[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 12 (Wednesday, January 19, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-1177]


[[Page Unknown]]

[Federal Register: January 19, 1994]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Research and Special Programs Administration

49 CFR Part 195

[Docket No. PS-133; Notice 1]
RIN 2137--AC 39

 

Emergency Flow Restricting Devices/Leak Detection Systems

AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT.

ACTION: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: In 1991, the Department issued a report on emergency flow 
restricting devices (EFRDs) that proposed seeking public input on the 
placement of EFRDs at certain locations on hazardous liquid pipelines. 
The Pipeline Safety Act of 1992 mandated that the Department issue 
regulations prescribing the circumstances under which operators must 
use EFRDs and other equipment used to detect and locate pipeline 
ruptures on hazardous liquid pipelines. The regulations are to be 
issued following a survey and assessment of the effectiveness of such 
equipment. This advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) poses a 
series of questions in order to solicit public input for the survey 
process.

DATES: Interested persons are invited to submit written comments in 
duplicate by April 19, 1994. Late-filed comments will be considered to 
the extent practicable. Interested persons should submit as part of 
their written comments all the material that is considered relevant to 
any statement of fact or argument made.

ADDRESSES: Send comments in duplicate to the Dockets Unit, Room 8421, 
Research and Special Programs Administration, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC 20590. Identify 
the docket and notice numbers stated in the heading of this advance 
notice. All comments and materials cited in this document will be 
available in the docket for inspection and copying in room 8421 between 
8 a.m. and 4 p.m. each working day. Visitors are admitted to DOT 
headquarters building through the southwest quadrant at Seventh and E 
Streets. Commenters may request copies of the questions in a format 
which can be filled out and returned to the RSPA. Requests should be 
made to Lloyd W. Ulrich, Office of Pipeline Safety, room 2335, 400 
Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 366-4556 or 
FAX (202) 366-4566.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lloyd W. Ulrich, (202) 366-4556, 
regarding the subject matter of this advance notice, or Dockets Unit, 
(202) 366-5046, for copies of this advance notice or other material in 
the docket.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    The RSPA has been concerned for some time with the issue of more 
rapid leak detection on hazardous liquid pipelines, and the optimum 
placement of EFRDs to limit commodity release after the location of the 
release in the hazardous liquid pipeline has been identified.
    Section 203 of the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act (codified 
at 49 U.S.C. app. Sec. 2002(n)) as amended by the Pipeline Safety Act 
of 1992 (the 1992 Act) (Pub. L. 102-508) mandated the Secretary, within 
two years of enactment, to conduct a survey and assess the 
effectiveness of emergency flow restricting devices (EFRDs) and other 
procedures, systems, and equipment used to detect and locate hazardous 
liquid pipeline ruptures and minimize product releases from hazardous 
liquid pipeline facilities. The 1992 amendments further mandated that 
the Secretary issue regulations within two years of completion of the 
survey and assessment. These regulations would prescribe the 
circumstances under which operators of hazardous liquid pipelines would 
use EFRDs and other procedures, systems, and equipment to detect and 
locate pipeline ruptures and minimize product release from pipeline 
facilities. The Secretary has delegated this authority to the Research 
and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) (See 49 CFR 1.53).
    Also, the Department's March 1991 report titled ``Emergency Flow 
Restricting Devices Study'' contained proposals that we seek public 
input on the placement of EFRDs in urban areas, at water crossings, at 
other critical areas affected by commodity release, and areas in close 
proximity to the public outside of urban areas.
    This ANPRM solicits public input for the survey process mandated by 
the 1992 Act as well as the proposals from the Department's 1991 EFRD 
study. The ANPRM requests information and data by posing a series of 
questions. This approach is utilized rather than conducting a 
traditional research survey of a selected number of respondents in 
order to obtain a broader base of data and to accelerate the regulatory 
process.

Notice on Highly Volatile Liquids--1978

    In 1978, the RSPA issued an NPRM (43 FR 39402; September 5, 1978) 
proposing requirements intended to limit spillage from hazardous liquid 
pipelines carrying highly volatile liquids (HVL)1 in inhabited 
areas by requiring installation of remotely controlled valves 
(RCVs)2 or automatically controlled valves (ACVs).3 This 
proposal was later withdrawn (46 FR 2130; January 8, 1981) because 
hazardous liquid pipeline industry studies demonstrated that placement 
of closely spaced valves over the full length of an HVL pipeline was 
not a reasonable method of reducing the effects of an accident.
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    \1\The term ``HVL'' is defined in 49 CFR 195.2 as a hazardous 
liquid which will form a vapor cloud when released to the atmosphere 
and which has a vapor pressure exceeding 276 kPa (40 psia) at 
37.8 deg.C (100 deg.F). The commodities included in the term ``HVL'' 
are LPG, anhydrous ammonia, and certain natural gas liquids.
    \2\An RCV is any valve which is operated from a location remote 
from where the valve is installed. The location is usually at the 
pipeline control or dispatching center. The linkage between the 
pipeline control center and the RCV may be by fiber optics, 
microwave, telephone lines, or satellite.
    \3\An ACV is any valve which automatically closes in response to 
a rate of pressure drop or flow rate in the pipeline which exceeds a 
preset level.
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Mounds View Accident

    A July 8, 1986, accident on a gasoline pipeline focused interest on 
EFRDs. The accident, caused by a ruptured pipe seam on a gasoline 
pipeline in Mounds View, Minnesota, resulted in two deaths, one injury, 
and property damage well in excess of $1,000,000. The accident was 
exacerbated by backflow or draining from the pipeline after the 
manually operated valves on either side of the ruptured section were 
closed. The spill ignited approximately 20 minutes after the rupture. 
It took the pipeline operator over 1 hour and 40 minutes from the time 
of the rupture to isolate the ruptured section. Since this accident, 
the pipeline company installed a computerized leak-detection system and 
RCVs on either side of Mounds View (a distance of about 5.7 miles).

Advance Notice on Certain Safety Proposals--1987

    In 1987, as a result of the same accident, the RSPA again addressed 
RCVs and ACVs in an ANPRM (52 FR 4361; February 11, 1987). This ANPRM 
invited public comment on the merit of certain safety proposals 
advanced by Congress, the Minnesota Commission on Pipeline Safety, and 
the National Transportation Safety Board. One safety proposal was to 
convert shutoff valves required by the pipeline safety regulations on 
existing pipelines to RCVs or ACVs, and require similar valves on new 
pipeline construction.
    Both gas and hazardous liquid pipeline operators indicated that 
neither RCVs nor ACVs were installed as shutoff valves as standard 
practice. They indicated that RCVs and ACVs had little effect to 
mitigate the extent of the spill because often, especially in populated 
areas on gas pipelines, ignition occurred before either type of valve 
could shut down a pipeline.
    The specific concern of false closure of ACVs was identified in 
these comments. There was substantial agreement by both gas and 
hazardous liquid pipeline operators that ACVs should not be used as 
EFRDs because of their unreliability. This unreliability was due to the 
inability of ACV sensors to distinguish between a leak and normal 
operating fluctuations. Pipeline operators indicated numerous 
documented cases of unintended closures of ACVs. A false closure of an 
ACV on a hazardous liquid pipeline can cause an immediate pressure 
buildup or surge which may result in a pipeline rupture.
    On September 23, 1987, the ANPRM was discussed at the joint meeting 
of the RSPA's Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committee and the 
Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee. (Both 
technical committees were established by the Secretary of 
Transportation to advise the Department on the technical feasibility, 
reasonableness, and practicability of all proposed gas and hazardous 
liquid pipeline safety standards and all amendments to existing 
standards.) The committees recommended that the Department study the 
selective use of RCVs and ACVs.

Emergency Flow Restricting Devices Study--1991

    Section 305 of the Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of 1988 
(Public Law 100-561), enacted on October 31, 1988, directed a study of 
the safety, cost, feasibility, and effectiveness of requiring gas and 
hazardous liquid pipeline operators to install EFRDs in existing and 
future pipeline systems in varying circumstances and locations.
    In March 1991, in response to this Congressional mandate, the 
Department issued the study titled ``Emergency Flow Restricting Devices 
Study.'' One of the conclusions in the study was that RCVs and check 
valves4 are the only feasible EFRDs. Another conclusion was that 
requiring the retrofitting of all existing manually operated valves to 
RCVs on hazardous liquid pipelines in urban locations, as well as new 
valves in urban areas appeared to be cost effective. Still another 
conclusion in the study was that for an RCV to be effective, a modern 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system with a well-
designed leak detection subsystem was necessary to reduce spills from 
hazardous liquid pipelines. The study found that there was no 
significant benefit from installing EFRDs on gas transmission 
pipelines.
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    \4\Check valves are valves that permit fluid to flow freely in 
one direction and contain a mechanism to automatically prevent flow 
in the other direction.
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    SCADA systems utilize computer technology to analyze data (e.g., 
pressure, temperature, and delivery flow rates) that are continuously 
gathered from remote locations on the pipeline. Computer analysis of 
this data is used to assist in day-to-day operating decisions on the 
pipeline and to provide input for real-time models of the pipeline 
operation which can identify and locate leaks.
    SCADA-based leak detection subsystems are composed of hardware and 
software programs that employ a real-time modelling procedure to 
compare the current operational conditions of a segment of pipe to an 
``ideal'' operating state. This ideal state is sometimes recalibrated 
during operations to accommodate variations in conditions (e.g., 
temperature or pressure fluctuations in the pipe that occur due to 
changes in the materials in transport or external environmental 
conditions). An ``alarm'' is sent to a central operator when the 
software model detects a condition that is ``substantially'' different 
from the idealized state. What makes the condition ``substantially'' 
different, thereby triggering the alarm, is determined by the model 
designer and the conditions imposed on the model, as well as by the 
amount of data available on the ``ideal'' state and its normal 
operational variability.
    An RCV can operate without a SCADA system installed. However, for 
an RCV to be used effectively in reducing a spill, the dispatcher must 
be able to determine that a pipeline failure has occurred, identify the 
location of the failure, and then quickly initiate closure of the 
valve. Accomplishing these actions in a timely manner requires the 
installation of a SCADA system including a well-designed leak detection 
subsystem. The extensive pollution which resulted from a 1988 pipeline 
failure in Maries County, Missouri, to be discussed later in this 
ANPRM, might have been avoided if a leak detection subsystem had been 
installed with the SCADA system allowing operator personnel to detect 
the leak.
    It is clear from the RSPA's analysis of information and data 
obtained in conducting the March 1991 EFRD study, that spillage from a 
pipeline failure can be significantly reduced by RCVs only where a 
modern SCADA system is equipped with a well-designed leak detection 
subsystem. The type and sophistication of the control system, installed 
as part of an existing SCADA system, depends on the age of the control 
system.
    The March 1991 EFRD study contained a number of proposals to 
address the issue of EFRDs. One of the proposals was that the 
Department conduct a research study on whether SCADA systems, including 
well-designed leak detection subsystems, should be required on 
hazardous liquid pipelines in order to enhance the safe operation of 
the pipelines. Enhanced safety requirements would include provision for 
more rapid response following accidents, including valve spacing 
criteria and initiating the closure of RCVs. This study is presently 
being conducted by the Volpe National Transportation System Center 
(VNTSC) and is discussed later in this ANPRM.
    Another proposal from this study was for the RSPA to issue a notice 
of proposed rulemaking proposing to require, on hazardous liquid 
pipelines with SCADA systems installed, that existing manually operated 
main line block valves5 in urban areas be retrofitted to make them 
RCVs and install RCVs when new valves are installed in urban areas. 
This ANPRM seeks data on valves located in urban areas.
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    \5\A valve which provides a positive shut off of commodity flow 
both upstream and downstream of the valve is generally known as a 
``block valve'' because it blocks the flow in the pipeline.
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    Other proposals in the study suggested public input on whether the 
hazardous liquid pipeline safety regulations in 49 CFR part 195 should 
be revised to require valve spacing criteria for EFRDs at the following 
locations: (1) Where the valves could most effectively reduce the 
likelihood of the escaping liquid entering the water at water crossings 
that are more than 100-feet wide, and on either side of a reservoir 
holding water for human consumption; (2) At other critical areas 
affected by commodity release; and (3) At specific locations outside of 
urban areas on hazardous liquid pipelines in proximity to the public.
    Some of the questions posed in this ANPRM are designed to provide 
data on which the RSPA will decide on a further course of action 
concerning the proposed placement of EFRDs in these locations.

Past Data Collection

    To broaden the data base for the March 1991 EFRD study, the RSPA 
solicited information from the public, including gas and hazardous 
liquid pipeline operators and equipment manufacturers, through a 
Federal Register notice (54 FR 20945; May 15, 1989). A series of 15 
questions addressed a number of EFRD/leak detection-related issues 
including SCADA technology, establishing a maximum allowable spill 
value, and criteria for valve spacing. The 72 responses to the notice 
are contained in Docket PS-104; Notice 1 and are available for review 
in the Docket Unit, room 8421.
    The notice included a series of questions about leak detection 
subsystems which are part of operators' SCADA systems. The responses to 
the questions indicated SCADA systems are becoming more sophisticated 
and leak detection subsystems are becoming more common on hazardous 
liquid pipelines. The sensitivity of leak detection subsystems on 
hazardous liquid pipelines was reported to range from 0.5 percent of 
flow to 5 percent of flow over a 1- to 2-hour period. Once a leak is 
suspected, the time for the dispatcher to respond by closing valves 
ranges from a few minutes for an RCV to an average of about 2 hours for 
manually operated valves.
    Commenters to the notice were also asked to discuss the advantages 
and disadvantages of establishing a valve spacing requirement based on 
a maximum spill criterion. Two advantages cited by commenters to 
support establishing a maximum spill criterion on a hazardous liquid 
pipeline were: (1) Reduction in the exposure to the public of the 
possible hazard created by a spill and (2) improved contingency plans 
since the plans could be based on a spill of a set volume. However, 
commenters cited more disadvantages than advantages.
    Most hazardous liquid pipeline operators opposed setting a maximum 
spill criterion. They indicated a maximum acceptable spill would vary 
widely along the length of any pipeline depending on spill location. 
Establishing one criterion for all pipelines would not account for the 
variables at each spill location. Commenters indicated that more 
important than establishing an arbitrary spill limit is the need to 
consider the line profile, drainage gradient, length, and diameter of 
the hazardous liquid pipeline, susceptibility to outside force damage, 
population density, and potential hazards to public safety and the 
environment. Commenters indicated a spill limit would require more 
valves, particularly on large diameter hazardous liquid pipelines. This 
would increase the opportunity for inadvertent valve closure, leakage 
from the valve itself, and vandalism. One commenter stated that 
protection of the public and environment is related more to exposure of 
the hazardous liquid pipeline to the public and response time in 
detecting and responding to a failure, than to setting a limit on the 
volume of product released. This commenter stated: ``The most effective 
means for mitigating potential pipeline failure hazards is prompt leak 
identification, rapid pipeline shutdown, and immediate dispatch of 
response crews to the failure site.''
    Commenters were asked if the spacing of RCVs and ACVs is determined 
by a maximum spill from the hazardous liquid pipeline, what should that 
maximum spill value be? None of the commenters provided a maximum spill 
value. Hazardous liquid pipeline operators reiterated that the 
information provided in the responses to the valve spacing question 
should be used in the context of spill mitigation rather than to 
establish a single maximum spill criterion. One commenter stated that, 
in addition to pipe diameter, terrain, and the pipeline's route near or 
in urban areas, the RSPA should consider the probability of failure, 
magnitude of the leak, and consequences of the leak in establishing a 
maximum spill criterion.

December 24, 1988, Failure in Maries County, Missouri

    The legislative history for the 1992 Act cites a December 24, 1988, 
failure in Maries County, Missouri to demonstrate the need of adequate 
leak detection equipment. The failure resulted in a crude oil spill of 
approximately 20,554 barrels (863,268 gallons). The cause was the 
abrupt change in pressure and fluid flow from the switching of flowing, 
low density crude oil from one pipeline into another containing a 
substantially heavier oil.
    Crude oil released entered a tributary of the Gasconade River, the 
Gasconade River, the Missouri River, and eventually the Mississippi 
River near St. Louis, Missouri. In order to control the contamination 
from the large volume of crude oil released, it was necessary to shut 
down several water companies along these rivers and a brewery in St. 
Louis.
    Failure of pipeline personnel at the dispatching station to 
recognize that a rupture had occurred and to shut down the pipeline 
greatly increased the volume of crude oil spilled.
    The Gasconade River and its tributary, into which the crude oil 
spill first entered, were bracketed by manually operated block valves. 
The RSPA estimates that the installation of a check valve would have 
prevented drainage from the 5 mile of pipe on either side of the river, 
thereby substantially reducing the size of the spill. Also, the 
installation of a leak detection subsystem on the SCADA system would 
probably have substantially reduced the size of the spill.

Report From the National Institute of Standards and Technology

    The legislative history of the 1992 Act also cites a July 1989 
report from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
U.S. Department of Commerce (Report Number NISTIR 89-4136) which 
resulted from an investigation of the Maries County, Missouri pipeline 
failure. In the report, titled ``An Assessment of the Performance of 
Older ERW Pipelines'', NIST found that the installation of EFRDs could 
significantly reduce the damage from pipeline failures and recommended 
that they be installed in ``critical risk locations.''

Current SCADA Study by the VNTSC

    In May 1992, the RSPA commenced a research study with the VNTSC to 
analyze SCADA systems and computer-generated leak detection systems. 
The purpose of the research study is to determine the feasibility and 
costs of requiring pipeline operators to install a SCADA system 
including a leak detection subsystem, and determine what impediments 
exist or what system improvements are needed to minimize the time it 
takes SCADA systems to detect and locate leaks, and make 
recommendations to resolve these difficulties. As mentioned previously, 
this new initiative is based on findings from the Department's March 
1991 EFRD study concerning RCVs. These valves maximize the value of 
SCADA-based leak detection systems by helping to mitigate damages from 
detected leaks.
    The first phase of this study included a literature search on the 
subject, on-site interviews with seven pipeline operators, interviews 
with five equipment vendors, and development of a mathematical model 
describing optimal valve spacing for given annual pipeline failure 
rates per mile and costs, and a method to evaluate alternative leak 
detection system performance characteristics to reduce pipeline spill 
volumes.
    Every pipeline operator surveyed by the contractor used some sort 
of SCADA system. Most operators had at least one computerized leak 
detection system, either one purchased from a vendor, custom designed 
by the operator, or a combination of the two systems. All operators 
interviewed believed that the condition of high false alarm rates was a 
major drawback to the installation and operation of leak detection 
systems. The problem occurs due to the required trade-off between the 
threshold volume sensitivity of the leak detection system and the 
resulting false alarm rate when this sensitivity is too high. All the 
operators interviewed emphasized that the most critical link in leak 
detection was the interface between the system itself and the pipeline 
dispatcher, and that there was no substitute for a highly competent 
pipeline dispatcher.
    The VNTSC is drafting a report on the first phase of the study. 
Once the report is completed, a copy will be placed in the docket to 
this rulemaking.

Regulatory Analysis and Notices

A. Impact Assessment

    This ANPRM is not considered a significant regulatory action under 
section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and was not reviewed by the 
Office of Management and Budget. The ANPRM is not considered 
significant under the Regulatory Policies and Procedures of the 
Department of Transportation (44 FR 11034).

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    This ANPRM would not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities (i.e., small businesses, 
governmental jurisdictions, and non-for-profit organizations) under the 
criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. This ANPRM would apply to 
operators of hazardous liquid pipelines, all of whom are large 
businesses. Therefore, I certify that this ANPRM will not, if 
promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities. This certification is subject to modification as a 
result of a review of comments received in response to this ANPRM.

C. Federalism Assessment

    The ANPRM has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and 
criteria in Executive Order 12612 (``Federalism''), and does not have 
sufficient federalism impacts to warrant the preparation of a 
federalism assessment.

D. Paperwork Reduction Act

    There are no new information collection requirements in this ANPRM.
Questions
    The RSPA is issuing this ANPRM to solicit data from the public 
through a series of questions as the means of conducting the survey 
mandated in the 1992 Act. The response from the public to these 
questions will aid in developing proposals on what circumstances and 
criteria operators must install EFRDs and other equipment to limit 
product release from hazardous liquid pipelines. The failures discussed 
above suggest that releases can be reduced when EFRDs and well-designed 
leak detection systems are installed on hazardous liquid pipelines.
    Assessing the data received from the questions in the ANPRM should 
accelerate the rulemaking process required by the 1992 Act. The data 
gathered by this ANPRM, the findings from earlier reports on the 
subject of EFRDs, including the Department's March 1991 EFRD study, and 
the work accomplished so far in the SCADA contract with the VNTSC could 
form the basis for any notice of proposed rulemaking concerning the 
proposed placement of EFRDs and criteria for leak detection systems.
    The RSPA is considering a systems approach to reducing spills from 
hazardous liquid pipelines. The system involved includes equipment, 
personnel, software and procedures to accomplish three tasks: (1) 
Detect that a failure and resultant spill has occurred; (2) Identify 
the location of the spill; and (3) Shut the pipeline down in order to 
reduce the amount of the spill. The first two tasks involve 
computerized leak detection systems, while the third task involves the 
installation of EFRDs.
    Many of the following questions are directed to the operators of 
hazardous liquid pipelines. They relate to pipeline system operational 
data in addition to the physical location of pipeline facilities in 
relation to geographical and topographical features which can only be 
obtained from pipeline operators. However, the RSPA solicits comments 
to questions which do not involve data on a particular hazardous liquid 
pipeline from other members of the public including State agencies, 
trade associations, and environmental organizations, both private and 
public. The RSPA believes that State pipeline safety agencies can 
contribute significantly to this rulemaking because of the States' 
unique experience with regulating intrastate hazardous liquid pipelines 
and as the Department's agent on interstate hazardous liquid pipelines. 
Questions 18 and 19 are directed to the nonregulated public. These 
commenters are requested also to suggest additional questions, 
including clarification questions, which may emerge from reviewing this 
ANPRM.
    To aid in analysis of the responses, commenters are requested to 
respond using the same numbering system which is used in this ANPRM.

SCADA-based Leak Detection System Sensitivity and Reliability

    The RSPA needs data on which to base decisions on what should be 
proposed for SCADA-based leak detection systems. The RSPA is starting 
from the premise that most if not all hazardous liquid pipeline 
operators have installed a SCADA system which is used for the everyday 
efficient operation of the pipeline. The SCADA study by the VNTSC has, 
so far, found this to be true. (Commenters are requested to indicate if 
this premise is true.) The RSPA must decide whether to propose: (1) A 
specific type of leak detection system; (2) whether to propose 
requiring certain criteria which would embody the attributes of all of 
the presently recognized computerized leak detection systems; (3) a 
combination of (1) and (2); or (4) some other leak detection system 
requirement which at present is unknown to the RSPA but which may 
emerge from comments to this ANPRM.
    The questions are intended to obtain responses which relate to 
operational data that a hazardous liquid operator has concerning the 
SCADA-based leak detection system installed on its pipeline system 
including the sensitivity and reliability of that system.
    Questions 1 through 6 primarily relate to the experience on a 
segment of the operator's hazardous liquid pipeline system which is 
covered by a SCADA-based leak detection system. If the operator has 
segments of its hazardous liquid pipeline system covered by more than 
one SCADA-based leak detection system, please submit responses to the 
series of questions 1 through 6 for each segment of the covered 
pipeline system. For instance, a SCADA-based leak detection system may 
be installed on a 400 mile segment of an interstate pipeline in Texas 
and another SCADA-based leak detection system on a 200 mile segment in 
Virginia. The RSPA requests a separate set of responses for each 
segment, not aggregate responses for all of the SCADA-based leak 
detection systems for all parts of the operator's pipeline system.
    Several topics will be addressed in the set of questions below. 
These are: (1) The method(s) of leak detection in use on the segment 
described in the data submission; (2) leak detection alarms which occur 
at the hazardous liquid pipeline systems operating center; (3) the leak 
detection and SCADA system availability; and (4) the actual performance 
of leak detection systems in identifying and locating leaks on an 
operational hazardous liquid pipeline.
    If the operator does not presently have this data, we encourage the 
operator to gather the data for at least one month and then submit it 
to the RSPA. System alarms history should be provided to the RSPA as a 
log and may be submitted either as a computer printout or on a diskette 
using standard ASCII format as long as the segment identifying 
information is clearly noted on the data. Experimental (or simulation-
based) data may be provided as well as operational data which only 
reflect actual operational experience.
    The leak detection performance data should be provided as a log and 
may be submitted either as a computer printout or on a diskette using 
standard ASCII format. Historical performance data gathered during 
developmental phases such as system installation and modification also 
should be submitted.
    It would be helpful if commenters group data for each different 
data collection time period or pipeline segment, so that all data 
(questions 1-6) relates to only one specific segment and time period. 
For the purposes of these questions, a pipeline segment is defined as 
that part of the pipeline between two points where the product can be 
contained, such as between two pressure pump stations, between a 
pressure pump station and a terminal, between a pressure pump station 
and a valve, or between two valves.
    Question 1: Provide the following general information about the 
segment of hazardous liquid pipeline to which the series of questions 
1-6 relate:

1.1  Pipeline segment length description covered in this data 
submission:
    1.1.1  Starting point (mile post or survey station no.)________
    1.1.2  Ending point (mile post or survey station no.)________
    1.1.3  Length of segment (miles)________
1.2  Pipeline nominal diameter (in.)________
1.3  Number of pumping stations on segment? ________
1.4  Number of injection points on segment?________
1.5  Number of delivery points on segment?________
1.6  Commodity(s) transported during this data history________
1.7  Nominal flow rate (bbls/day) ________
1.8  Beginning date covered by this data history (MM/DD/YY)________
1.9  Ending date of this data history (MM/DD/YY) ________

    Question 2: Classify the leak detection system(s) installed on this 
pipeline segment (check each that applies and answer questions 4 
through 6 for each system checked).

2.1  Mass balance________
2.2  Pressure wave ________
2.3  External hydrocarbon sensor________
2.4  Other (specify) ________

    Question 3: For each leak detection system checked in Question 2, 
check whether the system was supplied by an independent vendor or was 
the system developed within your company.

3.1  For the system in Question 2.1?
    3.1.1  Vendor (name) ________
    3.1.2  Internal company developed________
3.2  For the system in Question 2.2?
    3.2.1  Vendor (name) ________
    3.2.2  Internal company developed ________
3.3  For the system in Question 2.3?
    3.3.1  Vendor (name) ________
    3.3.2  Internal company developed ________
3.4  For the system in Question 2.4?
    3.4.1  Vendor (name)________
    3.4.2  Internal company developed ________

    Question 4: For the alarm history, leak detection system 
availability history, and performance data of the leak detection system 
submitted, include answers to the following:

4.1  For the time period reported, at what threshold volume was the 
leak detection system set to alarm (including any error bandwidth that 
is incorporated into that amount) (bbls.)?________
4.2  At that volume how long should detection take (mins.)? ________
4.3  What was the average detection time for that volume 
(mins.)?________
4.4  For each alarm during the time period reported in your response to 
Question 4, include the following data:
    4.4.1  Alarm Initiated (MM/DD/YR & hours & minutes in military 
time6)________
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    \6\``Military time'' is using a 24 hour clock. For instance, 
4:00 pm = 1600 hours or 5:15 pm = 1715 hours.
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    4.4.2  Alarm Cleared (MM/DD/YR & hours & minutes in military 
time)________
    4.4.3  The length of time it took to identify the cause of the 
alarm (if not equal to the difference between the initiation and 
cleared time)(mins.)?________
4.5  For each alarm, was the alarm attributed to one of these causes 
(Y/N)?
    4.5.1  A leak ________ (If ``yes'', go to 4.6)
    4.5.2  An operational change ________
    4.5.3  Data errors (associated with telemetry fluctuations) 
________
    4.5.4  Component failure (hardware or telecommunications) ________
    4.5.5  Human error (e.g., failure to adjust the leak detection 
software system to commodity-specific parameters) ________
    4.5.6  Other (specify) ________
    4.5.7  Undetermined ________
4.6  If a leak was detected--
    4.6.1  What was the cause of the leak (check)?
    4.6.1.1  Corrosion? ________
    4.6.1.2  Failed pipe or pipe seam? ________
    4.6.1.3  Outside force damage by other than natural forces? 
________
    4.6.1.4  Outside force damage by natural forces? ________
    4.6.1.5  Malfunction of control or relief equipment? ________
    4.6.1.6  Operator error? ________
    4.6.1.7  Other (specify) ________
    4.6.2  Was the leak on pipe originally installed on the pipeline 
segment (Y/N)? ________
    4.6.3  What year was the pipe originally installed (year)? ________
    4.6.4  If the answer to 4.6.2 was ``no'', what year was the pipe 
replaced or modified (year)? ________
    4.6.5  What action did you take?
    4.6.5.1  Shut pipeline down (Y/N) ________
    4.6.5.2  Shut down leak detection system (Y/N) ________
    4.6.5.3  Left pipeline and leak detection systems running, 
conducted visual inspection (Y/N) ________
    4.6.5.4  Other (specify) ________

    Question 5: For leak detection system availability (SCADA-based or 
non-SCADA-based), include answers to the following:

5.1  For each instance of leak detection system unavailability reported 
during the time period, include the following data:
    5.1.1  Was this a complete shutdown of the SCADA/leak detection 
system (Y/N)? ________ (If ``no'', go to question 5.3)
5.2  If ``yes'', answer the following (check all that apply):
    5.2.1  Date and time the system stopped running (MM/DD/YR & hours & 
minutes in military time) ________
    5.2.2  Date and time the system resumed (MM/DD/YR & hours & minutes 
in military time) ________
    5.2.3  Was the shutdown attributed to one of these causes (Y/N)?
    5.2.3.1  Dispatcher decision? ________
    5.2.3.2  Input failure (telemetry/telecomm error)? ________
    5.2.3.3  Software failure of the SCADA system? ________
    5.2.3.4  Software failure of the leak detection system? ________
    5.2.3.5  Software failure of both? ________
    5.2.3.6  Hardware failure of the SCADA system? ________
    5.2.3.7  Hardware failure of the leak detection system? ________
    5.2.3.8  Hardware failure of both? ________
    5.2.3.9  Undetermined ________
5.3  If the leak detection system itself did not completely shut down, 
did it issue an alarm (Y/N)? ________
5.4  If an alarm was issued, was the problem attributed to any of the 
following (Y/N)?
    5.4.1  Dispatcher decision? ________
    5.4.2  Input failure (telemetry/telecomm error)? ________
    5.4.3  Software failure of the SCADA system? ________
    5.4.4  Software failure of the leak detection system? ________
    5.4.5  Software failure of both? ________
    5.4.6  Hardware failure of the SCADA system? ________
    5.4.7  Hardware failure of the leak detection system? ________
    5.4.8  Hardware failure of both? ________
    5.4.9  Undetermined ________
    Question 6: Answer the following on leak detection system 
performance:

6.1  What was the circumstance(s) under which data was collected for 
this segment and time period?
    6.1.1  System development (Y/N) ________
    6.1.2  Leak detection system pre-operational demonstrations on a 
segment of operational pipeline (define segment length) (Y/N) ________
    6.1.3  Existing system modification/testing (Y/N) ________
    6.1.4  Actual system operation (Y/N) ________
    6.1.5  Other (specify) ________
6.2  For each leak detected by the system during the time period, 
include the following data:
    6.2.1  The specific detection threshold volume (include any error 
bandwidth that is incorporated in that amount)(bbls.) ________
    6.2.2  Pipeline length between leak detection measuring devices in 
the pipeline segment on which leak occurred (miles) ________
    6.2.3  Commodity transported at the time of the alarm ________
    6.2.4  Flow rate at the time of the alarm (bbls/hr) ________
    6.2.5  Estimated (or actual) leak volume (bbls.) ________
    6.2.6  Estimated (or actual if known) size of hole or rupture (in.) 
________
    6.2.7  Estimated7 (or actual) date and time leak occurred (MM/
DD/YR & hours & minutes in military time) ________
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\Data provided from simulations should include the simulated 
leak start and end times, however, actual leak start times are not 
expected from operational data since there is a lag between the 
actual leak start and when it is detected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    6.2.8  Date and Time leak detected (MM/DD/YR & hours & minutes in 
military time) ________
    6.2.9  Date and Time leak located (MM/DD/YR & hours & minutes in 
military time) ________
    6.2.10  Location of leak as indicated by leak detection system 
(mile post or survey station no.) ________
    6.2.10.1  Was a leak detection/SCADA system alarm issued (Y/N)? 
________
    6.2.10.2  If ``yes'', the date and time alarm issued (MM/DD/YR & 
hours & minutes in military time) ________
    6.2.10.3  If ``yes'', the date and time alarm cleared (MM/DD/YR & 
hours & minutes in military time) ________
    6.2.10.4  Dispatcher response (check all that apply):
    6.2.10.4.1  Pipeline shutdown ________
    6.2.10.4.2  Leak detection system shutdown only ________
    6.2.10.4.3  Contacted pipeline personnel to check for operational 
or system explanations for alarm (other than a leak) ________
    6.2.10.4.4  Dispatched personnel to approximate leak location 
________
    6.2.10.4.5  Other (specify) ________
    6.2.11  Actual location of leak as determined by field observation 
(mile post or survey station no.) ________

    Placement of EFRDs at water crossings, locations affected by 
commodity release, and rural areas where the public is in proximity The 
request for information notice, documented in the Department's March 
1991 EFRD study, asked ``Where should RCVs and ACVs be placed and 
why?'' The response provided a number of specific locations, e.g., 
locations where possible ground movement might occur, and densely 
populated locations, such as near a school or hospital, near an office 
building or factory, or near a shopping center. River crossings were 
also specified by some commenters. Although conventional wisdom would 
seem to suggest installing RCVs at these locations, the RSPA presently 
has no data which supports requiring the installation of EFRDs at these 
locations. The number of these locations is unknown, but one of the 
following questions will solicit data on the number of such areas which 
might be affected by a pipeline release.
    Likewise, the number of failures which have resulted in water 
pollution is unknown because the Department does not require the 
occurrence of pollution to be identified on the hazardous liquid 
pipeline accident report. However, the RSPA knows from research for 
developing the interim final rule for onshore oil pipeline response 
plans (58 FR 244, January 5, 1993) under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 
Public Law No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484, (OPA 90) that of the 
approximately 2,700 oil pipeline spills reported each year to the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), about half affect water. The 
accident effects which would be reduced by the installation of EFRDs 
are related more to pollution than safety. Once the hazardous liquid 
mixes with water, the likelihood of a fire or explosion is reduced 
considerably. Two of the following questions address the issue of water 
pollution as a result of pipeline failures.
    The accidents which occurred in Mounds View, Minnesota and Maries 
County, Missouri demonstrate that an assessment by the RSPA should be 
conducted concerning the installation of EFRDs at specific locations 
along hazardous liquid pipelines where the pipelines are in proximity 
to the public in rural areas, bodies of water (particularly bodies of 
water containing drinking water intakes), and other critical locations 
affected by commodity release. This position is supported by the NIST 
report (discussed above) which recommended installation of EFRDs in 
critical risk locations to significantly limit the extent of damage if 
a failure occurs. Critical risk locations are defined in the NIST 
report as locations where the risk to public safety, property, and the 
environment is great.
    The RSPA is also asking questions to gather data regarding 
locations where valves are presently required by the regulations to 
protect bodies of water (49 CFR 195.260 (e) and (f)). The regulations 
in 49 CFR 195.260 currently require valves to be placed at locations 
along a hazardous liquid pipeline that will minimize damage or 
pollution from accidental discharges\8\ (Section 195.260 (c)), on 
either side of a water crossing that is more than 100-feet wide 
(Section 195.260(e)), and on either side of a reservoir holding water 
for human consumption (Section 195.260(f)). The American Petroleum 
Institute has indicated that most of these main line block valves are 
manually operated. The current regulations do not require that they be 
EFRDs. The financial impact on the regulated industry, if the RSPA were 
to require the installation of RCVs, is unknown so cost data will be 
obtained through responses to questions set forth below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\DOT does not know on what factors hazardous liquid pipeline 
operators base their judgment on where and how far apart to place 
such valves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These questions apply only to hazardous liquid pipelines with leak 
detection systems since the March 1991 EFRD study concluded RCVs are 
only effective where leak detection systems are installed. In addition, 
the questions address valve spacing, particularly whether EFRDs should 
be installed at other critical locations. Such critical locations would 
be identified during the rulemaking process after a review of data on 
water pollution from hazardous liquid pipeline spills collected by 
agencies, such as the EPA, and as a result of the RSPA implementation 
of OPA 90. Placement of a check valve on one side of a location and an 
RCV on the other side could reduce the number of valves that would 
require remote control capability.
    The location of valves would be proposed, as a result of this 
assessment, only to effectively reduce the amount of liquid entering a 
body of water depending on the terrain, and would not necessarily be 
immediately located on either side of the water crossing. For instance, 
valves placed immediately on either side of a water crossing would be 
effective in reducing pollution only if the failure was in the water 
crossing, a rare occurrence according to anecdotal evidence. Valves 
would only be effective in locations where the hazardous liquid 
pipeline operator has a SCADA-based leak detection system so that each 
RCV can be closed soon after a failure is detected.

Past Leak History

    Question 7: For the period 1983 through 1992 (10 years), how many 
failures have occurred on your pipeline system resulting in product 
release entering a body of water?\9\________
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\``Body of water'' includes, but is not limited to, creeks, 
streams, rivers, tributaries to rivers, lakes, reservoirs, and 
waters which are used for recreation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 8: Provide the following information for each failure in 
Question 7:

8.1 Date of the failure (MM/YY)________
8.2 What was the cause of the release (check)?
    8.2.1 Corrosion?________
    8.2.2 Failed pipe or pipe seam?________
    8.2.3 Outside force damage by other than natural forces?________
    8.2.4 Outside force damage by natural forces?________
    8.2.5 Malfunction of control or relief equipment?________
    8.2.6 Operator error?________
    8.2.7 Other (specify)________
8.3 Answer the following concerning the commodity--
    8.3.1 At the time of the release what was the total volume of 
commodity between valves immediately upstream and downstream of the 
release location (bbls.)?________
    8.3.2 How much commodity was released (bbls.)?________
8.4 How far away from the point of release were the valves referred to 
in 8.3.1 (miles)?________
    8.4.1 Upstream from the release?________Type of valve (check)?
    8.4.1.1 manual________
    8.4.1.2 Check valve________
    8.4.1.3 RCV________
    8.4.1.4 ACV________
    8.4.2 Downstream from the release?________Type of valve (check)?
    8.4.2.1 manual________
    8.4.2.2 Check valve________
    8.4.2.3 RCV________
    8.4.2.4 ACV________
8.5 Were these valves installed to comply with 49 CFR 195.260 (e) or 
(f)\10\ (Y/N)?________
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\49 CFR 195.260 (e) requires valves to be installed on each 
side of a water crossing that is more than 100 feet wide from high-
water mark to high-water mark. 49 CFR 195.260 (f) requires valves to 
be installed on each side of a reservoir holding water for human 
consumption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

8.6 Were these valves EFRDs (RCVs or check valves)(Y/N)?________
8.7 Was there a leak detection system or systems operating on the 
pipeline which experienced the release   (Y/N)?________(specify each 
type):
    8.7.1 Pressure wave front monitoring?________
    8.7.2 Volume monitoring?________
    8.7.3 Other (specify)?________
8.8 Indicate for each activity the time to shut down the pipeline
    8.8.1 Detection time (mins.)?________
    8.8.2 Shutdown time including shutdown of pumping stations and 
isolation of the pipeline section (mins)?________
    8.8.3 Time to drain the pipeline section (mins.)?________
    8.8.4 Total time to shut down pipeline from the time release was 
detected to completion of drainage from the section involved 
(mins.)?________
8.9 If the pipeline section did not contain EFRDs, would the 
installation of EFRDs have reduced the shutdown time and/or amount of 
the release (Y/N)?________
    8.9.1 If ``yes'', by how much for each (estimate)?
    8.9.1.1 The total shutdown time of
    8.8.4 (mins.)?________
    8.9.1.2 Amount of the release (bbls.)?________
    8.9.2 If ``no'', why not?________________________
8.10 What was the total estimated cost of the release including--
    8.10.1 Cost of repair or replacement of pipeline facility? 
$________
    8.10.2 Cost of product lost? $________
    8.10.3 Cost attributed to loss of use of the pipeline? $________
    8.10.4 Cost of damage to property other than the pipeline? 
$________
    8.10.5 Cost of bodily harm and/or loss of life (For analytical 
purposes, loss of life is valued at $2,500,000 and significant bodily 
harm reported per Section 195.50(e) is valued at $450,000)? $________
    8.10.6 Cost of environmental clean-up (whether or not paid by the 
operator)? $________
    8.10.7 Estimated cost of damage to the environment, i.e., natural 
resource damage, assessed by a court or State agency (exclusive of 
clean-up cost)? $________
    8.10.8 Cost of litigation? $________
    8.10.9 Other costs? (specify) $________
    8.10.10 Total cost? $________
8.11 How far from the release did the commodity enter a body of water 
(miles)?________
8.12 Were there other areas of risk, other than a body of water, 
affected by the release (Y/N):
    8.12.1 Urban area?________ If yes, distance from release 
(miles)________
    8.12.2 Rural area in proximity to population?________ If yes, 
distance from release (miles)________
    8.12.3 Other (specify)________ Distance from release 
(miles)________
8.13 Were there one or more public water intakes affected by the 
release (Y/N)?________
    8.13.1 If the answer to question 8.13 was ``yes'', how 
many?________
    8.13.2 For each response to 8.13.1, approximately how far was the 
public water intake downstream from where the release entered the body 
of water (miles)?________
    8.13.3 Did high river flow due to flooding affect the release 
reaching the water intake(s)(Y/N)?________

Valves Installed Per 49 CFR 195.260 (e) & (f)

    As stated previously, 49 CFR 195.260 (e) and (f) require valves to 
be placed on hazardous liquid pipelines in order to protect water.\11\ 
The March 1991 EFRD study proposed that the RSPA obtain public comment 
on whether the valves at these locations should be EFRDs. The next 
series of questions are posed to obtain data to make that decision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\See footnote 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For this series of questions, operators are requested to provide 
data only on hazardous liquid pipelines which have leak detection 
systems installed, since the study concluded RCVs are effective only on 
hazardous liquid pipelines with leak detection systems.
    Question 9: How many locations have valves installed to comply with 
49 CFR 195.260 (e) and (f)?________

9.1  How many locations have two block valves installed?________
9.2  How many locations have one block valve and one check valve 
installed?________
9.3  How many locations have two block valves and one check valve 
installed?________
9.4  Are any of the block valves RCVs (Y/N)?________
    9.4.1  If ``yes'', how many locations reported in 9.1 are 
RCVs?________
    9.4.2  If ``yes'', how many locations reported in 9.2 are 
RCVs?________
9.5  How many block valves which are not RCVs are installed to comply 
with 49 CFR 195.260 (e) and (f)?________

    Question 10: Estimated cost data to convert the block valves 
reported in 9.4 to RCVs is requested. Report data to questions 10.1-
10.3 for each valve size (diameter) in your pipeline system:

10.1  What valve diameter does this series of questions pertain 
(in.)?________
10.2  How many block valves are installed of this diameter?________
10.3  What is the total estimated cost to convert all of these valves 
to RCVs? ________
    10.3.1  Installation cost (material & labor) $________
    10.3.2  Communication system cost $________
    10.3.3  Other installation costs (specify) $________
    10.3.4  Total installation cost $________
    10.3.5  Annual operating cost $________
    10.3.6  Annual maintenance cost $________
    10.3.7  Other annual costs (specify) $________
    10.3.8  Total annual costs $________

    Question 11: Estimated cost data for installing new RCVs on your 
pipeline system is requested. Report data to questions 11.1-11.6 for 
each valve size (diameter) in your pipeline system:

11.1  What valve diameter does this series of questions pertain 
(in.)?________
11.2  Cost of a manually operated block valve $________
11.3  Cost of an equivalent RCV $________
11.4  Communication cost $________
11.5  Other installation costs (specify) $________
11.6  Total installation costs $________

    Question 12: What factors should the RSPA use in determining when a 
manually operated valve should be converted to a RCV in order to reduce 
the effects to bodies of water in case of a release?________

Locations Affected by Commodity Release

    Question 13: Would a release from your pipeline affect the 
following locations (answer ``yes'' or ``no'' and provide rationale for 
your answer)?

13.1  Wetlands as defined in 40 CFR 230.3?12________
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\240 CFR 230.3(t) states: The term wetlands means those areas 
that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a 
frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal 
circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically 
adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally 
include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

13.2  Critical habitat for endangered/threatened species?________
13.3  National/State parks?________
13.4  Marine sanctuaries?________
13.5  Federal wilderness areas?________
13.6  Coastal Zone Management Act designated areas?________
13.7  National monuments?________
13.8  National seashore/lakeshore recreational areas?________
13.9  National preserves?________
13.10  National wildlife refuges?________
13.11  National conservation areas? ________
13.12  Hatcheries? ________
13.13  Waterfowl management areas? ________
13.14  Public drinking water intakes? ________
13.15  Other areas (specify)? ________

Rural Areas13 Affected
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\3As defined in 49 CFR 195.2: ``Rural area means outside the 
limits of any incorporated of unincorporated city, town, village, or 
any other designated residential or commercial area such as a 
subdivision, a business or shopping center, or community 
development.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 14: How many of the following areas would be affected by a 
release from your pipeline (answer 14.1-14.8 with the number of areas)?

14.1  Areas where it would take more than two hours to reach and close 
a block valve once the location of a release is identified? ________
14.2  Areas of possible ground movement including areas of: known 
seismic risk, slope instability, landslide, and mine subsidence? 
________
14.3  Schools? ________
14.4  Hospitals? ________
14.5  Closely spaced individual dwellings (defined as areas similar to 
class 2 locations as defined in 49 CFR 192.5(c)14)? ________
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\449 CFR 192.5(c) states: A Class 2 location is any class 
location unit that has more than 10 but less than 46 buildings 
intended for human occupancy. (A ``class location unit'' is defined 
in the regulations in 49 CFR 192.5(a) as an area that extends 220 
yards on either side of the centerline of any continuous 1-mile 
length of pipeline.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

14.6  Office buildings? ________
14.7  Factories or plants, such as power plants? ________

Valves in Urban Areas

    The March 1991 EFRD study concluded that it was feasible from a 
benefit to cost standpoint to retrofit existing manually operated block 
valves on hazardous liquid pipelines located in urban areas to RCVs and 
to install RCVs when installing new valves in urban areas. An urban 
area is one which is not a rural area15. A proposal to require 
RCVs in urban areas would apply to hazardous liquid pipelines which 
have installed leak detection systems, as the Department found in the 
March 1991 study that RCVs are effective only where leak detection 
systems are installed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\5See footnote #13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The RSPA wants to establish a data base on manually operated block 
valves located on hazardous liquid pipelines in urban areas to validate 
the conclusions made in the March 1991 study.
    Hazardous liquid pipeline operators are requested to respond to 
Questions 15-17 for pipelines in their systems which are located in 
urban areas and on which a leak detection system is installed:

    Question 15: For your pipeline system, report the number of 
manually operated block valves that are installed in urban areas. 
Report data to questions 15.1-15.4 for each pipeline nominal diameter 
located in urban areas in your pipeline system.

15.1  What nominal pipeline diameter does this series of questions 
pertain (in.)? ________
15.2  How many block valves are installed of this nominal diameter? 
________
15.3  For the total reported by nominal diameter, how many valves are 
installed to limit release of the commodity transported? ________
15.4  For each total reported by nominal diameter, how many are 
installed for pipeline maintenance purposes? ________

    Question 16: For the period 1983 through 1992 (10 years), how many 
failures have occurred on your pipeline system in urban areas? ________
    Question 17: Provide the following information for each failure in 
Question 16:

17.1  Date of the failure (MM/YY)________
17.2  What was the cause of the release (check)?
    17.2.1  Corrosion? ________
    17.2.2  Failed pipe or pipe seam? ________
    17.2.3  Outside force damage by other than natural forces? ________
    17.2.4  Outside force damage by natural forces? ________
    17.2.5  Malfunction of control or relief equipment? ________
    17.2.6  Operator error? ________
    17.2.7  Other? (specify) ________
17.3  How much product was released (bbls.)?________
17.4  How far away from the point of release were there block or check 
valves located on either side of the release (miles)
    17.4.1  Upstream from the release?________
    17.4.2  Downstream from the release?________
17.5  What was the total estimated cost of the release including--
    17.5.1  Cost of repair or replacement of pipeline facility? 
$________
    17.5.2  Cost of product lost? $________
    17.5.3  Cost attributed to loss of use of the pipeline? $________
    17.5.4  Cost of damage to property other than the pipeline? 
$________
    17.5.5  Cost of bodily harm and/or loss of life ( For analytical 
purposes, loss of life is valued at $2,500,000 and bodily harm reported 
per Section 195.50(e) is valued at $450,000)? $________
    17.5.6  Cost of environmental clean-up (whether or not paid by the 
operator)? $________
    17.5.7  Estimated cost of damage to the environment, i.e., natural 
resource damage, assessed by a court or State agency (exclusive of 
clean-up cost)? $________
    17.5.8  Cost of litigation? $________
    17.5.9  Other costs? (specify) $________
    17.5.10  Total cost? $________

Questions for the Nonregulated Public

    The preceding 17 questions relate to the gathering of pipeline 
system operational data which can be answered only by hazardous liquid 
pipeline operators. However, as stated earlier, the RSPA is also 
soliciting comments and ideas from the nonregulated public including 
State agencies, trade associations, and environmental organizations. 
The following 2 questions are directed to these members of the public.
    Question 18: The RSPA is attempting to determine which critical 
locations should be protected from hazardous liquid pipeline releases 
by the installation of EFRDs. From the locations listed below, please 
provide a ranking by probability with a ranking of ``1'' representing 
the location which poses the greatest probability of combined safety 
and environmental risk to the public. (Questions 18.10-18.12 are left 
blank for the commenter to specify locations of risk not listed in 
questions 18.1-18.9.)
18.1  Locations where valves are required to be placed by 49 CFR 
195.260 (e) and (f) on hazardous liquid pipelines in order to protect 
water?16________
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\6See footnote #10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

18.2  Locations where it would take more than two hours to reach and 
close a block valve once the location of a release is 
identified?________
18.3  Locations of possible ground movement including areas of: known 
seismic risk, slope instability, landslide, and mine 
subsidence?________
18.4  Schools?________
18.5  Hospitals?________
18.6  Closely spaced individual dwellings (defined as areas similar to 
class 2 locations as defined in 49 CFR 192.5(c)?)17________
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\7See footnote #14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

18.7  Shopping malls and similar locations?________
18.8  Office buildings?________
18.9  Factories or plants, such as power plants?________
18.10  Other location (specify)________
18.11  Other location (specify)________
18.12  Other location (specify)________

    Question 19: From the locations listed below, please provide a 
ranking of consequences from a hazardous liquid pipeline release with a 
ranking of ``1'' representing the location that would result in the 
greatest combined public safety and environmental consequences from a 
release of hazardous liquid from a pipeline. (Questions 19.10-19.12 are 
left blank for the commenter to rank the benefits for the risk 
locations specify in questions 18.10-18.12.)

19.1  Locations where valves are required to be placed by 49 CFR 
195.260 (e) and (f) on hazardous liquid pipelines in order to protect 
water?18________
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\8See footnote #10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

19.2  Locations where it would take more than two hours to reach and 
close a block valve once the location of a release is 
identified?________
19.3  Locations of possible ground movement including areas of: known 
seismic risk, slope instability, landslide, and mine 
subsidence?________
19.4  Schools?________
19.5  Hospitals?________
19.6  Closely spaced individual dwellings (defined as areas similar to 
class 2 locations as defined in 49 CFR 192.5(c)?)19________
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\9See footnote #14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

19.7  Shopping malls and similar locations?________
19.8  Office buildings?________
19.9  Factories or plants, such as power plants?________
19.10  Other location (specify)________
19.11  Other location (specify)________
19.12  Other location (specify)________

    Issued in Washington, DC on January 12, 1994.
George W. Tenley, Jr.,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 94-1177 Filed 1-18-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P