Impact assessment of Ammonia and Chlorine transshipment relative to commercial OTEC plant operation in Guam, USA a study / conducted for Guam Guam Energy Office, Energy Impact Program ; by Pacific Energy Management Consultants

[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]

ALENTOS GIYA GUAHAN

ENERGY -ON GUAM

NH3

CHLORI NE

CL2

COASTAL ZCI@2
U5,
INZORMATION CEj\jTZj
IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF
'AMMONIA AND CHLORINE
TRANSSHIPMENT RELATIVE
TO COMMERCIAL OTEC
PLANT OPERATION IN
GUAM, USA

61
GUAM ENERGY OFFICE
TECHNICAL REPORT N08102

TP
233
147
1981
GUAM ENERGY OFFICE

P.O. BOX 2950, AGANA, GUAM 96910 472-8711, 477-9445, 477-9526

Prepared by:

PACIFIC ENERGY MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS

Guam Office: Harmon Plaza, Wing D.
Post Office Box 8888 * Tamuning, Guam 96911
Tel. 646-8606, 646-1558;Telex 721 6295
Honolulu Office: 458A Keawc St.
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
Tel. (808) 521-2943; Telex: 723-8768

IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF AMMONIA AND CHLORINE

TRANSSHIPMENT RELATIVE TO COMMERCIAL OTEC

PLANT OPERATION IN GUAM, USA

A STUDY CONDUCTED FOR
oc@ THE GUAM ENERGY OFFICE

GOVERNMENT OF GUAM

COASTAL ENERGY IMPACT PROGRAM

PAUL M. CALVO, GOVERNOR

JAY L. LATHER, DIRECTOR

Cq1
by

PACIFIC ENERGY MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS

P.O. BOX 8888

TANNING, GUAM 96911

February, 1981

This report is funded under a grant provided by Coastal Zone
Management, Act of 1972, as amended, administered by the Office of
Coastal Zone Management, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration.

Pacific Energy Management Consultants was contracted to perform

an assessment of the Marine Terminal Facilities at Apra Harbor, Guam

with respect to the movement of large quantities of ammonia and

chlorine. This study was funded under a grant provided by the

Coastal Energy Impact Program and administered by the Guam Energy

Office, Jay L. Lather, Director, under Document Number C-0-3400017,

Job Order Number 34000160/130, dated August 6, 1980.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

SUMMARY .............................................................. I

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

].'I Study Objectives ............................................... 3
1.2 Study Methodology .............................................. 3
1.3 Report Forma@ ................................................. 5

CHAPTER Il THE ROLES OF COMMERCIAL PORT OF GUAM AND THE
PROPOSED OTEC PLANT IN NH3 AND CL2 TRANSFER

2.1 The OTEC Concept ............................................... 6
2.2 Commercial Port of Guam ........................................ 8
2.3 Proposed OTEC Plant Site ....................................... 9

CHAPTER III QUANTITIES AND PROPERTIES OF AMMONIA

3.1 Required Quantities and Importation of Ammonia ................. 12
3.2 Properties and Hazards of Ammonia .............................. 13

CHAPTER IV HAZARDS AND SAFETY PRECAUTIONS FOR AMMONIA

4.1 General ...................... ... 15
4.? Ammonia Vapor Hazards .......................................... 16
4.3 Personal Protective Equipment .................................. 17
4.4 Storage Area Precautions ....................................... 18
4.5 Labeling/Posting ............................................... 18
4.6 Fire Hazard .................................................... 19
4.7 Leak Hazard .................................................... 19
4.8 Health Hazards ................................................. 20

4.8.1 Warning Properties ....................................... 20
4.8.2 Severe Exposure .......................................... 21
4.8.3 Exposure Countermeasures ................................. 21

4.8.3 (a) Inhalation ...................................... 21
4.8.3 (b) Taken Internally ................................ 22
4.8.3 (c) Contact With the Eyes ........................... 22
4.8.3 (d) Contact With Skin and Mucous Membranes .......... 23

4.8.4 Procedures for Obtaining Medical Assistance .............. 23
4.8.5 Suggestions to Physicians ................................ 24

4.9 Personnel Safety Training ...................................... 25

4.9.1 Informing Employees of Hazards of Ammonia ................. 25
4.9.2 Training and Drills ...................................... 26

CHAPTER V TRANSPORTATION OF AMMONIA

5.1 Containerized Break-bulk Shipment ............................... 28
5.2 Bulk Shipment ................................................... 30

5.2.1 Ammonia Pipelines ......................................... 30

5.2.1 (a) Pipeline Leaks ................................... 32
5.2.1 (b) Routing .......................................... 33
5.2.1 (c) Government Regulations ............................ 33
5.2.1 (d,, Design ........................................... 33
5.2.1 (e) Installation ..................................... 34

5.2.2 Tank Trucks ............................................... 35

5.2.2 (a) Trailer and Semitrailer Requirements ............. 35
5.2.2 (b) Protection Against Collision ..................... 36
5.2.2 (c) Safety Equipment ................................. 36

CHAPTER VI CHLORINE PROPERTIES AND REQUIREMENTS

6.1 Required Quantities and Importation Of C12 ...................... 37
6.2 Properties and Hazards of Chlorine .............................. 38

CHAPTER VII HAZARDS AND SAFETY PRECAUTIONS FOR CHLORINE

7.1 General ......................................................... 40
7.2 Chlorine Vapor Hazards .......................................... 41
7.3 Personal Protective Equipment ................................... 42
7.4 Storage Area Precautions ........................................ 42
7.5 Labeling/Posting ................................................ 44
7.6 Container Handling Procedures ................................... 44
7.7 Trailer and Semitrailer Requirements ............................ 45
7.8 Fire Hazard ..................................................... 46
7.9 Leak Hazard ..................................................... 47
7.10 Health Hazards ..................................... ............. 49

7.10 (a) Warning Properties ..................................... 49
7.10 (b) Severe Exposures ....................................... 49
7.10 (c) Exposure Countermeasures ............................... 50

7.10 (c)(1) General ........................................ 50
7.10 (c)(2) Gas Inhalation .................................. 50
7.10 (c)(3) Chlorine Eye Contact ........................... 51
7.10 (c)(4) Chlorine Skin Contact .......................... 51

7.10 (a) Procedures for Obtaining Medical Assistance ........... 51

7.11 Personnel Safety Training ...................................... 52

7.11 (a) Informing Employees of Hazards of Chlorine ............. 52
7.11 (b) Training ano Drills .................................... 53

CHAPTER VIII TRANSPORTATION OF CHLORINE

8.1 break-bulk Shipment ............................................. 55
8.2 Ton Containers .................................................. 56

CHAPTER IX GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY AND REGULATIONS FOR
HANDLING AMMONIA

9.1 U.S. Coast Guard ................................................ 59

9.1.1 Statutory Authority ....................................... 60

9.1.1 (a) Title 33 CFR 6.12 ................................ 60
9.1.1 (b) Title 33 CFR 6.14 ................................ 61
9.1.1 (c) Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 ........... 61
9.1.1 (d) Section 311 of the FWPCA ........................ . 61
9.1.1 (e) Executive Order 11735 ............................ 62

9.1.2 Local Coast Guard Requirements ............................ 62

9.1.2 (a) Possible Vessel Requirements ..................... 63
9.1.2 (b) Possible Facility Requirements ................... 64

9.1.3 Facility of Particular Hazard ............................. 65

9.2 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ............................ 65
9.3 Occupational Safety and Health Administration ................... 67

CHAPTER X SUMMARY OF TASK

10.1 Determine Quantity, Mode and Frequency of
Hazardous Chemical Shipments ................................... 69
10.2 Deterine Storage Area Needs .................................... 70
10.3 Coordinate with U.S.C.G . ....................................... 71
10.4 Determine Medical Facilities and Support Available ............. 71
10.5 Coordinate With Fire Department ................................ 73
10.6 Establish Employee Education and Training ...................... 73
10.7 Establish a Written Contingency Plan for Emergencies ........... 74

APPENDICES

A-1 Footnotes
A-2 Bibliography

TABLES

TABLE PAGE

3-1 Chemical ana Physical Properties of Ammonia ................ 14A

4-1 Evacuation Table for Ammonia ............................... 16A

4-2 Physiological Effects of Ammonia ........................... 21A

6-1 Chemical and Physical Properties of Cholorine .............. 39A

7-1 Evacuation Table for Chlorine .............................. 54A

FIGURE FIGURES PAGE

2-1 OTEC System Schematic ...................................... 7A

2-2 Guam Commercial Port Transit.route for
NH3 and C12 to OTEC Site ................................... 8A

4-1 Ammonia Shipping Label ..................................... 18A

7-1 Chlorine Shipping Label ............ ....................... 44A

SUMMARY

A large and varied transportation system exists that can move ammonia

and chlorine from producing plants to the OTEC storage tanks.

Anhydrous ammonia and chlorine can be transported to Guam in bulk,

handled and stored safely if standard industry safety practices are

followed. The transshipment would not create unreasonable health or

safety hazards.

Shipment of the chemicals in bulk quantities will require personnel

specifically qualifieu in the bulk transfer of the chemicals involved.

The Coast Guard will require that satisfactory documentary evidence be

furnished as proof that the person in charge is capable of competently

performing all potential operations that could evolve in a cargo transfer

of a hazardous chemical. OTEC plant technicians may be able to perform

this function.

Bulk shipments of these chemicals will require additional

equipment in the form of a pipeline or tank trucks specifically

designed for that chemical, in order to transport the chemical from

the Commercial Port to the OTEC plant storage tanks.

The facilities at the Commercial Port are best suited for any

handling and transfer of ammonia and chlorine as compared to

privately maintained facilities adjacent to the Commercial Port.

The port would primarily serve a function as a transshipment center

and storage area for the chemicals.

A comprehensive plan, to include procedures for general

emergencies, fire control, emergency lighting and power systems,

first aid, dock emergencies, and responses to releases of all

hazardous substances as well as routine Commercial Port operations,

should be formulated as soon as possible.

CHAPTER I

IMODUCTION

1.1 Study Objectives

The objective of this study is to develop a detailed report on

all of the parameters embracing the transfer of large quantities of
anhydrous ammonia (NH 3) and chlorine (C12) at the Commercial
Port of Guam for delivery to a proposed Ocean Thermal Energy

Conversion plant (OTEC). The study focuses on the Commercial

Port's involvement in transportation, handling and storage of these

two chemicals in the quantities anticipated. The OTEC plant site is

presumed to be the Cabras Island site designated by the Government

of Guam although transshipment of chemicals to a possible sea based

plant is also discussed. The study considers ammonia and chlorine

transshipment and is not intended to address details of on-site

storage.

1.2 Study Methodology

This study was conducted under the authority of the U.S. Coastal

Energy Impact Program (CEIP). The purpose of the CEIP is to study

and plan for any economic, social or environmental consequence that

is likely to occur as a result of siting, constructing, or expanding

energy facilities within the coastal zone.

This study relied on existing literature concerning the

transportation, handling and storage of anhydrous ammonia and

chlorine and the conceptual and preliminary design studies on OTEC

performed by Westinghouse and TRW. Department of Energy Document:
Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Power System Development1l I was

used as a refereice for conceptual design of the OTEC plant.

Anticipated quantitles of anhydrous ammonia and chlorine needed to

operate a 50 MWe OTEC plant were extrapolated from data contained in

these volumes.

The transportation, handling and storage of anhydrous ammonia

and chlorine are regulated primarily by three government agencies:

the U.S. Coast Guard, Environmental Protection Agency and

Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Relevant regulations

of these agencies are discussed throughout the report as they

pertain to Commercial Port operations.

The Chlorine Institute, Inc. and The Fertilizer Institute are

private, nonprofit trade associations organized for the purpose of

promoting safety in all aspects of production, handling and use of

chlorine and anhydrous ammonia respectively. Their publications

were used extensively in the writing of this report.

1.3 Report Format

Chlorine and anhydrous ammonia are individually classified as

nonflammable and nonexplosive; they may react violently when in

contact with each other. Given their divergent chemical natures,

ammonia and chlorine are treated as distinct segments within the

report to as great an extent as possible.

Chapter Il deals with aspects common to both ammonia and

chlorine regarding the Commercial Port and the use of the chemicals

in the OTEC plant. Thereafter anhydrous ammonia is discussed in

chapters III thru V and chlorine is discussed in chapters VI thru

Vill.

CHAPTER II

THE ROLES OF COMMERCIAL PORT OF GUAM AND THE PROPOSED OTEC PLANT

IN NH 3 AND CL2 TRANSFER

2.1 The OTEC Concert

Guam, with almost total dependence on imported petroleum to meet

its increasing energy neeos, has recognized the need to develop

renewable energy resources. Wind, solar and OTEC technology are

available now, but OTEC is the singular viable baseload alternate

energy resource at this time.

Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion is a method for converting the

solar energy stored in warm tropical waters into electrical energy.

Approximately one million kilocalories per square yard per year of
solar radiation fall on the earth's surfacej 2 1 The oceans store

immense quantities of this incident solar energy in the form of

heat. Stored thermal energy can be converted to electrical energy

in a heat engine by utilizing the warm surface waters as a heat

source and the cold deeper waters as a heat sink. Because of the

high entropy character of this stored energy and the low resulting

efficiency of the heat engine, maximum achievable efficiencies of an

Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion plant range between four to ten

percent.L3 J This means that very large quantities of water must

be moved to extract usable amounts of energy. However, the amount

of available energy is nearly limitless.

The proposed OTEC plant will utilize anhydrous ammonia as a

working fluid. Using warm seawater as a heat source, the ammonia is

changea from liquid to vapor within a heat exchanger. The vapor

then turns a turbine that is connected to an electrical generator.

The ammonia vapor is then recondensed in a second heat exchanger

using cold, deep ocean water which has been pumped to the surface.

This cycle is repeated continuously. (Figure 2-1)

Biofouling is the growth and deposition of marine organisms on

surfaces in contact with seawater. Prevention of biofouling is an

important consideration for maximizing heat transfer rates.

Although biofouling rates are considerably less on Guam compared

with mainland and Hawaii sites, the plant will probably utilize

chlorine to prevent biofouling of heat transfer and hydraulic

systems. The neea for continuous chlorination is assumed, requiring

large quantities of the chemical. Most of the plant's chlorine

needs can be generated on site, as hypochlorite, by electrolysis.

This is discussed further in Chapter VI.

Both ammonia and chlorine have unique individual and combined

hazard traits. Hazards associated with the handling of these

chemicals by the Commercial Port will be discussed as they pertain

to Commercial Port operations.

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2.2 Commercial Port of Guam

Ammonia and chlorine must be imported to Guam, thus

necessitating handling and possit)le storage of these chemicals at

the Commercial Port. The Port of Guam is the only commercial

seaport on Guam and the principal seaport in Micronesia. It is

located at the northeast corner of Apra Harbor. The Commercial Port

is vital to Guam because of the import-dependent nature of the local

economy.

The Commercial Port consists of a total of 32 acres of land area

presently comprising 12 acres of container yard and 2,700 feet of

wharf. The land area will increase substantially if the recently

completed Commercial Port Master Plan (dated September 1980) is
executed.L4 I The facilities at the Commercial Port are best

suited for any handling and transfer of ammonia and chlorine for

OTEC, in comparison to private facilities in the Cabras Industrial

Park area.

Approximately 85% of the Port's total annual volume of 650,000

gross revenue tons is containerized cargo. Crude oil, refined

petroleum products and cement are transferred through privately

maintained facilities in the Cabras Island Industrial Park, adjacent

to the Commercial Port. Figure 2-2 depicts present configuration of

the Commercial Port and surrounding area.

At the present t i me, Guam i s served by eleven regularly

scheduled steamship lines, two in the United States-Guam trade,

seven in inter-regional trade with foreign areas, and three in

intra-regional trade including transhipment with Micronesia.

2.3 Proposed OTEC Plant Site

The prime consideration in siting a land-based OTEC plant is

proximity to cold, deep, ocean water which can be pumped a minimum

distance to the facility. Proximity of the OTEC plant to deep ocean

waters reduces the costs of construction and minimizes the warming

of the cold water prior to its delivery at the plant.

An additional site consideration for an OTEC plant is its need

for an extensive electrical distribution network. Proximity to the

existing power plants will preclude construction of a major

electrical network for the plant.

The requirements for deep ocean water and an electrical

distribution network are both met by the proposed location on Cabras

Island, (see Figure 2-2). Waters 3,000 feet deep occur within a

mile from shore. In addition, the proposed site is adjacent to the

Piti and Cabras power plants which comprise the major electrical

switching center for Guam.

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1he '1980 Master Plan for the Commercial Port and surrounding

area recommends that the land northwest of Cabras Power Plant be

reserveo for the OTEC plant or for an alternative coal storage

site. This area is approximately one mile from the Commercial Port

and adjacent to the power plants.

The focus of this study is on the land-based OTEC plant. Guam

is unique in its proximity to deep ocean water which can be pumped a

short distance to the OTEC plant. Waters 3,000 feet deep occur

close to shore in the vicinity of the glass breakwater.

An alternative to the land-based system is the sea-based OTEC

facility. The OTEC equipment would be contained in a large vessel

commonly called a platform. Several designs have been proposed,

either dynamically positioned or moored. A sea-based facility would

be positioned about 1-1/2 miles off the Glass Breakwater and the

mouth of Apra Harbor.

The considerations and constraints associated with a land-based

OTEC plant would be relevant to a sea-based system. The Commercial

Port would primarily serve a function as a transshipment center and

storage area for anhydrous ammonia and chlorine. Handling

procedures, health hazards, personal protective equipment and such

like would be equally applicable to transshipment operations. The

potential for an accident would be increased somewhat due to the

increased handling of the products.

The initial shipment of ammonia can be delivered directly to the

OTEC platform without any need for Commercial Port handling of the

chemical. Subsequent shipments of make up quantities in containers

would involve the port in handling and storage.

A sea-based plant would necessitate storage of chemical at the

Commercial Port given the limited space on board the platform and

the shipping distances and time frames involved in re-supply from

off-island. The additional space needed cannot be quantified at

this time. If the recommended expansion of the container yard is

undertaken, ample storage area will be available.

A sea-based plant would increase the Commercial Ports handling

and storage of hazardous chemical and would effect the quantity,

mode and frequency of hazardous chemical shipments.

CHAPTER III

QUANTITIES AND PROPERTIES OF AMMONIA

3.1 Required Quantities And Importation of Ammonia

Ammonia has been produced commercially for use in refrigeration

equipment for at least one hundred years. A large and varied

transportation system exists that can move ammonia from producing

plants to the OTEC storage tanks.

Ammonia is stored as a liquid either in-refrigerated tanks at

atmospheric pressure or in unrefrigerated carbon steel pressure

vessels. In order to avoid the operating and maintenance costs

involved with a refrigerated system, the ammonia system for the OTEC

plant includes pressurized storage vessels.

The ammonia storage system for the 50 MWe OTEC plant is

anticipated to consist of fourteen 30,000 gallon pressurized vessels
or a total of 420,000 gallons.[5 I These tanks will be located at

the OTEC plant site. There will be no permanent storage of ammonia

at the Commercial Port. The quantity (420,000 gallons) required to

initially charge the system can be shipped in bulk via barge, small

tanker or break-bulk in containers as described in Chapter V. If

system losses during plant operation prove to be minimal,

replenishment quantities of the chemical could be shipped thereafter

in break-bulk.

There are no 'local producers of anhydrous ammonia on Guam.

Ammonia in the quantities required for OTEC, therefore, must be

imported via shipping vessels. Whether the source of the chemical

is foreign or domestic is immaterial to Commercial Port operations,

provided all Fertinent U.S. regulations governing the

transportation, handling and storage of ammonia are met.

3.2 Properties and Hazards of Ammonia

Although the explosion and fire hazards associated with NH 3
are limited, the health hazards are serious. The objective of this

section is to identify the hazards that will be presented in the

transportation, handling and storage of this chemical.

At atmospheric pressure, liquid ammonia boils at about -280F;

at a vapor pressure of about 108 psia, it boils at 600F. Ammonia

can be in a liquid state when either refrigerated or at ambient

temperature depending upon storage pressure. Ammonia is very

soluble in water, and the dissolution process is exothermic.

Releases of ammonia are harmful for two primary reasons: first, the

vapor is toxic, and second, a solution of ammonia in water (ammonium

hydroxide) is deadly to both flora and fauna.

The major hazard from an ammonia vapor cloud is its toxicity.

Ammonia is an extremely irritating gas, even in relatively small

concentrations. In the case of excessive exposure, deleterious

reactions from anhydrous ammonia occur in the upper respiratory

tract as spasms, inflamation, or edema of the larynx. Fortunately,

the human olfactory system is capable of detecting the presence of

ammonia long before the toxic limit is reached. These hazards and

safety precautions are discussed in Chapter IV.

TABLE 3-1

CHEMICAL AND PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF AMMONIA

Chemical Formula NH3

Molecular Weight 17.03

Boiling Temperature at Atmospheric Pressure, C -2.22 (-28.0 F)

Freezing Temperature at Atmospheric Pressure, C -77.77(-108.0 F)

Critical Temperature, C 1-33.0 (271.4 F)

Critical Density, lb per cu ft 14.6

Density of Liquid at -28.0 F, lb per cu ft 42.56

Specific Volume of Saturated Vapor
at -28.0 F, cu ft per lb 18.00
Specific' Heat of Liquid at 86 F, Btu per (lb) (F) 1.143

Color Clear and
water white

Odor and Detection Irritating, odor, readily
detectable by smell.
Burning sulphur used for
locating leaks.

Flammability Limits (Per cent by volume) 15 to 25

Toxicity, Underwriters' Laboratories Classification Group 2

14A

CHAPTER IV

HAZARDS AND SAFETY PRECAUTIONS FOR AMMONIA

4.1 General

The hazards of ammonia have been well investigated because of

its long use as a refrigerant and agricultural fertilizer.

Anhydrous ammonia possesses the potential to inflict serious

personal injury. A mishap involving ammonia will usually cause the

victim great pain and may well blind him if contact with the

chemical is on the face.

Unuer normal atmospheric conditions, anhydrous ammonia in an

open vessel is always boiling and escaping into the atmosphere. To

prevent its escape, the anhydrous ammonia is stored in pressurized

vessels. Anhydrous ammonia weighs approximately 5 pounds per

gallon. The weight per gallon varies with the pressure and

temperature. It is stored, transported, and otherwise handled as a

liquid under pressure in cylinders and tanks. It may also be stored

under refrigerated conditions.

Upon release into the atmosphere, liquid ammonia vaporizes and

expands rapidly. As vapor it occupies about 850 times its liquid

volume. Liquid ammonia absorbs heat as it vaporizes and expands

into a gas. This property makes ammonia useful as a refrigerant.

Liquid ammonia released suddenly to the atmosphere usually results

in a white cloud of water vapor, which lasts a short time until

aispersed by air currents. This cloud is formed by the condensation

of water vapor in the air surrounding the liquid ammonia.

4.2 Ammonia Vapor Hazards

Ammonia can be released in two fashions. The first is the

release of gas or liquid in a continuous emission over a finite

period of time. The second is the instantaneous or slug release in

which the material is released in a very short period of time, as in

the catastrophic failure of a pressurized container or a pipeline.

The failure of a valve or fitting on a container or pipeline

usually results in a continuous release, and the downwind hazard

prevails as long as the emission continues. When such a failure is

associated with a container, the rate of emission will steadily

decrease as the pressure within the vessel decreases. The rate of

emission from pipeline ruptures will depend on the line size,

pressure, flow rate, line contents (liquid or gas), and the time to

stop the flow. The area affected by a gaseous release is dependent

upon the quantity released, rate of emission, total elapsed time of

emission, atmospheric conditions and the terrain.

Timely evacuation of an area contaminated by an ammonia

discharge may not always be possible. Recommended evacuation

distances are listed in Table 4-1, based on a prevailing wind of

6-12 mph. The safe evacuation distance may not be practical to

TABLE 4-1

EVACUATION TABLE - BASED ON PREVAILING WIND OF 6-12 MPH

Approximate Distat,ce to Evacuate For Maximum Safety
Size of Spill From Immediate Downwind Evacuation
Danger Area Area Should Be

200 square feet 40 yaras (48 paces) 1,056 feet long, 528 feet

400 square feet 60 yards (72 paces) 1,584 feet long, 1,056 feet widle

600 square feet 80 yards (96 paces) 2,112 feet long, 1,056 feet wide

800 square feet 90 yards (108 paces) 2,112 feet long, 1,584 feet wide

In the event of an explosion, the minimum safe distance from flying fragments
is 2,000 feet in all directions.

Source: Emergency Action Guide for Selected Hazardous Materials, 1978.

16A

attain. In such circumstances personnel should remain upwind of

spills or leaks, if possible, or remain indoors with windows shut

until the hazard has passed.

4.3 Personal Protective Equipment

Skin, eye or respiratory contact is not likely to occur except

during nonroutine operations involving accidental release of ammonia

into the atmosphere. The American National Standard Institute

(ANSI) requirements recommend that all storage areas have on hand,

as a minimum, the following equipment for emergency and rescue

purposes

(1) One full face mask with anhydrous ammonia refill canisters

(2) One pair of protective gloves

(3) One pair of protective boots

(4) One protective slicker

(5) Easily accessible shower and/or at least 50 gallons of

clean water in an open container

(6) Tight-fitting vented goggles or one face shield

Gloves, boots, slickers, jackets and pants should be made of

rubber or other material impervious to ammonia.

4.4 Storage Area Precautions

Consideration must be given to the physiological effects of

ammonia as well as to adjacent fire hazards. Storage areas must be

kept free from oxidizers and readily ignitible materials such as

waste and weeds.

Chlorine is incompatible and may react violently with ammonia.

These materials may not be stored immediately adjacent to each other.

4.5 Labeling/Posting

All shipping containers of ammonia must bear the label shown in

Figure 4-1 in addition to, or in combination with, labels required

by other statutes.

The following warning sign should be affixed in a readily

visible location at or near entrances to areas containing anhydrous

ammon i a and in wh i ch there is a reasonable potential for

emergencies. This sign should be printed both in English and in the

predominant languages of non-English-speaking workers. All

employees should be trained and informed of the hazardous areas,

with special instruction given to illiterate workers.

FIGURE 4-1

AMMONIA SHIPPING LABEL

AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS

DANGER! HAZARDOUS LIQUID AND GAS

LIQUID CAUSES BURNS

GAS EXTREMELY IRRITATING

DO NOT BREATHE GAS

DO NOT GET IN EYES, ON SKIN, ON CLOTHING

IN CASE OF EXPOSURE, EVACUATE TO FRESH AIR

IN CASE OF CONTACT, IMMEDIATELY FLUSH

SKIN OR EYES WITH PLENTY OF WATER FOR

AT LEAST 15 MINUTES. GET MEDICAL ATTENTION

AT ONCE IN CASE OF EYE CONTACT OR BURNS

TO THE NOSE OR THROAT, OR IF THE PATIENT IS UNCONSCIOUS.

18A

WARNING!

AMMONIA HAZARD AREA

UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS KEEP OUT

CAUSES BURNS, SEVERE EYE HAZARD

INHALATION OF HIGH CONCENTRATIONS MAY BE FATAL
GAS MASKS LOCATED AT 6

4.6 Fire Hazard

While not considered to be a serious fire or explosion hazard,

ammonia will burn or explode under some conditions, such as a large,

intense source of ignition and a high concentration of ammonia gas.

The presence of iron appreciably decreases the ignition temperature,

and the presence of oil or a mixture of ammonia with other flammable

substances increases the fire hazard. Increasing the oxygen content

of the air or increasing the temperature and pressure of the ammonia

broadens the flammable (explosive) range. Contact with other

chemicals such as mercury, silver oxide, iodine, chlorine halogens,

calcium, and hypochlorite can cause spontaneous explosions due to

chemical reactions.

4.7 Leak Hazard

A leak in an ammonia system can be detected by odor. The

location of the leak may be determined with moist phenolphthalein or

red litmus paper which change color in an ammonia vapor. Another

means of detection is the use of sulfur dioxide, which forms a white

fog in contact with ammonia vapor.

Only personnel trained for and designated to handle emergencies

should attempt to stop a leak. Respiratory equipment of a type

suitable for ammon'a must be worn. All persons not so equipped must

leave the affected area until the leak has been stopped.

If ammonia vapor is released, the irritating effect of the vapor

will force personnel to leave the area long before they have been

exposed to dangerous concentrations. With good ventilation or

rapidly moving air currents, ammonia-vapor, being lighter than air,

can be expected to dissipate readily without further action being

necessary.

4.8 Health Hazards

4.8.1 Warning Properties

At atmospheric temperatures and presures, ammonia is a

pungent and colorless gas and serves as its own warning agent;

special detection meters are not necessary to determine

dangerous concentrations of ammonia vapor. The human nose will

detect ammonia vapor in concentrations far below the injurious

level. The odor is so uncomfortable that personnel will not

voluntarily remain exposed to injurious concentrations. Table

4-2 shows the general physiological effects of selected

concentrations of ammonia.

4.8.2 Severe Exposure

There are a number of well documented cases of severe
exposure to ammoniaJ 7 1 The severity of the symptoms is, of

course, a function of the degree of exposure. Some symptoms

which may be expected if exposure is severe are irritation to

inflammatory processes of the entire respiratory tract,

pulmanary edema, bronchopneumonia, acute skin burns, and eye

injury among others.

4.8.3 Exposure Countermeasures

4.8.3 (a) Inhalation

Exposed persons must be removed at once to an uncontaminated

area. If the exposure has been to minor concentrations for a

limited time, usually no treatment will be required.

When there is severe exposure to higher concentrations, and

if oxygen apparatus is available, oxygen can be administered but

only by a person authorized by a physician. If the patient is not

breathing, an effective means of artificial respiration must be

initiated immediately. Call a physician.

TABLE 4-2

PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF AMMONIA

CONCENTRATION
NH3 VAPOR PERCENT GENERAL EFFECT EXPOSURE PERIOD
(PPM)

50 11200 Odor detectable Prolonged, repeated
by most persons. exposure produces no
injury.

100 1/100 No adverse affects Maximum allowable
for average person concentration for
8-hour working
exposure.

400 4/100 Nose and throat Infrequent short
to irritation. Eye (I hour) exposures
71100 irritation with ordinarily produce
tearing. no serious effect.

2,000 2110 Convulsive cough- No permissible
to to ing; severe eye exposure. May be
3,000 3/10 irritation. fatal after short
exposure.

5,000 112 Respiratory spasm. No exposure permis-
to to Rapid asphyxia. sible. Rapidly fatal.
10,000 1

Source: Operational Safety Manual for Anhydrous Ammonia

21A

The patient should be kept comfortably warm but not too hot

and kept at rest. Never attempt to give anything by mouth to an

unconscious patient.

4.8.3 (b) Taken Internally

If liquid anhydrous ammonia has been swallowed, call a

physician immediately. If the patient is conscious and able, he

should drink large amounts of water to dilute the

chemical. Do not induce vomiting if the patient is in

shock, extreme pain or unconscious. If vomiting begins,

place the patient face down with head lower than hips.

This prevents vomitus from entering the lungs and causing
further injuryJ 8

4.8.3 (c) Contact With The Eyes

While respiratory injuries may be lethal and skin

burns disfiguring, eye injuries constitute the most serious

hazard in regard to permanent disability. Ammonia is one

of the most damaging substances affecting the eyes.

Ammonia is fat-soluble but the key to its rapid penetration

is its extreme solubility in water and its destructiveness

in an alkaline solution. Because of the rapid penetration

of ammonia, even prompt flushing will not remove all of the

chemical. Although complete elimination of the chemical is

hopeless, the degree of injury varies with duration of

exposure; rapid, copious flushing is essential to limiting

damage.

4.8.3 (d) Contact With Skin and Mucous Membranes

Speed in removing ammonia from contact with the

patient and in moving the patient to an uncontaminated

atmosphere is of primary importance. If skin contact is

extensive and emergency showers available the employee

should get under the shower. Flushing with large amounts

of running water should be continued for at least 15

minutes.

Under no condition should salves or ointments be

applied to the skin or mucous membrane burns during the

24-hour period following the injury. Subsequent medical

treatment is otherwise the same as for thermal burns.

4.8.4 Procedures For Obtaining Medical Assistance

Procedures specified below should be formulated in advance

and employees should be instructed and drilled in their

implementation. Procedures should include assignment of

individual and/or team responsibilities and pre-arranged plans

for:

23,

I Immediate evacuation of workers with signs or symptoms of

adverse effects resulting from exposure.

2. Transportation of injured persons to medical facilities.

3. Any neces-lary calls to alert medical facilities of the

impending arrival of injurea persons.

4. Designation of medical receiving facilities and names of

physicians- trained in anhydrous ammonia emergency

procedures.

4.8.5 Suggestions to Physicians

There is no specific treatment for over-exposure or direct

local contact to anhydrous ammonia vapors. Oxygen has been

found useful in the treatment of inhalation exposures of many

chemicals, especially those capable of causing either immediate
or delayed harmful effects in the lungs.19 I

In most exposures, administration of 100% oxygen at

atmospheric pressures has been found to be adequate. This is

best accomplished by use of a face mask with a reservoir bag of

the non-rebreathing type. Inhalation of 100% oxygen should not

exceed one hour of continuous treatment. After each hour

therapy may be interrupted; and it may be reinstituted as the
clinical condition indicates.1101

Some believe that superior results are obtained when

exposures to lung irritants are treated with oxygen under an
exhalation pressure not exceeding 4 cm water.1111 Masks

providing for such exhalation pressures are obtainable. A

single treatment may suffice for minor exposures to irritants.

It is believed by some observers that oxygen under pressure is

useful as an aid in the prevention of pulmonary edema after

breathing irritants.

Caution: It may not be advisable to administer oxygen

under positive pressure in the presence of impending or existing

cardiovascular failure.

4.9 Personnel Safety Training

4.9.1 Informing Employees of Hazards of Ammonia

At the beginning of employment, workers whose jobs may

involve exposure to ammonia should be informed of the hazards,

relevant symptoms of overexposure, appropriate emergency

procedures, and precautions to ensure safe use and to minimize

exposure. First aid procedures should be included, with

emphasis on the importance of prompt, copious irrigation of the

eyes despite the initial lack of pain. The information must be

posted in the workplace and kept on file, readily accessible to

workers at all places of employment where ammonia is involved.

A continuing educational program, conducted by a person or

persons qualified by reason of experience or special training,

must be instituted to ensure that all workers have current

knowledge of job hazards, first-aid procedures, maintenance

procedures and clean up methods, and that they know how to use

respiratory protective equipment and protective clothing.

Retraining should be repeated at least annually.

4.9.2 Training and Drills

Members of emergency teams and employees who will work

adjacent to ammonia systems where a potential for

emergencies due to ammonia exists should be subjected to

periodic drills simulating emergency situations appropriate

to the work situation. These should be held at intervals

not exceeding 6 months. Drills should cover, but not be

limited to, the following:

1. Evacuation procedures;

2. Handling of spills and leaks, including

decontamination and use of emergency repair kits;

3. Location and use of emergency firefighting equipment;

4. Handling of containers in case of fire;

5. First aid and rescue, including procedures for

obtaining medical care;

6. Location, use, and care of protective clothing and

respiratory equipment;

7. Location and use of shut-off valves;

8. Location, reason for, and use of safety showers,

eyewash fountains, and other sources of water for

emercency use;

9. Operating procedures;

10. Entry procedures for confined spaces; and

11. Emergency phone numbers.

CHAPTER V

TRANSPORTATION OF AMMONIA

Anhydrous ammonia can be imported to Guam in bulk, break-bulk,

or a combination of both. The final decision on shipping mode will

aepend upon the rpsults of a detailed cost analysis. Such an

analysis is beyond the scope of this present work. In this study

the influence on Commercial Port operations during receipt and

handling of both bulk and break-bulk shipments are discussed.

5.1 Containerized Break-Bulk Shipment

Break-bulk shipment of ammonia is shipment in tanks mounted on

the chassis of open hopper containers. Tanks transported in this

manner are handled in the same fashion as other containerized cargo

and require no equipment not presently available at the Port. The

Commercial Port is primarily a containerized operation now, with 85%

of the general cargo being containerized.

In a typical unloading scenario, the containers are removed from

the ship by gantry crane, placed on a chassis and taken directly to

the plant site. In the event that the containers cannot be taken

directly to the plant site because of either insufficient chassis or

storage space at the OTEC plant, the Commercial Port container yard

space will have to be reserved. The current Master Plan for the

Commercial Port recommends expansion of the existing container yard

facilities. A temporary storage area must be designated prior to

delivery of a container shipment in event that immediate transfer to

the OTEC plant is delayed. It is anticipated that adequate storage

space will be available at the OTEC plant site for containers.

Portable tanks should be removed from the Commercial Port as

soon as possible. If temporary storage is necessary, the tanks must

be kept away from sources of heat, including direct sunlight, that

could increase the ammonia gas pressure, activating the relief

valve. Care must be taken to prevent mechanical damage to the

container and its appurtenances.

An accident involving a motar vehicle transporting a portable

tank can create a serious hazard. Only persons engaged in the

removal of such a hazard and wreckage should be allowed near the

accident scene. The rescue and salvage operation should be

supervised by competent personnel experienced in han dling ammonia.

Telephone notice of ammonia related accidents must be given by the

carrier to the DOT and followed with a written report. These

requirements are covered by 49 CFR 171.15, 171.16, 177.854 and

177.859. Motor vehicle requirements are discussed in section 5.2.2.

The hazardous chemical transfer route from the Commercial Port

to the OTEC plant is uninhabited with no intersections or transit

trafic. The route is approximately one mile from the Port to the

OTEC plant. (Figure 2-2)

Portable tanks used for transportation of ammonia must comply
with current DOT specifications.L121 This is of concern if the

ammonia is procured from a foreign source. These tanks are designed

to be temporarily attached to a motor vehicle and equipped with

skids, mountings or accessories to facilitate handling of the tank

by mechanical means.

5.2 Bulk Shipment

Anhydrous ammonia can be shipped in bulk quantities via barge or

small tanker. The quantity of ammonia initially required is about

420,000 gallons. Two viable options for transshipment of the

chemical from the port to the OTEC plant site are pipeline or tank

truck.

5.2.1 Ammonia Pipeline

Should a pipeline be installed for transportation of

anhydrous ammonia from the port to the OTEC plant, the most

probable location for the receiving manifold would be in the

area of Wharf F-6, as depicted on Figure 2-2.

The F-6 location at the east end of the Commercial Port, is

close to the proposed OTEC plant site and offers the least

interference with other berthing areas and container yard

activities. In addition, the distance from Wharf F-6 to the

Commercial Port office complex is approximately 2,000 feet and

offers maximum downwind safety in event of a hazardous chemical

spill or leak.

0ther potential receiving areas for, bulk ammonia shipments

are the -Mobil, GORCO and Navy fuel piers. Each of these
facilities are a greater distance than F-6 to 'the proposed OTEC

plant site and offer no advantage over the Commercial Port

location. The existing oil pipelines at these facilities cannot

be used for ammonia transfer.

A fixed piping system from the Commercial Port to the

proposed OTEC' plant site will be about one mile in length.

Fixed piping, either surface or underground, will require a

considerable investment. The system can be expected to be idle

for long periods of time while incurring maintenance costs. Due

to the high concentration of salt spray on Cabras Island,

pipeline maintenance costs are high. An aboveground pipeline

would be subject to vehicle collisions and will require periodic

painting, leak tests, and cathodic protection among other

procedures. Both aboveground and underground pipelines are

subject to earthquake damage.

A thorough engineering study of an ammonia pipeline is

required before a final decision; the pipeline may require

unconventional equipment design and pressure ratings to solve
potential problems.

5.2.1 (a) Pipeline Leaks

The problem of potential leaks is present in any pipeline.

Consequences of a leak and means of minimizing or handling leaks

must be considered in the early stages of design.

Leaks in ammonia handling equipment must be repaired

immediately. Some repairs are simple: valve packing gland

leaks may require only tightening of the nut. Other repairs,

however, require that all ammonia be purged from the system

before attempting to dismantle or repair it. All repairs must

be made in compliance with the code under which the pipe is

fabricated. Only code welding is permitted on pressure vessels,

after completely purging the line with nitrogen or water.

The presence of ammonia leaks is ordinarily obvious from

scent; the nose detects ammonia fumes in minute quantities.

Locating leaks, however, will often require special equipment

and procedures. One method of testing uses moistened strips of

red litmus paper which turn blue in the presence of ammonia;

another uses sulfer dioxide, which forms a white fog in contact

with ammonia vapor.

b.2.1 (b) kouting

Special care must be given to design criteria for long

pipelines due to the amount of ammonia which they may contain.

Also, the potential liability to the owner and/or operator of a

pipeline in event of leaks must be considered. Any above ground

line is subject to the hazards of fire; the route should be

cleared of grass, brush, and other combustible materials.

5.2.1 (c) Government Regulations

Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, Chapter 1, Parts

190-192 and 195 govern the transportation of gas by pipeline;

subparts included cover "Accident Reporting", "Design

Requirements", "Construction", and "Operation and Maintenance".

5.2.1 (d) Design

Moist ammonia corrodes copper, zinc and their alloys. Iron

and steel are, therefore, ordinarily used in piping and

fittings. Extra heavy steel (Schedule 80) is preferable for

ammonia pipeline and welded, not threaded, joints must be used.

Only all steel pressure gages must be used. Furthermore, any

pumps or compressors used for ammonia must be expressly

recommended and labeled for that purpose by the manufacturer.

Buried pipelines must be protected by a suitable cathodic

protection system.

5.2.1 (e) Installation

Pipelines may be installed above or below ground. The

entire system should be evaluated to determine the preferred

installation. For monitoring purposes, the above ground system

is preferred. An above ground installation must be designed so

as to preclude damage by vehicles.

If an ammonia ]in e is run in a pipe rack where it shares

space with other pipelines carrying flammable materials, the

ammonia line should be protected from fire resulting from a leak

or break in one of the other lines. Such protection can be

achieved through: (1), adequate physical separation of the

line; (2), erection of a steel barrier between lines; or (3),

proper insulation of the line with a fire-resistant material.

Above ground or buried pipelines must be suitably marked at

intervals of not over 200 feet. Permanent metal signs are

recommended. Recommended wording for liquid lines is:

"Liquified Gas Under Pressure--Ammonia". In addition, the name

and telephone number of the operator must be shown.

5.2.2 Tank Trucks

A barge or small tanker could unload ammonia into tank

trucks designed specifically for that chemical. The maximum

tank capacity is restricted by highway weight load limits

(76,000 lbs.). Two 8,000 gallon capacity tank trucks can

transfer 420,000 gallons of ammonia from a barge or small tanker

to the proposed OTEC plant site in approximately 30 hours. The

U.S. Coast Guard has required minor improvements to Route 11

prior to authorizing transshipment of explosives by truck.

maintenance and repair work (fixing pot holes, soft shoulders

etc.) can be required prior to transshipment if deemed necess,ary

by the Coast Guard.

5.2.2 (a) Trailers and Semitrailer Requirements

Trailers must be firmly and securely attached to their

tractors by means of suitable drawbars, supplemented by suitable

safety chain or safety cables.

Every trailer or semi-trailer must be equipped wit h a n

emergency braking system to be activated in the event of a hitch

failure.

5.2.2 (b) Protection Against Collision

Each tank motor vehicle must be provided with properly

attached bumpers or chassis extensions to protect the tank,

piping, valves and fittings from physical damage in case of

minor collision.

5.2.2 (c) Safety Equipment

All tank trucks, trailers and semi-trailers must be

equipped with the following equipment for emergency and rescue
purposes:[13]

One full face mask with anhydrous ammonia refill canisters.

One pair of protective gloves made of rubber or other material

impervious to ammonia.

Tight-fitting goggles or one full face shield.

A container of not less than five gallons of readily available

clean water.

Additionally, special markings indicating the special

characteristics of the ammonia cargo must be displayed on the

vehicle in accordance with Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations.

CHAPTER VI

QUANTITIES AND PROPERTIES OF CHLORINE

6.1 Required Quantities and Importation of C12

A chlorination system is provided in plant design to control

biofouling of heat transfer and hydraulic systems. Prevention of

biofouling is an important consideration for maximizing heat

transfer rates. Biofouling is caused by development and deposition

of micro-organisms and marine growth on surfaces in contact with

seawater. Although chlorination has been selected as the primary

method to control biofouling, a supplemental system may be

incorporated if data at the time of installation indicates that
chlorination is not sufficient to control biofouling.[141

Chlorine can be generated on-site, in the form of hypochlorite,

by passing a direct current through seawater:

Na Cl + H20 + Electric Current ==> NaOCl + H2

The chlorine dosage is expected to be 0.25 ppm into the evaporator
seawater and 0.1 ppm into condenser seawater.[151 This amounts to
approximately 11,700 lbs. of chlorine per day.[1611171 Although

not specifically stated in the preliminary design studies, the plant

is expected to be able to produce its total daily chlorine needs

while in operation.

The total cost and effectiveness of alternate fouling control

methods will ultimately determine the system chosen to,7Qontrol
biofouling. These costs include capital, installation, operating,

maintenance, and parasitic power requirements. Chlorine can be

added in the form of gaseous chlorine, concentrated hypochloride or

on-site electrolytically generated dilute hypochlorite. The latter

method of on-site generation is preferred at present for reasons of

cost, safety and equipment availability.

Effective biofouling control will be required from the first day
of flooding the system.1181 In addition, yearly maintenance

schedules will require plant shutdown for approximately two weeks.

During these periods on-site generated chlorine will not be

available. Therefore, for the purposes of Commercial Port planning,

limited importation of chlorine should be assumed.

6.2 Properties and Hazards of Chlorine

The properties of chlorine (in the form of hypochlorite)

applicable to OTEC are its effectiveness in deterring marine

biofouling. In addition this chemical can be electrolytically

generated on-site realizing savings in procurement and

transportation.

Chlorine is a chemical element. Neither its gas nor liquid

state is explosive or flammable; however, both react chemically with

many substances. Chlorine is only slightly soluble in water. The

gas has a characteristic odor and greenish yellow color and is about

two and one-half times as heavy as air. Thus, if it escapes from a

container or system, it will seek the lowest adjacent level. Liquid

chlorine is transparent, amber in color and is about one and

one-half times as heavy as water. At atmospheric pressure, it boils
at about 150OF and freezes at about -300F. One volume of liquid

chlorine, when vaporized, will yield about 460 volumes of gas.

Chlorine is very reactive when moisture is present.

Chlorine is classified as nonflammable and nonexplosive. The

major hazard associated with chlorine is toxicity. Some symtoms

from severe exposure are pulmanary congestion, difficult or labored

breathing, burning of the eyes, throat, skin or nasal passages,

choking, nausea, and vomiting. Hazards and safety considerations

associated with Cl 2 are discussed in Chapter VII.

TABLE 6-1

CHEMICAL AND PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF CHLORINE

Molecular weight 70.906 g/mole

Vapor pressure, 21 C 6.0 kg/sq cm gage
(85.3 psig)

Specific volume, 21 C, I atm 0.34 liters/g

Boiling point, I atm -34 C

Freezing point (bp), I atm -101 C

Specific gravity of gas at 0 C,
I atm (air = 1) 2.49

Specific gravity of liquid at 20 C 1.41

Density of gas at 0 C, I atin 3.214 g/liter

Density of liquid at 0 C, 3.65 atm 1468 g/liter

Critical temperature 144 C

Critical pressure 78.64 kg/sq cm
absolute (76.1 atm)

Latent heat of vaporization at bp 68.8 calories/g

Solubility in water at 20 C, I atm 7.30 g/liter

Color of gas Yellowish green

Color, of liquid Clear amber

Flammability Nonflammable

Reactivity Highly reactive

Odor Disagreeable, strong,
suffocating, pungent,
irritating,
characteristic

39A

CHAPTER VII

HAZARDS AND SAFETY PRECAUTIONS FOR CHLORINE

7.1 General

Chlorine gas is primarily a h@azardous respiratory irritant. It

is so intensely irritating that very low concentrations in the air

are readily detectable. In higher concentrations the severely

irritating effect of the gas makes it unlikely that any person would

remain in a chlorine contaminated atmosphere unless he is

unconscious or trapped.

When a sufficient concentration of chlorine gas is present, it

will irritate the mucous membranes, the respiratory system and the

skin. Large amounts cause irritation of eyes, coughing and labored

breathing. If the duration of exposure or the concentration of

chlorine is excessive, general excitement of the person affected

results, accompanied by restlessness, throat irritation, sneezing

and copious salivation. Additional symptoms of exposure to high

concentrations are retching and vomiting, followed by difficult

breathing. In extreme cases, the difficulty of breathing may

increase to the point where death can occur from suffocation.

7.2 Chlorine Vapor Hazards

A hazardous chemical can be released in two fashions. the first

is the release of gas or liquid in a continuous emission over a

finite peri,od, of time. The second is the instantaneous or slug

release in which t.ie material is released in a very short period of

time, as in the failure of a pressurized container.

The failure of a valve or fitting on a container usually results

in a continuous release, and the downwind hazard continues as long

as the emission continues. When such a failure is associated with a

container, the rate of emission will steadily decrease as the

pressure within the vessel decreases. The area affected by -@a

gaseous release is dependent upon the quantity released, the rate of

emission, the total elapsed time of emission, the atmospheric

conditions and the terrain.

The timely evacuation of a contaminated area by chlorine

discharge may not always be possible. Furthermore, the safe

evacuation distance may not always be practical to attain. In such

circumstances, personnel should remain upwind of spills or cleaks if

possible or remain indoors until the hazard has elapsed,.

7.3 Personal Protective Equipment

Normal work clothing will provide all the protection that is

required for the period of time it takes to escape from an

emergency. Skin, eye or respiratory contact is not likely to occur

except during nonr3utine operations involving accidental release of

chlorine into the dtmosphere. Protective clothing should never be

required under routine operating conditions. When an emergency

occurs, the personnel in the area would be expected to escape from

the hazard without special protective clothing.

Possible exposure to chlorine gas in the performance of

essential duties ot rescue, fire and emergency repair crews will

necessitate availability of rubber clothing, including boots and

hoods in combination with some form of life support system. When

such is used, it is essential that it be used by persons who have

been specifically and recently trained in the use and limitations of

such equipment.

7.4 Storage Area Precautions

Chlorine should be stored in adequately ventilated unoccupied

warehouses or outdoors shielded from the direct rays of the sun,

unless the containers are properly insulated and designed for

unshaded outdoor storage. Consideration must be given to the

physiological effects of chlorine as well as to adjacent fire

hazards. Storage areas must be kept free from oxidizers and readily

ignitable materials such as waste and weeds.

Gaseous chlorine is about 2.5 times as heavy as air.119 I

Therefore, in the absence of air currents, leaking chlorine tends to

accumulate in low spots. Storage areas must be planned and occupied

with this chlorine property in mind.

If indoor storage areas are utilized, at least two exits, remote

from each other and opening outward of the building, must be

provided for all chlorine storage rooms.

Chlorine is incompatible and may react violently with ammonia.

These materials may not be stored immediately adjacent to each

other. It is not anticipated that chlorine will be stored at the

Commercial Port for any significant length of time. Other

incompatible materials which can react violently with chlorine are

hydrogen, acetylene, fuel gases, ether, turpentine, most

hydrocarbons, finely divided metals and organic matter. These

materials must not be stored immediately adjacent to chlorine. The

degree of separation required will be dictated by quantities stored

and the type of storage facility.

Containers of chlorine should be used on a first-in-first-out

(FIFO) basis because valve packings may harden during prolonged

storage and cause leaks when containers are finally used.

7.5 Labeling/Posting

All shipping containers of chlorine must bear the following

label shown in Figure 7-1 or in combination with, labels required by
other statutes.[20J

The warning sign should be affixed in a readily visible location

at or near entrances to areas in which chlorine is present in

containers or systems. This sign should be printed both in English

and in the predominant languages of non-English-speaking workers.

All employees must be trained and informed of the hazardous areas,

with special instruction given to illiterate workers.

7.6 Container Handling Procedures

It is illegal to ship a leaking chlorine container or one

partially or fully loaded which has been exposed to fire. The Coast

Guard and the manufacturer must be consulted for advice under such
circumstances.[21]

If a ton container or its valves are found out of order, the

nearest distributor from whom the chlorine was purchased must be

notified, giving the container number and the nature of the damage.

Containers are carefully inspected before shipping, but rough

handling in transit may damage containers and their valves.

FIGURE 7-1

CHLORINE SHIPPING LABEL

CHLORINE

DANGER! HAZARDOUS GAS OR LIQUID UNDER PRESSURE

EXTREMELY IRRITATING

MAY BE FATAL IF INHALED

CAUSES BURNS

SEVERE EYE HAZARD

Do not breathe gas; use only with adequate

ventilation. In case of inhalation, remove to

uncontaminated atmosphere, get medical attention

immediately. If breathing has stopped, start

artificial respiration. Do not get in eyes, on

skin, or on clothing. In case of contact,

immediately flush skin or eyes with plenty of water

for a least 15 minutes, and get medical attention

immediately.

44A

A I Ichlorine containers must be handled with extreme care.

Containers cannot be allowed to drop or strike any object with

force. Heat should never be applied to containers or their valves.

Containers or their valves should never be altered or repaired.

Leaks around valve stems can usually be corrected by tightening

the packing nut in a clockwise direction. All threads on chlorine

valves are right hand threads.

Containers should never be presumed to be empty and therefore

non hazardous.

7.7 Trailer and Semitrailer Requirements

Every trailer or semi-trailer must be equipped with an emergency

braking system to be activated in event of a hitch failure.

Each tank motor vehicle must be provided with properly attached

bumpers or chassis extensions arranged to protect the tank, piping,

valves and fittings from physical damage in case of minor collision.

DOT regulations specify that as a minimum a gas mask approved

for chlorine must be on each chlorine motor vehicle. Although these

regulations pertain to tank trucks specifically designed for that

chemical, compliance with the regulation for trailers and

semitrailers would be advisable for obvious safety reasons.

7.8 Fire Hazard

Chlorine is classified as nonf I ammab 1 e and nonexplosive.
However, it will support combustion of certain materials[221 5

reacting explosively in some cases. At elevated temperatures, it

reacts vigorously with most metals. Carbon steel, for example,
ignites in an atmosphere of chlorine at (250QC) 4830F. It is

important that precautionary measures be taken to prevent chlorine

from coming into contact with materials with which it may react.

In case of fire, chlorine containers must be removed to a safe

place or cooled with water if leaks do not exist. Water cooling

must not be used at chlorine leaks because the water forms

hydrochloric acid and accelerates corrosion, enlarging the leak.
Fusible plugs in chlorine containers melt at 158-1640F, every

effort should be made to prevent containers from reaching this

temperature.

The Chlorine Institute recommends that: (1) firefighters

approach chlorine emergencies from an upwind direction while wearing

full protective clothing including self-contained breathing

apparatus, (2) only personnel required to remedy the problem should

enter the contaminated area; (3) for safety, firefighters should

work in pairs; and (4) as an added precaution a lifeline should be

attached to each firefighter.

7.9 Leak Hazard

As soon as the presence of chlorine in the air becomes apparent,

the condition must be corrected. Chlorine leaks rapidly become

worse if not corrected immediately.

When a chlorin,-:@ leak is discovered, all persons should stay

upwind of the leak and at a higher level. Only trained personnel

equipped with gas masks should be perm itted to attempt repairs on

leaking chlorine equipment. All persons. not properly equipped with

gas masks must be prohibited from the contaminated area.

Nonessential employees should be evacuated from exposure areas

during emergencies. Perimeters of areas of hazardous' exposure must

be delineated, posted and secured. Only personnel who have

appropriate training and who are adequately protected against the

attendant hazards should take appropriate control action: e.g. leak

isolation and repair, cleanup of spills, etc.

If a chlorine container is leaking, it should be shifted so that

gaseous rather than liquid chlorine will escape. A much smaller

amount of chlorine will be dissipated into the atmosphere if gaseous

rather than liquid chlorine is leaking. The removal of gaseous

chlorine from a container tends to lower the temperature of the

remaining chlorine, consequently, the pressure in the container is

reduced.

Chlorine leaks can be conveniently located by holding an open

bottle of strong aqueous ammonia near the suspected area, preferably

at a slightly lower level. The formation of dense white fumes will

indicate the point of leakage.

Standardized kits for control of leaks are available. The

Chlorine Insitute maintains current listings 9f the locations of
these kits.[231 The Chlorine Institute should be contacted for

the nearest location if emergency kits are not available locally.

These kits operate on the principle of capping off leaking valves or

sealing off a rupture in the side wall. It should be noted,

however, that the use of leak kits requires some training prior to

use in an emergency situation.

Studies by the Bureau of Mines[24] indicate that pinhole leaks

in chlorine containers are rapidly enlarged by corrosion if moisture

is present. Furthermore, the control of chlorine leaks or spills by

the use of water is not effective because of the limited solubility

of chlorine in water. Even the coldest water will supply sufficient

heat to cause an increase in the evaporation rate of chlorine.

Therefore, water must never be used on leaking containers of

chlorine or to control spills.

A safe method of absorbing the contents of leaking chlorine

cylinders or ton containers should be provided. Caustic soda

solutions furnish a convenient and cheap means of chlorine

disposal. Suitable containers and sufficient caustic soda to absorb

the contents of at least one full container should be available if

chlorine is to be stored at the Commercial Port.

7.10 Health Hazards

7.10 (a) Warning Properties

The readily identifiable odor of chlorine and the attendant

disagreeable reactions are the most common means by which

workers are warned of impending excessive exposure. However,

determinations of the threshold of odor have given varying

results. The variation of these results probably reflects

differences in methods of determination, and possibly
differences in the development of odor adaptation.[25] While

a noticeable odor of chlorine may indicate a potentially

hazardous exposure, it should not be relied on as a quantitative

indication.

7.10 (b) Severe Exposures

The dramatic response to substantial exposure is well

documented. Chlorine was used as a war gas during WWI and a

number of industrial accidents have been carefully recorded.

The severity of the symptoms is, of course, a function of the

degree of exposure. Some symtoms of severe exposure are severe

pulmonary congestion, difficult or labored breathing, burning of

the eyes, throat, or nasal passages, choking, nausea, vomiting,

anxiety and brief loss of consciousness.

7.10 (c) Exposure Countermeasures

7.10 (c)(1) General

Prompt treatment is essential. Immediately remove the

patient to an uncontaminated area. Liquid chlorine and

chlorinated water destroy clothing; and if such clothing is

next to the skin it will cause irritation and acid burns.

In such cases, remove contaminated clothing and wash

contaminated body parts.

7.10 (c)(2) Gas Inhalation

If breathing has ceased, commence artificial

respiration immediately and administer oxygen as soon as

possible. If breathing has not ceased, place the patient

in a comfortable position and administer oxygen as soon as

possible. Keep the patient warm, at rest and render other

necessary first aid.

A carbon dioxide and oxygen mixture, not to exceed

seven percent of carbon dioxide, can be given. This

mixture, ready prepared and sold with the necessary

apparatus, can be administered intermittently for periods

of two minutes followed by two-minute rest periods over a

total period not to exceed thirty minutes. Instructions of

the purveyor of the gas apparatus should be carefully

obeyed. If carbon dioxide and oxygen mixture is not
readily available, oxygen alone can be used.[26][271

7.10 (c)(3) Chlorine Eye Contact

Flush the eyes immediately with copious amounts of

running water for 15 minutes. The eyelids must be forcibly

held open to ensure complete irrigation of all eye and lid

tissues. Chemical neutralization of any kind should not be

attempted.

7.10 (c)(4) Chlorine Skin Contact

Wash well with copious amounts of soap and water.

Greases or salves should not be applied unless ordered by a

physician.

7.10 (d) Procedures For Obtaining Medical Assistance

The following procedures should be formulated in advance

and employees should be instructed and drilled in their

implementation. Procedures should include assignment of

individual or team responsibilities and pre-arranged plans for:

I Immediate evacuation of workers with signs or symptoms

of adverse effects resulting from exposure.

2. Transportation of injured persons to medical

facilities.

3. Any necessary calls to alert medical facilities of the

impending arrival of injured persons.

4. Designation of medical receiving facilities and names

of physicians trained in anhydrous ammonia emergency

procedures.

7.11 Personnel Safety Training

7.11 (a) Informing Employees of Hazards of Chlorine

At the beginning of employment, workers whose jobs may

involve exposure to chlorine must be informed of the hazards,

signs, symptoms and effects of overexposure, emergency

procedures, and precautions to take to ensure safe use of

chlorine and to minimize exposure to chlorine. Information

pertaining to first-aid procedures should be included. The

information must be posted in the workplace and kept on file,

readily accessible to workers at all places of employment where

chlorine is involved.

A continuing educational program, conducted by a person or

persons qualified by reason of experience or special training,

must be instituted to ensure that all workers have current

knowledge of job hazards, first-aid procedures, maintenance

procedures and cleanup methods, and that they know how to use

respiratory protective equipment and protective clothing.

Retraining should be repeated at least annually.

7.11 (b) Training and Drills

The value of drills and training in handlin g emergencies

and in using equipment for personal protection and control of

escaping chlorine is emphasized in professional literature about

the management of chlorine accidents. National Institute for

Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) reported a chlorine spill

caused by a rail car which discharged chlorine following a

collision. A total of 55 tons of chlorine could have been

released into the atmosphere; however, only a few tons escaped

because of quick action by employees and supervisory personnel.

The quick action was credited to rigorous and thorough training
and drills.L28]

Members of emergency teams and employees who will work

adjacent to chlorine systems or containers should be subjected

to periodic drills simulating emergency situations appropriate

to the work situation. These should be held at intervals not

exceeding 6 months. Drills should cover, but should not be

limited to, the following:

1. Evacuation procedures;

2. Handling of spills and leaks, including

decontamination and use of emergency repair kits;

3. Location and use of emergency firefighting

equipment;

4. Handling of containers in case of fire;

5. First aid and rescue, including procedures for

obtaining medical care;

6. Location, use, and care of protective clothing

and respiratory equipment;

7. Location and use of shut-off valves;

8. Location, reason for, and use of safety showers,

eyewash fountains, and other sources of water for

emergency use;

9. Operating procedures;

10. Entry procedures for confined spaces; and

11. Emergency phone numbers.

Deficiencies noted during the drill should form the basis

for a continuing educational program to ensure that all workers

have current knowledge. Records of drills and training

conducted should be established.

TABLE 7-1

EVACUATION TABLE - BASED ON PREVAILING WIND OF 6-12 MPS

Approximate Distance to Evacuate For Maximum Safety
Size of Spill From Immediate Downwind Evacuation
Danger Area Area Should Be

200 square feet 160 yards (192 paces) I mile long, 112 mile wide

400 square feet 240 yards (288 paces) 1-112 miles long, 1 mile wide

600 square feet 300 yards (360 paces) 1-112 miles long, 1 mile wide

800 square feet 340 yards (408 paces) 2,112, feet long, 1,584 feet wide

In the event of an explosion, the minimum safe distance from flying fragments
is 2,000 feet in all directions.

Source: Emergency Action Guide for Selected Hazardous Materials, 1978

54A

CHAPTER VIII

TRANSPORTAlION OF CHLORINE

Chlorine is shipped as a liquid under pressure in steel

containers conforming to federal Department of Transportation

specifications. The transportation system needed to move chlorine

from the supplier to the OTEC storage tanks requires no new

technology.

Chlorine can be shipped in bulk, break-bulk or a combination of

both. How the product is finally shipped will be dependent upon a

detailed cost comparison of various modes of shipment which are

feasible for this product and determination of the additional

quantity of chemical needed by the plant during periodic shut down

for maintenance. These quantities will be determined during the

preliminary design and engineering stages of the OTEC plant.

8.1 Break-bulk Shipment

Break-bulk shipment of chlorine is shipment in tanks mounted on

the chassis of open hopper or closed containers. Tanks transported

in this fashion are handled the same as other containerized cargo

and require no equipment not presently available at the Port. The

Commercial Port is primarily a containerized operation, 85% of

general cargo being containerized.

In a typical unloading scenario, the containers are removed from

the ship by gantry crane, placed on a chassis and taken directly to

the plant site. In event that the containers cannot be taken

directly to the plant site because of either insufficient chassis or

lack of storage space at the OTEC plant, Commercial Port container

yard space will have to be reserved. The current Master Plan for

the Commercial Port recommends expansion of the existing container

yard facilities. A temporary storage area must be designated and

reserved prior to delivery of a container shipment in event that

immediate transfer to the OTEC plant site is delayed. It is

anticipated that adequate storage space will be available at the

OTEC plant for shipping containers.

8.2 Ton Containers

Limited quantities of chlorine needed to service the plant

during shut down periods could be imported utilizing one-ton

containers. Ton containers for 'liquid chlorine are of steel

construction. They are fitted with valves of a type approved by the

Chlorine Institute and which comply with the specifications and

regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

The average ton container is about 30 inches outside diameter

and about 82 inches in length. Average tare weight is about 1,500

pounds and average gross weight is about 3,500 pounds, leaving 2,000

pounds net weight.

Each end of a ton container is concave, the sides being crimped

inward over the ends to form chimes that provide suitable grips for

hooks which are used in handling the ton containers. A ton

container is equipped with two valves, both of which are located in

the same end, near the Q,enter. The valves are connected to eduction

pipes. With the container placed so that the two valves are in

vertical alignment, the lower valve will deliver liquid chlorine

from above the liquid level.

There are six fusible metal plugs, three at each end, of a ton

container. The fusible metal in these plugs melts at about
1580F.[291 This safety device is designed to protect the ton

container against excessive pressure, caused by high temperatures,

through melting and allowing the contents of the container to

escape. The fusible metal plugs should not be tampered with under

any circumstances.

The container number, dates of hydrostatic tests and capacity

are stamped in the metal of an unpainted portion of chime at the

valve end of each ton container. The tare weight of each ton

container is stenciled on the end opposite the valves.

Portable tanks should be removed from the Commercial Port as

soon as possible. If temporary storage is necessary, the tanks

should be kept away from sources of heat that could increase the

pressure causing the relief valve to open. The safety plug protects

the chlorine cylinder against excessive pressure, caused by high

temperatures, through melting and allowing the contents of the

cylinder to escape. As with any cylinder, care must be taken to

prevent mechanical damage to the container or its appurtenances.

CHAPTER IX

GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY AND REGULATIONS

FOR HANDLING AMMONIA AND CHLORINE

Federal government regulations governing the transportation,

handling and storage of ammonia and chlorine are divided among three

agencies: the U.S. Coast Guard, the Environmental Protection Agency

and The Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The U.S.

Coast Guard has the greatest influence on the Commercial Port

operations due to its wide range of authority in the shipping,

handling, storage, safety and environmental areas pertinent to

waterfront facilities and vessels. The EPA and OSHA Regulations

influence Commercial Port operations to a much lesser degree.

9.1 U.S. Coast Guard

The U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office (MSO), located in the

Commercial Port office complex, is responsible for enforcing federal

laws and regulations for ports, waterways, port facilities as well

as for protecting vessels, persons, and property in the vicinity o,f

the ports from accidental or intentional destruction, damage, loss

or injury.

The District Commander, as principal agent and representative of

the Commandant of the Coast Guard, is responsible for the command

and support of MSO Guam. This office, located in Honolulu, also

performs an appellate review role.

The Commandant, located in Washington, D.C., directs the policy

and administration of the Coast Guard, and its implementation of

legislation, under the general supervision of the Secretary of

Transporation. In these matters he is assisted by a staff of

management and technical assistants who serve as principal advisors.

9.1.1 Statutory Authority

The following statutes are sufficient to point out the

Coast Guard's very broad, and sometimes overlapping, authority

to promote safety and protect the marine environment in the

transportation and handling of hazardous substances.

9.1.1 (a) Title 33 CFR 6.12 "Supervision and Control of

Explosives or Other Dangerous Cargo" gives the Coast Guard

authority to designate waterfront facilities for the

handling, storage, and vessel loading and discharging of

explosives, flammable or combustible liquids in bulk, or

other dangerous articles. Authority to require permits for

such handling, storage, loading and unloading is also

provided.

9.1.1 (b) Title 33 CFR 6.14 "Security of Waterfront

Facilities and Vessels in Port" authorizes the Coast Guard

to prescribe conditions and restrictions relating to the

safety of waterfront facilities and vessels in port as

deemed to be necessary under existing circumstances.

9.1.1 (c)-313 U.S.C. 1221 et seq "The Ports and Waterways

Safety Act of 1972". This Act promotes the safety and

environmental quality of ports, harbors, waterfront areas,

and navigable waters of the ,United States. The Secretary

of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating has

been given broad authority to take necessary action to

prevent damage to, or the destruction or loss of, any

vessel, bridge, or other structure on or in the navigable

waters of the United States, or any land structure on shore

area immediately adjacent to those waters; and to protect

the navigable waters and resources therein from

environmental harm resulting from vessel or structural

damage, destruction, or loss.

9.1.1 (d) FWPCA 33 U.S.C. 1321. Section 311 of the

"Federal Water Pollution Control Act" established United

States policy that there shall be no discharges of oil or

hazardous substances in harmful quantities into or upon the

navigable waters of the United States or adjoining

shorelines. The Coast Guard has been designated with

responsibility for enforcing federal laws on Guam with

regard to oil and hazardous substances entering marine

areas.

9.1.1. (e) Executive Order 11735. This order delegates the

following facility inspection-related functions of the

FWPCA to the Coast Guard: "... the establishment of

procedures, methods, and equipment and other requirements

for equipment to prevent discharges of oil and hazardous

substances from vessels and transportation-related onshore

and offshore facilities, and to contain such discharges."

9-.1.2 Local Coast Guard Requirements

Designated dangerous cargo may be handled, loaded,

discharged or transported at any-designated waterfront facility

only if a permit has been issued by the Coast Guard. The permit

will terminate automatically at the conclusion of the operation

and also may be terminated or suspended whenever the Coast Guard

deems that the security or safety of the port, vessels, or

waterfront facilities is jeopardized. The Coast Guard may

require additional constraints in th e permit other than those

found in 33 CFR Part 126.

The following are two lists of possible additional

requirements for vessels and facilities which may be required by

the local Coast Guard Marine Safety office to reduce risks of

hazardous materials incidents within the port area:

9.1.2 (a) Possible Vessels, Requirements

Require the vessel to anchor and be inspected prior to

permitting transit or commencing transfer.

Provide an escort vessel.

Require tugs to be in attendance while the vessel is

transiting the port area or port complex.

Establish a moving safety/security zone around the vessel

during transit.

Restrict vessel entry and movement to periods of good

visibility.

Require communications to be constantly maintained between

the vessel and the escort vessel(s) including towing

vessel(s).

Specify exact transit times permitted.

Require a report prior to entry, that all hazardous

material cargo alarms, safety devices, and shut-down

devices have been tested by the ship personnel and are in

good working order.

9-.1.2 (b) Possible Facility Requirements

Require a pre-transfer conference between ship and terminal

personnel.

Require effective communications during cargo transfer.

Require test of terminal alarm devices and emergency

shutdown prior to commencing transfer operations.

Prohibit other cargo operations during transfer operations.

Prohibit welding, burning, hot-work, smoking, open lights,

etc., while the vessel is moored at the terminal.

Prohibit bunkering during cargo transfer operations.

Require facility operator to post guards and restrict

access to those personnel who are essential to the

operation.

Establish a safety/security zone in the area where the

vessel is moored.

Require facility owners to furnish equipment and resources

to patrol the safety/security zones.

Require the facility to provide or make available,

additional firefighting equipment and personnel to operate

it.

9.1.3 Facility of Particular Hazard

A "facility of particular hazard" is defined in 33 CFR

126.05 (b). The Commercial Port would be designated a "facility

of particular hazard" by the U.S. Coast Guard upon authorization

to handle a cargo of particular hazard in bulk such as anhydrous

ammonia or chlorine. The basic requirements or conditions which

must be met are the same as for a "designated waterfront

facility", which the Commercial Port now meets, plus the

requirement to have a warning alarm and light.

9.2 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) office for

the Pacific Islands is located in San Francisco. There are no

USEPA offices on Guam. The Guam Environmental Protection Agency

(GEPA) has been designated by the USEPA to enforce selected

USEPA regulations on island. In addition, GEPA administers

local laws and regulations.

The federal responsibility for pollution prevention is

divided between the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency. The USEPA responsibility includes all

facilities, both onshore and within the territorial sea limits

(within three miles), that are not transportation-related.

Included in this definition of "non-transportation-related"

facilities are those facilities that drill, produce, gather,

store, process, refine, transfer, distribute or consume oil and

hazardous substances. USEPA regulations on determination of

reportable quantities for hazardous substances (40 CFR 117) sets

forth reportable quantities for hazardous substances when

discharged into or upon the navigable waters of the United

States or adjoining shorelines. The minimum reportable quantity

for an ammonia spill is 100 lbs. (approximately 20 gals.) The

minimum reportable quantity for a chlorine spill is 10 lbs.
(approximately one gallon). 1301

Facility owners and/or operators are subject to a fine of

not more than $10,000 for failure to notify the United States

Government of the prohibited discharge.

The owner, operator, or person in charge of a vessel or

onshore facility from which is discharged a minimum reportable

quantity of a hazardous substance is subject to a civil penalty

of not more than $5,000.

The owner, operator or p erson in charge will be liable to

the United States Government for the actual cost incurred in the

removal of a hazardous substance discharged into local waters.

It is very unlikely that removal or cleanup operations would be

initiated with respect to ammonia or chlorine due to their

solubility in sea water.

The USEPA has no legal authority over the transportation

storage, and handling of ammonia or chlorine.

9.3 Occupational Safety and Health Administration

The Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of

1970 sets forth a wide range of standards which require

conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices,

means, methods, operations or processes, to provide safe and

healthful working conditions. The U.S. Department of Labor has

primary responsibility for administering the act.

OSHA regulations are applicable to the Commercial Port and

are enforced on island by the Guam Department of Labor in the

absence of a federal OSHA office. The Commercial Port is

subject to numerous regulations in 29 CFR Part 1910. This study

will only consider additional constraints which can be imposed

upon the Commercial Port for storage and handling of anhydrous

ammonia or chlorine (29 CFR Part 1910.111).

OSHA reguldtions regarding permanent storage areas are not

of concern to the Commercial Port. Since permanent anhydrous

ammonia storage containers will be located on the OTEC plant

site, portable containers, used to transport ammonia, would be

stored at the Port on a temporary basis only.

If anhydrous ammonia is obtained from a U.S. supplier and

shipped on U.S. Flag vessels, containers will meet or exceed

OSHA requ irements. U.S. Coast Guard regulations regarding

standards for portable containers are stringent and U.S.

manufacturers of ammonia utilize containers which meet

nationally recognized standards for such equipment set forth in

OSHA and Coast Guard regulations.

There are no additional OSHA constraints addressed

specifically to the handling or transportation of chlorine.

OSHA regulations pertaining to full trailers and

semitrailers that serve the Port are discussed in section 5.2.2

of this study.

CHAPTER X

SUMMARY OF TASKS

10.1 Determine Mode and Frequency of Hazardous Chemical Shipments

The ammonia system for a 50 MWe OTEC plant will require an

initial shipment of approximately 420,000 gallons of ammonia. The

initial shipment can be shipped in container or in bulk quantiti'es.

If make- up quantities needed thereafter are minimal, containerized

shipments will be feasible.

The quantity, mode and frequency of shipment for NH3 is

directly dependent upon the continuous and intermittent losses of

ammonia in plant processes. Continuous losses are possible at the

glands of pumps and valves, the turbine seal system, and the

evaporator and condenser tube or tubesheet. Activities creating

potential intermittent ammonia losses are manual opening of vent,

drain, or instrument valves, relief activation, startup and
shutdown, equipment venting and ammonia loading operations.[311

Quantities of ammonia needed on a recurring basis will be

determined during preliminary design. Hence, mode and frequency of

ammonia shipment cannot be finally determined until operational

system losses are quantified. Ammonia losses and the costs

associated with the capital and operating costs of the ammonia

recovery equipment are factors in the economic viability of the

pl ant. Leakproof design and ammonia recovery are noted as an early
design requirement for all equipment.[321

Plant chlorine needs can be generated on board, in the form of

hypochlorite, by passing a direct current through seawater. The

plant is assumed to be able to produce its total daily chlorine

needs while in operation. Supplemental quantities, needed during

plant start up and during shutdown periods, will be determined

during the preliminary design and engineering stages of the OTEC

plant.

Government, safety, hazard and training requirements are, for

the most part, equally applicable to bulk or container shipment of

chlorine.

10.2 Determine Storage Area Needs

The Commercial Port Master Plan recommends the expansion of the

container yard. If this expansion is undertaken, adequate storage

capacity for hazardous chemicals will be available at the port if
needed .[33]

Limited space on board an OTEC platform and considerable

shipping distances involved in resupply will necessitate Commercial

Port storage of chemical for a sea based alternative.

Safety and hazard constraints previously delineated should be

examined when considering storage areas for ammonia and chlorine.

The U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office recommendations should be

sought if Commercial Port storage capacity is required for OTEC.

10.3 Coordinate with U.S. Coast Guard

The Coast Guard has indirect facility control by way of

operational safety regulations and enforcement. The Commercial Port

management should consult with the Coast Guard, at the earliest

possible time, after determination of the quantity, frequency and

mode of hazardous chemical shipment has been defined.

10.4 Determine Medical Facilities and Support Available

Liaison with local medical facilities should be established to

ensure prompt access to medical support in the event of a chemical

spill. Medical facilities should be aware of the types of chemical

products handled by the Commercial Port that they may be better

prepared in event of an accident.

The following must be established:

� Procedures for timely evacuation

* Medical facilities capable of treating exposure victims

� Procedures for alerting medical facilities of impending

arrival of injured persons

Names of physicians trained in ammon i a and chlorine

emergency procedures

10.5 Coordinate with Fire Department

Fire departments likely to respond to a Commercial Port fire

must be aware of the hazardous chemicals which are handled in

significant quantities at the port. Local fire stations which would

respond to a port fire alarm must be equipped with: self-contained

breathing apparatus and protective clothing impervious to

chemicals. Only personnel properly equipped and trained should

enter the contaminated area. Ability of local fire stations to

respond to a fire involving hazardous chemicals must be determined.

10.6 Establish Employee Education and Training

Shipment of ammonia and/or chlorine in bulk quantities will

require personnel specifically qualified in the bulk transfer of the

chemical(s) involved. OTEC plant technicians may be capable of

supervising cargo transfer operations, thereby releasing the

Commercial Port from the need to have their personnel trained. The

Coast Guard Marine Safety Office will require that satisfactory

documentary evidence be furnished as proof that the person in charge

is capable of competently performing all potential operations that

could evolve in a cargo transfer of a hazardous chemical.

Safety in handl ing hazardous chemicals depends, to a great

extent, upon the effectiveness of employee education, proper safety

instructions, intelligent supervision and use of suitable equipment.

Training of employees will primarily concern safety

considerations involveO with possible exposure to ammonia and

chlorine. If the chemicals are shipped in break-bulk quantities,

the mode of handling will be the same as for any other container

operation.

The education and training of employees in safe work practices

and the use personal protective equipment and other safeguards

provided for them are the responsibility of management. Training

classes for both new and old employees should be conducted

periodically to maintain a high degree of competence. Employees

must be thoroughly informed of the hazards that may result from

improper handling procedures. Each employee must know what to do in

an emergency and should be fully informed as to appropriate first

aid measures.

The Fertilizer Institute (NH3) and the Chlorine Institute are

resources for audio-visual training aids which can be used in an

employee education and training program.

10.7 Establish a Written Contingency Plan for Emergencies

A compre hens ive contingency plan should be formulated to

minimize the potential effects of accidents at waterfront

facilities. A contingency plan must include procedures for general

emergencies, fire control and fire fighting systems, emergency

lighting and power systems, first aid, dock emergencies, response to

release of hazardous substances and response to other potential

emergency situations. The generation of such a plan is a separate

project which should incorporate all of the parameters embracing the

transfer of large quantities of ammonia and chlorine as noted in the

report in addition to routine Commercial Port operations.

Timely notification of any discharge of hazardous substances

into coastal waters is required by federal law. A discharge

includes (but is not limited to) any spilling, leaking, pumping,

pouring, emitting, emptying or dumping of a hazardous substance.

Procedures should be established in a contingency plan for timely

notification of the Coast Guard Marine Safety Office and designated

Commercial Port personnel. The Coast Guard is presently considering

a requirement for all facilities to have an emergency manual which

would basically cover procedures suggested for inclusion in a

Commercial Port contingency plan for emergencies.

FOOTNOTES

1. U.S. Department of Energy, Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Power
System Development, National Technical Information Service, December
4, 1978.

2. Dames and Moore, Environmental Impact Report Projected OTEC
Development for Territory of Guam, p. 4, August 15, 1979.

3. Ibid.

4. Maruyama Associates, Ltd. and Dravo Van Houten, Inc., Commercial
Port of Guam Master Plan, draft report September 1980.

5 U.S. Department of Energy, Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Power
System Development, National Technical Information Service, SAN
1569-2, p. 7-65, December 4, 1980.

6. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Criteria
for a Recommended Standard .... Occupational Exposure to Ammonia, NEW
publication No. 74-36, p. 5 197T-.-

7. Ibid.$ p. 24.

8. The Fertilizer Institute, Operational Safety Manual for
Anhydrous Ammonia, p. 14$ 1971.

9. Ibid. p. 24.

10. The Fertilizer Institute, Chemical Safety Data Sheet TFI
Publication SD-8 p. 15.

11. Ibid.

12. Compressed Gas Association, Inc., Anhydrous Ammonia, CGA
pamphlet G-2, p. 23, 1977.

13. American National Standards Institute, Inc., Safety Requirements
for the Storage and Handling of Anhydrous Ammonia, ANSI K61.1, p. 23,
T9-72-.

14. U.S. Department of Energy, Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Power
System Development, National Technical Information Service, SAN
1569-2, p. 6-80 - 6-82, December 4, 1978.

15. U.S. Department of Energy, Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Power
System Development, National Technical Information Service, SAN
1569-1, Vol. 3, PT. 1 p. 159,, December 4, 1978.

16. Ibid. p. 7-39.

17. Cafky, J.W., Calculations performed September 1980.

18. U.S. Department of Energy, Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Power
System Development, National Technical Information Service, SAN
1569-1 Vol. 3, 771, p. 160, December 4, 1978.

19. The Chlorine Institute, Inc. Chlorine N.Y., N.Y. p. 20-21, 1969.

20. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Criteria
for a Recommended Standard .... Occupational Exposure to ChlorT-neNEW
publication /6-170, p. 3, 1`97F.

21. Dia,nond Shamrock, Inc., op. cit. p. 16.

22. NIOSH, op. cit. p. 109.
23. 10017 The Chlorine Institute, Inc., 342 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y.

24. NIOSH, op. cit. p. 106-107.

25. NIOSH, op. cit. p. Ill.

26. Diamond Shamrock, Inc. op. cit. p. 24.

27. The Chlorine Institute, Inc. First Aid Medical Management of
Chlorine Exporures, Edition 3, June 1978.

28. NIOSH, op. cit. p. 106.

29. Diamond Shamrock, Inc.,.Chlorine Handbook p. 14, 1976.

30. Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations, part 117, Environmental
Protection Agency Regulations on Determination of reportable
Quantities for Hazardous Substances, Wash. D.C., Government Printing
TT-ice.

31. U.S. Department of Energy, Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Power
System Development, National Technical Information service, 50
1570-2/1 p. 2.8-6 December 4, 1978.

32. Ibid.

33. Don Hill phone conversation with author 11/13/80.

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