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                        1992






                               
                              Oil Spill Cast Histories



                                     1967-1991
                                             
                                SUMMARIES of SIGNIFICANT
                             U.S. and INTERNATIONAL SPILLS









                                   US Department of Commerce
                              NOAA Coastal Services Center Library
                                    2234 South Hobson Avenue
                                    Charleston, SC 29405-2413
                             

                                         November 1992


                    Report No. HMRAD 92-11 to the U.S. Coast Guard Research and Development Center
                                                              




















                                           NOAA Hazardous Materials Response and Assessment Division
                                                           US Department of Commerce
                                            Seattle, Washington NOAA Coastal Services Center Library
           
                                                          2234 South Hobson Avenue
                                                         Charleston, SC 29405-2413
 



















































                                                                   .-.12RU






















                               -Aln








                                                 Introduction


                 The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (40 CFR
                 Part 300), referred to subsequently as "'The National Contingency Plan" (NCP), is
                 the principal Federal mechanism for operations pertaining to the identification,
                 containment, and cleanup of releases of oil and hazardous substances in the
0                coastal United States. NOAA has the responsibility, under the NCP, to provide
                 scientific support to the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) in planning for and
                 responding to spill emergencies in the marine environment.

                 Discussions between the USCG Research and Development Center and NOAA
                 concluded that, by providing insights into past experiences, a database of oil spill
                 case histories might be beneficial to the USCG, NOAA, and other agencies
                 involved in spill response and contingency planning. These case histories,
                 developed with significant funding and consultation from the USCG Research
                 and Development Center, are intended as references to be read as planning aids
                 for insights into scientific and operational decision-making, and to ensure that
0                particular strategic elements are properly addressed in contingency planning.
                 Although the files are configured for ready accessibility to details of particular
                 spills, these case histories can be used for constructing hypothetical scenarios and
                 for "gaming" a spill, e.g., "given the actual response to spill x, what would you
                 do?" or "what would you have done differently, and why?"
0                Criteria were established to limit the initial number of spills to be evaluated. The
                 case histories include all spills that:

                        exceeded 100,000 barrels internationally

                        exceeded 10,000 barrels in U.S. waters

                 0      involved the use of dispersants

                        involved bioremediation

                        involved severe environmental impacts: more than 500 birds killed, more
                        than 100 mammals killed, smothering of over a mile of intertidal
                        zone, closure of fisheries, etc.

                 Following this introduction there is an alphabetical list of spin case histories
                 included in the report and a dictionary of key words. The key words comprise
                 the dictionary from which shoreline types, resources at risk, etc. are chosen. The
                 dictionary was developed by Research Planning Inc., Columbia, South Carolina
                 (Guidelines for Developing a Spill Preparedness Plan: Focus on Environmental
                 Information, 1992, NOAA report HMRAD 92-3.)
:0






                                                                                                                    0


                  Each case history is organized as follows:

                         A list of headers that summarizes the spill name, location, product, size,
                         use of dispersants, bioremediation, and in-situ burning, other special
                         interests, shoreline types affected and keywords. (For the computerized
                         version, any word can also be searched as if it were a designated
                         keyword.)

                         A brief incident summary including weather conditions and events                           0
                         leading up to the spill.

                  0      A description of the behavior of the oil including movement, evaporation,
                         mousse formation, and dispersion.

                  0      A discussion of countermeasures and mitigation.

                  0      A description of other special interest issues such as communication
                         problems, unusual hazards encountered, and large losses of organisms.

                  0      A list of references from which the history was synthesized. The list                      0
                         ranges from very skimpy to very extensive; early spills were not well
                         documented.

                  Items within the text that the reader may want to find rapidly are highlighted by
                  the use of boldface italics These include proper names, amounts, or unusual                       40
                  conditions.

                  Sources of information for the case histories include U.S. Coast Guard OSC
                  Reports and Pollution Reports, file reports of the International Tanker Owners
                  Pollution Federation Ltd., NOAA Scientific Support Coordination (SSC) Branch
                  spill reports, commercial newsletters in the public domain, state agency reports,                 0
                  industry reports, and published scientific reports. Oil properties were taken
                  from Environment Canada's Catalogue of Crude Oil and Oil Product Properties (1990
                  version) (unpublished report EE-125, Ottawa). References are included at the
                  end of each case history.

                  The complete database consists of two parts: a text file, available on diskette or as
                  hard copy, and a HyperCard stack on diskette summarizing each of the case
                  histories. The HyperCard stack is based on CAMEOTM , hazardous materials
                  planning and response software developed by NOAA and the U.S.
                  Environmental Protection Agency.

                  We intend to add future spills to the database that meet the criteria for notable
                  impacts or innovative responses even though the size of the spill falls below the
                  values selected initially. Past spills will be re-reviewed with the same intention.
                  As new data are discovered, or participants in past spills provide additional
                  information, case histories will be updated. SSC reports are now being prepared
                  in the format used in this report. We encourage other national and international








                   This is one of several computer-based projects being conducted by the U.S. Coast
                   Guard and NOAA to improve planning and response to oil spills. We would
0                  particularly like to thank Cdr. Peter Tebeau of the USCG Research and
                   Development Center for his support of these projects.


                   Contributors to this report included:
0                  Cheryl Andersonl
                   Robert Barry2
                   Kenneth Barton3
                   R.G.B. Brown4
                   Gini Curl3                      Cover Art
0                  Herbert Curl, Jr.3              Project Manager
                   Sharon Christopherson3
                   Dean Da1e2                      Project Coordinator
                   Christopher HaU2
                   Lori HarriS3                    Editor
                   John Kaperick3
                   David Kennedy3
                   Edwin Levine3
                   Dan Maftson2
                   Barry McFarland2
                   Jacqueline McGee2
                   Clark Lee Merriam      5
                   Jim Morris3
                   John Murphy2
                   Robert Pavia3
                   Ellen ShaW2
                   jean Snider3                    NOAA-Coast Guard Liaison
                   Lynette StevenS2
                   Melody Straub2
                   Ian C. White6











                    Minerals Management Service, U.S. Department of the Interior
                   2Genwest Systems Inc.
                   31-lazardous Materials Response and Assessment Division, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
                   Administration
                   4Canadian Wildlife Service
                   -5The Cousteau Society
                   61ntemational Tanker Owners Pollution Federation, Ltd.


                                                                 iii








                                                                                        09 Spill Case Histories



                               SPILL NAME                                    LOCATION                                                            DATE         BTI-MELS
                               Al Rawdatain                                  Genoa, Italy                                                     10/29/77              7,350
                               Alvenus                                       Cameron, LA                                                         7/30/84           65,000
                               Amazon Venture                                Savannah River, GA                                                  12/4/86           11,900
                               Amerada Hess Oil Co. storage tanks Port Alucroix, Limetree Bay, St. Croix, U.S.V.1.                               9/20/89           10,000
                               American Trader                               I Huntington Bead%, CA                                              2/7/90,            9,458
                               Amoco Cadiz                                   Brittany, France                                                    3/16/78        1,619,048
                               APEX 3417,3503 Barges                         Galveston Bay, TX                                                   7/28/90           16,476
                               Arabian Gulf/Kuwait                           Persian Gulf                                                        1/19/91      900,000,000
                               Aragon                                        Madeira, Portugal                                                12/29/89            175,000
                               ARCO Anchorage                                Port Angeles, WA                                                 12/21/85              5,690
                               Argo Merchant                                 INantucket, MA                                                   12/15/76            183,000
                               Arrow                                         Nova Scotia, Canada                                                 2/4/70            77,000
                               Ashland Petroleum Co.                         Monongahela River                                                   1/2/88            23,810
                               Assimi                                        Oman                                                                1/7/83           379,0001
                               Athenian Ventu                                Canada                                                              4/22/88          252,429
                               Bahia Paraiso                                 Palmer Station, Antarctica                                          1/28/91            3,774
                               Bayou Lafousche                               I Upper Galveston Bay, Houston Ship Channel, TX                     3/9/731           10,000
                               Betelgeuse                                    Bantry Bay, SW Ireland                                              1/8/79            14,720
                               Bo-g                                          Keelung, Taiwan                                                     2/5/77,,,        213,692
                               Bouchard #65                                  Buzzards Bay, MA                                                    1/9/77             1,932
                               Brazilian Marina                              Sao Sebastiao, Brazil                                               1/9/7811          73,600
                               Buckeye Pipeline                              Knapp Run, PA                                                       3/30/90            1,786
                               Burmah Agate                                  I Galveston Bay, TX                                                 11/1/79          254,761
                               Cabo Pilar                                    Punta Davis, Chile                                                  10/8/87           40,900
                               Chevron Hawaii                                Deer Park, TX                                                       9/1/79'           20,000
                               Chevron Main Pass Block 41                    11 miles E of Mississippi River delta                               2/10/70           65,000
                               Christos Bitas                                Irish Sea, South Wales                                           10/12/78             21,990
                               Concho                                        Kill Van Kull, NY                                                   1/19/81           18,149
                               Corinthos                                     Delaware River, Marcus Hook, PA                                     1/31/75          266,000
                               E-24                                          Block Island Sound, Fishers Island, NY                           11/22/85                  71
                               Ekofisk Bravo oil field                       Norway, North Sea                                                   4/22/77,@        202,381
                               Eleni V                                       Norfolk, SE Coast of England                                        5/6/781           52,500
                               ESSO Puerto Rico                              Mississippi River, LA                                               9/3/88            23,000
                               Ethel H (11)                                  Hudson River, NY                                                    2/4/77            10,000
                               Exxon Bayway Refinery                         Arthur Kill, NY                                                     1/2/90            13,500
                               Exxon Valdez                                  Prince William Sound, AK                                            3/24/89          240,500
                               Funiwa No. 5                                  Niger Delta, Forcados, Nigeria                                      1/17/80          200,000
                               General Colocotrunis                          Eleuthera, Bahamas                                                  3/7/68            37,700
                               GlobtrW Sun                                   Gulf of Mexico                                                      8/15/75            7,000
                               Grand Eagle                                   Delaware River, Marcus Hook, PA                                     9/28/85           10,357
                               lHackensack Estuary, Tank Farnmn              Hackensack, NJ                                                      5/26/76           47,619
                               Hamilton Trader                               I Liverpool Bay, England                                            4/30/69            4,000
                               Hasbah 6                                      Saudi Arabia, Gulf of Arabia                                        10/2/80          100,000
                               Haven                                         Genoa, Italy                                                        4/11/9111        142,857
                               Howard Star                                   Tampa Bay, FL                                                       10/5/7811             952
                               Independenta                                  Istanbul, Turkey                                                 11/15/79            687,785
                               Irene's Challenge                             Pacific Ocean                                                       1/17/77,'        237,600
                               Ixtoc I                                       Bahia de Campeche, Gulf of Mexico                                   6/3/79           352,400
                               Jakob Maersk                                  Leixoes, Portugal                                                   1/29/75          637,500
                               Jupiter                                       Saginaw River, Bay City, MI                                         9/16/90           20,000
                               jKhark5                                       Morocco, (N of Las Palmas, Canary Islands)                       12/19/8911          452,400
                               jKirki                                        Cervantes, Western Australia                                        7/21/91          135,000
                               Kurdistan                                     Cabot Strait, Newfoundland                                                            43,900
                               Lakehead Pipeline Company                     Grand Rapids, MN                                                      /3/91           40,476
                               JMCN-5                                        Guemes Channel, Shannon Point, WA                                   1/31/98@ --- 1,604

                                                                                                   iv









                                                                                      Oil Spill Case Histories



                               SPILL NAME                                  LOCATION                                                        DATE          BARRELS
                               Mega Borg                                   Gulf of Mexico                                                   6/8/90         100,000
                               Metula
                               Mobil oil                                   First Narrows, Strait of Magellan                                8/9/74          398,019
                                                                           Columbia River, OR                                              3/19/84            3,925
                               Nestucca                                    Crays Harbor, WA                                               12/23/88            5,500
                                                                                                                                                           
                               Nord Pacific                                Corpus Christi, TX                                              7/13/88            15,350
                               Nowruz Oil Field                            Persian Gulf, Iran                                               2/4/83         1,904,762
                               Ocean Eagle                                 San Juan, Puerto Rico                                            3/3/68            83,400
                               Olympic Alliance                            Dover Strait, Pas de Calais, English Channel                   11/12/75            14,000
                               Olympic Glory                               Houston Ship Channel, TX                                        1/28/81            20,000
                               Oregon Standard                             San Francisco, CA                                               1/18/71            20,400
                               Pac Barvness                                                                                                            
                                                                           Point Conception, CA                                            9/21/87             9,200
                               Pacific Glory                               English Channel, Isle of Wight                                 10/23/70            24,780
                               Patmos                                      Strait of Messina, Italy                                        3/21/85             5,300
                               Peck Slip                                   Cape San Juan, Puerto Rico                                     12/19/78            11,000
                               Presidente Rivera                           Delaware River, Marcus Hook, PA                                 6/24/89             7,310
                               Puerto Rican                                San Francisco Bay, CA                                          10/31/84            38,500
                               Rockaway Fuel oil Spill                     Rockaway Point, NY                                              7/31/78             1,000
                               Ryuyo Maru #2                               St. Paul Island, AK
                                                                                                                                           11/8/79             6,190
                               Sanko Harvest                               EsPerance, Western Australia                                    2/13/91             4,400
                               Sansinena                                   Los Angeles Harbor, CA                                         12/17/76            30,000
                               Santa Barbara Well Blowout                  Santa Barbara, CA                                               1/28/69           100,000
                               Schuylkill River Spill                      Douglassville, PA                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                           6/22/72           170,000
                               Sea Speed Arabia                            New York Upper Harbor, NY                                       6/30/79             2,857
                               Sea Spirit                                  Strait of Gibraltar, Mediterranean Sea                           8/6/90            48,875
                               Sea Star                                    Gulf of Oman                                                   12/19/72           937,000
                               Seal Beach Well Blowout                     Peal Beach, CA                                                 10/31/90                20 
                               SFI 41                                      Mile 43.7 Upper Mississippi River, MO                          11/24/85            16,300
                               Shell Oil Complex                           Carquinez Straits, Martinez, CA                                 4/23/88             8,700  
                               Shell Platform 26                                                                                                               
                                                                           Gulf of Mexico, Louisiana                                       12/1/70            58,640
                               Sivand                                      Humber Estuary, England                                         9/28/83            48,000
                               St. Peter                                   Cabo Manglares, Colombia                                         2/5/76           279,000
                               STC-101                                     Chesapeake Bay, Northampton County, VA
                                                                                                                                            2/2/7600           5,959
                               Tamano                                      Casco Bay, ME                                                    7/22/72            2,380
                               Tanio
                                                                           Brittany, France                                                 3/7/80            98,955
                               Tarik Ibn Ziyad                             Rio de Janeiro, Brazil                                           3/26/75           109,950
                               Tenyo Maru                                  Neah Bay, WA                                                     7/22/91             7,143
                               Texaco Storage Tank                         Bahia Las Minas, Panama                                          4/27/86           240,000
                               Texas                                       Mile 43.4, Upper Mississippi River, MO
                               Torrey Canyon                               Lands End, England                                               3/7/86            17,055
                               Trinimar Marine Well 327                                                                                     3/18/67           860,000
                               U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve            Gulf of Paria, Venezuela                                         3/8/73             36,650
                                                                           West Hackqberry, LA                                              9/21/78            72,0001
                               UMTB 283                                    Aleutian Islands, AK                                            12/26/88            47,620
                               Urguiola                                    La Coruna, Spain                                                 5/12/76           733,000
                               V.I. Water and Power Authority              Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S.V.I.                               9/18/89            14,070
                               V884/V885/V883/V882                         Mile 179.0, Upper Mississippi River, MO                          4/2/83            13,212
                               Veqnoqil                                    Cape St. Francis, South Africa                                  12/16/77           219,000
                               Vista Bella                                 Nevis Island (British), eastern Caribbean                        3/6/91            13,300
                               Wafra                                       Cape Agulhas, South Africa                                      2/27/71           200,000
                               Whidbey Island spill                        Whidbey Island, WA                                             12/21/84               119
                               Witwater                                    Caleta Island, Canal Zone, Panama
                                                                                                                                          12/13/68            14,000
                               World Glory                                 Durban, South A4qh0qica                                         6/13/68           344,043
                               World Prodigy                               Narragansett Bay, Newport, RI
                                                                                                                                           6/23/89             6,873
                               YUM II/Zapqoteca                            Bahia de Campeche, Gulf of Mexico                              10/10/87             58,640
                               Z-102                                       Ensenada de Boca Vieja, San Juan, Puerto Rico                  12/09/75             7,679                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               q0q0q0
                               Zoe Colocotronis                            Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico                                          3/18/73            37,579                                                                 
  





                                           Dictionary of Keywords



                   A       Resources at Risk
                           Habitats
                           (See shoreline types key below), eelgrass beds, submerged aquatic vegetation (SAV), kelp,
                           coral reefs, worm beds


                           Marine Mammals
                           Whales, dolphins, sea lions, seals, sea otters, manatees, walruses, polar bears, population
                           concentration areas, haulouts, migration routes, seasonal use areas

                           Terrestrial Mammals
                           Mustelids, rodents, deer, bears, population concentration areas, intertidal feeding areas

                           ML&
                           Diving coastal birds, waterfowl, alcids, petrels, fulmars, shorebirds, wading birds, gulls, tems,
                           raptors, rookeries, foraging areas, wintering areas, migration stopover areas, wintering
                           concentration areas, nesting beaches, migratory routes, critical forage areas

                           EL,h
                           Anadromous fish, beach spawners, kelp spawners, nursery areas, reef fish (includes fish using
                           hard-bottom habitats) spawning streams, spawning beaches, estuarine fish, dernersal fish

                           Molluscs
                           Oysters, mussels, clams, scallops, abalone, conch, whelk, squid, octopus, seed beds, leased beds,
                           abundant beds, harvest areas, high concentration sites

                           Crustaceans
                           Shrimp, crabs, lobster, nursery areas, high concentration sites

                           Reptiles
                           Sea turtles, alligators, nesting beaches, concentration areas

                           Recreation
                           Beaches, marinas, boat ramps, diving areas, high-use recreational boating areas, high-use
                           recreational fishing areas, State Parks

                           Mana"ment Areas
                           Marine Sanctuaries, National Parks, Refuges, Wildlife Preserves, Reserves

                           Resource Extraction
                           Subsistence, officially designated harvest sites, commercial fisheries, power plant water
                           intakes, drinking water intakes, industrial water intakes, intertidal and subtidal n-dning
                           leases, fish /shrimp /bivalve/plant aquaculture sites, log storage areas

                           Cultural
                           Archaeological sites, Native American Lands





                                                                  v i








                   B       Shoreline Types Impacted
                           brackish marshes
                           coarse gravel beaches
                           coarse sand beaches
                           coastal structures
                           consolidated seawalls
                           consolidated shores
                           cypress swamps
                           developed upland
                           eroding bluffs
                           exposed bedrock bluffs
                           exposed bluffs
                           exposed fine sand beaches
                           exposed riprap
                           exposed rocky platforms
                           exposed rocky shores
                           exposed scarps
                           exposed seawalls
                           exposed tidal flats
                           exposed tidal flats (low biomass)
                           exposed tidal flats (moderate biomass)
                           exposed unconsolidated sediment bluffs
                           extensive intertidal marshes
                           extensive salt marshes
                           extensive wetlands
                           fine sand beaches
                           flats
                           freshwater flat
                           freshwater marshes
                           freshwater swamps
                           fringing salt marshes
                           fringing wetlands
                           hardwood swamps
                           levees
                           low banks
                           mangroves
                           marshes
                           mixed sand and shell beaches
                           mixed sediment beaches
                           piers
                           riprap
                           salt marsh
                           saltwater marshes
                           sand/gravel beaches
                           shell beaches                                                                                         lob
                           sheltered bedrock bluffs
                           sheltered fine-grained sand beaches
                           sheltered impermeable banks
                           sheltered mangroves
                           sheltered marshes
                           sheltered rocky shores
                           sheltered seawalls
                           sheltered tidal flats




                                                                 Vii









                   B, conL
                            shelving bedrock shores
                            spoil bank
                            supratidal marshes
                            swamp
                            tidal muciflat
                            unforested upland
                            unvegetated steep banks and cliffs
                            vegetated bluffs
                            vegetated low banks
                            vegetated riverbank
                            vertical rocky shores
                            wavecut platforms

                   C        Key words
                            absorbent pads
                            absorbents
                            adverse weather conditions
                            air activated pumps
                            air horns
                            Air-Deliverable Anti-Pollution Transfer System (ADAPTS)
                            airboats
                            Airspace Request Zone
                            Alpha Bio-Sea microbes
                            Ardox 6120
                            Atlantic Strike Team (AST)
                            Audubon Society
                            backhoes
                            Bennett boom
                            blowout
                            blowout preventer
                            boat ramps
                            bombing
                            boom
                            BP 1002
                            BP 1100D
                            BP 110OWD
                            BP 110OX
                            BRAS-X-plus
                            bulldozers
                            California Department of Fish and Game (CA DFG)
                            cannonball diaper sampler
                            Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
                            chalk
                            Channel Islands National Marine Sanctuary
                            clamshell bucket
                            Clean Bay Inc.
                            Clean Coastal Waters
                            Clean Gulf
                            Clean Harbors Cooperative
                            Clean Seas
                            Clean Sound
                            Clean Water




                                                                  viii









                     C, conL
                              collection boom
                              collision
                              containment boom
                              contingency plan
                              contracting
                              copper
                              copper sulfide
                              Corexit 7664
                              Corexit 8666
                              Corexit 9527
                              Corexit 9580
                              Crowley Environmental Services
                              Customblen
                              Dasic LTD
                              Davidson Current
                              deflection booms
                              Delaware Bay and River Cooperative
                              demolition
                              detergent
                              disposal
                              Drew
                              drift cards
                              elastol
                              Enjay 7664
                              evaporation
                              Expandiboom
                              explosion
                              filter fence
                              Finasol OSR
                              Finasol OSR-2
                              Finasol OSR-5
                              Finasol OSR-7
                              fingerprinting
                              fire
                              Flight Restricted Area
                              fog
                              Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
                              Gold Crew
                              Goodyear boom
                              Gulf Strike Team (GST)
                              hand mops
                              high-pressure hot water washing
                              high-pressure warm-water washing
                              high-pressure washing
                              high-viscosity screw pumps
                              hot-water flushing
                              hydro-blasting
                              Infra Red (IR)
                              Inipol
                              International Bird Rescue and Research Center (IBRRC)
                              International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF)
                              Intervention on the High Seas Act



                                                                        ix









                   C, conL
                           JBF skimmer
                           lightering
                           low pressure washing
                           Magnus
                           manual removal
                           Marco skimmer
                           Multi Agency Local Response Team (MALRT)
                           National Guard
                           National Strike Force (NSF)
                           National Wildlife Refuges
                           Navy boom
                           New Jersey State Department of Environmental Protection (NJ DEP)
                           New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NY DEC)
                           oil mop machines
                           oil snares
                           Open Water Oil Containment and Recovery System (OWOCRS)
                           Open Water Oil Recovery System (OWORS)
                           Pacific Strike Team (PST)
                           Point Reyes National Seashore
                           Polycomplex A
                           POMPOMS
                           propane cannons
                           Regional Response Team
                           relief well
                           remote response
                           remotely operated vehicle (ROV)
                           reoiling
                           salvage
                           sawdust
                           Sea Curtain boom
                           self-contained skimming devices
                           self-propelled skimmer
                           shallow water recovery
                           Shell Oil Herder
                           Shell Solvent 70
                           Shell VTS
                           shop vacuums
                           Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR)
                           sinking
                           siphon dam
                           skimmers
                           skimming pump
                           Slickgone LTE
                           Sorbent C
                           sorbent boom
                           sorbent pads
                           sorbent pillows
                           sorbent pompoms
                           sorbents
                           steam generators
                           stem trawl net
                           straw






                                                                   x









                  C, conL
                          sub-surface oil
                          submersible
                          suction operations
                          supersucker
                          toxic fumes
                          trenches
                          Tri-State Bird Rescue Center
                          Tullanox 500
                          U. S. Naval Explosive Ordnance Detachment (EOD)
                          U.S. Navy Superintendent of Salvage (NAVSUPSALV)
                          US Strategic Petroleum Reserve
                          vacalls
                          vacuum pumps
                          vacuum truck
                          vegetation cutting
                          volunteers
                          Washington Department of Ecology (WA DOE)
                          Washington Department of Natural Resources (WA DNR)
                          water-washing
                          weir sump
                          weir/pump skimmer



                  D       Other Special Interest Issues
                          Effects to tourism, recreation areas, or personal property
                          Closure of commercial or recreational fishing areas and public lands
                          Closure of shipping lanes and vehicle traffic routes

                          Wildlife impacts and rehabilitation
                          Ecological destruction and habitat loss due to spilled material impacts
                          Ecological destruction and habitat loss due to cleanup operations
                          Effects to human health and safety

                          Bioremediation, dispersant, in-situ burning operations
                          Unusual, experimental, or innovative cleanup techniques
                          Complex successful salvage operations
                          Logistical or operational problems (including adverse weather conditions)
                          Interaction with foreign or Native authorities
                          Media interest
                          Volunteer response and organization
                          Studies conducted; ongoing research

                                                                                                                             40












                                                               x









                  Name of Spill: Al Rawdatain
                  Date of Spill (mmddyy): 10/29/77
                  Location of Spill: Genoa, Italy
                  Latitude: 44 24 N
                  Longitude: 008 48 E
                  Oil Product: Kuwait crude oil
                  Oil Type: Type 3
                  Barrels: 7,350
                  Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                  Resources at Risk: commercial fisheries, recreational beaches, sardines,
                  anchovies, prawns.
                  Dispersants: Yes
                  Bioremediation: No
                  In-situ Burning: No
                  Other Special Interest:
                  Shoreline Types Impacted:
                  Keywords: Gamlen LT126, Finasol OSR2, Chimisol TC 66, Saros Meltout M,
                  Urruty Dispersol, Rochem, skimmer.

0                 Incident Summary:
                  On October 29, 1977, a valve was left open during the offloading of the Al
                  Rawdatain at the Genoa-Multedo dock. Seven thousand three hundred fifty
                  barrels of Kuwait crude oil spilled from the vessel over a period of several
                  hours. The spill was mitigated with chemical dispersants. No shoreline
0                 impacts occurred.

                  Behavior of Oil:

                  Kuwait crude oil is a medium weight product with an API gravity of 31.2 and
0                 a viscosity of 2.53 centistokes. Overflights on the morning of October 30
                  revealed a slick extending out 275 yards from the vessel. By October 31, a 7
                  mile long by 3 mile wide slick extended out to sea. A smaller amount of oil
                  broke off from the large slick and moved west towards Savona. This oil
                  formed a 5 mile long by 3 mile wide slick which stayed 2 miles off the shore
                  between Cogoleto and Varazza. No oil contaminated the shoreline.
















                                                                                   Al Rawdatain









            Countermeasures and Mitigation:

            The Genoa Port Authority was responsible for cleanup operations. On
            October 31, dispersants were applied to the offshore slick and in the vicinity of
            the tanker's mooring by 4 tugboats, which were directed by observers in
            helicopters. Two tugs were fitted with Warren Springs Laboratory dispersant
            spraying equipment and storage tanks. The other two tugs used improvised
            spraying gear. A harbor launch applied dispersants to the smaller slick near
            Savona on the morning of October 31. Two fire monitoring tugs joined the
            Savona operations later that day, and sprayed dispersants into the night using
            search lights. Overflights revealed that no significant amounts of oil
            persisted after the dispersants were applied. Operations were considered
            successful and were completed by November 2 in perfect weather.
            A Gaima skimmer was deployed near Genoa, but it broke down almost
            immediately.

            Approximately 1190 barrels (50,000 gallons) of dispersants were used, and
            included: Gamlen LT126, Finasol OSR2, Chimisol TC 66, Saros Meltout M,
            Urruty Dispersol, and Rochem.

            Other Special Interest Issues:

            Ref erences:

            *Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.




























            Al Rawdatain                          2








                   Name of Spill: Alvenus
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 07/30/84
                   Location of Spill: Calcasieu River bar channel, 11 miles SE of Cameron,
                   Louisiana.
                   Latitude: 29 35 N
                   Longitude: 093 15 W
                   Oil Product: Venezuelan Merey, Pilon Crude
                   Oil Type: Type 3, Type 3
                   Baff els: 65,000
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Benthic organisms, marsh grass, bird nesting sites, sea
                   turtles.
                   Dispersants: Y
                   Bioremediation: N
                   In-situ Burning: N
                   Other Special Interest: Logistical or operational problems, effects to tourism.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Exposed seawalls, piers, fine sand beaches,
                   sheltered tidal flats.
                   Keywords: Corexit 9527, hydro-blasting, recoiling, International Tanker
0                  Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF), sub-surface oil, manual removal.

                   Incident Summary:

                   On July 30, 1984 at 1236 the U.K. Tank Vessel Alvenus grounded in the
                   Calcasieu River Bar Channel 11 miles southeast of Cameron, Louisiana. The
                   vessel suffered a structural failure which ruptured the hull near the No.2
                   tanks. The resulting spill of approximately 65,500 barrels of Venezuelan
                   Merey and Pilon crude oil was carried in a westerly direction by wind and
                   currents. Offshore recovery was hampered by rough weather and the
                   magnitude of the spill. The water temperature was 80'F and winds were
                   from the east and northeast 15-20 knots.

























                                                                                         Alvenus






                                                                                                             0


             The spill moved slowly westward, coming ashore near Mgh Island, along the
             Bolivar Peninsula, and into Galveston Bay, Texas between Aug. 2-5. Oil
             impacts were severe at Rollover Inlet and Crystal Beach, and on Aug. 4 more                     0
             oil was pushed ashore further south along the Galveston Island coast. The
             spill affected 90% of Galveston's West Beach, including 80% of the Galveston
             seawall and the associated rock groins and pilings. Oil in the seawall area was
             a concern due to the oils smothering effect on marine organisms. Organisms
             in this area were determined to be a minor part of the entire ecosystem and
             due to their transient nature were able to move to more suitable habitats.
             Several dead crabs, rays, and fish were recovered along the seawall but could
             not be directly attributed to the spill. Also oiled were marsh grass areas in
             East Bay (10-20 barrels) and 2 small lagoons. Some oil which entered
             Galveston Channel did affect several small sand islands used as nesting sites
             for birds, although no affected birds or eggs were reported. One oiled sea                      41
             turtle was cleaned and released. Tourism losses were estimated at $1 million
             per day. Commercial shrimp fishermen filed a suit for $10 million. By
             October 1 the oiled beaches of Bolivar Peninsula and Galveston Island had
             been cleaned by the removal of oiled sand.

             Behavior of Oil:                                                                                0

             Merey crude oil is a medium crude oil with an API gravity of 17.3 and a pour
             point of -10 degrees F. Pilon crude is a heavy crude oil of API gravity 13.8
             with a pour point of -9 degrees F and a viscosity of 1,943 centistokes. The spin
             formed a heavy, coalescent slick which was initially predicted to move                          '41
             offshore to the south away from the Texas coast. Changes in wind direction
             resulted in a westerly trajectory, spreading the oil into a 75 mile long slick
             with three leading arms. The oil came ashore in the Galveston, Texas area
             forming as tar balls, sheens, and pancakes floating outside the surf zone. By
             August 7 an estimated 17,000 - 26,000 bbl (2,500-3,500 tons) of oil had
             accumulated on the shores of Galveston Island and the Bolivar Peninsula.                        0
             An additional 7400 - 11,100 bbl (1,000-1,500 tons) of oil adsorbed onto
             suspended solid particles (sediment) nearshore and sank in the surf zone
             where it was trapped among successive sandbars and trenches forming
             "blankets" to 4 inches in depth. Some of the subtidal oil formed cylindrical
             shaped rolls that moved up and down the beach with wave action. Warm
             temperatures on the beach (80'F water, 80-100'F air) may have contributed to
             keeping the oil highly fluid and fresh. Unless mixed with sand, the oil was
             easily dispersed with gentle agitation.















             Alvenus                                2








                    Countermeasures and Mitigation:

                    Oil booms and sea barrier were placed around the vessel on the day following
                    the grounding. Efforts to contain and recover the spilled oil at sea became
                    ineffective due to rough seas which pushed oil under the barrier, and the
                    refusal of the contracted lightering barge to receive oil recovered from
                    seawater. This refusal was a major contribution to the failed recovery effort.
                    A second barge and tug were contracted, but delayed due to a line becoming
0                   fouled in the screw of the towing vessel. The principal contractor, Clean Gulf
                    Association, an industry cooperative, was not equipped for massive at-sea
                    cleanup and equipment was not immediately available in Cameron,
                    Louisiana. Had the equipment been available, it still may not have been
                    loaned to a non-member company.
0                   Beach cleanup was determined to be best accomplished by using road graders
                    to move newly beached oil above the high tide zone. Graders were most
                    effective when used together in a staggered formation, moving oil up the
                    beach from the intertidal area to backshore storage areas. Oiled sand collected
                    in the storage areas was loaded into dump trucks for disposal. This operation
0                   involved as many as 50 graders and 100 dump trucks. Submerged oil in the
                    subtidal proved to be the greatest problem because reoiling necessitated
                    continual recleaning of beaches. Removal of the subtidal oil was attempted
                    with mesh screening, pumping, and heavy equipment, but none of these
                    techniques proved effective. During beach cleanup, conflict arose between
0                   state and private landowners over ownership of the contaminated sand, the
                    state wanting to remove the sand versus the landowners wanting it to
                    remain in place on the beach.

                    Cleaning of the seawall and revetment involved more than 150 workers
                    manually removing oil with sorbent materials, shovels, and rakes. Various
0                   "hydo -blasting" methods were tried. Low-pressure (850 psi) warmed seawater
                    left stains on the rocks, a high-pressure "sugar" sand blast was effective on the
                    rocks but not concrete seawall, and dry sand blasting proved too abrasive.
                    Hydro-sand blasting was chosen as the most effective for seawall cleanup. A
                    test of dispersant (Corexit 9527) was approved and conducted on the seawall.
0                   When the dispersant was unable to penetrate the oil, hydroblasting remained
                    the method of choice.



















                                                        3                                     Alvenus








             Extensive discussions with experts and representatives of the International
             Tanker Owners Pollution Federation concerning dispersants concluded that
             dispersant use on the water was not appropriate due to water depth,                            0
             proximity of the spill to shore and fisheries resources, and the inability of the
             dispersant to penetrate thick Venezuelan crude. Since the dispersant would
             have been only partially effective, the cost benefit of using an ineffective
             dispersant would have diverted funds from the beach cleanup deemed
             necessary in either case. See discussion below about subsequent dispersant
             use on the seawall.                                                                            0

             Other Special Interest Issues:

             Logistics became a problem during the beach cleanup due to the large number
             of heavy equipment units involved. Traffic constraints at disposal sites
             resulted in as many as 40 loaded vehicles waiting on the beaches to off-load.                  41
             Graders were only available from the Texas Department of Highways for a
             short time, so cleanup began prematurely, requiring recleaning as new oil
             came ashore.


             Mass balance calculations estimated the volume of the recovered oil at
             between 63,000 - 78,000 bbl (,8700 - 10,700 metric tons). This is very high
             considering that an estimate of the total spill was 65,000 bbl (10,000 metric
             tons).

             A severe case of oiling at a previously unaffected San Luis Pass area was
             cleaned up by the contractor and later analysis proved the oil was not of
             Alvenus origin.

             Ten liters of Exxon Corexit 9527 were applied toAlvenus oil stranded on the
             Galveston seawall on August 28, 1984. Ten samples were taken from the sea
             water at the base of the seawall before and after the application of Corexit 9527
             and analyzed for polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) by The Center
             for Bio-Organic Studies, University of New Orleans. The analytical data were
             interpreted by the Institute for Environmental Studies, Louisiana State
             University. Concentrations of aromatic hydrocarbons were very low and no
             discernable effects of the dispersant were obvious in the data set.
             Observations of marine organism mortalities made by National Marine
             Fisheries Service indicated no toxic effects.


















             Alvenus                                4










                  References:

                  *Alejandro, A.C. and J.L. Buri, 1987. M/V Alvenus: Anatomy of a major oil
                  spill. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings 1987, pp. 27-32.
                  *Baxter, Todd, NOAA SSC. Memo to Participants of the ALVENUS, Oil Spill,
                  January 4, 1984.
                  *NOAA Hotline report
                  *Petro-Canada report ("Alvenus file")
                  *USCG On Scene Coordinators report
                  oWorld Information Systems "Tanker losses in U.S. Waters 1978-1990













































                                                                                      Alvenus








                   Name of Spill: Amazon Venture
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 12/04/86
                   Location of Spill: Savannah River., Garden City, Georgia
                   Latitude: 40 35 N
                   Longitude: 073 52 W
                   Oil Product: No. 6 Fuel Oil
                   Oil Type: Type 4
                   Barrels: 11,900
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Oysters, clams, crabs, refuges, high-use recreational fishing
                   areas, commercial fisheries, birds.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Habitat impact due to oil.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Marshes, piers, riprap, sheltered seawalls, marshes,
                   saltwater marshes.
                   Keywords: Gulf Strike Team (GST), containment boom, National Wildlife
                   Refuges, vacuum truck, manual removal, sorbent boom, high-pressure
                   washing.                                                                             0

                   Incident Summary:

                   On December 4, 1986, at 2330, an oil spill of unknown origin at the Garden
                   City, Georgia container berths on the Savannah River was reported to the
                   U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Marine Safety Office (MSO) in Savannah, Georgia.
                   As the responsible party had not been identified, the On-Scene Coordinator
                   (OSC) declared a federally funded spill to facilitate response measures.

                   Early in the morning on December 5, before the source of the spill was
                   known, personnel contracted by the USCG deployed containment boom at the
                   Amoco and Southern Bulk Industries facilities. At first light, the Amazon
                   Venture was boarded and inspected as it was believed to be the most likely
                   source of the spill. The cause of the spill was later determined to be three
                   malfunctioning valves in the ballast and cargo discharge piping of the
                   Amazon Venture.























                                                                                  Amazon Venture











            Behavior of Oil:

            No. 6 fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to 14.
            The amount of spilled oil was initially estimated to be less than 50 barrels.
            During the first two days of the spill, much of the floating oil remained
            beneath the approximately eighteen acres of dock and wharf area at the edge
            of the Savannah River. On December 7, personnel from the USCG Gulf
            Strike Team (GS7) estimated that the amount of oil in the water was about
            11,000 barrels. The final estimate was reached on December 11, following tank
            gauging that revealed that approximately twelve thousand barrels of the
            Amazon Venture's cargo was missing.

            Approximately 25 miles of the Savannah River and its tributaries were
9           affected by the spill. An estimated 610 acres of marsh were oiled along the
            canals and tributaries of the Savannah National Wildlife Refuge (SNVR).
            Thirty-eight acres along major waterways were heavily oiled, and eighty acres
            along major waterways were lightly oiled.
0           Countermeasures and Mitigation:
            Shoreline cleanup consisted of washing with pressurized water and hand
            scrubbing of oiled surfaces. Dispersant use was not considered due to the
            environmental sensitivity of the area. The National Oceanic and
            Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC)
0           recommended against cutting marsh grass. Since the spill occured in winter,
            the grass was dormant at the time and it was felt that little harm would come
            to the grass if it were left intact. Also, increased traffic associated with grass
            cutting could force oil deeper into the sediments.
0           Areas with the heaviest concentrations of oil were isolated with containment
            boom. The oil was too thick initially for vacuum trucks to have any effect. A
            barrier boom was deployed at Middle River to protect the waters of the
            Savannah National Wildlife Refuge. The swift currents of the river made
            securing the boom very difficult, however, it was in place by the morning of
            December 6. Five hundred feet of boom was deployed at Steamboat Cut in the
0           SNVR on December 9. Sorbent boom was deployed at Fort Jackson and Fort
            Pulaski. Sorbent boom was deployed across the Dundee Canal at the request
            of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to prevent oil from
            contaminating sensitive inland areas.














            Amazon Venture                        2









                    Containment boom was deployed at seven sites in the wildlife refuge as
                    recommended by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). Oil in the
                    contained areas was difficult to remove because of currents and the relatively
                    small amount of oil actually contained by the booms. Booms were placed at
                    Hog Island, St. Augustine Creek, Upper Little Back River, Rifle Cut, and
                    Middle River. Booms in these areas required constant maintenance and
                    repositioning due to the currents. All booms were removed from the wildlife
                    refuge by December 23.

                    Limited cleanup operations continued until January 12, 1987. On January 16,
                    the OSC presented the vessel owners with the final recommendations for the
                    long-term cleanup and removal of the oil. The cleanup was completed by
                    March 13, 1987.

                    Other Special Interest Issues:

                    Disposal of oily debris was a problem. The dumpsters provided by the
                    cleanup contractor were unlined. This caused oil to leak into the soil around
                    the dumpsters until a dike was constructed and the dumpsters were lined                  46
                    with plastic, pending the acquisition of proper containers.
                    The FWS established a bird cleaning center. The center cleaned only a few
                    birds because the spill had only a minimal effect on the birds in the area.
                    Approximately 36-48 oiled birds were sighted by FWS personnel. Most of
                    these were cortnorants. There were fears that the Bald Eagles in the Refuge              41
                    would prey on the oiled birds, however no reports of affected Bald Eagles
                    were received.


                    Ref erences:
                    *Golob's 1978-1989 US Spill Report                                                       0
                    eMMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
                    *NOAA Hotline Reports
                    9NOAA Response Report
                    *OSIR Oil Spills, International Summary & Review, 1986-1988
                    *Tanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers.                   0
                    T.A.C. Inc. 1991.
                    oUSCG On-Scene Coordinators Report
                    -World Information Systems. Tanker Losses in U.S. Waters: 1978-1990.
                    World Information Systems. 1991.













                                                    3                                Amazon Venture








                   Name of Spill: Amerada Hess Oil Co. storage tanks
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 09/20/89
                   Location of Spill: Port Alucroix, Limetree Bay, St Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands.
                   Latitude: 17 40 N
                   Longitude: 064 45 W
                   Oil Product: Heavy crude oil
                   Oil Type: Type 4
                   Barrels: 10,000
                   Source of Spill: Facility
                   Resources at Risk: piers.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Human health and safety concerns, adverse weather
                   conditions, logistical or operational problems.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Fine sand beaches, exposed rocky shore.
                   Keywords: Atlantic Strike Team (AST), adverse weather conditions, boom,
                   skimming pump, oil snares, clamshell bucket.

                   Incident Summary:

                   On September 18, 1989, Hurricane Hugo hit the island of St. Croix with winds
                   in excess of 140 miles per hour. Five large oil storage tanks were destroyed
                   and several severely damaged at the Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation
                   (HOVIC) power plant in Port Alucroix, St Croix. Of the 10,000 barrels released,
                   approximately 9,000 barrels were contained within earthen berms on the
                   facility's grounds.

                   Coast Guard personnel of the Marine Safety Office (MSO) San Juan
                   participated in an overflight of the area on September 21. The overflight was
                   conducted to assess damages to two affected facilities. Members of the USCG
                   Atlantic Strike Team and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator arrived on-scene
                   September 22 to inspect the damaged storage tanks. Approximately 1,000
                   barrels of heavy crude oil were in HOVIC's main tanker harbor. HOVIC
                   employees had already begun countermeasures to contain the oil. HOVIC
                   personnel appeared to need little assistance from the Coast Guard. Coast
                   Guard personnel continued on to Virgin Islands Water Power Authority (VI
                   WAPA) to assess the damages and needs at that facility.















                                                                              Amerada Hess Oil Co.











              Behavior of Oil:
              Approximately 1,000 barrels of heavy crude escaped into the waters of                          0
              Limetree Bay. Natural wind and wave action pressed the oil against the
              shoreline, thus containing the oil within the narrow tanker harbor limits.
              Almost all of the 1,000 barrels were recovered.
              Countermeasures and Mitigation:                                                                0
              HOVIC employees quickly deployed 2,000 feet of 24 inch skirt boom between
              the piers to contain most of the oil in the harbor. HOVIC provided VI WAPA
              additional booms to help contain the spill on the north side of the island.
              Earthen berms on the facility grounds contained approximately 9000 barrels of                  41
              the estimated 10,000 barrels that were released. Skimming pumps were
              unsuccessful in recovering the oil at HOVIC due to the high pour point of the
              oil. As an alternative cleanup technique, oil-snare absorbent was applied to
              the boomed oil after which it was recovered by clamshell buckets. The buckets
              were used to lift the oil into a temporary earthen sump onshore. Using this                    49
              method, HOVIC was able to recover the majority of the water-borne oil and
              return it to an intact recovery tank. HOVIC accepted additional recovered oil
              from the VI WAPA spill that was placed into another recovery tank.

              Other Special Interest Issues:

              Due to the destruction from Hurricane Hugo, communications were
              disrupted. Therefore, mobile satellite communications were critical to the
              success of the response operation. Much of the island's infrastructure,
              including potable water, electricity, and sanitation facilities, was also
              destroyed by the hurricane. The widespread destruction on the island caused
              many logistical and operational problems. The resulting oil spill was simply
              one component of a much larger scale disaster.

              Response personnel experienced physical threats from armed groups of
              escaped convicts eluding capture in remote beach areas. Some civilians were
              also armed with weapons to protect their property from crowds of looters.
              Personnel at the VI WAPA command post regularly heard gunfire inthe
              evenings.

              The HOVIC facility was extremely well prepared for this response. The
              facility itself is designed to provide excellent opportunity for containment and
              recovery of spills. The northwest corner of each pier contains an oil recovery
              ramp. HOVIC was also able to provide VI WAPA with boom, a tank barge,
              and an oil recovery tank.









              Amerada Hess Oil Co.                   2











                   References:

                   oBills, C.E. and Whiting, D.C. 1991. Major Oil Spills Caused by Hurricane
                   Hugo, St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings 1991. pp.
                   247-251.
                   *OSIR International Spill Statistics 1989-1990, Special Report, 3/28/91
                   *OSIR Oil Spills, International Summary & Review, 1989-1990
















































                                                3                              Amerada Hess Oil Co.








                  Name of Spill: American Trader
                  Date of Spill (mmddyy): 02/07/90
                  Location of Spill: Huntington Beach, California
                  Latitude: 33 38 N
                  Longitude: 118 01 W
                  Oil Product: Alaskan North Slope Crude Oil
                  Oil Type: Type 4
                  Barr els: 9458
                  Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                  Resources at Risk: Kelp, marshes, terns, diving coastal birds, shorebirds,
                  clams, refuges, fish.
                  Dispersants: No
                  Bioremediation: No
                  In-situ Burning: No                                                              41
                  Other Special Interest: Wildlife impacts, wildlife rehabilitation, human
                  health and safety concerns.
                  Shoreline Types Impacted: Exposed rocky shores, riprap, exposed bluffs, fine
                  sand beaches, piers, sand/gravel beaches, marshes.
                  Keywords: Boom, Open Water Oil Containment and Recovery System
                  (OWOCRS), U.S. Navy Superintendent of Salvage (NAVSUPSALV), sorbent              49
                  pompoms, sorbent boom, sorbent pads, California Department of Fish and
                  Game (CA DFG), International Bird Rescue and Research Center (IBRRC),
                  Air-Deliverable Anti-Pollution Transfer System (ADAPTS), Expandiboom,
                  vacuum truck, Marco skimmer, hot-water flushing, Clean Coastal Waters,
                  Clean Seas, Pacific Strike Team (PST), National Wildlife Refuges, manual
                  removal.

                  Incident Summary:

                  On February 7, 1990 at 1620, the single-hull tank vessel American Trader
                  grounded on one of its anchors while approaching the Golden West Refining
                  Company's offshore mooring. Two holes were punctured in one of the
                  vessel's cargo tanks, releasing 9458 barrels of heavy crude oil into the water
                  approximately 1.3 miles from Huntington Beach, California.

                  The master of the vessel immediately reported the incident to the USCG
                  Marine Safety Office/Group Los Angeles-Long Beach (MSO/Group LA-LB).
                  The master moved the American Trader into deeper water one mile to the
                  south. The commanding officer of the MSO/Group assumed the role of the
                  Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSQ. The responsible parties assumed full
                  financial responsibility for the spill and sent representatives to the Long
                  Beach area.














                                                                             American Trader









             Oil began to come ashore on February 8 in light concentrations around
             Newport Pier. By February 9, oil was ashore at Huntington Beach; in some
             instances, oil in the surf zone here appeared to be in heavier concentrations
             than observed earlier at Newport Beach.
             Calm seas and fair weather for most of the response period resulted in a rapid
             and successful cleanup. All of the beaches were cleaned by March 2. The
             FOSC concluded all cleanup operations by April 3.

             The 22,000 barrels of crude remaining in the damaged cargo tank were
             lightered by personnel from the USCG Pacific Strike Team and the
             responsible party using the USCG Air-Deliverable Anti-Pollution Transfer
             System (ADAPTS). By 1200 on February 9, the oil from the damaged tank
             plus 90,000 barrels from the mid-body tanks had been transferred into barges
             to decrease the draft of the vessel. Temporary patches were applied to the
             holes in the hull and the American Trader was moved to an oil transfer
             facility in Long Beach Harbor to off-load the remaining 470,000 barrels of
             crude oil. The vessel was moved to San Francisco on February 18 for
             drydocking and repair.

             Behavior of Oil:

             Alaska North Slope Crude Oil is a medium weight oil with an API gravity of
             26.5 and a pour point of 0 degrees F. The release of oil from the damaged hull
             was rapid. Both of the puncture holes were in the No. 1 starboard wing tank.
             None of the other cargo tanks were damaged. The released oil was driven by
             the prevailing winds to the NNW of the grounding site. By the morning of
             the second day, the wind direction had changed and was blowing the oil away
             from the coastline. Most of the oil was held offshore by'winds in a forty
             square-mile slick for the first five days of the response, which allowed
             cleanup crews to concentrate on an extensive open-water recovery operation.

             On February 13, 35 knot winds forced most of the remaining slick ashore
             along fourteen miles of shoreline from Long Beach Harbor to Newport Beach.
             Heavy oil sludge and emulsified oil accumulated up to two inches thick in
             places. Most of this area had received only light to moderate oiling in the
             previous five day period.
















             American Trader                       2









                    Countermeasures and Mitigation:
                    Booming of the sensitive wetlands of the Bolsa Chica National Wildlife                    0
                    Refuge, Newport Bay, and the mouth of the Santa Ana River was completed
                    by 0200 on February 8. Double harbor booms were deployed at Anaheim Bay,
                    Newport Bay, and across the mouth of the Santa Ana River. Small skimmers
                    were stationed behind the first barrier to recover oil which passed beyond it.
                    Sorbent boom was also deployed between the two hard booms to collect oil                  0
                    which passed the outer barrier. Sorbent boom was placed across the mouths
                    of shallow inland channels in the Bolsa Chica marshlands.

                    Personnel from Orange County Flood Control constructed earthen berms
                    across the three channels of the Santa Ana River to keep oil from entering
                    the sensitive wetlands. The currents and tidal action in the river had made               0
                    exclusionary booming ineffective. Heavy rain runoff washed away all three
                    berms on February 17 and deposited debris from upriver onto Huntington
                    Beach. The berms were repaired before any oil contaminated the wetlands.
                    The berms proved to be very effective until February 25 when five to ten
                    gallons of oil were washed over the berm into the Huntington Beach                        0
                    wetlands by high tides and surf. This oil was removed with sorbent pads with
                    minimal damage to the wetlands.

                    As a result of prompt exclusion booming, no contamination to the wetlands
                    at Bolsa Chica and Newport Bay was observed. However, the FOSC
                    recommended that future exclusion booming operations employ a sturdier                    0
                    boom, such as Expandiboom, to prevent this outermost barrier from parting
                    during heavy weather.

                    Open-water recovery was done with fifteen skimming vessels and twenty-
                    five support/boom tow vessels. The USCG Pacific Strike Team responded to                  0
                    the scene with two Open Water Oil Containment and Recovery System
                    skimming barriers (OWOCRS). The U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage
                    (NAVSUPSALV) provided seven Marco Class V skimmers. The Clean
                    Coastal Waters and Clean Seas oil spill cooperatives provided three large
                    offshore skimmers. This extensive open-water recovery effort resulted in the
                    recovery of 14,000 barrels of emulsified oil and water (estimated to be over 25           0
                    per cent of the spilled oil). Offshore skimming operations were concluded by
                    February 17, as most of the remaining oil had beached by that time.

                    Beach cleanup methods included of manually deployed sorbent booms,
                    sorbent pads, and manual removal. These techniques were used to prevent                   0
                    destruction of the beach face and accelerated shoreline erosion that would
                    have been caused by moving heavy equipment on the beaches. Sorbent
                    pompoms were strung together and pulled through the surf zone to collect
                    oil before it contacted the beaches.

                    The exposed rocky shorelines, exposed bluffs, and riprap in the area of the               0
                    Bolsa Chica Bluffs, Newport Finger Piers, and Santa Ana River jetties were
                    heavily oiled by emulsified oil mousse and oil sludge during the February 13


                                                    3                                American Trader          0








             storm. Sorbents and vacuum trucks were used to remove free-standing pools
             of oil. These areas were further cleaned using hot-water flushing and
0            spraying. The temperature of the water was controlled by personnel from the
             California Department of Fish and Game (CA DIG) to keep it within the
             tolerance of the organisms inhabiting the rocks.
             Most of the beaches were cleaned and opened to the public by March 2.
             Cleaning of the rocky shorelines and riprap took place during February and
9            March. All of the shoreline cleaning was completed by April 3. In the final
             days of the spill, concern was expressed over the human health threat posed
             by reopening beaches that had been contaminated by oil. MEDTOX, a British
             Petroleum contractor, conducted limited surveys to determine the level of
             contamination. Survey results indicated no risk to human health.
0            Additionally, a modified EPA sand sampling test determined safe
             hydrocarbon limits for each beach before it was reopened. The approval
             process for reopening cleaned beaches was carried out by representatives of
             the USCG, CA DFG, and the city responsible for the beach.

             On the evening of February 7, the use of dispersing chemicals applied to
0            dissipate the spilled oil was discussed. The State of California concluded that
             the waters in the vicinity of the vessel were too shallow to consider
             dispersant use and a conclusive threat to specific wetland areas could not be
             identified, as required by California state law.
0            Other Special Interest Issues:
             Out of the 1,017 oiled birds taken to the bird rescue centers, 502 birds died as a
             result of the oiling. Two Pacific white-sided dolphins died from ingesting oil.
             A bird rehabilitation center was set up on Terminal Island and a bird rescue
             center was set up on Huntington Beach. Both centers were staffed by paid
41           contractors and volunteers, and were managed by biologists from CA DFG,
             British Petroleum, and the International Bird Rescue and Research Center
             UBRRC). Birds were initially cleaned at the Huntington Beach center and
             then transported to the Terminal Island center for further cleaning and
             rehabilitation. Rehabilitated birds were released approximately sixty miles
40           north of the spill location near Point Mugu.












             American Trader                        4









                   The major coastal bird species at risk was the brown pelican, a diving bird that
                   could become completely coated by oil while diving through the surface of
                   the water to feed. The Snowy Plover, a shorebird in the area, could also ingest
                   contaminated organisms at oiled shorelines. Many shorebird species,
                   however, tend to seek out non-contaminated areas for feeding. One hundred
                   forty one Brown Pelicans, an endangered species, were oiled during the spill;
                   sixty-eight of these died, an estimated 1.5 percent of the population at the
                   time.

                   Over one hundred grunion died while attempting to spawn on the oiled
                   beaches near the Bolsa Chica Bluffs according to wardens from the CA DFG.

                   References:

                   *Card, CPT J.C., and Meehan, LT J.A. 1991. Response to the American Trader
                   Oil Spill. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings 1991. pp. 305-311.
                   *NOAA Response Report
                   *Rolan, R.G. and Cameron, K.H. 1991. Adaptation of the Incident Command
                   System to Oil Spill Response During the American Trader Spill. Oil Spill
                   Conference Proceedings 1991. pp. 267-272.
                   *USCG On-Scene Coordinators Report
                   *White, J. and Williams, T. 1991. Saving Endangered Species in Major Oil
                   Spill Cleanup Efforts, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings 1991, pp. 221-223.































                                                 5                               American Trader








                   Name of Spill: Amoco Cadiz
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 03/16/78
                   Location of Spill: Brittany, France
                   Latitude: 48 35 N
                   Longitude: 004 43 W
                   Oil Product: Arabian light crude, Iranian light crude, Bunker C.
                   Oil Type: Type 2, Type 2, Type 4
                   Barrels: 1,619,048
0                  Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Oysters, clams, crustaceans, kelp, diving coastal birds,
                   waterfowl, bird nesting beaches, commercial fisheries.
                   Dispersants: Yes
                   Bioremediation: Yes
0                  In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Unusual or experimental cleanup techniques, habitat
                   impacts due to oil, habitat impacts due to cleanup operations, adverse
                   weather conditions, wildlife impacts, research conducted, closure of public
                   lands, closure of commercial fishing areas, closure of recreational fishing
                   areas, effects to tourism, effects to personal property, effects to recreation areas,
0                  media interest.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Marshes, sand/gravel beaches, exposed rocky
                   shores, piers, developed upland, salt marsh, tidal mudflat.
                   Keywords: Adverse weather conditions, boom, skimmer, vacuum truck,
                   manual removal, high-pressure hot water washing, sub-surface oil, remote
0                  response, BP 110OX, Finasol OSR, BP 110OWD, Finasol OSR-5, chalk, low
                   pressure washing, disposal.

                   Incident Summary:

                   On March 16, 1978, the Amoco Cadiz ran aground on Portsall Rocks, three
0                  miles off the coast of Brittany due to failure of the steering mechanism. The
                   vessel had been en route from the Arabian Gulf to Le Havre, France when it
                   encountered stormy weather which contributed to the grounding. The entire
                   cargo of 1,619,048 barrels, spilled into the sea. A slick 18 miles wide and 80
                   miles long polluted approximately 200 miles of Brittany's coastline. Beaches
                   of 76 different Breton communities were oiled.

                   The isolated location of the grounding and rough seas restricted cleanup
                   efforts for the two weeks following the incident. Severe weather resulted in
                   the complete break up of the ship before any oil could be pumped out of the
                   wreck. As mandated in the "Polmar Plan," the French Navy was responsible
                   for all offshore operations while the Civil Safety Service was responsible for
                   shore cleanup activities. Although the total quantity of collected oil and
                   water reached 100,000 tons, less than 20,000 tons of oil were recovered from
                   this liquid after treatment in refining plants.








                                                                                        Amoco Cadiz











             Behavior of Oil:

             Both Arabian Light and Iranian Light crude oil are medium weight oils with
             an API gravity of 33.8. Bunker C is a heavy product with an API of between 7
             and 14. A 12-mile long slick and heavy pools of oil were smeared onto 45
             miles of the French shoreline by northwesterly winds. Prevailing westerly
             winds during the following month spread the oil approximately 100 miles
             east along the coast. One week after the accident, oil had reached Cotes de                      0
             Nord.

             Oil penetrated the sand on several beaches to a depth of 20 inches. Sub-
             surface oil separated into two or three layers due to the extensive sand
             transfer that occurred on the beaches during rough weather. Piers and slips in
             the small harbors from Porspoder to Brehat Island were covered with oil.                         41
             Other impacted areas included the pink granite rock beaches of Tregastel and
             Perros-Guirrec, as well as the tourist beaches at Plougasnou. The total extent
             of oiling one month after the spill included approximately 200 miles of
             coastline.
             Oil persisted for only a few weeks along the exposed rocky shores that                           0
             experienced moderate to high wave action. In the areas sheltered from wave
             action, however, the oil persisted in the form of an asphalt crust for several
             years.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:                                                                  0

             A 2.5-mile long segment of boom protected the Bay of Morlaix. Although it
             required constant monitoring, the boom functioned properly because this
             sheltered area was protected from severe weather and from receiving
             excessive quantities of oil. Boom was largely ineffective in other areas due to                  0
             strong currents and enormous quantities of oil.

             Skimmers were used in harbors and other protected areas. However,
             skimmer efficiency was limited due to the blocking of pumps and hoses by
             seaweed. Vacuum trucks were used to remove oil from pier and boat slip
             areas where the seaweed was thick.                                                               0

             "Honey wagons," vacuum tanks designed to handle liquid manure, were
             effective in pumping out the emulsified oil along the coast. These wagons
             were able to pump oil, water, and seaweed. After the water and oil were
             separated as much as possible, the tanks were emptied through filter-buckets
             into interim storage tanks. When interim storage tanks were not available,
             the oil mixture was stored in large holes that were dug in the ground and
             lined with plastic sheets.

             Stranded oily seaweed was manually removed from the beaches using rakes
             and front-end loaders. Natural cleaning of the sand by wave action occurred
             on oil penetrated beaches after ploughing and harrowing of the sediments.



             Amoco Cadiz                             2                                                      0








                   Both artificial fertilizers and bacterial cultures were poured on the oily sand
                   before harrowing.
40                 Several brands of diluted and concentrated dispersants, including BP 1100 X,
                   Finasol OSR, BP 1100 WD, and Finasol OSR -5, were used by the French Navy.
                   Good dispersion of oil was difficult since the emulsified oil was several
                   centimeters thick in some places.

0                  Approximately 650 metric tons of oleophilic chalk, Nautex, was applied in an
                   effort to sink the oil and prevent it from entering the "goulet de Brest."' After
                   one month at sea, the oil was so viscous that the chalk could not penetrate it.
                   A rubber powder made from old tires was applied to promote oil absorption.
                   The powder was spread with water hoses aboard French Navy ships or
0                  applied manually by workers from small fishing boats. Wave action proved
                   to be insufficient in mixing the powder with the oil. The powder had little
                   effect on the slick because it remained on top of the oil.

                   High-pressure hot water (fresh water at 2,000 psi, heated to 80' - 140'C) was
0                  very effective in cleaning oil from rocky shoreline areas during the third and
                   fourth months of cleanup. A small amount of dispersant was applied to
                   prevent the oiling of the cleaned rocks during the next high tide.

                   Several of the impacted rivers contained oyster beds and marshes that
                   required manual cleaning. Soft mud river banks were cleaned by using a low
0                  pressure water wash to push the oil down the river. To make collection more
                   efficient, a sorbent material was mixed with water and poured in front of the
                   washing nozzles. The oil was later collected by a locally developed device
                   called an "Egmolap." This device was able to collect any material floating in
                   sheltered areas.
0                  Much of the collected oil was stored at Brest and Tregastel and treated with
                   quick-lime for encapsulation and stabilization.

                   Other Special Interest Issues:

0                  The nature of the oil and rough seas contributed to the rapid formation of a
                   "chocolate mousse" emulsification of oil and water. This viscous
                   emulsification greatly complicated the cleanup efforts. French authorities
                   decided not to use dispersants in sensitive areas or the coastal fringe where
                   water depth was less than 50 meters. Had dispersant been applied from the
                   air in the vicinity of the spill source, the formation of mousse may have been
Z                  prevented.

                   At the time, the Amoco Cadiz incident resulted in the largest loss of marine
                   life ever recorded from an oil spill. Mortalities of most animals occurred
                   over the two month period following the spill. Two weeks following the
                   accident, millions of dead mollusks, sea urchins, and other bottom-dwelling
                   organisms washed ashore. Diving birds constituted the majority of the nearly
                   20,000 dead birds that were recovered. The oyster mortality from the spill was



                                                      3                                  Amoco Cadiz








              estimated at 9,000 tons. Fishes with skin ulcerations and tumors were caught
              by fishermen in the area. Some of the fish caught in the area reportedly had a
              strong taste of petroleum. Although echinoderm and small crustacean
              populations almost completely disappeared, the populations of many species
              recovered within a year. Cleanup activities on rocky shores, such as pressure-
              washing, also caused habitat impacts.

              The Amoco Cadiz spill was one of the most studied oil spills in history.
              Many studies remain in progress. This was the largest recorded spill in
              history and was the first spill in which estuarine tidal rivers were oiled. No
              follow-up mitigation existed to deal with asphalt formation and problems
              that resulted after the initial aggressive cleanup. Additional erosion of
              beaches occurred in several places where no attempt was made to restore the
              gravel that was removed to lower the beach face. Many of the affected
              marshes, mudflats, and sandy beaches, were low-energy areas. Evidence of
              oiled beach sediments can still be seen in some of these sheltered areas.
              Layers of sub-surface oil still remain buried in many of the impacted beaches.







































              Amoco Cadiz                             4








ML





                    Ref erences:


                    98/9/91 & 8/28/91 Letters from Daniel Owen at ITOPF
                    e Bellier, P. and G. Massart. 1979. The Amoco Cadiz oil spill cleanup
                    operations - An overview of the organization, control, and evaluation of the
                    cleanup techniques employed, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1979, pp.141-
                    145.
0                   eBocand, et al. 1979. Cleaning products used in operations after the Amoco
                    Cadiz disaster, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1979, pp.163-167.
                    *D'Ozouville, et al. 1979. Occurrence of oil in offshore bottom sediments at
                    the Amoco Cadiz oil spill site, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1979, pp.187-
                    191.
0                   *Gundlach, E. and Marshall, M. 1990. The Physical Persistence of Spilled Oil:
                    An Analysis of Oil Spills Previous to Exxon Valdez. Final Report. HAZMAT.
                    OAD. NOAA. pp.21-41.
                    -Gundlach, et al. 1983. The Fate of AMOCO CADIZ Oil. The Physical
                    Persistence of Spilled Oil: An Analysis of Oil Spills Previous to Exxon Valdez.
                    Final Report. HAZMAT. OAD. NOAA. pp. A90-A97.
0                   sHann, R.W. 1979. Unit operations, unit processes and level of resource
                    requirements for the cleanup of the oil spill from the supertanker Amoco
                    Cadiz. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1979, pp.147-161.
                    e Hayes, et al. 1979. Role of dynamic coastal processes in the impact and
                    dispersal of the Amoco Cadiz oil spill (March, 1978) Brittany, France, Oil Spill
0                   Conference Proceedings, 1979, pp.193-198
                    9 Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
                    1987.
                    *MMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
                    90SIR Newsletter 2/21/91
                    *OSIR Oil Spills, International Summary & Review, 1978-1981
0                   *Overton, E. 1979. Chemical characterization of mousse and selected
                    environmental samples from the Amoco Cadiz oil spill, Oil Spill Conference
                    Proceedings, 1979, pp.169-173.
                    *Review of Oil Spill Occurrences and Impacts, Exxon Production Research
                    Company, 1989.
0                   eSamain. 1979. Ecophysiological effects of oil spills from Amoco Cadiz on
                    pelagic communities - preliminary results, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings,
                    1979, pp. 175-185.
                    *The SocioEconomic Impacts of Oil Spills, Final Report, WAPORA, March
                    1984.
                    *Vandermeulen, J.H. 1982. Oil Spills: What Have We Learned? Oil and
                    Dispersants in Canadian Seas-Research Appraisal and Recommendations.
                    Environment Canada. pp. 29-46.










                                                      5                                  Amoco Cadiz








                    Name of Spill: Apex 3417 Barge, Apex 3503 Barge
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 7/28/90
                    Location of Spill: near buoy 58 in Galveston Bay, Texas
                    Latitude: 29 29.9 N
                    Longitude: 094 52.2 W
                    Oil Product: No. 5 Oil (Vacuum Oil / Catalytic Feed Stock)
                    Oil Type: Type 4
                    Barrels: 16,476
                    Source of Spill: Tank Barge
                    Resources at Risk: Wading birds, waterfowl, marshes, submerged aquatic
                    vegetation, rookeries, spawning beaches, seed beds.
                    Dispersants: No
                    Bioremediation: Yes
                    In-situ Burning: No
                    Other Special Interest: Closure of public lands, closure of shipping lanes,
                    effects to recreation areas, research conducted, human health and safety
                    concerns.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Exposed seawalls, piers, fine sand beaches, fringing
                    salt marshes, extensive salt marshes, marshes.
                    Keywords: Low pressure washing, vacuum truck, sorbent boom,
                    containment boom, skimmer, shallow water recovery, Alpha Bio-Sea
                    microbes, collision, sinking, salvage, Clean Gulf, lightering.

                    -Incident Summary:

                    On July 28, 1990, at 1430, the Greek Tank Vessel Shinoussa collided with the
                    tank barges Apex 3417 and Apex 3503 in the Houston Ship Channel (HSQ
                    near buoy 58 in Galveston Bay, Texas. All three cargo tanks of the Apex 3417
                    were damaged, as well as the aft tank of the Apex 3503, resulting in the release
                    Of nearly 17,000 barrels of No. 5 oil (vacuum oil/catalytic feed stock) into
                    Galveston Bay. A third tank barge also under tow, the Apex 3510, was not
                    damaged in the collision.
                    The Apex 3417 sank with its stern resting on the bottom of the channel and
                    only its bow showing above the water. It released nearly all of its cargo, over
                    15,000 barrels of oil, over the course of two days. Apex 3503 was less damaged
                    and ultimately released 1130 barrels of oil into the water. The Apex 3510 was
                    towed to Houston, discharged its 23,000 barrel cargo, and returned on July 30
                    to offload the remaining oil from the Apex 3503.

                    The USCG Marine Safety Office (MSO) Galveston closed the Houston Ship
                    Channel to marine traffic from two miles north to two miles south of the
                    incident site (between buoys 51 and 60). Apex Towing Co., Inc. immediately
                    accepted responsibility for the spill. Apex hired Riedel-Peterson
                    Environmental Services to contain the oil at the site of the barges, and T & T
                    Marine Salvage to raise and remove the Apex 3417 barge from the channel.






                                                              1      Apex 3417 Barge, Apex 3503 Barge









             On July 29, Malin Environmental was hired for additional cleanup assistance,
             and the Clean Gulf Association provided skimmers for use by Apex. In a
             meeting with the USCG On-Scene Coordinator (OSC), Apex was criticized for
             allowing the cleanup contractors to operate without direct supervision. At
             the suggestion of the OSC, Apex hired O'Brien Oil Pollution Services to
             oversee the cleanup operations as well as Garner Environmental Services
             and Industrial Cleanup, Inc. for addition cleanup support.
             On July 30, the cargo of theApex 3503 was lightered to the Apex 3510 which
             was then taken to Houston for offloading. On July 31, the HSC was opened to
             inbound single-width barge tows only, under positive control of the Vessel
             Traffic Service, and with assistance from at least one tug when proceeding
             past the accident site. These traffic restrictions remained in effect until
             August 3. Following the movement of Apex 3417 from the middle of the
             channel on August 3, the HSC was restricted to one-way traffic only, with
             direction of travel being reversed every 8 to 12 hours. After cleaning, gas
             freeing, and welding repairs, Apex 3417 was towed to Galveston. The HSC
             was opened to all ship traffic without restriction on August 10. Cleanup
             operations continued until the case was closed on August 17, 1990.

             Behavior of Oil:

             Results of the initial overflight on July 28 showed a sheen to the South of
             Apex 3417 extending 0.75 miles. By late afternoon, the sheen was reported to
             be 3 miles long. On the first day, the oil moved to the SSW under the
             influence of the winds and tides. A shift in the wind on the second day
             resulted in the movement of the slick to the NE of the accident site, with
             sheen extending 3.5 miles.

             Oil landed on the eastern shoreline of Red Fish Island on July 29, with a
             heavy accumulation along its one-mile length. By the end of the day, the
             slick reached from four miles north to two miles south of the accident site,
             consisting mostly of sheen with heavy streamers of oil to the north. On July
             30, oil impacted the Texas City Dike and the north side of Pelican Island, 10
             miles south of the accident site. Oil continued to move to the north, south,
             and west driven by tidal currents and changing winds. By the morning of
             August 3, oil had made landfall along the northern shoreline of Galveston
             Bay. The primary focus of the cleanup shifted to this area, as only lighter
             residual oiling existed on the southern and western shorelines.

             A study performed by Louisiana State University characterized the oil as a
             non-sticky, heavy, refined product similar to 20W-50 motor oil. This allowed
             stranded oil to be re-floated by the tide rather than strongly adhering to objects
             and surfaces.









             Apex 3417 Barge, Apex 3503 Barge      2









                    Countermeasures and Mitigation:

                    Containment boom was in place by the morning of July 29 around the leaking
                    barges to keep the oil at the incident site. Booms were placed across the
                    entrance to Dickinson Bayou and the cooling water intake channel for the
                    Houston Lighting and Power Bacliff generating plant.

                    On July 29, the Texas Water Commission (TWC) Chairman and the Deputy
                    Commissioner of the Texas General Land Office suggested the use of
                    bioremediation for mitigation of the spill. The OSC felt that bioremediation
                    was not essential to the cleanup of the spill, but permitted it, provided that
                    payment came from the state or the spiller directly. Additionally, any
                    bioremediation plan would need approval of the Region 6 Regional Response
                    Team (RRT).

                    Four skimmers arrived on-scene on the morning of July 30 and began
                    skimming operations on the heavy concentrations of oil within the
                    containment boom around the barge, and to the north of the accident site.
                    Shallow water skimmers, capable of operating in 2-3 feet of water, proved to
                    be highly useful during the response to skim oil and deploy booms.
                    Skimmers and boats that were incapable of operating in these depths suffered
                    frequent groundings in the shallow estuaries. Skimmers, sent complete with
                    operators and support, were put to use immediately upon their arrival; the
                    crews and support for the Clean Gulf Association skimmers had to be
                    contracted separately which caused additional delays. A deck barge equipped
                    with two vacuum trailer units was also used at the collision site.

                    Cleanup operations began on July 31 on all impacted shorelines using
                    vacuum trucks and sorbent booms and pads. On August 1, the wind shifted
                    again to the SSE and remained from that direction for the next five days. The
                    oil slick moved steadily to the North and stranded along the northern
                    shoreline of the bay on August 3. The shallow water depth (less than six feet)
                    in the estuaries hampered operations with boats and skimmers. Deflection
                    booms were positioned east of Houston Point to direct oil to the shore for
                    removal by vacuum trucks. Low-pressure washing was used on the shoreline
                    at Red Fish Island, as well as some small sites near Cedar Point.

                    On August 2, approximately 100 pounds of Alpha Bio-Sea microbes with a
                    nutrient additive were applied to the marsh at the north end of Pelican
                    Island. On August 5, an application of 140 pounds of Bio-Sea microbes was
                    made in the Marrow Marsh area, just south of the entrance to Cedar Bayou.
                    Another application took place on August 6 at a point farther south of Cedar
                    Bayou using 150 pounds of Bio-Sea microbes. The final application of Bio-Sea
                    microbes was made on August 13 at Marrow Marsh to treat residual oil
                    remaining in an untreated site.
                    On August 10, surveys by members of the TWC, Texas Parks and Wildlife,
                    and the USCG determined that shoreline cleanup was complete except for the
                    final application of bioremediation agent to the Marrow Marsh area. The


                                                            3      Apex 3417 Barge, Apex 3503 Barge








            final shoreline survey was satisfactorily completed on August 17 and the case
            was closed.
0           Other Special Interest Issues:

            The proposed TWC bioremediation plan was approved by the RRT, allowing
            bioremediation in these areas:
            *Open water with concentrated oil
0           *Open water surface oil contained with booms
            *Impacted marshes with oil on grass, exposed mud and water surface
            *Beaches with residual oil following mechanical cleanup

            The TWC presented a monitoring plan which was required by the RRT. The
            RRT directed that the application of bioremediation take place away from the
0           commercial oyster beds, if possible, and that it not interfere with any other
            cleanup activities. Water and sediment samples were collected at various
            times until 11 days after the bioremediation application, but determination of
            the effectiveness of the bioremediation was inconclusive. Results of EPA
            laboratory analyses of samples showed no noticable differences between
0           treated and untreated plots 48 hours after microbe application. NOAA gas
            chromatography/ mass spectroscopy analyses of samples before and after
            treatment showed no apparent changes in the relative abundances of specific
            compounds in the oil. Because biodegradation takes place slowly, the 11 day
            period of sampling may not have been long enough. Results were clouded by
            poor control of the application and the disturbance of test areas by human
0           activities and livestock.

            On July 31, the Division of Shellfish Sanitation Control of the Texas State
            Department of Health ordered a ban on the removal of shellfish, shrimp, and
            finned fish from Galveston Bay in the area of the spill site until a
0           determination of fitness for human consumption was made. On August 2,
            thds was altered to include all of Galveston Bay. On August 4 the ban on fin
            fishing was lifted, but the ban on shellfish and shrimp removal remained in
            effect until September 2.
            On August 1, Apex announced its intention to terminate cleanup response,
            having reached the limit of liability. The OSC assumed federal responsibility
            for the cleanup on August 2, keeping all the current cleanup companies on
            contract. Apex continued to oversee the salvage operation until its
            completion.

            On August 5, TWC reported a fish kill of 200-300 speckled trout NE of the
            Houston Light and Power spillway near the Trinity River outflow.

            References:

            *Draft OSC Report
            *Golob's Oil Pollution Bulletin 11.16,17,26
            *Greene, CPT T.C. 1991. The Apex Barges Spill, Galveston Bay, July 1990, Oil
            Spill Conference Proceedings, 1991,. pp. 291-297.


            Apex 3417 Barge, Apex 3503 Barge      4








                   eHoff, R. 1991. A Summary of Bioremediation Applications Observed at
                   Marine Oil Spills. Report HMRB 91-2. Jan. 1991.
                   *Mearns, Alan J. 1991. Observations of an Oil Spill Bioremediation Activity        40
                   in Galveston Bay, Texas. NOAA Technical Memorandum NOS OMA 57.
                   Seattle. Hazardous Materials Response Branch, National Oceanic and
                   Atmospheric Administration. 38 pp.
                   9MMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
                   *Oil Spill Intelligence Reports )(III.31&SUP,32,33,51
                   *OSIR International Spill Statistics 1989-1990, Special Report, 3/28/91
                   *OSIR Oil Spills, International Summary & Review, 1989-1990



















                                                                                                      0

























                                                         5      Apex 3417 Barge, Apex 3503 Barge








                    Name of Spill: Arabian Gulf/Kuwait
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 01/19/91
                    Location of Spill: Persian Gulf, Kuwait
                    Latitude: 29 30 N
                    Longitude: 048 00 E
                    Oil Product: Kuwait crude oil
                    Oil Type: Type 3
                    Barrels: 900,000,000
                    Source of Spill: tank vessels, facilities, pipelines, platforms.
                    Resources at Risk: Power plant water intakes, drinking water intakes,
                    industrial water intakes, mangroves, salt marshes, fine sand beaches, tidal
                    mudflats, coral reefs, fishes, waterfowl, shrimp, shrimp nursery areas, oysters,
                    shorebirds, bird wintering area, bird migratory stopover areas, wading birds,
                    crabs, diving coastal birds, submerged aquatic vegetation.
                    Dispersants: No
                    Bioremediation: Yes
                    In-situ Burning: No
                    Other Special Interest: Human health and safety concerns, research
                    conducted, volunteer response and organization, wildlife impacts, wildlife
                    rehabilitation.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Mangroves, salt marshes, fine sand beaches, tidal
                    mudflats, coral reefs, submerged aquatic vegetation.
                    Keywords: Sub-surface oil, side-looking airborne radar (SLAR), skimmers,
                    boom, vacuum truck.

                    Incident Summary:

                    Oil was spilled into the Arabian Gulf when the Iraqi Army occupying Kuwait
                    began destroying tankers, oil tern-tinals, and oil wells late in January 1991.
                    Approximately 900,000,000 barrels of oil spilled.

                    Behavior of Oil:

                    Approximately 900,000,000 barrels of oil spilled onto Kuwait lands or into the
                    Arabian Gulf. An estimated third of the total amount of oil released
                    evaporated. Approximately 8,000,000 barrels of oil spilled directly into the
                    Arabian Gulf forming a 600-square mile oil slick. An unknown amount of
                    the oil sank. Four hundred miles of the western shoreline of the gulf was
                    oiled. The areas between Safaniya and Abu Ali Island in Saudi Arabia were
                    the most severely impacted. Tarmats up to 12 inches thick formed on some
                    of these beaches. Over a million barrels of oil were removed from the
                    Arabian Gulf by April 1991 by cleanup operations.











                                                            1      Arabian Gulf/Kuwait






                                                                                                              0



             Countermeasures and Mitigation:
             While the ongoing war between Iraq and the United Nations Coalition Forces                       0
             prevented most options for response to the spills, some efforts were made
             during the war. Most significant was the sealing of open pipelines at the
             Mina Al Ahmadi facility using smart bombs deployed from Coalition force
             aircraft. During the war, the United States Coast Guard conducted overflights
             with SLAR aircraft, and made onshore observations to track the movement                          0
             of the slick. Postwar efforts were organized by Saudi Arabia's Arabian
             American Oil Company (ARAMCO), a Saudi owned oil company, the
             Meteorological and Environmental Protection Administration (MEPA), and
             the Royal Commission for jubayl and Yanbu. Firefighting, environmental
             and biological experts from around the world came to the Middle East to                          41
             advise on mitigation operations. In Saudi Arabia the initial response
             concentrated on protecting desalinization plant water intakes. Of primary
             concern was the plant at Jubayl, which provides the city of Riyadh with 80 per
             cent of its water. Desalinization, industry and power plant intakes were
             protected by booms and skimming operations. Sensitive natural areas were
             also boomed to prevent oiling. Twenty-five miles of boom and 21 skimmers                         40
             were deployed in the Gulf.

             Recovery operations using skimmers, vacuum trucks and booms provided by
             ARAMCO recovered 1,400,000 barrels of oil from the gulf by April. Oil that
             collected in coastal depressions was boomed off and skimmed out. Earthen
             berms were built out from the shoreline to catch oil for skimming. Trenches                      0
             were dug to collect oil brought in on high tides.

             Other Special Interest Issues:
             A bird rehabilitation center was set up at Al Jubayl and staffed by Saudi                        0
             volunteers and Coalition armed forces personnel. An estimated 20,000 birds
             died from oiling, among them the Socotra Cormorant, which is an
             endangered species, and the Great Cormorant. Thousands of dead crabs were
             found in the salt marshes, mangroves, and beaches.
             Cleanup effectiveness and ecological impact research was conducted in salt
             marshes by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and Crowley
             Maritime Corporation (CMC). Testing of various bioremediation agents and
             sampling programs for the benthic, pelagic, and planktonic communities of
             habitats such as mangroves, mudflats, sand beaches, seagrass beds, and coral
             reefs were initiated by the Research Institute of King Fahd University of
             Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM/RI).











             Arabian Gulf /Kuwait                    2











                   Ref erences:

                   *Canby, T.. The Persian Gulf After the Storm. National Geographic. Vol.
                   180, No. 2. August 1991. pp.2-32.
                   *Environmental Crisis in the Gulf: The U.S. Response. A booklet produced
                   by the U.S. Gulf Task Force.

















































                                                         3      Arabian Gulf/Kuwait








                    Name of Spill: Aragon
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 12/29/89
                    Location of Spill: Madeiran Archipelago, Portugal                                            0
                    Latitude: 33 34 N
                    Longitude: 015 34 W
                    Oil Product: Mexican Maya crude oil
                    Oil Type: Type 3
                    Barrels: 175,000
                    Source of Spill: Tank Vessel                                                                 0
                    Resources at Risk: Seals, beaches, birds.
                    Dispersants: Yes
                    Bioremediation: Yes
                    In-situ Burning: No
                    Other Special Interest: Logistical or operational problems, interaction with                 40
                    foreign authorities, effects to tourism.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches, exposed rocky shores
                    Keywords: International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF),
                    boom, high-viscosity screw pumps, high-pressure washing, hot-water
                    flushing, Inipol, reoiling, manual removal, fingerprinting, sub-surface oil,
                    disposal.                                                                                    0

                    Incident Summary:

                    While under tow, the Spanish tank vessel Aragon suffered damage during a
                    storm on December 29, 1989, approximately 360 miles off the coast of Morocco.
                    The damage resulted in the release of approximately 175,000 barrels of                       41
                    Mexican Maya Crude Oil into the Atlantic Ocean, near the Madeiran
                    archipelago.

                    The Portuguese Navy was in charge of the response. They monitored the
                    initial movement of the oil until it made landfall. Approximately three                      0
                    weeks after the spill, pollution occurred on the Portuguese Island of Porto
                    Santo, with oil believed to have been from the Aragon. This was later
                    confirmed when oil samples were taken from the vessel.

                    Portuguese authorities requested assistance from the International Tanker
                    Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF) and the European Economic
                    Community (EEC) Task Force. Specialists from the ITOPF and EEC Task Force
                    recommended bringing additional equipment to the island, as there was no
                    pollution response force already in place.












                                                                                                Aragon











            Behavior of Oil:

            Mexican Maya oil is a medium crude with an API gravity of 22. The
            Portuguese Navy observed the oil drifting to the southwest. The oil was
            difficult to see in the water. Following the initial reporting and tracking, the
            oil was lost and was believed to have moved below the surface.

            Approximately three weeks after the spill, oil impacted the island of Porto
            Santo. Oil filled five coves on the east side of the island. The oil was held in
            place by the prevailing winds, although some along shore migration of oil
            was driven by currents. This caused pollution of the sand beach on the south
            coast of the island, an important tourist and recreation beach.

            A small amount of oil impacted on the rocky shores of the island of Madeira
            and the Desertas Islands. These islands are sparsely inhabited (only a small
            research station exists there), but are ecologically sensitive and have large
            seabird and monk seal populations. The monk seal is a threatened species.
            Impacts on the Desertas Islands consisted of scattered tarballs.

            Countermeasures and Mitigation:

            There was no response at-sea, as conditions in the area were too rough to use
            removal equipment. Vessels were unable to get into the coves to facilitate
            nearshore recovery. All cleanup took place from the shoreside and generally
0           consisted of pumping, manual, and mechanical removal with any equipment
            which could be obtained.

            Cleanup equipment was flown to Porto Santo from France, Denmark,
            Germany, and the United Kingdom in heavy transport aircraft. Armed forces
0           personnel unloaded the initial shipments during the night following their
            arrival, and the equipment was allowed to clear customs quickly so it could be
            deployed.

            Poor access to the shorelines and limited transportation assets on the island
            hampered the ability of the cleanup personnel to remove the oil. Where
0           access was possible, bulldozers, dump trucks, and backhoes provided effective
            recovery. Booms were used to hold oil against the coves, where it was
            pumped by high-viscosity screw pumps into storage tanks and pits which had
            been dug to increase the rate of recovery. Recovered bulk oil was stored
            temporarily in these tanks and pits until it could be carried away for longer
            term storage. A disused quarry near the port was used for this purpose, but
            transport of oil there was limited by the number of'trucks and the condition
            of the roads. An estimated 10,000 cubic meters of bulk oil were recovered
            from Porto Santo.

            Once the bulk oil was removed, the shoreline tended to self-clean by wave
            action. Dispersants and high-pressure, hot-water washing were used as
            secondary cleaning for the rocks in the public use areas. After one winter, all



            Aragon                                 2








                   of the residual oil was gone from the beaches, including beaches which had
                   not been cleaned.

                   Other Special Interest Issues:

                   Bioremediation was attempted on an experimental basis. Inipol was applied
                   at two sites on Porto Santo. Results of the experiments were inconclusive as
                   both sites were in high-energy locations and suffered from reoiling.

                   Oily solids were transported to the landfill near the airfield on Porto Santo
                   and disposed of with the island's domestic refuse. A hydrogeologist from the
                   United Kingdom recommended the action, following an investigation which
                   determined that there would be no risk to the local groundwater. Cleanup
                   personnel excavated proper refuse cells and made the landfill to EEC
                   standards.

                   Two options were considered for the remaining bulk oil in the quarry. The
                   first was to treat the oil and use it as road foundation. It was decided instead
                   to remove the oil from the island. A Dutch company built a pipeline from
                   the quarry to the port and used specialized pumps to move the heavily
                   emulsified oil directly into a barge. The quarry was cleaned and the oil was
                   shipped to a recycling facility in Amsterdam.

                   Logistics were a major problem during this response. Very little heavy
                   equipment was available for use and was brought to the island from other
                   locations. Trucks were shipped from Madeira. The spill affected areas which
                   were not accessible to large vehicles. Many roads had to be built or improved
                   on Porto Santo in order to handle the size and number of vehicles used in the
                   response.

                   The cleanup operation was an international effort. Organizations
                   instrumental in this response included the Portuguese Navy, the
                   International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation, the European Economic
                   Community Task Force (formed by the Commission of European
                   Communities), the governments of France, Germany, the United Kingdom,
                   and the Netherlands. Their efforts were critical to the rapid procurement and
                   proper use of cleanup equipment.

                   Tourist activity on Porto Santo increased following the spill due to interest in
                   the spill and response activity.













                                                          3                                Aragon










            References:


            *08/09/91 & 08/28/91 Letters from Daniel Owen at ITOPF
            *Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
            *MMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
            *Nichols, J.A. and Moller, T.H. 1991. International Cooperation in Oil Spill
            Response, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1991, pp. 61-64.
            *Oil Spill Intelligence Report 01/04/90
            eOil Spill Intelligence Report 01/03/91
            *Oil Spill Intelligence Report 02/21/91
            90il Spill Intelligence Report, International Summary & Review, 1989-1990
            *Tanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers. T.A.C.
            Inc. 1991.














































            Aragon








                   Name of Spill: ARCO Anchorage
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 12/21/85
                   Location of Spill: Port Angeles Harbor, Port Angeles, Washington.                     40
                   Latitude: 48 07 N
                   Longitude: 123 27 W
                   Oil Product: Alaska North Slope crude oil
                   Oil Type: Type 3
                   Barrels: 5690
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: National Wildlife Refuges, seals, diving coastal birds,
                   shorebirds, anadromous fish, demersal fish, recreational fishing areas,
                   commercial fisheries, fish aquaculture sites, log storage areas.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No                                                                    11
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Research conducted, unusual or experimental cleanup
                   techniques, wildlife impacts, wildlife rehabilitation, habitat impact due to oil.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: coarse gravel beaches, exposed rocky shores,
                   sand/gravel beaches.
                   Keywords: National Wildlife Refuges, adverse weather conditions,                      0
                   International Bird Rescue and Research Center (IBRRC), volunteers,
                   skimmer, vacuum truck, reoiling, sub-surface oil, Open Water Oil
                   Containment and Recovery System (OWOCRS), Air-Deliverable Anti
                   Pollution Transfer Systems (ADAPTS), boom, sorbents, manual removal
                   Incident Summary:                                                                     40

                   At 1626 on December 21, 1985 the Tank Vessel ARCO Anchorage ran aground
                   while anchoring in Port Angeles Harbor, Washington. The vessel was
                   carrying 814,000 barrels of Alaska North Slope crude oil en route from Valdez,
                   Alaska to the Cherry Point Refinery in Bellingham, Washington. Weather                0
                   conditions at the time of the incident were calm with a visibility of 3 miles.
                   The vessel was holed in two cargo tanks resulting in the loss of 5690 barrels of
                   oil into Port Angeles Harbor. Internal transfer of cargo from the holed tanks
                   stopped the discharge of oil into the water by 2052, December 21. The ARCO
                   Anchorage remained aground until 0244, December 22 when it was refloated
                   and moved to deeper anchorage within Port Angeles Harbor.                             0














                                                                                 ARCO Anchorage









             Through discussions with the Canadian Coast Guard it was decided that
             invocation of the joint U.S. Canadian response plan (CANUSPAC) was not
             necessary, but that close contact would be maintained. An ARCO spill
             response team was activated from Long Beach, California. Under the
             influence of wind and tides, the oil was carried to the west almost to Neah
             Bay and to the east to Dungeness Spit. No impacts were observed in Canada
             from thds incident. Cleanup activities were suspended on April 7, 1986.

             Behavior of Oil:

             Alaska North Slope crude oil is a medium weight oil with an API gravity of
             26.5 and a pour point of 0 degrees F. Shortly after the grounding, released oil
             was observed bubbling from under the port side of the vessel in the vicinity
             of the No. 4 and 5 tanks. Due to light wind conditions and calm seas, the
             movement of oil was primarily directed by tidal current influences.
             Movement of oil within the harbor was generally in a clockwise direction.
             Oil was carried out of the harbor around the end of Ediz Hook as well as to
             the east from the vessel itself. Most of the oil that left Port Angeles Harbor
             was carried to the east and west along the ten fathom contour. Heavy
0            concentrations of oil were observed to the east of the harbor immediately
             north and northeast of Dungeness Spit. The slick stalled in this area for
             nearly two weeks before the remaining patches began to move in a westerly
             direction. Scattered slicks and a sheens of emulsified oil were observed to the
             west of Port Angeles as far as Neah Bay. Some patches of brown oil were
0            observed between Angeles Point and Agate Bay.
             Impacted areas within Port Angeles Harbor included the oiling of 15 million
             board feet of wet stored logs and the shoreline oiling of approximately 7,000
             feet of coarse grain, cobble beach along Ediz Hook. Shoreline areas 15 miles to
             the east of Port Angeles at Dungeness Spit were only lightly impacted with oil
0            despite heavier concentrations offshore. During the first two weeks of the
             spill, the bird populations in the Dungeness Spit area were impacted by both
             beached oil and the offshore slick. Seals were seen in the area. One dead
             animal which was recovered was determined to have died of non-oil related
             causes. The inner lagoon at Sequim Bay was not affected; occasional reports
0            of oiling proved to be detritus. To the west of Port Angeles some light oiling
             of shoreline was reported at Crescent Bay, Little Agate Bay, Freshwater Bay,
             and Pillar Point.















             ARCO Anchorage                          2








                    Countermeasures and Mitigation:

                    By 2125 on the night of the incident, 4,500 feet of containment boom had been
                    deployed from Coast Guard, Clean Sound and Western Tug and Transport
                    storage facilities. Numerous vessels were dispatched to contain the oil
                    around the vessel. When the extent of the spill was realized, an additional
                    contractor, Crowley Environmental, was brought on-scene. A total of 9
                    skimmers and 15,spill response- vessels were ultimately used, including some
                    Canadian vessels from Burrard Clean. Open water recovery efforts were
                    hampered by fog which prevented spill overflights. All skimmers working
                    offshore had to be equipped with radar. Calm seas provided ideal conditions
                    for skimming operations. By developing an active communications system
                    and learning to predict local currents, operators were able to keep the
                    skimmers in recoverable concentrations of oil. When away from recoverable
                    oil, skimmer operators would start a systematic search, and contact other
                    vessels for redeployment if oil was not found. Skimmers using this system
                    were able to operate continuously, 24 hours a day, for five weeks. An
                    important element in this operation was the contracting of Foss Marine and
                    Wight Marine Service to provide on-scene mechanical and electrical repair to
                    any vessel around the clock. Of the 5,700 barrels of oil spilled, an estimated
                    3,126 barrels were recovered.

                    The cleanup of 15 million board feet of oiled logs posed a unique challenge.
                    Five million board feet were considered lightly oiled and were cleaned by
                    dragging the logs through a car wash and cleaning with high pressure fire
                    hoses. The remaining 10 million board feet (2,300 bundles of 10-20 logs each)
                    were heavily oiled and had to be removed from the water for cleaning. A
                    complete logging operation had to be established. Three barges equipped with
                    cranes were contracted from Seaspan Corp. of Canada to lift the log bundles
                    out of the water, load and transport the logs for cleaning, and finally dump
                    the logs back into the water after cleaning. The bundles of logs were cleaned
                    by dipping the bundles under water three or four times to release trapped oil
                    and then washing with high pressure water cannons aboard two Foss tugs.
                    Global Diving and Salvage was also contracted to assist in log cleanup. The
                    log cleaning operation was completed on January 29.

                    Reidel Environmental was contracted to cleanup impacted beaches to the
                    west at Crescent Bay, Agate Bay, and Freshwater Bay. Cleanup activities on
                    these lightly impacted beaches consisted of the removal of floating oil using
                    sorbents, debris removal, and wiping of logs and rocks. Volunteers were
                    dispatched to several areas to recover oiled birds and to take samples of kelp
                    and sea urchins. Samples analyzed by Battelle Pacific Northwest found no
                    tainting of sea urchins. Western cleanup activities were completed by
                    January 10 and a survey by Washington Department of Ecology (WDOE)
                    personnel sighted no oil on January 16.

                    Cleanup activities along the Dungeness Spit beaches were under the direction
                    of the Refuge Manager. Cleanup recommendations were agreed upon and set
                    forth in writing. WDOE arranged to have the Washington State



                                                            3                        ARCO Anchorage








            Conservation Corps remove oiled debris for ARCO. Logs were not removed
            from the beaches because of their contribution to the stability of the spit. By
            December 29, consensus among the NOAA, WDOE, U.S. Fish and Wildlife
            Service (FWS), and the OSC was reached concerning the detrimental effects of
            further cleanup activities. On January 7 all parties agreed that further cleanup
            of Dungeness Spit would be suspended and that a final evaluation of the
            area's condition would be made in April. On April 26, 1986, an inspection of
            the spit at low tide was made by the Coast Guard, SSC, FWS, ARCO, WDOE,
            and Clallam County. The beach was declared "clean" and ARCO was released
            from any further cleanup responsibility.

            Other Special Interest Issues:

            Discussions regarding dispersant use were opened during the second day of
            the spill. Dispersant use was ruled out due to the oil movement toward
            environmentally sensitive areas, weathering of the oil, uncommonly calm
            seas, and the fear that authorization for dispersant use would take too long.

            A monitoring program was established to include sampling of sediments for
0           three years, or until sediment hydrocarbon levels were reduced to background
            levels. Samples taken at Ediz Hook four months after cleanup operations
            were terminated showed decreased concentrations of oil in the sediments as
            well as some evidence of biological recovery.

            The beaches along Ediz Hook adjacent to the log storage area were being
            cleaned concurrently with the log operation. Crowley Environmental
            Services was contracted to conduct beach cleanup involving vacuum trucks,
            rope mops, and sorbents. After an occurrence of heavy weather the cleaned
            areas were reoiled and it was assumed that the logs were the likely source.
            When the reoiling occurred again after most of the logs had been cleaned,
0           another source of oil was sought. Fresh, unweathered oil was found 2-3 in.
            below the surface of the cobble and sand beach in a oil saturated layer of sand
            4-6 in. thick. Since the oil was unweathered it was determined that agitation
            of the sediments below the water would float the fresh oil free. Several
            mechanical agitators were designed using high pressure water nozzles. The
            most effective employed a bulldozer equipped with rippers and hydraulic
            nozzles fitted behind each ripper. The combination of the mechanical and
            hydraulic agitation proved to be fast and efficient. A 3,000 to 6,000 square yard
            section of beach was isolated with containment booms on three sides and
            sorbent sweeps placed three deep in the surf zone. The bulldozers worked
            parallel to shore with the tide to keep the rippers submerged.

            Beach cleaning continued 16 hours a day, six days a week, for nearly six weeks.
            Recovery estimates were as much as 50 barrels per 100 yards of beach with
            tests showing a recovery rate near 67%. Cleanup operations were suspended
            on April 7, 1986 after it was decided that further mechanical efforts to recover
            oil would not be productive nor environmentally advisable.




            ARCO Anchorage                        4








                   Throughout the spill, efforts to rescue, clean, and rehabilitate oiled birds were
                   carried out under the direction of the International Bird Rescue Research
                   Center. A total of 1,917 oiled birds were recovered. Of these, 1,560 were
                   treated by over 2,000 volunteers. Results of the bird rehabilitation were low
                   compared to other spills. Reasons for the disappointing results were
                   suggested to be the huge number of birds received over a short period of time
                   as well as quality control and variation in the cleaning techniques used by
                   volunteers. - A recommendation for future spills was that volunteers not be
                   used for bird cleaning. Volunteers can probably be used more effectively to
                   recover birds from the field while an organized labor force, such as the
                   Wasl-dngton Conservation Corps., under close supervision by specialists,
                   would produce better results in cleaning and overall care of recovered birds.

                   A salmon aquaculture operation in Port Angeles Harbor was boomed, but was
                   still oiled. There was no mortality to fish, but feeding was suspended until oil
                   was cleaned up with sorbents. All cages, nets, and catwalks were replaced by
                   ARCO.



                                                                                                            0




































                                                          5                        ARCO Anchorage










            References:

            *Blaylock, W.M. and Houghton, J.P. 1989. Infaunal Recovery at Ediz Hook
            Following the ARCO ANCHORAGE Oil Spill. The Physical Persistence of
            Spilled Oil: An Analysis of Oil Spills Previous to Exxon Valdez. Final Report.
            HAZMAT. OAD. NOAA. pp. A162-A168.
            *Gundlach, E. and Marshall, M. 1990. The Physical Persistence of Spilled Oil:
            An Analysis of Oil Spills Previous to Exxon Valdez. Final Report. HAZMAT.
            OAD. NOAA. pp. 47-68.
            eLevine, Robert A. 1987. Operational aspects of the response to the ARCO
            Anchorage oil spill, Port Angeles, Washington, Oil Spill Conference
            Proceedings, 1987, pp.3-7.
            *Lindstedt-Siva, June et al. 1987. Environmental aspects of the ARCO
            Anchorage oil spill, Port Angeles, Washington, Oil Spill Conference
            Proceedings, 1987, pp.407410.
            *Miller, J.A. 1989. Physical and Chemical Recovery of Intertidal and Shallow
            Subtidal Sediments Impacted by the ARCO ANCHORAGE Oil Spill, Ediz
            Hook, Washington. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings 1989, pp.487-491.
            oMiller, James A. 1987. Beach agitation for crude oil removal from intertidal
            beach sediments. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings 1987, pp.85-90.
            oNOAA Oil and hazardous materials response reports FY86.
            oNOAA Response Report.
            oOSIR Oil Spills, International Summary and Review, 1982-1985
            oReview of Oil Spill Occurrences and Impacts, Exxon Production Research
            Company, 1989.
            oUSCG Federal On-Scene Coordinators Report.


























            ARCO Anchorage                         6






                                                                                                        0


                   Name of Spill: Argo Merchant
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 12/15/76
                   Location of Spill: 29 miles southeast of Nantucket Island, Massachusetts
                   Latitude: 4102 N
                   Longitude: 069 27 W
                   Oil Product: No. 6 Fuel Oil, cutter stock
                   Oil Type: Type 4
                   Barrels: 183,000
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel                                                         41
                   Resources at Risk: Commercial fisheries, fish, diving coastal birds, gulls, marine
                   mammals.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: Yes
                   Other Special Interest: Research conducted, wildlife impacts, wildlife rehabilitation,
                   adverse weather conditions, media interest.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted:
                   Keywords: Drift cards, Air-Deliverable Anti-Pollution Transfer System (ADAPTS),
                   fingerprinting, sinking.

                   Incident Summary:

                   At approximately 0600 on December 15, 1976, the Liberian tanker Argo
                   Merchant went aground on Fishing Rip (Nantucket Shoals), 29 nautical miles
                   southeast of Nantucket Island, Massachusetts in high winds and ten foot seas.
                   The vessel was carrying approximately 183,000 barrels of No. 6fuel oil (80%)
                   and cutter stock (20%). The master of the Argo Merchant requested
                   permission to dump cargo in an effort to control draft and re-float the vessel.
                   Permission was denied and attempts to lighter and re-float the vessel using
                   emergency pumps and an Air Deliverable Anti-Pollution Transfer System
                   (ADAPTS) were unsuccessful. The following day the weather worsened and
                   the crew of the Argo Merchant was evacuated. On December 17 the vessel
                   began to pivot clockwise and buckle. On December 21 the vessel broke in two
                   aft of the king post, spilling approximately 36,000 barrels of cargo. The bow
                   section split forward of the bridge and capsized on December 22, resulting in
                   the loss of the remaining cargo. The bow section floated 400-500 yards to the
                   southeast and was eventually sunk by the USCG while the stern section
                   remained aground. Prevailing currents carried the spilled oil away from the
                   shorelines and beaches of Nantucket. Weather conditions and uncharted
                   depths surrounding the wreck made salvage attempts difficult.












                                                                                   Argo Merchant










            Behavior of Oil:

            No. 6 fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to 14.
            The bulk of the spill formed large pancakes (largest observed was 240 feet by
            760 feet) and sheens on the surface. Inspection of the pancakes by divers
            revealed flat bottoms. Fresh oil formed pancakes 1-1.5 inches thick with
            tiered edges. The pancakes thickened as the oil aged, some heavily weathered
            pancakes up to 10 inches thick were observed. The weathered pancakes
            lacked tiered edges and associated sheens. The cutter stock, which was mixed
            with the fuel oil to improve handling, entered the water column. Levels as
            high as 250 parts per billion were measured beneath areas of fresh oil.

            Extensive efforts were made to monitor and track the spill. Detailed mapping
            was undertaken due to the level of concern, potential impacts, and to help
            develop more accurate trajectory models for future spills. Multiple trajectory
            models were utilized and evaluated during the incident. Accurate
            measurements of the speed of the spill revealed that oil in pancakes traveled
            at an average speed of about 1.1% of the wind speed, and the sheens
            somewhat slower. The spill moved to the south-southeast of the wreck site,
            out over the continental shelf, and into the prevailing North Atlantic
            circulation pattern. As the oil moved further offshore, wind direction and
            weather conditions became less of a concern. Six thousand drift cards were
            deployed between the spill and the coast in an attempt to give advance
            warning at locations of imminent shoreline impacts.
0           Large tar balls (up to 70 pounds) came ashore in the Nantucket area during
            March of 1977. Analysis of the oil confirmed that it was No. 6 Fuel Oil, but it
            could not be directly identified as product from the Argo Merchant.

            Some impacts to the bottom sediments were observed in the area of the
0           sunken bow section of the vessel. In addition to this localized area, one
            sediment sample taken from the area of the spill showed oil contamination.

            Countermeasures and Mitigation:
0           In-situ burning was attempted on two occasions. The material used was composed
            of fine grained, fumed silica particles treated with silane to render the material
            hydrophobic. Originally marketed as CAB-O-SIL ST-2-0, the product was later
            marketed under the trade name Tullanox 500.

            In the first burning attempt, conducted on December 27, a USCG helicopter dropped
            isolated boxes of Tullanox 500 charged with JP-4 jetfuel onto the oil and ignited the
            boxes using a timed grenade. The isolated boxes burned, but the flame failed to
            spread. It was believed that the wicking agent was not sufficiently dispersed to allow
            spreading of the flames.

            The second attempt was conducted on December 31. The USCG vessel Spar, aided by
            aircraft, located a 90 foot by 120 foot elliptically shaped slick that was of a heavy, tarry
            consistency, and 6 to 8 feet thick. The slick broke into smaller pancakes as the Spar



            Argo Merchant                         2






                                                                                                              0


                    maneuvered alongside. Sixty-six pounds of Tullanox 500, in 11 pound bags, were
                    thrown near the center of a 30 foot by 60 foot slick. The bags were torn open and
                    much of the material was blown off of the slick. Another application of six bags was      0
                    applied along the edge of the slick and charged with JP-4- The experiment was
                    terminated after attempts to ignite the stick failed to sustain a burn.

                    Other Special Interest Issues:

                    Due to the offshore movement of the spill, concern for resources shifted from             0
                    potential shoreline impacts to the economically important fishing grounds in the
                    area of Georges Bank. Benthic fish and invertebrate populations and their
                    associated planktonic stages were at risk. Evidence of oil contamination was
                    observed in fish, shellfish, ichthyoplankton and zooplankton collected in the area of
                    the spill. Mortalities of Cod and Pollack embryos occurred in eggs contaminated           0
                    with oil, and large numbers of zooplankton were observed to be contaminated with
                    hydrocarbons. A decline in the population of Sandlance, an important prey species,
                    was reported during and following the spill, however, the decrease in numbers of
                    Sandlance could not be directly attributed to the spill.

                    Observers aboard vessels in the area reported that 25 to 75% of the seabirds seen         0
                    were fouled with oil. Fouling was observed mostly on the breast and abdominal
                    areas. Herring Gulls and Black-backed Gulls appeared to be the most heavily
                    impacted. Many boats in the area of the spill reported heavily oiled gulls landing
                    on-board their vessels. The birds often appeared weak and overly tame. Diving
                    birds that were reported oiled included Gannets and murres, but few of these species      0
                    were observed to be heavily oiled. A total of 43 marine mammals were observed in
                    the area of the spill, but none were in obvious distress or in direct contact with oil
                    pancakes or sheens.

                    The grounding of the Argo Merchant initiated intense scientific activity between
                    December 15 and February 12. Studies related to the fate and effects of the oil as well   0
                    as the modeling of trajectories were conducted to begin the process of assessing
                    ecological impacts.



















                                                            3                           Argo Merchant








             Shortly after the grounding, research vessels from NOAA and Woods Hole
             Oceanographic Institute (WHOI) were diverted from their scheduled itineraries to
             begin special operations concerned with the fate and effects of the spilled oil.
             Personnel from National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), WHOI and NOAA
             aboard two vessels began assessment of water column contamination. Cruises
             involving USCG, NOAA, WHOI, U.S. Geological Survey, and University of Rhode
             Island (URI) vessels collected more than 200 water and sediment samples. Fish and
             shellfish samples were collected at 43 biological stations during a subsequent NMFS
             cruise. Benthic sampling was conducted throughout the area of the continental
             shelf over which the oil spill passed on two cruises by personnel from URI, NOAA,
             and the USCG.

             Considerable credit for the success of the research operation was attributed to the
             Federal On-Scene Coordinator's efforts to combine the research activities rather
             than allowing fragmentation of the effort. The OSC was also responsible for making
             operational resources, such as aircraft and vessels, available for research purposes.

             Media attention during the Argo Merchant spill was considerable. Though the oil
             never impacted the coast, public perception a year after the spill was that widespread
             and serious damage had occurred. The USCG was the target of increasing criticism
             during the incident. Criticism of the Coast Guard's handling of the incident was
             noted at a U.S. Senate hearing. A problem of conflicting information had developed
             due to the release of information from two different sources, the district office and
             the Coast Guard air station. After the two command posts were consolidated, public
             information problems were minimized.

             Shore-based cleanup of oiled seabirds was funded by the OSC under the direction of
             the Massachusetts Division of Fisheries and Wildlife. A total of 160 oiled birds were
             recovered. The relatively low number of birds collected was attributed to the winter
             conditions and the scarcity of beach patrols. Oiled birds were recovered as far away
             as Dartmouth, Nova Scotia. A total of 47 birds were released after cleaning at either
             the Sandwich, Massachusetts, or Felix Neck Audubon Society facilities. Although
             oiling of gulls was the most commonly observed impact in the spill area, Common
             Murres were the most common birds recovered from the beaches.





















             Argo Merchant                           4






                                                                                                             0



                    References:
                    *1991 World Almanac
                    *8/9/91 & 8/28/91 Letters from Daniel Owen at ITOPF                                      0
                    *Hooke, N. Modem Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
                    1987.
                    *Meidt, R.M. 1987. On-scene coordinators can effectively inform the public
                    through the news media. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1987, pp. 583-585.
                    oMMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
                    *Rappaport, et al. 1981. The media and oil spills: Does the press influence              0
                    damage perceptions, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1981, pp. 707-712.
                    *Review of Oil Spill Occurrences and Impacts, Exxon Production Research
                    Company, 1989.
                    *Tanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers.
                    T.A.C. Inc. 1991.                                                                        0
                    *The Argo Merchant Oil Spill, a Preliminary Scientific Report, NOAA, March
                    1977
                    *The socioeconomic Impacts of Oil Spills, Final Report, WAPORA, March
                    1984.
                    *USCG Pollution Incident Case Analysis of the Argo Merchant.

























                                                                                                             0



                                                           5                          Argo Merchant         0








                   Name of Spill: Arrow
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 02/04/70
                   Location of Spill: Nova Scotia, Canada
                   Latitude: 45 28 N
                   Longitude: 06106 W
                   Oil Product: Bunker C Oil
                   Oil Type: Type 4
                   Barrels: 77,000
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Commercial fishing areas, soft shelled clams, lobsters,
                   scallops, lobster fisheries, fish processing plants, seals, gulls, petrels, fulmars,
                   waterfowl, wading birds, alcids, recreational beaches.
                   Dispersants: Yes
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: Yes
                   Other Special Interest: Wildlife impacts, adverse weather conditions, research
                   conducted.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Nfixed sediment beaches, sand and gravel beaches,
                   exposed rocky shores.
                   Keywords: Steam generators, suction operations, Corexit 8666, manual
                   removal, sinking, sorbents, boom.

                   Incident Summary:

                   On February 4, 1970, at 0935, the steam tanker Arrow ran hard aground on
                   Cerberus Rock in Chedabucto Bay off the coast of Nova Scotia, Canada. The
                   vessel had been traveling off course at nearly full speed when the grounding
                   occurred. The Arrow broke into two pieces on February 12, spilling between
                   77,000 and 82,500 barrels of Bunker C Oil into the waters of the bay. Visibility
                   at the time of the grounding was between five and six miles, water
                   temperatures were very cold and there was ice in the bays and inlets. There
                   were high winds and seas at the time of the spill. This worked to spread the
                   oil into Chedabucto Bay, and the oil eventually impacted approximately 300
                   kilometers of the bay's shoreline.

                   Behavior of Oil:

                   Bunker C fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to
                   14. Oil near the spill site took the form of rainbow, silver and dull sheen. Oil
                   was also visible in the water in the form of chunks, which were described as
                   "the size of a hand towel, rolled lengthwise." Oil at the spill site was observed
                   as a long narrow slick extending to the east. This pattern was seen usually
                   during periods of calm or light winds.










                                                                                            Arrow









             Oil moved under the influence of tides and currents and impacted the
             shoreline generally between the mid and high tide line. In some cases, the oil
             was driven above the high tide line by storms. In Chedabucto Bay,
             approximately 300 kilometers of shoreline were oiled ranging from a trace to
             very heavy coverage. In the lagoons and other low-energy locations, the oil
             mixed with sand and weeds. The north and west shores of the bay were
             heavily oiled and formed a -tar-like mix of -Bunker C and sediment.

             Oiled shorelines in high-energy locations were cleaned by natural processes
             within two to three years. Only traces of oil and no apparent damage to the
             ecosystem could be found in long-term studies of these areas. In low energy
             locations, such as Black Duck Cove and Janvrin Lagoon, damage to the
             ecosystem was still visible and the amount of oil on the shoreline remained
             relatively unchanged over seven years later.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             Large oil slicks were dispersed by wave action and chemical dispersants. Ten
             tons of the dispersant Corexit 8666 were applied to large portions of the oil.

             Oiled wharves and boats were cleaned with steam. Steam cleaning in this
             case was the best alternative, as it required no solvents or detergents,
             provided portability, required little maintenance and support, and could be
             used by crews of unskilled laborers. The oil removed during cleaning was
             absorbed by peat moss placed in the water and recovered with slick lickers, an
             oleophilic-belt type skimming system. These were used at various locations
             during the cleanup and were very effective at removing high viscosity oil.

             Oil remained for the longest time on the sheltered mixed sand and gravel
             beaches. Cleanup of these areas was performed by both manual and
             mechanical means. Mechanical equipment in these areas caused damage to
             the back of the beach and mixed oil deeper into the sand than it had been.
             Scrapers were not effective on the coarse gravel beaches, and only somewhat
             effective on the compact sand beaches. Oil was still visible to observers ten
             years after the spill in some of the sheltered areas.

             Other Special Interest Issues:

             Remaining cargo was removed from the stern section of the sunken vessel by
             hot-tapping in approximately ninety feet of water. Pumping operations began
             on March 2 and were concluded on April 11. Two boilers installed on the
             recovery barge were used to heat the cargo. Approximately thirty-seven
             thousand barrels of oil and emulsified oil and water were removed from the
             Arrow. The extremely adverse weather conditions, including snow, ice, high
             seas and gale-force winds, added to the difficulty of these operations.
             The scientific coordination team set up a large laundromat for cleaning oiled
             fishing nets. This cost approximately $22,000, but saved considerable time and




             Arrow                                 2








                   money over replacing all the oiled fishing nets. These nets cost
                   approximately twenty-five thousand dollars each.
0                  Experiments were conducted during the spill to test the effectiveness of
                   various natural sorbents and burning operations. At several sites in
                   Chedabucto Bay, peat moss was tested as an absorbent. Peat moss was spread
                   on the beach and oil was allowed to wash over it, or was forced onto it with
                   booms. The peat moss would stick to the oil and the mixture could be easily
0                  removed with a rake. The peat moss was found to be very effective as an
                   absorbent for Bunker C oil on sand beaches. Its ability to absorb decreased as
                   the oil weathered and formed a water-in-oil emulsion. An experiment
                   involving steam cleaning was performed at a test site that had not previously
                   been oiled. Rocks were purposefully covered with oil and then steam
                   cleaned. The oil ran onto peat moss that was being held by boom to keep it
                   from moving downstream, and to prevent further contamination of the area.
                   In-situ burning experiments were conducted on two-inch thick patches of oil
                   that had been exposed to the water for more than two weeks. In two separate
                   sites, peat moss was used as a wick, and fuel (gasoline or turbofuel) was used
0                  to start the fire burning. Results of both tests were negative. This is believed
                   to be due to the amount of weathering that had already taken place.

                   On February 14, 1970, only ten days after the grounding of the Arrow, an oil
                   barge called the Irving Whale spilled between 100 and 200 barrels of Bunker C
                   oil off the southeast coast of Newfoundland. This barge was later used to
0                  receive oil pumped from the Arrow during the salvage and lightering
                   operations. (The Irving Whale sank off the northern coast of Prince Edward
                   Island in July 1970 with a cargo of Bunker C aboard.) The spill from the
                   Irving Whale is estimated to have caused the deaths of at least 5,500 birds
                   along the southern coast of Newfoundland.
0                  Both the Irving Whale and the Arrow caused the deaths of a large number of
                   birds. The two spills caused the known deaths of 1,500 ducks and seabirds,
                   and deaths of an estimated 12,000 birds.




















                                                            3                                  Arrow











             References:

             *Brown et al. 1973. Bird Mortality from Slicks off Eastern Canada, February-
             April 1970. Canadian Field-Naturalist 87: 225-234.
             *Canadian Ministry of Transport. Report of the Task Force-Operation Oil
             (Cleanup of the Arrow Spill in Chedabucto Bay). 1970.
             *Environment Canada. 1982. Oil and Dispersants in Canadian Seas-
             Research and Appraisal Recommendations.
             *Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
             1987.
             eMostert, N. Supership. 1974.
             *Report of the Royal Commission. Pollution of Canadian Waters by Oil and
             Formal Investigation into Grounding of Steam Tanker "Arrow." 1970.
             oReview of Oil Spill Occurrences and Impacts, Exxon Production Research
             Company, 1989.
             *Tanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers.
             T.A.C. Inc. 1991.
             oWilson, M.P. Jr., et al., "The Spreading, Retention and Clean-up of Oil
             Spills," URI, Kingston, RI, 1976.                                                         0





































             Arrow








                   Name of Spill: Ashland Petroleum Company
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 01/02/88
                   Location of Spill: Monongahela River, West Elizabeth, Pennsylvania
                   Latitude: 40 33 N
                   Longitude: 080 00 W
                   Oil Product: diesel fuel
                   Oil Type: Type 2
                   Barrels: 23,810
                   Source of Spill: Facility
                   Resources at Risk: Waterfowl, fish, mustelids, drinking water intakes.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Logistical or operational problems, adverse weather
                   conditions, closure of shipping lanes or vehicle traffic routes, human health
                   and safety concerns, wildlife impacts, wildlife rehabilitation.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Vegetated riverbank, riprap, levees.

                   Keywords: Boom, skimmer, vacuum truck, sorbents.

                   Incident Summary:

                   On January 2, 1988, a 40 year old storage tank collapsed at the Ashland Oil
                   Facility in West Elizabeth, Pennsylvania. The tank collapse spilled 90,476
                   barrels of diesel fuel, 23,810 barrels of which flowed into the Monongahela
                   River 27 miles south of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. As the spill moved
                   downriver, water supplies were contaminated, resulting in the disruption of
                   water services to riverside cities in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia.

                   Behavior of Oil:

                   The slick flowed past Pittsburgh where the Monongahela and the Allegheny
                   rivers meet to form the Ohio River. By January 4, traces of oil reached
                   Newell, West Virginia 92 miles downstream from the spill site. By January
                   10, the oil had flowed past Steubenville, Ohio, and reached Wheeling, West
                   Virginia. By January 13, the spill had traveled 130 miles down the
                   Monongahela and Ohio rivers to reach Sisterville, West Virginia. Ice flows
                   in the rivers delayed the passage of the slick downstream. A National
                   Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) study suggested that there
                   would be minimal re-release of product due to oil being incorporated into the
                   ice.













                                                                        Ashland Petroleum Company






                                                                                                             0



             Countermeasures and Mitigation:
             The Coast Guard deployed booms at seven sites along the river near                              0
             Pittsburgh. Barges pushed by tugboats herded the oil behind the booms
             toward the shore where vacuum trucks picked it up. Skimmers and sorbents
             were used in other areas along the river. Small booms were placed on the
             Monongahela River in an attempt to deflect the oil away from water intakes.
             By January 7, only 1,905 barrels of product had been recovered. The effort to                   0
             recover the oil was hindered by emulsification and dispersion of the oil with
             the water. A 50-75% ice cover on the Monongahela and Ohio Rivers
             hindered the recovery of product. Efforts along the Ohio River were
             additionally hindered by the presence of dams and locks.
             The Pennsylvania Game Commission set up bird cleaning programs. As of                           4
             January 7, one goose was listed as an oil spill fatality and fish mortalities were
             in the hundreds.

             The response lasted for two weeks following the incident.
             Other Special Interest Issues:                                                                  0

             The Coast Guard closed the Monongahela River to vessel traffic between the
             Ashland facility in West Elizabeth and Pittsburgh. Rail and motor vehicle
             traffic was halted along some routes near the river, due to concerns about
             human health and fire hazards.                                                                  41

             Water service to 22,000 homes in Pittsburgh was turned off on January 4 and
             wasn't completely turned on again until January 10. In Steubenville, Ohio all
             nonessential businesses were closed with water service interrupted for three
             days.                                                                                           a
















             Ashland Petroleum Company              2











                  References:

                  * 1,200 Flee After Spill on River. The Seattle Times. January 3, 1988. p.A2.
                  *Diesel Oil Slick Reaches Wheelin, W.Va.; Citizens Urged to Conserve
                  Water. The Seattle Times. January 10, 1988. p.A2.
                  *More Towns Prepare as Diesel-fuel Spill Moves Downstream. The Seattle
                  Times. January 7,1988. p.A2.
0                 oOil Imperils Water in Two More States. Seattle Post-Intelligencer. January
                  7,1988. p.A3.
                  e Oil Slick Threatens More Cities along Pathway of Disaster. The Seattle
                  Times. January 13,1988. p.B6.
                  o Oil Spill Cuts Water Supply to Thousands West of Pittsburgh. Seattle Post-
                  Intelligencer. January5,1988. p.Al.
                  eOil Spill Shuts Off Water to Thousands. The Seattle Times. January 10,
                  1988. p.A3.
                  *Oil Spill Will Disperse in Next 2 Weeks, Experts Says. Seattle Post-
                  Intelligencer. January 13, 1988. p.A4.
                  *Spill Dries Spigots; Supplies Scarce. The Seattle Times. January 5,1988. p.2.
                  *They Cope Without the Water. Seattle Post-Intelligencer. January 6, 1988.
                  p.A3.
                  *Workers Race to Contain Oil Spill. The Seattle Times. January 4, 1988.
                  p.A10.





























                                                         3              Ashland Petroleum Company








                    Name of Spill: Assimi
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 01/07/83
                    Location of Spill: Oman
                    Latitude: 22 46.7 N
                    Longitude: 062 51.5 E
                    Oil Product: Light Iranian Crude Oil
                    Oil Type: Type 2
                    Barrels: 379,000
                    Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                    Resources at Risk: Power plant water intakes, drinking water intakes, beaches,
                    commercial fisheries, coral reefs, mangroves, river estuaries, coastal lagoons.
                    Dispersants: No
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: No
                    Other Special Interest: Logistical or operational problems.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted:
                    Keywords: International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Ltd. (ITOPF),
                    fire, explosion, sinking.

                    Incident Summary:

                    On January 7, 1983, a fire broke out in the engine room of the tanker Assimi.
                    The crew abandoned ship and the Assimi was taken under tow by the tug
                    Solano. On January 10, an explosion occurred aboard the vessel and it burned
                    fiercely for several days as it was towed into the Arabian Sea. The tanker was
                    towed to a point 200 miles off the coast of Oman where it sank on January 16.
                    A second explosion occurred as the vessel was sinking which ignited the oil
                    on the surface of the water. A slick formed above the area where the vessel
                    sank. There was no coastal pollution resulting from the incident.

                    Behavior of Oil:

                    Light Iranian crude oil is a medium weight product with an API gravity of
                    33.8 and a viscosity of 6.6 centistokes. An overflight on January 19 revealed a
                    slick of silver sheen in the vicinity of the sinking covering 100 square miles
                    and moving towards the northeast. Personnel on an overflight on January 22
                    found some fresh oil in the slick. The older oil had emulsified, and the total
                    area of the slick was reduced. The northernmost edge of the slick was 180
                    miles off the coast of Pakistan. An overflight on February 4 showed that most
                    of the oil had dispersed.













                                                                                               Assimi









            Countermeasures and Mitigation:

            The government of Oman convened a council that included representatives
            from the Council for Conservation of the Environment and Prevention of
            Pollution (CCEPP), Sultanate of Oman Navy (SON), Sultanate of Oman Air
            Force (SOAF), the Royal Oman Police (Marine), the Maritime Affairs
            Department, the Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals, and the petroleum
0           industry. The council was to form a response strategy in the event of a release
            of oil. International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Ltd. (ITOPF) and
            Smit International were asked to provide expertise, and representatives from
            those organizations arrived in Oman on January 12. International Transport
            Company Contractors, the salvors of the Assimi, contracted Smit
            International to help fight the fire. Equipment and personnel from Smit
            fought the fire using water and foam from their tug Smit Pioneer. On
            January 11, the fire was still burning, and the firefighters flooded the pump
            room in an attempt to keep the fire from spreading from the engine room to
            the cargo tanks.
0           The government of Oman contacted the Gulf Area Oil Companies Mutual
            Aid Organization (GAOCMAO) to provide an aircraft with dispersant
            spraying capabilities. Vessels from the Sultanate of Oman Navy (SON), were
            equipped with booms and dispersants. Dispersants were obtained from Saudi
            Arabia and Dubai to supplement the stock of Petroleum Development Oman
            (PDO). No dispersants were applied, because the oil was observed to dissipate
0           rapidly.
            The vessel began to sink while under tow by the Solano, and the Oman
            government ordered the salvors to tow the vessel to a point 200 miles from
            the coast of Oman and sink it. On January 16, the Assimi was sunk at 22'43'
0           N, 63058' E in 3000 meters of water. An explosion occurred as the vessel sank
            and a slick of burning oil formed on the surface.
            The International Maritime Organization (IMO) was contacted to assess the
            threat to environment and make recommendations to the Oman council.
            The council also contacted the Regional Organization for the Protection of the
0           Marine Environment (ROPME) to provide expertise. Observers of the
            sinking suggested that the oil released by the breakup had burned on site. The
            IMO and ROPME representatives advised further overflights to determine if
            the tanker was still leaking oil.














            Assimi






                                                                                                           0



                    An overflight on January 19 revealed a slick of silver sheen covering 100
                    square miles and moving towards the northeast. The government of
                    Pakistan was notified that the slick was heading towards their coast. An
                    overflight on January 22 found fresh oil on the surface near the sinking. The
                    older oil had emulsified, and the total area of the slick was reduced. The
                    northernmost edge of the slick was 180 miles off the coast of Pakistan. An
                    overflight on February 4 showed that most of the oil had dispersed.

                    Other Special Interest Issues:

                    The Assimi originally caught fire on January 7, and attempts were made to
                    extinguish the fire. After an explosion on January 10 the fire was burning
                    more fiercely. The salvors of the vessel were refused passage through the
                    Straits of Hormuz. On January 12 the tow had been let go due to fears that the         41
                    fire could flash back, however, the Solano was able to reconnect the tow and
                    pull the Assimi even further from the coast.
                    An expert from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United
                    Nations arrived in Oman on January 21 to determine the risk to fisheries in
                    the Arabian Sea. The FAO representative reported that a spill that far from
                    the coast would not affect the fisheries.

                    References:


                    *8/9/91 & 8/28/91 Letters from Daniel Owen at ITOPF                                    41
                    *Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
                    *Hayes, T.M. 1985. The Tanker Assin-d - A Case History. Oil Spill Conference
                    Proceedings 1985. pp. 307-310.
                    eMMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
                    *OSIR Newsletter 2/21/91
                    eOSIR Oil Spills, International Summary & Review, 1982-1985
                    -bTanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers. T.A.C.
                    Inc. 1991.



                                                                                                           41









                                                                                                           lab.

















                                                           3                                Assimi








                  Name of Spill: Athenian Venture
                  Date of Spill (mmddyy): 04/22/88
0                 Location of Spill: Canada, southeast of Cape Race, Newfoundland
                  Latitude: 42 30 N
                  Longitude: 049 30 W
                  Oil Product: Unleaded Gasoline
                  Oil Type: Type 1
                  Barrels: 252,429
0                 Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                  Resources at Risk:
                  Dispersants: No
                  Bioremediation: No
                  In-situ Burning: No
0                 Other Special Interest:
                  Shoreline Types Impacted:
                  Keywords: Explosion, fire, sinking, evaporation.

                  Incident Summary:

0                 Early on April 22, 1988, the tanker Athenian Venture was found by the
                  Canadian research vessel Hudson 400 miles southeast of Cape Race,
                  Newfoundland. The Athenian Venture had apparently experienced a violent
                  explosion as it was broken in two and on fire. The Athenian Venture had
                  been en route from Amsterdam, Netherlands, to New York, New York, with
0                 a cargo of approximately 250,000 barrels of unleaded gasoline on board. The
                  vessel was drifting at 40 38 N, 05109 W, and the bow and aft sections were
                  approximately two miles apart when found. The bow section sank at 1400 on
                  April 22. The aft section continued to drift on fire for the next 7 weeks, finally
                  sinking on June 17 about 200 miles from the Azores.
10                Behavior of Oil:
                  Automotive gasoline is a very light weight, refined product with an API
                  gravity of 60 to 63. Overflights on April 22 discovered a slick .5 by 4 miles.
                  However, most of the gasoline burned in the extensive fires. The remaining
                  oil dissipated very rapidly, most of which was lost to evaporation. Weather
0                 conditions immediately following the accident were good, with high visibility
                  and calm seas.

                  Countermeasures and Mitigation:

dk                No countermeasures were undertaken.













                                                                                Athenian Venture






                                                                                                          0



             Other Special Interest Issues:
             The USCG coordinated rescue efforts with the Canadian Coast Guard. Five                      0
             airplanes and seven merchant vessels participated in the two-day search for
             survivors. The Athenian Venture had a crew of 24, and the wives of 5 crew
             members were also on board. Initially it appeared that one of the lifeboats
             was missing from the vessel, but later it was found that all the lifeboats had
             burned. No survivors were ever found, and all 29 people were presumed                        0
             dead.


             References:

             *8/9/91 & 8/28/91 Letters from Daniel Owen at ITOPF
             *Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.                            0
             *MMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
             eOSIR Newsletter 5/02/88
             *OSIR Newsletter 2/21/91
             9OSIR Oil Spills, International Summary & Review, 1986-1988
             *Tanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers. T.A.C.                0
             Inc. 1991.





                                                                                                          49






                                                                                                          41
















             Athenian Venture                      2                                                      0








                   Name of Spill: Bahia Paraiso
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 01/28/89
                   Location of Spill: Palmer Station, Antarctica
                   Latitude: 64 47 S
                   Longitude: 064 06 W
                   Oil Product: Diesel fuel arctic (DFA)
                   Oil Type: Type 2
                   Barrels: 3,774
                   Source of Spill: Non-Tank Vessel.
                   Resources at Risk: Krill, amphipods, limpets, gulls, terns, Giant Petrels,
                   penguins, skua chicks, macroalgae, clams, fish, seals.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Research conducted, habitat impact due to oil, wildlife
                   impacts.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Exposed rocky shores.
                   Keywords: Evaporation, skimmer, U.S. Navy Superintendent of Salvage
                   (NAVSUPSALV), boom, salvage.

                   Incident Summary:

                   On January 28, 1989, the Bahia Paraiso , with a cargo of diesel fuel arctic, jet
                   fuel (JP-1), gasoline, and compressed gas cylinders, ran aground off Delaca
                   Island, 2 miles from the US scientific base at Palmer Station, Antarctica. A 30
                   foot gash was torn in the ship's hull. The vessel spilled 3,772 barrels of diesel
                   fuel arctic and cylinders of propane and compressed gas into the water. Heavy
                   losses occurred among krill and limpets. Scientists on-scene recorded a 50%
                   mortality rate among penguin chicks, but no significant losses among adult
                   penguins. The spill also resulted in the death of skua chicks. While these
                   chicks were not directly oiled, adult skuas were observed abandoning their
                   nests, allowing other skuas (which are cannibalistic) to prey on their young.
                   Thousand of other polar seabirds were reported killed. Several oiled seals
                   were spotted.




















                                                                                     Bahia Paraiso











             Behavior of Oil:
             By February 4, 1989, most of the islands within a 2 mile radius of the spill site                  0
             had been contaminated with oil. Ultimately, the oil formed a slick with a 10
             mile radius. The heaviest contamination occurred in Biscoe Bay and Arthur
             Harbor. Intertidal areas on Norse Point, Laggard Island, Limitrophe Island,
             Cormorant Island, and Jacobs Island were affected. Three weeks after the spill,
             Biscoe Bay had been cleaned through the processes of evaporation and wave                          0
             action. By April, the leakage from the Bahia Paraiso was greatly reduced, and
             only those areas close to the wreck (Bonaparte Point, DeLaca Island, and Janus
             Island) showed oil. A National Science Foundation (NSF) scientist estimated
             the initial leaking rate to be approximately 71 barrels a day.
             Countermeasures and Mitigation:                                                                    41

             The Argentinean ship Capitan Alacazar arrived February 5 from Chile's
             Antarctic Institute to assess the damage to the environment from the oil spill.
             The Capitan Alacazar took water samples and surveyed the area for oiled
             wildlife. The Polar Duke arrived at Palmer Station on February 6 carrying                          0
             equipment and various U.S. agency (NSF, NOAA, USCG, U.S. Navy
             Supervisor of Salvage (NAVSUPSALV) personnel and Chilean contract
             divers.

             The Chilean Coast Guard Tender Yelcho arrived February 6 and deployed a
             boom which didn't hold. By February 7 there were skimmers working on                               0
             scene and divers were inspecting the hull. Chilean divers sealed two holes in
             the vessel's fuel tanks. By February 8, 30% of the oil had been recovered.
             Emulsification and weathering of the oil hindered recovery efforts. Salvage
             engineers from Argentina began offloading fuel from the Bahia Paraiso on
             February 11. The Argentinean vessel Bahia San Blas was on scene as of                              0
             February 12 with recovery equipment. A NAVSUPSALV skimmer was used
             to transfer fuel from the Bahia Paraiso to the Bahia San Blas.

             Other Special Interest Issues:

             New Zealand conservationists reported that oil would take 100 times longer                         0
             to degrade in Antarctica's environment than in more temperate
             environments. They also reported that oil could be incorporated into the ice,
             depriving sunlight and nutrients to organisms beneath the ice. They
             emphasized the need to complete cleanup before winter ice formed.

                                                                                                                0






                                                                                                                0



             Bahia Paraiso                            2                                                         0









                   Intertidal areas were most directly affected by the spill, however samples
                   collected over a six-week period showed DFA contamination in tissues from
                   birds, limpets, macroalgae, clams, bottom feeding fish, and in water, and
                   sediment. Most of the DFA evaporated with the remainder dispersed by
                   currents. Possibly because of chronic releases from the ship, there was
                   evidence of persistence of contamination a year after the spill. Intertidal
                   limpet populations showed only partial recovery. Populations were reduced
0                  by 50 per cent directly after the spill.

                   As of March 12, 1992, the vessel remained on her starboard side in 50 feet of
                   water, still containing about 1500 barrels of diesel fuel. Occasional oil slicks
                   were observed around the vessel. U.S. cost estimates of pumping remaining
0                  oil from the ship are $3,000,000 and $60,000,000 to completely salve the vessel.
                   Because it only possible to work in the Antarctic summer, the salvage process
                   would take about 3 years. The governments of The Netherlands and
                   Argentina have signed a memorandum of understanding to remove the
                   remaining oil from the ship.

0                  References:

                   *Culver, M., Fraser, W., Kennicutt II, M., Stockton, W., and Sweet, S. The
                   Fate of Diesel Fuel Spilled by the Bahia Paraiso in Arthur Harbor, Antarctica,
                   Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1991, pp.493-500.
                   *Lloyds List, Monday, March 30, 1992.
0                  -Unpublished USCG report


























                                                                                        Bahia Paraiso








                   Name of Spill: Bayou Lafousche Marge PC 2901
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 03/09/73
                   Location of Spill: Upper Galveston Bay, Houston Ship Channel, Texas
                   Latitude: 29 38 N
                   Longitude: 094 58 W
                   Oil Product: Louisiana crude, Bunker C
                   Oil Type: Type 3, Type 4
                   Barrels: 10,000
                   Source of Spill: Tank Barge
                   Resources at Risk: Waterfowl, diving coastal birds, shrimp, oysters, marinas.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest- Adverse weather conditions.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Saltwater marshes, exposed tidal flats, sand/gravel
                   beaches.
                   Keywords: Collision, boom, vacuum truck, vacalls, oil mop machines, hand
                   mops, sawdust, Sorbent C, sorbent pillows, skimmer, filter fence, adverse
                   weather conditions, contingency plan.

                   Incident Summary:

                   On March 9, 1973 at approximately 1326, the tank vessel TIV Mayo Lykes
                   collided with the Bayou LafouschelBarge PC 2901. The bow of the TIV Mayo
                   Lykes, penetrated the port bow of the barge at a 45-60 degree angle, and almost
                   cut the barge in two. Only the starboard outer skin of the barge held the
                   vessel together.

                   A large quantity of the 23,000 barrels of Louisiana crude oil and Bunker C
                   spilled into the water upon impact. Later estimates reported 10,000 barrels of
                   pollutant spilled into the water. Part of the spilled amount was released in
                   the collision while the remainder leaked from the damaged tanks over the
                   next several days.

                   Weather conditions at the time of the accident were extremely adverse.
                   Extensive fog, winds of 30-35 knots with 40 knot gusts, and seas of 3-4 feet
                   hampered early contairunent attempts. Since the owner and operator of the
                   damaged barge denied any responsibility in cleaning up the oil, U.S. Coast
                   Guard (USCG) personnel began cleanup operations using the Oil Spill
                   Contingency Fund. Brine Service Company was the primary cleanup
                   contractor from March 12 until March 18 when Clean Channel Industries
                   became the principal contractor, focusing on beach cleanup. After March 12,
                   the USCG took on a strictly supervisory and monitoring role while contract
                   personnel performed the actual cleanup.








                                                                     Bayou Lafousche /Barge PC 2901









            Two days after the spill, the local Audubon Society, with USCG assistance,
0           collected and cleaned approximately 400 oil soaked Eared Grebes. The 320
            surviving birds were released in an unpolluted area selected by the Texas
            Parks and Wildlife Department. The Texas Department of Health, EPA
            Region 6, and Texas A&M University conducted ecological and pollutant
            studies in the affected area. Preliminary results showed little long-term
            adverse effect to the environment. Active cleanup continued until April 6
41          when the case officially closed, however cleaning on Atkinson and Bulkhead
            Reef Islands to the east of the Houston Ship Channel continued until the
            week of April 9.

            Behavior of Oil:
0           Louisiana crude oil is a medium to light oil with a range of API gravity
            values between 34.5 and 37. Bunker C fuel oil is a heavy product with an API
            gravity that ranges from 7 to 14. Prevailing southeasterly winds rapidly
            carried oil to beaches in upper Galveston Bay. A large quantity of oil drifted
            into the Houston Yacht Club in the hours following the incident. Overflight
0           observers on March 10 reported heavy concentrations of oil impacting the
            beaches and water north to Morgan Point, east to the Houston Ship Channel,
            south to Clear Creek Channel, and west to the shores of upper Galveston Bay.
            Overall, approximately seven miles of tidal flats and beach were
            contaminated as a result of the incident. High tides accompanied by strong
            south winds caused oil on the shore or trapped in bayous to contaminate
0           areas above the normal tidal zone. Increased impacts of this type were
            observed at Little Cedar Bayou, Sylvan Beach, Bayside Terrace, and Shoreside
            Acres.

            Considerable quantities of free floating oil were observed off Red Bluff Point
0           on a March 14 overflight. Oil pockets were spotted on the beach line from
            Todville to Morgan Point as well. On March 16, high winds caused the water
            level in Galveston Bay to drop 3-4 feet in 3-4 hours. As a result, much of the
            oil remaining in Bayport Channel and Little Cedar Bayou escaped into the bay
            and was pushed south by the wind.

0           By March 16, weathering had made the oil very heavy and viscous, making
            recovery difficult. Strong northerly winds on March 17 blew much of the oil
            to the south back down the bay, contaminating many of the beaches south of
            Red Bluff Point. When the case closed on April 6, some contamination
            remained on Atkinson and Bulkhead Reef Islands to the east of the Houston
all         Ship Channel. Approximately 519,302 gallons of liquid pollutant, and 400
            cubic yards of solid oil soaked debris, were collected in the 28-day cleanup
            response.









            Bayou Lafousche lBarge PC 2901          2









                    Countermeasures and Mitigation:
                    A total of 9600 feet of five different types of spill boom was deployed during               0
                    this response. Vessel wake over one foot and/or currents over 1 knot from
                    transiting ships reduced effectiveness of round boom. The round boom was
                    found to be bulky, difficult to tow, and relatively ineffective given the
                    weather conditions. Skirted boom (Uniroyal 18") was better suited for the job
                    and could be used in seas to four feet. A Boston Whaler easily towed 300 foot                0
                    lengths of this boom. Cedar Bayou was boomed off on March 10 to prevent
                    oil from escaping back into Galveston Bay. Multiple booms were required at
                    the Houston Yacht Club to prevent more oil from entering the harbor.
                    Vacuum trucks were used to removed approximately 190,000 gallons of
                    trapped oil from the Houston Yacht Club Marina.                                              41
                    Vacalls, which are small vacuum recovery devices, were a primary recovery
                    device at this incident. A total of 18 vacalls ranging in capacity from 50 barrels
                    to 130 barrels were on-scene at any one time. Vacalls were used almost
                    exclusively at Little Cedar Bayou due to availability of access roads leading
                    down to the areas of collected oil.                                                          0
                    Mopping techniques were used principally for beach cleanup between Surf
                    Oaks and Sylvan Beach. Two types of oil mop machines, the Mark 11-9D-PT
                    and the Mark 114E, provided excellent recovery of heavy concentrations of
                    oil. First, a continuous mop reclaimed oil from the water. The machine then
                    squeezed oil from the mop into a collection pan where it was then pumped                     0
                    into a vacuum truck. Hand mops, or Jambeaux Mops, were used to remove
                    sheen and small quantities of oil from the water in hard to reach areas such as
                    among marsh grass and on tidal flats. The oiled mops were then passed
                    through a mop wringer and the oil collected in 55 gallon drums.
                    Sawdust, Sorbent C, and sorbent pillows removed residual oil from the water.
                    Sorbents were used mainly along low lying areas and beach heads.
                    Two skimmers retrieved oil in open water areas. The 30'by 110'barge-style
                    Exxon skimmer performed well during this response due to its ability to
                    operate in various weather conditions. However, the skimmer could not
                    operate in water shallower than 5 feet. The Clean Channel Industry
                    skimmer, MIV Lady Alice, with a total capacity of 170 gallons, needed to be
                    unloaded every ten minutes since it was recovering 1,000 gallons per hour.
                    This skimmer was primarily used to recover oil in the immediate vicinity of
                    the barge as well as pump out barge tanks that were still leaking.










                                                             3            Bayou Lafousche /Barge PC 2901









            On March 26, a filter fence was constructed in Little Cedar Bayou to collect oil
            as it drifted in and out of the bayou. This fence consisted of chain link fence
            attached to four sets of aluminum fence posts across the bayou. Three sorbent
            pillows were placed in the resulting compartments to catch residual product
            as it was pushed through the fence.

            Other Special Interest Issues:

            Adverse weather prevailed throughout the response. Dense fog, high winds,
            and high seas resulted in poor visibility and vessel maneuverability. Strong
            winds and high tides moved the oil above normal tide lines in some beach
            areas. Periodic rain made the ground too soft at times to move heavy
            equipment, such as vacuum trucks, in and out of oil pick-up areas. On March
            16, high winds caused the water level in Galveston Bay to drop 3-4 feet in 3-4
            hours which severely affected the movement of the oil. Adverse weather
            also created safety hazards to responders.

            References:

            *USCG Federal On-Scene Coordinator's Report
































'ilk






            Bayou Lafousche lBarge PC 2901








                    Name of Spill: Betelgeuse
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 01/08/79
                    Location of Spill: Bantry Bay, Ireland
                    Latitude: 50 40 N
                    Longitude: 012 04 W
                    Oil Product: Mixed Arabian Crude Oil
                    Oil Type: Type 3
                    Barrels: 14,720
                    Source of Spill: Tank Vessel                                                                 0
                    Resources at Risk: Mussels, diving coastal birds, waterfowl, scallops, clams,
                    commercial fisheries.
                    Dispersants: Yes
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: No                                                                          0
                    Other Special Interest: Closure of commercial fishing areas, closure of
                    recreational fishing areas, wildlife impacts, complex salvage operations.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Rocky shores.
                    Keywords: Manual removal, suction operations, containment boom,
                    skimmer, BP 110OWD, explosion, fire, sinking, sub-surface oil, salvage,
                    lightering.                                                                                  0

                    Incident Summary:
                    In the early afternoon of January 8, 1979, the tanker Betelgeuse exploded at the
                    offshore pier of the Gulf Oil Terminal at Whiddy Island in Bantry Bay,
                    Ireland. The tanker broke in two and settled in 130 feet of water with 300,000               49
                    barrels of oil remaining onboard. The fire burned throughout the day.
                    During the night the fire was extinguished and the stem section sank
                    completely. Approximately 14,720 barrels of oil leaked from the vessel, 3,680
                    barrels of which impacted the shoreline.
                    Behavior of Oil:                                                                             41

                    The Mixed Arabian crude oil contained in the vessel had an API gravity of
                    about 36.5, and a viscosity of 23 centistokes at 20 degrees C. The oil that was
                    released from the tanker burned as it leaked until the fire went out late on
                    January 8. On January 9, a slick began to form, and oil impacted the east shore              41
                    of Bantry Bay and Reenydonagan Point on Whiddy Island. Inspections
                    revealed that 37 barrels of oil per hour was leaking from the wreck. Oil
                    leaked at this rate for a week. On January 12, the oil impacted the north and
                    south shores of Bantry Bay. By the next day the oil had spread as far west as
                    Castle Townbere on the north shore of the bay, and League Point on the south
                    shore. Bear Island was also impacted.                                                        1W







                                                                                              Betelgeuse         0









            Countermeasures and Mitigation:
            Cleanup operations were organized by the Cork County Council. Operations
            included the manual removal of oil, and the spreading of hay to absorb oil on
            the shoreline. Suction operations were also conducted on the shore. Booms
            contained the oil leaking from the tanker. Contained oil was treated with
            dispersants applied from planes, and was skimmed with a Gulf Oil Company
            Bay skimmer. Boom was placed across the mouth of the Glengariff Harbor to
            prevent oil from entering it.
            Undamaged tanks were lightered using floating hoses running to the shore
            facilities.

            Other Special Interest Issues:

            Dispersant application began on January 10 off Reenydonagan Point. BP
            110OWD was applied from Gulf tugs. The Cork County Council and the
            Department of Fisheries stopped the shoreline applications that morning
            when it was discovered that the dispersant were being applied incorrectly.
            Aerial spraying was done thereafter, and only on slicks of fresh oil. The
            aircraft used was a modified Piper Pawnee crop sprayer capable of 5 spraying
            sorties per hour due to the nearby location of a suitable landing strip.
            Application rates were generally around 2 to 3 gallons of BP 110OWD
            concentrate per acre. A total of about 35 tonnes (approximately 260 barrels) of
            dispersant was used in a 12-day period. The use of dispersants is believed to
            have successfully protected the shoreline.

            The slick prevented fishing in some areas and nets were fouled by sunken oil.
            The harvesting of shellfish, including periwinkles, scallops and clams was
            also affected as some catches were rejected by buyers. Oiled seabirds were also
            found.

            The bow section of the Betelgeuse was salvaged by L. Smit and Company. On
            February 21, it was towed to sea by the tug Smit-Lloyd 107. The bow was sunk
            at 50 40 N, 012 04 W on February 23. Salvage operations continued
            throughout the year. Part of the midsection was raised on August 30. The
            rest of the midsection was raised in December. The stern was raised on July 1,
            1980. The midsection and the stern were scrapped.













            Betelgeuse                              2











                    References:

                    *Cross, et al. 1979. The Initial Pollution of Shores in Bantry Bay, Ireland, by
                    Oil from the Tanker Betelgeuse. Marine Pollution Bulletin, Vol. 10, pp. 104-
                    107. Pergamon Press Ltd. 1979.
                    *Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
                    *Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
                    1987.
                    9MMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
                    eNational Research Council. 1989. Using Oil Spill Dispersants on the Sea.
                    National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. p.321-
                    *Nichols, J.A. and Parker, H. 1985. Dispersants: Comparison of Laboratory
                    Tests & Field Trials with Practical Experience at Spills., Oil Spill Conference
                    Proceedings 1985. pp. 421-427.
                    *Nichols, J.A. and White, I.C. 1979. Aerial Application of Dispersants in
                    Bantry Bay following the Betelqeuse Incident. Marine Pollution Bulletin,
                    Vol. 10. pp. 193-197. Pergamon Press, Ltd. 1979.
                    9OSIR Oil Spills, International Summary & Review, 1978-1981
                    sTanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers. T.A.C.         C
                    Inc. 1991.





































                                                                                        Betelgeuse








                    Name of Spill: Borag
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 02/05/77
                    Location of Spill: Keelung, Taiwan
                    Latitude: 25 12 N
                    Longitude: 12144 E
                    Oil Product: No. 4 Fuel Oil
                    Oil Type: Type 3
                    Barrels: 213,690
                    Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                    Resources at Risk: Power plant water intakes, industrial water intakes,
                    commercial fisheries, abalone, crabs, lobsters, crawfish, Japanese Eels,
                    seaweed, anchovies, mackerel, tuna, recreational beaches, fish aquaculture
                    stocks.
                    Dispersants: No
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: No
                    Other Special Interest: Wildlife impacts.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches, exposed rocky shores.
                    Keywords: International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF),
                    skimmer, boom, sinking, adverse weather conditions, oil mop machines,
                    manual removal.

                    Incident Summary:

                    On February 7, the Borag grounded on Hsin Lai Reef off Keelung, Taiwan
                    while en-route to the Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPQ oil terminal at
                    Shen Ao. On February 15, heavy weather caused the vessel to break up and
                    sink, releasing more oil. Approximately 213,690 barrels of No. 4 Fuel Oil
                    leaked from the vessel.


                    Behavior of Oil:

                    No. 4 fuel oil has an API gravity of about 16.5. Most of the oil drifted out to
                    sea, but 60 miles of sand beaches and rocky shores along Taiwan's northern
                    coast were oiled. A large amount of oil entered the Keelung Harbor, causing
                    welding to be prohibited for fear of igniting a fire. Oil was trapped in a
                    number of small fishing village harbors and accumulated to a thickness of up
                    to four inches.

















                                                                                                  Borag









             Countermeasures and Mitigation:
             International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Ltd. (ITOPF) personnel                           41
             arrived on scene on February 13 to assist in oil spill response operations. The
             CPC had a Rheinwerft skimmer which was deployed at the Sheh Ho power
             station. The oil there proved to be too viscous to be recovered by the
             skimmer. The power stations at Sheh Ho and Shen Ao had some Bennett
             boom which was effectively used. There were limited stocks of dispersant                          4
             available, but the necessary vessels and helicopters to make effective
             application of them were not available. Little additional oil spill response
             equipment was available in Taiwan.

             ITOPF personnel ordered two nine-inch Oil Mops, but they arrived three days
             later than expected. The Oil Mops, used in conjunction with tugs towing                           41
             booms to collect oil, proved very effective in recovering oil. Two four-inch
             Oil Mops arrived from Singapore and recovered oil effectively, but broke
             down almost immediately. On February 14, approximately 2000 feet of
             Bennett boom were deployed with good results around power plant water
             intakes and across a number of harbor entrances. Booms were supplied to                           0
             local fishermen to protect their boats, but many boats were oiled as the
             majority of the fisherman failed to use the booms as instructed.

             Further cleanup measures included offering five dollars reward for every
             barrel of recovered oil. Locals collected oil manually using buckets which
             were brought to the CPC oil terminal for disposal.

             Other Special Interest Issues:

             The anchovies fishery was disrupted as fishermen were reluctant to risk
             oiling their nets. Scarcity of abalone and tuna, and mortalities among crabs,
             lobsters, and crawfish were claimed by fishermen. Seaweed was claimed to be
             in short supply by those who collect it. Japanese eels are collected along the
             coast near Keelung for stocking of aquaculture sites, and for export to Japan.
             Fishermen claimed mortalities among the eels, and interference with their
             harvesting.

             References:

             eGenwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
             eHooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
             1987. pp. 75-76.
             *Spill Technology Newsletter, March-April 1977. pp. 58-59.









             Borag                                   2








                  Name of Spill: Bouchard #65
                  Date of Spill (mmddyy): 1/28/77
                  Location of Spill: Buzzards Bay, Massachusetts coast
                  Latitude: 4137 N
                  Longitude: 070 41 W
                  Oil Product: Number 2 home heating oil
                  Oil Type: Type 2
                  Barrels: 1,932
                  Source of Spill: Tank Barge
                  Resources at Risk: Lobsters, molluscs
                  Dispersants: No
                  Bioremediation: No
                  In-situ Burning: Yes
                  Other Special Interest: Unusual or experimental cleanup techniques, adverse
                  weather conditions, logistical or operational problems.
                  Shoreline Types Impacted:
                  Keywords: Atlantic Strike Team (AST), skimmer, vacuum truck, adverse
                  weather conditions, suction operations, lightering.

                  Incident Summary:

                  On the afternoon of January 28, 1977, the barge Bouchard #65 grounded in a
                  water depth of 17 feet in the ice covered waters of Buzzards Bay,
                  Massachusetts. The barge was carrying 76,191 barrels of Number 2 heating oil.
                  The grounding ruptured four of the seven tanks, initially spilling 95 barrels of
                  oil. The Bouchard #65 was towed 4 miles north to Wings Neck where it was
                  grounded intentionally to prevent its sinking and the further release of oil.
                  On the morning of January 29, the Bouchard #85 arrived to begin offloading
                  the oil remaining on the barge. Later that day the Atlantic Strike Team (AST)
                  arrived to assist in the offloading operations. The Bouchard #65 continued to
                  leak oil during the tow to Wings Neck and during lightering operations. The
                  barge was then towed to the Massachusetts Maritime Academy on January 29
                  where offloading operations continued. On January 30, the barge was finally
                  towed to Boston, Massachusetts where the remaining cargo was offloaded.




















                                                                                    Bouchard #65






                                                                                                          0




            Behavior of Oil:

            Number 2 fuel oil is a medium weight material with a minimum API gravity
            of 30. The Bouchard #65 spilled 1,932 barrels of No. 2 fuel oil. Approximately
            95 barrels of oil were spilled at the site of the initial grounding, and more oil
            leaked as the vessel was towed and grounded at Wings Neck. Approximately
            30% of the spilled oil collected into pools of almost pure product at the
            interstices formed by rafting ice. The ice also effectively contained the oil and
            prevented it from impacting the shoreline. Some long range transport of oil
            did occur as oiled ice drifted and melted in areas far from the spill site. The
            oil was originally contained in a .04-square mile area. After the ice broke up,
            the slick covered 7.5 square miles. Approximately 285 barrels of oil were lost
            to weathering.

            Countermeasures and Mitigation:

            Cleanup operations began on January 29. Cannon Engineering, Coastal
            Services, Inc., and Jetline Services, Inc. were contracted to clean up the spill.
            Vacuum trucks were used to remove the concentrations of almost pure
            product from the interstices formed by rafting ice. About 18 percent of the
            spilled oil (about 357 barrels) was recovered, mostly by this method. Initially,
            hoses were run from the trucks on the shore to the pools of oil. As the ice
            began to move and break up, a vacuum truck onboard a tug was used to
            continue the recovery operations. Five inches of snow fell on February 5 and
            mixed with the oil, resulting in an oily slush which was much harder to
            recover with vacuum trucks.

            A Navy Marco skimmer and a Lockheed Arctic Boat were deployed. The
            Marco skimmer did not recover any significant amounts of oil. Ice wedged in
            the Lockheed skimmer's intake area, preventing the oil from contacting the
            recovery disk. Skimmers worked well only in large areas of ice-free water.
            Because of this they were almost totally useless in the Buzzards Bay
            operations. Strong currents also hindered skimmer operations.
            Some oiled ice was removed using cranes and trucks. The crane used an "I"
            beam to rake oiled ice towards the shore. Once collected at the water's edge,                .41
            front end loaders loaded the oiled ice into trucks for removal to landfills.
            This method removed very little oil, and caused the shoreline to become
            oiled.

            On January 31, the USCG ignited the oil slick at the site of the initial
            grounding, burning approximately 48 barrels of oil.
            Movement and breakup of the ice, snowfall, and the extreme cold hindered
            the response, which continued until February 25.







            Bouchard #65                          2








                  Other Special Interest Issues:

                  Problems arose with ice clogging the hoses to the vacuum trucks. Sections of
                  hose had to be repeatedly removed and thawed. It was noted that when air
                  was prevented from entering the hoses, clogging problems were reduced.

                  References:

                  *Baxter, et al. 1978. The Bouchard #65 Oil Spill, January 1977, Appendices.
                  U.S. Department of Commerce, NOAA. 6 appendices.
                  *Deslauriers, et al. 1977. The Physical and Chemical Behavior of the
                  Bouchard #65 Oil Spill in the Ice Covered Waters of Buzzards Bay. Prepared
                  for U.S. Department of Commerce, NOAA. 77 pp.
                  *Gundlach, et al. 1978. Some Guidelines for Oil-Spill Control in Coastal
                  Environments, Based on Field Studies of Four Oil Spills. Chemical
                  Dispersants for the Control of Oil Spills, ASTM STP 659. L.T. McCarthy, Jr.,
                  G.P. Lindblom, and H.F. Walter, Eds. American Society for Testing and
                  Materials. pp. 98-118.
                  oMMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
                  *NOAA. 1977. Bouchard #65 Oil Spill in Ice Covered Waters of Buzzards Bay.



































                                                        3                          Bouchard #65








                     Name of Spill: Brazilian Marina
                     Date of Spill (mmddyy): 01/09/78
                     Location of Spill: Sao Sebastiao, Sao Paulo, Brazil
                     Latitude: 23 48 S
                     Longitude: 045 43 W
                     Oil Product: Kuwait Crude Oil
                     Oil Type: Type 3
                     Barrels: 73,600
                     Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                     Resources at Risk: Fine sand beaches, exposed tidal flats.
                     Dispersants: Yes
                     Bioremediation: No
                     In-situ Burning: No
                     Other Special Interest: Effects to tourism, effects to recreation areas.                    op
                     Shoreline Types Impacted: Fine sand beaches, exposed tidal flats.
                     Keywords: Pacific Strike Team (PST), Gulf Strike Team (GST), manual
                     removal, BRAS-X-plus, disposal.

                     Incident Summary:

                     On the morning of January 9, 1978, the tanker Brazilian Marina grounded in
                     the Sao Sebastiao Channel, Sao Paulo, Brazil. Tanks ruptured and spilled
                     approximately 73,600 barrels of Kuwait crude oil. Approximately 18,000
                     barrels of the spilled product impacted the shoreline. Personnel from the
                     United States Coast Guard (USCG) and the United States Environmental
                     Protection Agency (EPA) responded to the spill at the request of Brazilian
                     Authorities. Most of the organized shoreline cleanup was focused on the
                     recreational beaches. Cleanup personnel initially used dispersants to combat
                     the oil on some beaches, but this proved to have negative ecological effects
                     and was stopped.

                     Behavior of Oil:

                     The oil was carried to the northeast by the currents. Approximately 18,400
                     barrels of the spilled oil impacted the shoreline, and the remainder drifted
                     out to sea. Beaches and coastal embayments were oiled in the States of Sao
                     Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Six of the beaches of Ubatuba, Sao Paulo were
                     heavily impacted. Overflights on January 22, showed a 200 square mile slick
                     composed of sheen and some emulsified oil which remained off Ponta
                     juatinga for a week, and then began to dissipate.














                                                                                      Brazilian Marina









             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             Officials from Sao Paulo contacted the US EPA. The EPA and the USCG sent
             personnel to help in the spill response. The USCG personnel concentrated on
             directing cleanup operations while the EPA personnel concentrated on
             sampling and assessing the ecological damage.

             Recovery operations at sea involved the use of a Hydrovac, but most of the
             oil had dissipated by the time it was deployed.
             Shoreline cleanup operations concentrated on recreational beaches. Beaches
             of little economical importance or ecological sensitivity were left alone. Oiled
             sand was removed both manually and byfront end loaders. Hay was spread
             on some beaches to absorb the, oil, and was subsequently gathered and buried
             on the beach above the high water mark.

             Other Special Interest Issues:

             Petrobras (the national oil company of Brazil) applied dispersants to four of
             the Ubatuba beaches. Approximately 5,500 gallons of undiluted BRAS-X-plus
             were applied to 13 miles of beaches. The application of dispersants had great
             cosmetic effects on the beaches. The visible oil was removed and the beach
             could then be used recreationally. However, it was not an effective cleanup
             technique, as the dispersants, caused the oil to spread down into the sand,
             thereby complicating the manual removal of the oil, and causing it to persist
             longer in the environment. EPA tests proved BRAS-X-plus to be toxic even
             in small amounts to selected marine microfauna. Compania de Technologia
             de Saneamento Ambiental (CETESB) ordered that the application be stopped
             once its effects became evident.

             The beaches at Ubatuba are a tourist attraction, however, the incident caused
             little damage to the tourist trade. Vacationers used the beaches while beach
             cleanup was in progress. At some beaches, operations were delayed as the
             cleanup had to be conducted around sunbathers.

             Ref erences:

             *Dewling, R.T. and Silva, C. 1979. Impact of Dispersant use During the
             Brazilian Marina Incident. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1979, pp. 269-276.
             *Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
             9MMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database











             Brazilian Marina                       2








                   Name of Spill: Buckeye Pipeline
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 03/30/90
                   Location of Spill: Knapp Run, Pennsylvania
                   Latitude: 40 40 N
                   Longitude: 079 40 W
                   Oil Product: TransMix (Gasoline, Kerosene, No. 2 Fuel Oil)
                   Oil Type: Type 2
                   Baff els: 1,790
                   Source of Spill: Pipeline                                                           41
                   Resources at Risk: Marshes, drinking water intakes, industrial water intakes,
                   mussels, waterfowl, wading birds, nesting beaches
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Human health and safety concerns.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Vegetated riverbanks.
                   Keywords: Siphon dam, filter fence, skimmer, sorbent booms, collection
                   boom, vacuum truck, Atlantic Strike Team (AST), Regional Response Team.

                   Incident Summary:

                   At 2300 on March 30, 1990, a landslide caused a pipeline break and the
                   subsequent release of approximately 1,790 barrels of TransMix into the
                   Allegheny River at Knapp Run, located two miles above Freeport,
                   Pennsylvania. The spill was reported to the Marine Safety Office (MSO)
                   Pittsburgh on the morning of March 31. The spill posed a potential threat to
                   local drinking water intakes as well as sensitive habitats in back channels,
                   shoals, embayment areas, and tributaries.

                   The Regional Response Team was activated from April 1-4. The USCG
                   Atlantic Strike Team (AST) monitored cleanup and provided site safety. The
                   AST and MSO personnel formed two shoreline cleanup monitoring teams on
                   April 2. The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA)
                   promulgated information on potential alternative water supplies. The Ohio
                   River Sanitation and Navigation Commission (ORSANCO) collected water
                   samples and used fluorometry to analyze concentrations of the pollutant in
                   the river. River velocities were used to estimate the arrival time of pollutant
                   at several water intakes on the Ohio River. Several water intakes on the
                   Allegheny River were closed from April 2-4. Increasing the flow of the
                   Allegheny River to dilute the contaminant was considered and rejected. No
                   significant wildlife impacts were reported.











                                                                                Buckeye Pipeline











           Behavior of Oil:

           By the morning of March 31, the oil had traveled down the Allegheny River
           from the incident site near river mile 32 to river mile 25. At 1800 EST on
           April 1, the leading edge of visible oil was reported to be at river mile 13.3 in
           the area of Lock and Dam #3. Several seeps were also observed along the
           stream in the incident area.

           The leading edge was observed at river mile 5.0 at 1100 on April 2. A
           continuous rainbow sheen still emanated from Knapp Run. One of three
           settling ponds from an oil strip mining operation near Knapp Run contained
           a heavy accumulation of product.
           Mid-day on April 3, fluoremtry analyses indicated that the leading edge was at
           about Ohio River mile 22. Only one cleanable containment site was left on
           the Allegheny River. A few main seepage sites were still leaking pollutant
           into the settling ponds at Knapp Run. By April 4, cleanup efforts were
           exclusively at Knapp Run.

           Countermeasures and Mitigation:

           Buckeye personnel installed a siphon dam and filter fence in the stream. A
           second siphon dam with a 8" culvert pipe was built above the original dam.
           At this second dam, skimmers and vacuum trucks operated intermittently.

           Several sorbent booms and a hay filter dam were placed across the surface of
           the stream between the second siphon dam and the Allegheny River.
           Collection boom was deployed in several places along the Allegheny River.
6.1        Sorbent booms was placed at the mouth of the Knapp Run when the water in
           the river dropped.

           A suction hose removed pollutant from the settling ponds to a vacuum
           truck. Collection sumps as well as a drum in the ground collected pollutant
           seepage before in entered the stream.

           On the evening of April 10, heavy rains washed out some of the siphon dams
           and filter fences. Although the largest dam was still intact, water intakes on
           the Allegheny River were again closed as a precautionary measure.













           Buckeye Pipeline                      2









                  Other Special Interest Issues:

                  Since the pollutant in the ground remained unweathered until seepage
                  occurred, workers were in danger of being exposed to fresh sources of benzene
                  and other toxic components. Therefore, workers needed respiratory
                  protection for a variety of wind and weather conditions. The terrain of the
                  spill area was steep, wooded, and slippery. Also, responders needed to
                  traverse the stream, which made working conditions dangerous.

                  References:

                  *NOAA Hotline Reports







































                                                        3                       Buckeye Pipeline








                  Name of Spill: Bunnah Agate
                  Date of Spill (mmddyy): 11/01/79
                  Location of Spill: Galveston Bay, Texas
                  Latitude: 29 17.7 N
                  Longitude: 094 37.4 W
                  Oil Product: Nigerian Crude, blended crude (high naphtha content)
                  Oil Type: Type 4, Type 2
                  Barrels: 254,761
                  Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                  Resources at Risk: Fine sand beaches, marshes.
                  Dispersants: No
                  Bioremediation: No
                  In-situ Burning: Yes
                  Other Special Interest: Logistical or operational problems, closure of shipping
4W                lanes or vehicle traffic routes, adverse weather conditions.
                  Shoreline Types Impacted: Fine sand beaches, marshes.
                  Keywords: Collision, explosion, fire, vacalls, vacuum truck, Open Water Oil
                  Containment and Recovery System (OWOCRS), Open Water Oil Recovery
                  System (OWORS), skimmers, U.S. Navy Superintendent of Salvage
0                 (NAVSUPSALV), Clean Water, lightering, salvage, Gulf Strike Team (GST),
                  boom, manual removal.

                  Incident Summary:

                  On the morning of November 1, 1979, the Burmah Agate and the Mimosa
                  collided at the entrance to Galveston Harbor. The Mimosa struck the
                  Burmah Agate on its starboard side, tearing an 8 by 15 foot hole in the hull
                  near Cargo Tank No. 5. An explosion occurred upon impact, and the leaking
                  oil ignited. The USCG immediately dispatched the Coast Guard Cutter
                  Valiant to begin search and rescue operations. By 1230 all 26 crew members
                  of the Mimosa had been found, but only 6 of the Burmah Agate's 37 crew
                  members were accounted for. The owners of the Burmah Agate assumed
                  responsibility for the spill response. They contracted Clean Water, Inc. for
                  cleanup operations, and Smit International Inc. to fight fires on the Burmah
                  Agate, and to assist in salvage. The Burmah Agate burned until January 8,
                  1980 and was towed to Brownsville, Texas on February 1 for scrapping.















                                                                                  Burmah Agate











             Behavior of Oil:

             Booms and skimmers were deployed to protect beaches. Seasonal winds kept
             most of the oil offshore, however, heavy concentrations of oil washed ashore
             at Galveston and San Jose Island. Lighter concentrations of oil impacted
             Padre Island and the Bolivar Peninsula. Oil came ashore on November 5 at
             Galveston jetties and East Beach, and cleanup began immediately. Oil
             impacted the Matagorda Peninsula on November 6. On November 9, six
             barrels of oil impacted 437 yards of marshes and sand beaches around Smith
             Point and five areas on Galveston Island. The Smith Point area was the only
             inland area impacted by oil. The marsh areas were not cleaned up because
             response efforts could have caused greater damage than the oiling. Boom was
             deployed in the San Luis Pass area and there was an attempt to deploy a
             Marco skimmer in that area. A crane from Galveston was necessary to deploy
             the skimmer.

             By November 12, a slick composed of sheen and mousse in windrows
             extended 8.5 miles WSW of the tanker. Oil in the form of small tarballs
             impacted Padre Island near Mansfield Pass on November 13. Approximately
             eight barrels of oil came ashore at Padre Island where no cleanup was done.
             Heavy concentrations of oil impacted Galveston beaches on November 18.
             The heaviest impacts of oil occurred near Jamaica Beach November 19-21. On
             November 24, Jamaica Beach was cleaned with Vacalls. Streamers were
             observed near Bolivar Peninsula on November 27. Most of the oil burned in
             the ship or in the water near the ship, however by December 7, a 19 mile long
             slick extended to the SSW of the tanker.

             Most of the oil spilled from the tanker was blended crude with the remainder
             the heavier Nigerian crude. Thirty-eight per cent of the oil carried by the
             Burmah Agate was recovered through lightering operations. Of the
             remaining oil, an estimated 1.7 per cent was picked up by skimmers, .5 per
             cent impacted beaches, 48 per cent burned, and 12 per cent dispersed offshore.
             Ultimately, 2,100 barrels impacted various beaches and marshes.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:
             The G & H Towing Company tugs The Judge, Carol Hayden, and R.C. Hayden
             fought the fire under the direction of the Commanding Officer of the USCGC
             Valiant until Smit International, Inc. personnel arrived. The G & H tugs
             were not manned by trained firefighters, and they had a tendency to leave
             effective fire fighting positions when explosions occurred aboard the tanker.
             The G & H tugs continued under the direction of Smit International, Inc.                        0
             personnel until better vessels were procured.






             Burmah Agate                            2                                                       0









                 On November 2, the GST arrived with 612 feet of Open Water Oil
                 Containment and Recovery System (OWOCRS) and two Air-Deliverable
                 Anti-Pollution Transfer Systems (ADAPTS) . Western Marine provided boats
                 for the deployment of the GST's equipment. The shipping lanes into
                 Galveston were closed in both directions for a short time on the first day of
                 the incident, and again on November 5 while the Mimosa was towed to
                 Galveston. Subsequently, the outgoing lanes were opened.
                 GST personnel worked through the night and into the morning of
                 November 3 to deploy a boom astern of the tanker. In the early evening of
                 November 3, nine firefighters from the Netherlands arrived with additional
                 equipment. Various problems occurred during the evening of November 3;
                 kinks in the boom, no boom lights, and a boom line fouled the prop of a
                 deployment vessel. The Dutch tug Jacob Van Heemskerk was on-scene in the
                 morning of November 4, and began applying water to the Burmah Agate.
                 In the early morning of November 5, more explosions aboard the Burmah
                 Agate opened several starboard and center tanks. The On-Scene Coordinator
                 (OSC) and acting Captain of the Port (COT`P) contacted the U.S. Navy
                 Supervisor of Salvage (NAVSUPSALV) to bring in booms and skimmers
                 with personnel to operate them.

                 On November 7, the Linda Partain arrived on-scene to fight fires along with
                 the Jacob Van Heemskerk and the Seaspan Raider. Goodyear boom was
                 deployed astern of the Burmah Agate. On November 8, only the Linda
                 Partain remained alongside the tanker, applying water to the forward tanks to
                 cool them. The other two tugs had moved away due to explosions. Vessels
                 continued to deploy the Goodyear boom near the Burmah Agate. On
                 November 10, 2,000 feet of Goodyear boom was deployed north of the
                 Burmah Agate to protect the Galveston Channel and Bolivar Peninsula.
                 Booming of the San Luis Pass area was completed with the deployment of
                 4,000 feet of boom. Oil entrainment was discovered under the booms astern
                 of the tanker.

                 On November 11, a Marco Class V skimmer was deployed to back up the
                 boom under which oil had entrained. The boom to the north of the tanker
                 was damaged by a response vessel during the night of November 11, and was
                 replaced. It was damaged again on November 12, and on November 16.
                 Another portside tank exploded, and burning oil hit the booms and set them
                 on fire. A Lockheed skimmer Open Water Oil Recovery System (OWORS)
                 was deployed but one of its flotations was punctured, and was removed for
                 repairs. On November 13, two OWOCRS were deployed. The boom caught
                 fire again on November 14.

                 On November 17, the Bering Sea, with two Marco skimmers attached to
                 outriggers, and the Midnight Flash, with the Lockheed skimmer attached to
                 an outrigger, came on scene and began skimming operations.




                                                      3                         Burmah Agate








             By November 21, there were 400 people cleaning the beaches. Beach cleanup
             was done by manual removal of oiled sand, which was loaded into dump
             trucks by front-end loaders. Loaders removed too much sand from the
             beaches and they were replaced with vacuum trucks. Cleanup of beaches was
             complete by November 27.
             On January 8, the fire was put out, and deployment of 4000 feet of Goodyear
             boom and OWOCRS began in anticipation of -lightering efforts. There was a
             delay in offloading operations because the owners of the Burmah Agate were
             slow to award a contract. The lightering began on January 17 and continued
             until February 3. Approximately 160,000 barrels of crude oil were recovered
             by lightering operations.

             Other Special Interest Issues:

             On November 22, adverse weather prevented fire fighting and deployment of
             skimmers, and from November 28 to 29 bad weather prevented all cleanup
             operations.

             On December 5, the OSC requested the Pilots Association to meet ships 4
             miles farther out to sea than the Burmah Agate. as the OSC felt that ships
             were passing too close to the containment and recovery gear. On December 17
             a foreign vessel anchored near the Burmah Agate and carried away the
             Goodyear booms as it dragged anchor. The boom was re-deployed the next
             day.











                                                                                                       NOW


















             Burmah Agate                         4









                   Through the duration of the response, four skimming barriers (OWOCRS)
                   and one Lockheed skimmer (OWORS) were used. Heavy seas (typical of
                   winter weather in the area) hindered boon-dng and oil recovery efforts. Oil
                   began to entrain under the OWOCRS when the current reached .75 knots,
                   and once the current reached 1 knot the OWOCRS were totally useless.
                   Furthermore, the OWOCRS were only useful in a stationary configuration,
                   and could not be maneuvered effectively to follow a moving slick. Problems
0                  also arose due to the constant replacement of vessels in the OWOCRS
                   configuration. Eleven vessels were rotated through deployment and
                   maintenance of the OWOCRS. This rotation was caused by short-term
                   contracting of vessels by the owners of the Burmah Agate. While
                   problematic, the rotation of various types of vessels did illuminate the
                   characteristics of a vessel best suited for OWOCRS deployment and
                   maintenance. These characteristics were: seaworthiness (which the crew
                   boats did not have due to their small size), large work area astern,
                   maneuverability (twin-screw, bow-thruster equipped boats worked the best),
                   onboard tank space, open stern close to the water, and adequate power. Of all
                   the vessels used, a large offshore supply vessel worked the best. Deployment
                   of booms and skimmers around the burning tanker before the fire was
                   extinguished resulted in the ignition and subsequent loss of 4000feet of
                   Goodyear boom and one OWOCRS. The Marco Class V skimmer proved to
                   be the most effective skimmer.

                   The Lockheed skimmer (OWORS) broke down and spare parts were not
                   readily available. This made on-site repair of the OWORS impossible.
                   Furthermore, the deployment of the OWORS in conjunction with the
                   OWOCRS was difficult. When attached to an outrigger on a vessel, the
                   OWORS did have partial success in recovering oil.
                   Staging areas for response vessels and storing areas for USCG and
                   NAVSUPSALV equipment were difficult to find. The OSC finally rented a
                   dock from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, however the OSC had to
                   arrange for the docking of the Army dredge Gerig once it returned to port.

                   References:

                   *Kana, T., R. Pavia, E. Thompson. 1981. Burmah Agate - Chronology and
                   Containment Operations, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1981, pp.131-139.
                   *USCG On-Scene Coordinator's Final Report












                                                          5                          Burmah Agate








                     Name of Spill: Cabo Pilar
                     Date of Spill (mmddyy): 10/08/87
                     Location of Spill: Punta Davis, Chile
                     Latitude: 53 00 S
                     Longitude: 074 00 W
                     Oil Product: ENAP crude oil
                     Oil Type: Type 2
                     Barrels: 40,900
                     Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                     Resources at Risk: Crabs, kelp, submerged aquatic vegetation, sea lions.
                     Dispersants: Yes
                     Bioremediation: No
                     In-situ Burning: No
                     Other Special Interest: Wildlife impacts, research conducted, adverse weather
                     conditions.
                     Shoreline Types Impacted: Exposed rocky shores.
                     Keywords: Manual removal, disposal, Corexit 9527, Slickgone LTE.

                     Incident Summary:

                     On October 8, 1987, the Cabo Pilar grounded in the Magellan Strait, while en-
                     route from Clarencia-Gregorio to San Vincente, Chile. Approximately 40,900
                     barrels of ENAP crude oil was spilled into the Strait off Punta Davis.
                     Dispersants and manual methods were used in cleanup operations. The Cabo
                     Pilar was refloated on November 3, and continued on its voyage.

                     Behavior of Oil:

                     ENAP crude oil has an API gravity of 39.0, and a pour point of 6 degrees C. A
                     1 mile wide by 10 mile long oil slick formed along Paso Largo. Approximately
                     31 miles of coastline were oiled, with the Abra Canal suffering the worst
                     impacts.

                     Countermeasures and Mitigation:
                     Cleanup operations, conducted by the owners of the vessel, began on
                     December 12. Oil was cleaned up manually, using shovels and buckets. The
                     collected oiled debris was buried on the beaches. Cleanup was hampered by
                     the generally bad weather in the area.

                     On October 14, Wifsmuller Salvage was hired to offload the oil remaining on
                     the Cabo Pilar. Operations began on November 1, and the oil was transferred
                     to the Torn Rask.













                                                                                             Cabo Pilar









            Dispersant application began the day after the spill. Two different dispersants
            were applied using Warren Spring Laboratories (WSL) AIAXI and WSL MINI
            equipment. Corexit 9527 (582 gallons) and Slickgone LTE (3380 gallons) were
            used. Approximately 3774 barrels of oil were treated with dispersants. It
            could not be discerned whether the oil dissipated due to the high energy
            waters in the area or due to the dispersants. Studies done by the University of
            Magallanes three months after the spill showed that the dispersants did not
            affect the marine resources in the area.

            Other Special Interest Issues:

            Impacts to king crabs and seabirds were minimal. Seaweed was severely
            affected. The south coast of Abra Canal, the most heavily impacted area, was
            found to be totally devoid of intertidal organisms in studies conducted by the
            University of Magallanes three months after the spill.

            Ref erences:

            o Pizarro, F. 1989. The Cabo Pilar Grounding and Oil Spill, Oil Spill
            Conference Proceedings, 1989, pp.61-64.
            oThe Physical Persistence of Spilled Oil: An Analysis of Oil Spills Previous to
            Exxon Valdez. 1990. A report prepared by Advanced Technology, Inc. for
            NOAA HAZMAT.







































            Cabo Pilar                            2








                    Name of Spill: Chevron Hawaii
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 09/01/79
                    Location of Spill: Deer Park, Texas
                    Latitude: 29 42 N
                    Longitude: 095 08 W
                    Oil Product: Santa Maria Crude oil, Catalytic cracker feedstock
                    Oil Type: Type 3
                    Barrels: 20,000
                    Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                    Resources at Risk: Shrimp, waterfowl, oysters, abundant beds, State Park.
                    Dispersants: No
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: No
                    Other Special Interest: Effects to personal property.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Marshes, developed upland, swamps, piers, flats.
                    Keywords: Vacalls, vacuum truck, oil mop machines, skimmers, manual
                    removal, water-washing, absorbents, salvage, Gulf Strike Team (GST),
                    Atlantic Strike Team (AST), explosion, fire, sinking, adverse weather
                    conditions, boom, reoiling.

                    Incident Summary:

                    On September 1, 1979, at 1412, the SS Chevron Hawaii exploded, burned, and
                    sank while discharging cargo at the Deer Park Shell Oil Company terminal on
                    the south side of the Houston ship channel. The cargo of catalytic cracker
                    feedstock and Santa Maria crude oil spilled into the sea as the fire burned for
                    ten hours. Lightning apparently ignited accumulated cargo vapors on the
                    deck of the vessel. None of the cargo tanks had been gas-freed. The explosion
                    was so powerful that a 5 foot by 7 foot hull fragment from the burning vessel
                    penetrated the roof of a Shell Oil Company petroleum product shore tank
                    located 600 feet inland from the vessel. The contents of that shore tank,
                    approximately 26,000 barrels of ethyl alcohol, ignited and burned as well. As
                    the fire spread into a nearby barge slip, four barges that were discharging cargo
                    caught fire. Three of these barges exploded and sank. No significant amount
                    of pollution came from any of these four barges. Weather during the incident
                    was warm and windy with heavy downpours and lightning. The maximum
                    reported wind gust for the day was 33 knots, at 1300.                                      z
















                                                                                      Chevron Hawaii









             The fireboat MIV Captain F. L. Farnsworth, which had been moored 2.5
3            nautical miles from the terminal, was on-scene by 1430. Four boats and 14
             Coast Guard personnel assisted in fire fighting and lifesaving operations.
             Two Coast Guard pollution team investigators from the Houston Port Safety
             Station were already on their way to the Shell terminal when the accident
             occurred. They led the rescue of the burning vessel's boatswain from the
             forecastle. Representatives from both the USCG Pacific and Gulf Strike
0            Teams (PST and AST) monitored all phases of the cleanup. Eighteen
             different cleanup companies were involved in the cleanup operations. Since
             the spill occurred over a holiday weekend, it was difficult to recruit
             companies with equipment specifically needed for this spill.
             One crew member and two radar repairmen aboard the SS Chevron Hawaii
             were killed and 13 people were injured. Even though six tugs were available
             within the barge slip, no attempt was made by the Shell Oil Company
             dockman or the tugboat operators to move any adjacent barges into the
             channel where they might have been safe from the fire. Also, the dockman
             left the scene without activating the emergency cut-off switch. This would
             have assured that any adjacent barges' cargo openings were properly secured.
             Damages to the vessel, barges andfacility exceeded $27,000,000.

             Behavior of Oil:

             Oil leaking from the ship impacted the entire area from the ship to Diamond
             Shamrock for the first 6 days following the explosion. An oily rain fell on
             nearby houses, cars and swimming pools as a result of the explosion. The
             spreading of the oil on the water limited the usefulness of the Coast Guard
             boats in firefighting by clogging the boat engines and fire pump intakes. The
             oil continued to flow into the main stream in the middle of the channel.
             Much of the oil and oily debris collected in a bend in the channel near the
             incident area. Boom assisted this natural containment in slowing the spread
             of oil.

             A large amount of the oil collected at the oil tanking area on the north side of
             the channel. Due to wind and water movement, a substantial amount of oil
             accumulated at Jacinto Port. The western shore of Old River was heavily
             oiled, from two miles upstream down to the entrance of the river, while the
             flatlands on the east side were only slightly oiled. A small amount of oil
             entered the Peggy Lake area. Bayous, foreshores, and an area of marsh grass at
             San Jacinto State Park were lightly oiled. The sides of the battleship Texas in
             an adjacent small creek were oiled as well.
RW






0






             Chevron Hawaii









                    Large quantities of oil entered Paktank Equity ITC, a major grain loading and
                    general industrial facility. The oil was then covered with wheat dust, which
                    made it very difficult to clean up. Oil collected at the Diamond Shamrock
                    outfall when the wind was in the east. The Boggy Bayou refinery outfall was
                    also heavily oiled.

                    Between September 18 and 20, torrential rainfall caused considerable washing
                    of the whole spill area. An unknown amount of oil moved down the                            41
                    channel and out to sea. Many cleaned areas were re-impacted with oil and
                    oily debris following the rains. Oil also moved into marsh grass areas that
                    had not previously been affected.

                    Countermeasures and Mitigation:

                    The MIV Captain F. L. Farnsworth      fought fires around the vessel with
                    firefighting foam. This vessel stayed on-scene until September 2.
                    Containment boom was available but was not required for offloading
                    operations and had not been deployed prior to the incident. The stored boom
                    was engulfed by the flames. Boom was opened and closed at Diamond
                    Shamrock to collect oil when the wind was in the east. Boom helped collect a
                    major part of the oil east of the ship for direct pumping into the dirty ballast
                    system on shore. Opening and closing of boom for vessel traffic along with
                    some tugs running right over the boom often released the contained oil.
                                                                                                                4
                    Two kinds of vacuum trucks were employed during the cleanup. Vacalls,
                    vacuum trucks with very powerful air pumps, were the most efficient at
                    sucking up the oil. The other vacuum trucks were used primarily to
                    transport oil that had been collected by the vacalls. Oil mop recovery devices
                    were used in the oil tanking area.
                    Small floating skimmers were only useful in sheltered areas since the wakes
                    of passing ships made operations in the main channel too dangerous. A large
                    Exxon skimmer, directed by a helicopter overhead, collected oil from the
                    south end of the channel up towards the Lynchburg Ferry.

                    Many manual methods were used during the cleanup operations. Water
                    washing techniques and absorbent materials were used to clean the bayous in
                    San Jacinto State Park. Water washing was used to clean jetties as well. The
                    cleanup inspection team decided not to conduct cleanup operations on some
                    environmentally sensitive areas such as the east bank of Old River.
                    Commercial diving and salvage operations began in October. Damaged
                    portions of the hull and cargo tanks of the Chevron Hawaii were cut into
                    sections for removal by barges.







                                                                                        Chevron Hawaii









            Other Special Interest Issues:

            After this incident, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
            recommended that more attention be given to the proper maintenance and
            inspection of cargo tank closures.

            References:

            eGenwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
            eGolob's 1978-1989 US Spill Report
            *Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
            1987.
            9MMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
            *National Transportation Safety Board. 1980. Marine Accident Report:
            Explosion and Fire on Board the SS CHEVRON HAWAII with Damages to
            Barges and to the Deer Park Shell Oil Company Terminal, Houston Ship
            Channel, September 1, 1979.
            90il Spill Intelligence Report. Oil Spills, International Summary & Review,
            1978-1981
            *Tanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers. T.A.C.
            Inc. 1991.
            -,World Information Systems. Tanker Losses in U.S. Waters: 1978-1990.
            World Information Systems. 1991.






























            Chevron Hawaii








                   Name of Spill: Chevron Main Pass Block 41
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 2/10/70
                   Location of Spill: 11 miles east of the Mississippi River delta, Louisiana
                   Latitude: 29 23 N
                   Longitude: 088 59 W
                   Oil Product: crude oil
                   Oil Type: Type 3
                   Baff els: 65,000
                   Source of Spill: Platform
                   Resources at Risk: shrimp, crabs, fish
                   Dispersants: Yes
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Research conducted.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand beaches.
                   Keywords: Boom, skimmer, evaporation, fire, Shell Oil Herder, relief well,
                   straw.

                   Incident Summary:

                   The Chevron Main Pass Block 41C platform caught fire on February 10, 1970
                   and burned until March 10. Oil and gas flowed from the well until March 31.
                   Chevron hired Red Adair of Houston to put out the fire.

                   Behavior of Oil:

                   By February 13, a rainbow sheen extended a half of a mile from the platform
                   towards the northeast. By February 27, a 10-yard wide oil slick extended 10
                   miles to the southwest from the spill area. On March 4, oil impact estimated
                   at 20 barrels was found on Breton Island. Chevron began cleaning with straw
                   and skimmers that day. Collection of patches of oil extending 14 miles to the
                   northwest began that day with sweeping boom. By March 5, Breton Island
                   was cleaned of oil by rain and wave action. By March 12, a heavy slick was
                   extending in a 5 mile radius from the platform, and moderate slicks were
                   extending 15 miles to the southeast and the northwest. It was estimated that
                   of the oil spilled, 25-30% evaporated, 10-20% was recovered, and 1%
                   dissolved. Later studies estimated one per cent remained in the sediments
                   surrounding the platform. The remaining oil emulsified, dispersed or
                   biodegraded.














                                                          1               Chevron Main Pass Block 41









             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             Chevron immediately began cooling the platform with water and collecting
             booms in anticipation of the release of oil which would occur once the fire
             was out. About 2,000 barrels of two chemical dispersants mixed with water
             were sprayed on the platform during the spill to keep the platform water-wet
             for personnel safety and to prevent the structure from melting if the oil and
             gas reignited. No attempt was made to treat the entire slick with dispersants.
             Red Adair came on scene on February 26. The drilling barges Penrod and Mr.
             Arthur began drilling relief wells on March 4, while the drilling barge S-66
             was enroute to the scene. Construction of a platform from which firefighting
             and well capping operations could be carried out was completed by March 5.
             Louisiana State University Coastal Studies Institute came on scene on March
             6 and began current studies which were completed on March 21.

             The fire was put out on March 10 and the resulting release of oil was
             estimated at 1000 barrels per day. By the day the fire was put out, containment
             barges had been deployed around the platform and skimmers were on scene
             to catch any oil which slipped beyond the barge booms. While the Coast
             Guard estimated that 85%-90% of the oil was contained behind the ring of
             booms around the platform, on March 11, an oil slick was observed to extend
             7 miles to the north of the spill area. Five skimmer boats, one skimmer
             barge, and six Swedish skimmers were in operation as of March 11. Well
             capping efforts began that day, and continued through March 30 although
             they were occasionally interrupted by bad weather. It was noted on March 12
             that where a J M boom was failing to hold oil, a Navy boom was working
             effectively.

             Oil Herder #3, an experimental herder from Shell Chemical Company, was
             authorized on March 10 for use on the spill under the direction of the Federal
             Water Pollution Control Administration (FWPCA) personnel on scene. Later
             experiments with herder were inconclusive, and further tests were scheduled
             for the March 13. Two days later, permission to use one barrel of the herder
             per day was given by the United States Geological Survey (USGS). As of
             March 11, relief wells 1 and 2 continued to be drilled, and a third relief well
             had begun to be drilled. On March 13, the work platform for Red Adair's
             personnel was completed. A bird survey of the Chandeleur Island chain was
             conducted, and as of the March 13, there were no injuries to wildlife reported.
             One thousand seven hundred sixty barrels of oil emulsion were recovered by
             the March 13 with 957 barrels of it recovered by the skimmer barge alone. On
             March 14 an additional 2,367 barrels of oil emulsion were recovered. On
             March 15, marsh protection operations were readied and 2,800 barrels of
             emulsion were picked up. A March 16 survey of beaches revealed no oil
             impacts.
             Heavy weather on the March 17 caused extensive damage to the barges and
             booms. Most booms were damaged beyond the capability to repair them on
             scene and needed to be replaced. Barge redeployment did not begin again



             Chevron Main Pass Block 41               2








                   until March 21. Skimmers and skimmer boats were unable to operate in the
                   high seas generated by the weather. Oil impacted Breton Island again on
                   March 17, and the cleanup personnel there spread straw as an absorbent.
                   Skimmer operations collected 2,102 barrels on March 19 for a total of 15,613
                   barrels of emulsion recovered since skimming operations began on March 9.
                   Navy booms were deployed on March 23. All wells were capped by March 30.

                   Other Special Interest Issues:

                   Little damage appeared to have occurred to beaches, wildlife, or marine life
                   during the course of the spill from untreated or dispersed oil. Two hundred
                   thirty three benthic samples were collected in which over 550 benthic
                   organism species were identified. The number of species and the number of
                   individuals were lower in some samples near the platform, but seasonal
                   variations, sediment types, Mississippi River discharges, and other
                   environmental parameters may have been the cause of the reduced numbers.
                   Extensive trawl samples showed no changes in shrimp life cycles and blue
                   crab and fish populations were comparable to numbers from prior surveys.
                   No correlation was found between number of species, number of individuals
                   and hydrocarbon content of sediment samples collected within a ten mile
                   radius of the platform.

                   References:

                   *Groover, R., Jones, G., McAuliffe, C., Pickle, W., Smalley, A., Welsh, W.,
                   1975. Chevron Main Pass Block 41 Oil Spill: Chemical and Biological
                   Investigations. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1975, pp.555-566.
                   eNational Research Council. 1989. Using Oil Spill Dispersants on the Sea.
                   National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. pp.318-319.
                   *U.S. Coast Guard POLREP file.





























                                                         3               Chevron Main Pass Block 41








                   Name of Spill: Christos Bitas
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 10/12/78
                   Location of Spill: Irish Sea, South Wales
                   Latitude: 5143 N
                   Longitude: 005 40 W
                   Oil Product: Heavy Iranian Crude Oil
                   Oil Type: Type 3
                   Barrels: 21,990
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Wildlife refuge, oyster beds, seabirds, seals, bird sanctuaries.
                   Dispersants: Yes
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Adverse weather conditions, wildlife impacts, logistical
                   or operational problems.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches, exposed rocky shores.
                   Keywords: International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Ltd. (ITOPF),
                   skimmer, lightering, containment boom, manual removal, high-pressure
                   washing, suction operations, BP 110OX, sinking.

                   Incident Summary:

                   At 1634 on October 12, 1978, the Christos Bitas ran aground on rocks
                   approximately 10 miles off Milford Haven, Pembrokeshire, Wales. After
                   about half of its tanks ruptured, the tanker floated free of the rocks. The
                   master of the vessel requested assistance from Her Majesty's Coast Guard in
                   controlling the spilled oil, and the Christos Bitas continued for Belfast, its
                   planned destination. The tanker was stopped at 52 25 N, 005 40 W at the
                   request of British Petroleum Tanker Company, the owner of the cargo, and H.
                   M. Coast Guard.

                   The tanker was carrying 257,250 barrels of heavy Iranian crude oil.
                   Approximately 21,990 barrels spilled into the Irish Sea. Nearly all the cargo
                   was offloaded to other vessels, and the Christos Bitas was scuttled in the
                   North Atlantic on October 31, 1978. Oil impacted some beaches in South
                   Wales, as well as on Skomer Island, and the North Devon coast. Dispersants
                   were used throughout the spill response, which lasted until November 13.

















                                                                                     Christos Bitas











             Behavior of Oil:

             Heavy Iranian crude oil has an API gravity of 31.0, and a pour point of -5
             degrees F. The resulting oil slick off Milford Haven was approximately 6
             miles wide by 10 miles long. Dispersants were used almost immediately, and
             the combination of the chemicals and the gale-force winds and high seas
             helped to break up the oil. Oil impacted beaches in St. Bride's Bay, on Skomer
             Island and from 30 to 40 miles of the North Devon coastline. Approximately
             335 tons of emulsified oil and oiled debris were recovered in shoreline
             cleanup operations.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:
             On the morning of October 13 the vessel was listing heavily and H. M. Coast
             Guard began rescue operations. A British Petroleum representative arrived
             on the tanker to assess the situation. He suggested that three tankers would
             receive oil in offloading operations. Inspections revealed that the vessel was
             in danger of sinking, and it was decided at a meeting of the owner's agents
             and representatives from the Greek Embassy, International Tanker Owner's
             Pollution Federation Ltd. (ITOPF), the Protection and Indemnity (P & I) Club,
             the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, and
             the Nature Conservancy Council, that the ship should be lightered. In the
             early afternoon of October 13, British Petroleum contracted United Towing
             Ltd. to conduct salvage operations. The United Towing tug Guardsman began
             towing the Christos Bitas to a position that would minimize damage if a
             further release of oil occured. Skimmers and booms were brought to BP's
             Ocean Terminal at Angle Bay (the incident command post) in preparation for
             the possible release of oil. The Taurus arrived on scene on October 18 with
             two Oceanpacks, one Seaskimmer, one Midi-skimmer, and two Komara
             units.

             Pump specialists arrived with high-capacity Mohn pumps from Rotterdam
             in the late afternoon of October 14 for offloading operations. Oil transfer to
             the Esso York began late that night. By early the next day, the Esso York had
             received 9,849 barrels of oil. The Christos Bitas was now low in the water
             with the starboard side of its deck submerged. Air was pumped into intact
             tanks to make the vessel more buoyant. These efforts failed because the tanks
             were not airtight. On October 15, the Esso York departed with 13,965 barrels of
             oil onboard, and the British Dragoon took its place in the offloading
             operations. The British Dragoon had airtight fittings that were installed on
             the Christos Bitas. Efforts to maintain air pressure in the tanks were then
             successful, and the tanker's attitude in the water improved. By the early
             morning of October 17, the British Dragoon had received 88,935 barrels of oil,
             and the Christos Bitas was upright in the water. Later that morning the
             vessels had to separate due to a storm. By October 20, 191,100 barrels of oil had
             been removed and lightering operations ended two days later.
             Approximately 7,350 barrels of oil remained on the vessel.





             Christos Bitas                          2









or


                   Diving operations were conducted on October 22 and 23 to determine if the
                   Christos Bitas was fit for towing into the Atlantic Ocean to the chosen sinking
                   site. The diving operations suggested that the vessel was not as damaged as
                   had been originally thought. Upon receipt of this information, the owners of
                   the Christos Bitas requested time to consider repairing the tanker. Ultimately,
                   it was decided to tow the vessel to the Atlantic Ocean and sink it. A site 580
                   miles from the Irish coast was chosen for the sinking, and towing to that
                   point began on October 26. Weather worsened on October 30, and by the next
                   day the tug was having difficulty making headway. The Christos Bitas was in
                   an area considered to be a suitable alternative for a sinking location. The
                   vessel was sunk at 5122 N, 018 13 W in the afternoon of October 31,
                   approximately 300 miles west of Fastnet Rocks, Ireland. A 400 foot by 600 foot
                   slick formed at the sinking site, but periodic overflights of the area through
                   November 13 showed that the slick had dissipated.

                   Overflights of the coastline of Wales began immediately. On October 17, it
                   was discovered that several beaches in St. Bride's Bay were oiled. Two of
                   these were the ecologically sensitive areas of Martin's Haven on the
                   mainland and North Haven on the Skomer Island, which is a nature reserve.
                   An estimated 440 barrels of oil impacted Martin's Haven. British Petroleum
                   supplied a Cooper Pegler beach spray unit and backpack sprayers for beach
                   application of dispersants. Dispersants had little effect on the mousse, and
                   dispersant operations were abandoned in favor of manual removal of the oil
                   and oiled debris. Approximately 35 tons of oil and oiled debris were removed
                   from the beach using tractors, buckets and shovels. Final cleanup of the
z                  Martin's Haven beaches involved high-pressure water washing and
                   application of dispersants. Cleanup operations lasted four days ending on
                   October 20.

                   Approximately 2,570 barrels of water-in-oil emulsion impacted the beaches of
                   North Haven, Skomer Island, which was inhabited by 40 seals. Manual
                   removal of the mousse began on October 19. A boom was successfully used
                   on the beach to keep the mousse concentrated in one area. By the fourth day
                   of cleanup the mousse began to wash into the water, and three NOFI booms
                   were deployed to contain the oil. A Komara Miniskimmer (a disc skimmer)
                   was used to recover oil from the containment booms, but was ineffective due
                   to the high viscosity of the oil. A Bantry Bay skimmer (a belt skimmer) was
                   used with little success to recover the oil. The oil would not adhere to the
                   skimmer's belt, and it was observed that the oil had been treated with
                   dispersants and might not have had adequate surface tension to adhere to the
                   belt. A mono-suction pump on the Bantry Bay skimmer recovered oil
                   efficiently, and with a second pump brought on scene, the oil in the three
                   booms was recovered by October 26. By October 28, due to difficulty in
                   contracting labor, manual removal operations stopped. Approximately 250
                   tons of oil and oiled debris were manually removed, and 368 barrels of
                   emulsion were recovered from the containment booms.

                   Oil impacted the North Devon coastline in small amounts on October 25.
                   The oil impacts were deemed too small to warrant a response.



                                                            3                           Christos Bitas









             Other Special Interest Issues:
             Of the forty seals on Skomer Island, three died from oiling. Approximately                    0
             1,520 oiled birds were found, of these 1035 were dead and the rest were sent
             for cleaning. Of the total oiled, 1030 were Guillemots and 346 were Razor-
             bills. The rest included Gannets, Puffins, Manx Shearwaters, Common
             Scoters, Black Guillemots, Herring Gulls, Greater Black-backed Gulls, and
             Red-throated Divers.

             By the evening of October 14, thirty-seven vessels with dispersant spraying
             capabilities were on scene. Approximately 655 barrels of concentrated
             dispersant and 952 barrels of standard dispersant were applied to a 6 mile by 10
             mile slick. Applications were effective from both vessels and aircraft. British
             Petroleum boats applied 116 barrels of the dispersant BP 110OX.

             References:

             * "Christos Bitas-The Success Story," Safety at Sea, February 1979, No. 119, pp.
             24-27
             *Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
             *Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
             1987.
             *Oil Spill Intelligence Report, October 20 1978, Vol. I, No. 3
             *Oil Spill Intelligence Report, October 27,1978, Vol. I, No. 4
             *Oil Spill Intelligence Report, November 3, 1978, Vol. I, No. 5






























             Christos Bitas                         4








                    Name of Spill: Concho
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 01/19/81
                    Location of Spill: KillVan Kull, New York
                    Latitude: 40 35 N
                    Longitude: 074 01 W
                    Oil Product: No. 6 Fuel. Oil
                    Oil Type Type 4
                    Barrels: 18,149
                    Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                    Resources at Risk: Waterfowl, fish, marshes.
                    Dispersants: No
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: No
                    Other Special Interest: Wildlife impacts, adverse weather conditions,
                    volunteer response and organization.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches.
                    Keywords: Atlantic Strike Team (AST), self-propelled skimmer, boom, Air-
                    Deliverable Anti-Pollution Transfer System (ADAPTS), volunteers.

                    Incident Summary:

                    On the afternoon of January 19, 1981, the tank vessel Concho grounded in the
                    eastern end of Kill Van Kull, off the northeastern tip of Staten Island. The
                    bottom port side of the ship suffered damage. As the vessel continued down
                    the Narrows towards New York Lower Bay, crewmen noted that it was listing
                    to port. The vessel was deliberately grounded in Gravesend Bay off Brooklyn
                    to prevent its sinking. The Concho was carrying 190,476 barrels of No. 6 Fuel
                    Oil. Approximately 2,381 barrels of oil were spilled into the water.

                    Behavior of Oil:

                    No. 6 fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to 14.
                    Seventy-five per cent of New York Upper Harbor was covered with sheen.
                    The sheen extended from the Hudson River near the World's Trade Center
                    to Gravesend Bay in lower Brooklyn. Shoreline in Gravesend Bay was oiled.
                    Some oil washed up on New Jersey and New York beaches, but most of the
                    oil moved out to sea.




















                                                                                              Concho
Mr









             Countermeasures and Mitigation:
             The United States Coast Guard (USCG) was on scene on January 19. Sabine                     49
             Towing and Transport Company, the owners of the Concho, hired Ocean
             Salvors Company as cleanup contractor. On January 20, Atlantic Strike Team
             (AST) and Ocean Salvors personnel arrived on-scene and began offloading
             and diving operations. By January 21, a boom was in place around the vessel,
             skimming operations were underway, and 35,714 barrels of oil had been                       40
             offloaded into a barge provided by Exxon. Lightering operations were
             performed with Air-Deliverable Anti-Pollution Transfer System (ADAPTS)
             pumps until the No. 6 oil became too viscous for them. Lightering continued
             using Framo and Thune-Eureka cold pumping systems, and was completed
             on January 25 when the vessel was light enough to float off the mudflat
             where it had been grounded.                                                                 4

             Oil was recovered with JBF Dynamic Incline Plane (DIP) 3001 and 3003 self-
             propelled skimmers from Clean Harbors Cooperative. Booms were deployed
             in marsh areas in Bayonne by Clean Ventures personnel. The Concho was
             moved to Bayonne, New Jersey for temporary repairs and then sailed to
             Jacksonville, Florida for further repairs.

             The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the United States Fish and
             Wildlife Service (USFWS) monitored the environmental impacts of the spill.

             Other Special Interest Issues:

             The USFWS organized volunteers to rescue oiled birds. Rescue efforts were
             hampered by ice in the water, but 60 oiled birds, primarily ducks, were found.
             USFWS estimated that 500 birds had been oiled.

             Ice in the water hindered containment, recovery, and lightering operations.
             References:

             -Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
             *NTSB. 1981. Marine Accident Report - Grounding of the U.S. Tankship S.S.
             CONCHO, Constable Hook Reach of Kill Van Kull, Upper New York Harbor,
             January 19, 1981.
             eTanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers. T.A.C.
             Inc. 1991.


















             Concho                                2









W


                   Name of Spill: Corinthos
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 01/31/75
                   Location of Spill: Delaware River, Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania
                   Latitude: 39 49 N
                   Longitude: 075 25 W
                   Oil Product: Algerian crude oil
                   Oil Type: Type 2
                   Barrels: 266,000
9L
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Waterfowl.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Wildlife impacts, wildlife rehabilitation.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Exposed seawalls, developed uplands, piers, rip
                   rap.
                   Keywords: Manual removal, collision, boom, Atlantic Strike Team (AST),
                   fire, explosion, sinking, Regional Response Team, salvage.

                   Incident Summary:

                   At approximately 0030, on January 31, 1975, Corinthos was rammed as the
                   Edgar M. Queeny maneuvered away from its dock. The Corinthos was in the
                   process of offloading 315,000 barrels of Algerian crude oil at the British
                   Petroleum terminal at Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania. The resulting explosion
                   and fire reportedly shot flames 400-500 feet up into the air. The Corinthos'
                   hull split and sank, while continuing to smolder until February 6. The Edgar
                   M. Queeny was carrying phenol, vinyl acetate, and paraffin at the time of the
                   incident. Approximately 2,000 barrels of paraffin were released as a result of
                   the impact. Twenty six of the forty-four people aboard the Corinthos lost
                   their lives as a result of the collision, explosion, and fire. Although the Edgar
                   M. Queeny also caught fire, no fatalities were reported on that vessel.
                   Coast Guard personnel monitored the fire and pollution, controlled traffic
                   and patrolled the security zone during the response. Pollution contractors
                   were on scene within seventy-seven minutes of notification. Response
                   personnel began booming creeks and wildlife areas immediately. Oiled
                   waterfowl were taken to a cleaning facility at a New Jersey Armory. The
                   Regional Response Team (RRT) was activated from January 31 through
                   February 5. Coast Guard personnel from Marine Safety Office Philadelphia
                   and the Atlantic Strike Team (AST) responded to the spill. Other response
                   agencies included the Philadelphia City Fire Department, the U.S. Army, and
                   the U.S. Navy. During 1976, the two sections of the sunken Corinthos were
                   raised and towed to Camden, New Jersey to be scrapped.



_A0






                                                                                           Corinthos











             Behavior of Oil:
             Algerian crude oil has an API gravity of 44 to 45.5, and a viscosity of 2.2                   40
             centistokes. Burning crude oil covered a 10 mile stretch of the Delaware
             River following the incident. Heavy, asphalt-like residue adhered to the
             shorelines along the river.

             On February 6, a boarding party reported large amounts of burnt oil residue                    4
             on the stern deck plates. Two to three inches of oil on water were reported in
             a survey of accessible spaces and hatches on the Corinthos.
             Countermeasures and Mitigation:
             Asphalt-like residue on the shoreline of the Delaware River was manually                       4
             removed with shovels.

             Booms were placed at the entrances of Carby, Old Man's, and Raccoon Creeks.
             Floating boom deployed around the vessel created a security zone. Within
             seventy-seven minutes of notification cleanup personnel began deploying
             directional boom at Ehnsboro Point, New Jersey in an effort to trap free-
             floating oil.

             Since phenol, gasoline, and vinyl acetate monomer were involved in the fire,
             explosion meter readings and oxygen levels were monitored to assure a safe
             working atmosphere for responders.

             Other Special Interest Issues:

             During this time of year, about 4,000 birds use the area of the Delaware River
             where the incident occurred. A cleaning facility at the New Jersey Armory
             had treated 370 oiled birds as of February 10.

             References:


             *8/9/91 & 8/28/91 Letters from Daniel Owen at ITOPF
             *Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
             1987.
             *MMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
             *Tanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers. T.A.C.
             Inc. 1991.
             *USCG Case Summary












             Corinthos                              2








                    Name of Spill: E-24
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 11/22/85
                    Location of Spill: Block Island Sound, Fishers Island, New York
                    Latitude: 4113.9 N
                    Longitude: 072 01.3 W
                    Oil Product: No. 6 Fuel Oil, Diesel Fuel
                    Oil Type: Type 4, Type 2
                    Barrels: 71
                    Source of Spill: Tank Barge
                    Resources at Risk: Bird nesting beaches, bird migration stopover areas, bird
                    wintering concentration areas, diving coastal birds, waterfowl, bird migratory
                    routes, exposed tidal flats, sheltered tidal flats, marshes.
                    Dispersants: No
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: No
                    Other Special Interest: Complex salvage operations.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Exposed tidal flats, sheltered tidal flats, marshes.
                    Keywords: U.S. Navy Superintendent of Salvage (NAVSUPSALV), sinking,
                    skimmers, boom, contingency plan, adverse weather conditions, salvage.

                    Incident Summary:

                    On November 22, 1985, at 1345, the tug Norseman, with the Tank Barge E-24
                    in tow, reported that the barge was taking on water. The barge was loaded
                    with 20,000 barrels of Number 6 Fuel Oil. Fifteen minutes later, the E-24 was
                    standing almost vertically with about 20 feet of the barge visible above the
                    surface of the water. At the time of the incident, there was heavy rain, 5-6
                    foot seas, and winds from the east at 25 knots. The incident took place in an
                    area known as "The Race," the passage between the Long Island Sound and
                    the Atlantic Ocean, which typically has severe rip tides and rough,
                    unpredictable seas. On November 23 at 2250 the barge sank in a keel-up
                    position in 185 feet of water. Approximately 15-24 barrels of No. 6 fuel oil was
                    forced from compartment vents, and as much as 47 barrels of diesel Pei was
                    lost from the pump room. The cargo compartments were not damaged
                    during the sinking.

                    Oil from the barge formed a slick measuring 0.5 miles long by 500 yards wide
                    as observed on November 23. Cleanup of the Long Island shoreline began on
                    November 24 and was completed by December 5. Approximately 1000 gallons
                    of oily debris were recovered. Later releases of oil occurred during the salvage
                    operations, but skimming equipment was on station and recovered most of
                    that lost oil immediately. An estimated 225 birds were affected by the spill,
                    with 75 of these recovered dead.












                                                                                                  E-24









             Salvage of the barge without damaging the intact cargo compartments was the
             major concern. Due to heavy seas and limitations of equipment on scene, the
             exact position of the barge could not be determined and verified until
             December 19. On January 3, 1986, the USCG On-Scene Coordinator (OSC)
             federalized the case as the responsible party, Eklof Transportation Co., Inc. was
             unable to meet the deadlines imposed by the OSC for performing the hull
             survey and inspection.

             Evaluation, planning, and mobilization for the salvage operations took place
             from January 3 to May 4, 1986. The salvage plan was developed by the United
             States Navy Supervisor of Salvage (NAVSUPSALV) at the request of the
             OSC. The OSC staff report was completed on March 3, and detailed three
             salvage options determined by the NAVSUPSALV. After much deliberation,
             the OSC determined that the barge should be raised with its cargo intact.
             Salvage operations took place from May 5 to May 30, 1986. Approximately 235
             gallons of oil were lost during the entire operation, of which 185 were
             recovered. The barge was inspected and in tow by the evening of May 29, and
             was moored at Mariners Harbor, Staten Island, New York by 1900, May 30.
             The E-24 was completely offloaded by June 11, 1986, and the case was closed.

             Behavior of Oil:

             No. 6 fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to 14.
             Marine diesel fuel is a medium weight product with an API gravity of 31.3.
             The slick position observed on November 23 agreed with the trajectory
             provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
             Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC). This oil impacted the Long Island coast
             on November 23. Eklof Transportation Co. contracted Marine Pollution
             Control, Inc. to clean up the oil as it came ashore. Floating oil could not be
             recovered because of the rough sea conditions. The oil made its first landfall
             on the Long Island shoreline at 2220 on November 23, shortly before the barge
             finally sank. Intermittent contamination occurred from Montauk Point to
             Fort Pond Bay.





















             E-24                                    2






5



                   Countermeasures and Mitigation:
                   Due to the small amount of oil actually spilled, cleanup operations were
                   completed rapidly. Based upon spill trajectories provided by the NOAA SSC,
                   the entrance to Lake Montauk was boomed with 36 inch Sea Curtain as a
                   precautionary measure on November 23. Cleanup personnel, under the
                   supervision of Captain of the Port (COTP), New York, began cleanup of the
                   Long Island shoreline as the oil made landfall. Boom was removed from the
                   Lake Montauk entrance on November 25. On November 26, a representative
                   from the US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) estimated that as many as
                   300 birds would be affected by the spill. On December 13, the East Hampton,
                   New York Environmental Director reported 75 dead birds recovered.
                   Cleanup operations were finished by December 5, 1985.

                   The barge location was pinpointed on December 19,1985. Eklof planned to
                   perform a hull survey using a remotely operated vehicle on January 2,1986,
                   but the ROV was unavailable. The OSC gave Eklof until January 3 to produce
                   an alternate plan, which it was unable to do. At this time, the OSC
                   federalized the incident. Initial diving operations were largely unsuccessful
                   due to poor weather and high currents in the area. A survey was performed
                   from January 27-31 using a diving bell. This revealed that there was little
                   structural damage and that no oil was leaking from the vessel.

                   The salvage operation was planned for specific weather, tide, and current
                   conditions, and was scheduled to take place before mid-June to ensure that
                   the oil temperature would remain below its pour point. NOAA provided
                   trajectory scenarios for a catastrophic release. This was felt to be only a remote
                   possibility, due to the structural integrity of the barge and the viscous nature
                   of the oil at water temperatures below its pour point.

                   The final salvage plan involved partially lifting the E-24, moving the barge to
                   shallow water, rolling it into an upright position, restoring buoyancy to float
                   it and towing it to a disposal site. A comprehensive pollution contingency
                   plan was developed. It included: the possibility of a major release of oil; open
                   water and shoreline cleanup based on the predictions of the spill trajectory
                   models; equipment availability and response times, which included
                   equipment available from NAVSUPSALV as well as the notification of
                   contractors before the commencement of the operation; cost projections,
                   including the transport of SUPSALV equipment; and pre-positioning and
                   deploying the available equipment.

                   Salvage operations began on May 17, 1986. About one hundred gallons were
                   lost during rollover operations on May 27. Fifty gallons of this were
                   recovered and the remainder formed sheen and small globs of oil in the
                   water. On May 28, the barge was lifted to the surface, during which 130
                   gallons were lost and recovered.

..00
                   The location of the barge was in an area where pre-approval for the use of
                   dispersants exists, however, the oil composition precluded effective



-                                                         3                                  E-24








             dispersant use in this case. The use of chemical thickeners was not
             considered necessary due to the high viscosity of the oil in the barge.

             Other Special Interest Issues:

             Various plans for the fate of the barge were considered. These included
             leaving the barge and remaining cargo on the bottom; removing the cargo
             and leaving the barge on the bottom; and removing the barge and its cargo
             intact. Encapsulating the barge in place was not considered possible due to the
             strength of the currents in the area. The first option was ruled out because it
             was felt that the barge would rust and deteriorate over a period of years (as
             long as 20-30), causing a series of chronic spills, many pollution responses,
             and long term damage to the wildlife resources in the area. Additionally,
             once this course of action was chosen, the decision was irreversible; after
             deterioration had begun, the option to raise the barge and cargo intact would
             no longer be available.

             Removing the cargo and leaving the barge, would have involved hot tapping
             the oil from each of the twelve tanks. This was felt to be too costly and
             difficult due to the depth and current considerations, the high viscosity of the
             oil, and the diver-intensive nature of these operations. Considering the
             difficulty in performing the earlier dive survey, a hot tapping operation did
             not appear feasible.

             Raising the barge with its cargo intact was considered to be the best option
             under the circumstances. While some spilling during the rollover and lifting
             operations would occur, this option provided a permanent solution with the
             least chance of long-term spill damage, massive catastrophic spilling, and risk
             to personnel. In choosing this alternative, the high initial costs of the salvage
             were weighed against the long range costs of continual monitoring, response
             and cleanup of an ongoing spill, as well as the long term ecological damage
             presented by a slow deterioration.

             Ref erences:

             *Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
             1987.
             9MMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database.
             eNOAA Hotline reports.
             *OSIR Oil Spills, International Summary & Review, 1982-1985
             *USCG COTP New London. Final On-Scene Coordinator Report on the
             Sinking and Subsequent Raising of the T/ B E-24, 22 NOV 1985 - 29 MAY 1986.












             E-24                                    4








                  Name of Spill: Ekofisk Bravo oil field
                  Date of Spill (mmddyy): 04/22/77 - 04/30/77
                  Location of Spill: Norway, North Sea
                  Latitude: 56 34 N
                  Longitude: 003 12 E
                  Oil Product: Ekofisk crude oil
                  Oil Type: Type 3
                  Barrels: 202,381
                  Source of Spill: Platform
                  Resources at Risk: Commercial fisheries, alcids, petrels, fulmars.
                  Dispersants: No
                  Bioremediation: No
                  In-situ Burning: No
                  Other Special Interest: Adverse weather conditions, logistical or operational
                  problems.
                  Shoreline Types Impacted: None.

                  Keywords: Blowout, drift cards, evaporation, water washing.

                  Incident Summary:

                  On April 22, 1977, well B-14 on the Phillips Petroleum Company's "Bravo"
                  production platform in the Norwegian Ekofisk field experienced an oil and
                  natural gas blowout. This platform is 180 miles southwest of the Ekofisk oil
                  field center in approximately 230 feet of water. The blowout resulted in the
                  first major oil release in the North Sea. A red-brown mixture composed of
                  oil and mud spurted up to 180 feet into the air above the offshore drilling rig.
                  The "blowout preventer" had apparently been placed upside down on the
                  wellhead during an earlier maintenance procedure. The 112 crew members
                  on the platform were safely evacuated. The blowout resulted in a continuous
                  discharge of crude oil through an open pipe 20 meters above the sea surface.
                  At an estimated rate of 1,170 barrels per hour, approximately 202,380 barrels of
                  oil escaped before the well was finally capped seven days later on April 30.
                  Considerably less oil entered the water due to rapid evaporation. As much as
                  30-40% of the escaping oil may have evaporated before of shortly after hitting
                  the water. A higher-than-average air temperature (75T) and the formation of
                  small oil droplets contributed to rapid evaporation rate.

                  The area of the platform was experiencing 4-6 foot seas and below-average sea
                  surface temperatures at the time of the blowout.

                  Red Adair was contracted by Phillips to assist in capping the blowout.
                  Although weather conditions and hazardous gas accumulations slowed
                  capping efforts, the rig was capped on April 30. The Norwegian State
                  Pollution Control Board declared that no major ecological damage resulted
                  from the spill. Following an inspection tour on the day of the capping, two
                  U.S. Coast Guard experts recommended against sending any oil-skimming
                  equipment to Norway. Weather and wave action during the following days
                  were predicted to eliminate any visible slick.



                                                                            Ekofisk Bravo oil field










             Behavior of Oil:

             Ekofisk crude oil has an API gravity of 35.7, and a pour point of -5 degrees C.
             By April 25, the slick was reportedly 15 miles long by 5 miles wide. Rough
             seas and wave action later this day broke the slick into two sections, the first
             being 14 miles long by 3.5 miles wide and the second 5 miles long by 0.5 miles
             wide. The oil moved primarily in an easterly direction from the time of the
             blowout until April 28.

             Observations made on April 28 through May 1 described the previously tl-dck
             oil slicks to be broken into windrows interspersed with blue sheen. The
             windrows extended out from the platform for approximately 20 miles until
             turning into specks of emulsion 1.5 inches in diameter. Oil reportedly spread
             out a maximum of 45 miles long by 30 miles wide around the platform area,
             characterized as patches of emulsion in large areas of light blue sheen. On
             May 2, maximum concentrations of oil in the water column were found 6
             miles from the rig. Oil was found down to depths of 4 yards.

             By May 3, the oil had drifted northward from Ekofisk about 120 km. A shift
             in the wind direction moved the oil southward, back towards Ekofisk, on May
             12. Drift cards released at the time of the blowout were found along the
             northern coast of The Netherlands, indicating that in June the remaining oil
             drifted in a south-southeasterly direction. No shorelines were oiled.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:
             As a fire prevention method, water was pumped on the platform by a Phillips
             company utility and fire fighting vessel.

             Personnel from Red Adair, Phillips, and Moran International finally
             succeeding in stopping the geyser of oil on April 30.

             From April 6 to April 28, approximately 2,000 plastic-wrapped drift cards were
             released from a nearby platform. Three satellite monitored drift buoys were
             also released in cooperation with the Norwegian Meteorological Institute and
             Christian Michelsens Institute.

             Other Special Interest Issues:

             Although rough seas and strong winds delayed capping attempts, the wave
             action helped break up much of the oil, preventing it from reaching any
             shoreline. Boom would have been ineffective in the rough seas that are
             characteristic of the North Sea.

             The presence of dangerous gas concentrations forced an evacuation of the
             platform on April 25. Winds had previously kept the gas from accumulating
             around the platform.






             Ekofisk Bravo oil field











                  References:


                  *1991 World Almanac
                  *Fischer, D.W. ed. 1982. Managing Technological Accidents: Two Blowouts in
                  the North Sea. International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
                  Proceedings Series. 234 pp.
                  oReview of Oil Spill Occurrences and Impacts, Exxon Production Research
                  Company, 1989.















































                                                       3                   Ekofisk Bravo oil field








                    Name of Spill: Eleni V
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 05/06/78
                    Location of Spill: Norfolk, southeast coast of England
                    Latitude: 52 49 N
                    Longitude: 00148 E
                    Oil Product: Heavy Fuel Oil
                    Oil Type: Type 4
                    Barrels: 52,500
                    Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                    Resources at Risk: Molluscs, designated harvest sites, sand/gravel beaches,
                    recreational beaches.
                    Dispersants: Yes
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: Yes
                    Other Special Interest: Complex salvage operations, unusual or experimental
                    cleanup techniques.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches.
                    Keywords: BP 1100D, Dasic LTD, collision, explosion, fire, fingerprinting.

                    Incident Summary:

                    On the morning of May 6, 1978, the Greek tanker Eleni V was cut in two by
                    the French vessel Roseline in foggy conditions off the southeast coast of
                    England. The Eleni V was loaded with 117,280 barrels of Heavy Fuel Oil. The
                    collision caused the release of approximately 52,500 barrels of oil.

                    The aft section was towed to Rotterdam by five Dutch tugs. The cargo
                    remaining in the aft section was recovered by pumping it into storage tanks at
                    Europort. The forward section of the vessel drifted away from the collision
                    site. It went aground on May 8 on a sandbank near Lowestoft off the East
                    Anglian coast with approximately 8000 barrels still on board. Attempts to
                    salvage the forward part failed, and authorities decided to blow it up. The
                    bow was towed to a position several miles offshore and blown up with two
                    tons of explosives by Navy divers on May 30. Following the explosion, a large
                    part of the remaining oil burned.

                    Behavior of Oil:

                    The heavy fuel oil had a viscosity of 5,000 centistokes at 20 degrees C. It
                    formed a huge viscous slick that was brown to black in color. Oil washed
                    ashore on the English and Dutch coasts. Oil on the shoreline formed
                    pancakes between .25 and 12 inches in diameter. Oil was also reported as
                    globules of thick mousse that appeared on the beaches. This became the worst
                    case of marine pollution on the English coast since the Torrey Canyon spill,
                    more than 11 years earlier.
                    Oil impacting on the Dutch coast was identified as similar to that of the Eleni
                    V by gas chromatographic analysis. It was believed to have come from the
                    bow section when it was blown up. Analysis of trajectory model outputs
                    suggested that if the bow section had been blown up sooner, more of the oil



                    Eleni V                               1








             would have washed ashore in the estuaries of the Dutch coast, and along the
             British and Belgian coastlines. This was determined by the wind, weather
             and current conditions at the time of the demolition.

             The spill affected shellfish areas and private and recreational beaches along
             the British and Dutch coasts. The holiday beaches in Norfolk and Suffolk
             were also impacted with pancakes and tarballs of the thick viscous oil. The
             pancakes formed a thick skin due to weathering.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             This incident demonstrated the limits of dispersants on heavy viscous oils.
             When the slicks appeared following the collision, the immediate response
             was a major chemical dispersant spraying operation. It had been predicted
0            early in the response that this particular type of oil would not readily disperse.
             Nonetheless, 22 vessels were used over a period of three weeks spraying
             chemicals on the oil. Nearly 240,000 gallons of BP 1100D and Dasic LTD were
             used. The dispersant operation had virtually no effect on the oil, and almost
             all of it went ashore anyway.
0            Other Special Interest Issues:

             Dutch authorities used gas chromatography in an attempt to identify the oil
             that was impacting their shoreline. It was not positively identified as oil from
             the Eleni V, but it was determined to be similar. This research was combined
10           with trajectory forecasting to determine the origin of the oil and the potential
             effects of the pollution if the bow section had been blown up earlier.

             Ref erences:

0            -Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
             -Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
             1987.
             *National Research Council. 1989. Using Oil Spill Dispersants on the Sea.
             National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. pp. 319-320.
             *Nichols, J.A. and Parker, H. 1985. Dispersants: Comparison of Laboratory
0            Tests & Field Trials with Practical Experience at Spills, Oil Spill Conference
             Proceedings, 1985, pp. 421-427.
















             Eleni V                                2








                    Name of Spill: ESSO Puerto Rico
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 09/03/88
                    Location of Spill: Mississippi River, Louisiana
                    Latitude: 29 55N
                    Longitude: 090 15W
                    Oil Product: Carbon black feedstock
                    Oil Type: Type 4
                    Barrels: 23,000
                    Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                    Resources at Risk: Anadromous fish, bottom dwelling fish, water intakes
                    Dispersants: No
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: No
                    Other Special Interest: Logistical or operational problems.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Vegetated riverbank.
                    Keywords: Sub-surface oil, fingerprinting, Atlantic Strike Team (AST),
                    absorbent pads, suction operations.

                    Incident Summary:

                    At approximately midnight on September 3, 1988, the ESSO Puerto Rico,
                    loaded with carbon black feedstock, departed EXXON Corporation's Baton
                    Rouge facility bound for the Gulf of Mexico. Around 0800, the vessel
                    apparently struck the anchor of a Lykes ship at the Kenner Bend Anchorage
                    (river mile 114), opening the No. 1 starboard tank and releasing 23,000 barrels
                    of carbon black feedstock. The bulk of the material was released over a period
                    of 45 minutes. During this time, the vessel traveled about 10 miles down the
                    river. At the time of the incident, river currents were less than one knot,
                    wind was southerly, and the water temperature was approximately 85 degrees
                    F.

                    The U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office (MSO), New Orleans, was notified
                    of the spill and the vessel was anchored at mile marker 75. The USCG
                    Atlantic Strike Team's (AST) assistance was requested. Small, rainbow
                    sheens of about 12 inches in diameter developed near the anchor site and the
                    severely listing vessel. No other evidence of a spill was apparent.

                    EXXON hired Continental Shelf Associates (CSA) to sample the river bottom
                    for oil. Sampling began on September 5 by AST and September 6 by CSA. At
                    intervals of every mile between river mile 64.5 and 114, samples were taken
                    from bank to bank. In all samples taken, very little oil was detected. EXXON
                    Corporation was requested to provide data on the spilled material and its
                    physical characteristics in fresh, brackish, and saltwater environments. They
                    were also requested to conduct a study on the effects of the material on
                    bottom-dwelling, filter-feeding species residing in the river outflow region.








                                                                                     ESSO Puerto Rico











            Behavior of Oil:

            Carbon black feedstock is a very heavy (API of 2.0 to -1.5, specific gravity of 1.1)
            liquid with a dark brownish color. It is also known as RFD Extract, Aromatic
            Concentrate, or Aromatic Tar and is used in the manufacture of carbon black.
            The carbon black feedstock, with a pour point of 73 degrees F, rapidly emptied
            out of the cargo tank and into the river. The oil appeared to be churned into
            tiny globules and droplets by the actions of the vessel's propwash. The oil
            quickly dissipated with the river currents.

            Except for small traces of material obtained on weighted sorbent and in grab-
            sample casts conducted between mile markers 64.5 and 114, no significant
            amount of the original spill was ever detected. Directly below the vessel at
            the Belle Chasse anchorage, approximately 10 barrels of pooled oil was
            discovered and recovered. Overflight observers reported no other oil or
            sheen anywhere else on the river. No fish kills were reported as a result of
            this spill. All water intakes in the area remained open with no reports of
            contamination.

            Countermeasures and Mitigation:

            Hand leadlines wrapped with a cotton rag were lowered from a Strike Team
            utility boat and drug across the bottom in an attempt to locate oil. CSA used a
            water taxi equipped with LORAN C, Depth finder, and a winch to raise and
            lower sampling equipment. After intensive surveys detected no product
            within 0.5 miles of the grounding site, the survey team expanded the search
            area. At one mile intervals down the river, samples were collected across the
            river at various depths. Extremely small quantities of oil in the form of
            droplets or small globs were found, but only in deep locations. These samples
            were fingerprinted and compared to samples collected from the vessel. Ten
            of eleven samples were identified as the carbon black feedstock.

            The use of absorbent pads attached to the underside of clump weights on the
            end of the winch wire determined that there were no major oil pockets except
            the one under the anchored vessel. No recoverable quantities of the original
            23,000 barrels spilled between mile markers 114 and 100 were located.

            At mile marker 75, where the ESSO Puerto Rico was anchored to regain
            stability and affect repairs, a small pool of residual spillage (about 10 barrels)
            was detected and recovered by diving and suction operations.












            ESSO Puerto Rico






                                                                                                                 0



                    Other Special Interest Issues:
                    Lack of proper bottom sampling equipment slowed the process of evaluating                    0
                    the movement of the oil. Detection of the oil on the bottom was finally
                    accomplished by improvising a sampling system (i.e. rags on a leadline). The
                    determination that oil was being dispersed by the flow of the river possibly
                    could have been made sooner had the.correct sampling equipment been
                    available.                                                                                   0

                    The fuel tanks on the CG utility boat used by the Strike Team in this response
                    did not have the capacity for extended operations. Two 55 gallon drums had
                    to be carried on-board because of long travel times to fuel docks on the
                    Industrial and Harvey Canals. Varnish in the fuel tanks occasionally broke
                    up and clogged the fuel lines.                                                               140

                    Interference and antenna locations made direct radio communications
                    impossible. Cellular phone use was an effective solution to the problem.
                    An extensive Exxon planning meeting took place before active response                        0
                    actions were taken. In addition, response was delayed by logistics problems
                    and late delivery of physical property information on the spilled product by
                    Exxon. Estimates of river current velocities and bottom topography obtained
                    from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers differed substantially from actual
                    conditions experienced by vessels on-scene.
                                                                                                                 40
                    Ref erences:

                    *Esso Puerto Rico Carbon Black Spill Response Preliminary Post Survey
                    Report. Prepared for Exxon Shipping Co. Continental Shelf Associates, Inc.
                    Jupiter, Fl, 14 September 1988.                                                              0
                    *Golobs 1978-1989 US Spill Report
                    *Guidelines for Shipping Tanker Cargoes, Carbon Black Feedstock, ESSO
                    Chemical Co., New York, NY
                    eMMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
                    *NOAA Spill Report
                    *Tanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers. T.A.C.                49
                    Inc. 1991.
                    *USCG On-Scene Coordinators Report
                    *World Information Systems. Tanker Losses in U.S. Waters: 1978-1990.
                    World Information Systems. 1991.













                                                             3                          ESSO Puerto Rico








                   Name of Spill: Ethel H (II)
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 02/04/77
                   Location of Spill: Hudson River, New York
                   Latitude: 4121 N
                   Longitude: 073 57 W
                   Oil Product: No. 6 Fuel Oil
                   Oil Type: Type 4
                   Barrels: 10,000
                   Source of Spill: Tank Barge
                   Resources at Risk: Waterfowl, diving coastal birds, marinas, beaches, power
                   plant water intakes.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Adverse weather conditions, wildlife impacts, wildlife
                   rehabilitation.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Extensive wetlands, marshes, exposed rocky
                   shores, sand/gravel beaches.
                   Keywords: Atlantic Strike Team (AST), Air-Deliverable Anti-Pollution
                   Transfer System (ADAPTS), boom, vacuum truck, oil snares, manual
                   removal, skimmer, high-pressure washing, fingerprinting, steam generators,
                   Shell Solvent 70, lightering.

                   Incident Summary:

                   On February 4, 1977, at approximately 1900, the Ethel H (ID ran aground on
                   Con Hook Rock in the Hudson River near West Point, New York, while
                   being towed by the tug McAllister Brothers. The forward section of the barge
                   began taking on water. Due to darkness and heavy ice conditions, none of the
                   60,000 barrels of No. 6 oil aboard the Ethel H (II) was observed to be leaking
                   into the water at the time of the grounding.
                   At 0255 February 5, the dispatcher reported oil leaking from the #1 starboard
                   tank on the Ethel H (II). Oil was observed both north and south of the vessel,
                   but did not reach the shore due to 12 to 20 inches of shorebound ice. By 1015,
                   the Ethel H (II) had shifted partially off Con Hook Rock and was in danger of
                   sinking. Tugs assisted to help prevent the barge from sinking. Sea Land
                   Environmental Engineering Co, contracted by McAllister Towing Co., and the
                   USCG Atlantic Strike Team (AST) arrived on-scene February 5. After oil was
                   pumped from submerged tanks, the barge's list was reduced to 15 degrees.
                   Once the barge was secured from sinking, Amerada Hess Corporation, owners
                   of the Ethel H (ID and McAllister Towing Co., refused responsibility for clean-
                   up of any oil in the Hudson River. The USCG took control of the cleanup,
                   retaining Sea Land Environmental Engineering Company as the prime
                   contractor.

                   Reports of oiled birds prompted the New York State Department of
                   Conservation and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to establish a primary
                   bird cleaning center. Several marinas and boat clubs on the Hudson reported



                                                                                        Ethel H (II)








             oil impacts. Extensive cleanup efforts continued through April 14, funded by
             the federal 311(k) oil pollution fund.
             Behavior of Oil:                                                                                 0

             No. 6 fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to 14.
             On February 6, oil was reported two miles north and three miles south of the
             grounding area. Ice extending from the shore kept most of the oil from
             contaminating the shoreline. On February 8, oil soaked ice was observed
             extending north to Worlds End and south to the George Washington Bridge.
             Pockets of oil coated ice were observed at Peekskill Bay, Verplanck Point, and
             from Croton Point to East Haverstraw.

             Overflights of the Greater New York area on February 10, revealed an 80
             percent brash ice coverage with 75 percent being oil stained. Brown ice and
             stained shores were observed at the Harlem River, Gravesend Bay, and 79th
             Street Marina. A light sheen appeared in the middle of the Hudson River
             while the heaviest concentrations stayed close to the shoreline. The
             following day, oil entered the marsh area at Bowling Point.

             Heavy black oil was reported coming ashore on Fire Island beaches on March
             11 and April 11. Personnel on a Cedar Island beach survey conducted on
             April 7 reported moderate to heavy coverage of oil soaked debris, tarballs, and
             sludge from the eastern tip of the island extending two miles to the west.
             On July 5, the Vice President of the Philipse Manor Beach Club alerted the                       0
             Captain of the Port, New York, of the presence of oil on their beaches.
             Concentrations of black tar balls were found approximately two to four inches
             deep in the sand. Fingerprinting confirmed the oil to be from the Ethel H
             (II),. The oil soaked sand was removed by Coastal Services, Inc.
             Countermeasures and Mitigation:                                                                  0

             Air-Deliverable Anti-Pollution Transfer System (ADAPTS) pumps were used
             to pump approximately 19,000 barrels of oil from submerged tanks on the
             Ethel H (ID. The possibility of capsizing the barge prevented pumping of the
             exposed tanks. After lightering, the Ethel H (II) was afloat again and moved                     41
             to Standard Tank Cleaning Co. Eight feet of water ballast was added to the
             tanks that had been holed, creating a "water bottom" to prevent further
             leaking of oil during river transit.














             Ethel H (11)









                    Sea Land Environmental deployed boom early in the spill at Iona Island and
                    other potential impact areas. Boom was deployed at the Nuclear Power Plant
                    Indian Point to protect the water intakes. On February 19, boom was deployed
                    at the Marine Parkway Bridge. Three hundred feet of boom was deployed at
                    Con Edison Indian Point to prevent the oil from flowing into the facility's
                    intakes.

                    Ice and debris often clogged the skimmers. To solve this problem, crews used
                    a 1-configuration of boom to divert pieces of debris and ice away from the
                    skimmer. The Lockheed skimmer was not self-propelled and was towed
                    through the icy areas. Personnel could not be on board during transit due to
                    instability from ice impacts. Oil congealed on the belts of the Marco
                    skimmers. A Cold Weather skimmer was dispatched at Peekskill Bay.

                    Land-based vacuum truck operations began at Verplanck Point on February 8.
                    Vacuum trucks were marginally effective due to heavy ice and severely cold
                    weather.

                    Oil snares proved to be very effective in the adverse weather conditions.
                    They were the only countermeasures capable of picking up oil between, on,
                    and under pieces of ice. Snares were also used to wipe oil off rocks and
                    pilings. Manual removal methods using shovels, pitchforks, rakes, and
                    plastic bags were most effective at the northern spill site beaches.

                    Steam generators (Hotsies) and high-velocity water streams (Hydro-Laser)
                    were used for shore cleaning on selected private and public waterfront areas.
                    Both methods produced excessive splash of the product and could have led to
                    further contamination. However, these methods were the most effective and
                    efficient in cleaning steel bulkheads.

                    On February 11, the EPA representative requested that NOAA personnel
                    determine the quantity of oil remaining in the water in an attempt to predict
                    any possible effects. A February 14 NOAA survey detected no subsurface oil
                    in the water column of the Hudson River.

                    Other Special Interest Issues:

                    Ice and cold weather created unusual problems for this response. Most oil
                    recovery equipment is riot made to deal with oil mixed with ice. The ice
                    movement, magnified by tidal action, often stressed and broke boom. Skiffs
                    and skimmers were unable to maneuver around the ice. Seven clean-up
                    personnel fell into the water after slipping on icy areas. Ice and debris clogged
                    the skimmers, especially the Marco skimmers.

                    Floating ice functioned as a natural boom, protecting the shoreline from the
                    oil in some areas. Fast ice also performed a scouring action on the shore as it
                    broke up and moved away. Because of the icy conditions, only a small
                    number of waterfowl were present in the area at the time of the incident.




                                                            3                              Ethel H (H)








             The bird cleaning station, first established on February 12 at the I-Ii Tor
             Animal Center, Pomona, New York, was moved to the Stoney Point Highway
             Department on February 13. National Audubon Society personnel cleaned
             birds using the chemical Shell Solvent 70. Since the solvent presented a
             human health hazard, protective gear was distributed to bird cleaners. Dead
             birds collected on the beach may have died from starvation and harsh
             weather rather than from the oil. The Stoney Point center reported that 60
             birds were received, 52 were treated, and 17 died. On February 21, the center
             was moved back to the Hi Tor Animal Center.                                                40

             References:

             oMMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
             *USCG On-Scene Coordinator's Report








































             Ethel H (11)                         4








                  Name of Spill: Exxon Bayway Refinery
                  Date of Spill (mmddyy): 01/02/90
                  Location of Spill: Arthur Kill, New York
                  Latitude: 40 38 N
                  Longitude: 074 14 W
                  Oil Product: No. 2 heating oil
                  Oil Type: Type 2
                  Barrels: 13,500
                  Source of Spill: Pipeline
                  Resources at Risk: wading birds, bird nesting beaches, diving coastal birds,
                  gulls, waterfowl, mussels.
                  Dispersants: No
                  Bioremediation: Yes
                  In-situ Burning: No
                  Other Special Interest: Closure of shipping lanes or vehicle traffic routes,
                  volunteer response and organization, research conducted, wildlife impacts,
                  wildlife rehabilitation.
                  Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches, extensive wetlands, saltwater
                  marshes, coastal structures.
0                 Keywords: Customblen, Atlantic Strike Team (AST), Clean Harbors
                  Cooperative, boom, self-propelled skimmer, Marco skimmer, JBF skimmer,
                  vacuum truck, shop vacuum, sorbent boom, pompoms, trenches, New York
                  State Department of Environmental Conservation (NY DEC), New Jersey
                  State Department of Environmental Protection (NJ DEP), Tri-State Bird
0                 Rescue Center, volunteers.
                  Incident Summary:

                  On January 2, 1990, at approximately 0300, an Exxon underwater pipeline
                  located at the mouth of Morse Creek discharged approximately 13,500 barrels
0                 of No. 2 heating oil into the Arthur Kill waterway between New Jersey and
                  Staten Island, New York. Exxon personnel notified the U.S. Coast Guard
                  (USCG) as well as other involved agencies, and activated the Clean Harbors
                  Cooperative (Coop). Exxon company volunteers had periodically received
                  practical training on how to deploy boom and other Coop equipment. This
                  previous training expedited the decision-making process and allowed Exxon
;0                to begin response efforts immediately.

                  Initial response efforts focused on contairanent of the spill as well as removal
                  of the heaviest concentration of oil. Environmentally sensitive areas were
                  protected with boom and skimmers that collected the heavier concentrations
                  of free-floating oil. Since the incident occurred in January, few migratory
                  birds were in the spill area. Even so, Tri-State Bird Rescue treated over 100
                  oiled birds that were recovered during the incident. Cleanup crews in the
                  spill area found over 600 dead birds.
                  A cleanup committee, consisting of representatives from USCG, Exxon,
:;I               NOAA, New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NY
                  DEC), New Jersey State Department of Environrnental Protection (NJ DEP),
                  and New York City Parks and Recreation, monitored cleanup progress until


                                                                           Exxon Bayway Refinery








              the end of active recovery. On February 14, substantial deposits of fresh oil
              were found in sediments above peat areas on Pralls Island. Trenches were
              dug to collect oil for vacuuming.

              By March 15, all areas were considered "'clean" by the Federal On-Scene
              Coordinator (FOSC) except Pralls Island where further cleanup activity was
              postponed due to the arrival of wading birds that breed on the island. Exxon
              received permission to apply Customblen, a -nutrient enhancer for
              bioremediation, in this area after the fall migration.

              Behavior of Oil:

              No. 2 heating oil has a minimum API gravity of 30, and a pour point between
              -6 and -27 degrees C. Reports from observers on early overflights described oil
              extending north into the marshes of Newark Bay as well as south to the
              southern end of environmentally sensitive Pralls Island. Oil spread from the
              area north of the opening of Arthur Kill to Tufts Point.
              Observers on a January 4 overflight reported that the oil collecting in heavy
              concentrations in natural areas as well as behind booms had the black
              appearance of No. 6 oil. On January 5, observers reported sheens along the
              shores of Staten Island near Shooters and Pearl Islands. Oil concentrations
              were heavy near Gothels Bridge and Old Man Creek. Heavy concentrations of
              oil were stranded above the berm on the beaches from Cedar Point to
              Rossville.

              By January 7, more oil was leaching out of contaminated sediments than
              floating in the water. The majority of the remaining water-borne oil was
              observable as rainbow sheens which were spotted in the south part of the
              Kills. No additional significant amounts of oil were observed by January 10.
              On January 13, Old Place Creek showed no impacts of oiling except in the
              immediate area of boom locations.

              Areal extent of sheens continued to diminish for the next few weeks. Six to
              eight inch holes dug during a February 14 observation trip to Pralls Island
              quickly filled with dark unweathered oil. All other areas affected by the spin
              were considered clean.

              Countermeasures and Mitigation:

              Containment boom was deployed to protect sensitive areas and utilize
              natural collection areas between the north and south ends of Arthur Kill.
              Additional boom contained pockets of oil in Kill Van Kull and Newark Bay.
              Heavy concentrations of floating oil and mousse in the open water, primarily
              between Howland Hook and Fresh Kills, were collected by self-propelled
              skimmers. Two Marco skimmers and one JBF Navy skimmer were used in
              addition to the skimmers provided by the Coop.




              Exxon Bayway Refinery                  2








                  Where shoreline access permitted, vacuum trucks removed oil in
                  contaminated areas.

                  Sorbent materials were used on affected shorelines until these mechanical
                  methods proved more damaging than beneficial. The use of sorbent boom
                  and pompoms allowed natural flushing which helped the cleanup process in
                  areas where oil was stranded above the berm. Sorbents remained deployed in
                  marsh creeks until all visible signs of contamination were gone.
                  Six-foot-long by one-foot-deep trenches dug in the intertidal coarse grain
                  sediment of Pralls Island collected oil that was removed with shop vacuums.
                  This approach recovered a considerable quantity of oil with minimal
                  environmental disturbance. Vacuum operations were suspended in the
                  spring due to the anticipated arrival of migrating birds.

                  Other Special Interest Issues:

                  In June 1990, Customblen, a slow-release fertilizer, was applied by Exxon
                  Research and Engineering to selected areas of previously impacted shoreline
0                 on Pralls Island to enhance oil removal by increasing biological activity on
                  the remaining oil. In an effort to minimize variability, Customblen was
                  placed in bags containing beach substrate and a known quantity of oil. These
                  bags were placed in two shallow trenches in the intertidal zone. Microbial
                  counts, nitrogen/ phosphorous levels, and total hydrocarbons were measured
                  at the beginning and end of the application.

                  Results of the experiment in December 1990 showed no clear trend of
                  increased biodegradation in the fertilized plots versus the control plots. Since
                  Pralls Island has been impacted by many previous oil spills, indigenous
                  microbial populations may have already adapted to the presence of
                  hydrocarbons. Bioremediation may not have been effective on Pralls Island
                  because this area previously contained high levels of nitrogen and
                  phosphorus, which suggest that nutrients may not be a limiting factor for
                  natural biodegradation. Cross-contamination of the plots through leaching of
                  nutrients, may have also contributed to the inconclusive results of the
                  experiment.
 0

















                                                         3                  Exxon Bayway Refinery









             As of February 20, a total of 841 oiled birds had been collected. Six hundred
             ninety one were dead (including 40 that died at Tri-State Bird Rescue). Forty
             five percent (296) were gulls. Also recovered were 29 dead muskrats, 1
             cottontail rabbit, 1 domestic cat, and 9 live diamond back Terrapin Turtles.
             The level of volunteer efforts to clean and rehabilitate birds reached 2,900
             hours by February 20.
             Exxon's pre-planning, familiarity with cleanup equipment, and involvement
             with government agencies were beneficial during this response.

             To prevent vessel traffic from transiting the spill area, a safety zone was
             established from Howland Hook to Tuft's Point. Although the zone was
             maintained throughout the cleanup period, vessels were allowed to transit
             the area, at no-wake speed, five days into the response.

             Because No-2 fuel oil is flammable, vacuum trucks had to be grounded. Barge
             transfers had to be performed "splash free" by loading the tanks through a
             hose from the bottom rather than spilling product in from the top.
             The west side of Pralls Island had been previously impacted by two large
             asphalt spills. The No. 2 fuel oil was acting like a thinner, actually "melting"
             tar mats which had formed during the previous spills. Sausage boom placed
             along the shore collected the leaching oil.

             Ref erences:

             -Bubar, B.G. and Czarnecki, J.R. 1991. Response to the January 1990 Arthur
             Kill Heating Oil Spill, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1991, pp. 259-261.
             *Hoff, R. 1991. A Summary of Bioremediation Applications Observed at
             Marine Oil Spills. Report HMRB 91-2. Jan. 1991.
             9NOAA Hotline Reports
             *Oil Spill Intelligence Report. International Spill Statistics 1989-1990, Special
             Report, 3/28/91
             *Oil Spill Intelligence Report. Oil Spills, International Summary & Review.
             1989-1990




















             Exxon Bayway Refinery                 4









                   Name of Spill: Exxon Valdez
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 03/24/89
                   Location of Spill: Bligh Reef, Prince William Sound, Alaska
                   Latitude: 6102 N
                   Longitude: 146 05 W
                   Oil Product: Prudhoe Bay Crude
                   Oil Type: Type 3
                   Barrels: 240,500
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Coarse gravel beaches, eroding bluffs, exposed bluffs,
                   exposed rocky shores, mixed sediment beaches, sand/gravel beaches, sheltered
                   bedrock bluffs, sheltered rocky shores, vertical rocky shores, whales, seals, Sea
                   Otters, seal concentration areas, seal haulouts, whale migration routes, whale
9                  seasonal use areas, mustelids, rodents, deer, bears, mammal population
                   concentration areas, intertidal feeding areas, diving coastal birds, waterfowl,
                   alcids, shorebirds, wading birds, gulls, raptors, bird rookeries, bird migration
                   stopover areas, bird migratory routes, bird critical foraging areas, fish,
                   molluscs, crab, beaches, marinas, subsistence, officially designated harvest
                   sites, State Parks, National Parks, commercial fisheries, fish aquaculture sites,
0                  archaeological sites, Native American Lands.
                   Dispersants: Yes
                   Bioremediation: Yes
                   In-situ Burning: Yes
                   Other Special Interest: Wildlife impacts, wildlife rehabilitation, closure of
0                  commercial fishing areas, closure of shipping lanes or vehicle traffic routes,
                   human health and safety concerns, media interest, research conducted,
                   unusual or experimental cleanup techniques, volunteer response and
                   organization, logistical or operational problems, habitat impact due to
                   cleanup operations.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Coarse gravel beaches, eroding bluffs, exposed
Z                  bluffs, exposed rocky shores, mixed sediment beaches, sand/gravel beaches,
                   sheltered bedrock bluffs, sheltered rocky shores, vertical rocky shores.






















                                                                                      Exxon Valdez








             Keywords: Inipol, Customblen, skimmer, sorbent belt skimmer, rope mops,
             sorbents, boom, pomporns, Corexit 7664, Corexit 9580, Corexit 9527, BP 110OX,
             International Bird Rescue and Research Center (IBRRQ, Regional Response
             Team, fingerprinting, lightering, manual removal, vacuum truck, disposal,
             high-pressure hot water washing, high-pressure washing, low pressure
             washing, water-washing, remote response, Side Looking Airborne Radar
             (SLAR), steam generators, volunteers.
             Incident Summary:

             On March 24, 1989, the tanker Exxon Valdez, en route from Valdez, Alaska to
             Los Angeles, California, ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound,
             Alaska. The vessel was traveling outside normal shipping lanes in an
             attempt to avoid ice. Within six hours of the grounding, the Exxon Valdez
             spilled approximately 10.9 million gallons of its 53 million gallon cargo of
             Prudhoe Bay Crude. Eight of the eleven tanks on board were damaged. The
             oil would eventually impact over 1,100 miles of non-continuous coastline in
             Alaska, making the Exxon Valdez the largest oil spill to date in U.S. waters.
             The response to the Exxon Valdez involved more personnel and equipment
             over a longer period of time than did any other spill in U.S. history.
             Logistical problems in providing fuel, meals, berthing, response equipment,
             waste management and other resources were one of the largest challenges to
             response management. At the height of the response, more than 11,000
             personnel, 1,400 vessels and 85 aircraft were involved in the cleanup.
             Shoreline cleanup began in April of 1989 and continued until September of
             1989 for the first year of the response. The response effort continued in 1990
             and 1991 with cleanup in the summer months, and limited shoreline
             monitoring in the winter months. Fate and effects monitoring by state and
             Federal agencies are ongoing.

             Behavior of OiI:

             Prudhoe Bay crude oil has an API gravity of 27.0, and a pour point of 0 degrees
             C. The bulk of the oil spilled from the Exxon Valdez was released within 6
             hours of the ship's grounding. The general trend of the oil was south and
             west from the point of origin. For the first few days after the spill, most of the
             oil was in a large concentrated patch near Bligh Island. On March 26, a storm,
             which generated winds of over 70 mph in Prince William Sound, weathered
             much of the oil, changing it into mousse and tarballs, and distributed it over a
             large area. By March 30, the oil extended 90 miles from the spill site.
             Ultimately, oil would extend more than 500 miles from Bligh reef, oiling
             shorelines in Prince William Sound, the Kenai peninsula, the Alaskan
             peninsula and Kodiak island. Oil impacts in the Prince William Sound
             region were the most severe.
             In addition to the storm of March 26, the spill occurred at a time of year when
             the spring tidal fluctuations were nearly 18 feet. This tended to deposit the oil
             onto shorelines above the normal zone of wave action.



             Exxon Valdez                         2









                    The diversity in shoreline types in the affected areas led to varied oiling
                    conditions. In some cases, oil was present on sheer rock faces making access
                    and cleanup difficult, or rocky beaches with grain size anywhere from coarse
                    sand to boulders, where the oil could percolate to a sub-surface level. The
                    spill affected both sheltered and exposed (to high wave/weather action)
                    shorelines. Once oil landed on a shoreline it could be floated off at the next
                    high tide, carried to and deposited in a different location, making the tracking
                    of oil migration and shoreline impact very difficult. This migration ended by
0                   mid-summer 1989, and the remaining cleanup dealt with oiled shorelines,
                    rather than oil in the water.

                    Cleanup operations continued in the summer months of 1990 and 1991. By
                    1990, surface oil, where it existed, had become significantly weathered. Sub-
                    surface oil, on the other hand, was in many cases much less weathered and
                    still in a liquid state. The liquid sub-surface oil could give off a sheen when
                    disturbed. Cleanup in 1991 concentrated on the remaining reduced quantities
                    of surface and sub-surface oil.

                    Countermeasures and Mitigation:

                    The Alyeska Pipeline Service Company was immediately notified of the
                    incident and sent a tug to the site to assist in stabilizing the vessel. At the
                    time of the incident, the Alyeska spill response barge was out of service being
                    re-outfitted. It arrived on scene by 1500 on 24 March. Alyeska was
                    overwhelmed by the magnitude of the incident; by March 25, Exxon had
                    assumed full responsibility for the spill and cleanup effort.
                    Deployment of boom around the vessel was complete within 35 hours of the
                    grounding. Exxon conducted successful dispersant test applications on March
                    25 and 26 and was granted permission on March 26 to apply dispersants to the
                    oil slick. Due to the large storm that began the evening of March 26, much of
                    the oil turned into mousse. As dispersants aren't generally able to dissipate
                    oil in the form of mousse, it was no longer practical to use dispersants on
                    floating oil during this response.
                    On the evening of March 25, a test in-situ burn of oil on water was conducted.
                    Approximately 15,000 to 30,000 gallons of oil were collected using 3M Fire
                    Boom towed behind two fishing vessels in a U-shaped configuration, and
                    ignited. The oil burned for a total of 75 minutes and was reduced to
                    approximately 300 gallons of residue that could be collected easily. It was
                    estimated that the efficiency of this test burn was 98 per cent or better. Again,
                    continued in-situ burr-Ling was not possible because of the change in the oil's
                    state after the storm of March 26.













                                                             3                             Exxon Valdez







                                                                                                                 0



              Five dispersant trials took place between March 25 and March 28. Corexit 9527
              was used for the trials. Four of the tests used C-130 aircraft with ADDS packs,                    0
              and one test was applied from a DC-6 aircraft. By March 29 the Regional
              Response Team (RRT) decided that dispersants were no longer feasible.
              Because there was not enough equipment to protect all the shorelines that
              could be impacted, Federal, state and local agencies collaborated to establish
              shoreline protection priorities. The agencies decided that fish hatcheries and                     40
              salmon streams had the highest priority; accordingly, containment booms
              were deployed to protect these areas. Fivefish hatcheries in Prince William
              Sound and two in the Gulf of Alaska were boomed, with the largest amount
              of boom deployed at the Sawmill Bay hatchery in Prince William Sound. On
              April 15, the Sawmill Bay hatchery was boomed with 30,500 feet of sorbent
              boom and 28,600 feet of containment boom in multiple layers. As many as 15                         11
              to 20 boats were used daily for tending the boom and oil recovery by towing
              sorbent boom. Overall, the deflection of oil from the hatcheries was very
              successful.
              At the height of containment efforts, it is estimated that a total of 100 miles of                 0
              boom was deployed. Almost all the types of boom available on the market
              were used and tested during the spill response.

              Due to the size of the spill, it was necessary to employ inexperienced workers
              to deploy and tend booms, and this led to some boom being incorrectly used
              or handled, and sometimes damaged. Some boom sank because of improper
              deployment, infrequent tending, or leakage and/or inadequacy in the
              buoyancy system. Other problems included fabric tears in boom due to debris,
              and tearing at anchorage points from wave action. In some cases, ballast
              chains were ripped off during boom recovery if the boom was lifted by the
              chain. One estimate suggests that 50 per cent of the damage to larger boom
              came during boom recovery. For self-inflating booms, it was important to
              keep the inflation valves above the water during deployment so that the
              boom did not become filled with water and have to be replaced.

              Since most of the containment boom was in 50 to 100 feet long sections,
              several lengths of boom usually needed to be connected for deployment.
              When several types of boom were used in one operation, there were often
              problems with incompatible connectors between different types of boom.
              Bailing wire and other adaptations were used in the field for these situations.
              A universal type of connector (ASTM connector) came with some booms, but
              these were difficult to handle and hook up at sea and were hard to open once
              they had been submerged in cold water. Booms to be re-used were hand
              cleaned early on in the spill, and as the spill progressed were cleaned in one of
              the two barges with mechanical washing facilities.

              To contain oil on the open water, containment boom was towed between two
              vessels (usually fishing boats) to surround the oil and then the two ends of
              the boom were drawn together to close the loop and await collection by a
              skimmer.



              Exxon Valdez                            4








                   Aerial surveillance was used to direct the deployment of booms and
                   skimmers for open water oil recovery. Visual overflight observations as well
                   as ultraviolet/ infrared (LJV/IR) surveys were used by the USCG and Exxon to
                   track the floating oil. Satellite imagery was also tested as a method to track oil
                   but was not very useful because of the infrequency of satellite passes over
                   Prince William Sound (every 7 to 8 days), cloud cover, and lengthy turn
                   around time for results.

                   The primary means of open water oil recovery was with skimmers. In
                   general, most skimmers became less effective once the oil had spread,
                   emulsified and mixed with debris. To save time, it was most practical to keep
                   skimmer offloading equipment and oil storage barges near the skimmers.
40                 Weir skimmers were useful for collecting fresh oil that was present in a thick
                   layer on the water. As the oil became weathered and laden with debris,
                   however, it was the simple weir skimmers that were the first to clog. Some of
                   the larger weir skimmers had auger pumps with cutters for chopping debris
                   and were able to collect oil for a longer time than the simple models.

                   Oleophilic disc skimmers also worked well while the oil wasfairlyfresh.
                   Once the oil became viscous and associated with debris, these skimmers were
                   not very effective.

                   An Egmolap brand paddle belt skimmer (Egmolap IT) was used and was
                   effective for heavy mousse and debris. It collected very little water under
                   light sea conditions. A different paddle belt skimmer that was supplied by the
                   Canadian Coast Guard clogged easily when working with viscous oil.
                   When using rope mop skimmers, it was important to maintain the smallest
                   angle possible when lifting the skimmer out of the water, so that the oil did
                   not run down the mop and back into the water. In situations where the oil
                   was viscous, it was useful to cut down the diameter of the mop from nine to
                   six inches and inject diesel oil into the ringers as the mop was being rung out.





















                                                         5                           Exxon Valdez









              The most used skimmers during the response were the Marco sorbent lifting-
              belt skimmers that were supplied by the U. S. Navy. Once oil became viscous,
              the sorbent part of the skimmer was removed and the conveyor belt alone
              was sufficient to pull the oil up the ramp. The pump that came with the
              skimmer had difficulty offloading viscous oil, so that other vacuum
              equipment was used to unload the collected oil. The Marco skimmers were
              generally not used close to shore because they drawbetween three and four
              feet. In general, the paddle belt and rope mop skimmers were the most useful
              for recovery of oil from the shoreline. The skimmers were placed on self-
              propelled barges with a shallow draft.

              Sorbents were used to recover oil in cases where mechanical means were less
              practical. The drawback to sorbents was that they were labor intensive and
              generated additional solid waste. Sorbent boom was used to collect sheen
              between primary and secondary layers of offshore boom, and to collect sheen
              released from the beach during tidal flooding. Pompoms were useful for
              picking up small amounts of weathered oil. Towing of sorbent boom in a
              zigzag or circular fashion behind a boat was used to collect oil and was more
              efficient than towin the boom in a straight line. Sorbent booms made o
                                   9                                                         f
              rolled pads were more effective than booms made of individual particles
              because these absorbed less water and were stronger, and did not break into
              many small particles if they came apart.
              During the Exxon Valdez spill response, a hopper dredge was used to collect
              oil for the first time in the United States. The oil was gathered using a                            0
              containment boom, and the draghead of the dredge was placed under the
              boom below the oil surface. The oil was then sucked up and placed in storage
              containers on the dredge. The drawbacks to using the dredge were that it
              recovers large amounts of water with the oil and must be used offshore
              because of its deep draft.                                                                           0
              To transfer the recovered oil, water, and debris mixture from the skimmers to
              temporary storage containers, vacuum equipment and positive-displacement
              pumps were used. Vacuum trucks on barges or air-conveyers were most
              useful when used with an open-ended suction hose with a diameter of 6 to 8
              inches.                                                                                              41

              Early on in the response, storage space for recovered oil was in short supply.
              To combat the storage space problem, water was decanted from skimmers or
              tanks into a boomed area before offloading. As a result, the remaining
              viscous oil mixture was difficult to offload, the process sometimes taking up                        A&
              to 6 to 8 hours. High-capacity skimmer offloading pumps, in particular grain
              pumps, were the most useful in transferring viscous oil.

              Because recovery equipment was in near constant use, several vessels were
              set up to perform field repairs and conduct preventive maintenance.
              The oil remaining on the Exxon Valdez, was completely offloaded by the end
              of the first week in April 1989. After offloading operations were completed,


              Exxon Valdez                             6










                  the tanker was towed to a location 25 miles from Naked Island in Prince
                  William Sound for temporary repairs. Later in the surnmer of 1989, the
                  vessel was brought to California for further repairs.
RW
                  Shoreline assessment was a prerequisite for the implementation of any beach
                  cleanup. Assessment provided geomorphological, biological, archaeological
                  and oiling information that was used for the development of site specific
                  treatment strategies. Cleanup operations were scheduled around specific
0                 activities such as seal haulout activity, seal pupping, eagle nesting, fish
                  spawning, fishing seasons, and other significant events as much as possible.

                  In 1989, hoses spraying seawater were used to flush oil from shorelines. The
                  released oil was then trapped with offshore boom, and removed using
0                 skimmers, vacuum trucks (useful for thick layers of oil) and boom (sorbent,
                  snare, pompoms). For hard-to-reach areas, or locations with weathered oil,
                  heated seawater was used to flush oil from the shoreline.

                  Converted vessels and barges were used for beach washing operations. It
                  would take several days to outfit a conventional barge with the equipment
0                 needed to heat and pump the water. Smaller vessels that were used for beach
                  washing early in the spill were re-outfitted for bioremediation later in the
                  response.

                  Along with the large scale beach washing, manual cleanup, raking and tilling
                  the beaches, oily debris pickup, enhanced bioremediation and spot washing
0                 were used to cleanup the oil. In some locations, oil was thick enough to be
                  picked up with shovels and buckets. In addition, mechanical methods were
                  used on a few sites, including the use of bulldozers to relocate or remove the
                  contaminated beach surfaces. Mechanical rock washing machines, which
                  were manufactured for the spill, were not used to clean contaminated rocks
0                 and return them to the beach.
                  Oiled storm berm was mechanically relocated in some cases so that these
                  areas, which normally would not receive much wave action, would be more
                  exposed and cleaned by natural processes. If the oiling in the berm was
                  significant or persistent it was tilled to free the oil or washed to optimize the
0                 cleaning. Recommendations were made to restrict the movement of berm to
                  the upper third of the beach to ensure its return to the original location.



0














                                                                                    Exxon Valdez






                                                                                                                 0



              Beach applications of dispersants were tried in several locations. Corexit 7664
              was applied on Ingot Island, followed by a warm water wash. No significant                         0
              change in oil cover or the physical state of the oil was observed as a result of
              the treatment. Some ecological impacts were observed in the treated areas. It
              appeared that the effects were largely due to the intensive washing more that
              the use of Corexit 7664, and were evident in intertidal epibenthic macrobiota.

              In addition, the dispersant BP1100X was applied to a test area on Knight                           0
              Island. Toxicology studies indicated that the upper and lower intertidal biota
              were different from pre-application communities the day after dispersant
              application, and returned to pre-treatment levels after seven days.

              Exxon also tested the dispersant Corexit 9580 in Prince William Sound. The
              decision to approve a large scale test of Corexit 9580 in August was reached                       41
              after an extensive program aimed at evaluating shoreline cleaning
              technologies. The monitoring program addressed three major issues:
              migration of oil and Corexit in shoreline sediments, the migration of
              sediments and oil in the nearshore environments, and the migration of oil in
              the water column, each being evaluated in the monitoring program. The                              0
              dispersant's effectiveness and impact were then compared to mechanical
              shoreline cleanup methods, and this information was used to determine
              whether Corexit 9580 should be used for shoreline treatment. The Research
              and Development Committee evaluating the proposal for dispersant use
              recommended against broad-scale application of the product because tests had
              not adequately demonstrated that removal and recovery efficiency                                   0
              outweighed possible adverse effects. The committee recommended using
              Corexit only on Smith Island, subject to continued review of the effectiveness
              of recovery procedures by on-scene monitors.
              In May of 1989, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Exxon                                0
              conducted bioremediation trials at two test sites on Knight Island in Prince
              William Sound. On the basis of these tests and other trials later in the
              summer, Exxon recommended the use of the bioremediation enhancement
              agents, Inipol (Inipol EAP22, manufactured by Elf Aquitaine of France) and
              Customblen (Customblen 28-8-0, manufactured by Sierra Chemicals of
              California), and subsequently treated over 70 miles of shoreline in Prince                         41
              William Sound with these agents.
















              Exxon Valdez                            8











                  Past scientific research had determined that sufficient numbers of
0                 hydrocarbon degrading bacteria existed naturally in Alaska. It was decided
                  that the limiting factor in enhancing petroleum hydrocarbon degradation was
                  the availability of nitrogen and phosphorus for the indigenous bacteria. As a
                  result, bioremediation trials focused on agents that were basically "fertilizers,"
                  and contained no living microorganisms. Considerations in the selection of
                  bioremediation agents included ease of application, the possibility of causing
0                 algal blooms and eutrophication in areas where nitrogen/ phosphorus
                  concentrations would remain elevated (such as sheltered bays and estuaries),
                  the flushing of nutrients from the beach soon after application due to tidal
                  action, and the possible toxicity associated with concentrations of nitrogen
                  based compounds (such as ammonia).
0                 Winter monitoring of the effects of bioremediation consisted of surveys of
                  more than 20 beaches in Prince William Sound and the Gulf of Alaska.
                  These studies determined that oil degradation had been enhanced on the
                  shorelines monitored, but some debate existed over whether bioremediation
                  was solely, or even largely, responsible.
0                 Cleanup operations in 1989 ceased by the end of September. All parties
                  involved in the response agreed that continuation of cleanup into the
                  Alaskan winter would jeopardize the safety of cleanup crews. In addition, it
                  was speculated that the winter storms in Alaska could significantly remove
                  oil from shorelines, including sub-surface oil. By the end of the 1989 cleanup,
0                 more than 25,000 tons of oiled waste and several hundred thousand barrels of
                  oil/liquid waste were collected and disposed of in landfills.
                  Cleanup in 1990 began in April and ended in September. Surveys in the
                  spring of 1990 showed that oiling conditions had been reduced or changed
0                 over the winter. Surface oil in 1990 was significantly weathered but sub-
                  surface oil was relatively fresh in some locations. Cleanup techniques in
                  1990 focused more on manual methods of treatment such as hand wiping and
                  spot washing as well as bioremediation. Mechanical equipment was used on
                  a few sites.

                  Bioremediation was more extensive in 1990, with 378 of the 587 shoreline
                  segments treated that year receiving bioremediation application. In general,
                  Inipol was applied in cases where surface oiling existed and Customblen slow
                  release pellets were preferred for treating beaches with sub-surface oiling.
                  Generally, beaches were given one to three treatments over several months.
                  Concern over the possible toxicity of Inipol led to recommendations for
                  application of only Customblen on some sites.










                                                         9                           Exxon Valdez







                                                                                                        0



             By the spring of 1991, the scope of the cleanup effort was greatly reduced.
             Manual cleanup, bioremediation, and very limited use of mechanical
             equipment were employed. Cleanup took place from May of 1991 through
             July of 1991.

             An important observation that resulted from the Exxon Valdez oil spill was
             that natural cleaning processes, on both sheltered and exposed beaches, were
             in many cases very effective at degrading oil. It took longer for some sections            40
             of shoreline to recover from some of the invasive cleaning methods (hot
             water flushing in particular) than from the oiling itself.

             Other Special Interest Issues:
             The Exxon Valdez oil spill aroused more media and public interest (both
             national and international) than any other spill in U.S. history. Alaska is
             considered by many to be a pristine environment that includes many species
             of elsewhere endangered wildlife.

             In an effort to absorb and use input from the multitude of groups concerned
             with the effects of the spill, the Interagency Shoreline Cleanup Committees
             (ISCC) were formed to monitor beach cleanup progress. The ISCCs focused on
             identifying strategic resource planning needs and consisted of representatives
             from Exxon, environmental groups, private landowners, native groups and
             state and Federal agencies. There were ISCCs formed in Homer, Kodiak,
             Seward and Valdez.                                                                         0

             Concern over oil related wildlife mortality was intense during the spill. The
             grounding occurred at the beginning of the bird migration season. The U.S.
             Fish and Wildlife service estimated that mortalities directly related to the
             spill range from 350,000 to 390,000 birds, especially common and thick-billed
             murres, assorted sea ducks, bald eagles, and pigeon guillemots, 3,500 to 5,500             0
             sea otters and 200 harbor seals. In addition, killer whales may have been
             affected by the spill as their numbers in the area declined shortly after the
             spill. Of the 1,630 birds (over 36,000 dead birds were collected) and 357 Sea
             Otters that were trapped and treated by the International Bird Rescue
             Research Center (IBRRC)-run facilities (established in Homer, Kodiak, Seward               0
             and Valdez in response to this spill), the total survival rate was 50.7 per cent
             for birds, and 62 per cent for sea otters. These survival rates are considered
             very good for oil impacted animals.














             Exxon Valdez                         10










                  Unlike birds, sea otters had to be anesthetized to be washed which increases
                  the risk to the animal, and increases the cost of rehabilitation. The Sea Otter
                  rehabilitation program was complex, with a total of 29 veterinarians, and 9
                  veterinarian technicians scheduled to provide 24 hour care. The resulting
                  cost of the sea otter rehabilitation program was at least $51,000 per Sea Otter.
                  The highest percentages of sea otter fatalities (60 per cent) were recorded in
                  the first three weeks of the spill.
0
                  Due to the magnitude and remote location of the spill it was necessary to
                  bring significant additional resources (equipment and personnel) to Alaska to
                  respond to the spill. Most of the response equipment brought to Alaska early
                  on in the spill had to be delivered by air. Since the Valdez airport could not
0                 handle aircraft larger than a DC-6 or a C-130, most large air cargo shipments
                  went to Anchorage and were transferred to smaller planes. In addition, many
                  of the facilities (such as barge hotels for personnel) and equipment (such as
                  hot water beach washing barges) was designed specifically for this spill.

                  Most of the affected shorelines were inaccessible by land. Most of the cleanup
0                 operations were conducted from vessels. Initially, fishing boats and other
                  available craft were used to house personnel. Later, a state ferry, Navy
                  transport ships, camps established on deck barges, and a self-contained semi-
                  submersible derrick barge was used for berthing.

                  Besides other logistical problems with assembling and organizing a large
0                 work force in a short time, the majority of the personnel involved in the
                  cleanup effort had to be trained for their jobs as well as receive formal safety
                  training.

                  There were commercial fisheries closings as a result of the spill and great
0                 concern over the potential negative effect on hatcheries. The Alaska
                  Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEQ canceled the 1989 black
                  cod season in Prince William Sound, banned fishing for Pacific herring and
                  cut short the shrimp season as a result of the spill. It was determined in 1989
                  that at least 87 per cent of the herring spawning grounds in Prince William
                  Sound were heavily oiled.

                  In the winter of 1989/1990 and again in 1990/1991 the National Oceanic and
                  Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) conducted monitoring programs to
                  determine the extent of the natural removal of oil over the winter, and
                  identify treatment issues to be addressed in the coming cleanup seasons.
0                 These studies determined that removal of surface oil between September 1989
                  to February 1990, for exposed shorelines, was about 90 per cent; for sheltered
                  shorelines and those with intermittent energy, the removal rates were 70 per
                  cent. For sub-surface oil, the removal rate was approximately 55 per cent,
                  though this varied with the depth of the sub-surface oil impacts.

0                 Concern by Alaskan residents, in particular native villages, over the possible
                  contamination of subsistence foods, led NOAA to conduct research
                  addressing specific issues of subsistence food safety. In general, no quick


0                                                         11                          Exxon Valdez






                                                                                                           0


             method existed to quantitatively assess food safety, but the overall guideline
             was that if the food had no visible oiling or had no oily smell it was probably
             safe for consumption.                                                                         0
             The results of the NOAA study indicated that, in general, the aromatic
             contaminant level in fish varied little between affected areas and the
             unaffected reference site (Angoon, in southeast Alaska). The level of
             aromatic contamination in molluscs was higher than normal (tissue levels
             exceeded 100 ppb) in the areas of Windy Bay, Kodiak, Chenega Bay, and Old                     0
             Harbor, with the highest levels occurring in samples taken from Windy Bay
             and Kodiak. Mollusc samples taken in other areas affected by the oil spill
             were generally comparable in levels of aromatic contaminants to samples
             taken from the reference site.

             At the time of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, there were no national guidelines
             established to indicate the levels of aromatic contaminants acceptable in food.
             Results from the subsistence studies indicated that higher levels of
             carcinogenic aromatic hydrocarbons were found in smoked fish than in the
             unsmoked fish samples obtained after the Exxon Valdez spill.










                                                                                                           0
















             Exxon Valdez                          12                                                     0











                   References:

                   *Allen, A. A. 1991. Controlled Burning of Crude Oil on Water Following the
                   Grounding of the Exxon Valdez. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1991, pp.
                   213-216.
                   *Carpenter, et al. 1991. Marine Operations and Logistics During the Exxon
                   Valdez Spill Cleanup. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1991, pp. 205-211.
                   *Chianelli, et al. 1991. Bioremediation Technology Development and
                   Application to the Alaskan Spill. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1991, pp.
                   549-558.
                   *Ciancaglini, RADM D.E. 1991. The Federal On-Scene Coordinator's Role in
                   the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1991, pp. 325-331.
                   oDames and Moore 1991. Ecological Effects of BP1100X Shoreline Treatment
                   on Knight Island Prince William Sound, Alaska.
                   -DDames and Moore 1991. Ecological Effects of Corexit 7664 Shoreline
                   Treatment on Ingot Island Prince William Sound, Alaska.
                   *Glaser, et. al. 1991. Development and Evaluation of Application Techniques
                   for Delivery on Nutrients to Contaminated Shoreline in Prince William
                   Sound. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1991, pp. 559-562.
                   *Gundlach, E. 1991. Shoreline Surveys at the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: The
                   State of Alaska Response. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1991, pp. 519-529.
                   *Hayward Walker, A. and Field, L. J. 1991. Subsistence Fisheries and the
                   Exxon Valdez: Human Health Concerns. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings,
                   1991, pp. 441-446.
                   eHoff, R. 1991. A Summary of Bioremediation Applications Observed at
                   Marine Oil Spills. Report HMRB 91-2.
                   -Jahns, et al. 1991. Natural Cleaning of Shorelines Following the Exxon
                   Valdez Spill. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1991, pp. 167-176.
                   oMichel, et al. 1991. Trends in Natural Removal of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
                   in Prince William Sound from September 1989 to May 1990. Oil Spill
                   Conference Proceedings, 1991, pp. 181-187.
                   eNOAA Hotline Reports
                   *NOAA Response Report
                   *Noerager, et al. 1991. Oil Tracking, Containment, and Recovery During the
                   Exxon Valdez Response. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1991, pp. 193-203.
                   *Teal, A. R. 1991. Shoreline Cleanup - Reconnaissance, Evaluation, and
                   Planning Following the Valdez Oil Spill. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings,
                   1991, pp. 149-152.
                   *Varanasi, et al. 1990. NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS F/NWC-191;
                   Survey of Subsistence Fish and Shellfish for Exposure to Oil Spilled from the
                   Exxon Valdez
                   *White, J. and Williams, T. 1991. Saving Endangered Species in Major Oil
                   Spill Cleanup Efforts. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1991, pp. 221-223.
                   *Wood, M. and Heaphy, N. 1991. Rehabilitation of Oiled Seabirds and Bald
                   Eagles Following the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. Oil Spill Conference
                   Proceedings, 1991, pp. 235-239.
                   *World Information Systems. 1991. Tanker losses in U.S. Waters 1978-1990.




                                                           13                          Exxon Valdez








                    Name of Spill: Funiwa No. 5
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 01/17/80
                    Location of Spill: Niger Delta, Forcados, Nigeria
                    Latitude: 05 00 N
                    Longitude: 005 00 W
                    Oil Product: Nigerian Crude
                    Oil Type: Type 3
                    Barrels: 200,000
                    Source of Spill: Platform
                    Resources at Risk: Demersal fish, crabs, mangroves, shrimp, oysters.
                    Dispersants: Yes
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: No
                    Other Special Interest: Habitat impact due to oil, wildlife impacts.                        41
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Mangroves, sand/gravel beaches.
                    Keywords: Gold Crew, International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation
                    (ITOPF), blowout, relief well, fire.

                    Incident Summary:

                    On January 17, 1980, the Funiwa No. 5 well blew out. Approximately 200,000
                    barrels of oil spilled from the well, five miles off the Niger Delta, Nigeria. On
                    January 29 the oil ignited. The flow of oil stopped on February 1 as the
                    Funiwa No. 5 bridged.
                    Behavior of Oil:                                                                            0

                    Oil impacted the Nigerian coast on February 1, killing fish and crabs. Onshore
                    winds and the incoming tide carried the oil into the Niger River delta. Oil
                    heavily impacted the beaches between Fishtown and Sangana village. Lighter
                    concentrations of oil impacted the land between the Middleton and Nun                       0
                    Rivers. Some of the oil evaporated on the water, and some drifted out to sea.

                    Countermeasures and Mitigation:

                    Red Adair Corporation attempted to cap the well, but abandoned the effort
                    due to danger to personnel. Two rigs were brought on scene to dig relief                    0
                    wells, however, the Funiwa bridged before they were completed.

                    Cleanup operations consisted mainly of application of 8,800 gallons of Gold
                    Crew dispersant. Dispersants were spread near Otuo village and Sangana
                    town.

                    While the mangroves tended to retain the oil, sand beaches were cleaned by
                    wave and tide action.











                                                                                           Funiwa No. 5









            Other Special Interest Issues:

            Oil was retained in the Santana mangroves, killing crabs, winkles and
            mangrove tree seedlings. The larger seedlings and the mature trees were
            healthy. Approximately 836 acres of mangroves were destroyed by the oil.

            References:

            *Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
            eNigerian Well Spills 8.4 Million Gallons of Oil. Oil Spill Intelligence
            Reports. February 8, 1980, Vol. III, No. 6. p. 1.













































            Funiwa No. 5                          2








                   Name of Spill: General Colocotronis
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 03/07/68
                   Location of Spill: Eleuthera Island, Bahamas
                   Latitude: 25 20 N
                   Longitude: 076 20 W
                   Oil Product: Venezuelan crude oil, diesel fuel
                   Oil Type: Type 3, Type 2
                   Barrels: 37,700
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel                                                          41
                   Resources at Risk: Coral reefs, recreational beaches, crabs, lobster.
                   Dispersants: Yes
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: Yes
                   Other Special Interest: Adverse weather conditions, complex salvage
                   operations, research conducted, effects to tourism, unusual or experimental
                   cleanup techniques.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Coral reefs, fine sand beaches.
                   Keywords: Enjay 7664, Magnus, Drew, Polycomplex A, boom, International
                   Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF), lightering, sinking.

                   Incident Summary:

                   On March 7, 1968, the Greek tank vessel General Colocotronis ran aground on
                   the east side of Eleuthera Island in the Bahamas. The vessel was loaded with
                   approximately 119,000 barrels of Venezuelan crude oil. The hull was severely
                   damaged during the grounding causing the vessel to spill approximately
                   37,000 barrels of oil into the Atlantic Ocean at a location one and one-half
                   miles offshore.

                   Approximately 72,500 barrels of oil were pumped from the vessel into
                   another tanker, the Esso Margarita. Steam lines were rigged to heat the cargo
                   to facilitate pumping. Moving the salvage vessels into position and
                   offloading the remaining cargo was performed during extremely severe
                   weather.

                   Dive surveys reported that the keel was crushed and buckled and that there
                   was extensive damage to the hull of the vessel. Salvage and response
                   personnel decided that the only feasible action was to sink the General
                   Colocotronis. Following the offloading operations, the cargo tanks were
                   flushed with dispersants to remove the residual oil. The vessel was then
                   towed out to deep water and sunk.












                                                                               General Colocotronis











            Behavior of Oil:

            Approximately 37,000 barrels of crude oil rapidly spilled from the General
            Colocotronis. The resulting slick spread out along the coast and caused
            impacted recreational beaches and private residential shoreline. In addition
            to the spilled cargo, an unknown quantity of the vessel's diesel bunker fuel
            also leaked out.

            The oil impacted the sands of Eleuthera, in some cases penetrating deep into
            the beach sand and forming layers as thick as two inches. The coral reef was
            covered with oil. The slick offshore was 14 miles long by two miles wide.
            Countermeasures and Mitigation:

            The primary response tool for this spill was chemical dispersant. Four types
            of dispersants were reportedly used during the cleanup operation: Enjay 7664,
            Magnus, Drew, and Polycomplex A. A total of 10,900 gallons of dispersants
            were used to combat the oil slick. The water-based Enjay 7664 was only
            recently on the market at the time of the spill and was proven by tests
            conducted at Eleuthera to be of low toxicity. Polycomplex A was also water-
            based. Magnus was a light-oil base and was used in limited amounts. Drew
            was a kerosene based product that produced a slight skin-irritation to the
            cleanup personnel who worked with it. Tropical weather conditions
            reportedly made personal protective equipment impractical.
            Oil was sprayed with detergents while it was still on the water but close to the
            shoreline. This was done by spraying the detergent into the breakers from on
            shore or from a small boat close to the shore.

            There was a very high rate of "'bio-erosion" that effectively cleaned the
            intertidal coral reefs. Particularly noted were the chiton and other browsing
            molluscs. They were shown to clean up oil on the reefs rapidly.
            Sea grass and Sargassum weed were natural sorbents. These weeds washed
            up on the shore naturally and absorbed the oil as it hit the beach.

            Boom was used at the north end of the beach at French Leave. This booming
            was felt to have only psychological value and it was not believed that the
            boom could have held back the heavy crude oil.

            Other Special Interest Issues:

            A test of burning dry weed that had been used to mop up oil was conducted.
            This was determined to be impractical on a larger scale as the fire was quickly
            buried in sand or wet weeds. There was also a potential risk of the fire
            spreading to the dry scrub in the back-beach area.

            Foam tankers and pump trucks for fire fighting were used in the dispersant
            spraying operation. They were used from the beaches and from landing craft.



            General Colocotronis                   2








                   This spill occurred four days after the Ocean Eagle spill in Puerto Rico. Most
                   of the media attention was focused on that incident. There were no reported
                   adverse effects to the tourist industry of the area as a result of the spill.

                   References:

                   *Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
                   *Gilmore et al. 1970. Systems Study of Oil Spill Cleanup Procedures. Vol.1:
                   Analysis of Oil Spills and Control Measures.
                   *Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
                   1987.
                   *Potter, J. 1973. Disaster By Oil. The Macmillan Company, NY. pp. 119-151.












































                                                          3                     General Colocotronis








                    Name of Spill: Globtik Sun
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 08/15/75
                    Location of Spill: Gulf of Mexico
                    Latitude: 28 20 N
                    Longitude: 093 03 W
                    Oil Product: Arabian Crude oil
                    Oil Type: Type 3
                    Barrels: 7,000
                    Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                    Resources at Risk: Commercial fishing.
                    Dispersants: No
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: No
                    Other Special Interest: 'Logistical or operational problems.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: None
                    Keywords: Fire, collision, salvage, lightering.

                    Incident Summary:
                    At 0130 on August 15, 1975, the MIV Globtik Sun struck an unmanned
                    Chevron Oil Company oil production platform approximately 100 miles from
                    Galveston while en route from Aruba to Baytown, Texas. The platform,
                    designed for 12 oil wells, was unmanned because it was not yet in operation.
                    Approximately 7,000 barrels of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico after the
                    vessel's port bow tank ruptured. As flames engulfed the vessel, the master
                    gave the order to abandon ship. Forty of forty-six crew members were
                    rescued, three charred bodies were found on board the ship August 17, and
                    three crew members were lost at sea. Weather at the time was mild with clear
                    skies, wind at 10 knots out of the SW, and seas 1-2 feet.

                    Apparently, the ship was on autopilot with the radar turned off when the
                    watch was relieved at midnight. The charts that were in use were not up-to-
                    date and showed no fixed structures on the ship's trackline. When the radar
                    was turned at 0030, nothing was visible. At 0045, the radar revealed an object
                    approximately 9 miles away on the starboard side of the vessel. The Captain
                    of the vessel claimed that he saw no navigational lights on the platform even
                    though a Chevron spokesman said they were functioning properly. The mate
                    failed to plot the object. At 0130, the port bow of the vessel struck the eastern
                    side of the platform, opening up a gash 2 feet wide by the length of the bow
                    tank. The cargo ignited and the fire spread towards 15 drums of lube oil. An
                    emergency call was made and the ship was abandoned while fire and smoke
                    engulfed the forward port section of the ship.











                                                                                            Globtik Sun









             Personnel working on other platforms in the area immediately responded to
             the accident. Six utility boats surrounded the Globtik Sun within 30 minutes.
             Two Coast Guard cutters and four aircraft arrived on-scene on August 15.
             The charred vessel was towed by McAllister Towing to Galveston on August
             18. The Globtik Sun was later sold for scrap.

             Behavior of Oil:

             An oil slick about two n-dles long and half a mile wide leaked out from the
             vessel's damaged port bow. The majority of the oil slick was on fire and
             burned off, so no cleanup of oil on the water was required. Survivors of the
             incident reported encounters with flames and oil in the water. By the
             morning of August 16, only a very light, rapidly dissipating sheen was
             reported.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             After the fire was controlled, the vessel was towed and anchored off the coast
             of Galveston for inspection and lightering.                                                 41
             Other Special Interest Issues:

             Ref erences:

             o8/9/91 & 8/28/91 Letters from Daniel Owen at ITOPF
             oGenwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
             oMMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database.
             oU.S. Coast Guard POLREP file.
































             Globtik Sun                          2








                   Name of Spill: Grand Eagle
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 09/28/85
                   Location of Spill: Delaware River, Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania
                   Latitude: 39 50 N
                   Longitude: 075 25 W
                   Oil Product: Ninian Crude Oil
                   Oil Type: Type 3
                   Barrels: 10,357
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Bird migratory route, bird wintering concentration area,
                   marshes.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Effects to recreation areas, habitat impact due to
                   cleanup operations, habitat impact due to oil, wildlife impacts, logistical or
                   operational problems, research conducted.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Exposed seawalls, riprap, marshes, coarse sand
                   beaches, coarse gravel beaches, tidal mudflats.
                   Keywords: Vegetation cutting, water-washing, high pressure washing, low
                   pressure washing, Tri-State Bird Rescue Center, New Jersey State Department
                   of Environmental Protection (NJ DEP), Delaware Bay and River Cooperative,
                   U.S. Navy Superintendent of Salvage (NAVSUPSALV), manual removal,
                   boom, disposal, sorbent pads, vacuum truck.

                   Incident Summary:

                   At 2330 on September 28, 1985, the Panamanian Tank Vessel Grand Eagle,
                   loaded with 530,659 barrels of Ninian Crude oil, ran aground in the Delaware
                   River near Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania. A cargo tank ruptured causing the
                   release of 10,370 barrels of oil into the waterway, impacting a 12 mile section
                   of the river and the surrounding shoreline. The weather at the time of the
                   accident was clear with broken cloud coverage. Winds were NNW at 17-21
                   knots and the temperature was 68'F.

                   The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) was notified immediately. The On-Scene
                   Coordinator (OSC) supervised all response and cleanup operations from
                   September 28 to November 8, 1985.

                   The Grand Eagle was freed from its grounding site at 0040, September 29 and
                   was moved to the Sun Oil Company Refinery at Marcus Hook where the
                   remaining cargo was offloaded.

                   The OSC authorized movement of the vessel with tug escort to Pennsylvania
                   Shipbuilding in Chester, Pennsylvania to begin repairs on the damaged cargo
                   tank. Oil was boomed away from the vessel before beginning the moving
                   operation, and a skimmer remained with the vessel to collect any oil lost
                   during transit. The vessel was moved without incident, and there was no
                   significant loss of oil from the containment area.



                                                                                      Grand Eagle











              Behavior of Oil:

              Ninian crude oil has an API gravity of 35.5, and a viscosity of .42 centistokes.
              The initial trajectory predictions suggested that the oil would move rather
              rapidly down river, influenced both by the tides and the increased flow rate of
              the river due to the recent effects of Hurricane Gloria. Wind conditions at the
              time of the spill indicated that the New Jersey shoreline would be the main
              area impacted. By 0630 on September 29, the oil slick extended over about 9
              miles of the Delaware River. By the following morning the oil had spread in
              ribbons south of the Delaware Memorial Bridge to Pea Patch Island, about 14
              miles down the river from the grounding site. Oil impacted on both the New
              Jersey and Delaware shorelines between the Commodore Barry Bridge and to
              the south of the Delaware Memorial Bridge. By October 1, most of the
              floating oil had landed on the beaches and in the marshes.

              The primary areas impacted were mixed sand and gravel beaches, riprap,
              manmade harbor structures, and marshlands. Also affected was the Battery
              Park in New Castle, Delaware, a high use recreation area. The intertidal zone
              including riprap at the park was heavily oiled. Marshes fringing the park
              were heavily oiled within a tidal interval of one meter. Oil was scattered
              across the tidal flats in small patches and covered the sand in large mats.
              Oiled debris was present in the marshes, on the tidal flats, and on the beaches.

              Aquatic birds and the marsh areas they inhabit were felt to be the most
              seriously threatened resources in the area of the spill. Of particular concern
              was the Salem River because of its extensive wetlands. Approximately 78
              acres of marshland were moderately-to-heavily oiled (one of the largest
              recorded events of oil impact on marshland).

              The main areas of socioeconomic concern were the Battery Park and the
              Christiana River. Industry in the area attempted to carry on normal
              operations. In one case, an unattended boom was removed for ship passage
              and was not replaced, resulting in lost oil from the containment area.
              Approximately 8,060 barrels of oil were recovered through the efforts of the
              DELBAY skimmer, the 5 Navy skimmers, and vacuum trucks. Recovered oil
              and oiled debris were taken to the Sun Oil Refinery for disposal. Over
              twenty-five hundred cubic yards of debris were removed. Cleanup and
              inspection operations continued until November 8.

              Countermeasures and Mitigation:
              Following the grounding, booms were placed around the vessel. Booms and
              vacuum trucks were used between the Commodore Barry Bridge and the
              Delaware Memorial Bridge.

              The skimmer Delbay began skimming at the leading edge of the slick on 29
              September. It stayed in operation until October 6. It escorted the vessel from
              the Sun Oil Terminal to the shipyard on October 1, and was used in the


              Grand Eagle                            2








                    Christiana River to collect refloated oil from shore washing on October 5.
                    Five skimmers, requested from the U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage
                    (NAVSUPSALV), were working in the Christiana River area on October 2.

                    The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Scientific
                    Support Coordinator (SSC) nominated the Salem River, Pea Patch Island, and
                    the marsh area to the south as areas of immediate concern. Due to the vessel
                    owner's inability to protect the marshes adequately, the OSC declared a
                    limited federally funded spill response to the area south of the Delaware
                    Memorial Bridge. On October 1, a containment boom was placed across the
                    Salem River, and 10,000 feet of diversionary boom was deployed to protect the
                    Salem Cove area.

                    There was limited grass cutting in the vicinity of the Commodore Barry
                    Bridge and in the marsh grass at Battery Park, after water-washing proved to
                    be ineffective against pooled oil. The marsh grass in the Commodore Barry
                    Bridge vicinity was on the New Jersey side of the river, and the cutting was
                    done at the specific request of the New Jersey State Department of
                    Environmental Protection (NJ DEP). This area was cut to lessen the threat of
                    contamination to aquatic birds in the marsh. Some marsh grass was cut at
                    New Castle's waterfront park and near Deemer's Beach. NOAA
                    recommended that the marsh grasses not be cut, as this practice could allow
                    the oil to penetrate the tissues of the plants more readily, and it would allow
                    the oil to get deeper into the marshes. NOAA advised that damage could
                    occur to non-oiled plants in the course of cutting the oiled ones, through
                    trampling plants and introducing oil into previously uncontaminated areas.
                    In the marshes of Oldman's Creek and Raccoon Creek, the initial booming
                    failed due to untended and improperly secured boom. Small boats were used
                    to access the oiled areas. Sorbent pads were used to collect the loose oil. The
                    contractors found that the marshes were naturally cleaned with each change
                    in the tide.

                    NOAA recommended using high- and low-pressure washing of the oil from
                    man-made features (seawalls and riprap) into sorbent booms to be collected by
                    surface skimmers. Low-pressure washing was used to flush out the shoreline
                    rock and grass area near the Wilmington Marine Terminal. This method was
                    highly successful. The extensive bulkheads in the residential Pennsgrove
                    area were cleaned by hand-wiping. Seawalls were cleaned by hand-wiping
                    and scrubbing; NOAA recommended using high pressure washing or steam
                    cleaning. Coarse grain sand beaches were manually cleaned with rakes and
                    shovels after all the oil was onshore. Low pressure flushing was ineffective at
                    Battery Park and Deemer's Beach.
                    At the height of activity, there were 442 people involved in the cleanup.
                    Cleanup equipment included 27 vacuum trucks, 6 skimmers, a barge and tug
                    to service the skimmers, 47 small boats, 32 vehicles, and 59,695 feet of
                    containment/ sorbent booms.

                    Pollution monitors observed a contractor using Aquamix, an organic based
                    mixture used to clean vessel cargo tanks, to clean the rocks at Christiana Park.


                                                              3                               Grand Eagle






                                                                                                            0


              The contractor felt that very little of the Aquamix had gotten into the water.
              However, NOAA advised that this product was unsafe for use in the marine
              environment, and its use was subsequently discontinued.                                       0
              Other Special Interest Issues:

              Approximately two hundred birds were believed affected by the spill. Ninety-
              two oiled birds were taken to the Tri-State Bird Rescue Center. AM of the
              thirty-five ducks, geese and gulls recovered. Of the fifty-seven cormorants                   0
              recovered, only three survived. There were no reports of damage to fish or
              shellfish. Samples taken from bottom sediments showed negligible impact.
              The Navy skimmers collected approximately 70 barrels of oil. The USCG
              reported that an immediate partial federal response would have made the
              skimmers accessible sooner when they would have been more effective.                          4

              The Delaware Bay and River Cooperative (DELBAY COOP) was formed by oil
              companies in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware for oil spill
              prevention and cleanup. The Grand Eagle owners were not DELBAY COOP
              members, and thus could not direct the use of COOP equipment, including                       0
              the skimmer Delbay. The OSC was allowed to direct the deployment of the
              COOP's equipment, following the activation of cleanup efforts by Sun Oil
              Company, which is a member company.

              References:

              9GOLOB, 1978-1989 U.S. Spill Report.
              *MMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database.
              *Oil Spill Intelligence Report. Oil Spills, International Summary & Review,
              1982-1985.
              *Tanker Advisory Center, Inc., 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers.
              *U.S. Coast Guard On-Scene Coordinator's Report.




















              Grand Eagle                           4








                  Name of Spill: Hackensack Estuary, Tank Farm
                  Date of Spill (mmddyy),. 05/26/76
                  Location of Spill: Hackensack, New Jersey
                  Latitude: 40 44 N
                  Longitude: 074 11 W
                  Oil Product: No. 6 Fuel Oil
                  Oil Type: Type 4
                  Barrels: 47,619
                  Source of Spill: Facility
                  Resources at Risk: Marinas, waterfowl, wading birds, shorebirds, gulls, crabs,
                  bird nesting sites.
                  Dispersants: No
                  Bioremediation: No
                  In-situ Burning: No
                  Other Special Interest: Innovative cleanup techniques, wildlife impacts,
                  habitat impact due to oil.
                  Shoreline Types Impacted: brackish marshes, tidal mudflats, vegetated
                  riverbanks.
                  Keywords: Containment boom, vacuum truck, reoiling, vegetation cutting,
                  disposal.

                  Incident Summary:

                  On the morning of May 26, 1976, 47,619 barrels of No. 6 oil spilled into the
                  Hackensack River estuary from the Wellen Oil Company tank farm in Jersey
                  City, New Jersey. The oil moved upriver on incoming tides, and oiled
                  marshes, mudflats, and the banks of the Hackensack River. Cleanup
                  operations were supervised by the United States Coast Guard and the
                  Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission.

                  Behavior of Oil:

                  No. 6 fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to 14.
                  The oil initially entered the river and its estuaries on the ebbing of the tide,
                  and moved downriver where it was contained by a boom. Late on May 26 the
                  oil slick moved upriver due to the incoming tide and winds. The riverbank
                  was oiled as far north as Snake Hill. By the morning of May 28, the riverbank
                  and the marshes as far north as Secaucus were oiled. The Sawmill Creek
                  Wildlife Management Area was heavily oiled. Reoiling occurred with each
                  tidal cycle. By May 29, -there was little oil in the water, since most of the oil
                  was deposited on the marshes, mudflats, and riverbanks.











                                                                     Hackensack Estuary, Tank Farm









              Countermeasures and Mitigation:
              On May 26, 2,000 feet of boom was deployed across the Hackensack River,                           0
              downriver from the spill source, to contain the oil. Once in place, efforts
              turned to the preventive booming of the tributaries entering the Sawmill
              Creek Wildlife Management Area which is upriver from the source of the
              spill. On May 27, river currents reached 4 knots during the flood tide. Booms
              placed across theriver and tributaries failed. Subsequently, the oil entered the                  0
              marsh and mudflat areas.

              Oil on the water was recovered by mop-cats and vacuum trucks. On June 13,
              Disch Construction Company began cutting the oiled vegetation (primarily
              Salt Marsh Cordgrass) along the banks of Hackensack River. These operations
              removed the oil-coated marsh grasses to prevent re-oiling by oil floated off                      41
              the riverbank by the tide. The grasses in the inner marshes and tidal bays
              were not cut. Responders felt that the harvesting of inner marsh areas would
              do more harm than good. It was also decided that the marshes, mudflats, and
              tidal bays received adequate tidal flushing to sufficiently clean those areas. A
              total of 7900 feet of riverbank vegetation was cut during the 17 day operation.                   0
              The harvesting of the grass was done with scythes and pitchforks. The oiled
              grass was transported by boat to a temporary storage location on the river
              bank. The storage location had neither a protective ground cover, nor a boom
              placed between it and the Hackensack River. Some oil leached out of the
              debris into the ground and river, both at the harvesting site and at the storage
              location.                                                                                         0

              Later studies of the cut areas showed that the riverbank vegetation recovered
              more quickly where grass cutting began soon after the oiling. There was 4
              high mortality rate among the Salt Marsh Cordgrass that was oiled but not
              cut.

              Other Special Interest Issues:

              Several dead, oiled birds and oiled bird nests containing eggs were found.
              Subsequent inspections of nests showed that some were abandoned.
              Waterfowl and shorebirds oiled by the spill included Mallards, Black Ducks,
              Gadwalls, Green-Winged Teals, Blue Winged-Teals, Black Crowned Night
              Herons, Least Bitterns, Snowy Egrets, Florida Gallinules, Gulls, and Yellow-
              Leg Sandpipers.
              The greatest observed impacts were to marsh and red-jointed fiddler crabs.
              The crabs displayed signs of stress and sluggishness and the males displayed
              late breeding colors. Crabs along the riverbank were more severely affected
              than those in the marsh and mudflat areas where tidal flushing was greater.
              Diamondback Terrapins were also affected, and showed difficulty in moving.
              Damage to salt marsh cordgrass was due to smothering by the oil, and not to                       C
              the chemical properties of the oil.



              Hackensack Estuary, Tank Farm           2










                   References:

                   *Dibner, P. 1978. Response of a Salt Marsh to Oil Spill and Cleanup: Biotic
                   and Erosional Effects in the Hackensack Meadowlands, New Jersey. A report
                   prepared for Industrial Environmental Research Lab. 1978.
                   *Mattson, et al. 1977. Hackensack estuary oil spill: Cutting oil-soaked marsh
                   grass as an innovative technique, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1977, pp.
                   243-245.



















































                                                         3            Hackensack Estuary, Tank Farm








                    Name of Spill: Hamilton Trader
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 04/30/69
                    Location of Spill: Liverpool Bay, England
                    Latitude: 53 30 N
                    Longitude: 003 20 W
                    Oil Product: No. 6 Fuel Oil
                    Oil Type: Type 4
                    Barrels: 4,000
                    Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                    Resources at Risk: Diving coastal birds, waterfowl, alcids, shorebirds, shrimp,
                    recreational beaches, fish, commercial fisheries, high use recreational fishing
                    areas.
                    Dispersants: Yes
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: No
                    Other Special Interest: Wildlife impacts.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches, exposed rocky shores.
                    Keywords: Corexit 7664, manual removal, International Tanker Owners
                    Pollution Federation (ITOPF), collision, detergent.

                    Incident Summary:

                    Early on the morning of April 30, 1969, the Hannes Knuppel collided with the
                    tanker Hamilton Trader in Liverpool Bay in the Irish Sea. The Hamilton
                    Trader was anchored near the Bar Light Vessel at the time of the collision. A
                    starboard tank on the Hamilton Trader was holed and approximately 4,000
                    barrels of No. 6 Fuel Oil was spilled. The spilled oil impacted approximately
                    50 miles of shoreline. Cleanup was accomplished primarily with chemical
                    dispersants on the oil slicks at sea.

                    Behavior of Oil:

                    No. 6 fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to 14.
                    At around 1500 April 30, a Lancashire and Western Sea Fisheries vessel
                    reported a three-mile long slick extending southwest of the collision site. On
                    May 1, a slick six miles long extended to the northeast. On May 2, the slick
                    was 3 miles long by 2.5 miles wide and was 9 miles north of Rhyl, Wales. The
                    slick had dispersed somewhat by this time. The oil moved west to a point 10
                    miles north of Great Orme Head, Wales and remained there for two days. By
                    May 7, the slick was 20 miles long and extended from 10 miles off Colwyn Bay
                    to Red Wharf Bay.
                    Oil was driven to the north, and came ashore on May 11. Three miles of
                    beaches near Selker Bay, England were oiled. By May 21, the oil had impacted
                    various English beaches as far north as Allonby in the Solway Firth. A total
                    of 50 miles of shoreline were affected. The worst impacts were at Gutterby, St.
                    Bees Head, Fleswick, and Selker Bay.






                                                                                     Hamilton Trader








            Pollution on the beaches took the form of large patches of liquid oil. Near St.
            Bees Head, there was a thick coating of oil at the high water mark, but the
            sand lower on the beach stayed clear.
            Black oil patches on the western shore of Walney Island were not determined
            to be of Hamilton Trader origin. Other beaches along the Lancashire coast,
            particularly near Blackpool and Fleetwood, were contan-dnated with oil
            which was not Hamilton Trader oil.

            Countermeasures and Mitigation:
            During the first two days of the response, the oil remained fairly concentrated
            in an area where no fishing occurred, but nothing was done to combat the
0           spill at this time. Cleanup operations did not begin until May 2.
            Esso Petroleum Company Ltd,., the owners of the Hamilton Trader's cargo
            arrived in Liverpool on May 1 with dispersants. On May 2, Esso personnel
            began spraying dispersant on the slick off of Wales. Corexit 7664 was applied
            by a fishing vessel, a launch and two aircraft operating out of Rhyl, Wales.
0           Dispersant operations ended on May 4, after some success in dispersing light
            sheen. The two aircraft were incapable of operating out of sight of land. They
            were also restricted by poor visibility, thus they only performed limited
            spraying operations.

            The Corexit 7664 was effective in dispersing thin oil slicks. It was applied in a
0           3 or 4 per cent solution with seawater. It was not possible to judge its
            effectiveness against thicker oil, as none was sprayed. Esso representatives
            said that it would not effectively disperse thicker oil patches, but only break
            them up. The spraying did not appear to have any adverse biological effects,
            as it was performed over deep water.
0           On Walney Island, approximately 30 gallons of detergent were reportedly
            used on the beach near Thorney Nook. Oil that impacted the west side of the
            island was removed mechanically. Oil was cleaned from the beaches on the
            Cumberland coast using mechanical equipment.

0           Other Special Interest Issues:

            An estimated 5,000 seabirds were killed by the oil. Most of the dead birds were
            auks. Terns and Black-headed. Gulls were oiled when the oil came ashore at
            Sellafield and St. Bees Head, England, on May 12.

            Several important fisheries on the North Wales coast and along the Mersey
            Estuary were threatened by the spill. Favorable winds from the east kept the
            oil from impacting these sensitive areas,. which included flatfish and shrimp
            fisheries.


            References:

            -Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.



            Hainilton Trader                      2








                   Name of Spill: Hasbah 6
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 10/02/80
                   Location of Spill: 250 krn NW of Qatar, 140 krn N of Saudi Arabia, Gulf of
                   Arabia
                   Latitude: 20 10 N
                   Longitude: 050 00 E
                   Oil Product: Crude Oil
                   Oil Type: Type 4
                   Barrels: 100,000                                                                          41
                   Source of Spill: Platform
                   Resources at Risk: Power plant water intakes, drinking water intakes, fish.
                   Dispersants: Yes
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Unusual or experimental cleanup techniques, wildlife
                   impacts.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches.
                   Keywords: Boom, manual removal, vacuum trucks, sub-surface oil, blowout,
                   skimmer.

                   Incident Summary:
                   On the morning of October 2, 1980, exploratory well No. 6, being drilled by the
                   rig Ron Tappmeyer in the Hasbah oil field, blew out. Crude oil began to
                   discharge into the Gulf of Arabia. The hazard caused by the release of
                   hydrogen sulfide gas delayed efforts to control the blowout. The well
                   discharged oil until October 10 when it was capped.

                   Behavior of Oil:

                   The Iranian crude oil had an API gravity of 19 when fresh, and an API of 10
                   when weathered. By October 25, a slick covered 3,000 square miles of the
                   Arabian Sea. The slick ranged in density and composition from light sheen to
                   thick, weathered oil. On October 29, oil impacted 50 miles of shoreline to the
                   north of Qatar. By November 9 three quarters of Qatar's coast was oiled. Oil
                   entered Bahrainian waters on October 19 when a reef 15 miles north of the
                   coast was oiled. From October 29 to November 30 oil came ashore along the
                   northern and eastern shores of Bahrain. Throughout November the slick
                   remained offshore of the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E), but only oiled a small
                   portion of the U.A.E. westernmost shoreline.

                   Countermeasures and Mitigation:

                   Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates were the four
                   countries threatened by the spill. Response was organized and carried out by
                   various oil companies under the direction of their respective governments.

                   In Saudi Arabia, the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), for which
                   the Hasbah 6 was drilled, began conducting overflights on the afternoon of
                   October 2. Overflights continued until the oil moved into Iranian waters



                                                           1                              Hasbah 6








            where the Iran-Iraq war precluded any tracking of the oil. This limitation
            hindered Saudi Arabia's efforts to ascertain the magnitude of the spill.
0           From October 7 until October 28, dispersant was applied to the slick by surface
            vessels and by helicopter. Smit-Tak was contracted by ARAMCO and arrived
            on scene October 16 to begin recovery operations. Due to the lack of
            information about the slick's movement, early dispersant applications were
            random. As it became evident that the -oil would likely impact Qatar and
0           Bahrain, dispersant application was concentrated on the southwest edge of
            the slick. It is believed that these efforts greatly reduced the severity of the
            impacts to Qatar and Bahrain.

            Bahrainian cleanup operations of a previous spill were concluding when the
0           government was notified of the Hasbah 6 blowout. Spill response in Bahrain
            was directed by Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) under orders from the
            Bahrain government. BAPCO immediately bought additional response
            equipment. Helicopter overflights by the Bahrain Defense Force and the
            Bahrain State Police provided accurate information as to the location of the
            slick. This information allowed for efficient placement of response
0           equipment.

            The Bahrain shoreline was affected on October 19 when a reef 15 miles north
            of the coast was oiled. Dispersant application and recovery operations began
            in that area the next day. Precautionary booms were deployed at recreational
            areas and other facilities. Tarballs and tarmats that came ashore on October 29
ML
            were removed manually. Vacuum trucks were used to collect oil that
            collected along the edges of breakwaters and jetties.

            In Qatar, the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation (QCPC) hired
            environmental specialists to provide scientific assistance concerning the
            response operations. Overflights began on October 19. By this time the oil
            had weathered and was unaffected by dispersants. Booming of desalinization
            plant water intakes and power plant water intakes began with booms obtained
            from Gulf Area Oil Companies Mutual Aid Organization (GAOCMAO).
            Mere supplies of boom were short, discarded floating hoses from oil loading
            systems were used for precautionary booming of intake areas. It was reported
4W          that the hoses worked very well in this capacity.

            Approximately 15,000 barrels of oil and water emulsion were recovered by
            skimming operations. Cleanup of beaches began on October 30, 1980, and
            continued until March 1981. Vehicles with rubber tires lost traction while
            trying to remove the oil from water. Tracked bulldozers had to be used to
            push the oil out of the water and onto the beach where rubber tired vehicles
            loaded and removed the oil.

            The United Arab Emirates initiated surveys on October 7 to establish
            priorities for protection and Cleanup. Overflights were conducted to track the
            slick. Response equipment was placed at strategic locations, and
            precautionary booming was done at important water intakes. The response
            ended on November 29 with no severe impacts to the U.A.E. coast.



            Hasbah 6                               2









                   Other Special Interest Issues:
                   Because of the extreme density and viscosity of the oil, dispersants, would            40
                   often not penetrate the thicker portions of the slick, and were therefore
                   ineffective. Helicopter crews began to apply undiluted dispersant to the
                   thicker areas. This method achieved some success where diluted dispersant
                   application did not. Dead fish were observed in areas off Qatar where
                   dispersants, had been applied.
                   Attempts were made to sink some of the heavier patches of oil with sand, but
                   these failed. The oil was observed to be neutrally buoyant, and divers
                   reported that the oil was suspended several yards below the water surface.

                   Ref erences:

                   *Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
                   1987.
                   *IFP. PLATFORM DATABANK On Accidents to Drilling Vessels or Offshore
                   Platforms (1955-1989).
                   o Lehr, W.J. and Belen, M.S. 1983. The Fate of Two Large Oil Spills in the
                   Arabian Gulf. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1983, pp. 377-380
                   oNational Research Council. 1989. Using Oil Spill Dispersants on the Sea.
                   National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. p.320.
                   *Ryan, P.B. 1983. Hasbah 6: Oil Companies Response to Oil Pollution in the
                   Arabian Gulf. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1983, pp. 371-375.
                   *van Oudenhoven, J.A.C.M. 1983. The Hasbah 6 (Saudi Arabia) Blowout:                  z
                   The Effects of an International Oil Spill as Experienced in Qatar. Oil Spill
                   Conference Proceedings, 1983, pp. 381-388.




















                                                         3                              Hasbah 6         0








                   Name of Spill: Haven
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy)-@ 4/11/91
                   Location of Spill: Genoa, Italy
                   Latitude: 44 20 N
                   Longitude: 009 00 E
                   Oil Product: Iranian heavy crude
                   Oil Type: Type 3
                   Barrels: 142,857
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Recreational beaches, fish hatcheries, marinas.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Unusual or experimental cleanup techniques.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Fine sand beaches, coarse sand beaches.
                   Keywords: International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF),
                   volunteers, remotely operated vel-dcle (ROV), sub-surface oil, boom,
                   containment boom, skimmers, suction operations, vacuum trucks, manual
                   removal, preventative booming, fire, explosion, sinking.

                   Incident Summary:

                   On April 11, 1991, the tanker Haven caught fire while anchored 7 miles off of
                   Genoa, Italy. The Haven suffered a series of explosions and broke into three
                   parts. A portion of the deck sank, and the rest of the vessel began to drift to
                   the southwest. The bow section sank in water 7 miles off Arenzano. The rest
                   of the vessel was towed to shallower waters 1.5 miles off Arenzano where it
                   sank on April 14.

                   Behavior of Oil:

                   Iranian Heavy crude oil has an API gravity of 31, and a pour point of -5
                   degrees F. Of the 1,000,000 barrels onboard the Haven when it caught fire,
                   approximately 450,000 barrels burned. It was estimated that 142,857 barrels
                   spilled into the sea before the Haven sank, and small quantities of oil
                   continued to leak from the wreck afterwards. On April 17, oil impacted the
41                 beaches at Arenzano, Cogoleto, and Varazze. About 300 barrels of oil entered
                   the marina at Arenzano. Fishing boats, yachts, moorings, and the harbor
                   walls were heavily oiled. The marina at Varazze was also oiled to a lesser
                   degree. Twenty-five miles of Italian coastline were impacted by 1,400 barrels
                   of oil.















                                                                                           Haven









             By April 24, there was a 154 square mile slick off the coast of France. Mousse
             and sheen impacted the French shoreline near Nice on April 24. Impacts of
             oil on the shorelines of France and Monaco were light. St. Tropez suffered
             the worst damage in France, with about 700 barrels in the form of mousse
             impacting 3 miles of shoreline.
             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             The Harbor Master in Genoa was responsible for the cleanup and recovery of
             the oil. International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation, Ltd. (ITOPF)
             personnel arrived on scene the day of the spill to advise the Harbor Master,
             and to monitor the operations.

             The Italian Coast Guard maintained booms in the vicinity of the wreck, and
             attempted recovery of the oil with skimmers. Ecolmare was contracted for
             containment and recovery operations. Approximately 35,700 barrels of oil
             were recovered by April 16.
             Booms were deployed as a precautionary measure at recreational beaches.
             The booms held some slicks offshore, but storms eventually blew the booms
             and the oil onto the beaches. At Arenzano, Cogoleto, and Varazze, the oil
             settled 1-2 inches into the fine sand beaches, and up to 1 foot into the coarse
             grained beaches. Shoreline cleanup was conducted by authorities local to the
             oiled areas. Cleanup was done by volunteers and the army, and consisted
             mostly of manual removal of oil and oiled debris. Vacuum trucks were used
             to pick up the larger pools of oil. Approximately 26,140 cubic yards of oiled
             debris were collected.

             The French Navy attempted to prevent shoreline impacts with booms and
             skimmers. Shoreline cleanup operations in France and Monaco consisted
             mostly of manual removal of oil and oiled debris from' the beaches.

             Other Special Interest Issues:

             Surveys using side-scanning sonar, subbottom profiling, and remotely
             operated vehicles located areas under the track of the vessel where oil had
             sunk. Diving operations were attempted to recover some of the sunken oil.

             Suction operations cleaned burned oil residue from the main wreck, and
             divers managed to control some of the underwater leaks.














             Haven










                   References:

                   *Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
                   *International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund Annual Report 1991. pp.58-
                   70.
                   *Italian Spill Hits French Riviera, Oil Continues to Leak from Tanker. Oil
                   Spill Intelligence Report. Vol. XIV, No. 15. April 25, 1991. p.2.
                   *Officials Fear Italian Spill May Impact French Riviera. Oil Spill Intelligence
                   Report. Vol. )(IV, No. 14. April 18,1991. pp.1-2.
                   *Winds Prevent Further Damage to French Riviera. Oil Spill Intelligence
                   Report. Vol. XIV, No. 16. May 2,1991. pp.3-4.













































                                                         3                                Haven








                   Name of Spill: Howard Star
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 10/5/78
                   Location of Spill: Tampa Bay, Florida
                   Latitude: 27 51 N
                   Longitude: 082 25 W
                   Oil Product: Bunker C, Light diesel
                   Oil Type: Type 4, Type 2
                   Barrels: 952
                   Source of Spill: Non-Tank Vessel                                                     a
                   Resources at Risk: Diving coastal birds, power plant water intakes, crabs,
                   mangroves.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Closure of shipping lanes or vehicle traffic routes,
                   wildlife impacts, habitat impact due to oil, research conducted, effects to
                   recreational areas.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Mangroves, exposed rocky shores, riprap,
                   sand/gravel beaches, vegetated low banks, tidal mudflat.
                   Keywords: Boom, vacuum truck, manual removal, sorbents, skimmer, low-
                   pressure washing, disposal, fingerprinting, Gulf Strike Team (GST), Regional
                   Response Team.

                   Incident Summary:

                   Sometime between October 4 and 5, 1978, the dry bulk carrier Howard Star
                   discharged approximately 952 barrels of bunker C and light diesel into the Port
                   Sutton Channel. The incident most likely occurred while the vessel was
                   deballasting at the International Mineral and Chemical Corporation (IMC)
                   Phosphate Terminal in Tampa, Florida. The oil spread to East Bay, Tampa
                   Bay and Hillsborough Bay and impacted 15 widely separated shorelines over a
                   distance of approximately 20 miles.

                   Personnel aboard the Howard Star failed to notify authorities of the discharge.
                   The Coast Guard Marine Safety Office (MSO) Tampa was first notified by IMC
                   on October 4 at 2025 that approximately 15 gallons of oil was in the water at
                   the IMC terminal. The Coast Guard discovered large quantities of floating oil
                   streaming into Hillsborough Bay from the Port Sutton canal. The
                   Environmental Coastal Pollution Cleanup Service (ECPCS) was notified of
                   the spill and began mobilizing all available boom and cleanup equipment on
                   October 5. An additional cleanup contractor, Need-A-Diver, was contracted by
                   the Coast Guard. The Regional Response Team (RRT) was activated at 1115             Am
                   on October 5, and the USCG Gulf Strike Team was requested.                          mr



                                                                                                       40



                                                                                   Howard Star         0









            Because the entire transit system was affected, the port was dosed to help
            contain the oil. The MSO and cleanup contractors deployed four sections of
            boom to prevent the oil from spreading further into the surrounding bays.
            By October 9, approximately 643 barrels of oil had been recovered by the
            contractors and the Coast Guard. Since the populations of migratory
            waterfowl are low in October, there were only 14 known bird fatalities.
            Several dead crabs were found along Whiskey Key and E.G. Simmons Park,
            but the population appeared to recover within 60 days of the incident.
            Several mangrove trees died as a result of the oiling.

            Behavior of Oil:

            Bunker C fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to
            14. Light diesel is a refined, light weight material with an API gravity of about
            40. The oil was first spotted while it was streaming out of the Port Sutton
            canal into Hillsborough Bay. By October 5, the oil extended southwesterly
            from Port Sutton to within 0.5 miles of MacDi11 Air Force 'Base (AFB) on the
            Interbay Peninsula. On October 6, Coast Guard personnel discovered
            approximately 119 barrels of oil on the MacDill AFB shoreline. A large pocket
            of oil was also observed at the crash boat pier. Observations during an
            overflight revealed two heavy slicks off the eastern coast of MacDill AFB-

            On October 7, personnel at the Tampa Electric Company (TECO) at Big Bend
            reported approximately 36 barrels of oil trapped at their thermal dilution
            pump intakes. Oil came ashore at the E.G. Simmons Park swimming,
            camping, and picnicking area on the eastern side of Hillsborough Bay. Oil
            covering a 2 to 6 foot wide area from 1 to 4 inches thick was trapped along the
            beaches on the south side of the peninsula across from the Big Bend Terminal
            to Whiskey Key. Approximately 24 barrels of oil were trapped in a cove
            located across from Whiskey Key.
            On October 9, oil extended into the Gulf of Mexico from the Mullet Key
            Channel. An October 10 Coast Guard overflight identified large quantities of
            oil in a large drainage ditch and swamp north of the drive gate at MacDill
            AFB- On October 17, approximately 1,000 gallons of oil were discovered
            covering the northern shoreline of Paradise Island. Following the removal of
            80% of the oil, strong northeasterly winds drove most of the remaining oil
            into a small cove on the northern shore and saturated the sand to a depth of
            almost 6 inches.
















            Howard Star






                                                                                                                 0



                     Countermeasures and Mitigation:
                     On October 5, twenty-four hundred feet of containment boom were deployed                    0
                     from Pendola Point into Hillsborough Bay to contain the oil on the south
                     shore of Port Sutton. Oil trapped at the Seaboard Coast Line Rockport
                     Terminal in East Bay was contained by 2,000 feet of boom placed along the
                     north shore of Port Sutton. An additional 2,000 feet of boom deployed across
                     the 22nd Street Causeway protected the McKay Bay entrance. Four thousand                    4
                     feet of boom were placed at the Eastern Associated Terminal to trap oil on the
                     west shore. Oil Mop Inc. (OMI) personnel boomed off the intake valves at the
                     TECO plant. Two Coast Guard personnel placed boom at E.G. Simmons Park
                     by swimming across the mangrove-lined canals.
                     Vacuum trucks and barges, assisted the cleanup of trapped oil between the
                     Seaboard Coast Line Rockport Terminal and the Eastern Associated Terminal.
                     The south shores of Port Sutton and Pendola Point were cleaned manually by
                     workers using rakes, shovels, and sorbents. Sorbents materials were also used
                     to cleanup oil that entered the Ballast Point yacht basin. Vacuum trucks were
                     used to remove the oil trapped at the MacDill AFB drainage ditch. Further
                     cleanup in this area was limited due to soft mud banks and bottom that
                     prohibited the movement and use of heavy equipment.

                     A U.S. Navy skimmer collected oil that was not contained by boom in an
                     effort to reopen the port to vessel traffic. The two oil slicks along the eastern
                     shore of MacDill AFB were skimmed as well. The CG-32303 waterside
                     pollution patrol boat proved invaluable in assisting the skimmers. The fire
                     monitor aboard the boat was used to direct oil towards the skimmers and
                     flush trapped oil from under the crash boat pier.
                     Front-end loaders provided by the State of Florida were used to remove the
                     narrow strips of oil soaked sand at Whiskey Key and Apollo Beach. Raking
                     was effective in collecting oil-soaked shells, seaweed, dry leaves, and sand for
                     removal by front-end loaders and dump trucks. Low-pressure washing with
                     Air Force fire station water pumps cleaned shores near the MacDill AFB crash
                     boat dock. Boom was placed across the mouth of a nearby ditch to catch
                     residual oil as tidal movements flushed the oil from among the mangrove
                     roots.

                     Polyurethane sheeting was used to cover picnic tables, shoreline, and grass
                     during cleanup at E.G. Simmons Park. The oil-covered grassy banks and
                     mangrove roots were washed using low-pressure pumps on the
                     recommentation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The oil
                     streaming out with the wash water was trapped by booms and recovered
                     using sorbents.








                                                              3                            Howard Star









            Solid waste was removed to Taylor Road, Hillsborough County, Solid Waste
            Control Utilities Operations Department in Tampa, Florida for disposal.
            Recovered liquid oil went to International Petroleum Corporation and
            National Oil Service for disposal.

            Other Special Interest Issues:

0           The Coast Guard collected oil samples from several vessels and terminals in
            the area in the effort to identify the source of the spill. Nineteen samples
            were taken at each cleanup site for comparative analysis. Using two
            chromatography techniques and two types of spectroscopy, the Coast Guard
            Central Oil Identification Laboratory in Groton, Connecticut, determined the
            oil from the settling tanks of the Howard Star to be the same oil that was
0           collected at the cleanup sites. Analysis of weather, current patterns, and
            photographs of the vessel moored at the IMC Terminal confirmed that the
            Howard Star was the source of the spill. Had the responsible party notified
            the Coast Guard at the time of the incident, containment of the oil within
            Port Sutton channel would have been relatively simple, and would have
0           resulted in far less expense and environmental impact.
            Mangrove Systems, Inc. (MSI), conducted a study to assess the extent of
            ecological damage caused by the incident. MSI studied 25 oiled mangrove
            trees from three separate species, including Avicennia germinans,
            Laguncularia racemosa, and Rhizophora mangle, as well as 25 control
            mangrove trees at eight sampling stations. The stations were visited monthly
            between October 1978 and August 1980. During this time, only one oiled
            mangrove tree died and two showed signs of stress (root death, partial
            defoliation, yellow leaves, etc.). From this study, Mangrove Systems, Inc.,
            concluded that approximately 1.2 acres of mangrove trees died as a result of
            the oiling. Younger mangrove trees, less than 3 feet tall and between 1-3
            months old, died first while the older trees took up to a year to show signs of
            stress and/or death.

            References:

            *Lewis, R.R. 1980. The Impact of the Howard Star Oil Spill on Marine
            Communities in Tampa Bay, Florida. Mangrove Systems, Inc., Tampa,
            Florida. pp. 40.
            *U.S. Coast Guard On-Scene Coordinator's Report














            Howard Star                           4








                    Name of Spill: Independenta
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 11/15/79
                    Location of Spill: Istanbul, Turkey
                    Latitude: 4102 N
                    Longitude: 028 57 E
                    Oil Product. Es Sider Crude Oil
                    Oil Type: Type 2
                    Barrels: 687,785
                    Source of Spill: Tank Vessel                                                                41
                    Resources at Risk: Recreational beaches, intertidal and subtidal mining leases,
                    commercial fisheries.
                    Dispersants: No
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: No
                    Other Special Interest: Adverse weather conditions, closure of shipping lanes
                    or vehicle traffic routes.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Exposed seawalls, piers.
                    Keywords: Booms, International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation
                    (ITOPF), collision, explosion, fire.

                    Incident Summary:

                    On the morning of November 15, 1979, the Independenta and the Evrialy
                    collided at the southern entrance of the Bosphorus. The Independenta
                    exploded and both vessels began to burn. The Independenta grounded a half
                    of a mile from the port of Hydarpasa. The tanker burned until December 14.
                    The Independenta was carrying 714,760 barrels of Es Sider crude oil.

                    Behavior of Oil:

                    Es Sider crude oil has an API gravity of 36.7, and a pour point of 30 degrees F.
                    Little oil was found on the water, and it was surmised that the majority of the
                    oil had burned on the tanker. Any slicks of oil probably drifted into the Sea of
                    Marmara and dissipated. From November 17 to November 27, there was
                    slight leakage from the vessel. The vessel suffered another major explosion
                    on December 6, resulting in more oil spilled. The slick from the vessel drifted
                    towards the port of Hydarpasa, and despite booms across its entrance,
                    approximately 380 barrels of oil entered the harbor.

                    Countermeasures and Mitigation:

                    The Turkish Navy attempted to extinguish the fire early in the incident, but
                    the intensity of the fire caused these efforts to be abandoned. The Director of
                    the Marmara Sea District took over the spill on November 19, and the Navy
                    withdrew.

                    International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Ltd. (ITOPF) personnel
                    came on scene on November 17. The Turkish government refused
                    permission for overflights, and all pollution surveys were conducted by boat.
                    Little pollution was found and the ITOPF personnel left on November 27.


                                                       1                                  Independenta








             Explosions onboard the vessel on the night of December 6, prompted the
             return of ITOPF personnel on December 10. Surveys after the fire had
             extinguished itself revealed that there was no further leakage from the vessel.
             Approximately 15,240 barrels of oil were left on the vessel. It was surmised
             that the majority of the oil on the tanker had burned.

             The owner of the tanker arranged for boom and skimmers to be flown in
             from the United Kingdom. After the explosion on December 6, a slick was
             observed drifting towards the port of Hydarpasa, and boom was deployed
             across its entrance. The rest of the equipment, including five skimmers, was
             never used.

             Surveys showed that little of the spilled oil impacted the shoreline. The
             southeast shore of the Bosphorus was the most heavily oiled area. There was
             no reported cleanup of oiled shorelines.

             Other Special Interest Issues:
             Strong prevailing winds during the leakage of oil from the December 6
             explosion prevented the boom across the port of Hydarpasa from being more
             effective.

             The sides of the Bosphorus are heavily built up. There are many recreational
             beaches at the southern entrance to the Bosphorus, and in the Sea of
             Marmara. The largest concern was for the shorelines of Kalolimno and
             Marmara Islands. They are the source of important beach sand (used for
             construction) and marble industries.

             There were no reports of adverse effects to the local fishing industry, as
             neither a major fish migration nor the fishing season were in progress at the
Ilk          time.
W























             hidependenta                          2










                    References:

                    *8/9/91 & 8/28/91 Letters from Daniel Owen at ITOPF.
                    *Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF re:presentatives.
                    *Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
                    1987.
                    *MMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database.
                    *Oil Spill-Intelligence Report. 2/21/91.
                    *Oil Spill Intelligence Report. Oil Spills, International Summary & Review,
                    1978-1981.
                    *Tanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers. T.A.C.
                    Inc. 1991.

















































                                                   3                                Independenta








                   Name of Spill: Irene's Challenge
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 01/17/77
                   Location of Spill: Pacific Ocean, 50 miles north of the Hawaiian Islands
                   Latitude: 26 53 N
                   Longitude: 173 52 W
                   Oil Product: Light crude Oil
                   Oil Type: Type 2
                   Barrels: 237,600
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Wildlife preserves, seals, petrels, gulls, terns.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Logistical or operational problems.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted:None
                   Keywords: Sub-surface oil, sinking, Regional Response Team.
                   Incident Summary: On January 17, 1977, the 640-foot tank vessel Irene's
                   Challenge broke into two pieces approximately 200 miles south of Nfidway
                   Island and 50 miles north of Lisianski Island, Hawaii. The deck plates of the
                   vessel failed due to the stress incurred by several days of rough seas. Twenty-
                   eight of the thirty-one crewmen were picked up by the Pacific Arrow. The
                   three remaining crew members were not found.

                   The Regional Response Team (RRT) and Science Advisory Group (SAG)
                   agreed that the best option in dealing with the damaged vessel was to attempt
                   to tow the two sections away from the Hawaiian islands, and sink them. The
                   U.S. Coast Guard cutters Mallow and Jarvis were diverted to the scene for
                   towing operations. The sections were approximately 70 miles apart when the
                   two cutters arrived at the stern section. Since crew members were unable to
                   board or tow the stern section due to rough seas, the Mallow continued on
                   toward the bow section. The stern section of the tanker presumably sank at
                   approximately 26 55 N and 172 30 W. By January 21, the bow section had only
                   25 feet of freeboard. Visual observations estimated the sinking bow section
                   was settling at a rate of 20 inches per hour. The bow section sank of its own
                   accord. The two cutters, remained on-scene until January 22 to observe oil
                   conditions.


















                                                                                    Irene's Challenge











             Behavior of Oil:

             Personnel on an early morr-dng overflight on January 18 reported the slick to
             be 2 n-dles long. Participants on a later C-130 overflight reported the slick to be
             4-5 miles in length and drifting to the west. On January 19, leaking oil had
             created a slick 15 by 17 nautical miles which was drifting to the east, away
             from the Hawaiian Islands. Oil storage tanks in the bow section appeared to
             be intact until the bow sank. Oil released from the stern section on January 20
             was not as heavy as observed earlier, and was dissipating rapidly.
             Although the spill area was surrounded by three ecologically important
             wildlife refuges, favorable southwest winds prevented any shoreline oiling.
             On January 21 a 20 mile by 5 mile slick was observed near the position of the
             sunken stern. North of the main slick, a lighter, triangular shaped slick
             extended to the west. Seabirds were spotted between, but not within the two
             oil slicks.

             No residual oil was observed surfacing after January 22. The slick was
             dissipating rapidly from wind and wave action. The vessel sank in 2700
             fathoms of water. At this depth, the oil was presumed to have congealed due
             to the low temperature (1-2'C). Any oil released from the sunken sections
             was expected to disperse before reaching the surface. By January 27, the oil
             slick consisted of light streaks covering a 4 mile by 1/2 mile area.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             Since the two sections sank quickly, a towing operation was not attempted.
             Questions were raised concerning the feasibility of towing the partially
             submerged sections of the vessel. The resulting slick and surfacing oil was
             observed and tracked by the Coast Guard for ten days. Dispersant use was
             recommended in the event of any oil impacting the shoreline. The natural
             dispersion of the oil by wave action negated dispersant use.

             High Seas Oil Containment Barrier was transported from San Francisco to
             Honolulu for possible deployment on USCG Cutter Buttonwood, but was not
             used.                                                                                            0

             Other Special Interest Issues:

             The incident occurred 57 miles from U.S. coastline, which is outside the area
             of U.S. jurisdiction for action and reimbursement. Due to the location of the
             incident, the Intervention on the High Seas Act (33 USC 1471 et seq) was
             required. Section 1472 of this act allows the use of action when interests of
             the U.S. are threatened by pollution. Funding of the response was available
             through Section 1486 of the same act.







             Irene's Challenge                      2












                  References:


                  *8/9/91 & 8/28/91 Letters from Daniel Owen at ITOPF
                  -*Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
                  1987.
                  eMMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
                  *Tanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991. -Guide for the Selection of Tankers.
                  T.A.C. Inc. 1991.
                  *USCG Federal On-Scene Coordinator's Report













A.
-W









M,
1W






















                                                                                Irene's Challenge









                   Name of Spill: D(TOC I
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 06/03/79 to 03/23/80
                   Location of Spill: Bahia de Campeche, Mexico                                            40
                   Latitude: 19 24.5 N
                   Longitude: 092 19.5 W
                   Oil Product: IXTOC I crude oil
                   Oil Type: Type 3
                   Barrels: 3,522,400
                   Source of Spill: Platform                                                               0
                   Resources at Risk: Shrimp, shorebirds, wading birds, beaches, marinas.
                   Dispersants: Yes
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: Yes
                   Other Special Interest: Research conducted, habitat impact due to oil, wildlife
                   impacts, interaction with foreign or Native authorities, effects to tourism.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Marshes, mangroves, exposed fine sand beaches'
                   sheltered fine-grained sand beaches, eroding bluffs, mixed sand and shell
                   beaches, exposed tidal flats (low biomass), exposed tidal flats, sheltered tidal
                   flats.
                   Keywords: Boom, Corexit 9527, skimmer, manual removal, volunteers,
                   blowout, fire, evaporation, blowout preventer, relief well, submersible.
                   Incident Summary:
                   On June 3, 1979, the 2 mile deep exploratory well, LXTOC I, blew out in the
                   Bahia de Campeche, 600 miles south of Texas in the Gulf of Mexico. The
                   IXTOC I was being drilled by the SEDCO 135, a sen-d-submersible platform on
                   lease to Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX). A loss of drilling mud circulation
                   caused the blowout to occur. The oil and gas blowing out of the well ignited,
                   causing the platform to catch fire. The burning platform collapsed into the
                   wellhead area hindering any immediate attempts to control the blowout.
                   PEMEX hired blowout control experts and other spill control experts
                   including Red Adair, Martech International of Houston, and the Mexican
                   diving company, Daivaz. The Martech response included 50 personnel on
                   site, the remotely operated vehicle TREC, and the submersible Pioneer I. The
                   TREC attempted to find a safe approach to the Blowout Preventer (BOP). The              C
                   approach was complicated by poor visibility and debris on the seafloor
                   including derrick wreckage and 3000 meters of drilling pipe. Divers were
                   eventually able to reach and activate the BOP, but the pressure of the oil and
                   gas caused the valves to begin rupturing. The BOP was reopened to prevent
                   destroying it. Two relief wells were drilled to relieve pressure from the well
                   to allow response personnel to cap it. Norwegian experts were contracted to
                   bring in skimming equipment and containment booms, and to begin cleanup
                   of the spilled oil. The IXTOC I well continued to spill oil at a rate of 10,000 -
                   30,000 barrels per day until it was finally capped on March 23, 1980.







                                                                                          IXTOC I











             Behavior of Oil:

             Prevailing northerly currents in the western Gulf of Mexico carried spilled oil
             toward the U.S. A 60-mile by 70-mile patch of sheen containing a 300 foot by
             500 foot patch of heavy crude moved toward the Texas coast. On August 6,
             1979, tarballs from the spill impacted a 17 mile stretch of Texas beach. Mousse
             patches impacted the shoreline north of Port Mansfield Channel on August
             15 and again on August 18. On August 24, mousse impacted shoreline south
             of Aransas Pass. By August 26, most of North Padre Island was covered with
             moderate amounts of oil.

             As of September 1, all of the south Texas coast had been impacted by oil. A
A.           storm lasting from September 13-15 removed the majority of the oil. For the
1W           remainder of the response and subsequent study period (through August
             1980) only tarmats were observed on the beaches. Some oil escaped around
             boom barriers protecting the three major inlets. During the September storm,
             there was washing of oil over the Barrier Islands. Impacts to the estuaries
             were minor.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             In the initial stages of the spill., an estimated 30,000 barrels of oil per day were
             flowing from the well. In July 1979 the pumping of mud into the well
             reduced the flow to 20,000 barrels per day, and early in August the pumping of
             nearly 100,000 steel, iron, and lead balls into the well reduced the flow to
             10,000 barrels per day. Mexican authorities also drilled two relief wells into
             the main well to lower the pressure of the blowout. PEMEX claimed that half
             of the released oil burned when it reached the surface, a third of it evaporated,
             and the rest was contained or dispersed.

             PEMEX contracted Conair Aviation to spray the chemical dispersant Corexit
             9527 on the oil. A total of 493 aerial missions were flown, treating 1,100
             square miles of oil slick. Dispersants were not used in the U.S. area of the
             spill because of the dispersant's inability to treat weathered oil. Eventually
             the OSC requested that Mexico stop using dispersants; north of 25'N.
             In Texas, an emphasis was placed on coastal countermeasures protecting the
             bays and lagoons formed by the Barrier Islands. Impacts of oil to the Barrier
             Island beaches were ranked as second in importance to protecting inlets to the
             bays and lagoons. This was done with the placement of skimmers and
             booms. Efforts were concentrated on the Brazos-Santiago Pass, Port Mansfield
             Channel, Aransas Pass, and Cedar Bayou (which during the course of the spill
             was sealed with sand). Economically and environmentally sensitive barrier
             island beaches were cleaned daily. Laborers used rakes and shovels to clean
             beaches rather than heavier equipment which removed too much sand.
             Ultimately, 71,500 barrels of oil impacted 162 miles of U.S. beaches, and over
             10,000 cubic yards of oiled material were removed.





             IXTOC 1                                 2








                    On August 8, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) began
                    training volunteers for the handling of oiled birds and implemented beach
                    patrols on South Padre Island. Bird cleaning stations were set up by the FWS
                    on Mustang and South Padre Islands. An overall decrease in bird population
                    densities due to movement from their regular habitats along the oiled
                    shoreline may account for the fact that only a few dead, oiled birds were ever
                    found. After the beaches were cleaned, population densities increased, but
                    not to expected -levels. Contamination of food supplies caused many birds to
                    leave their habitats for the duration of the spill. One thousand four hundred
                    twenty one birds were recovered with oiled feathers or feet. The species
                    suffering the most incidents of oiling were the Royal Terns, Blue-faced
                    Boobies, Sanderlings, Willets, Piping Plovers, Black-bellied Plovers, and
                    Snowy Plovers suffered oiling to their feathers while Great Blue Herons,
                    Black-Crowned Night Herons, Noddy Terns, Cattle Egrets and Snowy Egrets
                    had tarred feet.

                    Other Special Interest Issues:
                    The U.S. government had two months to prepare for the expected impact of
                    the IXTOC I oil on the Texas shoreline. During this time the government
                    realized the importance of coastline mapping in regards to oil sensitivity.
                    This led to a mapping project which resulted in the first Environmental
                    Sensitivity Index (ESI) prepared by Research Planning, Inc. (RPI) under
                    contract to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
                    Placement of containment boom and other response equipment was done
                    after study of the environmental sensitivity as reported in the ESI.

                    The IXTOC I well blowout was an unusual situation with regard to
                    responsibility for, coordination of, and control and cleanup of the spilled oil.
                    The U.S. government publicly requested compensation from Mexico for
                    damages associated with the spill without first entering into negotiations
                    with the Mexican Government. Mexico denied being financially responsible
                    for damages incurred, and refused to help pay cleanup expenses to the U.S.

                    Officials reported that tourism along the Texas beaches dropped by 60%
                    during the course of the spill.



















                                                           3                                IXTOC I











            References:

            -Chapman, B. 1981. Effects of the IXTOC I Oil Spill on Texas Shorebird
            Population., Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1981, pp. 461-465.
            *Emery, B., Lara, M., and Lindblom, G. 1981. Aerial Application of
            Dispersants, at the IXTOC I Spill., Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1981,
            pp-259-262
            *Gundlach, E., Finkelstein, K., and Sadd, J. 1981. Impact and Persistence of
            IXTOC I Oil on the South Texas Coast, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1981,
            pp. 477-485.
            eMexico Refuses to Pay Damages in Oil Spill. The Seattle Times. August 24,
            1979.
            *NOAA Special Report
            -Pemex Claims 1 IXTOC oil flow cut to 10,000 barrels per day. Oil & Gas
            Journal. August 20, 1979. p. 62.
            *Pemex Says IXTOC Wells Set Drilling Speed Record. Oil & Gas journal.
            September 17,1979. p. 49.
            *Research Ships to Aid Oil Slick Fight off Texas. Oil & Gas journal. August
            27,1979. p. 41.
            *Texas Oil Cleanup Aimed at Labor Day. The Seattle Times. August 26,1979.
            *U.S. Seeks 'amicable' Cleanup Settlement. The Seattle Times. August 25,
            1979. p.A5.
            *Uncontrolled Mexican Blowout Will Require Relief Well. Sea Technology.
            August 1979.
            9USCG Federal On-Scene Coordinator Interim Activities Report
            *USCG On-Scene Coordinator's Final Report





























            IXTOC 1








                   Name of Spill: Jupiter
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 09/16/90
                   Location of Spill: Saginaw River, Bay City, Michigan
                   Latitude: 43 30 N
                   Longitude: 084 00 W
                   Oil Product: Unleaded gasoline
                   Oil Type: Type 1
                   Barrels: 20,000
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Fish, raptors, rookeries, migration stopover area,
                   waterfowl, drinking water intakes.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Closure of shipping lanes or vehicle traffic routes.
                   complex salvage operations.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: None
                   Keywords: Boom, vacuum truck, fire, manual removal, explosion,
                   lightering, disposal.

                   Incident Summary:

                   At 0845 on September 16, 1990, the tank vessel Jupiter caught fire and
                   exploded during offloading operations at the Total Oil Company refinery on
                   the Saginaw river near Bay City, Michigan. A wake from a passing bulk
                   carrier apparently caused the parting of the Jupiter's transfer hose, grounding
                   cable, and all but one of its mooring lines. Residual gasoline in the broken
                   transfer hose was believed to have been ignited by a spark on the dock. The
                   Jupiter's stern swung around into the Saginaw River and grounded
                   perpendicular to the direction of the river flow. The grounding resulted in a
                   crack in the vessel's hull from the manifold on the starboard side to 75 feet aft
                   of the manifold on the port side.

                   Area marinas were evacuated and vessel traffic was halted. Bangor County
                   Fire Department and USCG personnel arrived on-scene within 30 minutes of
                   the incident. The pier fire was extinguished in an attempt to save the last
                   mooring line while the fire onboard the vessel remained out of control.
                   Williams Boots & Coots Company (WB&C) from Houston, Texas, was
                   contracted to fight the fire due to the lack of locally available trained
                   personnel and equipment. At 1315 on September 17, WB&C personnel
                   extinguished the blaze by applying foam. Carbon black accumulations falling
                   from the overhead re-ignited the fire at 2300. This second blaze was cooled
                   with water and extinguished with foam on September 18. WB&C personnel
                   also applied foam inside the vessel's cargo tanks to prevent re-ignition of the
                   vessel.

                   River flow data were obtained from the Army Corps of Engineers to predict
                   the oil movement. Shock waves from the explosion may have contributed to
                   the deaths of several fish that were recovered from around the vessel.




                                                         1                               Jupiter









            Neither pollution nor shoreline contamination was observed during the
            final survey of the area on October 22.

            Behavior of Oil:

            Automotive gasoline is a very light weight, refined product with an API
            gravity of 60 to 63. No spill of product into the Saginaw River was reported
            until first light on September 17 when fuel up to three inches thick was
            observed in the water immediately surrounding the vessel. Some of the
            spilled product was held against the hull of the vessel by the wind until the
            starboard side submerged, releasing an additional 100 barrels of the fuel.
            Since the gasoline was not released rapidly, little environmental damage
            resulted from the incident.

91k
            Countermeasures and Mitigation:

            On September 16, containment boom was deployed around the vessel as a
            precaution against further spillage. The boom remained in place until the
            vessel was re-floated on October 16 and moved to the north side of the river.
            No product was observed leaking from the vessel as it was relocated.

            Vacuum trucks were used to recover the gasoline and water mixture.
            Approximately 262 barrels were recovered by September 28. Small amounts
            of carbon residue that impacted the shoreline were manually raked from
            beaches in the area.

            On September 19, gasoline odors were reported in the sewers of a residential
            community near the incident site. Contractors were dispatched to flush and
            foam the sewers. Sections of boom and a combustible gas detector were set up
            to monitor the sewer outfall.

            On September 27, approximately 770 barrels of product were offloaded from
            the Jupiter to a lightering barge. Gas freeing operations began on October 5,
            due to the explosion threat posed by some isolated pockets of product
            remaining in the #6 starboard cargo tank. Offloaded product was replaced
            with water to reduce the structural stress to the damaged vessel.

            Since trace concentrations of benzene, toluene, ethyl benzene, and xylene
            isomers were found in water samples near the Jupiter, water at a nearbywater
            treatment plant was treated with ozone as a precaution.












            Jitpiter                                2









                   Other Special Interest Issues:
                   The fire fighting foam (AFFF) that was used on the fire was water soluble and
                   moderately toxic. Contaminated water from the fire fighting operation was
                   collected and brought to a Bay City Wastewater Plant retention basin for
                   special treatment. The treatment involved removal of particulates followed
                   by carbon filtration to remove.organic constituents.

                   Ref erences:

                   oMMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database.
                   -,Oil Spill Intelligence Report. International Spill Statistics 1989-1990, Special
                   Report, 3/28/91.
                   *Oil Spill Intelligence Report. Oil Spills, International Summary & Review,
                   1989-1990.
                   *U.S. Coast Guard POLREP file.
                   *World Information Systems. 1991. Tanker Losses in U.S. Waters: 1978-1990.
                   World Information Systems.

































                                                                                           Jupiter








AL



                  Name of Spill: Khark 5
                  Date of Spill (mmddyy),: 12/19/89
                  Location of Spill: 400 miles north of Las Palmas, Canary Islands
                  Latitude: 34 32 N
                  Longitude: 099 34 W
                  Oil Product: Iranian Heavy crude oil
                  Oil Type: Type 4
                  Barrels: 452,400
                  Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                  Resources at Risk: Mig.ratory stopover area, high-use recreational fishing area,
                  commercial fisheries, oysters.
                  Dispersants: Yes
                  Bioremediation: No
                  In-situ Burning: No
                  Other Special Interest:
                  Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches.
                  Keywords: International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF),
                  Atlantic Strike Team (AST), manual removal, fire, explosion, evaporation,
                  Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR), Infra Red (IR), Finasol OSR-2-

                  Incident Summary:

                  On December 19, 1989, the Iranian tanker Khark 5 bound for refineries in
                  Northern Europe exploded and caught fire approximately 400 miles north of
                  the Canary Islands. An estimated 452,400 barrels (19 n-dllion gallons) of the
                  1,714,300 barrels (72 million gallons) on board spilled into the sea. The 35
                  crew members were rescued by the passing Soviet vessel Sarny.

                  Ocean currents carried the abandoned vessel south towards the Canary
                  Islands. A Moroccan Government Response Task Force consisting of
                  members from the Moroccan Royal Navy, Interior Ministry, Ministry of
                  Fisheries, and the Civil Defense Force responded to the incident. According
                  to a joint Spain/Morocco contingency plan, the Spanish government was
                  prepared to provide aid. if necessary. The Moroccan government sent a
                  formal request to the U.S. Coast Guard for technical assistance in evaluating
                  the situation. An Atlantic Strike Team (AST) representative was sent to the
                  scene on January 4, 1990. The International Tanker Owners Pollution
                  Federation (ITOPF) provided cleanup equipment and an on-scene advisor.

                  Smit Tak, a Dutch salvage company, repaired a 60 foot by 90 foot hole in the
                  vessel's port side. Early, efforts to tow the damaged vessel away from the
                  shore were hampered b- 8-foot waves and high winds. On January 1, a tug
                                         y`
                  secured a line to the Khark 5 and began towing the vessel towards the
                  Madeira Islands off Portugal as Morocco and Spain refused to allow the vessel
                  close to their shores. Fourteen aircraft and seven boats were used to spray
                  detergents on the slick.






                                                                                        Kha rk 5










             Behavior of Oil:
             Iranian Heavy crude oil has an API gravity of 31, a viscosity of 9.36                             0
             centistokes, and a pour point of -5 degrees F. The ITOPF representative flew
             over the stricken vessel on December 21 and 24 from London and reported oil
             leaking from the ship at a slow rate. The ITOPF representative conducted
             daily overflights based from Morocco beginning on December 29. Over the
             next few days he reported that oil was staying in the same general offshore
             areas with a southwesterly longshore drift. A large slick from the initial                        0
             release drifted to within 12 miles coast of Morocco by January 2. On a January
             5 overflight, the AST representative observed significant quantities of oil, but
             widely scattered and mostly sheen with scattered 100 yard by 50 yard patches of
             mousse. The closest mousse patch was 18 miles offshore while the majority
             of mousse was 60-70 miles offshore.                                                               0
             The French government used a Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) and
             infrared (IR) sensor equipped Cessna aircraft on daily overflights. They did
             not observe oil within 20 miles of the coast. Oil was reported on a 1 kilometer
             stretch of shoreline south of Casablanca. An estimated 75 per cent of the
             spilled oil evaporated, was dissipated by wave action, or was dispersed into                      0
             the water column.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:
             Approximately 600 meters of inflatable boom was placed across the lagoon at
             Oualidia to protect oysters from the oil. Some of the floating oil was                            0
             vacuumed into oil separators.

             Oil on the shoreline south of Casablanca was cleaned using rakes, shovels,
             and plastic bugs provided by ITOPF.
             Approximately 6,600 gallons of dispersal agents were applied to the floating                      41
             oil in the first week of January. Over 1,500 gallons of Finasol OSR-2, made
             from hydrocarbon-based solvents, were applied in two passes by six aircraft
             with spraying equipment. A tugboat dispatched from Spain applied
             approximately 5,000 gallons of A-3 dispersant closer to shore. These chemical
             dispersants were relatively ineffective, as they were applied after the oil had                   41
             weathered.

             On January 8, the AST representative recommended that overflights be
             reduced to one every other day as long as the winds remained from the
             northeast.                                                                                        2



                                                                                                               Am
                                                                                                               It





             Khark 5
                                                     2










                  Other Special Interest Issues:

                  The Khark 5 may not have been structurally sound since it had been
                  damaged three times in air strikes during the 8-year Iran-Iraq war. The
                  seaworthiness of the KUrk 5 was also questioned because it was
                  underinsured.

                  Morocco was ill-prepared to deal with the magnitude of this oil spill. News of
                  the incident did not appear in the international press until eleven days after
                  the initial explosion and fire. Much time was lost prior to any response while
                  the Iranian owners and the Dutch salvage company were involved in
                  financial disputes.

                  References:


                  o8/9/91 & 8/28/91 Letters from Daniel Owen at ITOPF.
                  *Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
                  oMMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
0                 oOSIR Newsletter 2/21/91
                  oOSIR Oil Spills, International Summary & Review, 1989-1990
                  oTanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers. T.A.C.
                  Inc. 1991.





































                                                        3                               Khark 5








                     Name of Spill: Kirki
                     Date of Spill (mmddyy): 07/21/91
                     Location of Spill: Cervantes, Western Australia
                     Latitude: 30 38 S
                     Longitude: 114 41 E
                     Oil Product: Light Murban crude
                     Oil Type: Type 2
                     Barrels: 135,000
                     Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                     Resources at Risk: Lobsters, sea lions, diving coastal birds, waterfowl,
                     commercial fisheries, reserves.
                     Dispersants: Yes
                     Bioremediation: No
                     In-situ Burning: No
                     Other Special Interest: Complex salvage operations.
                     Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches.
                     Keywords: Lightering, boom, fire, evaporation, Ardox 6120, Shell VTS,
                     salvage.

                     Incident Summary:

                     On July 21, 1991, the Greek tanker Kirki caught fire 20 miles off the coast of
                     Western Australia, near Cervantes. The vessel was en-route from the
                     Arabian Gulf to Kwinana, Australia. It was owned by Mayamar Marine
                     Enterprises of Piraeus, Greece. The Kirki's bow broke off in heavy seas,
                     rupturing two of the forward tanks. Approximately 135,000 barrels of light
                     Murban crude were spilled, most of it on the first day. Small amounts of oil
                     leaked during the subsequent towing of the Kirki. The salvage vessel Lady
                     Kathleen was in the area of the incident and responded quickly to the Kirki's
                     distress call. The Lady Kathleen towed the vessel to the west away from the
                     shore, preventing further casualties.

                     Behavior of Oil:

                     Light Murban crude oil has an API gravity of 40.5, and a pour point of -24
                     degrees F. The spill from the broken bow created a 60 mile long, 1 to 10 mile
                     wide slick just 4 miles off the coast of Western Australia. The fire on the                 z
                     Kirki was extinguished quickly, so little oil burned. By July 24, most of the
                     spilled oil had evaporated or dissipated in heavy seas. The small amount of
                     oil that leaked during the tow dissipated within a few miles of the vessel's
                     track. On July 23, some beaches around Jurien Bay were polluted by oil in the
                     form of small emulsified pellets.





                                                                                                                 C






                                                                                                  Kirki









            Countermeasures and Mitigation:

            The ruptured tanks on the Kirki continued to leak small amounts of oil as
            the vessel was towed an additional 55 miles west from the shoreline.
            Recovery and cleanup equipment were flown to the area, but application of
            dispersants was the primary response. Use of dispersants began on July 22
            and ended the next day. Dispersants (24 drums of Ardox 6120, 6 drums of
            Shell VTS) were applied from aircraft to the area of the initial spill. Small
            amounts of dispersants were sprayed by boat to areas closer to shore.

            While the heavy seas prevented use of booms and skimmers in the spill area,
            booms were deployed as a preventive measure around some of the more
            sensitive islands in the area. 'Besides the dispersion due to wave action, the
            oil was further broken up by five fishing boats that repeatedly traversed the
            slick.

            Beach impacts were slight and the Australian Environmental Protection
            Authority (EPA) recommended that no action be taken except for some tilling
            near inhabited areas.

            Plans were made to transfer the oil remaining on the stern section of the
            Kirki to another vessel. The Kirki was towed to a point 70 miles northwest of
            the Australian coast by the salvage ship Lady Elizabeth. Between August 14 to
            August 19, 484,000 barrels of light Murban crude, fuel oil, and waste oil, were
Z           transferred to the Liberian tanker Flying Clipper. Due to the missing bow, the
            Kirki could not be anchored, so the transfer operations were performed while
            all three vessels involved were underway. By August 22, United Salvage had
            the Kirki undertow en-route to Singapore for salvage or scrapping.

            Other Special Interest Issues:

            The transfer of oil while all the vessels involved were underway was
            unusual. The Australian Maritime Safety Authority reported that it was the
            first time that such an operation was ever performed and it was very
            successful.





















            Kirki                                 2











                   References:


                   -Australian Officials Conduct Successful Transfer of Oil from Greek Tanker
                   Kirki. Oil Spill Intelligence Report. Vol. XIV, No. 32. 22 August 1991. pp.2-3.
                   *Australian Officials Prepare to Transfer Oil from Greek Tanker Kirki. Oil
                   Spill Intelligence Report. Vol. XIV, No. 29. 1 August 1991. p.3.
                   eGenwest Systems,-Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
                   eGreek Tanker Breaks Up off Western Coast of Australia; Authorities
                   Question Ship's Crew and Captain. Oil Spill Intelligence Report. Vol. XIV,
                   No. 28. 25 July 1991. pp.1-2.















































                                                         3                                 Kirki








                  Name of Spill: Kurdistan
                  Date of Spill (mmddyy): 03/15/79
                  Location of Spill: Cabot Strait, Newfoundland
                  Latitude: 46 00 N
                  Longitude: 060 00 W
                  Oil Product: Bunker C
                  Oil Type: Type 4
                  Barrels: 43,900
                  Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                  Resources at Risk: Diving coastal birds, alcids, gulls, waterfowl, shorebirds,
                  bird wintering areas, seals, lobster, kelp.
                  Dispersants: No
                  Bioremediation: No
                  In-situ Burning: No
                  Other Special Interest: Wildlife impacts, adverse weather conditions, logistical
                  or operational problems, research conducted.
                  Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches, marshes, coarse gravel
                  beaches, vertical rocky shores.
                  Keywords: Backhoes, boom, sorbents, manual removal, sub-surface oil,
                  sinking, reoiling, disposal.

                  Incident Summary:

                  On March 15, 1979, the British motor tanker Kurdistan, en route from Nova
                  Scotia to Quebec, broke in two sections south of Cabot Strait, Newfoundland.
                  The damage was attributed to a fracture initiated by a weld defect and
                  aggravated by wave impacts on the bow at low temperatures. Although the
                  tanker remained intact for some time after the initial hull plate failure, the
                  bow and stern sections eventually separated and spilled an estimated 43,900
                  barrels of Bunker C into Cabot Strait. The bow and stern sections drifted
                  towards Canadian waters. Approximately 50,000 barrels of oil remained in
                  the bow section while 115,000 barrels remained in the stern.
























                                                                                       Kurdistan









              A wide band of mobile pack ice initially prevented the spilled oil from
              reaching the shoreline. The Environmental Protection Service (EPS)
              immediately initiated the formation of the Regional Environmental
              Emergencies Team (REET) to provide assistance and advice to the Canadian
              Coast Guard's (CCG) On-Scene Commander (OSC). REET members included
              the Atmospheric Environment Service, Bedford Institute of Oceanography,
              and Fisheries -Management Service. The REET was divided into three
              sections to deal with the three distinct problems: the bow, the stern, and the
              oil spill cleanup. Under Lloyds Open Forum, the stern section was towed to
              Port Hawkesbury, Nova Scotia, to recover remaining oil. The bow section
              was towed to a deep water area 200 nautical miles off Nova Scotia and sunk by
              gunfire from the HMCS Margaree on April 1, 1979. Oil started coming ashore
              in April and two cleanup control centers were established at Low Point and
              Mulgrave, Nova Scotia. The oil continued to contaminate shorelines along
              the eastern coast of Nova Scotia throughout the summer.

              Behavior of Oil:

              Bunker C fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to
              14. The oil slick movement was very difficult to track and monitor because
              the oil appeared to float a meter or two below the surface of the water. Ice-oil
              mixtures, first seen on March 23, moved to the northwest during the
              following two days at a mean rate of 8 to 10 miles per day. Oil first came
              ashore on March 28, although the majority of oil did not come ashore until
              mid-April, after shore-fast ice was gone. Oil on the beaches was not in the                        41
              form of mousse as expected, rather, it consisted of "toffee-like" particles
              ranging in diameter from millimeters to several meters.

              The Cape Breton shoreline and the mainland coast of Nova Scotia were most
              severely contaminated. Oil washed ashore in varying amounts from St.                               0
              Ann's Bay in north Cape Breton to as far south as Canso in Guysborough
              County, Nova Scotia. By April 14, Scatarie Island off the eastern extremity of
              Cape Breton Island and 25 miles to the southeast of Sydney was heavily oiled.
              Reports of oil on Fox Island were received on April 18. Oil was discovered on
              the Lingan sandbar on April 21. On gravel/cobble beaches, the oil often
              mixed with thick bands of accumulated kelp along the upper foreshore.                              0
              Oil continued to come ashore with little warning throughout the summer of
              1979 along 700 miles of eastern Nova Scotia and southern Newfoundland
              shoreline. Cleanup operations lasted six months due to continual reoiling of
              beaches by tidal action.                                                                           40








              Kurdistan                               2                                                          0









                   Countermeasures and Mitigation:

                   In an attempt clean the oil from the ice before it reached the shoreline, the
                   CCG fitted a barge with. backhoes, booms, and sorbent material. The barge
                   attempted to scoop the oil from the water with little success.

                   Rakes, shovels, and pitchforks were the main shoreline cleanup tools. The
                   oil was very viscous by the time it reached the beach and was easily placed in
                   sturdy plastic bags and 45 gallon drums. Ordinary rakes and garden hoes were
                   carefully used in marsh. areas to protect the root systems for future growth.
                   The CCG flew cleanup crews onto uninhabited Scatarie Island. Manual
                   cleaning methods using hand tools, 45 gallon drums, and heavy plastic bags
                   were employed. Over 1,000 barrels and 4,000 bags of oil and oil soaked debris
                   were collected on the island within several days. A temporary on-site
                   incinerator was constructed to dispose of the oily waste. The unit was
                   modeled after a design developed by Trecan, Ltd. and the Petroleum
                   Association for the Conservation of the Canadian Environment (PACE). The
                   Trecan-PACE incinerator, constructed primarily of automobile parts and 45
                   gallon drums, was assembled on Scatarie Island next to the largest pile of
                   debris-filled bags. Driftwood placed in the firebox was used to fuel the kiln.
                   During peak operations, the kiln processed 350 bags of beach material an
                   hour. The incinerator proved to be a cost-effective oil pollution
                   countermeasure technique.
                   A total of approximately one million bags and 1,500 barrels of oily debris were
                   collected over the 550 miles of shoreline that were accessible. Much of the
                   oily waste was disposed of at municipal landfills and strip mines on Cape
                   Breton Island. With increasing concerns over the amount of debris, new
                   disposal sites were developed at Hadleyville, Forchu, and St. Peter's on Cape
                   Breton Island.

                   Other Special Interest Issues:

                   Over 2,600 birds, primarily gulls and ducks, are known to have died as a result
                   of oiling from this spill. The actual number of birds affected by this oil spill
                   was much higher due to three primary factors. First, the slick was essentially
                   hidden from view from March 16 to April 9. It is suspected that many oiled
                   birds died during this period and sank. Second, little attempt was made
                   during cleanup to separate, count and identify dead birds from among the
                   other oiled debris. Third, much of the Cape Breton and Guysborough County
                   shoreline was inaccessible, so dead birds on these beaches were not counted.
                   Considering all factors, the bird mortality count from this incident is
                   estimated at between 12,000 and 25,000.

                   This was the first incident involving oil/ice interactions in Canadian
                   jurisdiction. Researchers from the Bedford Institute of Oceanography,
                   Canada's Centre for Remote Sensing, the Environmental Protection Service,




                                                           3                              Kurdistan








             and the Memorial University of Newfoundland studied these interactions
             extensively throughout the response.
             References:                                                                                 0

             *Brown, R.G.B. and Johnson, B.C. 1979. The Effects of Kurdistan Oil on
             Seabirds. Scientific Studies During the Kurdistan Tanker Incident:
             Proceedings of a Workshop, 26-27 June-1979. pp. 203-211.
             *Brown, R.G.B. Birds, Oil and the Canadian Environment, Oil and                             40
             Dispersants in Canadian Seas- Research and Recommendations.
             Environment Canada. 1982.
             -bGill S.D. and Stevens, G. 1980. Use of Trecan-Pace Oil Drum Incinerator
             During the Kurdistan Clean-Up Operation. Spill Technology Newsletter, v.5.
             pp. 9-14.                                                                                   41
             *Gundlach, E. and Marshall, M. 1990. The Physical Persistence of Spilled Oil:
             An Analysis of Oil Spills Previous to Exxon Valdez. Final Report. HAZMAT.
             OAD. NOAA. pp.47-68.
             *Troop, P.M. and Greenham, CPT M.S. 1991. Ship-Source Oil Pollution Fund:
             20 Years of Canada's Experience, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1991, pp.
             683-688.                                                                                    0
             *Vandermeulen, J.H. 1982. Oil Spills: What Have We Learned? Oil and
             Dispersants in Canadian Seas-Research Appraisal and Recommendations.
             Environment Canada. pp. 29-46.

                                                                                                         41








































             Kurdistan                             4








                  Name of Spill: Lakehead Pipeline Company
                  Date of Spill (mmddyy): 03/03/91
                  Location of Spill: Grand Rapids, Minnesota
                  Latitude: 47 14 N
                  Longitude: 093 38 W
                  Oil Product: Crude Oil
                  Oil Type: Type 3
                  Barrels: 40,476
                  Source of Spill: Pipeline
                  Resources at Risk: Fish
                  Dispersants: No
                  Bioremediation: No
                  In-situ Burning: No
                  Other Special Interest: Adverse weather conditions, human health and safety
                  concerns, logistical or operational problems, unusual or experimental
                  cleanup techniques
                  Shoreline Types Impacted: Marshes, vegetated riverbank.
                  Keywords: Vacuum truck, boom, skimmers.

                  Incident Summary:

                  On March 3, 1991, a pipeline owned by the Lakehead Pipeline Company, Inc.
                  in Grand Rapids, Minnesota, ruptured and spilled over 40,000 barrels of crude
                  oil into the surrounding area. A resident in the area noticed the smell of oil
                  and alerted the local fire department. The initial estimates by the company
                  placed the size of the spill at 15,000 barrels. After rechecking volume figures,
                  the company revised its estimate to 40,000 barrels. The spill occurred
                  approximately two miles north of Grand Rapids.

                  Following the initial notification, the company shut off the valve to the
                  pipeline. Approximately 300 people living in homes near the site were
                  evacuated for safety, but were allowed to return to their homes later in the
                  night. It was almost an hour after they had been notified before the company
                  shut the pipeline down. It is believed that this delay caused a significant
                  increase in the size of tire spill.

                  Representatives from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the Minnesota Pollution
                  Control Agency (MPCA), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
                  Region V, the Minnesota Department of Emergency Management (DEM) and
                  the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR) were on-scene and
                  involved in the response.











                                                                       Lakehead Pipeline Company











             Behavior of Oil:

             The rupture caused pressurized oil to shoot from the pipeline into the air.
             Nearby trees were immediately coated with oil. Within a few hours, oil had
             spread into a wetland area and a storm sewer. The oil impacted the Prairie
             River, which is a tributary to the Mississippi River.
             Some of the oil spilled onto the eighteen-inch thick ice sheets on the Prairie
             River. Oil formed into eight-inch deep pools on top of the ice in the middle
             of the river and was also present under the ice.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:
             The responsible party hired almost twenty cleanup contractors to respond to                 is
             the spill. The cleanup continued around the clock except when the weather
             was too cold to operate the equipment. Cleanup reportedly would have been
             much more difficult if the ice had melted, or warmer weather had allowed
             the oil to move more rapidly.

             Vacuum trucks were used by cleanup personnel to remove the oil from the
             surface of the ice. Workers used squeegees to push the oil along the ice to a
             removal location. Booms were used on the river by cutting a slot through the
             ice cover with chainsaws. Ice that had been permeated with oil was chopped
             into blocks small enough to be carried away to a separate part of the river.
             Cleanup personnel sprayed the ice blocks with hot water to wash out the oil,
             which was then recovered with skimmers. Blocks that were only slightly
             contaminated were moved to lined holding tanks and broken up. The
             crushed ice was then allowed to melt to recover residual oil.

             Other Special Interest Issues:

             Samples of the river water, groundwater, and well water were taken to
             determine the effects of the spill. Air samples showed that the vapors were
             within safe breathing limits. A small number of fish were reported killed as a
             result of the spill in the immediate area where the oil entered the water.

             Ref erences:

             -Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with NIPCA and MDNR-
             @Oil Spill Intelligence Reports, 14 March 1991.












             Lakehead Pipeline Company            2








                    Name of Spill: MCN-5
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 1/31/88
                    Location of Spill: Guernes Channel, Shannon Point, Washington
                    Latitude: 48 31 N
                    Longitude: 122 42 W
                    Oil Product: Heavy Cycle Gas Oil, Intermediate Fuel Oil, Marine Diesel Oil
                    Oil Type: Type 4, Type 2
                    Barrels: 1604
                    Source of Spill: Tank Barge
                    Resources at Risk: Kelp, eelgrass beds, diving coastal birds, gulls, alcids, terns,
                    raptors, bird nesting beaches, seal population concentration areas, seal
                    haulouts, river otters, shrimp, crabs, oysters, clam harvest areas, scallops,
                    abalone, anadromous fish, beaches, boat ramps, commercial fisheries, intakes.
                    Dispersants: No
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: No
                    Other Special Interest: Complex salvage operations, research conducted,
                    closure of shipping lanes or vehicle traffic routes, habitat impact due to oil.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Kelp beds.
                    Keywords: Washington Department of Natural Resources (WA DNR),
                    Washington Department of Ecology (WA DOE), Pacific Strike Team (PST),
                    Airspace Request Zone, Flight Restricted Area, skimmer, cannonball diaper
                    sampler, sub-surface oil, sinking, salvage, boom, vegatation cutting.


                    Incident Summary-

                    At approximately 0330 on 31 January 1988, the master of the tug James T.
                    Quigg reported that his tow, the Tank Barge MCN-5 had turned onto its port
                    side. At the time of the incident, the tug and barge were turning to the south
                    around Fidalgo, Head, near Shannon Point, Washington. The barge was
                    loaded with 9,874 barrels of Heavy Cycle Gas Oil (HCGO) and some residual
                    lighter fuel oils when it departed the Texaco Facility at Anacortes,
                    Washington, three hours earlier.
                    At 0530, the MCN-5 partially sank in an inverted position approximately
                    three hundred yards off Shannon Point. The stern rested on the bottom in
                    about 120 feet of water and the bow remained above the surface, supported by
                    an air bubble in the forward rake. The barge remained in this position for
                    more than a week while cleanup and salvage operations were organized. On
                    February 8, the barge sank completely, con-Ling to rest on its port side at an
                    angle of 17 degrees to the bottom.

                    Less than 2,500 barrels of oil were released into the water. Because the high
                    specific gravity of the cargo made it sink, there was little observed
                    environmental damage.







                                                                                                MCN-5










             Behavior of Oil:

             The barge contained 9,874 barrels of Heavy Cycle Gas Oil and approximately                      0
             524 barrels of residual Intermediate Fuel Oil (IFO) and Marine Diesel Oil
             (MDO) at the time of the incident. Marine diesel oil has an API gravity of
             31.3, and a pour point of 23 degrees C. Approximately 2,177 barrels of HCGO
             and 278 barrels of the residual oils were released when the barge capsized and
             sank. This was all the product in the number. one and number five cargo
             tanks.

             The HCGO had a specific gravity of 1.086, which made it sink to the bottom or
             remain suspended in the water column. Its pour point was 40', and when
             cold, the product was very thick and viscous in nature. The IFO and MDO
             residuals were less dense than the sea water and remained on the surface.
             This oil was generally observed as sheen spreading out from the area of the
             sunken barge. The observed sheen was determined to be too light to recover
             mechanically.
             The oil contaminated the kelp beds on Fidalgo Island, Burrows Island, and
             Allan Island. The degree of oiling ranged from very light to heavy. The risk
             to the kelp beds was not great enough to warrant any removal action.
             There were severalsmall releases of oil during the salvage operations that
             were caused by pumping air into the barge's tanks to maintain buoyancy.
             These were generally between 3 and 25 barrels and occurred at slack tide and
             while the vessel was boomed off. Cleanup contractors estimated ninety-five
             percent recovery in these cases.

             A diving survey of the sunken barge on February 9 revealed additional
             damage to No. 1 and No. 5 tanks and a pool of oil that had collected in the lee
             of the vessel. Swift currents at the bottom appeared to be dissipating the pool
             and the oil leaking from the damaged barge.

             Disposable diapers attached to a cannonball weight and lowered to the bottom
             were used to detect the presence of the heavy oil on the bottom. This
             technique was used at the Mobiloil incident and provided a rapid qualitative
             estimate of the distribution of the sub-surface oil.                                            Z




















             MCN-5                                  2









                    Countermeasures and Mitigation:

                    The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Scientific
                    Support Coordinator (SSC) recommended that the salvage operations be
                    undertaken during slack and ebb tide. On February 28, two derrick barges
                    commenced lifting the MCN-5 from the bottom. When the barge was at the
                    surface, the remaining product was pumped off and the barge was rolled to an
                    right-side-up position. Pumping and cleaning of the barge continued until
                    March 1 when the lifting slings were removed and the derrick barges were
                    released. On March 2, the MCN-5 was towed to a shipyard in Seattle. During
                    the final lifting stages of the salvage operation, a large inverted-plane type
                    skimmer was stationed on the ebb-current side of the barge and an oleophilic
0                   belt-type skimmer was stationed on the flood current side of the operation.
                    The skimmers were connected with booms to contain any oil discharged
                    during the operation. A tug and small oleophilic rope-type skimmer were
                    stationed outside the containment barrier to collect any oil that escaped the
                    booms.

0                   An unknown quantity of the lighter residual oil was released during the
                    salvage operations on February 28 which oiled kelp beds near Burrows Bay.
                    Washington Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) personnel
                    recommended that the oiled kelp not be removed because it was in a stage of
                    growth at which it was not particularly sensitive to the effects of the oil. The
0                   oiled sections of kelp broke off naturally during the next month.
                    Other Special Interest Issues:

                    The USCG On-Scene Coordinator's (OSC) decision to raise the MCN-5 was
                    based upon several considerations. By the time the salvage operation was
                    federalized, substantial planning and salvage work for raising the barge had
                    already been completed by the owners. Other available options were to leave
                    the barge in place or to pump off the remaining cargo with the barge
                    submerged. Leaving the barge in place was unacceptable to all parties
                    concerned and pumping heavy, viscous oil from such a depth would have
                    been very difficult. Pumping would also have presented the risk of the cargo
                    tanks collapsing as they were emptied.

                    Three sea water intakes for the Shannon Point Marine Center, operated by
                    Western Washington University, were located within one-half mile of the
                    barge. Two of these intakes were located at the surface and one was near the
                    bottom. All were potentially at risk from the released oil. Heavy oil on the
                    bottom was observed near the intakes on April 7. A pan was placed beneath
                    the bottom intake to prevent sediment and oil from being drawn into the
                    system.

                    On July 7, 1988, the NOAA SSC attended a meeting with WA DOE, U.S. Fish
                    and Wildlife Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, Institute of Marine
                    Studies of the University of Washington, and USCG representatives to
                    review the findings of benthic samples collected May 17. Four of the five



                                                            3                                  MCN-5








              samples collected closely matched the profile of the HCGO cargo from the
              MCN-5.
              The OSC requested that USCG District 13 Operations Center (OPCEN)                                 46
              officially close the airspace above the site during the salvage operations to
              prevent unauthorized aircraft from interfering with official overflights.
              During the initial stages of the salvage operations, the Federal Aviation
              Administration (FAA) -granted the _OSC an Airspace Request Zone, which
              requested, but not required, aircraft avoidance within a one mile radius of the                   40
              site up to 1,000feet. Notice of the Airspace Request Zone was promulgated
              through the OPCEN, Whidbey Island Naval Air Station (NAS), local airports,
              and local television news. On February 27, the closure was upgraded to a
              Flight Restricted Area to prevent additional hazards during the most critical
              stages of the salvage operation. The area was returned to an Airspace Request                     41
              Zone on February 29. The OSC canceled all airspace restrictions on March 1.

              Initially, Olympic Tug and Barge Co. of Seattle, Washington, accepted full
              financial responsibility for the response and the OSC was monitoring the
              events and coordinating the actions of the various organizations involved.
              The OSC assumed partial responsibility on February 10 after Olympic Tug and                       4
              Barge demonstrated inability to provide a suitable salvage platform. The OSC
              assumed full Federal responsibility for the salvage operations on February 25
              following Olympic Tug and Barge Co.'s inability to continue pollution
              cleanup and protection.

              References:

              *NOAA Hotline reports
              *USCG On-Scene Coordinator's Report
              *Yaroch, CDR. G.N. and LCDR. G.A. Reiter. The Tank Barge MCN-5: Lessons
              in Salvage and Response Operations. O.S.C.P. 1989. pp. 87-90.                                     Z






















              MCN-5                                   4








                   Name of Spill: Mega Borg
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy)@ 06/08/90
                   Location of Spill: Gulf of Mexico, 57 miles southeast of Galveston, Texas
                   Latitude: 28 33 N
                   Longitude: 094 08 W
                   Oil Product: Angolan Palanca crude oil
                   Oil Type: Type 2
                   Barrels: 100,000
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Shrimp, fish, terns, gulls, beaches.
                   Dispersants: Yes
                   Bioremediation: Yes
                   In-situ Burning: Yes
                   Other Special Interest: Logistical or operational problems, media interest,
                   volunteer response and organization, unusual or experimental cleanup
                   techniques.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Marshes, fine sand beaches, sand/gravel beaches.
                   Keywords: Corexit 9527, skimmer, Air-Eye aircraft, side looking airborne
                   radar (SLAR), Atlantic Strike Team (AST), U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage
                   (NAVSUPSALV), AE BioSea Process, explosion, fire, contingency plan

                   Incident Summary:
                   On June 8, 1990 at approximately 2330, while the Italian tank vessel Fraqmura
                   was lightering the Norwegian tank vessel Mega Borg, an explosion occurred
                   in the pump room of the Mega Borg. The two ships were in the Gulf of
                   Mexico, 57 miles southeast of Galveston Texas in international waters, but
                   within the U.S. exclusive economic zone. As a result of the explosion, a fire
                   started in the pump room and spread to the engine room. An estimated
                   100,000 barrels of Angolan Palanca crude was burned or released into the
                   water from the Mega Borg during the next seven days.

                   Approximately 238 barrels of oil was discharged when the Fraqmura
                   intentionally broke away from the Mega Borg. Explosions on the Mega Borg,
                   caused the stern of the ship began to settle lower in the water and list to the
                   port side. A continuous discharge of burning oil flowed over the aft port
                   quarter of the ship.

                   Less than an hour after the explosions on the Mega Borg, the U.S. Coast
                   Guard (USCG) in Galveston dispatched two USCG cutters to the scene.
                   Weather was calm throughout the incident. Winds were generally around 10
                   to 15 knots and air temperature were between 80 and 90 degrees Fahrenheit.









                                                                                         Mega Borg











             Behavior of Oil:

             Palancan crude oil has an API gravity of 38.6, and a pour point of 50 degrees F.
             Responders believed that abnormally high freshwater runoff from the Sabine
             River and other rivers in the area would have a tendency to keep the oil
             offshore. Initially the oil moved northwest toward Corpus Christi. By June
             18, the leading edge of the oil slick approached the environmentally sensitive
             area of Sabine Pass, but was kept offshore by winds and currents. After a few
             days it began to move to the north and east and first came ashore on the
             Southwestern Louisiana coast on June 28 in the form of small tarballs
             scattered over a distance of 18 miles. Shorelines that suffered oiling included
             Holly Beach and Dung Beach in Texas, Peveto Beach in Louisiana, and the
             Mermentau River in Louisiana. The tarballs on the shoreline amounted to                          IN
             very little oil.

             The floating oil spread out into a light sheen. Much of the spilled crude oil
             was lost to evaporation (as much as 50%) or burned. Overflight observations
             generally noted light sheen on the water mixed with tarballs. A small
             amount of reddish colored mousse was also observed.                                              0
             Countermeasures and Mitigation:
             The initial focus of the response effort was to extinguish the fire on the Mega
             Borg and offload the remaining cargo. Firefighting vessels began to arrive on
             the morning of June 9. Over 50 commercial vessels and more than a dozen                          41
             skimmers were used during the response. In addition, a USCG Air-Eye
             aircraft, equipped with side-looking airborne radar (SLAR), was used to
             determine the distribution of the spilled oil.
             Two more explosions occurred on board the Mega Borg on June 9. The fire                          0
             was fueled by cargo from the No. 4 tank which was leaking into the
             engine/pump room. Initially, the vessel was so hot that it was feared that the
             application of foam to extinguish the fire might be ineffective or increase the
             possibility of explosion. Firefighters cooled the hull of the ship and attempted
             to prevent the fire from spreading to the other cargo tanks.

             Six vessels were used to fight the fire. Four of the vessels hosed the Mega
             Borg with seawater in attempts to contain the fire and cool the vessel, and the
             other two vessels, which were equipped for foam application, kept the
             burning stern of the Mega Borg downwind.











             Mega Borg                               2









4W



                   Pump valves on the Mega Borg were secured (hydraulic block valves were
                   operated manually) on 10 June in an attempt to stop the flow of oil. The oil
                   continued to flow from the tanker, and later that day there were a series of
                   new explosions on board. The explosions intensified the fire and caused the
                   stern of the Mega Borg to become partially submerged, increasing the risk that
                   the tanker would sink and release the remainder of its cargo.

                   By June 13, firefighting efforts had contained the blaze sufficiently to attempt
                   foam application. The fire was out for almost an hour and a half while the
                   foam was being applied, but then re-ignited. Firefighters resumed hosing the
                   vessel with seawater until June 15, when a second foam application
                   successfully extinguished the fire.

                   With the fire out and the vessel stabilized, responders filled the cargo tanks
                   with inert gas to reduce the fire hazard. The remaining 809,500 barrels of oil
                   were lightered off the Mega Borg, using two small tankers. Lightering was
                   completed on July 27.

                   In preparation for the possible "worst case" oil release, involving over 833,000
                   barrels of cargo remaining on the Mega Borg, representatives from the USCG
                   Marine Safety Office (MSO) Galveston, and state and Federal resource
                   agencies met to draft a coastal protection priority plan.

                   Most of the sensitive resources in the area are located inside the inlets, and
                   cleanup of the oil in the estuaries would be very difficult. For these reasons,
                   the inlet areas were identified as the highest priority for protection. The
                   protection plan did not focus on strategies for protection of the coastal
                   beaches. The coastal beaches are generally fine grain beaches, allowing only
                   minimal oil penetration. into the sediments, and therefore making cleanup
                   easier. In addition, deploying protection equipment (such as deflection boom)
                   on coastal beaches would have been largely ineffective due to the high wave
                   activity and tidal action of the area.

                   In order to implement the protection plan quickly, twelve U.S. Navy
                   Supervisor of Salvage (NTAVSUPSALV) skimmers and 6,000 feet of 36-inch
                   boom were staged in Galveston. As the oil continued north, it threatened to
                   impact the Texas Point National Wildlife Preserve at the mouth of the Sabine
                   River. The main inlets in the area were boomed off and three of the Navy
                   skimmers were sent to the Sabine area. The oil continued in an easterly
                   direction, and did not impact the Preserve. Other sensitive areas where boom
                   was deployed included Rollover Pass on the Bolivar Peninsula, High Island
                   and Sea Rim State Park in Texas.











                                                           3                              Mega Borg










            To reduce the amount of oiled waste onshore, debris was removed from
            sensitive areas prior to possible oil impact. NOAA recommended that                          0
            organic debris not be removed from refuge shorelines where erosion was
            present, so that the shorelines would remain stable. Volunteers were used to
            remove debris from beaches west of Sea Rim Park through the Adopt A
            Beach Program supervised by the Texas Land Office.

            Another contingency plan was made in the event of imminent sinking of the
            Mega Borg. The vessel would be towed inshore and run aground. Two tugs
            were standing by in the event of such a possibility. It was speculated that if it
            sank at its offshore location, the vessel might implode and release the
            remainder of its cargo.
            On June 9, steps were taken to obtain dispersant approval in the event of a
            major release. Later that day, dispersant use within 5 nautical miles of the
            Mega Borg was approved, but dispersants were not expected to be used unless
            large amounts of oil were released. The Regional Response Team (RRT)
            requested that the dispersant trajectory be monitored and reported to the RRT
            if dispersants were used. Two commercial C-130 aircraft equipped for
            dispersant application were contracted from Florida and Arizona.

            On June 10, 4,000 gallons of Exxon Corexit 9527 were applied to part of the oil
            slick. Observers noted a definite change in the texture of the oil slick after
            dispersant application. Five sorties sprayed a total of 11,300 gallons of
            dispersant. The winds were very calm during and after the application,
            which may not have provided enough mixing energy for maximum
            dispersion.

            Bioremediation tests were conducted on June 15 and 18. These were the first
            tests of a bioremediation agent on an oil spill in open waters in the United
            States. The bioremediation agent used was AE BioSea Process, developed by
            Alpha Environmental, Inc. AE BioSea Process contains oil-metabolizing
            bacteria and nutrients. The results of the tests were inconclusive.
            In the first few days of the response, skimmers focused on oil localized
            around the Mega Borg. As the oil spread and approached shorelines in Texas,
            and the flow of oil from the Mega Borg decreased and more of the skimmers
            were focused on the leading edge of the slick. During the response, extensive
            air support was required to direct skimming operations.

            By June 16 the Mega Borg stopped leaking oil. Diver surveys of the vessel
            revealed that the hull of the Mega Borg was intact and structurally sound.









            Mega Borg                             4









                    Skimming operations were scaled back by June 20, due to the lack of
                    recoverable oil. On June 24, tarballs washed up on the shoreline of Louisiana.
                    Most of the tarballs localized on a five mile stretch of coast near Peveto Beach.
                    Beach crews manually picked up the majority of the tarballs. Some areas with
                    a minimal amount of tarballs were not cleaned. The Louisiana Department
                    of Environmental Quality advised that intervention could cause more
                    environmental damage by erosion than leaving the tarballs on the beach. A
                    total of 13,023 barrels of oil and mousse were recovered in response
                    operations. There were no reports of oiled wildlife from the incident.

                    Other Special Interest Issues:

                    Media attention to the Mega Borg spill was intense. The USCG set up a media
                    office with 11 USCG photojournalists and conducted two press briefings daily
                    on vessel status and cleanup.

                    There were logistical problems associated with communications and response
                    to a spill nearly 60 miles offshore. There were also communications delays
0                   with the owners of the vessel. Communications with offshore personnel
                    were facilitated with cellular phones (Petrocom cellular service), high
                    frequency radios and VHF-FM. USCG Air Station Houston became the
                    logistical base for the oil spill; personnel and equipment were transported to
                    the spill site and the Air Station became the staging area for much of the
                    response equipment. USCG Cutter Steadfast, equipped with a flight deck, was
                    very useful for shuttling equipment and personnel to the site.

                    Cleanup volunteers were coordinated by the Texas General Land Office and
                    received an abbreviated Occupational Safety and Health Administration
                    (OSHA) training course.

                    Ref erences:

                    e Hoff, R. 1991. A Summary of Bioremediation Applications Observed at
                    Marine Oil Spills. Report HMRB 91-2. Jan. 1991.
                    eLeveille, LCDR T.P. 1991. The Mega Borg Fire and Oil Spill: A Case Study, Oil
0                   Spill Conference Proceedings, 1991,pp. 273-278.
                    -MMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database.
                     NOAA Hotline Reports.
                     Oil Properties stack, CAMEO SSC (API 1986).
                     OSIR Oil Spills, International Summary & Review, 1989-1990.
                    *Tanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers. T.A.C.
                    Inc. 1991.
                    oU.S. Coast Guard On-Scene Coordinator's Report.
                    oWorld Information Systems. Tanker Losses in U.S. Waters: 1978-1990.
                    World Information Systems. 1991.






                                                            5                               Mega Borg








                     Name of Spill: Metula
                     Date of Spill (mmddyy): 08/09/74
                     Location of Spill: First Narrows, Strait of Magellan                                         40
                     Latitude: 52 34 S
                     Longitude: 069 41 W
                     Oil Product: Light Arabian Crude Oil and Bunker C.
                     Oil Type: Type 2, Type 4
                     Barrels: 398,020
                     Source of Spill: Tank Vessel                                                                 0
                     Resources at Risk: Diving birds, abundant mussel beds, bird rookeries, bird
                     migratory routes, bird nesting beaches.
                     Dispersants: No
                     Bioremediation: No
                     In-situ Burning: No                                                                          41
                     Other Special Interest: Adverse weather conditions, habitat impact due to oil,
                     logistical or operational problems, research conducted, wildlife impacts.
                     Shoreline Types Impacted: Marshes, exposed tidal flats, sand/gravel beaches,
                     mixed sediment beaches, salt marsh.
                     Keywords: Air-Deliverable Anti-Pollution Transfer System (ADAPTS),
                     lightering.                                                                                  0

                     Incident Summary:
                     On August 9, 1974, at 2220, the VLCC (Very Large Crude Carrier) Metula ran
                     hard aground on Satellite Bank, at the western end of First Narrows in the
                     Strait of Magellan near the southern tip of South America. The vessel was                    0
                     traveling from west to east at nearly fifteen knots and came to a stop in
                     approximately 260 feet (the Metula was over 1,000 feet long and ordinarily
                     required 3 miles to stop). Oil immediately began pouring into the water from
                     ruptured cargo and fuel tanks.
                     Behavior of Oil:                                                                             0

                     Light Iranian crude oil has an API gravity of 33.4 and a pour point of -30
                     degrees F. Bunker C fuel oil is a heavy product with an A.PI gravity that
                     ranges from 7 to 14. The oil moved predominantly to the west into Bahia
                     Felipe and Bahia Gregario, with lesser movement to the east into Bahia                       0
                     Posession. The oil was driven by currents as high as ten knots and winds
                     from the northwest at thirty to fifty knots. Within the first three weeks, the
                     wind forced the oil onto the northern shoreline of Tiera del Fuego. Oil
                     deposited on the beach took on two different forms. A dark brown mousse
                     with a five per cent water content plus sand, seaweed and other debris was                   49
                     deposited above the spring high-tide line and in the marshes and estuaries. A
                     lighter mousse with a thirty per cent water in oil emulsion was deposited
                     extensively in the intertidal zone.

                     The lighter mousse coated the beaches from 18 to 55 yards wide and up to 3
                     inches deep. Light mousse also covered the gravel and cobbles of the rocky                   0
                     intertidal area during low tide.


                                                                                                 Metula           0








             At Punta Espora, the intertidall flats near the ferry were paved with a mixture
             of mousse, sand, gravel, organisms and other debris. The observed area was
             more heavily covered in the January 1975 survey than at the time of the
             incident. At sheltered tidal flats, as found at First Narrows, the thick asphalt-
             like covering persisted for over 12 years with no signs of significant
             weathering.

             In the heavily oiled salt marsh, nearly all the vegetation was still dead over
             five years later. Some of the less heavily oiled salt marshes showed signs of
             recovery after only five months.

             Major contamination was still visible on the third survey, in January 1976,
             nearly seventeen months after the grounding. During this survey, the
             intertidal zone at Punta Espora was described as a paved roadway 550 to 650
             yards wide and 1.5 to 2.5 miles long, and ranging from 4 to 12 inches thick.
             The seaward 100 yards of the intertidal zone had abundant algae and mussels,
             and most of the hard pavement there had eroded away.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             The was no action taken to contain or disperse the oil that spilled from the
             Metula. Operations were hampered by rough weather, logistical difficulties
             and financial responsibility. For this reason, the Metula spill area became a
             natural laboratory for studying the long-term effects of oil on the
             environment.

             Consideration had been given to cleanup. Boom was expected to be
             ineffective due to the strong currents and tides. Chemical dispersants and the
             equipment to apply them were not available. They would have been difficult
             to use and possibly ineffective due to the weather and tidal conditions. It was
             estimated that 5,000 tons of dispersant chemicals would have been required to
             disperse the quantity of oil spilled from the Metula. Lack of cleanup
             equipment and personnel would have made an effective beach cleanup
             impossible. Much of the affected shoreline was inaccessible to heavy
             equipment, even if the equipment had been available. There was also
             considerable concern about the possible damage to the environment caused
             by cleanup with chemicals or mechanical equipment.
             Chilean authorities decided that cleanup of the beaches was not warranted, in
             view of other economic needs and the relative ecological importance of the
             area. It was felt that there was no way to have prevented the pollution of the
             beaches, and that the response effort was better spent on re-floating the vessel
             and preventing further spillage of oil.

             Four lightering operations were carried out to remove enough of the
             remaining cargo from the vessel to facilitate re-floating. All three of the
             USCG Air-Deliverable Anti-Pollution Transfer System (ADAPTS) lightering
             pumps were used during all phases of the offloading and ballasting.
             Following the lightering operations, air was pumped into sealed
             compartments. As the air was pumped in, the ADAPTS pumps continued to



             Metula                                  2








                   pump out ballast water in an effort to lighten and re-float the vessel. Two
                   attempts were made, but the tugs were unable to pull it free of the rocks. On
                   September 24, during a period of fifty knot winds, the Metula floated free and
                   was pulled to a pre-selected anchorage approximately 13 miles from Punta
                   Baxa. Offloading continued, despite periods of gale and hurricane force
                   winds, until October 10. The USCG personnel and equipment departed the
                   area on October 19.

                   Other Special Interest Issues:

                   Marine birds were very heavily affected by the spill. Observations during a
                   September 14 to 16 survey conducted between Punta Anegada and Punta
                   Piedra (nearly. fifty miles of impacted beach), found 581 dead birds. This
                   number included 84 seagulls, 23 ducks, 66 penguins, and 408 cormorants.
                   Estimates of bird mortality ran as high as 2,000. A penguin migration from
                   the Atlantic Ocean to rookery islands in the Strait of Magellan was a primary
                   concern to scientists at the time of the spill. A worst-case scenario involved
                   migration of tens of thousands of penguins. When this migration did finally
                   occur in mid-September, the leaking from the Metula was stabilized and most
                   of the spilled oil had already beached on the shore or in the estuaries.

                   USCG National Strike Force (NSF) personnel were sent to the site of the
                   grounding at the request of the Chilean government. Ten people were on-
                   scene to support and guide any cleanup measures that might be undertaken,
                   and to assist with the salvage and lightering operations of the vessel. They
                   arrived in Punta Arenas on August 27 with three Air-Deliverable Anti-
                   Pollution Transfer System (ADAPTS) and their supporting gear.
                   Personnel from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
                   (NOAA) arrived at the site of the grounding five months after the incident,
                   during January 1975, as part of a U.S. team that included representatives of
                   the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the USCG. The team
                   studied the effects of the oil on the habitats and marine life that were
                   impacted by the spill.




















                                                           3                                 Metula










            References;


            98/9/91 & 8/28/91 Letters from Daniel Owen at ITOPF
            *Gundlach, E. and Marshall, M. 1990. The Physical Persistence of Spilled Oil:
            An Analysis of Oil Spills Previous to Exxon Valdez. Final Report. HAZMAT.
            OAD. NOAA. pp. 9-19.
            -Gundlach, et al. 1978. Some Guidelines for Oil-Spill Control in Coastal
            Environments, Based-on Field Studies of Four Oil Spills. Chemical
            Dispersants for the Control of Oil Spills, ASTM STP 659. L.T. McCarthy, Jr.,
            G.P. Lindblom, and H.F. Walter, Eds. American Society for Testing and
            Materials. pp. 98-118.
            oGundlach, et al. 1982. Persistence of METULA Oil in the Strait of Magellan
            Six and One-Half Years After the Incident. The Physical Persistence of Spilled
            Oil: An Analysis of Oil Spills Previous to Exxon Valdez. Final Report.
            HAZMAT. OAD. NOAA. pp. A53-A64-
            oGunnerson, C.G. and Peter, G. 1976. The Metula Oil Spill. NOAA Special
            Report. September 1976.
            oHann, R.W. 1977. fate of oil from the supertanker Metula., Oil Spill
            Conference Proceedings 1977, pp. 465-468.
            *Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
            1987.
            oMMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
            *Owens, et al. 1987. Observations From a Visit to the Metula Spill 12 Years
            After the Incident. Environment Canada. Spill Technology Newsletter. v.12.
            pp. 83-92.
            eReview of Oil Spill Occurrences and Impacts, Exxon Production Research
            Company, 1989.
            oStraughan, D. 1976. Biological Survey of Intertidal Areas in the Strait of
            Magellan in January 1975, Five Months After the Metula Oil Spill. The
            Physical Persistence of Spilled Oil: An Analysis of Oil Spills Previous to Exxon
            Valdez. Final Report. HAZMAT. OAD. NOAA. pp. A65-A78.
            *Tanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers.
            T.A.C. Inc. 1991.
            oVandermeulen, J.H. 1982. Oil Spills: What Have We Learned? Oil and
            Dispersants in Canadian Seas-Research Appraisal and Recommendations.
            Environnient Canada. pp. 29-46.


















            Metula






                                                                                                                    0



                      Name of Spill: Mobiloil
                      Date of Spill (mmddyy): 03/19/84                                                              0
                      Location of Spill: Warrior Rock, Columbia River, near Portland, Oregon
                      Latitude: 45 51 N
                      Longitude: 122 47 W
                      Oil Product: Heavy residual oil, industrial fuel oil, No. 6 Fuel Oil
                      Oil Type: Type 4
                      Barrels: 3925                                                                                 0
                      Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                      Resources at Risk: Wildlife refuge, deer, raptors, industrial water intakes,
                      high-use recreational fishing areas, commercial fisheries, crab nursery areas,
                      seal population concentration areas, waterfowl, waterfowl nesting beaches,
                      waterfowl migratory routes, oysters, clams, recreational beaches, anadromous
                      fish, spawning streams.                                                                       4
                      Dispersants: No
                      Bioremediation: No
                      In-situ Burning: No
                      Other Special Interest: Research conducted.
                      Shoreline Types Impacted: Marshes, fine sand beaches, vegetated riverbanks.
                      Keywords: Volunteers, sub-surface oil, boom, manual removal, reoiling,
                      International Bird Rescue and Research Center (IBRRC), contingency plan,
                      cannonball diaper sampler.

                      Incident Summary:

                      The Tank Vessel Mobiloil, while en route from Ferndale, Washington to
                      Portland, Oregon, suffered a steering failure at 0005 on March 19, 1984 which
                      resulted in the grounding of the vessel near Warrior Rock in the Columbia
                      River approximately 10 miles downstream from Portland, Oregon. Punctures
                      and gashes ruptured the number 1-5 starboard cargo tanks releasing 3,925
                      barrels of heavy residual oil, industrial fuel oil, and No. 6 fuel oil.

                      The vessel remained grounded perpendicular to the current until March 26,
                      when it was refloated and escorted to dry dock in Portland. At the time of the
                      spill the wind was from the south and the river current velocities were 1.5-3.0
                      knots. The incident occurred in a turbulent area of the river that experiences
                      some tidal influence.


                      Behavior of Oil:

                      No. 6 fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to 14.
                      Spilled oil was distributed on the surface of the river, throughout the water
                      column, and on the river bottom. The shoreline was not impacted as severely
                      as anticipated. Areas thought to be thick oil were actually sheen. The only
                      black oil observed on the surface occurred as small tar balls that were
                      commonly found clinging to debris.

                      The sinking nature of the oil made estimates of the spill size difficult. Initial
                      Mobil and USCG estimates of 1,000 barrels were revised after additional




                                                                                                Mobiloil









              information suggested that the majority of the oil had been incorporated into
              the water column and in the river bed. The primary transport mechanism
              for spilled oil was the flow of the Columbia River.

              Shoreline areas downstream from the spill site were impacted by surface oil.
              These areas included sandy beaches, sloughs and islands. Beached oil was
              commonly found mixed with debris. Fluctuations in river height stranded
              oil on the river banks and caused re-oiling of affected areas.

              A significant amount of oil remained on the surface and moved rapidly
              downstream. Surface oil exited the river or was trapped along the shoreline
              within two or three days. Southerly winds tended to concentrate the oil on
              the northern side of the river causing shoreline impacts mainly on the
              Washington shorelines. Pancake shaped tarballs of up to 6 inches in diameter
              impacted some downstream locations.

              Sub-surface oil moved downstream in the same manner as the surface oil
              within a meter of the bottom. iffid-water oils rose to the surface in the area of
              seawater intrusion. Oil on the river bottom formed a pool in the eddy area
              created by the hull of the Mobiloil. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
              Administration (NOAA) personnel estimated the pool to contain between
              250 and 1,000 barrels of oil. This oil moved downstream when the vessel was
              refloated.

              Predicted flushing rates for the spilled oil ranged from a few days for surface
              oil to several weeks for bottom concentrations. Spilled materials that exited
              the river were deflected north within the river plume and impacted the
              beaches of the Washington coast mainly in the form of tarballs. Long-term
              trajectory estimates by NOAA personnel suggested the possibility of widely
              scattered tarball impacts on the beaches to the south of the river due to
              seasonal changes in the prevailing currents along the coastline.

              Countermeasures and Mitigation:
              Due to the swift current conditions, open water recovery was not effective.
              Much of the oil escaped under booms placed downstream from the vessel.
              The distribution of oil throughout the water column made recovery difficult.

              Environmental Emergency Services (EES) was contracted by Mobil Oil to
              conduct the cleanup operation. The local experience and knowledge of the
              river provided by EES personnel proved valuable in placing booms in the
              dark. Shoreline cleanup was accomplished through manual removal of oil
              and debris. Cleanup operations were hampered by strong currents, the
              inaccessibility of many impacted areas, and the large quantities of debris
              involved. The shoreline cleanup operation extended over a distance of 120
              miles. Cleanup crews were transported to many sites by boat. Heavy
              equipment was used in areas that contained very large amounts of oiled
              debris. Heavy equipment operations at areas not accessible from shore
              required a crane barge, storage barge, and bulldozer. Oil on hatchery ponds
              was recovered with sorbent rolls.



              Mobiloil                                 2









                       There were no reported attempts to recover oil in the water column.
                       Discovery of the oil that sank to the river bottom was attempted by lowering
                       weighted sorbents to the bottom. This method proved successful when oil
                       escaped from the vessel during dry docking.

                       Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (ODEQ) estimated that 3,000
                       cubic yards of oiled debris were removed from Washington shorelines during
                       the effort that recovered a total of 833 barrels of oil. NOAA personnel
                       reported low oil-to-debris ratios for the riverbank recovery and higher (up to
                       60%) ratios for the outer beaches. Mobil estimates of the volume recovered
                       were based on two gallons of oil in each 20 gallon plastic bag of debris.

                       NOAA personnel conducted a fate and effects study which concluded that the
                       initial Mobil spill estimate of 1,000 barrels was too low, and that as of April 2
                       the majority of the oil had either been recovered or flushed from the river.
                       Analysis of water samples found no presence of the highly toxic water soluble
                       fractions. Heavy aromatics were found in the tissue of sturgeon, and data
                       indicated that naphthalenes could be dissolved in water. The National
                       Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) conducted benthic sampling and
                       monitoring of fishes and Dungeness Crab by trawl survey.

                       The Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife (ODFW) monitored fish by test-
                       fishing and continued annual monitoring of spring Chinook salmon runs.
                       The ODEQ updated the Columbia River Oil Spill Contingency Plan. The U.S.
                       Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) performed continued monitoring of
                       impacts on seabirds. Washington Department of Ecology (WDOE) conducted
                       chemical monitoring of fishes and shoreline surveys. WDOE and
                       Washington Department of Fisheries (WDF) staff deployed cages containing
                       live fish to monitor toxicity. No mortality was observed during these 96-hour
                       tests.

                       Due to the number of Federal and state agencies having jurisdiction in the
                       Columbia River, a meeting was called on March 23 to coordinate the effort.
                       The meeting involved Federal agency representatives from the Department
                       of Interior (DOI), USCG, and NOAA, as well as state agencies from Oregon
                       and Washington. The state agencies and DOI representatives were to
                       continue biological assessment and record any oil impacts. NOAA personnel
                       continued to study the transport, trajectory, and fate of the oil, and acted as
                       central coordinator for all agencies. NOAA also developed an environmental
                       sampling plan to ensure that any research gaps would be filled.

                       Other Special Interest Issues:

                       There was wide agreement among the agencies involved that the presence of
                       a Columbia River Oil Spill Contingency Plan expedited the organization of
                       the cleanup and resource assessment. The quick response and assumption of
                       liability by Mobil Oil allowed Federal and the state agencies to concentrate on
                       monitoring and data collection. The agencies agreed to share information
                       and coordinate research activities regarding the fate and effects of the spill.



                                                                3                                  mobiloil









               The resulting study was planned and executed within a few days. NOAA
               pursued the methodology used for possible future operating procedures.

               Seabirds and waterfowl were impacted along the river and on the outer coast.
               Reports of the number of affected birds range from 698 birds received, 475
               treated and released (NOAA) to 450 received and 284 released (Mobil).
               Species involved were Western Grebes, Surf Scoters, Common Murres,
               White-winged Scoters, and Black Scoters. Initially, bird cleaning and
               treatment were carried out by personnel from the Portland Audubon Society
               until a rescue center could be established by the International Bird Rescue
               Research Center. No effects on Bald Eagles or Snowy Plovers were observed.

               Recovery of oiled birds involved the use of volunteers, USCG personnel,
               Audubon Society members, and representatives from the International Bird
               Rescue Research Center. Initially, volunteers collected and transported the
               birds to the centers. Due to the large area involved, the USCG agreed to
               collect and transport any birds brought to their stations. Sixty-three to sixty-
               eight per cent of the birds taken to the centers were reportedly treated and
               released.

               Catches of various fish were received by state agencies including sturgeon,
               petrale sole, and surf perch. Chemical sampling of sturgeon showed high
               concentrations of heavy naphthalenes. Oiling of shellfish beds on the coastal
               beaches occurred at Willapa Bay and Grays Harbor. The oiling of oyster shell
               material at Grays Harbor was considered a minimal loss of substrate for
               juvenile oyster recruitment. Two reports of oiling proved to be natural
               occurrences, one of jellyfish (Vellela) and the second, an algal bloom.

               The resources at risk included harbor seal populations that contained mostly
               pregnant females preparing to pup, the immediate scheduled hatchery release
               of several million juvenile salmon, the Lewis and Clark National Wildlife
               Refuge, and the Columbia Whitetail Deer National Wildlife Refuge. Several
               threatened or endangered species including the Bald Eagle, Snowy Plover,
               Columbia Whitetail Deer, and Peregrine Falcon were of concern. Feeding and
               nursery areas for shellfish, fish, birds, and mammals occur along the river
               and the coastal beaches. Also at risk were resources important to sport and
               commercial fisheries.

               Oil in the water column caused the contamination of the water intake system
               of one industrial facility. Filters on the system were alternately cleaned to
               mitigate any further potential problem. Hatchery ponds at the Trojan
               Nuclear Power Plant were oiled with sheen. The salmon that were
               introduced to the ponds the day of the incident were examined nine days later
               and found to be within acceptable physiological limits.









               Mobiloil


4W












                      References:

                      *Fate and effects of the Mobiloil spill in the Columbia River, NOAA
                      *Park, W.C. 1985. Response to the Mobiloil spill incident, Oil Spill Conference
                      Proceedings, 1985, pp. 335-339
                      *Sutherland, G.B. 1985. The value of natural resource protection plans under
                      actual spill conditions, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1985, pp. 93-96.
                                                                                                                40




























































                                                             5                               Mobiloil








                   Name of Spill: Nestucca
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 12/23/88
                   Location of Spill: Grays Harbor, Washington
                   Latitude: 46 55 N
                   Longitude: 124 15 W
                   Oil Product: Bunker C
                   Oil Type: Type 4
                   Barrels: 5,500
                   Source of Spill: Tank Barge
                   Resources at Risk: Eelgrass, diving coastal birds, waterfowl, shorebirds,
                   wading birds, raptors, seals, sea otters, oysters, crabs, clams, commercial
                   fisheries.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: Yes
                   Other Special Interest: Closure of commercial fishing areas, effects to
                   recreational areas, interaction with foreign or Native authorities,
                   experimental cleanup techniques, volunteer response and organization,
                   wildlife impacts, wildlife rehabilitation.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Marshes, sand/gravel beaches, tidal mudflats,
                   exposed rocky shores, vertical rocky shores.
                   Keywords: International Bird Rescue and Research Center (IBRRC), oil
                   snares, pompoms, sub-surface oil, manual removal, vegetation cutting,
                   collision, disposal, volunteers.
0                  Incident Summary:

                   In the early morning of December 23, 1988, the tug Ocean Service collided
                   with its tow, the barge Nestucca, while trying to replace a broken tow line.
                   Both the barge and tug were owned by Sause Brothers Ocean Towing Co. of
0                  Coos Bay, Oregon and were en route from Ferndale, Washington to Portland,
                   Oregon when the collision occurred approximately 3 kilometers off the coast
                   of Washington, near Grays Harbor. The barge was carrying over 69,000 barrels
                   of Number 6 fuel oil. The tug punctured a cargo tank, releasing an estimated
                   5500 barrels of the heavy marine fuel into the ocean. It was an overcast,
0                  moonlit night and the vessels were reportedly rolling in 6 to 10 foot swells.
                   Behavior of Oil:

                   Bunker C fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to
                   14. The oil began to impact the beaches in Grays Harbor on the morning of
0                  the spill, and was reported to be spreading to the north. By noon on
                   December 23, 1988, USCG personnel at Westport reported that beaches inside
                   Grays Harbor were covered with 1/2 inch thick patches of oil. Washington
                   Department of Ecology (DOE) representatives reported that oil was washing
                   ashore near Ocean Shores, Washington. Offshore oil was observed mainly in
                   the form of light sheen with small patches and pancakes of oil. The oil
0                  impacted several coastal beaches in the area of Ocean Shores in the first five
                   days. No oil from this spill was observed on beaches south of Grays Harbor.


0                                                          1                                Nestucca








             first five days. No oil from this spill was observed on beaches south of Grays
             Harbor.

             The oil moving north formed sheen; however, it was later determined that a
             substantial slick was moving beneath the surface. The initial estimates of the
             amount spilled were inaccurate and only small globules of oil could be
             detected at sea by December 29, 1988.

             Oil came ashore in Canada on Vancouver Island from near Victoria in the
             southeast to near Cape Scott in the north. Along the coastline, the CCG
             estimated that a total of about 95 miles of shoreline were oiled, with 1.5 miles
             heavily oiled. The first impact of oil was on December 31, 1988, at Carmanah
             Point, on the west coast of Vancouver Island. Over the next 15 days, the oil
             reached to Cape Scott at the northwest tip of Vancouver Island. On January
             27, 1989, oiled material, determined to be from the Nestucca, was found in the                        41
             Moore Islands area on the mainland of British Columbia.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:
             There was no attempt made at open water recovery by Canadian or U.S.                                  0
             authorities. High seas and currents precluded the use of containment booms,
             as did the fact that the oil was frequently not detected at sea before beaching.
             The use of skimmers and other methods of oil recovery were deemed to be
             ineffective as surface oil was not contained in booms. The USCG On-Scene
             Coordinator (OSC) did not seek authorization for dispersant use because
             approval was unlikely, and use of dispersants on Bunker C oil would likely be                         0
             ineffective after the considerable weathering of the oil.
             Grays Harbor consists of marshes and tidal flats, mostly mudflats. The
             Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC) from the National Oceanic and
             Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) recommended that no cleanup of the                                  0
             mudflats be attempted.

             The U.S. National Park Service (NPS) strictly monitored helicopter use in the
             Olympic National Park, Washington, area due to the presence of Bald Eagles
             in the area. Many of the affected locations along the northern part of the
             Washington coastline were extremely inaccessible to vehicles and cleanup
             equipment. Some oiled driftwood had to be cut up and removed by
             helicopter for disposal. Cleanup personnel needed special permission from
             the NPS to use power tools within the Olympic National Park grounds.

             Most of the shoreline cleanup was manual. Oiled debris and gravel were
             shoveled and raked into plastic bags that were eventually sling-loaded by
             helicopter to a disposal site (or trucked if the area was accessible by roads).
             Petromesh, oil snares, and oil-absorbing pompoms were used to scrape and
             absorb oil from the boulders, eelgrass, and beach sand.
             Cleanup of the shoreline was completed by April 21, 1989, when most of
             Washington's beaches were declared clean by the OSC. Passive cleaning using




             Nestitcca                                2








                  anchored oil snares continued at Norwegian Memorial and Yellow Bank for
                  another two months. Both sites are witl-dn Olympic National Park.

                  Other Special Interest Issues:

                  Several experimental techniques were tested for use in cleaning up the
                  shoreline. Under experimental conditions at the CCG Base at Amphirite
                  Point, napalm was used to burn oil off contaminated rocks. This was not put
0                 to real use during the spill because the napalm did not burn enough of the oil
                  during the tests. At Bajo Point, flame throwers (Tiger Torches) were tested on
                  the environmentally sensitive cobble beach. This was not used during the
                  cleanup because it moved the oil, risking the formation of new slicks on the
                  water and the contamination of the gravel substrata.

                  At Bajo Point, a beach near a sea otter colony, an archaeological site, and an
                  Indian Reserve, oil contaminated cobbles and gravel were burned in a
                  reciprocating kiln between February 20 and 25. This was inefficient because of
                  both the small amount of oil and huge quantity of contaminated material
                  requiring treatment. At several locations heavily oiled logs were burned.
                  These included some important tourist beaches and several islands in the
                  Pacific Rim National Park. On West Coast Trail beaches, oiled logs were
                  experimentally burned on oiled gravel, burning to a depth of half a meter.
                  This method was then put in practice at Estevan, Brooks Peninsula, Nootka
                  Island, and islands within Pacific Rim National Park in the Broken Group
                  Islands. In the Stubbs Island area, contaminated eelgrass was cut and
                  removed during low tide. The eelgrass is a crucial link in the food chain in
                  this ecosystem.

                  Oiled debris and logs were burned at sites approved by the Washington DOE.
                  Approximately 585 tons of non-burnable debris was disposed of in the
                  Aberdeen, Washington landfill.

                  Sea otters, harbor seals, Pacific oysters, and Dungeness crabs are also present,
                  and were believed to be at risk. In the coastal waters, marine diving birds and
                  the coastal razor clam fisheries were believed to be at risk. While high
                  mortality was not expected among the crabs and clams, their tainting would
                  make them unfit for harvesting for months.

                  The most disastrous impact as a result of the spill was to waterfowl. Many
                  species of waterfowl are present in Grays Harbor, including Double-crested
                  and Pelagic Cormorants, Common Murres, Rhinoceros Auklets, diving and
Z                 dabbling ducks and assorted shorebirds. Overwintering Peregrine Falcons and
                  Bald Eagles are also present in the bay. More than 10,300 oiled birds were
                  collected; roughly 9,300 were dead or died at the treatment centers. Most of
                  these were Common Murres and assorted grebes (Western, Red-necked,
                  Horned and Eared Grebes all winter in this area). Many more were believed
                  to have died and never collected.

                  The responsible party hired an expert from the International Bird Rescue
                  Research Center (IBRRC) who used volunteers and personnel from the



                                                        3                              Nestucca








            Washington Department of Ecology (DOE) and the Washington Conservation
            Corps (WCC) to staff the bird rescue and rehabilitation center at Ocean Shores,
            Washington. Over 3,000 birds were treated at the center, two-thdrds of which
            died. Approximately 1,000 birds. were released from the center.

            The Bald Eagle, fish, shellfish, and sea otter communities that were at risk
            were determined to be unaffected by the spill or response by the Washington
            Marine Resource Damage Assessment Team. No tainting of shellfish was
            reported nor were any fisheries reportedly closed as a result of the spill. On
            January 6, 1989, the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans closed two
            shellfish areas on Vancouver Island to prevent possibly contaminated
            shellfish from reaching the market.

            References

            eGundlach, E. and Marshall, M. 1990. The Physical Persistence of Spilled Oil:
            An Analysis of Oil Spills Previous to Exxon Valdez. Final Report. HAZMAT.
            OAD. NOAA. pp. 47-68.
            *Nestucca Oil Spill Report, Canadian Coast Guard, June 1989
            *NOAA Response Report
            *Owens, E.H. 1991. Shoreline Evaluation Methods Developed During the
            Nestucca Response in British Columbia. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings,
            1991, pp. 177-179.
            *U.S. Coast Guard On-Scene Coordinator's Report
            *Washington State Department of Ecology, Nestucca Oil Spill On-Scene                         41
            Coordinator's Report, August 1989.
            eYaroch, G.N. 1991. The Nestucca Major Oil Spill: A Christmas Story, Oil
            Spill Conference Proceedings, 1991, pp. 263-266.




























            Nestucca








                   Name of Spill: Nord Pacific
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 07/13/88
                   Location of Spill: Inner Harbor, Corpus Christi, Texas
                   Latitude: 27 48.7 N
                   Longitude: 097 24.8 W
                   Oil Product: Beatrice (North Sea) crude oil
                   Oil Type: Type 2
                   Barrels: 15,350
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Power plant water intakes, marshes.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Closure of shipping lanes or vehicle traffic routes.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Piers, marshes.
                   Keywords: Atlantic Strike Team (AST), containment boom, vacuum truck,
                   evaporation, propane cannons, air horns, volunteers, sorbents, filter fence,
                   Regional Response Team, Elastol, low pressure washing.

                   Incident Summary:

                   On the night of July 13, 1988, the Nord Pacific suffered hull damage while
                   docking at the Southwestern Oil and Refinery Dock #3, on the south side of
                   the inner harbor, Corpus Christi, Texas. The collision with the dock tore an 8
                   foot by 1 foot hole in the No. 6 port wing tank about one foot above the
                   waterline. The Nord Pacific was carrying 625,000 barrels of Beatrice crude oil,
                   15,350 barrels of which spilled into the harbor before the tank could be
                   pumped down. The spill response began immediately and lasted until July
                   22. This spill was a textbook case of things that went well, including favorable
                   weather conditions, no fire at the time of collision, rapid response, minimum
                   resources at risk, direct access to all impacted areas, and small tidal range in a
                   dead-end harbor.


                   Behavior of Oil:

                   Beatrice crude is a medium weight crude with a specific gravity of 0.83 and a
                   pour point of 13 degrees Celsius. An estimated twenty five percent of the oil
                   evaporated in the first two days of the spill, and by the end of the third day all
                   free-floating oil in the harbor had been removed. Of the 15,350 barrels spilled,
                   11,344 barrels, (74%) were recovered. The oil slick was contained in a 2.6 mile
                   long section of the inner harbor with most oil impacts on the north bank.
                   Rocks and beaches were cleaned with relative ease. One hundred eighteen
                   cubic yards of oiled debris were collected.









                                                                                         Nord Pacific









             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             Utara Shipping, the owner of the tanker, assumed responsibility for the spill.
             They contracted Corpus Christi Area Oil Spill Association and Miller
             Environmental Services to clean up the spill. Personnel from Garner Marine
             Services, and later, from O'Brien Oil Pollution Services, were hired to
             manage the contractors and coordinate with the United States Coast Guard
             (USCG). Within one hour after the collision with the dock, 1,400 feet of
             containment boom was in place around the vessel. Oil from the damaged
             tank was pumped into an empty tank, and within minutes after the boom
             was in place the vessel stopped leaking oil. Less than two hours later, two
             vacuum trucks were removing oil from the harbor.

             The Atlantic Strike Team (AST) was activated and arrived on scene July 14.
             By the early morning of July 14, three vacuum trucks were operating on
             scene, and 4,000 feet of boom stretched across the harbor at three separate
             locations. At the height of the response, 20 vacuum trucks were operating.
             Overflights began to survey the cleanup. A small quantity of oil entered a
             power plant water intake despite precautionary booming, and was discharged
             into Nueces Bay. The Nueces Bay slick dissipated rapidly. On July 16, the On
             Scene Coordinator (OSC) received permission from the Regional Response
             Team (RRT) to apply Elastol, an oil viscoelastic enhancing agent, to the slick.
             Conditions for use included conducting an initial test phase and continuous
             monitoring of the application. Due to the effectiveness of other response
             measures, Elastol was never used.

             From July 17 to July 22 the response personnel focused on removing oiled
             debris, and further cleaning of two marsh areas. On July 19, a filterfence was
             put up at the Tule Lake marsh area, which worked effectively in protecting
             that area. Sorbents were deployed at the Centex Cement marsh area on July
             21. The response ended on July 22.

             Other Special Interest Issues:

             The Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP) closed the Corpus Christi Inner
             Harbor to vessel traffic from July 13 to July 18. One-way, daytime traffic was
             permitted on July 16. Traffic from the spill area was closely monitored to
             ensure that oiled vessels were clean before entering unoiled areas.

             Texas Parks and Wildlife, Texas Water Commission, and United States Fish
             and Wildlife Service (FWS) monitored the spills effects on fish and
             waterfowl. The FWS coordinated volunteers to operate propane cannons and
             air horns in efforts to keep birds away from oiled areas. There were few
             impacts to fish and wildlife. The FWS continued to monitor the marshes
             after the spill response ended.







             Nord Paci c                            2
                     fi                                                                                    0











                  References:

                  e Alejandro, CAPT A.C. and Crickard, LT A.M. 1989. Corpus Christi
                  Catastrophe: Case of Classic Cleanup, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings,
                  1989,'pp. 71-76.
                  *Golobs 1978-1989 US Spill Report
                  *MMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
0                 *OSIR Oil Spills, International Summary & Review, 1986-1988
                  -,OSIR, August 1, 1988, Vol. XI, No.31
                  *Tanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers. T.A.C.
                  Inc. 1991.
                  *USCG On-Scene Coordinators Report
                  -World Information Systems. Tanker Losses in U.S. Waters: 1978-1990.
                  World Information Systems. 1991.




































                                                        3                           Nord Pacific








                     Name of Spill: Nowruz Oil Field
                     Date of Spill (mmddyy): 02/10/83
                     Location of Spill: Persian Gulf, Iran                                                      0
                     Latitude: 29 32 N
                     Longitude: 049 35 E
                     Oil Product: Crude oil
                     Oil Type: Type 3
                     Barrels: 1,904,762
                     Source of Spill: Platforms                                                                 0
                     Resources at Risk: Power plant water intakes, drinking water intakes,
                     industrial water intakes, mangroves, salt marshes, sand/gravel beaches,
                     intertidal mudflats, seagrass beds, coral reefs, fishes, waterfowl, shrimp,
                     oysters, shorebirds, bird wintering areas, bird migratory stopover areas,
                     wading birds, crabs.                                                                       41
                     Dispersants: No
                     Bioremediation: No
                     In-situ Burning: No
                     Other Special Interest: Human health and safety concerns.
                     Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches.
                     Keywords: Booms, skimmers, fire, collision.                                                0

                     Incident Summary:

                     In 1983, the Nowruz Oil Field in the Persian Gulf, Iran, was involved in a
                     number of oil pollution incidents. On February 10, 1983, a tanker collided
                     with a platform. The platform developed a 45-degree tilt and had to be shut                41
                     down. Wave action and corrosion apparently caused the riser to collapse into
                     the wellhead causing a spill of approximately 1,500 barrels per day. The well
                     was not capped because the field was in the middle of the Iran/Iraq war zone.
                     This platform was attacked by Iraqi planes in March and the resulting slick
                     caught fire. This well was capped by the Iranians on September 18, 1983.                   0
                     Eleven people were killed during the operation.

                     In March 1983, a nearby platform was attacked with rockets by Iraqi
                     helicopters. The platform burned and spilled oil at an initial rate of
                     approximately 5,000 barrels per day. The rate slowed to about 1,500 barrels per
                     day in the two years before the well was capped. In May 1985, the fire was                 0
                     extinguished and the well was plugged with the assistance of divers. Nine
                     men died during these operations. Approximately 733,000 barrels of oil
                     spilled into the sea as a result of this incident. It is estimated that the rate of
                     oil leaking into the Persian Gulf in mid-May of 1983 was between 4,000 and
                     10,000 barrels per day due to more war-related activity or the collapse of
                     burning platforms.










                                                                                       Nowruz Oil Field









            As a result of this incident, a cooperative program for large-scale trajectory
            modeling was developed between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
            Administration and Kuwait's Environment Protection Council under the
            Ministry of Public Health.

            Behavior of Oil:

            The Nowruz field crude oil had an API gravity of 22. Detailed information of
            the movement of the oil was not readily available since much of the slick was
            in a restricted war zone. An estimated 2/3 of the oil sank to the bottom as
            tarballs after sand carried by high winds mixed with the oil.

            Countermeasures and Mitigation:
            Norpol, a Norwegian company, used booms and skimmers in responding to
            the spill.

            References:

            *Galt, et al. 1983. Trajectory Analysis for the Nowruz Oil Spill with Specific
            Applications to Kuwait. MASS, HAZMAT, NOAA.
            eIFP. PLATFORM DATABANK On Accidents to Drilling Vessels or Offshore
            Platforms (1955-1989).
            *Oil Spill Intelligence Report, 2/21/91.
            *Oil Spill Intelligence Report. Oil Spills, International Summary & Review,
            1982-1985.





































            Nowruz Oil Field                     2








                   Name of Spill: Ocean Eagle
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 03/03/68
                   Location of Spill: San Juan, Puerto Rico
                   Latitude: 18 29 N
                   Longitude: 066 10 W
                   Oil Product: Venezuelan light crude oil
                   Oil Type: Type 2
                   Baff els: 83,400
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Recreational beaches, diving coastal birds, lobster, fish,
                   octopus.
                   Dispersants: Yes
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Effects to tourism, closure of shipping lanes or vehicle
                   traffic routes, effects to recreation areas, volunteer response and organization,
                   wildlife impacts, wildlife rehabilitation, adverse weather conditions.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches, exposed rocky shores.
                   Keywords: Sorbents, manual removal, emsulfier, sinking.

                   Incident Summary:

                   On the morning of March 3, 1968, the tanker Ocean Eagle grounded in the
                   harbor of San Juan, Puerto Rico. The vessel broke in two several hours after
                   the grounding, spilling Venezuelan light crude oil into the harbor. The aft
                   section of the vessel drifted farther into the harbor and grounded, while the
                   forward section was anchored in place. Three days later, U. S. Navy tugs tried
                   to tow the forward section out of the harbor. Adverse weather hindered the
                   operation, and eventually drove the forward section farther into the harbor.
                   On March 10, the forward section broke open in heavy seas and released more
                   oil into the water. By the first week of April, both parts of the tanker were
                   lightered and towed out to sea where they were sunk.

                   Behavior of Oil:

                   Over 70,000 barrels of oil spilled into the San Juan Harbor. A slick one inch
                   thick covered most of the harbor. Approximately 16 miles of Condado
                   beaches were oiled.

                   Countermeasures and Mitigation:

                   Representatives from the USCG, the United States Navy (USN), the Federal
                   Water Pollution Control Administration, and the United States Army Corps
                   of Engineers (COE) arrived on-scene to assist in the response. Spill response
                   included the use of sorbents, dispersants, and mechanical and manual
                   removal of the oil from beaches. The U. S. Navy began spraying the
                   emidsifier Wyandot 20 on the slick on the afternoon of March 3. Emulsifiers
                   were spread in Condado Lagoon on April 8. While the emulsifiers used were
                   effective, it was not clear that they did not complicate the effects of the oil on
                   the environment. Ekoperl, an absorbent, was spread on the slick.


                                                          1                           Ocean Eagle








             Murphy Pacific Marine Salvage Company, under contract to the U. S. Army
             Corps of Engineers, was responsible for the offloading and removal of the
             stern section, while the U.S. Navy was responsible for the bow. On April 3,
             the Navy finished lightering operations after recovering approximately 24,000
             barrels of oil, and towed the bow off its grounding location. The bow was
             sunk eight miles from San Juan on the next day, but continued to leak some
             oil. On April 15, the stern section was towed off its grounding location, and
             was also sunk eight miles out to sea.

             Other Special Interest Issues:

             Dispersants turned portions of the beaches into quicksand.
             A bird rehabilitation center was operated by USCG volunteers, and treated 70
             pelicans. Other bird rescue stations were established and staffed by tourist and
             civilian volunteers from San Juan. Approximately 300 pelicans were killed
             by oiling. A marine biologist from the University of Puerto Rico reported
             mortalities among sea urchins, spiny lobsters, and fish. Dead octopuses were
             also found.

             Hotels along the beaches received many cancellations, and some closed down
             during the worst part of the spill.

             Suspension of fishing was recommended by the Puerto Rican Department of
             Health, and most commercial and recreational fishermen complied.

             The USCG temporarily closed the channel into San Juan Harbor during the
             days following the grounding and while the sections were towed from the
             harbor.


             References:


             -8/9/91 & 8/28/91 Letters from Daniel Owen at ITOPF
             *Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
             1987.
             oPotter, J. 1973. Disaster By Oil. The Macmillan Company, NY. pp. 44-116.
             sTanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers. T.A.C.
             Inc. 1991.
             -Wilson, M.P. Jr., et al., "The Spreading, Retention and Clean-up of Oil
             Spills," URI, Kingston, RI, 1976.












             Ocean Eagle








                    Name of Spill: Olympic Alliance
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 11/12/75
                    Location of Spill: Dover Strait, Pas de Calais, English Channel                           40
                    Latitude: 50 59 N
                    Longitude: 00135 W
                    Oil Product: Iranian light crude oil
                    Oil Type: Type 2
                    Barrels: 87,000
                    Source of Spill: Tank Vessel                                                              40
                    Resources at Risk: Recreation beaches, power plant water intakes, marinas,
                    welk, alcids, fish.
                    Dispersants: Yes
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: No                                                                       is
                    Other Special Interest: Adverse weather conditions, logistical or operational
                    problems, wildlife impacts, wildlife rehabilitation.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches, coarse gravel beaches,
                    Keywords: BP 110OX, skimmer, Shell Oil Herder, collision, International
                    Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF).

                    Incident Summary:

                    Shortly after midnight on the morning of November 12, 1975, the tank vessel
                    Olympic Alliance and the Royal Navy Frigate, HMS Achilles collided in
                    Dover Strait. The collision occurred in the northeast traffic lane about 13
                    miles southeast of Dover, England. One of the Olympic Alliance's cargo tanks              0
                    was ruptured on impact resulting in the release of 14,000 barrels of Iranian
                    crude oil. The vessels were able to separate without assistance. Visibility at
                    the time of the collision was restricted by fog.
                    Response equipment and personnel were mobilized immediately in                            0
                    accordance with the local contingency plans. Vessels from a variety of sources
                    were obtained for use in the application of dispersant. The Kent County
                    Counsel (KCC) Oil Pollution Officer activated the county's contingency plan
                    and arranged for three fishing vessels to be equipped with dispersant spraying
                    equipment. The District Councils, Southern Water Authority, Nature
                    Conservancy Council, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Sea                      0
                    Fisheries Officer, as well as the coastal power stations were all alerted of the
                    incident. The forward base of operations was established at Dover.

                    Much of the resulting slick was dispersed by natural forces and the application
                    of 2,000 metric tons of the hydrocarbon, solvent-based dispersant BP 110OX.               0
                    Dispersant was applied in offshore and nearshore areas by surface vessel
                    spraying. Shoreline oiling was estimated at 2,200 barrels. Sand and coarse
                    gravel recreational beaches were oiled. Response activities were concluded
                    on November 18.

                    The vessel was reported to have spilled an additional 73,000 barrels of oil
                    between the site of the collision and Wilhelmshaven, West Germany.



                                                            I                        Olympic Alliance










            Behavior of Oil:

            Light Iranian crude oil is a medium weight product with an API gravity of
            33.4 and a pour point of -30 degrees F. The spffied oil initially formed
            medium to heavy streaks and patches within the vessel traffic lanes of Dover
            Strait. Some lighter pollution was observed to the north, apparently created
            as the Olympic Alliance continued up the coast. As the spill progressed,
            observed concentrations of oil decreased due to natural and chemical
0           dispersion. The bulk of the remaining oil moved to the west, toward the
            coast of England. As of November 13, no oil had washed ashore, though the
            closest slick was less than a mile offshore of Folkestone. The predicted areas
            of landfall included the beaches and shoreline between Deal and Hythe.
0           By November 14, oil had entered Folkestone Harbor and impacted the nearby
            shores at East Cliff Sands. Coarse gravel beaches near Deal were also oiled.
            Much of the oil that came ashore on the sand beaches was washed off by the
            tides. The washing off of the oil was attributed to the pre-treatment of the
            beaches with Shell Oil Herder. Oiling of sandy, low energy beaches near
            Folkestone was extensive. A wide band of oil 100 to 250 meters in width was
0           observed on low profile beaches. High profile, high energy gravel areas at
            Dover and Deal were characterized by a narrower 3 meter band of oil 15-30
            centimeters in depth. The exposed rocky shores between Dover and Deal
            were severely oiled. Many of the large tide pools were filled with oil.

            During the late afternoon of November 14, the winds shifted to the northwest
0           and moved the remaining floating oil away from the coast.

            Countermeasures and Mitigation:

            By 0800 on November 12, four dispersant spraying vessels were being
0           prepared for operations. A tug and three fishing vessels were prepared by
            DOT and KCC personnel. The tug, a dedicated oil spill response vessel, was
            being loaded with dispersant, while the fishing vessels were outfitted with
            spraying gear. A tug from Southhampton and a Royal Navy vessel from
            Chatham were also en route to the site to apply dispersant.

0           Initially the vessel operations were hampered by fog. As the fog lifted
            slightly, the vessels began applying dispersant while aided by aircraft
            observation reports. The fishing vessels operated in the Varne Bank area
            where shallow water depths prohibited the use of the larger vessels.
2           Fog persisted though the day, while the vessels sprayed nearly 700 gallons of
            concentrated dispersant and 6,000 gallons of non-concentrated dispersant on
            moderate to heavy slicks. Operations were halted in the evening since the
            vessels were dangerously exposed in the shipping lanes. By dusk on
            November 12, the main slick was still at sea, approximately 7.5 miles
            southeast of Dover. By the following day, ten vessels were involved in
            spraying dispersant in areas of medium to heavy streaks and patches. Two
            French vessels were employed to investigate reports of oil slicks in the
            southwest shipping lanes.


            Olympic Alliance                      2








                    As the slick moved closer to shore, dispersant applications were concentrated
                    in the Folkestone area, where both French and English spraying vessels
                    operated into the night, sometimes very near shore. On November 13, 20,000
                    gallons of non-concentrated and 400 gallons of concentrated dispersant were
                    applied. On November 14, one of the spraying vessels was dispatched to
                    search for oil slicks near the Dungeness Atomic Power Station. Spraying
                    operations were concluded on November 15, after an additional 1,500 gallons
                    of non-concentrated dispersant were applied near Folkestone Harbor.
                    Throughout the operation, a total of approximately 2,000 tons of BP 110OX
                    were applied to the floating oil.

                    Two Vikoma Sea Packs, comprised of inflatable boom, were used to protect
                    the harbor at Folkestone. Two fishing vessels and a heavy crane were
                    required to deploy 1,600 feet of inflatable boom. Oiling of the harbor occurred
                    after oil floated around the boom deployed at the harbor entrance. Vikoma,
                    Oil Mop, and Komara skimmers were used to recover floating oil in and
                    around the harbor. Recovery rates for the Oil mop and Komara Nfini
                    Skimmers were estimated at 7.3 barrels per hour, whereas the Vikoma Sea
                    Skimmers recovered an estimated 73 barrels per hour. The recovery rates
                    were lower than normal due to the high water and dispersant content of the
                    slicks.

                    The inflatable boom, which captured up to 1,500 barrels of oil, deflated due to
                    the failure of an air compressor. The weight of the captured oil also caused
                    the boom to drag its anchors. Once reinflated, one of the floatation cells in
                    the boom burst. The boom failure prevented responders from towing the
                    boomed oil offshore and dispersing it with chemicals. Polypropylene ropes
                    were floated in the harbor to contain oil that escaped from the failing boom.
                    One of the fishing vessels was deployed to spray the boomed oil with
                    dispersant. When the tides receded, dispersant was applied to oiled areas by
                    hand-held sprayers and backpack equipment.

                    Oiled shorelines were cleaned using chemical and mechanical techniques.
                    The beaches at East Cliff Sands were pre-treated with 80 gallons of Shell Oil
                    Herder in an effort to mitigate possible oiling. Oil failed to adhere to the pre-
                    treated beaches, and much of the oil either refloated off the beach or was
                    collected mechanically using heavy equipment. Oiled beaches were also
                    treated with dispersant using back pack spraying units.

                    Cleanup operations were suspended on November 18, when authorities
                    determined that the beaches had been restored and the harbor was clear of oil.

                    Other Special Interest Issues:

                    Fog and the inability to communicate with the vessels from shore or the air
                    caused logistical problems. The efficiency of the spraying vessels was
                    questioned by responders. Improperly rigged spraying gear and the bow wake
                    of vessels also caused problems. The use of vessels of opportunity resulted in
                    less than optimum dispersant application due to the bow wake o the vessel
                    pushing the oil away from the dispersant spray. The use of concentrated


                                                            3                        Olympic Alliance








            dispersant, which was mixed with seawater by metered pumps, allowed
            vessels to operate for extended periods without returning to port for
            reloading.

            There were 199 bird casualties reported during the incident, of which 77 were
            recovered dead and 122 were recovered alive and incapacitated. Most of the
            identifiable bird casualties were Guillemots, Cormorants and Razorbills.
            Cormorants were- particularly affected, due to a high percentage of the
            population becoming oiled. Some unexpected species that were recovered
            included a Brent Goose, Tufted Duck, and Coot. Approximately 100 Gulls
            were observed to be slightly oiled and apparently unharmed. Gulls that were
            oiled included Greater Black Backed Gulls, Herring Gulls, and Common
            Gulls. Some dead fish and a damaged welk bed were reported.

            Ref erences:

            *Dixon, T.R. and Dixon T.J. 1976. Olympic Alliance Oil Spillage. Marine
            Pollution Bulletin. v.7, n.5. pp. 86-90.
            *Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
            -Nichols, J.A. and Parker, H. 1985. Dispersants: Comparison of Laboratory
            Tests & Field Trials with Practical Experience at Spills, Oil Spill Conference
            Proceedings, 1985, pp. 421-427.






























            Olympic Alliance








                   Name of Spill: Olympic Glory
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 01/28/81
                   Location of Spill: Houston Ship Channel, Texas                                       41
                   Latitude: 29 41 N
                   Longitude: 095 00 W
                   Oil Product: Galeota crude
                   Oil Type: Type 3
                   Barrels: 20,000
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel                                                         41
                   Resources at Risk: saltwater marshes, abundant oyster beds, wildlife
                   preserves, marinas.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Adverse weather conditions, logistical or operational
                   problems, human health and safety concerns, media interest.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches, sheltered rocky shores,
                   sheltered marshes, marinas.
                   Keywords: Gulf Strike Team (GST), containment boom, vacuum truck,
                   vacuum pumps, adverse weather conditions, collision.

                   Incident Summary:
                   On January 28, 1981, at 0940, the chemical tanker Lucor Wickliffe struck the
                   Tank Vessel Olympic Glory on the port quarter, in the vicinity of the cargo
                   tanks. The collision occurred approximately two miles south of Morgan's
                   Point. After the Olympic Glory moored at Barbours Cut, an inspection diver
                   confirmed the presence of a 6 by 12 foot hole in the vessel's No. 6 port wing
                   tank. Approximately 20,000 barrels of Galeota crude were lost before the
                   damaged tank could be lightered by portable pumps.
                   First day response efforts focused on containment of the spilled product.
                   Crowley Environmental was contracted by the owners of the Olympic Glory
                   to lead the cleanup effort. Crowley subcontracted four other cleanup
                   companies to aid in the operation. Cleanup operations were divided into
                   three separated zones. Zone 1 covered the areas between Morgan's Point
                   and the Houston Yacht Club Marina. Zone 2 covered the northern areas from
                   Morgan's Point to the Exxon Refinery at Baytown, and included Upper San
                   Jacinto Bay. Zone 3 covered Barbours Cut. Barbours Cut also served as the
                   location of the cleanup operation's command post.

                   Parties involved in the cleanup included the U.S. Coast Guard, Texas
                   Department of Parks and Wildlife, Gulf Strike Team (GST), and Coast Guard
                   Marine Safety Office, Houston. Approximately 18,000 barrels of spilled
                   product was successfully removed within 30 days. The remaining 2,000
                   barrels were determined to be lost to natural dissipation.






                                                                                   Olympic Glory










            Behavior of Oil:

            Galeota crude has an API gravity of 32.8. In Zone 1, heavy concentrations of
            oil up to 3 inches thick and 30 feet in width impacted approximately 1.5 miles
            of private residential shoreline south of Morgan's Point. A wind shift caused
            the oil to migrate southwest, oiling the north side of the Houston Yacht Club
            Marina. Following another wind shift, back to the southeast, the oil moved
            to the northeast along the shoreline. Most of this oil was contained and
            recovered by the evening of January 31. Approximately 100 barrels remained
            along some inaccessible areas of shoreline. This remaining oil quickly
            migrated south 14 miles, coming ashore at Dollar Point.

            The closing of a flood gate prevented the oil from entering the
            environmentally sensitive area of Moses Lake. A wind sl-dft the following
            morning, entrained oil under triple boom at the mouth of Little Cedar Bayou.
            Strong wind driven currents pushed this escaping oil to the southwest.
            Boom that was previously placed along the north side of the Houston Yacht
            Club Marina trapped the oil (estimated at 1,500 barrels) for recovery. A total
            of 5,000 barrels of oil were removed from Zone 1 by February 4.

            In Zone 2, one thousand barrels of oil spread into several inaccessible areas.
            Heavy oiling was observed at both Black Duck Bay and the intake basin of
            Houston Light and Power Company, located in Upper San Jacinto Bay.
            Cleanup of the Zone 2 areas was completed by February 4.

            By the end of the first day some areas in Zone 3 were oiled to a depth of 8
            inches. Approximately 14,000 barrels of oil were contained by boom in thds
            area. Dirt roads and levees contributed to truck damage and access problems
            in the Barbours Cut area. The most accessible location could not be used for
            oil containment because it was a collection and fleeting point for barges. One
            of the barges in the fleeting area spilled an unknown quantity of styrene.
            Cleanup operations were haltedfor three days, to protect cleanup personnel
            from the hazardous styrene fumes. Cleanup operations within Zone 3 were
            completed February 25.

            Countermeasures and Mitigation:

            While the vessel was moored at Barbours Cut, portable pumps were used to
            lighter the remaining oil from the ruptured No. 6 wing tank. The release of
            oil was stopped by 1530 the day of the incident.
9           A 2,000 foot section of containment boom was placed around the entire vessel
            and across Barbours Cut within an hour after the vessel was moored. This
            quick containment response greatly reduced the amount of oil that escaped
            from the mooring area. Booms were also placed on the north side of the
            Houston Yacht Club Marina, while the mouth of Cedar Bayou was triple
            boomed.

            Several vacuum pumps were used to remove oil from the sand beach areas
            in all three cleanup zones. Vacuum trucks were also used to "chase" and


            Olympic Glory                           2








                    collect the oil which was pushed through the Houston Yacht Club area by the
                    shifting winds.
                    Closing of the flood gate near Dollar Point protected the sensitive, sheltered            0
                    salt marshes that line the Moses Lake area. Oil that was contained in this area
                    was removed by laborers using a vacuum truck and front end loader.

                    Tank barges were used to transport the recovered oil to the AMOCO Refinery
                    in Texas City. Oil contaminated with styrene that was refused by AMOCO,                   40
                    was taken to an approved local disposal site. Contaminated soil and oily
                    debris were removed to an approved site in Port Arthur, Texas.

                    Other Special Interest Issues:

                    Frequent shifts in wind direction hampered cleanup efforts. Weather                       41
                    forecasts that were wired from a distant National Weather Service office
                    failed to accurately predict the shifting winds. Wind shifts commonly
                    occurred before they were predicted.
                    The barge fleeting area at the west end of Barbours Cut was crowded with                  0
                    active barges. Although barge fleet movements in Zone 3 interfered with
                    clean-up efforts, closing down the fleet for more than five days would have
                    created an excessive financial burden on barge owners and operators.

                    Relying on Crowley Environmental to supervise all other contractors
                    resulted in the slow implementation of plans. Additional personnel were
                    not dispatched to assist the cleanup until the fifth day. The lack of sufficient
                    numbers of personnel early in the response resulted in a slow initial cleanup
                    effort.

                    Media coverage of the incident was favorable. The USCG District 8 Public
                    Affairs Office was the single contact point for the media. This relieved the              0
                    burden from others involved with the response, and ensured that all media
                    members were getting consistent and current information on the progress of
                    the cleanup operation.
                    References:                                                                               0
                    *Golobs 1978-1989 US Spill Report
                    9MMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
                    -Oil Spill Intelligence Report. Oil Spills, International Summary & Review,
                    1978-1981
                    *Tanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers. T.A.C.             2
                    Inc. 1991.
                    *U.S. Coast Guard On-Scene Coordinator's Report
                    *World Information Systems. Tanker Losses in U.S. Waters: 1978-1990.
                    World Information Systems. 1991.
                                                                                                              A&





                                                            3                           Olympic Glory








                    Name of Spill: Pac Baroness
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 09/21/87
                    Location of Spill: 12 miles southwest of Point Conception, California
                    Latitude: 34 21 N
                    Longitude: 120 45 W
                    Oil Product: Bunker Fuel (IFO 180 and diesel), lube oil, hydraulic oil.
                    Oil Type: Type 3, Type 4, Type 4.
                    Barrels: 9,200
                    Source of Spill: Non-Tank Vessel.
                    Resources at Risk: Exposed rocky shores, sand/gravel beaches, sheltered
                    marshes, sheltered tidal flats, wavecut platforms, marine mammals, birds,
                    fish, mollusks, crustaceans, resource extraction, recreation, management areas
                    Dispersants: Yes
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: No
                    Other Special Interest: Adverse weather conditions, logistical or operational
                    problems, research conducted.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: None
                    Keywords: International Bird Rescue and Research Center (IBRRC), adverse
                    weather conditions, Elastol, Davidson Current, side-looking airborne radar
                    (SLAR), skimmer.

                    Incident Summary:

                    On September 21, 1987 at 0600, the Liberian bulk carrier Pac Baroness and the
                    Panamanian freighter Atlantic Wing collided in foggy, high sea conditions,
                    twelve miles southwest of Point Conception, California. The Pac Baroness
                    was carrying 21,000 metric tons of dry bulk copper concentrate consisting of
                    30% copper, 30% iron, 30% other oxides and approximately 9,200 barrels of
                    bunker fuel (IFO-180 and marine diesel fuel) as well as quantities of lube oil
                    and hydraulic oil. TheAtlantic Wing was carrying automobiles and was
                    bound for Long Beach.

                    The Pac Baroness sustained damage to the number 4 and 5 cargo holds and
                    the Atlantic Wing suffered a 25 foot by 10 foot gash in her bow. The Chief
                    Engineer on board the Pac Baroness activated the vessel's bilge pumps and a
                    tug attached a towline to the vessel to prevent the Pac Baroness from drifting
                    toward the shoreline. By 1607, the Pac Baroness was still taking on water and
                    was close to sinking. The Pac Baroness sank at 1618 on September 21,
                    resulting in a release of approximately 9,200 barrels of oil and quantities of
                    copper ore over the next 20 days. The currents at the time of the incident
                    were to the northwest at 3-4 knots; winds in the area were from the N-NW at
                    10 knots. The seasonal Davidson Current flows north along isobaths at about
                    0.25 knots.

                    The Clean Seas Co-op was originally conducting cleanup on behalf of the
                    owners of the Pac Baroness. On September 24, Clean Seas notified the U.S.
                    Coast Guard's (USCG) Federal On Scene Coordinator (FOSC) that they would
                    no longer be continuing operations due to disagreements over their contract
                    with the owners. The FOSC declared the incident a Federal response and


                                                             1                             Pac Baroness








             opened the 311 W fund. The USCG began negotiations to contract Clean Seas
             as part of the Federal response. By September 28, Clean Seas had resumed
             working for the owners of the Pac Baroness, with the agreement that the                            0
             owners would finance the Clean Seas response inclusive of the period from
             September 24 to September 28.

             Behavior of Oil:

             The oil slick initially extended from the sunken Pac Baroness for a distance of                    ON
             1 mile to the southwest. By mid-day on September 22, the slick was 6 miles to
             the south of the Pac Baroness. Responders were initially concerned about
             toxicity from the spill because of the copper sulfide mixture that may have
             been present. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
             (NOAA) predicted that potential toxicity problems would remain localized
             due to the insolubility of copper sulfide.                                                         41

             Oil from the sunken ship rose to the surface but was not successfully collected
             using containment boom. The slick had a light sheen appearance and spread
             quickly from the source, breaking up approximately one-half mile from the
             source. Responders predicted that isolated cohesive patches of oil, if found,                      0
             would move south and west of San Miguel Island due to weak
             counterclockwise circulation around San Miguel Island and wind conditions.
             At the time of the incident many birds and mammals were present on San
             Miguel Island (part of the Channel Islands National Marine Sanctuary) with
             the highest concentration present on the western tip of Pt. Bennett. The                           40
             exposure of marine diving birds (Brown Pelicans, Cormorants, Black Storm-
             Petrels) and the Golden and Guadeloupe fur seals was of concern. Initially,
             wind and currents kept the slick offshore, away from San Miguel Island, but
             on September 24, winds increased in strength and changed direction causing
             the oil slick to move south toward San Miguel Island. By the following day,                        0
             weather conditions had improved and less oil was surfacing from the wreck
             and the threat to San Miguel Island had diminished.

             No oiled shorelines were reported as a result of the incident. The Pac
             Baroness continued to leak small quantities of oil after the sinking and was
             monitored by the USCG in conjunction with the Minerals Management
             Service.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:
             Weather conditions were poor during the spill response, with reduced                               0
             visibility and rough sea conditions prohibiting extensive mechanical cleanup
             operations. Three dispersant trials were conducted during the response.

             Three Clean Seas oil spill response vessels were on scene from September 22
             to September 25 and one vessel from September 25 to September 29. Clean
             Seas contracted services and equipment to supplement their own response                            0
             equipment. Mechanical containment and cleanup operations were hindered



             Pac Baroness                            2                                                          0








                   by wind and sea conditions but recovery operations collected approximately
                   350 barrels of oil during the second and third days of the spill.

                   Observation of the oil slick from both sea vessels and aircraft was hindered by
                   fog during the response effort. The USCG AirEye system side-looking
                   airborne radar (SLAR) system was used to track the position of oil when
                   visual observations were impaired.
                   Dispersant application required approval by the USCG FOSC, the
                   Environmental Protection Agency, California Fish and Game, NOAA Marine
                   Sanctuaries, and the National Parks Service. A test evaluation of dispersants
                   was authorized and carried out on September 22. A DC-4 aircraft specially
                   equipped for dispersant application was used for test application of dispersant.
                   Approximately 100 gallons of Corexit 9527 was used on a 1.4-mile by 120-foot
                   area of oil on the water at a ratio of 5 gallons per acre.

                   A second application took place on September 24, using the same technique
                   and spraying 250 gallons of dispersant on windrows of oil near San Miguel
                   island. Two helicopters -with observers were present during the second
                   application and their reports on the effectiveness of the dispersant application
                   varied.

                   By September 25, two of the three Clean Seas vessels were refired from the
                   response due to the lack of recoverable oil. The remaining vessel, with an
                   ODI VOSS skimming system, performed skimming as weather allowed, but
                   high winds and seas made operations difficult. The oil was spreading and
                   dissipating rapidly after surfacing from the sunken Pac Baroness. The weir-
                   type skimming device on the Clean Seas vessel was not able to collect the
                   light sheen. An attempt was made to deploy deflection boom between two
                   vessels and concentrate the oil for skimming, but increasingly high seas and
                   damage to boom forced skimming crews to abandon the effort.

                   A third dispersant application took place on September 29 for research
                   purposes. Two vessels, two helicopters and the USCG SLAR aboard a
                   surveillance Falcon aircraft were used for this application. A surface drogue
                   was deployed in the middle of the dispersant application area and measured
                   fluorescence for almost:2 hours after application. Fluorescence
                   measurements and water column samples were taken following dispersant
                   application to determine the levels of petroleum hydrocarbons in the area of
                   application. Levels of petroleum hydrocarbons in the top 10 meters of the
                   water column were determined to be no higher than background levels after
                   dispersant application, but it was not certain from visual observations if the
                   slick was being dispersed chemically or by the increasing winds.

                   On October 1, phase H of the previous dispersant trial was to take place, but
                   winds of up to 30 knots and seas of 8 to 10 feet forced postponement of the test
                   until the following day. A representative of GTA Additives Inc. applied a
                   small amount of Elastol to oil near the source, but no effect was observed by
                   NOAA personnel.




                                                           3                             Pac Baroness








             On October 2, the phase II dispersant application was canceled due to
             continuing high winds and seas, and a consensus among observers of the
             previous test that there was no conclusive evidence that the dispersants were                 0
             effective.

             Other Special Interest Issues:

             Wildlife impacts during the incident were minimal. California Department
             of Fish and Game managed the oiled bird response operations with the                          0
             assistance of Clean Seas and a representative from the International Bird
             Rescue Research Center at Berkeley, California. The Ventura County Animal
             Control facility was used for rehabilitation operations. Before dispersant
             application, NOAA provided the USCG with dispersant checklist information
             which addressed concerns about exposure of wildlife to dispersed oil vs. non-                 41
             dispersed oil. The dispersed oil was considered to be a lesser threat than the
             undispersed oil.

             The USCG and Clean Seas spent significant time negotiating a contract
             amount as they did not have a Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) established
             in advance of the incident.                                                                   0
             Effective radio communications were limited during the response. In the
             Santa Barbara area, personnel were able to utilize the Clean Seas local repeater
             network with radios borrowed from the co-op.
             An oceanographic survey of the sunken Pac Baroness was conducted in                           0
             November of 1987. High resolution side scanning sonar was used to locate
             the vessel. Results of the survey showed that the vessel had hit bottom with
             significant force, and had disrupted the seafloor. Scientists speculated that
             this impact to the seafloor could negatively affect the marine life in that area.
             Analysis of the tissue of heart urchins collected from the area showed                        0
             increased copper content.

             A post-spill study was conducted by Battelle Ocean Systems to examine the
             distribution and levels of hydrocarbons in surficial sediments and the effects
             of the copper and oil spill on the infaunal community near the wreck site.
             Sediment samples taken near the wreck site revealed a patchy distribution of
             oil contamination. Hydrocarbon levels at sampling locations within 500
             meters of the wreak ranged from 2 to 100 times that of background levels.
             Effects to the macroinfauna were documented by significant reductions in
             species abundance and mean numbers of individuals. Possible causes of the
             observed decreases include physical disturbance by the wreck itself or
             chemical contamination by oil or copper. Oil was noticed on the surface and
             within the gut cavities of some organisms.










             Pac Baroness                          4











                  References:
                  eClean Seas' Response to the "PACBARONESS" Oil Spill, January 1988
                  *Clean Seas' Response to the Sinking of the Pac Baroness, Oil Spill
                  Conference Proceedings, 1989, pp. 91-93.
                  *Environimental Effects of the Pac Baroness Oil and Copper Spill, Oil Spill
                  Conference Proceedings, 1989, pp. 413-419.
                  oModern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987 (p.355)
                  oNOAA Hotline Reports
                  oNOAA Response Report
                  oU.S. Coast Guard On-Scene Coordinator's Report













































                                                        5                           Pac Baroness








                     Name of Spill: Pacific Glory
                     Date of Spill (mmddyy): 10/23/70
                     Location of Spill: Isle of Wight, England
                     Latitude: 50 35 N
                     Longitude: 00120 W
                     Oil Product: Nigerian crude oil
                     Oil Type: Type 3
                     Barrels: 24,780
                     Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                     Resources at Risk: Fringing wetlands, tidal mudflats.
                     Dispersants: Yes
                     Bioremediation: No
                     In-situ Burning: No
                     Other Special Interest: Volunteer response and organization.
                     Shoreline Types Impacted:
                     Keywords: Fire, collision, explosion, International Tanker Owners Pollution
                     Federation (ITOPF).

                     Incident Summary:

                     On the evening of October 23, 1970, the tanker Pacific Glory and the tanker
                     Allegro collided six miles off the Isle of Wight, England. The Pacific Glory
                     caught fire, and was taken under tow as firefighting tugs tried to control the
                     fire. Explosions ruptured a starboard tank, and led to the flooding of the
                     engine space. The next day, the tanker began to settle and eventually touched
                     bottom at a point four miles from the shore. The Allegro continued on from
                     the collision site under her own power.

                     Behavior of Oil:

                     The initial leak stopped soon after the collision, but as explosions occurred on
                     the Pacific Glory additional leaks started from a starboard tank. The tank
                     contained 35,400 barrels of Nigerian crude oil. Some of the oil burned, but
                     approximately 24,780 barrels of oil spilled from the tank, forming three slicks.
                     Very little oil came ashore, but some oil impacted Brighton and Selsey.

                     Countermeasures and Mitigation:
                     Tugs from the Department of Trade and Industry began spraying dispersant,
                     and managed to dissipate a three-mile long slick. Wooden frames were
                     towed behind the tugs to agitate the slicks and to facilitate the action of the
                     dispersants. Two other slicks dissipated in the heavy seas without the use of
                     chemical dispersants.

                     The owners of the Pacific Glory hired L. Smit, a salvage company, to fight fires
                     and conduct salvage operations. L. Smit took the operations over from the
                     Royal Navy on October 27.
                     On October 29, the Shell tanker Halia came alongside the Pacific Glory to
                     offload some of her remaining fuel. The oil was pumped with eight portable


                                                              1                             Pacific Glory








            submersible electric pumps that were lowered into the cargo tanks. The Halia
            recovered 10,600 barrels of oil before adverse weather caused her to suspend
            operations until the next day. Lightering operations resumed with the Halia
            on November 5, and ultimately 44,000 barrels of oil were recovered. The
            Pacific Glory was refloated onNovember 6, and towed to Lymes Bay, England
            where water was pumped from her tanks in preparation for the completion
            of her journey. The Pacific Glory arrived in Europoort on November 17, and
            offloaded the rest of her oil. Approximately 453,120 barrels of oil were
            recovered from the tanker.

            Other Special Interest Issues:

            Local organizations, both public and private, were on watch in case any
            wildlife were impacted by the oil. The Royal Society for the Protection of
            Birds reported that very few oiled birds came ashore. Rescue operations were
            carried out by the Royal Navy, most of the crew was rescued. Fourteen people
            lost their lives during this incident.

            References:

            eGenwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
            *Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
            1987.


































            Pacific Glory                         2








                   Name of Spill: Patmos
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 03/21/85
                   Location of Spill: Straits of Messinal Sicily, Italy
                   Latitude: 38 15 N
                   Longitude: 015 35 E
                   Oil Product: Kirkuk Crude Oil
                   Oil Type: Type 2
                   Barrels: 5,300
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Recreational beaches, commercial fisheries.
                   Dispersants: Yes
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Effects to tourism.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches.
                   Keywords: Containment boom, skimmer, manual removal, collision, fire,
                   International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF).

                   Incident Summary:
                   On March 21, 1985, the Patmos and the Castillo de Montearagon collided in
                   the Straits of Messina. The Patmos was carrying 828,300 barrels of Kirkuk
                   crude oil while the Castillo de Montearagon was in ballast. The Patmos
                   caught fire and was grounded on the beach of Villagio Torre Faro, Sicily.
                   Firefighters subsequently towed the vessel off the beach to maneuver it for
                   firefighting efforts. The fire was extinguished on March 23, and the Patmos
                   was brought to dock at Messina, Sicily.

                   Behavior of Oil:

                   Kirkuk Crude Oil has an API gravity of 35.1, and a pour point of -8 degrees F.
                   Approximately 5,300 barrels of Kirkuk crude oil spilled from the Patmos. The
                   majority of the spilled oil moved south through the Straits of Messina. Most
                   of the oil broke up in the variable currents of the strait, forn-dng separate
                   slicks that moved south at different rates. Some of the oil initially released
                   moved to the north due to tidal currents. By March 23, most of the oil to the
                   north had dissipated, but there was some sheen and mousse in the area. As
                   the oil moved south it incorporated garbage, amounts of which typically exist
                   in the waters east of Sicily. A slick of about 750 barrels remained off the coast
                   near Taormina in spite of onshore winds, for two days. Small amounts of oil
                   impacted the shore near Agnone Bagni, Capo Campolato, and Pozzillo. The
                   rest of the oil moved to the southeast away from Sicily and dissipated in the
                   sea.















                                                                                          Patmos








             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             The Harbor Master at Messina was in charge of firefighting and salvage
             operations. The Harbor Masters at Messina, Catania, Augusta, and Syracuse
             were responsible for cleanup of oil at sea and on the land in their respective
             areas.

             Dispersant application was conducted in Messina on March 22 and 23.
             Operations were done from a variety of vessels outfitted with spray booms or
             fire monitors. There was no regular supervision by aircraft of the dispersant
             operations, and a great deal of dispersant was applied ineffectively. The
             complicated movement of the oil in the strait hindered operations. By March
             23, the oil had emulsified enough to be impervious to dispersants.
             Thereafter, dispersants were applied only to fresh oil near the Patmos. On
             March 24, containment and recovery operations began with the Columbia
             Tide. While the oil was containable with booms, the slick had incorporated
             so much garbage that it was riot recoverable with skimmers. Five other
             skimming vessels were deployed at Messina, but had little success in
             recovering oil.

             In the Catania area, approximately 3,100 gallons of dispersants were applied by
             aircraft. However, the oil had emulsified and collected garbage, and was not
             amenable to dispersing. Furthermore, the dispersant was hydrocarbon based
             and would not be effective when applied from aircraft. Skimming operations
             in the Catania area met with little success. Eventually, the vessels were used
             to break up the oil by traversing the slick at high speeds.

             The oil off Augusta was so emulsified, and had picked up so much garbage,
             that recovery at sea was done with pitchforks. The beach at Agnone was
             oiled. Cleanup operations were conducted by Salvesen Offshore Lin-dted with
             local contracted labor manually removing oil and oiled garbage. Five tons of
             oiled debris were picked up from the beach. Very little oil reached Syracuse as
             the slicks had begun to move in a southeasterly direction away from Sicily.

             Other Special Interest Issues:

             Fishing continued in the oiled areas, and no complaints about the quality of
             the fish were reported.

             The oil did not come ashore in many places, and the tourist trade was not
             considered to be adversely affected by the presence of the oil on the water.













             Patmos                                 2











                  Ref erences:

                  -Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
                  eInternational Oil Pollution Compensation Fund Annual Report 1988.
                  *International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund Annual Report 1989.
                  *International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund Annual Report 1990.
                  *International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund Annual Report 1991.
                  *Kang, P.B. et al, Analysis of Significant Oil Spill Incidents From Ships, 1976-
                  1985. Oil Spill Conference Proceedings 1987, p. 46













                                                                                                    41












































                                                                                     Patmos








                   Name of Spill: Peck Slip
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 12/19/78
                   Location of Spill: Cabo San Juan, Puerto Rico
                   Latitude: 18 15 N
                   Longitude: 065 34 W
                   Oil Product: Bunker C
                   Oil Type: Type 4
                   Barrels: 11,000
                   Source of Spill: Tank Barge
                   Resources at Risk: Beaches, marinas, manatees, sea turtles, diving coastal
                   birds, mangroves.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Logistical or operational problems, research conducted.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Fine sand beaches, coarse sand beaches, coarse
                   gravel beaches, mangroves, consolidated seawalls.
                   Keywords: Vacuum truck, high pressure washing, Corexit 9527, Gulf Strike
                   Team (GST), National Strike Force (NSF), sorbents.

                   Incident Summary:

                   On the morning of December 19, 1978, in unusually heavy seas, the TIB Peck
                   Slip struck the bottom near Cabo San Juan off the northeast corner of Puerto
                   Rico. The barge, carrying 80,000 barrels of Bunker C crude oil, suffered
                   structural damage and immediately began to spill oil. The barge was towed
                   back to Yabucoa Harbor. The owner of the barge reported a spill of a few
                   barrels to the Marine Safety Office (MSO) San Juan. Approximately 2 hours
                   after the spill was reported, a Coast Guard helicopter, en route to St. Croix,
                   Virgin Islands, observed dark oil in the water off Cabo San Juan. An
                   investigation determined that an estimated 11,000 barrels spilled from the
                   Peck Slip. The Captain of the Port (COTP) San Juan, Puerto Rico, was
                   designated as On-Scene Coordinator (OSC). Sun Oil Company assumed
                   responsibility for the incident and contracted Muratti Construction Company
                   and Crowley Environrnental Services for cleanup operations. The Clean
                   Caribbean Co-op was activated by Sun Oil Company. Cleanup operations
                   were directed by the Sun Oil Company until December 29, when the OSC
                   assumed control. Operations ended on January 19, 1979.

                   Behavior of Oil:

                   Bunker C fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to
                   14. Observers from the MSO San Juan on a helicopter overflight in the
                   afternoon of December 20 saw heavy concentrations of oil in the water from
                   U.S. Naval Station Roosevelt Roads to Luquillo Beach. Heavy concentrations
                   of oil came ashore at Isleta Marina, Fajardo Beach, Fajardo Ferry Terminal,
                   U.S. Naval Station, Roosevelt Roads, Luquillo Beach, and Yabucoa Harbor.
00                 Ramos Island, Rio Mar Beach, Isla Pinero, Isla Careza de Perro, Punta Puerca,
                   and Mosquito Island were also oiled to lesser degree. Mangroves east of



                                                                                           Peck Slip






                                                                                                           0


             Punta Medio Mundo were oiled. On December 30, a 5 mile long sheen was
             observed north of Luquillo Beach.
             Countermeasures and Mitigation:                                                               0

             Sun Oil Company requested permission from the Environmental Protection
             Agency (EPA) to use Corexit 9527 on the offshore oil. The request was routed
             to the Regional Response Team (RRT) which denied permission. The GST
             arrived at the MSO San Juan late in the night of December 20. An overflight                   0
             was conducted early the next day With the OSC, GST, Environmental
             Protection Agency (EPA), and USCG personnel. On December 21, a conunand
             post was established at Fajardo, Puerto Rico, and cleanup operations began.
             Cleanup operations were conducted by Muratti Construction Company at
             Yabucoa Harbor, Isleta Marina, Fajardo Beach, and Fajardo Ferry Terminal,
             and preventive booming was done at Villa Marina. Crowley Environmental                        48
             Services assisted in the operations at Isleta Marina. U.S. Naval Station
             Roosevelt Roads cleanup operations were conducted by U.S. Navy personnel
             who deployed boom as a precautionary measure upon being notified by the
             USCG of imminent impacts of oil.
             On December 27, a Landing Craft Medium (LCM) skimmer removed debris
             from Ramos Island. On December 28, cleaning of bulkheads at Isleta Marina
             was attempted with high-pressure water washing but with no success. On
             Ramos Island, Islet Marina, and in the Fajardo area cleanup was complete
             except for removal of oiled debris. Boom was deployed in Yabucoa Harbor,
             and a JBF skimmer collected sheen. Operations continued at Rio Mar with                       Z
             manual labor and heavy equipment, and areas that had begun leaching oil
             were cleaned with sorbents.

             On December 29, Sun Oil Company relinquished control of the cleanup
             operations and the OSC federalized the spill. Increased wave action from
             December 30 to -31 dispersed much of the oil that remained after cleanup
             operations. On January 1, the OSC determined that additional cleanup would
             do more damage than good, and released all cleanup contractors. Removal of
             oiled debris by Sun Oil Company contractors continued until January 3, at
             which time the OSC concluded the response. Periodic surveys of beaches
             continued until January 19, 1977.                                                             C















             Peck Slip                             2








                   Other Special Interest Issues:

                   At a December 22 RRT meeting, the OSC expressed concern with the lack of
                   organization in Sun Oil Company's response to the spill. Inspections by OSC
                   representatives revealed that response equipment and personnel were not
                   being used effectively. At Villa Marina there was no supervisor of the
                   contracted labor, a boom was deployed unnecessarily, and of three vacuum
                   trucks at the site, only one was in use, and that one was being used
                   improperly. At Fajardo Beach there were too many workers for the amount
                   of cleanup needed, and a boom was unnecessarily deployed. When Villa
                   Marina was inspected again by OSC representatives on December 24, the
                   disorganization of the contractors was still evident.

                   A follow-up field study of two impacted mangrove and sand beach areas was
                   conducted during March and April of 1979. A 0.5 acre area of Red Mangroves
                   suffered total defoliation and mortality within the most heavily oiled area
                   along Puerto Medio Mundo. There was a large reduction in the population of
                   Mangrove Tree Crabs, but tree snails apparently moved out of the area. The
                   only obvious biological effects to sand beach areas were the destruction of
                   supratidal beach plants in a few scattered localities.

                   Ref erences:

                   eGetter, et al. 1980 Biological Changes of Mangrove and Sand Beach
                   Communities at the Peck Slip Oil Spill Site, Eastern Puerto Rico: Prepared for
                   U.S. Department of Commerce, NOAA. RPI/R/80/2/18-6. 63 pp.
                   *Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
                   1987.
                   eMMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
                   *Robinson, J.H. ed. The Peck Slip Oil Spill. A Preliminary Scientific Report.
                   NOAA Special Report. 1979. Unpublished report.
                   -U.S. Coast Guard On-Scene Coordinator's Report



















                                                         3                             Peck Slip






                                                                                             0


                 Name of Spill: Presidente Rivera
                 Date of Spill (mmddyy): 06/24/89
                 Location of Spill: Delaware River., South of Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania
                 Latitude: 39 45 N
                 Longitude: 075 27 W
                 Oil Product: No. 6 Oil (heavy industrial grade)
                 Oil Type: Type 4
                 Barrels: 7,310
                 Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                 Resources at Risk: Vegetated riverbank, marshes, wading birds, waterfowl,
                 crabs, oysters, commercial fisheries, water intakes.
                 Dispersants: No
                 Bioremediation: No
                 In-situ Burning: No
                 Other Special Interest: Closure of commercial fishing areas, unusual or
                 experimental cleanup techniques.
                 Shoreline Types Impacted: Vegetated riverbanks, marshes, coarse sand
                 beaches, coarse gravel beaches, riprap, tidal mudflat.
                 Keywords: Atlantic Strike Team (AST), Open Water Oil Containment and
                 Recovery System (OWOCRS), Goodyear boom, Sea Curtain boom, Delaware
                 Bay and River Cooperative, stern trawl net, oil snares, National Guard, Tri-
                 State Bird Rescue Center, Multi Agency Local Response Team (MALRT),
                 vacuum truck, supersucker, skimmer, manual removal, weir/pump
                 skimmer, recoiling, sub-surface oil.
                 Incident Summary:                                                           Is

                 On June 24, 1989 at approximately 0500, the Uruguayan motor vessel
                 Presidente Rivera ran hard aground in the Delaware River near Claymont,
                 Delaware, south of Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania. The grounding damaged
                 four of the vessel's cargo tanks, resulting in the release of approximately 7,3100
                 barrels of No. 6 oil into the river. The weather at the time was cloudy with
                 occasional thunderstorms, variable light winds, 71'F, and 2-3 miles visibility.
                 The owners of the vessel assumed responsibility and hired a contractor to
                 deploy booms around the ship. Another company was hired as prime
                 contractor for the entire cleanup operation.                                10
                 Cleanup operations began immediately. By mid-morning of the first day, the
                 vessel had been boomed and lightering operations had commenced. A Multi
                 Agency Local Response Team (MALRT) meeting was held at noon on the first
                 day at the Marine Safety Office (MSO) Philadelphia. By the morning of June
                 25, the vessel had been refloated and moved to the Sun Oil Co. terminal at  0
                 Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania for final lightering and inspection. By June 28,
                 there was no significant free-floating oil observed in the river. The vessel
                 was in dry dock in Philadelphia by July 8. Cleanup operations continued into
                 the spring of 1990.







                                                                       Presidente Rivera










             Behavior of Oil:

             No. 6 fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to 14.
             The Presidente Rivera was carrying over 452,000 barrels of oil at the time of
             the incident. The No. 6 Oil was heavy and its pour point was greater than the
             temperature of the water. The spilled oil congealed into "pancake" like, tar
             globs which floated with the river current. Only 10 percent of the oil was
             visible above the surface. The vessel pilot reported to the USCG immediately
             after the grounding that 1,000 barrels had spilled. An overflight made at first
             light on June 24 determined that there was considerably more than this
             amount in the water. At the time of the overflight, the cargo surveyor
             reported that there were approximately 38,095 barrels of oil unaccounted for
             based upon tank soundings. Further inspection of the vessel showed that
             some of the missing oil had drained into previously empty cargo tanks due to
             internal damage to the bulkheads. The amount spilled was not accurately
             determined until 1400 June 27, by which time 21 miles of Pennsylvania and
             Delaware shoreline had been oiled.

             Due to the varying properties of number 6 oil, it took time to carefully assess
             the toxicity, specific gravity, and other physical characteristics to ensure an
             appropriate response. The thick, sticky nature of the product made it very
             hard to physically remove from both the water and shoreline.

             The heaviest shoreline impacts that occurred along the Delaware River were
             the shoreline and marshes just north and south of the Delaware Memorial
             Bridge. The marsh area one mile south of the bridge had been heavily
             impacted on previous spills. There was moderate oiling in the Marcus Hook
             area and along the Pennsylvania border. The shoreline of New Jersey was
             only lightly impacted in isolated areas. Approximately 30 miles of the
             riverbank were oiled in Delaware, Pennsylvania and New Jersey. The
             impacted beaches were cleaned by July 4, but some were reoiled and had to be
             cleaned again. By July 24, approximately 85% of the released oil had been
             recovered.

             Of the three states involved, Delaware's natural resources appeared to have
             been hit the hardest. This included wetlands, blue crab fisheries, and bird
             populations. Fish populations were generally not affected because of the
             insolubility of the oil.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             Booms were placed around the vessel shortly after the grounding occurred.
             Booms were also placed at the mouths of several area creeks to prevent their
             contamination. Eighteen-inch harbor booms were not heavy enough, nor did
             they extend deep enough to contain oil that was moving with the current.
             The oil was entrained with the current and flowed under the boom. The
             USCG Atlantic Area Strike Team responded to the scene with their Open
             Water Oil Containment and Recovery System (OWOCRS). This is a 48-inch
             high seas containment boom with a 27 inch draft. It was very effective at
             containing oil against the high currents in the river. Goodyear 36-inch


             Presidente Rivera                        2






                                                                                                                 0


                     inflatable boom was not as effective for this type of oil against the river
                     currents. The same was true with 36-inch Sea Curtain boom provided by the
                     State of Maryland. It tended to lose most of the oil it had collected after a
                     short time in the river currents. In this incident, better results were obtained
                     with towed boom when moving with the current. This tended to minimize
                     entrainment.

                     Boom was deployed at the mouths of creeks which drain into extensive
                     marsh areas. These included Oldman's Creek, Raccoon Creek, Naaman
                     Creek, Darby Creek, and the Christina River. There was some difficulty
                     anchoring the booms at the mouths, since there were few firm points on
                     which to anchor the booms. Pea Patch Island received precautionary
                     booming because it is a large nesting area for herons. As a result, Pea Patch
                     Island received only minor oiling. This was quickly removed without any
                     damage to the habitat or wildlife present. Some booms were removed or
                     damaged by recreational boaters in the area. State Marine Police units helped
                     to reduce this problem.
                     Vacuum trucks were ineffective in removing the oil from the water because
                     of the viscosity of the oil and the amount of oiled debris present. Supersucker
                     trucks were able to pick up small chunks of oil, but were generally ineffective
                     because of the lengthy and difficult process of emptying them.

                     A clamshell bucket and hopper barge were used to remove the oil from the
                     water. This technique worked well and allowed recovery of much of the oil
                     while retaining little water.

                     Suction skimmers and floating weir skimmers were not efficient because of
                     the tarry consistency of the congealed No. 6 oil. The Delaware Bay and River
                     Cooperative skimmer Delbay, a belted inclined plane system, efficiently
                     recovered oil from the river. However, it was unable to use its pumps to
                     discharge the unheated tar-like oil. Thus, its capacity was limited to the size
                     of the collection bay. A fishing vessel with a stern trawl net recovered 8 tons
                     of oil and oiled debris from the river. However, the net became so fouled
                     with oil and debris that it could not be used again.

                     Impacted shoreline was often inaccessible, except by boat. On the riverbanks,
                     cleanup workers used rakes, shovels, and pitchforks to remove the oil. Larger
                     chunks of oil collected sand as they rolled along the bottom with the river
                     current and tides. Some of the heavier chunks penetrated into the sand,
                     making their removal much more difficult. During low tide, oil chunks
                     which were stranded on the beach melted in the sun, spreading out as a fluid
                     to cover a large area. Oil snares were used in the marshes to clean the marsh
                     grass during the rise and fall of the tide. Once saturated with the heavy oil,
                     the snares were difficult to remove and frequently weighed down the marsh
                     grass.








                                                              3                        Presidente Rivera






 0


              Other Special Interest Issues:

              This spill occurred during a particularly bad time for oil shippers. Within 12
              hours, the World Prodigy (10,000 barrels spilled in Narragansett Bay, Rhode
              Island on 23 June), a tank barge (6,000 barrels in the Houston Ship Channel on
              24 June), and the Presidente lZivera were involved in marine pollution
              incidents. At the same time, the cleanup of the Exxon Valdez spill was still
              underway in Prince William Sound, Alaska. This put a strain on the oil spill
              response community, and limited the response personnel and equipment
              available for this spill.

              Within the first two days of the response, it was obvious that there were not
              enough personnel on-scene to undertake cleanup operations adequately. The
              governors of Pennsylvania and Delaware committed 300 personnel from the
              National Guard to the response. The Guardsmen were utilized for cleanup
              until three days later when the contractor provided an adequate number of
              civilian workers for cleanup. Although they were an available supply of
              personnel, the National Guard troops were not trained in the techniques or
              hazards inherent with oil spill cleanup.
0             Bird rescue was performed by the Tri-State Bird Rescue Center in
              Wilmington, Delaware. By July 24, 119 oiled birds had been brought to the
              Center. As of that date, only nine had died.
              Sub-surface oil was detected on crabs and crab pots by July 1. Blue crab fishing
              was banned in the area from the Delaware/ Pennsylvania state line to Pea
              Patch Island. Crab pot surveys in this area showed approximately 22% of the
              catch having some amount of oiling. The ban continued through July 26.

              Ref erences:

              -Corcoran, L. and Wiltshire, G.A. 1991. Response to the Presidente Rivera
              Major Oil Spill, Delaware River, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1991, pp.
              253-258.
              eNOAA Response Report
              *Tanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers. T.A.C.
              Inc. 1991.
              *USCG On-Scene Coordinator's Report
















              Presidente Rivera                      4








                   Name of Spill: Puerto Rican
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 10/31/84
                   Location of Spill: San Francisco Bay, California
                   Latitude: 37 30 N
                   Longitude: 123 02 W
                   Oil Product: Lube Oil, Lube Oil Additives, Bunker Fuel
                   Oil Type: Type 3, Type 3, Type 4
                   Barrels: 38,500
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Kelp, wading birds, coastal diving birds, waterfowl,
                   shorebirds, gulls, petrels, clams, oysters, anadromous fish, kelp spawners,
                   salmon harvesting area, commercial fisheries, high use recreational fishing
                   areas, seal concentration area, sea lion concentration area, whale migration
                   route, Point Reyes National Seashore, Point Reyes/Farallon Islands Marine
                   Sanctuary, Duxbury Reef, J.V. Fitzgerald Reserve.
                   Dispersants: Yes
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Adverse weather conditions, wildlife impacts, wildlife
                   rehabilitation.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches, eelgrass beds, kelp, exposed
                   rocky shores.
                   Keywords: Corexit 9527, U.S. Navy Superintendent of Salvage
                   (NAVSUPSALV), Pacific Strike Team (PST), Open Water Oil Containment
                   and Recovery System (OWOCRS), boom, absorbents, vacuum truck,
                   Intervention on the High Seas Act, International Bird Rescue and Research
                   Center (IBRRC), fire, explosion, sinking.

                   Incident Summary:

                   On October 31, 1984, at 0324, an explosion occurred on board the Tank Vessel
                   Puerto Rican outside the San Francisco Bay Entrance Channel. The vessel
                   was loaded with 91,984 barrels of lube oil and lube oil additives and 8,500
                   barrels of bunker fuel. Two crewmen and the pilot from the vessel were
                   thrown into the water by the blast. The pilot and one crewman were
                   recovered with serious burns. One crewman remained missing and was
                   presumed dead after an extensive search. The explosion caused a relatively
                   minor release of oil. Flames from the initial and subsequent explosions shot
                   as high as 1,000 feet into the sky. The fires on board the vessel were
                   extinguished by late afternoon on November 1.

                   Following the explosion, the USCG On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) ordered the
                   vessel towed out of the vicinity of San Francisco Bay. The intent of the order
                   was to minimize the potential for catastrophic environmental effect from a
                   massive release of oil. On the basis of trajectory forecasts, the National
                   Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) recommended that the
                   vessel be towed to the vicinity of a nearby ocean dumping site (37 32 N,
                   122 59 W). This position is at the continental shelf break, 10 miles SE of the
                   Farallon Islands. The ongoing firefighting and cooling efforts were hampered
                   as the vessel moved farther from shore.


                                                           1                             Puerto Rican








            The weather worsened on November 2, with seas as high as 16 feet and wind
            speeds up to 35 knots. Salvage and inspection activities ceased for the day.
            On November 3 at 0000, the Puerto Rican broke in two, releasing 25,000-35,000
            barrels of its cargo and an undetermined amount of the 8,500 barrels of
            bunker fuel onboard. The stern section sank one mile inside the boundary of
            the Point Reyes/Farallon Islands National Marine Sanctuary, taking most of
            the 8,500 barrels of bunker fuel with it.

            Keystone Shipping Co. of Philadelphia immediately assumed financial
            responsibility for the cleanup. They maintained responsibility throughout
            the response.

            From November 3-18, personnel from the USCG, NOAA, the U.S.
            Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the State of California, and
            numerous contractors and volunteers were involved with the response. On
            November 18, the forebody of the Puerto Rican was towed into the San
            Francisco Bay for repairs.

            Behavior of Oil:

            Bunker fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to
            14. During the towing operation, and as the vessel held position at the
            continental shelf break, oil was leaking and forming a slick and sheen. Eight
            to twelve foot seas prevented the Clean Bay skimmer from recovering this
            oil. Less than 1,000 barrels was estimated to be in the water at this time.
            Weather and sea conditions prevented mechanical removal of the oil and
            worked to naturally dissipate it. Approval of dispersant use was not sought at
            this time.

            Skimmers were used to collect the oil at sea. The USCG Pacific Strike Team
Ak          brought skimming barrier, Open Water Oil Containment and Recovery
            System (OWOCRS), to the scene. Weather delayed the deployment of the
            OWOCRS until it was no longer required.

            Countermeasures and Mitigation:

            A sheen and narrow slick of light mustard-brown oil were observed trailing
            from the vessel as it was towed. The skimmer Mr Clean II took up a position
            behind the tanker and began recovering the oil.
            When the vessel broke up, the Number 6 center independent tank floated
            free of the forebody and stern. The stern sank approximately one hour later.
            The OSC felt that most of the 8,500 barrels of bunker oil went down with this
            section. The breakup of the vessel released an estimated 25,000-35,000 barrels
            of the cargo oil into the water approximately 25 miles west of the coast. The
            weather conditions in the early morning prevented skimmers and barges
            from reaching the vessel to begin recovery and offloading operations. Clean
            Bay personnel advised the OSC that dispersant use was the only available
            alternative under these circumstances.





            Puerto Rican                         2








                   At 0600 on November 3, EPA and the California Department of Fish and
                   Game (CD F&G) approved the OSC's request for dispersant application. There
                   was some delay because wind and wave conditions prevented a vessel from
                   reaching the scene to take samples which was required by the Regional
                   Contingency Plan. At 1504, a Globe Air DC-4, which had been standing by
                   since shortly after the initial explosion, began the application of 1,958 gallons
                   of Corexit 9527. Dispersant was applied to 413 acres of the main body of the
                   spilled oil.. The application was monitored by Clean Bay, EPA, and the CD
                   F&G.

                   On November 4, the OSC decided against a second application of dispersants
                   based upon new trajectory forecasts and the observed movement of the oil.
                   At this time, the oil was not predicted to make landfall. The OSC ordered the
                   towing vessel to remain at sea and not to attempt bringing the forebody into
                   San Francisco Bay until the company's salvage plan was approved.
                   Oil impacted the beaches in Bodega Bay and along the rocky shoreline from
                   Bodega Head to Salmon Creek. Oil concentration was generally light, usually
                   consisting of a yellowish foam in the surf line. By November 14, the beaches
                   and ocean to the north of Point Reyes were reported to be dear, and cleanup
                   operations in Bodega Bay were nearly completed. On November 16,
                   personnel on an overflight reported no visible oil on the coastline from Point
                   Reyes to Fort Bragg, and observed a sheen at the location of the sunken stern
                   section.

                   Beach cleanup consisted of deflection boom, absorbents, and vacuum trucks.
                   Workers were unable to place containment boom across the mouths of many
                   of the bays due to the swift currents. Deflection booms and absorbent booms
                   were placed at the entrances to the harbors. On November 10, deflection
                   booms were deployed at the entrance to Bodega Bay Harbor. Marco skimmers
                   were used inside the harbor to recover oil that the booms failed to contain.
                   Skimmers were also used to the south of Point Reyes. These vessels were
                   provided and operated by personnel from the U.S. Navy Supervisor of
                   Salvage (IVAVSUPSALV). Skimmers collected about 1,500 barrels of oil-water
                   emulsion, about 2 to 3 percent of the amount spilled.
                   On November 18, following USCG OSC approval, the forebody of the vessel
                   was brought into San Francisco Bay. It was escorted by firefighting
                   equipment, a USCG cutter, and skimmer, as well as several towing vessels.
                   No leakage was observed during the towing operation. The procession was
                   met at the Golden Gate Bridge by several additional escort vessels and aircraft.
                   The transit to Graving Dock 3 at Triple A Shipyard proceeded without
                   incident. By 2100 the forebody was docked and completely isolated from the
                   waters of San Francisco Bay.

                   Other Special Interest Issues:
                   The Coast Guard Marine Safety Office (MSO) requested the broadcast of a
                   notice to mariners warning vessels in the region of the slick, the free-floating
                   independent tank, and the sunken stern section.



                                                        3                           Puerto Rican








            The results of the dispersant use were inconclusive. Most agreed that some
            dispersing action took place, but there was disagreement on the degree of
            dispersion or the relative success of the whole operation. Observers on an
            overflight on the day following the dispersant application estimated a range
            of none, to 20 to 30 percent dispersed.
            The offshore location for placement of the vessel suggested to the OSC by
            NOAA fell outside the jurisdiction of the Captain of the Port. The OSC
            sought the additional authority to oversee the response under the
            Intervention on the High Seas Act. This act gave the Coast Guard authority
            to order the owner not to move the stricken vessel closer to shore, and to
            move it further seaward if it appeared that there was a danger of sinking.
            The most seriously impacted natural resources were birds. Bird rescue was
            coordinated by the International Bird Rescue and Research Center and the
            Point Reyes Bird Observatory. These groups reported that a total of 1,320
            affected birds were observed, and that 1,013 of these were mortalities. Of the
            620 birds brought to the IBRRC for cleaning, 307 died. Point Reyes Bird
            Observatory personnel estimated that the total mortality of birds, including
            those which died at sea, could have been as high as 5,000.
            Personnel from the Point Reyes Bird Observatory reported observing 15
            elephant seals with oil splotches, some of which were heavily oiled. No
            immediately observed effects to the mammals were noted.

            References:

            eClean Bay's Response to the "'Puerto Rican" Spill
            eGolob's 1978-1989 US Spill Report
            e Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
            1987.
            9MMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
            eNational Research Council. 1989. Using Oil Spill Dispersants on the Sea.
            National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 335pp.
            9NOAA, Scientific Support Coordinator's report.
            9OSIR Oil Spills, International Summary & Review, 1982-1985
            *Tanker Advisory Center, Inc., 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers.
            T.A.C. Inc. 1991.
            oUSCG Federal On-Scene Coordinator's Report
            -World Information Systems. 1991. Tanker Losses in U.S. Waters: 1978-1990.
            World Information Systems.












            Puerto Rican                          4






                                                                                                                0


                    Name of Spill: Rockaway Fuel Oil Spill
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 07/31/78
                    Location of Spill: Rockaway Point, New York                                                 4
                    Latitude: 40 32 N
                    Longitude: 073 56 W
                    Oil Product: No. 6 Fuel Oil, No. 2 Fuel Oil
                    Oil Type: Type 4, Type 2
                    Barrels: 1,000
                    Source of Spill: Non-Tank Vessel                                                            41
                    Resources at Risk: Beaches, recreational boating areas, Wildlife Preserve,
                    gulls, terns.
                    Dispersants: Yes
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: No
                    Other Special Interest: Complex salvage operations, logistical or operational
                    problems.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: exposed fine sand beaches.
                    Keywords: Containment boom, salvage, skimmer, vacuum truck, Open
                    Water Oil Containment System (OWOCS), boom, Navy boom, Goodyear
                    boom, Bennett boom.

                    Incident Summary:

                    On July 31, 1978, the dredge Pennsylvania and its tug Gracie Moran ran
                    aground while entering Rockaway Inlet, New York under heavy weather.
                    The tug managed to free itself, but the dredge sank in 30 feet of water. The
                    Pennsylvania was carrying 140 barrels of No. 2 oil and 880 barrels of No. 6 oil.
                    Oil continued to leak from the vessel until August 7. A number of birds were
                    oiled and recovered. Oil came ashore at beaches at Coney Island, New York;
                    Rockaway, New York; and in lesser amounts at Sandy Hook, New Jersey.

                    Behavior of Oil:

                    No. 6 fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to 14.
                    No. 2 heating oil has a minimum API gravity of 30, and a pour point between
                    -6 and -27 degrees C. An oil slick measuring 2 miles long by 200 yards wide
                    composed mostly of sheen was observed emanating from the wreck site on
                    the afternoon of July 31. Most of the oil leaked out of the dredge in the first 24
                    hours. Oil reached Coney Island beaches and Manhattan Beach by August 2.
                    On August 3, Rockaway beaches were impacted, and oil was discovered at
                    Jacob Riis Park and Manasquam Inlet on August 4. As of August 5, oil was
                    leaking out of the vessel at a rate of 1-2 barrels per day. By August 7, the
                    United States Coast Guard Atlantic Strike Team (AST) reported that no new
                    oil was coming from the dredge.








                                                                                Rockaway Fuel Oil Spill









             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             The owner of the dredge Pennsylvania, The American Dredge Company,
             assumed responsibility, and contracted Clean Ventures, Inc. to clean up the
             spill. Clean Ventures arrived on-scene on July 31. The On-Scene Coordinator
             (OSC) was the Captain of the Port (COTP) New York. A system of anchors and
             buoys was deployed around the wreck site to which booms were attached.
             Booming of Sheeps Head Bay, Jamaica Bay, and Gerritsen Inlet was completed
             early on August 1. Rough weather and powerful currents at the grounding
             site made deployment and maintenance of booms, and diving operations
             difficult throughout the incident.

             The OSC activated the AST on July 31. They arrived on-scene early the next
             day, and deployed the Open Water Oil Containment System (OWOCS), but
             the barrier was not long enough to completely encircle the dredge. Diving
             operations by the AST and commercial divers beginning on the morning of
             August 1 revealed that No. 6 oil was leaking from tank vents and that oil was
             trapped in various parts of the dredge. Information about the piping layout of
             the vessel, necessary to locate and control leaking vents, was difficult to
             obtain. Clean Ventures, Inc. attempted to use a vacuum truck deployed on a
             landing craft in the recovery operations. This arrangement proved to be of
             limited use due to the unseaworthiness of the craft, and the need to
             reconfigure the boom for this operation.
             A decision was made on August 1 by the Department of Parks and Recreation
             to berm those beaches which might have impacts. Eventually, the oil would
             impact parts of the Coney Island beaches, 3.5 miles of the Rockaway beaches,
             and, in very small amounts, Sandy Hook, New Jersey. The New York beaches
             were closed for a short time while cleanup operations were conducted.

             A Navy JBF skimmer and a belt-type Bennett skimmer were brought on-
             scene on August 1 and were deployed the next day. Both skimmers suffered
             immediate mechanical difficulties. Eventually, the Bennett skimmer proved
             effective, but the JBF was not suited for the heavy seas. Helicopters efficiently
             directed the deployment of the skimmem. Early on August 2, the OWOCS
             fouled on the vessel. The day was spent in redeploying the OWOCS and
             deploying a contractor supplied Bennett boom while diving operations
             continued. The Bennett boom proved ineffective due to entrainment of the
             oil under the barrier and its inability to withstand the heavy seas. Boom
             deployed at Gerritsen Inlet had to be redeployed as well. Impacted beaches on
             Coney Island were cleaned on this day. One thousand feet of Goodyear boom
             arrived on-scene the evening of August 2.

             On August 3, the OWOCS was redeployed and Goodyear boom was deployed
             outside the OWOCS. On August 4, the Goodyear boom was found tangled on
             the Pennsylvania. The Goodyear boom was redeployed, but the OWOCS was
             retired.





             Rockaway Fuel Oil Spill                 2








                   The OSC received permission to use dispersants, and an EPA vessel was
                   deployed to apply Corexit 9257 on the spilled oil. The EPA vessel broke down
                   en route, so a Coast Guard 32-foot Ports and Waterways boat was used to apply
                   dispersant throughout the day under EPA supervision.

                   By August 5, an American Dredge contractor finished removing the
                   remaining recoverable oil from the dredge. The Goodyear boom was attached
                   .to heavier anchors deployed by the CGC Sassaftass to prevent the boom from
                   dragging onto the vessel again. Navy boom arrived at the site and was
                   deployed inside the Rockaway Inlet near the Marine Parkway Bridge as a
                   preventive measure. Dispersant operations continued on this day. On the
                   afternoon of August 6, the Goodyear boom around the dredge came apart and
                   several hours were spent reconnecting it. The AST verified that the tanks
                   were empty and suggested that dispersants be added to the oil which was
                   trapped in various parts of the dredge. The EPA approved the use of
                   dispersants in the vessel and plans were made to begin the next day.
                   Meanwhile, surface dispersant operations were conducted around the wreck
                   site throughout the day. Dispersants were applied in the vessel and on the
                   surrounding waters on August 7 and 8.
                   On August 8, the OSC took over the spill, skimmer operations ceased, and the             41
                   boom in the Rockaway Inlet was taken down. The AST was released on
                   August 10. On August 14, another application of dispersants was made as
                   more oil was observed near the vessel. A total of 288 gallons of dispersant
                   was used by the close of operations. On August 15, the Goodyear boom was
                   removed from around thePennsylvania and the OSC closed the incident.
                   The wreck site was monitored until the salvage of the dredge was complete.
                   Ultimately, 225 barrels of oil were recovered, and 775 barrels were lost.

                   The USFWS established a center for receiving oiled birds at Breezy Point on
                   August 3. Approximately 500 oiled gulls and 24 oiled terns were recovered in
                   Jamaica Bay.

                   Other Special Interest Issues:

                   Although the American Dredge Company initially assumed responsibility for
                   the incident, they never sent a representative to the spill site. This caused
                   problems for the OSC in coordinating the cleanup contractor's activities.
                   Heavy seas and strong currents at the site caused failure of booms and
                   difficulties in diving operations. Containment booms around the barge failed
                   constantly. Increasingly durable booms and heavier moorings were required
                   through the course of the cleanup. Of the four different kinds of boom used
                   at this incident, Goodyear boom proved more effective than the OWOCS,
                   Bennett boom, or Navy boom.

                   Ref erences:

                   *USCG Pollution Incident Case Analysis, unpublished report, USCGHQ.



                                                          3                  Rockaway Fuel Oil Spill       0








                   Name of Spill: Ryuyo Maru No. 2
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 11/08/79
                   Location of Spill: Village Cove, St. Paul Island, Bering Sea, Alaska
                   Latitude: 57 10 N
                   Longitude: 170 20 W
                   Oil Product: No. 2 Fuel Oil
                   Oil Type: Type 2
                   Barrels: 6,190
                   Source of Spill: Non-Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Seals, migratory waterfowl, Eider Ducks, arthropods.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: Yes
                   Other Special Interest: Logistical or operational problems, unusual or
                   experimental cleanup techniques, adverse weather conditions.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Exposed rocky shores, vertical rocky shores, coarse
                   gravel beaches, marshes.
                   Keywords: Pacific Strike Team (PST), U. S. Naval Explosive Ordinance
                   Detachment (EOD), Crowley Environmental Services, adverse weather
                   conditions, manual removal, sorbents, boom, low pressure washing,
                   demolition, toxic fumes, remote response.

                   Incident Summary:

                   On November 8, 1979, the fishing vessel Ryuyo Maru No. 2 grounded in 60-
                   knot winds and 30-foot seas in Village Cove, St. Paul Island, Bering Sea,
                   Alaska. The vessel initially spilled about 950 barrels of light oil and
                   continued to leak for the duration of the incident. An initial survey found
                   nine of 12 tanks holed. The ship's refrigeration system failed, releasing toxic
                   levels of ammonia gas in the interior. Access to the vessel was complicated
                   by the rough seas and a 200-foot high cliff at the grounding site. A makeshift,
                   90-foot highline was rigged from the base of the cliff to the ship. The only
                   alternative mode of access was by helicopter, which was not always available
                   because of weather.

                   The Commanding Officer, Marine Safety Office (MSO), Anchorage, the
                   predesignated On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) for the spill, sent a representative
                   to the site on November 9. The owners of the vessel initially assumed
                   responsibility for cleanup operations, but abandoned their responsibility on
                   November 15, at which time the OSC took full control of the spill response.
                   Explosives were used to vent dangerous accumulations of ammonia gas on
                   November 20, and also to finally destroy the vessel on November 22. The
                   response ended on December 5.









                                                                                  Ryuyo Maru No. 2











             Behavior of Oil:

             No. 2 fuel oil has a minimum API gravity of 30, and a pour point between -6
             and -27 degrees C. Initial reports from the LORAN Station on St. Paul
             indicated broken patches of oil in the water extending around Tolstoi Point
             and into seal rookeries. The oil was breaking up and dissipating in heavy
             weather with seas in excess of 20 feet. Village Cove and the saltwater lagoon
             connected to it were heavily oiled. Sheen and emulsified oil were found in
             Village Cove, Zoltoi Bay, and English Bay. Oil continued to leak from the
             vessel until November 22, when the vessel was destroyed. Much of the oil
             burned within the hulk and the remainder moved out to sea.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             The owners of the vessel hired Crowley Environmental Services (CES) to
             conduct cleanup operations. The Pacific Strike Team (PST) and CES arrived
             on scene on November 10. Alaska Department of Environmental
             Conservation personnel and Environmental Protection Agency personnel
             began beach surveys on the afternoon of November 10.
             The shoreline at the site of the grounding was exposed to extremely high
             wave energy so that no cleanup activities were needed except for removal of
             oil soaked debris. The northern edge of Village Cove is a shallow, saltwater
             lagoon. The initial release of oil killed 50 percent of the arthropods in the
             lagoon. To protect seals and waterfowl, and to minimize further damage to
             the lagoon's ecology, booming of the lagoon entrance was attempted.
             However, the 5- to 10-knot currents in the entrance caused entrainment of oil
             and physical damage to the booms. An attempt was made to build a dam
             across the entrance to the lagoon. This caused severe scouring at the bottom
             of the channel as the dam neared completion, and the project was abandoned.
             A sandbag dike was built with an attached boom to deflect oil into a pit dug in
             the shore near the dike. Wind action helped collect the oil entering the edge
             of the lagoon where it was recovered with absorbent materials. Oiled
             shoreline in the lagoon was cleaned by manual removal using sorbents. Low-
             pressure washing of beaches and grassy areas, and hazing operations to scare
             birds from the oiled areas began on November 18.

             Five options were considered to deal with the situation, including:

             *pumping oil from the ship to bladders on LCMs (Landing Craft Medium)
             *bringing an ocean-type tank barge to the scene from Seattle for the oil
               transfer
             *removal of the ship using expanding foam
             *pumping the oil to the top of the cliff
             edestruction of the vessel at a time when the weather would disperse it.

             Destruction of the vessel was the option chosen. On November 22, personnel
             from the United States Naval Explosive Ordnance Detachment (EOD) and the
             Coast Guard destroyed the vessel by demolition. Thermal grenades were also


             Ryuyo Maru No. 2                       2








                  used to ignite the oil and the nets which could not be removed from the
                  vessel. The slick resulting from the destruction of the vessel moved out to
                  sea and dissipated. Some of the 300 tons of fish and the fishing nets from the
                  vessel came ashore after the explosion, and were cleaned up.
                  Other Special Interest Issues:

                  Between 10,000 and 20,000 seals inhabit St. Paul Island between April and
                  November. Dead oiled seals were observed in the rookeries, but it was not
                  known if the oiling caused these deaths or not; high mortalities are normal
                  during this season. Fishing nets washed off the Ryuyo Maru caused
                  additional mortality when seals become trapped in them. Dead, oiled birds
                  were found; both seals and birds were killed by the concussion of explosives.
                  Lack of housing and food for the response personnel and the personnel from
                  the Ryuyo Maru No. 2 caused logistical and operational problems.
                  Equipment for the spill response, especially transportation and fuel for the
                  response personnel was in scarce supply on the island. Equipment and
                  supplies had to be transported in from remote locations. making operations
                  very difficult.

                  The Ryuyo Maru No. 2s refrigeration system ruptured during the grounding,
                  and released ammonia into the vessel. It was impossible to locate and seal
                  the source of the leak because no self-contained breathing apparatus units
                  were initially available.
                  The vessel was inaccessible for lightering or salvaging operations because of
                  extremely heavy weather. Storms, high winds, and cold temperatures
                  allowed only minimal work to be done on many days.

                  References:

                  eReiter, G. Cold Weather Response F/V Ryuyo Maru No.2 St. Paul, Pribilof
                  Islands, Alaska, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1981, pp. 227-231.
                  *USCG On-Scene Coordinator's Report


















                                                         3                       Ryuyo Maru No. 2








                     Name of Spill: Sanko Harvest
                     Date of Spill (mmddyy): 02/13/91
                     Location of Spill: Esperance, Western Australia
                     Latitude: 34 10 S
                     Longitude: 122 30 E
                     Oil Product: Fuel Oil
                     Oil Type: Type 2
                     Barrels: 4,400
                     Source of Spill: Non-Tank Vessel
                     Resources at Risk: Seals, birds, beaches, national parks.
                     Dispersants: Yes
                     Bioremediation: No
                     In-situ Burning: No
                     Other Special Interest: Adverse weather conditions, wildlife impacts.
                     Shoreline Types Impacted: Fine sand beaches, coarse sand beaches.
                     Keywords: Sorbents, sinking, International Tanker Owners Pollution
                     Federation (ITOPF), Corexit 9527

                     Incident Summary:

                     On the night of February 13, 1991, the Panamanian bulk cargo carrier Sanko
                     Harvest grounded on a submerged rock pinnacle 23 miles south of Esperance,
                     Western Australia. The vessel, out of the shipping lane at the time of the
                     incident, was loaded with 30,000 metric tons of fertilizer, diammonium.
                     phosphate, and triple superphosphate. The double hull of the vessel was
                     ripped open in the grounding and the freighter began leaking its fuel oil. On
                     February 18, the ship broke in two in a storm and sank with its entire cargo
                     and bunker fuel. Approximately 3,500 barrels of fuel oil were spilled during
                     the incident. The remaining 900 barrels of oil sank with the ship.

                     Behavior of Oil:

                     The spilled oil initially created a slick approximately 2 miles long and 1000
                     feet wide. As the slick grew to 9 miles long, it began to threaten nearby
                     islands. Approximately 2,100 barrels of the fuel oil came ashore along 17
                     miles of the northeast islands and the mainland of Australia. The worst of
                     the oiling was on beaches to the west of Esperance, particularly Hellfire Bay,
                     Thistle Bay, Lucky Bay, and Rossiter Bay. Oil sank into these coarse-grained
                     beaches to a depth of approximately one-half inch. The incident occurred
                     approximately six miles from Cape Le Grand, which is east of Esperance, and
                     the beach at Cape Le Grand National Park also received heavy oiling. On the
                     beaches with fine-grained sand, the oil did not penetrate the tightly
                     compacted beach sand, and was deposited on top.











                                                                                          Sanko Harvest









            Countermeasures and Mitigation:

            The Department of Marine and Harbors (DMH) deployed nearly 1,700 feet of
            Expandi containment boom around the ship in two rows. The sea and wind
            conditions at the time were very rough. More than two-thirds of the boom
            was damaged at sea and lost. Less than one-fifth of the deployed boom was
            recovered and cleaned enough to be reused.

            The primary response tool was chemical dispersant spraying. Dispersants
            were used in limited amounts to lessen environmental effects. Twenty-two
            200-liter drums of dispersant were sprayed on parts of the slick from
            helicopters and tugboats. BP.A-B, used in the surf zone, and Ardrox 6120,
            described as similar to Corexit 9527, were sprayed on the oil during the week
            long response. The spraying reportedly dispersed approximately 700 barrels of
            the spilled oil.

            Sorbents were used to clean the beaches to the west of Esperance, which were
            reportedly only moderately oiled. Mechanical cleanup was performed on the
            heavily impacted beaches at Cape Le Grand National Park and Lucky Bay.
            This included the use of graders and front-end loaders to remove the oiled
            debris. Lightly oiled beaches were rapidly cleaned naturally along the high
            energy coastal environment.

            Many of the oiled sites east of Esperance were difficult for cleanup personnel
            and equipment to reach. Contractors and volunteers manually cleaned the
            very fine sand beaches by scraping off the oiled sand, since the oil did not
            penetrate deeply into the beach in these areas. A substantial amount of oiled
            sand was placed in a gravel pit near Lucky Bay. The oil penetrated into the
            coarser sand beaches. Tarballs of stranded oil were reported on the beaches.

            Other Special Interest Issues:

            An unknown number of birds were killed as a result of the spill. The oil also
            impacted Hood Island and Seal Rock which were important breeding grounds
            for New Zealand fur seals. A team from the Australian Department Of
            Conservation and Land Management (CALM) worked to save the affected
            colony. Between 11 and 200 seal pups were reportedly oiled on Hood Island
            and Seal Rock. The team, made up of scientists and volunteers, went to the
            islands and cleaned the oiled pups on-scene using a simple detergent, CT 18,
            and a laundry stain remover, Preen, to remove the residual oil and detergent.
            There was only one reported seal pup death.











            Sanko Harvest






                                                                                                          0



                   References:

                   *Freighter Breaks Up and Spills 600 Metric Tons of Fuel Oil Off Western
                   Australia. Golob's Oil Pollution Bulletin. 01 March 1991.
                   *Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
                   *Oil Spill Threat to New Zealand Fur Seals. Marine Pollution Bulletin. Vol.
                   22. No. 4. April 1991. p. 166.
                   *Panamanian Ship Sinks in Uncharted Australian Waters. Oil Spill
                   Intelligence Report. 28 February 1991. pp. 3-4.


















































                                                                                    Sanko Harvest









                   Name of Spill: Sansinena
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 12/17/76
                   Location of Spill: Los Angeles Harbor, California
                   Latitude: 33 43 N
                   Longitude: 118 16 W
                   Oil Product: Bunker C
                   Oil Type: Type 4
                   Barrels: 30,000
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel, pipeline.
                   Resources at Risk: Gulls, mussels, crabs, marinas, boat ramps, beaches.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Complex salvage operations, research conducted,
                   unusual or experimental cleanup techniques.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Piers, sand/gravel beaches, developed upland.
                   Keywords: Boom, manual removal, self-contained skimming devices,
                   sorbent pads, sub-surface oil, suction operations, fire, explosion, sinking.

                   Incident Summary:

                   At 1938 on December 17, 1976, the Sansinena exploded, caught fire, and sank
                   during refueling at the Union Oil Terminal, Berth 46, in Los Angeles Harbor,
                   California. The vessel was loaded with 22,000 barrels of Bunker C at the time
                   of the incident. The apparent cause was a still-air situation that developed
Z                  between the mid-ship house and the afterdeck house. Vapors emitting from
                   the cargo tank vents created a vapor cloud during ballasting. These were
                   ignited in the midship house and flashed back through the vent piping
                   system. The largest explosion took place in the number 10 center cargo tank.
                   The force of the explosion propelled the main deck over the cargo tanks into
                   the air. When the deck landed, it severed a 36-inch cargo line on top of the
                   inshore isolation valve. This severed line fed fuel to the fire until response
                   personnel discovered and capped it on December 21. Nine lives were lost as a
                   result of the explosion. Debris and oil scattered in all directions.
                   Approximately 400 boats in the vicinity were damaged by the fine mist of
                   airborne oil, resulting in millions of dollars in property damage. An
                   estimated 30,000 barrels of oil were released into Los Angeles harbor from the
                   ship and the severed pipeline.

                   A U.S. Coast Guard boat and a Los Angeles City Fire Department boat arrived
                   on-scene within five minutes of the explosion to assist in firefighting and
                   rescue operations. Pollution surveys were conducted after the fire was under
                   control. Initial reports concluded that much of the oil had burned off, but on
                   December 19, underwater divers discovered a large quantity of oil on the
                   bottom of the harbor. The primary cleanup contractors were IT Corporation,
                   Crowley Environmental Services, Crosby & Overton, Inc., and Fred Devine
                   Diving and Salvage, Inc. Boom deployment began within two hours of the
                   explosion. Boom and other containment gear were utilized for the next 120
                   days, while mechanical removal of oil from the bottom of the harbor



                                                                                        Sansinena






                                                                                                                0



             continued for 16 months. Total oil removal costs exceeded three million
             dollars.


             Behavior of Oil:

             Bunker C fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to
             14. The lighter, more toxic fractions of oil burned on the surface of the water
             following the explosion. The remaining thick residue sank to the bottom of
             the harbor in approximately 50 feet of water.

             On December 21, USCG Pacific Strike Team (PST) and Parker Diving Service
             divers conducted an underwater survey of the harbor. They found large
             pools of oil on the harbor floor and in the lower portions of the cargo tanks
             resting on the bottom. The pools of oil, up to nine feet deep, had settled into
             hard, clay packed pockets and crevices along the bottom.

             By January 17, 1977, the amount of grease and oil on the surface of the water
             had increased and was greatest in the slip area and shallow beach area to the
             northwest and west of the spill site. In July 1977, grease and oil levels in the
             water column rose slightly while levels in the sediments decreased. The total
             amount of retrieved oil from the surface and the bottom of the harbor was
             33,000 barrels, partly as an oil/water emulsion.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             The first boom deployed consisted of 2,000 feet of 8-inch skirted harbor boom
             in a reverse "J" configuration from the bow of the vessel to 1,000 feet off her
             port beam. The boom contained a large portion of the floating oil while still
             allowing emergency and firefighting access to the area. After observing the
             oil near Cabrillo Beach, the On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) recommended a
             three phase booming operation. First, large booms were deployed to isolate
             the entire outer harbor area including Berth 46, Berth 47, the Los Angeles
             breakwater, and Fort MacArthur. After emergency vessels cleared the area, a
             second set of boom was deployed to enclose the Sansinena. The final set of
             boom was deployed along the breakwater and Cabrillo Beach area. These
             placements were selected to isolate the heaviest concentrations of oil along
             the sides of the outer harbor to enable easier removal of the oil.                                 z

             Beach areas were cleaned by manual removal of oil-soaked sand. This phase
             of cleanup was completed by December 20. By December 24, all collectable
             surface crude and diesel oil had been removed with two self-contained
             skimming devices and sorbent pads.
             A naval architect from Fred Devine Diving and Salvage, Inc., designed the
             pumping system used to collect oil from the harbor floor. A two-piece
             adjustable suction head, capable of pumping 2 to 4 gallons per minute, was
             controlled by guy wires aboard a salvage barge. A hydraulically driven screw-
             type progressive cavity pump mounted on top of the suction head was
             connected to the barge by hydraulic lines. After divers placed and adjusted
             the head in an oil pocket, the oil was pumped from the bottom and



             Sansinena                               2










                    transferred via a three-inch hose to an oil collection tank mounted on the
                    salvage barge. This oil was then transferred to an on-shore settling tank for
                    disposal. As removal operations continued and pumping became more
                    difficult due to smaller crevices, the suction head had to be redesigned into a
                    configuration with three smaller satellite heads. In sixty days, 10,000 barrels of
                    oil had been removed from the harbor bottom. This design was the first
                    known viable technique to remove heavy, highly viscous oil from the
                    bottom.

                    Other Special Interest Issues:

                    Harbors Environmental. Projects (HEP) conducted studies on the impact of the
                    spilled oil on biology and water quality at 24 stations in the area. This was the
                    first known Bunker C spill where both pre and post spill biological and water
                    quality data had been collected. This same area had been an HEP research area
                    since 1972. HEP studies revealed that most marine environmental damage
                    was in the intertidal zone of the beach and the breakwater and pilings.
                    Phytoplankton was most heavily impacted during the first month of the spill,
                    while copepod numbers significantly increased in the spill area between
                    January and April. Although small benthic infaunal organisms were heavily
                    impacted about 3-4 months after the spill, the community returned to normal
                    9 to 11 months after the incident when the residual oil had lost its toxicity.

                    References:

                    eHooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
                    1987.
                    *Hutchinson, J.H. andB.L. Simosen, 1979. Cleanup operations after the 1976
                    SS Sansinena explosion - An industrial perspective, Oil Spill Conference
                    Proceedings, 1979, pp. 429-433.
                    *MMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
                    eSoule, D.F. 1980. Evaluation of Impacts of the "Sansinena" Explosion and
                    Bunker C Spill in Los Angeles Harbor, December 1976. Marine
                    Environmental Pollution, 1. Hydrocarbons. Elsevier Oceanography Series,
                    27A. pp. 497-530.
                    *The Proceedings of the Conference on Assessment of Ecological Impacts of
                    Oil Spills, 14 - 17 June 1978
                    eWhite, W.W. and J.T. Kopeck, 1979. Oil spill control and abatement
                    techniques used at the SS Sansinena explosion site - A Coast Guard
                    perspective, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1979, pp.434-435.













                                                             3                                 Sansinena








                     Name of Spill: Santa Barbara Well blowout
                     Date of Spill (mmddyy): 01/28/69 - 02/07/69
                     Location of Spill: Santa Barbara, California
                     Latitude: 34 10 N
                     Longitude: 119 45 W
                     Oil Product: California crude oil
                     Oil Type: Type 4
                     Barrels: 100,000
                     Source of Spill: Platform
                     Resources at Risk: Commercial fisheries, diving coastal birds, shorebirds,
                     seals, sea lions, whales, bird migratory routes, marnmal migratory routes,
                     high-use recreational boating area.
                     Dispersants: Yes
                     Bioremediation: No
                     In-situ Burning: No
                     Other Special Interest: Closure of commercial fishing areas, effects to personal
                     property, effects to recreation areas, volunteer response and organization.
                     Shoreline Types Impacted: Exposed seawalls, sand/gravel beaches, exposed
                     rocky shores.
                     Keywords: Polycomplex A, Corexit, straw, high-pressure washing, booms.

                     Incident Summary:

                     On January 28, 1969, the Union Oil Company well number 21 under Platform
                     A, located 5.5 miles southeast of Santa Barbara, California, in the Dos Cuadras
                     field, experienced a blowout while drill bits were being changed. A massive
                     mixture of oil, gas, and drilling mud roared up the drill casing and spewed
                     out onto the platform. Well A-21 was capped on February 7 with 13,000
                     barrels of heavy drilling mud. Oil continued to vent from natural faults
                     several hundred yards from the platform, in tract 4042 between the coast and
                     a chain of islands. The faults released a total of 100,000 barrels of oil until
                     December 1969.

                     A record-breaking storm immediately before the incident contributed to the
                     large amount of oiled debris that needed to be collected as part of the spin
                     response. On February 2, the National Pollution Contingency Plan, instituted
                     by President Johnson in 1968, went into effect for the first time. The Federal
                     Water Pollution Control Administration was on-scene to monitor the well-
                     killing process and cleanup. Red Adair was brought in to provide expertise
                     capping the well. To aid in predicting the slick movement, the National
                     Weather Service set up a local station to monitor winds and tides. Weather
                     during the cleanup was moderate except for a storm on February 4 and 5 that
                     temporarily halted cleanup by damaging booms that were protecting harbors
                     and marinas.

                     The majority of the cleanup was completed within 45 days. Commercial
                     fishing was completely closed in the area from February until April.
                     Although the environmental effects of the spill were relatively minimal,
                     economic effects were extensive due to loss of fishing income, loss of
                     recreational facilities, and damage to personal property.


                                                               1               Santa Barbara Well blowout










            Behavior of Oil:

            California crude oil is a heavy product with a range of API values between
            10.3 and 13.2. During the first few days of the spill, the rate of crude oil release
            was estimated at 5,000 barrels per day. By March 3, the seepage from the
            surrounding natural faults had slowed to around 30 barrels per day. The rate
            then continued to decline to a relatively constant flow of 5-10 barrels per day
            over the next 2 to 3 months. Although there was no conclusive figure on the
            total amount of oil released into the water, it was estimated at from 33,000 to
            80,000 barrels.

            The day of the incident, the oil covered a 25-square mile area east of the
            platform. On January 31, the oil slick was reported to be 30 square miles with
            another 200 square miles of lighter fractions between Carpinteria and Santa
            Barbara. The oil stayed offshore for several days until a shift in the wind
            pushed a relatively small amount of oil onto the shoreline on February 1.
            The Rincon surfing area was the first affected beach and the slick in the ocean
            was 4 miles by 12 miles with lighter fractions extending for 80 square miles.
            Winds, high tides and surges on February 4 pushed oil onto the beaches
            directly east and west of Santa Barbara, carrying the oil to seawalls, roads and
            buildings. The oil slick scattered on February 6, affecting approximately 100
            miles of Southern California coastline. Oil was observed onshore at several
            mainland beaches from Pismo beach down to the Mexican border by March
            19. Approximately 40 miles of coastline from Pismo Beach to Santa Monica
            was contaminated over the next several months. Boats and seaside buildings
            were contaminated with the oil.

            Countermeasures and Mitigation:

            Dispersants were used up to two miles from the shore. Only low-toxicity
            dispersants, Polycomplex A and Corexit, were used.

            The predominant beach cleanup method was manual removal.

            Approximately 3,000 tons of straw were effectively used for beach cleanup.
            The straw was also dumped offshore to soak up floating oil.

            High-pressure water washing, sometimes followed by sandblasting, cleaned
            stains on rocky beaches, seawalls, and breakwaters.

            A mixture of talc and naphtha was used to dissolve the tar-like oil on rocks,
            seawalls, and the harbor breakwater. A crust of oil and talc would remain
            after the applied naphtha evaporated. This crust was blasted with high
            pressure water, causing it to disintegrate into a harmless brown dust.

            By February 11, about 18,900 feet of boom had been deployed. Booms were not
            always successful due to their late arrival. Boom placed at the harbor
            entrance shut down the commercial fishing industry from February until
            April.




            Santa Barbara Well blowout             2






                                                                                                             0


                   The well was plugged with drilling mud and cement on February 7, reducing
                   the leak to small gas bubbles. The natural fault seepage was slowed once the
                   well pumping operations were resumed and underwater tent collection                       0
                   begun.

                   Over 1,000 workers, 54 boats, and 125 pieces of mechanical equipment were
                   used during the cleanup effort. Approximately 5,200 truckloads of oily debris
                   were hauled to several major landfill sites around the Santa Barbara area.
                   Beaches were in use by June 1, though cleanup on rocky shores was not                     0
                   finished until August 15. The total cost due to cleanup exceeded $4.5 million.

                   Other Special Interest Issues:

                   This was the worst incident involving an offshore platform to date in the
                   United States. Residents of Santa Barbara were in the midst of a battle to stop           41
                   drilling in this channel, famous for its active oil seeps, when the accident
                   occurred. Many people felt that not enough attention had been given to the
                   environmental risks associated with drilling in this area. The accident may
                   not have occurred if Union Oil had put steel casing around the hole to a
                   depth of 2,000 feet. Even though this is a known unstable earthquake fault                0
                   area, Union had received a waiver from Federal officials to case the well to
                   only 238 feet. Media coverage was high and several protests and sit-ins
                   resulted. This incident was also influential in the development of the
                   National Environmental Policy Act, signed by President Nixon on January 1,
                   1970.

                   Ventura Humane Society received many of the early reports of oiled birds,
                   mostly gulls and grebes. On February 2, the primary bird treatment center was
                   moved from Carpinteria Beach State Park to the Santa Monica Bird Refuge
                   near Montecito due to traffic jams on Route 101. The birds were dipped in a
                   solution of Polycomplex A in an attempt to dissolve the crude oil without
                   removing the natural oils on their feathers. Volunteers also cleaned birds at
                   the Childs Estate bird center. Approximately 3,700 birds were known to have
                   died as a result of oiling. This number probably represents a small fraction of
                   the total number of bird deaths attributable to this oil spill.

                                                                                                             40






                                                                                                             z















                                                           3               Santa Barbara Well blowout











            Ref erences:

            -Cimberg, R., "A Reinvestigation of Southern California Rocky Intertidal
            Beaches Three and One-Half Years After the 1969 Santa Barbara Oil Spill: A
            Preliminary Report," Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1973, pp. 697-702.
            *Dye, L. "Blowout at Platform A." Doubleday & Co. 1971.
            *Easton, R.O. Black Tide: The Santa Barbara Oil Spill and its Consequences.
            Delacourt Press. New York. 1972. 336 pp.
            eGilmore et al. 1970. Systems Study of Oil Spill Cleanup Procedures. Vol.1:
            Analysis of Oil Spills and Control Measures.
            *Gundlach, E. and Marshall, M. 1990. The Physical Persistence of Spilled Oil:
            An Analysis of Oil Spills Previous to Exxon Valdez. Final Report. HAZMAT.
            OAD. NOAA. pp-47-68.
            -Hoult, D.P. Oil on the Sea. 1969.
            *Potter, J. 1973. Disaster By Oil. The Macmillan Company, NY. pp. 153-245.
            *The SocioEconomic Impacts of Oil Spills, Final Report, WAPORA, March
            1984.
            *Wilson, et al. 1976. "The Spreading, Retention and Clean-up of Oil Spills,"
            University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI.



































            Santa Barbara Well blowout






                                                                                                        0


                   Name of Spill: Schuylkill River Spill
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 06/22/72
                   Location of Spill: Douglassville, Pennsylvania
                   Latitude: 40 15 N
                   Longitude: 075 38 W
                   Oil Product: Waste oil and sludge
                   Oil Type: Type 3
                   Barrels: 170,000
                   Source of Spill: Facility
                   Resources at Risk: Terrestrial mammals, freshwater marshes, drinking water
                   intakes, industrial water intakes.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Human health and safety concerns, logistical or
                   operational problems, adverse weather conditions.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: vegetated riverbanks.
                   Keywords: Boom, filter fence, sorbent granules, National Strike Force (NSF),
                   manual removal.

                   Incident Summary:

                   On June 22, 1972, 140,000-190,000 barrels of waste oil and sludge from Berks
                   Associates oil reclamation plant escaped into the Schuylkill River at
                   Douglassville, Pennsylvania. The release resulted from heavy rains and
                   flooding of the entire lagoon complex. Twelve to eighteen inches of rainfall
                   from Hurricane Agnes on June 21-22 raised the Schuylkill River 20 feet over
                   its banks and flooded the waste oil lagoons. Agnes proved to be the worst
                   natural disaster in the U.S. at the time. Two billion dollars in damage and 100
                   fatalities were attributed to the storm.

                   The spilled oil was not sighted until June 23, due to the more pressing
                   concerns of evacuation and property damage. U.S. Coast Guard and
                   Environmental Protection Agency personnel conducted an overflight of the
                   area to assess the magnitude of the flood damage. Black oil and several
                   hundred drums containing hazardous chemicals were spread over much of
                   the countryside along the Schuylkill River. The Regional Response Team
                   (RRT) was assembled and an on-scene coordinator was assigned by the EPA.
                   The National Contingency Plan revolving fund was opened under the "Act
                   of God" provision. On June 28, the Coast Guard National Strike Force and
                   personnel from the Division of Oil and Hazardous Materials (DOHM) were
                   called.

                   The rains stopped on June 30. The top priorities at this point were to reduce
                   the amount of oil leaching from the lagoons into the river and to protect the
                   water intakes of downstream cities. On July 4, three main contractors,
                   Underwater Technics, Clean Water, and New England Pollution Control
                   were tasked with cleaning up a 16 mile stretch of the Schuylkill River. The
                   spill area became a testing ground for cleanup methods. The bulk of the



                                                         1                  Schuylkill River Spill








            cleanup was completed by early August. By the conclusion of operations on
            September 30, the cleanup bill totaled $4.5 million.

            Behavior of Oil:

            As a result of the flood waters overflowing the facility dikes, much of the
            sludge oil spread over 15 miles of downstream area. The area between
            Douglassville and Pennhurst was the most heavily oiled. As the rain washed
            oil from the banks into the river, the resulting slick was carried further
            downstream. Sticky oil coated fifteen islands in the river. The sticky sludge
            oil heavily coated many of the buildings, trees, and farmlands in the flood
            area. Channels cut in facility dikes by the oil and water mixture allowed the
            continued flow of oil to the flooded areas until June 27.

            Evaporation of oil from the foliage and ground was accelerated by warm
            muggy summer weather. The fumes from the evaporating oil created an
            explosion and fire hazard. The sludge was tested by Ocean Science and
            Engineering and found to contain high concentrations of lead. Poisoning
            from contact or drinking contaminated water became an immediate concern
            due to this unusually high lead content.

            Countermeasures and Mitigation:

            Industrial water supply intakes at Pottstown, Pennhurst, Black Rock Can and
            Kenilworth were protected with deflection boom. The installation of filter
dk
            fences proved ineffective at containing the oil due to thin sheens that floated
            down river in the strong currents. Two short sections of diversion boom
            were effectively used to guide surface oil into coves and back waters near
            Hanover Street Bridge. Thirteen hundred feet of diversion boom installed at
            Pennhurst successfully captured oil sheen. Collection of oil in natural low
Z           spots in farmlands, combined with various active collection methods resulted
            in the recovery of 8,330 barrels of oil and water mixture. Sludge oil was
            pumped out of the lagoons at the Berks Associates facility as soon as weather
            and resources permitted.

            During the first six days of the response, sorbent granules were generously
            spread in pools of liquid oil and in areas where oil covered the ground.
            Granules were also used on low bushes and shrubs with mixed results.
            Although sorbent granules stabilized the oily ground, enough to permit
            walking and vehicle traffic, they also made the oil too thick to recover by
            vacuum or pump. Oil and sorbent mix also proved to be a problem with
            regard to disposal since refineries would not accept recovered product.
            Widespread use of these sorbents was discontinued on July 7.

            Manual raking and shovelling, caused less environmental damage than
            removal equipment and proved most effective in picking up small debris.
            Horses and inules were used to drag containers of oil and skid pans of debris
            from inaccessible areas such as the river islands. The animals delivered the
            debris to boats and scows for offloading. Garden tractors with trailers were
            also valuable in hauling of debris.


            Schuylkill River Spill                2






                                                                                                         0


                   High concentrations of sludge oil that became mixed with collected debris
                   made burning the material inappropriate. The sludge oil contained high
                   residues of lead and other metals. Railroad hopper cars were used to                  40
                   transport the debris to suitable land fill sites. A total of 13,627 tons of oiled
                   debris was collected in 222 hopper cars.

                   Other Special Interest Issues:

                   A shortage of response resources was created by other needed rescue and
                   restoration activities from the destruction of Hurricane Agnes. Coordination
                   of efforts and allocation of resources had to be done carefully to cover the
                   prioritized needs as quickly as possible. Damage to water and sewer treatment
                   plants, communications, and power facilities required the most urgent
                   response. The immensity of the cleanup operation also carried with it many
                   problems of funding,public relations, logistics, disposal, sanitary facilities for
                   workers, and communications.

                   More than 2,000 drums and barrels with of assorted chemicals and oils from
                   various industrial companies lined the riverbed. Hundreds of these drums
                   were reported in West Virginia, along the Potomac River. Some drums were
                   also reported in the Delaware River below Philadelphia. Many of these toxic
                   drums were explosive or gave off poisonous fumes. The Army Corps of
                   Engineers was assigned the job of retrieving and disposing of these drums
                   after CHEMTREC and DOHM identified the contents.

                   Ref erences:

                   *EPA Report
                   eKaiser, et al. 1973. Tropical Storm Agnes Pennsylvania's Torrey Canyon. Oil
                   Spill Conference Proceedings, 1973, pp. 569-577.
                   *Wilson, M.P. Jr., et al. 1976. "The Spreading, Retention and Clean-up of Oil
                   Spills," URI, Kingston, RI, 1976.





















                                                          3                   Schuylkill River Spill








                   Name of Spill: Sea Speed Arabia
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy),. 06/30/79
                   Location of Spill: New York Upper Harbor, New York
                   Latitude: 40 40 N
                   Longitude: 074 11 W
                   Oil Product: No. 2 Diesel, No. 6 Fuel Oil
                   Oil Type: Type 2, Type 4
                   Barrels: 2,857
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Nesting beaches, wildlife refuge, beaches.
                   Dispersants: Yes
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Effects to recreation areas, effects to tourism, unusual
                   or experimental cleanup techniques.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted:
                   Keywords: Boom, skimmer, vacuum truck, Corexit 9527

                   Incident Summary:

                   On June 30, 1979, the Seaspeed Arabia grounded in the Kill Van Kull off
                   Bayonne, New Jersey. Two port fuel tanks were ruptured and approximately
                   3,000 barrels of combined No. 2 diesel fuel and No. 6 heavy fuel oil spilled
                   into the New York Upper Harbor. The vessel proceeded to Bethlehem Steel
                   Corporation's dock at the Military Ocean Terminal in Bayonne for repairs.

                   Behavior of Oil:

                   No. 6 fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to 14.
                   Oil was carried on tidal currents down the Verrazano, Narrows. Slicks formed
                   off Staten Island. Approximately 1,190 barrels of oil impacted 2.5 miles of
                   Staten Island beaches. Over 1,600 cubic yards of oiled debris were collected
                   from the beaches.

                   The oil threatened to impact the Jamaica Bay Wildlife Refuge, which was
                   inhabited by nesting birds at the time. The Unites States Navy planned to
                   boom the refuge if the oil began to move in that direction. Favorable winds
                   kept the oil from entering the refuge.

                   Countermeasures and Mitigation:
                   The vessel's owners assumed responsibility for the spill, and contracted Clean
                   Venture, Inc., AAA Pollution Control, and Coastal Services, Inc. for cleanup
                   and containment operations. The responders used booms to direct the oil
                   towards Staten Island where three self-propelled skimmers supplied by the
                   Unites States Navy, Clean Ventures, Inc., and Clean Harbors Cooperative
                   collected the oil. Vacuum trucks were also used to recover the oil. As of July
70,                9, approximately 1,084 barrels of oil were recovered from the water. The
                   Unites States Coast Guard (USCG) constructed berms on the beaches of Coney
                   Island to prevent oiling.


                                                                                    Sea Speed Arabia








              The dispersant Corexit 9527 was effectively used to disperse the slick off the
              Staten Island.

              Other Special Interest Issues:

              The Regional Response Team (RRT) authorized the use of Corexit 9527 on
              the spilled oil. Clean Services, Inc. applied 440 gallons of dispersant to the
              slick under the supervision of the Unites States Environmental Protection
              Agency (EPA). The USCG also tested the dispersant Sea Master NS-555 from
              Whale Chemical Company, Inc. on the spill. The test showed that the
              dispersant was effective in breaking up the slick.

              Oiled Staten Island beaches were closed to recreation during the July 4
              holiday.

              References:

              *Cleanup Nears Completion in N. Y. Harbor. Oil Spill Intelligence Report.
              Vol. II, No. 28. July 13, 1979. p.3.
              eGrounded Ship Spills 120,000 Gallons in New York Harbor. Oil Spill
              Intelligence Report. Vol. 11, No. 27. July 6, 1979. p.3.
              *MMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
              -World News Briefs. Oil Spill Intelligence Report. Vol. II, No. 29. July 20,
              1979. p.3.





























              Sea Speed Arabia                        2









                   Name of Spill: Sea Spirit
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 08/06/90
                   Location of Spill: Strait of Gibraltar
                   Latitude: 35 53 N
                   Longitude: 005 58 W
                   Oil Product: Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO)
                   Oil Type: Type 4
                   Barrels: 48,875
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Beaches, commercial fisheries, fish aquaculture sites, fish,
                   molluscs.
                   Dispersants: Yes
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Closure of commercial fishing areas, effects to
                   recreation areas, effects to tourism.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches, exposed rocky shores.
                   Keywords: International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF), side-
                   looking airborne radar (SLAR), remote sensing, collision, manual removal,
                   boom, straw.

                   Incident Summary:

                   On the evening of August 6, 1990, the Cypriot tanker Sea Spirit and the
                   Norwegian Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) carrier Hesperus collided in the
                   Strait of Gibraltar. The Sea Spirit was holed on the starboard side above and
                   below the waterline, causing approximately 48,875 barrels of oil to be spilled
                   into the Mediterranean Sea. Estimates of the total volume spilled ranged
                   from 48,875 to 89,426 barrels. The bows of the Hesperus were destroyed, but
                   the vessel was still capable of sailing and did not leak any of her cargo.

                   Behavior of Oil:

                   Prevailing currents drew the oil into the Mediterranean Sea. The oil was
                   caught in the flow of a clockwise gyre between Morocco and Spain and made
                   approximately two to three revolutions in the gyre over the following week,
                   breaking up and dispersing naturally. As the main body of the oil moved in
                   the gyre, it passed within a few miles of the Moroccan coast, near Punta de los
                   Frailes.

                   The oil spread out with extensive sheen due to the warm, calm conditions at
                   the time. Sheen and large patches of emulsified oil were visible from
                   overflights, and reported by fishermen and observers in vessels in the waters
                   off the coast.

                   Oil began to come ashore on the coasts of Spain and Morocco within a few
                   days of the spill. The Moroccan province of Al Hoceim was the hardest hit
                   area. The first impacts here were on August 13. Large slicks were observed in
                   the bay and in nearby offshore areas of Al Hoceim. Most of the oiling along
                   the Moroccan coastline consisted of a band of tarballs between two- and six



                                                                                        Sea Spirit








             feet wide. With the exception of a few sites, this band was nearly continuous
             for the approximately 600 kilometers of Moroccan coastline.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:
             Slicks were monitored and tracked as they neared the coastlines of Spain and
             Morocco. Heavy fuel oil is resistant to chemical dispersants. Spanish
             authorities attemptedwith little success.to break up the slick with dispersants
             sprayed from a tug. A representative from the International Tanker Owners
             Pollution Federation, Ltd. (ITOPF) recommended that chemical dispersant
             use be discontinued, as it could have made mechanical cleanup techniques
             ineffective. No other open-water cleanup and recovery operations were
             undertaken. Another tug remained offshore monitoring the slick with
             boom, a skimmer, and dispersants aboard, but these dispersants were never
             used.

             The oil was mechanically dispersed at sea and in coastal waters. This
             involved running a boat through the oil at high speed, churning and
             breaking up the oil into smaller particles. Because of this technique, most of
             the beach impacts were in the form of tarballs and lumps of oil.

             Precautionary booming was used at tourist beaches in Al Hoceim. Other sites
             were protected using floating booms, sorbent pillows, and fixed absorbent
             barriers made of straw bales. Booms were constructed from straw bales and
             staked into the shallow water to protect a shellfish lagoon. The inflatable
             barriers were reportedly not effective because the personnel on-scene did not
             have adequate training or experience to install or tend them properly.
             The passage into the lagoon at Nador was protected with a fixed barrier after
             floating inflatable boom was shown to be ineffective. The lagoon contained a
             sensitive sea bream, shrimp, and oyster farming installation. There was
             considerable concern about long term effects to the sea brearn population as
             they are usually collected from outside the lagoon. There were no reports of
             contaminated fish catches.

             Cleanup of the coastline was accomplished manually using shovels, scrapers,
             and rakes. In some locations, straw was placed on the shoreline to absorb the               C
             oil as it came ashore. The straw was then burned. Some mechanical
             equipment was used to remove the oily waste and debris from the beach. At a
             Cabo Negro site, the beach was raked daily with an automatic raking machine
             pulled behind a tractor. Beach cleaning was performed daily on the private
             resort beaches by the hotels and resorts that owned them. One case of
             dispersant use on the beach in Al Hoceim province was reported. This
             occurred on a private beach in Bades Cove.

             The affected beaches along the Spanish coast were tourist and recreational
             beaches. These beaches were cleaned thoroughly and professionally on a
             regular basis. Cleanup of the pollution along these areas proceeded rapidly.
             Most of the beach impacts in this area were in the form of scattered tarballs.



             Sea Spirit                           2










                   Recovered waste was often buried at the back of the beach from which it
                   came. Waste from other sites was taken to a garbage dump and disposed with
                   domestic waste.

                   Other Special Interest Issues:

                   A French Customs aircraft equipped with remote sensing gear arrived in
                   Malaga on August 10, 1.990. The aircraft was equipped with side-looking
                   airborne radar (SLAR).

                   Moroccan authorities suspended fishing. There was a severe impact to the
                   tuna fishing industry in Morocco. There was no reported significant tuna
                   mortality, but the catch rigs were badly oiled and the tuna stopped eating
                   mackerel for a time. Fishermen reported 70 to 80 percent reduction in their
                   catches. Some of the oiled fishing equipment was thrown away, but most of
                   the tuna rigs were cleaned in place. Spanish authorities reportedly suspended
                   fishing for the first few days of the spill.

                   The spill occurred during the height of the tourist season along both the
                   Spanish and Moroccan coastlines. There was a mixed effect to tourism in the
                   area. Among many private clubs, there was no noticeable reduction in
                   business. Authorities in Morocco reported many cancellations and a severe
                   reduction in the number of tourists present. Tourists who were staying in
                   campsites along the beaches vacated them. There was a minimal effect
                   reported in Spain. This was attributed to the amount of oil that impacted the
                   Spanish coast, the accessibility of the beaches, and the regular, general
                   cleaning of the beaches.

                   Ref erences:

                   -Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
                   90il Spill Intelligence Report, 2/21/91.




















                                                          3                             Sea Spirit









                   Name of Spill: Sea Star
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 12/19/72
                   Location of Spill: Gulf of Oman                                                       0
                   Latitude: 25 18 N
                   Longitude: 057 34 E
                   Oil Product: Crude Oil
                   Oil Type:
                   Barrels: 937,000
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest:
                   Shoreline Types Impacted:
                   Keywords: International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF),
                   collision, fire, sinking.

                   Incident Summary:

                   Early on the morning of December 19, 1972, the Sea Star and the Horta
                   Barbosa collided in the Gulf of Oman. Both vessels caught fire, and were
                   abandoned by their crews. The Horta Barbosa fire was extinguished within a
                   day. The Sea Star drifted SSE, leaking burning oil from a forty-foot hole in its
                   side. The Sea Star was taken under tow by Awal Contracting and Trading
                   Company tug while still on fire on December 21. Occasional explosions
                   rocked the vessel, and eventually caused it to sink at 25 04 N, 058 12 E on
                   December 24, 1972.

                   Behavior of Oil:

                   Approximately 937,000 barrels of crude oil spilled from the Sea Star.

                   References:

                   *Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
                   *Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
                   1987.



















                                                                                        Sea Star








                   Name of Spill: Seal Beach Well Blowout
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 10/31/90
                   Location of Spill: Seal Beach, California
                   Latitude: 33 46 N
                   Longitude: 118 11 W
                   Oil Product: Crude oil
                   Oil Type: Type 3
                   Barrels: 20
                   Source of Spill: Platform
                   Resources at Risk: Wildlife Refuge, tidal wetlands, coastal diving birds,
                   waterfowl.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: Yes
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Habitat impact due to oil, research conducted.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Tidal wetlands.
                   Keywords: National Wildlife Refuge, United States Fish and Wildlife Service
                   (FWS), blowout.

                   Incident Summary:

                   On October 30, 1990, a drilling rig within the Seal Beach National Wildlife
                   Refuge (NWR) blew out. The blowout resulted when the drill hit a high
                   pressure gas pocket and a bolt on the safety collar gave out. Natural gas and a
                   mist of approximately 20 barrels of crude oil were propelled into the air. The
                   oil mist was carried into the adjacent tidal wetlands by the wind. Breit Burn
                   Energy Corporation, the owners of the drilling rig, assumed responsibility,
                   and hired L & J Vaughtco International to clean up the spill. The United
                   States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) supervised the cleanup and
                   bioremediation operations.

                   Behavior of Oil:

                   Twenty barrels of crude oil were spread in a mist over 3 acres of wetlands.

                   Countermeasures and Mitigation:

                   The FWS was notified the day of the blow out, but it was not verified that the
                   oil had impacted the wetlands. On October 31, the assistant manager of the
                   Seal Beach NWR informed the FWS that three acres of the refuge had been
                   oiled. Inspections by FWS, NWR, and cleanup personnel revealed oiled salt
                   marsh grasses, primarily cordgrass and pickleweed. The FWS supervised
                   sampling of water, sediments, and vegetation to determine the extent of the
                   oiling.









                                                                           Seal Beach Well Blowout






                                                                                                         0



             Other Special Interest Issues:
             Bioremediation operations began one week after the oiling of the wetlands.                  0
             The initial application consisted of 20 ounces of the fertilizer Miracle-Gro and
             8 pounds of the bioaugmentation product INOC 8162 mixed with water. A
             week later a second application consisted of Miracle-Gro mixed with water.
             The treatment involved application of the products to oiled grass blades with
             hand spraying equipment. Subsequent studies, involving bacterial counts                     41
             and carbon 14 mineralization, showed that bioremediation did not
             significantly increase the degradation of the oil. Additional studies
             concerning the ability of INOC 8162 were conducted by the U.S.
             Enviroru-nental Protection Agency. Uninoculated controls of Prudhoe Bay
             crude oil showed little or no difference in the concentrations of indicator
             compounds after 16 days. The microbial product INOC 8162 was ineffective in                 41
             accelerating biodegradation of oil under controlled conditions.

             Ref erences:

             *Hoff, R. 1991. A Summary of Bioremediation Applications Observed at                        41
             Marine Oil Spills. Report HMRB 91-2. NOAA.
             *USFWS Seal Beach NWR Bioremediation Studies Summary
             *USFWS Seal Beach NWR Oil Spill Briefing






















             Seal Beach Well Blowout               2                                                     0








                  Name of Spill: SFI 41
                  Date of Spill (mmddyy): 11/24/85
                  Location of Spill: River mile 43.7, Mississippi River, Missouri
                  Latitude: 37 20 N
                  Longitude: 089 30 W
                  Oil Product: No. 6 Fuel Oil
                  Oil Type: Type 4
                  Barrels: 16,300
                  Source of Spill: Tank Barge
                  Resources at Risk:
                  Dispersants: No
                  Bioremediation: No
                  In-situ Burning: No
                  Other Special Interest:
                  Shoreline Types Impacted: Vegetated riverbanks.
                  Keywords: Gulf Strike Team (GST), containment boom.

                  Incident Summary:

                  On the morning of November 24, 1985, the MIV Jimmie L and its tow, the
                  SFI 41, struck the Thebes Railroad Bridge at mile 43.7 on the Mississippi
                  River. The barges broke free, and began to drift. The barge SFI 41 struck a
                  bridge span pier, rupturing two of the starboard cargo tanks, spilling 16,300
                  barrels of number 6 fuel oil into the river. The SFI 41 was later retrieved by
                  the MIV Charles Southern and pushed into the riverbank at mile 30.8. The
                  Captain of the Port (COTP) Paducah, Kentucky, was the On-Scene Coordinator
                  (OSC) for the incident.

                  Behavior of Oil:

                  No. 6 fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to 14.
                  The oil impacted the riverbank in isolated areas between river mile 0.0 and
                  river mile 39.5. Most of the oil dissipated rapidly due to the high energy
                  turbulence of the Mississippi River.

                  Countermeasures and Mitigation:

                  On an early November 24 overflight, the OSC noted heavy pollution between
                  river miles 13.0 and 39.5. In the early afternoon, MSO Paducah response
                  personnel reported failed attempts to boom the SFI 41 due to high-velocity
                  river currents. The OSC activated the Gulf Strike Team (GST) that afternoon,
                  and contracted Riedel Environmental Services, Inc. (RES) to conduct cleanup
                  operations.

                  On November 25, personnel from the GST arrived and made arrangements
                  with MSO Paducah to establish a command post and begin surveying. The
                  OSC made an overflight in the morning and observed extensive pollution
                  between mile 0.0 and mile 39.5. System Fuels Inc., the owner of SFI 41,
                  informed the OSC that they would assume responsibility for the spill. They




                                                                                          SFI 41








            retained RES for cleanup operations. By the late afternoon, the GST
            equipment and the remaining GST personnel arrived.

            At noon on November 26, the lightering barge APEX 3504 arrived and began
            offloading the oil remaining on the SFI 41. Offloading was completed late
            that night. RES began cleanup operations.

            On November 27, the OSC determined that only isolated areas required
            cleaning, and released the GST. Cleanup operations continued until
            suspended on December 12, due to bad weather. Cleanup was resumed from
            January 8 until January 15 at which time the OSC released the owner from
            any further responsibility.

            References:

            *USCG On-Scene Coordinator's Report



























                                                                                                      C






            SFI 41








                 Name of Spill: Shell Oil Complex
                 Date of Spill (mmddyy): 04/23/88
                 Location of Spill: Carquinez Straits, Martinez, California
                 Latitude: 38 00 N
                 Longitude: 122 07 W
                 Oil Product: San Joaquin Valley heavy crude oil
                 Oil Type: Type 4
                 Barrels: 8,700
                 Source of Spill: Facility
                 Resources at Risk: Freshwater marshes, salt marsh, migratory routes,
                 waterfowl, tidal mudflats, rodents.
                 Dispersants: No
                 Bioremediation: No
                 In-situ Burning: No
                 Other Special Interest: Habitat impact due to oil, wildlife impacts, wildlife
                 rehabilitation, research conducted.
                 Shoreline Types Impacted: Exposed seawalls, piers, exposed rocky shores,
                 riprap, freshwater marshes, fringing salt marshes, extensive salt marshes
                 Keywords: Clean Bay Inc., vacuum truck, weir/pump skimmer, sorbent
                 pomporns, vegetation cutting, high-pressure warm-water washing, sorbent
                 boom, filter fences, siphon dams, U.S. Navy Superintendent of Salvage
                 (NAVSUPSALV), International Bird Rescue Research Center (IBRRC),
                 California Department of Fish and Game (CA DFG), Marco skimmer.

                 Incident Summary:

                 On April 23, 1988, the Shell Oil Complex at Martinez, California released
                 approxiinately 8,700 barrels of San Joaquin Valley crude oil into Peyton
                 Slough and Shell Marsh. Some oil travelled through Peyton Slough into
                 Suisun Bay and Carquinez Strait. Oil was first sighted in the water near the
                 Shell dock in Carquinez Strait. The United States Coast Guard (USCG) was
                 notified and the source of the leakage was secured. Shell Oil Company
                 accepted responsibility for the spill and contracted Clean Bay, Inc. to initiate
                 cleanup operations.

                 Cleanup operations began on April 23 on the marshes, shorelines, and waters
                 of the Martinez area, including Peyton Slough, Pancheco Creek, Shell Marsh,
                 Suisun Bay, and Carquinez Strait. The cleanup involved personnel from the
                 USCG, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
                 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. Navy (USN), and the
                 California Department of Fish and Game (CA DFG). Members of various city,
                 county, and state governments were also involved. Cleanup was completed
                 on August 8.









                                                                           Shell Oil Complex






                                                                                                        0




             Behavior of Oil:

             San Joaquin Valley crude oil is a heavy product with an API gravity value
             between 10.3 and 13.2. The tide gate between Peyton Slough and Suisun Bay
             forced some oil to overflow the slough during high tide and drain into
             adjacent Shell Marsh. Approximately two-thirds of this 170-acre marsh were
             contaminated with oil.

             Oil flowed from Peyton Slough into Suisun Bay and Carquinez Strait.
             Shoreline was impacted for approximately 11 miles, from the Carquinez
             Bridge to the west in Carquinez Strait, to Roe and Ryer islands to the east in
             Suisun Bay. Heavy sheen was reported even further to the west. Oil was
             forced into smaller sloughs by tides, resulting in a total of approximately 50
             miles of contaminated shoreline in Peyton Marsh.

             Several sensitive areas were affected by this spill. On the south side of
             Carquinez Strait, the marsh and riprap of Martinez Shoreline Park, the
             Martinez Marina (a staging area for the cleanup operation), three miles of
             rocky shoreline (including some industrial development), and the salt
             marshes in the area of Peyton Slough and Pancheco Creek were impacted
             with oil. On the north side of the Carquinez Strait, oil impacted the shoreline
             of Benicia (residential areas) and the rocky shoreline to the west near the
             Carquinez Bridge. The west side of the islands at the east end of Suisun Bay
             showed some oiling of shoreline vegetation, but generally were not heavily
             oiled.                                                                                     41

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             Open-water recovery was conducted using skimmers (owned and operated by
             Clean Bay, Inc. and the U.S. Navy). On one of the larger sloughs, low                      0
             pressure water was used to move the oil on the water to a Marco Class I
             skimmer.

             Oil recovery in the fresh water marsh was accomplished withvacuum trucks,
             air activated pumps, a weir1pump skimmer, and pompom sorbents.
             Following the removal of as much oil as possible, the marsh was drained.                   0
             Powered hand-held weed cutters were then used to remove any residual oiled
             vegetation. Effort was made to avoid root and rhizome damage during this
             process. Cleanup personnel removed puddles of free-floating oil and were
             instructed to avoid walking on the oiled substrate in the marsh. Oil
             remaining on the substrate after the vegetation cutting was removed with                   It
             shovels or cultivated to speed biodegradation.

             In salt marsh sloughs, oil contamination was generally limited to a band at
             the high tide line, and on the stems of marsh vegetation. Due to the potential
             hazard to wildlife in the marshes, contaminated vegetation was cut using the
             same technique as in the freshwater marshes. Oiled vegetation was cut and
             removed as necessary from the bay fronts of most of the salt marshes.



             Shell Oil Complex                    2








                    High-pressure, warm-water washing was used to remove oil from the rocky
                    intertidal shoreline at Dillon Point, and from the bulkheads and piling in the
                    Benicia, Glen Cove, and Martinez marinas. Sorbent boom was used to keep
                    the oil at the shoreline during these operations.

                    Sorbent pompoms were used on Ryer Island, the Benicia shoreline, and
                    Martinez Waterfront Park. The riprap at Martinez Waterfront Park was
                    removed and replaced to facilitate removal of oil trapped in spaces of the
                    breakwater.

                    Filter fences with sorbent pompoms were constructed across sloughs which
                    were too narrow to permit skimmers. The sorbent pomporns were removed
                    and replaced at low tide every day for three weeks during the cleanup.

                    Two siphon dams, made of rock, mud, sand, and hay bales, were placed across
                    Peyton Slough in the first four days of the spill. They were used in
                    conjunction with boom farther downstream to stop the flow of oil from the
                    slough into the Carquinez Strait. The effectiveness of the boom was reduced
                    due to high currents and grounding of the boom at low fide. The dams
                    proved effective in containing oil and provided good collection points for
                    vacuum trucks.

                    Other Special Interest Issues:

                    Two endangered species inhabited this area: the salt marsh harvest mouse
                    and the California Clapper Rail. Also at risk from this spill were wetlands of
                    the Suisun Marsh, which is the largest remaining wetland region on the
                    Pacific flyway. This habitat provides a feeding and resting area for millions of
                    birds during annual migrations. The spill occurred after the major spring
                    migration of waterfowl, so effects to wildlife were far less than were possible.

                    Wildlife collection centers were set up in Martinez and Benicia. Animals
                    were then transported to the rehabilitation centers at the International Bird
                    Rescue Research Center in Berkeley and the Alexander Lindsay, Jr. Museum
                    in Walnut Creek. Wildlife rehabilitation was performed by trained
                    volunteers and managed by biologists from the Department of Fish and
                    Game.

                    A natural resource damage assessment study concluded that the effect of the
                    oil was generally limited to the fish, macroinvertebrate, and benthic
                    communities in the sloughs. The oiled vegetation, which did not extend
                    beyond the high tide line, was mostly recovering by Fall 1989. Bird
                    populations returned to pre-spill levels after the march was reflooded.
                    Removal of salt marsh harvest mouse habitat as part of the response may
                    preclude maintenance of a viable population in Shell Marsh.

                    Of 589 oiled birds recovered, 171 were dead. Approximately two-thirds of the
                    418 birds taken to the treatment centers survived. Forty eight mammals,
                    mostly muskrats, died as a result of the spill. Seven live muskrats were taken
                    to the centers for cleaning, but only four survived. Four endangered salt


                                                            3                        Shell Oil Complex








          marsh harvest mice, not contaminated by oil, were killed in CA DFG traps.
          The CA DFG used propane cannons and a starshell-type device to scare birds
          away from the contaminated areas in oiled marshes.                          0
          The first federal representatives on the scene were officials from the USCG
          Marine Safety Office (MSO) San Francisco Bay, which assumed the
          responsibilities of On-Scene-Coordinator (OSC) for the incident. It was later
          discovered that the incident occurred in an area under the jurisdiction of the
          U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, while the area impacted fell under    0
          USCG jurisdiction. By agreement between these two agencies, the USCG
          remained the OSC.

          On April 25, the spill was partially federalized to obtain two U.S. Navy Marco
          Class V skimmers (with crews and support personnel) from the U.S. Navy      41
          Supervisor of Salvage (NAVSUPSALV).

          The San Francisco Vessel Traffic Service issued an advisory for large
          commercial vessels to reduce speed in the Carquinez Strait. This was done at
          the request of the OSC to prevent wake interference with skimming
          operations.                                                                 0
          A team of three people (representatives from USCG, CA DFG, and Shell)
          suggested guidelines for determining proper cleanup techniques used during
          the spill. The team kept the OSC informed as cleanup operations were
          performed. Use of these guidelines was felt to be a very effective and
          organized method of controlling cleanup operations falling under several
          jurisdictions. The OSC estimated that 90% of the spilled oil was recovered
          within the first four weeks of the cleanup.

          References:

          *Fischel, M. 1991. Natural Resource Damage Assessment of the Shell Oil
          Spill at Martinez, California, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1991, pp.371-
          376.
          *Fraser, et al. 1989. Response to the April 1988 Oil Spill at Martinez,
          California, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1989, pp. 65-69.
          9NOAA Response Report                                                       0
          -OSC Report



                                                                                      It






                                                                                      41





          Shell Oil Complex              4








                  Name of Spill: Shell Platform 26
                  Date of Spill (mmddyy): 12/01/70
ML                Location of Spill: Gulf of Mexico, Louisiana
                  Latitude: 28 46 N
                  Longitude: 090 10 W
                  Oil Product: Crude oil
                  Oil Type: Type 3
                  Barrels: 58,640
                  Source of Spill: Platform
                  Resources at Risk: Beaches
                  Dispersants: Yes
                  Bioremediation: No
                  In-situ Burning: No
                  Other Special Interest: Human health and safety concerns, complex salvage
                  operations.
                  Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches, exposed rocky shores.
                  Keywords: Corexit 7664, Shell Oil Herder, skimmer, straw, boom, vacuum
                  truck, explosion, fire.

                  Incident Summary:

                  On December 1, 1970, Shell Oil Co. Platform 26 exploded and caught fire. The
                  platform included 22 production wells with a capacity of 15,000 barrels of
                  crude oil per day. The flames from the burning platform blazed 400 feet into
                  the air. The 21-B well, with a 424-barrel per day capacity, ruptured 12 feet
                  above the water. By December 3, the service crane had collapsed towards the
                  center of the platform at a 60' angle. Burning oil covered the surface of the
                  water within 50 feet of the platform. By December 7, well No. 21-B was
                  contributing to 30-50 percent of the fire. Shifting winds, fog and rough seas
                  slowed response efforts at times.

                  Holes were shot into the tubing of some of the wells to determine whether oil
                  was still being produced. On January 12, Shell Oil Co. personnel perforated a
                  relief well in an attempt to contain the flow. On January 20, eight of the wells
                  remained on fire. Corexit 7664 dispersant was applied to the slick at a rate of 3
                  barrels per hour.

                  Response operations began moderating on March 1. A U.S. Coast Guard
                  cutter and helicopter were released from the scene. Shell Oil Co. officials
                  were required to submit daily pollution reports to the U.S. Coast Guard
                  Captain of the Port (COTP), New Orleans, in advance of any operations that
                  may have increased pollution.

                  Drilling, capping, and pumping of the wells continued throughout April. By
                  April 16, the estimated rate of release was 20 barrels per day. The slick was
                  reportedly staying within a 6-mile radius of the platform, with sheen
                  extending to 12 miles. The slick was reduced to sheen during the following
                  months as pumping and capping operations continued.





                                                                                 Shell Platform 26








              Beach surveys were conducted by personnel from the U.S. Coast Guard, Shell
              Oil Co., the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Louisiana Wildlife
              and Fisheries, and other local observers. The only shoreline oiling that                           0
              resulted from the incident was between Caminada Pass and Bay Champagne.
              The case was closed by the U.S. Coast Guard on May 17,1971. The explosion
              and subsequent fire killed four people and seriously burned 37 others.

              Behavior of Oil:

              A slick of burning oil spread 50 feet from the platform on the day of the
              incident. On December 21, a slick entering Timbalier Bay caused minimal
              beach impact. December 28 pollution surveys reported four scattered oil
              accumulations. One accumulation was observed at the southern end of
              Grand Isle and three were southwest of Caminada Pass. Sheen on the water
              surrounding the platform continued to dissipate.

              On January 13, oil along Grand Isle Beach was reported to be breaking up into
              globs and patches with the incoming tide. A 1.5-inch thick accumulation of
              oil was observed near the Grand Isle Beach jetty. A slick 10 feet wide and 6-12
              inches thick floated on the water.

              By January 20, the slick extended two miles southwest of the fire, producing a
              fan of rainbow sheen for another six miles. Streaks of sheen extended for up
              to 29 miles southwest of the platform with a maximum width of four miles.
              Throughout February, March, and April, the slick became progressively
              smaller as it was driven by the currents and winds. By April, extensions of
              rainbow sheen were all that remained of the slick.

              Countermeasures and Mitigation:
              Several drilling rigs were constructed in an effort to contain the spilling oil.
              Salt water was pumped into the 21-B relief well starting December 30. jet
              Barges Jaraffe and Red Adair pumped approximately 19 million gallons of
              water per day to cool the structure. The first of the relief wells, started on
              December 5, reduced the oil flow.

              Chemical dispersant spraying was started early in the response. Corexit 7664                       z
              was sprayed in the immediate platform and work areas to prevent oil slicks
              from developing. Slicks forming near the platform may have ignited,
              endangering response personnel. The dispersant concentration was not
              allowed to exceed 0.03 percent of the total spray stream, due to its toxic nature.
              The Regional Response Team concurred with the conditional use of
              dispersants.
              Shell Oil Herder was used to aid skimming operations two miles southwest
              of Belle Pass. Aerial application of the substance was also used along the
              shoreline from the west end of east Timbalier Island to 1.5 miles west of Belle
              Pass. Skimmers, straw, and boom were used to contain and collect oil when
              possible. Vacuum trucks recovered oil from Grand Isle Beach. Six truck loads
              of litter and 600 gallons of emulsion were picked up by January 15.



              Shell Platform 26                       2








                   Other Special Interest Issues:

                   Well head piping was severely damaged by the intense heat of the fire. Shell
                   Oil Co. personnel constructed an abrasive cutting boom to attempt to cut the
                   damaged well head off of the B-8 well, which was bent into the water and
                   partially submerged, causing a pollution problem. This device was used to
                   cut the well heads off of B-3 and B-5. A sand blast cutting device was used to
                   cut the piping of wells B-8 and B-28. Well heads B-17, B-15, and B-4 were cut
                   by February 11.

                   Ref erences:

                   91FP. Platform Databank on Accidents to Drilling Vessels or Offshore
                   Platforms (1955-1989). #7032.
                   -U.S. Coast Guard POLREP file
















































                                                          3                       Shell Platform 26








                    Name of Spill: Sivand
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 09/28/83
                    Location of Spill: Humber Estuary, England
                    Latitude: 53 40 N
                    Longitude: 000 15 W
                    Oil Product: Nigerian Forcados Crude Oil
                    Oil Type: Type 2
                    Barrels: 48,000
                    Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                    Resources at Risk: Tidal mudflats, salt marshes, waterfowl, wading birds,
                    nature reserves, wildlife refuges, recreational beaches, industrial water
                    intakes, commercial fisheries, marinas, diving coastal birds.
                    Dispersants: Yes
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: No
                    Other Special Interest: Wildlife impacts.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Tidal mudflats, salt marshes.
                    Keywords: International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF),
                    manual removal, boom, skimmer, vacuum truck, collision.

                    Incident Summary:
                    Very early on the morning of September 28, 1983, the tanker Sivand
                    grounded on a jetty at the Immingharn oil terminal in the Humber Estuary.
                    Cargo tanks ruptured upon impact, and Nigerian Forcados Crude Oil spilled
                    into the Humber River estuary.

                    Behavior of Oil:

                    Nigerian Forcados crude oil has as API gravity of 29.7, and a pour point of -4
                    degrees F. Approximately 48,000 barrels of the crude oil spilled into the
                    estuary. Oil impacted the north and south shores of the estuary late on
                    September 28, including the docks at Immingham and Grimsby, and beaches
                    at Cleethorpes. Easterly winds on September 30 pushed the oil up the
                    Humber River as far as the River Trent. The mudflats of the Blacktoft Sands
                    Nature Reserve, and the salt marshes of the River Ouse were oiled on
                    September 30.

                    Of the oil spilled, it was estimated that 12,000 barrels evaporated, 16,000 barrels
                    were chemically dispersed, and the rest dispersed naturally, was carried out to
                    sea, or came ashore. The oil spread on the tides throughout approximately 50
                    miles of the estuary. About 900 metric tons of oil and oiled debris were
                    recovered in cleanup operations.

                    Countermeasures and Mitigation:
                    British Petroleum's Environmental Control Center was notified of the spill,
                    and sent a team including representatives from the British Petroleum Oil
                    Spill Response Base at Southampton. The team came on scene on the
                    afternoon of September 28. Her Majesty's Coast Guard notified the Marine



                                                            1                                 Sivand








           Pollution Control Unit (MPCU) of the Department of Transportation, which
           immediately contracted six tugs and four aircraft to spray dispersants.
It,        The oil was recovered from the various parts of the estuary using disc and
           vacuum skimmers. The beach at Cleethorpes was cleaned with front end
           loaders and shovels. Oil was recovered from between the docks at
           Immingham and Grimsby with collection booms and Komara skimmers.
           Recovered oil was suctioned by vacuum trucks and transported to a refinery
0          for disposal. At one point the downdraft from a helicopter was used to herd
           the oil into containment booms. Debris in the water among the docks
           hindered skimming operations.

           Dispersant operations began on the morning of September 28 under the
0          direction of the MPCU. Poor weather prevented the use of aircraft on the first
           morning's operations, but the six tugs began spraying dispersants on the slick
           near the Sivand. Later that day, weather conditions improved and two of the
           aircraft joined the operations. Operations continued throughout the next day.
           By September 30, the large patches of oil were broken up, and dispersant
           spraying operations were terminated. Approximately 680 barrels of dispersant
0          were applied during the spill response.

           Oil was recovered from the various tributaries of the Humber River using
           containment booms, Komara skimmers and vacuum trucks. On October 2, a
           helicopter deployed booms across the creek into the Blacktoft Sands Nature
           Reserve to prevent oil on its outlying mudflats from penetrating farther into
z          the reserve. By October 7, the boom was too waterlogged to function properly,
           but the threat of future oiling was gone. Cleanup operations ended on
           October 11, 1983.

           Other Special Interest Issues:

           Among the birds threatened by the oil were Mallard Ducks, United Kingdom
           Bearded Tit, and Water Rails. Oiled waterfowl and wading birds were
           observed on the Ouse and Trent rivers, and in the Blacktoft Sands Nature
           Reserve. The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds reported 160 dead,
           oiled birds found, and estimated that up to 4,000 birds were oiled. There were
           extensive mortalities among ragworms in the Humber Wildlife Refuge.
           There was some oiling of nets belonging to fishermen operating out of
           Grimsby.














           Sivand                                2











                    References:

                    *Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
                    *Gundlach, E. and Marshall, M. 1990. The Physical Persistence of Spilled Oil:
                    An Analysis of Oil Spills Previous to Exxon Valdez. Final Report. HAZMAT-
                    OAD. NOAA. pp.47-68.
                    -,Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
                    1987.
                    oMitchell, et al. 1985. An estuarine oil spill incident in the United Kingdom,
                    Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1985, pp. 342-345.
                    *Nichols, J.A. and Parker, H. 1985. Dispersants: Comparison of Laboratory
                    Tests & Field Trials with Practical Experience at Spills, Oil Spill Conference
                    Proceedings, 1985, pp. 421-427.












































                                                          3                                Sivand









                  Name of Spill: St. Peter
                  Date of Spill (mmddyy): 02/05/76
                  Location of Spill: Cabo Manglares, Colombia
                  Latitude: 0130 N
                  Longitude: 079 30 W
                  Oil Product: Orito Crude Oil
                  Oil Type: Type 2
                  Barrels: 279,000
                  Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                  Resources at Risk: Mangroves, birds, fish, molluscs, crustaceans, reptiles.
                  Dispersants: No
                  Bioremediation: No
                  In-situ Burning: No
                  Other Special Interest: 'Habitat impact due to oil, logistical or operational
                  problems, research conducted, wildlife impacts.
                  Shoreline Types Impacted: Mangroves, sand/gravel beaches, exposed rocky
                  shores.
                  Keywords: Fire, explosion, sinking.

                  Incident Summary:

                  The tank vessel St. Peter departed Tumaco, Colombia on February 4, 1976
                  with 279,000 barrels of Orito crude. On the evening of February 4, a fire broke
                  out in the engine room and the crew abandoned ship after unsuccessful
                  attempts to extinguish the fire. There were subsequent explosions on board
                  the St. Peter and the fire continued to burn until February 5 or February 6,
                  when the vessel sank in over 3,000 feet of water approximately 18 miles off
                  Cabo Manglares, Colombia. An Ecuadorian patrol boat returning to the site
                  on February 6, found only an oil slick approximately one square mile in area.

                  The sunken vessel released an initial burst of oil and then continued to
                  slowly leak oil for some time. The vessel was known to be leaking oil nine
                  months after the sinking.
                  The area affected by the spill covered a distance of over 200 miles, from
                  Buenaventura, Colombia in the north to Punta Galera, Ecuador in the south.
                  The predominant shorelines in the area were sandy beaches, rocky shores,
                  and estuarine areas with mangroves. The heaviest oiling occurred in the area
                  of Tumaco, Colombia and portions of the shoreline to the south, near the
                  border of Ecuador.

                  Behavior of Oil:

                  Orito crude is a light Columbian crude with an API of 35.5, viscosity of 4.8
                  centistokes, and a pour point of 25 degrees F. Oil released from the vessel
                  moved in a northeasterly direction and came ashore in Tumaco in Colombia,
                  and Esmaraldas and Isla Gallo in Ecuador.







                                                                                         St. Peter








              Countermeasures and Mitigation:
              Several logistical and financial constraints restricted the cleanup and response                   4
              options available to Colombia and Ecuador. Little or no oil spill control and
              cleanup equipment was available in the area, and freight costs to bring such
              equipment into the area were high. Some dispersant was available in
              Ecuador, but it was considered toxic, and no equipment was available to apply
              the dispersant to the spill. Specialized diving equipment needed for any
              vessel salvage was unavailable.                                                                    0

              An advisor from the Canadian Coast Guard was consulted for treatment and
              contamination removal recommendations, but no known response activities
              were ever undertaken.
              Other Special Interest Issues:                                                                     41

              Mangrove swamps in Tumaco and to the south were severely oiled in late
              February 1976. As a result, mangroves suffered defoliation and some trees
              died. In some of the locations where trees died, there was evidence of
              erosion. Sessile organisms (barnacles, mussels, and oysters) in areas of heavy                     4
              oiling were absent or greatly reduced in numbers for at least two months after
              the spill. Some organisms, like gastropods, moved out of the oiled area.
              Numbers of fiddler crabs, especially young crabs, were reduced, and dead fish,
              snakes and sea birds were observed.

              Mangroves also served as breeding grounds for two commercially important
              species harvested in the area. Shrimp, which were valued by the commercial
              fisheries at approximately $18 million per year, and a type of clam considered
              a delicacy in Ecuador and Colombia, were thought to be susceptible to long-
              term effects from the oil.
              Between May and June 1976, observers noted'that most of the oiling on the                          Z
              Tumaco area mangroves was located at the highest high tide line and that
              lower areas had generally been cleaned by tidal action. In many areas,
              mangroves that had been defoliated had recovered and areas that were
              previously devoid of crabs, molluscs, barnacles, fishes, shrimp, and insects
              had been repopulated by these species.

              Another possible consequence of the spill was the disappearance of migratory
              tuna usually present in the Tumaco area between March and April. It was
              speculated that the tuna may have avoided the area due to the oiling.
              Unusually high tuna catches in other parts of the region supported this
              theory.











              St. Peter                               2












                   References:

                   9 Modern Shipping Disasters 1963 - 1987, Hooke, Norman, Lloyd's of London
                   Press, p. 405.
                   9 Sinking of Tanker St. Peter off Colombia; Hayes, T. M., Proceedings Oil Spin
                   Conference, 1977, pp. 289-291.
                   * The Effects of Oil Pollution on Mangroves and Fisheries in Ecuador -
                   Colombia, Swedish Water and Air Pollution Research Institute; jernelov, A.,
                   Linden, 0., May 1981.















































                                                          3                               St. Peter








                    Name of Spill: STC-101
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 02/02/76
                    Location of Spill: Chesapeake Bay, Northampton County, Virginia
                    Latitude: 37 49 N
                    Longitude: 076 11 W
                    Oil Product: No. 6 Fuel Oil
                    Oil Type: Type 4
                    Barrels: 5,959
                    Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                    Resources at Risk: Diving coastal birds, waterfowl, shorebirds, wading birds,
                    gulls, oysters, mussels.
                    Dispersants: No
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: Yes
                    Other Special Interest: Habitat impact due to oil, wildlife impacts, volunteer
                    response and organization, unusual or experimental cleanup techniques.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Salt marshes, riprap, piers, sand/gravel beaches.
                    Keywords: Vacuum truck, manual removal, high pressure washing,
                    vegetation cutting, sub-surface oil, salvage, boom, disposal.

                    Incident Summary:

                    On February 2, 1976, the petroleum transport barge STC-101, under tow by the
                    Allied Towing Company Tug Falcon, partially sank during stormy weather in
                    Chesapeake Bay approximately 3.5 miles off Smith Point Light. The bow,
                    protruding at a 30' angle, was approximately 30 to 40 feet out of the water
                    while the stern rested on the bottom in approximately 105 feet of water. The
                    STC-101, loaded with 19,531 barrels of No. 6 fuel oil, was en route from the
                    AMOCO Refinery in Yorktown, Virginia, to the AMOCO Terminal in
                    Baltimore at the time of the incident.

                    Initially, only a small rainbow sheen, believed to be from deck machinery
                    diesel and lube oil, was observed around the barge. Clean Water Inc. was
                    contracted by Steuart Transportation, the barge owner, to stage pollution
                    abatement equipment near the scene in the event of a spill during salvage
                    operations. An underwater survey of the barge on February 4 reported no oil
                    leaking from the barge, however, oil patches and light sheen were reported in
                    the surrounding area on February 5. After the STC-101 was refloated on
                    February 6 by the McLean Construction Company, the barge was intentionafly
                    grounded in Ingram Bay for dewatering operations. Extensive damage to the
                    port side was discovered. Severe wind and weather conditions as well as
                    poorly maintained and improperly secured cargo hatches may have
                    contributed to the oil spillage.
                    After the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office Hampton Roads received
                    several reports of oil and birds washing up on surrounding shorelines, a
                    Federal spill was declared on February 8. On February 19, the AMOCO
                    Terminal in Baltimore, Maryland, concluded that 5,959 barrels of oil were
                    missing from the STC-101 barge.




                                                           1                                 STC-101








            Beach and marsh areas of both the eastern and western shores of Chesapeake
            Bay were contaminated. Large areas of dormant oiled marsh grasses were cut,
            leaving the root systems intact. Virginia authorities estimated that between
            20,000 and 50,000 waterfowl were killed as a result of the spill.
            The bulk of the cleanup was completed by mid-March. A final inspection on
            November 5 revealed little evidence of oil remaining in the affected areas.

            Behavior of Oil:

            No. 6 fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to 14.
            A light horseshoe-shaped sheen observed around the vessel the day of the
            incident was believed to be diesel and lube oil from the deck machinery. An
            aerial survey on February 5 revealed several areas of scattered light sheen in
            the water between Bluff Point and Smith Point Light. Also, a sheen
            measuring 1 mile wide by 3 miles long with widely scattered patches of black
            oil was observed approximately 8-10 miles due south of the barge. On
            February 7, approximately 800 gallons of oil washed ashore east of the
            Windmill Point Marina. A large slick impacted the eastern side of the bay
            between Nadua Creek and Cherrystone Creek on February 8. This 71-mile
            distance consisted of creeks, marshes, and irregular shoreline, of which 27
            miles suffered some oiling. The most adversely affected area was a 15-mile
            stretch between Hungar's Creek and Nassawadox Creek. Observers on a
            February 9 overflight reported heavy concentrations at Fleet Island on the
            western shore. Oil also pooled in localized areas such as Windmill Point,
            Cameron Marsh, and Gwynn's Island on the western shore.

            Since no heavy oil impacts were observed until February 7, the heavy No. 6
            oil was believed to be submerged just below the suif@ce of the water until it
            reached the shore. Adverse weather conditions made the oil difficult to
            observe from the air. Approximately 3,980 of the 5,959 barrels of oil spilled
            were recovered during cleanup operations. Much of the missing oil was
            believed to be on marsh grass roots on the eastern shore.

            Countermeasures and Mitigation:

            Heavy pools of oil on the sand beaches were removed usingfront-end
            loaders. This cleanup method. was used only at low tide and in daylight
            hours. The effort was complicated by tidal exchanges covering the oiled areas
            with new layers of sand that created oil and sand mixtures.

            Boom was deployed around the vessel during salvage and towing operations.
            Containment boom was also used around the Windmill Point Marina.
            Booms were ineffective because of strong wind, wave, and tidal action.
            Vacuum trucks also proved ineffective because the oil was viscous and
            plugged the suction hoses. Consequently, shovels were the predominant
            beach cleanup tool.






            STC-101                               2






                                                                                                                 0


                    High-pressure washing was effectively used to remove oil on rocky areas,
                    piers, and groins. High-pressure washing was also tested on marsh grass, but
                    quickly proved ineffective due to the viscosity of the oil.
                    Salt marshes on the eastern side of the bay were severely impacted. After all
                    responsible parties agreed that it was not advisable to remove the marsh grass
                    root system, the On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) decided to cut and remove the
                    marsh grass while leaving the root system intact. Grass cutting was done by
                    hand or with "weedeaters." Dry grass was spread over areas where thick oil
                    remained in the root system, walked on to compact it into the soil, and
                    removed using rakes and pitchforks. This slow, labor intensive process was
                    used on ten miles of shoreline. The contaminated grass was transported to a
                    landfill for disposal.

                    Disposing of 4,000 barrels of recovered oil in landfills was not a viable option
                    on the eastern side of the bay since the water table is close to the surface and
                    groundwater is the primary source of drinking water in this area. The State
                    Water Control Board, State Department of Health, and State Air Pollution
                    Control Board decided the landfills could be used as burning sites, A brush-
                    and tree stump-burning device consisting of a gasoline-powered forced draft
                    blower hooked to a tractor was used to burn recovered oil. The burned
                    residue was disposed of in the landfill. Sand/oil mixtures recovered during
                    beach cleanup on the eastern shore were used as road fill and repair material
                    for damage done by heavy cleanup machinery. The sand/oil mixture
                    collected on the western shore was given to the Lancaster County Raceway for
                    dust control use.

                    Other Special Interest Issues:

                    The Chesapeake Bay Oil Spill Task Force was organized as an investigative
                    group after the oil spill. The purpose of the Task Force was to assess cleanup
                    activities and environmental damage, consider preventive measures, and
                    provide input to the Attorney General's office to support potential litigation.
                    Preliminary reports indicated that environmental damage was not as great as
                    initially expected. A small loss of habitat in marsh grass areas resulted, but
                    finfish and benthic organisms did not appear to be severely affected.

                    The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service estimated that 20,000 birds died as a result
                    of this incident. A total of 8,469 dead waterfowl, mostly Horned Grebes and
                    Old Squaw, were recovered. Forty-six dead Whistling Swan, an endangered
                    species, were recovered. Several problems were experienced in the cleaning
                    of live, oiled waterfowl: volunteer groups were given little or no direction or             0
                    assistance in their efforts to save the birds; and the contingency plan for the
                    area did not include provisions for bird cleaning operations. Under the
                    National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, the
                    Department of Interior's representatives and state liaison to the Regional
                    Response Team were assigned the task of waterfowl rehabilitation. Due to
                    poor planning and coordination by the predesignated agencies, the OSC, who                  0
                    did not have lead responsibility for bird cleanup operations, was constantly
                    questioned by the public and media about bird cleanup operations.


                                                             3                                 STC-101          0










            Ref erences:

            -,Hershner, C. and Moore, K. 1977. Effects of the Chesapeake Bay Oil Spill on
            Salt Marshes of the Lower Bay, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1977, pp.
            529-533.
            *Roland, et al. 1977. The Chesapeake Bay Oil Spill-February 2, 1976: A Case
            History, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1977, pp. 523-527.
            9USCG On-Scene Coordinator's Report

















































            STC-101








                  Name of Spill: Tamano
                  Date of Spill (mmddyy): 07/22/72
                  Location of Spill: Casco Bay, Maine                                                 AD
                  Latitude: 43 40 N
                  Longitude: 70 10 W
                  Oil Product: No. 6 Fuel Oil
                  Oil Type: Type 4
                  Barrels: 2,380
                  Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                  Resources at Risk: Clams, Oysters, Lobsters, kelp, marshes, coarse sand
                  beaches, sand/gravel beaches, diving coastal birds, waterfowl, worm beds,
                  demersal fish, power plant water intakes, commercial fisheries.
                  Dispersants: No
                  Bioremediation: No
                  In-situ Burning: No
                  Other Special Interest: Closure of shipping lanes or vehicle traffic routes,
                  wildlife rehabilitation.
                  Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches, coarse sand beaches.
                  Keywords: Atlantic Strike Team (AST), sorbent boom, boom, skimmer,
                  vacuum truck, hay, manual removal, high-pressure warm water washing,
                  disposal.

                  Incident Summary:
                  In the early morning of July 22, 1972, the tanker Tamano grounded on
                  Soldier's Ledge in Casco Bay, Maine, tearing a 20-foot hole in a starboard tank.
                  The tanker continued to its anchorage in Casco Bay before the leak was
                  noticed. The tanker was carrying 550,000 barrels of No. 6 Fuel Oil, 2,380
                  barrels of which spilled into Casco Bay. The Captain of the Port (COT'P),
                  Portland, Maine, was the On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) for the incident. The
                  response ended on October 16.

                  Behavior of Oil:

                  No. 6 fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to 14.
                  Due to the prompt action of the vessel pilot in getting the tanker boomed
                  most of the spilled oil was contained. Of the 2,380 barrels of oil that leaked
                  from the vessel, 1670 were recovered from within the boom. Oil impacted 46
                  miles of mainland beaches. All the islands in Portland Harbor were oiled.

                  Countermeasures and Mitigation:
                  Transfer of oil from the ruptured tank began immediately upon discovery of
                  the leak. The pilot of the tanker notified Sea Coast Ocean Services (SCOS) at
                  0215 that the vessel was leaking, and that booms were needed. SCOS
                  responded immediately with booms and barges, and had the bow boomed by
                  0530. The OSC activated the Atlantic Strike Team (AST), and conducted
                  overflights. The tanker was completely boomed by 0930 on July 22, and the
                  situation appeared to be under control.




                                                                                       Tamano








            On July 23, it was discovered that the oil had moved under the boom and was
            surfacing some distance from the tanker. SCOS had insufficient response
40          equipment available to handle the spill; the OSC contacted Texaco Inc. which
            had chartered the vessel from the Norwegian owner, Wilh Wilhelmsen.
            Texaco denied responsibility but agreed to temporarily fund the cleanup
            operations. The OSC hired more cleanup contractors, including SCOS.
            Skimming of the contained oil, and skimming of oil outside the containment
            boom began. Hay spread on the uncontained slickproved effective as a herder
            and absorbent, but it clogged the skimmers. Beach cleanup began on the
            mainland and island shores. Oiled hay and seaweed on the beaches were
            removed manually.

            Oil recovery operations lasted two weeks. Skimming operations used a JBF
40          Dynamic Incline Plane (DIP) skimmer, two T-T Oil Recovery Units, a 1000
            Series Rheinwerft Skimmer, three Oleo III skimmers, and a Slurp Skimmer.
            The Rheinwerft Skimmer worked most effectively, and the JBF DIP skimmer
            was satisfactory exceptfor its, small holding tank. The other skimmers
            collected too much water along with the oil, and under rougher conditions
            than the ideal weather that the Tamano operations experienced, these
            skimmers would not have been seaworthy.

            Booms deployed included 13,700 feet of 36-inch T-T boom, 1200 feet of 6-inch
            Slick Bar boom, 300 feet of 3-foot Uniroyal boom, and 800 feet of 15-inch
            Coastal Service boom. The T--T boom was used as the primary containment
            boom, and in the skimming of the free slick. This boom proved effective for
            containment, but had to be tended at all times. The 6-inch Slick Bar boom
            was used in collecting oil in the Long Island area, and was not effective. The
            3-foot Uniroyal boom was used effectively in skimming operations. The 15-
            inch Coastal Service boom was used effectively inside the larger containment
            boom for coralling the oil towards skimmers. Six vacuum trucks deployed on
            barges were also used to pick up the contained oil.

            Two Hydroclean Rock Washing units were used on Long Island and Cape
            Elizabeth. One unit was deployed from a barge at one area and the other from
            a trailer at the other area. The unit was effective in washing the rocks, but
            would have been more effective if used when the oil was fresher. Booms and
            absorbent pads were used to collect the sheens resulting from the washing
            operations.

            Additional pumps were brought on board the Tamano to expedite the
            transfer of oil from the leaking tank which was completed on July 25.
            Lightering of the Tamano was completed on August 3, and the tanker sailed
            for dry dock the next day. The owners assumed responsibility for the cleanup
            costs on August 11.

            Western Beach on Long Island was heavily impacted by oil. Cleanup
            operations involved the removal of 6 inches of sand from a 100-foot by 2,300-
            foot strip of beach. Tracked and rubber-tired vehicles had trouble operating
            on the beach, and occasionally became stuck in the oiled sand and gravel.




            Tamano                                 2








                    The slick reached the Cousin's Island power plant water intakes. The intakes
                    had been boomed as a precautionary measure, so no impacts occurred.
                    By October 4, the cleanup was mostly completed except for removal of
                    accumulated oily debris. Some of the 46 miles of oiled shoreline was remote
                    from the Portland area where operations were based. Due to the expense of
                    transporting personnel and equipment to these areas, the OSC requested that
                    each local town's public works departments pick up the oiled debris from
                    their own beaches. Each town was reimbursed for their costs.

                    Operations were delayed until a dump site for the oiled debris was found. On
                    August 3, a suitable site was found in Gray, Maine, and most of the debris was
                    sent there. Oiled sand and gravel were used in construction at the Brunswick
                    Naval Air Station.

                    Other Special Interest Issues:

                    The shipping lanes were closed to all traffic, because the wakes of passing
                    vessels disturbed the containment booms. The OSC requested that the Army
                    Corps of Engineers survey the sound for uncharted obstructions. No
                    obstructions were found, and the lanes were opened again on August 4.

                    Clam harvesting was closed by the United States Public Health Service.
                    Worm digging, and whiting, flounder, and herring fisheries were also
                    affected.

                    Many oiled birds were found, and attempts were made to clean them.
                    Among the birds affected were: Eider Ducks, White-Winged Scoters, loons,
                    Common Terns, Common Scoters, Guillemots, Herring Gulls. Heavily oiled
                    birds were humanely killed. Of the 34 Eider Ducks that were cleaned, only 10
                    survived. After a week, the Maine Fish and Game Department advised the
                    public to stop bringing in oiled birds for cleaning. It was believed that birds
                    that had survived in an oiled condition for a week would survive the oiling
                    without cleaning.
                    Vast Inc. was hired by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
                    study the ecological damage from the spill.

                    References:

                    *Bianchi, R., Johanson, E., Farrel, J. 1975. Use of the Massachusetts Dip Oil
                    Skimmer on Free Slicks in the Casco Bay (Portland) Spill, Oil Spill Conference              do
                    Proceedings, 1975, pp. 643-655.                                                             wr
                    * Eidem, C., Fitzpatrick, E., Conlon, J. 1975. The Casco Bay Oil Spill: Problems
                    of Cleanup and Disposal, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1975, pp. 217-221.
                     USCG On Scene Coordinator's Report

                                                                                                                0



                                                             3                                  Tamano          0








                  Name of Spill: Tanio
                  Date of Spill (mmddyy): 03/07/80
                  Location of Spill: Brittany, France
                  Latitude: 49 10 N
                  Longitude: 004 16 W
                  Oil Product: No. 6 FuelOil
                  Oil Type: Type 4
                  Barrels: 98,955
                  Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                  Resources at Risk: Commercial fisheries, anadromous fish, oysters, crabs,
                  clams, abundant beds, designated harvest sites, reserves, shorebirds, diving
                  coastal birds.
                  Dispersants: Yes
                  Bioremediation: No
                  In-situ Burning: No
                  Other Special Interest: Wildlife impacts, wildlife rehabilitation, habitat impact
                  due to oil, volunteer response and organization, complex salvage operations,
                  effects to tourism, closure of public lands.
                  Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches, flats, marshes.
                  Keywords: Skimmer, vacuum truck, manual removal, high-pressure
                  washing, sorbents, Finasol OSR 2, International Tanker Owners Pollution
                  Federation (ITOPF), sinking, contingency plan, suction operations.

                  Incident Summary:

                  On March 7, 1980, the tanker Tanio, carrying 190,580 barrels of No. 6 fuel oil,
                  broke in two off the coast of Brittany, France during a violent storm. The
                  master and seven crew members died as a result of the accident.
                  Approximately 98,955 barrels of oil spilled into the sea as a result of the
                  breakup. The bow section, which still contained 36,650 barrels of oil, sank in
                  300 feet of water. Substantial amounts of oil continued to leak from the
                  sunken bow until several small leaks in the bow were sealed in May. The
                  stern remained afloat and was towed to the port of Le Havre where its
                  remaining 54,975 barrels of oil were offloaded.

                  Strong northwest winds at the time of the incident moved the oil towards the
                  Breton coast. Due to the high viscosity of the oil and severe weather
                  conditions, containment or dispersal at sea was impossible. Because the
                  spring tides in this region have an average tidal range of 26 feet, many areas
                  along the coast could not be boomed effectively. Consequently, the Breton
                  coast (which had already received major oil impacts from the Torrey Canyon
                  spill in 1967 and the Amoco Cadiz in 1978), was again severely oiled.
                  Approximately 45 percent of the Amoco Cadiz spill area was affected by oil
                  from the Tanio. Approximately 125 miles of the coastline of the two
                  Departments of Finistere and Cotes-du-Nord were oiled.
                  Both Departments implemented the Plan Polmar, the French national oil
                  spill contingency plan, due to the severity of the coastal oiling. This enabled
                  them to use the national army for cleanup operations. Personnel from the
                  Civil Defense organization, fire service, local governments, commercial


                                                                                           Tanio








             contractors, and local farmers were also involved in the cleanup. The
             International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF) provided
             technical advice and monitored cleanup activities on behalf of the
             International Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) Fund. Cleanup operations
             in the two Departments varied due to differences in the severity of the
             pollution, nature of the shoreline, and the cleanup policies that were
             implemented. Cleanup was completed and all beaches except St. Guirec were
             in use by early July. Damages and costs incurred during cleanup exceeded $50
             million.


             Behavior of Oil:

             No. 6 fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to 14.
             The oil first came ashore on March 9, with the bulk of oil impacting the shore
             on March 10. The Cotes de Granit Rose area to the east of Perros-Guirec and
             the north- and northwest-facing beaches and bays in the Tregastel and
             Ploumanac'h vicinities were the most heavily affected. The pink granite
             rocks in these vicinities as well as in St. Guirec in Cotes-du-Nord were
             severely oiled. Several small boats, primarily in the Ploumanac'h region,
             were contaminated. By March 11, patches of oil and heavy streaks of sheen
             were observed by aerial reconnaissance to be moving out of the bays in an
             easterly direction. I-Egh tides and changes in wind direction over the
             following two weeks redistributed the oil on the coast. In all, about 125 miles
             of shoreline with a large tidal range of 26feet was oiled.

             A 1983 survey found remnants of oil along high-energy gravel shores in tarry
             blotches on rock surfaces, asphalt-like layers above the active intertidal zone,
             and mobile oil in a small number of sheltered, coarse-grained sediments.
             Notable oil persisted in the sediments five years after the incident.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             Boom was deployed at Carport on the Jaudy River to protect trout and salmon
             fisheries in the area. By March 12, the Ile Grande marsh and the Trieux
             River near Lezardrieux were boomed. Boom was also installed across the
             Leguer River to protect Lannion. Ten priority areas were boomed and
             monitored by a specialist team from the Navy. Strong currents generated by
             the large tidal range reduced the effectiveness of the booms, requiring the use
             of strong boom that took several days to deploy. Approximately 13,000 yards
             of boom were deployed in Cotes-du-Nord and 3,500 yards in Finistere.

             Plastic sheets were used to cover promenades, jetties, walls, and sand at the
             top of several beaches in the Cotes-du-Nord Department.

             An Egmolap skitniner collected oil at the entrance of Ploumanac'h. In
             general, vacuum systems did not work well because the hoses became blocked
             with stones and seaweed. A Rolba beach cleaning machine picked up pellets
             of oily sand on Greve de Goulven in Finistere. A knife edge on the machine
             scraped across the sand and then placed the oil and sand into a vibrating and
             rotating screen. The sand then dropped back to the beach while the oil lumps



             Tanio                                   2








                   moved on to a collection bin. This machine only worked on beaches with
                   good access and hard-packed sand that could support the weight of the
                   vehicle.

                   Tractor-drawn vacuum trucks removed oil on warmer days; on cold days the
                   oil was too viscous. Due to the oil viscosity and the concern that the next tide
                   would rapidly spread the pollution, bulldozers and front-end loaders were
                   employed to quickly remove the-bulk of the oil. Although much oil was
                   removed in a short time, the extensive use of bulldozers and front-end
                   loaders pushed the oil into the underlying sediments at a number of beaches.
                   This sub-surface oiling required extensive restoration work later.

                   Shovels were used to reach areas where the oil was thin or hard to access.
0                  Collected oil was put into sacks or tractor-drawn trailers for transport to a
                   tanker- deb allas ting station.

                   Approximately 20,000 tons of oily sand and debris were collected in Finistere.
                   At the tanker-deballasting station in Brest, the collected material was mixed
                   with quicklime to produce a dry inert material for use as fill in roads and hard
0                  standings. Approximately 1,800 tons of liquid material was collected in Cotes-
                   du-Nord and transported to the deballasting station. The 34,000 tons of oiled
                   sand and debris collected in the Cotes-du-Nord area was deposited in storage
                   pits behind the beaches, where quicklime was mixed into the material using
                   mechanical trenchers. This new mixture was then transported to secondary
                   treatment and disposal sites.
                   Mediu in -press ure, hot-water washing machines and high-pressure, cold-
                   water jets delivered from high-capacity pumps were used to wash oil from
                   the rocks in the tourist areas. Around 390 hot-water washing machines were
                   used in Cotes-du-Nord while 200 were used in Finistere. To help collect the
                   oil washed from the rocks, cleanup crews in Finistere applied granular
                   mineral sorbents, primarily Ekoperl 33, to the oil before washing it off. This
                   oil/sorbent mixture was then collected from the base of the rocks. In Cotes-
                   du-Nord, considerable amounts of dispersants were used to help remove the
                   oil from the rocks. In some instances, undiluted dispersant, mainly Finasol
                   OSR 2, was applied to the oil on the rocks and then washed off with cold
                   water. In other cases, pre-mixed solutions of 0.5 to 1 per cent concentrated
                   Gamlen Sybrom OSR 2000 or Hydrosol DN40 dispersants were used directly
                   in the water wash. Over 50,000 gallons of dispersants had been applied by
                   May 22.
                   Although the leaks on the sunken bow had been sealed, the French
                   government decided to pump the remaining oil out of the sunken bow
                   section. This difficult operation took until August 1981 to complete. Strong
                   currents and inadequate equipment slowed the operation.








                                                           3                                   Tanio









             Other Special Interest Issues:
             A number of areas, including Roscoff, Kerfissien, and Loquivy sur la Mer,                   41
             reported shellfish losses. Loquivy lost approximately 60 tons of crabs, clams,
             and winkles due to oil contamination on March 15 to 16. Oyster beds were
             contaminated at Plougrescant and Loquenole on the Morlaix River. Seaweed
             harvesting along the coast of Ile de Brehat, Point de l'Arcouest, and Sillon de
             Talbert was disrupted during the cleanup. Due to the nearby Les Sept Iles                   0
             seabird reserve, approximately 1,700 dead birds, primarily guillemots; and
             other auks, were recovered during the incident. Volunteer clinics were set up
             at Trebeurden, Saint Michel-en-Greve and Pleneuf Val Andre to clean the
             less severely oiled birds.

             References:

             *Ganten 'R.H. 1985. The Tardo Spill: A Case History Illustrating the Work of
             the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, Oil Spill Conference
             Proceedings, 1985, pp. 135-139.
             -Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
             *Gundlach, E. and Marshall, M. 1990. The Physical Persistence of Spilled Oil:
             An Analysis of Oil Spills Previous to Exxon Valdez. Final Report. HAZMAT.
             OAD. NOAA. pp.47-68.
             *Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
             1987.
             *OSIR Oil Spills, International Summary & Review, 1978-1981
             *Review of Oil Spill Occurrences and Impacts, Exxon Production Research
             Company, 1989.

















                                                                                                        49






             Tanio                                4








                   Name of Spill: Tarik Ibn Ziyad
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy).-, 03/26/75
                   Location of Spill: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
                   Latitude: 22 54 S
                   Longitude: 043 10 W
                   Oil Product: Crude Oil
                   Oil Type:
                   Barrels: 109,950
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel.
                   Resources at Risk: Mangroves, crabs, commercial fishing, industrial water
                   intakes, shrimp, recreational beaches, wildlife preserves.
                   Dispersants: Yes
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: Yes
                   Other Special Interest: Habitat impact due to oil.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Mangroves, sand/gravel beaches, piers.
                   Keywords: Straw, skimmer, boom, manual removal, sub-surface oil, fire,
                   International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF).

                   Incident Summary:

                   The Tarik Ibn Ziyad grounded on March 26, 1975 while entering the Sao
                   Sebastiao terminal at Santos, Brazil. Tanks ruptured and the vessel leaked oil
                   for approximately 15 hours.'

                   Behavior of Oil:

                   Oil impacted beaches at Governador Island, Bananal, Freguesia, Pitangueriras,
                   Bandeiras, Engenhoca, jardim Guanabara, and the Island of Fundao. Oil was
                   accidentally ignited on the Island of Fundao. Oil entered the Jequia River,
                   heavily oiling the biological preserve there. The oil in the preserve caught
                   fire and destroyed mangrove trees.

                   Countermeasures and Mitigation:
                   The State Environmental Engineering Foundation (FEEMA) coordinated the
                   spill response of which the Ministry of the Navy, the Municipal Street
                   Cleaning Company (COMLURB) of the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, and
                   Petroleo Brasileiro (PETROBRAS) were the principal participants. Overflights
                   from helicopters supplied by the Navy began within five days to monitor the
                   movement of the oil. Application of dispersants, and the use of straw as an
                   absorbent were the two principal cleanup techniques. Skimmers and 440
                   yards of boom supplied by PETROBRAS were deployed in the Jequia Channel.

                   Cleanup operations on the beaches were conducted by COMLURB and
                   included the spreading of straw as an absorbent, and some applications of
                   dispersant. Oil soaked straw was removed manually.

                   Cleanup response lasted until April 6, 1975.



                                                          1                         Tarik Ibn Ziyad








             Other Special Interest Issues:

             The dispersant P-69 was sprayed on the slicks and on oiled docks. On open
             water slicks the dispersant caused the oil to emulsify and sink to a depth of 3
             to 6 feet. The submerged emulsion leaked oil back to the water surface.

             Oil in the Jequia River biological preserves caught fire, and destroyed
             approximately 24,000 square yards of mangroves.

             References:

             -Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
             PMMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database


























                                                                                                         0











             Tarik Ibn Ziyad                       2








                   Name of Spill: Tenyo Maru
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 07/22/91
                   Location of Spill: Neah Bay, Washington
                   Latitude: 48 28 N
                   Longitude: 125 18 W
                   Oil Product: Intermediate fuel oil, diesel oil, lube oil, bilge oil, fish oil.
                   Oil Type: Type 2, Type 3
                   Barrels: 7,143
                   Source of Spill: Non-Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Exposed rocky shores, sand/gravel beaches, kelp, whales,
                   seals, sea otters, sea lions, diving coastal birds, waterfowl, alcids, shorebirds,
                   wading birds, gulls, terns, raptors, anadromous fish, demersal fish, oysters,
                   mussels, clams, mollusc harvest areas, crabs, high-use recreational fishing
                   areas, State Parks, beaches, National Parks, subsistence, commercial fisheries,
                   Native American Lands.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Adverse weather conditions, closure of public lands,
                   closure of recreational fishing areas, interaction with foreign or Native
                   authorities, unusual or experimental cleanup techniques, wildlife impacts,

                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Exposed rocky shores, sand/gravel beaches.
                   Keywords: Collision, remotely operated vehicle (ROV), boom, skimmer,
                   suction operations, International Bird Rescue Research Center (IBRRC),
                   pomporns, sorbents, manual removal, sinking.

                   Incident Summary:

                   At approximately 0815 on July 22, 1991, the fish processor vessel Tenyo Maru
                   and the Chinese freighter Tuo Hai collided in the Pacific Ocean,
                   approximately 20 miles west of Cape Flattery, Washington, and 20 n-dles
                   south of Vancouver Island, British Columbia, Canada. Ten to fifteen minutes
                   after the collision, the Tenyo Maru sank in an estimated 350 feet of water.
                   The Tenyo Maru, carrying 6,500 barrels of intertnediate fuel oil, 2,166 barrels
                   of diesel oil, and some quantity of lube, bilge and fish oils, began leaking oil
                   shortly after it sank. There were conflicting reports of the weather at the time
                   of the collision, several reports claiming that the weather was clear, while
                   others maintained that it was foggy.

                   The incident occurred in Canadian waters very near the Canadian/United
                   States boundary. The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) and the United States
                   Coast Guard (USCG) implemented the Canadian/U. S. joint Marine Pollution
                   Contingency Plan. Since the spill occurred in Canadian waters, the CCG took
                   the lead role in coordinating the spill response. Ultimately, the majority of
                   shoreline oiling occurred in the United States. The USCG federalized the U.S.
                   cleanup effort, accessing funding through the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund,
                   on July 30 when the owner of the Tenyo Maru discontinued funding the
                   cleanup.



                                                                                       Tenyo Maru









             The Tenyo Maru continued to leak oil after it sank, with the largest amount
             released shortly after the sinking. Response to the incident continued into
             late August. The bulk of the response effort was scaled down by August 29, as                       0
             the amount of oil being released from the sunken vessel on a daily basis had
             reduced significantly. The Canadian and U.S. Coast Guard planned to
             monitor the spill site for at least another month with regularly scheduled
             overflights and beach surveys as warranted.

             Behavior of Oil:                                                                                    0

             Oil released from the sunken vessel was carried southeast by currents and
             wind. Observations made from overflights the day after the sinking indicated
             that the leading edge of the oil slick was approximately 22 nautical miles west
             of Cape Flattery and 7 nautical miles south of the spill site.

             Within a few days after the sinking oil began to wash ashore at points along
             the Washington coast. Oil was first observed at Shi Shi beach, Cape Flattery,
             and the area between Tatoosh Island and Rialto Beach, with the heaviest
             impacts at Shi Shi. Shoreline impacts were also observed at Hobach Beach,
             Sooes Beach and Cape Alava. These impacts were generally light and
             consisted of scattered bands of tarballs and oiled debris.

             Oil also impacted beaches within Olympic National Park in Washington. As
             a result, park rangers closed several beaches and trails along the affected areas,
             including the area between Sands Point to the Waatch River, and the Ozette
             and Cape Alava hiking trails.                                                                       0
             Initially,the Tenyo Marti released oil at a rate of about 100 barrels a day. That
             rate had decreased by July 28. On July 31 it was estimated that the amount of
             oil released from the Tenyo Maru up to that point was less than 2,380 gallons.
             The oil slick had spread over a large area, with the leading edge of the oil at                     0
             approximately 80 miles from the source, or about 20 miles west of Ocean City
             in northern Oregon.

             By August 8, scattered sheen and tarballs had reached Fort Stephens State Park
             in northern Oregon. These oil impacts were removed by a storm the same
             day. Some oil was also reported at Seaside and at Cannon Beach in Oregon.                           0
             As a result, these beaches were briefly closed to recreational vehicles and
             shellfishing.
             Oil surfacing from the vessel generally had the appearance of rainbow sheen.
             Later the oil would coalesce into dark patches with sheen, tarballs, and                            0
             occasionally mousse. The oil would generally tend east from the source for
             several miles and then begin to head south. Some of the oil continued east
             into the Strait of Juan de Fuca 'and oiled beaches along the northern tip of the
             Olympic Peninsula. Tarballs and sheen were sometitnes held offshore in kelp
             beds and beaches would then be re-oiled when the tide changed.

             On August 9, very small amounts of oil were found on a beach at Green Point
             in the Pacific Rim National Park in southern British Columbia. In addition,


             Tenyo Mani                               2                                                        0








                    light oiling was found along five Canadian beaches between Tofino and
                    Ucluelet on August 13 and 14, and light oiling was observed on Effingham
                    and Wouwer islands, also in British Columbia.

                    Countermeasures and Mitigation:
                    Oil tracking and skimming operations were periodically hindered during the
                    response effort by foggy, weather.
0
                    Skimmers arrived on-scene from Canadian and U. S. sources. Skimming
                    operations took place around the spill site, and in other areas where
                    concentrated patches of oil were located. Skimmers attempted to collect oil at
                    the leading edge of the slick when the oil was approximately 80 miles from
                    the source, but had limited success due to the dispersed nature of the slick. In
0                   general the skimmers worked well, but had difficulty collecting some of the
                    light sheen, especially in heavy seas or when the oil was too thinly spread
                    over the water. The total oillwater mixture collected by July 31 was about 714
                    barrels.

0                   Two tugs were used to deploy the CCG's Ro-boom to assist with skimming
                    operations. The Ro-boom was manufactured by Roulunds from Denmark.
                    Ro-boom was towed in a V-configuration between the two tugs so that the oil
                    would be concentrated for the skimmers. Manufacturer specifications for the
                    boom claimed that the boom could work in 12 foot seas and at current speeds
                    of up to 1.5 knots. In some cases, it was found that the Ro-boom did not work
0                   well in high seas or when towed at high speeds. The tugs utilized for towing
                    the boom were not designed to operate at very slow speeds, and it was
                    suggested that vessels with variable pitch propellers would have worked
                    better under these conditions.

0                   Sensitive clam beds in Neah Bay were boomed on July 30 and a boat cleaning
                    station was established in the Neah Bay harbor.

                    Shoreline cleanup took place on Sooes Beach, Shi Shi Beach, Cape Alava, and
                    other affected areas along the Washington coast. Beach crews used sorbents,
                    rakes and shovels, manually collected oily debris, and in some cases, scrubbed
                    oiled rocks. In addition to the manual cleanup, pompoms were strung
                    together and deployed along the intertidal zone. This passive method of oil
                    collection was reported to have worked very well. A portion of the Makah
                    Reservation land at Tatoosh Island and Cape Flattery was cleaned by Makah
                    Tribe members, supervised by the cleanup contractors. Federal, state and
                    Tribal representatives worked closely throughout the spill to find the best
                    solutions to removing oil from Native lands with minimum impact on
                    cultural areas. Similarly, tribal council members from the Nuu-Chah-Nulth
                    tribe in British Columbia removed oiled debris from beaches in the area
                    between Tofino and Ucluelet in British Columbia. By mid-August, beach
                    cleanup crews had collected a total of about 35,000 bags of oily debris.

                    Beginning on August 3, the CCG began using anunmanned remotely
                    operated vehicle (ROV) to survey the sunken Tenyo Maru. A manned


                                                            3                               Tenyo Maru








              submersible was not used due to the risk of entanglement in the wreck.
              Surveys indicated that the vessel was lying on a silt layer in the ocean floor
              and that it had a considerable amount of debris (fishing nets, rigging, fallen                    0
              masts) in it's vicinity. In addition, it was discovered that the oil leaking from
              the vessel was pouring out from two portholes on the ship's bow. By August
              14, the CCG was able to use the ROV, with its mechanical arms, to insert a 3-
              inch diameter suction hose into one of the sunken vessel's portholes, and
              begin pumping oil from the vessel. The ROV was also used to secure the
              hose with an anchor so that it would not be dislodged during pumping. The                         0
              pumping platform had a 14,000 gallon capacity storage tank for storing the
              oil/water mixture pumped up from the vessel. The pumping operations
              were very successful.
              The pumping operations continued until August 27, with a total volume of                          0
              over 120,000 gallons of an oillwater mixture collected. Approximately 25,000
              gallons of this was oil. Pumping operations were suspended because the
              amount of oil leaking from the vessel, and the oil recovery rate from
              pumping, decreased markedly by the second week. It was estimated that less
              than 50 gallons of sheen was released from the vessel the day after pumping
              operations ceased.

              Skimming operations were suspended on August 20, with some of the
              skimmers waiting on standby in case the rate of oil leakage from the vessel
              increased. It was estimated that all the fuel tanks on board the Tenyo Maru
              had been ruptured when the vessel sank. As a safety measure, U.S. and
              Canadian Coast Guard personnel observed the vessel for another month,
              conducting about four overflights per week, after the cleanup effort had been
              scaled down.

              Other Special Interest Issues:

              It was noted that several other vessels used the Tenyo Maru oil spill as an
              opportunity to dump waste oil illegally into already oiled waters.

              By mid-August, approximately 800 live oiled birds and 3,700 dead oiled birds
              had been recovered. The majority of the birds recovered were Common
              Murres, but other birds collected included Tufted Puffins, Rhinoceros
              Auklets, Pigeon Guillemots, Marbled Murrelets, loons, gulls, terns, and
              scoters. The International Bird Rescue Research Center (IBRRC) operated a
              bird care facility at St. Edwards State Park in Washington during the spill.
              Two emergency care stations were established close to the spill site to house
              and stabilize birds until they were ready to be transported to the bird cleaning
              center.









              Tenyo Mani                             4                                                         0











                   Ref erences:

                   *Golob's Oil Pollution Bulletin; World Information Systems and the Center
                   for Short-Lived Phenomena; 2 August 1991; Vol. III, No. 16.
                   eGolob's Oil Pollution Bulletin; World Information Systems and the Center
                   for Short-Lived Phenomena; 16 August 1991; Vol. III, No. 17.
                   9 Golob's Oil Tollution Bulletin; World Information Systems and the Center
0                  for Short-Lived Phenomena; 30 August 1991; Vol. III, No; 18.
                   *Marine Response Bulletin; Marine Digest; September 19, 1991; Vol. 1, No. 6.
                   9NOAA Hotline Reports
                    *Oil Spill Intelligence Report; Cutter Information Corp.; I August 1991; Vol.
                   XIV, No. 29.
0                   e0il Spill Intelligence Report; Cutter Information Corp.; 15 August 1991; Vol.
                   XIV, No. 31.
                    *Oil Spill Intelligence 'Report; Cutter Information Corp.; 22 August 1991; Vol.
                   XIV, No. 32.
                   *Oil Spill Intelligence Report; Cutter Information Corp.; 25 July 1991; Vol.
                   XIV, No. 28.
0                  -Oil Spill Intelligence Report; Cutter Information Corp.; 29 August 1991; Vol.
                   XIV, No. 33.




0





























                                                          5                             Tenyo Maru








                    Name of Spill: Texaco Storage Tank
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 04/27/86
                    Location of Spill: Bahia Las Minas, Panama
                    Latitude: 09 40 N
                    Longitude: 079 05 W
                    Oil Product: Venezuelan crude, Mexican Isthmanian crude
                    Oil Type: Type 3, Type 3
                    Barrels: 240,000
                    Source of Spill: Facility
                    Resources at Risk: Mangroves, coral reefs, eelgrass beds, molluscs, crustaceans,
                    crabs.
                    Dispersants: Yes
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: No                                                                          41
                    Other Special Interest: Research conducted, habitat impact due to oil, habitat
                    impact due to cleanup operations.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Mangroves, coral reefs, sand/gravel beaches,
                    eelgrass beds.
                    Keywords: Skimmer, vacuum truck, Corexit 9527, pressure washing, reoiling,
                    manual removal.

                    Incident Summary:

                    On April 27, 1986, a Texaco storage tank at a refinery near Isla Payardi,
                    Panama, ruptured, releasing approximately 240,000 barrels of medium-weight
                    crude oil. Some of the oil was contained within dikes at the facility.
                    Approximately 140,000 barrels of oil flooded through a dike and overflowed
                    separators and a retaining lagoon and flowed into Bahia Cativa. Refinery
                    personnel reported that a total of 60,000 barrels of oil were recovered. It is not
                    known how much of this recovered oil was from the sea.

                    Behavior of Oil:

                    Isthmus crude oil has an API gravity of 32.8, and a pour point of 10 degrees F.
                    Onshore winds initially confined the spill within Bahia Cativa, adjacent to
                    the refinery. On May 3, winds and rain runoff pushed much of the oil out to
                    sea, beyond a containment boom at the mouth of the bay. Once the spill was                   C
                    no longer contained, dispersant application began.

                    The distribution of oil was surveyed from aircraft for two months following
                    the release. Surveys covered the area between Rio Chagres, 17 miles to the
                    west, and Punta San Blas, 61 miles to the east of the refinery. During the
                    surveys, the degree of oiling was assessed visually and quantified as heavy,
                    moderate, light, or absent. Also noted during the surveys were the habitat
                    types and organisms affected by the oil.
                    By May 15, the oil was contaminating fringing reefs, sand beaches,
                    mangroves, and estuaries within 6 miles of the refinery. Heavy oiling was                    C
                    reported along much of the shoreline between Isla Margarita and Islas
                    Naranjos. Two partially isolated lagoons with entrances facing the northwest


                                                             1                       Texaco Storage Tank         49



             --------- ---







             were spared the effects of heavy oiling. A total of 51 miles of shoreline was
             heavily oiled. Oiled shorelines within this distance included extensive
0            mangroves, intertidal reef flats, seagrass beds, and subtidal coral reefs. Little
             of the oil was spotted west of the Panama Canal entrance or east of Maria
             Chiquita.

             The most heavily oiled habitats were those closest to the refinery.
             Concentrations of beached oil were highly variable within each habitat type.
0            Variable oiling was likely due to variation in distance from the spill source,
             water depth, and directional orientation of the shoreline. Shorelines facing
             north or northeast were the most severely affected since much of the oil that
             escaped from Bal-da Cativa moved to the west. Shorelines that faced the
             south or west tended to be less heavily oiled. Low tides between May 10 and
0            19 resulted in the oiling of the seaward reef flat margins. As a result of the
             low tides, the heaviest accumulations of oil were observed in the intertidal
             areas slightly above mean low water. Habitats impacted included mangroves,
             seagrass beds, coral rock, and beaches. Small-scale patchiness was also
             observed visually and among replicate samples of the surface sediments.

0            Reoiling of the shoreline and mangroves was a continuing problem. Oil
             slicks were regularly observed within Bahia Las Minas for at least four years
             following the spill with oil coming predominantly from the areas of the
             fringing mangroves. It is believed that as the red mangrove trees
             (Rhizophora mangle)that were killed by the oiling decay, the erosion of the
             underlying sediments released trapped oil. Some observed oil appeared to
             originate from the landfill beneath the refinery.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             The deployment of boom across the mouth of Bahia Cativa helped contain
40           the spilled oil during the first six days of the incident. When wind and rain
             water run off pushed the oil out of the bay, dispersant application was begun.

             Approximately 132 barrels of the dispersant Corexit 9527 were applied from
             aircraft. Dispersant application took place in Bahia Cativa, Islas Naranjos,
             offshore of Bahia Las Minas, near Portobelo, and along the northern
9            breakwater at the mouth of the Panama Canal. The dispersant application
             appeared to be ineffective due to the weathered state of the oil and the calm
             seas.

             Floating oil was recovered by skimmers. Vacuum trucks were used as part of
0            the shore-based cleanup effort. Several channels were dug through the
             mangroves in an effort to drain the oil. These channels appeared instead to
             have the detrimental effect of aiding the movement of the oil inshore.
             Increased disturbance due to the construction of the channels may have also
             contributed to subsequent erosion. Manual removal of oiled rocks and debris
             was conducted along the more accessible shorelines. Seawater was sprayed on
             some sandy areas to aid oil removal. The recovery of floating oil by pumping
             appeared to be the most effective oil recovery method. The shallow waters



             Texaco Storage Tank                   2






                                                                                                                 0


                     and mangroves made many of the typical oil spill cleanup techniques
                     impractical.
                     Other Special Interest Issues:                                                              0

                     Many of the affected shoreline habitats were sites of ongoing study by the
                     Smithsonian Tropical Research Station at Punta Galeta. A great amount of
                     research has been conducted in the affected areas since the spill. Historical
                     time-series data on the biota and physical conditions greatly aided the                     0
                     documentation of the pre-spill conditions.
                     The first heavy oiling of the Punta Galeta area occurred on May 9. Although
                     the oil had weathered for 12 days, it was still fluid, and had the appearance of
                     used crankcase oil. The heaviest oiling occurred along the seaward side of the
                     reef flat at low tide. Organisms within a 6-meter wide zone were directly                   0
                     immersed in oil, and included zoanthids, corals, and calcareous and fleshy
                     algae. A systematic visual survey determined that less than 10 percent of the
                     original sessile community survived the oiling. None of the crabs that
                     normally inhabit this zone were found. Some live crabs (Grapsus grapsus)
                     that were found on nearby emergent structures appeared to be blind.                         0
                     By June, patches of oil remained in some areas of the reef flat. Algal growths
                     showed no visible damage in the deep tide pools, but were much less
                     abundant on emergent substrates than before the oiling. Some areas of
                     coralline algae and active crab burrows were bare of algal growth. Microalgae
                     quickly colonized the vacant substrate created by the mortality of other
                     organisms

                     The short-term effects of the oil on the common shallow subtidal corals were
                     studied. The number of corals, total coral cover, and species diversity
                     decreased significantly with increased oiling. The greatest decrease in percent             0
                     cover was found in the large branching coral Acropora palmata. Growth of
                     three species of massive corals was less on oiled reefs during 1986, than the
                     average of the nine previous years.

                     A study of mangrove trees revealed that one- to two-year-old seedlings
                     appeared to survive where the surrounding adults died. It was believed that                 9
                     somehow, young seedling structure (perhaps lack of prop roots) enabled the
                     young trees to tolerate periods of oil immersion. It was suggested that the
                     disruption of the substrate before replanting may remove such survivors,
                     hampering forest recovery. Oil persisted in the mangroves through May
                     1989. Initial oiling of the trees produced measurable amounts of oil on 100%                0
                     of all the roots that were sampled. Through May 1989, the mangrove roots in
                     the open coast and channel areas showed 70 percent oiling, while the oiled
                     proportion in the stream mangroves remained 100 percent. The decrease in
                     oil coverage resulted from weathering, microbial degradation, and loss of
                     oiled bark or encrusting organisms. Observed root mortality was greater in
                     oiled areas.




                                                             3                       Texaco Storage Tank         0










            References:

            oKeller, Brian D. and J.B.C. Jackson, eds. 1991a. Long-term assessment of the
            oil spill at Bahia Las Minas, Panama, interim report, volume I: executive
            summary. OCS Study MMS 90-0030. U.S. Department of the Interior,
            Minerals Management Service, Gulf of Mexico OCS Regional Office, New
            Orleans, La. 48 pp.
            oKeller, Brian D. and J.B.C. Jackson, eds. 1991b. Long-term assessment of the
            oil spill at Bahia Las Minas, Panama, interim report, volume II: technical
            report. OCS Study MMS 90-0030. U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals
            Management Service, Gulf of Mexico OCS Regional Office, New Orleans, La.
            48 pp.








































            Texaco Storage Tank








                  Name of Spill:Texas
                  Date of Spill (mmddyy): 03/07/86
                  Location of Spill: Mile 43.4, Upper Mississippi River, between Missouri and
                  Illinois
                  Latitude: 37 10 N
                  Longitude: 089 30 W
                  Oil Product: Western Crude Oil
                  Oil Type: Type 3
                  Barrels: 17,055
                  Source of Spill: Tank Barge
                  Resources at Risk:
                  Dispersants: No
                  Bioremediation: No
                  In-situ Burning: No
                  Other Special Interest:
                  Shoreline Types Impacted: Piers, vegetated riverbank.
                  Keywords: Boom, sorbents.

                  Incident Summary:

                  On March 7, 1986, the Tank Barges Kansas and Texas, under tow from the
                  MIV Edwin L. Kennedy, ran aground on the Grand Chain Rocks at Upper
                  Mississippi river mile 43.4 while en route to Garyville, Louisiana. The tow
                  consisted of eight barges, all loaded with western crude oil. Texas and Kansas
                  were the two barges at the front of the tow which included six other barges.
                  The grounding occurred shortly after the pilot had navigated to clear the
                  Thebes Railroad Bridge. While the Kansas appeared undamaged, the Texas
                  sustained heavy damage to the bottom of its number 1-6 starboard and 1-3
                  port cargo tanks. USCG Group Upper Mississippi River was notified of the
                  incident at 0308.
                  Early attempts to rig boom around the damaged barge failed due to rapid            Z
                  currents and river conditions. Ingram Barge Company of Nashville,
                  Tennessee, the owner/operator of the MIV Edwin L. Kennedy and the Texas,
                  hired Paducah Mutual Assistance Association (PMAA) as the primary
                  cleanup contractor. The owner representative also participated in overflights
                  to provide a better summary of the situation. Lightering operations of the
                  Kansas began at 1400. By 0800, March 8, this barge floated free with no
                  apparent damage. Lightering of the Texas began on March 8. At 1420, March
                  9, the barge was free and repositioned at mile 43.4 left descending bank. By
                  1615, the barge was drafting approximately five feet after ballasting. No
                  evidence of further pollution was noted.

                  After a Permit to Proceed was issued to the Texas, the barge was allowed to
                  continue on to New Orleans for offloading and repairs. Simpson
                  Environmental Services of Port Natchez, Texas, was brought in as a second
                  cleanup contractor. Soundings taken on March 12 revealed 17,055 barrels of
                  oil were missing from the Texas. Cleanup operations were completed by
                  March 28.





                                                                                        Texas










             Behavior of Oil:

             The incident occurred during high water, so the oil was carried into several
             landlocked areas. Product in the water appeared to weather and dissipate
             rapidly under the influence of river currents.

             Extensive oiling between miles 43.3 and 39 was observed from a USCG
             overflight at 1100 on the day of the incident. The On-Scene Coordinator
             (OSC) noted extensive pollution on March 8 from mile 43.3 to mile 37.8 with
             moderate amounts below 37-8. These moderate amounts were inaccessible
             and midstream. Observers on a March 10 overflight noted pockets of oil in
             various areas from mile 37.2 to 7.3. A March 25 overflight conducted by the
             OSC revealed that cleanup in most of these areas was complete. Two small
             pockets of oil, one at mile 22.0 in the Upper Mississippi River and the other at
             mile 952 in the Lower Mississippi River, remained to be cleaned.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             Boom placed around the barges after the grounding was ineffective due to
             river conditions and currents. An area downstream of the rock dike was
             boomed off to contain held oil. Trapped oil was then removed with sorbents.
             Containment boom was also deployed at mile 39.5 and mile 12.4 on the Upper
             Mississippi River, and across the mouth of the Cache River. Little or no
             observable effects to wildlife were noted.

             Other Special Interest Issues:

             Both the States of Missouri and Illinois were involved in the incident. The
             State of Illinois and other local authorities were mainly involved in
             assessment of damage and mitigation since the T/B Texas had been stored
             along the Missouri shore. The States representatives deferred to the OSC's
             judgment for conditional approval of cleanup.

             Ref erences:

             *USCG On-Scene Coordinator's Report


















             Texas








                   Name of Spill: Torrey Canyon
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 3/18/67
                   Location of Spill: Lands End, England
                   Latitude: 50 03 N
                   Longitude: 004 44 W
                   Oil Product: Kuwait crude oil
                   Oil Type: Type 3
                   Barrels: .860,000 -
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Abundant shellfish beds, shorebirds, waterfowl, diving
                   birds, bird nesting beaches, oysters, crabs.
                   Dispersants: Yes
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: Yes
                   Other Special Interest: Habitat impact due to cleanup operations, research              MP
                   conducted, wildlife impacts, wildlife rehabilitation
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: sand/gravel beaches, exposed rocky shores.
                   Keywords: BP1002, straw, chalk, bombing, manual removal, fire.
                   Incident Summary:                                                                       41

                   On the morning of March 18, 1967, the TIV Torrey Canyon ran aground on
                   Pollard Rock on Seven Stones Reef off Lands End in England due to the
                   master's negligence. The entire cargo, approximately 860,000 barrels
                   (references range between 857,600 and 872,300 barrels), was released into the
                   sea or burned during the next twelve days. Ships of the Royal Navy carrying             0
                   detergents were en route to the scene within four hours of the grounding.

                   The response command post was established at Plymouth. The Royal Air
                   Force and the Royal Navy implemented an early warning system for oil
                   movement. A panel of expert scientists was assembled to consider scientific             0
                   problems involved with the cleanup procedure. Local authorities were
                   instrumental in dealing with the oil beached within their jurisdictions.
                   A detergent, primarily BP1002, was sprayed on much of the floating oil to
                   emulsify and disperse it. Manual methods were used for removal of oil on
                   many of the sandy beaches, although the dissected nature of the shoreline               0
                   made it impossible to clean the whole coastline. The vessel lost structural
                   integrity on March 26, releasing more oil into the water. Since towing the
                   vessel off of the reef was deemed impossible, the government decided to
                   bomb the vessel.
                   Behavior of Oil:                                                                        0

                   Kuwait Export crude oil has an API gravity of 31.4, and a pour point of 0
                   degrees F. The spilled oil formed three distinct slicks. The first slick,
                   composed of approximately 219,900 barrels, drifted up the English Channel,
                   oiling the north coasts of France and Guernsey. The following week, about               0
                   146,600 more barrels escaped the vessel. Approximately 102,620 barrels of this
                   second pulse stranded on 200 miles of the coast of West Cornwall. One


                                                          1                          Torrey Canyon         0








             hundred miles of coastline between Perranporth and The Lizard, at the
             southern tip of Cornwall, were affected. The third slick, estimated at 366,500
             barrels, formed on March 26 when the vessel broke up. This slick drifted
             south into the Bay of Biscay and remained at sea for two months, during
             which time as much as 50 percent of the lighter fractions of the oil evaporated
             The west coast of Brittany was only lightly oiled.
             The formation of water-in-oil emulsions, containing up to 80 percent water,
             greatly increased the volume of material and its resistance to dispersants.
             Approximately half of the cargo did not reach the shore because it weathered,
             evaporated, or was dispersed by natural mechanisms. For several months
             following the dispersant application, many shorelines were recoated with oil-
             dispersant mixtures.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             Over 10,000 tons of detergents, primarily BP1002, which contained 12 percent
             nonionic surfactant and 3 percent stabilizer, were sprayed on the floating oil
             to emulsify and disperse it. Forty-two vessels were chartered for the spraying
             operation. Concentrations of 10 parts per million or less of these detergents
             were acutely toxic to many marine mammals and plants. Many limpets on
             intertidal rocks in the spray area were killed. A prodigious growth of green
             weed occurred due to enhanced nutrients from the dispersants. Detergents
             were not used on the 40-mile long coastal section between Trebeurden and Ile
             de Brehat so that inshore shellfish would not be contaminated with toxic
             components of detergents.

             Manual removal methods, including the use of straw and gorse to soak up
             oil, were used on many of the sandy beaches on the north coast of Brittany.
             Cleanup operations included pumping and bailing of oil as well as bulldozing
             of oiled sand on the beaches. Over 1,400 personnel from the British armed
             services assisted with beach cleanup. Approximately 4,000 tons of oil and oil
             emulsions were removed from the foreshores of Guernsey and 4,200 tons
             were removed from French beaches.

             The French treated floating oil with approximately 3,000 tons of natural chalk
             containing stearic acid which made the chalk oleophilic. It was believed that
             this chalk caused the oil to sink or disperse. The high density of the floating
             oil, the length of time the oil had been at sea, and relatively calm seas
             contributed to the apparent success of this method.

             After considering the options of towing the vessel or attempting to pump oil
             off the vessel while it was still on the reef, government authorities decided to
             bomb the vessel to burn the remaining oil. The vessel was bombed by the
             Royal Navy on March 28-30 during periods of low water when the vessel was
             in clear view. A Navy helicopter dropped napalm, sodium chlorate, and
             aviation fuel to fuel the fire.





             Torrey Canyon                         2








                    Other Special Interest Issues:

                    This incident prompted the English Government to take the initiative in
                    organizing an early meeting of the Intergoverrunental Maritime Consultative
                    Organization to consider needed changes in international maritime law and
                    practice. Relevant maritime laws were considered to be overly complex and
                    out of date in many respects.

                    An estimated 25,000 birds died as a result of the Torrey Canyon spill because
                    the incident coincided with their northerly migration. The coasts of southern
                    England and Brittany are nesting beaches for a variety of seabirds such as
                    guillemots, razorbills, shags, puffins, and Great Northern divers. Thousands
                    of oiled birds were picked up from the beaches for treatment, but the survival
                    rate was only around one percent due to ingestion of oil, pneumonia, and
                    improper handling and cleaning.

                    The Torrey Canyon incident was the first incident to draw universal
                    attention to the dangers of dispersants. Extremely large quantities of
                    dispersants were used during the response, clearly for aesthetic and not
                    ecological purposes. Contamination by oil without dispersants resulted in
                    less adverse biological effect than where dispersants were used. Many
                    herbivores, mainly limpets, and some barnacles were killed due to the toxicity
                    of the dispersant. Widespread mortalities on the West Cornish coast set the
                    stage for a large-scale experiment on the development of a mature
                    community, normally found on rocky shores, and the influence of
                    herbivores and predators on the ecosystem. However, the resultant statistical
                    comparisons may be somewhat inaccurate due to the small amount of pre-
                    spill data, the lack of control sites where the oil was left totally untreated, and
                    uncertainties of how much dispersant reached marginal areas. Early
                    estimates indicated rapid recovery of species along the beach, while long term
                    studies revealed extremely slow recovery. Wave-beaten rocky areas that
                    received only light oiling took approximately 5-8 years to return to normal
                    while areas receiving heavy and repeated dispersant applications took 9-10
                    years to recover. A 1978 study showed that a rare hermit crab species had not
                    re-appeared in the spill area.

















                                                           3                          Torrey Canyon











            Ref erences:


             1991 World Almanac
            *8/9/91 & 8/28/91 Letters from Daniel Owen at ITOPF
            *Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
            1987.
            *National Research Council. 1989. Using Oil-Spill Dispersants on the Sea.
            National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. pp.318-319.
            *Oil on the Sea, David P. Hoult, 1969
            *Potter, J. Disaster by Oil. Oil Spills: Why They Happen, What They Do, How
            We Can End Them. Macmillan Co., New York. 1973.
            *Review of Oil Spill Occurrences and Impacts, Exxon Production Research
            Company, 1989.
            *Tanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers. T.A.C.
            Inc. 1991.
            *The SocioEconomic Impacts of Oil Spills, Final Report, WAPORA, March
            1984.
            *The Torrey Canyon, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, April 1967
            *Wilson, M.P. Jr., et al., "The Spreading, Retention and Clean-up of Oil
            Spills," URI, Kingston, RI, 1976.































            Torrey Canyon                        4








                    Name of Spill: Trinimar Marine Well 327
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 08/08/73
                    Location of Spill: Gulf of Paria, Venezuela
                    Latitude: 10 30 N
                    Longitude: 062 00 W
                    Oil Product: Venezuelan crude oil
                    Oil Type: Type 3
                    Barrels: 36,650
                    Source of Spill: Platform
                    Resources at Risk:
                    Dispersants: Yes
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: No
                    Other Special Interest:                                                                    41
                    Shoreline Types Impacted:
                    Keywords: Shell Dispersant L.T., International Tanker Owners Pollution
                    Federation (ITOPF), blowout.

                    Incident Summary:

                    On the afternoon of August 8, 1973, the Trinimar Marine Well 327 blew out.
                    Oil spilled from the well at a rate of 2,000 barrels per day until August 12
                    when the well sanded up.

                    Behavior of Oil:
                                                                                                               41
                    An estimated 36,650 barrels of oil spilled from the well. Overflights on
                    August 10, indicated slicks extending 6 miles to the WSW and 3 miles to the
                    north. The slicks were comprised of patches of thin sheen. The majority of
                    the oil travelled to the southwest until Icacos Point where dominant currents
                    brought it into the center of the Gulf of Paria and through the North Bocas to             41
                    the Atlantic Ocean. Oil impacted beaches from Irois Bay to Los Gallos Point.
                    By August 17, the slick had dissipated.

                    Countermeasures and Mitigation:

                    On August 10, responders began pumping water into the well to lessen the                   0
                    chance of igniting the blowout. As a result the oil came out as an emulsion.

                    Cleanup operations concentrated on keeping the oil from impacting the
                    beaches by dispersing it at sea. Dispersant applications began on August 9, and
                    were supervised by Texaco Trinidad, Inc. Application was done by airplane,
                    and continued until August 14.

                    Approximately 3,200 gallons of dispersant were used. Most of the dispersant
                    applied was Petrolite W923; however, Basol AD6, Amoco Wellaid 311, and
                    Shell Dispersant L.T. were also used. The Petrolite W923 proved to be the
                    most effective, while Basol AD6 was the least effective.- Dispersant applied in
                    greater concentrations worked the best on the slicks.




                                                            1                 Trinimar Marine Well 327










            References:

            *Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
            *IFP. PLATFORM DATABANK on Accidents to Drilling Vessels or Offshore
            Platforms (1955-1989).

























































            Trinimar Marine Well 327            2








                   Name of Spill: UMTB 283
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 12/26/88
                   Location of Spill: Aleutian Islands, Alaska
                   Latitude: 54 46 N
                   Longitude: 158 18 W
                   Oil Product: Diesel
                   Oil Type: Type 2
                   Barrels: 47,620
                   Source of Spill: Barge
                   Resources at Risk: Shorebirds, bird wintering areas, anadromous fish,
                   spawning streams.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest- Adverse weather conditions.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: None
                   Keywords: Adverse weather conditions, remotely operated vehicle (ROV),
                   sinking, remote response, evaporation.
                   Incident Summary:

                   On December 26, 1988, the United Marine Tug and Barge, Inc. (UMTB) Tank
                   Barge 283, towed by the tug Marine Explorer, began sinking stern down
                   approximately 35 miles southeast of Simeonof Island, on the western side of
                   the Gulf of Alaska. The tug and barge, en route to Dutch Harbor with
                   approximately 47,620 barrels of diesel on board, encountered extremely rough            41
                   weather. The pump room and starboard aft tanks, which had been empty,
                   were now flooded, causing the barge to turn bow-up with approximately 80
                   feet of the barge above water and the remaining 200 feet below the surface.
                   The tug's crew members observed oil coming from the vicinity of the waste
                   oil tanks in the stern area. Although the barge owner speculated that the               0
                   stern anchor had punctured the aft waste oil tank, the exact cause of the
                   sinking was never determined. The salvage vessel M1V Salvage Chief hired
                   by Seattle-based UMTB arrived on January 7 after an eight-day passage from
                   Astoria, Oregon. Meanwhile, the barge continued leaking diesel fuel as 50-60
                   knot winds and 20-25 foot seas pounded the area.                                        0
                   By January 4, only 40 feet of the barge's bow remained above the surface.
                   From the attitude of the barge, the owner's naval architects and salvage
                   master speculated that four tanks remained filled with diesel fuel while the
                   other tank's cargo was displaced by water.
                   Initially, the owner requested resource agency clearance to move the barge to           0
                   Stepovak Bay for lightering and repair operations. As the barge, with the tug
                   and tow line still attached, drifted northeast parallel to the coast, evaluations
                   of Stepovak, Castle, Devil's, and Kuiukta bays, along the southeastern side of
                   the Alaska Peninsula, were requested of NOAA. The upright-floating barge
                   was extremely difficult to tow. The vessels were caught in a clockwise back-
                   eddy off of the southwesterly flowing Alaska stream which carried them
                   towards the northeast.



                                                         1                              UMTB 283








            The weather remained severe (Beaufort Force 9 with icy conditions)
            throughout the entire incident. Even though the tug Marine Explorer
            remained attached to the barge, it was virtually impossible for it to influence
            their naturally drifting motion and trajectory. On January 11, 1989, the
            owners requested USCG assistance in sinking the barge. On January 13, the
            USCG Cutter Sedge used 1500 rounds of 20 mm fire to sink Barge 283 in
            approximately 102 fathoms of water. The case was closed on January 18, 1989.

            Behavior of Oil:

            Even though divers from the Salvage Chief were able to plug some of the
            barge leaks, an estimated 23,810 barrels of diesel was lost before the barge was
            sunk.

            A representative from the Alaska State Department of Environmental
            Conservation (ADEC) estimated that up to 95 per cent of the diesel oil
            evaporated as it was agitated by seas of up to 18 feet.

            On December 29, USCG observers noted a very light sheen around the barge
            which was still notable on January 9. Overflights after the sinking on January
            13 revealed only a minor oil sheen of approximately 1 mile by 0.5 miles near
            the sinking.

            Countermeasures and Mitigation:

            The tug Salvage Chief arrived on-scene January 7 with divers and a remotely
            operated vehicle (ROV) to investigate the bottom of the barge. Small cracks
            found in the port and starboard main decks were sealed with wooden plugs.
            After considering all the options, UMTB asked the USCG for assistance in
            sinking the barge. The barge was sunk by the USCG Cutter Sedge at 1246 on
            January 13, 1989, approximately 11 miles southwest of the Semidi Islands at 55
            48 N and 156 46 W.

            Due to the location of the spill, on-scene weather conditions, and the rate of
            oil leakage, no cleanup action was performed.

            Other Special Interest Issues:

            Adverse weather conditions prevailed throughout the response. UMTB had
            to ask the USCG for assistance in the scuttling of Barge 283 because the
            weather prevented them from dealing with it themselves. The MIV Salvage
            Chief arrived on-scene several. days later than scheduled due to rough seas
            and gale-force winds.










            UMTB 283                              2











                    Ref erences:

                    *Oil Spill Intelligence Report. International Spill Statistics 1989-1990, Special
                    Report, 3/28/91
                    *Oil Spill Intelligence Report. Newsletter 2/21/91
                    *Oil Spill Intelligence Report. Oil Spills, International Summary & Review,
                    1989-1990
                    *U.S. Coast Guard POLREP file.



























































                                                          3                               UMTB 283








                    Name of Spill: Urquiola
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 05/12/76
                    Location of Spill: La Corufia, Spain
                    Latitude: 43 22 N
                    Longitude: 008 23 W
                    Oil Product: Light Arabian crude oil, Bunker fuel
                    Oil Type: Type 3, Type 4
                    Barrels: 733,000
                    Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                    Resources at Risk: Recreational beaches, marinas, waterfowl, gulls, wading
                    birds, commercial fisheries, power plant water intakes, sand/gravel beaches,
                    exposed rocky shores, marshes, tidal mudflats, clams, oysters, mussels.
                    Dispersants: Yes
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: Yes
                    Other Special Interest: Adverse weather conditions, closure of commercial
                    fishing areas, effects to tourism, habitat impact due to oil, habitat impact due
                    to cleanup operations, logistical or operational problems, research conducted.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches, exposed rocky shores,
                    marshes, tidal mudflats.
                    Keywords: Adverse weather conditions, skimmer, boom, fire, explosion,
                    manual removal, contingency plan, sawdust, recoiling, vacuum truck,
                    lightering.

                    Incident Summary:

                    On May 12, 1976, the Tank Vessel Urquiola struck a submerged object while
                    approaching the Corufia Oil Terminal at La Corufia, Spain. The vessel began
                    to leak cargo from the damaged bow section. Due to the threat of explosion
                    and fire, the Port Commandant ordered the Urquiola out of the harbor, away
                    from the refinery and town of 200,000 inhabitants. While being assisted out
                    of the harbor by two tugs, the leaking vessel grounded again, further
                    rupturing the bow tanks. All of the crew, except for the captain and pilot,
                    abandoned the ship when it began to list.
                    Two hours later the vessel exploded, killing the captain. Approximately
                    513,000 barrels of oil burned in the subsequent 16-hour fire. Burning oil
                    spread out from the vessel and was eventually extinguished by the cooling
                    effect of the seawater. Dense clouds of smoke were blown over the town of La
                    CoruAa. A safety zone one mile in radius was established around the vessel
                    after air monitors detected high levels of volatile gases. Despite these
                    precautions, a second explosion and fire rocked the vessel on the morning of
                    May 14.

                    Between May 12 and May 21, oil was estimated to be leaking at a rate of 2,200
                    barrels per day. An estimated 180,000-220,000 barrels of the cargo polluted the
                    Spanish coast. On May 21, a smaller tanker and tug began lightering the
                    Urquiola. About 50,000 barrels of crude oil had been removed from the vessel
                    by May 25, when lightering operations were halted by rough seas. Ten- to
                    fifteen-foot seas detached a large section of the bow. On June 8, the stern


                                                           1                                Urquiola








             section, containing an estimated 22,000 barrels of bunker fuel, was towed to a
             more protected area five miles to the west. The stern was partially lightered
             before developing a crack in one of the tanks that resulted in further, limited
             leakage.

             Following the fire, the Spanish Navy and a fleet of commercial vessels
             applied over 2,000 tons of chemical dispersants to the Urquiola and
             surrounding waters in spite of resistance mounted by Spanish
             oceanographers. Cleanup of the oiled shoreline was primarily accomplished
             by manual labor. Skimmers and booms were used for water recovery with
             mixed results.

             Behavior of Oil:

             Arabian Light crude oil is a medium weight product with an API gravity of
             33.4 and a pour point of -30 degrees F. Bunker fuel oil is a heavy product with
             an API gravity that ranges from 7 to 14. Prevailing northwest winds blew the
             oil onshore. The smoke from the fires rained oil droplets on the city of La
             Corufia. Oil escaping from the vessel was spread toward shore by a weak
             northerly coastal current and onshore winds. The heaviest oiling occurred
             within the bays closest to the grounding site. The three bays, or rias, that
             experienced the most oiling were Rias de La Corufla, Rias Area, and Rias
             Betanzos. Some oil coverage in excess of 65 per cent was reported along the
             shoreline areas of these bays. Beaches at Raso and Perbes were severely oiled.
             Even though oil quickly entered these bays, it took nearly a week before the
             marshes and tidal flats at the heads of the bays were oiled. These marshes and
             tide flats may have been protected if boom had been deployed during the
             previous week. Along the outer coast, moderate oiling was observed as far
             north as Playa de Doninos, approximately 10 miles from the grounding site.
             By May 19, oil had come ashore further to the north, near Frouxeria and
             Pantin. Large slicks of oil were spotted offshore of Ria de Cede-ira, but no
             shoreline oiling occurred in this area.

             Oiling was observed to the southwest near Barranan on May 21. Strong
             northeast winds on May 25 and 26 resulted in further westward movement of
             the slicks. On May 31, westward contamination stretched to Playa de Beo, 28
             miles from the grounding. Beach areas between La Corufta and Playa de Beo
             were lightly oiled, mainly in the form of oil swashlines. By June 1, nearly 215
             kilometers of the northwestern Spanish coast was oiled. Moderate (25-65
             percent coverage) and heavy (greater than 65 percent coverage) oiling occured
             on 37 miles of shoreline.

             Much of the floating oil became emulsified and mixed with seaweed and
             debris, making recovery difficult. Some emulsions were up to a half-meter
             thick. Many of the recreational beaches were heavily oiled. Oil penetrated
             several feet deep in the intertidal zone of some exposed beaches. The
             chemical dispersant application was believed to have dissipated several
             thousand barrels of the light crude oil into the 18'C water of the inner bays.                    40



             Urquiola                                2                                                         0









                  Countermeasures and Mitigation:

                  The largest mobilization of resources occurred during the dispersant
                  application. As many as eleven vessels were involved in applying the
                  hydrocarbon based chemical products. Many different products were
                  reportedly used during the operations, including BP 1100X BP 110OWD,
                  Finasol, OSR2, Shell Dispersant LT, Solufax 85, Seaklin 1100ATT, Kraken
                  MC563, CEPSA 3 Marine Dispersant, and Marlu. However, some observers
                  believed that all the dispersant applied was of Spanish origin. Several
                  hundred empty dispersant drums labeled with old product names were seen
                  beingfilledfrom tank trucks.

                  Some attempts were made to contain floating oil with boom. Due to the lack
                  of an oil spill response or contingency plan, booming equipment was not
                  available locally. A 36-inch French-made boom was borrowed from a nearby
                  refinery, but sank after three days of use. American Marine Optimax and 18-
                  inch Uniroyal boom were flown in from Great Britain. These two booms
                  managed to contain oil but broke loose because of wind and sea conditions.

                  Komara skimmers were used to recover floating oil at various locations. One
                  skimmer was staged near a power plant intake to prevent the oiling of the
                  water intake. Very little oil appeared near the plant, and the skimmer was
                  put on standby. The Komara skimmer was tested at Conabal Bay and Mera
                  Bay. At these locations the emulsified oil was up to half a meter thick.
                  Recovery rates in these conditions were about 15 barrels per hour. The
                  Petroliba oil refinery provided a Vikoma skimmer that had recently been
                  delivered. The Vikoma skimmer immediately clogged with debris and was
                  damaged. After being repaired with parts shipped from Great Britain, the
                  skimmer failed to pick up the thick emulsions of oil that were collected in
                  booms. A large British Petroleum Seaskimmer was also quickly clogged by
                  oiled debris and thick weathered oil. The use of both the Vikoma and
                  Seaskimmer equipment was discontinued.

                  Skimming equipment was also flown in to aid the cleanup effort. Oil Mop
                  (UK) Ltd. negotiated a 30 day contract to conduct oil recovery. Oil Mop
                  personnel claimed they would recover 733-1100 barrels per day, but were only
                  able to recover an average of about 220 barrels per day. The Oil Mop
                  scavenger unit did, however, compare favorably to the recovery rates of the
                  other skimmers and was also able to follow and recover oil in areas otherwise
                  inaccessible from shore.

                  Cleanup of the oiled beaches was a slow and methodical process. Many of the
                  affected areas were unsuitable for the use of mechanical cleanup equipment.
                  The decision was made by local authorities to spend available money to
                  employ the local people rather than purchase complex equipment. Cleanup
                  operations were very slow where oiling was extremely heavy. Much of the
                  cleanup was conducted simply by using buckets and shovels. A 12-foot tidal
                  range contributed to the difficult task of removing heavy concentrations of
                  oil. In some areas, cleanup techniques were improperly applied. The
                  application of sawdust as an absorbent proved ineffective in areas with heavy


                                                        3                               Urquiola








             oil accumulation. A front-end loader and grader were later used
             unsuccessfully to aid the cleanup of beaches. Repeated working of the beach
             with heavy equipment forced oil deeper into the sediments. Removal o
                                                                                       f
             large quantities of sand threatened to destabilize the beaches. This threat was
             augmented by additional cleaning required by reoiling
             The most successful cleanup operation involved the combination of
             machinery and manual removal. Trenches were dug above the high fide line
             with mechanical equipment. Laborers swept or hosed floating oil into the
             trenches where it was recovered by vacuum trucks.

             Beaches were initially hosed with chemical dispersants. This was soon
             abandoned due to a lack of pumps. Oil penetration into the sediments at La
             Corufia may have resulted from this initial washing of the beach with
             dispersants.

             Other Special Interest Issues:

             The shellfish stocks of the La Corufia area are among the most important in
             Spain. The spill's effect on the local shellfish fisheries was noticed almost
             immediately. By May 17, nearly 20 percent of the cockle (Cerastoderma edule)
             population in the Rio de Burgo area was dead. Many of the survivors were
             moribund and thought likely to die. Mortality in some areas was as high as
             70 percent. There was concern about the reproduction of these stocks, and
             recovery rates were expected to be slow. Slow growth rates of clams, oysters,
             and mussels suggested that recovery for these organisms would also be a very
             slow process.
             Observed effects to bird populations were minimal. Except for gulls, very few
             seabirds or shorebirds were seen in the area. A few oiled wading birds were
             spotted, but the only observed bird mortality was a duck.

             The inshore fisheries of the area, which include sardines and hake, were shut
             down. The fishermen chose not to fish due to fears of oiled nets, tainted fish,
             and depleted stocks. However, the offshore fisheries remained open during
             the duration of the spill, and unusually large catches of certain species were
             made the following year.












             Urquiola                                                                                        1C











                   References:


                   *1991 World Almanac
                   *8/9/91 & 8/28/91 Letters from Daniel Owen at ITOPF
                   eGenwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
                   *Gundlach, E.R. and Hayes, M.O. 1977. The Urquiola Oil Spill, La Corufta,
                   Spain: Case History and Discussion of Methods of Control and Clean-up.
                   Marine Pollution Bulletin. v.8, n.6. pp. 132-136.
                   @Gundlach, et al. 1978. Some Guidelines for Oil-Spill Control in Coastal
                   Environments, Based on Field Studies of Four Oil Spills. Chemical
                   Dispersants for the Control of Oil Spills, ASTM STP 659. L.T. McCarthy, Jr.,
                   G.P. Lindblom, and H.F. Walter, Eds. American Society for Testing and
                   Materials. pp. 98-118.
                   *Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
                   1987.
                   eMMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
                   *Robertson, et al. 1976. The Urquiola Spill, La Corufia, Spain. Environment
                   Canada. Spill Technolo y Newsletter. v.1. pp. 54-57.
                                         9,
                   *Tanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers. T.A.C.
                   Inc. 1991.




































                                                         5                               Urquiola








                   Name of Spill: U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 09/21/78
                   Location of Spill: West Hackberry, Louisiana
                   Latitude: 29 59 N
                   Longitude: 093 22 W
                   Oil Product: Arabian Light crude oil
                   Oil Type: Type 3
                   Barrels: 72,000
                   Source of Spill: Facility
                   Resources at Risk: Waterfowl, fish nursery areas, crabs, shrimp, crustacean
                   nursery areas.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Research conducted
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Freshwater marshes
                   Keywords: U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, blowout, fire, boom, skimmer,
                   vacuum truck, Regional Response Team, contingency plan.
                   Incident Summary:

                   The U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve is a one-billion barrel store of imported
                   crude oil. The Hackberry facility is one of three active storage sites in the U.S.
                   The sites consist of caverns that are leached out of subterranean salt domes
                   and are filled with oil by barges, tankers, and pipelines. The oil contained in
                   these domes is injected under pressure and, if any of the domes are vented,
                   they will discharge until depressurized.

                   At 1600 on September 21, a major oil spill and fire occurred at the
                   U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) in West Hackberry, Louisiana. At the
                   time of the accident, the storage facility at Hackberry contained roughly 14.2
                   million barrels of crude oil. During the removal of a well string for
                   maintenance, the plug used to cap the well was released, sending drilling
                   mud and crude oil out the top of the string. The low-flash point crude oil was
                   ignited by nearby diesel engines and the resulting fire burned for five days.
                   The release of 72,000 barrels of oil was initially contained within a
                   containment dike. A breach of the dike the next day spilled 32,000 barrels of
                   the oil into nearby Black Lake.

                   Containment of the spill in the lake was accomplished by redundant tiers of
                   boom. After the fire was extinguished, skimmers were used to recover the
                   contained oil. Consistent winds and good weather greatly aided the recovery
                   efforts. Coast Guard personnel were involved in deploying boom and other
                   recovery operations. Cleanup operations were concluded on October 11,
                   following an on-site inspection by the Regional Response Team (RRT).







                                                         1           U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve











             Behavior of Oil:

             Arabian Light crude oil is a medium-weight product with an API gravity of
             33.4 and a pour point of -30 degrees F. Oil fumes escaping from the drill string
             were drawn into the intakes of nearby diesel motors and ignited. The fire
             burned for five days and resulted in one fatality. Airborne smoke and oil
             were blown downwind to the southwest, hampering oil spill response. Most
             of the 72,000 barrels of oil that escaped from the well was initially contained
             within the dike that surrounded the facility. The dike gave way the following
             morning, dumping 32,000 barrels of oil into Black Lake, which serves as an
             important nursery area for fish, crabs, and shrimp. The dike, which was not
             designed to retain a spill of this magnitude, was found to be structurally
             deficient before the blowout, but had not yet been repaired.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             Countermeasures involved the control of the fire and well blowout, as well
             as the contaimnent and recovery of the spilled oil. Recovery of the oil was
             delayed until fire fighters extinguished the blaze at the western end of the site
             with foam. A number of pits were dug into the shoreline at the western edge
             of the site. These pits temporarily stored the oil recovered by skimmers and
             pumps. Oil in the pits was picked up by vacuum trucks and hauled to nearby
             storage tanks and barges.

             Seven skimmers operated on the lake at the peak of the cleanup. Three
             "paddle wheel"type skimmers and four Oil Mop Rope Skimmers recovered
             as much as 8 barrels of oil per hour until skimming operations were
             terminated on October 2.

             The floating oil was contained by boom that was deployed at the western end
             of the facility. Three tiers of boom were eventually used to contain the oil.
             The inner most boom was breached in areas where segments of different
             types of boom were joined. All of the oil that entered the lake was contained
             within booms near the facility. Oil that collected in the booms was up to 5
             inches deep. More than 32,000 barrels of oil were reported recovered from the
             lake. Another 20,000 barrels of oil trapped on the facility grounds was
             returned to storage. Some onshore accumulations of oil were as deep as 18
             inches.

             Winds remained from the northeast and helped to hold the floating oil
             against the shoreline and within the booms. Had the winds shifted, however,
             the immense quantity of oil would have made containment difficult. Backup
             plans were made in the event of adverse weather or a shift in the winds.
             Additional equipment was deployed in the lake. A DIP 3001 skimmer was
             stationed in the lake, north of the third barrier of boom. A second DIP 3001
             skimmer was brought on-scene from the Brian Mound (SPR) and launched
             nearby as a backup. Two 8,000-barrel barges were stationed in the area to
             receive recovered oil from the skimmers. A total of three tiers of
             containment boom were deployed to contain the floating oil.


             U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve         2






                                                                                                         0


                   After the recovered oil was analyzed for contamination, the bulk of it was
                   reinjected back into the storage caverns. More than 72 percent of the 72,000
                   barrels of oil that escaped was eventually returned to the reserve. An
                   estimated 20,000 barrels of oil were either burned in the fire or deemed
                   unrecoverable. Long-term protection of the lake against residual oiling was
                   mitigated by deployment of an 1,800-foot section of heavy-duty boom
                   surrounding the well pad. The RRT inspected the site on September 26 and
                   approved the termination of cleanup operations on October 11.

                   Other Special Interest Issues:

                   The Department of Energy retained overall control of the cleanup operation
                   and assigned an On-Scene Coordinator (OSC). Coast Guard personnel,
                   operating under the OSC, managed the cleanup contractors and provided
                   field experience and oil spill expertise.

                   Cleanup of the lake was termed "a classic in oil containment from a major
                   spill" in testimony at the hearings that followed accident. Although a final
                   contingency plan was not in place at the time of the accident, personnel from
                   the facility were involved in a contingency planning seminar the day before
                   the spill. The DIP 3001 skimmer had been made active the week before the
                   accident and was tied up at a nearby dock.

                   Research activities following the incident included attempts to identify both
                   oil and airborne combustion products from the spill over the year following
                   the incident. Results of this study concluded that oil contamination from the
                   Hackberry site was confined to a small area of Black Lake. The extent of
                   contamination was measured, and fluoranthene and pyrene levels due to
                   combustion products from the fire were monitored in foliage, soil, and
                   sediments in adjacent areas.

                   References:

                   eOSIR Oil Spills, International Summary & Review, 1978-1981
                   *Overton, et al. 1981. Identification of Petroleum Residue Sources After a Fire
                   and Oil Spill, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1981, pp. 541-546.
                   oU.S. DOE. 1978. Report on the Explosion, Fire, and Oil Spill Resulting in
                   One Fatality and Injury on September 21, 1978, at Well 6 of Cavern 6 at the
                   West Hackberry, Louisiana, Oil Storage Site of the Strategic Petroleum
                   Reserve.
                   *Wilson, J.E. and Gallagher, J. 1979. Cleanup of a 32,000-Barrel Crude Oil Spill
                   at the West Hackberry Dome Storage Site in Louisiana, Oil Spill Conference
                   Proceedings, 1979, pp. 437-440.









                                                         3           U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve








                   Name of Spill: Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 09/18/89
                   Location of Spill: Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands
                   Latitude: 17 45N
                   Longitude: 064 40W
                   Oil Product: No. 6 Fuel Oil
                   Oil Type: Type 4
                   Barrels: 14,070
                   Source of Spill: Facility
                   Resources at Risk: Coral reefs, diving coastal birds, Pelicans, sea turtle
                   nesting beaches, water intake.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Human health and safety concerns.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Fine sand beaches, mangroves, exposed rocky
                   shores.
                   Keywords: Atlantic Strike Team (AST), boom, vacuum truck, hydro-blasting,
                   manual removal, sorbent boom.

                   Incident Summary:

                   On September 18, 1989, Hurricane Hugo hit the island of St. Croix with winds
                   in excess of 140 miles per hour, damaging the steel containment walls around
                   two of the main No. 6 fuel oil storage tanks at the Virgin Islands Water and
                   Power Authority (VIWAPA) power plant in Christiansted Harbor on the
                   north coast of St. Croix. Oil leaked from a severed discharge line near the
                   bottom of one or both of these 54,000-barrel capacity tanks. It then overflowed
                   the containment dike and moved toward the beach 250 feet away. VIWAPA
                   personnel constructed sand-based containment trenches and berms along the
                   beach to contain the oil. They also diverted oil to a diesel storage tank
                   containment area. Oil began to leak through the trenches, proceeding down
                   the sloping base toward the shoreline. U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Marine
                   Safety Office (MSO) San Juan personnel flew over the area on September 21
                   and estimated that approximately 48 barrels of oil had overflowed the trench
                   and entered the harbor, impacting the sand beaches west of the facility.

                   MSO and USCG Atlantic Area Strike Team (AST) personnel arrived on-scene
                   on September 22. They immediately began working with VIWAPA and
                   contractor personnel to locate and stop the leak. The Strike Team lowered the
                   level of oil in the containment areas and secured the leak on September 25.
01                 The containment wall had been blown by the wind onto a ten-inch transfer
                   pipe, rupturing the pipe. An open valve had permitted the oil to escape
                   through the broken pipe. A total of 14,076 barrels escaped from this tank
                   between September 18 and 25. Approximately 1,000 barrels overflowed the
                   containment area and entered the water. Three miles of sand beaches were
                   heavily oiled, with some impacts east of the power plant in the harbor area.
40                 Some of the oil refloated, but local meteorological and oceanographic
                   conditions isolated the resultant secondary impacts to previously oiled



                                                           1   Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority








             beaches. Response efforts concentrated on the recovery and removal of the
             oil after it was on the beaches. No dead fish or animals were reported.

             Behavior of Oil:

             No. 6 fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to 14.
             The trenches helped contain the oil initially, but by September 21,
             approximately 1,000 barrels of oil had overflowed the trench and impacted the
             tourist beaches west of VIWAPA, leaving a band 10 feet wide and three miles
             long on the beach. The oil was driven into the sandy beaches by strong
             easterly winds and longshore currents. Oil continued to spread along the
             coastline towards a mangrove area in and around Salt River Bay.

             The shoreline to the east was less heavily oiled, extending one mile to the
             downtown Christiansted waterfront area. None of the oil made it west to
             White Horse or into Altoona Lagoon. However, sand beaches were oiled as
             deep as two feet in some places. Tarballs continued to appear near Cathy's
             Fancy up to four months after the incident.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             Booms were used extensively in the response effort. One thousand feet of
             two-foot high boom was used to hold oil along the concrete pier west of
             VIWAPA. Absorbent booms were deployed in the surf line for two miles
             west of VIWAPA. The winds and currents were used to an advantage in the
             deployment of absorbent boom. Expandiboom was used at several points to
             the west to deflect the moving oil onto the beaches where it could be
             recovered. Two thousand feet of two-foot boom was placed to the east of
             VIWAPA, towards downtown. Two hundred feet of two-foot boom protected
             a Kings Wharf desalination plant intake from the oil. The primary
             containment area started by VIWAPA personnel was reinforced with
             additional outboard boom. In total, five thousand feet of boom was deployed
             in the area surrounding VIWAPA.

             Oil was pumped from the base of the leaking tank to a Hess Oil Virgin Islands
             Corporation (HOVIC) tank barge using a repaired discharge pipeline on
             September 25. Pumping at a rate of 1000 barrels per hour, the oil containment
             level lowered three feet in three hours. With the lower level, the Atlantic
             Strike Team was able to locate and secure the source of the leak.

             Vacuum trucks were used to remove the oil in the earthen trenches and
             waterborne booms. Oil went from the vacuum trucks to the No. 6 tank
             containment pit where it was pumped into the HOVIC barge via the repaired
             discharge pipe. The diesel tank containment was emptied by September 30 by
             the Strike Team while contractors continued pumping the No. 6 containment
             pit. HOVIC took this oil to their facility on the south side of St. Croix for
             recovery.

             Four hundred people were hired for manual beach cleanup. The gently
             sloping beaches consisted of mostly fine-grained sand. Front-end loaders


             Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority2








                   skimmed contaminated layers of sand from long stretches of beach. As the
                   response and cleanup progressed, 30,000 cubic yards of sand was removed
                   from three miles of beach. The Virgin Islands Department of Planning and
                   Natural Resources (DPNR) became concerned that too much sand was being
                   removed from the beaches. High tide caused re-oiling to continue for several
                   weeks. USCG, DPNR, and VIWAPA agreed to try to reduce the amount of
                   sand being scraped off the beaches. [Since the spill, natural longshore
                   transport of-sand has restored the majority of the beaches.] Rocky areas and
                   waterfront piers received hydro-blasting treatment. The oily runoff was then
                   caught in booms. Beaches were considered "ofl-free" after 60 straight days of
                   manual cleaning. Four creek areas required extensive use of sorbent
                   materials beyond the initial 60 days.

                   On October 3, the Coast Guard MSO requested that the National Oceanic and
                   Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC)
                   travel to St. Croix to advise DPNR on the oiled sand disposition and beach
                   replenishment. After observing the cleanup operations and meeting with
                   DPNR, USCG, and VIWAPA cleanup contractor personnel, the SSC
                   recommended that very heavily oiled sand be removed from the island, for
                   disposal in an approved landfill, and a landfarming technique be used to
                   bioremediate the remaining sand. Landfarming would allow the natural
                   biodegradation of the oil in the sand to progress at a faster rate than if left on
                   the beach or in mounds. By spreading it out and turning it over periodically,
                   the oil level in the sand would eventually be low enough to return it to the
                   beaches. This would drastically reduce the amount of sand hauled off the
                   island, thus needing to be replaced.

                   Two other options considered were sand washing with solvents in a soil-
                   cleaning apparatus, and complete off-island disposal with replacement using
                   similar sand from an off-island source. The landfarming option was
                   preferred over the sand washing because of expense, the lack of a precedent in
                   a Caribbean area, and the introduction of another pollutant (solvent) into the
                   system. The removal/ replacement option was prohibitively expensive. Also,
                   land farming is currently an approved method of oily sludge treatment at the
                   Hess Oil Refinery on St. Croix.

                   Other Special Interest Issues:

                   Due to the destruction from Hurricane Hugo, all agencies were lacking vital
                   communication facilities. Therefore, mobile satellite communications were
                   critical to the success of the response. Other parts of the island's
                   infrastructure, such as potable water, electricity, and sanitation facilities, were
                   also destroyed by the hurricane and hampered response efforts.
                   Response personnel experienced physical security threats from armed groups
                   of escaped convicts in remote beach areas. Beach monitors often encountered
                   armed individuals on these remote beaches. Also, civilians were armed to
                   protect their property from crowds of looters. Personnel at the VIWAPA
                   command post regularly heard gunfire in the evenings.



                                                          3   Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority








             Political pressure to emphasize activities of beach cleanup crews may have
             interfered with the primary goals of securing the discharge and containing
             and recovering all floating oil. The desire to focus on more visible cleanup                  41
             such as beach crews appeared to affect the cleanup efforts.

             References:

             9 Bills, C.E. and Whiting, D.C. 1991. Major Oil Spills Caused by Hurricane
             Hugo, St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands, Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, 1991,
             pp. 247-251.
             9NOAA Response Report
             *Oil Spill Intelligence Report International Spill Statistics 1989-1990, Special
             Report, 3/28/91
             eOil Spill Intelligence Report Oil Spills, International Summary & Review,
             1989-1990
             *USCG On-Scene Coordinator's Report




































             Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority4








                    Name of Spill:V882, V883, V884, V885
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 04/02/83
                    Location of Spill: Mile 179.0 Upper Mississippi River, St. Louis, Missouri
                    Latitude: 38 40 N
                    Longitude: 090 15 W
                    Oil Product: Montana Mix sour crude oil
                    Oil Type: Type 2
                    Barrels: 13,212
                    Source of Spill: Tank Barge
                    Resources at Risk: Vegetated riverbanks, low banks, developed uplands.
                    Dispersants: No
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: Yes
                    Other Special Interest: Adverse weather conditions
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Vegetated riverbanks, low banks, developed
                    uplands.
                    Keywords: Adverse weather conditions, Gulf Strike Team (GST), deflection
                    booms, vacuum truck, sorbents, airboats, manual removal, oil snares, fire,
                    explosion, reoiling.

                    Incident Summary:

                    At approximately 2315 on April 2, 1983, the MY City of Greenville with a
                    tow of four tank barges struck the Illinois pier of the Poplar Street Bridge near
                    downtown St. Louis, Missouri, on the Mississippi River. Weather at the time
                    was cloudy and overcast with light rain. Visibility was 8 miles with winds
                    gusting from the northwest to 25 miles per hour. Crew error was the primary
                    cause of the accident. The barges, V882, V883, V884, and V885, were laden
                    with a total of approximately 65,003 barrels of Montana Mix sour crude oil.
                    One of the barges exploded on impact and burst into flames. As the fire
                    continued to spread, the tow broke, setting three of the burning barges adrift
                    down the river. The tug and attached barge V885 were moved to the Peabody
                    Coal facility at mile 179.2 for lightering and inspection.

                    The three drifting barges caused extensive damage to facilities and other
                    barges along the left descending bank on the Illinois side of the river. WhHe
                    traveling downriver, one of the barges struck the Pillsbury Grain dock facility.
                    The fire spread to the dock, the grain elevator, and trees and bushes on the
                    shoreline. Three grain barges nearby caught fire as well. A coal barge on the
                    Missouri side of the river ignited from contact with one of the barges. The
                    Monsanto dock caught fire after being struck by one of the barges, and the
                    impact ruptured a pipeline on a walkway, releasing approximately 100
                    pounds of monochlorobenzene into the river.

                    Barge V884 suffered the most damage, both the barge and its discharged cargo
                    on the river's surface were in flames. After drifting downstream, V884 sank
                    at mile 178.2 Upper Mississippi River (UMR) near the Cahokia Power Plant.
                    The barge continued to release its total cargo of 10,882 barrels of crude oil.
                    While burning out of control, barge V883 lodged bow first into the bank
                    above the Cahokia Power Plant. The fire spread uncontrollably onto the


                                                             1                    V882, V883, V884, V885








              shore. An hour later, V883 broke loose and continued drifting down the
              river, still engulfed in flames. The MIV Katie eventually grounded V883 by
              pushing it into the bank at the Pillsbury Facility. The leading barge, V882, was
              forced into the Arsenal Island barge fleet area after being controlled by the
              MIV Gary D. Partridge.

              The USCG Cutters Obion and Cheyenne fought the fire on V883 as well as
              the fire at the Phillips facility. The cutters used all but two of their fire
              fighting foam cans. To reduce the probability of reflash, the Cheyenne
              applied a low-velocity water fog to V883. The MIV Tom McConnel used her
              propwash to keep burning oil on the water from reaching the Cheyenne
              during firefighting operations. By 1330 on April 3, the fires on the three
              escaped barges, the three grain barges, and the Pillsbury dock were out.
              Valley Towing Service, Inc., the owners of the tug and barges, assumed
              financial responsibility for the cleanup. Three pollution cleanup sites were
              established at mile 177.6, 176.6, and 176.2 UMR. A joint Regional Response
              Team (RRT) Region V and VII meeting was held in St. Louis on April 5, 1983.

              Behavior of Oil:

              Each barge leaked at least some of its cargo as it drifted down the river. After
              it sank, a heavy stream of black oil flowed from V884 down the Illinois side of
              the river and into the lowlands. Personnel on an April 4 overflight observed
              heavy patches of oil from mile 179.0 to mile 160.0 in the Upper Mississippi
              River and heavy ribbons of oil were observed below mile 160.0. Sheen was
              sighted all the way to St. Genevieve, Missouri.
              On April 5, discharge from V884 stopped, but there was still a great deal of oil
              in the river. Oil coverage on the river between miles 179 and 168 was
              substantially reduced by April 6 due to the swift currents. Sheen covered 5 to
              10 percent of the river between miles 155.1 and 168 UMR. Heavy
              concentrations were spotted at mile 155 UMR on the Missouri side.

              Due to the continued rise and fall of the river from day to day, the remaining
              oil in the Mobil East site was stranded on the shore by April 26. Heavy rains
              and rising water a few days later spread some of collected oiled debris out
              again. Cleanup operations, which ended on May 9, cost approximately
              $550,000. An estimated 41,871 gallons of spilled oil and 4,201 cubic yards of
              oily debris were collected during cleanup operations.

              Countermeasures and Mitigation:
              APEX Towing Company lightered barge V885. The barge was then moved to
              the National Marine Service gas-free plant in Woodriver, Illinois, for survey
              and repair. After barge V882 had been moved to the Arsenal Island barge fleet
              area by the tug MIV Gary D. Partridge, MSO and GST personnel plugged the
              vents on it to stop any further oil leakage.





              V882, V883, V884, V885                    2








                   Oil was collected at the three sites along the Illinois shore with the use of
                   deflection booms and vacuum trucks. About 100 feet of deflection boom was
                   deployed between a buoy and a tree on the bank near the Arsenal Island
                   shoreline. This boom contained escaping oil from the fleeted barges
                   upstream.

                   Sorbents were used at Lock and Dam 27 to collect and recover oil. A crane
                   barge removed an oil soaked log jam at the Cargill Salt dock.

                   Oil herding techniques varied due to the constantly changing winds. Jon
                   boats and wash pumps were successful to an extent. Airboats were the most
                   effective tool for herding the oil, although they require open spaces to work
                   in so that they don't catch anything in their props.
0                  Heavy equipment and manual labor was necessary to clean up the saturated
                   lowlands of Arsenal Island. Collected debris was piled up for drying and was
                   then burned. Heavy rains in late April often extinguished the burn piles.
                   Landlocked oil at the Mobil East site required manual removal and garden
                   tractors.
0                  Barge V884 salvage operations took place from August 22 to October 21. Oil
                   snares were deployed around the equipment to collect any escaping oil. Only
                   minor ribbons of quickly dissipating oil were released when the barge was
                   raised.

0                  Other Special Interest Issues:

                   Wind changes, high water, and swift currents were a continuous problem
                   throughout the response. Wind changes were unpredictable, requiring
                   constant changes in the cleanup plan. Weather during the response ranged
                   from sunny and warm -to snow, and was harsh most of the time, requiring
                   the use of personal protective clothing for all weather conditions. Cleanup
                   was slowed because the unusually high waters had deposited oil in trees and
                   heavy underbrush.

                   References:

                   *USCG On-Scene Coordinator's Report















                                                         3                   V882, V883, V884, V885








                    Name of Spill: Venoil
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 12/16/77
                    Location of Spill: Cape St. Francis, South Africa                                          0
                    Latitude: 34 26 S
                    Longitude: 024 04 E
                    Oil Product: Iranian heavy crude oil, Bunker fuel oil
                    Oil Type: Type 3, Type 4
                    Barrels: 219,000
                    Source of Spill: Tank Vessel                                                               0
                    Resources at Risk: Recreational beaches, National Park, bivalve aquaculture
                    site, oysters, lagoons, fringing wetlands, tidal mudflats, salt marshes,
                    commercial fisheries, seabirds, seabird breeding colonies, seals, dolphins,
                    whales, crabs, shrimp, Nature Reserve.
                    Dispersants: Yes                                                                           -0
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: No
                    Other Special Interest: Effects to recreation areas, unusual or experimental
                    cleanup techniques, wildlife impacts.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Fringing wetlands, tidal mudflats, salt marshes,
                    coral reefs.                                                                               0
                    Keywords: Manual removal, straw, suction operations, sub-surface oil,
                    collision, fire, International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF).

                    Incident Summary:
                    On the morning of December 16, 1977, the Venoil and the Venpet collided 40                 0
                    miles off Cape St. Francis, South Africa. The Venpet was damaged, releasing
                    burning bunker oil over the starboard deck of the Venoil and into the
                    surrounding water. The Venoil suffered serious fire damage. The impact
                    also holed two of the Venoil's tanks. Both ships were abandoned, and began
                    to drift towards the coast. The fires on board both vessels went out as they               0
                    drifted.

                    Behavior of Oil:

                    Iranian Heavy crude oil has an API gravity of 31.0, and a pour point of -5
                    degrees F. Bunker fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges              9
                    from 7 to 14. Approximately 155,000 barrels of Iranian heavy crude oil, and
                    33,000 barrels of bunker fuel oil spilled from the Venoil. Approximately
                    31,000 barrels of bunker fuel oil spilled from the Venpet, in ballast at the time
                    of the collision. Of the 219,000 barrels of oil spilled, it is estimated that 25
                    percent burned.                                                                            0
                    Overflights on December 17 revealed a slick of emulsified oil 25 miles from
                    the coast and moving west. The slick moved towards the coast for a week. By
                    December 24, the oil was in the Plettenberg Bay area, four miles from the coast
                    of the Tsitsikama Nature Reserve. A day later the oil moved away from the
                    coast in a WSW direction. A previously undiscovered slick was found in the                 0
                    area between Plettenberg Bay and Mossel Bay on December 25. The slick
                    consisted of patches of emulsified oil in a 100-square mile area. The slick


                                                            1                                  Venoil         0








            moved in a westerly direction. On December 28, the oil came ashore and,
            over the next four days, 80 miles of shoreline were impacted. Most of the area
            received light oiling, with the area between the Little Brak and Great Brak
            rivers receiving some heavy concentrations of oil. Oil impacted the river
            banks, mudflats, sandflats, marshes, and a reef in that area. Oil also sank in
            the river and nearby lagoons as sand became incorporated into the mousse
            and salinity levels dropped. Oil reached two miles up the Little Brak River.
            Overflights on January 3 revealed that there was no oil in the water in the
            area 45 miles from the shore between Cape Agulhas and Port Elizabeth.
            Countermeasures and Mitigation:

            Both vessels were taken under tow to prevent their grounding near the coast.
            By December 18, the Venoil was 30 miles from the coast, and the Venpet was
            47 miles away. The vessels were towed into the Agulhas Current so that any
            release of oil would be carried away from the shoreline. The Venpet was
            brought to Algoas Bay for repairs on December 24. The Agulhas Current
            carried the Venoil and one tug 250 miles southwest of the coast. Two tugs
            were required to tow the Venoil into Algoas Bay, where it arrived on January
            1, 1978. Lightering operations began on January 4 and were completed on
            January 7.

            Dispersant spraying operations began almost immediately from five Kusweg
            anti-pollution vessels directed by aircraft. However, by December 18, the oil
            had emulsified to an extent where the dispersants were not effective. The oil
            became so thick that it significantly slowed the vessels traversing it.
            Dispersant operations were scaled down at this point, and only slicks of fresh
            oil were sprayed. When the second slick was found dispersant operations
            began there. However, as this slick was also composed of thick, emulsified
            oil, operations were suspended shortly after beginning. Approximately
            158,500 gallons of dispersant were sprayed on the various slicks.
            Oil impacts to the rocky shore areas were left to degrade under the influence
            of the weather, except for one recreational rocky shore beach that was treated
            by manual removal and sandblasting of rocks followed by dispersant
            application. Cleanup on other rocky shores consisted of manual removal of
            mousse trapped among the rocks. Oiled recreational sand beaches were
            treated by manual removal of oiled sand and debris. Removal of sand was
            minimized, and no dispersants were used on the sand beaches. Straw was
            spread on some sand beaches to absorb the oil. Oiled straw, debris and sand
            were disposed of in landfills, and in sorne cases, was buried above the high
            tide watermark on the beaches where they were collected.

            Oil stranded on the river banks, mudflats, sandflats, and the reef near the
            Brak River areas was removed manually. Sunken oil in the Brak River areas
            was up to 18 inches thick. Diaphragm pumps were successfully used to
            suction the oil from the river and lagoon bottoms. Drag lines were also used,
            but removed too much uncontaminated sand when pulled by barges. Small-
            scale drag line operations were attempted using people to pull the line, but


            Venoil                                2








                    this proved too exhausting for the workers. A cofferdam was constructed
                    across the mouth of the Little Brak River. One-way pipes in the cofferdam
                    and the use of pumps lowered the level of the lagoon by 4 feet, facilitating
                    suction operations. Straw bale barriers were placed across some areas in the
                    Little Brak River estuary to prevent their oiling.

                    Other Special Interest Issues:

                    The greatest wildlife damage was seen in the sand and mudflat areas of the
                    Brak rivers. Crabs and prawns were severely oiled, and mortalities were high.
                    There were reports of about 100 oiled birds, including Cape Gannets and
                    Jackass Penguins, during the course of the spill. It was assumed that many
                    more were oiled but never recovered. The oil missed most of the breeding
                    colonies. Some seals showed irritation to the eyes and mouth after surfacing
                    in dispersant spraying areas. Most of the oil missed the seal breeding areas.

                    References:

                    oGenwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.






































                                                            3                                 Venoil









                     Name of Spill: Vista Bella
0                    Date of Spill (mmddyy)- 3/6/91
                     Location of Spill: 12 miles northeast of Nevis Island (British), eastern
                     Caribbean.
                     Latitude: 17 17 N
                     Longitude: 062 18 W
                     Oil Product: No. 6 Fuel Oil
0                    Oil Type: Type 4
                     Barrels: 13,300
                     Source of Spill: Tank Barge
                     Resources at Risk: Shrimp aquaculture sites, fish, crabs, eelgrass beds, diving
                     coastal birds, sea turtle nesting beaches, recreational beaches, coral reefs.
                     Dispersants: Yes
0                    Bioremediation: No
                     In-situ Burning: No
                     Other Special Interest: Adverse weather conditions, logistical or operational
                     problems, interaction with foreign or Native authorities.
                     Shoreline Types Impacted: Exposed rocky shores, sand/ gravel beaches,
                     mangroves.
                     Keywords: Atlantic Strike Team (AST), FINASOL OSR-7, adverse weather
                     conditions, manual removal, skimmer, fingerprinting.

                     Incident Summary:

                     On March 6, 1991, the Vista Bella sank in the Atlantic Ocean approximately 12
                     miles northeast of Nevis Island (British). The barge, carrying 13,300 barrels of
                     No. 6fuel oil, sank in approximately 2000 feet of water. The wind speed on
                     the day of the incident was approx. 6-10 knots. The cause of the sinking was
                     not determined. The barge was owned by Offshore Marine Limited and
                     operated under the Trinidad flag.

                     Dispersant was applied from March 9-15, within a two-nautical mile area of
                     the source. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Atlantic Strike Team (AST) was on-
                     scene from March 14-23. Contractor beach cleanup began on March 27.

                     Behavior of Oil:

                     No. 6 fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to 14.
                     A slick was observed downcurrent from the source (extending from 17 18 N,
                     062 21 W to 17 26 N, 062 31 W) by observers on a USCG flight on March 7.
                     This slick, which was estimated to cover an area of 7.5 nautical miles,
                     contained patches of sheen with some areas of brown oil. Personnel from the
                     U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) predicted
                     that islands up to 100 miles from the source could be oiled under the
                     prevailing conditions.

                     Personnel aboard a French Customs overflight on March 9 observed the slick
                     moving to the northwest toward the strait between Saba and St. Maarten.
41                   Beach oiling first occurred on the islands of St. Maarten (Netherlands
                     Antilles), St. Barthelemy (French), St. Kitts, and Nevis. Beached oil was



                                                                                        Vista Bella









                confirmed along 14-16 nautical miles of shoreline on St. Maarten and St.
                Barthelemy by March 12. March 14 overflight observers estimated the slick to                           0
                be 12 miles long by 200 feet wide. Coverage of oil within this area was
                estimated at 80 percent, with some breaking up observed at the leading edge
                of the slick. Although dispersant operations were discontinued on March 15,
                observers on a March 17 overflight noted that the Vista Bella continued to
                release oil. The area east of St. Kitts escaped oiling. Beach survey results
                indicated the presence of minor oiling along the rocky shoreline of Sand
                Bank Bay, and regularly occurring tarballs (2-5 inches) mixed in with the
                seagrass and sand between Muddy Point and Dieppe Bay. No cleanup of this
                second area had occurred as of March 19.

                By March 25, tarballs were coming ashore on Culebra Island (Playa Brava) in
                Puerto Rico, 200 miles from the source. Chemical fingerprinting confirmed
                that the oil was from the Vista Bella. Personnel at Playa Larga (Puerto Rico)
                reported a one-kilometer band of oiling with 100 percent coverage. Oil was
                also reported on the seaward bases of reefs in the area. Cayo Barca, a NOAA
                reserve on San Juan, was oiled by tarmats up to one meter in diameter. Eight
                nautical miles of shoreline on St. John required cleanup and received final
                assessment on April 8. Cleanup crews recovered tarballs and oiled seagrass.
                Skimming operations conducted near the source of the spill from April 16-25,
                failed to recover any measurable oil.
                Countermeasures and Mitigation:

                Dispersant was applied under the approval of the Caribbean Regional
                Response Team (CRRT). The French Navy supplied the water-based
                dispersant FINASOL OSR-7, which is on the EPA product schedule. During
                March 9-15, personnel aboard French and Dutch Navy vessels applied the
                dispersant using onboard firefighting systems since dispersant application
                equipment was unavailable. The use of FINASOL OSR-7 was discontinued
                on March 15 due to its ineffectiveness on the No. 6fuel oil. FINASOL OSR-52
                was considered as a replacement, but was not applied.

                Cleanup personnel deployed boom at St. Barthelemy. Snarebooms were
                placed along oiled shoreline and across creek mouths to protect mangroves in
                the area.                                                                                              0
                Removal of oily debris on Haulover Bay, Mennebeck Bay, Leinster Point, and
                Threadneedle Point began on March 27. Early cleanup consisted of oily debris
                removal and manual reworking of the oiled swash line. Pom-poms placed in
                the surf below reworked sections of swash line were effective in picking up
                the loosened oil. Bagged oily debris from the beaches of St. Johns was stored                          0
                temporarily at a facility in St. Johns and later permanently landfilled in
                Puerto Rico.

                Shoreline cleanup was extensive, along the populated tourist beaches of
                Puerto Rico. Bilingual shoreline assessment forms were prepared. Prison
                work crews contributed to the beach cleanup under the incentive of reduced                             0



                Vista Bella                              2









                     sentences. On less-used recreational beaches, seagrass wrack was left to act as a
                     natural sorbent for a period of time before being removed.
                     Skimming operations, scheduled to begin on April 12 were delayed until the
                     late arrival of a third vessel. Skimming began on April 16, but was
                     discontinued on April 25 due to the inability of the skimmers to recover oil.
                     On April 21, seven hundred feet of boom parted in 6-8 foot seas. Additional
                     damages to cleanup equipment due to high seas included 250-350 feet of
                     boom, a Zodiac, and a support vessel's transmission. High sea conditions,
                     inappropriate equipment, and engine problems all contributed to the
                     unsuccessful booming operation at the source of the spill.

                     Other Special Interest Issues:

                     Commercial response equipment was not available on Antigua, St. Kitts, or
                     Nevis. The nearest commercial response equipment was located in San Juan
                     and Venezuela. Local government agencies and companies aided the cleanup
                     effort on St. Kitts by donating equipment. Volunteers and prisoner labor
                     crews helped with the cleanup effort as well.
                     Early in the incident it was difficult to reach U.S. Embassy personnel in
                     Antigua. Mechanical problems and the difficulty in reaching agency
                     personnel in the area during the weekend both contributed to the
                     communication problem. Due to the differences in electrical current at the
                     cleanup locations, electrical equipment had to be operated while using a step-
                     down power transformer. It was recommended that local aircraft should be
                     used in the event of future spills due to less expensive operating costs
                     compared to the Coast Guard C-130. Smaller aircraft are also more readily
                     available and provide a better observation platform than the C-130.

                     References:

                     *MMS Worldwide Tanker Spill Database
                     *Oil Spill Intelligence Report, Volume XIV, #12, April 4, 1991
                     *U.S. Coast Guard Incident Summary Report
                     *U.S. Coast Guard On-Scene Coordinator's Report

















                                                           3                            Vista Bella








                    Name of Spill: Wafra
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 02/27/71
                    Location of Spill: Cape Agulhas, South Africa
                    Latitude: 35 00 S
                    Longitude: 020 02 E
                    Oil Product: Arabian crude oil
                    Oil Type: Type 2
                    Barrels: 200,000
                    Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                    Resources at Risk: Beaches.
                    Dispersants: Yes
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: No
                    Other Special Interest: Wildlife impacts.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches, exposed rocky shores.
                    Keywords: Sinking.

                    Incident Summary:
                    On the morning of February 27, 1971, the tanker Wafta was taken under tow
                    off Cape Agulhas, South Africa after her engine room flooded. Later that day
                    the towline broke, and the Wafra drifted onto the Agulhas Reef, five miles
                    from Cape Agulhas. Cargo tanks were ruptured, and Arabian crude oil began
                    to leak from the vessel. On March 8, the vessel was pulled off the reef by the
                    tug Oceanic, and towed to a position 200 miles from the coast where it was
                    deliberately sunk on March 12.

                    Behavior of Oil:

                    Approximately 200,000 barrels of crude oil spilled into the sea, about half of it
                    at the site of the grounding and the rest as the tanker was towed to the site of
                    its sinking. A 30-mile long by 5-mile wide oil slick formed at the site of the
                    grounding. Approximately 45,000 barrels of oil polluted the coastline between
                    Cape Agulhas and Struisbaai.

                    Countermeasures and Mitigation:
                    It was decided that the Wafra would be towed offshore and sunk in order to
                    prevent a large release of oil in a location where it could threaten the
                    coastline. The vessel was towed to a point 200 miles from the coast of South
                    Africa. The Wafra was blown up with missiles from South African Air Force
                    jets and with depth charges. The vessel sank at 36 57 S, 020 42 E on March 12.
                    A helicopter applied an oil solvent to the slick immediately after it formed,
                    but failed to prevent its spreading.
                    Dispersant operations were conducted under the supervision of the Division
                    of Sea Fisheries. Five vessels participated in the application of dispersants,
                    and were guided by observers in aircraft.



                                                                                                Wafra








            Other Special Interest Issues:

            Dead oiled birds and fish were found on the shore near Cape Agulhas and
            Struisbaai.


            References:

            eGenwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
            *Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
            1987.
            4,The South African Shipping News and Fishing Industry Review: April,
            1971. Vol. XXVI, No. 4.











































            Wafra








                    Name of Spill: Whidbey Island Spill
                    Date of Spill (mmddyy): 12/21/84
                    Location of Spill: South end of Whidbey Island, Washington
                    Latitude: 47 50 N
                    Longitude: 122 25 W
                    Oil Product: Bunker fuel oil
                    Oil Type: Type 4
                    Barrels: 119
                    Source of Spill: Unknown
                    Resources at Risk: Kelp, wintering concentration area, diving coastal birds,
                    waterfowl.
                    Dispersants: No
                    Bioremediation: No
                    In-situ Burning: No
                    Other Special Interest: Wildlife impacts, habitat impact due to oil, wildlife
                    rehabilitation.
                    Shoreline Types Impacted: Marshes
                    Keywords: Fingerprinting, manual removal.

                    Incident Summary:

                    At 1130 on December 21, 1984, the United States Coast Guard was notified by a
                    boater of an oil slick off Edmonds, Washington. The actual spiller, estimated
                    to have released 119 barrels, had not reported the incident. Six suspect vessels
                    had their oil "fingerprinted" by the Coast Guard to identify the responsible
                    party. Funds for the spill cleanup initially came from the USCG revolving oil
                    pollution fund. An overflight of the area was conducted at 1400.

                    The spill occurred during a time when thousands of migratory birds are
                    overwintering in the area. Between 1,500 and 2,000 of these birds were oiled
                    as a result of the spill. Many birds were treated at the South Whidbey Island            0
                    Wildlife Clinic. On December 23, personnel at a bird clinic established at
                    Mukilteo's Olympic Junior High school began cleaning and feeding hundreds
                    of oiled birds. The birds were washed with dish washing detergent and tube-
                    fed a mixture of Kaopectate, honey, high-protein baby cereal, activated
                    charcoal, thirst-quencher, and poison antidote until the center received a
                    high-protein feed donated by Ralston Purina's Woodinville, Washington                    0
                    plant. Due to this donation and excellent handling, 60 percent of the 428
                    cleaned birds were last reported as surviving, as compared to an average
                    survival rate of 20 percent for oiled birds.
                    Manual cleanup of beaches was most prevalent where waters were too                       0
                    shallow for cleanup vessels. In many of these narrow channels, the water
                    was not deep enough to float boats carrying boom.








                                                                                 Whidbey Island Spill











             Behavior of Oil:

             Bunker fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to
             14. The oil spread into a 10-mile long by 500-yard wide ribbon by the
             afternoon of December 21. As predicted, the oil also impacted the kelp beds
             offshore of Possession Point on the southeast edge of Whidbey Island. The oil
             came ashore along six miles of beachfront on Bainbridge Island's Point
             Monroe, Yeomalt Point, and Indian Island. Oil also landed on a mile of beach
             on the east side of Bainbridge Island, as well as scattered patches on
             Marrowstone Island to the west of Whidbey Island.

             Due to cool winter temperatures, the lighter fractions in the oil did not
             readily evaporate. High tidal ranges in the Whidbey Island area trapped
             much of the oil in the supratidal zone where there was little marine life.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             Manual beach cleanup was conducted by personnel under contract to the
             USCG- Plastic bags full of collected oil and debris were incinerated at Thermal
             Reduction Company, Inc., in Bellingham, Washington.

             Other Special Interest Issues:

             Initial bird mortality was extremely high in this incident. Detergent washings
             leave the birds without the natural oils that usually allow them to float and
             stay warm. It takes from a few weeks to several months for the birds' feathers
             to naturally re-oil, depending on the species. Delayed stress mortality from
             the shock of being handled was a likely cause of death as well. Autopsies on
             dead birds revealed intestines with stripped-off linings while others showed
             signs of kidney failure.

             Chemical fingerprinting, used to attempt to identify the source of the spill,
             was performed at the U.S. Coast Guard Combined Oil Identification
             Laboratory (COIL) in Washington, D.C.

             References:

             -Long term damage of oil spills not known. Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
             January 4, 1985, p. C22.
             oOil Spill Intelligence Report, Vol. VIII, No. 1.
             oOil Spill Intelligence Report, Vol. VIII, No. 2.
             oOil spill cleanup costs top $100,000. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, December 27,
             1984, p. B12.
             oOil spill far bigger than first thought. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, December 26,
             1984, p. Dl.
             oVolunteers report success in saving oil-soaked birds. The Seattle Times,
             December 27,1984, p. Bl.
             oWhidbey oil spill caught Coast Guard off guard. The Seattle Times, January
             2, 1985, p. Al.



             Whidbey Island Spill                    2








                   Name of Spill: Witwater
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 12/13/68
                   Location of Spill: Galeta Island, Canal Zone, Panama
                   Latitude: 09 35 N
                   Longitude: 080 40 W
                   Oil Product: Diesel, Bunker C
                   Oil Type: Type 2, Type 4
                   Barrels: 14,000
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Mangroves, sea turtles, oysters, mussels, wading birds,
                   coastal diving birds, crustaceans, fish, molluscs.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: Yes
                   Other Special Interest: Habitat impact due to oil.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Exposed rocky shores, sand/gravel beaches,
                   mangroves, tidal mudflats, fire.
                   Keywords:

                   Incident Summary:

                   On December 13, 1968, the oil tanker Witwater broke up in heavy seas off the
                   Atlantic coast of Panama. The breakup of the vessel, and continued leaking
                   of the wreck spilled 14,000 barrels of Bunker C and diesel oil into the water 5
                   miles from Galeta Island. The oil eventually impacted Galeta Island.

                   Behavior of Oil:

                   Bunker C fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to
                   14. Marine diesel oil has an API gravity of 31.3, and a pour point of 23 degrees
                   C. Strong seasonal winds pushed the slick towards Galeta Island. Sand
                   beaches, rocky coasts and mangroves along the island were oiled. Oil
                   collected in a small bay on the island. An estimated 8,000 barrels of oil
                   remained in the bow section of the wreck and leaked at a rate of 50 barrels per
                   day.

                   Countermeasures and Mitigation:

                   The United States Coast Guard (USCG), the Smithsonian Tropical Research
                   Institute in Panama, and the Federal Water Pollution Control
                   Administration (FWPCA) responded to the oiling of Galeta Island. Several
                   thousand barrels were pumped from the waters surrounding the island, and
                   approximately 5,000 barrels were ignited and burned in the bay. By December
                   17, it was estimated that half of the spilled oil was cleaned up.










                                                                                       Witwater









            Other Special Interest Issues:

            Both red and black mangrove trees were severely oiled, and the majority of
            the red mangrove seedlings were killed. Oil damaged many of the mangrove
            inhabitants, including fiddler crabs, oysters, mussels, barnacles, sponges,
            tunicates, bryozoans, crustaceans, fishes, and molluscs. Oiled herons and
            cormorants were also found in the mangroves. Dead sea turtles were found
            on mangrove beaches.

            References:

            eRutzler, K. and Sterrer, W. Oil Pollution: Damage Observed on Tropical
            Communities along the Atlantic Seaboard of Panama. BioScience Vol. 20,
            No. 4. February 15, 1970. pp.222-224.









































            Witwater                              2








                   Name of Spill: World Glory
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 06/13/68
                   Location of Spill: 65 miles ENE of Durban, South Africa                                  40
                   Latitude: 29 38 S
                   Longitude: 032 15 E
                   Oil Product- Kuwait crude oil
                   Oil Type: Type 3
                   Barrels: 334,043
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Diving coastal birds, Nature Reserve, beaches, marinas.
                   Dispersants: Yes
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Adverse weather conditions, effects to tourism.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: None
                   Keywords: Adverse weather conditions, sinking.

                   Incident Summary:

                   At 1500 on June 13, 1968, the World Glory, bound for Huelva, Spain, broke                40
                   up approximately 65 miles ENE of Durban, South Africa. At the time of the
                   incident the weather consisted of southwesterly gale force winds, overcast
                   skies, heavy swells, and poor visibility. Only ten of the 34 crew members
                   survived the accident. The stern section of the vessel sank after about two
                   hours, while the bow section drifted southwest with the Agulhas Current.
                   The bow was presumed to sink at 30 06 S, 03154 E, approximately 40 miles                 is
                   from the initial breakup. All the ship's cargo, 334,043 barrels of Kuwait crude
                   oil, eventually spilled into the Indian Ocean.

                   The response was led by the Port Captain of Durban. Since the economy of
                   Natal, South Africa, depended on the upcoming winter tourist season, the                 0
                   primary response goal was to keep the oil from impacting the mainly
                   recreational shoreline. Dispersant operations were organized by personnel
                   from the Department of Fisheries and the Department of Industries. Other
                   parties involved in the response include the Department of Transportation,
                   South African Defense Force, the Durban Corporation, the Oceanographic
                   Research Institute, the Natal Anti-Shark Measures Board, and the Council for             0
                   Scientific and Industrial Research. Wildlife impacts were minimal. Duration
                   of response was approximately 20 days with an estimated cost of $420,000.

                   Behavior of Oil:
                   Kuwait Export crude oil has an API gravity of 31.4, and a pour point of 0                0
                   degrees F. On June 17, a 60-n-dle by 1-n-dle slick came within two miles of the
                   coast. Thin films of oil were also spotted immediately behind the breaker
                   zone. At this time, authorities predicted the slick would reach the St. Lucia
                   Game Reserve. By June 21, the oil was observed in varying amounts from
                   the Tugela River in the north to Port Shepstone in the south and out to 100              0
                   miles offshore. Approximately 150 miles of mostly recreational beaches were
                   threatened.


                                                                                       World Glory          0









            On June 23, the slick was observed four miles off Durban Bluff. The two
            halves of the ship were still leaking oil in their positions 47 and 65 miles
            from Durban. Although dispersants had effectively broken up the slick off
            Durban Bluff by June 24, a 10-mile by 6-mile slick off the Umhlali River was
            still posing a threat to the shoreline. Light films of oil were reported near the
            bluff separating Brighton Beach and the Durban Whaling Station on June 25.
            No confirmed reports of oil impacting the shore had been received.

            Countermeasures and Mitigation:
            Fly ash residue from burnt coal was applied in an attempt to soak up oil and
            settle it on the bottom.

            Aerial dispersant spraying operations began on June 16. Aerial surveys were
            performed before dispersant application to create grid surveys plotting the
            extent of the spill and inshore reconnaissance surveys to track the inner edge
            of the slick. These surveys identified the areas that were most severely
            threatened. Initially, non-toxic dispersants were applied between Tongaat and
            Scottburgh with three crop-spraying planes. Although the aircraft provided
            speed and flexibility, their usefulness was limited due to the large amount of
            dispersant that needed to be applied and high winds in the area. The aircraft
            were most useful in applying dispersants to oil behind the breaker zone
            where ships could not operate.

            Due to the growing threat of shoreline pollution, the South African Navy,
            the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, and the Oceanographic
            Research Institute provided four vessels for dispersant operations. After
            pumps, spraying equipment, and engines were quickly assembled, these
            vessels started applying dispersants on June 19. Several additional vessels
            were chartered as well. The larger vessels were fitted with 500-gallon farm
            tanks so they would not need to replenish supplies as often. At the height of
            operations, twelve ships were applying up to 20,000 gallons of non-ionic
            detergents per day. Dispersant operations were completed by July 2.

            Other Special Interest Issues:

            Southwesterly gale-force winds, overcast skies, 50-70 foot waves, and poor
            visibility most likely led to the breakup. Winds during the response were
            primarily moderate to strong south to southwesterly with intermittent calms.
            While the winds hampered some of the aircraft dispersing ability, favorable
            currents helped the vessel dispersing operations.











            World Glory






                                                                                                        0




                   References:


                   *1991 World Almanac
                   *8/9/91 & 8/28/91 Letters from Daniel Owen at ITOPF.
                   *Genwest Systems, Inc. communications with ITOPF representatives.
                   *Gilmore et al. 1970. Systems Study of Oil Spill Cleanup Proceedures. Vol.1:
                   Analysis of Oil Spills and Control Measures.
                   *Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987. Lloyds of London Press.
                   1987.
                   *Stander, G.H. 1968. Oil Pollution off the SA Coast - The "World Glory"
                   Disaster. The South African Shipping News and Fishing Industry Review:
                   November 1968. pp. 47-51.
                   *Tanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers. T.A.C.
                   Inc. 1991.
                   eWilson, et al. 1976. "The Spreading, Retention and Clean-up of Oil Spills."
                   University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI, 1976.



































                                                        3                           World Glory








                   Name of Spill: World Prodigy
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 06/23/89
                   Location of Spill: Newport, Rhode Island
                   Latitude: 4126 N
                   Longitude: 07122 W
                   Oil Product: No. 2 heating oil
                   Oil Type: Type 2
                   Barrels: 6,873
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Diving coastal birds, waterfowl, spawning beaches,
                   abundant mollusc beds, beaches, marinas, boat ramps.
                   Dispersant-'., No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Closure of commercial fishing areas, closure of
                   recreational fishing areas, closure of public lands, human health and safety
                   concerns, research conducted.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Exposed seawalls, piers, exposed rocky shores,
                   coarse sand beaches, coarse gravel beaches.
                   Keywords: Centers for Disease Control (CDC), Food and Drug Administration
                   (FDA), skimmer, vacuum truck, volunteers, boom.

                   Incident Summary:

                   At 1640 on June 23, 1989, the Greek Tank Ship World Prodigy ran hard
                   aground on Brenton Reef near the entrance to Narragansett Bay,
                   approximately four miles south of Newport, Rhode Island. The vessel was
                   loaded with 8.2 million gallons (over 195,000 barrels) of No. 2 home heating
                   oil. The grounding tore a 200-foot gash in the hull of the ship, ruptured 9 of
                   the 23 cargo tanks and released approximately 6,900 barrels of oil into the
                   waters of Rhode Island Sound. Immediately before the accident, the vessel
                   was observed operating out of the shipping channel, closer to the Brenton
                   Reef than it should have been. The accident occurred during daylight hours
                   with partly cloudy skies, calm seas, winds NW at 5-10 knots, and visibility 6-8
                   miles.

                   The response began immediately. Seven rescue ships and several USCG
                   vessels with boom arrived at the scene of the grounding within eleven
                   minutes. The USCG Atlantic Strike Team (AST) was activated within thirty
                   minutes. The pre-designated Federal On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) was the
                   Captain of the Port (COTP), Providence, Rhode Island. The OSC assumed
                   federal responsibility for the spill response within two hours, following the
                   determination that the incident was beyond the control of the ship's captain
                   and the owners, Ballard Shipping of Monrovia, Liberia. A $50,000 ceiling on
                   the pollution fund was established, which was later raised to $3.4 million.
                   The OSC immediately hired cleanup contractors and requested boom and
                   other cleanup equipment. The COTP Providence established a 500 yard safety
                   zone around the grounded vessel.




                                                                                       World Prodigy








            The vessel was surrounded with three layers of containment boom. The
            remaining cargo onboard was offloaded into barges beginning June 24. The
            area within the boom was cleaned with skimmers beginning on June 26. The
            booms remained in place until the vessel was cleared by the OSC to sail on
            July 2. The World Prodigy arrived at New York Harbor on July 3.

            Behavior of Oil:

            No. 2 heating oil has a minimum API gravity of 30, and a pour point between
            -6 and -27 degrees C. Approximately 6,900 barrels of No. 2 heating oil were
            released into Rhode Island Sound. No. 2 oil is a light refined petroleum oil
            that floats on the water surface and quickly evaporates. This rapid
            evaporation was critical to the minimal overall environmental impact. The
            oil did not emulsify and was recoverable with pumps. Favorable weather,                      Ift
            winds, calm seas, warm air and warm water temperatures were all factors in                   1W
            the success of the cleanup efforts. The rate of evaporation of the oil was
            maximized, while the warm weather provided good working conditions for
            personnel undertaking cleanup and salvage operations.
            The impacted areas of Narragansett Bay were predominantly high-energy                        40
            rocky headlands and coarse sand and gravel beaches. This resulted in little
            deep penetration of affected shorelines by concentrated oil. Impacted areas
            such as Mackerel Cove and Hull Cove were flushed during regular tidal cycles
            and subsequent storms, minimizing the environmental effects of the spill.
            Countermeasures and Mitigation:                                                              41

            By 2015 on June 23, roughly 3.5 hours after the incident, the vessel was
            encircled with two layers of protective boom; a third layer was in place within
            eight hours. The oil contained within the boom was removed using
            skimmers and vacuum equipment. Cleanup inside the boom began at 1600                         0
            on June 25 and was completed with on June 27.
            A dive survey was conducted at 1745 on June 23 to determine the extent of
            damage to the vessel. At this time, the TIS World Prodigy was settling
            rapidly and there was a possibility that the vessel could break up and sink.
            The dive surveys videotaped the damaged hull, which showed longitudinal                      0
            dents running 150 feet on both sides of the vessel, as well as a hole large
            enough for a diver to enter. By 1030 on June 24, the offloading operation was
            underway. The vessel was stabilized and the danger of sinking eliminated.
            The heaviest concentration of spilled oil was near the vessel. Sheen was                     0
            reported to the north as far as East Greenwich Bay. Four sensitive sites on
            Jamestown Island were given priority for cleanup, as well as Narragansett
            Beach, located on the western shore of the bay. Mackerel Cove was heavily
            impacted, with oil up to two inches thick on the water surface. Hull Cove
            was also severely impacted. Both sites were cleaned using containment and
            sorbent booms, sorbent pads, and vacuum trucks. Cleanup of both sites was                    0
            completed by June 27.



            World Prodigy                         2                                                       0








                   At both sites, oil penetrated into the sand and was heavily concentrated at the
                   water table. The NOAA Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC) recommended
                   no cleanup methods beyond the use of sorbents and vacuum trucks to
                   prevent accelerating erosion of the beach. The State of Rhode Island closed
                   the beach at Mackerel Cove until August 31 while the Rhode Island
                   Department of Emergency Management (RI DEM) attempted aeration of the
                   beach sediment. Beavertail Point and Fort Weatherhill were the other
                   priority sites on Jamestown Island. Both were significantly affected, and were
                   cleaned with sorbents and vacuum trucks. Cleanup at both locations was
                   completed by June 28.

                   Moonstone Beach/Charlestown Breachway in Charlestown, Rhode Island,
                   was the location of a nest of eight Piping Plovers, an endangered species.
                   Precautionary booming with over 3,000 feet of sorbent boom kept the beach
                   from being contaminated, though oil did come within 100 yards of the beach.

                   Offloading of the remaining cargo began on June 24 at 0220 and was
                   completed by the early afternoon of June 28.

                   Other Special Interest:

                   During the spill, the oil could be smelled all along the coastline. There were
                   reports of local residents suffering from nausea and headaches from inhaling
                   vapors. Officials saw the need for a system for public service human health
                   advisories from the Centers for Disease Control during future spills.

                   Shellfish beds were immediately closed in the Narragansett Bay area by the
                   State of Rhode Island. Ninety percent of the state's shellfish beds were
                   reopened by June 29, following organoleptic and gas chromatograph analysis
                   by the U. S. Food and Drug Administration laboratories in Davisville, Rhode
                   Island and Winchester, Massachusetts.

                   Scientific and technical support was augmented by forces already in place in
                   the Narragansett Bay area. The University of Rhode Island's Narragansett
                   Bay campus houses the Graduate School of Oceanography, the EPA's
                   Narragansett Laboratory, and the NOAA National Marine Fisheries Service
                   Laboratory.

                   Five hundred drums of Corexit 9527 dispersant and an air delivery system
                   were assembled and ready by 0220 on June 24. Dispersants were not used
                   because of the sensitivity of many spawning species to dispersed oil in the
                   water column. Environmental conditions at the time were ideal for allowing
                   rapid evaporation of oil from the sea surface without the use of chemical
                   dispersants.

                   Volunteers, National Guardsmen, and inmates from the State Adult
                   Correctional Institute were utilized during the spill response. While the
                   National Guardsmen did play an important role in traffic control and
                   logistical support, the use of untrained workers was problematic. Early in the
                   spill there were reports of volunteers deploying and collecting sorbent


                                                           3                          World Prodigy








             material and moving booms. These actions were performed without USCG
             supervision, and frequently without any prior training, experience or most
             importantly, protective clothing. While the willingness and concern of the
             volunteers was appreciated, the use of untrained and ill-equipped volunteers
             should not be permitted at future spills.

             References:

             *Golob's 1978-1989 U.S. Spill Report
             *Golob's Oil Spill Bulletin v. II nos. 1,2,7,26; v. III no. 7
             ojaworski, C. 1989. Close Call! The Narragansett Bay Oil Spill. Nor'easter. Fall
             1989. pp. 16-21.
             oNOAA Response Report
             oOil Spill Intelligence Report. v. 12, nos. 27-29,32,34-36; v. 13 no. 51 1989
             Summary
             oTanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers. T.A.C.
             Inc. 1991.
             oUSCG On-Scene Coordinator's Report TIS World Prodigy
































             World Prodigy                        4








                  Name of Spill: YUM H/Zapoteca
                  Date of Spill (mmddyy): 10/10/87
                  Location of Spill: Campeche, Gulf of Mexico
                  Latitude: 18 48 N
                  Longitude: 092 35 W
                  Oil Product: Light crude oil
                  Oil Type: Type 2
                  Barrels: 58,640
                  Source of Spill: Platform
                  Resources at Risk: Commercial fisheries, unforested upland, shrimp.
                  Dispersants: No
                  Bioremediation: No
                  In-situ Burning: Yes
                  Other Special Interest: Closure of commercial fisl-dng areas, interaction with
                  foreign or Native authorities.
                  Shoreline Types Impacted: Brackish marshes.
                  Keywords: Boom, fire, skimmers, bulldozers, blowout preventer, blowout.

                  Incident Summary:

                  On October 10, 1987, the YUM II, a Mexican exploratory oil well located
                  approximately 20 miles northwest of Ciudad del Carmen in the Bay of
                  Campeche under the Zapoteca rig, experienced a blowout and fire.
                  Apparently, a blowout preventer (BOP) valve malfunction caused the initial
                  blowout. Although the BOP had successfully shut the annulus between the
                  drill pipe and well casing, the blind rams failed to shear through the drill pipe
                  that was still in the well casing. Therefore, oil and gas flowed out of the well,
                  up the drill pipe, and onto the platform where it ignited. The oil discharge
                  increased after the escaping gas and oil forced the drill pipe out of the well.
                  The initial fire was extinguished by October 17. As of October 28, the well was
                  still spewing out a yellow gas/crude mix 60-100 feet in the air. The owners of
                  the well, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), and the Mexican Navy participated in
                  cleanup operations. The well was finally "killed" on November 30.

                  Even though the incident site was 600 miles from Texas, the slick could have
                  traveled in a northerly direction to reach United States waters depending on
                  the duration of the spill. Accordingly, the USCG Marine Safety Office (MSO)
                  at Corpus Christi, Texas, was notified of the incident on October 13.
                  Verification and correct information were not received until October 16.
                  Even though USCG assistance was refused, the USCG conducted overflights
                  of the area every other day until the well was capped to track the spill
                  response and the movement of the oil. Reports of cleanup activities from the
                  Mexican authorities were infrequent and largely erroneous. Daily reports
                  from the Mexican Embassy to USCG Headquarters in Washington, D.C. were
                  not available when promised.







                                                                                 YUM H/Zapoteca










             Behavior of Oil:

             The rate of oil discharged was believed to be approximately 30,000 barrels per
             day based on other production rates in the area. Much of this oil probably
             burned off.

             On October 16, patches of crude oil extended out from the well site 7 miles,
             while rainbow sheen continued out to 14 miles. A USCG October 18
             overflight observed a rainbow sheen 250 yards wide extending westerly from
             the spill site for 55 miles. As of October 22, oil had been spotted 115 miles
             west of the well and 45 miles north of the furthest western advance. No
             impact had been observed on the Mexican Coast at this time.
             On October 24, streaks of orange-brown mousse extended west from the well
             for 8-10 nautical miles. A second slick of the same description was observed                     Z
             approximately 95 nautical miles west of the well. Orange-red bands of heavy
             sheen were observed drifting west out to 25 nautical miles on October 26. A
             dark colored oil slick extending on the surface 3 miles downwind from the rig
             was observed as of October 28. Oil was observed impacting approximately 20
             miles of Mexican shoreline southwest of the rig. The most heavily impacted
             beaches were Tabasco and Campeche. Much of this coastline area contained
             small islands used for cattle grazing.
             On November 1, the slick extended approximately 90 miles to the west of the
             well. Strong northeast winds moved the oil slick slightly to the southwest
             near November 7. Some oil patches were blown 15 kilometers up the San
             Pedro River. Fishermen on Nuevo Campechito beach reported a slick 10
             kilometers long and 13 centimeters deep. No more oil was spilled into the
             water after the capping on November 6. As a result, no oil was observed
             beyond 16 miles of the well on a November 8 overflight.
             Mexican officials reported 75 miles of impacted shorelines. The final USCG                       0
             overflight on December 10 noted light sheen 200 feet wide and scattered
             patches of oil approximately 9 and 10 miles southwest of the well.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:
             Although approximately 300-400 feet of boom was deployed at the scene on                         0
             October 17, the booming was ineffective because cleanup vessels were
             dragging the boom through the slick to break it up rather than using the
             boom to contain the oil.
             From October 18-24, the Mexican authorities conducted a controlled burn-off                      0
             operation. During tl-ds burning, 90 percent of the escaping oil probably
             burned off while 10 percent entered the water. Three firefighting vessels
             cooled the rig while the oil was allowed to burn. The fire was re-ignited
             when the engineers did not need to be near the well head in an attempt to
             keep water pollution to a minimum.                                                               0



             YUM 11/Zapoteca                        2                                                       0








                  According to Mexican authorities, most of the oil on the ocean was a gas
                  condensate and was successfully skimmed with two skimmers, one
0                 manufactured by Vikoma and the other by Frank Mohn.

                  PEMEX used bulldozers to clean oiled beaches. This method was questionable
                  since much of the affected coastline consisted of brackish marshes.

                  Other Special Interest Issues:
0
                  The USCG extended an offer of assistance to the Mexican Navy in accordance
                  with the existing bilateral agreement, even though the oil was not projected
                  to impact U.S. waters or land. The Mexican Navy chose not to accept this
                  offer. Communications between the USCG and the Mexican Embassy were
                  not forthcoming. Overflights conducted by the USCG were the primary
                  source of correct information of the progress of the spill response.

                  The Mexican Navy ordered fishing cooperatives in Frontera and Barra de San
                  Pedro to keep approximately 300 fishing boats tied up for 25 days. The
                  cooperatives sued PEMEX for 600 million pesos to compensate for lost
                  income.

                  References:


                  *IFP Platform Databank
                  *U.S. Coast Guard POLREP file.














40






0











                                                        3                       YUM 11/Zapoteca








                   Name of Spill: Z-102
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 12/09/75
                   Location of Spill: Ensenada de Boca Vieja, San Juan, Puerto Rico
                   Latitude: 18 28 N
                   Longitude: 066 08 W
                   Oil Product: Bunker C, Diesel Fuel
                   Oil Type: Type 4, Type 2
                   Barrels: 7,679
                   Source of Spill: Tank Barge
                   Resources at Risk: Recreational beaches, industrial water intakes.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Adverse weather conditions, complex salvage
                   operations, interaction with foreign or Native authorities, logistical or
                   operational problems.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Sand/gravel beaches
                   Keywords: Gulf Strike Team (GST), U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage
                   (NAVSUPSALV), vacuum truck, manual removal, weir sump, lightering.
                                                                                                             0
                   Incident Summary:

                   On December 9, 1975, the tank barge Z-1 02 grounded at the mouth of the
                   Ensenada de Boca Vieja, northwest of the entrance to San Juan Harbor. The
                   unmanned barge was loaded with 10,476 barrels of Bunker C and 2,403 barrels
                   of diesel fuel oil when its tow line broke. Attempts to free the vessel from the          0
                   surf line failed. Heavy surf pounded the vessel for over a week, eventually
                   damaging all ten of the cargo tanks. An estimated 7,679 barrels of Bunker C
                   and diesel fuel were released during the next 30 days. The barge was
                   eventually lightered and beached.
                   Oil released from the barge affected the beaches within the Ensenada de Boca              0
                   Vieja. Beaches at Punta Salinas and Levittown were the most heavily oiled.
                   The release of oil and subsequent cleanup operations occurred over a
                   prolonged period, from December 9 to February 5, 1976. Beach restoration in
                   the form of sand replacement continued until April 2, 1976.                               0
                   Agencies involved in the response included the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG),
                   Gulf Strike Team (GST), U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage (NAVSUPSALV),
                   U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
                   (EPA), Commonwealth Department of Natural Resources (CDNR), Puerto
                   Rico Environmental Quality Board, and a host of commercial companies.

                   Responsibility for the spill and cleanup was initially accepted by McAllister
                   Towing. On December 15, McAllister announced that it would no longer
                   undertake or fund any further cleanup. The Coast Guard then requested and
                   received funding under the Federal Pollution Control Fund.





                                                                                              Z-102










            Behavior of Oil:

            Bunker C fuel oil is a heavy product with an API gravity that ranges from 7 to
            14. Marine diesel has an API of 31.3 and a pour point of 23 degrees C. During
            the initial days of the spill, strong currents resulted from the discharge of the
            Bayamon River. The oil released from the Z-102 moved to the southwest
            until encountering the river discharge. The oil was then carried out to sea,
            beyond the mouth of the bay. Some quantities of the released oil that escaped
            the bay dispersed into the Atlantic. Slicks of oil were observed along the
            outer coast from Isla Verde to Dorado Beach. These offshore slicks were of
            constant concern because of the threat to prime tourist beaches. Favorable
            weather prevented any significant shoreline impacts outside the bay.

            As the spill progressed, the river influence diminished. Without the strong
            river currents, the released oil remained on a southwest course, re-entered
            the bay, and oiled the shoreline. Shorelines between the Bayamon river and
            Punta Salinas were affected the most during minimal river current
            conditions.

            On a December 9 overflight, USCG personnel spotted oil escaping from the
            barge and spreading six to seven miles to the west in a one-half mile wide
            streak. On December 12, approximately 300 barrels was observed in the surf
            line at the mouth of the bay. The barge appeared stable and was emitting a
            silvery oil sheen. On December 16, a release of 1,500 barrels of product was
            reported. The rate of release was estimated at 200 barrels per hour. Tarballs
            and tarmats came ashore along the Condado Beach area. Oil began spreading
            toward the Levittown area beaches on December 17, while streaks of Bunker C
            threatened the beaches west of Punta Salinas.

            The first salvage efforts were conducted on December 30. Salvage attempts
            resulted in the release of an additional 200 barrels of product. The oil released
            from the barge collected along the Levittown Beaches. The refloating of the
            barge on January 7 resulted in another release of oil estimated at 100 barrels.
            January 8 overflight observers reported only light streaks of oil escaping from
            the barge and a barely discernible sheen west of Punta Salinas.

            Following the salvage of the barge and the lightering operations, the Z-102
            was anchored and grounded. A boom was deployed around the vessel to
            contain any further leakage and none was observed.

            Countermeasures and Mitigation:

            The response to the Z-102 grounding involved two elements. The first
            priority was the cleanup while the second involved the prevention of any
            additional pollution from the salvage operations. Cleanup of the beaches at
            Punta Salinas was initiated on December 10. Manual removal was the main
            form of cleanup of oiled beaches. Vacuum trucks and hand held equipment
            was used to remove oil and debris. Absorbent materials were not used due to
            the quantity and high viscosity of the oil. The warm temperatures in Puerto
            Rico enabled the use of vacuum trucks throughout the cleanup operation.



            Z-1 02                                2









                    Where the beach was narrow, small wier sumps (3-5 feet in diameter), were
                    dug in the ground along the shoreline areas of Punta Salinas. The sumps
                    were used as collection points for the floating oil. Larger sumps, up to 30 feet           41
                    in diameter, were bulldozed along the wider stretches of beach. A trench was
                    cut between the sumps and the bay. As the oil was pushed along the
                    shoreline by the current, tides and wind, the slicks were trapped in the sumps
                    for collection.

                    Oil also collected along storm sewer outfalls and jetties. Vacuum trucks and               41
                    cleanup crews were moved along the shoreline from collection point to
                    collection point to recover the oil. Front loaders aided the removal of oil that
                    was deposited within the sediments along the high water line. A total of
                    3,212 barrels of water-contaminated product was recovered during the
                    cleanup operation.                                                                         4
                    Nighttime cleanup of the beaches was attempted, but was ineffective. At
                    night, cleanup crews were unable to move along the shore with the oil as it
                    drifted. The work area was limited due to artificial lighting and workers had
                    difficulty identifying oil from water in the dark. Working under the artificial
                    lights also caused hazardous conditions among the submerged rocks and                      op
                    debris. The nighttime recovery rate of oil was less than 25 percent of the
                    daytime rate.

                    Cleaning of the oiled sand was attempted by dumping the sand into the surf
                    zone. This technique was a failure since the active surf required for the
                    cleaning action also dispersed the oil. Recovery of the dispersed oil proved to
                    be impossible. A repeated attempt to clean beach sands with this technique is
                    not recommended.

                    Nearly 3,400 cubic yards of beach sediment was removed from the beaches
                    during the cleanup operation. Sand removal from the Levittown beaches
                    was substantial enough to require replacement. Personnel from the USCG,
                    EPA, and the Commonwealth Department of Natural Resources (CDNR)
                    agreed that sand replacement was necessary to prevent further erosion.
                    Permits were secured for the excavation of sand from the Bayamon River
                    sand bar. Local sand was used since replacement sand was not available
                    elsewhere in Puerto Rico at a reasonable cost. Cleanup efforts were concluded
                    with the end of sand replacement operations on April 2, 1976. A total of 3,249
                    cubic yards of sand was replaced.
                    Other Special Interest Issues:

                    Adverse weather hampered the salvage operations throughout the first week
                    of the incident. The moderation of sea conditions on December 17, finally
                    permitted the boarding and inspection of the vessel. The proposed salvage
                    plan was to bring the Z-102 into calmer waters inside the bay. The proposal to
                    move the vessel was weighed against the possible loss of cargo caused by
                    refloating the barge. The pollution threat from a salvage attempt was
                    determined to be less than the total cargo loss that would likely result if no
                    salvage operation was attempted. The initial attempt to shift the barge was

                                                             3                                   Z-1 02










            made on December 30. The vessel was to be beached near the Palo Seco Power
            Plant, where the remaining cargo would be pumped to the plant for disposal.

            By January 1, 1976, the barge had shifted 600 feet toward shore. This was
            accomplished by creating a head of air within the compartments of the Z-102
            and winching the vessel toward shore with beaching gear. The new position
            of the vessel inside the surf line and fair weather made lightering the
            remaining cargo possible. Plans were made to establish a better water seal on
            the vessel since oil continued to leak at a rate of two barrels per hour.
            A U.S. Navy landing craft was used to tow a lightering barge to the scene of
            the Z-102. After lightering 1,500 barrels of product from the Z-102, the
            lightering barge was beached at the Palo Seco Power Plant. The lightered
            product was pumped to the power plant for disposal. By January 6, a total of
            three lightering operations had removed 4,100 barrels of cargo from the Z-102.
            The Z-102 was re-floated and moored. The barge was eventually moved to a
            more permanent location in the lee of Isla de Cabras.
            The CDNR provided valuable information concerning beach conditions
            within Ensenada de Boca Vieja. The CDNR also operated as liaison to other
            Commonwealth agencies.

            References:

            *USCG Federal On-Scene Coordinator's Report.






























            Z-1 02








                   Name of Spill: Zoe Colocotronis
                   Date of Spill (mmddyy): 03/18/73
                   Location of Spill: Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico
                   Latitude: 18 00 N
                   Longitude: 067 15 W
                   Oil Product: Venezuelan crude oil
                   Oil Type: Type 3
                   Barrels: 37,579
                   Source of Spill: Tank Vessel
                   Resources at Risk: Mangroves, eelgrass beds, conchs, shrimp, beaches.
                   Dispersants: No
                   Bioremediation: No
                   In-situ Burning: No
                   Other Special Interest: Research conducted, logistical or operational problems,
                   wildlife impacts.
                   Shoreline Types Impacted: Vertical rocky shores, sand beaches, Mangroves,
                   exposed rocky shores.
                   Keywords: Weir/pump skimmer, contingency plan, remote response, boom,
                   sorbents, skimmer, vacuum truck.

                   Incident Summary:

                   At 0255 on March 18, 1973, the Zoe Colocotronis en route to Guayarilla,
                   Puerto Rico ran aground on a reef 3.5 miles off the La Parguera tourist area on
                   the southwest coast of Puerto Rico. The master ordered water and cargo from
                   the forward tank jettisoned to help get the vessel off the reef, so 37,579 barrels
                   of crude oil were intentionally released. The master later stated that the gyro
                   compass, radar and depth sounder were not working properly. No distress or
                   notification calls were made, and the master initially insisted that no oil had
                   been released. Winds were 18-19 knots, and seas were 1-1.5 feet.

                   Oil started coming ashore on the beaches of Cabo Rojo, on the Bahia Sucia
                   side, by the evening of the grounding. Efforts to minimize beach impacts
                   began on March 19. These efforts involved booming, digging sumps, and
                   pumping the collected oil into tank trucks. On March 21, a substantial
                   number of sea cucumbers, conchs, prawns, sea urchins, and polychaete
                   annelids washed ashore. Organisms were dying in the Thalassia beds off-
                   shore as well.

                   On March 23, the On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) activated the USCG Atlantic
                   Strike Team (AST). Wind shifts had caused more shoreline oiling, and an
                   increase in pumping capability was needed.

                   After receiving training from the AST, Underwater Technics personnel
                   manually cleaned beaches until April 26, when it was decided to leave the
                   beaches alone since new sand was accumulating rapidly. An estimated 24,000
                   barrels impacted the shores of Cabo Rojo. The final site inspection was on
                   September 24.





                                                                                 Zoe Colocotronis










             Behavior of Oil:

             A large, tl-dck black oil slick measuring 0.10 mile wide by 4 miles long was
             observed from a helicopter shortly after the grounding. The slick was drifting
             westward from the vessel towards Cabo Rojo. That evening, thick black oil
             had visibly impacted the shoreline of Bahia Sucia. Much of the slick moved
             past Cabo Rojo to the south and entered Mona Passage, posing no immediate
             shoreline threat.

             On March 19, a 0.5-mile by 2.5-mile slick was located moving west one mile
             south of Cabo Rojo. The shore of Cabo Rojo (on the Bahia Sucia side) was
             impacted by three separate pools of black oil 6-8 inches thick. These areas were
             designated A, B, and C with A, being the northern, B the middle, and C the
             southern area. A portion of the slick moved west around Cabo Rojo broke off
             and appeared to be heading towards Punta Aquila. This oil moved parallel to
             the beach, then traveled NE and eventually offshore.

             On March 23, plans were made to recover the oil still in the mangroves of
             areas A and B. However, before these plans could be executed, an unexpected
             wind shift drove patches of oil out of the mangroves in area B into the bay 50
             yards offshore of area C. On March 25, oil moved back into areas A and B
             driven by NNE winds at four to six knots. Oil was now stranded on three
             miles of shoreline, much of it inaccessible. A large amount of oiled trash and
             debris continued to wash up along sections of area C.

             Countermeasures and Mitigation:

             Boom was deployed to protect the beaches of Punta Aquila. Fifty bags of
             absorbent were also spread on these beaches to prevent the oil from mixing
             with the sand. The oil actually moved by without touching the beach,
             although the boom showed some oiling. A special configuration of two
             sections of boom, floats and crossed metal poles placed 200 feet apart was very
             effective in containing and preventing the oil from moving north up the
             coast of area C. Absorbents were not used in area C because the oil there was
             thick, but pumpable.

             A weir sump with a shallow entrance channel was dug in area C to collect oil.
             This design allowed much oil and little water to collect so a skimmer could
             pump oil directly to a tank truck. Additional sumps were dug on the
             southern part of area C where roads provided access to the beach. Large
             holding tanks next to the sumps were constructed to hold the oil until an
             adequate number of tank trucks were available. With help from the AST,
             pumping operations became more extensive. By March 24, 604,000 gallons of
             nearly pure oil had been removed from area C using sumps, skimmers, and
             vacuum trucks.

             Two ACME skimmers and several vacuum trucks transported the recovered
             oil to CORCO. Clean Water, Inc. provided three double diaphragm pumps.





             Zoe Colocotronis                        2










                    The concrete walls of the salt works intake channel were scoured of all oil
                    traces using a portable sandblaster. Steam cleaning was not used because
                    there was no accessible source of fresh water.                                             41
                    Other Special Interest Issues:

                    Approximately 2.5 acres of mangroveforest died due to. oiling. Repopulation
                    of other affected species in the area appeared to be taking place. As of January
                    1976, sediment analyses indicated that significant levels of petroleum
                    hydrocarbon residues were still present.

                    Communications difficulties created many problems for the responders.
                    Difficulty in contacting people on a Sunday afternoon slowed initial response
                    efforts. The nearest telephone was 30 miles from the spill site.

                    Access roads to the impacted beaches were also a problem. Fiberglass beach
                    mats were obtained from the Navy to improve access to the northern section
                    of area C.

                    CORCO, Mobil (which had the vessel under charter), and the ships' owner all
                    declined to accept financial responsibility for the spill cleanup. Finally, on
                    March 21, the vessel's insurance underwriters assumed all cleanup costs.

                    Neither CORCO nor Mobil had any pollution control equipment or cleanup
                    personnel in Puerto Rico, so the USCG made the clean-up arrangements. The
                    Region H Contingency Plan was grossly out of date. Some of the listed
                    response team members had retired three years prior to this incident. Also,
                    local contingency plans did not include sources of heavy equipment and tank
                    trucks.

                    References:

                    eNadeau, R.J. and E.T. Bergquist, 1977. Effects of the March 18, 1973 oil spill
                    near Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico on tropical marine communities, Oil Spill
                    Conference Proceedings, 1977, pp. 535-538.
                    oTanker Advisory Center, Inc. 1991 Guide for the Selection of Tankers. T.A.C.
                    Inc. 1991.
                    *The SocioEconomic Impacts of Oil Spills, Final Report, WAPORA, March
                    1984.
                    9USCG On-Scene Coordinator's Report














                                                             3                         Zoe Colocotronis






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