[Economic Report of the President (1996)]
[Administration of William J. Clinton]
[Online through the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

[DOCID: f:erp_c3._]
Economic Report of the President - - - - - - - - - - - - H. Doc. 104-161
[From the online service of the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[wais.access.gpo.gov]


CHAPTER 3

Making Fiscal Policy Choices Within and Across Generations

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT in a modern market economy was discussed in
Chapter 1. That discussion largely centered on what government should
do. This chapter shifts the focus to how government should be financed.
Although these decisions are interrelated, separating them permits more
detailed analysis of each. In particular, this chapter examines the
tradeoffs between equity and efficiency that are pervasive in government
finance.
The primary means of obtaining resources to fund government
activities is the tax system. Even if public goods and services are
financed initially by debt, the costs of debt service in later years and
the ultimate repayment of the debt are covered through taxes. Decisions
regarding the design of tax systems incorporate compromises between the
sometimes competing concerns of economic efficiency and equity, as well
as reflect competition among entities seeking favorable treatment. The
current U.S. tax system reflects these considerations in various ways
both large (the proportion of revenue raised by various components of
the tax system) and small (provisions affecting single industries).
Recently numerous policymakers and others have called for an
overhaul of the tax system because the current system is complex and
sometimes has inappropriate economic incentives. In thinking about major
or minor reforms to the tax system, it is important to judge them on
several criteria: equity, economic efficiency, revenue adequacy, and
simplicity. One should also remember that the details of tax proposals
can affect greatly the extent to which a reform would satisfy these
criteria.
As if the fiscal policy environment facing today's policymakers were
not challenging enough, demographic trends are likely to make future
fiscal policy choices even more difficult. Today the United States has
3.3 workers for every retiree. Under reasonable projections, by 2030
that number is expected to fall to 2.0. This will have major
implications for government transfer programs such as Social Security
and Medicare. Private sector institutions may also come under stress
from these large and largely predictable demographic changes. How the
U.S. economy adjusts to these changes may be the single greatest
economic challenge facing today's children as they grow older. The
second part of this chapter examines the policy implications of these
demographic changes.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE TAX SYSTEM

The Federal Government raises revenues from payroll taxes,
individual and corporate income taxes, estate and gift taxes, and excise
taxes on a wide range of commodities. Revenues from each component of
the tax system are the product of established tax rates (e.g., cents per
gallon, percentages of taxable income) applied to defined tax bases
(e.g., gallons of gasoline, dollars of taxable income). In some cases,
tax bases are easy to define, while in others (such as taxable income)
the definitions can be quite lengthy and complex. Statutory rules and
administrative interpretations affect the amounts raised, as do the
levels of compliance.
For over 200 years, Americans have debated the appropriate base for
taxation of individuals. Some have claimed that income is the most
appropriate base, because it provides a measure of an individual's (or
household's) ability to pay tax. Others have claimed that consumption is
a more appropriate tax base, because it measures how much of the
resources available to society are claimed (or consumed) by an
individual or household. Economics generally cannot settle this debate
over what is, at heart, a philosophical concern. However, economists can
contribute to the debate by analyzing the consequences of choosing
alternative tax bases. For instance, generally the broader the tax base,
the lower the rate required to raise a given amount of revenue. Since
income in any period equals consumption plus saving, a broad-based
consumption tax is assessed on a smaller base than a comprehensive
income tax. In effect, a consumption tax exempts saving from taxation,
whereas an income tax does not. This means that to raise the same
revenue, lower tax rates can be applied to an income base than to a
consumption base. But this simple arithmetic ignores possible supply
responses to different tax systems (e.g., changes in saving behavior or
labor supply). Economic analysis can provide insight into the likely
magnitudes of these responses, contributing further to the policy
debate.
The Federal tax system (like most State and local systems) has
evolved into a hybrid, incorporating elements of both a consumption tax
and an income tax. Elements of consumption taxation are the various
excise taxes and the favorable tax treatment provided to capital income
under both the individual income tax (e.g., individual retirement
arrangements, pensions, favorable treatment of capital gains income,
favorable treatment of investment in owner-occupied housing) and some
provisions of the corporate income tax (e.g., immediate expensing of
certain investments and accelerated depreciation). These provisions
either partly or completely exempt the normal returns to capital
investments from tax, either directly through a low or zero tax rate on
this income (as with capital gains income; Box 3-1), or by allowing a
deduction of all or part of an investment from taxable income. Table 3-1
lists a number of consumption tax components of today's income tax
(individual and corporate), along with the amount of tax expenditure
associated with each. (A tax expenditure is the revenue loss due to
preferential provisions of tax law, such as special exclusions,
exemptions, deductions, credits, deferrals, or preferential tax rates.
These revenue losses are measured against a comprehensive income tax
base.) Taken together, these components mean that the existing tax
system is part income tax, part consumption tax.
Contrary to what some have claimed, taxes collected at all levels of
government--Federal, State, and local--have been a fairly constant
proportion (between 26 and 30 percent) of gross domestic product (GDP)
for the last 30 years, despite numerous major changes in the Federal and
State tax structures. By this same measure, the United States ranks
among the lowest taxed of the countries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Table 3-2).
Federal revenues as a fraction of GDP have not changed dramatically
over the past few decades (mostly fluctuating between 17 and 20
percent). However, the same cannot be said for the composition of
revenues. Three major changes in revenue composition are illustrated in
Table 3-3: an increased reliance on payroll taxes (Social Security,
Medicare, and unemployment insurance), a reduced reliance on the
corporate income tax, and a reduced reliance on excise taxes. Increased
payroll taxes reflect changes in the Social Security system as well as
the creation of Medicare. The reduction in corporate tax revenues
reflects both lower corporate income tax rates and, more important, a
reduction in recent years in domestic corporate profits as a share of
the economy, as business organizational structures and financing
arrangements have evolved. Through this period, the significance of the
individual income tax has ebbed and flowed without any discernible
pattern. Over time, tax base and rate changes have combined to more or
less maintain the relative importance of the individual income tax as a
Federal revenue source.
The level of taxation is important, but so is the distribution of
the tax burden among individuals of different incomes. The recent debate
over the tax system reveals considerable confusion about the share of
taxes borne by taxpayers at various income levels. The Office of Tax
Analysis of the Treasury Department estimates that, in 1995, effective
tax rates for households generally increased with family economic
income, which is a broad measure of income (Box

Box 3-1.--Taxation of Capital Gains Income

A capital gain (or loss) is the difference between what a taxpayer
sells an asset for and the purchase price. Under current law, capital
gains income is favored compared with other forms of income, and
especially other forms of capital income:
 Capital gains income for individuals is never taxed at more
than 28 percent, whereas other income is taxed at rates up to
39.6 percent. This preferential rate provides those facing the
highest marginal tax rate with a benefit equivalent to excluding
30 percent of the gain.
 Capital gains income is not taxed until the asset
generating the gain is sold with the timing of the sale at the
option of the owner. Other forms of income (e.g., labor and
interest income) are taxed as earned. This feature provides two
distinct advantages to capital gains income. First, for assets
held many years, deferral of tax liability significantly reduces
the tax burden on capital gains assets compared with assets that
generate income taxed annually. Second, taxpayers can
strategically time sales of assets with accumulated gains and
choose to realize gains in a year when they face a temporarily
low tax rate.
 Under the ``step-up in basis at death'' provision, the
income tax liability on assets with accumulated gains is
forgiven when the asset holder dies. Heirs claim a new tax basis
for these assets: the fair market value at the time of the
previous owner's death. Each year more than $25 billion in
capital gains income escapes taxation permanently through this
provision.
 Taxpayers may defer gains from the sale of one primary
residence by purchasing another of greater value. Moreover,
those age 55 and over may exclude up to $125,000 of gain on
personal residences from taxation.
 The 1993 budget act contained a provision excluding half of
the gains on equity investments in certain ``small'' businesses
held at least 5 years.
The tax advantages enjoyed by capital gains income tend to benefit
disproportionately those taxpayers with the highest incomes, who tend to
have the largest asset holdings. The 1 percent of the population with
the highest adjusted gross incomes report over half the total capital
gains realized and Treasury Department estimates that for a recent year,
about 12,000 taxpayers realized gains over $1 million.

Table 3-1.--Selected Consumption Tax Elements of the Income Tax
[Billions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated tax
Consumption tax elements                  expenditure at
FY 1996 level
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Expensing of:

Small investments....................................              1.1
Research and development costs.......................              2.6
Timber-growing costs.................................              0.4
Multiperiod agricultural production costs............              0.1

Accelerated depreciation of:

Nonresidential real property.........................              4.4
Machinery and equipment..............................             20.9

Exclusion of:

Pension contributions and earnings (employer plans)..             59.0
Interest on life insurance savings...................             11.2

Deduction of IRA contributions and deferral of earnings             6.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Office of Management and budget.


Table 3-2.--Tax Share of GDP in Selected OECD Countries, 1994
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Country                          Percent of GDP
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Group of Seven

United States.......................................              31.5
Japan...............................................              32.3
Germany.............................................              46.5
France..............................................              48.9
Italy...............................................              44.9
United Kingdom......................................              36.4
Canada..............................................              42.2

Australia.............................................              32.9
Austria...............................................              47.5
Belgium...............................................              51.1
Denmark...............................................              60.0

Finland...............................................              53.1
Greece................................................              35.4
Ireland...............................................              41.6
Netherlands...........................................              51.4

Norway................................................              55.3
Portugal..............................................              45.7
Spain.................................................              39.0
Sweden................................................              58.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

3-2). These data (shown in Table 3-4) indicate that the Federal tax
system maintains some degree of progressivity. (A progressive tax system
is one where the proportion of income paid in taxes rises with a
person's income.) This overall progressivity reflects the fact that the
more progressive elements in the tax system outweigh the effects of the
less progressive elements. When State and local taxes are factored into
the analysis, this overall progressivity is reduced but not eliminated.
The Federal tax system has become somewhat less progressive over the
past few decades, as payroll taxes came to account for a greater
proportion of overall revenues. But the tax changes made

Table 3-3.--Composition of Federal Receipts
[Percent of total receipts]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Social
Individual  Corporation    insurance       Excise
Fiscal year                      income       income      taxes and       taxes      Other \1\
taxes        taxes     contributions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1950.........................................         39.9         26.5          11.0          19.1          3.4
1955.........................................         43.9         27.3          12.0          14.0          2.8
1960.........................................         44.0         23.2          15.9          12.6          4.2
1965.........................................         41.8         21.8          19.0          12.5          4.9
1970.........................................         46.9         17.0          23.0           8.1          4.9
1975.........................................         43.9         14.6          30.3           5.9          5.4
1980.........................................         47.2         12.5          30.5           4.7          5.1
1985.........................................         45.6          8.4          36.1           4.9          5.0
1990.........................................         45.3          9.1          36.9           3.4          5.4
1995 \2\.....................................         43.7         11.2          36.0           4.3         4.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Includes estate and gift taxes, customs duties and fees, and Federal Reserve earnings transferred to the
Treasury.
\2\Estimate.
Note.--Detail may not add to 100 percent because of rounding.

Source: Office of Management and Budget.

Box 3-2.--Family Economic Income

The Treasury Department uses a broad measure of economic well-
being, called family economic income, when performing distributional
analyses on tax proposals. Family economic income combines the incomes
and taxes of related family members who form a single economic unit.
This fairly comprehensive measure of income starts with adjusted gross
income as reported to the Internal Revenue Service and then adds an
estimate of unreported income; deductions claimed for individual
retirement account (IRA) and Keogh contributions; employer-provided
fringe benefits such as health coverage; earnings on pensions, IRAs,
Keoghs, and life insurance policies; tax-exempt interest; nontaxable
cash transfer payments; and imputed rent on owner-occupied housing.
Capital gains are computed on an accrual basis, with the inflation
component removed (if possible). Inflation adjustments are also made to
the incomes of borrowers and lenders.
in the 1990 and 1993 budget acts tended to increase progressivity, both
in the income tax and overall.
Chart 3-1 shows Gini coefficients for the before-tax distribution of
income in the United States and for the distribution after tax and
transfer programs are included. (The Gini coefficient is a measure of
income inequality, indicating the extent to which the actual income
distribution differs from equal incomes for all. A coefficient of 0.0
indicates exactly equal incomes and a coefficient of 1.0 maximum income
inequality.) The smaller Gini coefficient for after-tax incomes
indicates that the Federal tax and transfer system acts to reduce income
inequality. In general, the after-tax data tell a story

Table 3-4.--Projected Effective Federal Tax Rates, 1996
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Effective
Family economic income class \1\                 tax rate
\2\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-$10,000....................................................        8.0

$10,000-$20,000..............................................        8.8

$20,000-$30,000..............................................       13.3

$30,000-$50,000..............................................       17.5

$50,000-$75,000..............................................       19.9

$75,000-$100,000.............................................       21.1

$100,000-$200,000............................................       22.0

$200,000 and over............................................       23.7

Total......................................................       20.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Family economic income (FEI) is defined as the sum of adjusted gross
income, unreported income, IRA and Keogh deductions, nontaxable
transfer payments, employer-provided fringe benefits, tax-exempt
interest, inside build-up on tax-favored investments, imputed rental
value of owner-occupied housing, and inflation-adjusted capital gains
and losses accrued during the year. FEI aggregates the incomes for all
family members.
\2\Effective tax rate equals total taxes divided by family economic
income.
Note.--Estate and gift taxes and custom duties are excluded. It is
assumed that: individual incomes taxes are borne by the people who pay
them; corporate income taxes are borne by all owners of capital;
excise taxes on purchases by individuals are borne by the purchaser
and those on business purchases are borne by individuals in proportion
to total consumption; and payroll taxes are assumed borne by
employees.

Source: Department of the Treasury.

similar to the before-tax measures, with substantial increases in income
inequality occurring in the 1980s.



When considering the distributional consequences of government
actions, it would be desirable to incorporate all aspects of the tax-
and-transfer system. However, distributional analysis for some important
government transfer programs (such as Medicare, Medicaid, Food Stamps,
and others) and discretionary spending is not as completely developed as
the analysis for the tax system. Steps to integrate both tax and
transfer programs into the same distribution tables can, in principle,
lead to more informed decisionmaking. In contrast, omitting tax
components such as the earned income tax credit from a distributional
analysis of a tax proposal may be misleading.

CHARACTERISTICS OF A WELL-DESIGNED TAX SYSTEM

Three main traits define a well-designed tax system: fairness,
economic efficiency, and simplicity. As with almost everything else in
government finance, design of a tax system requires tradeoffs among
these desirable properties. Policymakers need to be aware how the
various components of the existing tax system contribute toward meeting
these objectives and how any potential reform of the tax system measures
up.

FAIRNESS

Fairness is generally characterized as horizontal and vertical
equity. Horizontal equity means similar tax treatment (i.e., tax
payments of equal size) for similarly situated taxpayers. Economists
generally view taxpayers as similarly situated when they have similar
abilities and similar levels of human capital and financial wealth.
However, economists may not agree about the type of adjustments
necessary to reflect other personal circumstances (e.g., health status).
Components of a tax system that do not meet the basic standards of
horizontal equity will appear unfair.
Vertical equity is often associated with a progressive tax system.
For the overall tax system to be progressive requires that at least some
major revenue-raising components be progressive. The individual and
corporate income taxes are generally judged to be the most progressive
elements in the portfolio of taxes that make up the U.S. tax system.
These elements more than offset the effects of the other, less
progressive elements.
Horizontal and vertical equity can be thought of as objective,
measurable indicators of fairness. But the perceived fairness (a less
measurable indicator) of a tax system is also key to its acceptance by
the public, which in turn is a very important determinant of the level
of compliance.

EFFICIENCY

To be economically efficient, a tax system should not impede
economic growth and should avoid excessive interference with private
economic decisionmaking. In general, a tax characterized by a broad base
and a low tax rate will cause less distortion of economic decisionmaking
than one with a narrower base and higher rates that raises a similar
amount of revenue. Minimal distortion means that competitive prices can
better serve as reliable market signals, promoting an efficient
allocation of resources and, hence, overall economic efficiency. These
efficiency effects can be quite large and, if economic decisions
affected by the tax are sensitive (elastic) to the tax rate, these
distortions can be quite costly to the economy. A key issue in this
regard is how sensitive various economic decisions are to contemplated
changes in tax rates. For instance, many economists believe that the
interest elasticity of saving is relatively low, so that reducing taxes
on returns to a broad range of saving may not elicit much additional
private saving. In fact, unless revenues are made up elsewhere,
aggregate national saving may actually be reduced, as the increased
Federal deficit (lower public sector saving) resulting from lower tax
revenues more than offsets any increased private saving.
Correcting Market Failure. A tax system can also be used to address
market failure: the under- or overprovision of goods by the private
sector. For instance, a tax subsidy for research activities may offset
the tendency for private organizations to undertake too little research
because they cannot appropriate for themselves all the benefits of that
activity. In the case of negative externalities, or spillover effects
(e.g., pollution), a tax on the activities generating the externality
may discourage them. It may be possible to design a revenue-neutral
``tax swap'' where, for example, revenues generated by a pollution tax
can be used to reduce the rate of a distortionary tax elsewhere in the
tax system. Judicious choice of the elements of such a tax swap can, in
principle, enhance economic efficiency.
Direct Spending Versus Tax Expenditures. The government often has a
choice of methods to promote activities considered desirable (e.g.,
because they yield positive externalities): it can do so either through
the tax system (tax expenditures) or through direct spending programs.
Two key issues in assessing the relative merits of these alternative
approaches are targeting and administrative costs. The essential goal in
targeting is ``bang for the buck'': how much extra stimulation of the
desired activity can be accomplished per dollar of forgone tax revenue
or dollar of direct expenditure. Some beneficiaries of either tax
expenditures or direct expenditures would have undertaken the desired
activity anyway, but claim the benefit nonetheless. This concern may be
addressed in a direct spending program by screening mechanisms to
identify subsidized activities that would not have been undertaken
without the subsidy. Of course, such mechanism requires administrative
resources (e.g., the cost of obtaining the required information).
However, direct spending programs are not always better at targeting. In
some situations, the tax system may be more effective than spending
programs at targeting subsidies, especially where income is a criterion
for targeting.
Sometimes the administrative costs of providing incentives through
the tax code can be lower than those for direct spending provisions.
Because tax incentives piggyback on the existing structure of the tax
system, the added administrative costs of providing an additional
subsidy may be minimal. In contrast, spending programs may require a
bureaucratic structure to deliver the subsidy, increasing administrative
costs. For some cases, then, the savings in administrative costs
associated with a tax subsidy can outweigh its somewhat inferior
targeting, compared with a well-designed direct spending program. In
other cases, however, the overall cost to the Internal Revenue Service
of administering tax expenditure programs can be quite substantial.
Moreover, the costs of tax administration for particular incentives may
be hidden in the overall budget for the Internal Revenue Service. The
administrative costs of direct spending programs, however, are
explicitly accounted for.
The annual review process to which appropriated expenditures are
subjected may be another advantage of direct spending programs over tax
expenditures. This regular review is especially important in today's
austere fiscal environment to ensure that obsolete programs do not
remain on the books. Tax code provisions do not generally undergo annual
scrutiny (although a handful routinely expire and must be renewed by the
Congress). A determination that tax subsidies are desirable policy
should be subject to the same criterion that spending programs are: do
the society-wide benefits delivered exceed the social costs of the
forgone revenues?
Corporate Subsidies and Loopholes. Subsidies can take the form of
tax preferences or direct Federal payments, or more subtle forms such as
import quotas that limit competition with domestically produced goods,
below-market-rate sales or credits, or implicit government guarantees.
Recently many observers have called for a reexamination of these
subsidies, with an eye toward trimming those that lack adequate
justification.
One strength of a market economy is that the incentives provided by
prices and profits--not government subsidy--generally lead to the
efficient supply of essential goods and services. The argument for
government intervention must be predicated on the undersupply, absent
government help, of valuable goods and services. Such is the case for
many expenditures on research and technology development where large
spillovers benefit other individuals and firms. Government support for
research activity can offset a tendency for the private sector to
underinvest in research. But other subsidies do not generate such
spillover benefits and are much more difficult to justify on efficiency
grounds.
Some might argue that government subsidies are necessary to prevent
profits in an industry from falling below the normal rate of return,
threatening the industry's existence. However, with or without
subsidies, industries whose products are valued by consumers will
survive. The only issue is their ultimate scale of operation and absent
a significant market failure, such as associated with an externality,
market prices provide appropriate signals for expansion or contraction.
Market entry and competitive markets tend to ensure that private, risk-
adjusted rates of return, taking into account all available government
subsidies, are equated across activities through adjustments in prices
and aggregate supply. Removing unwarranted subsidies would begin a
process of exit from the industry, driving up the returns for those that
remain until they reach competitive levels. In the end, ironically,
because the value of government subsidies is likely to get capitalized
in the value of scarce resources associated with an industry, the
benefit of current subsidy payments may accrue not to the current
subsidy recipient but to a previous owner of the scarce resource.
The bottom line is that unwarranted business subsidies lower
economic efficiency. In contrast, subsidies that compensate for market
failures, such as large positive spillovers, increase economic
efficiency (as described in detail in Chapter 1).
Many business subsidies are hidden and receive scant attention from
policymakers, in part because they do not show up in annual
appropriations bills or on lists of tax expenditures, and because they
confer relatively subtle benefits. However, hidden subsidies can be
brought to light and undone in many ways. User fees can be set to cover
the full costs of service provision. Auctions can be used to transfer
resources to the private sector (e.g., portions of the electromagnetic
spectrum). Other hidden subsidies could include below-market interest
rates on government provision of credit to businesses and the implicit
Federal guarantee provided to government-sponsored enterprises.
Addressing these subsidies could increase overall economic efficiency
(for instance, well-designed auctions would ensure that resources are
allocated to those who can best use them), eliminate a source of
unfairness, and raise substantial Federal revenues.
Other Efficiency Effects. Two other effects of the tax system
contribute to economic efficiency: the provision of macroeconomic
automatic stabilizers and the provision of a form of society-wide income
insurance. Automatic stabilizers are mainly associated with the income
tax components of the tax system (i.e., the individual and corporate
income taxes). As the economy expands sharply, progressive tax rates
ensure that individual income tax revenues grow even faster than the
economy. Similarly, since corporate profits follow the business cycle,
an economic expansion leads to increased corporate income tax revenues.
These increased revenues exert a contractionary effect by lowering the
Federal deficit (or increasing the surplus). The same effect happens in
reverse when the economy slumps: tax revenues fall, widening the deficit
(or reducing the surplus). The tax system thus helps stabilize the
swings of the broader economy. Although any tax that raises additional
revenue when incomes increase may function as an automatic stabilizer,
progressive taxes are likely to be more effective automatic stabilizers
than proportional or regressive taxes.
A progressive component of the tax system, such as the individual
income tax, can also provide a form of income insurance in an economy
where income fluctuations are unpredictable. This occurs because a
progressive income tax can substantially reduce the variability of
after-tax incomes without reducing average income very much. If incomes
increase, in part because of an earner's good fortune, a progressive
income tax system claims more than a proportional share of this
increase. These additional revenues can be thought of as providing
income insurance to those whose incomes are low, in part because of bad
luck, by reducing their tax burden more than proportionally. The
progressive rate structure of the income tax (including the earned
income tax credit) accomplishes a significant amount of this income
insurance.
This income insurance has the direct benefit of reducing the income
risk borne by individuals themselves, shifting it to society as a whole,
but it also provides an indirect benefit. Because households will be
willing to bear more risk if they have access to income insurance, they
will undertake investments (in both financial and human capital,
including increased labor mobility) with greater risk and greater
expected return. Aggregated over all individuals, the effect of
undertaking such investments is a higher expected national income.
Private markets will not offer such income insurance because the
inherent difficulty of separating effort and luck from an individual's
ability subjects private purveyors to adverse selection: those who
expect poor outcomes would be more likely to purchase the insurance. The
income tax system, in contrast, applies to virtually all economically
active people, mitigating concerns with adverse selection.

SIMPLICITY

The third element of a desirable tax system is simplicity, as
measured both by the cost of compliance to taxpayers and by the
administrative cost to the government. Recent studies have suggested
high costs of compliance (e.g., one study reports total compliance and
administrative costs of around $75 billion, or around 6 percent of
revenues). These estimates may be overstated, however, because it is
difficult for taxpayers (especially businesses, for which the costs may
be especially high) to separate out tax compliance costs from accounting
and business planning costs they would incur anyway. However, even if
true compliance costs (those above costs incurred for ordinary business
reasons) are only half those reported, the concern is well-founded,
because resources used to comply with the tax system do not increase
output but are simply the costs associated with transferring resources
from one party to another. A well-designed tax system attempts to
minimize the sum of administrative and compliance costs, subject, of
course, to the system attaining the other objectives.

ASSESSING THE CURRENT TAX SYSTEM

With respect to horizontal equity, the current U.S. tax system has
some shortcomings. Different types of income are taxed differently, the
composition of a household or family can affect its tax liability but
not its ability to pay tax, and some forms of consumption are favored
over others. Many of these departures from horizontal equity result from
decisions by the Congress and partly reflect the difficulty in
determining whether individuals are truly in ``similar'' positions in
terms of ability to pay taxes.
Evaluating the current system in terms of vertical equity is more
difficult, because economic reasoning provides no objective guide to
what the degree of progressivity should be. We do know that the current
tax system is progressive and that the tax-and-transfer system
accomplishes a significant amount of redistribution. But observers
disagree about whether the overall system exhibits an appropriate degree
of progressivity.
Survey data provide one way to analyze the perceived fairness of the
tax system. Public opinion polls often find that a substantial portion
of Americans view their tax system as unfair. This may reflect the
concern that others are able to exploit loopholes and avoidance
mechanisms to reduce their tax payments. Whatever their origin, these
feelings that the tax system is unfair have attracted the attention of
policymakers and tax administrators. One concern is that, absent
corrective action, these perceived inequities could lead to erosion of
the present level of compliance.
Concerns with efficiency often focus on the possible adverse
incentive effects of high marginal tax rates. Some advocates of the
reforms that lowered the highest individual marginal tax rates in 1981
and 1986 argued that they would unleash supply-side responses that would
lift the economy to new heights and, as a result, would raise rather
than lower overall tax revenues. The evidence does not support these
claims. Far from raising total tax revenues, the tax reductions of 1981
were followed by reduced individual and corporate income tax revenues as
a share of GDP. Even though payroll taxes were increased, this led to
the first huge peacetime budget deficits in the United States. These
deficits crowded out private investment and led to the fiscal morass
from which we are now just emerging. Moreover, the statistical evidence
shows no significant break in the pace of productivity increases or
labor force participation rates with either the 1981 or the 1986 tax
changes. Whatever can be said for these tax changes, it cannot be
claimed that they had marked effects on economic growth.
The minor effects of these tax rate reductions on labor supply are
consistent with other evidence. Conventional estimates suggest that
primary earners in a household generally change their behavior very
little in response to relatively small changes in tax rates. The
response of secondary earners is generally found to be larger. However,
since secondary earners work fewer hours than primary earners, the
overall labor supply response to a change in marginal tax rates is often
quite limited. Similarly, conventional estimates of the response of
saving behavior to changes in after-tax rates of return suggest that
changes in individual income tax rates should not have a major effect on
our low national saving rate.
Since 1986, marginal rates for individuals with the very highest
incomes have been raised modestly in order to reduce the Federal
deficit. Some have claimed that these rate increases (e.g., in 1993)
would do severe harm to the economy by creating a disincentive for
individuals to work and save. Again, these forecasts turned out to be
false, just as did the earlier, supply-side forecasts of rapid economic
growth from tax reductions.
Some critics claim that increases in marginal tax rates fail to
raise the predicted revenues. One recent study estimated that the rate
increases on high-income individuals in the 1993 budget act raised less
than half the revenues predicted by the Treasury. But as Box 3-3 argues,
subsequent analysis indicates that the 1993 provisions did raise the
revenues predicted.
The current income tax system is often characterized as complex. A
large part of the complexity results from eight decades of statutory and
administrative modifications to address economic situations unforeseen
when the income tax was originally enacted. Another part stems from tax
initiatives intended to address important policy concerns. Policymakers
should periodically review existing law to determine which provisions
have outlived their usefulness and which can be streamlined or otherwise
simplified. This Administration, as part of its National Performance
Review and other efforts, has proposed several simplifications. One
example is the pension simplification initiative announced in June 1995
and incorporated in the Administration's 1997 budget proposal. Other
examples include simplified forms, greater use of electronic filing, and
increased access to filing individual tax returns by telephone.
The Administration recognizes that the current tax system has some
real and perceived problems. Some progress toward addressing them was
made in the 1993 budget act. Further steps proposed in the budget for
fiscal 1996 are described in Box 3-4.

EVALUATING REFORM PROPOSALS:
THE FLAT TAX

Several proposals for a so-called flat tax have been offered over
the past few years. In its most basic form, a flat tax applies a single
tax rate on all business activities and individuals. This discussion
focuses on the flat tax in its prototypical form, which may differ in
some details from any particular legislative proposal.
The prototype flat tax is effectively a consumption tax--that is, a
tax on wage income plus a tax on consumption from existing wealth at the
time the tax is imposed. As such, a flat tax shares many of the benefits
and shortcomings of other consumption taxes.
On the business side, all new investment could be immediately
expensed under a flat tax, effectively exempting the normal returns to
investment from tax. All types of business organizations would be
subject to the flat tax: sole proprietorships, partnerships, and
corporations. No deduction would be allowed for interest or dividends
paid. Purchases from other businesses could be deducted, as could wage
payments. However, the cost of fringe benefits (except for employer-
provided pensions) would not be deductible.
For individuals, a flat tax would provide a standard deduction and
some level of personal exemption for dependents. These amounts are
intended to be large enough to exempt many households from tax. But few,
if any, other deductions would be allowed. Moreover, individuals who run
a business likely would have to file both a business and an individual
return, with wage compensation from the business appearing as income on
the individual return.
The prototypical flat tax would be less progressive than the current
income tax. Its single tax rate would be set far below the highest
marginal rate in the present individual income tax. Therefore, for the
same amount of total revenue, it would raise less revenue from upper
income households than the taxes it would replace (generally the
individual and corporate income taxes). It follows that lower and
middle-income households would see their taxes raised. If the earned
income tax credit were repealed as part of the

Box 3-3.--Revenue Effects of the 1993 Tax Rate Increases

The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93) raised
income tax rates on higher income taxpayers. The marginal tax rate on
couples with taxable income over $140,000 (over $115,000 for single
taxpayers) was raised from 31 to 36 percent, and a 39.6 percent marginal
rate was imposed on taxpayers with taxable incomes above $250,000. A
taxable income of $140,000 roughly corresponds to an adjusted gross
income of $200,000, so these rate increases apply to the 1.2 percent of
the population with the highest incomes.
The Treasury Department predicted that these rate changes would
raise $16 billion in the initial year. But some claim that revenues from
these high-income taxpayers were as much as 50 percent smaller than
predicted, as taxpayers reacted to the changes. The data generally do
not support these claims and show that the revenues came in as
predicted.
Analysts claiming substantial revenue shortfalls point to the
difference between income growth among a ``control group'' not affected
by the tax change and that of the affected group. This technique has
several shortcomings. First, the Treasury Department estimates that
taxpayers shifted at least $20 billion in income from early 1993 to late
1992 in anticipation of higher tax rates for 1993. This estimate is
corroborated by data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, which show a
$20 billion spike in personal income in the fourth quarter of 1992. Such
income shifting (which is to be expected when taxpayers can choose the
timing of income receipts) is sufficient to explain the revenue
shortfall claimed by critics of the OBRA93 tax increases. This is true
even after accounting for another income shift: some wage and salary
payments moved from 1994 to 1993 in response to a scheduled increase in
the Medicare payroll tax.
Second, the incomes of taxpayers affected by the OBRA93 tax rate
changes are notoriously hard to predict. Year-to-year income variations
for those in the top 1 percent of the income distribution are large,
because of the large share (over 50 percent in 1993) of nonwage income
(interest, dividends, capital gains, and business income) in these
taxpayers' total income. Predictions of income for this group on the
basis of changes in a lower income control group's income are very
imprecise.
Thus, although the marginal rate increases in OBRA93 may affect
economic behavior over the longer term, the evidence to date suggests
that they raised the revenues predicted.

Box 3-4.--Tax Proposals in the Middle Class Bill of Rights

The Administration's Middle Class Bill of Rights contains a three-
part tax package: a tax credit of $500 per child, a tax deduction for
postsecondary training and education, and an expansion of individual
retirement accounts to all middle-class families. These proposals would
encourage taxpayers to save and invest in themselves and their children.
The proposed child tax credit is meant to partly compensate for
the failure of the personal exemption for dependent children to keep
pace with inflation and income growth over the last 50 years. The $500
credit would apply to taxpayers with children under age 13 and would be
nonrefundable (that is, it would not exceed the amount of tax otherwise
due). It would be phased out for families with adjusted gross incomes
(AGIs) between $60,000 and $75,000.
Taxpayers, their spouses, and dependents would be eligible for the
proposed deduction for postsecondary training and education. When fully
phased in, the measure would allow taxpayers to deduct up to $10,000 per
year in qualifying educational expenses (generally those paid to
institutions and programs eligible for Federal assistance). The
deduction would be phased out for married couples with AGIs between
$100,000 and $120,000.
The expanded IRA is intended to encourage households to save more.
The proposal doubles the existing income limits on deductible IRAs for
taxpayers with employer-provided pension coverage. IRA contributions up
to $2,000 would be completely deductible for joint filers with AGIs
below $80,000, with the amount deductible phased out for those with AGIs
up to $100,000. In addition, these income limits and the maximum
deductible contribution ($2,000) would be indexed for future inflation.
The proposal would also permit taxpayers to make withdrawals from an IRA
before age 59\1/2\ without payment of the 10 percent excise tax for the
following purposes: to buy a first home, to pay for postsecondary
education, to defray large medical expenses, or to cover expenses during
spells of long-term unemployment. Finally, the Administration proposes a
new form of IRA to which contributions would not be deductible but whose
earnings would never be subject to income tax.
proposal, the tax burden of lower income working families would be
raised substantially.
Often the tax rate contained in flat tax proposals is between 15 and
20 percent. Revenue estimates generally conclude that such proposals
would raise significantly less revenue than the taxes they would
replace, increasing future Federal budget deficits. One example is the
Treasury Department analysis of H.R. 2060 (the Armey-Shelby flat tax
proposal). At its proposed 17 percent rate, this tax plan would raise
about $138 billion less per year (at 1996 income levels) than the taxes
it would replace. Proponents of a flat tax respond that lower tax rates
will so stimulate economic growth, and therefore raise tax revenues,
that the projected shortfalls will vanish. However, these claims are
generally not supported by the available evidence, including the
historical record of the 1980s. A prudent reading of the economic
literature suggests that the effects of a shift to a flat tax on
economic growth are likely to be small.
Other shortcomings of a flat tax have received much less attention.
For instance, since a flat tax effectively exempts capital income from
taxation at the individual level, it would create strong incentives for
entities to recharacterize payments to individuals as capital income.
Similarly, since businesses would be taxed on gross receipts from the
sale of goods and services but not on interest income, they would have
an incentive to relabel payments they receive from other entities as
interest. This distinction between the taxation of payments labeled
``interest'' and other payments creates an enormous potential loophole,
and the concern is magnified when multinational firms enter the picture
(because firms outside the United States would be subject to completely
different tax regimes). This is a problem that could be solved, but only
at the expense of introducing some complexity in distinguishing between
payment types. Such a solution, though, undercuts one of the main
arguments for the flat tax, namely simplicity. In addition, it
indirectly points out that defining the tax base often is a major source
of complexity, rather than the tax rate schedule.
The flat tax would change the relative desirability of many assets.
Owner-occupied housing has received particular scrutiny in this regard.
Housing would become much less tax-advantaged under a flat tax that
eliminates the deduction for mortgage interest. The result could be a
sizable drop in housing values. But owner-occupied housing is only one
type of asset that could be affected in this manner. For example,
existing plant and equipment or tax-exempt bonds could also suffer a
marked decline in value. The impact on these assets indicates that tax
reform proposals must be attentive to short-run effects; designing
adequate transition rules is a crucial task.
A flat tax would apply to more types of organizations than the
current tax. In addition to requiring separate business and individual
tax returns for sole proprietorships and partnerships, a flat tax could
require many currently tax-exempt entities to file.
Finally, since much middle-class saving is in the form of pensions
and IRAs and is thus already effectively exempt from income tax, a flat
tax would provide little additional benefit to saving for many middle-
income families. Instead, it would skew much of the benefit of exempting
capital income to the very wealthiest in society.
Although the flat tax discussed here is not the answer, reforms of
the current tax system can certainly be found that can meet these three
traditional tests. Our challenge is to design policies that recognize
the inherent tradeoffs among them and that reflect deeply held American
values. Moreover, decisions made today regarding tax reform are not made
in a static economy. Any reforms made must not only be appropriate for
today's economy but, more important, must also be flexible enough to
address the long-term challenges affecting tomorrow's economy.

LONG-TERM DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES

Both Republicans and Democrats agree that the Federal budget should
be balanced over the next 7 years. Balancing the budget will require
many tough choices, but putting our fiscal house in order is an
important first step toward meeting the many challenges that stem from
the aging of the population that is projected to begin in the early part
of the next century.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

The median age in the United States in 1995 was 33 years. By 2015 it
is projected to be 37, and by 2030 it will be 39. The elderly as a share
of the population is projected to increase from roughly 13 percent today
to over 20 percent by 2035 (Chart 3-2).
This aging of the U.S. population is the result of two demographic
forces: a decline in fertility (lifetime births per woman of
childbearing age) since the 1950s and 1960s (Box 3-5), and an increase
in life expectancy. Whereas the average woman in 1950 had three children
over her lifetime, the average woman today has only two. This decline in
fertility means fewer children today and fewer workers tomorrow. With
the increase in life expectancy, more people survive to age 65, and
those who do live longer beyond 65. The result is an increase in the
share of the over-65 population. Between 1950 and 1995, life expectancy
at birth increased roughly 7 years for men and 8 years for women; life
expectancy at age 65 increased 2.5 years for men and 4 years for women
over this same period. In the future, life expectancy is projected to
continue to increase, although at a somewhat slower rate.
The total dependency ratio--the ratio of dependents (children and
elderly) to workers--can be used to summarize the effects on the economy
of the decline in fertility and the increase in life ex-



Box 3-5.--Changes in Fertility Over Time

Chart 3-3 reports changes in the total fertility rate, defined as
the number of children a woman would bear in her lifetime (assuming she
survives her entire childbearing period) if she were to experience the
average birth rate by age observed in the selected year. It seems clear
that the baby bust associated with the Great Depression and World War
II, and the postwar baby boom that followed it, were temporary blips in
a long-run trend of declining fertility. Without the postwar baby boom,
elderly dependency ratios would be climbing steadily and by 2070 would
reach the levels currently projected. The cycle of baby bust and baby
boom actually observed accounts for the path of dependency between now
and then: relatively little change over the next 20 years, as the
relatively small cohort born in the 1930s and 1940s reaches retirement,
followed by the rapid increases associated with the retiring of the
baby-boom generation.



pectancy. The ratio is a rough measure of how many nonworking people
must be supported by the output of the economy's workers. Chart 3-4
reports trends in the total dependency ratio and its two major
components: the elderly dependency ratio, calculated as the ratio of the
population over 65 to the population aged 20 to 64, and the youth
dependency ratio, the ratio of those under 20 to those aged 20 to 64.
The chart reveals that the total dependency ratio is currently quite
low by recent historical standards, because the youth dependency ratio
is relatively low and the elderly dependency ratio has risen very little
recently. In contrast, in the 1960s the ratio of children to workers was
very high, and in the future (after 2010) the ratio of elderly to
workers is expected to be high. Although the total dependency ratio is
expected to climb significantly in the future, it will be climbing from
a relatively low level and is not projected to reach the high rates
experienced--and supported without great difficulty--in the mid-1960s.
From this perspective, the expected aging of the population does not
look so threatening.
Yet children demand different resources from society than the
elderly, so it is worth separating elderly dependency from total
dependency. Looking only at the elderly dependency ratio does show a
dramatically different picture. The ratio of elderly to the working-age
population rose slowly between 1950 and 1995, is expected to



stay roughly constant between 1995 and 2010, and then is expected to
increase sharply, by roughly 75 percent, in the years between 2010 and
2035.

ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AN AGING POPULATION

Much public discussion of the impact of demographic changes on the
economy has focused on the potential effects of aging on government
programs like Social Security and Medicare. This focus, although
certainly not misplaced, may give the impression that the aging of the
population would have little impact in an economy with no government
programs for the aged. This is clearly not the case. Population aging
has broad economic implications in any economy, regardless of the
breadth of government support for the elderly.
As discussed above, the aging of the U.S. population stems from
increased life spans and declining fertility. Increased life
expectancy--which accounts for only a small fraction of the change in
dependency over the next 40 years--has relatively direct effects on
individuals. Although living longer is undoubtedly a good thing (and
something in which we invest many research dollars), it does require
individuals to make certain adjustments. People need to generate enough
resources to support themselves over more years of life. They can do
this by working more years (if they are able to, Box 3-6), by increasing
their saving rate while working, by reducing their consumption when
retired, or by receiving greater transfers from those of working age
during their retirement.

Box 3-6.--Will Increases in Longevity Permit Increased Work Effort?

The impact of an older population will depend, in part, on the
ability of the elderly to remain active and economically productive. An
important question, therefore, is whether tomorrow's 65-year-olds will
be healthier than today's. If so, delaying retirement may be a viable
option for many people. Advances in medical technology not only save
lives but also improve lives by reducing the severity of disabling
illnesses. For example, cataract surgery preserves vision, and hip
replacements preserve the ability to walk, permitting people to remain
independent and active. On the other hand, to the extent that medical
advances extend life without reducing disabilities, increasing years of
work would not be a viable response to the increase in longevity.
Which of these effects dominates the other is still uncertain.
Still, so long as the first effect is present, some individuals can
extend their working years, and the average work span can thus increase.
The decline in fertility rates from the levels of the 1960s means
that the current generation of workers now has fewer children to care
for; they can therefore consume more. This corresponds to the finding
that the total dependency ratio is quite low now relative to the 1960s.
As members of this generation age, however, they will also find that
they have fewer children in the workforce. This corresponds to the
increase in the elderly and total dependency ratios expected in the
early part of the next century. Since workers today generally do not
support their parents' retirement directly, this reduction in the ratio
of workers to elderly should not have large direct effects. But it may
have a number of indirect effects.
People can save for their retirement by purchasing homes and by
investing in financial assets, either directly or through a pension
fund, if they have one. When they retire, they support themselves with
the income they earn on these assets, and with money they receive from
selling them, and of course with benefits they receive from programs
such as Social Security and Medicare. The value of those assets may be
affected, however, by the number of workers in the next generation. For
example, if the number of workers in the United States declines, the
total value of what can be produced may also decline (relative to what
could have been produced by a constant number of workers). The result
might be to reduce the value of U.S. financial assets. Similarly, an
economy with fewer people of working age has less demand for houses,
leading some analysts to predict that housing values will not increase
by as much as they might otherwise, or might actually decline. On the
other hand, at our current rate of productivity growth, future
generations will undoubtedly be better off than current generations. And
this Administration has focused on policies devoted to improving
productivity--policies like job training, education, and technology
investment--which should make future generations even better off.
Furthermore, some researchers have found that slow growth in the
workforce could actually spur productivity growth, substantially
offsetting or even eliminating the effects of aging on output and on the
value of assets (Box 3-7).

Box 3-7.--Linking Productivity Growth to Demographics

Demographic developments and the rate of productivity growth have
a number of potential links. Some observers argue that population aging
will lead to slower productivity growth because of two factors. First,
as the growth rate of the labor force slows, so does growth in demand
for new capital goods. Innovation could become less profitable as the
fixed costs of innovation are spread over fewer goods. Second, the aging
of the population means that the average age of the workforce will rise.
If innovators tend to be young, productivity growth could suffer.
On the other hand, many analysts believe that the incentives to
innovate are strongest when labor is scarce. This theory, that
``necessity is the mother of invention,'' predicts that as labor force
growth slows, labor-saving technology will be developed to keep economic
output from falling.
Finally, the actual effects of population aging in the United States
will depend on international factors. If the United States were a small
economy that traded freely with the rest of the world, the effects of
population aging would be small: demographic changes in the United
States would have little effect on the value of tradeable assets, which
would largely reflect values established in international markets. But
the United States is not a small economy--its population and income are
too large for its demographic changes not to have significant worldwide
effects. Furthermore, the demographic changes observed here are not
confined to the United States--if anything, the countries that are our
current principal trading partners are aging faster than we are (Box 3-
8). If current trading patterns continue, we are likely to see lower
returns to saving as labor force growth in the United States and in the
rest of the industrialized world declines. If, however, conditions for
trade between the United States and what are today's developing
countries improve substantially over the next few decades, as they have
over the past decade, it is possible that high-yielding investment
opportunities in these countries will keep the rate of return on savings
relatively high.

Box 3-8.--Demographic Changes Around the World

Chart 3-5 summarizes trends in the dependency ratios of the United
States, Japan, and the countries of the European Union, as projected by
the United Nations. Although the U.N. projections are somewhat different
from those in Chart 3-4, which uses data generated by the Social
Security Administration, the same general patterns emerge. In 1995,
elderly dependency is quite similar across the three regions. Dependency
in Europe and the United States is not projected to climb until around
2010. In contrast, the elderly dependency ratio in Japan is already on
the rise. The U.N. projects that dependency in Japan will be 54 percent
higher by 2010 and 110 percent higher by 2030.



EFFECTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE ON THE FEDERAL BUDGET

Government support programs make up a large fraction of the
retirement income of the elderly. These programs have worked
successfully to reduce poverty among the aged (Chart 3-6) and enhance
the health and economic security of both the aged and their families.
Social Security and the insurance value of Medicare alone represent
roughly half of all income (including the value of Medicare) received by
elderly households. These programs also account for a significant
portion of Federal expenditures--over 30 percent in 1995.



Social Security

The largest program for the elderly is Social Security. This program
has traditionally been financed on a pay-as-you-go basis; that is, most
of the payroll taxes collected from the current generation of workers
(largely the baby-boom generation) are used to pay current benefits.
However, Social Security is now developing a trust fund that will permit
some advance funding in the future, at least temporarily. Accumulated
assets in the trust fund are currently equal to roughly 1.5 years of
benefits.
As currently structured, then, Social Security is mainly an
intergenerational transfer program. The aging of the population will
make such a transfer between workers and retirees more difficult. The
Social Security actuaries consider three different scenarios for the
program's future: one in which the Social Security program is in
relatively good financial shape, with relatively high birth rates and
real growth in income, and relatively slow growth in longevity; one in
which the system is in relatively bad financial shape; and an
intermediate scenario, which we focus on here.
Small differences in growth rates, compounded over decades, result
in large differences in estimates of levels of expenditures and
receipts. This means that we need to be cautious in interpreting any
particular scenario. On the other hand, we need to be at least aware of
some of the potential risks. How policy responds will depend on our
degree of risk aversion and the consequences of delay. Under the Social
Security actuaries' intermediate assumptions, benefits are expected to
increase from the current 11.5 percent of payroll to 17.3 percent by
2030; Social Security income (tax collections plus interest on the trust
fund assets) climb more slowly: from 12.6 percent now to 13.1 percent in
2030. Total income is projected to exceed benefits until 2020. After
that, redemption of trust fund holdings can help finance benefits for an
additional 10 years, until the trust fund finally runs out in 2030.
Clearly, steps need to be taken to ensure the long-term solvency of
Social Security, and a bipartisan effort will be required. The
Quadrennial Advisory Council on Social Security was charged with
developing ways to balance Social Security in the long run, and is
expected to release its recommendations in the near future.
Even without any changes to the program, the rate of return that
people will receive on their Social Security contributions is declining.
In the early years of the program, the benefits conferred on retirees
far exceeded their contributions. Since then rates of return have
declined because of statutory increases in tax rates, increases in the
number of years that workers' wages have been subject to tax, and the
slowdown in labor productivity growth, although these have been offset
somewhat by increases in life expectancy. (Productivity growth affects
the rate of return received on Social Security contributions because the
calculation of a worker's initial benefit level reflects the
productivity gains that occurred over his or her working years.) Even at
current levels, Social Security, by providing returns that are fully
indexed for inflation, offers a kind of economic security that is simply
not available elsewhere in the market. And, increases in productivity
growth beyond what is currently projected could lead to higher rates of
return on Social Security contributions in the future.

Medicare

Government expenditures on Medicare, the program that provides
health insurance for the elderly, are also projected to grow over the
next 75 years. The projected expenditure growth over the first 25 years
of that period is primarily due to projected increases in the cost of
providing health care. For the remainder of the projection period,
however, most of the growth is attributable to increases in enrollment
stemming from the retirement of the baby-boom generation.
Medicare is composed of two parts. Part A covers inpatient hospital
services, and Part B covers primarily physician and outpatient hospital
services. Part A is financed by a 2.9 percent payroll tax, shared
equally by employers and employees. Most of the taxes are used to
finance current benefits, but like Social Security, at least until
recently, some tax revenue was retained in a trust fund to finance
future health care benefits. According to the 1995 Annual Report of the
Board of Trustees of the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, the trust fund
for Medicare Part A is projected to be exhausted by the year 2002.
Medicare reforms proposed by this Administration should extend the life
of the Medicare Part A trust fund through at least 2011. Medicare Part B
is financed partly from general revenues, but partly from premiums paid
by beneficiaries. Expenditures on Part B are also expected to increase
with the aging of the population.
Many policymakers have called for a commission, similar to the
Quadrennial Advisory Council for Social Security, to develop
recommendations to ensure the long-term solvency of the overall Medicare
program.

Medicaid

Medicaid, the program that provides health care to low-income people
with little wealth, is not exclusively a program for the elderly. But
Medicaid does pay for nursing home care for elderly and other Americans
who have depleted their assets. In 1995 roughly one-third of total
Medicaid expenditures went to the elderly (with the remaining two-thirds
split about equally between people with disabilities and the nonelderly,
nondisabled poor).
The aging of the population is bound to lead to a significant
increase in the number of people needing long-term care assistance. Not
only will the number of old people increase, but so will the average age
of those over 65. People over 85 made up about 11 percent of the elderly
population in 1995; according to the Social Security Administration's
projections, by 2050, they will make up over 16 percent. Older people
are much more likely to be in a nursing home: in 1993, 31 percent of
those 85 and older spent time in a nursing home, compared to just 7
percent of the general population over 65. If this rate of nursing home
utilization is maintained, population aging will bring significant
increases in the nursing home population and in expenditures on long-
term care.

Box 3-9.--Gauging the Accuracy of the Consumer Price Index

The consumer price index (CPI) is used to index Social Security
benefits as well as elements of the tax code (e.g., personal exemptions,
standard deductions, and tax bracket thresholds). It is generally
believed that the CPI overstates changes in the cost of living, although
opinion varies about the exact magnitude of the overstatement.
Correcting any bias in the CPI would ensure that Social Security
benefits and tax brackets increase as intended--that is, to keep pace
with the cost-of-living.
The bias comes from a variety of sources, including the problem
inherent in approximating a cost-of-living index by a fixed weight price
index like the CPI, and the difficulty of assessing the value to
consumers of quality changes in new and existing products. (See Economic
Report of the President, 1995 for details concerning bias in the CPI.)
The Bureau of Labor Statistics is engaged in a multiyear revision of the
CPI and has, as well, been working to fix a technical limitation in the
formula used to compute basic components of the index. By 1998, these
efforts should reduce the bias in the CPI. It is more difficult to
address the remaining sources of bias because they are harder to gauge
and thus there is greater controversy over their magnitude.

MAINTAINING VALUABLE PROGRAMS

The aging of the population will pose significant challenges for the
economy and in particular for the government. Although changes to these
programs are inevitable, certain features should be maintained. Medicare
and Social Security do provide unique benefits that the private sector
cannot provide. In particular, because Medicare and Social Security
cover all Americans, they are not subject to the adverse selection
problems that can plague the private annuity and health insurance
markets. And Social Security and Medicare provide income streams that
generate constant real purchasing power (Box 3-9). Administrative costs
(which are less than 1 percent of benefits for Social Security) are far
lower than for most private insurance plans or pensions. Social Security
and Medicare are programs of universal participation that have received
a great deal of public support. To maintain this support, it is
important that these programs remain universal, but it is also important
that they be put on a sound financial footing.