hazardous concentration of flammable gases or vapors from accumulating.
As an alternative, an employer could use a continuous monitoring system
that ensures that no hazardous atmosphere develops and no increase in
flammable gas or vapor concentration occurs. The definition of
hazardous atmosphere contains guidelines for the determination of
whether or not the concentration of a substance is at a hazardous
level. OSHA has included a note to this effect after paragraph (e)(11)
of final Sec. 1910.269. An identical note has been included after
paragraph (e)(14).
The provisions of paragraphs (e)(9), (e)(10), and (e)(11) have been
taken from requirements contained in existing Sec. 1910.268(o)(2) and
in ANSI C2-1987, Section 426B, with changes, as noted earlier, based on
the rulemaking record.
Paragraph (e)(12) sets forth specific requirements for the
ventilation of enclosed spaces. When forced air ventilation is used, it
is required to be maintained before entry for a period of time long
enough to purge the atmosphere within the space of hazardous amounts of
flammable gases and vapors and long enough to supply an adequate
concentration of oxygen. After the ventilation has been maintained for
this amount of time, employees can then safely enter the space.
In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested public comment on
whether the Agency should specify what number of air changes of the
atmosphere within the enclosed space should be required before
employees are allowed to enter. Several commenters opposed specifying
an exact number of air changes in the standard (Ex. 3-20, 3-21, 3-32,
3-80, 3-82, 3-112). In general, they argued that no number of air
changes can be specified to cover all situations and that a performance
approach was appropriate. Many stated that testing should be used to
indicate the presence of a safe atmosphere.
Based on these comments, OSHA has decided not to specify a minimum
number of air changes before employee entry into the enclosed space.
Instead, the Agency will strictly interpret Sec. 1910.269(e)(12) to
require either testing to determine the safety of the atmosphere in the
space or a thorough evaluation of the air flow required to make the
atmosphere safe. As noted by Mr. Eugene Briody of UWUA Local 1-2, the
safety of employees working in enclosed spaces should not rely on the
``potentially faulty judgment of a supervisor or of an employee'' (DC
Tr. 427).
Paragraph (e)(12) also requires the air provided by the ventilating
equipment to be directed at the area within the enclosed space where
employees are at work. The forced air ventilation is required to be
maintained the entire time the employees are present within the space.
These provisions ensure that a hazardous atmosphere does not reoccur
where employees are working.
In order to ensure that the air supplied by the ventilating
equipment will provide a safe atmosphere, paragraph (e)(13) requires
the air supply to be from a clean source and prohibits it from
increasing the hazards in the enclosed space. For example, positioning
the air intake for the ventilating equipment near the exhaust from a
gasoline or diesel engine would contaminate the atmosphere in the
enclosed space. This practice would not be allowed under the standard.
The use of open flames in enclosed spaces is safe only when
flammable gases or vapors are not present in hazardous quantities. For
this reason, paragraph (e)(14) requires additional testing for
flammable gases and vapors if open flames are to be used in enclosed
spaces. The tests must be performed immediately before the open flame
device is used and at least once per hour while the device is in use.
This requirement is based on existing Sec. 1910.268(o)(5)(i).
In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested comments on whether
the frequency of testing is appropriate or whether the frequency should
be increased or decreased. Several utility representatives stated that
the periodic testing not be required if continuous ventilation is
provided (Ex. 3-27, 3-32, 3-59, 3-112, 3-120). NIOSH, IBEW, and UWUA
supported the proposed requirement for periodic testing (Ex. 3-21, 3-
107; DC Tr. 427). In fact, NIOSH and UWUA argued that once per hour is
not frequent enough.
OSHA believes that the use of open flames in enclosed spaces poses
a substantial risk of severe injury should hazardous quantities of
flammable gases or vapors accumulate within the space. If the
ventilation is not positioned properly, areas within the enclosed space
can develop hazardous atmospheres. In such cases, an explosion would
likely result from the use of open flames within the space. OSHA agrees
with NIOSH and UWUA that hourly testing is not always sufficient.
Therefore, the final rule sets a minimum testing frequency of once per
hour (as did the proposal), but more frequent testing would be required
if conditions indicate the need for it. Examples of such conditions
include the presence of volatile flammable liquids in the enclosed
space and a history of hazardous quantities of flammable vapors or
gases in a given space.
Paragraph (f). Paragraph (f) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses
excavating operations. This paragraph simply references the appropriate
existing regulations in the Construction Standards (Part 1926)
pertaining to excavations, which are contained in 29 CFR Part 1926,
Subpart P. The hazards involved are common to all types of excavating
operations, such as trenching. Since excavating work is normally
considered a construction operation and since construction regulations
dealing with the hazards involved already exist, OSHA considers it
appropriate to refer to the construction requirements directly. This
ensures that the regulations are the same whether or not the work is
``construction work'' as defined in Sec. 1910.12. Employers covered by
this standard should already be familiar with these requirements
because they frequently perform the type of work covered under Subpart
V of Part 1926 (which contains a similar reference in
Sec. 1926.956(c)(2)).
EEI, IBEW, and UWUA supported OSHA's adoption of the excavation
standards for construction (Ex. 3-76, 3-107, 3-112). EEI also
recommended that the Agency adopt provisions from the EEI/IBEW draft
standard that they claimed were omitted from the OSHA proposal. The
hazards addressed by the draft requirements are, however, already
covered by rules in Subpart P of Part 1926. Therefore, OSHA has not
adopted the EEI recommendation.
It should be noted that OSHA has promulgated, in a separate
rulemaking project, a revision of the regulations contained in Subpart
P of Part 1926. This revision was published on October 31, 1989 (54 FR
45894). In proposed Sec. 1910.269(f), OSHA referred to the individual
sections contained in Subpart P of Part 1926 but noted that operations
covered by Sec. 1910.269 would be required to follow whatever is
promulgated as a final standard under the Construction Standards
rulemaking. Because the revised excavation standard contains different
section numbers than those proposed in Sec. 1910.269(f), OSHA has
decided to refer to Subpart P as a whole in final Sec. 1910.269.
Additionally, the proposal's reference to trenching has been dropped
for consistency in terminology between the two standards--trenching is
simply one type of excavating work and is covered without being
specifically mentioned.
Paragraph (g). Paragraph (g) of final Sec. 1910.269 sets forth
requirements for personal protective equipment (PPE), which includes
eye and face protection, respiratory protection, head protection, foot
protection, protective clothing, electrical protective equipment, and
personal fall protection equipment. In accordance with
Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(iii), paragraph (g)(1) emphasizes that the
requirements of Subpart I of Part 1910 apply. It should be realized
that OSHA considers PPE which meets the requirements of current (as of
today) editions of the American National Standards referenced in
Subpart I to be in compliance with the current requirements of this
subpart.45 For example, Subpart I of Part 1910 references American
National Standard for Industrial Head Protection (Z89.1-1969), although
other later editions have been published for head protection (for
example, ANSI Z89.1-1986). OSHA considers equipment meeting these newer
standards to be acceptable. Subpart I of Part 1910 was proposed for
revision on August 16, 1989 (54 FR 33832), and the updating of the PPE
requirements with the latest American National Standards will be
accomplished when that revision becomes a final rule. The clarifying
statement in proposed Sec. 1910.269(g)(1) noting that equipment meeting
American National Standard for Industrial Protective Helmets for
Electrical Workers (ANSI Z89.2-1971) is acceptable head protection has
not been carried forward into the final rule. This ANSI standard is out
of date (this equipment is now covered under ANSI Z89.1), and the
reference to it will be unnecessary when the revision of Subpart I is
published. In the interim, OSHA's existing policy of accepting head
protection meeting ANSI Z89.1-1986 will continue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\5 OSHA's de minimis policy with respect to later editions of
consensus standards incorporated by reference in OSHA's standards is
described earlier in this preamble under the summary and explanation
of final Sec. 1910.137. The Agency has evaluated the current ANSI
PPE standards and has found them to be acceptable under that policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (g)(2) of final Sec. 1910.269 sets forth requirements for
personal fall protection systems including fall arrest equipment (body
belts and life lines) and work positioning equipment (body belts and
safety straps).
In paragraphs (g)(2)(i) and (g)(2)(ii), OSHA is requiring that body
belts, lifelines, and lanyards for fall arrest, and body belts and
safety straps for work positioning, meet the requirements of Subpart E
of Part 1926 and Sec. 1926.959 of this chapter, respectively. Although
these regulations are contained in the Construction Standards, OSHA
believes that they apply equally as well to personal fall protection
systems and to work positioning equipment used in overhead electric
line work. Additionally, body belts, lifelines, lanyards, and safety
straps used in overhead line work are currently required to comply with
pertinent regulations of Part 1926, including Secs. 1926.104 and
1926.959, during the construction of transmission and distribution
lines and equipment. Since the same personal fall arrest systems and
work positioning equipment are used during all phases of overhead
electric line work (maintenance work and construction work alike), the
standard's reference to existing construction standards is appropriate.
OSHA has proposed, in a separate rulemaking project, Safety
Standards for Fall Protection in the Construction Industry (November
25, 1986, 51 FR 42718), to revise and simplify most of the existing
fall protection regulations for construction, which are currently
scattered throughout 29 CFR Part 1926, and to consolidate them in
Subpart M of that Part. Requirements corresponding to Sec. 1926.104
were proposed to be placed in Sec. 1926.502(d). Proposed
Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(i) referred to Sec. 1926.104, which is contained in
Subpart E of the Construction Standards, for requirements on body
belts, lifelines, and lanyards used for fall arrest. So that this
reference can easily be corrected when the final revision of this
construction standard is issued, final Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(i)
incorporates by reference the personal fall arrest requirements of
Subpart E of Part 1926.
OSHA has also proposed a general industry standard for fall
protection, contained in Secs. 1910.128 through 1910.131 (April 10,
1990, 55 FR 13423). The Agency has made every effort to make these two
proposed standards (for general industry and for construction)
compatible. It is the Agency's belief that, once the two standards are
published as final rules, fall protection systems meeting the relevant
portions of either of them would be acceptable.46
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\4\6 Whether or not body belts are an acceptable component of a
fall arrest system was an issue in the two fall protection
rulemakings. The outcome of this issue in these rulemakings will
affect whether or not body belts will be acceptable under paragraph
, which now references Subpart E of the Construction Standards in
Part 1926.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Nigel Ellis urged OSHA to adopt the provisions of Appendix C of
Sec. 1910.66 as the standard that fall protection systems for electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution work must meet. This
appendix contains provisions that the Agency feels are appropriate for
fall protection systems in general; and, in fact, proposed
Secs. 1910.128 through 1910.131 were largely based on the material in
Sec. 1910.66. However, because existing construction standards already
apply to fall protection equipment in use in the electric utility
industry, the Agency is continuing to use them as the basis for
Sec. 1910.269 fall protection equipment standards. As noted earlier,
the construction standards have been proposed for revision, and the
construction and general industry requirements for this equipment will
be compatible when the two other proposals are finalized. Therefore, in
the future, OSHA may combine the fall protection requirements in
Sec. 1910.269(g)(2) with those in Secs. 1910.128 through 1910.131 so
that there is one consistent set of standards for fall protection
systems.
Paragraph (g)(2)(iii) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires body belts,
safety straps, lanyards, lifelines, and body harnesses to be inspected
before use each day to determine if the equipment is in safe working
condition. This provision also prohibits the use of defective
equipment. This requirement helps ensure that the protective equipment
in use will, in fact, be able to protect employees when called upon to
do so.
Paragraph (g)(2)(iv) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires lifelines to
be protected against being cut or abraded. Cuts and abrasions
significantly reduce the strength of lifelines and could cause them to
fail during use.
In Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(v), OSHA proposed requirements covering the
use of fall arrest, work positioning, and travel restricting equipment.
The Agency proposed that, unless another type of fall protection was
provided, one of these systems be used by employees when they were
working at heights more than 4 feet (1.2 m) above the ground on poles,
towers, trees, or structures or when they were working from vehicle-
mounted elevating and rotating work platforms (aerial lifts). The
proposal further stated that the use of fall protection equipment would
not have been required when a qualified employee was climbing or
changing location on poles, towers, or similar structures which had
steps or step bolts. The step bolts or ladders would have had to meet
the design requirements proposed in Sec. 1910.269, as well as the
applicable requirements in subpart D for fixed ladders. However, OSHA
did propose that fall protection equipment (safety straps) be used by
employees climbing wood poles not containing step bolts except when
they were climbing around obstructions, such as crossarms, pins, or
braces. This paragraph was proposed to clarify when the use of personal
fall protection would be required and when exceptions to its use would
have been permitted.
This provision received much attention from the commenters and from
the witnesses at the hearing. Most argued that (1) fall protection
should not be required when poles are being climbed (Ex. 3-9, 3-11, 3-
18, 3-23, 3-32, 3-38, 3-51, 3-53; DC Tr. 367-369, 537-538) or (2) the
minimum height such protection should be required is 10 feet (Ex. 3-15,
3-22, 3-26, 3-27, 3-39, 3-42, 3-45, 3-66, 3-82, 3-83, 3-102, 3-109, 3-
125, 3-128), or (3) advanced both arguments (Ex. 3-20, 3-62, 3-69, 3-
80, 3-101, 3-107, 3-112, 3-123, 56; DC Tr. 845-853). Expressing both
arguments, Mr. Larry Hobart, Executive Director of APPA, stated:
The four foot arrest requirement to protect against unexpected
falls which is established by this section is too restrictive, and
impractical. (Footnote omitted.) APPA recommends that OSHA establish
a fifteen foot requirement. A requirement of this sort is by no
means extreme. The State of California, for example, has established
a fifteen foot height for fall protection requirements. (Footnote
omitted.)
In addition, utilities have for many years used the practice of
ascending and descending poles without fall protection, which is
referred to as ``free climbing.'' Free climbing is a safe, well
established, widely accepted and proven practice. Employees who
climb and perform other tasks on poles are qualified employees who
have climbing duties as one of their routine work activities.
If fall protection were required (belting-off around the pole),
it would equal or exceed the hazards of not wearing fall protection
equipment. For example, an employee using a waist belt when
ascending or descending a pole would have to reposition the belt
every few steps. This would fatigue the employee more than free
climbing. Positioning and maneuvering to adjust the belt to the
changing diameter of the pole creates additional exposure to fall
and injury, as the body must be brought close to the pole and the
length adjustment buckle is placed in a position where operation is
impractical while maintaining balance.
In addition, large transmission poles are often so large at 4
feet above the ground that a safety belt of ten or twelve feet in
length would be required under the rule in order to secure the
employee and still permit climbing to occur. As the employee gained
height and the pole tapered, the safety belt would have to be
shortened (adjusted) frequently and when fully adjusted, would prove
too long for safe work at the top of the pole. (Ex. 3-80)
Mr. Gene Trombley, representing EEI, testified at the hearing that
using a safety strap while climbing was unnecessary and sometimes even
unsafe. He stated:
Electric utility workers who climb poles and towers for a living
are trained to approach each job on the basis of existing
conditions, evaluating any hazards that may be faced in ascending
and descending poles and towers.
Workers are trained to climb using a variety of techniques and
the decision on which technique to use is based on a number of
factors including weather, the condition of the pole, and the kind
of attachments on the structure like guy wires, telephone cables and
cross arms.
Also, where unusual conditions or obstacles do not dictate the
kinds of methods to use, line workers have favorite methods of
climbing poles with which they are comfortable and therefore the
safest.
Any one of these methods is acceptable and has proven safe over
the years. I feel very strongly about these statements based upon my
own personal experiences. I worked in an area where we shared our
poles with another electric utility. We not only had to contend with
the usual Bell and Cable TV attachments, we also had to deal with
all of the facilities of a fair sized municipal power company.
* * * * *
You need to understand that when a lineman has to climb from ground
level to the top of a pole or tower that has numerous attachments,
such as telephone cables, Cable TV, guy wires and various other
obstructions, your proposal would require him to attach and detach
his safety strap each time an obstruction is encountered. This does
not protect him; it increases the risk of a fall.
Some of the poles I mentioned earlier could require belting as
many as 25 or 30 times from the bottom up and down again.
* * * * *
Climbing a pole with a safety strap results in other problems
that can create a risk to the worker. For example, the climbing
motion can result in a considerable amount of movement at the top of
the pole and can cause energized lines to swing together resulting
in a fault that could burn the lines down.
For a lineman to eliminate this motion when climbing belted in,
he must first develop a rhythm. This is [best] done by learning to
climb hand over hand. This develops the proper hand to foot
relationship that is necessary to ascend and descend poles smoothly.
* * * * *
We have been successfully using the same climbing methods and
equipment for decades and there has never been any indication
whatsoever that they place the line workers at risk.
Our methods have been developed over the years through actual
experience. They are also backed up with training.
Climbing is fundamental to the electric utility line worker.
Line workers are given extensive training and possess a great deal
of confidence in their ability. To suddenly try to require them to
change years and years of training and experience would, I feel,
cause a serious reduction in that high level of confidence and
ability. (DC Tr. 848-853)
These witnesses and commenters agreed that existing practices in
electric utilities were safe and that the OSHA standard should simply
adopt these practices (Ex. 3-23, 3-80; DC Tr. 852). They argued that
the line worker was in the best position to determine the proper
technique to be used in climbing the pole or tower and that the
regulation should not interfere with his or her judgment (DC Tr. 581-
582, 850-851). Furthermore, witnesses at the hearing, including OSHA's
expert witness, Mr. Arthur Lewis, maintained that the use of a pole
strap by an employee climbing a pole would be more hazardous under most
conditions than climbing without the strap (DC Tr. 367, 849-850).
Others addressed the need for and existing technology of fall
protection systems and supported requirements for fall protection for
workers climbing poles, towers, and similar structures (Ex. 3-13, 3-16,
3-43, 3-52, 54; DC Tr. 73, 648-659, 686-689). NIOSH supported OSHA's
proposed requirement for employees to have fall protection at the work
locations on poles, towers, and similar structures and while climbing
unstepped wooden poles (DC Tr. 73). Mr. George R. Weedin, Safety
Officer for the Electrical Division of the Panama Canal Commission,
stated that their employees are tied off at all times while climbing or
working on elevated structures and suggested that OSHA adopt a
requirement patterned after their practices (Ex. 3-43).
Dr. J. Nigel Ellis of the Research and Trading Corporation and Mr.
Andrew Sulowski of Ontario Hydro (representing the U.S. Technical
Advisory Group to ANSI on the International Standards Organization's
ISO/TC94/SC4, discussed fall protection options available to electric
utility workers (DC Tr. 647-659, 683-689). The evidence presented by
these witnesses demonstrates that there is a range of options available
for protecting electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution workers from falls. Dr. Ellis recommended that equipment
used for fall protection should meet the requirements of Appendix C of
Sec. 1910.66, which was published as a final OSHA standard on July 28,
1989 (54 FR 31408).47 Mr. Sulowski highlighted the success that
Ontario Hydro experienced in totally eliminating their fatalities from
falling to none through the use of a ground-to-ground system of fall
protection.
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\4\7Appendix C of Sec. 1910.66 covers fall protection systems
used with powered platforms for building maintenance. OSHA's
proposed Sec. 1910.128 through 1910.131 noted earlier contain
comparable requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NIOSH stated that risks associated with climbing poles are a major
cause of injuries and fatalities in the electric utility industry (DC
Tr. 44) and submitted a Canadian study48 that listed falls as
accounting for 21.9 percent of all accidents (Ex. 15). ``Climbing up or
down a pole, tower, basket, truck'' accounted for 14.8 percent of all
accidents in this study. The ``IBEW Utility Department Survey of Fatal
and Serious Occupational Accidents'' for the years 1984, 1986, and 1988
report 13 fatalities from slips and falls during the period represented
by these surveys49 (Ex. 12-12).50 The total number of deaths
was 121, and the total non-electrical accidents was 37. In this data
base, falls represented about 12 percent of all fatalities and 35
percent of non-electrical deaths. Injuries due to falls from elevations
(as coded on the forms) were involved in 10 percent (61 of 637) of the
fatality/catastrophe investigations recorded in Exhibits 9-3 and 9-4.
These investigations included only electric utilities (SIC 4911).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\8Kedl E., Laflamme L., et al. [1986]. ``Typical Accidents
Involving Linemen in the Construction Sector''. Montreal, Quebec,
Canada: Canadian Center for Occupational Health and Safety.
\4\9These surveys cover IBEW local unions that represent the
employees in investor-owned utilities, rural electric cooperatives,
and municipal and governmental utilities.
\5\0These IBEW surveys represented reports received by the
International Office of the IBEW as follows:
1984--July 15, 1981, to October 1, 1983.
1986--October 1, 1983, to December 31, 1985.
1988--January 1, 1986, to December 31, 1987.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All of these exhibits demonstrate that electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution workers face a significant risk of
serious injury due to falls under current industry practices. To
determine the extent to which they face hazards addressed by proposed
Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(v), OSHA analyzed fall accidents included in
various exhibits contained in the rulemaking record. The results of
this analysis are presented in Table 1. As can be seen from the table,
employees do fall while climbing poles, towers, or similar structures--
26 percent of the falling accidents related to Sec. 1910.269 occurred
in this manner. The evidence in the record indicates that climbing a
pole, tower, or similar structure is not as safe, under current
industry practices, as some of the hearing witnesses testified.
Therefore, the Agency has decided that the final standard must provide
additional protection beyond that provided by the existing industry
practices noted in the record and stated in the EEI/IBEW draft
standard.
Most of the witnesses agreed that it was not always safe to ``free
climb'' a pole (that is, climb it without the use of a pole strap). Mr.
Arthur Lewis, OSHA's expert witness, testified that a pole strap would
be needed where the diameter of the pole was too great for an employee
to grip it comfortably, if ice was present on the pole, or if there
were impediments to the use of climbers (strap-on gaffs) on the pole
(DC Tr. 369, 376-377). Mr. Andrew Sulowski of Ontario Hydro noted that
some wooden poles were treated with a chemical that made them so hard
that they were unsafe to climb without fall protection (DC Tr. 673).
Additionally, he mentioned other conditions making it unsafe to climb a
pole, tower, or similar structure, such as static electricity on a
metal structure, direct contact with energized lines, and falling
objects striking an employee from above (DC Tr. 649). Mr. Robert
Macdonald of the IBEW and Mr. Gene Trombley representing EEI also
stated that some conditions would make it unsafe to climb a pole
without the use of a pole strap (DC Tr. 537-538, 1117-1118).
OSHA has accepted the position that it is not always necessary for
a qualified employee to use a pole strap when climbing an unstepped
wooden pole. On the other hand, the Agency has determined that, under
certain circumstances, climbing poles, towers, and similar structures
poses a significant risk of serious injury to electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution workers. Even EEI recognized
that the level of competence of the climber, the condition of the pole,
the configuration of attachments on the pole, the weather, and other
factors affect the determination of which method of climbing is safe
and appropriate to use (Ex. 3-112). Therefore, the final rule adopts a
requirement for employees to use a pole strap or other fall protection
equipment when they are climbing a pole, tower, or similar structure
that is not safe to climb without such protection. The language used in
final Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(v) reads as follows:
The use of fall protection equipment is not required to be used
by a qualified employee climbing or changing location on poles,
towers, or similar structures, unless conditions, such as, but not
limited to, ice, high winds, the design of the structure (for
example, no provision for holding on with hands), or the presence of
contaminants on the structure, could cause the employee to lose his
or her grip or footing.
Table 1.--Falls by Type of Accident
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of
Type of fall accidents\1\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fall from Pole or Tower
Climbing or descending................................ 10
Changing location..................................... 1
At work location...................................... 7
Other (not stated).................................... 3
Fall from tree............................................ 6
Failure of structure...................................... 12
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Each accident involves the death or serious injury of one or more
employees.
Source: Ex. 3-21, 9-1, 9-6, 9-7, 12-12, 53. Duplicate entries were not
counted. The time period covered by these exhibits varied, but
included accidents in the years 1981 to 1989. It does not represent
all fall accidents involving death or serious injury during this 9
year period, however. For example, the years 1981 to 1984 are
represented only by IBEW data, which includes only accidents that were
reported by IBEW local unions during that period.
The term ``high winds'' is also used in paragraph (q)(4)(iv) of
final Sec. 1910.269. OSHA believes that this term is somewhat vague and
that further clarification is needed. Therefore, a definition of ``high
winds'' has been incorporated in Sec. 1910.269(x). Winds are considered
to be ``high'' if they are of such velocity (1) that employees would be
exposed to being blown from elevated locations, or (2) that an employee
or material handling equipment could lose control of material being
handled, or (3) that the winds would expose employees to other hazards
not controlled by the provisions of the standard involved (for example,
winds strong enough to move energized conductors far enough to reduce
the minimum approach distance to less than that required under
paragraph 1). Additionally, the Agency has included a compliance
guideline of 40 miles per hour (30 miles per hour if material handling
is involved). Winds beyond this speed are normally considered as being
hazardous unless additional precautions are taken to protect employees.
At this point, the danger that a worker will be blown off a structure
or that workers will lose control of parts of a structure being
assembled presents a significant risk to employees. The Agency has used
this guideline in enforcing similar standards in the past. (See, for
example, 55 FR 13397.) It should be noted that if wind is present in
combination with other conditions such as snow or ice, it could be
hazardous to climb the pole or structure even if the guideline is not
exceeded. The standard requires fall protection to be used in such
cases.
It should be noted that the conditions listed in the rule are not
the only ones warranting the use of fall protection. Other factors
mentioned in the record as affecting the risk of an employee's falling
include the level of competence of the employee, the condition of a
pole or structure, the configuration of attachments on a pole (Ex. 3-
112), and the need to have both hands free for climbing (Ex. 3-18). In
fact, OSHA believes that climbing without the use of fall protection is
only safe if the employee is using his or her hands to hold onto the
structure while he or she is climbing. If the employee is not holding
onto the structure (for example, because the employee is carrying tools
or equipment in his or her hands), fall protection is required under
the final rule. The video tapes entered into the record by EEI (Ex. 12-
6), which they claimed represented typical, safe climbing practices in
the utility industry, demonstrate employees using their hands to
provide extra support and balance. Climbing in this manner will enable
an employee to continue to hold onto the structure in case his or her
foot slips. If the employee is not using his or her hands for
additional support, he or she would be much more likely to fall as a
result of a slip.
The note also indicates that fall protection is required for
unqualified employees and for employees undergoing training any time
they are at heights greater than 4 feet (1.2 m). These employees would
not be able to judge for themselves whether or not a safety strap
should be used (and, in some cases, may not even be qualified in its
use). Additionally, the record indicates that training and experience
is one of the reasons a line worker can climb a pole or structure
safely without fall protection (Ex. 3-80, 3-112; DC Tr. 848-849, 852-
853) and that employees in training are at increased risk of injury due
to falling (Ex. 12-12, 54; DC Tr. 689).
Many commenters were also concerned that the standard would apply
to ladders, loading docks, and other elevated areas (Ex. 3-26, 3-80, 3-
82, 3-86, 3-112, 3-123). Others objected to the use of fall protection
for employees climbing trees, although such a requirement was not
proposed (Ex. 3-48, 3-63, 3-67, 3-75, 3-77, 3-87, 3-90, 3-91, 3-92, 3-
93, 3-98, 3-99, 3-100, 3-113). These commenters requested clarification
of the rule in the final standard. OSHA spokespersons testified at the
hearing that the standard applied only to structures that were similar
to poles and towers used in overhead electric power installations, not
to ladders or loading docks (DC Tr. 234). General fall protection
requirements for working conditions that are not unique to electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution work (such as working
on loading docks, ladders, or equipment) are addressed in Subpart D
(walking and working surfaces) of OSHA's General Industry Standards.
Agency spokespersons also stated that it was not requiring fall
protection to be used by employees while they were climbing trees (DC
Tr. 100-103).
Because of the widespread confusion of the application of proposed
Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(v), OSHA has modified the language from the
proposal. First, the requirement for the use of fall protection for
tree trimming work has been moved to Sec. 1910.269(r)(8). A fall
protection requirement is included in the ANSI tree trimming standard
(ANSI Z133.1 discussed later in this preamble), and the Agency feels
that this subject is more appropriately covered with the other tree
trimming provisions.
Second, the word ``similar'' has been added before the word
``structures'' wherever it appears in paragraph (g)(2)(v) of final
Sec. 1910.269. This will reflect the meaning of the rule more
accurately. Types of structures covered under this provision include
substation structures and other conductor support structures. It does
not include loading docks, electric equipment such as transformers or
circuit breakers, or fixed or portable ladders used or installed on
chimneys, stacks, or buildings. Requirements for these installations,
which are not unique to electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work, are addressed in other parts of the OSHA standards,
such as Subpart D of the General Industry Standards. A note to this
effect also appears in the final rule.
Lastly, the Agency has not included in final Sec. 1910.269 the
proposed requirement for the use of fall protection in aerial lifts.
Paragraph (c)(2)(v) of existing Sec. 1910.67 requires employees working
from an aerial lift to use a body belt with a lanyard attached to the
boom or basket. In light of all the injuries and fatalities associated
with falls from aerial lifts, however, a reference to Sec. 1910.67 is
included in the first note to Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(v).
These changes clarify the rule so that employees and employers will
know that it applies to poles, towers, and similar structures and not
to trees, buildings, or aerial lifts.
The current OSHA telecommunications standard, in
Sec. 1910.268(g)(1), requires the use of personal fall protection
equipment when work is performed at heights more than 4 feet (1.2 m)
above the ground. The existing standards in Subpart D of Part 1910 also
require fall protection (usually in the form of guard rails) for
situations where employees are exposed to falls of more than 4 feet
(1.2 m). Additionally, in Subpart V of the Construction Standards, OSHA
requires fall protection to be used by ``employees working at elevated
locations'' without specifying the height at which such protection
would be necessary (Sec. 1926.951(b)(1)). The Agency proposed to retain
the construction requirement, but clarify it as requiring protection to
be initiated at 4 feet (1.2 m) to be consistent with the other OSHA
general industry standards dealing with the same hazard.
The EEI/IBEW draft standard applied fall protection requirements
beginning at 10 feet (3.05 m). Many commenters objected to the proposed
4-foot (1.2-m) distance and strongly urged OSHA to adopt the EEI/IBEW
distance (Ex. 3-15, 3-22, 3-26, 3-39, 3-42, 3-45, 3-62, 3-66, 3-69, 3-
80, 3-82, 3-83, 3-101, 3-107, 3-109, 3-112, 3-123, 3-125, 3-128; DC Tr.
846-847). These commenters argued that protection at levels below 10
feet (3.05 m) was inconsistent with industry practice and cited loading
docks and ladders as two areas where the proposed requirement would be
inappropriate. However, the rule would not apply in these areas.
The other reason cited by these commenters for increasing the
distance was that a 6-foot (1.8-m) lanyard would not arrest a fall of
less than 6 feet (1.8 m). To address this concern, OSHA is adding a
requirement to Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(vi) for fall arrest systems to be
rigged so that the employee can neither fall more than 6 feet (1.8 m)
nor contact any lower level. In other words, if the ground is only 5
feet (1.5 m) below the employee, the fall arrest system is required to
arrest the fall in less than 5 feet (1.5 m). Fall arrest systems
installed in accordance with final Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(vi) will thus
arrest a fall before an employee strikes a lower level. This new
provision is consistent with Sec. 1910.129(c)(3) in the previously
mentioned general industry fall protection proposal. In fact, the
language for this requirement was taken from proposed Sec. 1910.129.
(Work positioning systems used for fall protection assist the employee
in maintaining a work position, so that no fall is likely. The new
provision does not need to apply to this equipment.)
Paragraph (g)(2)(vi) of Sec. 1910.269 proposed that, when stopping
or preventing a fall, fall arrest systems not produce an arresting
force on an employee of more than ten times the employee's weight or
1800 pounds (8 kN), whichever was lower. Based on section 3.3.5 of ANSI
A10.14-1975 (Ex. 2-24), and a National Bureau of Standards report, A
Study of Personal Fall-Safety Equipment, (NBS IR 76-1146; Ex. 2-25), as
well as other literature on fall arrest forces, this proposed
requirement was intended to minimize injury to an employee in the event
of a fall.
One commenter argued that the portion of the requirement based on
the employee's weight was redundant and should be removed (Ex. 3-20).
Another (Ex. 3-16) urged OSHA to adopt separate limits for systems
using body belts (900 pounds or 4 kN) and for those using body
harnesses (1800 pounds or 8 kN). This is the approach taken in Appendix
C to existing Sec. 1910.66 and in proposed Sec. 1910.129(b)(1). To be
consistent with these other OSHA general industry standards, the Agency
has accepted these arguments and has adopted language from proposed
Sec. 1910.129(b)(1)(i) and (b)(1)(ii) in final
Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(vi)(A) and (g)(2)(vi)(B). (A full discussion of the
rationale of setting separate limits for body belts and body harness is
presented in the preambles to final Sec. 1910.66 and proposed
Sec. 1910.129(b)(1), 54 FR 31449-31450 and 55 FR 13429, respectively.
Briefly, the reason for the difference in separate limits for body
belts and body harnesses is because the force distribution on the body
when a fall is arrested differ between the two systems, with the body
belt being more likely to result in injury at a given arresting force.)
Additionally, as noted previously, paragraph (g)(2)(vi)(C) adds a
requirement that protects employees from falling too far.
Paragraph (g)(2)(vii) of final Sec. 1910.269 prohibits more than
one employee from being attached to any one lifeline when vertical
lifelines or droplines are used. This limitation recognizes that it is
inherently unsafe to use a single vertical lifeline to tie off two or
more employees performing separate tasks. Movement by one employee
could cause the lifeline to be pulled to one side. This could, in turn,
cause the other employee to lose balance. Therefore, if one employee
did fall, movement of the lifeline during the arrest of the fall would
very likely cause other employees connected to the lifeline to fall.
In paragraphs (g)(2)(viii) and (g)(2)(ix), OSHA is requiring that
snaphooks not be connected to loops in webbing-type lanyards or to each
other. These provisions prohibit two methods of attachment that are
considered unsafe due to the potential for accidental disengagement of
the snaphooks during use.
Paragraph (h). Paragraph (h) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses
ladders, platforms, step bolts, and manhole steps. Paragraph (h)(1)
emphasizes that the requirements for ladders in Subpart D of Part 1910
continue to apply.
Paragraph (h)(2) contains requirements for special ladders and
platforms used for electrical work. Because of the nature of overhead
line work and the limitations of structures available for ladder
support, OSHA exempts portable hook ladders and other special ladders
used on structures or on overhead lines from the general provisions of
Secs. 1910.25(d)(2)(i), 1910.25(d)(2)(iii), and 1910.26(c)(3)(iii),
which deal with ladder support and placement. To provide employees with
protection which approximates that afforded by the ``exempted'' Subpart
D provisions, paragraphs (h)(2)(i) through (h)(2)(iv) apply to these
special types of ladders. These same paragraphs also apply to platforms
designed for and used in this type of work. The requirements provide
that these special ladders and special platforms be secured, specify
the acceptable loads and proper strength of this equipment, and provide
that they be used only for the particular types of application for
which they are designed. (The ratings and design of this equipment are
specified by the manufacturer and can usually also be found in standard
references.) OSHA has concluded that these alternative criteria provide
for the safe use of this special equipment.
The revision of Subpart D mentioned earlier proposed to modify the
requirements dealing with ladders so as to make the exceptions listed
in Sec. 1910.269(h)(2) unnecessary. The language exempting special
ladders will be removed or revised as necessary upon promulgation of
the Subpart D revision as a final rule.
Most of the comments received regarding proposed paragraph (h)(2)
concerned the requirement in paragraph (h)(2)(iv) that this equipment
be capable of supporting without failure at least four times its
maximum intended load. Three commenters and two hearing witnesses
argued that the four-to-one safety factor was not appropriate for these
devices (Ex. 3-51, 3-112, 3-120; DC Tr. 360-362, 722-724). These
commenters stated that equipment presently in use can achieve a 2.5-to-
1 safety factor with a load rating of 500 pounds. Mr. Joseph Van Name,
testifying on behalf of the National Electrical Safety Code Committee,
Working Group 8, and the Line Maintenance Group of the Pennsylvania-New
Jersey-Maryland Interconnection, said: ``Since 1961, continued research
on this material indicates that adequate mechanical performance is
achieved with a factor of safety of 2 to 2\1/2\ for a `failure' [DC Tr.
723].'' Mr. Arthur Lewis, one of OSHA's expert witnesses, stated that
ASTM is developing a standard for platforms covered by proposed
paragraph (h)(2) and presented the reasoning behind adopting a
requirement with a 2.5-to-1 safety factor. He explained as follows:
I am specifically commenting on the lineman's insulating work
platform, a device that is temporarily attached at one end to a pole
and which provides a cantilevered work platform for the worker.
The purpose is two-fold in that it insulates the worker from the
pole, which normally has to be considered as a ground conductor,
while at the same time it provides a work platform for the worker to
reach line construction. Such a platform is usually used in
locations where an aerial lift vehicle cannot be utilized.
The platform has to be raised from the ground to the work
position by hand or by the use of a portable capstan winch. This
necessitates that the platform be constructed of lightweight
materials. ASTM is currently developing a standard for such
platforms. Industry experience with this equipment is extensive and
is useful in setting parameters for design standards.
In adopting ratings and safety factor, the committee considered
the maximum loading that the platform board could reasonably be
expected to carry during use, the need for lightweight construction
to prevent injury during installation, the nature of materials of
which the platform and supporting members are constructed, and
industry experience with platforms presently available in the
country.
Material choice today is an aluminum alloy for the metal
attachment to the pole and a platform of fiberglass reinforced
plastic. Design and manufacture of FRP is at an advanced stage with
long term performance of the material being very predictable.
A working load rating of 500 pounds is considered adequate to
allow a lineman weighing 250 pounds with tools and materials of an
additional 50 pounds to [lift] a heavy conductor or other piece of
equipment and not exceed the rating of the platform. Tests on
existing platforms on the market and in use throughout industry show
that with the 500 pound working load rating a 2.5 to one safety
factor is achievable and relatively standard.51
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\1 According to this testimony, a platform rated at 500 pounds
will withstand 1250 pounds of force before failure. Using the
proposed 4 to 1 safety factor, the working load rating on such a
platform would have to be reduced to 312 pounds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Industry experience with platforms in use today has been
excellent. [DC Tr. 360-362, corrected at Ex. 6-26]
OSHA agrees that there is a need for these special ladders and
platforms to be as light as possible. They are handled by employees
working on poles and towers at various heights above the ground. If the
ladder or platform is heavier than necessary, injury could result from
maneuvering the device in an awkward position or from dropping the
device on an employee below. OSHA believes that this risk exceeds the
risk that the ladder or platform will fail under load. Additionally,
there is no evidence in the record to indicate that existing equipment
is posing a significant risk to employees. In fact, OSHA's own expert
witness stated that experience with these platforms has been excellent
(DC Tr. 362). Therefore, the Agency has accepted the 2.5-to-1 safety
factor recommended by the comments and testimony. Paragraph (h)(2)(iv)
of final Sec. 1910.269 reflects this lower safety factor.
In Sec. 1910.269(h)(3), OSHA is prohibiting the use of portable
metal and other portable conductive ladders near exposed energized
lines or equipment. This paragraph addresses the hazard to employees of
contacting energized lines and equipment with conductive ladders.
However, in specialized high-voltage work, the use of nonconductive
ladders could present a greater hazard to employees than the use of
conductive ladders. In such situations, the clearances between live
parts operating at differing voltages and between the live parts and
grounded surfaces are large enough that it is relatively easy to
maintain the minimum approach distances required by paragraph (l).
Voltage is induced on objects in the vicinity of these high-voltage
lines. Using a conductive ladder can minimize the voltage differences
between objects52 within an employee's reach, reducing the hazard
to the employee. Therefore, the standard allows a conductive ladder to
be used where an employer can demonstrate that the use of a
nonconductive ladder would present a greater hazard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\2 These induced voltages do not normally pose an
electrocution hazard. However, the involuntary muscular reactions
from contacting objects at different voltages can lead to falls.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (h)(4) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 addressed step bolts and
manhole steps. The existing OSHA standards do not specifically address
step bolts or manhole steps; rather, they address fixed ladders which
are not normally used in manholes or on poles. OSHA proposed that step
bolts and manhole steps for general use meet paragraphs (h)(4)(i)
through (h)(4)(xiv) and the requirements of Sec. 1910.27 for ladder
safety devices. However, as noted previously, after the publication of
proposed Sec. 1910.269, OSHA proposed to revise subpart D of part 1910.
The latter proposal included provisions on step bolts and manhole steps
in Sec. 1910.24 that were almost identical to those proposed in
Sec. 1910.269(h)(4). In the subpart D revision, OSHA proposed to remove
the step bolt and manhole step provisions in Sec. 1910.268
(telecommunications) as they would no longer be necessary. Such
requirements are unnecessary here as well. Therefore, OSHA has not
carried the provisions of proposed Sec. 1910.269(h)(4) forward into the
final rule. All the comments received in response to this rulemaking
dealing with step bolts or manhole step will be considered in the
promulgation of Sec. 1910.24.
Similarly, the provisions of proposed paragraph (h)(5) dealt with a
subject that was addressed in the subpart D proposal--the exemption of
ladders or step bolts on triangulation, telecommunication, electrical
power, and similar towers, and ladders on poles and other structures
(including stacks and chimneys) from the current requirements in
subpart D of this part for ladder safety devices and cages if only
qualified employees use these ladders. The generic exemption of ladders
and step bolts used by qualified climbers from the general industry
requirements for ladder safety devices would eliminate the need to
exempt ladders and step bolts under Sec. 1910.269. OSHA has decided
against adopting a specific exemption for electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work at this time. If the Agency
determines that a ``qualified climber'' exemption is appropriate for
all of general industry, OSHA will take the comments in the
Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking record into consideration in the adoption of
the revision of subpart D as a final rule. If the Agency decides
against the adoption of a general exemption, OSHA will revisit this
issue as it relates to electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work in the future and will adopt an appropriate revision
of final Sec. 1910.269 based on this rulemaking record.53
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\3At this time, the Agency is not making a determination as to
the appropriateness of exempting ladders and step bolts used in
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution work from
the subpart D requirements for ladder safety devices. OSHA is simply
postponing the determination of this issue until the same issue in
the subpart D rulemaking, upon which proposed Sec. 1910.269(h)(5)
depends, is resolved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (i). Paragraph (i) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses hand
and portable power tools. Portable and vehicle-mounted generators
supplying cord- and plug-connected equipment are also covered by
paragraph (i).
Electric tools connected by cord and plug are required to meet
paragraph (i)(2). If the equipment is supplied by the wiring of a
building or other premises, existing Subpart S of Part 1910 continues
to apply as it does now. If premises wiring is not involved (in which
case Subpart S does not currently apply), paragraph (i)(2)(ii) requires
that the tool frame be grounded or that the tool be double insulated or
that the tool be supplied by an isolating transformer with ungrounded
secondary. Any of these three methods can protect employees from
electric shock, which could directly injure the employee or which could
cause an involuntary reaction leading to a secondary injury.
OSHA received several comments suggesting that ground-fault circuit
interrupter (GFCI) protection be allowed as an additional alternative
(Ex. 3-80, 3-81, 3-112). However, although a GFCI can prevent
electrocution, the device cannot by itself prevent an initial electric
shock to an employee before it interrupts the circuit. This initial
shock could lead to injury from involuntary reaction. This is of
particular concern if the employee is in an elevated position, exposing
him or her to a fall in the event of electric shock. For this reason,
existing electrical standards (for example, Sec. 1910.306(j)(2) and
Sec. 1926.404(b)(1)) require GFCI protection in addition to, not in
place of, equipment grounding and double insulation. Therefore, in
final Sec. 1910.269(i)(2)(ii), OSHA is not allowing the use of a GFCI
alone to protect employees using cord- and plug-connected equipment.
Two others suggested that the standard require GFCI protection in
addition to that provided by the three alternative protective methods
listed in the proposal (Ex. 3-21, 3-76; DC Tr. 415-416, 503). The UWUA
was particularly concerned that tools may be dropped and lose whatever
protection was afforded by double insulation (DC Tr. 503). OSHA's
electrical standards for general industry and for construction
recognize double insulation as an appropriate method of protection
against electric shock. The Agency has no evidence under these
standards that double-insulated tools lose their protective abilities
once they are dropped or that electric power generation, transmission,
and distribution maintenance work exposes tools and cords to the same
degree of mishandling and abuse found on construction sites, where
GFCIs are required in addition to double insulation or grounding.
Therefore, the final rule adopts the approach presented in paragraph
(i)(2) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 (that is, tools must be protected by
grounding, double insulation, or an isolating transformer).
Paragraph (i)(3) of final Sec. 1910.269 essentially extends the
requirements of existing Sec. 1926.404(f)(3) to electric transmission
and distribution field operations. The standard basically requires that
portable and vehicle-mounted generators provide a means for grounding
cord- and plug-connected equipment and allows the frame of the
generator to serve as the grounding electrode (reference ground).
Paragraph (i)(4) of final Sec. 1910.269 applies to pneumatic and
hydraulic tools. Safe operating pressures are required to be maintained
by paragraph (i)(4)(i). This protects employees from the harmful
effects of tool failure. Of course, if hazardous defects are present,
no operating pressure would be safe, and the tools could not be used.
In the absence of defects, the maximum rated operating pressure (as
specified by the manufacturer or by standard references) is the maximum
safe pressure. A note to this effect has been included in the final
rule.
If a pneumatic or hydraulic tool is used where it may contact
exposed energized parts, the tool is required to be designed and
maintained for such use (paragraph (i)(4)(ii)). Hydraulic systems for
tools used near live parts would need to provide protection against the
formation of a partial vacuum in the hydraulic line (paragraph
(i)(4)(iii)). A pneumatic tool would have to provide protection against
the accumulation of moisture in the air supply (paragraph (i)(4)(iv)).
These three requirements protect employees from electric shock by
restricting current flow through hoses.
Proposed Sec. 1910.269(i)(4)(ii) would have simply required hoses
used with hydraulic and pneumatic tools to be nonconductive. The
National Electrical Manufacturers Association was concerned that other
considerations were also involved in making these tools safe around
energized lines (Ex. 3-81). They mentioned the type of oil used,
contamination, and the voltage involved as factors that could also
affect safety. OSHA agrees with these concerns and has worded paragraph
(i)(4)(ii) in the final rule to require that the equipment be designed
and maintained for use near energized parts.
Several commenters were concerned about the lack of a requirement
in the proposal to prevent the loss of insulating value in hydraulic
tools from the creation of a partial vacuum in the hydraulic line (Ex.
3-80, 3-81, 3-107, 3-112; DC Tr. 612-613). If such tools are used so
that the highest point on the system is more than about 35 feet (10.7
m) above the oil reservoir, a partial vacuum can form inside the line.
This can lead to loss of insulating value in tools used on high voltage
lines and to the failure of the system while the employee is working on
the power line. The IBEW reported that two accidents resulted from such
an occurrence and suggested that OSHA adopt language requiring
protection for these systems (DC Tr. 613). The Agency agrees with these
comments and has added such a requirement to the final rule in
Sec. 1910.269(i)(4)(iii).
OSHA has reworded proposed Sec. 1910.269(i)(4)(iii), which
specified the use of accumulators for pneumatic tools used near
energized parts in order to accommodate the concerns of EEI that
certain pneumatic systems do not need accumulators (Ex. 3-112). The
final version of this provision (Sec. 1910.269)(i)(4)(iv)) states the
requirement in performance language--the system must protect against
the accumulation of moisture in the air supply--rather than specify the
means by which this is accomplished.
Paragraphs (i)(4)(v) and (i)(4)(vi) set forth work-practice
requirements to protect employees from the accidental release of
pressure and from injection of hydraulic oil into the body. The first
of these two provisions requires the release of pressure before
connections in the lines are broken, unless the quick-acting, self-
closing connectors commonly found on tools are used. The other
prohibits employees from attempting to use their bodies in order to
locate or stop a hydraulic leak.
Paragraph (j). Paragraph (j) of final Sec. 1910.269 contains
requirements for live-line tools, some of which are commonly called
``hot sticks.'' This type of tool is used by qualified employees to
handle energized conductors. The tool insulates the employee from the
energized line, allowing the employee to safely perform the task at
hand. For example, a wire tong, a slender insulated pole with a clamp
on one end, is used to hold a conductor at a distance while work is
being performed. Common types of live-line tools include wire tongs,
wire tong supports, tension links, and tie sticks.
Paragraph (j)(1) requires live-line tools to be designed and
constructed to be able to withstand 100,000 V/ft if made of fiberglass,
75,000 V/ft if made of wood, or other equivalent tests. (The voltage
per unit length varies with material because the two different
insulating materials are capable of withstanding different voltages
over equal lengths. A higher design standard for wood would cause most
wood to fail to meet the specification. A lower design specification
would allow substandard products into service. Paragraph (j)(1), which
contains the design criteria for materials used in live-line tools, is
based on the capabilities of the materials in question.) Since the
withstand voltages are consistent with those in existing
Sec. 1926.951(d) and with ASTM F 711-83, Standard Specification for
Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Rod and Tube Used in Live-Line
Tools (Ex. 2-27), tools complying with standards currently in use in
the industry continue to be acceptable. A note to this effect and
language clarifying that the rule applies to rods and tubes as well as
``poles'' has been added as suggested by EEI (Ex. 3-112). Together with
the minimum approach distances in Sec. 1910.269(l), paragraph (j)(1)
protects employees from electric shock during use of these tools.
Paragraph (j)(2)(i) requires the daily visual inspection of live-
line tools before they are used. Several commenters suggested that this
provision include a requirement for wiping the tool as well, because
contamination can frequently be removed at this time (Ex. 3-40, 3-71,
3-112). OSHA has accepted this suggestion.
If any contamination or defect that could lower the insulating
value of the live-line tool is present after the tool is wiped, it
could be discovered during this inspection, and the tool would have to
be removed from service, as required by paragraph (j)(2)(ii). This
paragraph protects employees from the failure of live-line tools during
use.
EEI and IBEW recommended adding language to this requirement
prohibiting defects that could affect the mechanical integrity of the
tool as well (Ex. 56, 61). Because mechanical defects can also lead to
failure of the tool in use, OSHA has adopted this recommendation.
Additionally, to clarify Sec. 1910.269(j)(2)(ii), as requested by
several commenters (Ex. 3-40, 3-80, 3-82, 3-102, 3-112), OSHA has added
language to indicate that the tool must be removed from service if the
defect is present after wiping. Also, the tool must be examined and
tested as described under new paragraph (j)(2)(iii) before further use.
The performance criteria given in paragraph (j)(1) are intended to
be ``design standards'' and are to be met at the time of manufacture.
The test voltages and length of time that they are applied are not
appropriate for periodic retesting of the hot sticks because the live-
line tools could sustain damage during the test. In the notice of
proposed rulemaking and in the notice of public hearing, OSHA requested
information on whether retesting should be required, what values of
voltage and time should be used for retests, and what period of time
should be allowed between retests.
OSHA received many comments on this issue. Some supported requiring
periodic testing of live-line tools (Ex. 3-30, 3-46, 3-57, 3-69, 3-82,
3-123, 61; DC Tr. 362-363). Others opposed mandatory routine testing of
these tools (Ex. 3-42, 3-65, 3-94, 3-112, 3-119, 3-120, 56; DC Tr. 762-
767, 1152-1153).
Supporters of periodic live-line tool testing expressed concern
that the tool needed to be checked periodically in order to verify the
tool's ability to protect the worker. In expressing this view, Mr.
Arthur Lewis, one of OSHA's expert witnesses, noted that current
practices of most firms in the country conform to a 1- to 2-year
testing interval (DC Tr. 373-374). Others also endorsed intervals of 2
years or less (Ex. 3-46, 3-57, 61).
Those opposed to a requirement for regular testing argued that
inspection of the tool was sufficient to detect defects which could
cause failure and that no fatalities have been caused by the failure of
a live-line tool. They asserted that testing was necessary only when an
inspection found defects in the tool. Several pointed to the Institute
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Guide for In-Service
Maintenance and Electrical Testing of Live-Line Tools, IEEE Std. 978-
1984, which states ``Insulating tools should be shop maintained and
tested at an interval dependent on their exposure, manner of use, care
they receive, individual company policy, and as field inspection
dictates (Ex. 60). In response to questions by EEI and OSHA attorneys,
Mr. Joseph Van Name made the case for thorough examination of hot
sticks as follows:
Mr. Yohay: Are you familiar with the study on live-line tool
testing performed by the Georgia Power Company which was mentioned
in the hearing last week?
Mr. Van Name: Yes, I am.
Mr. Yohay: Would you please comment on it briefly for the
benefit of the OSHA Panel?
Mr. Van Name: * * * The study that they did came out of an
incident on their transmission system on [a] 115 kV line. The
essential parts of it were published in Electric, Light and Power in
August of 1978.
And the reason for this study was that when the workers were
performing a job on a 115 kV transmission structure, it started to
rain, a very severe storm. And when it started to rain, they had
arcing across the sticks on the structure * * *.
[The study stated:] ``As the crew prepared to leave the rainy
site, they observed arcing over the surface of the sticks. When
tak[en] out of service for examination, all the sticks on that
structure showed signs of tracking.''
Now the reason the study was done then was to evaluate the
condition of the surface * * *.
* * * they found out quite early in their review that the dry
testing procedures that had been followed would not discriminate as
well as a wet test * * * where you actually applied water to the
stick in your testing procedures. That enables you in a laboratory
environment to evaluate the surface condi[ti]on.
Now what that means is if the sticks are not inspected visually
and any stick that is inspected visually, except a hollow one, you
can determine this without having to go through an electrical test.
A visual inspection is much more important in this case and for this
condition than an electrical test. [DC Tr. 748-750]
* * * * *
Mr. Van Name: * * * my personal opinion is that the requirement
should be that hot sticks should be periodically inspected visually.
And a period of one to two years is very important.
But just automatically testing them for electrical performance
is not going to insure a good performing hot stick. In other words,
the periodicity should be related to the inspection, not the
electrical test.
If you inspect it and you find it is defective in any way or has
to be maintained or recoated, as part of that process you do an
electrical test before you send it back to the crew.
Ms. Thurber: Are there any flaws that visual inspection would
not reveal?
Mr. Van Name: Not that I know of. I was going to make one more
comment.
Ms. Thurber: Certainly.
Mr. Van Name: And that is, [that my comment applies to] hot
sticks which are not wood * * * and the hot sticks that are not
hollow. And there are very few, if any, [wood] sticks in the
industry.
* * * * *
So that I would say that hollow sticks require some additional
care which could be electrical testing.
Electrical testing also with hollow sticks does not guarantee
that there is nothing defective inside a hollow stick--nothing wrong
inside a hollow stick. [DC Tr. 763-764]
Although no injuries related to the failure of a hot stick could be
found in the record, evidence does indicate that these tools have
failed in use (without injury to employees) and that employees do
depend on their insulating value in using them to handle energized
conductors (Ex. 60, 61; DC Tr. 371, 376, 380-381, 748-749, 765). The
fact that live-line tools are not typically used to provide protection
for employees in the rain (when work is normally suspended) probably
accounts for the lack of injuries in the record. Regardless, live-line
tools might be used under wet conditions, in which case it is important
to ensure that these tools will retain their insulating qualities when
they are wet. Therefore, OSHA has determined that additional regulation
of the condition of live-line tools is necessary and appropriate.
Also, although Mr. Van Name's testimony shows that inspection can
detect the presence of hazardous defects and contamination, the Agency
is concerned about whether the daily inspections required in the OSHA
standard will, indeed, detect these problems. In fact, referring to the
live-line tools that had failed in use, the Georgia Power Company study
that he cited in his testimony stated: ``Under visual inspection all
the sticks appeared to be relatively clean with no apparent surface
irregularities [Ex. 60].'' (These tools also passed a ``dry'' voltage
test, but failed a ``wet'' test.) While the study further noted that
the surface luster on the sticks had been reduced, apparently the
visual inspection alone was not able to detect such defects as the ones
that caused these tools to fail.
To address these concerns, OSHA is adopting additional requirements
for the thorough examination, cleaning, repair, and testing of live-
line tools on a periodic basis. The tools would undergo this process on
a 2-year cycle and any time tools are returned on the basis of the
daily inspection required by Sec. 1910.269(j)(2)(ii). The final rule
first requires a complete examination of the hot stick (paragraph
(j)(2)(iii)(A)). After the examination, the tool must be cleaned and
waxed, or it must be repaired and refinished if necessary (paragraph
(j)(2)(iii)(B)). According to Sec. 1910.269(j)(2)(iii)(C), a test would
also be required: (1) After the tool has been repaired or refinished
regardless of its composition; (2) After the examination if the tool is
made of wood or hollow FRP; or (3) After the examination if the tool is
solid FRP rod or foam-filled FRP tube, unless the employer can
demonstrate that the examination has revealed all defects that could
cause the tool to fail during use. The test method used must be
designed to verify the tool's integrity along its full length and, if
made of FRP, its integrity under wet conditions (paragraph
(j)(2)(iii)(D)). The test voltages are 75 kV/ft for FRP and 50 kV/ft
for wood, and the voltage must be applied for a minimum of 1 minute
(paragraph (j)(2)(iii)(E)). Other equivalent tests are permitted. The
final rule also includes a note referring to IEEE Std. 978-1984 (Ex.
60), which is an excellent guide to the inspection, care, and testing
of live-line tools. This document recommends the practices that are
required by the OSHA standard.
Paragraph (k). Paragraph (k) sets forth requirements for material
handling and storage. Paragraph (k)(1) simply provides that Subpart N
of Part 1910 continues to apply. The phrase ``except as modified in
this paragraph'' from the proposal has not been carried into the final
rule because paragraph (k) supplements rather than modifies Subpart N.
Paragraph (k)(2) addresses the handling and storage of materials in
the vicinity of energized lines and exposed parts of energized
equipment. In general, as is the case through most of the General
Industry Standards, material is not allowed to be taken or stored
within 10 feet of the lines or exposed parts of equipment. This
clearance distance must be increased by 4 inches for every 10 kilovolts
over 50 kilovolts. For materials storage, the distance must also be
increased to account for the maximum sag and side swing of any
conductor and to account for the use of material handling equipment.
Maintaining these clearances protects unqualified employees, who are
not trained in the recognition and avoidance of the hazards involved,
from contacting the energized lines or equipment with materials being
handled. However, the work practices these unqualified workers would
employ in handling material stored near energized lines are addressed
by Subpart S. The general approach taken in new Sec. 1910.269 is to
provide safety-related work practices for qualified employees to follow
when they are performing electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work. Safe work practices for unqualified employees are
not addressed in final Sec. 1910.269, because these practices are
already spelled out in Subpart S of OSHA's General Industry Standards
(see in particular Sec. 1910.333(c)(3)(i) for work performed by
unqualified employees near overhead power lines). In fact,
Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(B) specifically excludes these practices from
coverage under Sec. 1910.269. Therefore, proposed Sec. 1910.269(k)(2)
relating to work practices used by unqualified employees has not been
carried forward into the final rule.
Paragraph (k)(2)(i) only regulates the storage of materials where
exposure is not restricted to qualified employees. If the materials are
stored where only qualified workers have access to them, the materials
may be safely stored closer to the energized parts than 10 feet,
providing these employees have sufficient room to perform their work.
To ensure that enough room is available, paragraph (k)(2)(ii) prohibits
material from being stored in the working space around energized lines
or equipment. (See the discussion of paragraphs (u)(1) and (v)(3) of
final Sec. 1910.269 for an explanation of the requirements for access
and working space.)
Two commenters suggested specifying the minimum approach distances
proposed in paragraph (l) in place of the reference to ``working
space'' (Ex. 3-80, 3-112).
The working space about electric equipment is the clear space to be
provided around the equipment to enable qualified employees to work on
the equipment. An employee enters this space to service or maintain the
electric equipment. The minimum working space specifies the minimum
distance an obstruction can be from the equipment. For example, if a
switchboard is installed in a cabinet into which an employee will
enter, the inside walls of the cabinet must provide a minimum working
space to enable the employee to work safely within the cabinet.
The minimum approach distance to be maintained from a live part is
the limit of the space about the equipment that a qualified employee is
not permitted to enter. The minimum approach distance a qualified
employee must maintain from an energized part (covered in final
Sec. 1910.269(l)) are smaller than the working space that is required
to be provided around the part. The employee must ``enter'' the working
space and still maintain the minimum approach distance. Storing
materials in this space would tempt employees to work on energized
equipment in cramped quarters if access were necessary in an emergency.
Alternatively, if materials stored in the working space had to be moved
so that adequate room could be provided, accidents could result from
the movement of the material. Therefore, OSHA has not accepted the
suggestion to replace ``working space'' with ``clearance distance''.
Paragraph (l). Paragraph (l) of final Sec. 1910.269 covers the
hazards of working on or near exposed parts of energized lines or
equipment.
Paragraph (l)(1) requires employees working on or in areas
containing exposed live parts of electric lines or equipment to be
qualified. Without proper training in the construction and operation of
the lines and equipment and in the electrical hazards involved, workers
would likely be electrocuted attempting to perform this type of work
and would also expose others to injury as well. In areas containing
unguarded live parts energized at more than 50 volts, untrained
employees would not be familiar with the practices that are necessary
to recognize and avoid contact with these parts.
However, employees in training, under the direct supervision of a
qualified employee, are permitted to perform work on live parts and in
areas containing unguarded live parts. OSHA believes that the close
supervision of trainees will reveal errors ``in the act'', before they
cause accidents. Allowing these workers the experience of performing
tasks under actual conditions may also better prepare the employees to
work safely.
In the proposal, OSHA included this concept in the text of
paragraph (l)(1) itself. In the final rule, the Agency has added a note
to the definition of ``qualified employee'' to indicate that employees
who are undergoing on-the-job training are considered to be qualified
if they have demonstrated an ability to perform duties safely and if
they are under the immediate supervision of qualified employees.
Therefore, paragraph (l)(1) of final Sec. 1910.269 no longer refers to
employees in training. (See the discussion of the definition of this
term under the summary and explanation of Sec. 1910.269(x).) These
changes will allay the concerns of those who argued that the language
in the proposal would have required fully trained qualified employees
to work under the direct supervision of another qualified employee (Ex.
3-20, 3-26, 3-42, 3-80, 3-101, 3-112).
In response to the notice of proposed rulemaking, many employer and
employee groups commented on the issue of whether or not a minimum of
two employees should be required for work involving energized electric
equipment. OSHA did not propose such a rule, but the Agency listed this
as an issue in the notice announcing the public hearing. At that time,
OSHA stated that it would consider evidence supporting or opposing this
type of rule and invited the public to comment on the issue of what
conditions necessitate the presence of at least two employees.
NIOSH and the UWUA supported a rule prohibiting a single employee
from performing work on energized lines or equipment (Ex. 3-76; DC Tr.
33-34, 42, 412-413). NIOSH maintained that a second employee is needed
to provide emergency care to an employee who contacts live parts. (Much
of their testimony and evidence relates to the usefulness of CPR
training, which was discussed earlier in this preamble.) UWUA witnesses
stated their concern that an employee who was injured would not get
prompt assistance in case of an accident and testified about two
accidents in which employees working alone were involved (DC Tr. 468-
470).54
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\4In their post-hearing comments, EEI argued that one of the
accidents actually involved a worker who was not alone (Ex. 56). It
is not clear whether or not the two parties were discussing the same
accident; however, the Agency is not relying on the UWUA testimony
alone in resolving this issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many commenters claimed that certain types of electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution work could be performed
safely by a single employee (Ex. 3-2, 3-12, 3-17, 3-47, 3-80, 3-112, 3-
119, 3-125, 3-128). Witnesses and commenters described the following
tasks as not necessitating the presence of a second employee under
current industry practices: installing and removing meters; low voltage
(generally below 600 volts) work; opening and closing switches, circuit
breakers, sectionalizing devices, and other disconnects; and replacing
fuses (Ex. 3-2, 3-31, 3-47, 3-80, 3-112, 3-119, 3-125, 3-128, 47; DC
Tr. 536, 599-600, 1143, 1157). Additionally, one person noted that high
voltage work by a lone employee was only permitted if live-line tools
were used (DC Tr. 992-993). In fact, the types of high-voltage work
mentioned by the witnesses as safe to perform alone are normally
associated with hot stick work.
EEI also argued that the presence of an additional employee is not
necessary because most accidents are a result of a worker's disregard
for training and well established procedures put in place for his or
her protection (Ex. 56). However, if this argument is relevant at all,
OSHA believes that it is justification for having an extra employee
simply because workers should be able to point out poor work practices
to their fellow employees. This alone could prevent many accidents.
In any event, OSHA believes that the most relevant consideration in
determining whether or not to require the presence of at least two
employees is whether the hazards of the work would be significantly
reduced by the presence of an additional worker. Therefore, OSHA
believes it is important to determine what types of work frequently
result in electric shock, regardless of the number of employees
present. Electric shock accidents, in particular, necessitate the
immediate availability of a person trained in CPR.
To ascertain this information, the Agency reviewed the accident
data in Exhibit 9-2. The results of this analysis are presented in
Table 2, which tabulates the number of accidents involving different
categories of work. Accidents unrelated to work by qualified employees
on energized parts are not included in this table.55 Data in the
other categories demonstrate that working directly on energized lines
causes most of the accidents and is presumably the most hazardous job
performed by line workers. Even some of the jobs claimed by utilities
to be safe for a single employee to perform were involved in a few of
the accidents, namely, replacing fuses, opening disconnects with live-
line tools, and ``low voltage'' (600 volts or less) work. In
particular, lines operating at 600 volts or less accounted for 13
percent (11 of 86) of the relevant accidents, as shown in Table 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\5Of 117 accidents in Exhibit 9-2, 31 are not relevant to the
issue of whether or not qualified employees should be able to work
alone near exposed live parts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result of this analysis, OSHA has determined that there is a
need for some regulation of what types of work can be performed safely
by a solitary employee. For the most part, the types of jobs witnesses
and commenters maintained were safe generally involved few injuries or
fatalities. Specifically, OSHA has concluded that the following work
can be performed with minimal hazard to qualified employees working by
themselves:
(1) Substation work not involving direct contact with live parts or
climbing on structures, and
(2) Opening disconnects with live-line tools, if the employee is
well away from the live parts.
Other types of work, such as line installation and removal, use of
mechanical apparatus to lift or position material or persons, and
electric station work on energized parts, are much more hazardous.
These operations are the types of jobs that the witnesses and
commenters generally described as being performed by two or more
employees. This was also evident from the accident abstracts. However,
the Agency is concerned that some employers may force their employees
to do this work alone, whether or not it is common industry practice to
provide additional workers. One IBEW witness stated that he heard
reports of such an occurrence (DC Tr. 600-601), and EEI also admitted
that consideration is being given to reduction of crew size in the
future (Ex. 56). Therefore, OSHA is adopting a rule requiring the
presence of at least two employees under conditions closely following
those in which two or more workers would be present under current
industry practices.
Table 2.--Number of Accidents by Type of Work
------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. of
Type of work accidents\1\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moving or repairing lines................................. 18
Line stringing............................................ 10
Replacing or repairing equipment.......................... 10
Rubber glove (or bare hand) work, other................... 17
Hot stick work, other..................................... 5
-------------
Subtotal................................................ 60
Mechanical equipment used to lift or position............. 10
Setting poles............................................. 4
-------------
Subtotal................................................ 14
Station work, work on energized parts..................... 9
Station work, misc........................................ 3
-------------
Subtotal................................................ 12
=============
Total................................................. 86
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Accidents involving one or more employees injured due to contact with
energized parts.
Source: Exhibit 9-2.
Table 3.--Number of Accidents by Voltage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. of
Voltage range accidents
------------------------------------------------------------------------
120/240...................................................... 10
440.......................................................... 1
2.4kV........................................................ 1
7.2-14.4 kV\1\............................................... 53
69kV......................................................... 1
115kV........................................................ 2
Unspecified.................................................. 18
----------
Total...................................................... 86
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\The voltage specified was in this range; however, it was not always
clear whether the voltage was phase-to-phase or phase-to-ground.
Source: Exhibit 9-2.
EEI was also concerned that a prohibition on working alone would
hinder restoration efforts, as follows:
There are a number of crucial operating functions within the
electric utility industry that are performed by one qualified
worker, alone, and on energized equipment, at all voltage ranges. A
classic example is the expert troubleman who works alone on
energized lines in emergencies to restore power, such as during
storms. These functions are performed safely literally thousand of
times daily. [Ex. 3-112]
OSHA believes that the loss of power can create public safety
concerns that outweigh the safety concerns of individual employees. In
such cases, action must be taken to restore power so that public safety
is assured. To address this concern in the final rule, OSHA is also
permitting an employee to work alone to effect emergency repairs to the
extent necessary to safeguard the general public.
Paragraph (l)(1)(i) of final Sec. 1910.269 applies to the following
types of work involving exposed parts energized at more than 600 volts:
(1) Installation, removal, or repair of lines that are energized,
(2) Installation, removal, or repair of deenergized lines if an
employee is exposed to contact with other energized parts,
(3) Installation, removal, or repair of equipment, such as
transformers, capacitors, and regulators, if an employee is exposed to
contact with energized parts,
(4) Work involving the use of mechanical equipment, other than
insulated aerial lifts, near energized parts, and
(5) Other work that exposes an employee to electrical hazards
greater than or equal to those posed by operations that are
specifically listed in the standard.
The first four work operations are those that the record
demonstrates expose employees to the greatest risk of electric shock.
OSHA has included the fifth category to cover types of work that, while
not specifically identified in the record, pose equal or greater
hazards.
As the record demonstrates, however, some work can be performed
safely by a single employee or must be performed as quickly as possible
for reasons of public safety. The standard, in Sec. 1910.269
(l)(1)(ii), recognizes this type of work by granting exceptions for the
following operations:
(1) Routine switching of circuits, if the employer can demonstrate
that conditions at the site allow this work to be performed
safely,56
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\6 This provision corresponds to the common types of
substation work identified earlier in this preamble as being safe to
perform. OSHA has written this provision in performance language to
recognize types of work with similar characteristics. It is the
hazards associated with the work that is the determining factor
rather than the specific task.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Work performed with live-line tools if the employee is
positioned so that he or she is not exposed to contact with energized
parts,57 and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\7 This provision corresponds to work involving the use of
live-line tools to operate disconnects. Any similar work performed
with a hot stick at a safe distance is also safe to perform by a
qualified employee working alone. Here, too, OSHA has written this
provision in performance language.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Emergency repairs to the minimum extent necessary to safeguard
the general public.
OSHA has placed restrictions on the use of these exceptions in view
of the accidents that occurred even under these limited conditions.
Accidents involving hot stick work have typically occurred only when
the employee was using a live-line tool but was close enough to
energized parts to be injured--sometimes through direct contact, other
times by contact through conductors being handled. Employees have been
injured during switching operations when unusual conditions, such as
poor lighting, bad weather, and hazardous configuration or state of
repair of the switching equipment, were present. Because such
conditions make the work unsafe, paragraph (l)(1)(ii)(A) would not
permit switching operations to be performed by an employee working
alone.
The requirement for at least two employees to be present during
certain operations does not apply if the voltage of the energized parts
involved is 600 volts or less. The record contains conflicting data
regarding the safety of performing work at these voltages. Many
witnesses and commenters said that it was safe to perform such work,
but the data in Table 3 strongly suggests that this is not true.
Unfortunately, the types of work involving voltages of 600 volts or
less are not clearly defined in the rulemaking record, at least with
respect to the degree of risk they present. For example, electric meter
work, which typically involves these lower voltages, is one type of
work commonly performed by electric utility workers. However, there are
very few accidents involving this type of work. It appears that many of
the lower voltage accidents in the record involved qualified employees
working on service drops, but there may be conditions making even this
type of work safe.
There is insufficient evidence in the record as to whether or not
it is safe for qualified employees to work alone on live parts
energized at these lower voltages. Therefore, the final rule does not
address this situation. OSHA intends to address this issue when Subpart
V of Part 1926 is proposed for revision. (The absence of a requirement
in the final standard addressing this hazard should not be regarded as
a determination that this type of work is always safe under existing
industry practices.)
Paragraph (l)(2) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires employees to
maintain minimum approach distances from exposed energized parts. The
minimum approach distances are specified in Table R-6 through Table R-
10.
Paragraph (l)(2) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 set forth the minimum
approach distance requirements for work near exposed energized parts.
The language of the proposed paragraph was taken from existing
Sec. 1926.950(c)(1). Basically, the proposal would have required
employees to maintain the minimum approach distances listed in the
standard, unless the employee was insulated from the live part or the
part was insulated from the employee or the employee was insulated from
all other conductive objects.
The proposed rule used the term ``clearance'' in the heading and in
the distance tables to describe the distance an employee must stay away
from energized parts. The term clearance was also used in proposed
paragraphs (m), (u), and (v). In proposed paragraph (m), ``clearance''
meant authorization to perform work. In proposed paragraphs (u) and
(v), the term meant the clear distance between two objects. OSHA is
concerned that this term as used in paragraph (l)(2) might be confused
with the same term used in paragraphs (m), (u)(5), and (v)(5) of final
Sec. 1910.269. The term ``minimum approach distance'' has been adopted
in the final rule to refer to distances to be maintained from energized
parts, and the term ``clearance'' in the final rule relates only to
authorization to perform work or to the clear distance between objects.
To make this change clear in final Sec. 1910.269, OSHA has defined the
term ``minimum approach distance'' in paragraph (x), Definitions. This
new definition reads as follows:
Minimum approach distance. The closest distance an employee is
permitted to approach an energized or a grounded object.
The Agency has carried forward the proposal's definition of
``clearance (for work)'' into paragraph (x) of final Sec. 1910.269.
OSHA has also adopted a definition of ``clearance (between objects)''
in paragraph (x) of final Sec. 1910.269, as follows:
Clearance (between objects). The clear distance between two
objects measured surface to surface.
This definition has been taken from the 1987 NESC (Ex. 2-8).
The minimum approach distances proposed in Table R-6 were for AC
voltages up to 765 kilovolts, nominal. Taken in large part from
existing Table V-1 in Part 1926, each of these distances was intended
to provide a sufficient gap between the worker and the line so that
current could not arc to the employee under the most adverse transient
voltage that could be imposed on the line, plus an extra amount for
inadvertent movement on the part of the employee. To make it clear that
direct contact with live parts was not permitted, OSHA also proposed to
add to the distances given in the existing standard an ``avoid
contact'' entry under the lowest voltage. Additionally, to make the
proposal more consistent with ANSI C2, OSHA proposed to adopt a minimum
approach distance of 2 feet for voltages between 1.1 and 15 kilovolts.
(Table V-1 gives no minimum approach distances below 2.1 kilovolts.)
Proposed table R-7 applied to DC voltages between 250 and 750
kilovolts, nominal. These distances were taken directly from Table 422-
3 of ANSI C2-1984. Since systems of DC voltages other than those listed
are rare, no distances were presented for them in the table.
For the highest voltages, the two proposed tables contained notes
permitting minimum approach distances smaller than those listed. The
smaller minimum approach distance would have been at least the length
of the line insulator, and the smaller distance would have had to be
necessary to perform the work. In the existing Construction Standards,
subpart V uses a similar note, except that the distance may be reduced
to the shortest distance between the energized part and a grounded
surface. The proposed note differed from the note in subpart V because
the subpart V version allowed an employee to be exposed to a risk of
arc-over equal to that at the point in the energized system where the
probability of arc-over is greatest. The Agency believed that the risk
to the employee had to be reduced to a safer level. Taking a different
approach, ANSI C2-1984 had separate tables for AC voltages of 345 to
765 kilovolts, nominal, and for all DC voltages of systems with a known
transient overvoltage factor. The ANSI C-2 tables used minimum approach
distances which increased with increasing surge factors and provided
for greater minimum approach distances, in many cases, than the
footnotes in OSHA's proposed tables. In the notice of proposed
rulemaking, OSHA requested comments on whether it would be more
appropriate to use the ANSI C-2 minimum approach distances for the
affected voltages and whether the ANSI tables provided better
protection for employees than the OSHA proposal.
The comments presented various views on this issue. Two supported
the proposal (Ex. 3-13, 3-20), while others suggested that the Agency
adopt the ANSI C-2 requirements (Ex. 3-35, 3-57, 3-65, 3-80, 3-82, 3-
107). In its pre-hearing comments, Edison Electric Institute also
supported the ANSI minimum approach distance tables, but they expressed
concern that neither ANSI nor OSHA recognized reductions in minimum
approach distances for certain maintenance operations, such as painting
and adjusting hardware (Ex. 3-112).
EEI witnesses at the hearing testified about situations that
presented problems if they had to meet the proposed minimum approach
distances. They were especially concerned about the differences between
the footnotes in the proposal and those in subpart V (DC Tr. 856-885).
At the hearing, they presented new minimum approach distance tables for
use in Sec. 1910.269(1), and one of their witnesses gave testimony
providing technical support for the new tables (DC Tr. 872-905). Mr.
Nestor Kolcio of the American Electric Power Services Corporation
stated that the distances in EEI's tables were based on two formulas
(Ex. 31; DC Tr. 899-901):
Equation (1)--For voltages of 1.1 kV to 72.5 kV:
TR31JA94.000
Where:
D=Distance in air in feet
Vmax=Maximum rated line-to-ground rms58 voltage in kV
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\8Root mean square.
Source: AIEE Standard No. 4, 1943.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
pu=Maximum switching surge factor in per unit
Equation (2)--For voltages of 72.6 kV to 800 kV:
TR31JA94.001
Where:
D=Insulation distance in feet
C1=0.01 or 1 percent of line-to-ground kV, based on 60-Hz rod-gap
withstand spacing
C2=1.1, composed of 1.06 for live-line tool-to-air withstand
distance ratio plus intangibles
a=saturation factor for system voltages of 345 kV and more
S=Maximum anticipated per unit switching surge
kV=System rms line-to-ground kV, actual
Source: ANSI/IEEE Standard No. 516, 1987.
The distances resulting from these formulas were the basis for
calculating the electrical component of the minimum approach distance
to energized parts (that is, the distance at which the probability of
arc-over or flashover becomes extremely low). Although these formulas
were taken from consensus standards, Mr. Kolcio reduced the resultant
electrical component of the minimum approach distance by 25 percent at
voltages over 72.5 kV, which has the effect of increasing the
probability of arc-over at these voltages (Ex. 31; DC Tr. 901). He
acknowledged that this reduction was based on ``new data'' and that no
national consensus standard recognized such a reduction as valid (DC
Tr. 1134).\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\The NESC subcommittee working on new minimum approach
distance tables (see discussion of their work later in this
preamble), which reviewed all the latest technical data, did not
accept a similar reduction of the electrical component of the
minimum approach distance (Ex. 64, 65).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another witness, Mr. Joseph Van Name, representing the National
Electrical Safety Code Committee, Working Group 8, and the Line
Maintenance Group of the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland
Interconnection, testified about the technical basis upon which minimum
approach distances rely (LA Tr. 471-510). He explained that the
technical basis for determining the distance needed to protect against
sparkover and flashover (types of disruptive discharge\60\) is
contained in the IEEE Guide for Maintenance Methods on Energized Power-
Lines, ANSI/IEEE Std. 516-1987 (Ex. 60; LA Tr. 491). He described the
procedure as follows:
\60\``Disruptive discharge'' means the phenomena associated with
the failure of insulation, under electric stress, that include a
collapse of voltage and the passage of current; the term applies to
electrical breakdown in solid, liquid, and gaseous dielectrics and
combinations of these. Terms relating to various types of disruptive
discharge include ``sparkover'', ``flashover'', and ``puncture''.
``Sparkover'' is the term used for a disruptive discharge occurring
in a gaseous or liquid dielectric. ``Flashover'' is the term used
for a discharge occurring over the surface of a solid dielectric in
a gaseous or liquid medium. ``Puncture'' is the term used for the
discharge occurring through a solid dielectric. (These definitions
were taken from Ex. 8-2. These terms were also explained by Mr. Van
Name at LA Tr. 486.) The term ``sparkover'' generally applies to a
breakdown that occurs when an employee is using air as an insulating
medium; ``flashover'' usually applies when he or she is using a
live-line tool and a breakdown occurs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The guideline that is fundamental to our work is if the
electrical withstand capability of the insulation exceeds not only
the operating voltage but any transient or temporary over voltage
that might appear during the work process. And I for one, who works
on the lines, [feel] that that is kind of important.
Let's go through the process, the major item in this process of
determining the safe working clearances. You determine the maximum
electrical stress that can appear at the work site from whatever
source. The stress then determines the withstand requirement, that's
the three sigma requirements. Then, you get a clearance at the work
site to preclude flashover, then you assure that if a flashover
happens, it will not cause injury.
I'll go back. If I am at the work site and I effectively am the
same electrical gap as the physical gap there, I don't want it to
flashover to me. So, to make sure it doesn't come to me, I have to
add some more sigmas, not three, but I add the other two to make
sure it goes over a known gap, and not to the worker. So, that's
what we're trying to do in this whole determination. That's the
fundamental thing. [LA Tr. 492-493]
Mr. Van Name also described the factors that influence the length
of the safe gap, for the purpose of determining minimum approach
distances: temporary overvoltages caused by faults, switching, or
lightning; the wave shape of the overvoltage; polarity of the
overvoltage; insulating medium; gap geometry; and atmospheric
conditions (LA Tr. 493-496). He defined the critical flashover (CFO)
voltage as that voltage that would flashover 50 percent of time for a
given gap (LA Tr. 496-497). The withstand voltage is three standard
deviations (that is, ``three sigmas'') above that voltage (or 1.15
times the CFO) for a probability of flashover of about 0.1 percent (LA
Tr. 496). Mr. Van Name also illustrated the technique of reducing the
minimum safe approach distance by installing a gap in the system and
specified the technique used for determining the sizes of gaps and
minimum approach distances (LA Tr. 508-509).
In concluding his testimony, Mr. Van Name suggested that the
standard adopt a ``user-friendly'' approach consisting of various
tables supplying the distances to be maintained from different voltages
(LA Tr. 509-510). The numbers in the tables presented at the hearing
needed additional refinement, which he promised in the post-hearing
comment period. He also suggested that OSHA include the National
Electrical Safety Code action on this issue in the record and rely on
it as being the best and latest technical information available (LA Tr.
515-516, 534-537, 550-551, 567-569).
From Mr. Kolcio's and Mr. Van Name's presentations, it is clear
that OSHA must first determine the size of the air gap that must be
present so that an arc does not occur during the most severe
overvoltage on a system. This has been referred to as the electrical
component of the minimum approach distance. To determine the minimum
safe approach distance, OSHA must then add an extra distance to account
for ergonomic considerations, or human error.
The electrical component depends on five factors (Ex. 60):
(1) The maximum voltage,
(2) The wave shape of this voltage,
(3) The configuration of the ``electrodes'' forming the end points
of the gap,61
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\1Typical configurations include rod-rod, rod-plane, and
conductor-plane. The terminology refers to the configuration of the
two electrodes. For example, in a rod-plane configuration, one of
the electrodes is a rod perpendicular to an electrode in the shape
of a plane.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(4) The insulating medium in the gap, and
(5) The atmospheric conditions present.
ANSI/IEEE Std. 516-1987 listed values for the electrical component
of the minimum approach distance, both for air alone as an insulating
medium and for live-line tool sticks in air, that were accepted as
being accurate when the standard was adopted (by IEEE) in 1987 (Ex.
60). Using information regarding the wave shape of typical switching
surges, Mr. Kolcio argued that these distances could be reduced by 25
percent (DC Tr. 900-901, 1133-1134). On the other hand, OSHA's expert
witness, Dr. Robert J. Harrington, testified that the Agency's proposed
minimum approach distances were correct. He also noted that OSHA's
proposed minimum approach distances were by no means the most
conservative in the world (DC Tr. 305-308, 318-319). An IEEE paper
presented at the IEEE Power Engineering Society's 1988 Summer Meeting
asserted that more conservative distances might be warranted based on
gap configurations that more closely reflect actual exposure than the
rod-to-rod gap on which IEEE Std. 516-1987 is based and on wave shapes
that are close to the critical wave shape62 (Ex. 60).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\2This refers to the graph of the voltage as a function of
time. The ``critical wave shape'' flashes over at the lowest voltage
if all other factors remain constant. If the transient overvoltage
on the line presents this critical wave shape it may flash over at a
voltage lower than that anticipated by Equation (2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NESC subcommittee having responsibility for the ANSI C-2
minimum approach distance tables completed their review of the latest
technical information related to this issue and adopted a change
proposal for the 1993 edition of the National Electrical Safety Code
(Ex. 64, 65). The basic electrical components of the minimum approach
distances in the subcommittee's proposed tables were based on Equation
(1) and Equation (2).
OSHA has accepted this approach to establishing the basic
electrical component of minimum approach distance. None of the evidence
in the record supporting either a smaller or a larger electrical
component is substantial enough to outweigh the consensus of expert
opinion (that is, ANSI and IEEE) on this matter. However, this distance
is only a portion of the minimum approach distance needed for the
safety of the employee. Other factors also bear on the total safe
distance for employees to maintain from energized parts; the electrical
component of the minimum approach distance does not take into account
human errors in judging and maintaining the required minimum approach
distance.
The NESC subcommittee accepted a set of seven principles to be used
in the development of the proposed minimum approach distance tables.
These principles were listed as follows:
(1) The following principles shall guide the development of a
change proposal for the revision of minimum approach distances under
Rule 441.
(2) ANSI/IEEE Standard 516 is to be the electrical basis of the
NESC Rules for approach distances: Table 4 (Alternating Current) and
Table 5 (Direct Current) for voltages * * * above 72.5 KV. Lower
voltages are to be based on ANSI/IEEE Standard 4. The application of
ANSI/IEEE Standard 516 shall be inclusive of the formula used by that
standard to derive electrical clearance distances.
(3) Altitude correction factors shall be in accordance with ANSI/
IEEE Standard 516, Table 1.
(4) The maximum design transient overvoltage data to be used in the
development of the basic approach distance tables shall be: 3.0 per
unit for voltage[s] 362 KV and less, 2.4 per unit for 500 to 550 KV,
2.0 per unit [for] 765 to 800 KV.
(5) All phase to phase values shall be calculated from the EPRI
Transmission Line Reference Book for 115 to 138 KV. ([S]ee EPRI book
figure 5.2)
(6) An inadvertent movement factor shall be added to all basic
electrical approach distances for all voltage ranges. A distance of one
foot shall be added to all voltage ranges. An additional distance of
one additional foot shall be added to voltage ranges below 72.6 KV.
(7) The voltage reduction allowance for controlled maximum
transient overvoltage shall be such that the minimum allowable approach
distance is not less than the given approach distance specified for the
highest voltage of the given range. The reason for this is that
controlled transient overvoltage factors cannot be applied due to
consideration that power frequency dictates the minimum approach
distance for the voltage involved.
(8) The transient overvoltage tables will be applied only at
voltage ranges inclusive of 72.6 KV to 800 KV. All tables shall be
established using the higher voltage of each separate voltage range.
[Ex. 64, 65]
OSHA has also accepted these principles in forming the minimum
approach distance tables in the final rule. Each of the factors listed
by the subcommittee is supported by substantial evidence in the record
(Ex. 60, 64, 65). The technical aspects of most of these considerations
are such that the Agency must rely heavily on the judgment of these
experts. Nevertheless, OSHA has reviewed the technical information
supporting the subcommittee's action and has found that the data do
justify the NESC criteria. Therefore, the Agency has accepted the NESC
method of computing the minimum approach distances.63
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\3The minimum approach distance tables in the original NESC
change proposal contained several errors in calculation. OSHA, while
accepting the NESC method of computing the distances, has calculated
the actual distances and has carried the correct distances into
final Sec. 1910.269.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The only other factor to cause any debate was the ergonomic
distance to be added to the basic electrical component of minimum
approach distance to account for human errors in judging and
maintaining the required minimum approach distance. Electric utilities
commonly add an ergonomic distance of 1 to 3 feet to the electrical
component of minimum approach distance to determine allowable approach
distances (Ex. 60). The distances set forth in subpart V Tables V-1 and
V-2 provide the ergonomic distances shown in Table 4.
The ergonomic data in the record are limited. Relevant data from
the record include a typical arm's reach of about 2 feet and a reaction
time to a stimulus of 0.2 to more than 1.0 second (Ex. 8-19). To
prevent an employee from breaching the air gap required for the
electrical component, the ergonomic distance must be sufficient for the
employee to be able to recognize a hazardous approach to an energized
line and withdraw to a safe position. Thus, the distance should equal
the response time multiplied by the average speed of an employee's
movement plus ``braking'' distance. (This is comparable to the
calculation of total braking distance for a motor vehicle. This
distance equals the initial speed of the vehicle times the driver's
reaction time plus the braking distance for the vehicle itself after
the brakes have been applied.) The maximum reach (or range of movement)
may place an upper bound on the ergonomic component, however.
For system voltages up to 72.5 kV, phase-to-phase, much of the work
is performed using rubber gloves, and the employee is working within
arm's reach of energized parts (Ex. 64, 65). The ergonomic component of
the minimum approach distance must account for this since the employee
may not have time to react and position himself or herself out of
danger. A distance of 2 feet appears to meet this criterion and was, in
fact, adopted by the NESC subcommittee. OSHA also accepts this value.
Therefore, for voltages of 72.5 kV and less, the minimum approach
distances set forth in the final rule adopt the electrical component of
minimum approach distance given by equation (1) plus an ergonomic
component of 2 feet.
Table 4.--Ergonomic Distances Based on Subpart V, Table V-1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Distance (ft)
---------------------------
IEEE 4
Voltage range (kV) phase to phase IEEE
V-1 516\1\ Differ.\2\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.1 to 15................................... 2.00 0.08 1.92
15.1 to 35.................................. 2.33 0.33 2.00
35.1 to 46.................................. 2.50 0.50 2.00
46.1 to 72.5................................ 3.00 1.00 2.00
72.6 to 121................................. 3.33 2.08 1.25
138 to 145.................................. 3.50 2.58 0.92
161 to 169.................................. 3.67 3.00 0.67
230 to 242.................................. 5.00 4.17 0.83
345 to 362.................................. 7.00 7.42 -0.42
500 to 552.................................. 11.00 10.25 0.75
700 to 765.................................. 15.00 13.83 1.17
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\This column represents the electrical component of the minimum
approach distance as given in the following standards:
2.1 to 7.5 kV: AIEE Standard 4-1943, High Voltage Testing Techniques.
7.6 kV and above: ANSI/IEEE Standard 516-1987, IEEE Guide for
Maintenance Methods on Energized Power Lines.
\2\This equals the ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance
based on Subpart V, Table V-1.
For operations involving lines energized at voltages over 72.5 kV,
the applicable work practices change. Generally, live-line tools are
employed to perform the work while equipment is energized (Ex. 64, 65).
When hot sticks are not used, employees use work methods that more
tightly control their movements than when they perform rubber glove
work. Additionally, exposure to conductors at a potential different
from the one on which work is being performed is limited or
nonexistent. Therefore, a smaller ergonomic component is appropriate
for the higher voltages.64 The NESC subcommittee has accepted a
value of 1 foot for this component. OSHA has adopted this distance as
well. Therefore, for voltages over 72.5 kV, the minimum approach
distances set forth in the final rule adopt the electrical component of
the minimum approach distance given by Equation (2) plus an ergonomic
component of 1 foot.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\4It can also be argued that a large part of the electrical
component of the minimum approach distance at the higher voltages
results from the unlikely, though possible, imposition of a surge on
the energized equipment. This line of reasoning implies that it is
safe to approach an energized part closer than the electrical
component, as long as such approach takes a minimal amount of time.
OSHA does not, however, believe that it is safe to enter this zone
at any time. At the electrical component distance the probability of
flashover is 1 in 1000 if it occurs at the same moment as the
maximum transient overvoltage. The record has little information
regarding what the probability is that a given overvoltage would be
at a maximum. However, it is clear that, given sufficient exposure,
a sparkover will eventually occur at distances less than the
electrical component of the minimum approach distance. Because
OSHA's standard allows for the reduction of minimum approach
distances for systems with known transient overvoltages, it is
logical to assume that the maximum possible transient overvoltage is
reasonably likely to occur. This would place an employee at
significant risk of serious injury due to sparkover if the
electrical component of the minimum approach distance is violated.
It should be noted that one of the sources of temporary overvoltage
is faults, which could be caused by the work operation being
performed. (For example, a conductor being handled could drop onto a
tower. The resultant ground fault could cause a temporary
overvoltage on the unfaulted phase conductors.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It should be noted that the ergonomic component of the minimum
approach distance is only considered a safety factor that protects
employees in case of errors in judging and maintaining the full minimum
approach distance. The actual working position selected must account
for the range of movements that could normally be anticipated while an
employee is working. Otherwise, the employee would violate the minimum
approach distance while he or she is working.
As noted earlier, the proposal permitted work to be performed at
distances less than those given in proposed Tables R-6 and R-7 at
voltages of 345 kV or more if the work was performed at a distance that
was at least as long as the insulator string. Several commenters and
witnesses urged OSHA to recognize methods of working on or near
energized parts that would permit an employee to approach the parts
closer than permitted by proposed Sec. 1910.269(1)(2) and Tables R-6
and R-7 (Ex. 3-35, 3-65, 3-72, 3-80, 3-82, 3-112, 56; DC Tr. 856-868;
LA Tr. 280-281, 471-511). They noted that Subpart V allows approach as
close as the shortest distance between an energized part and a grounded
surface. EEI suggested that Sec. 1910.269 contain a similar footnote
and that the note be extended to lower voltages as well (Ex. 3-112; DC
Tr. 856-858).
As OSHA explained at the hearing, the language in subpart V permits
employees to work at a distance from energized parts that may expose
them to a flashover (DC Tr. 254-255). Under questioning, Mr. Joseph Van
Name agreed that it was not proper to use this distance as the minimum
approach distance:
Mr. Wallis: * * * you really shouldn't take the shortest
distance anywhere on the system, no matter how far away it is?
Mr. Van Name: As a general term, the answer is positively no. I
think I tried to make that rather clear. [LA Tr. 542]
The language in subpart V exposes employees to a probability of
flashover that is equal to the worst case probability anywhere on the
system. No leeway for inadvertent movement is included in this
distance. Additionally, it is possible (though perhaps not likely) that
the shortest distance between a live part and a grounded surface is
less than the withstand distance for the voltage involved. Clearly,
this is neither safe nor acceptable.
Some commenters and witnesses proposed that the standard recognize
limiting surge factors65 as one method of reducing the minimum
approach distance (Ex. 3-35, 3-65, 3-72, 3-80, 3-82; DC Tr. 881-882; LA
Tr. 280-281, 471-511). They argued that, if the maximum transient
overvoltage that could occur on a line was lower than the worst case
estimates used to compile proposed Tables R-6 and R-7, the minimum
approach distance between an employee and an energized part could be
safely reduced. These commenters and witnesses listed various methods
of controlling the maximum surge factor on a line including:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\5Surge factor is the ratio of the maximum overvoltage due to
switching or faults to the normal system voltage. This value is
expressed in ``per unit''; the maximum transient overvoltage is
typically expressed in kilovolts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Modifying the operation of a circuit breaker or other switching
device, including blocking the reclosing feature of a circuit,
(2) Installing surge arresters or temporary protective gaps, and
(3) Changing the operation of the system to restrict the effect of
switching operations (Ex. 64, 65).
Mr. Van Name explained the method of using protective gaps to
reduce the surge factor in great detail (LA Tr. 478-482, 509). He also
explained the technical considerations involved in protecting the
employee when such a gap is used. He indicated that the minimum
approach distances that would be supplied in the post-hearing comment
period would incorporate this concept (LA Tr. 534-537, 550-551, 567-
569). In fact, the NESC subcommittee, as mentioned previously, did
incorporate this concept into their proposed change for the 1993
National Electrical Safety Code (Ex. 64, 65).
The Agency has adopted the approach of the NESC subcommittee in the
final rule. Final Sec. 1910.269 recognizes the use of gaps and other
means of decreasing the surge factor on energized lines as acceptable
methods of reducing the required minimum approach distance. Table R-6
through Table R-10 list minimum approach distances for various surge
factors and phase-to-phase voltages.
In response to questions by EEI, Mr. Van Name acknowledged that
explanatory material would be necessary to enable employers and
employees to use a standard adopting this approach (LA Tr. 516-517).
OSHA has accepted this suggestion as well. The final rule incorporates
an appendix (Appendix B) presenting information necessary to the proper
use of Sec. 1910.269(1)(2). Much of this information is based on
material provided by the NESC subcommittee on work rules (Ex. 64, 65).
There is one difference between the OSHA tables of minimum approach
distances and the proposed ANSI tables. The lowest voltage given in the
ANSI subcommittee's tables is 300 volts, for which the appropriate
minimum approach distance is ``avoid contact.'' The final rule extends
this ``minimum approach distance'' down to 50 volts.
OSHA proposed that employees ``avoid contact'' with all voltages at
1000 volts or less. In response to the proposal, EEI argued that
electrical protective equipment was unnecessary below 300 volts (Ex.
56). They claimed that ``the record evidence does not show that linemen
have been placed at significant risk * * *''
The Agency strongly disagrees with EEI on this point. As Table 3
shows, 15 percent of the accidents to qualified employees working on or
near live parts were at voltages below 300 volts (Ex. 9-2).66 OSHA
believes that there is a hazard for employees exposed to any voltage
higher than 50 volts. Requirements in Subpart S for guarding of live
parts start at 50 volts (see, for example, Sec. 1910.303(g)(2)), and
even qualified electric utility workers have been electrocuted at
voltages as low as 120 volts to ground (Ex. 9-2). Therefore, a level of
50 volts rather than 300 volts has been adopted in the final rule as
the low voltage cutoff for taking measures to prevent employee contact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\6The percentage does not include accidents in which the
voltage level was not given.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One last method of reducing minimum approach distances was
addressed at the hearing. Three witnesses discussed limiting the reach
of employees by means such as barriers as a method of reducing the
ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance (DC Tr. 873-885,
903-905; LA Tr. 509-510). They argued that, if the employee's movements
were restricted, a smaller ergonomic component would be warranted. This
concept was also suggested to the NESC subcommittee on work rules for
inclusion in the change proposal for the 1993 National Electrical
Safety Code (Ex. L62-44, 64, 65). At the hearing, EEI suggested an
ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance of 1 foot for
employees protected by means of position or warning barriers (DC Tr.
878). A similar suggestion to the NESC subcommittee included an
ergonomic distance of 0.5 feet (Ex. L62-44). This concept was not
accepted by the NESC subcommittee, however (Ex. 64, 65).
OSHA has not accepted a reduction in the ergonomic component of the
minimum approach distance by means of warning barriers or employee
positioning for a number of reasons. First, no amount of reduction in
the ergonomic distance is supported by any evidence in the record.
EEI's original suggestion of a 1-foot distance for this component under
limited conditions has been incorporated into the final minimum
approach distances without restriction for voltages above 72.5 kV. The
later recommendation for a 0.5-foot add-on appears to be justified
solely on the basis of what the absolute minimum approach distance is
on an industry-wide basis under current practices rather than on the
basis of what is technologically justified and safe for employees.
Second, for voltages over 72.5 kV, the ergonomic component of the
minimum approach distance is only 1 foot. This relatively short
distance gives the employee very little room to err in judging and
maintaining the minimum approach distance involved. While a warning
barrier may aid the employee in judging the distance, the 0.5-foot
ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance is simply too
small to protect the employee if he or she inadvertently moves too
close to the energized part.
For voltages of 72.5 kV and less, the minimum approach distance is
between 2 and 3 feet. The minimum approach distance recommended by the
rejected change proposal for these voltages would be only 0.5 to 1.5
feet. Clearly, any tools or equipment being held by an employee would
expose him or her to inadvertent contact with the lines, regardless of
the electrical component of the minimum approach distance. The
accidents in the record amply demonstrate that this is a common
occurrence.
If anything, the accidents in the record indicate that the
ergonomic component should be increased, not decreased. The ergonomic
component of the minimum approach distance is a cushion against an
employee's coming too close to an energized part. Unfortunately, it
cannot be reasonably sized to ensure that no employee will ever get
close enough to be injured or killed. The Agency must choose a distance
that will be sufficient under typical working conditions to provide
adequate safety to electrical line workers. Given existing industry
practices and the other provisions included in this final rule, OSHA
believes that the 1- and 2-foot ergonomic components of the minimum
approach distance provided in Table R-6 through Table R-8 will afford
this protection.
As noted earlier, EEI argued that minimum approach distances
smaller than those required by Subpart V were sometimes necessary to
perform work on energized systems. Although the minimum approach
distances set forth in final Sec. 1910.269(1)(2) are basically no less
than those in the construction standard, the rule does recognize
procedures that permit closer approaches.
The standard provides smaller minimum approach distances for
systems with surge factors that are limited by means such as system
design, switching controls, and temporary protective gaps. Frequently,
built-in or temporary limits on the surge factor on a system can result
in a minimum approach distance that is small enough to permit work to
be performed without additional protective measures. Because the line
worker cannot determine surge factors at the jobsite, surge factor
reduction is permitted only when the employer can demonstrate, through
engineering analysis, that the possible surges on the line will be held
to values no more than permitted under Table R-7 and Table R-8. Methods
of controlling and determining the surge factor for a system are given
in appendix B.
Other means of allowing closer approach are also permitted.
Proposed Sec. 1910.269(l)(2) provided three exceptions to the use of
the minimum approach distances in Tables R-6 and R-7. The first
exception was that the employee be insulated from the energized part.
The second exception was for the live part to be insulated from the
employee. The last exception was for the employee to be insulated from
energized parts at a voltage different from that on which work was
being performed. Similar exceptions are provided in the final rule as
well.
Existing Sec. 1926.950(c)(1)(i), from which proposed
Sec. 1910.269(l)(2)(i) was taken, also specifically permits the
employee to be guarded or isolated from the live parts. This language
was omitted from the proposal. EEI strongly objected to the omission
and urged that the final rule adopt the language of the requirement in
the Construction Standards (Ex. 3-112; DC Tr. 868-870). However, it
should be noted that the introductory language in final
Sec. 1910.269(l)(2) requires minimum approach distances to be
maintained from ``exposed'' energized parts. Guarded live parts,
whether they are guarded by enclosures or barriers or are guarded by
position (isolated), are not addressed by this rule.\67\ Including
language exempting live parts that are ``guarded'' or ``isolated''
would be redundant and could lead to misinterpretation of the rule.
Therefore, EEI's suggestion has not been adopted. Additionally, similar
redundancies in paragraphs (c)(1)(ii) and (iii) of Sec. 1926.950 have
not been carried forward into paragraphs (l)(2)(ii) and (l)(2)(iii) of
final Sec. 1910.269. To clarify the rule, however, a note has been
included following paragraph (l)(2) to indicate that parts of electric
circuits meeting paragraphs (u)(5)(i) and (v)(5)(i) are not considered
as ``exposed'' unless a guard is removed or an employee enters the
space intended to provide isolation from the live parts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\Paragraphs (u)(5)(i) and (v)(5)(i) contain requirements for
the guarding of live parts. Parts of electric circuits that meet
these two provisions are not considered as ``exposed'' unless a
guard is removed or an employee enters the space intended to provide
isolation from the live parts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Sec. 1910.269(l)(2)(i) contains the first exception--
insulating the employee from the energized part. This insulation can
take the form of rubber insulating gloves and rubber insulating
sleeves. This equipment protects the employee from electric shock as he
or she works on the line or equipment. Even though uninsulated parts of
the employee's body may come closer to the live part than would
otherwise be permitted by Table R-6 through Table R-10, the employee's
hand and arm would be insulated from the live part, and the working
distances involved would be sufficient protection against arc-over. As
noted earlier the tables include a component for inadvertent movement,
which is unnecessary for employees using rubber insulating equipment.
In the worst case situation, an employee would be working on a line
requiring a 3-foot minimum approach distance.\68\ The electrical
component of this minimum approach distance is 1 foot. Because the
distance from the hand to the elbow is about 1 foot and because it
would be uncomfortable to work closer than this distance to a line
being held in the hand, the worst case minimum approach distance would
exceed the electrical component of the minimum approach distance, and
the employee would be protected from sparkover. In any event, the
accident data in the record show that the overriding hazard to
employees is posed by other energized conductors in the work area, to
which the minimum approach distances still apply. The rubber gloves, of
course, provide protection only for the line on which work is being
performed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\The maximum use voltage for Class IV rubber gloves is 36
kilovolts. If only single-phase exposure is involved, the maximum
phase-to-phase voltage would be in the 46.1 to 72.5 kilovolt range
Table R-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of course, the insulation used would have to be designed for the
voltage. (The revision of Sec. 1910.137 gives use voltages for
electrical protective equipment.) As a clarification, paragraph
(l)(2)(i) notes that the insulation is considered as protection only
against parts upon which work is being performed; the required minimum
approach distances would have to be maintained from other exposed
energized parts.
As a second option to maintaining the minimum approach distances,
paragraph (l)(2)(ii) of final Sec. 1910.269 allows the energized part
to be insulated from the employee. Such insulation could be in the form
of insulating blankets or line hose or other suitable insulating
equipment. Again, the insulation would have to be adequate for the
voltage.
Paragraphs (l)(2)(i) and (l)(2)(ii) recognize the protection
afforded to the employee by an insulating barrier between the employee
and the energized part. As long as the insulation is appropriate and is
in good condition, current will not flow through the worker, and he or
she is protected.
The third option (paragraph (l)(2)(iii)) to the maintenance of the
minimum approach distances is to insulate the employee from exposed
conductive objects other than the live part upon which work is to be
performed. Much of the work performed under this option is called
``live-line bare-hand'' work. (For specific practices for this type of
work, see the discussion of final Sec. 1910.269 (q)(3).) In this type
of work, the employee is in contact with the energized line, like a
bird on a wire, but is not contacting another conductive object at a
different potential. Because there is no complete circuit, current
cannot flow through the worker, and he or she is protected.
In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested public comment on
whether rubber insulating sleeves should be required when gloves are
used on lines or equipment. The Agency received a significant amount of
comment on this issue.
Several commenters supported a requirement for employees to wear
rubber insulating sleeves when working on or near exposed energized
parts (Ex. 3-13, 3-46, 3-57, 3-107, 64; DC Tr. 558-561, 610-612). They
stressed the extra safety that sleeves would provide. Mr. James Ozzello
of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers summarized the
IBEW accident data relating to the lack of rubber insulating sleeves by
electric line workers, as follows:
Mr. Ozzello: Regarding the rubber sleeves, I only included those
accidents where the electric contact was in the area that would be
covered by the rubber sleeves. I did not include those accidents
where the electric contact was in the area of rubber sleeves and the
victim was not wearing rubber gloves or where the victim was using a
live line tool, a hot stick.
If the employee was not wearing rubber gloves, chances are he
would not be wearing the rubber sleeves. Also, many companies do not
require the use of rubber protective equipment when live line tools
are used.
* * * * *
To summarize the three surveys on fatal and serious accidents,
there were a total of 171 fatal accidents and 271 serious accidents.
* * * * *
Rubber sleeves might have prevented nine of the fatalities and
[sixteen] of the serious accidents. [DC Tr. 558-561]
Others opposed a requirement for employees to wear sleeves as well
as gloves (Ex. 3-23, 3-32, 3-42, 3-60, 3-82, 3-112, 46, 47, 56, L62-33,
L62-43, L62-44; DC Tr. 925-926). EEI pointed to the experience of four
electric utilities that have had no electrical contact accidents that
the use of rubber insulating sleeves would have prevented (Ex. 46). The
experience of these companies was summarized by Mr. Tony E. Brannan of
Georgia Power Company, representing EEI, who stated:
Mr. Brannan: I would like to make, if I may, just one comment,
one side comment here.
Please note that rubber glove. Now our fine faithful colleague
friends from up north have been showing you some slides where
employees use sleeves. That is those things that go around the
shoulder and come down the arm.
Well, that is all well and good and I am not trying to criticize
their work practices. But I am trying to show you here that there
are other ways of protecting employees other than using sleeves.
(Viewgraph displayed)
Mr. Brannan: Now look at this glove. That glove goes up over the
elbow of that individual. That gloves [sic] has what is called an
18-inch cuff, which means that it goes up, way up onto the forearm.
Now what I am suggesting and requesting, respectfully
requesting, is that if you in this case follow the language in
Subpart V where gloves ``or'' sleeves and gloves shall be used. In
other words, please continue and let the use of rubber sleeves be
optional.
Some companies use them and some companies don't. In our company
we have a tremendous cover-up program and we cover-up even the paths
to ground up on the pole.
So therefore we do not use sleeves. They are hot in the south in
the summertime. They don't breathe. And we look at them as a
nuisance. I can tell you that we in our company have never had an
accident that rubber sleeves would have prevented. [DC Tr. 925-926]
EEI also pointed to the cost and inadequate supply of rubber
insulating sleeves as factors the Agency should consider as factors
supporting their view (Ex. 56). They submitted many petitions urging
OSHA not to adopt a requirement for the use of sleeves (Ex. 46) and
stated that ``[t]his spontaneous expression of concern by employers and
employees alike surely cannot be ignored by the Agency'' (Ex. 56).
OSHA's primary concern is for the safety of employees. The injuries
and fatalities to which Mr. Ozzello referred constitute 5.9 and 5.3
percent of the totals, respectively. This is a significant portion of
the total number of serious accidents occurring among electric line
workers. The Agency believes that these injuries and fatalities are
clearly preventable.
The use of rubber insulating sleeves would certainly have prevented
most of these accidents. However, as demonstrated by the commendable
safety record of the companies cited by EEI, the extensive use of
insulating equipment to cover energized parts in the employee's work
area would also appear to prevent employees' upper arms and shoulders
from contacting live parts. In fact, if every energized part within
reach of an employee were insulated, electrical contacts involving
other parts of the body, such as an employee's head or back, would be
averted as well. The NESC subcommittee on work rules also recognized
this method as providing protection to employees (Ex. 64, 65).
The proposal and existing subpart V do not require any protection
for employees working on or near exposed live parts beyond the use of
rubber insulating gloves, and it appears from the descriptions of the
accidents cited by the IBEW that some companies do not go beyond the
existing OSHA regulations. To prevent such accidents from occurring in
the future, the Agency has decided to require protection in addition to
that required by subpart V.
The final rule adopts a provision, Sec. 1910.269(l)(3), requiring
the use of rubber insulating sleeves (in addition to rubber insulating
gloves), unless live parts that are exposed to contact with an
employee's upper arm or shoulder are insulated. Employees can work
without sleeves by installing rubber line hose, rubber blankets, and
plastic guard equipment on energized equipment. However, an employee
installing such protective equipment on energized lines must wear
rubber sleeves unless his or her upper arms and shoulders are not
exposed to contact with other live parts during this operation.
OSHA believes that paragraph (l)(3) incorporates the most effective
approach to preventing accidents involving work on or near exposed live
parts. Companies that rely on extensive insulation of live parts in the
work area can generally continue to use this method to protect
employees. Companies that use gloves alone to protect their employees
may have to purchase additional supplies of rubber insulating
equipment.
Evidence in the record indicates that supplies of rubber insulating
sleeves at the time the rulemaking record closed were not sufficient to
enable employers to acquire them in quantities adequate to ensure
compliance with the standard (Ex. 46, 56). In its post-hearing brief
(Ex. 56), EEI stated: ``Any requirement for additional rubber
protective sleeves could only be phased in over a period of three years
at a minimum.'' That statement was made in August of 1990, over 3 years
ago. As EEI noted in their brief, demand for additional supplies of
rubber insulating sleeves was anticipated by the manufacturers as early
as 1990. Furthermore, the NESC requirement on the use of sleeves was
adopted in July of 1992, well over 1 year ago. Thus, employers and
manufacturers have had over 1 year's lead time based on compliance with
the NESC. Lastly, the standard recognizes alternative approaches for
protecting employees. Because of this, some employers may not need to
purchase rubber sleeves to comply with the final rule. Taking this
information into consideration, OSHA has determined that no additional
delay in effective date, beyond the 120 days given for the final rule
as a whole, is needed to enable employers to obtain sufficient supplies
of rubber insulating equipment.
Paragraph (l)(3) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 would have required
employees to position themselves so that a shock or slip would not
cause the worker's body to move towards exposed parts at a potential
different from that of the employee. Since slips, and even electric
shocks, are not entirely preventable, it is important for the employee
to take a working position so that such an event will not increase the
severity of any incurred injury. This proposed requirement was taken
from ANSI C2-1984, Section 422F.
Several commenters objected to this provision (Ex. 3-20, 3-22, 3-
42, 3-60, 3-80, 3-82, 3-101, 3-112). They noted that the ANSI
requirement was not written in mandatory language and that it was not
always possible to work from below an energized part. Most suggested
alternative language, such as replacing ``employees may not work'' to
``employees shall avoid, where practical'' (Ex. 3-20) and replacing
``may'' with ``should'' (Ex. 3-42). Some gave examples demonstrating
the impracticality of such a rule (Ex. 3-20, 3-42, 3-101; DC Tr. 991-
992).
OSHA agrees that it is not always possible to comply with the rule
as proposed. However, the Agency believes that it is important for an
employee to work from a position where a slip or a shock will not bring
him or her into contact with an energized part unless other conditions,
such as the configuration of the lines involved or fatigue of the
employee, would make another working position safer. The position taken
must be the safest available to accomplish the task, but may not be the
most efficient one. Even electric utility representatives stated that
it is common practice to teach employees to work from below energized
parts, where a slip would take the employee away from the parts (Ex. 3-
82, 3-112; DC Tr. 989-991). Unfortunately, most of the suggested
alternatives would render the provision largely unenforceable. To
provide employees with the safest work position feasible, OSHA has
adopted the following language in paragraph (l)(4) of final
Sec. 1910.269:
The employer shall ensure that each employee, to the extent
that other safety-related conditions at the worksite permit, works
in a position from which a slip or shock will not bring the
employee's body into contact with exposed, uninsulated parts
energized at a potential different from the employee.
The revised language recognizes situations that preclude working
from a position from which a slip would bring the employee into contact
with a live part but remains enforceable in the Agency's view. The
language contained in this provision also allows such options as
guarding or insulating the live part as alternative means of
compliance.
Paragraph (l)(5) addresses the practices of connecting and
disconnecting lines and equipment. Common industry practice, as
reflected in ANSI C2-1984, Section 422G, is to make a connection so
that the source is connected as the last item in sequence and to break
a connection so that the source is removed as the first item in
sequence. In this way, conducting wires and devices used to make and
break the connection are deenergized during almost the entire
procedure. Since these wires and devices must be handled during the
procedure, the requirement reduces the chance for an electrical
accident. Also, to prevent the disconnected conductors from being
energized, loose conductors must be kept away from live parts. These
requirements have been broken into separate paragraphs in the final
rule.
Taken from ANSI C2-1984, Section 420I2, Sec. 1910.269(l)(6)(i)
prohibits the wearing of conductive articles by employees working
within reach of exposed live parts of equipment if these articles would
increase the hazards associated with accidental contact with the live
parts. If an employee wants to wear metal jewelry, he or she can cover
the jewelry so as to eliminate the contact hazard. This requirement is
not intended to preclude workers from wearing metal rings or watch
bands if the work being performed already exposes them to electric
shock hazards and if the wearing of metal would not increase the
hazards. (For example, for work performed on an overhead line, the
wearing of a ring does not increase the likelihood that an employee
would contact the line, nor would it increase the severity of the
injury should contact occur.) However, this requirement would protect
employees working on energized circuits with small clearances and high
current capacities (such as some battery-supplied circuits) from severe
burn hazards to which they would otherwise be exposed. The rule also
protects workers who are only minimally exposed to shock hazards from
being injured as a result of a dangling chain's making contact with an
energized part. OSHA has accepted the suggestion of two commenters that
the proposed term ``in the vicinity of'' be replaced with ``within
reaching distance'' to help clarify the requirement (Ex. 3-20, 3-80).
OSHA mentioned in the preamble to the proposal that certain
clothing fabrics were easily ignited and could pose severe burn
hazards. The Agency noted that, since qualified employees are commonly
exposed to electric arcs, it had been suggested that clothing made of
these materials be prohibited for exposed employees. The preamble also
stated that American Society for Testing and Materials Committee F-18
on Electrical Protective Equipment for Workers was exploring possible
standards for application to clothing. However, since no standards
existed, OSHA requested public comment on the desirability of adopting
requirements in this area and on the costs and benefits of any
suggested provisions. The notice of public hearing informed interested
parties that the Agency was considering a prohibition of any clothing
that would substantially increase the severity of any injury received
from arcing electric equipment.
OSHA received many comments on this issue. In its original
submission, EEI maintained that electric utility employees are rarely
exposed to electric arcs because of the quality of their training and
the extent of the safeguards provided (Ex. 3-112). If this were true,
the Agency would not need to regulate the type of clothing these
workers wear. However, this statement was strongly rebutted by the
testimony of Mr. James Ozzello of the IBEW, who stated:
When examining the accident reports for these accidents where
burns might have been the cause of a death or contributing factor to
the death of a victim, or a factor in the seriousness of the
accident, I did not include flash burns or burns that could have
been solely electrical burns.
I only included the type of burns that the wearing of either
flame resistant clothing or a natural fiber clothing might have
prevented or lessened the degree of injury.
I also did not include burns that were caused by either escaping
steam or hot water.
* * * * *
To summarize the three surveys on fatal and serious accidents,
there were a total of 171 fatal accidents and 271 serious accidents
[overall].
* * * * *
If 65 of the employees who were involved in serious accidents
had been wearing natural fiber clothing or flame retardant clothing,
their accidents might not have been classified as serious accidents.
[DC Tr. 559-562]
OSHA has determined, therefore, that electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution workers do face a significant risk of
injury from burns due to electric arcs.
The evidence was nearly universal that certain fabrics increase the
extent of injuries to employees caught in an electric arc or otherwise
exposed to flames (Ex. 3-9, 3-10, 3-13, 3-20, 3-22, 3-51, 3-57, 3-80,
3-82, 3-88, 3-95, 3-107, 12-12, 47, 56; DC Tr. 363-364). Nonetheless,
the commenters disagreed on the approach that OSHA should take in
regulating the type of clothing worn by employees. Several claimed that
requirements dealing with this subject would be difficult to enforce
and suggested that OSHA adopt either no regulation or a simple
provision requiring workers to be trained in the relevant hazards (Ex.
3-10, 3-42, 3-69, 3-123, 56). Most, however, took a position similar to
that of OSHA's expert witness Mr. Arthur Lewis, who recommended
adopting a rule that would prohibit employees from wearing clothing
made of fabrics that could increase the extent of their injuries in the
event of exposure to electric arc (Ex. 3-9, 3-13, 3-20, 3-57, 3-82, 3-
107, 47; DC Tr. 363-364).69
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\9Some of these supported a requirement for natural fibers,
such as cotton; others supported a prohibition against synthetic
materials, such as polyester.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several interested parties submitted evidence regarding the
flammability of various materials and the degree of injuries that would
occur under certain conditions. The IBEW introduced a videotape,
produced by the Duke Power Company, demonstrating the effects of
different types of clothing upon exposure to electric arcs (Ex. 12-12).
This tape provides clear evidence of the hazards of wearing clothing
made from certain untreated synthetic fabrics, such as polyester,
acetate, nylon, and rayon. Representatives from E. I. du Pont de
Nemours and Company and from Hoechst Celanese Corporation submitted
test data on various fabrics (Ex. 44, 3-95). The du Pont data, contrary
to other evidence in the record, indicated that untreated cotton
resulted in a higher predicted percentage of second and third degree
burns than an untreated polyester/cotton blend. However, these results
were obtained with a 4-second gas heat flux of 2 calories/cm\2\-sec--
not a normal electric arc exposure, which is of high energy density but
short duration.
OSHA believes the data from the Duke Power Company study are more
directly related to electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work, at least at present. In the future, the results of
the ASTM Committee work should improve the data available to the Agency
and should provide a basis upon which a detailed standard could be
based. In the meantime, OSHA has decided that a performance-oriented
approach to the problem is warranted. The risk to employees is too
great for the Agency simply to ignore the problem, and the quickest
immediate solution is for employees to avoid wearing fabrics that might
worsen any injuries they experience from an electric arc. Therefore,
for exposed employees, paragraph of final Sec. 1910.269 adopts a
requirement that these employees be trained in the hazards related to
the clothing that they wear, and paragraph sets forth a prohibition of
apparel that could increase the extent of injuries received by a worker
who is exposed to an electric arc. OSHA has also included a note
following paragraph to indicate the types of clothing fabrics that the
record demonstrates are hazardous to wear by employees exposed to
electric arcs.
The requirement is intended to prohibit the types of fabrics shown
in the Duke Power Company videotape to be expected to cause more severe
injuries than would otherwise be anticipated. These include such
untreated materials as polyester and rayon, unless the employee is
otherwise protected from the effects of their burning. Natural fabrics,
such as 100 percent cotton or wool, and synthetic materials that are
flame resistant or flame retardant are acceptable under the final rule.
(If and when a national consensus standard on clothing for electrical
workers becomes available, OSHA will examine whether or not to revise
the rule to require materials conforming to such a standard.) The
Agency realizes that employers may have difficulties enforcing company
rules on the types of clothing that their employees may wear. OSHA will
adopt flexible enforcement policies in this area for employers making
good faith efforts to comply with the standard. Additionally, the
Agency intends to support such outreach activities as training,
speeches, and informational pamphlets to educate employers and
employees about the hazards associated with flammable clothing.
To protect employees from contacting energized parts, paragraph
(l)(6) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 would have required fuses for circuits
over 300 volts to be installed and removed using insulated tools or
gloves. Additionally, employees installing expulsion-type fuses would
have been required to wear eye protection and would have had to stand
clear of the fuse's exhaust path. This requirement was taken from ANSI
C2-1984, Section 420O.
Two commenters argued that, at higher voltages, the proposal was
not adequate to protect employees (Ex. 3-69, 3-123). They also
suggested that some protection be required for voltages below 300
volts.
OSHA agrees that there is a hazard for employees exposed to any
voltage higher than 50 volts. Requirements in Subpart S for guarding of
live parts start at 50 volts (see, for example, Sec. 1910.303(g)(2)),
and even qualified electric utility employees have been electrocuted at
voltages as low as 120 volts to ground (Ex. 9-2). Therefore, the final
standard also requires protection for the installation or removal of
fuses with exposed parts energized at more than 50 volts.
The installation and removal of fuses on circuits energized at
voltages much higher than 300 volts can also lead to hazards not
completely addressed by proposed Sec. 1910.269(l)(6) if expulsion-type
fuses are involved. When an expulsion fuse operates on a fault or
overload, the arc from the fault current erodes the tube of the fuse
holder (Ex. 8-5). This produces a gas that blasts the arc out through
the fuse tube vent or vents, and with it any loose material in the way.
Employees could be injured by the arc blast or by particles blown, by
the blast, in their eyes. (For this reason, OSHA has not accepted the
argument of three commenters, Ex. 3-38, 3-125, 3-128, that no
protection is needed by employees handling the fuses with 30-foot hot
sticks.) Employees should never install or remove such fuses using
gloves alone. Therefore, in final Sec. 1910.269(l)(7), the Agency is
requiring them to use eye protection and tools rated for the voltage.
Paragraph (l)(8) explains that covered conductors are treated under
the standard as uninsulated. (See the definition of ``covered
conductor'' in Sec. 1910.269(x).) The covering on this type of wire
protects the conductor from the weather but does not provide adequate
insulating value.
Since ungrounded metal frames of equipment can become energized,
paragraph (l)(8) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 would have required the
testing of these metal parts for voltage before they could be treated
as deenergized. Two commenters questioned the wisdom of this provision
(Ex. 3-69, 3-123). They noted that a test is only good at the specific
time the test is done.
OSHA has accepted this recommendation. Paragraph (l)(9) in the
final rule restates the requirement so that noncurrent-carrying metal
parts of equipment or devices must be treated as energized unless the
installation is inspected and these parts are determined to be
grounded. Grounding these parts, whether by permanent grounds or by the
installation of temporary grounds, would provide protection the entire
time work is being performed.
Paragraph (l)(10) requires devices used to open circuits under load
conditions to be designed to interrupt the current involved.
This provision was not included in proposed Sec. 1910.269. The
National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) urged OSHA to add
a requirement for opening circuits under load only with devices
intended to interrupt current (Ex. 3-81). Edison Electric Institute
recommended adoption of a similar requirement (Ex. 28). The Agency
agrees with EEI and NEMA that it is hazardous to open a circuit with a
device that is not designed to interrupt current if that circuit is
carrying current. Non-load-break switches used to open a circuit while
it is carrying load current could fail catastrophically, severely
injuring or killing any nearby employee. Therefore, OSHA has adopted a
requirement that devices used to open circuits under load conditions be
designed to interrupt the current involved as paragraph (l)(10) of
final Sec. 1910.269.
Paragraph (m). Paragraph (m) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses the
deenergizing of electric transmission and distribution lines and
equipment for the protection of employees. Transmission and
distribution systems are different from other energy systems found in
general industry or even in the electric utility industry itself. The
hazardous energy control methods for these systems are necessarily
different from those covered under Sec. 1910.269(d). Transmission and
distribution lines and equipment are installed outdoors and are subject
to being reenergized by means other than the normal energy sources. For
example, lightning can strike a line and energize an otherwise
deenergized conductor, or a line could be energized by unknown
cogeneration sources not under the control of the employer.
Additionally, some deenergized transmission and distribution lines are
subject to being reenergized by induced voltage from nearby energized
conductors or by contact with other energized sources of electrical
energy. Another difference is that energy control devices are often
very remote from the worksite and are frequently under the centralized
control of a system operator.
For these reasons, OSHA proposed to cover the control of hazardous
energy sources related to transmission and distribution systems
separately. Because paragraph (m) covers this area, the general
requirements for hazardous energy control in paragraph (d) of final
Sec. 1910.269 do not apply to the disconnection of transmission and
distribution lines and equipment from sources of electrical energy.
There was no significant objection to this approach in the record, and
OSHA has carried it forward into the final rule.
In addition to setting forth the application of Sec. 1910.269(m),
paragraph (m)(1) explains that conductors and equipment that have not
been deenergized under the procedures of either paragraph (d) or (m) of
Sec. 1910.269 have to be treated as energized. Therefore, there are no
gaps in the coverage of these two paragraphs.
Several commenters objected to the application of the requirements
of proposed Sec. 1910.269(m) to distribution lines of 600 volts or less
(Ex. 3-20, 3-42, 3-80, 3-112). These commenters stated that their
procedures for the lower voltages did not conform to OSHA's proposal
and that they had experienced no accidents as a result of using them.
EEI specified how utilities' approach differs for lines and equipment
operating at 600 volts or less. They stated:
OSHA has not proposed to use the triggering level of 600 volts
contained in subpart V, [Sec. ]1926.950(d) and proposed by EEI/IBEW
as the threshold for application of these requirements. Accordingly,
formal clearance70 procedures would be used to work voltages
lower than 600 volts without personal protective equipment. To
initiate these procedures for voltages less than 600 volts would
result in substantial work delays that are completely unnecessary.
Once again, we do not understand why OSHA proposes to depart from
subpart V for a hazard which is truly identical whether performing
maintenance or construction. Stated simply, 600 volts is 600 volts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\0The word ``clearance'', as used in the discussion of this
paragraph, means the procedure used to deenergize lines and
equipment (and hold them ``clear'') for the protection of employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA has also omitted the phrase ``visibly open'' contained in
the EEI/IBEW draft. This could mean that formal clearance procedures
would be required even on small jobs where the crew working on the
facility can clearly see that the disconnect switches are open or
locked out or tagged out. Subpart V, section 1926.950(d)(1) provides
that its requirements do not apply if the disconnecting means is
``visibly open or visibly locked out.'' Again, the reason for
departing from subpart V for identical hazards is not explained or
justified.
The ``visibly open'' provision is utilized on some high voltage
work, involving one or two spans of conductor, removing transformers
from the line, and some substation work. The ``visibly open''
provision and the ``600 volt'' threshold are also used on most
secondary and service work. Consistent with OSHA's existing
standards, most utilities presently allow personnel to work on
deenergized equipment normally energized below 600 volts without
rubber protective equipment if the means of disconnecting is visibly
open or visibly tagged or locked open. There are other precautions,
such as testing for voltage, removal of customer meters,
disconnecting service taps or shunting the transformer secondary
leads, that are used to protect workers. Most utilities do not
require personal protective grounds below 600 volts.
With no voltage threshold for application of this [paragraph],
prohibitive costs will be incurred for utilities that presently
comply with subpart V and use the 600 volt threshold for both
construction and maintenance work. These added costs will flow from
instituting centralized control for these low voltage operations,
purchasing additional grounds and implementing procedures on a daily
basis. [Ex. 3-112]
OSHA firmly believes that certain procedures must be followed for
deenergizing live parts at any voltage over 50 volts71 if
employees will be in contact with the parts during the course of work.
Contact with electric circuit parts energized at 600 volts or less can
be as fatal as contact with higher voltages. The basic steps necessary
for deenergizing electric circuits are the same regardless of voltage--
first, the disconnecting means for the circuit must be opened; second,
a method of securing the disconnecting means from accidental closure
must be used; third, the circuit must be tested to ensure that it is in
fact deenergized; and, fourth, measures (such as grounding) must be
used to ensure that no hazardous voltage can be impressed on the
circuit while employees are working. These are the steps that were
proposed in Sec. 1910.269(m) and that have been carried into the final
rule. These are the same steps that are set forth, without a voltage
limitation, in 1987 NESC Section 423, on which the proposal was based
(Ex. 2-8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\1This is also the voltage limit for the application of the
requirement for deenergizing live parts in OSHA's electrical safety-
related work practices standard, Sec. 1910.333(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to the comments, OSHA has modified the details of the
individual steps (that is, paragraphs in the final rule), as explained
later in this section of the preamble (see, for example, the summary
and explanation of paragraphs (m)(2)(ii) and (m)(3)(i)). These
modifications have been based, not on voltage, but on the circumstances
involved with different types of installations. For example, one of
these circumstances is whether or not central control of the electric
circuit is exerted. Central control of transmission and distribution
circuits is not required by the standard (as implied by EEI) but, if
present, necessitates modifications of the details of the basic steps
to be taken. This is true regardless of the voltage involved.
For these reasons, OSHA has not limited the application of
paragraph (m) of final Sec. 1910.269 to circuit parts operating at more
than 600 volts.
Proposed Sec. 1910.269(m)(2) outlined how the individual provisions
in paragraph (m)(3) would have applied under various conditions. The
entire paragraph (m)(3) would have applied to situations in which the
employee depended on others for deenergizing the circuits or in which
the employee obtained authorization to perform the task himself or
herself. All of paragraph (m)(3) would also have applied if a single
employee, other than the system operator, was in complete control of
the lines or equipment and of their means of disconnection. In this
case, the employee in charge would have been required to take the place
of the system operator, as necessary, to open and tag switches and
other devices controlling electrical energy to the lines or equipment
involved. (The system operator is a qualified person, commonly located
in a control room, who operates the system or its parts.)
If an employee was working alone and if the means of disconnection
were visible to the employee, the only requirements of paragraph (m)(3)
which would have applied were those directly pertaining to the
deenergizing and reenergizing of lines and equipment. Provisions for
tagging and for communication with others would not have applied.
EEI suggested that this last condition be extended to apply to a
crew of employees, as well as employees working alone (Ex. 3-112; LA
Tr. 240-241). They argued that tags were not necessary if a single
group of employees was working on a deenergized circuit and if the
disconnecting means for that circuit was visibly open.
OSHA has accepted this recommendation. The Agency agrees that,
under certain conditions, tagging a disconnecting means that is open
and visible to a crew as they are performing their work would not
increase the safety of the employees. As noted by the commenters, some
systems are under the direction of a central system operator who
controls all switching operations. Other systems (mostly distribution
installations) are not under any centralized control. These systems are
energized and deenergized in the field without the direct intervention
of a system operator. To incorporate EEI's suggestion into the final
rule and to reflect more clearly this bifurcated approach to
deenergizing transmission and distribution lines and equipment, OSHA
has reorganized and revised paragraph (m)(2).
Paragraph (m)(2)(i) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 has been carried
forward into the final rule. The language of this provision, however,
has been modified to make it clear that all of the requirements of
paragraph (m)(3) apply only if a system operator is in charge of the
lines and equipment and of their means of disconnection.
Paragraph (m)(2)(ii) defines the general application of the rule to
crews working on lines that are not under the control of a system
operator. In the usual case, one employee is designated to be in charge
of the clearance. All the requirements in paragraph (m)(3) apply, with
the employee in charge of the clearance taking the place of the system
operator. In this manner, the final rule provides protection against
the unintended energizing of transmission and distribution lines
without requiring all lines to be under the control of one employee.
One employee in a crew will be in charge of the clearance for the crew;
procedures will be followed to ensure that the lines are truly
deenergized; tags will be placed on the lines; and procedures will be
followed to remove the tags and reenergize the lines.
However, in some cases, certain requirements contained in paragraph
(m)(3) are not necessary for the safety of employees. If only one crew
will be working on transmission or distribution lines and if the means
of deenergizing the lines is accessible and visible to and under the
sole control of the employee in charge of the clearance, the provisions
requiring tags on the disconnecting means are unnecessary. The proposed
rule would have applied the appropriate provisions for this situation,
but only for employees working alone. As EEI noted in their comments,
the hazards are basically the same whether an employee is working alone
or as part of a crew, as long as the disconnecting means are accessible
and visible to the employees and are under the sole control of a single
employee.
Therefore, paragraph (m)(2)(iii) exempts a portion of the
requirements of paragraph (m)(3) from applying to work that is
performed by a single crew of employees,72 if the means of
disconnection of the lines and equipment are accessible and visible to
and under the sole control of the employee in charge of the clearance.
The provisions of paragraph (m)(3) that would not apply are those
relating to (1) requesting the system operator to deenergize the lines,
(2) automatic and remote control of the lines, (3) the wording on tags,
(4) two crews working on the same line, and (5) tag removal. It is not
necessary to request the system operator to deenergize the lines
because he or she would not be in control of the disconnecting means
for the lines. Only one person would be in charge of the clearance for
the crew, and the means of disconnection for the lines would be
accessible and visible to and under the control of that person.73
Thus, tags would not be needed for the protection of the crew, and
remote and automatic switching of the lines would not be recognized
under paragraph (m)(2)(iii). Additionally, this paragraph does not
apply to work performed by two crews working on lines or equipment
controlled by the same disconnecting means. (A group of employees made
up of several ``crews'' of employees who are under the direction of a
single employee and who are working in a coordinated manner to
accomplish a task on the same lines or equipment are considered to be a
single crew, rather than as multiple independent crews, for the
purposes of paragraph (m)(2)(iii).) If the crews are independent, each
crew would need an employee-in-charge of its clearance. Therefore, no
one could be considered as having sole control over the disconnecting
means protecting the crews, and the exceptions listed in paragraph
(m)(2)(iii) would not apply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\2An employee working alone is considered to be a ``crew'' of
one.
\7\3The means of disconnection is under the sole control of the
employee in charge of the clearance, and it need only be accessible
and visible to that employee. Other employees in the crew have no
control whatsoever over the disconnecting means.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under any of the preceding scenarios, disconnecting means that are
accessible to people not under the employer's control must be rendered
inoperable. For example, a switch handle mounted at the bottom of a
utility pole that is not on the employer's premises must be locked in
the open position while the overhead line is deenergized. This
requirement, which is contained in paragraph (m)(2)(iv) prevents a
member of the general public or an employee (of a contractor, for
example) who is not under the employer's control from closing the
switch and energizing the line.
Paragraph (m)(3) of final Sec. 1910.269 sets forth the exact
procedure for deenergizing transmission and distribution lines and
equipment. The procedure must be followed in the order presented in the
rule. Except as noted, the rules are consistent with existing
Sec. 1926.950(d)(1), although the language originally contained in the
proposal was taken in large part from ANSI C2-1987, section 423. The
Agency has attempted to simplify the language of the consensus standard
and to write the requirements in performance-oriented terms whenever
possible. In the final rule, OSHA has incorporated changes that are
justified on the basis of the record considered as a whole, as noted in
the following discussion of the individual paragraphs.
Paragraph (m)(3)(i) requires an employee to request the system
operator to deenergize a particular section of line or equipment. So
that control is vested in one authority, a single designated employee
would be assigned this task. This designated employee thus becomes the
employee in charge of and responsible for the clearance for work.
One commenter was concerned that this provision would require the
presence of a foreman on the worksite (Ex. 3-2). Others thought that
the provision would prohibit prearranged switching requests performed
by someone who would not be performing the actual work (Ex. 3-20, 112;
LA Tr. 241-242).
These concerns are unfounded. The designated employee who requests
the clearance need not be in charge of other aspects of the work; the
regulation intends for this designated employee to be in charge of the
clearance. He or she is responsible for requesting the clearance, for
informing the system operator of changes in the clearance (such as
transfer of responsibility), and for insuring that it is safe for the
circuit to be reenergized before the clearance is released. If someone
other than an employee at the worksite requests the clearance and if
that clearance is in place before the employee arrives at the site,
then clearance must be transferred under Sec. 1910.269(m)(3)(ix). The
Agency believes that the person requesting the clearance, once the
lines are indeed deenergized, must be the one to contact in case
alterations in the clearance are necessary. The employees who will be
performing the actual work at some time in the future would not
necessarily be aware that a clearance has been requested and would not
be in position to answer questions about the clearance.
OSHA believes that this intent is clear from the wording of the
last sentence of paragraph (m)(3)(i), which reads as follows: ``The
designated employee becomes the employee in charge (as this term is
used in paragraph of this section) and is responsible for the clearance
[emphasis added].'' Therefore, no changes have been made to the
language of this provision.
The second step (paragraph (m)(3)(ii)) is to open all switches
through which electrical energy could flow to the section of line or
equipment. The disconnecting means must then be made inoperable if the
design of the device permits. For example, the removable handle of a
switch could be detached. Also, the switches must be tagged to indicate
that employees are at work. This paragraph ensures that the lines are
disconnected from their sources of supply and protects against the
accidental reclosing of the switches.
Several commenters noticed that the phrase ``lines and equipment to
be energized'' in this paragraph in the proposal referred to lines and
equipment that actually were to be deenergized (Ex. 3-32, 3-40, 3-42,
3-82, 3-107, 3-112). This was an inadvertent error in the proposal, and
it has been corrected in the final rule.
Some commenters also expressed the concern that this provision
would require the disconnection of hundreds of transformers, in certain
cases, in order to eliminate possible unexpected sources of electric
energy (Ex. 3-101, 3-123). This rule is intended to require the
disconnection of known sources of electric energy, and the language in
the final rule makes this clear. Hazards related to the presence of
unexpected energy sources are controlled by testing for voltage and by
grounding the circuit, as required by paragraphs (m)(3)(v) and
(m)(3)(vi), respectively.
Paragraph (m)(3)(iii) requires the tagging of automatically and
remotely controlled switches. An automatically or remotely controlled
switch must also be rendered inoperable if the design of the switch
allows for it to be made inoperable. This provision would also protect
employees from being injured as a result of the automatic operation of
such switches.
In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested public comment on
whether it is appropriate to require all new and replacement switches
that are to be automatically or remotely controlled to be designed so
that they could be rendered inoperable and on whether it is feasible
for such switches to be so designed.
Some commenters supported such a requirement (Ex. 3-76, 3-107; DC
Tr. 416-417). The UWUA argued that all disconnecting means should be
locked out and under the control of the employee performing the work
(DC Tr. 416-417). Mr. G. F. Stone of the Tennessee Valley Authority
claimed that it would be feasible to require new switches to be
designed so that they could be rendered inoperable only if the rule
applied to automatically or remotely controlled switches (Ex. 3-82).
Three commenters opposed such a requirement (Ex. 3-59, 3-81, 3-
112). Mr. James W. Broome of the Arizona Electric Power Cooperative,
Inc., expressed the view that the procedures already in place
adequately protect employees and that any requirement for changes in
the design of automatic and remotely controlled switches would increase
the cost of these devices (Ex. 3-59). EEI believed that there were too
many different types of switches in use and that most of them currently
have the capability of disabling the automatic or remote control
feature (Ex. 3-112). Agreeing with EEI, the National Electrical
Manufacturers Association, which represents manufacturers of such
devices, also opposed regulations requiring a change in the design of
these devices (Ex. 3-81).
There is insufficient evidence on the record to determine whether
or not it is feasible to require automatically and remotely controlled
switches to be capable of having the automatic or remote control
feature disabled. In any event, the procedures required by the standard
will protect employees from the hazards involved. Paragraph (m)(3)(iii)
requires automatically and remotely controlled switches to be tagged at
the point of control. This alerts the person who would initiate action
to reenergize the circuit that the line or equipment is deenergized for
the protection of employees. The only way the line or equipment could
be reenergized is for someone to override the tag, and the requirements
of paragraph (m) are intended to prevent that. Therefore, the Agency is
not adopting a requirement that new automatically and remotely
controlled switches be designed so that they could be rendered
inoperable.
Paragraph (m)(3)(iv) requires tags to prohibit operation of the
switches to which they are attached. They are also required to state
that employees are at work.
After the previous four requirements have been met and after the
employee in charge of the work has been given a clearance by the system
operator, paragraph (m)(3)(v) requires the lines or equipment to be
tested. This test ensures that the lines have in fact been deenergized
and is intended to prevent accidents resulting from someone's opening
the wrong disconnect. It also protects employees from hazards
associated with unknown sources of electric energy.
The proposal would have required the testing to be performed by the
employee in charge. Mr. Carl D. Behnke of EEI and Mr. G. F. Stone of
the Tennessee Valley Authority suggested allowing other employees to
perform the testing (Ex. 3-82).
OSHA believes that it is not necessary for the employee in charge
to perform the actual testing. Therefore, Mr. Behnke's and Mr. Stone's
suggestions have been accepted, and the final rule does not specify who
is to execute the tests.
Edison Electric Institute and Oglethorpe Power Company recommended
allowing visual determination of whether a line was deenergized (Ex. 3-
102, 3-112).
Existing Sec. 1926.950(d)(1)(iii) permits visual inspection in lieu
of tests. However, especially because of the increasing amount of
cogeneration (electric generation of power by customers of the
utility), which can unknowingly supply lines with electricity, a visual
determination of the state of energization is not always accurate. The
IBEW supported this view, stating:
The IBEW supports OSHA in the requirement that a test of the
lines or equipment be made after clearance has been given by the
system operator. A visual inspection cannot reliably determine if a
line is deenergized. The IBEW has had reports from its local unions
where the failure to test lines or equipment for the absence of
voltage was a critical factor in an accident. [Ex. 3-107]
OSHA has concluded that it is important that lines and equipment on
which work is to be performed always be tested for an energized
condition, so that employees will not falsely believe that the line or
equipment is deenergized. As the IBEW comment indicates and as the
accident descriptions in the record demonstrate (Ex. 9-2, 12-12), the
failure to test for voltage has been a cause of accidents. Therefore,
the final rule does not allow visual inspection in lieu of testing the
lines or equipment.
Paragraph (m)(3)(vi) requires the installation of any protective
grounds required by Sec. 1910.269(n) at this point in the sequence of
events. Since the lines or equipment have been deenergized and tested
in accordance with the previous provisions, it is now safe to install a
protective ground.
After the six previous rules have been followed, paragraph
(m)(3)(vii) permits the lines or equipment to be treated as
deenergized.
Paragraph (m)(3)(viii) requires each independent crew to follow the
steps outlined in Sec. 1910.269(m)(3) separately, to ensure that a
group of workers does not make faulty assumptions about what steps have
been or will be taken by another group to deenergize lines or
equipment.
Three commenters stated that some utilities use one tag for all
crews involved, maintaining a log to identify each crew separately (Ex.
3-20, 3-27, 3-112). They recommended that the standard allow this
practice to continue.
Paragraph (m)(3) of final Sec. 1910.269 does not require a separate
tag for each crew (nor did paragraph (m)(3) in the proposal); it does
require, however, separate clearances for each crew. There must be one
employee in charge of the clearance for each crew, and the clearance
for a crew is held by this employee. In complying with paragraph
(m)(3)(viii), the employer must ensure that no tag is removed unless
its associated clearances are released (paragraph (m)(3)(xii)) and that
no action is taken at a given point of disconnection until all
protective grounds have been removed, until all crews have released
their clearances, until all employees are clear of the lines or
equipment, and until all tags have been removed at that point of
disconnection (paragraph (m)(3)(xiii)).
In some cases, as when an employee in charge has to leave the job
because of illness, it may be necessary to transfer a clearance. Under
such conditions, paragraph (m)(3)(ix) requires that the employee in
charge inform the system operator and that the employees in the crew be
informed of the transfer. If the employee holding the clearance is
forced to leave the worksite due to illness or other emergency, the
employee's supervisor could inform the system operator of the transfer
in clearance. (The proposed rule used the term ``forced absence''. As a
clarification, the final rule replaces this term with language stating
specifically that the absence is ``forced'' due to illness or other
emergency.)
After the clearance is transferred, the new employee in charge is
then responsible for the clearance. It is important that only one
employee at a time be responsible for any clearance; otherwise,
independent action by any worker could endanger the entire crew.
Once work is completed, the clearance will have to be released so
that the lines or equipment can be reenergized. Paragraph (m)(3)(x)
covers this procedure. To ensure that it is safe to release the
clearance, the employee in charge must: (1) Notify workers in the crew
of the release, (2) determine that they are clear of the lines and
equipment, (3) determine that grounds have been removed, and (4) notify
the system operator that the clearance is to be released.
Paragraph (m)(3)(xii) in the proposal would have required that the
employee requesting tag removal be the one who requested its placement.
The intent of this proposed rule was to ensure that any one clearance
is always under the control of a single employee.
Several commenters pointed out that the description of this
provision in the preamble depicted the actual procedure for releasing a
clearance but the rule itself did not (Ex. 3-20, 3-27, 3-112; LA Tr.
243-244). The preamble text stated: ``Paragraph (m)(3)(xii) proposes
that the employee releasing the clearance be the one who was
responsible for requesting it.'' Mr. Howard D. Wilcox of Consumers
Power Company, representing EEI, pointed out that the person normally
requesting tag placement is literally the system operator (LA Tr. 243-
244). He stated that when a request is actually made to remove the tag
the person requesting its removal could quite possibly be someone else
acting in that capacity. All these commenters agreed that the person
releasing the clearance would be the same one who requested it.
OSHA has accepted these suggestions. The language of this provision
in the final rule, which has been moved to paragraph (m)(3)(xi) to
reflect its true position in the procedure, now conforms to the
description of the proposed rule. The person who is releasing the
clearance must be the one who requested it, unless responsibility has
been transferred. However, because the persons who place and remove the
tags may not be the same, it is important for the regulation to
prohibit removing a tag without the release of the clearance by the
employee who is responsible for it. Therefore, OSHA has added a
requirement adopting this prohibition as paragraph (m)(3)(xii) of final
Sec. 1910.269. It should be noted that the person requesting a
clearance is the employee in charge of the clearance under paragraph
(m)(3)(i). If the supervisor or the system operator is the person who
originally requested the clearance, the clearance must be transferred
to another employee under paragraph (m)(3)(ix) before that employee can
become responsible for the clearance.
According to paragraph (m)(3)(xiii), action may be taken to
reenergize the lines or equipment only after grounds and tags have been
removed, after all clearances have been released, and after all
employees are in the clear. This protects employees from the
possibility that the line or equipment could be reenergized while
employees are still at work.
Several commenters objected to the language of this provision as
proposed in paragraph (m)(3)(xi) (Ex. 3-20, 3-42, 3-62, 3-112; LA Tr.
229-230, 242-243). They were concerned that this requirement would
force employees to remove all tags from all disconnecting means, then
retrace their steps to reclose the switches, even if they were miles
apart. For example, a 5-mile section of line could be deenergized by
opening and tagging switches at each end of the line. These commenters
were concerned that the standard would require them to remove the tags
from one end, and then travel 5 miles to the other end to remove the
tags there before any switch could be closed.
The Agency did not intend for this provision to require the removal
of all tags from all disconnecting means before any of them could be
reclosed. It was intended to require that all tags for any particular
switch be removed before that switch was closed. It is very important
in a tagging system that no energy isolating device be returned to a
position allowing energy flow if there are any tags on it that are
protecting employees. OSHA has reworded the language of proposed
Sec. 1910.269(m)(3)(xi) to reflect its meaning more accurately. In the
case of the 5-mile section of line used in the earlier example, after
all the tags were removed from any one switch that one switch could
then be closed. The Agency believes that paragraph (m)(3)(xiii) of
final Sec. 1910.269 will eliminate the objections raised by the
commenters.
Paragraph (n). Sometimes, normally energized lines and equipment
which have been deenergized to permit employees to work become
accidentally energized. This can happen in several ways, for example,
by contact with another energized circuit, by voltage backfeed from a
customer's cogeneration installation, by lightning contact, or by
failure of the clearance system outlined in Sec. 1910.269(m).
Transmission and distribution lines and equipment are normally
installed outdoors where they are exposed to damage from the weather
and from actions taken by members of the general public. Many utility
poles are installed alongside roadways where they may be struck by
motor vehicles. Distribution lines have been damaged by falling trees,
and transmission line insulators have been used for target practice.
Additionally, customers fed by a utility company's distribution line
may have cogeneration or backup generation capability, sometimes
without the utility company's knowledge. All these factors can
reenergize a deenergized transmission or distribution line or
equipment. Energized lines can be knocked down onto deenergized lines.
A backup generator or a cogenerator can cause voltage backfeed on the
deenergized power line. Lastly, lightning, even miles from the
worksite, can reenergize a line. All of these problems pose hazards to
employees working on deenergized transmission and distribution lines
and equipment. In fact, these problems have been a factor in 14 of the
accidents in Exhibit 9-2.
Grounding the lines and equipment is used to protect employees from
injury should such reenergizing occur. Grounding also provides
protection against induced voltages and static charges on a line.
(These induced and static voltages can be high enough to endanger
employees, either directly from electric shock or indirectly from
involuntary reaction.)
Grounding, as a temporary protective measure, involves connecting
the deenergized lines and equipment to earth through conductors. As
long as the conductors remain deenergized, this maintains the lines and
equipment at the same potential as the earth. However, if voltage is
impressed on a line, the voltage on the grounded line rises to a value
dependent upon the impressed voltage, the impedance between its source
and the grounding point, and the impedance of the grounding conductor.
Various techniques are used to limit the voltage to which an
employee working on a grounded line would be exposed. Bonding is one of
these techniques. Conductive objects within the reach of the employee
are bonded together to create an equipotential work area for the
employee. Within this area of equal potentials, voltage differences are
limited to a safe value.
Paragraph (n) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses protective grounding
and bonding.\74\ As noted in paragraph (n)(1), entire paragraph (n)
applies to the grounding of deenergized transmission and distribution
lines and equipment for the purpose of protecting employees.
Additionally, paragraph (n)(1) indicates that paragraph (n)(4) applies
to the protective grounding of nonelectrical equipment, such as aerial
lift trucks, as well. Under normal conditions, such equipment would not
be connected to a source of electric energy. However, to protect
employees in case of accidental contact of the equipment with live
parts, protective grounding is required elsewhere in the standard (in
Sec. 1910.269(q)(3)(xi), for example); and, to ensure the adequacy of
this grounding, the provisions of paragraph (n)(4) must be followed.
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\74\As used throughout the rest of this discussion and within
paragraph (n) of final Sec. 1910.269, the term ``grounding''
includes bonding. Technically, grounding refers to the connection of
a conductive part to ground, whereas bonding refers to connecting
conductive parts to each other. However, for convenience, OSHA is
using the term ``grounding'' to refer to both techniques of
minimizing voltages to which an employee will be exposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Three commenters objected to the inclusion of systems of 600 volts
and less within the scope of paragraph (n) of proposed Sec. 1910.269
(Ex. 3-20, 3-80, 3-120). They argued that the cramped spaces involved
made working with grounds more hazardous than working without them.
OSHA has not accepted these changes. Neither existing Sec. 1926.954
nor the NESC limit the application of grounding requirements to
voltages over 600 volts. In fact, even the EEI/IBEW draft standard
contained no such limitation. Additionally, the commenters did not
provide any information indicating that work on ungrounded deenergized
equipment normally operating at 600 volts or less is safe. The Agency
is particularly concerned that undetected voltage from a customer's
generating system may backfeed the low voltage circuit and energize the
line while the employee is working. Several of the accidents in the
record occurred in this manner (Ex. 9-2). Although the employee usually
happened to be working on the high voltage side of a transformer in
these cases, a similar result would have occurred had the worker been
contacting the low voltage side. For these reasons, no voltage
limitation has been included in paragraph (n)(1) of final
Sec. 1910.269.
The general requirement contained in paragraph (n)(2) states the
conditions under which lines and equipment must be grounded. Basically,
in order for lines or equipment to be treated as deenergized, they must
be deenergized under paragraph (m) of final Sec. 1910.269 and grounded.
Grounding may be omitted only if the installation of a ground is
impracticable (such as during the initial stages of work on underground
cables, when the conductor is not exposed for grounding) or if the
conditions resulting from the installation of a ground would introduce
more serious hazards than work without grounds. It is expected that
conditions warranting the absence of protective grounds will be
relatively rare.
In the preamble to the notice of proposed rulemaking, OSHA invited
public comment on what conditions were appropriate for this exception
and on whether the standard should list the specific types of
conditions for which grounding would not be required. Several
commenters provided examples of situations where grounding would not be
required under the proposed requirement (Ex. 3-13, 3-20, 3-42, 3-45, 3-
112). However, no definitive guidelines were presented. Therefore, the
language of paragraph (n)(2) of final Sec. 1910.269 has not been
changed from that in the proposal.
If grounds are not installed and the lines and equipment are to be
treated as deenergized, however, precautions have to be observed, and
certain conditions must be met. Obviously, the lines and equipment
still must be deenergized by the procedures of Sec. 1910.269(m). Also,
there may be no possibility of contact with another source of voltage,
and the hazard of induced voltage may not be present. Since these
precautions and conditions do not protect against the possible
reenergizing of the lines or equipment under all conditions, the
omission of grounding is permitted only in very limited circumstances.
Paragraph (n)(3) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 would have required
protective grounds to be installed at the work location. However, if it
was not feasible to provide a ground where the employee is working,
grounds would have been required on both sides of the work location.
This was to provide for situations such as those that could arise when
an employee worked from an aerial lift between two structures
supporting a transmission or distribution line.
Several commenters objected to the language in the proposal and
suggested that OSHA use the wording similar to that contained in the
EEI/IBEW draft standard or in Sec. 1926.954(f) (Ex. 3-2, 3-42, 3-112,
3-123, 56; DC Tr. 929-931). They argued that grounding on both sides of
the work location is a common and accepted method of protecting
employees from the hazards associated with deenergized lines. Two other
commenters stated that placement of grounds on each side of the work
location does not necessarily protect the employee (Ex. 3-44, 3-58).
They argued that such grounds are intended to operate the protective
equipment for the circuit.
EEI pointed to the IEEE proposed Guide for Protective Grounding of
Power Lines, IEEE P1048-1989, as evidence supporting their position
that employers should be given the choice as to what method of
grounding should be used (Ex. 3-112). On behalf of EEI, Mr. Carl D.
Behnke stated:
The specification of the placement of protective grounds cannot
be treated with a simple, one paragraph regulation. For example, on
page 8 of IEEE's recently published ``Guide for Protective Grounding
on Power Lines'', prepared by Work Group 15.07.06, Safety and
Regulations, Engineering in the Safety, Maintenance, and Operation
of Line[s] Subcommittee, Transmission and Distribution Committee
(ESMOL), IEEE Power Engineering Society, the Work Group states:
The decision to use work site grounds (single point) or bracketed
(adjacent structure grounds) involves evaluation of the electrical
risk to all members of the crew and requires analysis of line design
and permanent structure grounding practices of the industry.
* * * * *
The IEEE guide referred to above illustrates on pages 11-12 the
varying practices of selected companies, and the varying practices
used in transmission as opposed to distribution work. Since some
companies use single point grounding, OSHA might conclude that
single point is ``feasible,'' in that ``it is capable of being
done.'' But this does not mean it can be required for all utilities
under section 3(8) in a safety standard. The IEEE guide demonstrates
that various grounding methods provide safety, and that one method
is not necessarily superior to the other.
* * * * *
The question of grounding for the protection of employees has
long been, and still remains, a subject for debate among those
knowledgeable and experienced in the electric utility industry and
engineering fields. OSHA's concern should be whether grounds are
provided in such a manner so as to provide protection for workers,
and not the specific location of the grounds.
In developing safe work practices and procedures for the
construction and maintenance of overhead power lines, many factors
must be considered. Grounding strategies which will afford maximum
protection for workers can be accomplished in a variety of ways
which do not necessarily include placing grounds at the very
location where workers are positioned.
Others supported OSHA's preference for single point grounds
wherever possible (Ex. 3-29, 3-53, 3-55, 3-107). At the hearing and in
the post-hearing comment period, the IBEW went further to suggest that
the standard provide an equipotential work area for the exposed
employees (Ex. 64; DC Tr. 543-545). Mr. James L. Dushaw, Director of
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers' Safety and Health
Department testified in support of this position as follows:
Reasonable and technically sound provisions for protective
grounding of lines and equipment is fundamental to the safety of
line workers. It is remarkable that the well-recognized concept of
creating [an] equipotential work zone is not better accepted and
established.
* * * * *
The fundamental purpose of the equipotential work zone is to
minimize electric current flow across the worker's body. It is very
simple and should be easily understood.
The proposed rule requires temporary protective grounds as
required be placed at the work location or, in the alternative, on
each side of the work location as close to it as possible.
Given the stated knowledge about performance of protective
grounds for line workers working from or close to poles or other
supporting structures that are at ground potential or a percentage
of ground potential, the OSHA proposal does not provide adequate
protection for workers where conductors may become energized as
discussed in OSHA's summary and explanation of the proposed
standard.
It has become clear that, standing alone, grounds installed on
either side of the work location or bracketed grounds do not prevent
potentially lethal current from reaching and flowing through the
worker.
I think there is a conception here that with electrical power
that in bracketed grounds somehow those bracketed grounds are going
to stop the electric current from flowing through the worker and it
simply doesn't happen. The current takes every path.
* * * * *
Similarly, grounds installed at the work location without
bonding or connection directly to the pole or structure at a point
close or-below the work area does not diminish the current flow
through the worker who is in contact with the line and the structure
simultaneously.
* * * * *
Our Union recommends that OSHA revise 1910.269 paragraph
((n)(3)) to performance based language as follows. * * * temporary
protective grounds shall be placed at locations in such a manner as
to prevent worker exposure to hazardous differences in electrical
potentials. (DC Tr. 543-545)
A similar performance-oriented approach was also supported by the
American Public Power Association and by the Tennessee Valley Authority
(Ex. 3-80, 3-82). At the public hearing, EEI also lent limited support
to the IBEW approach, as follows:
The proposed language that you have seen (that was contained in
the EEl/IBEW draft) is a reflection of our industry safety rules and
safe work practices that are in place because they work and we urge
you to allow these safe practices to continue.
In the alternative, the performance-oriented language that was
submitted the other day by the IBEW through Mr. Dushaw's testimony
appears to be an acceptable option that would provide the level of
flexibility that we need. (DC Tr. 930)
OSHA reviewed the accidents in Ex. 9-2 and Ex. 9-2A for those
involving improper protective grounding. There were nine accidents in
these two exhibits related to protective grounding. In three cases,
inadequate grounds were present. Based on the fact that grounding is a
backup measure, intended to provide protection only when all other
safety-related work practices fail, OSHA believes that this is a
significant incidence of faulty grounding. Grounding practices that do
not provide an equipotential zone in which an employee is safeguarded
from voltage differences do not provide complete protection. In case
the line is accidentally reenergized, voltages to which an employee
would be exposed due to inadequate grounding would be lethal, as can be
seen by some of the exhibits in the record (Ex. 6-27, 57). The employee
would be protected only if he or she is not in contact with the line
until the energy source is cleared by circuit protective
devices.75
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\5Facilitating the opening of circuit protective devices is
another function of protective grounding. However, on the basis of
the record, OSHA believes this is secondary to providing a safe area
in which employees can work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For these reasons, OSHA has accepted the IBEW approach to the
problem. Final Sec. 1910.269 (n)(3) requires protective grounds to be
so located and arranged that employees are not exposed to hazardous
differences in potential. The final rule thus allows employers and
employees to use whatever grounding method they prefer as long as
employees are protected. For employees working at elevated positions on
poles and towers, single point grounding may be necessary, together
with grounding straps to provide an equipotential zone for the worker.
Employees in insulated aerial lifts working at midspan between two
conductor supporting structures may be protected by grounding at
convenient points on both sides of the work area. Bonding the aerial
lift to the grounded conductor will ensure that the employee remains at
the potential of the conductor in case of a fault. Other methods may be
necessary to protect workers on the ground, including grounding mats
and insulating platforms. The Agency believes that this performance-
oriented approach will provide the flexibility needed by employers, but
will afford the best protection to employees.
Paragraph (n)(4) contains requirements that grounding equipment
must meet. So that the protective grounding equipment does not fail, it
is required to have an ampacity high enough so that the fault current
would be carried for the amount of time necessary to allow protective
devices to interrupt the circuit. This provision is contained in
paragraph (n)(4)(i) of final Sec. 1910.269. One commenter noted that
the fault current is not always single-phase to ground as implied by
the proposal, but can also be phase to phase or three-phase to ground
(Ex. 3-45). The language in the final rule requires the protective
grounding equipment to be able to carry the maximum fault current,
regardless of the type of fault. Also, as suggested by another
commenter (Ex. 3-120), OSHA has added a note referencing the ASTM
standard on protective grounding equipment (ASTM F855-83).
Under paragraph (n)(4)(ii), the impedance of the grounding
equipment is required to be low enough to ensure the quick operation of
the protective devices. As recommended by a commenter (Ex. 3-40), the
phrase ``impedance to ground'' contained in the proposal has been
changed to ``impedance'' in the final rule. This change recognizes that
the relevant impedance is sometimes between phases rather than between
phase and ground, and the revision is consistent with the modification
of the preceding paragraph.
Paragraphs (n)(4)(i) and (n)(4)(ii) help ensure the prompt clearing
of the circuit supplying voltage to the point where the employee is
working. Thus, the grounding equipment limits the duration and reduce
the severity of any electric shock, though it does not itself prevent
shock from occurring.
Paragraph (n)(5) of Sec. 1910.269 requires lines and equipment that
are to be grounded to be tested for voltage before a ground is
installed. If a previously installed ground is evident, no test need be
conducted. This requirement prevents energized equipment from being
grounded, which could result in injury to the employee installing the
ground.
The proposed version of this paragraph would have required the test
to determine that the line or equipment was ``absent of voltage''. Many
commenters suggested that the standard require only that the line or
equipment be free of nominal voltage (Ex. 3-20, 3-33, 3-42, 3-44, 3-58,
3-69, 3-80, 3-82, 3-102, 3-112, 3-123; DC Tr. 719). They argued that
lines which are deenergized frequently have voltage induced on them
from other nearby energized lines and that it was safe to install
grounds as long as the nominal line voltage was absent. OSHA has
accepted this argument. Final Sec. 1910.269(n)(5) requires that the
line or equipment be free of nominal voltage.76
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\6``Nominal voltage'' is discussed in the definition of
``voltage'' as follows:
The nominal voltage of a system or circuit is the value assigned
to a system or circuit of a given voltage class for the purpose of
convenient designation. The operating voltage of the system may vary
above or below this value.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraphs (n)(6) and (n)(7) set forth the procedure for installing
and removing grounds. To protect employees in the event that the
``deenergized'' equipment to be grounded is or becomes energized, the
standard requires the ``equipment end'' of the grounding device to be
applied last and removed first and that a live-line tool be used for
both procedures in order to protect workers.
The proposal would have required the use of a live-line tool or
``other insulated device''. Several commenters were concerned that this
language implied that rubber insulating gloves could be used to install
and remove grounds (Ex. 3-11, 3-44, 3-58, 3-69, 3-71, 3-123). They
noted that it was unsafe for an employee to be too close when
connecting or disconnecting a ground and urged OSHA to eliminate the
phrase ``or other insulated device'' from the rule.
The Agency agrees with these commenters and has adopted their
suggestion in the final rule. OSHA will consider any device that is
insulated for the voltage and that allows an employee to apply or
remove the ground from a safe position to be a live-line tool for the
purposes of Sec. 1910.269 (n)(6) and (n)(7). It should be noted that,
during the periods before the ground is installed and after it is
removed, the line or equipment involved must be considered as energized
(under paragraph (l)(1)). As a result, the minimum approach distances
specified in paragraph (l)(2) apply when grounds are installed or
removed.
With certain underground cable installations, a fault at one
location along the cable can create a substantial potential difference
between the earth at that location and the earth at other locations.
Under normal conditions, this is not a hazard. However, if an employee
is in contact with a remote ground (by being in contact with a
conductor that is grounded at a remote station), he or she can be
exposed to the difference in potential (because he or she is also in
contact with the local ground). To protect employees in such
situations, paragraph (n)(8) prohibits grounding cables at remote
locations if a hazardous potential transfer could occur under fault
conditions.
Paragraph (n)(9) addresses the removal of grounds for test
purposes. Under the proposal, the previously grounded lines and
equipment would have had to be treated as energized while they remain
ungrounded.
Several commenters objected to this proposed provision (Ex. 3-20,
3-42, 3-80, 3-101, 3-112). They were concerned that the tests could not
be performed if the equipment was considered energized. To correct this
problem, some of these commenters suggested the following language from
the EEI/IBEW draft standard:
Grounds may be temporarily removed only when necessary for test
purposes and caution shall be exercised during the test procedures.
(Ex. 2-3)
OSHA acknowledges the problems that the proposed rule would have
caused. However, the Agency does not believe that the language proposed
in the EEI/IBEW draft contains any safeguards for employees. Certainly,
such a requirement would be difficult to enforce. To resolve this
issue, OSHA has adopted the following language in final
Sec. 1910.269(n)(9):
Grounds may be removed temporarily during tests. During the test
procedure, the employer shall ensure that each employee uses
insulating equipment and is isolated from any hazards involved, and
the employer shall institute any additional measures as may be
necessary to protect each exposed employee in case the previously
grounded lines and equipment become energized.
The examples of precautions that should be taken are based on
suggestions of New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, Inc., Federated
Rural Electric Insurance Company, National Utility Training and Safety
Education Association, and Oglethorpe Power Company (Ex. 3-11, 3-44, 3-
58, 3-102). OSHA believes that this approach will address the concerns
of the commenters objecting to the proposal but will still protect
employees.
Paragraph (o). Paragraph (o) of final Sec. 1910.269 sets forth
safety work practices covering electrical hazards arising out of the
special testing of lines and equipment (namely, in-service and out-of-
service, as well as new, lines and equipment) to determine maintenance
needs and fitness for service. Generally, the need to conduct tests on
new and idle lines and equipment as part of normal checkout procedures,
in addition to maintenance evaluation, is specified in the National
Electrical Safety Code (ANSI C2). Basically, as stated in paragraph
(o)(1), the rules apply only to testing involving interim measurements
utilizing high voltage, high power, or combinations of both, as opposed
to testing involving continuous measurements as in routine metering,
relaying and normal line work.
For the purposes of these requirements, high-voltage testing is
assumed to involve voltage sources having sufficient energy to cause
injury and having magnitudes generally in excess of 1000 volts,
nominal. High-power testing involves sources where fault currents, load
currents, magnetizing currents, or line dropping currents are used for
testing, either at the rated voltage of the equipment under test or at
lower voltages. Paragraph (o) covers such testing in laboratories, in
shops and substations, and in the field and on transmission and
distribution lines.
Examples of typical special tests in which either high-voltage
sources or high-power sources are used as part of operation and
maintenance of electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution systems include cable-fault locating, large capacitive
load tests, high current fault-closure tests, insulation resistance and
leakage tests, direct-current proof tests, and other tests requiring
direct connection to power lines.
Excluded from the scope of paragraph (o) are routine inspection and
maintenance measurements made by qualified employees in accordance with
established work practice rules where the hazards associated with the
use of intrinsic high-voltage or high-power sources require only those
normal precautions peculiar to such periodic work. Obviously, the work
practices for these routine tests must comply with the rest of final
Sec. 1910.269. Because this type of testing poses hazards that are
identical to other types of routine electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work, OSHA has determined that the
requirements of Sec. 1910.269 excluding paragraph (o) adequately
protect employees performing these tests. Two typical examples of such
excluded test work procedures would be ``phasing-out'' testing and
testing for a ``no voltage'' condition. To clarify the scope of this
paragraph in the final rule, as suggested by two commenters (Ex. 3-20,
3-80), a note to this effect has been added after paragraph (o)(1).
Additionally, because the scope of final Sec. 1910.269 has been
extended to cover non-utilities, proposed language limiting the
application of paragraph (o) to electric utilities has been removed.
(See the discussion of final Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(i).)
Paragraph (o)(2)(i) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires employers to
establish work practices governing employees engaged in certain testing
activities. These work practices are intended to delineate precautions
that employees must observe for protection from the hazards of high-
voltage or high-power testing. For example, if high-voltage sources are
used in the testing, employees are required to follow the safety
practices established under paragraph (o)(2)(i) to protect against such
typical hazards as inadvertent arcing or voltage overstress
destruction, as well as accidental contact with objects which have
become residually charged by induced voltage from electric field
exposure. If high-power sources are used in the testing, employees are
required to follow established safety practices to protect against such
typical hazards as ground voltage rise as well as exposure to excessive
electromagnetically-caused physical forces associated with the passage
of heavy current.
These practices apply to work performed at both permanent and
temporary test areas (that is, areas permanently located in the
controlled environment of a laboratory or shop and in areas temporarily
located in a non-controlled field environment). At a minimum, the
safety work practices are required to cover the following types of
test-associated activities:
(1) Guarding the test area to prevent inadvertent contact with
energized parts,
(2) Safe grounding practices to be observed,
(3) Precautions to be taken in the use of control and measuring
circuits, and
(4) Periodic checks of field test areas.
Paragraph (o)(2)(ii) complements the general rule on the use of
safe work practices in test areas with a requirement that all employees
involved in this type of work be trained in these safety test
practices. This paragraph further requires a periodic review of these
practices to be conducted from time to time as a means of providing
reemphasis and updating.
Although specific work practices used in test areas are generally
unique to the particular test being conducted, three basic elements
affecting safety are commonly found to some degree at all test sites:
Guarding, grounding, and the safe utilization of control and measuring
circuits. By considering safe work practices in these three categories,
OSHA has attempted to achieve a performance-oriented standard
applicable to high-voltage and high-power testing and test facilities.
OSHA believes that guarding can best be achieved when it is
provided both around and within test areas. By controlling access to
all parts that are likely to become energized by either direct or
inductive coupling, the standard will prevent accidental contact by
employees. Paragraph (o)(3)(i) requires permanent test areas to be
guarded by having them completely enclosed by walls or some other type
of physical barrier. In the case of field testing, paragraph (o)(3)(ii)
attempts to achieve a level of safety for temporary test sites
comparable to that achieved in laboratory test areas. For these areas,
a barricade of tapes and cones or observation by an attendant are
acceptable methods of guarding.
Three commenters objected to the specification of safety tape with
signs as the only acceptable type of barricade or barrier (Ex. 3-69, 3-
82, 3-112). They suggested a performance-oriented approach that would
accept other types of barriers or barricades. OSHA has accepted this
suggestion. Final Sec. 1910.269(o)(3)(ii)(B) accepts any barrier or
barricade that provides a means of limiting access to the test area
physically and visually equivalent to safety tape with signs.
Since the effectiveness of the temporary guarding means can be
severely compromised by failing to remove it when it is not required,
frequent safety checks must be made to monitor its use. For example,
leaving barriers in place for a week at a time when testing is
performed only an hour or two per day is likely to result in disregard
for the barriers. For this reason, paragraph (o)(3)(iii) requires the
temporary barriers to be removed when they are no longer needed.
Within test areas, whether temporary or permanent, additional
safety can be achieved by observing the guarding practices that control
access to test areas. Paragraph (o)(3)(iv) therefore requires that such
guarding be provided if the test equipment or apparatus under test may
become energized as part of the testing by either direct or inductive
coupling. A combination of guards and barriers, preferably interlocked,
is intended to provide protection to all employees in the vicinity.
Suitable grounding is another important work practice that can be
employed for the protection of personnel from the hazards of high-
voltage or high-power testing. If high currents are intentionally
employed in the testing, an isolated ground-return conductor, adequate
for the service, is required so that no intentional passage of heavy
current, with its attendant voltage rise, will occur in the ground grid
or in the earth. Another safety consideration involving grounding is
that all conductive parts accessible to the test operator during the
time that the equipment is operating at high voltage be maintained at
ground potential, except portions of the equipment that are isolated
from the test operator by suitable guarding. Paragraph (o)(4) of final
Sec. 1910.269 contains requirements for proper grounding at test sites.
Paragraph (o)(4)(i) requires that grounding practices be
established and implemented for test facilities and that the basic
grounding practice be to treat as energized all ungrounded terminals of
test equipment or apparatus under test until reliably determined
otherwise. Paragraph (o)(4)(ii) requires visible grounds to be properly
applied before work is performed on the circuit or item or apparatus
under test.
Paragraph (o)(4)(iii) addresses hazards resulting from the use of
inadequate ground-returns in which a voltage rise in the ground grid or
in the earth can result whenever high currents are employed in the
testing. Test personnel who may be exposed to such potentials are
required to be protected from the hazards involved.
Proposed Sec. 1910.269(o)(4)(iii) would have required the employer
to establish an essentially equipotential safe area through the use of
an isolated ground-return system. Three commenters objected to this
requirement (Ex. 3-20, 3-35, 3-80). Exemplifying their objections, Mr.
Eldon A. Cotton of the Department of Water and Power of the City of Los
Angeles submitted the following comment:
To insure the validity of test results, occasionally power
systems must be tested under actual operating conditions. These
tests can require high ground currents (e.g., system fault tests).
To fully test control and protective relay system response or power
system recovery characteristics during a major disturbance, testing
must be as realistic as possible. This is not accomplished by
requiring an isolated ground current return system from a fault
staged miles from the power system facility.
Before performing such operational tests, qualified electrical
engineers study system conditions and develop appropriate test
plans. The primary responsibility of individuals writing these test
plans is to assure the safety of personnel and equipment under
expected and unexpected conditions. Utilities have a long history of
safety when staging tests requiring large ground currents. [Ex. 3-
20]
OSHA agrees that, under such conditions, it is not reasonable to
require an isolated ground-return conductor system. Therefore,
paragraph (o)(4)(iii) of final Sec. 1910.269 provides an exception to
the requirement for such a system. The exception applies if the
isolated ground-return cannot be provided because of the distance
involved and if employees are protected from hazardous step and touch
potentials that may develop. Consideration must always be given to the
possibility of voltage gradients developing in the earth during
impulse, short-circuit, inrush, or oscillatory conditions. Such
voltages may appear between the feet of an observer, or between his or
her body and a grounded object, and are usually referred to as ``step''
and ``touch'' potentials. Examples of acceptable protection from step
and touch potentials include suitable electrical protective equipment
and the removal of employees from areas that may expose them to
hazardous potentials.
Another grounding situation is recognized by paragraph (o)(4)(iv)
in which grounding through the power cord of test equipment may be
inadequate and actually increase the hazard to test operators.
Normally, an equipment grounding conductor is required in the power
cord of test equipment to connect it to a grounding connection in the
power receptacle. However, in some circumstances, this practice can
prevent satisfactory measurements, or current induced in the grounding
conductor can cause a hazard to personnel. If these conditions exist,
the use of the equipment grounding conductor within the cord is not
mandatory, and paragraph (o)(4)(iv) requires that an equivalent safety
ground be provided.
Paragraph (o)(4)(v) further requires that a ground be placed on the
high-voltage terminal and any other exposed terminals when the test
area is entered after equipment is deenergized. In the case of high
capacitance equipment or apparatus, before a direct ground can be
applied, the initial grounding discharge must be accomplished through a
resistor having an adequate energy rating.
Paragraph (o)(4)(vi) recognizes the hazards associated with field
testing in which test trailers or test vehicles are used. In addition
to requiring the chassis of such vehicles to be grounded, paragraph
(o)(4)(vi) provides for a performance-oriented approach by requiring
that protection be provided against hazardous touch potentials by
bonding, by insulation, or by isolation. The protection provided by
each of these methods is described in the following examples:
(1) Protection by bonding can be effected by providing, around the
vehicle, an area covered by a metallic mat or mesh of substantial
cross-section and low impedance which is bonded to the vehicle at
several points and is also bonded to an adequate number of driven
ground rods or, where available, to an adequate number of accessible
points on the station ground grid. All bonding conductors must be of
sufficient electrical size to keep the voltage developed during maximum
anticipated current tests at a safe value. The mat must be of a size
which precludes simultaneous contact with the vehicle and with the
earth or with metallic structures not adequately bonded to the mat.
(2) Protection by insulation can be accomplished, for example, by
providing around the vehicle an area of dry wooden planks covered with
rubber insulating blankets. The physical extent of the insulated area
must be sufficient to prevent simultaneous contact with the vehicle, or
the ground lead of the vehicle, and with the earth or with metallic
structures in the vicinity.
(3) Protection by isolation can be implemented by providing an
effective means to exclude personnel from any area where simultaneous
contact could be made with the vehicle (or conductive parts
electrically connected to the vehicle) and with other conductive
materials. A combination of barriers together with effective,
interlocked restraints may be employed to prevent the inadvertent exit
from the vehicle during the testing.
Finally, a third category of safe work practices applicable to
employees performing testing work, which complements the first two
safety work practices of guarding and grounding, involves work
practices associated with the installation of control and measurement
circuits utilized at test facilities. Practices necessary for the
protection of personnel and equipment from the hazards of high-voltage
or high-power testing must be observed for every test where special
signal-gathering equipment is used (that is, meters, oscilloscopes, and
other special instruments). In addition, special settings of protective
relays and the re-examination of backup schemes may be necessary to
ensure an adequate level of safety during the tests or to minimize the
effects of the testing on other parts of the system under test. As a
consequence, paragraphs (o)(5)(i) through (o)(5)(iii) address the
principal safe work practices involving control and measuring circuit
utilization within the test area.
Generally control and measuring circuit wiring should remain within
the test area. If this is not possible, however, paragraph (o)(5)(i)
covers requirements to minimize hazards should it become necessary to
have the test wiring routed outside the test area. Cables and other
wiring must be contained within a grounded metallic sheath and
terminated in a grounded metal enclosure, or other precautions must be
taken to provide equivalent safety.
Paragraph (o)(5)(ii) covers the avoidance of possible hazards
arising from inadvertent contact with energized accessible terminals or
parts of meters and other test instruments. Meters with such terminals
or parts must be isolated from test personnel.
Work practices involving the proper routing and connection of
temporary wiring to protect against damage are covered in paragraph
(o)(5)(iii). This paragraph also requires the various functional wiring
used for the test set-up to be kept separate, to the maximum extent
possible, in order to minimize the coupling of hazardous voltages into
the control and measuring circuits.
A final safety work practice requirement related to control
circuits is addressed by paragraph (o)(5)(iv). This paragraph requires,
if employees are present within the guarded test area during the test,
a test observer who can, in cases of emergency, immediately deenergize
all test circuits for safety purposes.
Since the environment in which field tests are conducted differs in
important respects from that of laboratory tests, extra care must be
taken to ensure appropriate levels of safety. Permanent fences and
gates for isolating the field test area are not usually provided, nor
is there a permanent conduit for the instrumentation and control
wiring. As a further hazard, there may be other sources of high-voltage
electric energy in the vicinity in addition to the source of test
voltage.
It is not always possible in the field to prevent ingress of
persons into a test area physically, as is accomplished by the fences
and interlocked gates of the laboratory environment. Consequently,
readily recognizable means are required to discourage such ingress;
and, before test potential or current is applied to a test area, the
test operator in charge must ensure that all necessary barriers are in
place.
As a consequence of these safety considerations, paragraph
(o)(6)(i) calls for a safety check to be made at temporary or field
test areas at the beginning of each group of continuous tests (that is,
a series of tests conducted one immediately after another). Paragraph
(o)(6)(ii) requires that, as a minimum for the safety check, the person
responsible for the testing verify, before the initiation of a
continuous period of testing, the status of a general group of safety
conditions. These conditions include the state of guards and status
signals, the marking of disconnects, the provision of ground
connections and personal protective equipment, and the separation of
circuits.
Paragraph (p). Requirements for mechanical equipment are contained
in Sec. 1910.269. (Subpart N of Part 1910 contains additional
requirements related to specific types of lifting equipment.)
Paragraph (p)(1) sets forth general requirements for mechanical
equipment used in the generation, transmission, or distribution of
electric power. Paragraph (p)(1)(i) requires the critical safety
components77 of mechanical elevating and rotating equipment to be
inspected before use on each shift. Some commenters were concerned that
this provision, as proposed, would require the disassembly of
components of mechanical equipment each time it was used (Ex. 3-20, 3-
22, 3-62). This was not the intent of this paragraph. OSHA has worded
the provision in the final rule to make it clear that a thorough visual
inspection is required. It is not necessary to disassemble equipment to
perform a visual inspection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\7The critical safety components of aerial lifts are
identified in Sec. 1910.67(c)(4) as being components whose failure
would result in a free fall or free rotation of the boom. A note has
been included following paragraph (p)(1)(i) of final Sec. 1910.269
similarly defining these components in the electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (p)(1)(ii) requires a reverse signal alarm or a
designated employee78 to signal when it is safe to back up the
vehicle for vehicles operated under certain conditions exposing an
employee to hazards. (It is not intended for this provision to require
the presence of a second employee. If the driver of the equipment is
the only employee present and if no employees would be exposed to the
hazards of vehicle backup, the standard would not apply.) This
provision is based on existing Secs. 1926.601(b)(4) and
1926.602(a)(9)(ii), which apply to construction. Because the same
equipment is used for electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work during maintenance, as well as construction, and
because the type of work being performed is similar in both situations,
OSHA believes it is appropriate to make the requirements applying to
this equipment the same whether maintenance or construction work is
being performed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\8A designated employee is someone who is designated by the
employer to perform specific duties under the terms of the standard
and who is knowledgeable in the construction and operation of the
equipment and the hazards involved. (See Sec. 1910.269(x),
Definitions.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (p)(1)(iii) prohibits the operator of an electric line
truck from leaving his or her position at the controls while a load is
suspended, unless the employer can demonstrate that no employee,
including the operator, might be endangered. This ensures that the
operator will be at the controls if an emergency arises that
necessitates moving the suspended load. For example, due to wind or
unstable soil, the equipment might start to tip over. Having the
operator at the controls ensures that corrective action can be taken
quickly enough to prevent an accident. Equivalent requirements for
truck cranes and derricks are contained in Secs. 1910.180(h)(4)(i) and
1910.181(i)(4)(i), respectively, which also apply to those types of
equipment.
Paragraph (p)(1)(iv) requires roll-over protective structures to be
provided on certain types of mechanical equipment. The equipment listed
in this paragraph is frequently used for electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work during construction, and Subpart W
of Part 1926, which contains the same list, already requires this
equipment to have such protection. The final rule extends the
protection afforded by the construction standards to operations that do
not involve construction work. The roll-over protective structures must
conform to subpart W of part 1926.
Paragraph (p)(2) sets forth requirements for outriggers. Paragraph
(p)(2)(i) requires vehicular equipment provided with outriggers to be
operated with the outriggers extended and firmly set as necessary for
the stability of the equipment in the particular configuration
involved. The stability of the equipment in various configurations is
normally provided by the manufacturer, but it can also be derived
through engineering analysis. This paragraph also prohibits the
outriggers from being extended or retracted outside the clear view of
the operator unless all employees are outside the range of possible
equipment motion. Paragraph (p)(2)(ii) applies where the work area or
terrain precludes the use of outriggers and limits the operation of the
equipment only within the maximum load ratings as specified by the
manufacturer for the particular configuration without outriggers. These
two paragraphs help ensure the stability of the equipment while loads
are being handled and prevent injuries caused by extending outriggers
into employees. (Additional requirements for the use of outriggers on
truck cranes are contained in Sec. 1910.180(h)(3)(ix).)
A few of the accident descriptions submitted into the record by
OSHA indicated that fatalities are occurring because of the use of
aerial lift buckets to move overhead power lines (Ex. 9-1, 9-2). The
employees in the aerial lift were killed when the unrestrained line
slid up the bucket and contacted the employee (in two cases) or when
current passed through a leakage hole in the bottom of the bucket (in
the other case). In order to prevent such accidents, the Agency
requested public comment on a possible prohibition against moving or
contacting overhead power lines with the bucket of an aerial lift (54
FR 30404).
The following discussion with the IBEW witnesses represents the
most detailed and useful information in the record on this issue:
Ms. Thurber: I would like to ask your comments on [this issue].
Mr. Dushaw: Given the proper equipment, I see no reason to
prohibit moving of aerial conductors with aerial lift equipment and
bucket trucks. Pieces of equipment are designed to do just exactly
that.
And it certainly in many cases puts a man in a safer
configuration than [if] he [were] to do it by some other means.
The cases talked about there, with the hole in the bottom of the
bucket truck, I don't know what you can do to prevent that. If
somebody doesn't like the water in the bottom of the bucket truck
and decides to take a drill and drill a hole to let the water out,
he has bridged the insulating quality of the bucket truck and put
himself in a bad position, which should be prevented under any
circumstances.
Ms. Thurber: What about those instances where the cable will
knock a person out, slide over and knock a person out of a bucket?
Is there a way to prevent that?
Mr. Dushaw: Well, I don't know. That can happen.
Ms. Thurber: Electrocute him and knock him out.
Mr. Dushaw: If you have lost control of the job site to that
extent, this could happen whether a person is in a bucket truck, on
a pole or flying. It doesn't make any difference.
Obviously he has lost control of something there that is not the
fault of the equipment itself but the planning of the job.
Ms. Thurber: Can you tell me if bucket trucks are designed to
move cables? We are talking about when a bucket truck is designed to
move a cable, not when one is standing on a bucket working on a
cable or something.
Mr. MacDonald: Yes, they are. It depends on their load-lifting
capacity.
Mr. Ozzello: They make a [device] that is attached to the aerial
unit and on that [device] you can attach the electric wires. Then
you can lift those wires up off the cross-arm. You can replace the
cross-arm or lower that [device] down and reattach those wires to
the cross-arm. That is a normal procedure. The [device] is made out
of fiberglas[s] and is theoretically tested on a periodic basis.
Ms. Thurber: Let me let David follow up on that just briefly.
Mr. Wallis: The two cases in the record were not using the
equipment you mentioned. The bucket itself was used to push the
conductors out of the way.
Mr. Ozzello: That was a misuse of the equipment.
Mr. Wallis: So should that practice be prohibited?
Mr. Ozzello: Yes it should be. That is misuse of the equipment.
The equipment was not designed to be used in that manner.
Mr. Wallis: Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Dushaw: I would say that with that a consideration here is
what the load is you are lifting.
Mr. Ozzello: There are devices that will measure that load to
keep you from exceeding the load limit of the vehicle. [DC Tr. 604-
606]
Proposed Sec. 1910.269(p)(3) addressed loads applied to lifting
equipment. As proposed, this provision would have limited the maximum
load to be lifted. Based on the testimony of the IBEW witnesses and on
the accident descriptions in the record, OSHA believes that this
provision should be broadened to extend to all types of loads applied
to mechanical equipment. It is important for mechanical equipment to be
used within its design limitations so that the lifting equipment does
not fail during use and so that employees are not otherwise endangered.
Therefore, OSHA has adopted the following language in paragraph (p)(3)
of final Sec. 1910.269:
Mechanical equipment used to lift or move lines or other
material shall be used within its maximum load rating and other
design limitations for the conditions under which the work is being
performed.
This provision will better protect employees than the comparable
provision in the proposal.
Even in electric-utility operations, contact with live parts
through mechanical equipment causes many fatalities each year. A sample
of typical accidents involving the operation of mechanical equipment
near overhead lines is given in Table 5. Industry practice and existing
rules in subpart V of the Construction Standards require aerial lifts
and truck-mounted booms to be kept away from exposed energized lines
and equipment at distances greater than or approximately equal to those
set forth in Table R-6. However, some contact with the energized parts
does occur during the hundreds of thousands of operations carried out
near overhead power lines each year. If the equipment operator is
distracted briefly or if the distances involved or the speed of the
equipment towards the line is misjudged, contact with the lines is the
expected result, rather than simple coincidence, especially when the
minimum approach distances are relatively small. Mr. James L. Dushaw of
the IBEW agreed stating, ``It is impractical and dangerous to believe
that electrical contact with uninsulated vehicular equipment or
suspended loads such as occurs in [pole-]setting or any other
operations can simply be avoided [DC Tr. 547].'' Because these types of
contacts cannot be totally avoided, OSHA believes that additional
requirements are necessary for operating mechanical devices near
exposed energized lines. Paragraph (p)(4) of final Sec. 1910.269
addresses this problem.
Proposed paragraph (p)(4)(i) would have required the minimum
approach distances in Table R-6 to be maintained between the equipment
and the live parts while equipment was being operated near exposed
energized lines or equipment, without exception. Edison Electric
Institute and Tennessee Valley Authority suggested that this provision
provide an exception for insulated equipment (Ex. 3-82, 3-112; DC Tr.
906-912). They argued that it was safe for this equipment to be brought
close to energized lines. Mr. Gene Trombley, representing EEI, stated
that not only was it safe to operate this equipment very close to the
lines, it would be unsafe to operate it farther away (DC Tr. 906-912).
He stated that employees would be forced to lean out of the bucket to
reach the conductors to perform work on them, possibly causing back
injuries and other muscle strains. He said, ``These trucks are designed
to put you in the work area, not to be on the outside looking in [DC
Tr. 907].''
Table 5.--Accidents Involving the Operation of Mechanical Equipment Near Overhead Lines
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of fatalities
--------------------------------
Type of equipment Grounded Type of accident
Total ------------------------
Yes No ?
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boom Truck/Derrick Truck........... 7 1 ...... 6 Boom contact with energized line.
2 1 ...... 1 Pole contact with energized line.
Aerial lift........................ 1 ...... ...... 1 Boom contact with energized line.
3 ...... 1 2 Lower boom contact with energized line.
3 ...... ...... 3 Employee working on deenergized line when
upper boom contacted energized line.
1 ...... ...... 1 Winch on lift used on energized line arced
to nearby ground.
Vehicle............................ 1 ...... 1 ...... Line fell on vehicle.
1 ...... ...... 1 Unknown type of vehicle and type of
accident.
--------------------------------
Total.......................... 19 2 2 15
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Exhibits 9-2 and 9-2A.
OSHA has accepted this recommendation. Aerial lifts are designed to
enable an employee to position himself or herself at elevated locations
with a high degree of accuracy. The aerial lift operator is in the
bucket next to the energized lines and can easily judge the approach
distance. This minimizes the chance that the equipment will contact an
energized line and that the energized line will be struck down should
contact actually occur. The employee operating the lift in the bucket
is protected from the hazards of contacting the live parts under the
provisions of paragraph (1). As the device is insulated, employees on
the ground are protected from electric shock in the case of contact
with the lines. Lastly, paragraph (p)(3) prevents the aerial lift from
striking down the power line. Therefore, final Sec. 1910.269 (p)(4)(i)
provides an exception to the requirement to maintain specific minimum
approach distances for the insulated portion of an aerial lift operated
by an employee in the lift. (It should be noted that this exception
relates only to the conductor on which the employee is working.
Paragraph (1)(2) still requires the employee to maintain the required
distance from conductors at potentials different from that on which he
or she is working.)
Determining the distance between objects that are themselves
relatively far away from the observer can sometimes be difficult. For
example, different perspectives can lead to different estimates of the
distance, and lack of a suitable reference can result in errors (Ex. 8-
19). If the minimum approach distance cannot be accurately determined
by the operator, an extra person is required, by paragraph (p)(4)(ii),
to observe the operation and give warnings when the specified minimum
approach distance is approached.
EEI recommended that the phrase ``[i]f it is difficult for the
operator to determine the distance between the equipment and the
energized parts'' to ``where it is difficult for the operator to
maintain the desired clearance by visual means'' (Ex. 3-112). They
claimed that whether the minimum approach distance was sufficient was
the determining factor, not whether the distance itself could be
judged.
The purpose of proposed Sec. 1910.269(p)(4)(ii) was to ensure that
an observer was used if the approach distance between the equipment and
a live part could not be maintained due to difficulty in judging the
minimum approach distance by the operator. OSHA agrees with EEI that
the determining factor is whether the minimum approach distance can be
maintained. The Agency also realizes that the proposed rule may not
have made this clear and has modified the language of this provision in
the final rule to read as follows:
A designated employee other than the equipment operator shall
observe the approach distance to exposed lines and equipment and
give timely warnings before the minimum approach distance required
by paragraph (p)(4)(i) is reached, unless the employer can
demonstrate that the operator can accurately determine that the
minimum approach distance is being maintained.
This language clarifies that an observer is needed unless the
employer can demonstrate that the operator can accurately determine
that the minimum approach distance can be maintained.
Proposed paragraph (p)(4)(iii) would have required one of two
alternative protective measures to be taken if it was possible during
operation for the equipment to come closer to the live parts than the
required minimum approach distance. The first alternative was for the
mechanical equipment and any attached load to be treated as live parts.
The second alternative was for the equipment to be insulated for the
voltage involved. Under this alternative, the mechanical equipment
would have had to be positioned so that uninsulated portions of the
equipment could not have come within the specified minimum approach
distance of the line. The proposal was intended to protect employees
from electric shock in case contact was made.
In the development of proposed paragraph (p)(4), OSHA considered
other methods of protecting employees from accidental contact with
exposed energized lines. For example, OSHA considered allowing the
mechanical equipment to be grounded as an additional option to the two
alternatives proposed in paragraph (p)(4)(iii). However, grounding
alone does not provide sufficient protection for employees, because if
contact is made with a line of common distribution voltage, the
equipment will still rise to a hazardous voltage with respect to earth
only a few feet from the grounding point. OSHA requested comments and
suggestions on the proposed rule and solicited information on
additional methods of protecting employees.
Many commenters provided their views on protecting workers from the
hazards of contacting overhead power lines through mechanical
equipment. Most of the individual comments on this paragraph related to
its application to line-clearance tree-trimming work (Ex. 3-48, 3-63,
3-67, 3-75, 3-77, 3-78, 3-89, 3-90, 3-92, 3-98, 3-99, 3-100, 3-104, 3-
113, 3-118). Except for a few who supported the proposal (Ex. 3-92, 3-
98, 3-118), the commenters argued that the proposed rule would prohibit
tree workers on the ground from contacting a chipper hooked to an
aerial lift that was used to position an employees trimming trees near
power lines. Because the aerial lifts are insulated, they contended,
employees on the ground could safely feed the chipper. A description of
the method of performing this work was summarized by Mr. Robert Felix,
Executive Vice President of the National Arborist Association, as
follows:
The normal equipment configuration of many line clearance tree
trimming crews is a fully insulated aerial lift truck with a chipper
in tow. While one employee is in an elevated insulated bucket,
typically another is on the ground feeding the cut brush into the
chipper. In that fashion, the brush is effectively cut, and removed,
in integrated fashion. This time-proven method is safe. NAA's 1989
survey of its members performing line clearance work using properly
fully insulated aerial lift trucks with attached chipper indicates
that in the past 3 years, covering approximately 192 million man/
hours [sic] of work, no personnel were injured by electric shock
incident to operating a chipper while a fully insulated aerial lift
device was elevated. [Ex. 3-113]
The OSHA proposal clearly presented two alternatives if equipment
could come too close to exposed energized power lines: (1) The
equipment and attached load could be treated as energized or (2) the
equipment could be insulated for the voltage. Equipment operated under
the second alternative would have had to be positioned so that
uninsulated portions could not violate the minimum approach distance
requirements. The Agency believes that the language contained in the
proposal clearly recognized the safe use of insulated aerial lifts
outlined by Mr. Felix.
Under the proposal, the only time an employee feeding a chipper
would have had to consider the equipment energized was when the aerial
lift was positioned so that the uninsulated portion (normally, the
lower part of the boom) could have come too close to a power line. If
the uninsulated portion contacted the line, any employee in contact
with the chipper would probably have been electrocuted. In fact, this
happened to tree-trimming crews in the past. Two of the accidents,
resulting in two deaths and one hospitalized injury, described in
Exhibit 9-6 involved employees contacting chippers energized when the
boom of an aerial lift struck a power line. Three additional accidents,
resulting in three fatalities, occurred to employees in contact with
the aerial lift truck itself. One of the commenters supporting the
proposed rule included a memorandum describing one of these accidents
as a reason why the proposal was correct (Ex. 3-92).
OSHA has therefore carried forward the option of using equipment
insulated for the voltage, without change, as
Sec. 1910.269(p)(4)(iii)(B).
Many of the commenters suggested allowing additional options to the
two presented for operations of mechanical equipment near exposed
energized power lines (Ex. 3-13, 3-23, 3-40, 3-60, 3-62, 3-112). Two of
them urged OSHA to include the installation of insulating protective
equipment on the lines as an acceptable option (Ex. 3-23, 3-62). They
argued that this would also protect employees.
The proposal limited its application to ``exposed energized lines
or equipment''. Insulating barriers used on the lines would render them
unexposed. Thus, under the proposed rule, insulating barriers were an
acceptable alternative. Rubber insulation is not, however, normally
considered to be a ``barrier''79 and would not have been an
acceptable option under most conditions. For certain types of
operations, rubber insulating line hose and blankets would not provide
sufficient protection. For example, using a crane to lift and position
metal tower sections exposes the insulation to damage upon inadvertent
contact. Other operations, such as the use of an aerial lift operated
by an employee in the lift, would be much less likely to damage the
insulation. Therefore, OSHA has decided to accept insulating the
energized lines or equipment as an option if the insulating material
used will withstand the type of contact likely to result during
operation. Paragraph (p)(4)(iii)(A) of final Sec. 1910.269 sets forth
this option.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\9``Exposed'' means not isolated or guarded. ``Guarded'' means
covered, fenced, enclosed, or otherwise protected, by means of
suitable covers or casings, barrier rails or screens, mats, or
platforms, designed to minimize the possibility, under normal
conditions, of dangerous approach or accidental contact by persons
or objects. A note under the definition of ``guarded'' states that
wires that are insulated, but not otherwise protected, are not
considered as guarded. Examples of barriers that are acceptable
included electrically insulating plastic guard equipment (see ASTM
F968-90) and ``goalpost-type'' guards installed to limit the
movement of mechanical equipment. Whatever barrier is used must be
capable of withstanding any impact that is likely to be imposed and
must be installed so as to prevent the mechanical equipment from
approaching too close to the energized lines or equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another method supported by these commenters was grounding the
mechanical equipment (Ex. 3-13, 3-23, 3-40, 3-60, 3-62, 3-112, 56; DC
Tr. 918-920; LA Tr. 195-196). Most argued that, although grounding does
not provide complete protection, it facilitates rapid opening of the
circuit protective devices, which deenergizes the lines. They stressed
that it is important for the line to be deenergized quickly. In its
prehearing comment, EEI made the strongest argument for accepting
vehicle grounding, as follows:
Similarly, in 1926.950(c) and 1926.952(c)(2)(ii), OSHA
recognizes grounding as a satisfactory means of protecting
employees. In the preamble, however, OSHA asserts that ``grounding
does not provide sufficient protection for employees.'' 54 Fed. Reg.
4994. No accident or engineering data is cited, however, to support
this assertion.
A decision not to permit equipment grounding as a method of
providing protection and compliance would be a mistake. As OSHA
knows, it is a common industry practice to use grounding as a method
of providing protection to employees working on the ground. The
industry is well aware of the possibilities of hazardous touch and
step potentials. However, after considering all safety elements
involved in various work practices requiring the use of mechanical
equipment, grounding continues to be one of the viable methods of
protecting employees.
Grounding may not prevent injury if the employee happens to be
in contact with the truck when it becomes energized, but the
seriousness of the accident is generally limited. Similarly, it
becomes obvious that when barricading rules are broken (and they are
hard to enforce), and the truck becomes energized, a serious
accident may occur. However, the option of using grounding should
not be eliminated, particularly when it can be used in combination
with other methods to enhance worker protection.
The requirements of the proposed standard appear to be driven by
a concern for step potentials. However, the phenomena associated
with both touch and step potentials have been well known for years.
For example, we submit as Attachment J the Harrington and Martin
AIEE article in the August 1954 Transactions which describes the
concept of step potentials.
Considering that this phenomenon has been known for years, it is
worth asking why, over the years, both OSHA and national consensus
standards have permitted grounding as a means of protecting
employees on the ground. Among the consensus standards which permit
grounding for this purpose are the 1987 National Electrical Safety
Code, for lifting equipment, and IEEE Standard 516, 6.6 for lifting
equipment and aerial lifts. (See attachments K and L).
An advantage of having a vehicle grounded is that if contact is
made, protective fusing or relaying is instantaneously activated to
deenergize a faulted line. Because grounding is intended to trigger
rapid deenergizing of the overhead line, it substantially decreases
the likelihood that the person will sustain a severe electrical
shock.
An ungrounded vehicle could become a booby trap should the
vehicle or equipment remain in contact with the energized conductor
and not be noticed. In this instance, a path to ground could be
completed if a worker gets on or off the truck or reaches into a
tool bin. This situation is more likely at 4,160 volts or below. But
if the vehicle is grounded, this risk to the unsuspecting worker
would not be present. Also, when equipment is located under
transmission lines, induced voltage, if present, will be shorted
out, eliminating this startling but generally not harmful current
flow.
Also, at phase-to-neutral voltage of 7,200 volts and above, the
ungrounded vehicle in contact with an energized conductor presents
another potential hazard--fire. The voltage stresses across the
surface of the outrigger and resultant creepage will cause tires to
burn or possibly start grass fires, a very serious threat to the
workers in the vehicle or up in the air. [Ex. 3-112]
OSHA does not dispute the fact that grounding can facilitate the
deenergizing of energized conductors. The proposal did not prohibit the
use of vehicle grounding; it simply did not recognize it alone as being
capable of completely protecting employees working around the vehicles.
While vehicle grounding can also limit the voltage impressed on a
vehicle in contact with an energized line, however, it does not
normally reduce the voltage to a safe level. Evidence in the record,
including descriptions of two fatal accidents, supports this assertion
(Ex. 3-57, 6-10, 6-27, 9-2; DC Tr. 309-310, 349-350, 548). Dr. Robert
J. Harrington, one of OSHA's expert witnesses, explained why this
occurs:
Dr. Harrington: While at first sight it would appear that
grounding of the equipment is advisable, there are implications with
respect to any equipotentials appearing on the surface of the ground
close to the actual grounding point. Even if the grounding is solid,
the current penetration will probably be insufficient to prevent the
presence of equipotentials due to fault current. [DC Tr. 309-310]
* * * * *
Ms. Thurber: Does voltage appear on grounded mechanical
equipment when that equipment contacts an energized line?
Dr. Harrington: Oh, yes, certainly.
Ms. Thurber: Can you explain for those of us who do not
understand this very well how that happens?
Dr. Harrington: Well, even if you have got solid ground up there
for the vehicle itself, what essentially happens once we get
connection to the energized part * * * the vehicle itself is
probably fairly close to it as a zero potential, but along the
ground there is a pattern of equal potentials which may be quite
considerable in terms of voltage. If I had a diagram or something, I
could explain it more precisely.
But essentially the grounding point at which the vehicle is
supposed to be grounded and the actual ground of the system may be
considerably far apart, and it probably will be. And in between that
point of the so-called ground of the vehicle and the actual
grounding of the system there will be these equal potentials
appearing on the surface of the earth, the surface of the ground.
Now that is partly due to the fact that the current penetration
around the actual grounding point is not perfect * * * So
essentially therefore one gets on the surface of the earth fairly
close to the vehicle quite considerable voltage equal potentials.
And therefore there is a considerable risk and hazard to those
in the region of the vehicle at this time. [DC Tr. 349-350]
The IBEW was also concerned about equipotentials, but was even more
concerned that the OSHA standard might encourage employers not to
ground mechanical equipment when operated near overhead lines (Ex. 64;
DC Tr. 545-550). On their behalf, Mr. James Dushaw cited the continued
presence of step potentials and fires as hazards that would be caused
by the lack of grounding (DC Tr. 547-548).
On the basis of the record considered as a whole, OSHA believes
that vehicle grounding alone cannot always be depended upon to provide
sufficient protection against the hazards of mechanical equipment
contact with energized power lines. On the other hand, the Agency
recognizes the usefulness of grounding as a protective measure that can
be used in combination with other techniques to protect employees from
electric shock. Such supplemental techniques include:
(1) Using the best available ground to minimize the time the lines
remain energized,
(2) Bonding equipment together to minimize potential differences,
(3) Providing ground mats to extend areas of equipotential, and
(4) Using insulating protective equipment or barricades to guard
against any remaining hazardous potential differences.
The final rule recognizes all these techniques. Paragraph
(p)(4)(iii)(C) of final Sec. 1910.269 sets forth the performance-
oriented requirement that assures that employees on the ground will be
protected from the hazards that could arise if the equipment contacts
the energized parts. The protective measures used must ensure that
employees are not exposed to hazardous differences in potential.
Information in appendix C to the standard provides guidelines for
employers and employees that explain the various measures and how they
can be used. A note referencing this appendix has been included in the
final rule.
The last issue related to paragraph (p)(4)(iii) of proposed
Sec. 1910.269 concerned when the rule should apply. The proposed
paragraph used the phrase ``[i]f it is possible for the mechanical
equipment or any attached load to be taken closer to exposed energized
lines or equipment than the clearance specified''. This language was
chosen because of the difficulty OSHA experienced in enforcing
comparable provisions in subpart V of the Construction
Standards.80
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\0The relevant subpart V regulations are:
Sec. 1926.952(c)(2) ``mechanical equipment shall not be
operated closer to any energized line or equipment than the
clearances set forth in Sec. 1926.950(c) unless . . . [emphasis
added]''
Sec. 1926.955(a)(6)(i) ``equipment or machinery working
adjacent to energized lines or equipment. [emphasis added]''
Sec. 1926.955(a)(6)(ii) ``Lifting equipment shall be . . . when
utilized near energized equipment or lines. [emphasis added]''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EEI noted that the wording of these provisions had caused
enforcement-related problems (Ex. 3-112, 56). They pointed to two
federal Court of Appeals decisions which reached the conclusion that
these requirements are unclear and need substantial revision
(Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. v. OSHRC, 737 F.2d 350; and Wisconsin
Electric Power Co. v. OSHRC, 567 F.2d 735, 738).
Many commenters objected to this approach (Ex. 3-26, 3-63, 3-89, 3-
112, 3-113, 3-120, 56, 58; DC Tr. 914-928; LA Tr. 343). They were
concerned that the provision would apply whenever there was a
possibility of close approach even if the chance of the equipment's
getting too close to the power line was remote. EEI argued that ``the
pointless cost and loss of productivity resulting from such a
requirement would be enormous, especially if one considers how many
times per day electric utilities around the country operate mechanical
equipment in locations where extension of a boom to reach an overhead
power line is at least physically possible [Ex. 3-112].'' Mr. Tony E.
Brannan of Georgia Power Co., representing EEI, described several
example situations that would unnecessarily require precautions to be
taken under the proposal, as follows:
(1) Work on one side of a street where energized power lines are on
the opposite side and where the boom of a line truck could reach the
energized lines,
(2) Work, such as lifting material, that is unrelated to energized
lines but that is close enough to power lines to present the
possibility of contact,
(3) Work performed with the boom lowered, such as entry into and
exit from the truck upon arrival or departure, and
(4) Work on the vehicle while it is parked near energized lines (DC
Tr. 920-928).
Several commenters suggested that OSHA use the phrase ``when it is
intended'' or ``where it can be reasonably anticipated'' in the final
rule in place of the proposed phrase ``if it is possible'' (Ex. 3-26,
3-112, 56, 64). EEI urged OSHA to use a reasonable triggering point and
to rely on job planning to determine when the triggering point was
reached (Ex. 56). The National Arborist Association simply suggested
removing the offensive phrase from the requirement (Ex. 3-113, 56).
OSHA believes that these commenters have a valid point. While some
of the examples presented by Mr. Brannan would not be covered under
Sec. 1910.269 (for example, vehicle servicing) or would still pose a
substantial risk to employees (for example, work unrelated to energized
lines), others demonstrated that the risk of contact with an energized
line may not be significant even though there is a possibility of
contact. In particular, the Agency can envision a line crew working on
deenergized equipment across the street from an energized line. If the
mechanical equipment is positioned so that it is barely possible to
contact the energized lines and if the crew performs all the work on
the deenergized side of the street the likelihood of contact is remote.
However, many situations covered under the standard do require the
employees to be exposed to a substantial risk of having the mechanical
equipment contact an energized line. The nature of electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution work naturally brings
employees and the equipment they use near energized lines.
The question then becomes what language can be used to describe the
triggering point. Eliminating the phrase ``if it is possible'' as NAA
suggests would require precautions to be taken only when the minimum
approach distance is violated, an act prohibited by paragraph of final
Sec. 1910.269.
EEI's and IBEW's suggested phrase, ``when it is intended'', is
better. However, it cannot always be foreseen before work starts
whether the mechanical equipment will be taken too close to energized
lines. Some of the accident descriptions contained in the record depict
situations involving changes in approach directions not envisioned in
the job plan (Ex. 9-2). For example, a different approach than
originally planned may be necessary for an articulating device to be
able to reach a desired position. In such cases, the employee operating
the equipment has his or her mind on the task of positioning the
device, and whether or not it was originally intended to get too close
to the lines is irrelevant. In one of the cases cited by EEI, an
accident occurred when the job plan was allegedly violated by the
operator himself (Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. v. OSHRC, 737 F.2d
350; Ex. 46).
Additionally, OSHA believes it is important to initiate protective
measures before the boom (or an equivalent part) of the equipment is
moved. Once the boom has been started in motion to perform work near
the power lines, the employee will be concentrating on maneuvering it
into position and may not remember to or be convinced of the need to
stop to take these measures.
For these reasons, the Agency is taking a different, more
performance-oriented approach than anything suggested by the
commenters. OSHA has decided to require that the necessary protective
steps be taken if the employer knows or reasonably could have known
that the hazard of the mechanical equipment's becoming energized exists
during operation. Such a hazard could exist because of the likelihood
of direct contact with the line, of current arcing to the equipment, or
of hazardous induced voltage. This concept is set forth in the
introductory text of Sec. 1910.269, which reads as follows:
If, during operation of the mechanical equipment, the equipment
could become energized, the operation shall also comply with at
least one of paragraphs (p)(4)(iii)(A) through (p)(4)(iii)(C) of
this section.
The Agency believes that the final rule addresses the problem
directly, by applying only to hazardous operations, rather than
indirectly as the proposal did. Under paragraph (p)(4)(iii) of final
Sec. 1910.269, only operations exposing employees to the hazard of
dangerous voltage being impressed or induced on mechanical equipment
require measures to be taken to minimize the risk of injury from
electric shock.
Paragraph (q). Paragraph (q) of final Sec. 1910.269 applies to work
involving overhead lines or equipment. The types of work performed on
overhead lines and addressed by this paragraph include the installation
and removal of overhead lines, live-line bare-hand work, and work on
towers and structures. While performing this type of work, employees
are typically exposed to the hazards of falls and electric shock.
Paragraph (q)(1)(i) requires the employer to determine that
elevated structures such as poles and towers are of adequate strength
to withstand the stresses which will be imposed by the work to be
performed. For example, if the work involves removing and reinstalling
an existing line on a utility pole, the pole will be subjected to the
weight of the employee (a vertical force) and to the release and
replacement of the force imposed by the overhead line (a vertical and
possibly a horizontal force). The additional stress involved may cause
the pole to break, particularly if the pole has rotted at its base. If
the pole or structure cannot withstand the loads to be imposed, it must
be reinforced so that failure does not occur. This rule protects
employees from falling to the ground upon failure of the pole or other
elevated structure.
As the last step in ascertaining whether a wood pole is safe to
climb, as required under paragraph (q)(1)(i), checking the actual
condition of the pole is important because of the possibility of decay
and other conditions adversely affecting the strength of the pole.
Appendix D of final Sec. 1910.269 contains methods of inspecting and
testing the condition of wood structures before they are climbed. These
methods, which can be used in ascertaining whether a wood pole is
capable of sustaining the forces imposed by an employee climbing it,
have been taken from Sec. 1910.268, the telecommunications standard. It
should be noted that the employer must also ascertain whether the pole
is capable of sustaining any additional forces that will be imposed
during the work.
Several commenters argued that the standard should be changed to
require this determination to be performed by a qualified employee (Ex.
3-22, 3-32, 3-40, 3-42, 3-69, 3-112, 3-116, 3-123, 3-125, 3-128). They
argued that employees climbing the poles and structures are qualified
to inspect poles and structures and determine whether they are safe to
climb. In their view, it is the worker, not the employer, who is the
most appropriate one to perform this function.
OSHA realizes that the employee at the worksite will be the one to
inspect the structure for deterioration and will also determine whether
it is safe to climb. However, under the OSH Act, it is the employer's
responsibility to ensure that this is accomplished, regardless of who
performs the work. (See the discussion of this issue under the summary
and explanation of the introductory text of paragraph (c), earlier in
the preamble.) Additionally, some work involves changing the loading on
the structure. For example, replacement transformers may be heavier,
and the equipment needed to perform the work will impose extra stress
on the pole. The employee in the field is not necessarily skilled in
structural engineering, and a determination as to whether or not the
pole could withstand the stresses involved would need to be performed
by the employer's engineering staff. (Typically, this task is performed
in the initial design of the system or when changes are made.) For this
reason, OSHA believes it is necessary to specify in the standard the
employer's responsibility in this regard. Therefore, the wording of
this provision has not been changed in the final rule. However, the
Agency expects the determination of the condition of the pole or
structure to be made at the worksite by an employee who is capable of
making this determination. The employer fulfills the obligation imposed
by the standard by training his or her employees and by enforcing
company rules that adhere to the standard.
When poles are handled near overhead lines, it is necessary to
protect the pole from contact with the lines. Paragraph (q)(1)(ii)
prohibits letting the pole come into direct contact with the overhead
lines. Measures commonly used to prevent such contact include
installation of insulating guards on the pole and pulling conductors
away from the area where the pole will go.
Paragraph (q)(1)(iii) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires employees
handling the poles to be insulated from the pole. This provision was
proposed as part of Sec. 1910.269(q)(1)(ii). However, for clarity, the
two requirements contained in the proposed paragraph have been
separated into two distinct paragraphs ((q)(1)(ii) and (q)(1)(iii)) in
the final rule. These requirements protect employees from hazards
caused by falling power lines and by contact of the pole with the line.
They are in addition to the requirements in paragraph (p)(4) for
operations involving mechanical equipment.
Several commenters suggested limiting the application of these two
provisions to lines of more than 600 volts (Ex. 3-20, 3-42, 3-80, 3-
112). They noted that the EEI/IBEW draft contained such a limitation.
Additionally, EEI claimed that providing protection at the lower
voltage levels would be impractical and would add nothing to the safety
of employees handling poles (Ex. 3-112).
Two existing OSHA requirements apply to setting, moving, and
removing poles near overhead lines: Sec. 1910.268(n)(11), in the
telecommunications standard, and Sec. 1926.955(a), in Subpart V. Both
contain requirements comparable to proposed Sec. 1910.269(q)(1)(ii),
and neither contains a lower voltage limitation. Furthermore, poles are
often conductive. They can be made of metal or concrete, which OSHA
considers to be conductive, as well as wood. Even wood poles pose an
electric shock hazard when being moved near electric power lines. Wet
poles and poles with ground wires running along their length are both
highly conductive. Some of the accidents described in the record
involve wood poles with installed ground wires being placed between
energized conductors (Ex. 9-2). Even though the voltage was greater
than 600 volts or was unspecified, these accidents show the dangers,
regardless of the voltage involved. (Any voltage greater than 50 volts
is normally considered lethal.) Therefore, OSHA has not accepted the
suggested 600-volt limitation.
To protect employees from falling into holes into which poles are
to be placed, paragraph (q)(1)(iv) requires the holes to be guarded by
barriers or attended by employees. For clarification, the language in
this provision has been changed slightly from the wording in the
proposal. The final version is similar to that suggested by the
American Public Power Association (Ex. 3-80).
Paragraph (q)(2) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses the installation
and removal of overhead lines. The provisions contained in final
Sec. 1910.269 (q)(2) have been taken, in large part, from existing
Sec. 1926.955(c), on stringing and removing lines, and
Sec. 1926.955(d), on stringing adjacent to energized lines. However,
the final rule combines these provisions into a single paragraph
(q)(2).
EEI objected to the merging of these two paragraphs into one (Ex.
3-112, 56). They noted that the EEI/IBEW draft followed the Subpart V
format and that it was widely understood in the industry.
OSHA believes that paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 1926.955 are
confusing. Paragraph (c) in the construction standard is entitled
``Stringing or removing deenergized conductors'', while paragraph (d)
is ``Stringing adjacent to energized lines''. However, whereas both of
these paragraphs relate to the installation of deenergized conductors,
paragraph (c) also contains provisions related to stringing lines
adjacent to live conductors. Additionally, some of the requirements are
redundant\81\ or inconsistent,\82\ even though paragraph (d)
incorporates the requirement of paragraph (c) by reference. Therefore,
OSHA has retained the proposed approach of combining these two
paragraphs from the Construction Standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\For example, both Sec. 1926.955(c)(5) and (d)(2) require the
use of the tension stringing method or other means of preventing the
line being installed from contacting an energized conductor.
\82\For example, Sec. 1926.955(c)(10), (d)(5), and (d)(8)(iii)
relate to the removal of grounds and imply that it is permissible to
remove them at different times during the operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (q)(2)(i) requires precautions to be taken to prevent the
line being installed or removed from contacting existing energized
power lines. Common methods of accomplishing this include the use of
the following techniques: Stringing conductors by means of the tension
stringing method (which keeps the conductors off the ground and clear
of energized circuits) and the use of rope nets and guards (which
physically prevent one line from contacting another). These
precautions, or equivalent measures, are necessary to protect employees
against electric shock and against the effects of equipment damage
resulting from accidental contact of the line being installed with
energized parts.
Even though the precautions taken under paragraph (q)(2)(i)
minimize the possibility of accidental contact, there is still a
significant risk that the line being installed or removed could make
contact with energized lines. Paragraph (q)(2)(i)(A) of proposed
Sec. 1910.269 would have required the line being installed, plus any
connected equipment, to be treated as energized if any of several
listed accident situations could energize the line. This was intended
to ensure that, in the event of contact with other energized lines,
these workers would be handling the equipment (which would now be
energized as a result) only through insulating devices.
Several commenters argued that OSHA should recognize the widely
used practice of grounding the installed cable to protect employees
(Ex. 3-62, 3-112, 3-120, 3-123). They offered reasons similar to those
used on the issue of whether to recognize vehicle grounding for
mechanical equipment used near exposed electric power lines. (See the
previous discussion of this issue.)
OSHA believes that this issue is equivalent to the one on vehicle
grounding. In fact, the hazards are identical: employees are exposed to
hazardous differences in potential if the conductor being installed or
equipment being used makes contact with an energized line. The methods
of protection that can be applied are also the same in both cases.
Therefore, the Agency has determined that the approach used for the
hazard of contact between mechanical equipment and overhead lines
should also be used for the hazard of contact between a line being
installed or removed and an existing energized conductor. To accomplish
this, paragraph (q)(2)(ii) of final Sec. 1910.269 simply adopts the
requirements of paragraph (p)(4)(iii) by reference. Basically, the
employer is required to institute measures to protect employees from
hazardous differences in potential at the work location. (See the
discussion of final Sec. 1910.269(p)(4)(iii) and Appendix C to
Sec. 1910.269 for acceptable methods of compliance.)
Paragraph (q)(2)(i)(B) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 would have allowed
employees working aloft to be protected by grounding the line being
installed. Because paragraph (q)(2)(ii) of final Sec. 1910.269 takes a
performance-oriented approach to the protection of employees from
hazardous differences in potential, this proposed paragraph is no
longer necessary and is not being carried forward into the final rule.
Paragraph (q)(2)(iii) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires the disabling
of the automatic-reclosing feature of the devices protecting any
circuit that operates at more than 600 volts and that passes under
conductors being installed. If it is not made inoperative, this feature
would cause the circuit protective devices to reenergize the circuit
after they had tripped, exposing the employees to additional or more
severe injury.
Many commenters argued that, because older circuit reclosing
devices did not permit the disabling of the automatic circuit reclosing
feature, the rule should permit alternative protective measures, such
as guarding the energized lines and grounding the lines being installed
(Ex. 3-2, 3-42, 3-44, 3-58, 3-62, 3-69, 3-71, 3-80, 3-112).
Paragraph (q)(2)(i) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires the use of
techniques that minimize the possibility of contact between the
existing and new conductors. Paragraph (q)(2)(ii) of final
Sec. 1910.269 requires the use of measures that protect employees from
hazardous differences in potential. These two paragraphs encompass all
the suggested alternatives and provide the primary protection to
employees installing conductors. Paragraph (q)(2)(iii) is secondary
protection; it provides an additional measure of safety in case the
first two provisions are violated. Therefore, in the final rule, OSHA
is applying this paragraph only to circuit reclosing devices that are
designed to permit the disabling of the automatic reclosing feature.
(The issue of whether or not OSHA should require new automatic
switching devices to be made so as to allow disabling of the automatic
switching feature was discussed under the summary and explanation of
paragraph (m)(3)(iii), earlier in this preamble.) The Agency believes
that the combination of these three paragraphs in final Sec. 1910.269
will provide better protection than the comparable provisions in the
proposal.
Paragraph (q)(2)(iv) sets forth rules protecting workers from the
hazard of voltage induced on lines being installed near (and usually
parallel to) other energized lines. These rules, which provide
supplemental provisions on grounding, would be in addition to those
elsewhere in the standard. In general, when employees may be exposed to
the hazard of induced voltage on overhead lines, the lines being
installed must be grounded to minimize the voltage and to protect
employees handling the lines from electric shock.
Several commenters (Ex. 3-13, 3-20, 3-40, 3-62, 3-80, 3-82, 3-112)
objected to the limited options available under this provision in the
proposal (proposed Sec. 1910.269(q)(2)(iii)). Some argued that it was
not always possible to determine the exact voltage that would be
induced on a line (Ex. 3-13, 3-20, 3-82, 3-101, 3-107, 3-112). Others
suggested that a determination of voltage was unnecessary if the line
was assumed to carry a hazardous voltage (Ex. 3-20, 3-40, 3-82, 3-101,
3-107, 3-112). Still others suggested allowing work to be performed as
if the conductors were energized (Ex. 3-20, 3-40, 3-62, 3-80, 3-112).
OSHA has accepted all of these recommendations. Paragraph
(q)(2)(iv) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires a determination of the
``approximate'' voltage, unless the line being installed is assumed to
carry a hazardous induced voltage. Additionally, workers may treat the
line as energized rather than comply with the additional grounding
requirements contained in this paragraph.
The standard does not provide guidelines for determining whether or
not a hazard exists due to induced voltage. The hazard depends not only
on the voltage of the existing line, but also on the length of the line
being installed and the distance between the existing line and the new
one. Electric shock from induced voltage poses two different hazards.
First, the electric shock could cause an involuntary reaction, which
could cause a fall or other injury. Second, the electric shock itself
could cause respiratory or cardiac arrest. If no precautions are taken
to protect employees from hazards associated with involuntary reactions
from electric shock, a hazard is presumed to exist if the induced
voltage is sufficient to pass a current of 1 milliampere through a 500
ohm resistor. (The 500 ohm resistor represents the resistance of an
employee. The 1 milliampere current is the threshold of perception.) If
employees are protected from injury due to involuntary reactions from
electric shock, a hazard is presumed to exist if the resultant current
would be more than 6 milliamperes (the let-go threshold for women). It
is up to the employer to ensure that employees are protected against
serious injury from any voltages induced on lines being installed and
to determine whether the voltages are high enough to warrant the
adoption of the additional provisions on grounding spelled out in
paragraphs (q)(2)(iv)(A) through (q)(2)(iv)(E) of final Sec. 1910.269.
These rules set forth the following requirements:
(1) Grounds must be installed in increments of no more than 2 miles
(paragraph (q)(2)(iv)(A));
(2) Grounds must remain in place until the installation is
completed between dead ends (paragraph (q)(2)(iv)(B) );
(3) Grounds must be removed as the last phase of aerial cleanup
(paragraph (q)(2)(iv)(C));
(4) Grounds must be installed at each work location and at all open
dead-end or catch-off points or the next adjacent structure (paragraph
(q)(2)(iv)(D)); and
(5) Bare conductors being spliced must be bonded and grounded
(paragraph (q)(2)(iv)(E)).
Proposed paragraphs (q)(2)(iii)(F) and (q)(2)(iii)(G), which
related to the connection and removal of grounds, respectively, have
not been carried forward into the final rule. As noted by EEI (Ex. 3-
112), these two paragraphs simply repeated the provisions of
Sec. 1910.269 (n)(6) and (n)(7) and were therefore unnecessary.
Paragraph (q)(2)(v) requires reel handling equipment to be in safe
operating condition and to be leveled and aligned. Proper alignment of
the stringing machines will help prevent failure of the equipment,
conductors, and supporting structures, which could result in injury to
workers.
Prevention of the failure of the line pulling equipment and
accessories is also the purpose of paragraphs (q)(2)(vi), (q)(2)(vii),
and (q)(2)(viii). These provisions respectively require the operation
to be performed within the load limits of the equipment, require the
repair or replacement of defective apparatus, and prohibit the use of
conductor grips not specifically designed for use in pulling
operations. Equipment that has been damaged beyond manufacturing
specifications or that has been damaged to the extent that its load
ratings would be reduced are considered to be defective. Load limits
and design specifications are normally provided by the manufacturer,
but they can also be found in engineering and materials handbooks (see,
for example, The Lineman's and Cableman's Handbook, Ex. 8-5).
When the tension stringing method is used, the pulling rig (which
takes up the pulling rope and thereby pulls the conductors into place)
is separated from the reel stands and tensioner (which pay out the
conductors and apply tension to them) by one or more spans (the
distance between the structures supporting the conductors). In an
emergency, the pulling equipment operator may have to shut down the
operation. Paragraph (q)(2)(ix) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires
communication to be maintained between the reel tender and the pulling
rig operator, so that in case of emergency at the conductor supply end,
the pulling rig operator can shut the equipment down before injury-
causing damage occurs. The proposed version of this rule, paragraph
(q)(2)(viii), would have required simply that ``reliable
communications'' be maintained. The language contained in paragraph
(q)(2)(ix) of final Sec. 1910.269 clarifies that two-way radios or
other equivalent means constitute ``reliable communication''.
Paragraph (q)(2)(x) prohibits the operation of the pulling rig
under unsafe conditions. This provision was proposed as part of
Sec. 1910.269(q)(2)(viii). It has been designated as a separate
paragraph in the final rule. OSHA has included a note following
paragraph (q)(2)(x) of the final rule. The explanatory note, which was
not contained in the proposal, provides examples of unsafe conditions.
Paragraph (q)(2)(xi) prohibits employees from unnecessarily working
directly beneath overhead operations or on the cross arm. This
provision minimizes exposure of employees to injury resulting from the
failure of equipment, conductors, or supporting structures during
pulling operations.
Under certain conditions, work must be performed on transmission
and distribution lines while they remain energized. Sometimes, this
work is accomplished using rubber insulating equipment or live-line
tools. However, this equipment has voltage and other limitations which
make it impossible to insulate the employee performing work on live
lines under all conditions. In such cases, usually on medium- and high-
voltage transmission lines, the work is performed using the live-line
bare-hand technique. If work is to be performed ``bare handed'', the
employee works from an insulated aerial platform and is electrically
bonded to the energized line. Since there is essentially no potential
difference across the worker's body, he or she is protected from
electric shock. Paragraph (q)(3) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses the
live-line bare-hand technique.
Paragraph (q)(3)(i) requires employees using or supervising the use
of the live-line bare-hand method on energized lines to be trained in
the use of the technique. Periodic retraining must be provided as
required under paragraph (a)(2) of final Sec. 1910.269. Without this
training, employees would not be able to perform the highly specialized
work safely.
Before work can be started, the voltage of the lines on which work
is to be performed must be known. This voltage determines the minimum
approach distances and the types of equipment which can be used. If the
voltage is higher than expected, the minimum approach distance will be
too small and the equipment may not be safe for use. Therefore,
paragraph (q)(3)(ii) requires a determination to be made of the voltage
of the circuit, of the minimum approach distances involved, and of the
voltage limitations of equipment to be used.
Paragraph (q)(3)(iii) requires insulated tools and equipment to be
designed, tested, and intended for live-line bare-hand work and that
they be kept clean and dry. This requirement is important to ensure
that equipment does not fail under constant contact with high voltage
sources. The final version of this rule explains that it applies to
insulated tools, insulated equipment, and aerial devices and platforms
used in live-line work. This clarification was made in response to the
request of three commenters (Ex. 3-65, 3-81, 3-112). The Agency
considers insulated equipment that is rated for the voltage on which it
is used (such as a live-line tool) to meet this requirement.
Paragraph (q)(3)(iv) requires the automatic-reclosing feature of
circuit protective devices to be made inoperative. In case of a fault
at the worksite, it is important for the circuit to be deenergized as
quickly as possible and for it to remain deenergized once the
protective devices have opened the circuit. This prevents any possible
injuries from becoming more severe. Additionally, this measure helps
limit the possible switching surge voltage, which provides an extra
measure of safety. (The issue of whether or not OSHA should require new
automatic switching devices to be made so as to allow disabling of the
automatic switching feature was discussed under the summary and
explanation of paragraph (m)(3)(iii), earlier in this preamble.)
Sometimes the weather makes live-line bare-hand work unsafe. For
example, lightning strikes on lines being worked can create severe
transient voltages, against which the minimum approach distances
required by final Sec. 1910.269 may not provide complete protection.
Additionally, the wind can reduce the minimum approach distance below
acceptable values. To provide protection against environmental
conditions which can increase the hazards by an unacceptable degree,
paragraph (q)(3)(v) prohibits live-line bare-hand work in the midst of
a thunderstorm or under any other conditions that make the work
unusually hazardous (that is, hazardous in spite of the precautions
taken under the final rule). Also, work may not be performed under any
conditions that reduce the minimum approach distances below required
values. If insulating guards are provided to prevent hazardous approach
to other energized parts and to ground, then work may be performed
under conditions reducing the minimum approach distances.
Paragraph (q)(3)(vi) requires the use of a conductive device,
usually in the form of a conductive bucket liner, which creates an area
of equipotential in which the employee can work safely. The employee
must be bonded to this device by means of conductive shoes or leg clips
or by another effective method. Additionally, if necessary to protect
employees further, electrostatic shielding would be required.
To avoid receiving a shock caused by charging current, the employee
must bond the conductive bucket liner (or other conductive device) to
the energized conductor before he or she touches the conductor.
Typically, a hot stick is used to bring a bonding jumper (already
connected to the conductive bucket liner) into contact with the live
line. This connection brings the equipotential area surrounding the
employee to the same voltage as that of the line. Paragraph (q)(3)(vii)
requires the conductive device to be bonded to the energized conductor
before any employee contacts the energized conductor and requires this
connection to be maintained until work is completed.
Paragraph (q)(3)(viii) requires aerial lifts used for live-line
bare-hand work to be equipped with upper controls that are within reach
of any employee in the bucket and with lower controls that permit
override operation at base of the boom. Upper controls are necessary so
that employees in the bucket can precisely control the lift's direction
and speed of approach to the live line. Control by workers on the
ground responding to directions from those in the bucket could lead to
contact by an employee in the lift with the energized conductor before
the bonding jumper is in place. Controls are needed at ground level,
however, so that employees in the lift who might be disabled as a
result of an accident or illness could be promptly lowered and
assisted. For this reason, paragraph (q)(3)(ix) prohibits operation of
the ground level controls except in case of emergency.
In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested comments on whether
there were operations involving live-line bare-hand work that require
the use of the lower controls in lieu of the ones in the lift. In
response to this request, the IBEW supported the proposed language (Ex.
3-107). EEI suggested that the standard allow the lower controls to be
operated with the permission of the employee in the lift because in
some situations it would be necessary or safer (Ex. 3-112). However,
EEI did not specify what type of procedure would necessitate such
operation or explain how this could be done safely. Because OSHA does
not believe it would be either safer or necessary for an employee on
the ground to operate the lift in other than emergency conditions, the
final rule adopts the provision as proposed.
Paragraph (q)(3)(x) requires aerial lift controls to be checked to
ensure that they are in proper working order before any employee is
lifted into the working position.
To protect employees on the ground from the electric shock that
would be received upon touching the truck supporting the aerial lift,
paragraph (q)(3)(xi) requires the truck to be grounded or treated as
energized. In this case the insulation of the lift limits the voltage
on the body of the truck to a safe level if the truck itself is
grounded.
Aerial lifts that are used in live-line bare-hand work are exposed
to the full line-to-ground voltage of the circuit for the duration of
the job. To ensure that the insulating value of the lift being used is
high enough to protect employees, paragraph (q)(3)(xii) requires a
boom-current test to be made before work is started each day. The test
is also required when a higher voltage is encountered and when
conditions change to a degree that warrants retesting the equipment.
Under the standard, the test consists of placing the bucket in
contact with a source of voltage equal to that being encountered during
the job and keeping it there for at least 3 minutes. This is normally
accomplished at the worksite by placing the bucket in contact with the
energized line on which work is to be performed (without anyone in it,
of course).
Several smaller electric utility companies and one oil company
objected to the requirement to test aerial lifts on a day-to-day basis
(Ex. 3-2, 3-12, 3-17, 3-26, 3-124). These commenters argued that the
insulating value of this type of equipment does not change
significantly from day to day and that this type of test was very
expensive.
OSHA believes that, if live-line bare-hand work is to be performed,
a test must be conducted before work starts each day. The aerial lift
is deliberately placed into contact with the energized line, and any
damage to the insulation could quickly lead to the death of an
employee. The insulation on these devices must be constantly monitored
for adequacy.
The test proposed in Sec. 1910.269(q)(3)(xii) is already required
under Sec. 1926.955(e)(11) for similar work performed under the
Construction Standards. Additionally, all aerial lifts insulated for
voltages over 69 kV are required by Sec. 1910.6783 (through ANSI
A92.2-1969) to be equipped with electrodes for conducting these tests.
Final Sec. 1910.269 does not require these devices to be sent to a test
facility for testing (in fact, this would be counterproductive), nor
does it require these tests to be performed on all aerial lifts used in
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution work. This
provision applies only to lifts used in live-line bare-hand work and
only when they are so used. For these reasons, OSHA has carried this
requirement forward into the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\3Paragraph (b)(1) of Sec. 1910.67 requires all vehicle-
mounted elevating and rotating work platforms (aerial lifts) to
conform to the provisions of ANSI A92.2-1969, Vehicle Mounted
Elevating and Rotating Work Platforms. Section 4.11 of that standard
contains the requirement for platforms insulated for more than 69 kV
to be equipped with test electrodes. These electrodes can be used
for field testing as noted in the Appendix to that standard and in
Section 6.3.1.3 of the 1979 version of that standard (ANSI A92.2-
1979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To provide employees with a level of protection equivalent to that
provided by American National Standard for Vehicle-Mounted Elevating
and Rotating Aerial Devices (ANSI A92.2-1979; Ex. 2-28),
Sec. 1910.269(q)(3)(xii) proposed to permit a leakage current of up to
1 microampere per kilovolt of nominal phase-to-ground voltage. In
contrast, the corresponding provisions in Subpart V of Part 1926
(Sec. 1926.955(e)(11)) and in the EEI/IBEW draft allow up to 1
microampere of current for every kilovolt of phase-to-phase voltage.
(For a three-phase, Y-connected system, the phase-to-phase voltage
equals 1.73 times the phase-to-ground voltage.) Because of the
inconsistency between the proposal and OSHA's existing standard, the
Agency requested comments on the appropriateness of the leakage current
level permitted by the proposal.
Four commenters responded to this request (Ex. 3-41, 3-82, 3-107,
3-112). EEI and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) supported the
Subpart V level of 1 microampere per kilovolt of phase-to-phase voltage
(Ex. 3-82, 3-112). They argued that this level was more appropriate for
field testing and was consistent with the existing OSHA standard.
IBEW and the Manufacturers of Aerial Devices & Digger Derricks
Council supported the lower level proposed in Sec. 1910.269(q)(3)(xii)
(Ex. 3-41, 3-107). They noted that this is the level adopted in the
consensus standard. Also, the latest version of the ANSI standard
includes a provision for field testing of insulated aerial devices at a
level of 1 microampere per kilovolt of phase-to-ground voltage (Ex. 2-
28, 60).
The manufacturers of insulated aerial lifts and the national
consensus standard support the leakage level contained in the proposal.
Neither EEI nor TVA explained how a higher leakage current level would
better protect employees than the level set in the national consensus
standard. Therefore, OSHA is adopting the maximum leakage current of 1
microampere per kilovolt of phase-to-ground voltage from ANSI A92.2-
1979.
Paragraph (q)(3)(xii) requires the suspension of related work
activity any time (not only during tests) a malfunction of the
equipment is evident. This requirement is intended to prevent the
failure of insulated aerial devices during use. As requested by a
commenter (Ex. 3-62), this provision in the final rule has been
clarified so that only work from the aerial lift is affected. Work not
involving the aerial lift could be continued. Halting work from the
lift will protect employees in the lift, as well as those on the
ground, from the electrical hazards involved.
Paragraphs (q)(3)(xiii), (q)(3)(xiv), and (q)(3)(xv) of final
Sec. 1910.269 require the minimum approach distances specified in Table
R-6 through Table R-10 to be maintained from grounded objects and from
objects at a potential different from that at which the bucket is
energized. (The proposal contained a separate table for live-line bare-
hand work. The final rule has consolidated all the minimum approach
distance tables in one place, under Sec. 1910.269(1).) Paragraph
(q)(3)(xiii) applies to minimum approach distances in general;
paragraph (q)(3)(xiv) covers minimum approach distances to be used as
the employee approaches or leaves the energized conductor; and
paragraph (q)(3)(xv) relates to the distance between the bucket and the
end of a bushing or insulator string. The phrase ``or any other
grounded surface'' has been added after ``insulator string'' to
indicate that the bucket must maintain this minimum approach distance
from any grounded surface, as recommended by Mr. Joseph Van Name (DC
Tr. 732).
The tables referenced in paragraphs (q)(3)(xiii), (q)(3)(xiv), and
(q)(3)(xv) are those set forth in paragraph (1)(2) of final
Sec. 1910.269. The rationale behind the adoption of those tables and
the discussion of issues related to minimum approach distances is
presented under the preamble summary of that paragraph. The principles
behind the two sets of tables are the same. (In fact, EEI proposed
placing all these requirements under paragraph (l). OSHA has not
adopted this approach at this time because of concerns of sufficient
notice to interested parties. However, consolidation of the live-line
bare-hand requirements and the other regulations relating to work on
energized lines will be considered in future rulemaking efforts.)
Paragraph (q)(3)(xvi) prohibits the use of hand lines between the
bucket and boom and between the bucket and ground. Such use of lines
could set up a potential difference between the employee in the bucket
and the power line when the employee contacts the hand line. If the
hand line is supported by the energized conductor, as permitted by the
paragraph, no potential difference is generated at the bucket. Unless
the rope is insulated for the voltage, employees on the ground must
treat it as energized.
For similar reasons, paragraph (q)(3)(xvii) prohibits passing
uninsulated equipment or materials to an employee bonded to an
energized part.
Paragraph (q)(3)(xviii) requires a durable chart reflecting the
minimum approach distances prescribed by Table R-6 through Table R-10
to be mounted so that it is visible to the operator of the boom. Of
course, a table prescribing minimum approach distances greater than
those required would also be acceptable. Paragraph (q)(3)(xix) requires
a non-conductive measuring device to be available to the employee in
the lift. Compliance with these two provisions in the final standard
will assist the employee in determining the minimum approach distances
required by the standard.
Paragraph (q)(4) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses hazards
associated with towers and other structures supporting overhead lines.
To protect employees on the ground from hazards presented by
falling objects, paragraph (q)(4)(i) prohibits workers from standing
under a tower or other structure, unless their presence is necessary to
assist employees working above.
Paragraph (q)(4)(ii) relates to operations which involve lifting
and positioning tower sections. This provision normally requires tag
lines or other similar devices to be used to control tower sections
being positioned. The use of tag lines protects employees from being
struck by tower sections that are in motion.
Paragraph (q)(4)(iii) requires loadlines to remain in place until
the load is secured so that it cannot topple and injure an employee.
Some weather conditions can make work from towers and other
overhead structures more hazardous than usual. For example, icy
conditions may make slips and falls much more likely, in fact even
unavoidable. Under such conditions, work from towers and other
structures would generally be prohibited by Sec. 1910.269(q)(4)(iv).
However, when emergency restoration work is involved, the additional
risk may be necessary for public safety, and the standard permits such
work to be performed even in bad weather.
The final rule allows work to continue under any type of emergency
restoration,84 whether or not power is available. This change was
requested by two commenters that noted that emergency conditions
sometimes develop with actual loss of power and that it would be better
to allow restoration work to avoid this situation (Ex. 3-69, 3-123).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\4Emergency restoration work is considered to be that work
necessary to restore an electric power generation, transmission, or
distribution installation to an operating condition to the extent
necessary to safeguard the general public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (r). Paragraph (r) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses
safety considerations related to line-clearance tree trimming. As can
be seen from the definition in Sec. 1910.269(x), line-clearance tree
trimming is the trimming of any tree or brush that is within 10 feet
(305 cm) of an electric power line. Since Sec. 1910.269 addresses
hazards unique to electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work, general tree trimming is not covered by this
paragraph. For example, tree trimming contractors performing work at a
residence where there are no overhead power lines within 10 feet of any
trees or brush are not required to follow Sec. 1910.269(r).
The requirements for this paragraph have been taken, in large part,
from ANSI Z133.1-1982, American National Standard Safety Requirements
for Pruning, Trimming, Repairing, Maintaining, and Removing Trees, and
for Cutting Brush (Ex. 2-29).
Paragraph (r)(1) covers the electrical hazards associated with
line-clearance tree trimming. This paragraph does not apply to
qualified employees. These employees are highly trained and are
adequately protected by other provisions in the standard, including the
requirements for personal protective equipment in paragraph (g) and for
working on or near exposed energized parts in paragraph (l). Line-
clearance tree trimmers, on the other hand, do not have such extensive
training, and more stringent requirements dealing with electrical
hazards are necessary and appropriate for their protection. Paragraph
(r)(1) of final Sec. 1910.269 sets forth such requirements.
The distinction between the ``qualified employee'' and ``line-
clearance tree trimmer'' is discussed in summary and explanation of
final Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(i)(E), earlier in this preamble, and final
Sec. 1910.269(x), later in this preamble. As noted in those
discussions, a ``qualified employee'' under Sec. 1910.269 is an
employee who has been trained to work on energized electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution installations. Line-
clearance tree trimmers are not considered to be ``qualified
employees'' under Sec. 1910.269. As explained earlier, they do not have
the necessary training to use the protective equipment that would be
necessary to work on energized electric power generation, transmission,
and distribution installations. They do, however, have the training
necessary to perform tree-trimming work very close to energized
transmission and distribution lines, and the work they perform is
directly associated with electric power transmission and distribution
installations. Therefore, work practices necessary for their safety are
included in Sec. 1910.269.
Subpart S of the General Industry Standards also contains safety-
related work practice requirements for work, such as tree trimming,
that is performed near overhead power transmission and distribution
lines. However, the Subpart S safety-related work practices do not
apply to work performed by ``qualified persons on or directly
associated with'' electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution installations. Because line-clearance tree trimmers do
have training necessary to enable them to work very close to energized
electric power transmission and distribution lines and because the work
practices necessary for their safety have been included in
Sec. 1910.269, they are considered to be ``qualified persons'' for the
purpose of Sec. 1910.331(c)(1).85
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\5This paragraph reads as follows:
(c) Excluded work by qualified persons. The provisions of
Secs. 1910.331 through 1910.333 do not apply to work performed by
qualified persons on or directly associated with the following
installations:
(1) Generation, transmission, and distribution installations.
Installations for the generation, control, transformation,
transmission, and distribution of electric energy (including
communication and metering) located in buildings used for such
purposes or located outdoors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other tree workers do not have the training necessary for them to
be either ``qualified employees'' or ``line-clearance tree
trimmers'',86 as defined under Sec. 1910.269(x). These employees
are not covered under Sec. 1910.269 at all. The work practices these
employees must use are contained in Subpart S of Part 1910. Under
Subpart S, tree workers must maintain a 10-foot minimum approach
distance from overhead lines. (In fact, trimming any branch that is
within 10 feet of an overhead power line is prohibited by Subpart S.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\6For the purposes of paragraph (r), trainees working under
the supervision of a qualified line-clearance tree trimmer are
considered to be qualified line-clearance tree trimmers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 1910.269(r)(1)(i) would have required an inspection
to be made of the tree on which work is to be performed to see if an
electric conductor passes within 10 feet of the tree. This inspection
was intended to give an indication of whether an electrical hazard
exists.
The preamble discussion of final Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(i)(E) noted
that OSHA had decided to move the requirement for the determination of
voltage levels, as it relates to line-clearance tree trimming, to
paragraph (r)(1)(i). Under this paragraph, the employer must make a
determination of the voltages to which employees are exposed, so that
employees would be able to maintain the proper minimum approach
distances. However, if employees treat all conductors as energized at
the maximum voltage to be encountered, only the maximum voltage need be
determined. Because Sec. 1910.269 applies only to line-clearance tree
trimming activities, the proposed general requirement for an inspection
of the tree for the presence of electric power lines, which must be
present for the standard to apply, has been eliminated.
Paragraphs (r)(1)(ii) and (r)(1)(iii) of the proposal would have
required a 10-foot (305-cm) minimum approach distance for non-line-
clearance tree trimmers and would have prohibited these tree trimmers
from trimming trees that were within 10 feet of an electric power line.
The National Arborist Association noted that the Electrical Safety-
Related Work Practices Standard87 (which was also a proposal at
the time of their comments) covered work performed by unqualified
employees near overhead power lines (Ex. 3-113, 58; LA Tr. 347-350).
They were concerned that the two standards contained conflicting
provisions aimed at protecting non-line-clearance tree workers. These
concerns were expressed by Mr. Richard Proudfoot of Pruett Tree Service
as follows:
\8\7This standard is set forth in Secs. 1910.331 through
1910.335 of Subpart S, which was promulgated as a final rule on
August 6, 1990 (55 FR 31984).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I'm Dick Proudfoot. I'm General Manager of Pruett Tree Service
in Lake Oswego, Oregon. We do not perform line clearance tree
trimming work. For that reason alone, I should not be here today in
behalf of residential and commercial tree trimmers because this
proposed standard supposedly is directed only to line clearance tree
trimming work.
The rub is twofold. First, this proposed standard actually
regulates us even though it pretends not to, and second, OSHA
already has dealt with residential and commercial tree trimmers in
the pending OSHA section 1910.331, electrical related safe work
practice standard, but contradicts that regulation in today's
standard.
Specifically, the pending .331, electric related safe work
practice standard, covers tree care workers, such as those employed
by my company, who do not perform line clearance work and excludes
line clearance workers with the intention they be covered by today's
line clearance standard. Thus, the pending electrical related work
practice standard requires residential/commercial trimmers who work
in a non-line clearance context to maintain ten feet between the
tree trimmer and the overhead conductor. That approach is entirely
correct.
However, OSHA contradicts in today's standard the correct
approach it has taken in the pending .331 standard, because in
today's line clearance standard OSHA says that a non-line clearance
tree trimmer may not trim a tree if any part of the tree is within
ten feet of a conductor, even though under the pending .331 standard
we could trim the tree, so long as we stayed ten feet away from the
wire. Thus, the standard that is intended to apply to us properly
measures the distance of the employee to the wire, while this
standard would measure for the same employee the distance of the
tree to the wire.
To begin with, if we are subject to the .331 standard, as OSHA
tells us we are, the agency has no business to regulate the same
conduct of non-line clearance trimmers in this standard. Safety
compliance requires non-contradictory standards. Contradictory
signals from OSHA breeds non-compliance and unsafe conditions.
OSHA should, therefore, delete from today's standards its
attempt in section (r)(1)(iii) to regulate non-line clearance
trimmers and leave that to OSHA's sound resolution of that issue in
the pending .331 standard. Section (r)(1)(iii) should, therefore, be
deleted from today's line clearance standard altogether. [LA Tr.
347-349]
Proposed Sec. 1910.269 did, in fact, overlap the provisions of the
Electrical Safety-Related Work Practices Standard in Subpart S. The
Subpart S requirements currently apply to tree workers who are not
line-clearance tree trimmers regardless of the type of work being
performed--commercial, residential, or line-clearance tree trimming.
The presence of proposed paragraphs (r)(1)(ii) and (r)(1)(iii) in final
Sec. 1910.269 would only confuse employers. In fact, under
Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(B), work practices covered by Subpart S (that
is, work by unqualified employees near electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution installations) are not regulated under
the electric power generation, transmission, and distribution standard.
Therefore, Proposed paragraphs (r)(1)(ii) and (r)(1)(iii) are beyond
the scope of Sec. 1910.269, and the Agency has not carried them forward
into the final rule.
Paragraph (r)(1)(ii) of final Sec. 1910.269 lists the conditions
under which a second qualified line-clearance tree trimmer is required
to be present. The listed conditions are: (1) if the employee is to
come closer than 10 feet (305 cm) to electric circuit parts energized
at more than 750 volts; (2) if a branch or limb is closer to such parts
than the distances listed in Table R-6, Table R-9, and Table R-10; or
(3) if roping must be used to remove branches or limbs from such parts.
Under these conditions, a line-clearance tree trimmer is placed in a
more hazardous environment than is usual, and errors are more likely to
lead to an electrical accident. The second employee would be able to
assist an employee in trouble or would be able to summon help readily.
Some electric utility representatives argued that this requirement
(proposed as paragraph (r)(1)(iv)) would be burdensome (Ex. 3-69, 3-
112, 3-120, 3-123). They claimed that it would unnecessarily restrict
crews clearing lines and restoring service.
The hazards posed by working close to electric power lines are
widely recognized. The need for a second employee is acknowledged in
section 4.2.3 of the ANSI Z133.1 standard and is amply demonstrated by
the accident descriptions of tree trimmers electrocuted while trimming
trees (Ex. 9-5 and 9-6). Therefore, OSHA has retained this provision as
proposed. However, it should be noted that, if qualified employees are
involved, Sec. 1910.269(l)(1)(i), and not paragraph (r)(1)(ii),
addresses the need for the presence of a second employee.
In general, line-clearance tree trimmers do not have the experience
or training for work on overhead electric power lines. However, they do
have the training and skills necessary to be able to perform work
safely near these lines. By using special techniques and equipment,
these workers trim trees that are close to the overhead lines without
bringing their bodies or other conductive objects within the danger
zone. Therefore, paragraph (r)(1)(iii) requires the same minimum
approach distances (listed in Table R-6, Table R-9, and Table R-10) for
line-clearance work as those for regular line work, but the standard
does not permit line-clearance tree trimmers to come closer than the
minimum approach distances in the tables even when using protective
equipment.
Employees could receive an electric shock through the branches of
the trees they are trimming if the branch, once it is cut or breaks
free, contacts an energized conductor. To prevent electric shock to an
employee if this should occur, paragraph (r)(1)(iv) requires branches
that are closer to the lines than permitted under Table R-6, Table R-9,
and Table R-10 to be removed by the use of insulating equipment. This
can be accomplished through the use of pruners with insulating handles.
The proposal's preamble discussion of this paragraph (proposed
Sec. 1910.269(r)(1)(vi)) implied that the insulating equipment would
also have to be in strict conformance to proposed Sec. 1910.269(j) on
live-line tools. Some commenters objected to this (Ex. 3-112, 3-113,
58; LA Tr. 343-345). They stated that the testing requirements in
paragraph (j) were unnecessary for the type of equipment tree trimmers
use and that no injuries have resulted from the use of a wood-handled
tree pruner.
As OSHA representatives noted at the hearing, the reference to the
provisions on live-line tools was meant to clarify what type of
equipment would be considered as ``insulating'' under the proposed
tree-trimming rule and that individual tool poles would not have to be
tested (DC Tr. 115-119). The Agency believes that some guidance is
necessary with respect to what types of tools will meet the requirement
that ``insulating equipment'' be used. Wood pruner poles that meet the
test criteria given in final Sec. 1910.269(j)(1), which gives design
criteria for live-line tools, and that are not wet88 or
contaminated meet Sec. 1910.269(r)(1)(iv). Individual tool poles need
not be tested. The Agency will accept evidence indicating that tools of
a given construction generically meet the test criteria. A note to this
effect has been included following paragraph (r)(1)(iv) of final
Sec. 1910.269.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\8It should be noted that untreated wood absorbs moisture,
even if it is not exposed to rain. It is important to keep wood
poles dry and to maintain their finish so that they do not become
conductive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (r)(1)(v) prohibits ladders, platforms, and aerial
devices from coming closer to energized lines than the distances listed
in Table R-6, Table R-9, and Table R-10. This provision is intended to
prevent electric shock to line-clearance tree trimmers, who are not
familiar with the practices necessary to contact the lines safely.
Proposed paragraph (r)(1)(viii) would have prohibited line-
clearance tree-trimming operations during storms and under emergency
conditions. This provision received most of the objections raised to
the proposal. Electric utilities, unions, and tree trimming contractors
alike overwhelmingly opposed this provision (Ex. 3-9, 3-11, 3-20, 3-23,
3-27, 3-29, 3-32, 3-38, 3-40, 3-42, 3-48, 3-55, 3-62, 3-63, 3-66, 3-67,
3-69, 3-75, 3-77, 3-78, 3-82, 3-87, 3-89, 3-90, 3-91, 3-92, 3-93, 3-94,
3-97, 3-98, 3-99, 3-100, 3-104, 3-107, 3-112, 3-113, 3-118, 3-119, 3-
120, 3-123, 3-125, 3-128, 47, 58; DC Tr. 931-934, 1141-1142; LA Tr.
345-346). They all argued that tree-trimming contractors have assisted
electric utilities in restoring power after storms and during other
emergencies. They claimed that the work was performed safely and with
few accidents. The testimony of Mr. Robert Felix, Executive Vice
President of the National Arborist Association, represented these
objections as follows:
The section (r)(1)(viii), storm work prohibition, is utterly
unacceptable to us. It's unacceptable to the utilities and to the
IBEW, as well. It must be discarded in its entirety. Obviously, line
clearance work is never done during a storm. After a storm is over,
however, line clearance crews' work are vital to the effort to clear
debris so that the utilities can have their linemen efficiently
restore power. To require, as is proposed, linemen to perform the
debris clearance work would be doubly dysfunctional. One, linemen
are not trained in tree and branch removal proximate to energized
conductors. Two, if linemen had to do such work to the exclusion of
line clearance tree trimmers, the task of restoring power to
hospitals, homes, offices and school would be indefinitely delayed.
This provision is ill conceived, it's intolerable and it must go.
We would support instead the ANSI Z133 requirement, or a similar
proposal, that requires storm emergency work to be performed only by
qualified line clearance tree trimmers and qualified line clearance
tree trimmer trainees, who are trained in recognition of the hazards
involved and work practices appropriate to those hazards. [LA Tr.
345-346]
The commenters gave many examples of successful tree trimming
operations performed in the aftermath of severe storms. The testimony
of Mr. William R. Powell, representing the American Public Power
Association, gave a typical example:
Consider for example the proposed rules, limitations on line
clearance tree trimming. The proposed rule would prohibit line
clearance tree trimming operations conducted by other than qualified
employees during quote, ``storms or under emergency conditions,''
close quote.
The impact of Hurricane Hugo, one of the major natural disasters
to recently hit our country provides ample illustration that the
proposed prohibition is unworkable for large and small utilities
alike.
The South Carolina Public Service Authority, [SCPSA], which
employs over 1600 people reports that it could have taken several
months rather than several weeks to restore power to its customers
if it had not been able to use the service of line clearance tree
trimmers in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo.
As it was, it took [SCPSA] almost two solid weeks of 16- to 18-
hour days working over 13, or over 300 independent line clearance
tree trimmers in addition to a substantial complement [of] qualified
linemen to restore power to its service community.
None of the participating line clearance tree trimmers suffered
significant injuries during this restoration effort.
If in the emergency situation, the utility the size of [SCPSA]
which has access to substantial internal * * * manpower resources,
could not have restored electric service to its community in a
timely fashion without the help of line clearance tree trimmers, a
smaller utility having as few as four employees would even be more
hard pressed to restore service to its customers without outside
assistance.
For this reason, the Agency's [proposed] rule needs to be
modified to allow the use of line clearance tree trimmers during
emergencies or other similar situations.
In this regard, the APPA strongly supports the Agency's
suggestion that the proposed restriction be * * * replaced by
performance-oriented language designed to insure that those clearing
lines are aware of the dangers involved at all times and under all
circumstances. [DC Tr. 1141-1142]
Mr. Felix noted, however, that restoration work is limited to work
performed in the aftermath of a storm, testifying as follows:
Obviously, line clearance work is never done during a storm.
After a storm is over, however, line clearance crews' work [is]
vital to the effort to clear debris so that the utilities can have
their linemen efficiently restore power. [LA Tr. 345]
OSHA recognizes the need for power to be restored quickly after
storms. Public safety considerations demand that electric service not
be interrupted any longer than necessary.
The Agency's concern in proposing the prohibition on storm and
emergency work by line-clearance tree trimmers was that these employees
were not trained sufficiently for this type of work. In fact, several
accident descriptions submitted to the record tend to support this
concern (Ex. 9-6, 53). The widespread objection to this prohibition,
however, seems to indicate that line-clearance tree trimmers are
trained in emergency restoration work (at least insofar as it involves
clearing trees from electric power lines). This training is limited,
however, to emergency restoration work performed after, rather than
during, a storm.
OSHA is acquiescing to the nearly unanimous opposition to proposed
Sec. 1910.269(r)(1)(viii), and the final rule does not include a
prohibition of line-clearance work for the restoration of power in the
aftermath of a storm. However, the final rule does prohibit line-
clearance tree trimming when adverse weather conditions make the work
hazardous in spite of the work practices required by Sec. 1910.269 and
includes a note explaining what these weather conditions are.
Additionally, to ensure that employees who perform line-clearance work
in the aftermath of storms or who work under other emergency conditions
are properly trained, the Agency is adopting a requirement for specific
training in the hazards posed by this type of work. This requirement is
contained in final Sec. 1910.269(r)(1)(vi).
In Sec. 1910.269(r)(2), OSHA is adopting requirements for brush
chippers. These requirements specify that chippers be equipped with a
locking ignition system, that access panels be in place during
operation, that the inlet feed hopper be of sufficient length to
prevent workers from contacting the blades during operation, that
trailer chippers be chocked or secured when not attached to a vehicle,
and that employees wear proper protective equipment in the area of
operation. (It should be noted that the existing general machine
guarding requirements of Sec. 1910.212 continue to apply to brush
chippers.) These requirements are derived from Section 5.3 of ANSI
Z133.1-1982 and are intended to prevent injury to employees operating
or maintaining brush chippers.
The only provision in this proposed paragraph that received comment
was the requirement in Sec. 1910.269(r)(2) that brush chipper operators
wear eye and face protection. A similar requirement was also proposed
for stump cutter operators under paragraph (r)(4)(ii). Many commenters
argued that operators of brush chippers and stump cutters did not need
full face protection (Ex. 3-38, 3-48, 3-63, 3-69, 3-112, 3-113, 3-118,
3-123, 3-125, 3-128, 58; LA Tr. 346). In fact, Mr. Robert Felix argued
that face protection was actually harmful because ``those masks fog up,
obscure vision and hinder employee communication'' (LA Tr. 346).
OSHA is concerned that employees using eye protection alone will
not be fully protected from the hazards of flying debris from brush
chippers and stump cutters. However, there is insufficient evidence in
the record for the final rule to require full face protection on an
industry-wide basis. Therefore, the Agency has modified the language of
paragraphs (r)(2)(v) and (r)(4)(ii) in final Sec. 1910.269 so that
employees must wear personal protective equipment as required by
Subpart I. Using such information as the chipper manufacturer's
recommendations and the hazards noted during the inspection, OSHA will
determine on a case-by-case basis whether or not the hazards at the
jobsite warrant full face protection. This is the policy currently in
use for tree-trimming operations.
In Sec. 1910.269(r)(3), OSHA is adopting requirements for sprayers
and associated equipment. These provisions require walking and working
surfaces to be slip-resistant. If the slippery conditions cannot be
removed, slip-resistant footwear or handrails meeting the requirements
of Subpart D of Part 1910 are required to be used to prevent employees
from slipping. In addition, if the spraying operation takes place with
the vehicle in motion, the area from which the operator works must be
provided with guardrails to protect him or her from falling from the
vehicle. These requirements are based on Section 5.4 of ANSI Z133.1-
1982.
Paragraph (r)(4) contains requirements for stump cutters. These
provisions specify that cutters be equipped with enclosures or guards
to protect employees from the blades and debris and that employees wear
personal protective equipment in the immediate area of stump grinding
operations. These requirements are essentially the same as those
contained in Section 5.5 of ANSI Z133.1-1982. Paragraph (r)(4)(ii) of
final Sec. 1910.269 has been changed from the proposal as noted
earlier.
Paragraph (r)(5) sets forth requirements intended to protect
employees from the hazards presented by power saws. Paragraph (r)(5)
adopts the requirements of Sec. 1910.266(c)(5)89 (dealing with
instructions for power saw operations). In addition, paragraph (r)(5)
of final Sec. 1910.269 contains requirements for starting saws, saw
design relative to chain movement and idling speed, saw operation,
refueling, cleaning, and other saw maintenance. These requirements are
based on Section 6.2 of ANSI Z133.1-1982 and on requirements contained
in the draft standard recommended by EEI and IBEW.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\9OSHA has proposed to revise the logging standard,
Sec. 1910.266. The reference in final Sec. 1910.269(r)(5) to the
relevant power saw requirements in the logging standard, which were
contained in Sec. 1910.266(e)(5) of that proposal, will be revised
when the logging standard is promulgated as a final rule.
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Several commenters suggested revising the wording of proposed
paragraph (r)(5)(iv) (Ex. 3-11, 3-44, 3-58, 3-69, 3-102). The proposal
would have required employees to have ``secure footing'' when starting
a saw. They noted that an employee working in a tree would not have
``secure footing'' and recommended that the standard require the
employee to be in a secure working position instead. OSHA has revised
the language of this provision in the final rule to accommodate this
concern. The language contained in final paragraph (r)(5)(iv) agrees
with the comparable provision proposed in the logging standard,
Sec. 1910.266(e)(5)(v), which makes it clear that it is the saw that is
to be firmly supported when it is started. (It should be noted that
paragraph (r)(5)(vi) prohibits employees from carrying a running saw
into a tree.)
In Sec. 1910.269(r)(6), OSHA is adopting requirements for backpack
power units. To protect employees operating or maintaining this
equipment and other employees in the area, the requirements of the
final rule specify that no one other than the operator be within 10
feet (305 cm) of the cutting head of the brush saw, that the unit be
equipped with a quick shutoff switch, and that power unit engines be
stopped for all cleaning, refueling, adjustments, and repairs. These
requirements are based on Section 6.3 of ANSI Z133.1-1982.
Paragraph (r)(7) contains requirements for climbing rope. To
protect employees from hazards posed by rope breakage, these provisions
require that ropes have a specified minimum strength (taken from
section 7.9 of the ANSI standard), that defective or damaged rope not
be used, that rope contact with chemicals be avoided, that climbing
rope not be spliced to effect repair, that rope ends be secured to
prevent unraveling, and that ropes be stored properly. In accordance
with the recommendations of NIOSH, OSHA has added, to paragraph
(r)(7)(ii), a requirement for inspection of rope before use. The
inspection will enable an employee to detect damage and defects.
Proposed Sec. 1910.269(r)(7)(vii) would have required that ropes
that could be taken closer to exposed energized lines than the
specified minimum approach distances be treated as energized by
employees on the ground or in contact with ground unless electrical
protective equipment was used.
Several commenters objected to this provision (Ex. 3-20, 3-48, 3-
63, 3-80, 3-112, 3-113, 58; LA Tr. 346-347). They argued that it would
render the ropes unusable in many situations, including rescue of an
injured employee. The NAA offered this explanation, along with an
alternative:
We complained in our pre-hearing Comment that OSHA's proposed
Sec. (r)(7)(vii) requirement that all rope brought within the Table
R-6 and R-7 minimum separation distances be treated as energized,
was unacceptable because it (1) would defeat the long standing safe
work practice of line clearance tree trimmers to pull branches back
from conductors to permit safe cutting of those branches; (2) would
prohibit the use of ropes in effecting tree rescues of employees;
and (3) would conflict with the proposed Sec. (r)(1)(iv)(C) practice
permitting the roping of branches in line clearance work.
While the proposed requirement to treat as energized all rope
brought within the separation distances is so over broad as to wipe
out all of the proper uses of rope proximate to overhead conductors,
OSHA indicated at the public hearing that its concern was of a far
more limited order: namely, to prevent the use of ``wet or
contaminated'' ropes proximate to wires (D.C. Tr. 127-130). OSHA
asked us to submit an alternative more closely tailored to OSHA's
legitimate concerns (id). We therefore propose the following
substitute language to replace proposed (r)(7)(vii) [footnote
omitted]:
``(vii) Ropes which are (A) wet, or (B) so contaminated so as
reasonably to impair their dielectric capacity, or (C) are not
considered to be dielectric for the voltage of the wires they are
used proximate to, may not be taken closer to exposed energized
lines than the clearance distance specified in Table R-6 or R-7.''
[Ex. 58]
OSHA has accepted the NAA approach. Paragraph (r)(7)(vii) of final
Sec. 1910.269 prohibits rope that is wet, contaminated, or otherwise
not insulated for the voltage from being used near overhead power
lines.
A paragraph providing for fall protection for line-clearance tree-
trimming work has been added as Sec. 1910.269(r)(8). This requirement
was originally proposed under paragraph (g)(2)(v). A detailed
explanation of this provision and of why it was moved is presented in
the preamble discussion of final Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(v).
Paragraph (s). Final Sec. 1910.269(s) addresses communication
facilities associated with electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution systems. Typical communications installations include
those for microwave signaling and power line carriers.
Microwave signaling systems are addressed by paragraph (s)(1). To
protect employees' eyes from being injured by microwave radiation,
paragraph (s)(1)(i) prohibits employees from looking into an open
waveguide or antenna which is connected to an energized source of
microwave radiation.
Existing Sec. 1910.97, which covers non-ionizing radiation,
prescribes a warning sign with a special symbol indicating non-ionizing
radiation hazards. Paragraph (s)(1)(ii) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires
areas which contain radiation in excess of the radiation protection
guide set forth in Sec. 1910.97 to be posted with the warning sign.
Also, the standard requires the lower half of that sign to be labeled
as follows:
Radiation in this area may exceed hazard limitations and special
precautions are required. Obtain specific instruction before
entering.
The sign is intended to warn employees about the hazards present in
the area and to inform them that special instructions are necessary to
enter the area.
In Sec. 1910.97, the radiation protection guide is advisory only.
Paragraph (s)(1)(iii) of final Sec. 1910.269 makes the guide mandatory
for electric utilities by requiring the employer to institute measures
that prevent any employee's exposure from being greater than that set
forth in the guide. These measures may be of an administrative nature
(such as limitations on the duration of exposure) or of an engineering
nature (such as a design of the system that limits the emitted
radiation to that permitted by the guide) or may involve the use of
personal protective equipment.
Power line carrier systems use the power line itself to carry
signals between equipment at different points on the line. Because of
this, OSHA is requiring, in paragraph (s)(2), that work associated with
power line carrier installations be performed according to the
requirements for work on energized lines.
Paragraph (t). In many electric distribution systems, electric
equipment is installed in enclosures, such as manholes and vaults, set
beneath the earth. Paragraph (t) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses
safety for these underground electrical installations. The requirements
set forth in this paragraph are in addition to requirements contained
elsewhere in the standard (and elsewhere in Part 1910) because
paragraph (t) only contains considerations unique to underground
facilities. For example, paragraph (e), relating to enclosed spaces,
also applies to underground operations involving entry into an enclosed
space.
Paragraph (t)(1) requires the use of ladders or other climbing
devices for entrance into and exit from manholes and subsurface vaults
that are more than 4 feet (122 cm) deep. Because employees can easily
be injured in the course of jumping into subsurface enclosures or in
climbing on the cables and hangers which have been installed in these
enclosures, the standard requires the use of appropriate devices for
employees entering and exiting manholes and vaults. The practice of
climbing on equipment such as cables and cable hangers is specifically
prohibited by paragraph (t)(1).
In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested public comment on
the appropriateness of requiring ladders or other climbing devices for
subsurface enclosures more than 4 feet (122 cm) deep, as opposed to
requiring them for shallower enclosures or for deeper enclosures. Three
commenters addressed this issue. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and
EEI supported the 4-foot (122-cm) depth as being appropriate (Ex. 3-22,
3-112). Only Tennessee Valley Authority suggested a different depth, 6
feet (183 cm), but did not provide a reason (Ex. 3-82).
Because the 4-foot (122-cm) depth is consistent with requirements
in Sec. 1910.23 (contained in Subpart D of Part 1910) and in paragraph
(g)(2)(v) of final Sec. 1910.269 to provide fall protection starting at
this height (and in light of the lack of significant opposition), OSHA
has carried the proposed provision forward into the final rule without
change.
Paragraph (t)(2) requires equipment used to lower materials and
tools into manholes or vaults to be capable of supporting the weight
and requires this equipment to be checked for defects before use.
Paragraph (t)(2) also requires employees to be in the clear when tools
or materials are lowered into the enclosure. This provision protects
employees against being injured by falling tools and material.
The proposed rule would not have required employees to be clear of
tools or material other than hot compounds being lowered into the
manhole. Two commenters noted the possibility of injury due to falling
objects and suggested that OSHA extend application of this requirement
to any tools or material being lowered (Ex. 3-46, 3-107).
The probability that an object will fall while being lowered is not
related to whether or not it is a hot compound. Additionally, the
likelihood and degree of injury is relatively constant whether or not a
hot compound is involved. Therefore, OSHA has decided to extend the
application of this provision as suggested. It should be noted that,
because work addressed by paragraph (t) of final Sec. 1910.269 exposes
employees to the danger of head injury, Sec. 1910.132(a) requires
employees to wear head protection when they are working in underground
electrical installations.
Paragraph (t)(3) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 would have required
attendants for manholes. During the time work was being performed in a
manhole which contained energized electric equipment, an employee would
have been required to be available in the immediate vicinity (but not
normally in the manhole) to render emergency assistance. However, the
attendant would have been allowed to enter the manhole, for brief
periods, to provide other than emergency assistance to those inside.
Also, an employee working alone would have been permitted to enter a
manhole briefly for the purpose of inspection, housekeeping, taking
readings, or other similar work, if this work could be performed
safely.
The provisions in paragraph (t)(3) were proposed so that emergency
assistance could be provided to employees working in manholes, where
the employees work unobserved and where undetected injury could occur.
Taken from existing Sec. 1926.956(b)(1), these proposed requirements
were intended to protect employees within the manhole without exposing
the attendants outside to a risk of injury greater than that faced by
those inside. The existing and proposed standard applied to manholes
containing equipment energized at any voltage. However, the EEI/IBEW
draft standard suggested that OSHA require attendants only if the
voltage exceeded 250 volts. Although it might seem safe to allow
employees to work alone in manholes containing equipment energized at
250 volts or less, employees could be seriously injured at these lower
voltages under certain conditions. In the preamble to the proposal,
OSHA requested public comment on whether an attendant was necessary for
entry into manholes or vaults containing electric equipment energized
at 250 volts or less. OSHA also requested comments on whether employees
should ever be allowed to enter manholes alone and, if so, under what
conditions and for what length of time.
Several commenters urged OSHA to require an attendant for all
underground operations, regardless of the voltage of electric equipment
(Ex. 3-21, 3-46, 3-76). The UWUA noted that there have been fatalities
encountered at voltages much less than 250 volts (Ex. 3-76). EEI argued
that an attendant was not necessary unless the voltage level presented
a hazard (Ex. 3-112). They went on to suggest 250 volts as an
appropriate limit.
OSHA believes that the current subpart V regulation is correct in
not providing a lower limit on the voltage of energized equipment
requiring the presence of an attendant. The National Electrical Safety
Code (ANSI C2-1987, Section 426C) also requires an attendant regardless
of the voltage of energized equipment (Ex. 2-8). Additionally, at least
one of the accidents described in the record involves an employee
electrocuted by a voltage lower than 250 volts (Ex. 53). Therefore, the
final rule requires an attendant for work involving energized electric
equipment regardless of voltage.
Most of the comments received on paragraph (t)(3) supported
allowing an employee to work alone, as proposed, when he or she is
performing inspections, housekeeping, or similar work (Ex. 3-22, 3-32,
3-103, 3-107, 3-112). They contended that this work could be performed
alone safely. Additionally, EEI noted that the NESC permits this type
of work to be performed by employees working alone (Ex. 3-112). The
UWUA supported allowing this only if it has been clearly established
that no work hazards exist, if the manhole is continually ventilated,
if there is sufficient clearance from live parts, and if the work does
not require contact with or close approach to the live parts (Ex. 3-76;
DC Tr. 417). Opposing these views, NIOSH and IBEW Local 17 supported
requiring an attendant under all conditions because of the presence of
other hazards in enclosed spaces (Ex. 3-21, 3-66).
OSHA has retained the language of proposed paragraphs (t)(3)(ii)
and (t)(3)(iii) in the final rule. On balance, the record supports the
proposed conditions for permitting work by an employee in a manhole
without an attendant. If other hazards in the space warrant the
presence of an additional employee, final Sec. 1910.269(e)(7) already
requires it. The electrical hazards addressed by the UWUA are covered
in final Sec. 1910.269(1). Because the hazards addressed by paragraph
(t)(3) are primarily related to electric shock, allowing the attendant
to enter the manhole briefly\90\ has no significant effect on the
safety of the employee he or she is protecting. In case of electric
shock, the attendant would still be able to provide assistance. The
final rule requires the attendant to be trained in first aid and in CPR
as required by final Sec. 1910.269(b)(1) to ensure that CPR and other
first aid treatment will be available if needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\The attendant is permitted to remain within the manhole only
for the short period of time necessary to assist the employee inside
the manhole with a task that one employee cannot perform alone. For
example, if a second employee is needed to help lift a piece of
equipment into place, the attendant could enter only for the amount
of time that is needed to accomplish this task. However, if
significant portions of the job require the assistance of a second
worker in the manhole, the attendant would not be permitted to
remain in the manhole for the length of time that would be
necessary, and a third employee would be required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, if other hazards are believed to endanger the employee in
the manhole, paragraph (e)(7) of final Sec. 1910.269 also applies.\91\
Paragraph (e)(7) requires attendants for work in an enclosed space (for
example, a manhole) if there is reason to believe that a hazard may
exist within the space or if a hazard exists because of traffic
patterns in the area of the opening to the enclosed space. For example,
if the ventilation of the manhole required by paragraph (e)(11) reduces
the concentration of flammable vapors to an acceptable level and if
failure of the ventilation system could allow the concentration
flammable vapors to become hazardous again, an attendant would be
required. An attendant is also required when traffic patterns in the
area around the manhole opening endanger an entrant exiting the
manhole. In such situations, the employee on the surface would be
exposed to the same hazards against which he or she is trying to
protect the original entrant. Therefore, the final rule does not permit
attendants required under paragraph (e)(7) to enter the manhole. To
clarify the application of the two different attendant requirements, a
note has been added to paragraph (t)(3)(ii) in the final rule. The note
indicates that if an attendant is also required under paragraph (e)(7),
one person may serve to satisfy both requirements, but is not permitted
to enter the manhole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\Additionally, as noted in the discussion of paragraph (e),
earlier in this preamble, the entry would have to be conducted in
accordance with Sec. 1910.146, the generic permit-required confined
spaces standard, if paragraphs (e) and (t) of final Sec. 1910.269 do
not adequately protect the entrants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA has included a second note following paragraph (t)(3)(ii) in
the final rule. The note serves as a reminder that paragraph (l)(1)
prohibits unqualified employees from working in areas containing
unguarded, uninsulated energized lines or parts of equipment.
Under paragraph (t)(3)(iv) reliable communications are required to
be maintained among all employees involved in the job, including any
attendants, the employees in the manhole, and employees in separate
manholes working on the same job. The language of this provision has
been modified slightly from that in the proposal for consistency with
final Sec. 1910.269(q)(2)(ix), which contains a similar requirement.
Several hearing participants addressed the issue of manhole rescue.
The UWUA and Mr. J. Nigel Ellis, President of the Research and Trading
Corporation, suggested that OSHA adopt provisions relating to the
availability of manhole rescue equipment (Ex. 54; DC Tr. 434, 436-437,
483-488). EEI and IBEW recommended language also addressing this
concern (Ex. 56, 64).
OSHA has decided to address rescue under the requirements
pertaining to enclosed spaces. The hazards related to rescuing
employees working in spaces with restricted means of access are common
to all enclosed spaces and are more appropriately covered under
provisions dealing with such spaces. The discussion and resolution of
this issue can be found in the summary and explanation of final
Sec. 1910.269(e)(3).
To install cables into the underground ducts, or conduits, that
will contain them, employees use a series of short jointed rods or a
long flexible rod inserted into the ducts. The insertion of these rods
into the ducts is known as ``rodding.'' The rods are used to thread the
cable-pulling rope through the conduit. After the rods have been
withdrawn and the cable-pulling ropes have been inserted, the cables
can then be pulled through by mechanical means.
Paragraph (t)(4) of Sec. 1910.269 requires the duct rods to be
inserted in the direction presenting the least hazard to employees. To
make sure that the rod does not contact live parts in the far manhole
or vault, the final rule also requires an employee to be stationed at
the remote end of the rodding operation.
To prevent accidents resulting from working on the wrong cable, one
that may be energized, paragraph (t)(5) requires the identification of
the proper cable when multiple cables are present in a work area. The
identification must be made by electrical means, unless the proper
cable is obvious because of appearance, location, or other means of
readily identifying the proper cable.
This provision in the proposal would have allowed distinctive
appearance or location to be the only alternative means of identifying
the proper cable. Several commenters requested a more performance-
oriented approach that would allow for other means of identifying the
cable, such as cable tags (Ex. 3-42, 3-62, 3-120, 3-125, 3-128), OSHA
has added language in the final rule recognizing any means of readily
identifying the correct cable. Additionally, this paragraph was
originally proposed as Sec. 1910.269(t)(6), but was switched with
proposed paragraph (t)(5) in the final rule.
If any energized cables are to be moved during underground
operations, paragraph (t)(6) requires them to be inspected for possible
defects that could lead to a fault. (If a defect is found, paragraph
(t)(7) applies.) These provisions protect employees against possibly
defective cables, which could fault upon being moved, leading to
serious injury.
This paragraph, which was proposed as Sec. 1910.269(t)(5), also
would have required the cable to be moved under the direct supervision
of a qualified employee. Because final Sec. 1910.269(l)(1) already
requires such work to be performed by a qualified employee, this
additional portion of proposed paragraph (t)(5) is unnecessary.
Additionally, at least one commenter misinterpreted the proposal to
forbid the employee supervising the work from actually performing it
(Ex. 3-62). Therefore, this language has not been carried forward into
the final rule.
Since defective energized cables may fail with an enormous release
of energy, precautions must be taken to minimize the possibility of
such an occurrence while an employee is working in a manhole.
Therefore, paragraph (t)(7) proposed to prohibit employees from working
in a manhole which contains an energized cable with a defect that could
lead to a fault. The proposal listed typical abnormalities that could
expose employees to injury as: oil or compound leaking from a cable or
joint (splice), a broken cable sheath or joint sleeve, hot localized
surface temperatures on a cable or joint, or a joint that is swollen so
much that its circumference exceeds 3.5 times the standard sleeve
diameter. OSHA invited comments on whether there were additional
defects that should be listed. OSHA also invited data on whether any of
the listed defects could not possibly lead to a fault in the cable
system.
Three commenters contended that it is not unusual to have small
amounts of oil or compound leaking from a cable or joint (Ex. 3-20, 3-
42, 3-80). They claimed that this would not indicate the presence of an
impending fault but would suggest the need for closer inspection and
evaluation.
On the other hand, Edison Electric Institute agreed that all the
conditions listed in the proposal could be indicators of impending
faults, except for the presence of swelling in a joint (Ex. 3-112).
They cited surveys of two electric utilities that had disassembled over
100 joints apiece. In both cases, they noted, no evidence was found
that a swollen or collapsed lead casing on a cable joint was more
susceptible of failure than a joint with no change to its exterior
geometry. They argued that there is no basis for OSHA to select a
particular circumference formula or measurement as an indication in all
instances that a fault is impending.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\EEI also cited an Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission decision that they felt supported their claim (Ex. 56).
In fact, the Administrative Law Judge cited proposed
Sec. 1910.269(t)(7) in his decision as validating the respondent's
measures to protect employees, which he found did not expose
employees to unreasonable hazards and conformed to the OSHA proposal
(Secretary of Labor v. Consolidated Edison Company of New York,
Inc., OSHRC Docket Nos. 88-004, 88-461).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By contrast, the UWUA testified that joints swollen to any degree
posed a threat of failure (Ex. 3-76; DC Tr. 417-418, 427-429, 515-521).
Mr. George Hollman, on behalf of the UWUA, stated their position as
follows:
It has been my experience as a troubleshooter in the emergency
department that most of the cable failures that I see have been in
fact swollen joints. That we have seen a great number of them that
have already exploded and nobody realizes whether in fact it was a
swollen joint.
We had on our [``D'' fault] procedure which is a procedure
utilized by the Edison Company they have the chart for what the
circumference of a sleeve should be. The integrity of that joint is
compromised considerably when you get the joint swollen beyond the
engineering specification.
So our position would be if that if it is a 5.5 inch sleeve,
that that is the engineering specification for the sleeve. For them
to go beyond that to say that it is okay, the integrity is severely
compromised. So we have seen in many instances that upon opening it
that water came right out of the bottom, and water and oil do not
mix.
So that would tell you immediately that any cable joint that has
water in it other than a sleeve which might be from a polyethylene
type cable or EPR cable would be in danger of failures. Any type of
immersible cable that has water in it is in danger of failure. I
think that both sides agree on that.
And it has been my experience that many times when we open up a
swollen joint that we find water in it. So we feel that it is
definitely assumed to fail, at what point where the sleeve ruptures
and starts emitting fluid out of it. I think that when you take a
chart and you say well at this point in the chart it is not going to
kill you and go one-eighth of an inch more and now it will, I think
is ludicrous.
So that has been the argument all along, of where you got the
chart from, where did you get the numbers, and where did you say
that that is the stress point. What type lead sleeve from one lead
sleeve to another manufacturer, which is stronger, how many
manufacturers are you utilizing, and who came up with it. And
usually we do not get any answers. Somebody just hands you a piece
of paper with that sleeve.
And I think that when you take the OSHA standard that you put
forward of 3.5, 3.5 of a circumference or a diameter, right away
they are going to get bulldozed on that job, and they are going to
be confused on what 3.5 is. Because I think that I was a little bit
confused on it myself until I really got into it. [DC Tr. 519-521]
Mr. David J. Mahoney of the Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power testified that joints on their system were corrected before
swelling to the extent cited in the proposal (LA Tr. 457-458).
OSHA considers the conditions listed in the proposal as indications
that a cable or joint is not normal and may be in danger of failing. If
a cable is leaking, it is certainly capable of allowing the entrance of
moisture (which is an undisputed cause of faults). In certain cases, an
employer may be able to demonstrate that a particular condition is not
related to a possible fault-producing state. There is some evidence in
the record, for example, that a joint that is swollen is not in danger
of failing unless other conditions, such as the presence of higher than
normal temperatures or leaks, also exist (Ex. 46). Unfortunately, the
record does not contain good evidence of what symptoms a joint or cable
displays before failing. (Since the fault destroys most of the
available evidence, this is not surprising.) However, the record does
demonstrate what the likely consequences of employee exposure to a
fault on an underground power line--severe burns, possibly resulting in
death (Ex. 6-16). Additionally, the conditions listed in the proposal
are considered abnormal, requiring the use of protective measures.
OSHA has concluded that employees may work in a manhole that
contains a cable with abnormalities only when service load conditions
and feasible alternatives prevent deenergizing the cable and only when
the employees are protected from a failure. Rather than specify the
precise conditions requiring protective measures, paragraph (t)(7) of
final Sec. 1910.269 presumes that certain conditions are indicative of
a problem, as follows:
Where a cable in a manhole has one or more abnormalities that
could lead to or be an indication of an impending fault, the
defective cable shall be deenergized before any employee may work in
the manhole, except when service load conditions and a lack of
feasible alternatives require that the cable remain energized. In
that case, employees may enter the manhole provided they are
protected from the possible effects of a failure by shields or other
devices that are capable of containing the adverse effects of a
fault in the joint.
Note: Abnormalities such as oil or compound leaking from cable
or joints, broken cable sheaths or joint sleeves, hot localized
surface temperatures of cables or joints, or joints that are swollen
beyond normal tolerance are presumed to lead to or be an indication
of an impending fault.
The abnormalities listed in proposed paragraph (t)(7) have been
moved to a note following this provision in the final rule. The
criterion for determining the amount of acceptable swelling has also
been revised to indicate that joints ``that are swollen beyond normal
tolerance'' are presumed to be an abnormality. The note states that the
listed conditions are presumed to lead to or be an indication of a
possible impending fault. An employer could demonstrate that any one of
these conditions, in a particular case, is not indicative of an
impending fault, in which case Sec. 1910.269(t)(7) would not require
protective measures to be taken.
Under some service load conditions, it may not be feasible for the
electric utility to deenergize the cable with the defect at the same
time that another line is deenergized for maintenance work. In such
cases, paragraph (t)(7) of final Sec. 1910.269 allows the defective
cable or splice to remain energized as long as the employees in the
manhole are protected against the possible effects of a failure. For
example, a ballistic blanket wrapped around a defective splice can
protect against injury from the effects of a fault in the splice.
Some commenters noted that handling a conductor to wrap a
protective blanket around it may itself induce the impending fault to
occur (Ex. 3-20, 3-80). The UWUA was concerned that a ballistic blanket
might not provide complete protection (Ex. 3-76; DC Tr. 519).
Paragraph (t)(7) requires employees to be protected by shields
capable of containing the adverse effects of a failure. The energy that
could be released in case of a fault is known, and the energy absorbing
capability of a shield can be obtained from the manufacturer or can be
calculated. As long as the energy absorbing capability of the shield
exceeds the available fault energy, the shield will protect employees.
Employees are required to be protected, regardless of the type of
shielding device used and of how it is applied. Additionally, the
standard permits this option to be used only ``if the defective cable
or splice cannot be deenergized due to service load conditions''.
Employers are required to use alternatives such as those mentioned by
Mr. Eugene Briody (for example, the use of shunts or other means of
supplying areas with power [DC Tr. 518-519]) whenever feasible before
allowing access.
Paragraph (t)(8) requires metallic sheath continuity to be
maintained while work is performed on underground cables. Bonding
across an opening in a cable's sheath protects employees against shock
from a difference in potential between the two sides of the opening.
Several commenters objected to this requirement (Ex. 3-32, 3-42, 3-
45, 3-62, 3-112, 3-123). They generally argued that it was not always
possible to provide a bonding jumper across the opening in the sheath.
Some cited the problems of jacketed cables (Ex. 3-32, 3-112), one cited
corrosion problems (Ex. 3-123), and others simply suggested allowing
alternatives (Ex. 3-42, 3-45, 3-62).
The Lineman's and Cableman's Handbook describes the purpose behind
bonding cable sheaths as follows:
Cable Bonding and Grounding. The purpose of bonding and
grounding the cable sheaths is to maintain them at or near ground
potential. A No. 2 AWG copper wire is generally used. It must be
attached to the sheaths with a special bond clip which is soldered
to the wire and sheath and connected to a low-resistance ground.
Bonding and grounding reduce the likelihood of arcing between
the sheath of a faulted cable and other nearby sheaths. It thus
reduces the danger to cablemen who may be in a manhole when a cable
fault occurs. It also minimizes the harmful effects of corrosive
action due to stray currents.93 [Ex. 8-5]
\9\3Kurtz, Edwin B., and Shoemaker, Thomas M., The Lineman's and
Cableman's Handbook, Sixth Edition, 1981, McGraw-Hill Book Co., p.
33-13.
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While this description relates to the permanent installation of
grounds and bonding jumpers on cable installations, it nonetheless
holds true for temporary bonding across the opening in a sheath. Under
fault conditions, the voltage difference between the two sides of the
opening can reach lethal levels if proper bonding is not in place. This
hazard is currently recognized in Sec. 1926.956(c)(7), which contains a
requirement equivalent to the one being adopted in final
Sec. 1910.269(t)(8). The final rule is performance oriented, accepting
any method of ensuring continuity that limits potential differences to
safe levels (per Sec. 1910.269(n)(3)). However, as noted by Union
Carbide Corporation, there are certain periods, such as during the
cable stripping process, when cable sheath continuity cannot be
maintained (Ex. 3-45). They recommended that the standard allow the use
of electrical protective equipment during these periods. OSHA agrees
with Union Carbide, and paragraph (t)(8) of final Sec. 1910.269 allows
the cable sheath to be treated as energized in lieu of bonding. (The
voltage to which the sheath is to be considered energized is equal to
the maximum voltage that could be seen across the sheath under fault
conditions.) This is consistent with other parts of the final rule,
such as paragraph (l)(9), which recognize treating objects as energized
as an alternative to grounding.
Paragraph (u). Paragraph (u) of final Sec. 1910.269 addresses work
performed in substations. As is the case elsewhere in the standard, the
provisions of this paragraph are intended to supplement (rather than
modify) the more general requirements contained in other portions of
Sec. 1910.269, such as paragraph (1) on minimum approach distances.
Paragraph (u)(1) requires enough space to be provided around
electric equipment to allow ready and safe access to and operation and
maintenance of the equipment. This rule prevents employees from
contacting exposed live parts as a result of insufficient maneuvering
room. A note has been included to recognize, as constituting
compliance, the provisions of ANSI C2-1987 for the design of workspace
for electric equipment.
Some commenters objected to the application of this provision to
installations made before the standard's effective date (Ex. 3-20, 3-
22, 3-80, 3-82, 3-101, 3-112; DC Tr. 833-836). Arguing that this
pointed out the need for an omnibus grandfather clause, they claimed
that older substations do not meet the access and working distances
specified in the latest ANSI standards. They noted that these
facilities were built under standards in effect at the time of
installation. Mr. Howard D. Wilcox, representing EEI, testified on this
subject as follows:
One of the best examples of the need for a grandfather clause is
electric substations. A substation is a facility that transforms
electricity from one voltage to another.
In certain types of substations, there are buildings that house
control switches, relays and associated circuitry. The purpose of
this equipment is to control circuit breakers that are located in
the substation yard. Photo No. 1 shows the front of one of these
panels. You can see that it has been around for a while.
The reverse side of these panels must be periodically accessed
by relay technicians, substation mechanics and other qualified
personnel to perform inspections and tests.
As you can see in Photo NO. 2, the clearances between panels in
these older stations is less than 30 inches and in this station is
about 23 inches from the back of both of those panels.
Paragraph (u) of the proposal as written calls for sufficient
access and working space to be provided in accordance with the
National Electric [sic] Safety Code, ANSI C2-1987, which would
require a 30-inch clearance between the panels.
A significant number of older indoor substations do not comply
with ANSI C2-1987 because they were built prior to the 30-inch
requirement. However, ANSI C2 contains a grandfather provision which
exempts existing facilities from its design requirements.
The preamble to this proposed rule recognizes that ``older
installations may not meet the exact dimensions set forth in the
latest version'' of the National Electric Safety Code, and notes
that the agency believes the language of the standard to be
sufficiently performance-oriented to exempt these older
installations.
The actual language of the proposed standard, however, merely
requires sufficient access and working space and references the 1987
version of the National Electric Safety Code.
We are concerned, therefore, that the standard could be
interpreted as requiring strict compliance with the National
Electric Safety Code clearance requirements even though the NESC
itself ``grandfathers'' the existing equipment.
If so, compliance with the standard would require massive
retrofitting of numerous older substations, which, although they
provide adequate access and working space, do not provide the full
clearances required by ANSI C2-1987.
In order to perform the retrofit, the substation control houses
would have to be completely rebuilt. Present cost for a complete 138
kV/46 kV substation control house is in the order of $350,000 for
material, labor, engineering and overheads on the Consumers Power
Company system.
Rebuild of the substation control house shown in Photos Nos. 1
and 2, which has a significantly larger number of outgoing circuits,
would be in the $900,000 range on the Consumers Power Company
system.
I cannot begin to estimate what the capital cost to the entire
industry would be, and what the impact on the nation's electric
system and customers would be, if we had to systematically shut down
older substations and completely rebuild their control houses to
provide for this extra clearance.
The number of accidents experienced in this environment on the
Consumers Power Company System in the time I have been with the
company is zero.
We, as all other utilities, provide safe work practices and
equipment to allow working in this environment, such as insulated
tools, rubber gloves, and protective cover-up. (DC Tr. 833-836)
As noted in the preamble to the proposal, OSHA realizes that older
installations may not meet the dimensions set forth in the latest
version of the national consensus standard. The Agency continues to
believe that the language of proposed Sec. 1910.269(u)(1) is
sufficiently performance oriented that older installations built to
specifications in the standards that were in effect at the time they
were constructed would meet the requirement for sufficient workspace
provided that the installation and work practices used enable employees
to perform work safely within the space and to maintain the minimum
approach distances specified in paragraph (1)(2). The note for this
provision clearly states that the NESC specifications are guidelines.
The ANSI standard is specifically not being incorporated by reference
here. To clarify the guidelines in the final rule, OSHA has included
the following language in the note to paragraph (u)(1):
Note: Guidelines for the dimensions of access and workspace
about electric equipment in substations are contained in American
National Standard-National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI C2-1987.
Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply with paragraph
(u)(1) of this section. An installation that does not conform to
this ANSI standard will, nonetheless, be considered as complying
with paragraph (u)(1) of this section if the employer can
demonstrate that the installation provides ready and safe access
based on the following evidence:
(1) That the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2
that was in effect at the time the installation was made,
(2) That the configuration of the installation enables employees
to maintain the minimum approach distances required by paragraph
(1)(2) of this section while they working on exposed, energized
parts, and
(3) That the precautions taken when work is performed on the
installation provide protection equivalent to the protection that
would be provide by access and working space meeting ANSI C2-1987.
This language accomplishes three goals. First, it explains that an
installation need not be in conformance with ANSI C2-1987 in order to
be considered as complying with final Sec. 1910.269(u)(1). Second, it
informs employers whose installations do not conform to the latest ANSI
standard of how they can demonstrate compliance with the OSHA standard.
Third, it ensures that, however old an installation is, it provides
sufficient space to enable employees to work within the space without
significant risk of injury.
The Agency has not adopted Mr. Wilcox's suggested complete
exemption of older installations from final paragraph (u)(1). The basic
rule is for the equipment to provide adequate access and working space.
Even Mr. Wilcox believes that his company's older installations meet
this. If a facility does not provide sufficient space, it poses a
hazard to employees and should be modified. Based on the record,
however, OSHA believes that the vast majority of installations were
made in accordance with standards in effect at the time they were
built. In such cases, the working and access space involved should
normally be sufficient, and the note in the final rule ensures that it
is.
Paragraph (u)(2) requires draw-out-type circuit breakers to be
inserted and removed while the breaker is in the open position. (A
draw-out-type circuit breaker is one in which the removable portion may
be withdrawn from the stationary portion without the necessity of
unbolting connections or mounting supports.) Additionally, if the
design of the control devices permits, the control circuit for the
circuit breaker would have to be rendered inoperative. (Some circuit
breaker and control device designs do not incorporate a feature
allowing the control circuit for the breaker to be rendered
inoperative.) These provisions are intended to prevent arcing which
could injure employees.
Because voltages can be impressed or induced on large metal objects
near substation equipment, paragraph (u)(3) requires conductive fences
around substations to be grounded. Continuity across openings is also
required in order to eliminate voltage differences between adjacent
parts of the fence.
Paragraph (u)(3)(ii) proposed the locking of unattended
substations. Two commenters suggested limiting the application of this
rule to substations containing exposed live parts (Ex. 3-34, 3-45). One
of them made a similar comment regarding proposed paragraph (u)(4)(i),
which contains the same requirement (Ex. 3-34).
OSHA has decided to omit proposed paragraph (u)(3)(ii) from the
final rule. The hazard it addressed is covered in the same manner in
final Sec. 1910.269(u)(4), discussed next.
Paragraph (u)(4) addresses the guarding of energized parts. In the
proposal, all rooms and spaces containing electric supply lines or
equipment would have been required to be enclosed within fences,
screens, partitions, or walls to prevent unqualified persons from
entering. The entrances to such rooms and spaces would have been
required to be locked or attended, and warning signs would have been
required. These provisions, which were proposed in paragraph (u)(4)(i),
were intended to prevent unqualified persons from gaining access to
high voltage equipment and from contacting exposed live parts.
Several other commenters suggested changing the phrase
``unqualified persons'' to ``unauthorized employees'' (Ex. 3-11, 3-44,
3-58, 3-69, 3-102, 3-112, 3-123). Two of them maintained that the rule
would preclude apprentices from entering the area containing energized
electric supply equipment (Ex. 3-44, 3-58, 3-102). Others argued that
the word ``qualified'' was too restrictive and that it would prevent
activities such as meter reading, inspection, and engineering from
these areas (Ex. 3-11, 3-69, 3-112, 3-123). Two additional commenters
urged OSHA to limit the application of the rule to areas accessible to
the public (Ex. 3-20, 3-80).
OSHA does not agree that the requirement is too restrictive with
respect to which persons are denied access to hazardous areas. The term
``authorized employee'' is not appropriate for use in this rule. The
definition of this term restricts its use to requirements dealing with
the control of hazardous energy sources.94 Even assuming that the
commenters intended the EEI/IBEW draft definition of ``authorized
employee'' to apply, the Agency believes that the definition in their
draft standard would result in a requirement that is no less
restrictive than the OSHA rule. Their definition reads as follows:
\9\4Authorized employee--``An employee who locks out or tags out
machines or equipment in order to perform servicing or maintenance
on that machine or equipment. An affected employee becomes an
authorized employee when that employee's duties include performing
servicing or maintenance covered under this section.''
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A qualified employee to whom the authority and responsibility to
perform a specific assignment has been given by the employer. (Ex.
2-3, emphasis supplied in the original document)
Thus, under the EEI/IBEW draft standard, a person would still have
to be ``qualified'' to be an ``authorized employee''. (The issue of
whether OSHA's definition of ``qualified employee'' is too restrictive
is discussed under the summary and explanation of Sec. 1910.269(x).)
OSHA believes that it is important to prohibit unqualified persons
from areas containing energized electric supply equipment regardless of
the work they would be performing. Employees working in these areas
must be trained in the hazards involved and in the appropriate work
practices, as required by paragraph (a)(2)(ii). Otherwise, they would
not be able to distinguish hazardous circuit parts from non-hazardous
equipment and would not be familiar with the appropriate work
practices, regardless of the jobs they are performing. There are
accidents described in the record that involve contact of unqualified
persons with energized parts in such areas. Accidents of this type
responsible for the deaths of three employees were described in Exhibit
9-2.
For these reasons, the Agency has retained the term ``unqualified
persons'' in final Sec. 1910.269(u)(4).
As noted earlier, two commenters suggested revising the
restrictions on access by unqualified persons to apply only to areas
containing exposed live parts, at least with respect to industrial
installations (Ex. 3-34, 3-45).
OSHA agrees with these commenters, at least in part. Section
1910.269 is intended to apply to electrical installations that are
largely unregulated. The Subpart S installation standards typically do
not apply, and the electric equipment may pose hazards in addition to
those of exposed live parts. For example, equipment enclosures may be
ungrounded. If the requirements of Subpart S are not being met, then it
is important to prevent unqualified persons from gaining access to
areas containing electric supply equipment.
If, on the other hand, the installation conforms to Subpart S, at
least with respect to the guarding of live parts and to the grounding
of enclosures for these parts, the provisions of proposed paragraph
(u)(4)(i) are unnecessary. In Subpart S, suitable protection is
provided in a similar, though not identical, requirement contained in
Sec. 1910.303(h)(2). This requirement in Subpart S, along with
Secs. 1910.303(g)(2) and 1910.304(f)(5), provides safety to employees
equivalent to that provided by proposed Sec. 1910.269(u)(4)(i). These
provisions prohibit unqualified persons from accessing areas containing
exposed live parts operating at 50 volts through 600 volts and located
less than 8 feet above the floor or other working surface. Unqualified
persons are also prohibited from areas containing live parts operating
at more than 600 volts, unless the live parts are completely enclosed
in metal enclosures or are installed at an elevation of at least 8
feet, 6 inches. The metal enclosures must be grounded, and the minimum
height increases with increasing voltage.
In the final rule, OSHA is adopting requirements that follow the
Subpart S approach to excluding unqualified persons from access to
unsafe areas. Final Sec. 1910.269(u)(4) sets forth criteria for access
by unqualified persons to spaces containing electric supply lines or
equipment that are equivalent to those contained in Subpart S, with one
exception. Paragraph (u)(5)(i) of final Sec. 1910.269 does not permit
the installation of unguarded live parts operating at more than 150
volts, although it does recognize ``guarding by location''. Following
these guidelines, paragraph (u)(4)(i) divides areas containing electric
supply equipment into three categories, rather than two, as follows:
(1) areas where exposed live parts operating at 50 to 150 volts to
ground are located within 8 feet of the ground or other working
surface,
(2) areas where live parts operating at between 150 and 601 volts
and located within 8 feet of the ground or other working surface are
guarded only by location, as permitted under paragraph (u)(5)(i), and
(3) areas where live parts operating at more than 600 volts are
located, unless:
(a) the live parts are enclosed within grounded, metal-enclosed
equipment whose only openings are designed so that foreign objects
inserted in these openings will be deflected from energized parts, or
(b) the live parts are installed at a height above ground and any
other working surface that provides protection at least equivalent to
an 8-foot height at 50 volts.
Paragraphs (u)(4)(ii) through (u)(4)(v) contain the requirements
that apply to these areas. The areas have to be so enclosed as to
minimize the possibility that unqualified persons will enter; warning
signs have to be displayed; and entrances not under the observation of
an attendant have to be kept locked. Additionally, unqualified persons
are not permitted to enter these areas while the electric supply lines
or equipment are energized.
With these changes, OSHA has codified the provisions in the final
rule that are equivalent to proposed paragraph (u)(4)(i) as entire
paragraph (u)(4). The remaining requirements of proposed paragraph
(u)(4) (proposed as Sec. 1910.269(u)(4)(ii) through (u)(4)(iv)) have
been placed under paragraph (u)(5) in final Sec. 1910.269.
Paragraph (u)(5)(i) requires live parts operating at more than 150
volts to be guarded (by physical guards or by location) or insulated.
This provision protects qualified employees from accidentally
contacting energized parts. Guidance for clearance distances
appropriate for guarding by location can be found in ANSI C2.
Installations meeting ANSI C2-1987 are considered to meet paragraph
(u)(5)(i), which is based on Section 124A.1 of that standard.
Several interested parties made comments to this paragraph
(proposed Sec. 1910.269(u)(4)(ii)) that were similar to the comments on
paragraph (u)(1), discussed earlier (Ex. 3-62, 3-65, 3-80, 3-82, 3-
112). Namely, they claimed that older installations did not meet
current ANSI standards. OSHA has used the same approach in the final
version of this provision as the Agency used under the earlier
requirement. In this case, OSHA will consider installations that do not
meet ANSI C2-1987 as meeting paragraph (u)(5)(i) provided the employer
can demonstrate that the installation provides sufficient clearance
based on the following evidence:
(1) That the installation meets the requirements of the edition of
ANSI C2 that was in effect at the time the installation was made,
(2) That each employee is isolated from live parts at the point of
closest approach, and95
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\9\5 An employee is isolated from an energized part if the
installation prevents the employee from coming within the withstand
distance for the voltage involved. Appendix ------ contains
information on determining withstand distances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) That the precautions taken protect employees to the same degree
as the clearances specified in ANSI C2-1987.
This approach affords employers flexibility in complying with the
standard and affords employees protection from injury due to sparkover
from live circuit parts.
Paragraph (u)(5)(ii) provides that the guarding of live parts
within a compartment be maintained during operation and maintenance
functions. This guarding is intended to prevent accidental contact with
energized parts and to prevent objects from being dropped on energized
parts. However, since access must be gained to energized equipment by
qualified employees, an exception to this proposed requirement allows
the removal of guards for this purpose. In such cases, paragraph
(u)(5)(iii) protects other employees working nearby by requiring the
installation of protective barriers around the work area.
So that employees can receive pertinent information on conditions
that affect safety at the substation, paragraph (u)(6)(i) requires
employees who do not regularly work at the station to report their
presence to the employee in charge. Typical conditions affecting safety
in substations include the location of energized equipment in the area
and the limits of any deenergized work area. Paragraph (u)(6)(ii)
requires this specific information to be communicated to employees
during the job briefing required by paragraph (c) of final
Sec. 1910.269.
Paragraph (v). Paragraph (v) of final Sec. 1910.269 contains
requirements pertaining to electric power generating plants and to work
practices used in these plants. As is the case elsewhere in the
standard, the provisions of paragraph (v) are intended to supplement
(rather than modify) the other more general requirements of
Sec. 1910.269.
Paragraph (v)(1)(i) requires the employer to maintain interlocks
and other safety devices (such as relief valves) in a safe and operable
condition. This requirement ensures that these devices perform their
intended function of protecting workers when called upon to do so. To
ensure further that these devices remain operable, paragraph (v)(1)(ii)
prohibits them from being modified to defeat their function, except as
necessary for the test, repair, or adjustment of the device.
Three commenters suggested allowing safety devices to be modified
when necessary to permit operations to continue (Ex. 3-20, 3-80, 3-
112).
No evidence was presented to demonstrate why defeating a safety
device would be necessary nor was any evidence given as to how this
could be accomplished without endangering employees. These devices are
required by safety codes (such as the NESC) and are installed to
protect persons from hazards posed by different types of equipment. For
example, pressure vessels are commonly equipped with safety relief
valves so that the safe operating pressure of the vessel is not
exceeded. Defeating this valve would expose employees to possible
explosion, a widely recognized hazard. OSHA does not believe that these
devices could be defeated without exposing employees to hazards, so
paragraph (v)(1)(ii) has been adopted as proposed.
Sometimes the brushes on a generator or exciter must be replaced
while the machine is in operation. This work is unusually hazardous,
and extreme caution must be observed by employees performing the job.
To protect these workers, paragraph (v)(2) contains requirements for
replacing brushes while the generator is in service. Since field
windings and exciters are operated in an ungrounded condition, there is
no voltage with respect to ground on the brushes as long as there is no
ground fault in the circuit. So that no voltage to ground is present
while employees are changing the brushes, paragraph (v)(2) requires the
exciter-field circuit to be checked to ensure that a ground condition
does not exist.
Paragraph (v)(2) in the proposal also contained the following
requirement:
If the equipment has ground protecting devices, the protective
devices shall be disconnected and tagged before brushes are changed.
Several commenters objected to this requirement (Ex. 3-42, 3-61, 3-
82, 3-112, 3-123). They maintained that this provision was unnecessary.
EEI stated that ``[c]ontinuation in service of ground detection/
protection devices is advantageous to reliability of service'' (Ex. 3-
112). They recommended substitution of the following EEI/IBEW provision
(from which the OSHA proposal was taken):
Where such equipment has ground protecting devices, such devices
shall be disconnected and tagged before changing brushes.
The proposed OSHA paragraph simply corrected grammatical errors in
the EEI/IBEW version. Accepting EEI's suggested language would not
overcome the objections to this provision.
Mr. G.F. Stone of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) aptly
described the purpose of disconnecting ground protecting devices and
the reasons for their opposition to this requirement as follows:
The ground protecting devices are disconnected before the
brushes are changed for operational reasons and not for employee
protection.
The ground protecting device serves to trip the generator when a
ground condition is detected on the generator field, but only for
equipment protection. The ground protecting devices are disconnected
only to ensure the generator does not trip off line while the
brushes are being changed and not for protecting employees from
electrical hazards. While employees are changing brushes they are
exposed to a maximum of 375 volts dc from the positive brush to the
negative brush regardless of whether or not the ground protecting
devices are disconnected.
Employee protection is provided by an insulative barrier of
fiber board between the positive and negative brushes, following
safe operating and maintenance procedures, and training employees in
safe methods to change brushes. However, disconnecting the ground
protecting devices does not provide employee protection.
This requirement would require unnecessary costs due to tagging
equipment without increasing the level of protection provided the
employee. [Ex. 3-82]
The Agency has accepted TVA's recommendation and has not carried
the proposed requirement forward into final Sec. 1910.269(v)(2).
Paragraph (v)(3) requires enough space to be provided around
electric equipment to allow ready and safe access to and operation and
maintenance of the equipment. This rule prevents employees from
contacting exposed live parts as a result of insufficient maneuvering
room. A note has been included to recognize, as constituting
compliance, the provisions of ANSI C2-1987 for the design of workspace
for electric equipment.
Several interested parties made comments to this paragraph that
were similar to the comments on paragraph (u)(1), discussed earlier
(Ex. 3-20, 3-22, 3-80, 3-82, 3-102). Namely, they claimed that older
installations did not meet current ANSI standards. OSHA has used the
same approach in the final version of this provision as the Agency used
under the earlier requirement. The language in the note following
paragraph (v)(3) includes a statement regarding older installations.
This language is identical to that contained in the note following
paragraph (u)(1), except that the paragraph references are different.
(See the summary and explanation of paragraph (u)(1), earlier in this
preamble for a discussion of this language.)
Paragraphs (v)(4) and (v)(5) contain requirements on the guarding
of energized parts. Comments on these provisions were similar to the
ones on proposed Sec. 1910.269(u)(4), which has been split in the final
rule into paragraphs (u)(4) and (u)(5). These two sets of provisions
contain equivalent requirements for guarding live parts, with
paragraphs (u)(4) and (u)(5) of final Sec. 1910.269 applying to
substations and paragraphs (v)(4) and (v)(5) applying to generating
plants. OSHA has adopted the same changes, based on the record, in both
places in the final rule. For discussion of the rationale behind these
changes and the comments upon which they were based (as well as
suggestions that were not accepted), see the summary and explanation of
paragraphs (u)(4) and (u)(5) earlier in this preamble.
Paragraph (v)(4)(i) divides areas containing electric supply
equipment into three categories, rather than two, as follows:
(1) areas where exposed live parts operating at 50 to 150 volts to
ground are located within 8 feet of the ground or other working
surface,
(2) areas where live parts operating at between 150 and 601 volts
and located within 8 feet of the ground or other working surface are
guarded only by location, as permitted under paragraph (v)(5)(i), and
(3) areas where live parts operating at more than 600 volts are
located, unless:
(a) the live parts are enclosed within grounded, metal-enclosed
equipment whose only openings are designed so that foreign objects
inserted in these openings will be deflected from energized parts, or
(b) the live parts are installed at a height above ground and any
other working surface that provides protection at least equivalent to
an 8-foot height at 50 volts.
Paragraphs (v)(4)(ii) through (v)(4)(v) contain the requirements
that apply to these areas. The areas have to be so enclosed to minimize
the possibility that unqualified persons will enter; warning signs have
to be displayed; and entrances not under the observation of an
attendant have to be kept locked. Additionally, unqualified persons are
not permitted to enter these locations while the electric supply lines
or equipment are energized.
Paragraph (v)(5)(i) requires live parts operating at more than 150
volts to be guarded (by physical guards or by location) or insulated.
This provision protects qualified employees from accidentally
contacting energized parts. Guidance for clearance distances
appropriate for guarding by location can be found in ANSI C2.
Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply with paragraph
(v)(5)(i). Installations meeting ANSI C2-1987 are considered to meet
paragraph (v)(5)(i), which is based on Section 124A.1 of that standard.
Several interested parties made comments to this paragraph that
were similar to the comments on paragraph (u)(5)(i), discussed earlier
(Ex. 3-80, 3-82, 3-112, 3-120). Namely, they claimed that older
installations did not meet current ANSI standards. OSHA has used the
same approach in the final version of this provision as the Agency used
under the earlier requirement. The language in the note following
paragraph (v)(3) includes a statement regarding older installations.
This language is identical to that contained in the note following
paragraph (u)(5)(i), except that the paragraph references are
different. (See the summary and explanation of paragraph (u)(5)(i),
earlier in this preamble for a discussion of this language.)
Paragraph (v)(5)(ii) provides that the guarding of live parts
within a compartment be maintained during operation and maintenance
functions. This guarding is intended to prevent accidental contact with
energized parts and to prevent objects from being dropped on energized
parts. However, since access must be gained to energized equipment by
qualified employees, an exception to this proposed requirement allows
the removal of guards for this purpose. In such cases, paragraph
(v)(5)(iii) protects other employees working nearby by requiring the
installation of protective barriers around the work area.
Paragraph (v)(5) of proposed Sec. 1910.269 addressed the breaking
of pressure connections. Paragraph (v)(5)(i) would have required lines
which exposed employees to hazardous pressures or temperatures to be
isolated, drained, and locked out or tagged in accordance with proposed
Sec. 1910.269(d) before a valve bonnet or stuffing box gland was moved
or removed and before a flanged joint or other pressure connection was
broken. Paragraph (v)(5)(ii) would have required that the bolts, nuts,
or other fasteners be loosened after locking out or tagging the line.
Several commenters were concerned that proposed paragraph (v)(5)
would not permit adjusting or repacking valves while they were in
service (Ex. 3-42, 3-112, 3-120, 56; DC Tr. 828-829). EEI argued that
this provision would require locking or tagging out of equipment that
could be safely worked while it was in service. They illustrated their
problem with examples, as follows:
Examples are re-packing valves which are backseated, adjusting
pump packing glands, retorquing pressure boundary bolts per
manufacturers' instructions (such as feedwater heater heads, boiler
feed pump casings, turbine shell bolts) after heating, effecting
temporary leak repairs by applying clamp-on covers, connecting/
disconnecting instrumentation, etc. [Ex. 3-112]
These rulemaking participants urged OSHA to adopt provisions
specifically permitting this type of work under procedures established
by the employer and performed by employees trained in this operation.
Additionally, Mr. Stephen R. Marsh of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
urged OSHA to provide an alternative to loosening bolts, nuts, and
other fasteners to recognize the fact that these devices sometimes
freeze in place and have to be broken off (Ex. 3-22).
OSHA does not believe the incorporation of these suggestions is
necessary. The proposed paragraph was intended to provide requirements
that would supplement the lockout and tagging requirements of paragraph
(d). The proposed requirements provided specific procedures on how
lines were to be relieved of hazardous temperatures and pressures. It
was not intended to require the deenergizing of equipment that would
not otherwise be required to be locked out or tagged out under
paragraph (d). However, the comments received on proposed paragraph
(v)(5) indicate that this was not clear. OSHA believes that employees
are fully protected from the hazards associated with the control of
hazardous energy sources under final Sec. 1910.269(d) and that the
provisions proposed in paragraph (v)(5) are unnecessary. The employer's
lockout and tagging procedures required under paragraph (d) will state
exactly how employees are to be protected from the hazards related to
the control of hazardous temperatures and pressures in lines.
Boilers are an essential part of steam-driven electric generating
plants. Water is heated and converted to steam, which in turn drives
the steam turbine generating equipment. Boilers, whether of the water
tube or fire tube type, contain water and steam spaces that must be
entered periodically for maintenance. Paragraph (v)(6) of final
Sec. 1910.269 contains two provisions relating to some of the hazards
involved. (An introductory sentence has been added to this paragraph in
the final rule to clarify that it applies to work in water and steam
spaces associated with boilers.)
Paragraph (v)(6)(i) requires an inspection to be undertaken by a
designated person to ensure that work can be initiated safely. To
protect employees who may have to reenter the work area from hazards
arising from incomplete work or other problems that may have occurred
during the course of work, this paragraph also requires a similar
inspection to be performed after work is completed. As a further
precaution, this paragraph requires employees to wear eye or face
protection during cleaning operations.
Proposed paragraph (v)(6) only specified eye protection. However,
as noted previously, the provisions of Sec. 1910.269 are intended to
supplement the other requirements of OSHA's General Industry Standards
in Part 1910. Section 1910.132(a) already requires employees to wear
full face protection any time it is necessary for their protection. So
that it is clear that final Sec. 1910.269 does not reduce the
protection afforded by Sec. 1910.132, paragraph (v)(6)(i) of final
Sec. 1910.269 requires full face protection if it is necessary.
Paragraph (v)(6)(ii) requires provisions to be made to shield
employees working near the end of water or steam tubes during cleaning
operations.
In Sec. 1910.269(v)(7), OSHA is promulgating requirements for the
chemical cleaning of boilers and pressure vessels. These requirements
specify that areas be cordoned off to restrict access during cleaning
and that the number of workers in the area be limited to those needed
to do the operation. Because of the flammability of chemicals used in
cleaning and the possibility of flammable gases in the boiler or
pressure vessel, the standard prohibits smoking, welding, and other
ignition sources during cleaning operations. In addition, requirements
are set forth for the use of protective clothing, goggles, boots, and
gloves and for the availability of water or showers in the general area
of work. (A note has been included after paragraph (v)(7)(iii) in final
Sec. 1910.269 to indicate that Sec. 1910.141 contains requirements
related to water supply and to washing facilities.) These provisions
recognize the safety hazards of chemical cleaning and are intended to
minimize risks to employees during these operations.
Mr. Robert L. Barham of the Carolina Power and Light Company
suggested restricting the application of provisions addressing the
hazards of flammable materials to cleaning operations that used such
materials (Ex. 3-23). OSHA has accepted his recommendation and has
revised the final rule accordingly.
Paragraph (v)(8) of final Sec. 1910.269 contains requirements for
chlorine system safety. (These requirements, of course, are in addition
to other provisions in Part 1910 addressing the hazards of exposure to
chlorine, such as those in Subparts I and Z. These subparts also have
application to some of the other hazards addressed by paragraph (v),
such as paragraph (v)(8) on chlorine systems.) OSHA is requiring
gaseous chlorine system enclosures to be posted with signs restricting
entry and warning of the hazards. Entry into the restricted area is
permitted only for designated employees equipped with personal
protective equipment and is limited to the number required to perform
the task. In addition, OSHA requires repair kits (for the emergency
repair of chlorine leaks) to be available. Chlorine tanks, pipes, and
equipment must also be purged and isolated from other sources of
chlorine before repair operations begin. Lastly, OSHA requires the
employer to take precautions to prevent the accidental mixing of
chlorine with reactive materials that could produce a hazardous
situation.
Paragraph (v)(9) of final Sec. 1910.269 contains requirements for
boiler repair work. These requirements specify that boiler furnaces and
ash hoppers be inspected for possible falling objects, such as failed
liners, before repair work is begun. If this hazard exists, overhead
protection is required to be provided. An employer could instead choose
to remove objects that could fall and injure employees. Obviously,
after the hazard is removed, no overhead protection would be required.
Additionally, OSHA requires employees to stand clear of the opening of
an operating boiler when opening the door to prevent injury which may
be caused by hot gases escaping from the open door.
Paragraph (v)(10) of final Sec. 1910.269 contains requirements for
turbine-generator systems. Turbine generators are typically cooled by
air or hydrogen circulated by fans mounted on the generator rotor. The
requirements of paragraph (v)(10) address the fire and explosion
hazards of hydrogen in turbine generators and are based on requirements
in the draft standard recommended by EEI and IBEW. These requirements
prohibit smoking or other ignition sources near hydrogen or hydrogen
sealing systems and require the posting of signs warning of the
explosion hazard (paragraph (v)(10)(i)). In addition, conditions of
excessive hydrogen makeup or abnormal pressure loss are considered to
be an emergency situation requiring correction (paragraph (v)(10)(ii)),
and a quantity of inert gas suitable for purging hydrogen from
generators is required to be available (paragraph (v)(10)(iii)).
Two commenters recommended that paragraph (v)(10)(ii) in the
proposal be amended to require an inspection upon evidence of excessive
hydrogen makeup or abnormal pressure loss (Ex. 3-20, 3-80). They
maintained that these conditions do not always constitute an emergency.
OSHA has not adopted this suggestion. Excessive hydrogen makeup and
abnormal loss of pressure are indications that hydrogen may be leaking
from the system, and the escaping hydrogen poses serous explosion
hazards. Even if these symptoms are not caused by leaks, it would be
much more difficult to detect a leak that occurred while the symptoms
were being ignored. Thus, it is important to correct the problems
causing the excessive hydrogen makeup or abnormal loss of pressure as
soon as possible.
Paragraph (v)(11) contains requirements for the handling of coal
and ash and includes provisions on the use of railroad equipment and
conveyors for this purpose. Several provisions within this paragraph
relate to the hazards of coal or coal handling. It should be noted that
MSHA has jurisdiction over the handling of coal until it is fully
processed. (For a complete discussion of the extent of OSHA's authority
over coal-related hazards, see the summary and explanation of
Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(i)(B), earlier in this preamble.)
Paragraph (v)(11)(i) permits only designated persons to operate
railroad equipment. Designated persons are persons who are
knowledgeable of the construction and operation of the equipment (in
this instance, railroad equipment) and hazards involved and who are
assigned by the employer to perform this task.
Restricting the running of railroad equipment to persons who are
knowledgeable of the way to operate the equipment and of the accepted
rules, such as right-of-way and signalling, will prevent accidents by
assuring that the equipment operator is competent.
Paragraph (v)(11)(ii) requires a warning to be given before a
locomotive or locomotive crane is moved. This warning will allow
employees the opportunity to stand clear of the train and track before
the equipment moves.
The standard requires, in paragraphs (v)(11)(iii) and (v)(11)(iv),
that drawheads not be aligned by employees kicking the drawheads (to
prevent injury to or loss of the employees' feet) and that drawheads
and knuckles not be shifted while railroad equipment is in motion (to
prevent runaway rail cars). (A drawhead is the body of the automatic
coupler, and the knuckle is the movable arm which connects with the
drawhead to form the coupling on cars and locomotives.)
Paragraph (v)(11)(v) proposed that railroad cars, when stopped for
unloading, be blocked to prevent the cars from moving. Several
commenters objected to this provision (Ex. 3-20, 3-23, 3-26, 3-42, 3-
59, 3-80, 3-82, 3-112). They argued that other means were available to
secure railroad cars from movement during unloading operations. For
example, the unloading equipment itself may serve to hold the car in
place.
The Agency agrees with these comments. Therefore, the final rule
states the provision in terms of the performance desired, that is, that
railroad cars be secured from displacement so that they cannot move
during the unloading operation.
In paragraph (v)(11)(vi), the standard requires an emergency means
of stopping railcar dumping during this operation. In the event an
incident occurs, this safeguard will allow interruption of the dumping
operation to prevent or minimize injury to employees.
Paragraph (v)(11)(vii) requires employees to be trained and
knowledgeable in coal- and ash-handling conveyors operations if they
work in conveyor areas. For example, their training and knowledge
should be thorough in the subjects of: (1) operation of the conveyor
system, (2) hazards associated with conveyors, (3) how to minimize
these hazards, and (4) requirements of this standard that pertain to
conveyor operation.
The standard prohibits, in paragraph (v)(11)(viii), employees from
riding on coal- or ash-handling conveyors. Belt conveyors are not
designed to carry persons and riding the conveying medium can be very
hazardous. This paragraph further provides that employees be allowed to
cross over a belt conveyor only at walkways, unless the conveyor is
locked out or tagged in accordance with Sec. 1910.269(d).
Paragraph (v)(11)(ix) addresses the hazard of unexpected startup of
conveyors. If a conveyor could cause injury when it is started,
paragraph (v)(11)(ix) requires personnel in the area to be alerted by a
signal or by a designated employee that the conveyor is about to start.
For automatically and remotely controlled conveyors, an audible warning
device that could be heard and recognized by employees at all points
along the conveyor where personnel could be present is required.
However, a visual warning is permitted if it would be more effective in
alerting employees. The requirements for warning devices are contained
in paragraph (v)(11)(x).
Exceptions to the requirement for warning devices are given in
paragraph (v)(11)(x) for systems whose function would be seriously
hindered by the required time delay. In such cases, warning signs are
required to be provided at locations along the conveyor where it is not
guarded by position or location. These exceptions protect employees at
conveyor installations that cannot have warning devices installed for
design reasons.
The provisions of paragraph (v)(11)(ix) are intended to protect
employees from getting caught in and injured by a conveyor that is
started unexpectedly. This paragraph is based on provisions in the
Safety Standard for Conveyors and Related Equipment, ASME/ANSI B20.1-
1987 (Ex. 2-30).
Three commenters maintained that the cost of this requirement was
not justified by the benefits (Ex. 3-23, 3-26, 3-112). They argued that
precautions, such as covering the conveyors, installing emergency stop
devices, and avoiding unsafe positions unless the equipment was locked
or tagged out, are effective measures to prevent injury. They submitted
cost estimates ranging from $9,000 to $50,000 per station for
retrofitting existing systems.
Mr. James W. Broome of the Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.
believed that all conveyors should be provided with alarms and warning
signs to alert employees of automatic starting (Ex. 3-59).
OSHA's final rule does recognize guarding as an alternative to
warning systems. Conveyor systems that do not expose employees to
hazards do not require warning alarms. Of course, if the guards are
removed, the conveyor system would have to be locked out or tagged in
accordance with Sec. 1910.147.
For conveyor systems that are not completed guarded, OSHA has
decided to provide an exception to the requirement for warning devices
for conveyor systems installed before [insert date 1 year after date of
publication] until their control systems are rebuilt. Conveyors that
are currently in place and those that are in the final stages of
installation would require substantial costs to retrofit warning
devices. OSHA does believe that warning signs and training can provide
adequate protection for older conveyors, although warning devices are
considered more effective for the long run.96 Therefore, paragraph
(v)(11)(x) of final Sec. 1910.269 exempts existing conveyor
installations from the requirement for warning alarms until their
control systems are rebuilt. Incorporating warning devices into a
conveyor in its initial design stage or when its controls system is
rebuilt is a much more cost-effective approach, one that OSHA has taken
in the final rule. Before the conveyor system is installed it is a
relatively simple matter to incorporate warning devices as a part of
the control system. Similarly, when the control system is rebuilt
(rewired), installing a warning system and connecting it to the control
system can be a cost-effective technique of preventing injuries
associated with unexpected conveyor movement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\6 There is at least one accident described in the record that
could have been prevented by warning devices (Ex. 6-23, 6-24).
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In adopting final paragraph (v)(11)(x), OSHA has also clarified the
language from the corresponding provision of the proposed rule
(paragraph (v)(12)(ix)(A)) to indicate that the alarm must be
recognized by employees as a warning that the conveyor will be started.
Obviously, an alarm that could not be identified by employees would not
be an effective warning, and the final rule requires employers to
ensure (through such means as training and the design of the alarm
system) that the alarm is recognized. Additionally, because the alarm
will be understood by employees, OSHA has not carried forward the
provision in the proposal exempting conveyor systems from the alarm
requirements if the intent of the alarm could be misinterpreted.
Paragraph (v)(11)(xi) addresses hazards associated with emergency
situations involving automatically and remotely controlled conveyors.
These conveyors are required to have emergency stop devices so that the
equipment could be deenergized in case an employee becomes endangered
by its operation. However, if the design, function, and operation of a
conveyor is not hazardous to personnel, an emergency stop is not
required. For example, a conveyor system that operates at low speed and
that does not contain exposed nip or pinch points is considered as not
posing a hazard to employees.
The emergency stop devices have to be easily identifiable and have
to be placed anywhere the conveyor is not guarded. They are also
required to act directly on the control of the conveyor (not dependent
on the stopping of other intermediate equipment) and to be installed so
that they cannot be overridden.
The requirements contained in paragraph (v)(11)(xi) are also based
on ASME/ANSI B20.1-1987.
Paragraph (v)(11)(xii) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires that, where
a combustible atmosphere may be produced in coal-handling operations,
sources of ignition be eliminated or controlled to prevent the ignition
of combustible gases. This requirement mitigates the hazard of fire and
explosion in coal-handling operations. It also indicates that a
combustible atmosphere may occur in these operations. An area in which
this may occur must be considered a Class II location as far as
ignition sources are concerned, and a note to this effect is included
in the final rule. (See subpart S of part 1910 for requirements
pertaining to the control of electrical ignition sources in Class II
locations--locations that are hazardous because of the presence of
combustible dust, such as coal dust.)
In paragraph (v)(11)(xiii), OSHA is prohibiting employees from
working on or beneath overhanging coal. Based on requirements contained
in the draft standard recommended by EEI and IBEW, this requirement
addresses the hazards of an employee's being struck or crushed by
falling coal or suffocating by being buried in coal.
Mr. Charles T. Autry of the Oglethorpe Power Company urged OSHA to
allow utilities to provide protection so that employees could work, if
necessary, in areas with overhanging coal (Ex. 3-102).
OSHA has accepted his recommendation. Paragraph (v)(11)(xiii)
permits employees to work in these areas if they are protected from all
hazards associated with shifting coal. For example, support structures
could be provided to protect employees from the falling coal or to
prevent the coal from falling.
Paragraph (v)(11)(xiv) requires employees entering a bunker or silo
to wear a safety harness with lifeline attached to a fixed support
outside the bunker attended at all times by a standby employee. Also
based on requirements contained in the draft standard recommended by
EEI and IBEW, this requirement further addresses the hazard of an
employee's suffocating by being buried in coal or ash.
Proposed Sec. 1910.269(v)(12) contained requirements for walking
and working surfaces. Proposed paragraph (v)(12)(i) emphasized that the
requirements of Subpart D of Part 1910 would continue to apply.
Paragraph (v)(12)(ii) would have provided an exception to the Subpart D
requirements whereby a floor hole, through which passes machinery,
piping, or other equipment that may expand or contract in the hole,
would have been permitted to be guarded by a toeboard if the opening
around the machinery or pipe was 12 inches (30.5 cm) or less. This
provision recognized the need to provide for expansion and contraction
of equipment. OSHA believed that a toeboard would normally prevent an
employee's foot from entering the opening as well as prevent tools from
falling through the hole.
Ms. Nancy Weinberg of the American Textile Manufacturers Institute
was concerned about consistency of proposed paragraph (v)(12) with
Subpart D (Ex. 3-54).
OSHA proposed equivalent provisions in its revision of Subpart D
(paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(4) of proposed Sec. 1910.27, 55 FR 13401).
In order to ensure consistency with Subpart D, as requested by Ms.
Weinberg, and because the proposed provision addressed a condition
common to many industries, the Agency is not carrying proposed
Sec. 1910.269(v)(12) forward into this final rule. The subject will be
addressed in the forthcoming revision of Subpart D.
Paragraph (v)(12) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires employees working
near gates, valves, intakes, or flumes of a hydroplant to be warned
before changes are made in water flow rates, if such a change would
pose a hazard to employees. As a clarification of the intent of this
paragraph, the Agency has added the phrase ``and shall vacate dangerous
areas'' to the wording contained in the proposal. Thus, the final
provision reads as follows:
Employees working on or close to water gates, valves, intakes,
forebays, flumes, or other locations where increased or decreased
water flow or levels may pose a significant hazard shall be warned
and shall vacate such dangerous areas before water flow changes are
made. [Emphasis added.]
OSHA believes that this will point out the purpose of the rule and
will ensure that employees are not injured as a result of water flow
changes.
Paragraph (w). Paragraph contains requirements for special
conditions that are encountered during electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work.
Since capacitors store electric charge and can release electrical
energy even when disconnected from their sources of supply, some
precautions may be necessary, in addition to those contained in
Sec. 1910.269(m) (deenergizing lines and equipment) and
Sec. 1910.269(n) (grounding), when work is performed on capacitors or
on lines which are connected to capacitors. Paragraph (w)(1) sets forth
precautions which will enable this equipment to be considered as
deenergized. Under paragraph (w)(1)(i), capacitors on which work is to
be performed must be disconnected from their sources of supply and
short-circuited. This not only removes the sources of electric current
but relieves the capacitors of their charge as well.
Two commenters suggested adding a requirement for a 5-minute wait,
after disconnection, before the short circuit is applied (Ex. 3-80, 3-
82). They pointed out that ANSI/IEEE Standard No. 18 requires all
capacitors to have an internal resistor across its terminals to reduce
the voltage to 50 volts or less within 5 minutes after the capacitor is
disconnected from an energized source. OSHA is not applying this
requirement to lines to which capacitors are connected. The employees
who would be short-circuiting and grounding these lines would
frequently not be the same as the employees who would be deenergizing
them. Thus, the time between deenergizing the lines and short-
circuiting them cannot be controlled in such cases. In any event, lines
are normally deenergized at a different point from where they are
short-circuited and grounded, and a delay of more than 5 minutes is
effectively built into this process.
OSHA has accepted the suggested delay before short circuiting is
applied. Paragraph (w)(1)(i) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires capacitors
to be deenergized and, after a 5-minute wait, short circuited.
For work on individual capacitors in a series-parallel capacitor
bank, each unit must be short-circuited between its terminals and the
capacitor tank or rack; otherwise, individual capacitors could retain a
charge. This consideration is set forth in paragraph (w)(1)(ii).
Lastly, paragraph (w)(1)(iii) also requires lines to which capacitors
are connected to be short-circuited before the lines can be considered
deenergized.
Several commenters suggested adding requirements for capacitor
circuits to be grounded, as well, before they could be considered
deenergized (Ex. 3-44, 3-58, 3-66, 3-80, 3-82, 3-102, 3-112).
Rather than add a specific requirement for grounding, the Agency
has decided to add a note referring to the requirements for
deenergizing electric transmission and distribution lines and
equipment, paragraph (m), and for grounding, paragraph (n). OSHA
believes that this will alert readers to the appropriate requirements
for deenergizing and grounding without adding redundant, and perhaps
inconsistent, provisions.
Although the magnetic flux density in the core of a current
transformer is usually very low, resulting in a low secondary voltage,
it will rise to saturation if the secondary circuit is opened while the
transformer primary is energized. If this occurs, the magnetic flux
will induce a voltage in the secondary winding high enough to be
hazardous to the insulation in the secondary circuit and to personnel.
Because of this hazard to workers, paragraph (w)(2) prohibits the
opening of the secondary circuit of a current transformer while the
primary is energized. If the primary cannot be deenergized for work to
be performed on the secondary, then the secondary circuit must be
bridged so that an open-circuit condition does not result.
In a series streetlighting circuit, the lamps are connected in
series, and the same current flows in each lamp. This current is
supplied by a constant-current transformer, which provides a constant
current at a variable voltage from a source of constant voltage and
variable current. Like the current transformer, the constant current
source attempts to supply current even when the secondary circuit is
open. The resultant open-circuit voltage can be very high and hazardous
to employees. For this reason, paragraph (w)(3) sets forth a
requirement, similar to that in paragraph (w)(2), that either the
streetlighting transformer be deenergized or the circuit be bridged to
avoid an open-circuit condition.
Frequently, electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution employees must work at night or in enclosed places, such
as manholes, that are not illuminated by the sun. Since inadvertent
contact with live parts can be fatal, good lighting is important to the
safety of these workers. Therefore, paragraph (w)(4) requires
sufficient illumination to be provided so that work can be performed
safely.
The proposal did not provide specific guidance with respect to
levels of illumination that are necessary for safety under various
conditions. In the notice of proposed rulemaking, OSHA requested
comments and supporting data on this issue. Unfortunately, the comments
on this paragraph did not include any recommended specifications.
Therefore, the final rule sets forth the requirement as proposed. In
enforcing this provision, the Agency will use, as guidelines, other
OSHA and national consensus standards that apply to this subject (for
example, Sec. 1926.56, which applies to work performed during the
construction of electric power transmission and distribution
installations).
To protect employees working in areas that expose them to the
hazards of drowning, paragraph (w)(5) requires the provision and use of
personal flotation devices. Additionally, to ensure that these devices
will provide the necessary protection upon demand, they must be
approved by the U.S. Coast Guard, be maintained in safe condition, and
be regularly inspected for defects that render them unsuitable for use.
Lastly, employees would not be permitted to cross streams unless a safe
means of passage is provided.
Three commenters were concerned that the language in proposed
Sec. 1910.269(w)(5)(i) could be interpreted to require floatation
devices where the danger of drowning is minimal, such as near
decorative fountains and swimming pools (Ex. 3-20, 3-80, 3-112).
OSHA does not believe the language proposed in this paragraph and
carried forward into the final rule normally requires personal
floatation devices when work is performed over a fountain or swimming
pool. However, there may be times when the size and depth of a fountain
or pool and the type of work being performed would expose the employee
to the hazard of drowning. In enforcing paragraph (w)(5)(i) of final
Sec. 1910.269, the Agency will consider the extent of the hazard faced
by the worker.
Employees working in areas with pedestrian or vehicular traffic are
exposed to additional hazards compared to employees working on an
employer's premises, where public access is restricted. One serious
additional hazard faced by workers exposed to the public is that of
being struck by a vehicle (or even by a person). To protect employees
against being injured as a result of traffic mishaps, paragraph (w)(6)
requires the placement of warning signs or flags or other warning
devices to channel approaching traffic away from the work area if the
conditions in the area pose a hazard to employees. If warning signs are
not sufficient protection or if employees are working in an area in
which there are excavations, barricades must be erected. Additionally,
warning lights are required for night work.
Edison Electric Institute suggested incorporating the requirements
of Sec. 1926.200(g)(2), which covers traffic control devices (Ex. 3-
112). This provision in OSHA's Construction Standards incorporates ANSI
D6.1-1971, Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and
Highways, by reference. OSHA has accepted this recommendation and has
added the reference to the construction standard in paragraph
(w)(6)(i).
Paragraph (w)(7) addresses the hazards of voltage backfeed due to
sources of cogeneration or due to the configuration of the circuit
involved. Under conditions of voltage backfeed, the lines upon which
work is to be performed remain energized after the main source of power
has been disconnected. As noted by this provision, the lines have to be
worked as energized, under Sec. 1910.269(l), or could be worked as
deenergized, following paragraphs (m) and (n) of final Sec. 1910.269.
The referenced paragraphs contain the appropriate controls and work
practices to be taken in case of voltage backfeed.
Sometimes, electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work involves the use of lasers. Appropriate requirements
for the installation, operation, and adjustment of lasers are contained
in existing Sec. 1926.54 of the Construction Standards. Rather than
develop different requirements for electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work, OSHA has adopted the construction
regulation by reference in paragraph (w)(8) of final Sec. 1910.269.
To ensure that hydraulic equipment retains its insulating value,
paragraph (w)(9) requires the hydraulic fluid used in insulated
sections of such equipment to be of the insulating type.
Paragraph (x). Final Sec. 1910.269(x) contains definitions of terms
used in the standard.\97\ Since these definitions have been taken, in
large part, from consensus standards and existing OSHA regulations and
since the definitions included are generally self-explanatory, OSHA
expects these terms to be well understood, and no explanation is given
here beyond that needed to discuss issues raised during the rulemaking
period. However, for terms whose meaning may not be readily apparent,
the Agency has provided an explanation in the discussion of the
provision in which the term first appears.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\Paragraph (x) only defines terms that are used in
Sec. 1910.269. However, many of the documents listed in Appendix
contain definitions of terms generally associated with electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution work. In
particular, IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronic
Terms (IEEE Std. 100-1988), IEEE Guide to the Installation of
Overhead Transmission Line Conductors (IEEE Std. 524-1992), and IEEE
Guide on Terminology for Tools and Equipment to Be Used in Live Line
Working (IEEE Std. 935-1989) set out definitions of commonly used
terms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA received several comments relating to the definitions of
authorized, designated, and qualified employees (Ex. 3-20, 3-31, 3-40,
3-42, 3-44, 3-66, 3-69, 3-73, 3-80, 3-82, 3-102, 3-112, 3-123). The
definitions in the proposal were based on the relevant national
consensus standards (for example, American National Standard C2, the
National Electrical Safety Code). However, the commenters believed that
the proposed language was inappropriate.
Most of the commenters objected to the definition of ``qualified
employee'' (Ex. 3-20, 3-40, 3-42, 3-44, 3-58, 3-69, 3-80, 3-82, 3-102,
3-112, 3-123). They were concerned that the wording in the proposal was
too broad and that it would require an employee to be trained in all
aspects of electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
equipment. The comments of Ms. Meredith McCoy on behalf of the National
Rural Electric Cooperative Association were typical:
The proposed standards require that only a ``qualified
employee'' or ``qualified person'' perform certain functions, and
define these terms to mean ``[o]ne knowledgeable in the construction
and operation of electric power generation, transmission and
distribution equipment and the hazards involved.'' * * *
Thus, the proposed standards appear to require that workers know
all aspects of both the construction and operation of electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution, even though many of
these aspects have no relevance to their jobs or job safety. For
example, the safety of employees at distribution co-ops does not
require that they be trained in problems related to generation. As
another example, the proposed standards could be interpreted to
require that line clearance tree trimmers be knowledgeable in power
plant ash handling. NRECA does not believe that OSHA intended such a
requirement, which would be impracticable in terms of the cost and
time of the training which would be necessary, and which would bear
little, if any, relationship to worker safety. Consequently, the
proposed standards should be clarified to provide that employees
need only be ``qualified'' in regard to those aspects of the
construction and operation of electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution which directly relate to their job
safety. [Ex. 3-123]
Ms. McCoy is correct. OSHA did not intend to require employees to
be knowledgeable in all aspects of electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution equipment in order to be considered as
``qualified''. The proposed definition of ``qualified employee'' read
as follows:
Qualified employee (qualified person). One knowledgeable in the
construction and operation of electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution equipment and the hazards involved.
[Emphasis added.]
The Agency intended the word ``involved'' to modify ``equipment'',
as well as ``hazards''. From the comments on this definition, OSHA can
see that this interpretation is not apparent from the proposed
language. Therefore, the Agency has revised the wording slightly in the
final rule. The definition of ``qualified employee'' in the final rule
reads as follows:
Qualified employee (qualified person). One knowledgeable in the
construction and operation of electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution equipment involved, along with the
associated hazards.
OSHA believes that this language will convey the Agency's true
intent and will allay the concerns of the commenters. It should be
noted that the final rule uses the term ``qualified employee'' to refer
only to employees who have the training to work on energized electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution installations.
Paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of final Sec. 1910.269 sets out the training an
employee must have to be considered a qualified employee. A note to
this effect has been included following the definition of this term.
EEI also commented on the related definitions of ``authorized
employee'' and ``designated employee'' (Ex. 3-112). They argued that no
employee should be authorized or designated without first being
qualified.
OSHA notes that the term ``authorized employee'' is used in the
standard only in Sec. 1910.269(d) with regard to the control of
hazardous energy sources. Therefore, the definition of that term is
necessarily restricted to applications involving lockout and tagging.
Since the Agency relied heavily on the language of final Sec. 1910.147
in promulgating paragraph (d) of final Sec. 1910.269, OSHA has decided
to use the definition from the generic standard on hazardous energy
control in that context. Similarly, the definition of ``affected
employee'' in this final rule has also been taken from Sec. 1910.147.
The term ``qualified employee'', as used in final Sec. 1910.269,
relates only to employees who perform work on energized electric
equipment. The term ``designated employee'' is used in a more general
way to refer to employees who are competent to perform a task and who
are assigned that task by their employers, and it was defined in this
manner in the proposal. For example, Sec. 1910.269(v)(11)(i) requires
railroad equipment to be operated by designated employees. These
employees are not necessarily ``qualified'' electrical workers.
Therefore, OSHA has retained the proposed definition of ``designated
employee'' in the final rule.
Other commenters were concerned that the proposal did not refer to
line-clearance tree trimmers as ``qualified'' (Ex. 3-20, 3-80, 3-113,
58; DC Tr. 85-87). Mr. Robert Felix, Executive Vice President of the
National Arborist Association, stated these concerns as follows:
* * * NAA fully supports the wisdom of the Agency's decision to
treat differently persons who work on conductors from those, such as
line clearance tree trimmers, who are trained to work proximate to,
but not on, conductors. This appropriate distinction is based on the
Agency's proper recognition that the very foundation of safety in
the line clearance tree trimming industry is training in using
special techniques to work safely proximate to energized conductors
but never to touch conductors. These special techniques serve the
public interest by enabling trees growing in the vicinity of power
lines to be trimmed without de-energizing lines, consistent with
maintaining employee safety by forbidding them to ever touch
conductors. Thus, the proposed standard is entirely correct in
recognizing the fundamentally different regulatory concerns in
dealing with those who work on conductors, as compared to those
trained to work near, but not on, conductors.
Our problem is purely semantic and not substantive: because line
clearance tree trimmers are uniquely qualified to trim trees
proximate to conductors, it is misleading and utterly confusing to
term them ``not qualified'' for the purpose of applying only
portions of the subject proposed standard to them; for line
clearance tree trimmers are, indeed, uniquely qualified to perform
this highly specialized service.
In fact, this confusion is compounded when the subject standard
is viewed, as it must, in conjunction with ANSI Z-133 and the
pending proposed Sec. 1910.331 electric safe work practice standard
for general industry. OSHA's intent under that standard, it will be
recalled, is to exempt ``qualified line clearance tree trimmers''--
the very same personnel who would be covered under this standard as
``not qualified''! This anomalous terminology is untenable.
To disarm this needless incongruity, we suggest that in order to
achieve consistency between 1910.331 and .269, the same terminology
used in 1910.331 be employed by OSHA in the subject standard--that the
term ``qualified line clearance tree trimmer'' [footnote omitted] be
used in both standards to indicate their exemption from 1910.331 and
their partial coverage under the subject standard, because of their
qualification to work proximate to conductors. To distinguish these
employees who are partially covered by the subject standard, from
utility employees who work on conductors and therefore are subject to
the entire standard, we suggest that the latter be referred to as
``qualified utility employees''. [Ex. 3-113]
The Agency understands the tree trimming contractors' concerns.
Under Sec. 1910.331(c)(1), line-clearance tree trimming is exempt from
the Subpart S work practices standard only if performed by ``qualified
employees'' as defined in Sec. 1910.399. This definition is quite
similar to that contained in Sec. 1910.269(x). Thus, Subpart S could be
misinterpreted as applying to line-clearance tree trimmers, even though
that is not the Agency's intent. OSHA has decided to provide a note
under the definition of ``line-clearance tree trimmer'' to indicate
that these employees, though not considered to be ``qualified
employees'' under Sec. 1910.269, are still considered to be ``qualified
employees'' under Sec. 1910.331. The Agency believes that this note
will clarify the rule and will prevent enforcement difficulties.
However, OSHA has not adopted the National Arborist Association's
suggestion. As noted previously, the only employees considered
``qualified'' under final Sec. 1910.269 are those trained to work on
energized conductors. Additionally, paragraph (a)(2)(ii) imposes
training requirements for qualified employees that line-clearance tree
trimmers do not normally, by NAA's own admission, meet. Therefore, to
state that line-clearance tree trimmers are also considered as
``qualified employees'' under Sec. 1910.269 would lead to confusion and
possible misinterpretation of the standard.
Appendices. OSHA is including five appendices to final
Sec. 1910.269.
Appendix A (A-1 through A-5) contains flow charts depicting the
interface between Sec. 1910.269 and the following standards:
Sec. 1910.146, Permit-required confined spaces; Sec. 1910.147, The
control of hazardous energy (lockout/tagout); and Part 1910, Subpart S,
Electrical. This appendix will assist employers in determining which of
these standards applies in different situations.
Appendix B provides information relating to the determination of
appropriate minimum approach distances as required by
Sec. 1910.269(l)(2) and (q)(3).
Appendix C provides information relating to the protection of
employees from hazardous step and touch potentials as addressed in
Sec. 1910.269(o)(4)(iii), (p)(4)(iii)(C), and (q)(2)(ii).
Appendix D contains information on the inspection and testing of
wood poles addressed in Sec. 1910.269(q)(1)(i).
Appendix E contains references to additional sources of information
that may be used to supplement the requirements of final Sec. 1910.269.
The national consensus standards referenced in this appendix contain
detailed specifications that employers may follow in complying with the
more performance-oriented requirements of OSHA's final rule. Except as
specifically noted in Sec. 1910.269, however, compliance with the
national consensus standards is not a substitute for compliance with
the provisions of the OSHA standard.
C. Subpart S
The notice of proposed rulemaking did not contain any changes to
Subpart S of Part 1910. The provisions of Subpart S most directly
affected by new Sec. 1910.269 are contained in Part II of that subpart,
electrical safety-related work practices. These provisions are
contained in Secs. 1910.331 through 1910.335 of this chapter and, at
the time Sec. 1910.269 was proposed, were only in the proposed rule
stage themselves.
Because the two standards are related, however, the Agency believes
that it will be helpful to revise two of the existing notes to
requirements in Subpart S and, as mentioned previously, to add one
additional note. This will clarify the interface between the two
standards. Only the informational notes are being amended; the
requirements of Subpart S are not affected by these changes.
As discussed under the explanation of final
Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(B), OSHA is adding the following new note after
Sec. 1910.331(c)(1):
For work on or directly associated with utilization
installations, an employer who complies with the work practices of
Sec. 1910.269 (electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution) will be deemed to be in compliance with
Sec. 1910.333(c) and Sec. 1910.335. However, the requirements of
Sec. 1910.332, Sec. 1910.333(a), Sec. 1910.333(b), and Sec. 1910.334
apply to all work on or directly associated with utilization
installations, regardless of whether the work is performed by
qualified or unqualified persons.
The first note following this paragraph in Subpart S describes the
types of installations covered by the electrical safety-related work
practices standard. The new note should give employers and employees
guidance as to what standard to follow when both standards address the
same hazards.
OSHA is adding the following paragraph at the end of the second
note after Sec. 1910.331(c)(1):
Such [electric power generation, transmission, and distribution]
work is covered by Sec. 1910.269 of this part.
Additionally, the Agency is revising the first sentence in the note
after the introductory text in Sec. 1910.333(c)(3):
The work practices used by qualified persons installing
insulating devices on overhead power transmission or distribution
lines are covered by Sec. 1910.269 of this part, not by
Secs. 1910.332 through 1910.335 of this part.
These two amendments will refer interested parties to Sec. 1910.269
for requirements that apply to electric power generation, transmission,
and distribution work.
IV. Statutory Considerations
A. Introduction.
OSHA has described the hazards in the generation, transmission, and
distribution of electric power and the measures required to protect
affected employees from those hazards in section I, Background, and in
section III, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this
preamble. The Agency is providing the following discussion of the
statutory mandate for OSHA rulemaking activity to explain the legal
basis for its determination that the Electric Power Generation,
Transmission, and Distribution standard and the revised Electrical
Protective Equipment standard, as promulgated, are reasonably necessary
to protect affected employees from significant risks of injury and
death.
Section 2(b)(3) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
authorizes ``the Secretary of Labor to set mandatory occupational
safety and health standards applicable to businesses affecting
interstate commerce'', and section 5(a)(2) provides that ``[e]ach
employer shall comply with occupational safety and health standards
promulgated under this Act'' (emphasis added). Section 3(8) of the OSH
Act (29 U.S.C. Sec. 652(8)) provides that ``the term `occupational
safety and health standard' means a standard which requires conditions,
or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods,
operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to
provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment.''
In two recent cases, reviewing courts have expressed concern that
OSHA's interpretation of these provisions of the OSH Act, particularly
of section 3(8) as it pertains to safety rulemaking, could lead to
overly costly or under-protective safety standards. In International
Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the District of
Columbia Circuit rejected substantive challenges to OSHA's lockout/
tagout standard and denied a request that enforcement of that standard
be stayed, but it also expressed concern that OSHA's interpretation of
the OSH Act could lead to safety standards that are very costly and
only minimally protective. In National Grain & Feed Ass'n v. OSHA, 866
F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1989), the Fifth Circuit concluded that Congress
gave OSHA considerable discretion in structuring the costs and benefits
of safety standards but, concerned that the grain dust standard might
be under-protective, directed OSHA to consider adding a provision that
might further reduce significant risk of fire and explosion.
OSHA rulemakings involve a significant degree of agency expertise
and policy-making discretion to which reviewing courts must defer. (See
for example, Building & Constr. Trades Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Brock, 838
F.2d 1258, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 655 n. 62 (1980).) At the same
time, the agency's technical expertise and policy-making authority must
be exercised within discernable parameters. The lockout/tagout and
grain handling standard decisions sought clarification of the agency's
view of the scope of its expertise and authority. In light of those
decisions, the preamble to this safety standard states OSHA's views
regarding the limits of its safety rulemaking authority and explains
why the Agency is confident that its interpretive views have in the
past avoided regulatory extremes and continue to do so in this rule.
Stated briefly, the OSH Act requires that, before promulgating any
occupational safety standard, OSHA demonstrate based on substantial
evidence in the record as a whole that: (1) the proposed standard will
substantially reduce a significant risk of material harm; (2)
compliance is technologically feasible in the sense that the protective
measures being required already exist, can be brought into existence
with available technology, or can be created with technology that can
reasonably be developed; (3) compliance is economically feasible in the
sense that industry can absorb or pass on the costs without major
dislocation or threat of instability; and (4) the standard is cost
effective in that it employs the least expensive protective measures
capable of reducing or eliminating significant risk. Additionally,
proposed safety standards must be compatible with prior agency action,
must be responsive to significant comment in the record, and, to the
extent allowed by statute, must be consistent with applicable Executive
Orders. These elements limit OSHA's regulatory discretion for safety
rulemaking and provide a decision-making framework for developing a
rule.
B. Congress Concluded That OSHA Regulations are Necessary to Protect
Workers From Occupational Hazards and That Employers Should be Required
to Reduce or Eliminate Significant Workplace Health and Safety Threats
At section 2(a) of the OSH Act (29 U.S.C. Sec. 651(a)), Congress
announced its determination that occupational injury and illness should
be eliminated as much as possible: ``The Congress finds that
occupational injury and illness arising out of work situations impose a
substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance to, interstate commerce in
terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability
compensation payments.'' Congress therefore declared ``it to be its
purpose and policy * * * to assure so far as possible every working man
and woman in the Nation safe * * * working conditions [29 U.S.C.
Sec. 651(b)].''
To that end, Congress instructed the Secretary of Labor to adopt
existing federal and consensus standards during the first two years
after the OSH Act became effective and, in the event of conflict among
any such standards, to ``promulgate the standard which assures the
greatest protection of the safety or health of the affected employees
[29 U.S.C. Sec. 655(a)].'' Congress also directed the Secretary to set
mandatory occupational safety standards (29 U.S.C. Sec. 651(b)(3)),
based on a rulemaking record and substantial evidence (29 U.S.C.
Sec. 655(b)(2)), that are ``reasonably necessary or appropriate to
provide safe * * * employment and places of employment.'' When
promulgating permanent safety or health standards that differ from
existing national consensus standards, the Secretary must explain ``why
the rule as adopted will better effectuate the purposes of this Act
than the national consensus standard [29 U.S.C. Sec. 655(b)(8)].''
Correspondingly, every employer must comply with OSHA standards and, in
addition, ``furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or
are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees [29
U.S.C. Sec. 654(a)].''
``Congress understood that the Act would create substantial costs
for employers, yet intended to impose such costs when necessary to
create a safe and healthful working environment. Congress viewed the
costs of health and safety as a cost of doing business * * * Indeed,
Congress thought that the financial costs of health and safety problems
in the workplace were as large as or larger than the financial costs of
eliminating these problems [American Textile Mfrs. Inst. Inc. v.
Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 519-522 (1981) (ATMI); emphasis was supplied in
original].'' ``[T]he fundamental objective of the Act [is] to prevent
occupational deaths and serious injuries [Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall,
445 U.S. 1, 11 (1980)].'' ``We know the costs would be put into
consumer goods but that is the price we should pay for the 80 million
workers in America [S. Rep. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970);
H.R. Rep. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Legislative History of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, (Committee Print 1971)
(``Leg. Hist.'') at 444 (Senator Yarborough)].'' ``Of course, it will
cost a little more per item to produce a washing machine. Those of us
who use washing machines will pay for the increased cost, but it is
worth it, to stop the terrible death and injury rate in this country
[Id. at 324; see also 510-511, 517].''
[T]he vitality of the Nation's economy will be enhanced by the
greater productivity realized through saved lives and useful years
of labor.
When one man is injured or disabled by an industrial accident or
disease, it is he and his family who suffer the most immediate and
personal loss. However, that tragic loss also affects each of us. As
a result of occupational accidents and disease, over $1.5 billion in
wages is lost each year [1970 dollars], and the annual loss to the
gross national product is estimated to be over $8 billion. Vast
resources that could be available for productive use are siphoned
off to pay workmen's compensation and medical expenses * * *
Only through a comprehensive approach can we hope to effect a
significant reduction in these job death and casualty figures. [Id.
at 518-19 (Senator Cranston)]
Congress considered uniform enforcement crucial because it would
reduce or eliminate the disadvantage that a conscientious employer
might experience where inter-industry or intra-industry competition is
present. Moreover, ``many employers--particularly smaller ones--simply
cannot make the necessary investment in health and safety, and survive
competitively, unless all are compelled to do so [Leg. Hist. at 144,
854, 1188, 1201].''
Thus, the statutory text and legislative history make clear that
Congress conclusively determined that OSHA regulation is necessary to
protect workers from occupational hazards and that employers should be
required to reduce or eliminate significant workplace health and safety
threats.
As Construed by the Courts and by OSHA, the OSH Act Sets Clear and
Reasonable Limits for Agency Rulemaking Action
OSHA has long followed the teaching that section 3(8) of the OSH
Act requires that, before it promulgates ``any permanent health or
safety standard, [it must] make a threshold finding that a place of
employment is unsafe--in the sense that significant risks are present
and can be eliminated or lessened by a change in practices [Industrial
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 642
(1980) (plurality) (Benzene); emphasis was supplied in original].''
Thus, the national consensus and existing federal standards that
Congress instructed OSHA to adopt summarily within two years of the OSH
Act's inception provide reference points concerning the least an OSHA
standard should achieve (29 U.S.C. Secs. 655(a)). As a result, OSHA is
precluded from regulating insignificant safety risks or from issuing
safety standards that do not at least lessen risk in a significant way.
The OSH Act also limits OSHA's discretion to issue overly
burdensome rules, as the agency also has long recognized that ``any
standard that was not economically or technologically feasible would a
fortiori not be `reasonably necessary or appropriate' under the Act.
See Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, [499 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir.
1974)] (`Congress does not appear to have intended to protect employees
by putting their employers out of business.') [American Textile Mfrs.
Inst. Inc., 452 U.S. at 513 n. 31 (a standard is economically feasible
even if it portends `disaster for some marginal firms,' but it is
economically infeasible if it `threaten[s] massive dislocation to, or
imperil[s] the existence of,' the industry)].''
By stating the test in terms of ``threat'' and ``peril,'' the
Supreme Court made clear in ATMI that economic infeasibility begins
short of industry-wide bankruptcy. OSHA itself has placed the line
considerably below this level. (See for example, ATMI, 452 U.S. at 527
n. 50; 43 FR 27360 (June 23, 1978). Proposed 200 g/m3 PEL for
cotton dust did not raise serious possibility of industry-wide
bankruptcy, but impact on weaving sector would be severe, possibly
requiring reconstruction of 90 percent of all weave rooms. OSHA
concluded that the 200 g/m3 level was not feasible for weaving
and that 750 g/m3 was all that could reasonably be required.
See also 54 FR 29245-29246 (July 11, 1989); American Iron & Steel
Institute, 939 F.2d at 1003. OSHA raised engineering control level for
lead in small nonferrous foundries to avoid the possibility of
bankruptcy for about half of small foundries even though the industry
as a whole could have survived the loss of small firms.)
All OSHA standards must also be cost-effective in the sense that
the protective measures being required must be the least expensive
measures capable of achieving the desired end (ATMI, at 514 n. 32;
Building and Constr. Trades Dep't AFL-CIO v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1269
(D.C. Cir. 1988)). OSHA gives additional consideration to financial
impact in setting the period of time that should be allowed for
compliance, allowing as much as 10 years for compliance phase-in. (See
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1278 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).) Additionally, OSHA's
enforcement policy takes account of financial hardship on an
individualized basis. OSHA's Field Operations Manual provides that,
based on an employer's economic situation, OSHA may extend the period
within which a violation must be corrected after issuance of a citation
(CPL 2.45B, chapter III, paragraph E6d(3)(a), Dec. 31, 1990).
To reach the necessary findings and conclusions, OSHA conducts
rulemaking in accordance with the requirements of section 6 of the OSH
Act. The rulemaking process enables the Agency to determine the
qualitative and, if possible, the quantitative nature of the risk with
(and without) regulation, the technological feasibility of compliance,
the availability of capital to the industry and the extent to which
that capital is required for other purposes, the industry's profit
history, the industry's ability to absorb costs or pass them on to the
consumer, the impact of higher costs on demand, and the impact on
competition with substitutes and imports. (See ATMI at 2501-2503;
American Iron & Steel Institute generally.) Section 6(f) of the OSH Act
further provides that, if the validity of a standard is challenged,
OSHA must support its conclusions with ``substantial evidence in the
record considered as a whole,'' a standard that courts have determined
requires fairly close scrutiny of agency action and the explanation of
that action. (See Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1206-1207.)
OSHA's powers are further circumscribed by the independent
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, which provides a
neutral forum for employer contests of citations issued by OSHA for
noncompliance with health and safety standards (29 U.S.C. Secs. 659-
661; noted as an additional constraint in Benzene at 652 n. 59). OSHA
must also respond rationally to similarities and differences among
industries or industry sectors. (See Building and Constr. Trades Dep't,
AFL-CIO v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1272-73 (D.C. Cir. 1988).)
OSHA rulemaking is thus constrained first by the need to
demonstrate that the standard will substantially reduce a significant
risk of material harm, and then by the requirement that compliance is
technologically capable of being done and not so expensive as to
threaten economic instability or dislocation for the industry. Within
these bounds, further constraints such as the need to find cost-
effective measures and to respond rationally to all meaningful comment
militate against regulatory extremes.
D. The Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution
Standard and the Electrical Protective Equipment Standard Comply With
the Statutory Criteria Described Above and Are Not Subject to the
Additional Constraints Applicable to Section 6(b)(5) Standards
Standards which regulate hazards that are frequently undetectable
because they are subtle or develop slowly or after long latency
periods, are frequently referred to as ``health'' standards. Standards
that regulate hazards, like explosions or electrocution, that cause
immediately noticeable physical harm, are called ``safety'' standards.
(See National Grain & Feed Ass'n v. OSHA (NGFA II), 866 F.2d 717, 731,
733 (5th Cir. 1989). As noted above, section 3(8) provides that all
OSHA standards must be ``reasonably necessary or appropriate.'' In
addition, section 6(b)(5) requires that OSHA set health standards which
limit significant risk ``to the extent feasible.'' OSHA has determined
that the Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution
standard and the revised Electrical Protective Equipment standard are
safety standards, because these two standards address hazards, such as
high voltage electricity and falls from elevations, that are
immediately dangerous to life or health, not the longer term, less
obvious hazards subject to section 6(b)(5).
The OSH Act and its legislative history clearly indicate that
Congress intended for OSHA to distinguish between safety standards and
health standards. For example in section 2(b)(6) of the OSH Act,
Congress declared that the goal of assuring safe and healthful working
conditions and preserving human resources would be achieved, in part:
* * * by exploring ways to discover latent diseases,
establishing causal connections between diseases and work in
environmental conditions, and conducting other research relating to
health problems, in recognition of the fact that occupational health
standards present problems often different from those involved in
occupational safety.
The legislative history makes this distinction even clearer:
[The Secretary] should take into account that anyone working in
toxic agents and physical agents which might be harmful may be
subjected to such conditions for the rest of his working life, so
that we can get at something which might not be toxic now, if he
works in it a short time, but if he works in it the rest of his life
might be very dangerous; and we want to make sure that such things
are taken into consideration in establishing standards. [Leg. Hist.
at 502-503 (Sen. Dominick), quoted in Benzene at 648-49]
Additionally, Representative Daniels distinguished between
``insidious 'silent killers' such as toxic fumes, bases, acids, and
chemicals'' and ``violent physical injury causing immediate visible
physical harm'' (Leg. Hist. at 1003), and Representative Udall
contrasted insidious hazards like carcinogens with ``the more
visible and well-known question of industrial accidents and on-the-
job injury'' (Leg. Hist. at 1004). (See also, for example, S. Rep.
No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess 2-3 (1970), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 1970, pp. 5177, 5179, reprinted in Leg. Hist. at 142-143,
discussing 1967 Surgeon General study that found that 65 percent of
employees in industrial plants ``were potentially exposed to harmful
physical agents, such as severe noise or vibration, or to toxic
materials''; Leg.Hist at 412; id. at 446; id. at 516; id. at 845;
International Union, UAW at 1315.)
In reviewing OSHA rulemaking activity, the Supreme Court has held
that section 6(b)(5) requires OSHA to set ``the most protective
standard consistent with feasibility'' (Benzene at 643 n. 48). As
Justice Stevens observed:
The reason that Congress drafted a special section for these
substances * * * was because Congress recognized that there were
special problems in regulating health risks as opposed to safety
risks. In the latter case, the risks are generally immediate and
obvious, while in the former, the risks may not be evident until a
worker has been exposed for long periods of time to particular
substances. [Benzene, at 649 n. 54.]
Challenges to the grain dust and lockout/tagout standards included
assertions that grain dust in explosive quantities and uncontrolled
energy releases that could expose employees to crushing, cutting,
burning or explosion hazards were harmful physical agents so that OSHA
was required to apply the criteria of section 6(b)(5) when determining
how to protect employees from those hazards. Reviewing courts have
uniformly rejected such assertions. For example, the Court in
International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
rejected the view that section 6(b)(5) provided the statutory criteria
for regulation of uncontrolled energy, holding that such a ``reading
would obliterate a distinction that Congress drew between 'health' and
'safety' risks.'' The Court also noted that the language of the OSH Act
and the legislative history supported the OSHA position (International
Union, UAW at 1314). Additionally, the Court stated: ``We accord
considerable weight to an agency's construction of a statutory scheme
it is entrusted to administer, rejecting it only if unreasonable''
(International Union, UAW at 1313, citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
The Court reviewing the grain dust standard also deferred to OSHA's
reasonable view that the Agency was not subject to the feasibility
mandate of section 6(b)(5) in regulating explosive quantities of grain
dust (National Grain & Feed Association v. OSHA (NGFA II), 866 F.2d
717, 733 (5th Cir. 1989)). It therefore applied the criteria of section
3(8), requiring the Agency to establish that the standard is
``reasonably necessary or appropriate'' to protect employees.
As explained in section I, Background, and section III, Summary and
Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble, and in section
V, Regulatory Impact Assessment, later in this preamble, OSHA has
determined that the generation, transmission, and distribution of
electric power and the non-use or misuse of appropriate electrical
protective equipment poses significant risks to employees (86
fatalities and 12,977 injuries annually) and that the provisions of the
final rule are reasonably necessary to protect affected employees from
those risks. The Agency estimates that compliance with the Electric
Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution standard and the
revised Electrical Protective Equipment standard will cost $40.9
million in the first year and $21.7 million annually thereafter and
will reduce the risk of the identified hazards (preventing 61
fatalities and 1634 injuries annually). This constitutes a substantial
reduction of significant risk of material harm for the exposed
population of approximately 382,073 employees in electric utilities and
in general industries. The Agency believes that compliance is
technologically feasible because the rulemaking record indicates that
the engineering controls, work practices, and personal protective
equipment required by the standard are already in general use
throughout the industries covered by the standard. Additionally, OSHA
believes that compliance is economically feasible, because, as
documented in the Regulatory Impact Analysis, all regulated sectors can
readily absorb or pass on compliance costs.
As detailed in section V, Regulatory Impact Assessment, later in
this preamble, and in Table 6, the standard's costs, benefits, and
compliance requirements are consistent with those of other OSHA safety
standards, such as the Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency
Response (HAZWOPER) standard.
OSHA assessed employee risk by evaluating exposure to the hazards
associated with electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work in a large range of industries. Section V, Regulatory
Impact Assessment, later in this preamble, presents OSHA's estimate of
the costs and benefits of the Electric Power Generation, Transmission,
and Distribution standard and the revised Electrical Protective
Equipment standard in terms of the Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) codes for the industries regulated.
The Agency acknowledges that some industries covered by the
Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution standard and
by the revised Electrical Protective Equipment standard have more
documented injuries or fatalities associated with electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution work than do others. OSHA
does not believe that the risk associated with exposure to electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution hazards varies
according to the number of incidents documented for a particular SIC
code. OSHA has set the scope of the Electric Power Generation,
Transmission, and Distribution standard and the revised Electrical
Protective Equipment standard to address situations in which employees
are exposed to these hazards, regardless of the relative frequency of
incidents. The Agency believes, based on analysis of the elements of
the hazards identified, that there is sufficient information for OSHA
to determine that employees in the covered sectors face significant
risks related to electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work and to the non-use or misuse of electrical protective
equipment. Therefore, the Agency has determined that all employees
within the scope of the Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and
Distribution standard and the revised Electrical Protective Equipment
standard face a significant risk of material harm and that compliance
with these standards is reasonably necessary to protect affected
employees from that risk, regardless of the number of injuries or
fatalities reported for the SIC code to which the employer has been
assigned.
Table 6.--Summary of Benefits and Costs of Recent OSHA Safety Standards
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual
No. of No. of cost Annual
Standard (CFR cite) Final rule date (FR deaths injuries first cost next
cite) prevented prevented five yrs five yrs
annually annually (mill) (mill)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grain handling (Sec. 1910.272)................ 12-31-87 (52 FR 18 394 5.9-33.4 5.9-33.4
049622)
HAZWOPER (Sec. 1910.120)...................... 3-6-89 (54 FR 9311) 32 18,700 153 153
Excavations (subpart P)....................... 10-31-89 (54 FR 74 800 306 306
45,954
Process safety mgmt (Sec. 1910.119)........... 2-24-92 (57 FR 6356) 330 1,917 880.7 470.8
Permit-required confined spaces (Sec. 1-14-93 (58 FR 4462) 54 5,041 202.4 202.4
1910.146).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA has considered and responded to all substantive comments
regarding the proposed Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and
Distribution and Electrical Protective Equipment standards on their
merits in section III, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule,
earlier in this preamble. In particular, OSHA evaluated all suggested
changes to the proposed rule in terms of their impact on worker safety,
their feasibility, their cost effectiveness, and their consonance with
the OSH Act.
V. Regulatory Impact Assessment
A. Introduction
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has
determined that there is a significant risk to the health and safety of
workers who are exposed to the hazards of electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution. To protect workers from the unique
hazards encountered in these work environments, OSHA is issuing this
final standard on electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution and the revised general industry standard on electrical
protective equipment (29 CFR Sec. 1910.269 and 29 CFR Sec. 1910.137).
The final standard in Sec. 1910.269 addresses work practices to be
used during the operation and maintenance of electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution installations. Additionally,
Sec. 1910.137 incorporates revisions made to the general industry
standard on electrical protective equipment. These revisions primarily
consist of performance-oriented requirements that are consistent with
the latest national consensus standards.
Executive Order 12886 requires that a regulatory analysis be
conducted for any rule having major economic consequences on the
national economy, individual industries, geographical regions, or
levels of government. In addition, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires federal agencies to determine
whether a regulation will have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
Consistent with these requirements, OSHA has prepared this
Regulatory Impact and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis for the standards
on electric power generation, transmission, and distribution and on
electrical protective equipment. This analysis includes an estimate of
affected industries and employees, estimated benefits, the
technological feasibility of the standards, estimated compliance costs,
nonregulatory alternatives, and a discussion of the economic and
environmental impacts of these final standards.
B. Industries and Employees Affected by the Standard
The final standard in Sec. 1910.137 consists of revisions made to
the general industry standard on electrical protective equipment. Those
industries which utilize equipment necessary for electrical protective
measures are affected by the scope of this rule. However, OSHA
anticipates that these revisions will primarily impact industries
involved in electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
and industries in the non-utility sector involved with the cogeneration
of electric power. This final standard is, therefore, considered to
have a de minimis effect on all other industries.
Thus, on the basis of OSHA's analysis, these final standards will
cover the electric utility industry (SIC 491 and part of SIC 493),
contract power line workers, contract line-clearance tree trimmers,
independent power producers, industrial generators of electric power,
and establishments that perform high-voltage electrical work (including
contractors). As Table 7 shows, there are 12,074 affected
establishments within the scope of these final standards, and 382,073
employees who are considered exposed.
Within the three phases of electric power operations (that is,
generation, transmission, and distribution), employees encounter a
variety of occupational hazards. Although many of these hazards are
specific to a particular phase, electricity is the most common source
of occupational fatalities and serious injuries throughout. The
consequences of inadvertent contact with high-voltage electricity are
often death or serious injuries such as second-degree and third-degree
burns, amputation of limbs, damage to internal organs, and neurological
damage.
Electric power generation, transmission, and distribution employees
also face occupational hazards other than electrocution. For example,
high-pressure steam might be released inadvertently during maintenance
work on multi-story boilers, machinery might accidentally be activated
during maintenance work, or employees might fall from ladders,
scaffolds, poles, or other elevations.
C. Benefits
The final standards mandate a comprehensive approach for the
control of the hazards discussed earlier. Included in the standards are
provisions for electrical protective equipment, initial training
requirements, CPR training, lockout/tagout, equipment inspections, and
live-line maintenance, among others. The majority of benefits are
expected to be achieved in electric utilities, which account for
approximately 80 percent of fatalities to be prevented and nearly two-
thirds of the lost-workday injuries to be prevented.
The final rules are expected to significantly reduce the number of
fatalities and injuries involving electrical contact, flash burns, and
thermal burns, as well as other accidents involving uncontrolled
exposure to occupational hazards. The rules are expected to prevent at
least 59 fatalities and 323 lost-workday injuries per year. Several
provisions within Sec. 1910.269 reference existing OSHA standards. By
increased recognition of these referenced standards, through employee
training and administrative emphasis on hazard recognition (through job
briefings, for example), OSHA estimates that an additional 2 fatalities
and 1,310 lost-workday injuries will be prevented annually. Table 8
shows the summary of total benefits expected to be achieved through
promulgation of the final rules.
D. Technological Feasibility
In assessing the technological feasibility of these final rules,
OSHA reviewed existing electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution practices and electrical protective equipment practices
among the affected industries. Based on this review, OSHA considers the
implementation of the final rules to be technologically feasible.
The final rule in Sec. 1910.269 has included several new provisions
or requirements that differ from the proposed rule. These new
modifications primarily involve personnel time to develop programs and
procedures and to train employees. Any equipment required to comply is
either currently in use or readily available. OSHA has determined,
based on its review, that all of the work practices and specifications
required by the final standard are consistent with equipment
procurement, installation, and work practices widely accepted in these
industries.
E. Costs of Compliance
The cost of compliance with the final standards were estimated
using the baseline of current electric utility practices. Electric
utilities have had to comply with other parts of OSHA standards since
1970, and have been subject to various national consensus standards
such as the National Electrical Safety Code and those of the American
Society for Testing and Materials. Since many costs have already been
incurred to comply with these standards, this analysis covers
incremental costs that will need to be incurred to comply with new
requirements imposed by Secs. 1910.137 and 1910.269.
Compliance costs of the standards were based on industry profile
information, current compliance rates, unit costs for required
equipment, and hourly compensation of labor. For each provision of the
standard, OSHA estimated initial costs and annual recurring costs.
Initial costs represent up-front expenditures for program development
and equipment. Any equipment that will need to be purchased was then
annualized over the expected life of the resource in order to show
these costs on an annual basis. Other ongoing expenditures incurred
annually include refresher training, equipment maintenance, and
inspections. OSHA summed the annualized capital costs and ongoing costs
to estimate total annual costs.
OSHA estimates that the first year cost of compliance with the
final rule will be $40.9 million and that the annual cost of compliance
thereafter will be $21.7 million. Table 9 outlines the first year costs
and annual costs by each sector affected by the final rule.
F. Nonregulatory Alternatives
The primary objective of OSHA's standards for electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution work and for electrical
protective equipment is to reduce the number of employee fatalities and
injuries associated with the hazards involved in this work. OSHA
believes these standards will eliminate to a considerable degree the
worker risk experienced within the scope of the rules.
The Agency examined the nonregulatory approaches for promoting
safety practices within industries that generate, transmit, and
distribute electric power, including: (1) economic forces generated by
the private market system, (2) incentives created by workers'
compensation programs or the threat of private suits, and (3) related
activities of private agencies. Following this review, OSHA determined
that the need for government regulation arises from the significant
risk of job-related injury or death caused by inadequate safety
practices for electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
work. Private markets fail to provide enough safety and health
resources due to the lack of information on risk, immobility of labor,
and externalization of part of the social costs of worker injuries and
deaths. Workers' Compensation systems do not offer an adequate remedy
because premiums do not reflect specific workplace risk and liability
claims are restricted by statutes preventing employees from suing their
employers. While certain voluntary industry standards exist, their
scope and approach fail to provide adequate protection for all workers.
Thus, OSHA has determined that a federal standard is necessary.
G. Economic Impacts
OSHA assessed the potential economic impact of the final standards
on the affected industry sectors and has determined that impacts on
prices, profits, and sales will be modest for most industries. In order
to determine the economic feasibility of the standards, OSHA compared
first-year compliance costs and recurring annual costs with revenue per
firm (to produce price impact estimates) and before-tax profits per
firm (to produce profit impact estimates) by Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) Code. Revenue and profit data were derived from
Dun & Bradstreet databases.
Affected industries included SIC 0783, Shrub and Tree Services
(line-clearance tree trimmers); SIC 1731, Electrical Work (high-voltage
contractors); SIC 491, Electric Services (electric utilities and
independent power producers); and SIC 493, Combination Electric and
Gas, and Other Utility Services (electric utilities and independent
power producers). Industrial generators and high-voltage customers were
identified in SIC 13, Oil and Gas Production; SICs 20-39,
Manufacturing; SICs 42-48, Transportation and Communications; SICs 50-
57, Wholesale and Retail Trade; SICs 60-65, Finance, Insurance, and
Real Estate; and SICs 70-87, Services.
Impacts were separately identified for large firms (20 or more
employees) and small firms (1 to 19 employees). Among large firms in
the electric utility industry, first-year price impacts were estimated
to be less than 0.1 percent, assuming full cost pass through of
contract power line workers' compliance costs. Estimated maximum profit
impacts for large electric utilities in the first year were not
expected to exceed 0.5 percent of pre-tax profits, also assuming full
cost pass through of contract power line workers' compliance costs. For
large line-clearance tree-trimming contractors, first-year price
impacts were estimated to be 1.1 percent with maximum profit impacts of
13.1 percent. However, OSHA believes that large line-clearance tree-
trimming firms will be able to pass the compliance costs through to
their customers and therefore will not experience the decreased profits
associated with the maximum profit impact scenario.
Large firms in the non-utility industry were identified among the
independent power producers, industrial generators, high-voltage
customers, and high-voltage contractors. First-year price and profit
impacts for independent power producers are not expected to exceed 0.1
percent and 0.7 percent, respectively. Among industrial generators,
first-year price impacts across all affected industries did not exceed
0.11 percent. First-year profit impacts in the industrial generating
sector were generally less than 1.0 percent, with the highest impact
(2.0 percent) occurring in SIC 82, Education Services. In industries
with high-voltage customers, the first-year price impacts across all
affected industries did not exceed 0.1 percent. First-year profit
impacts for high-voltage customers were less than 1.0 percent in most
industries, with the highest impact (1.2 percent) occurring in SIC 82,
Education Services. Among high-voltage contractors, first-year price
and profit impacts were not expected to be greater than 0.1 percent and
0.4 percent, respectively. OSHA concluded that these low levels of
impact make the standards economically feasible for impacted large
firms in all affected industries.
Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et
seq.), OSHA assessed the impact of the final standards on small
businesses. Within the electric utility industry, small businesses are
not expected to experience price or profit impacts in excess of 0.2
percent even assuming full cost pass-through of contract power line
workers' compliance costs. Estimated price impacts for small line-
clearance tree trimmers were less than 0.6 percent, while the maximum
estimated pre-tax profit impact was 8.2 percent. However, OSHA believes
that small line-clearance tree-trimming firms will be able to pass the
compliance costs through to their customers and therefore will not
experience the decreased profits estimated under the maximum profit
impact scenario. In the non-utility industries, only the independent
power producer sector was identified as having affected small
businesses. Small independent power producers are not expected to
experience price impacts in excess of 0.1 percent or profit impacts in
excess of 1.0 percent. Therefore, consistent with the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, OSHA has concluded that the standards are economically
feasible and will have no significant impact for small firms.
Thus, OSHA concludes that the economic impacts on affected industry
groups will be small. It is not anticipated that small businesses will
be disproportionately affected by the standards. OSHA also examined
international trade and environmental issues and concludes that the
standards will have no major negative impacts in those areas.
Table 7.--Profile of Establishments and Employees in the Utility and Non-utility industries
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Number of Number of
affected affected large affected small Number of
Industry Group\1\ establishments establishments establishments exposed
employees
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electric Utilities:
Total Utilities Including:..................... 2,134 1,693 441 242,164
Investor-Owned, Cooperatively-Owned, Publicly
Owned,\2\ Federally Owned, and Contract
Power Line Workers.......................... .............. .............. .............. 16,500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total: Electric Utilities.......................... 2,134 1,693 441 258,664
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contract Line-Clearance Tree Trimmers:
National Arborist Association.................. 55 55 0 26,932
Others......................................... 1,750 0 1,750 10,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total: Contract Tree Trimmers...................... 1,805 55 1,750 36,932
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Independent Power Producers and Industrial
Generators:
Independent Power Producers...................... 2,160 85 2,075 7,647
Industrial Generators............................ 1,682 1,682 0 20,400
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total: IPP's and Generators........................ 3,842 1,767 2,075 28,047
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
High-Voltage Contractors:
Union Contractors................................ 200 200 0 9,750
Non-Union Contractors............................ 200 200 0 9,750
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total: High-Voltage Contractors.................... 400 400 0 19,500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
High-Voltage Utility Customers:
Firms Performing In-House Work................. 3,893 3,893 0 38,930
================================================================================================================
Total........................................ 12,074 7,808 4,266 382,073
================================================================================================================
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Refer to the Industry Profile (Chapter II) of the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis of the Electric Power
Generation, Transmission and Distribution and the Electrical Protective Equipment Final Rules for a detailed
explanation of establishments and employees covered in the final standards.
\2\The number of publicly owned utilities and employees included among Affected Establishments and Exposed
Employees excludes publicly owned utilities in non-state-plan states.
Source: OSHA, Office of Regulatory Analysis; Eastern Research Group, 1993.
Table 8.--Summary of Benefits Associated With the Final Electric Power Generation Standard and the Final
Electrical Protective Equipment Standard
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accident cases
---------------------
Type of accident/sector Prevented
Baseline by final
standards
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fatalities:
Electric utilities\1\................................................................. 60.7 42.6
Utility contractors
Electrical contractors.............................................................. 9.4 6.6
Line-clearance tree trimmers........................................................ 8.6 5.8
Non-utility establishments............................................................ 6.8 5.6
---------------------
Total............................................................................. 85.5 60.6
Lost-Workday Injuries:
Electric utilities\1\................................................................. 7,773.0 917.2
Utility Contractors
Electrical contractors.............................................................. 529.0 62.4
Line-clearance tree trimmers........................................................ 1,920.5 226.6
Non-utility establishments
Power line workers.................................................................. 1,856.0 259.8
Power plant employees............................................................... 898.0 167.0
---------------------
Total............................................................................. 12,976.5 1,633.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Excludes totals for utility contractors.
Source: Eastern Research Group.
Table 9.--Total Costs of Compliance for the Final Rules
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
First year First year Total costs Recurring Annualized Annual costs
costs capital first year costs capital (Year 2--)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Small Utilities..................................... $132,630 $7,905 $140,535 $108,894 $7,905 $116,799
Large Utilities..................................... 12,906,120 696,719 13,602,840 9,645,738 696,719 10,342,458
Total: Utilities........................................ 13,038,750 704,624 13,743,374 9,754,633 704,624 10,459,257
Contract Power Line Workers............................. 1,623,738 0 1,623,738 1,623,738 0 1,623,738
Line-Clearance Tree Trimmers--Small................. 1,204,789 0 1,204,789 498,851 0 498,851
Line-Clearance Tree Trimmers--Large................. 3,244,737 0 3,244,737 1,343,506 0 1,343,506
Total: Line-Clearance Tree Trimmers..................... 4,449,525 0 4,449,525 1,842,357 0 1,842,357
Independent Power Producers--Small.................. 2,915,395 386,503 3,301,898 978,182 386,503 1,364,686
Independent Power Producers--Large.................. 1,067,586 15,833 1,083,419 208,910 15,833 224,742
Total: Independent Power Producers...................... 3,982,981 402,336 4,385,317 1,187,092 402,336 1,589,428
Industrial Cogenerators................................. 6,716,043 18,535 6,734,578 2,775,258 18,535 2,793,794
High-Voltage Customers.................................. 9,335,958 15,572 9,351,530 2,735,590 15,572 2,751,162
High-Voltage Contractors................................ 648,504 0 648,504 648,504 0 648,504
Total............................................. 39,795,499 1,141,068 40,936,567 20,567,171 1,141,068 21,708,238
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, OSHA, Office of Regulatory Analysis, 1993.
VI. International Trade
Increases in the prices of domestically manufactured goods in
general result in an increase in the demand for imports and a decrease
in the demand for exports. The magnitude of this impact depends on the
relevant demand elasticities and the magnitude of the price changes.
While the final standard may result in slightly higher prices of
manufactured goods, the estimated magnitude of this increase is so
small that the Agency has concluded that any resultant impact on
foreign trade will be negligible.
VII. Effective Date
In developing the Final Rule, OSHA has considered whether a delayed
effective date is necessary for any of the provisions of the standard.
Employers will need adequate time to integrate their procedures for
complying with the lockout and tagging provisions in this standard into
the procedures used under the generic lockout standard, Sec. 1910.147,
published on September 1, 1989 (54 FR 36644), and under the lockout
requirements of the electrical safety-related work practices standard,
published on August 6, 1990 (55 FR 31984). The work practices developed
under final Sec. 1910.269 will also have to be blended into the work
practices required by the Subpart S standard. A period of 120 days
should be adequate for this purpose, since most of the requirements in
the Final Rule do not require extensive retrofitting or major
modifications of existing equipment. The recently published electrical
safety-related work practices and generic lockout standards, which are
similar types of standards, also gave employers 120 days delay in
effective date. Lastly, this amount of time should be adequate for
employers to ensure that their work practices conform to the
requirements of the new standard.
However, OSHA received evidence during the Subpart S rulemaking
that it could take some electric utility employers a year or more to
incorporate the training required by that standard into their existing
training programs. The preamble to the final electrical safety-related
work practices standard cited the testimony of Mr. Lamont Turner, who
stated, on behalf of Edison Electric Institute, that it took his
company 15 months to restructure their training program in order to
meet regulations on hazardous waste (55 FR 32013-32014). This standard
provided a 1-year's delay in effective date for its training
requirements, and OSHA found this delay to be appropriate. Therefore,
OSHA is similarly making the requirements on training contained in
Sec. 1910.269(a)(2) effective one year from the date of publication of
the standard.
VIII. Federalism
This Final Rule has been reviewed in accordance with Executive
Order 12612 (52 FR 41685, October 30, 1987), regarding Federalism. This
Order requires that agencies, to the extent possible, refrain from
limiting state policy options, consult with states before taking any
actions which would restrict state policy options, and take such
actions only if there is clear constitutional authority and the
presence of a problem of national scope. The Order provides for
preemption of state law only if there is a clear Congressional intent
for the Agency to do so. Any such preemption is to be limited to the
extent possible.
Section 18 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act)
expresses Congress' clear intent to preempt state laws relating to
issues on which Federal OSHA has promulgated occupational safety and
health standards. Under the OSH Act, a state can avoid preemption only
if it submits, and obtains Federal approval of, a plan for the
development of such standards and their enforcement. Occupational
safety and health standards developed by such Plan-States must, among
other things, be at least as effective in providing safe and healthful
employment and places of employment as the Federal standards. Where
such standards are applicable to products distributed or used in
interstate commerce, they may not unduly burden commerce and must be
justified by compelling local conditions. (See section 18(c)(2) of the
OSH Act).
The Federal standards on the operation and maintenance of electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution systems and on
electrical protective equipment address hazards which are not unique to
any one state or region of the country. Nonetheless, states with
occupational safety and health plans approved under Section 18 of the
OSH Act will be able to develop their own state standards to deal with
any special problems which might be encountered in a particular state.
Moreover, because these standards are written in general, performance-
oriented terms, there is considerable flexibility for state plans to
require, and for affected employers to use, methods of compliance which
are appropriate to the working conditions covered by the standard.
In brief, this Final Rule addresses a clear national problem
related to occupational safety and health in general industry. States
which have elected to participate under section 18 of the OSH Act are
not preempted by this standard and will be able to address any special
conditions within the framework of the Federal Act, while ensuring that
the state standards are at least as effective as this standard.
IX. State Plan Standards
The 23 states and 2 territories with their own OSHA-approved
occupational safety and health plans must adopt a comparable standard
within 6 months of the publication date of the final standard. These
states and territories are: Alaska, Arizona, California,
Connecticut,98 Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, New York,99 North
Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Virgin Islands, Washington, and Wyoming. Until such
time as a state standard is promulgated, Federal OSHA will provide
interim enforcement assistance, as appropriate, in these states.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\8Plan covers only State and local government employees.
\9\9Plan covers only State and local government employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
X. Index Terms and Authority
Authority
This document was prepared under the direction of Joseph A. Dear,
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, U.S.
Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC
20210.
List of Subjects in 29 CFR Part 1910
Electric power; fire prevention; flammable materials; occupational
safety and health; Occupational Safety and Health Administration;
safety; signs and symbols; and tools.
Accordingly, pursuant to sections 4, 6, and 8 of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657), Secretary of
Labor's Order No. 1-90 (55 FR 9033), and 29 CFR part 1911, 29 CFR part
1910 is amended as set forth below.
Signed at Washington, DC, this 13th day of January, 1994.
Joseph A. Dear,
Assistant Secretary of Labor.
Part 1910 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended
as follows:
PART 1910--[AMENDED]
Subpart I--Personal Protective Equipment
1. The authority citation for subpart I of part 1910 is revised to
read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 4, 6, 8, Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657); Secretary of Labor's Order No. 12-71
(36 FR 8754), 8-76 (41 FR 25059), 9-83 (48 FR 35736), or 1-90 (55 FR
9033) as applicable. Sections 1910.134 and 1910.137 also issued
under 29 CFR part 1911.
2. Section 1910.137 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 1910.137 Electrical protective equipment.
(a) Design requirements. Insulating blankets, matting, covers, line
hose, gloves, and sleeves made of rubber shall meet the following
requirements:
(1) Manufacture and marking. (i) Blankets, gloves, and sleeves
shall be produced by a seamless process.
(ii) Each item shall be clearly marked as follows:
(A) Class 0 equipment shall be marked Class 0.
(B) Class 1 equipment shall be marked Class 1.
(C) Class 2 equipment shall be marked Class 2.
(D) Class 3 equipment shall be marked Class 3.
(E) Class 4 equipment shall be marked Class 4.
(F) Non-ozone-resistant equipment other than matting shall be
marked Type I.
(G) Ozone-resistant equipment other than matting shall be marked
Type II.
(H) Other relevant markings, such as the manufacturer's
identification and the size of the equipment, may also be provided.
(iii) Markings shall be nonconducting and shall be applied in such
a manner as not to impair the insulating qualities of the equipment.
(iv) Markings on gloves shall be confined to the cuff portion of
the glove.
(2) Electrical requirements. (i) Equipment shall be capable of
withstanding the a-c proof-test voltage specified in Table I-2 or the
d-c proof-test voltage specified in Table I-3.
(A) The proof test shall reliably indicate that the equipment can
withstand the voltage involved.
(B) The test voltage shall be applied continuously for 3 minutes
for equipment other than matting and shall be applied continuously for
1 minute for matting.
(C) Gloves shall also be capable of withstanding the a-c proof-test
voltage specified in Table I-2 after a 16-hour water soak. (See the
note following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B) of this section.)
(ii) When the a-c proof test is used on gloves, the 60-hertz proof-
test current may not exceed the values specified in Table I-2 at any
time during the test period.
(A) If the a-c proof test is made at a frequency other than 60
hertz, the permissible proof-test current shall be computed from the
direct ratio of the frequencies.
(B) For the test, gloves (right side out) shall be filled with tap
water and immersed in water to a depth that is in accordance with Table
I-4. Water shall be added to or removed from the glove, as necessary,
so that the water level is the same inside and outside the glove.
(C) After the 16-hour water soak specified in paragraph
(a)(2)(i)(C) of this section, the 60-hertz proof-test current may
exceed the values given in Table I-2 by not more than 2 milliamperes.
(iii) Equipment that has been subjected to a minimum breakdown
voltage test may not be used for electrical protection. (See the note
following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B) of this section.)
(iv) Material used for Type II insulating equipment shall be
capable of withstanding an ozone test, with no visible effects. The
ozone test shall reliably indicate that the material will resist ozone
exposure in actual use. Any visible signs of ozone deterioration of the
material, such as checking, cracking, breaks, or pitting, is evidence
of failure to meet the requirements for ozone-resistant material. (See
the note following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B) of this section.)
(3) Workmanship and finish. (i) Equipment shall be free of harmful
physical irregularities that can be detected by the tests or
inspections required under this section.
(ii) Surface irregularities that may be present on all rubber goods
because of imperfections on forms or molds or because of inherent
difficulties in the manufacturing process and that may appear as
indentations, protuberances, or imbedded foreign material are
acceptable under the following conditions:
(A) The indentation or protuberance blends into a smooth slope when
the material is stretched.
(B) Foreign material remains in place when the insulating material
is folded and stretches with the insulating material surrounding it.
Note: Rubber insulating equipment meeting the following national
consensus standards is deemed to be in compliance with paragraph (a)
of this section:
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) D 120-87,
Specification for Rubber Insulating Gloves.
ASTM D 178-88, Specification for Rubber Insulating Matting.
ASTM D 1048-88a, Specification for Rubber Insulating Blankets.
ASTM D 1049-88, Specification for Rubber Insulating Covers.
ASTM D 1050-90, Specification for Rubber Insulating Line Hose.
ASTM D 1051-87, Specification for Rubber Insulating Sleeves.
These standards contain specifications for conducting the
various tests required in paragraph (a) of this section. For
example, the a-c and d-c proof tests, the breakdown test, the water
soak procedure, and the ozone test mentioned in this paragraph are
described in detail in the ASTM standards.
(b) In-service care and use. (1) Electrical protective equipment
shall be maintained in a safe, reliable condition.
(2) The following specific requirements apply to insulating
blankets, covers, line hose, gloves, and sleeves made of rubber:
(i) Maximum use voltages shall conform to those listed in Table I-
5.
(ii) Insulating equipment shall be inspected for damage before each
day's use and immediately following any incident that can reasonably be
suspected of having caused damage. Insulating gloves shall be given an
air test, along with the inspection.
(iii) Insulating equipment with any of the following defects may
not be used:
(A) A hole, tear, puncture, or cut;
(B) Ozone cutting or ozone checking (the cutting action produced by
ozone on rubber under mechanical stress into a series of interlacing
cracks);
(C) An embedded foreign object;
(D) Any of the following texture changes: swelling, softening,
hardening, or becoming sticky or inelastic.
(E) Any other defect that damages the insulating properties.
(iv) Insulating equipment found to have other defects that might
affect its insulating properties shall be removed from service and
returned for testing under paragraphs (b)(2)(viii) and (b)(2)(ix) of
this section.
(v) Insulating equipment shall be cleaned as needed to remove
foreign substances.
(vi) Insulating equipment shall be stored in such a location and in
such a manner as to protect it from light, temperature extremes,
excessive humidity, ozone, and other injurious substances and
conditions.
(vii) Protector gloves shall be worn over insulating gloves, except
as follows:
(A) Protector gloves need not be used with Class 0 gloves, under
limited-use conditions, where small equipment and parts manipulation
necessitate unusually high finger dexterity.
Note: Extra care is needed in the visual examination of the
glove and in the avoidance of handling sharp objects.
(B) Any other class of glove may be used for similar work without
protector gloves if the employer can demonstrate that the possibility
of physical damage to the gloves is small and if the class of glove is
one class higher than that required for the voltage involved.
Insulating gloves that have been used without protector gloves may not
be used at a higher voltage until they have been tested under the
provisions of paragraphs (b) (2) (viii) and (b) (2) (xi) of this
section.
(viii) Electrical protective equipment shall be subjected to
periodic electrical tests. Test voltages and the maximum intervals
between tests shall be in accordance with Table I-5 and Table I-6.
(ix) The test method used under paragraphs (b)(2)(viii) and
(b)(2)(xi) of this section shall reliably indicate whether the
insulating equipment can withstand the voltages involved.
Note: Standard electrical test methods considered as meeting
this requirement are given in the following national consensus
standards:
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) D 120-87,
Specification for Rubber Insulating Gloves.
ASTM D 1048-88a, Specification for Rubber Insulating Blankets.
ASTM D 1049-88, Specification for Rubber Insulating Covers.
ASTM D 1050-90, Specification for Rubber Insulating Line Hose.
ASTM D 1051-87, Specification for Rubber Insulating Sleeves.
ASTM F 478-92, Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating
Line Hose and Covers.
ASTM F 479-88a, Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating
Blankets.
ASTM F 496-91, Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating
Gloves and Sleeves.
(x) Insulating equipment failing to pass inspections or electrical
tests may not be used by employees, except as follows:
(A) Rubber insulating line hose may be used in shorter lengths with
the defective portion cut off.
(B) Rubber insulating blankets may be repaired using a compatible
patch that results in physical and electrical properties equal to those
of the blanket.
(C) Rubber insulating blankets may be salvaged by severing the
defective area from the undamaged portion of the blanket. The resulting
undamaged area may not be smaller than 22 inches by 22 inches (560 mm
by 560 mm) for Class 1, 2, 3, and 4 blankets.
(D) Rubber insulating gloves and sleeves with minor physical
defects, such as small cuts, tears, or punctures, may be repaired by
the application of a compatible patch. Also, rubber insulating gloves
and sleeves with minor surface blemishes may be repaired with a
compatible liquid compound. The patched area shall have electrical and
physical properties equal to those of the surrounding material. Repairs
to gloves are permitted only in the area between the wrist and the
reinforced edge of the opening.
(xi) Repaired insulating equipment shall be retested before it may
be used by employees.
(xii) The employer shall certify that equipment has been tested in
accordance with the requirements of paragraphs (b)(2)(viii),
(b)(2)(ix), and (b)(2)(xi) of this section. The certification shall
identify the equipment that passed the test and the date it was tested.
Note: Marking of equipment and entering the results of the tests
and the dates of testing onto logs are two acceptable means of
meeting this requirement.
Table I-2.--A-C Proof-Test Requirements
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum proof-test current, mA (gloves only)
Proof-test -----------------------------------------------
Class of equipment voltage 267-mm
rms V (10.5-in) 356-mm (14- 406-mm (16- 457-mm (18-
glove in) glove in) glove in) glove
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0................................................... 5,000 8 12 14 16
1................................................... 10,000 .......... 14 16 18
2................................................... 20,000 .......... 16 18 20
3................................................... 30,000 .......... 18 20 22
4................................................... 40,000 .......... .......... 22 24
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table I-3.--D-C Proof-Test Requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proof-test
Class of equipment voltage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.......................................................... 20,000
1.......................................................... 40,000
2.......................................................... 50,000
3.......................................................... 60,000
4.......................................................... 70,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The d-c voltages listed in this table are not appropriate
for proof testing rubber insulating line hose or covers. For this
equipment, d-c proof tests shall use a voltage high enough to
indicate that the equipment can be safely used at the voltages
listed in Table I-4. See ASTM D 1050-90 and ASTM D 1049-88 for
further information on proof tests for rubber insulating line hose
and covers.
Table I-4.--Glove Tests--Water Level1 2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AC proof test DC proof test
Class of glove -------------------------------
mm. in. mm. in.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0....................................... 38 1.5 38 1.5
1....................................... 38 1.5 51 2.0
2....................................... 64 2.5 76 3.0
3....................................... 89 3.5 102 4.0
4....................................... 127 5.0 153 6.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\The water level is given as the clearance from the cuff of the glove
to the water line, with a tolerance of 13 mm. (0.5 in.).
\2\If atmospheric conditions make the specified clearances impractical,
the clearances may be increased by a maximum of 25 mm. (1 in.).
Table I-5.--Rubber Insulating Equipment Voltage Requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum use Retest Retest
Class of equipment voltage\1\ a- voltage\2\ a- voltage\2\ d-
c--rms c--rms c--avg
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0....................... 1,000 5,000 20,000
1....................... 7,500 10,000 40,000
2....................... 17,000 20,000 50,000
3....................... 26,500 30,000 60,000
4....................... 36,000 40,000 70,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\The maximum use voltage is the a-c voltage (rms) classification of
the protective equipment that designates the maximum nominal design
voltage of the energized system that may be safely worked. The nominal
design voltage is equal to the phase-to-phase voltage on multiphase
circuits. However, the phase-to-ground potential is considered to be
the nominal design voltage:
(1) If there is no multiphase exposure in a system area and if the
voltage exposure is limited to the phase-to-ground potential, or
(2) If the electrical equipment and devices are insulated or isolated or
both so that the multiphase exposure on a grounded wye circuit is
removed.
\2\The proof-test voltage shall be applied continuously for at least 1
minute, but no more than 3 minutes.
Table I-6.--Rubber Insulating Equipment Test Intervals
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Type of equipment When to test
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rubber insulating line hose........ Upon indication that insulating
value is suspect.
Rubber insulating covers........... Upon indication that insulating
value is suspect.
Rubber insulating blankets......... Before first issue and every 12
months thereafter.\1\
Rubber insulating gloves........... Before first issue and every 6
months thereafter.\1\
Rubber insulating sleeves.......... Before first issue and every 12
months thereafter.\1\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\If the insulating equipment has been electrically tested but not
issued for service, it may not be placed into service unless it has
been electrically tested within the previous 12 months.
Subpart R--Special Industries
3. The authority citation for subpart R of part 1910 is revised to
read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 4, 6, 8, Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657); Secretary of Labor's Order No. 12-71
(36 FR 8754), 8-76 (41 FR 25059), 9-83 (48 FR 35736), or 1-90 (55 FR
9033) as applicable.
Sections 1910.261, 1910.262, 1910.265, 1910.266, 1910.267,
1910.268, 1910.269, 1910.274, and 1910.275 also issued under 29 CFR
Part 1911.
4. A new Sec. 1910.269 is added to Subpart R to read as follows:
Sec. 1910.269 Electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution.
(a) General. (1) Application. (i) This section covers the operation
and maintenance of electric power generation, control, transformation,
transmission, and distribution lines and equipment. These provisions
apply to:
(A) Power generation, transmission, and distribution installations,
including related equipment for the purpose of communication or
metering, which are accessible only to qualified employees;
Note: The types of installations covered by this paragraph
include the generation, transmission, and distribution installations
of electric utilities, as well as equivalent installations of
industrial establishments. Supplementary electric generating
equipment that is used to supply a workplace for emergency, standby,
or similar purposes only is covered under Subpart S of this Part.
(See paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(B) of this section.)
(B) Other installations at an electric power generating station, as
follows:
(1) Fuel and ash handling and processing installations, such as
coal conveyors,
(2) Water and steam installations, such as penstocks, pipelines,
and tanks, providing a source of energy for electric generators, and
(3) Chlorine and hydrogen systems.
(C) Test sites where electrical testing involving temporary
measurements associated with electric power generation, transmission,
and distribution is performed in laboratories, in the field, in
substations, and on lines, as opposed to metering, relaying, and
routine line work; and
(D) Work on or directly associated with the installations covered
in paragraphs (a)(1)(i)(A) through (a)(1)(i)(C) of this section.
(E) Line-clearance tree-trimming operations, as follows:
(1) Entire Sec. 1910.269 of this Part, except paragraph (r)(1) of
this section, applies to line-clearance tree-trimming operations
performed by qualified employees (those who are knowledgeable in the
construction and operation of electric power generation, transmission,
or distribution equipment involved, along with the associated hazards).
(2) Paragraphs (a)(2), (b), (c), (g), (k), (p), and (r) of this
section apply to line-clearance tree-trimming operations performed by
line-clearance tree trimmers who are not qualified employees.
(ii) Notwithstanding paragraph (A)(1)(I) of this section,
Sec. 1910.269 of this Part does not apply:
(A) To construction work, as defined in Sec. 1910.12 of this Part;
or
(B) To electrical installations, electrical safety-related work
practices, or electrical maintenance considerations covered by Subpart
S of this Part.
Note 1: Work practices conforming to Secs. 1910.332 through
1910.335 of this Part are considered as complying with the
electrical safety-related work practice requirements of this section
identified in Table 1 of Appendix A-2 to this section, provided the
work is being performed on a generation or distribution installation
meeting Secs. 1910.303 through 1910.308 of this Part. This table
also identifies provisions in this section that apply to work by
qualified persons directly on or associated with installations of
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution lines or
equipment, regardless of compliance with Secs. 1910.332 through
1910.335 of this Part.
Note 2: Work practices performed by qualified persons and
conforming to Sec. 1910.269 of this Part are considered as complying
with Sec. 1910.333(c) and Sec. 1910.335 of this Part.
(iii) This section applies in addition to all other applicable
standards contained in this Part 1910. Specific references in this
section to other sections of Part 1910 are provided for emphasis only.
(2) Training. Employees shall be trained in and familiar with the
safety-related work practices, safety procedures, and other safety
requirements in this section that pertain to their respective job
assignments. Employees shall also be trained in and familiar with any
other safety practices, including applicable emergency procedures (such
as pole top and manhole rescue), that are not specifically addressed by
this section but that are related to their work and are necessary for
their safety.
(ii) Qualified employees shall also be trained and competent in:
(A) The skills and techniques necessary to distinguish exposed live
parts from other parts of electric equipment,
(B) The skills and techniques necessary to determine the nominal
voltage of exposed live parts,
(C) The minimum approach distances specified in this section
corresponding to the voltages to which the qualified employee will be
exposed, and
(D) The proper use of the special precautionary techniques,
personal protective equipment, insulating and shielding materials, and
insulated tools for working on or near exposed energized parts of
electric equipment.
Note: For the purposes of this section, a person must have this
training in order to be considered a qualified person.
(iii) The employer shall determine, through regular supervision and
through inspections conducted on at least an annual basis, that each
employee is complying with the safety-related work practices required
by this section.
(iv) An employee shall receive additional training (or retraining)
under any of the following conditions:
(A) If the supervision and annual inspections required by paragraph
(a)(2)(iii) of this section indicate that the employee is not complying
with the safety-related work practices required by this section, or
(B) If new technology, new types of equipment, or changes in
procedures necessitate the use of safety-related work practices that
are different from those which the employee would normally use, or
(C) If he or she must employ safety-related work practices that are
not normally used during his or her regular job duties.
Note: OSHA would consider tasks that are performed less often
than once per year to necessitate retraining before the performance
of the work practices involved.
(v) The training required by paragraph (a)(2) of this section shall
be of the classroom or on-the-job type.
(vi) The training shall establish employee proficiency in the work
practices required by this section and shall introduce the procedures
necessary for compliance with this section.
(vii) The employer shall certify that each employee has received
the training required by paragraph (a)(2) of this section. This
certification shall be made when the employee demonstrates proficiency
in the work practices involved and shall be maintained for the duration
of the employee's employment.
Note: Employment records that indicate that an employee has
received the required training are an acceptable means of meeting
this requirement.
(3) Existing conditions. Existing conditions related to the safety
of the work to be performed shall be determined before work on or near
electric lines or equipment is started. Such conditions include, but
are not limited to, the nominal voltages of lines and equipment, the
maximum switching transient voltages, the presence of hazardous induced
voltages, the presence and condition of protective grounds and
equipment grounding conductors, the condition of poles, environmental
conditions relative to safety, and the locations of circuits and
equipment, including power and communication lines and fire protective
signaling circuits.
(b) Medical services and first aid. The employer shall provide
medical services and first aid as required in Sec. 1910.151 of this
Part. In addition to the requirements of Sec. 1910.151 of this Part,
the following requirements also apply:
(1) Cardiopulmonary resuscitation and first aid training. When
employees are performing work on or associated with exposed lines or
equipment energized at 50 volts or more, persons trained in first aid
including cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) shall be available as
follows:
(i) For field work involving two or more employees at a work
location, at least two trained persons shall be available. However,
only one trained person need be available if all new employees are
trained in first aid, including CPR, within 3 months of their hiring
dates.
(ii) For fixed work locations such as generating stations, the
number of trained persons available shall be sufficient to ensure that
each employee exposed to electric shock can be reached within 4 minutes
by a trained person. However, where the existing number of employees is
insufficient to meet this requirement (at a remote substation, for
example), all employees at the work location shall be trained.
(2) First aid supplies. First aid supplies required by
Sec. 1910.151(b) of this Part shall be placed in weatherproof
containers if the supplies could be exposed to the weather.
(3) First aid kits. Each first aid kit shall be maintained, shall
be readily available for use, and shall be inspected frequently enough
to ensure that expended items are replaced but at least once per year.
(c) Job briefing. The employer shall ensure that the employee in
charge conducts a job briefing with the employees involved before they
start each job. The briefing shall cover at least the following
subjects: hazards associated with the job, work procedures involved,
special precautions, energy source controls, and personal protective
equipment requirements.
(1) Number of briefings. If the work or operations to be performed
during the work day or shift are repetitive and similar, at least one
job briefing shall be conducted before the start of the first job of
each day or shift. Additional job briefings shall be held if
significant changes, which might affect the safety of the employees,
occur during the course of the work.
(2) Extent of briefing. A brief discussion is satisfactory if the
work involved is routine and if the employee, by virtue of training and
experience, can reasonably be expected to recognize and avoid the
hazards involved in the job. A more extensive discussion shall be
conducted:
(i) If the work is complicated or particularly hazardous, or
(ii) If the employee cannot be expected to recognize and avoid the
hazards involved in the job.
Note: The briefing is always required to touch on all the
subjects listed in the introductory text to paragraph (c) of this
section.
(3) Working alone. An employee working alone need not conduct a job
briefing. However, the employer shall ensure that the tasks to be
performed are planned as if a briefing were required.
(d) Hazardous energy control (lockout/tagout) procedures. (1)
Application. The provisions of paragraph (d) of this section apply to
the use of lockout/tagout procedures for the control of energy sources
in installations for the purpose of electric power generation,
including related equipment for communication or metering. Locking and
tagging procedures for the deenergizing of electric energy sources
which are used exclusively for purposes of transmission and
distribution are addressed by paragraph (m) of this section.
Note 1: Installations in electric power generation facilities
that are not an integral part of, or inextricably commingled with,
power generation processes or equipment are covered under
Sec. 1910.147 and Subpart S of this Part.
Note 2: Lockout and tagging procedures that comply with
paragraphs (c) through (f) of Sec. 1910.147 of this Part will also
be deemed to comply with paragraph of this section if the procedures
address the hazards covered by paragraph (d) of this section.
(2) General. (i) The employer shall establish a program consisting
of energy control procedures, employee training, and periodic
inspections to ensure that, before any employee performs any servicing
or maintenance on a machine or equipment where the unexpected
energizing, start up, or release of stored energy could occur and cause
injury, the machine or equipment is isolated from the energy source and
rendered inoperative.
(ii) The employer's energy control program under paragraph (d)(2)
of this section shall meet the following requirements:
(A) If an energy isolating device is not capable of being locked
out, the employer's program shall use a tagout system.
(B) If an energy isolating device is capable of being locked out,
the employer's program shall use lockout, unless the employer can
demonstrate that the use of a tagout system will provide full employee
protection as follows:
(1) When a tagout device is used on an energy isolating device
which is capable of being locked out, the tagout device shall be
attached at the same location that the lockout device would have been
attached, and the employer shall demonstrate that the tagout program
will provide a level of safety equivalent to that obtained by the use
of a lockout program.
(2) In demonstrating that a level of safety is achieved in the
tagout program equivalent to the level of safety obtained by the use of
a lockout program, the employer shall demonstrate full compliance with
all tagout-related provisions of this standard together with such
additional elements as are necessary to provide the equivalent safety
available from the use of a lockout device. Additional means to be
considered as part of the demonstration of full employee protection
shall include the implementation of additional safety measures such as
the removal of an isolating circuit element, blocking of a controlling
switch, opening of an extra disconnecting device, or the removal of a
valve handle to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent energizing.
(C) After [insert date 120 days after publication], whenever
replacement or major repair, renovation, or modification of a machine
or equipment is performed, and whenever new machines or equipment are
installed, energy isolating devices for such machines or equipment
shall be designed to accept a lockout device.
(iii) Procedures shall be developed, documented, and used for the
control of potentially hazardous energy covered by paragraph (d) of
this section.
(iv) The procedure shall clearly and specifically outline the
scope, purpose, responsibility, authorization, rules, and techniques to
be applied to the control of hazardous energy, and the measures to
enforce compliance including, but not limited to, the following:
(A) A specific statement of the intended use of this procedure;
(B) Specific procedural steps for shutting down, isolating,
blocking and securing machines or equipment to control hazardous
energy;
(C) Specific procedural steps for the placement, removal, and
transfer of lockout devices or tagout devices and the responsibility
for them; and
(D) Specific requirements for testing a machine or equipment to
determine and verify the effectiveness of lockout devices, tagout
devices, and other energy control measures.
(v) The employer shall conduct a periodic inspection of the energy
control procedure at least annually to ensure that the procedure and
the provisions of paragraph (d) of this section are being followed.
(A) The periodic inspection shall be performed by an authorized
employee who is not using the energy control procedure being inspected.
(B) The periodic inspection shall be designed to identify and
correct any deviations or inadequacies.
(C) If lockout is used for energy control, the periodic inspection
shall include a review, between the inspector and each authorized
employee, of that employee's responsibilities under the energy control
procedure being inspected.
(D) Where tagout is used for energy control, the periodic
inspection shall include a review, between the inspector and each
authorized and affected employee, of that employee's responsibilities
under the energy control procedure being inspected, and the elements
set forth in paragraph (d)(2)(vii) of this section.
(E) The employer shall certify that the inspections required by
paragraph (d)(2)(v) of this section have been accomplished. The
certification shall identify the machine or equipment on which the
energy control procedure was being used, the date of the inspection,
the employees included in the inspection, and the person performing the
inspection.
Note: If normal work schedule and operation records demonstrate
adequate inspection activity and contain the required information,
no additional certification is required.
(vi) The employer shall provide training to ensure that the purpose
and function of the energy control program are understood by employees
and that the knowledge and skills required for the safe application,
usage, and removal of energy controls are acquired by employees. The
training shall include the following:
(A) Each authorized employee shall receive training in the
recognition of applicable hazardous energy sources, the type and
magnitude of energy available in the workplace, and in the methods and
means necessary for energy isolation and control.
(B) Each affected employee shall be instructed in the purpose and
use of the energy control procedure.
(C) All other employees whose work operations are or may be in an
area where energy control procedures may be used shall be instructed
about the procedures and about the prohibition relating to attempts to
restart or reenergize machines or equipment that are locked out or
tagged out.
(vii) When tagout systems are used, employees shall also be trained
in the following limitations of tags:
(A) Tags are essentially warning devices affixed to energy
isolating devices and do not provide the physical restraint on those
devices that is provided by a lock.
(B) When a tag is attached to an energy isolating means, it is not
to be removed without authorization of the authorized person
responsible for it, and it is never to be bypassed, ignored, or
otherwise defeated.
(C) Tags must be legible and understandable by all authorized
employees, affected employees, and all other employees whose work
operations are or may be in the area, in order to be effective.
(D) Tags and their means of attachment must be made of materials
which will withstand the environmental conditions encountered in the
workplace.
(E) Tags may evoke a false sense of security, and their meaning
needs to be understood as part of the overall energy control program.
(F) Tags must be securely attached to energy isolating devices so
that they cannot be inadvertently or accidentally detached during use.
(viii) Retraining shall be provided by the employer as follows:
(A) Retraining shall be provided for all authorized and affected
employees whenever there is a change in their job assignments, a change
in machines, equipment, or processes that present a new hazard or
whenever there is a change in the energy control procedures.
(B) Retraining shall also be conducted whenever a periodic
inspection under paragraph (d)(2)(v) of this section reveals, or
whenever the employer has reason to believe, that there are deviations
from or inadequacies in an employee's knowledge or use of the energy
control procedures.
(C) The retraining shall reestablish employee proficiency and shall
introduce new or revised control methods and procedures, as necessary.
(ix) The employer shall certify that employee training has been
accomplished and is being kept up to date. The certification shall
contain each employee's name and dates of training.
(3) Protective materials and hardware. (i) Locks, tags, chains,
wedges, key blocks, adapter pins, self-locking fasteners, or other
hardware shall be provided by the employer for isolating, securing, or
blocking of machines or equipment from energy sources.
(ii) Lockout devices and tagout devices shall be singularly
identified; shall be the only devices used for controlling energy; may
not be used for other purposes; and shall meet the following
requirements:
(A) Lockout devices and tagout devices shall be capable of
withstanding the environment to which they are exposed for the maximum
period of time that exposure is expected.
(1) Tagout devices shall be constructed and printed so that
exposure to weather conditions or wet and damp locations will not cause
the tag to deteriorate or the message on the tag to become illegible.
(2) Tagout devices shall be so constructed as not to deteriorate
when used in corrosive environments.
(B) Lockout devices and tagout devices shall be standardized within
the facility in at least one of the following criteria: color, shape,
size. Additionally, in the case of tagout devices, print and format
shall be standardized.
(C) Lockout devices shall be substantial enough to prevent removal
without the use of excessive force or unusual techniques, such as with
the use of bolt cutters or metal cutting tools.
(D) Tagout devices, including their means of attachment, shall be
substantial enough to prevent inadvertent or accidental removal. Tagout
device attachment means shall be of a non-reusable type, attachable by
hand, self-locking, and non-releasable with a minimum unlocking
strength of no less than 50 pounds and shall have the general design
and basic characteristics of being at least equivalent to a one-piece,
all-environment-tolerant nylon cable tie.
(E) Each lockout device or tagout device shall include provisions
for the identification of the employee applying the device.
(F) Tagout devices shall warn against hazardous conditions if the
machine or equipment is energized and shall include a legend such as
the following: Do Not Start, Do Not Open, Do Not Close, Do Not
Energize, Do Not Operate.
Note: For specific provisions covering accident prevention tags,
see Sec. 1910.145 of this Part.
(4) Energy isolation. Lockout and tagout device application and
removal may only be performed by the authorized employees who are
performing the servicing or maintenance.
(5) Notification. Affected employees shall be notified by the
employer or authorized employee of the application and removal of
lockout or tagout devices. Notification shall be given before the
controls are applied and after they are removed from the machine or
equipment.
Note: See also paragraph (d)(7) of this section, which requires
that the second notification take place before the machine or
equipment is reenergized.
(6) Lockout/tagout application. The established procedures for the
application of energy control (the lockout or tagout procedures) shall
include the following elements and actions, and these procedures shall
be performed in the following sequence:
(i) Before an authorized or affected employee turns off a machine
or equipment, the authorized employee shall have knowledge of the type
and magnitude of the energy, the hazards of the energy to be
controlled, and the method or means to control the energy.
(ii) The machine or equipment shall be turned off or shut down
using the procedures established for the machine or equipment. An
orderly shutdown shall be used to avoid any additional or increased
hazards to employees as a result of the equipment stoppage.
(iii) All energy isolating devices that are needed to control the
energy to the machine or equipment shall be physically located and
operated in such a manner as to isolate the machine or equipment from
energy sources.
(iv) Lockout or tagout devices shall be affixed to each energy
isolating device by authorized employees.
(A) Lockout devices shall be attached in a manner that will hold
the energy isolating devices in a ``safe'' or ``off'' position.
(B) Tagout devices shall be affixed in such a manner as will
clearly indicate that the operation or movement of energy isolating
devices from the ``safe'' or ``off'' position is prohibited.
(1) Where tagout devices are used with energy isolating devices
designed with the capability of being locked out, the tag attachment
shall be fastened at the same point at which the lock would have been
attached.
(2) Where a tag cannot be affixed directly to the energy isolating
device, the tag shall be located as close as safely possible to the
device, in a position that will be immediately obvious to anyone
attempting to operate the device.
(v) Following the application of lockout or tagout devices to
energy isolating devices, all potentially hazardous stored or residual
energy shall be relieved, disconnected, restrained, or otherwise
rendered safe.
(vi) If there is a possibility of reaccumulation of stored energy
to a hazardous level, verification of isolation shall be continued
until the servicing or maintenance is completed or until the
possibility of such accumulation no longer exists.
(vii) Before starting work on machines or equipment that have been
locked out or tagged out, the authorized employee shall verify that
isolation and deenergizing of the machine or equipment have been
accomplished. If normally energized parts will be exposed to contact by
an employee while the machine or equipment is deenergized, a test shall
be performed to ensure that these parts are deenergized.
(7) Release from lockout/tagout. Before lockout or tagout devices
are removed and energy is restored to the machine or equipment,
procedures shall be followed and actions taken by the authorized
employees to ensure the following:
(i) The work area shall be inspected to ensure that nonessential
items have been removed and that machine or equipment components are
operationally intact.
(ii) The work area shall be checked to ensure that all employees
have been safely positioned or removed.
(iii) After lockout or tagout devices have been removed and before
a machine or equipment is started, affected employees shall be notified
that the lockout or tagout devices have been removed.
(iv) Each lockout or tagout device shall be removed from each
energy isolating device by the authorized employee who applied the
lockout or tagout device. However, if that employee is not available to
remove it, the device may be removed under the direction of the
employer, provided that specific procedures and training for such
removal have been developed, documented, and incorporated into the
employer's energy control program. The employer shall demonstrate that
the specific procedure provides a degree of safety equivalent to that
provided by the removal of the device by the authorized employee who
applied it. The specific procedure shall include at least the following
elements:
(A) Verification by the employer that the authorized employee who
applied the device is not at the facility;
(B) Making all reasonable efforts to contact the authorized
employee to inform him or her that his or her lockout or tagout device
has been removed; and
(C) Ensuring that the authorized employee has this knowledge before
he or she resumes work at that facility.
(8) Additional requirements. (i) If the lockout or tagout devices
must be temporarily removed from energy isolating devices and the
machine or equipment must be energized to test or position the machine,
equipment, or component thereof, the following sequence of actions
shall be followed:
(A) Clear the machine or equipment of tools and materials in
accordance with paragraph (d)(7)(i) of this section;
(B) Remove employees from the machine or equipment area in
accordance with paragraphs (d)(7)(ii) and (d)(7)(iii) of this section;
(C) Remove the lockout or tagout devices as specified in paragraph
(d)(7)(iv) of this section;
(D) Energize and proceed with the testing or positioning; and
(E) Deenergize all systems and reapply energy control measures in
accordance with paragraph (d)(6) of this section to continue the
servicing or maintenance.
(ii) When servicing or maintenance is performed by a crew, craft,
department, or other group, they shall use a procedure which affords
the employees a level of protection equivalent to that provided by the
implementation of a personal lockout or tagout device. Group lockout or
tagout devices shall be used in accordance with the procedures required
by paragraphs (d)(2)(iii) and(d)(2)(iv) of this section including, but
not limited to, the following specific requirements:
(A) Primary responsibility shall be vested in an authorized
employee for a set number of employees working under the protection of
a group lockout or tagout device (such as an operations lock);
(B) Provision shall be made for the authorized employee to
ascertain the exposure status of all individual group members with
regard to the lockout or tagout of the machine or equipment;
(C) When more than one crew, craft, department, or other group is
involved, assignment of overall job-associated lockout or tagout
control responsibility shall be given to an authorized employee
designated to coordinate affected work forces and ensure continuity of
protection; and
(D) Each authorized employee shall affix a personal lockout or
tagout device to the group lockout device, group lockbox, or comparable
mechanism when he or she begins work and shall remove those devices
when he or she stops working on the machine or equipment being serviced
or maintained.
(iii) Procedures shall be used during shift or personnel changes to
ensure the continuity of lockout or tagout protection, including
provision for the orderly transfer of lockout or tagout device
protection between off-going and on-coming employees, to minimize their
exposure to hazards from the unexpected energizing or start-up of the
machine or equipment or from the release of stored energy.
(iv) Whenever outside servicing personnel are to be engaged in
activities covered by paragraph (d) of this section, the on-site
employer and the outside employer shall inform each other of their
respective lockout or tagout procedures, and each employer shall ensure
that his or her personnel understand and comply with restrictions and
prohibitions of the energy control procedures being used.
(v) If energy isolating devices are installed in a central location
under the exclusive control of a system operator, the following
requirements apply:
(A) The employer shall use a procedure that affords employees a
level of protection equivalent to that provided by the implementation
of a personal lockout or tagout device.
(B) The system operator shall place and remove lockout and tagout
devices in place of the authorized employee under paragraphs (d)(4),
(d)(6)(iv) and (d)(7)(iv) of this section.
(C) Provisions shall be made to identify the authorized employee
who is responsible for (that is, being protected by) the lockout or
tagout device, to transfer responsibility for lockout and tagout
devices, and to ensure that an authorized employee requesting removal
or transfer of a lockout or tagout device is the one responsible for it
before the device is removed or transferred.
(e) Enclosed spaces. This paragraph covers enclosed spaces that may
be entered by employees. It does not apply to vented vaults if a
determination is made that the ventilation system is operating to
protect employees before they enter the space. This paragraph applies
to routine entry into enclosed spaces in lieu of the permit-space entry
requirements contained in paragraphs (d) through (k) of Sec. 1910.146
of this Part. If, after the precautions given in paragraphs (e) and (t)
of this section are taken, the hazards remaining in the enclosed space
endanger the life of an entrant or could interfere with escape from the
space, then entry into the enclosed space shall meet the permit-space
entry requirements of paragraphs (d) through (k) of Sec. 1910.146 of
this Part.
Note: Entries into enclosed spaces conducted in accordance with
the permit-space entry requirements of paragraphs (d) through (k) of
Sec. 1910.146 of this Part are considered as complying with
paragraph (e) of this section.
(1) Safe work practices. The employer shall ensure the use of safe
work practices for entry into and work in enclosed spaces and for
rescue of employees from such spaces.
(2) Training. Employees who enter enclosed spaces or who serve as
attendants shall be trained in the hazards of enclosed space entry, in
enclosed space entry procedures, and in enclosed space rescue
procedures.
(3) Rescue equipment. Employers shall provide equipment to ensure
the prompt and safe rescue of employees from the enclosed space.
(4) Evaluation of potential hazards. Before any entrance cover to
an enclosed space is removed, the employer shall determine whether it
is safe to do so by checking for the presence of any atmospheric
pressure or temperature differences and by evaluating whether there
might be a hazardous atmosphere in the space. Any conditions making it
unsafe to remove the cover shall be eliminated before the cover is
removed.
Note: The evaluation called for in this paragraph may take the
form of a check of the conditions expected to be in the enclosed
space. For example, the cover could be checked to see if it is hot
and, if it is fastened in place, could be loosened gradually to
release any residual pressure. A determination must also be made of
whether conditions at the site could cause a hazardous atmosphere,
such as an oxygen deficient or flammable atmosphere, to develop
within the space.
(5) Removal of covers. When covers are removed from enclosed
spaces, the opening shall be promptly guarded by a railing, temporary
cover, or other barrier intended to prevent an accidental fall through
the opening and to protect employees working in the space from objects
entering the space.
(6) Hazardous atmosphere. Employees may not enter any enclosed
space while it contains a hazardous atmosphere, unless the entry
conforms to the generic permit-required confined spaces standard in
Sec. 1910.146 of this Part.
Note: The term ``entry'' is defined in Sec. 1910.146(b) of this
Part.
(7) Attendants. While work is being performed in the enclosed
space, a person with first aid training meeting paragraph (b) of this
section shall be immediately available outside the enclosed space to
render emergency assistance if there is reason to believe that a hazard
may exist in the space or if a hazard exists because of traffic
patterns in the area of the opening used for entry. That person is not
precluded from performing other duties outside the enclosed space if
these duties do not distract the attendant from monitoring employees
within the space.
Note: See paragraph of this section for additional requirements
on attendants for work in manholes.
(8) Calibration of test instruments. Test instruments used to
monitor atmospheres in enclosed spaces shall be kept in calibration,
with a minimum accuracy of 10 percent.
(9) Testing for oxygen deficiency. Before an employee enters an
enclosed space, the internal atmosphere shall be tested for oxygen
deficiency with a direct-reading meter or similar instrument, capable
of collection and immediate analysis of data samples without the need
for off-site evaluation. If continuous forced air ventilation is
provided, testing is not required provided that the procedures used
ensure that employees are not exposed to the hazards posed by oxygen
deficiency.
(10) Testing for flammable gases and vapors. Before an employee
enters an enclosed space, the internal atmosphere shall be tested for
flammable gases and vapors with a direct-reading meter or similar
instrument capable of collection and immediate analysis of data samples
without the need for off-site evaluation. This test shall be performed
after the oxygen testing and ventilation required by paragraph (e)(9)
of this section demonstrate that there is sufficient oxygen to ensure
the accuracy of the test for flammability.
(11) Ventilation and monitoring. If flammable gases or vapors are
detected or if an oxygen deficiency is found, forced air ventilation
shall be used to maintain oxygen at a safe level and to prevent a
hazardous concentration of flammable gases and vapors from
accumulating. A continuous monitoring program to ensure that no
increase in flammable gas or vapor concentration occurs may be followed
in lieu of ventilation, if flammable gases or vapors are detected at
safe levels.
Note: See the definition of hazardous atmosphere for guidance in
determining whether or not a given concentration of a substances is
considered to be hazardous.
(12) Specific ventilation requirements. If continuous forced air
ventilation is used, it shall begin before entry is made and shall be
maintained long enough to ensure that a safe atmosphere exists before
employees are allowed to enter the work area. The forced air
ventilation shall be so directed as to ventilate the immediate area
where employees are present within the enclosed space and shall
continue until all employees leave the enclosed space.
(13) Air supply. The air supply for the continuous forced air
ventilation shall be from a clean source and may not increase the
hazards in the enclosed space.
(14) Open flames. If open flames are used in enclosed spaces, a
test for flammable gases and vapors shall be made immediately before
the open flame device is used and at least once per hour while the
device is used in the space. Testing shall be conducted more frequently
if conditions present in the enclosed space indicate that once per hour
is insufficient to detect hazardous accumulations of flammable gases or
vapors.
Note: See the definition of hazardous atmosphere for guidance in
determining whether or not a given concentration of a substances is
considered to be hazardous.
(f) Excavations. Excavation operations shall comply with Subpart P
of Part 1926 of this chapter.
(g) Personal protective equipment. (1) General. Personal protective
equipment shall meet the requirements of Subpart I of this Part.
(2) Fall protection. (i) Personal fall arrest equipment shall meet
the requirements of Subpart E of Part 1926 of this Chapter.
(ii) Body belts and safety straps for work positioning shall meet
the requirements of Sec. 1926.959 of this Chapter.
(iii) Body belts, safety straps, lanyards, lifelines, and body
harnesses shall be inspected before use each day to determine that the
equipment is in safe working condition. Defective equipment may not be
used.
(iv) Lifelines shall be protected against being cut or abraded.
(v) Fall arrest equipment, work positioning equipment, or travel
restricting equipment shall be used by employees working at elevated
locations more than 4 feet (1.2 m) above the ground on poles, towers,
or similar structures if other fall protection has not been provided.
The use of fall protection equipment is not required to be used by a
qualified employee climbing or changing location on poles, towers, or
similar structures, unless conditions, such as, but not limited to,
ice, high winds, the design of the structure (for example, no provision
for holding on with hands), or the presence of contaminants on the
structure, could cause the employee to lose his or her grip or footing.
Note 1: This paragraph applies to structures that support
overhead electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
lines and equipment. It does not apply to portions of buildings,
such as loading docks, to electric equipment, such as transformers
and capacitors, nor to aerial lifts. Requirements for fall
protection associated with walking and working surfaces are
contained in Subpart D of this Part; requirements for fall
protection associated with aerial lifts are contained in
Sec. 1910.67 of this Part.
Note 2: Employees undergoing training are not considered
``qualified employees'' for the purposes of this provision.
Unqualified employees (including trainees) are required to use fall
protection any time they are more than 4 feet (1.2 m) above the
ground.
(vi) The following requirements apply to personal fall arrest
systems:
(A) When stopping or arresting a fall, personal fall arrest systems
shall limit the maximum arresting force on an employee to 900 pounds (4
kN) if used with a body belt.
(B) When stopping or arresting a fall, personal fall arrest systems
shall limit the maximum arresting force on an employee to 1800 pounds
(8 kN) if used with a body harness.
(C) Personal fall arrest systems shall be rigged such that an
employee can neither free fall more than 6 feet (1.8 m) nor contact any
lower level.
(vii) If vertical lifelines or droplines are used, not more than
one employee may be attached to any one lifeline.
(viii) Snaphooks may not be connected to loops made in webbing-type
lanyards.
(ix) Snaphooks may not be connected to each other.
(h) Ladders, platforms, step bolts, and manhole steps. (1) General.
Requirements for ladders contained in Subpart D of this Part apply,
except as specifically noted in paragraph (h)(2) of this section.
(2) Special ladders and platforms. Portable ladders and platforms
used on structures or conductors in conjunction with overhead line work
need not meet paragraphs (d)(2)(i) and (d)(2)(iii) of Sec. 1910.25 of
this Part or paragraph (c)(3)(iii) of Sec. 1910.26 of this Part.
However, these ladders and platforms shall meet the following
requirements:
(i) Ladders and platforms shall be secured to prevent their
becoming accidentally dislodged.
(ii) Ladders and platforms may not be loaded in excess of the
working loads for which they are designed.
(iii) Ladders and platforms may be used only in applications for
which they were designed.
(iv) In the configurations in which they are used, ladders and
platforms shall be capable of supporting without failure at least 2.5
times the maximum intended load.
(3) Conductive ladders. Portable metal ladders and other portable
conductive ladders may not be used near exposed energized lines or
equipment. However, in specialized high-voltage work, conductive
ladders shall be used where the employer can demonstrate that
nonconductive ladders would present a greater hazard than conductive
ladders.
(i) Hand and portable power tools. (1) General. Paragraph (i)(2) of
this section applies to electric equipment connected by cord and plug.
Paragraph (i)(3) of this section applies to portable and vehicle-
mounted generators used to supply cord-and plug-connected equipment.
Paragraph (i)(4) of this section applies to hydraulic and pneumatic
tools.
(2) Cord- and plug-connected equipment. (1) Cord-and plug-connected
equipment supplied by premises wiring is covered by Subpart S of this
Part.
(ii) Any cord- and plug-connected equipment supplied by other than
premises wiring shall comply with one of the following in lieu of
Sec. 1910.243(a)(5) of this Part:
(A) It shall be equipped with a cord containing an equipment
grounding conductor connected to the tool frame and to a means for
grounding the other end (however, this option may not be used where the
introduction of the ground into the work environment increases the
hazard to an employee); or
(B) It shall be of the double-insulated type conforming to Subpart
S of this Part; or
(C) It shall be connected to the power supply through an isolating
transformer with an ungrounded secondary.
(3) Portable and vehicle-mounted generators. Portable and vehicle-
mounted generators used to supply cord- and plug-connected equipment
shall meet the following requirements:
(i) The generator may only supply equipment located on the
generator or the vehicle and cord- and plug-connected equipment through
receptacles mounted on the generator or the vehicle.
(ii) The non-current-carrying metal parts of equipment and the
equipment grounding conductor terminals of the receptacles shall be
bonded to the generator frame.
(iii) In the case of vehicle-mounted generators, the frame of the
generator shall be bonded to the vehicle frame.
(iv) Any neutral conductor shall be bonded to the generator frame.
(4) Hydraulic and pneumatic tools. (i) Safe operating pressures for
hydraulic and pneumatic tools, hoses, valves, pipes, filters, and
fittings may not be exceeded.
Note: If any hazardous defects are present, no operating
pressure would be safe, and the hydraulic or pneumatic equipment
involved may not be used. In the absence of defects, the maximum
rated operating pressure is the maximum safe pressure.
(ii) A hydraulic or pneumatic tool used where it may contact
exposed live parts shall be designed and maintained for such use.
(iii) The hydraulic system supplying a hydraulic tool used where it
may contact exposed live parts shall provide protection against loss of
insulating value for the voltage involved due to the formation of a
partial vacuum in the hydraulic line.
Note: Hydraulic lines without check valves having a separation
of more than 35 feet (10.7 m) between the oil reservoir and the
upper end of the hydraulic system promote the formation of a partial
vacuum.
(iv) A pneumatic tool used on energized electrical lines or
equipment or used where it may contact exposed live parts shall provide
protection against the accumulation of moisture in the air supply.
(v) Pressure shall be released before connections are broken,
unless quick acting, self-closing connectors are used. Hoses may not be
kinked.
(vi) Employees may not use any part of their bodies to locate or
attempt to stop a hydraulic leak.
(j) Live-line tools. (1) Design of tools. Live-line tool rods,
tubes, and poles shall be designed and constructed to withstand the
following minimum tests:
(i) 100,000 volts per foot (3281 volts per centimeter) of length
for 5 minutes if the tool is made of fiberglass-reinforced plastic
(FRP), or
(ii) 75,000 volts per foot (2461 volts per centimeter) of length
for 3 minutes if the tool is made of wood, or
(iii) Other tests that the employer can demonstrate are equivalent.
Note: Live-line tools using rod and tube that meet ASTM F711-89,
Standard Specification for Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Rod
and Tube Used in Live-Line Tools, conform to paragraph (j)(1)(i) of
this section.
(2) Condition of tools. (i) Each live-line tool shall be wiped
clean and visually inspected for defects before use each day.
(ii) If any defect or contamination that could adversely affect the
insulating qualities or mechanical integrity of the live-line tool is
present after wiping, the tool shall be removed from service and
examined and tested according to paragraph (j)(2)(iii) of this section
before being returned to service.
(iii) Live-line tools used for primary employee protection shall be
removed from service every 2 years and whenever required under
paragraph (j)(2)(ii) of this section for examination, cleaning, repair,
and testing as follows:
(A) Each tool shall be thoroughly examined for defects.
(B) If a defect or contamination that could adversely affect the
insulating qualities or mechanical integrity of the live-line tool is
found, the tool shall be repaired and refinished or shall be
permanently removed from service. If no such defect or contamination is
found, the tool shall be cleaned and waxed.
(C) The tool shall be tested in accordance with paragraphs
(j)(2)(iii)(D) and (j)(2)(iii)(E) of this section under the following
conditions:
(1) After the tool has been repaired or refinished; and
(2) After the examination if repair or refinishing is not
performed, unless the tool is made of FRP rod or foam-filled FRP tube
and the employer can demonstrate that the tool has no defects that
could cause it to fail in use.
(D) The test method used shall be designed to verify the tool's
integrity along its entire working length and, if the tool is made of
fiberglass-reinforced plastic, its integrity under wet conditions.
(E) The voltage applied during the tests shall be as follows:
(1) 75,000 volts per foot (2461 volts per centimeter) of length for
1 minute if the tool is made of fiberglass, or
(2) 50,000 volts per foot (1640 volts per centimeter) of length for
1 minute if the tool is made of wood, or
(3) Other tests that the employer can demonstrate are equivalent.
Note: Guidelines for the examination, cleaning, repairing, and
in-service testing of live-line tools are contained in the Institute
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Guide for In-Service
Maintenance and Electrical Testing of Live-Line Tools, IEEE Std.
978-1984.
(k) Materials handling and storage. (1) General. Material handling
and storage shall conform to the requirements of Subpart N of this
Part.
(2) Materials storage near energized lines or equipment. (i) In
areas not restricted to qualified persons only, materials or equipment
may not be stored closer to energized lines or exposed energized parts
of equipment than the following distances plus an amount providing for
the maximum sag and side swing of all conductors and providing for the
height and movement of material handling equipment:
(A) For lines and equipment energized at 50 kV or less, the
distance is 10 feet (305 cm).
(B) For lines and equipment energized at more than 50 kV, the
distance is 10 feet (305 cm) plus 4 inches (10 cm) for every 10 kV over
50 kV.
(ii) In areas restricted to qualified employees, material may not
be stored within the working space about energized lines or equipment.
Note: Requirements for the size of the working space are
contained in paragraphs (u)(1) and (v)(3) of this section.
(1) Working on or near exposed energized parts. This paragraph
applies to work on exposed live parts, or near enough to them, to
expose the employee to any hazard they present.
(1) General. Only qualified employees may work on or with exposed
energized lines or parts of equipment. Only qualified employees may
work in areas containing unguarded, uninsulated energized lines or
parts of equipment operating at 50 volts or more. Electric lines and
equipment shall be considered and treated as energized unless the
provisions of paragraph (d) or paragraph (m) of this section have been
followed.
(i) Except as provided in paragraph (l)(1)(ii) of this section, at
least two employees shall be present while the following types of work
are being performed:
(A) Installation, removal, or repair of lines that are energized at
more than 600 volts,
(B) Installation, removal, or repair of deenergized lines if an
employee is exposed to contact with other parts energized at more than
600 volts,
(C) Installation, removal, or repair of equipment, such as
transformers, capacitors, and regulators, if an employee is exposed to
contact with parts energized at more than 600 volts,
(D) Work involving the use of mechanical equipment, other than
insulated aerial lifts, near parts energized at more than 600 volts,
and
(E) Other work that exposes an employee to electrical hazards
greater than or equal to those posed by operations that are
specifically listed in paragraphs (l)(1)(i)(A) through (l)(1)(i)(D) of
this section.
(ii) Paragraph (l)(1)(i) of this section does not apply to the
following operations:
(A) Routine switching of circuits, if the employer can demonstrate
that conditions at the site allow this work to be performed safely,
(B) Work performed with live-line tools if the employee is
positioned so that he or she is neither within reach of nor otherwise
exposed to contact with energized parts, and
(C) Emergency repairs to the extent necessary to safeguard the
general public.
(2) Minimum approach distances. The employer shall ensure that no
employee approaches or takes any conductive object closer to exposed
energized parts than set forth in Table R-6 through Table R-10, unless:
(i) The employee is insulated from the energized part (insulating
gloves or insulating gloves and sleeves worn in accordance with
paragraph (l)(3) of this section are considered insulation of the
employee only with regard to the energized part upon which work is
being performed), or
(ii) The energized part is insulated from the employee and from any
other conductive object at a different potential, or
(iii) The employee is insulated from any other exposed conductive
object, as during live-line bare-hand work.
Note: Paragraphs (v)(5)(i) and of this section contain
requirements for the guarding and isolation of live parts. Parts of
electric circuits that meet these two provisions are not considered
as ``exposed'' unless a guard is removed or an employee enters the
space intended to provide isolation from the live parts.
(3) Type of insulation. If the employee is to be insulated from
energized parts by the use of insulating gloves (under paragraph
(l)(2)(i) of this section), insulating sleeves shall also be used.
However, insulating sleeves need not be used under the following
conditions:
(i) If exposed energized parts on which work is not being performed
are insulated from the employee and
(ii) If such insulation is placed from a position not exposing the
employee's upper arm to contact with other energized parts.
(4) Working position. The employer shall ensure that each employee,
to the extent that other safety-related conditions at the worksite
permit, works in a position from which a slip or shock will not bring
the employee's body into contact with exposed, uninsulated parts
energized at a potential different from the employee.
(5) Making connections. The employer shall ensure that connections
are made as follows:
(i) In connecting deenergized equipment or lines to an energized
circuit by means of a conducting wire or device, an employee shall
first attach the wire to the deenergized part;
(ii) When disconnecting equipment or lines from an energized
circuit by means of a conducting wire or device, an employee shall
remove the source end first; and
(iii) When lines or equipment are connected to or disconnected from
energized circuits, loose conductors shall be kept away from exposed
energized parts.
(6) Apparel. (i) When work is performed within reaching distance of
exposed energized parts of equipment, the employer shall ensure that
each employee removes or renders nonconductive all exposed conductive
articles, such as key or watch chains, rings, or wrist watches or
bands, unless such articles do not increase the hazards associated with
contact with the energized parts.
(ii) The employer shall train each employee who is exposed to the
hazards of flames or electric arcs in the hazards involved.
(iii) The employer shall ensure that each employee who is exposed
to the hazards of flames or electric arcs does not wear clothing that,
when exposed to flames or electric arcs, could increase the extent of
injury that would be sustained by the employee.
Note: Clothing made from the following types of fabrics, either
alone or in blends, is prohibited by this paragraph, unless the
employer can demonstrate that the fabric has been treated to
withstand the conditions that may be encountered or that the
clothing is worn in such a manner as to eliminate the hazard
involved: acetate, nylon, polyester, rayon.
(7) Fuse handling. When fuses must be installed or removed with one
or both terminals energized at more than 300 volts or with exposed
parts energized at more than 50 volts, the employer shall ensure that
tools or gloves rated for the voltage are used. When expulsion-type
fuses are installed with one or both terminals energized at more than
300 volts, the employer shall ensure that each employee wears eye
protection meeting the requirements of Subpart I of this Part, uses a
tool rated for the voltage, and is clear of the exhaust path of the
fuse barrel.
(8) Covered (noninsulated) conductors. The requirements of this
section which pertain to the hazards of exposed live parts also apply
when work is performed in the proximity of covered (noninsulated)
wires.
(9) Noncurrent-carrying metal parts. Noncurrent-carrying metal
parts of equipment or devices, such as transformer cases and circuit
breaker housings, shall be treated as energized at the highest voltage
to which they are exposed, unless the employer inspects the
installation and determines that these parts are grounded before work
is performed.
(10) Opening circuits under load. Devices used to open circuits
under load conditions shall be designed to interrupt the current
involved.
Table R-6.--AC Live-Line Work Minimum Approach Distance
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Distance
-------------------------------
Phase to Phase to phase
Nominal voltage in kilovolts phase to ground exposure
phase exposure ---------------
----------------
(ft- (ft- (m)
in) (m) in)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.05 to 1.0............................. (\4\) (\4\) (\4\) (\4\)
1.1 to 15.0............................. 2-1 0.64 2-2 0.66
15.1 to 36.0............................ 2-4 0.72 2-7 0.77
36.1 to 46.0............................ 2-7 0.77 2-10 0.85
46.1 to 72.5............................ 3-0 0.90 3-6 1.05
72.6 to 121............................. 3-2 0.95 4-3 1.29
138 to 145.............................. 3-7 1.09 4-11 1.50
161 to 169.............................. 4-0 1.22 5-8 1.71
230 to 242.............................. 5-3 1.59 7-6 2.27
345 to 362.............................. 8-6 2.59 12-6 3.80
500 to 550.............................. 11-3 3.42 18-1 5.50
765 to 800.............................. 14-11 4.53 26-0 7.91
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: These distances take into consideration the highest switching
surge an employee will be exposed to on any system with air as the
insulating medium and the maximum voltages shown.
Note 2: The clear live-line tool distance shall equal or exceed the
values for the indicated voltage ranges.
Note 3: See Appendix B of this part for information on how the minimum
approach distances listed in the tables were derived.
\4\Avoid contact.
Table R-7.--AC Live-Line Work Minimum Approach Distance With Overvoltage Factor Phase-to-Ground Exposure
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum Distance in feet-inches
anticipated --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
per-unit Maximum phase-to-phase voltage in kilovolts
transient --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
overvoltage 121 145 169 242 362 552 800
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5.......... ............. ............ ............ ............ ............ 6-0 9-8
1.6.......... ............. ............ ............ ............ ............ 6-6 10-8
1.7.......... ............. ............ ............ ............ ............ 7-0 11-8
1.8.......... ............. ............ ............ ............ ............ 7-7 12-8
1.9.......... ............. ............ ............ ............ ............ 8-1 13-9
2.0.......... 2-5 2-9 3-0 3-10 5-3 8-9 14-11
2.1.......... 2-6 2-10 3-2 4-0 5-5 9-4 ............
2.2.......... 2-7 2-11 3-3 4-1 5-9 9-11 ............
2.3.......... 2-8 3-0 3-4 4-3 6-1 10-6 ............
2.4.......... 2-9 3-1 3-5 4-5 6-4 11-3 ............
2.5.......... 2-9 3-2 3-6 4-6 6-8 ............ ............
2.6.......... 2-10 3-3 3-8 4-8 7-1 ............ ............
2.7.......... 2-11 3-4 3-9 4-10 7-5 ............ ............
2.8.......... 3-0 3-5 3-10 4-11 7-9 ............ ............
2.9.......... 3-1 3-6 3-11 5-1 8-2 ............ ............
3.0.......... 3-2 3-7 4-0 5-3 8-6 ............ ............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: The distance specified in this table may be applied only where the maximum anticipated per-unit
transient overvoltage has been determined by engineering analysis and has been supplied by the employer. Table
R-6 applies otherwise.
Note 2: The distances specified in this table are the air, bare-hand, and live-line tool distances.
Note 3: See Appendix B of this part for information on how the minimum approach distances listed in the tables
were derived and on how to calculate revised minimum approach distances based on the control of transient
overvoltages.
Table R-8.--AC Live-Line Work Minimum Approach Distance With Overvoltage Factor Phase-to-Phase Exposure
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum Distance in feet-inches
anticipated --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
per-unit Maximum phase-to-phase voltage in kilovolts
transient --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
overvoltage 121 145 169 242 362 552 800
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5.......... ............. ............ ............ ............ ............ 7-4 12-1
1.6.......... ............. ............ ............ ............ ............ 8-9 14-6
1.7.......... ............. ............ ............ ............ ............ 10-2 17-2
1.8.......... ............. ............ ............ ............ ............ 11-7 19-11
1.9.......... ............. ............ ............ ............ ............ 13-2 22-11
2.0.......... 3-7 4-1 4-8 6-1 8-7 14-10 26-0
2.1.......... 3-7 4-2 4-9 6-3 8-10 15-7 ............
2.2.......... 3-8 4-3 4-10 6-4 9-2 16-4 ............
2.3.......... 3-9 4-4 4-11 6-6 9-6 17-2 ............
2.4.......... 3-10 4-5 5-0 6-7 9-11 18-1 ............
2.5.......... 3-11 4-6 5-2 6-9 10-4 ............ ............
2.6.......... 4-0 4-7 5-3 6-11 10-9 ............ ............
2.7.......... 4-1 4-8 5-4 7-0 11-2 ............ ............
2.8.......... 4-1 4-9 5-5 7-2 11-7 ............ ............
2.9.......... 4-2 4-10 5-6 7-4 12-1 ............ ............
3.0.......... 4-3 4-11 5-8 7-6 12-6 ............ ............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: The distance specified in this table may be applied only where the maximum anticipated per-unit
transient overvoltage has been determined by engineering analysis and has been supplied by the employer. Table
R-6 applies otherwise.
Note 2: The distances specified in this table are the air, bare-hand, and live-line tool distances.
Note 3: See Appendix B of this part for information on how the minimum approach distances listed in the tables
were derived and on how to calculate revised minimum approach distances based on the control of transient
overvoltages.
Table R-9.--DC Live-Line Work Minimum Approach Distance With Overvoltage Factor
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Distance in feet-inches
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum anticipated per-unit transient Maximum line-to-ground voltage in kilovolts
overvoltage ---------------------------------------------------------------------
250 400 500 600 750
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5 or lower.............................. 3-8 5-3 6-9 8-7 11-10
1.6....................................... 3-10 5-7 7-4 9-5 13-1
1.7....................................... 4-1 6-0 7-11 10-3 14-4
1.8....................................... 4-3 6-5 8-7 11-2 15-9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: The distances specified in this table may be applied only where the maximum anticipated per-unit
transient overvoltage has been determined by engineering analysis and has been supplied by the employer.
However, if the transient overvoltage factor is not known, a factor of 1.8 shall be assumed.
Note 2: The distances specified in this table are the air, bare-hand, and live-line tool distances.
Table R-10.--Altitude Correction Factor
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Altitude
------------------------------------------------- Correction factor
ft m
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3000................... 900 1.00
4000................... 1200 1.02
5000................... 1500 1.05
6000................... 1800 1.08
7000................... 2100 1.11
8000................... 2400 1.14
9000................... 2700 1.17
10000.................. 3000 1.20
12000.................. 3600 1.25
14000.................. 4200 1.30
16000.................. 4800 1.35
18000.................. 5400 1.39
20000.................. 6000 1.44
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: If the work is performed at elevations greater than 3000 ft (900
m) above mean sea level, the minimum approach distance shall be
determined by multiplying the distances in Table R-6 through Table R-9
by the correction factor corresponding to the altitude at which work
is performed.
(m) Deenergizing lines and equipment for employee protection. (1)
Application. Paragraph (m) of this section applies to the deenergizing
of transmission and distribution lines and equipment for the purpose of
protecting employees. Control of hazardous energy sources used in the
generation of electric energy is covered in paragraph (d) of this
section. Conductors and parts of electric equipment that have been
deenergized under procedures other than those required by paragraphs
(d) or (m) of this section, as applicable, shall be treated as
energized.
(2) General. (i) If a system operator is in charge of the lines or
equipment and their means of disconnection, all of the requirements of
paragraph (m)(3) of this section shall be observed, in the order given,
before work is begun.
(ii) If no system operator is in charge of the lines or equipment
and their means of disconnection, one employee in the crew shall be
designated as being in charge of the clearance. All of the requirements
of paragraph (m)(3) of this section apply, in the order given, except
as provided in paragraph (m)(2)(iii) of this section. The employee in
charge of the clearance shall take the place of the system operator, as
necessary.
(iii) If only one crew will be working on the lines or equipment
and if the means of disconnection is accessible and visible to and
under the sole control of the employee in charge of the clearance,
paragraphs (m)(3)(i), (m)(3)(iii), (m)(3)(iv), (m)(3)(viii) and
(m)(3)(xii) of this section do not apply. Additionally, tags required
by the remaining provisions of paragraph (m)(3) of this section need
not be used.
(iv) Any disconnecting means that are accessible to persons outside
the employer's control (for example, the general public) shall be
rendered inoperable while they are open for the purpose of protecting
employees.
(3) Deenergizing lines and equipment. (i) A designated employee
shall make a request of the system operator to have the particular
section of line or equipment deenergized. The designated employee
becomes the employee in charge (as this term is used in paragraph
(m)(3) of this section) and is responsible for the clearance.
(ii) All switches, disconnectors, jumpers, taps, and other means
through which known sources of electric energy may be supplied to the
particular lines and equipment to be deenergized shall be opened. Such
means shall be rendered inoperable, unless its design does not so
permit, and tagged to indicate that employees are at work.
(iii) Automatically and remotely controlled switches that could
cause the opened disconnecting means to close shall also be tagged at
the point of control. The automatic or remote control feature shall be
rendered inoperable, unless its design does not so permit.
(iv) Tags shall prohibit operation of the disconnecting means and
shall indicate that employees are at work.
(v) After the applicable requirements in paragraphs (m)(3)(i)
through (m)(3)(iv) of this section have been followed and the employee
in charge of the work has been given a clearance by the system
operator, the lines and equipment to be worked shall be tested to
ensure that they are deenergized.
(vi) Protective grounds shall be installed as required by paragraph
(n) of this section.
(vii) After the applicable requirements of paragraphs (m)(3)(i)
through (m)(3)(vi) of this section have been followed, the lines and
equipment involved may be worked as deenergized.
(viii) If two or more independent crews will be working on the same
lines or equipment, each crew shall independently comply with the
requirements in paragraph (m)(3) of this section.
(ix) To transfer the clearance, the employee in charge (or, if the
employee in charge is forced to leave the worksite due to illness or
other emergency, the employee's supervisor) shall inform the system
operator; employees in the crew shall be informed of the transfer; and
the new employee in charge shall be responsible for the clearance.
(x) To release a clearance, the employee in charge shall:
(A) Notify employees under his or her direction that the clearance
is to be released;
(B) Determine that all employees in the crew are clear of the lines
and equipment;
(C) Determine that all protective grounds installed by the crew
have been removed; and
(D) Report this information to the system operator and release the
clearance.
(xi) The person releasing a clearance shall be the same person that
requested the clearance, unless responsibility has been transferred
under paragraph (m)(3)(ix) of this section.
(xii) Tags may not be removed unless the associated clearance has
been released under paragraph (m)(3)(x) of this section.
(xiii) Only after all protective grounds have been removed, after
all crews working on the lines or equipment have released their
clearances, after all employees are clear of the lines and equipment,
and after all protective tags have been removed from a given point of
disconnection, may action be initiated to reenergize the lines or
equipment at that point of disconnection.
(n) Grounding for the protection of employees. (1) Application.
Paragraph (n) of this section applies to the grounding of transmission
and distribution lines and equipment for the purpose of protecting
employees. Paragraph (n)(4) of this section also applies to the
protective grounding of other equipment as required elsewhere in this
section.
(2) General. For the employee to work lines or equipment as
deenergized, the lines or equipment shall be deenergized under the
provisions of paragraph (m) of this section and shall be grounded as
specified in paragraphs (n)(3) through (n)(9) of this section. However,
if the employer can demonstrate that installation of a ground is
impracticable or that the conditions resulting from the installation of
a ground would present greater hazards than working without grounds,
the lines and equipment may be treated as deenergized provided all of
the following conditions are met:
(i) The lines and equipment have been deenergized under the
provisions of paragraph (m) of this section.
(ii) There is no possibility of contact with another energized
source.
(iii) The hazard of induced voltage is not present.
(3) Equipotential zone. Temporary protective grounds shall be
placed at such locations and arranged in such a manner as to prevent
each employee from being exposed to hazardous differences in electrical
potential.
(4) Protective grounding equipment. (i) Protective grounding
equipment shall be capable of conducting the maximum fault current that
could flow at the point of grounding for the time necessary to clear
the fault. This equipment shall have an ampacity greater than or equal
to that of No. 2 AWG copper.
Note: Guidelines for protective grounding equipment are
contained in American Society for Testing and Materials Standard
Specifications for Temporary Grounding Systems to be Used on De-
Energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment, ASTM F855-1990.
(ii) Protective grounds shall have an impedance low enough to cause
immediate operation of protective devices in case of accidental
energizing of the lines or equipment.
(5) Testing. Before any ground is installed, lines and equipment
shall be tested and found absent of nominal voltage, unless a
previously installed ground is present.
(6) Order of connection. When a ground is to be attached to a line
or to equipment, the ground-end connection shall be attached first, and
then the other end shall be attached by means of a live-line tool.
(7) Order of removal. When a ground is to be removed, the grounding
device shall be removed from the line or equipment using a live-line
tool before the ground-end connection is removed.
(8) Additional precautions. When work is performed on a cable at a
location remote from the cable terminal, the cable may not be grounded
at the cable terminal if there is a possibility of hazardous transfer
of potential should a fault occur.
(9) Removal of grounds for test. Grounds may be removed temporarily
during tests. During the test procedure, the employer shall ensure that
each employee uses insulating equipment and is isolated from any
hazards involved, and the employer shall institute any additional
measures as may be necessary to protect each exposed employee in case
the previously grounded lines and equipment become energized.
(o) Testing and test facilities. (1) Application. Paragraph (o) of
this section provides for safe work practices for high-voltage and
high-power testing performed in laboratories, shops, and substations,
and in the field and on electric transmission and distribution lines
and equipment. It applies only to testing involving interim
measurements utilizing high voltage, high power, or combinations of
both, and not to testing involving continuous measurements as in
routine metering, relaying, and normal line work.
Note: Routine inspection and maintenance measurements made by
qualified employees are considered to be routine line work and are
not included in the scope of paragraph (o) of this section, as long
as the hazards related to the use of intrinsic high-voltage or high-
power sources require only the normal precautions associated with
routine operation and maintenance work required in the other
paragraphs of this section. Two typical examples of such excluded
test work procedures are ``phasing-out'' testing and testing for a
``no-voltage'' condition.
(2) General requirements. (i) The employer shall establish and
enforce work practices for the protection of each worker from the
hazards of high-voltage or high-power testing at all test areas,
temporary and permanent. Such work practices shall include, as a
minimum, test area guarding, grounding, and the safe use of measuring
and control circuits. A means providing for periodic safety checks of
field test areas shall also be included. (See paragraph (o)(6) of this
section.)
(ii) Employees shall be trained in safe work practices upon their
initial assignment to the test area, with periodic reviews and updates
provided as required by paragraph (a)(2) of this section.
(3) Guarding of test areas. (i) Permanent test areas shall be
guarded by walls, fences, or barriers designed to keep employees out of
the test areas.
(ii) In field testing, or at a temporary test site where permanent
fences and gates are not provided, one of the following means shall be
used to prevent unauthorized employees from entering:
(A) The test area shall be guarded by the use of distinctively
colored safety tape that is supported approximately waist high and to
which safety signs are attached,
(B) The test area shall be guarded by a barrier or barricade that
limits access to the test area to a degree equivalent, physically and
visually, to the barricade specified in paragraph (o)(3)(ii)(A) of this
section, or
(C) The test area shall be guarded by one or more test observers
stationed so that the entire area can be monitored.
(iii) The barriers required by paragraph (o)(3)(ii) of this section
shall be removed when the protection they provide is no longer needed.
(iv) Guarding shall be provided within test areas to control access
to test equipment or to apparatus under test that may become energized
as part of the testing by either direct or inductive coupling, in order
to prevent accidental employee contact with energized parts.
(4) Grounding practices. (i) The employer shall establish and
implement safe grounding practices for the test facility.
(A) All conductive parts accessible to the test operator during the
time the equipment is operating at high voltage shall be maintained at
ground potential except for portions of the equipment that are isolated
from the test operator by guarding.
(B) Wherever ungrounded terminals of test equipment or apparatus
under test may be present, they shall be treated as energized until
determined by tests to be deenergized.
(ii) Visible grounds shall be applied, either automatically or
manually with properly insulated tools, to the high-voltage circuits
after they are deenergized and before work is performed on the circuit
or item or apparatus under test. Common ground connections shall be
solidly connected to the test equipment and the apparatus under test.
(iii) In high-power testing, an isolated ground-return conductor
system shall be provided so that no intentional passage of current,
with its attendant voltage rise, can occur in the ground grid or in the
earth. However, an isolated ground-return conductor need not be
provided if the employer can demonstrate that both the following
conditions are met:
(A) An isolated ground-return conductor cannot be provided due to
the distance of the test site from the electric energy source, and
(B) Employees are protected from any hazardous step and touch
potentials that may develop during the test.
Note: See Appendix C of this part for information on measures
that can be taken to protect employees from hazardous step and touch
potentials.
(iv) In tests in which grounding of test equipment by means of the
equipment grounding conductor located in the equipment power cord
cannot be used due to increased hazards to test personnel or the
prevention of satisfactory measurements, a ground that the employer can
demonstrate affords equivalent safety shall be provided, and the safety
ground shall be clearly indicated in the test set-up.
(v) When the test area is entered after equipment is deenergized, a
ground shall be placed on the high-voltage terminal and any other
exposed terminals.
(A) High capacitance equipment or apparatus shall be discharged
through a resistor rated for the available energy.
(B) A direct ground shall be applied to the exposed terminals when
the stored energy drops to a level at which it is safe to do so.
(vi) If a test trailer or test vehicle is used in field testing,
its chassis shall be grounded. Protection against hazardous touch
potentials with respect to the vehicle, instrument panels, and other
conductive parts accessible to employees shall be provided by bonding,
insulation, or isolation.
(5) Control and measuring circuits. (i) Control wiring, meter
connections, test leads and cables may not be run from a test area
unless they are contained in a grounded metallic sheath and terminated
in a grounded metallic enclosure or unless other precautions are taken
that the employer can demonstrate as ensuring equivalent safety.
(ii) Meters and other instruments with accessible terminals or
parts shall be isolated from test personnel to protect against hazards
arising from such terminals and parts becoming energized during
testing. If this isolation is provided by locating test equipment in
metal compartments with viewing windows, interlocks shall be provided
to interrupt the power supply if the compartment cover is opened.
(iii) The routing and connections of temporary wiring shall be made
secure against damage, accidental interruptions and other hazards. To
the maximum extent possible, signal, control, ground, and power cables
shall be kept separate.
(iv) If employees will be present in the test area during testing,
a test observer shall be present. The test observer shall be capable of
implementing the immediate deenergizing of test circuits for safety
purposes.
(6) Safety check. (i) Safety practices governing employee work at
temporary or field test areas shall provide for a routine check of such
test areas for safety at the beginning of each series of tests.
(ii) The test operator in charge shall conduct these routine safety
checks before each series of tests and shall verify at least the
following conditions:
(A) That barriers and guards are in workable condition and are
properly placed to isolate hazardous areas;
(B) That system test status signals, if used, are in operable
condition;
(C) That test power disconnects are clearly marked and readily
available in an emergency;
(D) That ground connections are clearly identifiable;
(E) That personal protective equipment is provided and used as
required by Subpart I of this Part and by this section; and
(F) That signal, ground, and power cables are properly separated.
(p) Mechanical equipment. (1) General requirements. (i) The
critical safety components of mechanical elevating and rotating
equipment shall receive a thorough visual inspection before use on each
shift.
Note: Critical safety components of mechanical elevating and
rotating equipment are components whose failure would result in a
free fall or free rotation of the boom.
(ii) No vehicular equipment having an obstructed view to the rear
may be operated on off-highway jobsites where any employee is exposed
to the hazards created by the moving vehicle, unless:
(A) The vehicle has a reverse signal alarm audible above the
surrounding noise level, or
(B) The vehicle is backed up only when a designated employee
signals that it is safe to do so.
(iii) The operator of an electric line truck may not leave his or
her position at the controls while a load is suspended, unless the
employer can demonstrate that no employee (including the operator)
might be endangered.
(iv) Rubber-tired, self-propelled scrapers, rubber-tired front-end
loaders, rubber-tired dozers, wheel-type agricultural and industrial
tractors, crawler-type tractors, crawler-type loaders, and motor
graders, with or without attachments, shall have roll-over protective
structures that meet the requirements of Subpart W of Part 1926 of this
chapter.
(2) Outriggers. (i) Vehicular equipment, if provided with
outriggers, shall be operated with the outriggers extended and firmly
set as necessary for the stability of the specific configuration of the
equipment. Outriggers may not be extended or retracted outside of clear
view of the operator unless all employees are outside the range of
possible equipment motion.
(ii) If the work area or the terrain precludes the use of
outriggers, the equipment may be operated only within its maximum load
ratings for the particular configuration of the equipment without
outriggers.
(3) Applied loads. Mechanical equipment used to lift or move lines
or other material shall be used within its maximum load rating and
other design limitations for the conditions under which the work is
being performed.
(4) Operations near energized lines or equipment. (i) Mechanical
equipment shall be operated so that the minimum approach distances of
Table R-6 through Table R-10 are maintained from exposed energized
lines and equipment. However, the insulated portion of an aerial lift
operated by a qualified employee in the lift is exempt from this
requirement.
(ii) A designated employee other than the equipment operator shall
observe the approach distance to exposed lines and equipment and give
timely warnings before the minimum approach distance required by
paragraph (p)(4)(i) is reached, unless the employer can demonstrate
that the operator can accurately determine that the minimum approach
distance is being maintained.
(iii) If, during operation of the mechanical equipment, the
equipment could become energized, the operation shall also comply with
at least one of paragraphs (p)(4)(iii)(A) through (p)(4)(iii)(C) of
this section.
(A) The energized lines exposed to contact shall be covered with
insulating protective material that will withstand the type of contact
that might be made during the operation.
(B) The equipment shall be insulated for the voltage involved. The
equipment shall be positioned so that its uninsulated portions cannot
approach the lines or equipment any closer than the minimum approach
distances specified in Table R-6 through Table R-10.
(C) Each employee shall be protected from hazards that might arise
from equipment contact with the energized lines. The measures used
shall ensure that employees will not be exposed to hazardous
differences in potential. Unless the employer can demonstrate that the
methods in use protect each employee from the hazards that might arise
if the equipment contacts the energized line, the measures used shall
include all of the following techniques:
(1) Using the best available ground to minimize the time the lines
remain energized,
(2) Bonding equipment together to minimize potential differences,
(3) Providing ground mats to extend areas of equipotential, and
(4) Employing insulating protective equipment or barricades to
guard against any remaining hazardous potential differences.
Note: Appendix C of this part contains information on hazardous
step and touch potentials and on methods of protecting employees
from hazards resulting from such potentials.
(q) Overhead lines. This paragraph provides additional requirements
for work performed on or near overhead lines and equipment.
(1) General. (i) Before elevated structures, such as poles or
towers, are subjected to such stresses as climbing or the installation
or removal of equipment may impose, the employer shall ascertain that
the structures are capable of sustaining the additional or unbalanced
stresses. If the pole or other structure cannot withstand the loads
which will be imposed, it shall be braced or otherwise supported so as
to prevent failure.
Note: Appendix D of this part contains test methods that can be
used in ascertaining whether a wood pole is capable of sustaining
the forces that would be imposed by an employee climbing the pole.
This paragraph also requires the employer to ascertain that the pole
can sustain all other forces that will be imposed by the work to be
performed.
(ii) When poles are set, moved, or removed near exposed energized
overhead conductors, the pole may not contact the conductors.
(iii) When a pole is set, moved, or removed near an exposed
energized overhead conductor, the employer shall ensure that each
employee wears electrical protective equipment or uses insulated
devices when handling the pole and that no employee contacts the pole
with uninsulated parts of his or her body.
(iv) To protect employees from falling into holes into which poles
are to be placed, the holes shall be attended by employees or
physically guarded whenever anyone is working nearby.
(2) Installing and removing overhead lines. The following
provisions apply to the installation and removal of overhead conductors
or cable.
(i) The employer shall use the tension stringing method, barriers,
or other equivalent measures to minimize the possibility that
conductors and cables being installed or removed will contact energized
power lines or equipment.
(ii) The protective measures required by paragraph (p)(4)(iii) of
this section for mechanical equipment shall also be provided for
conductors, cables, and pulling and tensioning equipment when the
conductor or cable is being installed or removed close enough to
energized conductors that any of the following failures could energize
the pulling or tensioning equipment or the wire or cable being
installed or removed:
(A) Failure of the pulling or tensioning equipment,
(B) Failure of the wire or cable being pulled, or
(C) Failure of the previously installed lines or equipment.
(iii) If the conductors being installed or removed cross over
energized conductors in excess of 600 volts and if the design of the
circuit-interrupting devices protecting the lines so permits, the
automatic-reclosing feature of these devices shall be made inoperative.
(iv) Before lines are installed parallel to existing energized
lines, the employer shall make a determination of the approximate
voltage to be induced in the new lines, or work shall proceed on the
assumption that the induced voltage is hazardous. Unless the employer
can demonstrate that the lines being installed are not subject to the
induction of a hazardous voltage or unless the lines are treated as
energized, the following requirements also apply:
(A) Each bare conductor shall be grounded in increments so that no
point along the conductor is more than 2 miles (3.22 km) from a ground.
(B) The grounds required in paragraph (q)(2)(iv)(A) of this section
shall be left in place until the conductor installation is completed
between dead ends.
(C) The grounds required in paragraph (q)(2)(iv)(A) of this section
shall be removed as the last phase of aerial cleanup.
(D) If employees are working on bare conductors, grounds shall also
be installed at each location where these employees are working, and
grounds shall be installed at all open dead-end or catch-off points or
the next adjacent structure.
(E) If two bare conductors are to be spliced, the conductors shall
be bonded and grounded before being spliced.
(v) Reel handling equipment, including pulling and tensioning
devices, shall be in safe operating condition and shall be leveled and
aligned.
(vi) Load ratings of stringing lines, pulling lines, conductor
grips, load-bearing hardware and accessories, rigging, and hoists may
not be exceeded.
(vii) Pulling lines and accessories shall be repaired or replaced
when defective.
(viii) Conductor grips may not be used on wire rope, unless the
grip is specifically designed for this application.
(ix) Reliable communications, through two-way radios or other
equivalent means, shall be maintained between the reel tender and the
pulling rig operator.
(x) The pulling rig may only be operated when it is safe to do so.
Note: Examples of unsafe conditions include employees in
locations prohibited by paragraph (q)(2)(xi) of this section,
conductor and pulling line hang-ups, and slipping of the conductor
grip.
(xi) While the conductor or pulling line is being pulled (in
motion) with a power-driven device, employees are not permitted
directly under overhead operations or on the cross arm, except as
necessary to guide the stringing sock or board over or through the
stringing sheave.
(3) Live-line bare-hand work. In addition to other applicable
provisions contained in this section, the following requirements apply
to live-line bare-hand work:
(i) Before using or supervising the use of the live-line bare-hand
technique on energized circuits, employees shall be trained in the
technique and in the safety requirements of paragraph (q)(3) of this
section. Employees shall receive refresher training as required by
paragraph (a)(2).
(ii) Before any employee uses the live-line bare-hand technique on
energized high-voltage conductors or parts, the following information
shall be ascertained:
(A) The nominal voltage rating of the circuit on which the work is
to be performed,
(B) The minimum approach distances to ground of lines and other
energized parts on which work is to be performed, and
(C) The voltage limitations of equipment to be used.
(iii) The insulated equipment, insulated tools, and aerial devices
and platforms used shall be designed, tested, and intended for live-
line bare-hand work. Tools and equipment shall be kept clean and dry
while they are in use.
(iv) The automatic-reclosing feature of circuit-interrupting
devices protecting the lines shall be made inoperative, if the design
of the devices permits.
(v) Work may not be performed when adverse weather conditions would
make the work hazardous even after the work practices required by this
section are employed. Additionally, work may not be performed when
winds reduce the phase-to-phase or phase-to-ground minimum approach
distances at the work location below that specified in paragraph
(q)(3)(xiii) of this section, unless the grounded objects and other
lines and equipment are covered by insulating guards.
Note: Thunderstorms in the immediate vicinity, high winds, snow
storms, and ice storms are examples of adverse weather conditions
that are presumed to make live-line bare-hand work too hazardous to
perform safely.
(vi) A conductive bucket liner or other conductive device shall be
provided for bonding the insulated aerial device to the energized line
or equipment.
(A) The employee shall be connected to the bucket liner or other
conductive device by the use of conductive shoes, leg clips, or other
means.
(B) Where differences in potentials at the worksite pose a hazard
to employees, electrostatic shielding designed for the voltage being
worked shall be provided.
(vii) Before the employee contacts the energized part, the
conductive bucket liner or other conductive device shall be bonded to
the energized conductor by means of a positive connection. This
connection shall remain attached to the energized conductor until the
work on the energized circuit is completed.
(viii) Aerial lifts to be used for live-line bare-hand work shall
have dual controls (lower and upper) as follows:
(A) The upper controls shall be within easy reach of the employee
in the basket. On a two-basket-type lift, access to the controls shall
be within easy reach from either basket.
(B) The lower set of controls shall be located near the base of the
boom, and they shall be so designed that they can override operation of
the equipment at any time.
(ix) Lower (ground-level) lift controls may not be operated with an
employee in the lift, except in case of emergency.
(x) Before employees are elevated into the work position, all
controls (ground level and bucket) shall be checked to determine that
they are in proper working condition.
(xi) Before the boom of an aerial lift is elevated, the body of the
truck shall be grounded, or the body of the truck shall be barricaded
and treated as energized.
(xii) A boom-current test shall be made before work is started each
day, each time during the day when higher voltage is encountered, and
when changed conditions indicate a need for an additional test. This
test shall consist of placing the bucket in contact with an energized
source equal to the voltage to be encountered for a minimum of 3
minutes. The leakage current may not exceed 1 microampere per kilovolt
of nominal phase-to-ground voltage. Work from the aerial lift shall be
immediately suspended upon indication of a malfunction in the
equipment.
(xiii) The minimum approach distances specified in Table R-6
through Table R-10 shall be maintained from all grounded objects and
from lines and equipment at a potential different from that to which
the live-line bare-hand equipment is bonded, unless such grounded
objects and other lines and equipment are covered by insulating guards.
(xiv) While an employee is approaching, leaving, or bonding to an
energized circuit, the minimum distances in Table R-6 through Table R-
10 shall be maintained between the employee and any grounded parts,
including the lower boom and portions of the truck.
(xv) While the bucket is positioned alongside an energized bushing
or insulator string, the phase-to-ground minimum approach distances of
Table R-6 through Table R-10 shall be maintained between all parts of
the bucket and the grounded end of the bushing or insulator string or
any other grounded surface.
(xvi) Hand lines may not be used between the bucket and the boom or
between the bucket and the ground. However, non-conductive-type hand
lines may be used from conductor to ground if not supported from the
bucket. Ropes used for live-line bare-hand work may not be used for
other purposes.
(xvii) Uninsulated equipment or material may not be passed between
a pole or structure and an aerial lift while an employee working from
the bucket is bonded to an energized part.
(xviii) A minimum approach distance table reflecting the minimum
approach distances listed in Table R-6 through Table R-10 shall be
printed on a plate of durable non-conductive material. This table shall
be mounted so as to be visible to the operator of the boom.
(xix) A non-conductive measuring device shall be readily accessible
to assist employees in maintaining the required minimum approach
distance.
(4) Towers and structures. The following requirements apply to work
performed on towers or other structures which support overhead lines.
(i) The employer shall ensure that no employee is under a tower or
structure while work is in progress, except where the employer can
demonstrate that such a working position is necessary to assist
employees working above.
(ii) Tag lines or other similar devices shall be used to maintain
control of tower sections being raised or positioned, unless the
employer can demonstrate that the use of such devices would create a
greater hazard.
(iii) The loadline may not be detached from a member or section
until the load is safely secured.
(iv) Except during emergency restoration procedures, work shall be
discontinued when adverse weather conditions make the work hazardous in
spite of the work practices required by this section.
Note: Thunderstorms in the immediate vicinity, high winds, snow
storms, and ice storms are examples of adverse weather conditions
that are presumed to make this work too hazardous to perform, except
under emergency conditions.
(r) Line-clearance tree trimming operations. This paragraph
provides additional requirements for line-clearance tree-trimming
operations and for equipment used in these operations.
(1) Electrical hazards. This paragraph does not apply to qualified
employees.
(i) Before an employee climbs, enters, or works around any tree, a
determination shall be made of the nominal voltage of electric power
lines posing a hazard to employees. However, a determination of the
maximum nominal voltage to which an employee will be exposed may be
made instead, if all lines are considered as energized at this maximum
voltage.
(ii) There shall be a second line-clearance tree trimmer within
normal (that is, unassisted) voice communication under any of the
following conditions:
(A) If a line-clearance tree trimmer is to approach more closely
than 10 feet (305 cm) any conductor or electrical apparatus energized
at more than 750 volts or
(B) If branches or limbs being removed are closer to lines
energized at more than 750 volts than the distances listed in Table R-
6, Table R-9, and Table R-10 or
(C) If roping is necessary to remove branches or limbs from such
conductors or apparatus.
(iii) Line-clearance tree trimmers shall maintain the minimum
approach distances from energized conductors given in Table R-6, Table
R-9, and Table R-10.
(iv) Branches that are contacting exposed energized conductors or
equipment or that are within the distances specified in Table R-6,
Table R-9, and Table R-10 may be removed only through the use of
insulating equipment.
Note: A tool constructed of a material that the employer can
demonstrate has insulating qualities meeting paragraph (j)(1) of
this section are considered as insulated under this paragraph if the
tool is clean and dry.
(v) Ladders, platforms, and aerial devices may not be brought
closer to an energized part than the distances listed in Table R-6,
Table R-9, and Table R-10.
(vi) Line-clearance tree-trimming work may not be performed when
adverse weather conditions make the work hazardous in spite of the work
practices required by this section. Each employee performing line-
clearance tree trimming work in the aftermath of a storm or under
similar emergency conditions shall be trained in the special hazards
related to this type of work.
Note: Thunderstorms in the immediate vicinity, high winds, snow
storms, and ice storms are examples of adverse weather conditions
that are presumed to make line-clearance tree trimming work too
hazardous to perform safely.
(2) Brush chippers. (i) Brush chippers shall be equipped with a
locking device in the ignition system.
(ii) Access panels for maintenance and adjustment of the chipper
blades and associated drive train shall be in place and secure during
operation of the equipment.
(iii) Brush chippers not equipped with a mechanical infeed system
shall be equipped with an infeed hopper of length sufficient to prevent
employees from contacting the blades or knives of the machine during
operation.
(iv) Trailer chippers detached from trucks shall be chocked or
otherwise secured.
(v) Each employee in the immediate area of an operating chipper
feed table shall wear personal protective equipment as required by
Subpart I of this Part.
(3) Sprayers and related equipment. (i) Walking and working
surfaces of sprayers and related equipment shall be covered with slip-
resistant material. If slipping hazards cannot be eliminated, slip-
resistant footwear or handrails and stair rails meeting the
requirements of Subpart D may be used instead of slip-resistant
material.
(ii) Equipment on which employees stand to spray while the vehicle
is in motion shall be equipped with guardrails around the working area.
The guardrail shall be constructed in accordance with Subpart D of this
Part.
(4) Stump cutters. (i) Stump cutters shall be equipped with
enclosures or guards to protect employees.
(ii) Each employee in the immediate area of stump grinding
operations (including the stump cutter operator) shall wear personal
protective equipment as required by Subpart I of this Part.
(5) Gasoline-engine power saws. Gasoline-engine power saw
operations shall meet the requirements of Sec. 1910.266(c)(5) of this
Part and the following:
(i) Each power saw weighing more than 15 pounds (6.8 kilograms,
service weight) that is used in trees shall be supported by a separate
line, except when work is performed from an aerial lift and except
during topping or removing operations where no supporting limb will be
available.
(ii) Each power saw shall be equipped with a control that will
return the saw to idling speed when released.
(iii) Each power saw shall be equipped with a clutch and shall be
so adjusted that the clutch will not engage the chain drive at idling
speed.
(iv) A power saw shall be started on the ground or where it is
otherwise firmly supported. Drop starting of saws over 15 pounds (6.8
kg) is permitted outside of the bucket of an aerial lift only if the
area below the lift is clear of personnel.
(v) A power saw engine may be started and operated only when all
employees other than the operator are clear of the saw.
(vi) A power saw may not be running when the saw is being carried
up into a tree by an employee.
(vii) Power saw engines shall be stopped for all cleaning,
refueling, adjustments, and repairs to the saw or motor, except as the
manufacturer's servicing procedures require otherwise.
(6) Backpack power units for use in pruning and clearing. (i) While
a backpack power unit is running, no one other than the operator may be
within 10 feet (305 cm) of the cutting head of a brush saw.
(ii) A backpack power unit shall be equipped with a quick shutoff
switch readily accessible to the operator.
(iii) Backpack power unit engines shall be stopped for all
cleaning, refueling, adjustments, and repairs to the saw or motor,
except as the manufacturer's servicing procedures require otherwise.
(7) Rope. (i) Climbing ropes shall be used by employees working
aloft in trees. These ropes shall have a minimum diameter of 0.5 inch
(1.2 cm) with a minimum breaking strength of 2300 pounds (10.2 kN).
Synthetic rope shall have elasticity of not more than 7 percent.
(ii) Rope shall be inspected before each use and, if unsafe (for
example, because of damage or defect), may not be used.
(iii) Rope shall be stored away from cutting edges and sharp tools.
Rope contact with corrosive chemicals, gas, and oil shall be avoided.
(iv) When stored, rope shall be coiled and piled, or shall be
suspended, so that air can circulate through the coils.
(v) Rope ends shall be secured to prevent their unraveling.
(vi) Climbing rope may not be spliced to effect repair.
(vii) A rope that is wet, that is contaminated to the extent that
its insulating capacity is impaired, or that is otherwise not
considered to be insulated for the voltage involved may not be used
near exposed energized lines.
(8) Fall protection. Each employee shall be tied in with a climbing
rope and safety saddle when the employee is working above the ground in
a tree, unless he or she is ascending into the tree.
(s) Communication facilities. (1) Microwave transmission. (i) The
employer shall ensure that no employee looks into an open waveguide or
antenna that is connected to an energized microwave source.
(ii) If the electromagnetic radiation level within an accessible
area associated with microwave communications systems exceeds the
radiation protection guide given in Sec. 1910.97(a)(2) of this Part,
the area shall be posted with the warning symbol described in
Sec. 1910.97(a)(3) of this Part. The lower half of the warning symbol
shall include the following statements or ones that the employer can
demonstrate are equivalent:
Radiation in this area may exceed hazard limitations and special
precautions are required. Obtain specific instruction before
entering.
(iii) When an employee works in an area where the electromagnetic
radiation could exceed the radiation protection guide, the employer
shall institute measures that ensure that the employee's exposure is
not greater than that permitted by that guide. Such measures may
include administrative and engineering controls and personal protective
equipment.
(2) Power line carrier. Power line carrier work, including work on
equipment used for coupling carrier current to power line conductors,
shall be performed in accordance with the requirements of this section
pertaining to work on energized lines.
(t) Underground electrical installations. This paragraph provides
additional requirements for work on underground electrical
installations.
(1) Access. A ladder or other climbing device shall be used to
enter and exit a manhole or subsurface vault exceeding 4 feet (122 cm)
in depth. No employee may climb into or out of a manhole or vault by
stepping on cables or hangers.
(2) Lowering equipment into manholes. Equipment used to lower
materials and tools into manholes or vaults shall be capable of
supporting the weight to be lowered and shall be checked for defects
before use. Before tools or material are lowered into the opening for a
manhole or vault, each employee working in the manhole or vault shall
be clear of the area directly under the opening.
(3) Attendants for manholes. (i) While work is being performed in a
manhole containing energized electric equipment, an employee with first
aid and CPR training meeting paragraph (b)(1) of this section shall be
available on the surface in the immediate vicinity to render emergency
assistance.
(ii) Occasionally, the employee on the surface may briefly enter a
manhole to provide assistance, other than emergency.
Note 1: An attendant may also be required under paragraph (e)(7)
of this section. One person may serve to fulfill both requirements.
However, attendants required under paragraph (e)(7) of this section
are not permitted to enter the manhole.
Note 2: Employees entering manholes containing unguarded,
uninsulated energized lines or parts of electric equipment operating
at 50 volts or more are required to be qualified under paragraph
(l)(1) of this section.
(iii) For the purpose of inspection, housekeeping, taking readings,
or similar work, an employee working alone may enter, for brief periods
of time, a manhole where energized cables or equipment are in service,
if the employer can demonstrate that the employee will be protected
from all electrical hazards.
(iv) Reliable communications, through two-way radios or other
equivalent means, shall be maintained among all employees involved in
the job.
(4) Duct rods. If duct rods are used, they shall be installed in
the direction presenting the least hazard to employees. An employee
shall be stationed at the far end of the duct line being rodded to
ensure that the required minimum approach distances are maintained.
(5) Multiple cables. When multiple cables are present in a work
area, the cable to be worked shall be identified by electrical means,
unless its identity is obvious by reason of distinctive appearance or
location or by other readily apparent means of identification. Cables
other than the one being worked shall be protected from damage.
(6) Moving cables. Energized cables that are to be moved shall be
inspected for defects.
(7) Defective cables. Where a cable in a manhole has one or more
abnormalities that could lead to or be an indication of an impending
fault, the defective cable shall be deenergized before any employee may
work in the manhole, except when service load conditions and a lack of
feasible alternatives require that the cable remain energized. In that
case, employees may enter the manhole provided they are protected from
the possible effects of a failure by shields or other devices that are
capable of containing the adverse effects of a fault in the joint.
Note: Abnormalities such as oil or compound leaking from cable
or joints, broken cable sheaths or joint sleeves, hot localized
surface temperatures of cables or joints, or joints that are swollen
beyond normal tolerance are presumed to lead to or be an indication
of an impending fault.
(8) Sheath continuity. When work is performed on buried cable or on
cable in manholes, metallic sheath continuity shall be maintained or
the cable sheath shall be treated as energized.
(u) Substations. This paragraph provides additional requirements
for substations and for work performed in them.
(1) Access and working space. Sufficient access and working space
shall be provided and maintained about electric equipment to permit
ready and safe operation and maintenance of such equipment.
Note: Guidelines for the dimensions of access and workspace
about electric equipment in substations are contained in American
National Standard--National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI C2-1987.
Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply with paragraph
(u)(1) of this section. An installation that does not conform to
this ANSI standard will, nonetheless, be considered as complying
with paragraph (u)(1) of this section if the employer can
demonstrate that the installation provides ready and safe access
based on the following evidence:
(1) That the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2
that was in effect at the time the installation was made,
(2) That the configuration of the installation enables employees
to maintain the minimum approach distances required by paragraph
(l)(2) of this section while they are working on exposed, energized
parts, and
(3) That the precautions taken when work is performed on the
installation provide protection equivalent to the protection that
would be provided by access and working space meeting ANSI C2-1987.
(2) Draw-out-type circuit breakers. When draw-out-type circuit
breakers are removed or inserted, the breaker shall be in the open
position. The control circuit shall also be rendered inoperative, if
the design of the equipment permits.
(3) Substation fences. Conductive fences around substations shall
be grounded. When a substation fence is expanded or a section is
removed, fence grounding continuity shall be maintained, and bonding
shall be used to prevent electrical discontinuity.
(4) Guarding of rooms containing electric supply equipment. (i)
Rooms and spaces in which electric supply lines or equipment are
installed shall meet the requirements of paragraphs (u)(4)(ii) through
(u)(4)(v) of this section under the following conditions:
(A) If exposed live parts operating at 50 to 150 volts to ground
are located within 8 feet of the ground or other working surface inside
the room or space,
(B) If live parts operating at 151 to 600 volts and located within
8 feet of the ground or other working surface inside the room or space
are guarded only by location, as permitted under paragraph (u)(5)(i) of
this section, or
(C) If live parts operating at more than 600 volts are located
within the room or space, unless:
(1) The live parts are enclosed within grounded, metal-enclosed
equipment whose only openings are designed so that foreign objects
inserted in these openings will be deflected from energized parts, or
(2) The live parts are installed at a height above ground and any
other working surface that provides protection at the voltage to which
they are energized corresponding to the protection provided by an 8-
foot height at 50 volts.
(ii) The rooms and spaces shall be so enclosed within fences,
screens, partitions, or walls as to minimize the possibility that
unqualified persons will enter.
(iii) Signs warning unqualified persons to keep out shall be
displayed at entrances to the rooms and spaces.
(iv) Entrances to rooms and spaces that are not under the
observation of an attendant shall be kept locked.
(v) Unqualified persons may not enter the rooms or spaces while the
electric supply lines or equipment are energized.
(5) Guarding of energized parts. (i) Guards shall be provided
around all live parts operating at more than 150 volts to ground
without an insulating covering, unless the location of the live parts
gives sufficient horizontal or vertical or a combination of these
clearances to minimize the possibility of accidental employee contact.
Note: Guidelines for the dimensions of clearance distances about
electric equipment in substations are contained in American National
Standard--National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI C2-1987.
Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply with paragraph
(u)(5)(i) of this section. An installation that does not conform to
this ANSI standard will, nonetheless, be considered as complying
with paragraph (u)(5)(i) of this section if the employer can
demonstrate that the installation provides sufficient clearance
based on the following evidence:
(1) That the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2
that was in effect at the time the installation was made,
(2) That each employee is isolated from energized parts at the
point of closest approach, and
(3) That the precautions taken when work is performed on the
installation provide protection equivalent to the protection that
would be provided by horizontal and vertical clearances meeting ANSI
C2-1987.
(ii) Except for fuse replacement and other necessary access by
qualified persons, the guarding of energized parts within a compartment
shall be maintained during operation and maintenance functions to
prevent accidental contact with energized parts and to prevent tools or
other equipment from being dropped on energized parts.
(iii) When guards are removed from energized equipment, barriers
shall be installed around the work area to prevent employees who are
not working on the equipment, but who are in the area, from contacting
the exposed live parts.
(6) Substation entry. (i) Upon entering an attended substation,
each employee other than those regularly working in the station shall
report his or her presence to the employee in charge in order to
receive information on special system conditions affecting employee
safety.
(ii) The job briefing required by paragraph (c) of this section
shall cover such additional subjects as the location of energized
equipment in or adjacent to the work area and the limits of any
deenergized work area.
(v) Power generation. This paragraph provides additional
requirements and related work practices for power generating plants.
(1) Interlocks and other safety devices. (i) Interlocks and other
safety devices shall be maintained in a safe, operable condition.
(ii) No interlock or other safety device may be modified to defeat
its function, except for test, repair, or adjustment of the device.
(2) Changing brushes. Before exciter or generator brushes are
changed while the generator is in service, the exciter or generator
field shall be checked to determine whether a ground condition exists.
The brushes may not be changed while the generator is energized if a
ground condition exists.
(3) Access and working space. Sufficient access and working space
shall be provided and maintained about electric equipment to permit
ready and safe operation and maintenance of such equipment.
Note: Guidelines for the dimensions of access and workspace
about electric equipment in generating stations are contained in
American National Standard--National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI
C2-1987. Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply with
paragraph (v)(3) of this section. An installation that does not
conform to this ANSI standard will, nonetheless, be considered as
complying with paragraph (v)(3) of this section if the employer can
demonstrate that the installation provides ready and safe access
based on the following evidence:
(1) That the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2
that was in effect at the time the installation was made,
(2) That the configuration of the installation enables employees
to maintain the minimum approach distances required by paragraph
(l)(2) of this section while they work on exposed, energized parts,
and
(3) That the precautions taken when work is performed on the
installation provide protection equivalent to the protection that
would be provided by access and working space meeting ANSI C2-1987.
(4) Guarding of rooms containing electric supply equipment. (i)
Rooms and spaces in which electric supply lines or equipment are
installed shall meet the requirements of paragraphs (v)(4)(ii) through
(v)(4)(v) of this section under the following conditions:
(A) If exposed live parts operating at 50 to 150 volts to ground
are located within 8 feet of the ground or other working surface inside
the room or space,
(B) If live parts operating at 151 to 600 volts and located within
8 feet of the ground or other working surface inside the room or space
are guarded only by location, as permitted under paragraph (v)(5)(i) of
this section, or
(C) If live parts operating at more than 600 volts are located
within the room or space, unless:
(1) The live parts are enclosed within grounded, metal-enclosed
equipment whose only openings are designed so that foreign objects
inserted in these openings will be deflected from energized parts, or
(2) The live parts are installed at a height above ground and any
other working surface that provides protection at the voltage to which
they are energized corresponding to the protection provided by an 8-
foot height at 50 volts.
(ii) The rooms and spaces shall be so enclosed within fences,
screens, partitions, or walls as to minimize the possibility that
unqualified persons will enter.
(iii) Signs warning unqualified persons to keep out shall be
displayed at entrances to the rooms and spaces.
(iv) Entrances to rooms and spaces that are not under the
observation of an attendant shall be kept locked.
(v) Unqualified persons may not enter the rooms or spaces while the
electric supply lines or equipment are energized.
(5) Guarding of energized parts. (i) Guards shall be provided
around all live parts operating at more than 150 volts to ground
without an insulating covering, unless the location of the live parts
gives sufficient horizontal or vertical or a combination of these
clearances to minimize the possibility of accidental employee contact.
Note: Guidelines for the dimensions of clearance distances about
electric equipment in generating stations are contained in American
National Standard--National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI C2-1987.
Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply with paragraph
(v)(5)(i) of this section. An installation that does not conform to
this ANSI standard will, nonetheless, be considered as complying
with paragraph (v)(5)(i) of this section if the employer can
demonstrate that the installation provides sufficient clearance
based on the following evidence:
(1) That the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2
that was in effect at the time the installation was made,
(2) That each employee is isolated from energized parts at the
point of closest approach, and
(3) That the precautions taken when work is performed on the
installation provide protection equivalent to the protection that
would be provided by horizontal and vertical clearances meeting ANSI
C2-1987.
(ii) Except for fuse replacement or other necessary access by
qualified persons, the guarding of energized parts within a compartment
shall be maintained during operation and maintenance functions to
prevent accidental contact with energized parts and to prevent tools or
other equipment from being dropped on energized parts.
(iii) When guards are removed from energized equipment, barriers
shall be installed around the work area to prevent employees who are
not working on the equipment, but who are in the area, from contacting
the exposed live parts.
(6) Water or steam spaces. The following requirements apply to work
in water and steam spaces associated with boilers:
(i) A designated employee shall inspect conditions before work is
permitted and after its completion. Eye protection, or full face
protection if necessary, shall be worn at all times when condenser,
heater, or boiler tubes are being cleaned.
(ii) Where it is necessary for employees to work near tube ends
during cleaning, shielding shall be installed at the tube ends.
(7) Chemical cleaning of boilers and pressure vessels. The
following requirements apply to chemical cleaning of boilers and
pressure vessels:
(i) Areas where chemical cleaning is in progress shall be cordoned
off to restrict access during cleaning. If flammable liquids, gases, or
vapors or combustible materials will be used or might be produced
during the cleaning process, the following requirements also apply:
(A) The area shall be posted with signs restricting entry and
warning of the hazards of fire and explosion; and
(B) Smoking, welding, and other possible ignition sources are
prohibited in these restricted areas.
(ii) The number of personnel in the restricted area shall be
limited to those necessary to accomplish the task safely.
(iii) There shall be ready access to water or showers for emergency
use.
Note: See Sec. 1910.141 of this Part for requirements that apply
to the water supply and to washing facilities.
(iv) Employees in restricted areas shall wear protective equipment
meeting the requirements of Subpart I of this Part and including, but
not limited to, protective clothing, boots, goggles, and gloves.
(8) Chlorine systems. (i) Chlorine system enclosures shall be
posted with signs restricting entry and warning of the hazard to health
and the hazards of fire and explosion.
Note: See Subpart Z of this Part for requirements necessary to
protect the health of employees from the effects of chlorine.
(ii) Only designated employees may enter the restricted area.
Additionally, the number of personnel shall be limited to those
necessary to accomplish the task safely.
(iii) Emergency repair kits shall be available near the shelter or
enclosure to allow for the prompt repair of leaks in chlorine lines,
equipment, or containers.
(iv) Before repair procedures are started, chlorine tanks, pipes,
and equipment shall be purged with dry air and isolated from other
sources of chlorine.
(v) The employer shall ensure that chlorine is not mixed with
materials that would react with the chlorine in a dangerously
exothermic or other hazardous manner.
(9) Boilers. (i) Before internal furnace or ash hopper repair work
is started, overhead areas shall be inspected for possible falling
objects. If the hazard of falling objects exists, overhead protection
such as planking or nets shall be provided.
(ii) When opening an operating boiler door, employees shall stand
clear of the opening of the door to avoid the heat blast and gases
which may escape from the boiler.
(10) Turbine generators. (i) Smoking and other ignition sources are
prohibited near hydrogen or hydrogen sealing systems, and signs warning
of the danger of explosion and fire shall be posted.
(ii) Excessive hydrogen makeup or abnormal loss of pressure shall
be considered as an emergency and shall be corrected immediately.
(iii) A sufficient quantity of inert gas shall be available to
purge the hydrogen from the largest generator.
(11) Coal and ash handling. (i) Only designated persons may operate
railroad equipment.
(ii) Before a locomotive or locomotive crane is moved, a warning
shall be given to employees in the area.
(iii) Employees engaged in switching or dumping cars may not use
their feet to line up drawheads.
(iv) Drawheads and knuckles may not be shifted while locomotives or
cars are in motion.
(v) When a railroad car is stopped for unloading, the car shall be
secured from displacement that could endanger employees.
(vi) An emergency means of stopping dump operations shall be
provided at railcar dumps.
(vii) The employer shall ensure that employees who work in coal- or
ash-handling conveyor areas are trained and knowledgeable in conveyor
operation and in the requirements of paragraphs (v)(11)(viii) through
(v)(11)(xii) of this section.
(viii) Employees may not ride a coal- or ash-handling conveyor belt
at any time. Employees may not cross over the conveyor belt, except at
walkways, unless the conveyor's energy source has been deenergized and
has been locked out or tagged in accordance with paragraph (d) of this
section.
(ix) A conveyor that could cause injury when started may not be
started until personnel in the area are alerted by a signal or by a
designated person that the conveyor is about to start.
(x) If a conveyor that could cause injury when started is
automatically controlled or is controlled from a remote location, an
audible device shall be provided that sounds an alarm that will be
recognized by each employee as a warning that the conveyor will start
and that can be clearly heard at all points along the conveyor where
personnel may be present. The warning device shall be actuated by the
device starting the conveyor and shall continue for a period of time
before the conveyor starts that is long enough to allow employees to
move clear of the conveyor system. A visual warning may be used in
place of the audible device if the employer can demonstrate that it
will provide an equally effective warning in the particular
circumstances involved.
Note: Exception: If the employer can demonstrate that the
system's function would be seriously hindered by the required time
delay, warning signs may be provided in place of the audible warning
device. If the system was installed before [insert date 1 year after
publication date], warning signs may be provided in place of the
audible warning device until such time as the conveyor or its
control system is rebuilt or rewired. These warning signs shall be
clear, concise, and legible and shall indicate that conveyors and
allied equipment may be started at any time, that danger exists, and
that personnel must keep clear. These warning signs shall be
provided along the conveyor at areas not guarded by position or
location.
(xi) Remotely and automatically controlled conveyors, and conveyors
that have operating stations which are not manned or which are beyond
voice and visual contact from drive areas, loading areas, transfer
points, and other locations on the conveyor path not guarded by
location, position, or guards shall be furnished with emergency stop
buttons, pull cords, limit switches, or similar emergency stop devices.
However, if the employer can demonstrate that the design, function, and
operation of the conveyor do not expose an employee to hazards, an
emergency stop device is not required.
(A) Emergency stop devices shall be easily identifiable in the
immediate vicinity of such locations.
(B) An emergency stop device shall act directly on the control of
the conveyor involved and may not depend on the stopping of any other
equipment.
(C) Emergency stop devices shall be installed so that they cannot
be overridden from other locations.
(xii) Where coal-handling operations may produce a combustible
atmosphere from fuel sources or from flammable gases or dust, sources
of ignition shall be eliminated or safely controlled to prevent
ignition of the combustible atmosphere.
Note: Locations that are hazardous because of the presence of
combustible dust are classified as Class II hazardous locations. See
Sec. 1910.307 of this Part.
(xiii) An employee may not work on or beneath overhanging coal in
coal bunkers, coal silos, or coal storage areas, unless the employee is
protected from all hazards posed by shifting coal.
(xiv) An employee entering a bunker or silo to dislodge the
contents shall wear a body harness with lifeline attached. The lifeline
shall be secured to a fixed support outside the bunker and shall be
attended at all times by an employee located outside the bunker or
facility.
(12) Hydroplants and equipment. Employees working on or close to
water gates, valves, intakes, forebays, flumes, or other locations
where increased or decreased water flow or levels may pose a
significant hazard shall be warned and shall vacate such dangerous
areas before water flow changes are made.
(w) Special conditions. (1) Capacitors. The following additional
requirements apply to work on capacitors and on lines connected to
capacitors.
Note: See paragraphs (m) and (n) of this section for
requirements pertaining to the deenergizing and grounding of
capacitor installations.
(i) Before employees work on capacitors, the capacitors shall be
disconnected from energized sources and, after a wait of at least 5
minutes from the time of disconnection, short-circuited.
(ii) Before the units are handled, each unit in series-parallel
capacitor banks shall be short-circuited between all terminals and the
capacitor case or its rack. If the cases of capacitors are on
ungrounded substation racks, the racks shall be bonded to ground.
(iii) Any line to which capacitors are connected shall be short-
circuited before it is considered deenergized.
(2) Current transformer secondaries. The secondary of a current
transformer may not be opened while the transformer is energized. If
the primary of the current transformer cannot be deenergized before
work is performed on an instrument, a relay, or other section of a
current transformer secondary circuit, the circuit shall be bridged so
that the current transformer secondary will not be opened.
(3) Series streetlighting. If the open-circuit voltage exceeds 600
volts, the series streetlighting circuit shall be worked in accordance
with paragraph (q) or (t) of this section, as appropriate. A series
loop may only be opened after the streetlighting transformer has been
deenergized and isolated from the source of supply or after the loop is
bridged to avoid an open-circuit condition.
(4) Illumination. Sufficient illumination shall be provided to
enable the employee to perform the work safely.
(5) Protection against drowning. (i) Whenever an employee may be
pulled or pushed or may fall into water where the danger of drowning
exists, the employee shall be provided with and shall use U.S. Coast
Guard approved personal flotation devices.
(ii) Each personal flotation device shall be maintained in safe
condition and shall be inspected frequently enough to ensure that it
does not have rot, mildew, water saturation, and or any other condition
that could render the device unsuitable for use.
(iii) An employee may cross streams or other bodies of water only
if a safe means of passage, such as a bridge, is provided.
(6) Employee protection in public work areas.
(i) Traffic control signs and traffic control devices used for the
protection of employees shall meet the requirements of
Sec. 1926.200(g)(2) of this Chapter.
(ii) Before work is begun in the vicinity of vehicular or
pedestrian traffic that may endanger employees, warning signs or flags
and other traffic control devices shall be placed in conspicuous
locations to alert and channel approaching traffic.
(iii) Where additional employee protection is necessary, barricades
shall be used.
(iv) Excavated areas shall be protected with barricades.
(v) At night, warning lights shall be prominently displayed.
(7) Backfeed. If there is a possibility of voltage backfeed from
sources of cogeneration or from the secondary system (for example,
backfeed from more than one energized phase feeding a common load), the
requirements of paragraph (1) of this section apply if the lines or
equipment are to be worked as energized, and the requirements of
paragraphs (m) and (n) of this section apply if the lines or equipment
are to be worked as deenergized.
(8) Lasers. Laser equipment shall be installed, adjusted, and
operated in accordance with Sec. 1926.54 of this Chapter.
(9) Hydraulic fluids. Hydraulic fluids used for the insulated
sections of equipment shall provide insulation for the voltage
involved.
(x) Definitions.
Affected employee. An employee whose job requires him or her to
operate or use a machine or equipment on which servicing or maintenance
is being performed under lockout or tagout, or whose job requires him
or her to work in an area in which such servicing or maintenance is
being performed.
Attendant. An employee assigned to remain immediately outside the
entrance to an enclosed or other space to render assistance as needed
to employees inside the space.
Authorized employee. An employee who locks out or tags out machines
or equipment in order to perform servicing or maintenance on that
machine or equipment. An affected employee becomes an authorized
employee when that employee's duties include performing servicing or
maintenance covered under this section.
Automatic circuit recloser. A self-controlled device for
interrupting and reclosing an alternating current circuit with a
predetermined sequence of opening and reclosing followed by resetting,
hold-closed, or lockout operation.
Barricade. A physical obstruction such as tapes, cones, or A-frame
type wood or metal structures intended to provide a warning about and
to limit access to a hazardous area.
Barrier. A physical obstruction which is intended to prevent
contact with energized lines or equipment or to prevent unauthorized
access to a work area.
Bond. The electrical interconnection of conductive parts designed
to maintain a common electrical potential.
Bus. A conductor or a group of conductors that serve as a common
connection for two or more circuits.
Bushing. An insulating structure, including a through conductor or
providing a passageway for such a conductor, with provision for
mounting on a barrier, conducting or otherwise, for the purposes of
insulating the conductor from the barrier and conducting current from
one side of the barrier to the other.
Cable. A conductor with insulation, or a stranded conductor with or
without insulation and other coverings (single-conductor cable), or a
combination of conductors insulated from one another (multiple-
conductor cable).
Cable sheath. A conductive protective covering applied to cables.
Note: A cable sheath may consist of multiple layers of which one
or more is conductive.
Circuit. A conductor or system of conductors through which an
electric current is intended to flow.
Clearance (between objects). The clear distance between two objects
measured surface to surface.
Clearance (for work). Authorization to perform specified work or
permission to enter a restricted area.
Communication lines. (See Lines, communication.)
Conductor. A material, usually in the form of a wire, cable, or bus
bar, used for carrying an electric current.
Covered conductor. A conductor covered with a dielectric having no
rated insulating strength or having a rated insulating strength less
than the voltage of the circuit in which the conductor is used.
Current-carrying part. A conducting part intended to be connected
in an electric circuit to a source of voltage. Non-current-carrying
parts are those not intended to be so connected.
Deenergized. Free from any electrical connection to a source of
potential difference and from electric charge; not having a potential
different from that of the earth.
Note: The term is used only with reference to current-carrying
parts, which are sometimes energized (alive).
Designated employee (designated person). An employee (or person)
who is designated by the employer to perform specific duties under the
terms of this section and who is knowledgeable in the construction and
operation of the equipment and the hazards involved.
Electric line truck. A truck used to transport personnel, tools,
and material for electric supply line work.
Electric supply equipment. Equipment that produces, modifies,
regulates, controls, or safeguards a supply of electric energy.
Electric supply lines. (See Lines, electric supply.)
Electric utility. An organization responsible for the installation,
operation, or maintenance of an electric supply system.
Enclosed space. A working space, such as a manhole, vault, tunnel,
or shaft, that has a limited means of egress or entry, that is designed
for periodic employee entry under normal operating conditions, and that
under normal conditions does not contain a hazardous atmosphere, but
that may contain a hazardous atmosphere under abnormal conditions.
Note: Spaces that are enclosed but not designed for employee
entry under normal operating conditions are not considered to be
enclosed spaces for the purposes of this section. Similarly, spaces
that are enclosed and that are expected to contain a hazardous
atmosphere are not considered to be enclosed spaces for the purposes
of this section. Such spaces meet the definition of permit spaces in
Sec. 1910.146 of this Part, and entry into them must be performed in
accordance with that standard.
Energized (alive, live). Electrically connected to a source of
potential difference, or electrically charged so as to have a potential
significantly different from that of earth in the vicinity.
Energy isolating device. A physical device that prevents the
transmission or release of energy, including, but not limited to, the
following: a manually operated electric circuit breaker, a disconnect
switch, a manually operated switch, a slide gate, a slip blind, a line
valve, blocks, and any similar device with a visible indication of the
position of the device. (Push buttons, selector switches, and other
control-circuit-type devices are not energy isolating devices.)
Energy source. Any electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic,
chemical, nuclear, thermal, or other energy source that could cause
injury to personnel.
Equipment (electric). A general term including material, fittings,
devices, appliances, fixtures, apparatus, and the like used as part of
or in connection with an electrical installation.
Exposed. Not isolated or guarded.
Ground. A conducting connection, whether intentional or accidental,
between an electric circuit or equipment and the earth, or to some
conducting body that serves in place of the earth.
Grounded. Connected to earth or to some conducting body that serves
in place of the earth.
Guarded. Covered, fenced, enclosed, or otherwise protected, by
means of suitable covers or casings, barrier rails or screens, mats, or
platforms, designed to minimize the possibility, under normal
conditions, of dangerous approach or accidental contact by persons or
objects.
Note: Wires which are insulated, but not otherwise protected,
are not considered as guarded.
Hazardous atmosphere means an atmosphere that may expose employees
to the risk of death, incapacitation, impairment of ability to self-
rescue (that is, escape unaided from an enclosed space), injury, or
acute illness from one or more of the following causes:
(1) Flammable gas, vapor, or mist in excess of 10 percent of its
lower flammable limit (LFL);
(2) Airborne combustible dust at a concentration that meets or
exceeds its LFL;
Note: This concentration may be approximated as a condition in
which the dust obscures vision at a distance of 5 feet (1.52 m) or
less.
(3) Atmospheric oxygen concentration below 19.5 percent or above
23.5 percent;
(4) Atmospheric concentration of any substance for which a dose or
a permissible exposure limit is published in Subpart G, Occupational
Health and Environmental Control, or in Subpart Z, Toxic and Hazardous
Substances, of this Part and which could result in employee exposure in
excess of its dose or permissible exposure limit;
Note: An atmospheric concentration of any substance that is not
capable of causing death, incapacitation, impairment of ability to
self-rescue, injury, or acute illness due to its health effects is
not covered by this provision.
(5) Any other atmospheric condition that is immediately dangerous
to life or health.
Note: For air contaminants for which OSHA has not determined a
dose or permissible exposure limit, other sources of information,
such as Material Safety Data Sheets that comply with the Hazard
Communication Standard, Sec. 1910.1200 of this Part, published
information, and internal documents can provide guidance in
establishing acceptable atmospheric conditions.
High-power tests. Tests in which fault currents, load currents,
magnetizing currents, and line-dropping currents are used to test
equipment, either at the equipment's rated voltage or at lower
voltages.
High-voltage tests. Tests in which voltages of approximately 1000
volts are used as a practical minimum and in which the voltage source
has sufficient energy to cause injury.
High wind. A wind of such velocity that the following hazards would
be present:
(1) An employee would be exposed to being blown from elevated
locations, or
(2) An employee or material handling equipment could lose control
of material being handled, or
(3) An employee would be exposed to other hazards not controlled by
the standard involved.
Note: Winds exceeding 40 miles per hour (64.4 kilometers per
hour), or 30 miles per hour (48.3 kilometers per hour) if material
handling is involved, are normally considered as meeting this
criteria unless precautions are taken to protect employees from the
hazardous effects of the wind.
Immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH) means any condition
that poses an immediate or delayed threat to life or that would cause
irreversible adverse health effects or that would interfere with an
individual's ability to escape unaided from a permit space.
Note: Some materials--hydrogen fluoride gas and cadmium vapor,
for example--may produce immediate transient effects that, even if
severe, may pass without medical attention, but are followed by
sudden, possibly fatal collapse 12-72 hours after exposure. The
victim ``feels normal'' from recovery from transient effects until
collapse. Such materials in hazardous quantities are considered to
be ``immediately'' dangerous to life or health.
Insulated. Separated from other conducting surfaces by a dielectric
(including air space) offering a high resistance to the passage of
current.
Note: When any object is said to be insulated, it is understood
to be insulated for the conditions to which it is normally
subjected. Otherwise, it is, within the purpose of this section,
uninsulated.
Insulation (cable). That which is relied upon to insulate the
conductor from other conductors or conducting parts or from ground.
Line-clearance tree trimm. An employee who, through related
training or on-the-job experience or both, is familiar with the special
techniques and hazards involved in line-clearance tree trimming.
Note 1: An employee who is regularly assigned to a line-
clearance tree-trimming crew and who is undergoing on-the-job
training and who, in the course of such training, has demonstrated
an ability to perform duties safely at his or her level of training
and who is under the direct supervision of a line-clearance tree
trimmer is considered to be a line-clearance tree trimmer.
Note 2: A line-clearance tree trimmer is not considered to be a
``qualified employee'' under this section unless he or she has the
training required for a qualified employee under paragraph
(a)(2)(ii) of this section. However, under the electrical safety-
related work practices standard, a line-clearance tree trimmer is
considered to be a ``qualified employee''. Tree trimming performed
by such ``qualified employees'' is not subject to the electrical
safety-related work practice requirements contained in
Secs. 1910.331 through 1910.335 of this Part. (See also the note
following Sec. 1910.332(b)(3) of this Part for information regarding
the training an employee must have to be considered a qualified
employee under Secs. 1910.331 through 1910.335 of this part.)
Line-clearance tree trimming. The pruning, trimming, repairing,
maintaining, removing, or clearing of trees or the cutting of brush
that is within 10 feet (305 cm) of electric supply lines and equipment.
Lines. (1) Communication lines. The conductors and their supporting
or containing structures which are used for public or private signal or
communication service, and which operate at potentials not exceeding
400 volts to ground or 750 volts between any two points of the circuit,
and the transmitted power of which does not exceed 150 watts. If the
lines are operating at less than 150 volts, no limit is placed on the
transmitted power of the system. Under certain conditions,
communication cables may include communication circuits exceeding these
limitations where such circuits are also used to supply power solely to
communication equipment.
Note: Telephone, telegraph, railroad signal, data, clock, fire,
police alarm, cable television, and other systems conforming with
this definition are included. Lines used for signaling purposes, but
not included under this definition, are considered as electric
supply lines of the same voltage.
(2) Electric supply lines. Conductors used to transmit electric
energy and their necessary supporting or containing structures. Signal
lines of more than 400 volts are always supply lines within this
section, and those of less than 400 volts are considered as supply
lines, if so run and operated throughout.
Manhole. A subsurface enclosure which personnel may enter and which
is used for the purpose of installing, operating, and maintaining
submersible equipment or cable.
Manhole steps. A series of steps individually attached to or set
into the walls of a manhole structure.
Minimum approach distance. The closest distance an employee is
permitted to approach an energized or a grounded object.
Qualified employee (qualified person). One knowledgeable in the
construction and operation of the electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution equipment involved, along with the
associated hazards.
Note 1: An employee must have the training required by paragraph
(a)(2)(ii) of this section in order to be considered a qualified
employee.
Note 2: Except under paragraph (g)(2)(v) of this section, an
employee who is undergoing on-the-job training and who, in the
course of such training, has demonstrated an ability to perform
duties safely at his or her level of training and who is under the
direct supervision of a qualified person is considered to be a
qualified person for the performance of those duties.
Step bolt. A bolt or rung attached at intervals along a structural
member and used for foot placement during climbing or standing.
Switch. A device for opening and closing or for changing the
connection of a circuit. In this section, a switch is understood to be
manually operable, unless otherwise stated.
System operator. A qualified person designated to operate the
system or its parts.
Vault. An enclosure, above or below ground, which personnel may
enter and which is used for the purpose of installing, operating, or
maintaining equipment or cable.
Vented vault. A vault that has provision for air changes using
exhaust flue stacks and low level air intakes operating on
differentials of pressure and temperature providing for airflow which
precludes a hazardous atmosphere from developing.
Voltage. The effective (rms) potential difference between any two
conductors or between a conductor and ground. Voltages are expressed in
nominal values unless otherwise indicated. The nominal voltage of a
system or circuit is the value assigned to a system or circuit of a
given voltage class for the purpose of convenient designation. The
operating voltage of the system may vary above or below this value.
Appendix A to Sec. 1910.269 Flow Charts
This appendix presents information, in the form of flow charts,
that illustrates the scope and application of Sec. 1910.269. This
appendix addresses the interface between Sec. 1910.269 and Subpart S of
this Part (Electrical), between Sec. 1910.269 and Sec. 1910.146 of this
Part (Permit-required confined spaces), and between Sec. 1910.269 and
Sec. 1910.147 of this Part (The control of hazardous energy (lockout/
tagout)). These flow charts provide guidance for employers trying to
implement the requirements of Sec. 1910.269 in combination with other
General Industry Standards contained in Part 1910.
Appendix A-1 to Section 1910.269--Application of Section 1910.269
and Subpart S of this Part to Electrical Installations.
TR31JA94.002
Appendix A-2 to Section 1910.269--Application of Section 1910.269
and Subpart S of this Part to Electrical Safety-Related Work Practices.
TR31JA94.003
Table 1.--Electrical Safety-Related Work Practices in Section 1910.269
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Compliance with subpart S is
considered as compliance with Sec. Paragraphs that apply regardless of
1910.269\1\ compliance with subpart S
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(d), electric shock hazards only... (a)(2)\2\ and (a)(3)\2\.
(h)(3)............................. (b)\2\.
(i)(2)............................. (c)\2\.
(k)................................ (d), other than electric shock
hazards.
(l)(1) through (l)(4), (l)(6)(i), (e).
and (l)(8) through (l)(10).
(m)................................ (f).
(p)(4)............................. (g).
(s)(2)............................. (h)(1) and (h)(2).
(u)(1) and (u)(3) through (u)(5)... (i)(3)\2\ and (i)(4)\2\.
(v)(3) through (v)(5).............. (j)\2\.
(w)(1) and (w)(7).................. (l)(5)\2\, (l)(6)(iii)\2\,
(l)(6)(iii)\2\, and (l)(7)\2\.
(n)\2\.
(o)\2\.
(p)(1) through (p)(3).
(q)\2\.
(r).
(s)(1).
(t)\2\.
(u)(2)\2\ and (u)(6)\2\.
(v)(1), (v)(2)\2\, and (v)(6)
through (v)(12).
(w)(2) through (w)(6)\2\, (w)(8),
and (w)(9)\2\.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\If the electrical installation meets the requirements of Secs.
1910.332 through 1910.308 of this Part, then the electrical
installation and any associated electrical safety-related work
practices conforming to Secs. 1910.332 through 1910.335 of this Part
are considered to comply with these provisions of Sec. 1910.269 of
this Part.
\2\These provisions include electrical safety requirements that must be
met regardless of compliance with Subpart S of this Part.
Appendix A-3 to Section 1910.269--Application of Section 1910.269
and Subpart S of This Part to Tree-Trimming Operations.
TR31JA94.004
Appendix A-4 to Section 1910.269--Application of Section 1910.147,
Section 1910.269 and Section 1910.333 to Hazardous Energy Control
Procedures (Lockout/Tagout).
TR31JA94.005
\1\If the installation conforms to Secs. 1910.303 through 1910.308
of this part, the lockout and tagging procedures of Sec. 1910.333(b) of
this part may be followed for electric shock hazards.
\2\Commingled to the extent that the electric power generation,
transmission, or distribution installation poses the greater hazard.
\3\Section 1910.333(b)(2)(iii)(D) and (b)(2)(iv)(B) of this part
still apply.
Appendix A-5 to Section 1910.269--Application of Section 1910.146
and Section 1910.269 to Permit-Required Confined Spaces.
TR31JA94.006
Appendix B to Section 1910.269--Working on Exposed Energized Parts
I. Introduction
Electric transmission and distribution line installations have
been designed to meet National Electrical Safety Code (NESC), ANSI
C2, requirements and to provide the level of line outage performance
required by system reliability criteria. Transmission and
distribution lines are also designed to withstand the maximum
overvoltages expected to be impressed on the system. Such
overvoltages can be caused by such conditions as switching surges,
faults, or lightning. Insulator design and lengths and the
clearances to structural parts (which, for low voltage through
extra-high voltage, or EHV, facilities, are generally based on the
performance of the line as a result of contamination of the
insulation or during storms) have, over the years, come closer to
the minimum approach distances used by workers (which are generally
based on non-storm conditions). Thus, as minimum approach (working)
distances and structural distances (clearances) converge, it is
increasingly important that basic considerations for establishing
safe approach distances for performing work be understood by the
designers and the operating and maintenance personnel involved.
The information in this Appendix will assist employers in
complying with the minimum approach distance requirements contained
in paragraphs (l)(2) and (q)(3) of this section. The technical
criteria and methodology presented herein is mandatory for employers
using reduced minimum approach distances as permitted in Table R-7
and Table R-8. This Appendix is intended to provide essential
background information and technical criteria for the development or
modification, if possible, of the safe minimum approach distances
for electric transmission and distribution live-line work. The
development of these safe distances must be undertaken by persons
knowledgeable in the techniques discussed in this appendix and
competent in the field of electric transmission and distribution
system design.
II. General
A. Definitions
The following definitions from Sec. 1910.269(x) relate to work
on or near transmission and distribution lines and equipment and the
electrical hazards they present.
Exposed. Not isolated or guarded.
Guarded. Covered, fenced, enclosed, or otherwise protected, by
means of suitable covers or casings, barrier rails or screens, mats,
or platforms, designed to minimize the possibility, under normal
conditions, of dangerous approach or accidental contact by persons
or objects.
Note: Wires which are insulated, but not otherwise protected,
are not considered as guarded.
Insulated. Separated from other conducting surfaces by a
dielectric (including air space) offering a high resistance to the
passage of current.
Note: When any object is said to be insulated, it is understood
to be insulated for the conditions to which it is normally
subjected. Otherwise, it is, within the purpose of this section,
uninsulated.
B. Installations Energized at 50 to 300 Volts
The hazards posed by installations energized at 50 to 300 volts
are the same as those found in many other workplaces. That is not to
say that there is no hazard, but the complexity of electrical
protection required does not compare to that required for high
voltage systems. The employee must avoid contact with the exposed
parts, and the protective equipment used (such as rubber insulating
gloves) must provide insulation for the voltages involved.
C. Exposed Energized Parts Over 300 Volts AC
Table R-6, Table R-7, and Table R-8 of Sec. 1910.269 provide
safe approach and working distances in the vicinity of energized
electrical apparatus so that work can be done safely without risk of
electrical flashover.
The working distances must withstand the maximum transient
overvoltage that can reach the work site under the working
conditions and practices in use. Normal system design may provide or
include a means to control transient overvoltages, or temporary
devices may be employed to achieve the same result. The use of
technically correct practices or procedures to control overvoltages
(for example, portable gaps or preventing the automatic control from
initiating breaker reclosing) enables line design and operation to
be based on reduced transient overvoltage values. Technical
information for U.S. electrical systems indicates that current
design provides for the following maximum transient overvoltage
values (usually produced by switching surges): 362 kV and less--3.0
per unit; 552 kV--2.4 per unit; 800 kV--2.0 per unit.
Additional discussion of maximum transient overvoltages can be
found in paragraph IV.A.2, later in this Appendix.
III. Determination of the Electrical Component of Minimum Approach
Distances
A. Voltages of 1.1 kV to 72.5 kV
For voltages of 1.1 kV to 72.5 kV, the electrical component of
minimum approach distances is based on American National Standards
Institute (ANSI)/American Institute of Electrical Engineers (AIEE)
Standard No.4, March 1943, Tables III and IV. (AIEE is the
predecessor technical society to the Institute of Electrical and
Electronic Engineers (IEEE).) These distances are calculated by the
following formula:
Equation (1)--For voltages of 1.1 kV to 72.5 kV
TR31JA94.010
Where:
D=Electrical component of the minimum approach distance in air in feet
Vmax=Maximum rated line-to-ground rms voltage in kV
pu=Maximum transient overvoltage factor in per unit
Source: AIEE Standard No. 4, 1943.
This formula has been used to generate Table 1.
Table 1.--AC Energized Line-Work Phase-to-Ground Electrical Component of
the Minimum Approach Distance--1.1 to 72.5 kV
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum anticipated Phase to phase voltage
per-unit transient ---------------------------------------------------
overvoltage 15,000 36,000 46,000 72,500
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3.0................. 0.08 0.33 0.49 1.03
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The distances given (in feet) are for air as the
insulating medium and provide no additional clearance for
inadvertent movement.
B. Voltages of 72.6 kV to 800 kV
For voltages of 72.6 kV to 800 kV, the electrical component of
minimum approach distances is based on ANSI/IEEE Standard 516-1987,
``IEEE Guide for Maintenance Methods on Energized Power Lines.''
This standard gives the electrical component of the minimum approach
distance based on power frequency rod-gap data, supplemented with
transient overvoltage information and a saturation factor for high
voltages. The distances listed in ANSI/IEEE Standard 516 have been
calculated according to the following formula:
Equation (2)--For voltages of 72.6 kV to 800 kV
TR31JA94.011
Where:
D=Electrical component of the minimum approach distance in air in feet
C=0.01 to take care of correction factors associated with the variation
of gap sparkover with voltage
a=A factor relating to the saturation of air at voltages of 345 kV or
higher
pu=Maximum anticipated transient overvoltage, in per unit (p.u.)
Vmax=Maximum rms system line-to-ground voltage in kilovolts--it
should be the ``actual'' maximum, or the normal highest voltage for the
range (for example, 10 percent above the nominal voltage)
Source: Formula developed from ANSI/IEEE Standard No. 516, 1987.
This formula is used to calculate the electrical component of
the minimum approach distances in air and is used in the development
of Table 2 and Table 3.
Table 2.--AC Energized Line-Work Phase-to-Ground Electrical Component of
the Minimum Approach Distance--121to 242 kV
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum anticipated Phase to phase voltage
per-unit transient ---------------------------------------------------
overvoltage 121,000 145,000 169,000 242,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.0................. 1.40 1.70 2.00 2.80
2.1................. 1.47 1.79 2.10 2.94
2.2................. 1.54 1.87 2.20 3.08
2.3................. 1.61 1.96 2.30 3.22
2.4................. 1.68 2.04 2.40 3.35
2.5................. 1.75 2.13 2.50 3.50
2.6................. 1.82 2.21 2.60 3.64
2.7................. 1.89 2.30 2.70 3.76
2.8................. 1.96 2.38 2.80 3.92
2.9................. 2.03 2.47 2.90 4.05
3.0................. 2.10 2.55 3.00 4.29
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The distances given (in feet) are for air as the
insulating medium and provide no additional clearance for
inadvertent movement.
Table 3.--AC Energized Line-Work Phase-to-Ground Electrical Component of
the Minimum Approach Distance--362 to 800 kv
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum anticipated per- Phase to phase voltage
unit transient -----------------------------------------------
overvoltage 362,000 552,000 800,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5..................... .............. 4.97 8.66
1.6..................... .............. 5.46 9.60
1.7..................... .............. 5.98 10.60
1.8..................... .............. 6.51 11.64
1.9..................... .............. 7.08 12.73
2.0..................... 4.20 7.68 13.86
2.1..................... 4.41 8.27 ..............
2.2..................... 4.70 8.87 ..............
2.3..................... 5.01 9.49 ..............
2.4..................... 5.34 10.21 ..............
2.5..................... 5.67 .............. ..............
2.6..................... 6.01 .............. ..............
2.7..................... 6.36 .............. ..............
2.8..................... 6.73 .............. ..............
2.9..................... 7.10 .............. ..............
3.0..................... 7.48 .............. ..............
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The distances given (in feet) are for air as the
insulating medium and provide no additional clearance for
inadvertent movement.
C. Provisions for Inadvertent Movement
The minimum approach distances (working distances) must include
an ``adder'' to compensate for the inadvertent movement of the
worker relative to an energized part or the movement of the part
relative to the worker. A certain allowance must be made to account
for this possible inadvertent movement and to provide the worker
with a comfortable and safe zone in which to work. A distance for
inadvertent movement (called the ``ergonomic component of the
minimum approach distance'') must be added to the electrical
component to determine the total safe minimum approach distances
used in live-line work.
One approach that can be used to estimate the ergonomic
component of the minimum approach distance is response time-distance
analysis. When this technique is used, the total response time to a
hazardous incident is estimated and converted to distance travelled.
For example, the driver of a car takes a given amount of time to
respond to a ``stimulus'' and stop the vehicle. The elapsed time
involved results in a distance being travelled before the car comes
to a complete stop. This distance is dependent on the speed of the
car at the time the stimulus appears.
In the case of live-line work, the employee must first perceive
that he or she is approaching the danger zone. Then, the worker
responds to the danger and must decelerate and stop all motion
toward the energized part. During the time it takes to stop, a
distance will have been traversed. It is this distance that must be
added to the electrical component of the minimum approach distance
to obtain the total safe minimum approach distance.
At voltages below 72.5 kV, the electrical component of the
minimum approach distance is smaller than the ergonomic component.
At 72.5 kV the electrical component is only a little more than 1
foot. An ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance is
needed that will provide for all the worker's expected movements.
The usual live-line work method for these voltages is the use of
rubber insulating equipment, frequently rubber gloves. The energized
object needs to be far enough away to provide the worker's face with
a safe approach distance, as his or her hands and arms are
insulated. In this case, 2 feet has been accepted as a sufficient
and practical value.
For voltages between 72.6 and 800 kV, there is a change in the
work practices employed during energized line work. Generally, live-
line tools (hot sticks) are employed to perform work while equipment
is energized. These tools, by design, keep the energized part at a
constant distance from the employee and thus maintain the
appropriate minimum approach distance automatically.
The length of the ergonomic component of the minimum approach
distance is also influenced by the location of the worker and by the
nature of the work. In these higher voltage ranges, the employees
use work methods that more tightly control their movements than when
the workers perform rubber glove work. The worker is farther from
energized line or equipment and needs to be more precise in his or
her movements just to perform the work.
For these reasons, a smaller ergonomic component of the minimum
approach distance is needed, and a distance of 1 foot has been
selected for voltages between 72.6 and 800 kV.
Table 4 summarizes the ergonomic component of the minimum
approach distance for the two voltage ranges.
Table 4.--Ergonomic Component of Minimum Approach Distance
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Distance
Voltage range (kV) (feet)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.1 to 72.5.................................................. 2.0
72.6 to 800.................................................. 1.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: This distance must be added to the electrical component of
the minimum approach distance to obtain the full minimum approach
distance.
D. Bare-Hand Live-Line Minimum Approach Distances
Calculating the strength of phase-to-phase transient
overvoltages is complicated by the varying time displacement between
overvoltages on parallel conductors (electrodes) and by the varying
ratio between the positive and negative voltages on the two
electrodes. The time displacement causes the maximum voltage between
phases to be less than the sum of the phase-to-ground voltages. The
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Technical Committee
28, Working Group 2, has developed the following formula for
determining the phase-to-phase maximum transient overvoltage, based
on the per unit (p.u.) of the system nominal voltage phase-to-ground
crest:
pup=pug+1.6.
Where:
pug=p.u. phase-to-ground maximum transient overvoltage
pup=p.u. phase-to-phase maximum transient overvoltage
This value of maximum anticipated transient overvoltage must be
used in Equation (2) to calculate the phase-to-phase minimum
approach distances for live-line bare-hand work.
E. Compiling the Minimum Approach Distance Tables
For each voltage involved, the distance in table 4 in this
appendix has been added to the distance in Table 1, Table 2 or Table
3 in this appendix to determine the resulting minimum approach
distances in Table R-6, Table R-7, and in Table R-8 in
Sec. 1910.269.
F. Miscellaneous Correction Factors
The strength of an air gap is influenced by the changes in the
air medium that forms the insulation. A brief discussion of each
factor follows, with a summary at the end.
1. Dielectric strength of air. The dielectric strength of air in
a uniform electric field at standard atmospheric conditions is
approximately 31 kV (crest) per cm at 60 Hz. The disruptive gradient
is affected by the air pressure, temperature, and humidity, by the
shape, dimensions, and separation of the electrodes, and by the
characteristics of the applied voltage (wave shape).
2. Atmospheric effect. Flashover for a given air gap is
inhibited by an increase in the density (humidity) of the air. The
empirically determined electrical strength of a given gap is
normally applicable at standard atmospheric conditions (20 deg.C,
101.3 kPa, 11 g/cm3 humidity).
The combination of temperature and air pressure that gives the
lowest gap flashover voltage is high temperature and low pressure.
These are conditions not likely to occur simultaneously. Low air
pressure is generally associated with high humidity, and this causes
increased electrical strength. An average air pressure is more
likely to be associated with low humidity. Hot and dry working
conditions are thus normally associated with reduced electrical
strength.
The electrical component of the minimum approach distances in
Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3 and has been calculated using the
maximum transient overvoltages to determine withstand voltages at
standard atmospheric conditions.
3. Altitude. The electrical strength of an air gap is reduced at
high altitude, due principally to the reduced air pressure. An
increase of 3% in the minimum approach distance for altitudes above
1000 meters is required. Table R-10 of Sec. 1910.269 presents this
information in tabular form.
Summary. After taking all these correction factors into account
and after considering their interrelationships relative to the air
gap insulation strength and the conditions under which live work is
performed, one finds that only a correction for altitude need be
made. An elevation of 1000 meters is established as the base
elevation, and the values of the electrical component of the minimum
approach distances has been derived with this correction factor in
mind. Thus, the values used for elevations below 1000 meters are
conservative without any change; corrections have to be made only
above this base elevation.
IV. Determination of Reduced Minimum Approach Distances
A. Factors Affecting Voltage Stress at the Work Site
1. System voltage (nominal). The nominal system voltage range
sets the absolute lower limit for the minimum approach distance. The
highest value within the range, as given in the relevant table, is
selected and used as a reference for per unit calculations.
2. Transient overvoltages. Transient overvoltages may be
generated on an electrical system by the operation of switches or
breakers, by the occurrence of a fault on the line or circuit being
worked or on an adjacent circuit, and by similar activities. Most of
the overvoltages are caused by switching, and the term ``switching
surge'' is often used to refer generically to all types of
overvoltages. However, each overvoltage has an associated transient
voltage wave shape. The wave shape arriving at the site and its
magnitude vary considerably.
The information used in the development of the minimum approach
distances takes into consideration the most common wave shapes;
thus, the required minimum approach distances are appropriate for
any transient overvoltage level usually found on electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution systems. The values of
the per unit (p.u.) voltage relative to the nominal maximum voltage
are used in the calculation of these distances.
3. Typical magnitude of overvoltages. The magnitude of typical
transient overvoltages is given in Table 5.
4. Standard deviation--air-gap withstand. For each air gap
length, and under the same atmospheric conditions, there is a
statistical variation in the breakdown voltage. The probability of
the breakdown voltage is assumed to have a normal (Gaussian)
distribution. The standard deviation of this distribution varies
with the wave shape, gap geometry, and the atmospheric conditions.
The withstand voltage of the air gap used in calculating the
electrical component of the minimum approach distance has been set
at three standard deviations (3\1\) below the critical
flashover voltage. (The critical flashover voltage is the crest
value of the impulse wave that, under specified conditions, causes
flashover on 50 percent of the applications. An impulse wave of
three standard deviations below this value, that is, the withstand
voltage, has a probability of flashover of approximately 1 in 1000.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Sigma is the symbol for standard deviation.
Table 5.--Magnitude of Typical Transient Overvoltages
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Magnitude
Cause (per
unit)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Energized 200 mile line without closing resistors............ 3.5
Energized 200 mile line with one step closing resistor....... 2.1
Energized 200 mile line with multi-step resistor............. 2.5
Reclosed with trapped charge one step resistor............... 2.2
Opening surge with single restrike........................... 3.0
Fault initiation unfaulted phase............................. 2.1
Fault initiation adjacent circuit............................ 2.5
Fault clearing............................................... 1.7-1.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: ANSI/IEEE Standard No. 516, 1987.
5. Broken Insulators. Tests have shown that the insulation
strength of an insulator string with broken skirts is reduced.
Broken units may have lost up to 70% of their withstand capacity.
Because the insulating capability of a broken unit cannot be
determined without testing it, damaged units in an insulator are
usually considered to have no insulating value. Additionally, the
overall insulating strength of a string with broken units may be
further reduced in the presence of a live-line tool alongside. The
number of good units that must be present in a string is based on
the maximum overvoltage possible at the worksite.
B. Minimum Approach Distances Based on Known Maximum Anticipated Per-
Unit Transient Overvoltages
1. Reduction of the minimum approach distance for AC systems.
When the transient overvoltage values are known and supplied by the
employer, Table R-7 and Table R-8 of Sec. 1910.269 allow the minimum
approach distances from energized parts to be reduced. In order to
determine what this maximum overvoltage is, the employer must
undertake an engineering analysis of the system. As a result of this
engineering study, the employer must provide new live work
procedures, reflecting the new minimum approach distances, the
conditions and limitations of application of the new minimum
approach distances, and the specific practices to be used when these
procedures are implemented.
2. Calculation of reduced approach distance values. The
following method of calculating reduced minimum approach distances
is based on ANSI/IEEE Standard 516:
Step 1. Determine the maximum voltage (with respect to a given
nominal voltage range) for the energized part.
Step 2. Determine the maximum transient overvoltage (normally a
switching surge) that can be present at the work site during work
operation.
Step 3. Determine the technique to be used to control the
maximum transient overvoltage. (See paragraphs IV.C and IV.D of this
appendix.) Determine the maximum voltage that can exist at the work
site with that form of control in place and with a confidence level
of 3. This voltage is considered to be the withstand
voltage for the purpose of calculating the appropriate minimum
approach distance.
Step 4. Specify in detail the control technique to be used, and
direct its implementation during the course of the work.
Step 5. Using the new value of transient overvoltage in per unit
(p.u.), determine the required phase-to-ground minimum approach
distance from Table R-7 or Table R-8 of Sec. 1910.269.
Methods of Controlling Possible Transient Overvoltage Stress Found on a
System
1. Introduction. There are several means of controlling
overvoltages that occur on transmission systems. First, the
operation of circuit breakers or other switching devices may be
modified to reduce switching transient overvoltages. Second, the
overvoltage itself may be forcibly held to an acceptable level by
means of installation of surge arresters at the specific location to
be protected. Third, the transmission system may be changed to
minimize the effect of switching operations.
2. Operation of circuit breakers.2 The maximum transient
overvoltage that can reach the work site is often due to switching
on the line on which work is being performed. If the automatic-
reclosing is removed during energized line work so that the line
will not be re-energized after being opened for any reason, the
maximum switching surge overvoltage is then limited to the larger of
the opening surge or the greatest possible fault-generated surge,
provided that the devices (for example, insertion resistors) are
operable and will function to limit the transient overvoltage. It is
essential that the operating ability of such devices be assured when
they are employed to limit the overvoltage level. If it is prudent
not to remove the reclosing feature (because of system operating
conditions), other methods of controlling the switching surge level
may be necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The detailed design of a circuit interrupter, such as the
design of the contacts, of resistor insertion, and of breaker timing
control, are beyond the scope of this appendix. These features are
routinely provided as part of the design for the system. Only
features that can limit the maximum switching transient overvoltage
on a system are discussed in this appendix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transient surges on an adjacent line, particularly for double
circuit construction, may cause a significant overvoltage on the
line on which work is being performed. The coupling to adjacent
lines must be accounted for when minimum approach distances are
calculated based on the maximum transient overvoltage.
3. Surge arresters. The use of modern surge arresters has
permitted a reduction in the basic impulse-insulation levels of much
transmission system equipment. The primary function of early
arresters was to protect the system insulation from the effects of
lightning. Modern arresters not only dissipate lightning-caused
transients, but may also control many other system transients that
may be caused by switching or faults.
It is possible to use properly designed arresters to control
transient overvoltages along a transmission line and thereby reduce
the requisite length of the insulator string. On the other hand, if
the installation of arresters has not been used to reduce the length
of the insulator string, it may be used to reduce the minimum
approach distance instead.3
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Surge arrestor application is beyond the scope of this
appendix. However, if the arrester is installed near the work site,
the application would be similar to protective gaps as discussed in
paragraph IV.D. of this appendix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Switching Restrictions. Another form of overvoltage control
is the establishment of switching restrictions, under which breakers
are not permitted to be operated until certain system conditions are
satisfied. Restriction of switching is achieved by the use of a
tagging system, similar to that used for a ``permit'', except that
the common term used for this activity is a ``hold-off'' or
``restriction''. These terms are used to indicate that operation is
not prevented, but only modified during the live-work activity.
D. Minimum Approach Distance Based on Control of Voltage Stress
(Overvoltages) at the Work Site.
Reduced minimum approach distances can be calculated as follows:
1. First Method--Determining the reduced minimum approach
distance from a given withstand voltage.4
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Since a given rod gap of a given configuration corresponds
to a certain withstand voltage, this method can also be used to
determine the minimum approach distance for a known gap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Step 1. Select the appropriate withstand voltage for the
protective gap based on system requirements and an acceptable
probability of actual gap flashover.
Step 2. Determine a gap distance that provides a withstand
voltage5 greater than or equal to the one selected in the first
step.6
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The withstand voltage for the gap is equal to 85 percent of
its critical flashover voltage.
\6\ Switch steps 1 and 2 if the length of the protective gap is
known. The withstand voltage must then be checked to ensure that it
provides an acceptable probability of gap flashover. In general, it
should be at least 1.25 times the maximum crest operating voltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Step 3. Using 110 percent of the gap's critical flashover
voltage, determine the electrical component of the minimum approach
distance from Equation (2) or Table 6, which is a tabulation of
distance vs. withstand voltage based on Equation (2).
Step 4. Add the 1-foot ergonomic component to obtain the total
minimum approach distance to be maintained by the employee.
2. Second Method--Determining the necessary protective gap
length from a desired (reduced) minimum approach distance.
Step 1. Determine the desired minimum approach distance for the
employee. Subtract the 1-foot ergonomic component of the minimum
approach distance.
Step 2. Using this distance, calculate the air gap withstand
voltage from Equation (2). Alternatively, find the voltage
corresponding to the distance in Table 6.7
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Since the value of the saturation factor, a, in is dependent
on the maximum voltage, several iterative computations may be
necessary to determine the correct withstand voltage using the
equation. A graph of withstand voltage vs. distance is given in
ANSI/IEEE Std. 516, 1987. This graph could also be used to determine
the appropriate withstand voltage for the minimum approach distance
involved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Step 3. Select a protective gap distance corresponding to a
critical flashover voltage that, when multiplied by 110 percent, is
less than or equal to the withstand voltage from Step 2.
Step 4. Calculate the withstand voltage of the protective gap
(85 percent of the critical flashover voltage) to ensure that it
provides an acceptable risk of flashover during the time the gap is
installed.
Table 6.--Withstand Distances for Transient Overvoltages
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Withstand
distance
Crest voltage (kV) (in feet)
air gap
------------------------------------------------------------------------
100......................................................... 0.71
150......................................................... 1.06
200......................................................... 1.41
250......................................................... 1.77
300......................................................... 2.12
350......................................................... 2.47
400......................................................... 2.83
450......................................................... 3.18
500......................................................... 3.54
550......................................................... 3.89
600......................................................... 4.24
650......................................................... 4.60
700......................................................... 5.17
750......................................................... 5.73
800......................................................... 6.31
850......................................................... 6.91
900......................................................... 7.57
950......................................................... 8.23
1000........................................................ 8.94
1050........................................................ 9.65
1100........................................................ 10.42
1150........................................................ 11.18
1200........................................................ 12.05
1250........................................................ 12.90
1300........................................................ 13.79
1350........................................................ 14.70
1400........................................................ 15.64
1450........................................................ 16.61
1500........................................................ 17.61
1550........................................................ 18.63
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Calculations are based on Equation (2).
Note: The air gap is based on the 60-Hz rod-gap withstand distance.
3. Sample protective gap calculations.
Problem 1: Work is to be performed on a 500-kV transmission line
that is subject to transient overvoltages of 2.4 p.u. The maximum
operating voltage of the line is 552 kV. Determine the length of the
protective gap that will provide the minimum practical safe approach
distance. Also, determine what that minimum approach distance is.
Step 1. Calculate the smallest practical maximum transient
overvoltage (1.25 times the crest line-to-ground voltage):\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\To eliminate unwanted flashovers due to minor system
disturbances, it is desirable to have the crest withstand voltage no
lower than 1.25 p.u.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TR31JA94.012
This will be the withstand voltage of the protective gap.
Step 2. Using test data for a particular protective gap, select
a gap that has a critical flashover voltage greater than or equal
to:
TR31JA94.013
For example, if a protective gap with a 4.0-foot spacing tested to a
critical flashover voltage of 665 kV, crest, select this gap
spacing.
Step 3. This protective gap corresponds to a 110 percent of
critical flashover voltage value of:
TR31JA94.014
This corresponds to the withstand voltage of the electrical
component of the minimum approach distance.
Step 4. Using this voltage in Equation (2) results in an
electrical component of the minimum approach distance of:
TR31JA94.015
Step 5. Add 1 foot to the distance calculated in step 4,
resulting in a total minimum approach distance of 6.5 feet.
Problem 2: For a line operating at a maximum voltage of 552 kV
subject to a maximum transient overvoltage of 2.4 p.u., find a
protective gap distance that will permit the use of a 9.0-foot
minimum approach distance. (A minimum approach distance of 11 feet,
3 inches is normally required.)
Step 1. The electrical component of the minimum approach
distance is 8.0 feet (9.0-1.0).
Step 2. From Table 6, select the withstand voltage corresponding
to a distance of 8.0 feet. By interpolation:
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Step 3. The voltage calculated in Step 2 corresponds to 110
percent of the critical flashover voltage of the gap that should be
employed. Using test data for a particular protective gap, select a
gap that has a critical flashover voltage less than or equal to:
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For example, if a protective gap with a 5.8-foot spacing tested to a
critical flashover voltage of 820 kV, crest, select this gap
spacing.
Step 4. The withstand voltage of this protective gap would be:
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The maximum operating crest voltage would be:
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and the maximum per unit transient overvoltage during the time the
protective gap is installed would be:
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If this is acceptable, the protective gap could be installed
with a 5.8-foot spacing, and the minimum approach distance could
then be reduced to 9.0 feet.
4. Comments and variations. The 1-foot ergonomic component of
the minimum approach distance must be added to the electrical
component of the minimum approach distance calculated under
paragraph IV.D of this appendix. The calculations may be varied by
starting with the protective gap distance or by starting with the
minimum approach distance.
E. Location of Protective Gaps
1. Installation of the protective gap on a structure adjacent to
the work site is an acceptable practice, as this does not
significantly reduce the protection afforded by the gap.
2. Gaps installed at terminal stations of lines or circuits
provide a given level of protection. The level may not, however,
extend throughout the length of the line to the worksite. The use of
gaps at terminal stations must be studied in depth. The use of
substation terminal gaps raises the possibility that separate surges
could enter the line at opposite ends, each with low enough
magnitude to pass the terminal gaps without flashover. When voltage
surges are initiated simultaneously at each end of a line and travel
toward each other, the total voltage on the line at the point where
they meet is the arithmetic sum of the two surges. A gap that is
installed within 0.5 mile of the work site will protect against such
intersecting waves. Engineering studies of a particular line or
system may indicate that adequate protection can be provided by even
more distant gaps.
3. If protective gaps are used at the work site, the work site
impulse insulation strength is established by the gap setting.
Lightning strikes as much as 6 miles away from the worksite may
cause a voltage surge greater than the insulation withstand voltage,
and a gap flashover may occur. The flashover will not occur between
the employee and the line, but across the protective gap instead.
4. There are two reasons to disable the automatic-reclosing
feature of circuit-interrupting devices while employees are
performing live-line maintenance:
To prevent the reenergizing of a circuit faulted by
actions of a worker, which could possibly create a hazard or
compound injuries or damage produced by the original fault;
To prevent any transient overvoltage caused by the
switching surge that would occur if the circuit were reenergized.
However, due to system stability considerations, it may not
always be feasible to disable the automatic-reclosing feature.
Appendix C to Section 1910.269--Protection from Step and Touch
Potentials
I. Introduction
When a ground fault occurs on a power line, voltage is impressed
on the ``grounded'' object faulting the line. The voltage to which
this object rises depends largely on the voltage on the line, on the
impedance of the faulted conductor, and on the impedance to
``true,'' or ``absolute,'' ground represented by the object. If the
object causing the fault represents a relatively large impedance,
the voltage impressed on it is essentially the phase-to-ground
system voltage. However, even faults to well grounded transmission
towers or substation structures can result in hazardous
voltages.1 The degree of the hazard depends upon the magnitude
of the fault current and the time of exposure.
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\1\ This appendix provides information primarily with respect to
employee protection from contact between equipment being used and an
energized power line. The information presented is also relevant to
ground faults to transmission towers and substation structures;
however, grounding systems for these structures should be designed
to minimize the step and touch potentials involved.
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II. Voltage-Gradient Distribution
A. Voltage-Gradient Distribution Curve
The dissipation of voltage from a grounding electrode (or from
the grounded end of an energized grounded object) is called the
ground potential gradient. Voltage drops associated with this
dissipation of voltage are called ground potentials. Figure 1 is a
typical voltage-gradient distribution curve (assuming a uniform soil
texture). This graph shows that voltage decreases rapidly with
increasing distance from the grounding electrode.
B. Step and Touch Potentials
``Step potential'' is the voltage between the feet of a person
standing near an energized grounded object. It is equal to the
difference in voltage, given by the voltage distribution curve,
between two points at different distances from the ``electrode''. A
person could be at risk of injury during a fault simply by standing
near the grounding point.
``Touch potential'' is the voltage between the energized object
and the feet of a person in contact with the object. It is equal to
the difference in voltage between the object (which is at a distance
of 0 feet) and a point some distance away. It should be noted that
the touch potential could be nearly the full voltage across the
grounded object if that object is grounded at a point remote from
the place where the person is in contact with it. For example, a
crane that was grounded to the system neutral and that contacted an
energized line would expose any person in contact with the crane or
its uninsulated load line to a touch potential nearly equal to the
full fault voltage.
Step and touch potentials are illustrated in Figure 2.
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C. Protection From the Hazards of Ground-Potential Gradients. An
engineering analysis of the power system under fault conditions can be
used to determine whether or not hazardous step and touch voltages will
develop. The result of this analysis can ascertain the need for
protective measures and can guide the selection of appropriate
precautions.
Several methods may be used to protect employees from hazardous
ground-potential gradients, including equipotential zones,
insulating equipment, and restricted work areas.
1. The creation of an equipotential zone will protect a worker
standing within it from hazardous step and touch potentials. (See
Figure 3.) Such a zone can be produced through the use of a metal
mat connected to the grounded object. In some cases, a grounding
grid can be used to equalize the voltage within the grid.
Equipotential zones will not, however, protect employees who are
either wholly or partially outside the protected area. Bonding
conductive objects in the immediate work area can also be used to
minimize the potential between the objects and between each object
and ground. (Bonding an object outside the work area can increase
the touch potential to that object in some cases, however.)
2. The use of insulating equipment, such as rubber gloves, can
protect employees handling grounded equipment and conductors from
hazardous touch potentials. The insulating equipment must be rated
for the highest voltage that can be impressed on the grounded
objects under fault conditions (rather than for the full system
voltage).
3. Restricting employees from areas where hazardous step or
touch potentials could arise can protect employees not directly
involved in the operation being performed. Employees on the ground
in the vicinity of transmission structures should be kept at a
distance where step voltages would be insufficient to cause injury.
Employees should not handle grounded conductors or equipment likely
to become energized to hazardous voltages unless the employees are
within an equipotential zone or are protected by insulating
equipment.
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Appendix D to Section 1910.269--Methods of Inspecting and Testing
Wood Poles
I. Introduction
When work is to be performed on a wood pole, it is important to
determine the condition of the pole before it is climbed. The weight
of the employee, the weight of equipment being installed, and other
working stresses (such as the removal or retensioning of conductors)
can lead to the failure of a defective pole or one that is not
designed to handle the additional stresses.\1\ For these reasons, it
is essential that an inspection and test of the condition of a wood
pole be performed before it is climbed.
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\1\A properly guyed pole in good condition should, at a minimum,
be able to handle the weight of an employee climbing it.
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If the pole is found to be unsafe to climb or to work from, it
must be secured so that it does not fail while an employee is on it.
The pole can be secured by a line truck boom, by ropes or guys, or
by lashing a new pole alongside it. If a new one is lashed alongside
the defective pole, work should be performed from the new one.
II. Inspection of Wood Poles
Wood poles should be inspected by a qualified employee for the
following conditions:\2\
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\2\The presence of any of these conditions is an indication that
the pole may not be safe to climb or to work from. The employee
performing the inspection must be qualified to make a determination
as to whether or not it is safe to perform the work without taking
additional precautions.
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A. General Condition
The pole should be inspected for buckling at the ground line and
for an unusual angle with respect to the ground. Buckling and odd
angles may indicate that the pole has rotted or is broken.
B. Cracks
The pole should be inspected for cracks. Horizontal cracks
perpendicular to the grain of the wood may weaken the pole. Vertical
ones, although not considered to be a sign of a defective pole, can
pose a hazard to the climber, and the employee should keep his or
her gaffs away from them while climbing.
C. Holes
Hollow spots and woodpecker holes can reduce the strength of a
wood pole.
D. Shell Rot and Decay.
Rotting and decay is a cutout hazard and a possible indication
of the age and internal condition of the pole.
Knots
E. Knots
One large knot or several smaller ones at the same height on the
pole may be evidence of a weak point on the pole.
F. Depth of Setting
Evidence of the existence of a former ground line substantially
above the existing ground level may be an indication that the pole
is no longer buried to a sufficient extent.
G. Soil Conditions
Soft, wet, or loose soil may not support any changes of stress
on the pole.
H. Burn Marks
Burning from transformer failures or conductor faults could
damage the pole so that it cannot withstand mechanical stress
changes.
III. Testing of Wood Poles
The following tests, which have been taken from
Sec. 1910.268(n)(3), are recognized as acceptable methods of testing
wood poles:
A. Hammer Test
Rap the pole sharply with a hammer weighing about 3 pounds,
starting near the ground line and continuing upwards
circumferentially around the pole to a height of approximately 6
feet. The hammer will produce a clear sound and rebound sharply when
striking sound wood. Decay pockets will be indicated by a dull sound
or a less pronounced hammer rebound. Also, prod the pole as near the
ground line as possible using a pole prod or a screwdriver with a
blade at least 5 inches long. If substantial decay is encountered,
the pole is considered unsafe.
B. Rocking Test
Apply a horizontal force to the pole and attempt to rock it back
and forth in a direction perpendicular to the line. Caution must be
exercised to avoid causing power lines to swing together. The force
may be applied either by pushing with a pike pole or pulling with a
rope. If the pole cracks during the test, it shall be considered
unsafe.
Appendix E to Section 1910.269--Reference Documents
The references contained in this appendix provide information
that can be helpful in understanding and complying with the
requirements contained in Sec. 1910.269. The national consensus
standards referenced in this appendix contain detailed
specifications that employers may follow in complying with the more
performance-oriented requirements of OSHA's final rule. Except as
specifically noted in Sec. 1910.269, however, compliance with the
national consensus standards is not a substitute for compliance with
the provisions of the OSHA standard.
ANSI A92.2-1979, American National Standard for Vehicle-Mounted
Elevating and Rotating Aerial Devices.
ANSI C2-1993, National Electrical Safety Code.
ANSI Z133.1-1988, American National Standard Safety Requirements
for Pruning, Trimming, Repairing, Maintaining, and Removing Trees,
and for Cutting Brush.
ANSI/ASME B20.1-1990, Safety Standard for Conveyors and Related
Equipment.
ANSI/IEEE Std. 4-1978 (Fifth Printing), IEEE Standard Techniques
for High-Voltage Testing.
ANSI/IEEE Std. 100-1988, IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical
and Electronic Terms.
ANSI/IEEE Std. 516-1987, IEEE Guide for Maintenance Methods on
Energized Power-Lines.
ANSI/IEEE Std. 935-1989, IEEE Guide on Terminology for Tools and
Equipment to Be Used in Live Line Working.
ANSI/IEEE Std. 957-1987, IEEE Guide for Cleaning Insulators.
ANSI/IEEE Std. 978-1984 (R1991), IEEE Guide for In-Service
Maintenance and Electrical Testing of Live-Line Tools.
ASTM D 120-87, Specification for Rubber Insulating Gloves.
ASTM D 149-92, Test Method for Dielectric Breakdown Voltage and
Dielectric Strength of Solid Electrical Insulating Materials at
Commercial Power Frequencies.
ASTM D 178-88, Specification for Rubber Insulating Matting.
ASTM D 1048-88a, Specification for Rubber Insulating Blankets.
ASTM D 1049-88, Specification for Rubber Insulating Covers.
ASTM D 1050-90, Specification for Rubber Insulating Line Hose.
ASTM D 1051-87, Specification for Rubber Insulating Sleeves.
ASTM F 478-92, Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating
Line Hose and Covers.
ASTM F 479-88a, Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating
Blankets.
ASTM F 496-91, Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating
Gloves and Sleeves.
ASTM F 711-89, Specification for Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic
(FRP) Rod and Tube Used in Live Line Tools.
ASTM F 712-88, Test Methods for Electrically Insulating Plastic
Guard Equipment for Protection of Workers.
ASTM F 819-83a (1988), Definitions of Terms Relating to
Electrical Protective Equipment for Workers.
ASTM F 855-90, Specifications for Temporary Grounding Systems to
Be Used on De-Energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment.
ASTM F 887-91a, Specifications for Personal Climbing Equipment.
ASTM F 914-91, Test Method for Acoustic Emission for Insulated
Aerial Personnel Devices.
ASTM F 968-93, Specification for Electrically Insulating Plastic
Guard Equipment for Protection of Workers.
ASTM F 1116-88, Test Method for Determining Dielectric Strength
of Overshoe Footwear.
ASTM F 1117-87, Specification for Dielectric Overshoe Footwear.
ASTM F 1236-89, Guide for Visual Inspection of Electrical
Protective Rubber Products.
IEEE Std. 62-1978, IEEE Guide for Field Testing Power Apparatus
Insulation.
IEEE Std. 524-1992, IEEE Guide to the Installation of Overhead
Transmission Line Conductors.
IEEE Std. 1048-1990, IEEE Guide for Protective Grounding of
Power Lines.
IEEE Std. 1067-1990, IEEE Guide for the In-Service Use, Care,
Maintenance, and Testing of Conductive Clothing for Use on Voltages
up to 765 kV AC.
Subpart S--Electrical
5. The authority citation for subpart S of part 1910 continues to
read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 4, 6, 8, Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657); Secretary of Labor's Order No. 8-76
(41 FR 25059) or 1-90 (55 FR 9033), as applicable; 29 CFR Part 1911.
6. Note 2 following paragraph (c)(1) of Sec. 1910.331 is
redesignated as Note 3.
7. A new Note 2 is added, and existing Note 3 is revised, to read
as follows:
Sec. 1910.331 Scope.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(1) * * *
Note 2: For work on or directly associated with utilization
installations, an employer who complies with the work practices of
Sec. 1910.269 (electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution) will be deemed to be in compliance with
Sec. 1910.333(c) and Sec. 1910.335. However, the requirements of
Sec. 1910.332, Sec. 1910.333(a), Sec. 1910.333(b), and Sec. 1910.334
apply to all work on or directly associated with utilization
installations, regardless of whether the work is performed by
qualified or unqualified persons.
Note 3: Work on or directly associated with generation,
transmission, or distribution installations includes:
(1) Work performed directly on such installations, such as
repairing overhead or underground distribution lines or repairing a
feed-water pump for the boiler in a generating plant.
(2) Work directly associated with such installations, such as
line-clearance tree trimming and replacing utility poles.
(3) Work on electric utilization circuits in a generating plant
provided that:
(A) Such circuits are commingled with installations of power
generation equipment or circuits, and
(B) The generation equipment or circuits present greater
electrical hazards than those posed by the utilization equipment or
circuits (such as exposure to higher voltages or lack of overcurrent
protection).
This work is covered by Sec. 1910.269 of this Part.
* * * * *
8. The first sentence of the note after the introductory text in
Sec. 1910.333(c)(3) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 1910.333 Selection and use of work practices.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(3) * * *
Note: The work practices used by qualified persons installing
insulating devices on overhead power transmission or distribution
lines are covered by Sec. 1910.269 of this Part, not by
Sec. Sec. 1910.332 through 1910.335 of this Part. * * *
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 94-1300 Filed 1-28-94; 8:45 am]
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