[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 19 (Friday, January 28, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page ]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-1922]


[Federal Register: January 28, 1994]


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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Social Security Administration


Social Security Ruling SSR 94-3c; Timely Filing for Attorney Fees 
Under the Equal Access to Justice Act

AGENCY: Social Security Administration, HHS.

ACTION: Notice of Social Security Ruling.

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SUMMARY: In accordance with 20 CFR 422.406(b)(1), the Commissioner of 
Social Security gives notice of Social Security Ruling 94-3c. This 
Ruling, based on the Supreme Court's decision in Shalala v. Schaefer, 
________ U.S. ________, 113 S.Ct. 2625 (1993), concerns the time period 
for filing for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act 
(EAJA). Specifically, the issue before the Court was whether the 30-day 
period for filing a petition for EAJA fees begins immediately upon 
expiration of the time for appeal of a remand order issued by a court 
under sentence four of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, or 
after the administrative proceedings on remand are complete.

EFFECTIVE DATE: January 28, 1994.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joanne K. Castello, Office of 
Regulations, Social Security Administration, 6401 Security Boulevard, 
Baltimore, MD 21235, (410) 965-1711.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Although we are not required to do so 
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552 (a)(1) and (a)(2), we are publishing this 
Social Security Ruling in accordance with 20 CFR 422.406(b)(1).
    Social Security Rulings make available to the public precedential 
decisions relating to the Federal old-age, survivors, disability, 
supplemental security income, and black lung benefits programs. Social 
Security Rulings may be based on case decisions made at all 
administrative levels of adjudication, Federal court decisions, 
Commissioner's decisions, opinions of the Office of the General 
Counsel, and other policy interpretations of the law and regulations.
    Although Social Security Rulings do not have the force and effect 
of the law or regulations, they are binding on all components of the 
Social Security Administration, in accordance with 20 CFR 
422.406(b)(1), and are to be relied upon as precedents in adjudicating 
other cases.
    If this Social Security Ruling is later superseded, modified, or 
rescinded, we will publish a notice in the Federal Register to that 
effect.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Programs Nos. 93.802 Social 
Security--Disability Insurance; 93.803 Social Security--Retirement 
Insurance; 93.805 Social Security--Survivors Insurance; 93.806 
Special Benefits for Disabled Coal Miners; 93.807 Supplemental 
Security Income.)

    Dated: January 11, 1994.
Shirley S. Chater,
Commissioner of Social Security.

Sections 205(g) and 223 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 405(g) 
and 423) Timely Filing for Attorney's Fees Under the Equal Access to 
Justice Act

Shalala v. Schaefer, ________ U.S. ________, 113 S.Ct. 2625 (1993)

    This Ruling concerns whether the 30-day period for filing an 
application for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice 
Act (EAJA) begins immediately upon expiration of the time for appeal 
of a remand order issued by a court under sentence four of section 
205(g) of the Social Security Act (the Act), or after the 
administrative proceedings on remand are complete. Sentence four 
states, ``[t]he court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings 
and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or 
reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding 
the cause for a rehearing.''
    The claimant filed for and was denied title II disability 
benefits. The claimant sought review in district court under section 
205(g) of the Act. Reversing the Secretary, the district court held 
that the Secretary had erred in her decision on this case and 
remanded the case under sentence four of section 205(g) of the Act 
to the Secretary for further consideration. The Secretary 
subsequently awarded benefits.
    More than a year later, the claimant filed a petition for 
attorney's fees under the EAJA. The Secretary, in response, noted 
that the claimant was required to file the petition for EAJA fees 
``within 30 days of final judgment in the action'' pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(B), and argued that the ``final judgment'' in this 
case was the administrative decision on remand.
    The district court relied on Welter v. Sullivan in which the 
eighth circuit held that the district court did not intend to enter 
final judgment when it remanded the plaintiffs' cases under sentence 
four. When the Secretary appealed Schaefer to the circuit court, the 
court declined the Secretary's suggestion for en banc 
reconsideration of Welter.
    The circuit court affirmed the district court's award of EAJA 
fees to the claimant. On review by the Supreme Court, the Secretary 
argued that, in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Sullivan 
v. Finkelstein and Melkonyan v. Sullivan, a district court cannot 
retain jurisdiction of a case after a remand under sentence four of 
section 205(g) of the Act. Although the Supreme Court affirmed the 
circuit court's decision to award EAJA fees, it rejected its 
analysis. The Court held that, under the clear language of section 
205(g) of the Act, a district court may not retain jurisdiction 
after a sentence four remand. The Court found that a sentence four 
remand is an appealable final judgment of the district court that 
terminates the action and makes a plaintiff a ``prevailing party'' 
for the purposes of the EAJA. The Court clarified dicta in Sullivan 
v. Hudson, emphasizing that a sentence four remand (as opposed to a 
remand under sentence six of section 205(g), in which the court 
retains jurisdiction of the case) confers prevailing party status on 
the plaintiff.
    The Court also clarified that, in a sentence four remand, the 
time period in which an EAJA petition must be filed begins at the 
conclusion of the appeal period following the district court's entry 
of a judgment. However, in this case, the Court found that, because 
the district court failed to enter a judgment pursuant to Rule 58 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, neither the appeal period nor 
the EAJA 30-day filing period had lapsed.
    For the foregoing reasons, the Court affirmed the judgment of 
the court of appeals.

SCALIA, Supreme Court Justice

    This case concerns the proper timing of an application for 
attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) in a 
Social Security case. Under 42 U.S.C. 405(g), a claimant has the right 
to seek judicial review of a final decision of the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services denying Social Security benefits. One possible 
outcome of such a suit is that the district court, pursuant to sentence 
four of section 405(g), will enter ``a judgment * * * reversing the 
decision of the Secretary * * * (and) remanding the cause for a 
rehearing.'' The issue here is whether the 30-day period for filing an 
application for EAJA fees begins immediately upon expiration of the 
time for appeal of such a ``sentence-four remand order,'' or sometime 
after the administrative proceedings on remand are complete.
    In 1986, respondent Richard Schaefer filed an application for 
disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 
622, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 401 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. III). He was 
denied benefits at the administrative level, and sought judicial review 
by filing suit against the Secretary as authorized by section 405(g). 
Schaefer and the Secretary filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On 
April 4, 1989, the District Court held that the Secretary had committed 
three errors in ruling on Schaefer's case and entered an order stating 
that ``the Secretary's decision denying disability insurance benefits 
to [Schaefer] is reversed, that the parties' cross-motions for summary 
judgment are denied, and that the case is remanded to the Secretary for 
further consideration in light of this Order.'' App. to Pet. for Cert. 
27a.
    In accordance with this order, Schaefer's application for benefits 
was reconsidered at the administrative level, and was granted. On July 
18, 1990, Schaefer returned to the District Court and filed an 
application for attorney's fees pursuant to EAJA. In response, the 
Secretary noted that Schaefer was required to file any application for 
EAJA fees ``within thirty days of final judgment in the action,'' 28 
U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(B), and argued that the relevant ``final judgment'' 
in the case was the administrative decision on remand, which had become 
final on April 2, 1990. The District Court stayed action on Schaefer's 
EAJA application pending this Court's imminent ruling in Melkonyan v. 
Sullivan, 501 U.S. ________, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991).
    Melkonyan was announced shortly thereafter, holding that a final 
administrative decision could not constitute a ``final judgment'' for 
purposes of section 2412(d)(1)(B). Id., at ________, 111 S.Ct., at 
2162. In light of Melkonyan, the Secretary changed positions to argue 
that EAJA's 30-day clock began running when the District Court's April 
4, 1989 order (not the administrative ruling on remand) became final, 
which would have occurred at the end of the 60 days for appeal provided 
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). Thus, the Secretary 
concluded, Schaefer's time to file his EAJA application expired on July 
3, 1989, over a year before the application was filed. The District 
Court, however, found Schaefer's EAJA application timely under the 
controlling circuit precedent of Welter v. Sullivan, 941 F.2d 674 (CA8 
1991), which held that a sentence-four remand order is not a final 
judgment where ``the district court retain[s] jurisdiction * * * and 
plan[s] to enter dispositive sentence four judgmen[t]'' after the 
administrative proceedings on remand are complete. Id., at 675. The 
District Court went on to rule that Schaefer was entitled to $1,372.50 
in attorney's fees.
    The Secretary fared no better on appeal. The Eighth Circuit 
declined the Secretary's suggestion for en banc reconsideration of 
Welter, and affirmed the District Court in an unpublished per curiam 
opinion. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari, urging us to 
reverse the Court of Appeals summarily. We granted certiorari, 506 U.S. 
______, 113 S.Ct. 594, 121 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992), and set the case for 
oral argument.
II
    The first sentence of 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(B) provides:

    ``A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, 
within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the 
court an application for fees and other expenses which shows that 
the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award 
under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an itemized 
statement from any attorney or expert witness representing or 
appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended 
and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed.'' 
(Emphasis added.)

    In Melkonyan v. Sullivan, we held that the term ``final judgment'' 
in the highlighted phrase above ``refers to judgments entered by a 
court of law, and does not encompass decisions rendered by an 
administrative agency.'' See 501 U.S., at ______, 111 S.Ct., at 2162. 
Thus, the only order in this case that could have resulted in the 
starting of EAJA's 30-day clock was the District Court's April 4, 1989 
order, which reversed the Secretary's decision denying disability 
benefits and remanded the case to the Secretary for further 
proceedings.
    In cases reviewing final agency decisions on Social Security 
benefits, the exclusive methods by which district courts may remand to 
the Secretary are set forth in sentence four and sentence six of 
section 405(g), which are set forth in the margin.1 See Melkonyan, 
supra, at ______-______, 111 S.Ct., at 2163-2164. Schaefer correctly 
concedes that the District Court's remand order in this case was 
entered pursuant to sentence four.2 He argues, however, that a 
district court proceeding under that provision need not enter a 
judgment at the time of remand, but may postpone it and retain 
jurisdiction pending completion of the administrative proceedings. That 
argument, however, is inconsistent with the plain language of sentence 
four, which authorizes a district court to enter a judgment ``with or 
without'' a remand order, not a remand order ``with or without'' a 
judgment.
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    \1\Sentences four and six of section 405(g) provide:
    ``[4] The [district] court shall have power to enter, upon the 
pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, 
modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or 
without remanding the cause for a rehearing * * *. [6] The court 
may, on motion of the Secretary made for good cause shown before he 
files his answer, remand the case to the Secretary for further 
action by the Secretary, and it may at any time order additional 
evidence to be taken before the Secretary, but only upon a showing 
that there is now evidence which is material and that there is good 
cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record 
in a prior proceeding; and the Secretary shall, after the case is 
remanded, and after hearing such additional evidence if so ordered, 
modify or affirm his findings of fact or his decision, or both, and 
shall file with the court any such additional and modified findings 
of fact and decision, and a transcript of the additional record and 
testimony upon which his action in modifying or affirming was 
based.''
    \2\Sentence-six remands may be ordered in only two situations: 
where the Secretary requests a remand before answering the 
complaint, or where new, material evidence is adduced that was for 
good cause not presented before the agency. See section 405(g) 
(sentence six); Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. ______, ______, and 
n. 2, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 2163-2164, and n. 2, (1991); cf. Sullivan v. 
Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 626, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 2664, 110 L.Ed.2d 
563 (1990). The District Court's April 4, 1989 remand order clearly 
does not fit within either situation.
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    See Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 629, 110 S. Ct. 2658, 
2666, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990). Immediate entry of judgment (as opposed 
to entry of judgment after postremand agency proceedings have been 
completed and their results filed with the court) is in fact the 
principal feature that distinguishes a sentence-four remand from a 
sentence-six remand. See Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at ______-______, 111 
S.Ct., at 2164-2165.
    Nor is it possible to argue that the judgment authorized by 
sentence four, if it includes a remand, does not become a ``final 
judgment''--as required by section 2412(d)--upon expiration of the time 
for appeal. If that were true, there would never be any final judgment 
in cases reversed and remanded for further agency proceedings 
(including those which suffer that fate after the Secretary has filed 
the results of a sentence-six remand). Sentence eight of section 405(g) 
states that ``(t)he judgment of the court''--which must be a reference 
to a sentence-four judgment, since that is the only judgment authorized 
by section 405(g)--``shall be final except that it shall be subject to 
review in the same manner as a judgment in other civil actions.'' Thus, 
when the time for seeking appellate review has run, the sentence-four 
judgment fits squarely within the term ``final judgment'' as used in 
section 2412(d), which is defined to mean ``a judgment that is final 
and not appealable.'' 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(2)(G). We described the law 
with complete accuracy in Melkonyan, when we said:

    In sentence four cases, the filing period begins after the final 
judgment (``affirming, modifying, or reversing'') is entered by the 
court and the appeal period has run, so that the judgment is no 
longer appealable * * *. In sentence six cases, the filing period 
does not begin until after the postremand proceedings are completed, 
the Secretary returns to court, the court enters a final judgment, 
and the appeal period runs. 501 U.S. at ______, 111 S.Ct., at 2165.

    Schaefer raises two arguments that merit further discussion. The 
first is based on our decision in Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 
892, 109 S.Ct. 2248, 2257, 104 L.Ed.2d 941, (1989), which held that 
fees incurred during administrative proceedings held pursuant to a 
district court's remand order could be recovered under EAJA. In order 
``to effectuate Hudson,'' Schaefer contends, a district court entering 
a sentence-four remand order may properly hold its judgment in abeyance 
(and thereby delay the start of EAJA's 30-day clock) until postremand 
administrative proceedings are complete; otherwise, as far as fees 
incurred during the yet-to-be-held administrative proceedings are 
concerned, the claimant would be unable to comply with the requirement 
of section 2412(d)(1)(B) that the fee application include ``the amount 
sought'' and ``an itemized statement * * * [of] the actual time 
expended'' by attorneys and experts. In response, the Secretary argues 
that Hudson applies only to cases remanded pursuant to sentence six of 
section 405(g), where there is no final judgment and the clock does not 
begin to run. The difficulty with that, Schaefer contends, is that 
Hudson itself clearly involved a sentence-four remand.
    On the last point, Schaefer is right. Given the facts recited by 
the Court in Hudson, the remand order there could have been authorized 
only under sentence four. See 490 U.S., at 880-881, 109 S.Ct.,at 2252; 
cf. n. 2, supra. However, the facts in Hudson also show that the 
District Court had not terminated the case, but had retained 
jurisdiction during the remand. And that was a central element in our 
decision, as the penultimate sentence of the opinion shows:

    We conclude that where a court orders a remand to the Secretary 
in a benefits litigation and retains continuing jurisdiction over 
the case pending a decision from the Secretary which will determine 
the claimant's entitlement to benefits, the proceedings on remand 
are an integral part of the ``civil action'' for judicial review, 
and thus attorney's fees for representation on remand are available 
subject to the other limitations in the EAJA. 490 U.S., at 892, 109 
S.Ct., at 2258 (emphasis added).

    We have since made clear, in Finkelstein, that that retention of 
jurisdiction, that failure to terminate the case, was error: Under 
section 405(g), ``each final decision of the Secretary [is] reviewable 
by a separate piece of litigation,'' and a sentence-four remand order 
``terminate[s] the civil action'' seeking judicial review of the 
Secretary's final decision. 496 U.S., at 624-625, 110 S.Ct., at 2663 
(emphases added). What we adjudicated in Hudson, in other words, was a 
hybrid: a sentence-four remand that the District Court had improperly 
(but without objection) treated like a sentence-six remand.3 We 
specifically noted in Melkonyan that Hudson was limited to a ``narrow 
class of qualifying administrative proceedings'' where ``the district 
court retains jurisdiction of the civil action'' pending the completion 
of the administrative proceedings. 501 U.S. at ______, 111 S.Ct., at 
2162. We therefore do not consider the holding of Hudson binding as to 
sentence-four remands that are ordered (as they should be) without 
retention of jurisdiction, or that are ordered with retention of 
jurisdiction that is challenged.4
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    \3\ The Secretary not only failed to object to the District 
Court's retention of jurisdiction, but affirmatively endorsed the 
practice as a means of accommodating the lower court cases holding 
that a section 405(g) plaintiff does not become a prevailing party 
until Social Security benefits are actually awarded. Reply Brief for 
Petitioner in Sullivan v. Hudson, O.T. 1988, No. 616, pp. 12-13. 
Those precedents were highly favorable to the Government, of course, 
because they relieved the Secretary of liability for EAJA fees in 
all cases where Social Security benefits were ultimately denied. But 
they were also at war with the view--expressed later in the 
Secretary's Hudson reply brief--that a sentence-four remand order is 
a ``final judgment'' in the civil action. Id., at 16. Essentially, 
the Secretary in Hudson wanted it both ways: He wanted us to regard 
retention of jurisdiction as proper for purposes of determining 
prevailing-party status, but as improper for purposes of awarding 
fees on remand.
    \4\Justice STEVENS says that our holding ``overrul[es]'' 
Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 109 S.Ct. 2248, 104 L.Ed.2d 941, 
(1989). Post, at 2633, 2636. We do not think that is an accurate 
characterization. Hudson remains good law as applied to remands 
ordered pursuant to sentence six. And since the distinction between 
sentence-four and sentence-six remands was neither properly 
presented nor considered in Hudson, see supra, at 2630 and n. 3, and 
infra, at 2631, limiting Hudson to sentence-six cases does not 
``overrule'' the decision even in part. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
507 U.S. ______, ______, 113 S.Ct., 1710, 1718, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 
(1993). We agree with Justice STEVENS that until today there has 
been some contradiction in our case law on this subject. In 
resolving it, however, we have not simply chosen Melkonyan's dicta 
over Hudson, but have grounded our decision in the text and 
structure of the relevant statutes, particularly section 405.
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    Schaefer's second argument is that a sentence-four remand order 
cannot be considered a ``final judgment'' for purposes of section 
2412(d)(1)(B) because that provision requires the party seeking fees to 
submit an application ``show[ing] that [he] is a prevailing party.'' 
That showing, Schaefer contends, cannot be made until the proceedings 
on remand are complete, since a Social Security claimant does not 
``prevail'' until he is awarded Social Security benefits. The premise 
of this argument is wrong. No holding of this Court has ever denied 
prevailing-party status (under section 2412(d)(1)(B)) to a plaintiff 
who won a remand order pursuant to sentence four of section 405(g). 
Dicta in Hudson stated that ``a Social Security claimant would not, as 
a general matter, be a prevailing party within the meaning of the EAJA 
merely because a court had remanded the action to the agency for 
further proceedings.'' 490 U.S., at 887, 109 S.Ct., at 2255. But that 
statement (like the holding of the case) simply failed to recognize the 
distinction between a sentence-four remand, which terminates the 
litigation with victory for the plaintiff, and a sentence-six remand, 
which does not. The sharp distinction between the two types of remand 
had not been made in the lower-court opinions in Hudson, see Hudson v. 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 1453 (CA11 1988); App. 
to Pet. for Cert. in Sullivan v. Hudson, O.T.1988, No. 616, pp. 17a-20a 
(setting forth unpublished District Court opinion), was not included in 
the question presented for decision,5 and was mentioned for the 
first time in the closing pages of the Secretary's reply brief, see 
Reply Brief for Petitioner in Sullivan v. Hudson, O.T.1988, No. 616, 
pp. 14-17. It is only decisions after Hudson--specifically Finkelstein 
and Melkonyan--which establish that the sentence-four, sentence-six 
distinction is crucial to the structure of judicial review established 
under section 405(g). See Finkelstein, 496 U.S., at 626, 110 S.Ct., at 
2664; Melkonyan, 501 U.S., at ______-______, 111 S.Ct., at 2162-2163.
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    \5\As formulated in the Secretary's petition, the question on 
which the Court granted certiorari in Hudson was: ``Whether Social 
Security administrative proceedings conducted after a remand from 
the courts are `adversary adjudications' for which attorney fees are 
available under the [EAJA].'' Pet. for Cert. in Sullivan v. Hudson, 
O.T.1988, No. 616, p. I.
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    Hudson's dicta that remand does not generally confer prevailing-
party status relied on three cases, none of which supports that 
proposition as applied to sentence-four remands. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 
446 U.S. 754, 758-759, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 1990, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980), 
rejected an assertion of prevailing-party status, not by virtue of 
having secured a remand, but by virtue of having obtained a favorable 
procedural ruling (the reversal on appeal of a directed verdict) during 
the course of the judicial proceedings. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 
107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987), held that a plaintiff does not 
become a prevailing party merely by obtaining ``a favorable judicial 
statement of law in the course of litigation that results in judgment 
against the plaintiff,'' id., at 763, 107 S.Ct., at 2677 (emphasis 
added). (A sentence-four remand, of course, is a judgment for the 
plaintiff.) And the third case cited in Hudson, Texas Teachers Assn. v. 
Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 
L.Ed.2d 866 (1989), affirmatively supports the proposition that a party 
who wins a sentence-four remand order is a prevailing party. Garland 
held that status to have been obtained ``[i]f the plaintiff has 
succeeded on any significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some 
of the benefit * * * sought in bringing suit.'' Id., at 791-792, 109 
S.Ct., at 1493 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Obtaining a sentence-four judgment reversing the Secretary's denial of 
benefits certainly meets this description. See also Farrar v. Hobby, 
506 U.S. ______, 113 S.Ct., 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992).

III

    Finally, Schaefer argues that, even if the District Court should 
have entered judgment in connection with its April 4, 1989 order 
remanding the case to the Secretary, the fact remains that it did not. 
And since no judgment was entered, he contends, the 30-day time period 
for filing an application for EAJA fees cannot have run. We agree.
    An EAJA application may be filed until 30 days after a judgment 
becomes ``not appealable''--i.e., 30 days after the time for appeal has 
ended. See section 2412(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(G); see also Melkonyan, 501 
U.S., at ______, 111 S.Ct., at 2165. Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure establishes that, in a civil case to which a 
federal officer is a party, the time for appeal does not end until 60 
days after ``entry of judgment,'' and that a judgment is considered 
entered for purposes of the rule only if it has been ``entered in 
compliance with Rul[e] 58 * * * of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.'' Fed. R. App. Proc. 4(a)(1), (7). Rule 58, in turn, 
requires a district court to set forth every judgment ``on a separate 
document'' and provides that ``[a] judgment is effective only when so 
set forth.'' See United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 220, 93 
S.Ct. 1562, 1564, 36 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973) (per curiam).
    Since the District Court's April 4 remand order was a final 
judgment, see ante, at 2630, a ``separate document'' of judgment should 
have been entered. It is clear from the record that this was not done. 
The Secretary does not dispute that, but argues that a formal 
``separate document'' of judgment is not needed for an order of a 
district court to become appealable. That is quite true, see 28 U.S.C. 
1291; Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 98 S.Ct. 1117, 55 
L.Ed.2d 357 (1978) (per curiam); Finkelstein, supra, 496 U.S. at 628, 
n. 7, 110 S.Ct., at 2665, n. 7, but also quite irrelevant. EAJA's 30-
day time limit runs from the end of the period for appeal, not the 
beginning. Absent a formal judgment, the District Court's April 4 order 
remained ``appealable'' at the time that Schaefer filed his application 
for EAJA fees, and thus the application was timely under section 
2412(d)(1).6
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    \6\We disagree with Justice STEVENS' assertion that ``the 
respondent has prevailed precisely because the District Court in 
this case did enter a remand order without entering a judgment.'' 
Post, at 2633, n. 2 (emphasis in original). By entering a sentence-
four remand order, the District Court did enter a judgment; it just 
failed to comply with the formalities of Rule 58 in doing so. That 
was error but, as detailed in the text, the relevant rules and 
statutes impose the burden of that error on the party seeking to 
assert an untimeliness defense, here the Secretary. Thus, contrary 
to Justice STEVENS' suggestion, see post, at 2633, n. 2, our ruling 
in favor of respondent is not at all inconsistent with the 
proposition that sentence four and sentence six provide the 
exclusive methods by which district courts may remand a section 405 
case to the Secretary.
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    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed.
    Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and 
Thomas joined. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the 
judgment, in which Justice Blackmun joined.

[FR Doc. 94-1922 Filed 1-27-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4190-29-P