[Economic Report of the President (2004)]
[Administration of George W. Bush]
[Online through the Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]


 
Chapter 3

The Year in Review and the Years Ahead

The U.S. economy made notable progress in 2003. The recovery was
still tenuous coming into the year, as continued fallout from
powerful contractionary forces--the capital overhang, corporate
scandals, and uncertainty about future economic and geopolitical
conditions discussed in Chapter 1, Lessons from the Recent Business
Cycle--still weighed against the stimulus from expansionary monetary
policy and the Administration's 2001 tax cut and 2002 fiscal
package. However, the contractionary forces dissipated over the
course of 2003, and the expansionary forces were augmented by the
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) that was
signed into law at the end of May. The economy now appears to have
moved into a full-fledged recovery.  This chapter reviews the
economic developments of 2003 and discusses the Administration's
forecast for the years ahead. The key points in this chapter are:

  Real GDP growth picked up appreciably in 2003.
Growth in consumer spending, residential investment, and,
particularly, business equipment and software investment appear
to have increased noticeably in the second half of the year.
  The labor market began to rebound in the final
five months of 2003.
  Core consumer inflation declined to its lowest
level in decades.
  The Administration's forecast calls for the
economic recovery to strengthen further this year, with real GDP
growth running well above its historical average and the
unemployment rate falling. Looking further ahead, the economy is
expected to continue on a path of strong, sustainable growth.

Developments in 2003 and the Near-Term Outlook

After rising 2.8 percent during the four quarters of 2002, real GDP
expanded at an average annual rate of 4.4 percent during the first
three quarters of 2003. The economy appears to have gained momentum
as the year went on, with annualized real GDP growth averaging close
to 21/2 percent during the first half of the year and more than 8
percent in the third quarter. The available data suggest solid
further growth in the fourth quarter, though not as
spectacular as in the third quarter. (The Report went to print
before GDP data for the fourth quarter were available.)

The Administration expects real GDP to grow at an annual rate of
4.0 percent during the four quarters of 2004, a figure that is close
to the latest Blue Chip consensus economic forecast (as of
January 10, 2004). The unemployment rate, which peaked at 6.3
percent in June 2003, is projected to fall to 5.5 percent by the
fourth quarter of 2004.

The pace of real GDP growth during the first three quarters of 2003
was supported by robust gains in consumption, residential investment,
and defense spending. Inventory investment, in contrast, declined
over the first three quarters of last year.  In 2004, the composition
of GDP growth is expected to shift away from government spending and
toward business fixed investment and net exports. Evidence of
emerging momentum in investment accumulated over the course of 2003:
businesses began to hire, build inventories, and increase shipments
of nondefense capital goods. In addition, expected faster growth among
our trading partners and the recent decline in the exchange value of
the dollar make U.S. exporters well positioned for expansion.

Much of the growth of private demand during 2003 was attributable to
theeffects of expansionary fiscal and monetary policy designed to
counteract the lingering effects of the stock market decline, the
capital overhang,worries about geopolitical developments, and concern
about accounting scandals. Much stimulus remains in the pipeline in
the form of refunds on 2003 tax liabilities this spring and the
ongoing effects of the current low interest rates. The fiscal
stimulus will not disappear suddenly. The reduction in the tax
withholding schedule included in the 2003 fiscal package (JGTRRA)
only began in July 2003, and households are still adjusting to
these lower tax rates. Moreover, tax refunds in the first half of
2004 are expected to be higher than usual: the tax cuts were
retroactive to January 2003, but last year's
withholding changes generally did not capture tax savings on income
earned in the first half of the year. In addition, because of the
2002 and 2003 tax cuts, businesses will be able to cut their tax
liabilities by expensing 50 percent of their equipment investment
(rather than depreciating the new capital) through the end of 2004.
The lower tax rates, higher tax refunds, and investment expensing
included in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act are
expected to reduce tax collections by about $146 billion in 2004,
up from about $49 billion (or about $98 billion at an annual rate)
in the second half of 2003.

Consumer Spending

Consumer spending increased briskly in 2003. Real personal
consumption expenditures increased at an average annual pace of 3
percent during the first half of the year, and then surged at an
annual rate of 6.9 percent in the third quarter. Data on retail
sales and motor vehicle purchases through December and services
outlays through November are consistent with consumer spending
remaining at a high level in the fourth quarter. As a result,
real consumption growth in the second half of the year likely ran
noticeably above that in the first half.

The pickup in spending growth in the second half of the year
corresponded to an increase in the rate of growth of household
income. After rising at an annual rate of 3.6 percent in the first
half, real disposable personal income (that is, inflation-adjusted
household income after taxes) jumped at an annual rate of 6.3 percent
in the third quarter, boosted by tax relief, and appears to have
held steady in the fourth quarter.

Wages and salaries increased moderately in the second half of the
year, bolstered by the emerging recovery in the labor market.
Moreover, the personal tax cuts included in the 2003 fiscal package
(JGTRRA) meant that U.S. households were able to keep substantially
more of theirearnings. The reduction in withholding and the advance
rebates of the child tax credit added $37 billion to disposable income
(not at an annual rate) in the second half of the year.

Other factors also likely contributed to the strengthening of
consumer spending over the course of 2003. The robust performance of
equity markets and solid gains in home prices bolstered wealth.
Household wealth (net financial resources plus the value of
nonfinancial assets such as cars and homes) increased $21/4 trillion
during the first three quarters of 2003, and it probably rose
substantially further in the fourth quarter given the solid
increase in broad indexes of stock prices in the last few months of
the year. Consumer sentiment was depressed early in the year by the
prospect of war with Iraq. Sentiment jumped in April and May
following the successful resolution of major combat operations and
then was little changed until November, when it picked up noticeably.
By the end of the year, household sentiment was somewhat higher than
it had been at the end of 2002 and much higher than it was just prior
to the war with Iraq.

All told, consumption grew in line with household after-tax income
during 2003. Personal saving as a fraction of disposable personal
income averaged 2.3 percent in 2002 and remained at this level, on
average, in the first three quarters of 2003. Swings in personal
saving have contributed to movements in national saving in recent
years (Box 3-1).

Growth of real consumption is expected to be lower than that of real
GDP in coming years. As explained in Box 3-1, the relative flatness
of the personal saving rate over the past couple of years is likely
the result of offsetting forces. On the one hand, capital losses
associated with the decline in the stock market from March 2000 to
March 2003 probably tempered consumption (with some lag) and,
in turn, caused the personal saving rate to increase. On the other
hand, personal saving was likely depressed by the

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Box 3-1: Personal Saving and National Saving
One important influence on the personal saving rate (the saving of
the household sector divided by its after-tax income) over the past
10 years has been changes in households' wealth, although the past
couple of years appear to have been an exception.
Driven by movements in stock prices, the ratio of household wealth to
personal income climbed dramatically in the second half of the 1990s,
peaked in early 2000, and then retreated substantially over the next
two years. Economic theory suggests that increases in wealth tend to
raise household spending, and decreases in wealth tend to lower
household spending. This "wealth effect" often produces a negative
correlation between household wealth and the personal saving rate
because personal saving is defined in the national accounts as the
difference between income excluding capital gains and spending
(Chart 3-1).

Empirical studies suggest that an additional dollar of wealth leads
to a permanent rise in the level of household consumption of about two
to five cents, with the adjustment occurring gradually over a period of
one to three years (the range depends on the exact specification--for
example, one study found that including the components of wealth
separately produces lower estimates). Such estimates of the wealth
effect can explain the behavior of personal saving in the second
half of the 1990s fairly well. For example, assuming that a dollar
of wealth leads to an increase in consumption of three cents and
that adjustment lags are typical, one would predict that the rise
in wealth in the late 1990s would have caused the saving rate to
decline by 4 percentage points between the end of 1994 and the end
of 2000--close to the actual decline in the saving rate (ignoring
the quarter-to-quarter volatility in the series).

The wealth effect also suggests that the (net) fall in wealth after
2000 would have caused a rebound in the personal saving rate of more
than 2 percentage points. In fact, however, the personal saving rate
has not risen materially. One potential explanation for the divergence
is that households have raised consumption in anticipation that the
labor market recovery will continue and, in turn, bolster income. Some
of the additional consumption may have been funded through the wave of
cash-out home mortgage refinancing enabled by the combination of low
interest rates and technological advances that have made such
transactions easier. Another possibility is that the availability of
low-interest-rate loans on cars and other items has spurred
households to replace cars and other durable goods earlier than they
otherwise would have.

Direct saving by households represents only part of the total saving
done in the United States. Corporations also save in the form of
retained earnings--the difference between after-tax profits and
dividends. Most of the year-to-year variation in retained earnings stems
from profits because dividend payments tend to have a fairly smooth
upward trend over time. Profits rose in the early and mid-1990s,
boosted by brisk productivity growth. After peaking as a share of
GDP in 1997, profits fell over the next few years, owing to the 1998
global financial crisis, a catch-up of wages to productivity gains,
and the economic slowdown. Retained earnings as a share of GDP also
trended lower over this period. During the first three quarters of
2003, both profits and retained earnings picked up.

National saving is the sum of private saving (that is, the saving of
households and corporations) and government saving (equal to
the Federal budget surplus plus the state and local government
budget surpluses). The saving of state and local governments tends
to make a small positive contribution to government saving, but in
the past few years, deteriorating fiscal conditions in states and
localities have pushed their overall saving into slightly negative
territory. Saving of the Federal government has declined sharply
since 2000, as the recession and tax cuts have pulled down revenue,
and homeland security and national defense expenditures have
increased.

National saving rose (as a fraction of GDP) during the 1990s, but has
fallen sharply since 2000 (Chart 3-2). As a fraction of GDP, it now
stands at the low end of its range since World War II. Although
both government saving and private saving are above their historic
lows, the fact that they are both fairly low at the same time has
led to the low level of national saving.

National saving is important because it represents the portion of
our country's current income that is being set aside for investment
in new capital. In particular, national saving plus the net capital
inflow from abroad equals domestic investment. Greater saving and
investment today boost future national income. To increase national
saving, the President supports raising Federal saving by restraining
Federal spending. He has also proposed Lifetime Savings Accounts and
Retirement Savings Accounts, which are designed to increase
incentives for households to save.
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boost to consumption from low interest rates (both directly through
the availability oflow-interest-rate loans on durable goods and
indirectly through the funds made available by cash-out mortgage
refinancings). As interest rates and incomes rise over the course of
the next several years, the transitory forces boosting consumption
growth should dissipate, and as a result, real consumption is
expected to grow more slowly than real GDP over the forecast period.

An increase in corporate contributions for defined-benefit pension
plans is likely to boost the saving rate in the near term from what
it might be otherwise. The Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation
(PBGC) has estimated that corporate contributions to defined-benefit
plans will increase sharply above 2003 levels. Indeed, rapid
increases have already begun, according to separate data included
in the Employment Cost Index. The contributions raise personal
income, but because these funds are not placed in the hands of
employees until retirement, they seem unlikely to affect
current-year consumption. As a result, they should increase the
personal saving rate.

Residential Investment

The housing sector continued to show remarkable vigor in 2003, with
real residential investment climbing at an average annual rate of
more than 10 percent in the first three quarters of the year. Housing
starts moved above the already high 2002 level to 1.8 million units
in 2003, the largest number of starts since 1978. In addition, sales
of both new and existing single-family homes rose to record levels.
Some of the strength in housing demand reflected the same gains in
after-tax income and wealth that bolstered real consumer spending.
The low levels of mortgage interest rates were another important
driving force. The interest rate on new fixed-rate 30-year mortgages
slipped from an average of 61/2 percent in 2002 to an average of
53/4 percent in 2003. This level is the lowest in the 32 years for
which comparable data are available. Indeed, according to data from
the Michigan Survey Research Center, consumers' assessments of
home-buying conditions remained very positive in 2003, largely
because of low mortgage interest rates. As a result of the very
favorable conditions in the housing sector, the U.S. home-ownership
rate climbed to 68.2 percent in the third quarter of 2003--equal to
its highest level on record.

During 2004, real residential investment is expected to slip lower
as housing starts edge down to levels determined by long-run
demographics.

Business Fixed Investment

Real business fixed investment (firms' outlays on equipment,
software, and structures) turned around in 2003, posting an
annualized gain of 6.2 percent during the first three quarters of
the year after declines of 10.2 percent during the four quarters of
2001 and 2.8 percent during  the four quarters of 2002. The
acceleration during the year was noteworthy, with real investment
rising at an annual rate of 12.8 percent in the third quarter and
indications of further growth in the fourth quarter, compared with an
average annual pace of 3.1 percent in the first half of the year.
The improvement from 2002 to 2003, as well as the pickup over the
course of 2003, largely reflected a strengthening in real purchases
of equipment and software.

Within the equipment and software category, the largest increases
occurred for certain high-tech items. Real outlays for computers
increased at an annual rate of 43 percent in the first three
quarters of 2003, and real spending on communications equipment,
which had performed particularly poorly during the recession, rose
almost 15 percent. Shipments data suggest that spending in these
categories remained strong in the fourth quarter. Meanwhile, real
investment in software continued its solid upward trend, rising 12
percent during the first three quarters of the year. Outlays for
transportation equipment were held down by further large declines in
purchases of aircraft in the first three quarters of the year.
Finally, the available data suggest that real spending on equipment
outside of the high-tech and transportation categories posted a
solid gain over the course of 2003.

The increased momentum in business purchases of capital goods in
2003 likely reflects the factors mentioned in Chapter 1. First,
with capital overhangs probably behind them, firms were poised to
take advantage of further declines in prices of high-tech goods
stemming from continued technological advances. Second, striking
gains in productivity and falling unit labor costs bolstered
corporate profits.  Third, the cost of capital was held down by a
number of factors, including falling prices for high-tech capital
goods, but also by low interest rates, rising stock prices, and the
investment incentives introduced in the Job Creation and Worker
Assistance Act of 2002 (JCWAA) and expanded in the 2003 fiscal
package (JGTRRA).

The Administration expects the recovery in real business investment
in equipment to strengthen further this year, reflecting the
acceleration in output, continued low interest rates, and the
investment incentives provided by the 2002 and 2003 tax cuts. Fixed
investment in equipment and structures tends to be related to the
pace of growth in output (along with the cost of capital), and so
the pickup in real GDP growth from 2.8 percent during the four
quarters of 2002 to 4.4 percent during the first three quarters
of 2003 is projected to lead to an increase in investment during
2004.

One reason for the development of a capital overhang was the
lowered business expectations of the future level of output that
developed just prior to the past recession. As these projections
fell, the demand for investment also fell. In contrast to that
period, current projections of 2004 output have been rising since
mid-2003 and are expected to lead to increased demand for capital
goods in the initial quarters of the forecast.

Growth in equipment investment in 2004 should be further boosted as
firms pull forward spending in anticipation of the expiration of the
period when businesses are able to expense (rather than depreciate)
50 percent of the value of their equipment investment. The flip side
of some investment being advanced into 2004 is that investment may
grow more slowly in 2005. Even so, the growth of equipment
investment in 2005 is projected to be solid.

Despite the emerging recovery in spending on equipment and software,
business demand for structures remained soft in 2003. High
overcapacity seems to have offset the impetus imparted by low
interest rates and higher cash flow. In the office sector,
vacancy rates rose substantially for the third consecutive year.
Vacancy rates moved still higher in the industrial sector and now
stand at extremely elevated levels. The good news is that the
substantial declines in total spending on structures seem to have
abated. Indeed, real investment in nonresidential structures was
approximately flat over the first three quarters of 2003, in
contrast with a plunge of more than 25 percent during the preceding
two years. Strength in oil and gas drilling and an increase in
construction of general merchandise stores during the year have
offset continued softness in some other sectors.

The forces that shape the outlook for business structures--the
growth of output and the cost of capital--are much the same as for
business equipment. However, they operate with a longer lag because
of the time it takes to plan and build these structures.
Investment in business structures is projected to post a small
gain during 2004.

Business Inventories

Businesses began 2003 with lean inventories following a massive
liquidation in 2001 and little restocking during 2002. Inventory
investment was substantially negative over the first three quarters
of 2003, as increases in production lagged those in final demand. The
reasons for this slow response of production are unclear. Firms may
have been surprised by the strength of final demand, or they may
simply have been waiting for compelling evidence that a sustainable
recovery was under way.

The net decline in inventories during the first three quarters of
2003 left stocks in their leanest position relative to final sales
of goods and structures in at least 50 years. (This lean position
results, at least in part, from efficiencies generated by
just-in-time inventory-management techniques.) Stockbuilding seems
to have begun in September, however. Inventory investment appears
likely to have made a positive contribution to GDP growth in the
fourth quarter of 2003, and the contribution is projected to remain
noticeably positive through the first half of 2004. Inventory
investment is expected to plateau thereafter at a level that keeps
stocks in line with rising sales throughout 2004 and 2005.

Government Purchases

Real Federal spending (consumption expenditures and gross
investment) climbed at an annual rate of 8 percent during the
first three quarters of 2003. The available data suggest that
2003 as a whole likely saw the largest increase in more than 30
years. The gain during the first three quarters was led by an
annualized rise of 10 percent in real defense spending largely
related to military operations in Iraq. Real nondefense spending
rose at an average annual pace about 4 percent. This gain was less
than half as large as the gain during the four quarters of 2002,
when outlays were stepped up considerably for homeland security.

The defense supplemental appropriations for FY 2004, signed in
November, allows for some further near-term growth in government
purchases. Defense spending is projected to fall during FY 2005, and
as a result, overall Federal spending is projected to edge down.

Like the Federal government, the governments of states and
localities saw their tax receipts decelerate during the economic
slowdown. Budgets have also deteriorated because of rising health
care costs and increased demand for security-related spending.
With many of these governments subject to balanced-budget rules,
they have taken a variety of measures to address their fiscal
imbalances, including drawing on accumulated reserves
(so-called "rainy day funds"), raising taxes, and restraining
spending. Real expenditures of state and local governments were
little changed during the first three quarters of 2003, in contrast
with an average annual gain of around 3 percent over the preceding
five years. With state and local governments still under
pressure, their real expenditures are projected to increase slowly
during the coming year. Eventually, their fiscal situations should be
improved by increases in tax revenue resulting from the
strengthening of the economy.

Exports and Imports

The U.S. current account deficit as a share of GDP was little
changed, on net, during the first three quarters of 2003, averaging
about 5 percent. The deficit on trade in goods and services as a
share of GDP also moved in a narrow range during the first three
quarters. U.S. net investment income (the income paid to U.S.
investors in foreign endeavors less that paid to foreign investors
in U.S. projects) was roughly flat, as both receipts from abroad and
payments to foreign investors rose somewhat during the first three
quarters of 2003. Real imports of goods and services have likely
been restrained in recent quarters by the decline in the value of
the dollar. Real imports rose at an annual rate of 1 percent during
the first three quarters of 2003, a substantially slower pace than
during the four quarters of 2002. Real imports of capital goods
(other than autos) rose solidly, as would be expected given the
recovery in U.S. investment. Real oil imports increased at a
faster pace (on an annual basis) than during the four quarters of
2002. Real services imports fell markedly in the first half of 2003
but turned up in the third quarter.

America's major trading partners have recovered from the global
slowdown somewhat more slowly than has the United States. For
example, an index of real GDP for our G-7 trading partners increased
at an average annual pace of less than 2 percent during the first
three quarters of 2003. As a result, foreign demand for U.S. exports
was lackluster in the first half of 2003. Real exports picked up
sharply around the middle of 2003, increasing at an annual pace of
10 percent in the third quarter. The increase was led by a gain in
real exports of capital goods. Even so, the level of exports
remained well below its peak in 2000.

Prospects for exports over the next two years look better. Growth
among the non-U.S. OECD countries is projected by the OECD
Secretariat to rise 2.6 percent during the four quarters of 2004,
up from a pace of 1.6 percent during 2003. Growth is expected to
rise further to 2.8 percent in 2005. The expected growth in foreign
markets should support growth in U.S. exports. In addition, the
effect will likely be augmented by a rise in the U.S. market share
of world exports owing to the effects of the 23 percent decline in
the value of the dollar against major currencies from its peak in
early 2002 through the end of 2003.  The effect of the recent dollar
decline on exports will likely take a couple of years to be fully
felt.

Real imports are projected to increase along with domestic output,
but the growth of real imports is likely to be slowed by the recent
decline in the dollar's value relative to other currencies. On
balance real imports are projected to grow at about the same pace
as GDP, on average, during the next two years. Nominal imports will
increase faster than real imports because import prices will rise
in reaction to the recent dollar decline. Even so, the current
account deficit, which rose to about 5 percent of GDP in the first
three quarters of 2003, is projected to edge up in 2004 and decline
thereafter.

Overall, real net exports are expected to be approximately flat
during the next year and are likely to make a positive contribution
to real GDP growth thereafter. Over the next six years, the returns
to foreign owners of U.S. capital are likely to grow faster than the
returns to U.S. owners of foreign capital, a legacy of a long period
of strong foreign investment in the United States during the past
decade. As a result, real gross national product (GNP), which
includes these net foreign returns to capital, is expected to grow
slower than real gross domestic product (GDP).

The Labor Market

Nonfarm payroll employment fell an average of 50,000 workers per
month in the first seven months of 2003, before increasing 35,000 in
August, 99,000 in September, and an average of 48,000 per month in
the fourth quarter. The strengthening was experienced in most
sectors. Job gains in professional and business services stepped up
appreciably from the modest upward pace seen earlier in the year.
Construction employment began to expand in the second quarter after
two years of modest job losses, and the quarterly averages of
employment in the wholesale trade, transportation, and utilities
industries turned up at the end of the year. The manufacturing
sector continued to shed jobs through year-end, though the pace of
decline slowed, and the factory workweek climbed more than 0.5 hour,
on balance, in the final five months of 2003.

The unemployment rate increased in the first half of 2003, reaching
a peak of 6.3 percent in June, before falling during the second half
of the year. In the fourth quarter, the unemployment rate averaged
5.9 percent, the same as it had been a year earlier. Because the
labor force is constantly expanding, employment must be growing
moderately just to keep the unemployment rate steady. For example,
if the labor force is growing at the same rate as the population
(about 1 percent per year), employment would have to rise 110,000
a month just to keep the unemployment rate stable, and larger job
gains would be necessary (and are expected) to induce a downward trend
in the unemployment rate.

Looking ahead, temporary-help services employment--a leading
indicator for the labor market--suggests substantial further
employment growth. Average growth in temporary-help services
employment over a six-month period has a striking positive
correlation with growth in overall employment over the subsequent
six months (Chart 3-3).  Statistical analysis suggests that an
increase of one job in temporary-help services corresponds to a
subsequent rise of seven jobs in overall employment. Employment in
temporary-help services has expanded 194,000 since last April,
suggesting robust growth in overall employment this year. The
unemployment rate is projected to fall to 5.5 percent by the fourth
quarter of 2004.

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Productivity, Prices, and Wages

The consumer price index (CPI) increased 1.9 percent over the 12
months ended in December 2003, a little below the 2.4 percent rise
experienced during the same period the previous year. Consumer energy
prices fluctuated markedly over the course of 2003, but ended the year
6.9 percent above their level at the end of 2002. The core CPI
(which excludes food and energy) rose only 1.1 percent during 2003,
considerably below the 1.9 percent increase of the previous year.
This deceleration likely stems from the slack in labor and product
markets last year. In addition, unit labor costs were held down by
an impressive performance for labor productivity, with output per
hour in the nonfarm business sector rising at an annual pace of about
6 percent during the first three quarters of the year following an
increase of roughly 41/2 percent during the four quarters of 2002.
This pace of productivity growth is well above the annual average of
just over 2 percent experienced since 1960.

Hourly compensation of workers appears to have picked up a little
last year. During the 12 months of 2003, the employment cost index
(ECI) for private nonfarm businesses moved up 4 percent following a
3.2 percent gain during the previous year. The wages and salaries
component of the index rose 3.0 percent during 2003, slightly below
the 2.7 percent increase recorded for 2002. The benefits component of
the ECI,however, surged 6.4 percent over the 12 months of 2003, much
faster than the 4.7 percent pace during 2002. The increase in
benefits was especially large in the first quarter of 2003, led by
a jump in contributions to defined-benefit pension plans as
employers began making up for losses in the value of pension fund
assets.  Employer-paid health premiums rose 10.5 percent during
2003, roughly the same pace as in 2002.

Core CPI inflation is expected to continue at a low level in 2004,
and overall inflation is expected to be even lower as energy prices
retreat further. Overall CPI inflation is projected to fall to 1.4
percent during the four quarters of 2004--close to the past year's
pace of core inflation. With the unemployment rate expected to
average 5.6 percent for the year as a whole (above our estimated 5.1
percent midpoint of the range of rates consistent with stable
inflation) the level of slack--although less than in 2003--is still
projected to hold down inflation during 2004. Also keeping inflation
in check is the recent rapid pace of--and solid near-term prospects
for--productivity growth. Offsetting this effect is the somewhat
higher pace of import-price inflation (resulting from the recent
dollar decline) and the quicker pace of GDP growth. Over the next
five years, CPI inflation is expected to edge up, eventually
flattening out at 2.5 percent, a level that is identical to the
consensus forecast.

The path of inflation as measured by the GDP price index is similar,
but a bit lower throughout the projection period. Inflation as
measured by the GDP price index is projected fall to 1.2 percent
during the four quarters of 2004, the same as the 1.2 percent pace
of the core GDP price index during the first three quarters of 2003.
GDP price inflation is projected to increase slowly
thereafter--roughly parallel to the rise in CPI inflation.

The wedge between the CPI and the GDP measures of inflation has
important implications for the Federal budget and budget projections.
A larger wedge reduces the Federal budget surplus because
cost-of-living adjustments for Social Security and other indexed
programs rise with the CPI, whereas Federal revenue tends to increase
with the GDP price index. For a given level of nominal income,
increases in the CPI also cut Federal revenue because they raise
income tax brackets and affect other inflation-indexed features of
the tax code. Of the two indexes, the CPI tends to increase faster in
part because it measures the price of a fixed market basket.
In contrast, the GDP price index increases less rapidly than the CPI
because it reflects the choices of households and businesses to shift
their purchases away from items with increasing relative prices and
toward items with decreasing relative prices. In addition, the GDP
price index includes investment goods, such as computers, whose
relative prices have been falling rapidly. Computers, in particular,
receive a much larger weight in the GDP price index (0.8 percent)
than in the CPI (0.2 percent).

During the eight years ended in 2002, the wedge between inflation in
the CPI-U-RS (a version of the CPI designed to be consistent with
current methods) and the rate of change in the GDP price index
averaged 0.5 percentage point per year. With the core CPI and the
core GDP price index both increasing at about a 11/4 percent pace
during the past year, inertia suggests that the near-term wedge will
be only about 0.2 percentage point in 2004. The wedge is expected to
widen eventually to its recent mean of 0.5 percent by 2009.

Financial Markets

Stock prices skidded early in the year, but rallied in March and have
been on a solid uptrend since then. During the 12 months of 2003, the
Wilshire 5000 index--a broad measure of stock prices--rose 29
percent. An increase of this magnitude has not been seen since
1997. High-tech stocks did even better; for example, the Nasdaq
index, which is heavily weighted toward high-tech industry, rose
50 percent during 2003. Nearly two-thirds of the rise in broad
measures of stock prices occurred after the President signed the
2003 tax cut (JGTRRA) in late May; the Act reduced marginal tax rates
on dividends and capital gains and thus likely contributed to the
robust performance of stock prices.

Following a large decline in 2001, and a smaller one in 2002, the
interest rate on 91-day Treasury bills fell an additional 29 basis
points in 2003 and ended the year at 0.9 percent. These reductions
reflected the Federal Reserve's efforts to stimulate the economy,
leaving real short-term rates (that is, nominal rates less expected
inflation) slightly negative. Following market-based expectations of
interest rates (derived from rates on Eurodollar futures), the
Administration does not expect real rates this low to persist once the
recovery becomes firmly established, and nominal Treasury bill rates
are projected to increase gradually. Long-term interest rates fell
sharply last spring and then rebounded in the summer. For the year as
a whole, long-term Treasury rates were about unchanged, but corporate
interest rates dropped a bit as the spread over Treasury rates
narrowed. The Administration projects that the yield on 10-year
Treasury notes, which averaged 4.3 percent in December 2003, will
edge up gradually next year, consistent with the path of short-term
Treasury rates.

The Long-Term Outlook

The economy could well grow faster than in the projection presented
here, as the long-run benefits from the full reductions in marginal
tax rates are felt. These should lead to higher labor force
participation than would occur otherwise, more entrepreneurial
activity, and greater work effort by highly productive individuals.
The Administration, however, chooses to adopt conservative economic
assumptions that are close to the consensus of professional
forecasters. As such, the assumptions provide a prudent and cautious
basis for the budget projections.

Growth in Real GDP and Productivity over the Long Term

The economy continues to display supply-side characteristics
favorable to long-term growth. Productivity growth has been remarkable,
and inflation remains low and stable. As a result of stimulative
fiscal and monetary policies, real GDP is expected to grow faster
than its 3.1 percent potential rate during the next four years.
The Administration forecasts that real GDP growth will average 3.7
percent at an annual rate during the four years from 2003 to 2007--in
line with the consensus projection. Because this pace is somewhat
above the assumed rate of increase in productive capacity, the
unemployment rate is projected to decline over this period.  In 2008
and 2009, real GDP growth is projected to continue at its long-run
potential rate of 3.1 percent, and the unemployment rate is projected
to be flat at 5.1 percent (Table 3-1).

The growth rate of the economy over the long run is determined by its
supply-side components, which include population, labor force
participation, productivity, and the workweek. The Administration's
forecast for the contribution of different supply-side factors to
real GDP growth is shown in Table 3-2.

[Graphic Not Available in Tiff Format]



The Administration expects nonfarm labor productivity to grow at a
2.1 percent average annual pace over the forecast period, virtually
the same as that recorded during the 43 years since the
business-cycle peak in 1960. The projection is notably more
conservative than the roughly 41/2 percent average annual rate of
productivity growth since the output peak in the fourth quarter of
2000. After such an extraordinary surge, a period of slower
productivity growth is likely as firms shed their hesitancy to
hire. In addition, the slower pace of productivity assumed in the
forecast reflects the Administration's view that in the absence of
a good explanation for the recent acceleration, it is wiser to base
the productivity forecast on longer-term averages.

In addition to productivity, growth of the labor force (also shown
in Table 3-2) is projected to contribute 1.0 percentage point per
year to growth of potential output on average through 2009. Labor
force growth results from growth in the working-age population and
changes in the labor force participation rate. The Bureau of the
Census projects that the working-age population will grow at an
average annual rate of 1.1 percent through 2009--roughly the same
pace as during the years between 1990 and 2003. The last year in
which the labor force participation rate increased was 1997, so the
long-term trend of rising participation appears to have come to an
end. Since then, the participation rate has fallen at an average 0.2
percent annual pace--although some of the decline in 2001 and 2002
probably resulted from the recession-induced decline in job
prospects. In 2003, the baby-boom cohort was 39 to 57 years old, and
over the next several years the boomers will be moving into older
age brackets with lower participation rates.  As a result, the labor
force participation rate is projected to edge down an average of 0.1
percent per year through 2009. The decline may be greater, however,
after 2008, which is the year that the first baby boomers (those born
in 1946) reach the early-retirement age of 62.

In sum, potential real GDP is projected to grow at a 3.1 percent
annual pace, slightly above the average actual pace since 1973 of 3.0
percent. Actual real GDP growth during the six-year forecast period
is projected to be slightly higher, at 3.4 percent, because the
civilian employment rate (line 4 of Table 3-2) makes a small
(0.2 percentage point) and transitory contribution to growth through
2007 as the unemployment rate falls. This contribution then ends as
the unemployment rate stabilizes at 5.1 percent.


Interest Rates over the Long Term

The gradual increase in the interest rate on 91-day Treasury bills
is projected to continue through 2009. The rate is expected to reach
4.4 percent by 2009, at which date the real interest rate on 91-day
Treasury bills will be close to its historical average. The
projected path of the interest rate on 10-year Treasury notes is
consistent with that on short-term Treasury rates. By 2008, this
yield is projected to be 5.8 percent, 3.3 percentage points above
expected CPI inflation--a typical real rate by historical standards.
By 2009, the projected term premium (the difference between the
10-year interest rate and the 91-day rate) of 1.4 percentage
points is in line with its historical average.

The Composition of Income over the Long Term

A primary purpose of the Administration's economic forecast is to
estimate future government revenue, which requires a projection of
the components of taxable income. The Administration's income-side
projection is based on the historical stability of the long-run labor
and capital shares of gross domestic income (GDI). During the first
three quarters of 2003, the labor share of GDI was on the low side of
its historical average.  From this jump-off point, it is projected to
rise to its long-run average and then remain at this level over the
forecast period. (The income share projections are consistent with
data available through December 2, 2003. They exclude any effects of
the later comprehensive revision to the National Income and
Product Accounts.) The labor share consists of wages and salaries,
which are taxable, employer contributions for employee pension and
insurance funds (that is, fringe benefits), which are not taxable,
and employer contributions for government social insurance. The
Administration forecasts that the wage and salary share of
compensation will decline while employer contributions for employee
pension and insurance funds grow faster than wages. This pattern has
generally been in evidence since 1960 except for a few years in the
late 1990s. During the next five years, the fastest growing
components of employer contributions for employee pension and
insurance funds are expected to be employer-paid health insurance and
contributions for defined-benefit pension plans.

The capital share (the complement of the labor share) of GDI is
expected to fall before leveling off at its historical average.
Within the capital share, a near-term decline in depreciation
(an echo of the decline in short-lived investment during 2001
and 2002) helps boost corporate economic profits, which in the third
quarter 2003 were noticeably above their post-1973 average of about
8 percent of GDI. The share of corporate economic profits in GDI is
projected to be bolstered in 2004 by the strong recent productivity
growth together with stable gains in hourly compensation, and an
expected decline in depreciation. From 2005 forward, the profit share
is expected to slowly decline back to its historical average of about
8 percent. The projected pattern of book profits (known in the
national income accounts as "profits before tax") reflects the 30
percent expensing provisions of the Job Creation and Worker
Assistance Act of 2002 and the 50 percent expensing provisions of the
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003. These
expensing provisions reduce taxable profits from the third quarter of
2001 through the fourth quarter of 2004. The expiration of the
expensing provisions increases book profits thereafter, however,
because those investment goods expensed during the three-year
expensing window will have less remaining value to depreciate
thereafter. The share of other taxable income (the sum of rent,
dividends, proprietors' income, and personal interest income) is
projected to fall, mainly because of the delayed effects of past
declines in long-term interest rates, which reduce personal interest
income during the projection period.

Conclusion

The Administration's policies have been a key force shaping recent
economic developments and the prospects for economic growth in coming
years. The policies are designed to enhance U.S. economic growth, not
just maintain it. The remaining chapters of this Report illustrate
the ways in which pro-growth economic policies can improve economic
performance by striking a balance between encouragement and
regulation of firms, by reducing barriers to trade, and by reducing
tax-based disincentives to economic activity.