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              Natural Disaster Survey Report
              Hurricane Hugo
              September 10=22, 1989

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              U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
              National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
              National Weather Service, Silver Spring, Maryland
       QC
       945                      US Department of commerce
       N38                      NOAA Coastal Services Center Library
       1990                     2234 South Hobson Avenue
                                Charleston, SC 29405-2413             A


















































                Left: Enhanced infrared satellite imagery of Hurricane Hugo moving through the U.S.
                Virgin Islands, 2AM AST September 18.

                Right: Visible spectra satellite imagery of Hurricane Hugo approaching South
                Carolina, 330PM EDT September 21.










                        
                       






                        


                    Natural Disaster Survey Report
                    Hurricane Hugo
                    September 10 22, 1989


                    May 1990




















                    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
                    Robert A. Mosbacher, Secretary
                    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
                    Dr. John A. Knauss, Administrator

                    National Weather Service
                    Dr. Elbert W. Friday, Jr., Assistant Administrator
 




























                                    "Mr. President, I have mentioned a number of organizations that have
                                    responded with great skill and dedication to this crisis. Certainly, the
                                    U.S. National Weather Service must be near the top of anyone's list.
                                    They have performed magnificently before, during and after Hugo. It
                                    was the Weather Service's accurate and timely forecasts that saved so
                                    many lives and allowed us to avoid even worse destruction. My hat _,s
                                    off to this superb outfit. It consistently does the Government proud."



                             Excerpt from a speech by Senator Ernest F. Hollings of South Carolina on the
                             Senate floor -- October 2, 1989.



















                                           Tis i)epartment of coymerco
                                           NO-NA Coastal services Center Library
                                           2234 south Hobson Avenue
                                           Charleston# SC 29405-2413


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                                                         PREFACE



           Hurricane Hugo, one of the most powerful storms of the century, proved to be a double catastrophe
           for the United States. Its course through the Caribbean and the Carolinas caused untold suffering and
           the largest economic loss that this country has ever experienced from a hurricane. Our thoughts and
           prayers reach out to those courageous individuals who suffered Hugo's fury and are now struggling to
           rebuild their lives. Furthermore, I congratulate all of those in NOAA and the National Weather Service
           who, in many instances, disregarded personal concerns to ensure that the warnings and the response
           to the storm were of the highest order. Their dedication and professionalism shall ever inspire us.




                                                                      Dr. Elbert W. Friday, Jr.



                                                                      May 1990












                                                                 FOREWORD



                   This report on Hurricane Hugo was prepared by the disaster survey team after a week of interviews
                   and visits to damaged areas with commonwealth, state, local and Federal officials in the U.S. Virgin
                   Islands, Puerto Rico, Florida, South and North Carolina and the citizens who survived the storm's
                   devastation.


                   The team is grateful to the many state and local officials and representatives of private relief agencies
                   who took time from urgent duties in helping the injured and the homeless, as well as coping with
                   Hugo's havoc, to share their impressions of events before and during the storm's onslaught. We
                   appreciate the understanding and courtesy of the many citizens who consented to interviews while still
                   trying to comprehend and deal with the appalling national disaster that struck their communities. The
                   team was impressed by their courage, candor and graciousness under conditions of intense stress.

                   Where the team believed it would serve to clarify the report, we have attributed a specific action or
                   comment to an identified person. We recognize that many individual acts of professional skill and
                   judgment and, indeed, heroism are not recorded in this report. While this document is not intended
                   to chronicle the entire history of the storm and its aftermath, it attempts to assess accurately the
                   National Weather Service performance to determine whether improvements are possible in forecasting
                   and preparing for severe storms.

                   In carrying out our assignment, we acknowledge -- with gratitude and admiration -- the many
                   individuals who can be justly proud of what they accomplished in concert with others. We salute all
                   whose participation made the response to Hurricane Hugo such a success.



                                                                                The Disaster Survey Team



























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                    Alexander Hamilton Airport, St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands. Hugo's eye made landfall to the west of this area along the southwest
                    coast. Over portions of the island, wind gusts were estimated near 160 mph. Photo courtesy of Jose Meitin.













                                                     TABLE OF CONTENTS



                Preface   ..............................................................                         iii


                Foreword     ............................................................                        iv


                Acronyms     ............................................................                        vii

                The Disaster Survey Team     ................................................                    ix

                Executive Summary     .....................................................                      xi

                Chapter I - Hurricane Hugo: The Event and Its Impact     ............................            1

                Chapter II - Summary of Preparedness Actions, Information
                and Warning Services    ....................................................                     9

                Chapter III - Data Collection and Communications    ................................             20

                Chapter IV - An Evaluation of the Processing, Interpretation
                and Dissemination of NWS Information      .......................................                27


                Chapter V - Public Response and User Benefits    ..................................              53

                Chapter VI - Findings and Recommendations by Chapter       ...........................           58

                Appendix A - Summary of Recorded and Estimated Wind Speeds
                in Hurricane Hugo    .....................................................                    A-1

                Appendix B - Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale   ...................................             B-1

                Appendix C - Fujita Tornado Intensity Scale   ...................................             C-1

                Appendix D - SLOSH Modeling       ............................................                D-1

                Appendix E - Direction of Damaging (All) Winds    ................................            E-1

















                                                                Vi












                                          ACRONYMS



         ABT             Auxiliary Backup Terminal
         ADM             Alphanumeric Display Module
         AFOS            Automation of Field Operations and Services
         ALERT           Automated Local Evaluation in Real Time
         AP              Associated Press
         ART             Automatic Radiotheodolite
         ASL             Above Mean Sea Level
         ASOS            Automatic Surface Observing System
         AWIPS           Advanced Weather Information Processing System
         CD              Civil Defense
         CLIPER          Climatological/Persistence Model
         DLM             Deep Layer Mean
         DoD             Department of Defense
         EBS             Emergency Broadcast System
         EOC             Emergency Operations Center
         EPA             Environmental Protection Agency
         EPD             Emergency Preparedness Division
         ETV             Educational Television
         FAA             Federal Aviation Administration
         FEMA            Federal Emergency Management Agency
         GDM             Graphics Display Module
         GOES            Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite
         HLS             Hurricane Local Statement
         IFLOWS          Integrated Flood Observing and Warning System
         MB              Millibar
         MEOW            Maximum Envelopes of Water
         MIC             Meteorologist in Charge
         MLW             Mean Low Water
         MMT             McEntire Air National Guard Base
         NAWAS           National Warning System
         NESDIS          National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Service
         NEXRAD          Next Generation Weather Radar
         NGVD            National Geodetic Vertical Datum
         NHC             National Hurricane Center
         NMC             National Meteorological Center
         NOAA            National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
         NSSFC           National Severe Storms Forecast Center
         NWR             NOAA Weather Radio
         NWS             National Weather Service
         NWWS            NOAA Weather Wire Service
         OIC             Official in Charge
         PNS             Public Information Statement
         PPI             Plan Position Indicator
         QLM             Quasi-Lagrangian Model
         QPF             Quantitative Precipitation Forecast
         RFC             River Forecast Center
         SAB             Synoptic Analysis Branch
         SLOSH           Sea, Lake and Overland Surges from Hurricanes
         SPE             Satellite Precipitation Estimate




                                            vii











           SSC             Shaw Air Force Base
           SWIS            Satellite Weather Information System
           UPI             United Press International
           VAS             VISSR Atmospheric Sounder
           VDUC            VAS Data Utilization Center
           VISSR           Visual and Infrared Spin Scan Radiometer
           VITEMA          Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Management Agency
           WPM             Warning Preparedness Meteorologist
           WSFO            Weather Service Forecast Office
           WSO             Weather Service Office
           WSR             Weather Surveillance Radar





















































                                           viff












                                              THE DISASTER SURVEY TEAM



             After a severe weather event, such as a hurricane, a disaster survey team is assigned by the National
             Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to evaluate the role played by the National Weather
             Service (NWS), provide an objective appraisal and make findings and recommendations. The Hurricane
             Hugo team was divided between the Caribbean and the Carolinas.



                                                       Team Members



             Leader, James W. Brennan, Assistant Administrator for Fisheries, NOAA; currently Deputy General
             Counsel, NOAA

             Coordinator, Linda Kremkau, Program Assistant, Warning and Forecast Branch, NWS


             Puerto Rico/U.S. Virgin Islands:

                    R. Augustus Edwards III, Special Assistant to the Deputy
                       Administrator, NOAA
                    Edward M. Gross, Chief, Constituent Affairs Office, NWS
                    Jose G. Meitin, Jr., Meteorologist, Environmental Research
                       Laboratories, NOAA
                    Donald R. Wernly, Chief, Warning and Forecast Branch, NWS

             The Carolinas:


                    Mr. Brennan
                    Gary Ellrod, Meteorologist, Satellite Applications
                       Laboratory, NESDIS
                    Dr. Lee W. Larson, Central Regional Hydrologist, NWS
                    Robert E. Muller, Senior Meteorologist, Transition Program
                       Office, NWS
                    Roy S. Popkin, Consultant
                    Mitchell A. Rosenfeld, Consultant
                    Dr. Wilson A. Shaffer, Chief, Marine Techniques Branch, NWS

















                                                              ix











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                   Romain Retreat, Southeast Corner of Bulls Bay, South Carolina. This area received the strongest part of the storm and suffered
                   estimated maximum winds of 135 mph and a storm surge of 20 feet. There were 43 homes in this development.
                   Photo courtesy of NHC.












                                                  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



            The Storm

            NOAA pronounced 1989's Hurricane Hugo as the strongest storm to strike the United States in 20
            years. The NWS, through its National Hurricane Center (NHC), reported that Hugo smashed into the
            Charleston, South Carolina, area minutes before midnight, September 22, with winds estimated at 135
            MPH in Bulls Bay north of the city. Four days earlier, the storm crossed the U.S. Virgin Islands and
            Puerto Rico with equal force. See Appendix A for a summary of Hugo's recorded and estimated
            surface wind speeds.

            During the hurricane's approach to the Leeward Islands, a NOAA research aircraft east of Guadeloupe
            measured winds of 160 MPH and a central pressure of 27.1 inches or 918 millibars (mb). This
            qualified Hugo as a Category 5 storm -- the highest -- on the Saffir-Simpson Scale (see Appendix B).
            The storm was rated as Category 4 when it pounded the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and South
            Carolina. Although rainfall was moderate in the Caribbean and on the U.S. mainland, Hugo produced
            record storm tides of up to 20 feet in South Carolina.

            The hurricane was the Nation's costliest in terms of monetary losses but not in lives lost. Forty-nine
            directly-related storm fatalities were recorded, 26 in the U.S and its Caribbean islands. Twenty-three
            died in other Leeward Islands. NHC estimated more than $9 billion in damages and economic losses
            on the mainland, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The mainland alone accounted for $7 billion of
            the total.



            Services and Benefits


            Hugo's dangerous winds and storm surges had the potential of exacting a heavy death toll in the
            Carolinas and the Caribbean. Some 216,000 people evacuated from the coasts before the storm struck.
            The key to these evacuations, which undoubtedly saved hundreds of lives, was communications -- long
            before Hugo, in the days immediately before the storm and during the event.

            Cooperation and coordination among NWS, state, county and local officials developed over the years
            provided the basis for the response to the hurricane. Working together, NWS and local officials
            conducted broad-based weather awareness programs highlighting hurricane preparedness.
            NOAA-produced print and electronic materials were used extensively.

            Local relationships should continue to be encouraged. Programs on emergency preparedness and other
            educational activities should be expanded. Under conditions of budget constraints, NOAA and NWS
            should continue to emphasize public information programs as a very effective way to save lives. Their
            contributions in saving lives and protecting property are worthy of dollar and moral support.

            Survey team members found that local officials from state to local governments relied primarily on
            local NWS personnel in making important decisions. Two striking examples are: the South Carolina
            Governor's decision to call for an early, voluntary evacuation of barrier islands and the Puerto Rico
            Governor's decision to take part in a radio broadcast to emphasize the need for early evacuations and
            other precautions as the storm approached. The NWS should encourage all local offices to build
            rapport with local emergency managers based on long-term, mutual respect.







                                                              Xi










                 Timely, reliable information from the NWS and NHC contributed greatly to the emergency
                 management and public response. In the crucial hours before the storm's arrival, local officials said
                 access to local NWS meteorologists was critical. Despite overloaded telephone circuits, power outages
                 and difficult working conditions, Weather Service Forecast Offices (WSFOs) and Weather Service
                 Offices (WSOs) were able, for the most part, to meet local needs. The media also responded well in
                 using NWS and NHC storm information.

                 Hugo tested NWS's aging equipment to the utmost. NWS radar is late 1950s technology. It cannot
                 measure wind velocity or integrate information horizontally and vertically in storins. Such information
                 was inferred or missing in warning processes. NWS should continue to develop and implement Next
                 Generation Weather Radar (NEXRAD) Doppler Radar as planned.

                 Low density of surface observations in the Caribbean and the Carolinas proved troubling during Hugo
                 and after the storm in trying to reconstruct the hurricane's movement and intensity. As part of
                 modernization and restructuring, Automatic Surface Observing Systems (ASOS) should be implemented
                 as soon as possible.

                 The hurricane revealed a deficiency in buildings housing WSFOs and WSOs. Strong winds and rain
                 caused damage and exposed important equipment to the elements. Emergency generators, supplied
                 to provide short-run power during outages, were operated in some cases until they failed with other
                 NWS offices forced to provide backup support. Spare parts, in other instances, were unavailable.

                 In the midst of these problems, NWS personnel whose families and properties were threatened by the
                 storm worked under adverse conditions. Toilets failed. Only minimum refrigeration, cooking and
                 resting facilities were provided. No sleeping or shower facilities were available. Yet, personnel worked
                 12-hour shifts and longer.

                 All new construction in hurricane-vulnerable locations should include hardened hurricane-proof areas
                 for safety. Provision for amenities, such as cots, limited shower and kitchen facilities, refrigerators,
                 emergency food supplies and backup toilets, should also be considered.

                 Communications' deficiencies must be corrected. The National Warning System (NAWAS) is vital to
                 coordination with external agencies, emergency managers and other NWS offices. In Puerto Rico and
                 the Virgin Islands, there is no NAWAS. Coordination was accomplished by telephone. In the
                 Carolinas, lack of sufficient NAWAS drops made communication between neighboring states difficult.
                 The NWS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should investigate the possibility
                 of a system that allows communications within and without states among NWS and emergency
                 management agencies.

                 In Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, limited NOAA Weather Wire Service (NWWS) drops resulted
                 in few emergency managers having hard copies of NWS products. The upgraded weather wire should
                 be implemented in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands as soon as practical. The NWS should explore
                 with FEMA the funding of critical outlets.

                 Hugo's experience showed that aircraft reconnaissance will remain a necessary tool in forecasting
                 hurricanes until other sensing platforms can provide data fields of equal accuracy.










                                                                   Xii










           A potentially disastrous error in base elevation was discovered when a high school shelter at a South
           Carolina coastal community was inundated by a storm surge. One evacuation document showed the
           shelter elevation to be 11 feet higher than it was. Base information on shelters and evacuation routes
           should be verified before becoming final. NWS coastal offices should encourage local emergency
           management officials to verify shelters' structural soundness periodically, preferably before the
           hurricane season.


           Another problem revealed was the difficulty in communicating the threat of hurricane winds to
           emergency managers and the public in inland areas. The NWS should develop policy and provide
           guidance to NHC and field offices on how to deal with this situation.

           Despite deficiencies noted in existing facilities and equipment, the survey team concluded that Senator
           Hollings' speech on the Senate floor accurately portrayed the NWS role. Employees of NWS did
           perform "magnificently before, during and after Hugo." Those in the path of the storm merit special
           praise. They performed coolly and professionally in the face of personal danger.

           Cooperation among state, local and Weather Service personnel, coupled with a mutual commitment to
           continuing public education, was the key to minimizing loss of life. The coordination between local
           Weather Service employees and emergency preparedness people at all levels in the affected
           communities and the cooperation of the citizenry could well serve as a model of disaster awareness,
           preparedness and execution for all areas of the country. The survey team found extraordinary levels
           of mutual respect, trust and ultimately reliance between local and state professionals, on the one hand,
           and the professionals at the WSOs and the WSFOs on the other.

           The report makes a series of recommendations grounded on the concept that full communication is the
           key to maintaining that mutual respect and confidence.              With that in mind, it includes
           recommendations to recognize and further strengthen the existing cooperation. Even in times of
           constrained resources (and perhaps because of constrained resources) the survey team recommends that
           NWS continue to dedicate sufficient time and monies to public education and preparedness. Based
           upon what the team heard in the Carolinas and Puerto Rico, public education and preparedness will
           provide significant payoffs in future weather emergencies.



























                                                             Xiii























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                      Charleston, South Carolina. Photo courtesy      of






           Chapter I

           HURRICANE HUGO: THE EVENT AND ITS IMPACT



        Hurricane Hugo was the strongest storm to strike             The hurricane approached the Virgin Islands the
        the United States since Camille pounded the                  next evening when its forward speed began to slow
        Louisiana and Mississippi coasts in 1969. At one             (Fig. 1-2). This had the effect of prolonging Hugo's
        point east of Guadeloupe, a NOAA research air-               fury. A couple hours after midnight Monday,
        craft measured winds of 160 MPH and a central                September 18, the hurricane's eye crossed the
        pressure of 27.1 inches (918 mb) which rated Hugo            southwestern coastline of St.           Croix near
        as a Category 5 -- the highest -- storm on the               Frederiksted severely damaging this Dutch-style
        Saffir-Simpson Scale. When Hugo struck the                   town. Maintaining 140 MPH maximum winds, the
        Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and the Carolinas, it            hurricane destroyed or damaged more than 90 per-
        was classified as a Category 4. Storm tides of               cent of the buildings on St. Croix leaving the island
        approximately 20 feet were experienced along part            without power, telephone service or water. No offi-
        of the South Carolina coast. These are record                cial wind velocities were recorded on the island.
        storm tide heights for the East Coast. Although              Weather observers had abandoned the exposed
        the highest surges struck sparsely populated areas           airport site.
        north of Charleston, South Carolina, damage was
        extensive and lives were lost.                               Based on the Fujita Tornado Intensity Scale (see
                                                                     Appendix C), damage surveys indicated that there
                                                                     was widespread upper (Fl) and (F2) straightline
        The HistoKy of the Storm                                     wind damage. Thus, wind speeds as high as 161
                                                                     MPH were estimated. Some localized damage
        Hurricane Hugo began as a cluster of thunder-                appeared to be (F3) but might have been caused by
        storms which was first detected on satellite imagery         topographic channel effects or microbursts.
        as it moved off the coast of Africa. It became a
        tropical depression on September 10, 1989, about             With Hugo's forward speed slowing to 9 MPH over
        125 miles south of the Cape Verde Islands. The               the 12-hour period, St. Croix experienced strong
        tropical storm traveled due west over the eastern            winds both before and after the passage of the eye.
        Atlantic Ocean along 12 degrees north latitude for           From the lie of downed power poles and from the
        several days. Late on September 13, the circulation          entire island's vegetation, which was literally
        had gained sufficient strength and organization to           stripped bare, it was deduced that all of St, Croix
        be classified as a full hurricane by NHC. At this            experienced the storm's maximum winds.
        time, the storm was located 1,100 miles east of the
        Leeward Islands and was continuing due west at 20            The eye missed the island of St. Thomas as it con-
        MPH.                                                         tinued through the channel between Puerto Rico
                                                                     and the Virgin Islands. Although St. Thomas was
        By Thursday, September 14, Hugo had slowed its               buffeted by hurricane-force winds, it fared far
        westward movement to 16 MPH while its winds in-              better than St. Croix. Even so, St. Thomas exper-
        creased to 115 MPH. The storm was 650 miles                  ienced extensive damage to structures, utilities and
        east of the Leeward Islands. (See Fig. 1-1.) The             vegetation. Maximum wind readings were unavail-
        next day, reconnaissance aircraft measured winds             able for St. Thomas.       Two days after Hugo's
        of 150 MPH making Hugo         a strong Category 4           passage, St. Thomas sustained additional flooding
        storm on the Saffir-Simpson Scale. The eye was               from rainbands associated with Tropical Storm Iris.
        positioned 400 miles east      of Guadeloupe.       A
        hurricane watch was posted     for Puerto Rico and           Subsequent to its Virgin Islands course, Hugo
        the U.S. Virgin Islands. On    Saturday, September           shifted slightly northward. After sunrise Monday,
        16, the hurricane aimed for Guadeloupe and                   September 18, the hurricane increased its forward
        Dominica with wind speeds reaching 140 MPH.                  speed as it crossed over the Puerto Rican islands of
        That afternoon, hurricane warnings were raised for           Vieques and Culebra and skirted the northeast tip
        Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. At midnight,             of Puerto Rico near Fajardo. As the eye passed
        Hugo's eye passed over Guadeloupe where a surface            over Vieques, maximum winds were estimated at
        pressure of 27.8 inches (941 mb) was reported.               132 MPH. At Culebra just north of Vieques, an
                                                                     unofficial gust of 170 MPH was reported by the

















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                         Figure 1-2








             yacht, Night Cap. Storm surges of 7- to 8-feet              Beach, Florida, to Cape Hatteras, North Carolina.
             were estimated. Culebra Island sustained major              Meanwhile, the threat to the Bahamas and south
             damage. Structures, as well as many boats which             Florida had diminished.
             sought'refuge, were destroyed.
                                                                         On September 21, Hugo reached the Gulf Stream
             On'Puerto Rico proper, peak gusts at Roosevelt              current. Air Force reconnaissance and NOAA re-
             Roads Naval Air Station, 10 miles south of Fajardo,         search aircraft reported falling central pressures
             were recorded at 120 MPH. Sustained winds hit               throughout the day. Maximum sustained winds in-
             98 MPH. The hardest hit areas were Fajardo and              creased to 138 MPH by evening which qualified
             Luquillo Beach on the northeast coast where dam-            Hugo again as a Category 4 storm.               Hugo
             age paralleled that of St. Croix. The larger ships          developed an enormous eye (Fig. 1-3) more than 40
             at Roosevelt Roads left well before conditions              miles in diameter. Hurricane warnings were issued
             worsened. Smaller vessels, which remained in port,          at 6 AM from Fernandina Beach to Cape Lookout,
             were piled against the seawall.                             North Carolina.

             By noon Monday, the eye was positioned north of             State and local governments ordered evacuation of
             San Juan moving to the northwest at 15 MPH.                 barrier islands and beach areas from Georgia to
             San Juan International Airport reported wind gusts          southern North Carolina. Hugo continued to move
             of 92 MPH around 8 AM' that day. Sustained                  relentlessly toward the northwest with its forward
             winds of 77 MPH were clocked. San Juan, in-                 speed increasing to 25 MPH. Landfall of the eye
             cluding the "old city," fared well although power           was expected by late night or early morning along
             and water were out in many areas for more than              the South Carolina coast close to the time of
             a week. The lowest surface pressure reading frorn           normal high tide. NHC bulletins alerted coastal
             Puerto Rico was 27.94 inches (946 mb) at                    residents of tides 12 to 17 feet above normal and
             Roosevelt Roads.                                            rainfall of 5 to 10 inches in the path of the storm.

             Hugo weakened after its encounter with Puerto               The eye crossed the coast near Charleston minutes
             Rico. By the morning of September 19, the eye of            before midnight, September 22, at a forward speed
             the storm had become poorly defined in satellite            of nearly 30 MPH. Winds increased rapidly as the
             images (Fig. 1-3) and the strongest sustained winds         eye wall moved over land. Maximum sustained
             had diminished to 100 MPH. As it continued to               winds were estimated at 135 MPH in Bulls Bay
             move out over the open Atlantic, however, the               north of Charleston while wind gusts to 137 MPH
             storm slowly began to regain strength. Hurricane            were recorded on the 118 foot anemometer at the
             warnings were in effect for the southern Bahamas            Charleston Naval Station. Gusts to 125 MPH were
             as Hugo resumed a northwestward track at 12                 observed by Navy ships in Charleston Harbor. An
             MPH.                                                        unofficial observer reported a minimum pressure of
                                                                         27.68 inches (937 mb) in the eye. Hurricane-force
             On September 20, Hugo had become better                     winds extended nearly 100 miles to the northeast
             organized with a well-defined eye once more. By             along the coast and 50 miles to the southwest.
             late in the day, forward speed increased to 18              Myrtle Beach Air Force Base reported gusts to 76
             MPH. The storm was entering a strong south-                 MPH with unofficial reports of 110 MPH gusts at
             easterly current of air which was sandwiched                the oceanfront.
             between an upper level high centered north of
             Bermuda and an upper low in the northeastern                Electrical power was lost in most areas as uprooted
             Gulf of Mexico. Hugo appeared to be taking aini             trees, broken limbs or debris severed power lines.
             at the southeastern United States.        Hurricane         Roofs were peeled off many buildings and homes.
             watches were issued for the coast from Fernandina           The Ben Sawyer swivel-bridge connecting Sullivans
                                                                         Island to the mainland near Charleston was severe-
                                                                         ly damaged and became stuck in the open position






                Atlantic Standard and Eastern Daylight Times coincide.


                                                                    4







                                                                                             Ilk



















































             Figure 1-3. Composite history of Hurricane Hugo shown by GOES-7 infrared satellite images.  Times
             are Universal Coordinated Times (UTC). Subtract 4 hours to convert to EDT. Image at landfall (0401,
             22 Sept) is enhanced with "MB curve".


                                                             5









              A storm tide of up to 20 feet inundated coastal                 Hickory, North Carolina, after sunrise, September
              sections from around Charleston northward to                    22. Other tornadoes were suspected in Georgetown
              Myrtle Beach. In McClellanville, a small fishing                and Cherokee Counties in South Carolina and
              village 35 miles northeast of Charleston, residents             Union and Mecklenburg Counties near Charlotte.
              taking shelter in a school had to clamber on top of             Aerial surveys in South Carolina could not observe
              tables and chairs to escape the rising waters.                  tornado-like damage signatures with any certainty
                                                                              since there was such widespread destruction result-
              The eye of Hugo passed just to the east of                      ing from straightline winds.
              Columbia, 100 miles inland, shortly after 3 AM,
              September 22. At Shaw Air Force Base near
              Sumter, 30 miles east of Columbia, winds gusted to              Rainfall with Hugo
              109 MPH. The minimum pressure of 28.73 inches
              (972.9 mb) set an all-time record for Columbia.                 The rapid forward movement of Hugo greatly
                                                                              reduced the maximum rainfall potential and thus
              By sunrise the same day, Hugo was downgraded to                 the threat of severe flooding other than from the
              a tropical storm after it had passed just west of               storm surge. Rainfall of 5 to 9 inches was reported
              Charlotte, North Carolina. Peak winds at the                    in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands with a max-
              Charlotte Airport had reached 87 MPH a few hours                imum of 13.55 inches recorded at the Lower Rio
              earlier.     High winds resulted in a nearly                    Blanco rain gauge in the mountains of northeastern
              50-mile-wide swath of downed trees and power                    Puerto Rico.      Some flash flooding occurred at
              lines in this portion of North Carolina. Pleasure               Luquillo in northeast Puerto Rico.
              boats on Lake Norman, north of Charlotte, were
              piled into a heap like toys.                                    Rainfall of 4 to 6 inches was common along coastal
                                                                              sections of South Carolina diminishing to 2 to 4
              Hugo then swept northward across southwest                      inches inland. On the coast at Edisto Beach, a
              Virginia reaching Charleston, West Virginia, by                 maximum of 10.28 inches was observed. Some
              midday. The Appalachian Mountains began to                      small stream flooding occurred as far north as
              weaken the storm rapidly but not before winds in                southwest Virginia and western North Carolina
              excess of 60 MPH and locally-heayy rains pounded                where     orographic     effects   caused     by     the
              southwest Virginia. By that evening, the remnants               Appalachians produced local rainfall totals of more
              of Hugo turned northeastward across western New                 than 6 inches.
              York and exited the United States less than 25
              hours and 600 miles from where it had come
              onshore.                                                        Casualty and Damage Statistics

                                                                              Hugo was the Nation's costliest hurricane in terms
              Hurricane-induced Tornadoes                                     of monetary damage but not in lives lost. NHC
                                                                              estimated more than $9 billion in damages and eco-
              No tornadoes were observed in the Virgin Islands                nomic losses to the mainland, Puerto Rico and the
              or Puerto Rico although damage surveys suggested                Virgin Islands. The mainland accounted for $7
              possible microbursts on St. Croix, Culebra and                  billion of the total.
              Vieques.    Residents, including personnel at the
              Roosevelt Roads Naval Air Station, believed that                Although the death toll was kept low by excellent
              some tornadoes did occur although none could be                 weather information, planning and evacuations,
              confirmed.                                                      Hugo's ferocity resulted in 49 directly-related
                                                                              fatalities; 26 in the U.S. and its Caribbean islands
              The National Severe Storms Forecast Center                      and 23 in other Leeward Islands. (Directly-related
              (NSSFQ received several unconfirmed reports of                  deaths are those actually resulting from weather
              tornadoes in the interior of South Carolina and                 conditions as opposed to fatalities, such as
              west-central North Carolina.         The most likely            electrocutions and automobile accidents which are
              tornado events occurred near Florence and Sumter                considered indirectly related to the storm's effects.)
              about 2 hours after landfall and northwest of






                                                                         6









          Hard-hit South Carolina suffered the greatest toll           establish disaster operations. Of the 29 deaths in
          with 13 lives lost. Other fatalities included: Puerto        the U.S. Caribbean islands, 22 were recorded on
          Rico, 2; Virgin Islands, 3; Virginia, 6; North               Puerto Rico. Five died on St. Croix; two deaths
          Carolina, 1; and New York, 1. In comparison, a               were reported from St. Thomas and St. John.
          total of 256 hurricane-related deaths were recorded
          in 1969 when Camille struck the mainland.                    The Red Cross totaled more than 200,000 families
                                                                       that were affected by the hurricane with homes
          The American Red Cross Disaster Services reported            destroyed or damaged. The figure was expected to
          79 hurricane-related deaths in the Carolinas, Puerto         rise as new tallies were reported from Puerto Rico
          Rico and the Virgin Islands. Fifty deaths were               and the Virgin Islands. In the Carolinas, initial
          recorded in the Carolinas, most in South Carolina.           reports showed 129,687 families were affected while
          No separate records were kept on the individual              in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, the total
          Carolinas or states where the Red Cross did not              reached 87,700.

















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                   Northeastern Puerto Rico near Fajardo. Photo courtesy of Joseph Golden.








              Chapter 11

              SUMMARY OF PREPAREDNESS ACTIONS, INFORMATION AND
              WARNING SERVICES



          PREPAREDNESS ACTIONS                                          In June, the Puerto Rican Department of Natural
                                                                        Resources held its annual Hurricane Conference
          The true measure of a warning program's effec-                that included a presentation on the hurricane
          tiveness is the degree of response that the warning           season by Matos as well as an explanation on the
          elicits from the public and local officials. Social           use of hurricane probabilities. Media covered this
          scientists repeatedly point out that individuals must         session that was attended by more than 100 per-
          be able to assess adequately their risk before they           sons. In July, three hurricane workshops were
          are willing to take action. To do this, a timely              conducted for radio station managers and Civil
          stream of credible and consistent information must            Defense (CD) personnel at San Juan, Ponce and
          flow from the Weather Service, emergency manage-              Quebradillas, all in Puerto Rico.
          ment community and the media.                                 Also in June, MIC Matos critically reviewed the
          The NWS must work closely with emergency                      evacuation plan for San Juan that had been devel-
          managers, officials and the media to gain their               oped by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for
          trust and to ensure that their needs for technical            FEMA. The WSFO staff used this plan and its
          information are met.        Similarly, active public          "decision arc" (see Fig. 2-1) methodology to advise
          awareness campaigns conducted with the media                  Commonwealth CD personnel on times necessary to
          and local officials foster heightened awareness of            begin evacuation to ensure an effective public
          local weather hazards in the general population.              response.
          Local weather office personnel thus have a critical
          role to play. They are recognized by local decision-          In July, WAPA-TV, Channel 4, one of Puerto Rico's
          makers as part of the local community, providers of           major television stations, began allocating 15
          local information and as an educational resource on           minutes each Wednesday morning to the WSFO
          technical matters.                                            San Juan staff for presentations on hurricane
                                                                        awareness through the end of the most active
                                                                        portion of the hurricane season.
          Puerto Rico/Virzin Islands
                                                                        This effort on the part of the San Juan office to
          WSFO San Juan has a dedicated warning and pre-                improve coordination and awareness resulted in a
          paredness individual assigned to the station. This            high level of community preparedness and cul-
          office conducted comprehensive warning coor-                  minated in one of the largest evacuations, 30,000
          dination and hazard awareness programs. Almost                people, ever experienced in Puerto Rico.
          100 preparedness meetings were conducted in May,
          June and July by the office staff including
          Meteorologist in Charge (MIC) Israel Matos and the            North and South Carolina
          Warning and Preparedness Focal Point, Francisco
          Torres. During the first 6 months of the year,                Extensive preparedness and drill activities also had
          meetings and office tours reached upwards of 2,000            been conducted by all coastal offices in both
          people.     For the Virgin Islands, hurricane                 Carolinas prior to the hurricane season. In addi-
          preparedness conferences were held for local                  tion, an active public awareness campaign was
          government officials at St. Thomas and St. Croix in           orchestrated in both states.
          May. During that month, a hurricane drill was
          conducted by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico                  The Raleigh and Columbia Management Areas each
          using materials prepared by WSFO San Juan. The                has a Warning Preparedness Meteorologist (VvTM)
          Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Management               assigned to its station. Both of these individuals
          Agency (VITEMA) participated as an observer.                  conducted Hurricane Awareness Weeks for the


                                                                   9







                                                    POSITION OF                      POSITION OF STORM
                                                    STORM WHEN                       WHEN EVACUATION
                                                    EVACUATION HAS                   HAS TO BE STARTED
                                                    TO BE FINISHED                   BASED ON TIMES
                                                    BECAUSE OF                       NEEDED TO
                                                    HIGH WINDS                       EVACUATE OF
                                                                                     4-8-12    HOURS




                                                                                             START
                                                                 FINISH              4          \8             12

                                                                        ANE?@DA
                                           SANJUAN                    VIRGIN" RDA        !@ BRERO
                AGU@DILL@
                                                    VIEQUES                                       . .........
                                                                                                                              2700
                                                                                            ANOUILA
                            PUERTO RICO         ...            ST. JOHN
                                                                                           ST. MA@41
                                                          Is S VIRGEN
               CABO ROJO
                                                                                            ftr ST. BARTS!@!@t

                                                      ST. CROIX

                                                                                        BA  S   U TA IU SAI
                                                                                                iT
                                                                                                   KTTS

                                                                                                   NEVIS
                             ,*1@100MILLAS                                                                           A/

                                                                                                               RATE


                                                                                                        -:.t.        GUADALUPE
                            "-@@150MILLAS-`-'
                                                FINISH.
                                                                                                                     *MARIE GALANTE
                            --@200MILLAS

                                                                                                                       D
                ,*-@670W                66__ W                          640w            b1i               ow           61OW
                                                    _,65
                                                        65 W


                 .15 MPH STORM                                          S,                                                    MARTINICA
                                                             300
                   20MPH STORM                                                                  .10,
                                                                                                ,01-
                                                                                                                             ST. LUCIA
                        (GUIDE)
                                                         MAR CARIBE                                                  IIIIST. VICENTE

                                                 MUNICIP10 OF SAN JUAN


                            Figure 2-1. Decision arc methodology for evacuation planning in Puerto Rico.



                                                                            10









           public. They also worked closely with state, county            In July, a Coastal Zone Conference was conducted
           and local coastal emergency management                         in Charleston. Attendees included representatives
           coordinators as well as their respective state                 of NOAA, Department of the Interior, Sea Grant
           government offices. In addition, a number of                   organizations, the Environmental Protection Agency
           workshops and discussions took place that were led             (EPA), NWS offices in South Carolina and Emer-
           by the MIC at Charleston, Richard Shenot; the MIC              gency Preparedness Directors from the coastal
           at Wilmington, Albert Hinn; the Official in Charge             counties. Presentations were made by the WSFO
           (OIC) at Cape Hatteras, Wallace DeMaurice; and                 Columbia MIC, Bernard Palmer; NHC Director, Dr.
           the two Warning Preparedness Meteorologists --                 Robert Sheets; NWS Techniques Development
           Dennis Decker, WSFO Raleigh, and Mary Jo                       Laboratory Scientist, Dr. Wilson Shaffer; and the
           Parker, WSFO Columbia. Participating were the                  Beaufort County Emergency Preparedness Director,
           media, private industry, local decision-makers,                William Winn. This conference was aimed at
           state, city and county officials, law enforcement              coastal management issues and addressed the Sea,
           officers from coastal areas, voluntary relief agencies         Lake and Overland Surges from Hurricanes
           and the public.                                                (SLOSH) (see Appendix D) model that had been
                                                                          prepared for the Charleston basin.
           During Hurricane Awareness Weeks conducted at
           the beginning of the hurricane season, all offices in          Furthermore, local decision-makers were apprised
           the eastern Carolinas, including the forecast offices          of how the Maximum Envelopes of Water (MEOWs)
           at Raleigh and Columbia, provided public infor-                could be factored into evacuation planning. SLOSH
           mation releases on the NWWS and NOAA Weather                   results allowed the local officials of the five coastal
           Radio (NWR) dealing with hurricane safety,                     South Carolina counties to design suitable evac-
           hurricane climatology and historical facts and                 uation zones from the various storm scenarios and
           information for local areas.                                   to study potential storm surge effects on evacuation
                                                                          routes and emergency shelters.
           Mailings were made to the media and others.
           Print media releases in the two-state area during              Similarly, North Carolina had just completed its
           Hurricane Awareness Week included articles deal-               comprehensive hurricane evacuation plan. This
           ing with the potential dangers of hurricanes to the            plan was a cooperative effort by the North Carolina
           areas and historical storms. Some newspapers                   Division of Emergency Management, FEMA, the
           included evacuation routes and maps showing                    Corps of Engineers, NHC, WSFO Raleigh and the
           shelter areas designated by the respective govern-             19 coastal counties in the state. During the plan's
           ments. NWS offices in the Carolinas participated               formulation, there were numerous meetings with
           extensively with on-air interviews with local                  state, county and local officials; the NHC Director
           television and radio stations including a number of            or hurricane forecasters and SLOSH experts; state
           on-site television interviews from weather offices.            emergency management coordinators and planners;
                                                                          and personnel from the NWS offices at Raleigh,
           An extensive 2-day hurricane conference was held               Wilmington and Cape Hatteras. These were con-
           in June for all coastal law enforcement agencies,              ducted to train officials on the use of the SLOSH
           local and county decision-makers and the Emer-                 model and to show them examples of damage in
           gency Preparedness Division (EPD) of South                     their areas from various record storms. Vulnerable
           Carolina. Representatives from the FEMA regional               areas were located, shelters defined and evacuation
           office at Atlanta, Georgia, were among the 150                 routes developed for the entire eastern areas of the
           persons who attended. During the conference a                  state.
           scenario type of hurricane exercise was conducted.
           Decision-makers used a computer program to assist              North Carolina state, county and local officials
           them in deciding what actions would be needed                  were taught to use the "decision are" and hurricane
           following receipt of locally prepared hurricane drill
           bulletins.









            strike probabilities to aid them in making evac-              The Carolinas
            uation decisions. This comprehensive evacuation
            plan and the technique were also tested thoroughly            The Charleston area was among the first areas
            in a full-scale, 2-day exercise conducted by NWS              modeled by SLOSH. An 80 x 100 grid (Fig. 2-2)
            and the state of North Carolina in June.             It       extends over South Carolina from Hilton Head Is-
            involved the 19 coastal counties and the inland               land in the south to Myrtle Beach in the north.
            counties that would be involved in providing                  The geography of the area includes coastal barrier
            evacuation routes and shelters.                               islands, extensive areas of marshland, rising terrain
                                                                          from the edge of the marsh inland and complex
            The Hugo evacuation was successful due in large               river/sound systems. Later in the SLOSH modeling
            part to the thorough planning and testing that had            effort, the Myrtle Beach/Wilmington and Hilton
            been done in both of the Carolinas. More than                 Head areas were covered with additional basins.
            90,000 people were moved to 400-plus shelters in
            the two states, and another 96,000 found shelter              MIC Shenot, together with the Coastal Council of
            with families or friends.                                     South Carolina, encouraged NHC to do a SLOSH
                                                                          simulation study for the Charleston area with fund-
                                                                          ing from South Carolina and various Federal
            NWS REGIONAL              OFFICES                             agencies. The result was an atlas containing pre-
                                                                          dicted flooding from each of the simulated storms
            At the start of the hurricane season, the NWS                 to assist in making evacuation decisions. From
            Eastern and Southern Regional Headquarters                    that study a comprehensive hurricane evacuation
            assessed their coastal offices to determine staffing          plan was completed for the Charleston area in
            patterns, critical equipment needs and facilities.            1986. The plan details the evacuation procedures to
            When it became apparent that Hugo would pose a                follow preceding a hurricane and gives recom-
            threat to the islands and the mainland, both                  mended evacuation routes and designated shelter
            regional offices put their contingency plans into             locations. Each of the area's emergency managers
            effect to ensure that offices in vulnerable areas had         and many local officials have copies* of this
            the resources necessary to meet responsibilities.             document.
            Personnel were detailed to offices in the Carolinas,
            Georgia and northern Florida to augment staffs                In the village of McClellanville, the Lincoln High
            where necessary.        Similarly, Eastern Region             School was used as an evacuation shelter. The
            dispatched a needed part for the aging radar at               evacuation plan listed the base elevation of the
            Cape Hatteras to guarantee its continued operation.           school as 20.53 feet National Geodetic Vertical
                                                                          Datum (NGVD). Many of the residents took shelter
                                                                          in this school. During the height of the storm,
            STORM SURGE MODELING AND                                      water rose outside the school and eventually broke
            EVACUATION PLANNING                                           through one of the doors. Water rushed in and
                                                                          continued to rise inside the school reaching a depth
            In the early 1980's, the NWS embarked on an                   of 6 feet within the building. A resident with a
            effort to apply the SLOSH model to the entire U.S.            videocassette recorder documented people climbing
            Gulf and Atlantic coastlines. The SLOSH model                 on tables and bleachers to escape the rising water.
            takes into account an area's bathymetry and                   As the water reached its maximum height, children
            terrain features in a manner commensurate with                were lifted onto the school's rafters. Fortunately,
            the model's resolution for that area. The model               everyone survived the event although not without
            aids forecasters in making real-time forecasts of             considerable anxiety.
            hurricane storm surge and is useful for determining           Later examination revealed that the base elevation
            areas that could flood in various hurricane                   of the school was 10 feet, not the 20.53 feet listed
            scenarios. Such information is the first step in              on the evacuation plan. This school should not
            developing a comprehensive hurricane evacuation               have been used as a shelter for any storm greater
            plan for an area.                                             than a Category 1 hurricane.



                                                                    12













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             Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands                                 Puerto Rico. Similarly, the hurricane warning lead
                                                                            times were 35 hours for St. Croix, 41 hours for
             A coarse mesh SLOSH model was developed in                     Vieques and 42 hours for the big island. (See Fig.
             1982 to cover Puerto Rico. Dr. Aurelio Mercado of              2-3.) Although lead times of this magnitude helped
             the University of Puerto Rico, Mayaguez, under                 local decision-makers and the public in taking
             contract with FEMA for the Department of Natural               adequate precautions, it did pose some problems for
             Resources, has modified the model to run on the                the Red Cross which was required to provide shel-
             university's computer. Dr. Mercado has run many                ters for longer periods of time than ordinarily
             simulation studies; however, they are not of the               planned for hurricanes.
             magnitude of simulation studies done on the
             mainland and have not been folded into a compre-               NHC is also responsible for issuing forecast storm
             hensive evacuation study. On the Saturday before               positions out to -72 hours as well as hurricane
             Hugo struck, Dr. Mercado provided WSFO San                     strike probabilities. As in all forecasts, the forecast
             Juan a copy of the only simulation study pertinent             storm position has an associated error for each
             to a landfalling storm of Hugo's characteristics.              forecast period. The NHC average 24-hour forecast
             This study predicted a surge of 8 to 9 feet for the            position error is approximately 100 miles. Position
             southeast coast. Information from this study was               error is the distance between the forecast position
             shared with emergency managers and was instru-                 and the actual observed position.
             mental in the evacuation of affected persons along
             Puerto Rico's southeast coast.                                 Due to the uncertainties involved in hurricane
                                                                            forecast positions, emergency managers and the
             FINDING 2.1: Errors in base elevation infor-                   media have been advised not to focus their sole
             mation on shelters or evacuation routes could result           attention on the forecast track.             Hurricane
             in loss of life as evacuees move to unsafe shelters            probabilities were developed to assist in interpreting
             or through unsafe evacuation routes.                           the forecast track by including the average forecast
                                                                            position errors. Hurricane probabilities give the
             FINDING 2.2: A comprehensive evacuation study                  probability in percent of a storm center passing
             has not been undertaken for Puerto Rico and the                within 75 nautical miles to the left or 50 nautical
             Virgin Islands.                                                miles to the right (looking out from the beach) of
                                                                            the coastal location within the forecast period.
                                                                            Decision-makers are urged to use both the forecast
             WARNING SERVICES                                               track and the probabilities to assist in defining the
                                                                            coastal areas most at risk.
             Puerto Rico/Virurin Islands                                    During much of Sunday, the storm's forecast track
             NHC's goal is to issue a watch approximately 36                suggested a landfall on Puerto Rico's southeastern
             hours before a hurricane's eye makes landfall and              coast. By 6 PM, the track suggested the southwest
             a warning about 24 hours before the eye crosses                coast but targeted the southeast coast by midnight.
             the coast. Hurricane watches were issued for the               Six hours before landfall, the track focused on
             Virgin Islands and all of Puerto Rico at 6 PM                  eastern Puerto Rico. The island of Puerto Rico is
             Friday, September 15. Hurricane warnings were                  only about 40 miles wide and a little over 100
             posted for the Virgin Islands and all of Puerto Rico           miles long which is approximately the size of
             at 3 PM Saturday, September 16. Partly as a                    NHC's 24-hour average hurricane forecast error.
             result of the slowing of Hugo's forward motion,                NHC advisories through this whole period indicated
             lead times for the hurricane watches were 56 hours             that Hugo would move over the island of Puerto
             for St. Croix, 62 hours for the Puerto Rican island            Rico implying that all areas were equally at risk.
                                                                            WSFO San Juan's Hurricane Local Statements
             of Vieques and 63 hours for the big island of









                                                                       14







                 Wafch and Warning InformatTon for Hugo
            1p
            to





                          72

                                            62   63

                          60 -         56




                          48
                      E                                                          42
                                                                            41

                                                            Ideal      35
     F"                   36                               Watch
     CA                                    ...



                                                                                              Ideal
                          24                                                                Warning


                          12




                             0
                                          Watch                          Warning


                                 mst. croixF--@ViequesRMPuerto RiCOMSOuth Carolina
                                             t i









             (HLSs), however, mentioned the potential landfall                 actions occurred in the Virgin Islands where EBS
             positions as suggested, by the forecast tracks.                   was activated and live broadcasts were made by the
                                                                               Governor and the Civil Defense Director.
             This could have posed problems for evacuation
             decisions by CD officials. In coordination calls to               The Carolinas
             the emergency managers, WSFO San Juan empha-
             sized the uncertainty in track predictions and                    After passing over Puerto Rico, Hugo continued on
             stressed that the forecast tracks could be off as                 a west-northwest to northwest track and main-
             much as 60 miles. Interviews with CD directors of                 tained a steady course for the next 4 days. A
             the Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of Puerto                    hurricane watch was issued at 6 PM Wednesday,
             Rico and San Juan, and the Mayor of San Juan                      September 20, from St. Augustine, Florida, to Cape
             indicate that the changes in potential landfall                   Hatteras. At 6 AM Thursday, a hurricane warning
             locations were not that significant to their                      was posted from Fernandina Beach, Florida, to
             planning. They essentially prepared for a direct                  Cape Lookout. This afforded a lead time of 30
             hit.                                                              hours for the watch and 18 hours for the warning.
                                                                               This is somewhat less than the ideal but approx-
             Hurricane strike probabilities for Puerto Rico were               imated the NHC average (see Fig. 2-3).
             always higher at San Juan than at Ponce. That
             landfall probabilities were so close, usually with                The potential for a hurricane watch being posted
             differences of 10 percent or less, reflected the fact             along a portion of the East Coast was mentioned in
             that chances for landfall on the northeast or south               the NHC advisories 3 hours before the watch went
             coasts were practically the same. Local officials                 into effect. Similarly, the potential for upgrading
             and media representatives interviewed mentioned                   the watch to a warning was highlighted 12 hours
             that they used hurricane probabilities and did not                before the warning was issued. This heightened
             concentrate on the forecast track. Survey team                    awareness in the threatened areas and was a
             members were left with the impression that fre-                   critical factor in the consultations between WSFO
             quent coordination with the WSFO served to                        Columbia's MIC Palmer and the Governor of
             encourage that tendency.                                          South Carolina. The Governor's highly successful
                                                                               voluntary evacuation order, issued in anticipation of
             Emergency managers and the Governor of Puerto                     the warning, resulted from his discussions with
             Rico were concerned that the public's response to                 Palmer.
             evacuation might be negatively influenced by recent
             memories of Hurricane Dean. This did not appear                   In the hurricane advisory issued at 3 PM Thursday,
             to be the case. In August, Dean aimed directly for                NHC extended the hurricane warning from Cape
             Puerto Rico when at the last minute it stalled and                Lookout to Oregon Inlet, North Carolina. The
             made an abrupt turn to the north missing the                      advisory also stated that Hugo was expected to
             island.                                                           make a gradual turn to the north within the next
                                                                               12 hours.
             The constant coordination between WSFO San
             Juan, the emergency managers and elected officials                The barrier islands require more than 12 hours to
             ensured that all decision-makers kept current with                evacuate, and by mid-afternoon Thursday when the
             the evolving scenario.         This resulted in the               warning was extended, surface winds had increased
             Governor of Puerto Rico taking a lead role along                  to a point that precluded ferry boat operations.
             with the Commonwealth CD Director and the                         This extension of the warning posed a dilemma to
             WSFO MIC in a critical Sunday night broadcast to                  emergency managers. Furthermore, the advisory
             the entire island over the Emergency Broadcast                    gave no reason for the gradual turn to the north so
             System (EBS) Network.            As a result, 30,000              that emergency managers and the media did not
             persons were evacuated.            This included the              know and could not share with the public the
             impoverished northern coastal community of La                     reasons for the forecast change.
             Perla which evacuated for literally the first time in
             memory. Government officials claim that this was                  The extension of the warning to the north and the
             one of the best evacuation responses ever. Similar                forecast of a gradual turn to the north were linked




                                                                         16









          by some local officials and residents. Concern was           coast, forecast sustained winds of near 60 MPH
          heightened when a local television station stressed          with gusts to 75 MPH as far inland as Charlotte.
          the turn to the north.                                       Marine advisory #46, issued at 11 PM Thursday
                                                                       when the eye was near the South Carolina coast,
          The reasoning behind the extension of the warning            forecast the storm center to move within 30 miles
          and the forecast turn to the north was discussed by          of Charlotte and to reach southwestern Virginia by
          NHC with local NWS offices over the Hurricane                7 PM Friday with wind gusts to 86 MPH. The
          Hotline.    When the local offices shared this               extent to which hurricane-force winds would extend
          information with the emergency managers, it was              inland was not emphasized in the public advisories,
          apparent to them that the area would be on the               and many inland residents were surprised to be
          fringe of the hurricane and that evacuations would           awakened by hurricane-force winds as far inland as
          not be required.      To assuage public concerns,            200 miles from the point of landfall of the storm.
          however, North Carolina officials opened three
          shelters on the coast even though they were                  Because the public advisories did not highlight the
          convinced that evacuations were not necessary.               extent of high winds inland, it was left to the local
                                                                       NWS offices to emphasize the threat to emergency
          Table 2-1 lists the probabilities for the southeast          managers in vulnerable areas.         On Thursday,
          coast Thursday afternoon and evening.             The        September 21, Ronald Kuhn, OIC of WSO
          segment of the coast from Morehead City to Cape              Charlotte, discussed with the local emergency
          Hatteras corresponds to the area where the                   coordinator, Wayne Broome, the possibility that
          warning was extended at 3 PM. The probabilities              Charlotte might suffer high winds, flooding and
          show a change in forecast track to the north at 3            perhaps tornadoes particularly if the gradual turn
          PM although the magnitude of the values still                to the north did not materialize. Kuhn advised
          suggest that the area of greatest threat was                 him that if these possibilities matured into
          between Wilmington and Charleston.                           probabilities, the appropriate response would be to
                                                                       close schools, alert power companies and set up
                                                                       traffic control and road clearance procedures. In
                              TABLE 2-1                                short, respond as though it were a winter storm.

              HURRICANE HUGO PROBABILITIES                             At 3 AM, September 22, the WSO advised the local
                   THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 21                              emergency coordinator of imminent high winds.
                                                                       The official issued emergency orders immediately.
                                                                       High winds struck at 4 AM and continued through
                                                                       the morning. Wind gusts of 90 MPH were reported
                                 Noon  3 PM   6 PM   8 PM              at the control tower in Charlotte before it was
              Savannah, GA         37     10       7     25            evacuated. Wind damage exceeded $500 million in
              Charleston, SC       48     56     69      99            all of Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. Closer
              Myrtle Beach, SC     35     63     69      62            to the coast, wind gusts of nearly 110 MPH
              Wilmington, NC       17     48     53       6            destroyed 200 homes and heavily damaged 1,000
              Morehead City, NC      5    20     24       X            others at the Air Force Base in Sumter.
              Cape Hatteras, NC      1      5      6     X

                                                                       Taken all together, this illustrates how important
                                                                       it is that NHC communicate fully as possible on a
          The storm's track, after Hugo made landfall, was             level understood by the public. When updating
          further west than the NHC forecast 24 hours                  advisories, NHC must ensure that all language is
          before landfall. Later forecasts adjusted the track          clear and all information properly conveys its true
          to the west.                                                 intent. Furthermore, NHC cannot assume that the
                                                                       public has knowledge of all previously released
          Hurricane-force winds were forecast well inland              information.
          with this strong storm. Marine advisory #41,
          issued about 24 hours before the storm crossed the           The timing of NHC bulletins sometimes posed
                                                                       problems for local NWS offices in keeping all





                                                                  17









             forecast and warning products current and                    capabilities allow. Frequent coordination calls with
             consistent. One example was when the hurricane               users kept decision-makers from overly focusing on
             watch was posted at 6 PM Wednesday. Public fore-             the forecast track.
             casts for the East Coast are issued between 3 and
             4 PM. This meant that all forecast products had              FINDING 2.4: In both the Caribbean and the
             to be reworded and reissued following the posting            Carolinas, hurricane probabilities were used in
             of the warning. Although all offices were apprised           varying degrees by decision-makers to incorporate
             of this possibility from an earlier Hurricane Hotline        forecast uncertainties in their planning efforts.
             conference call, it still required considerable work.
             The need for frequent updates is unavoidable.                FINDING 2.5: In two hurricane advisories, the
             Unfortunately, local offices do not have the                 addition of two significant changes without reasons
             interactive product formatting (word processing)             for these changes created some problems for
             capability which would expedite rapid revisions of           emergency managers and the media.
             forecasts.
                                                                          FINDING 2.6: The lack of emphasis in NHC
             FINDING 2.3: In its HLSs, WSFO San Juan                      public advisories for the Carolinas on inland high
             referenced potential landfall sites with a degree of         winds left the media and local officials with little
             specificity that was greater than current forecast           guidance on how to respond.









































                                                                    18













                                                                                     3 42 41
                                                                                    El    6
                                             AL

                                                    APO                             300 's 3w

                                           AL                                      Podar Owleston
                                                                                        HUGO
                                                                                    Sep  22, 1%9



                                                                                       4S dBZ
                                                                                     4
                                                                                      -45
                                                                                      2
                                                                                     39-42-
                                                                                     36-39
                                                                                     34-36
                                                                                     31-34
                                                                                     28-31
                                                                                     26-28
                                                                                     23-26
                                                                                     20-23
                                                                                     18-20
                                                                                     is-is
                                                                                     12-IS
                                                                                     10-12
                                                                                        10 dEC
                                                                                      to@ - k-ft
                                                                                          HPD


               Digitized representation of the Charleston, South Carolina radar image of Hugo crossing the coast near Charleston.
               Photo courtesy of Peter Dodge, Hurricane Research Division, ERL.










                 Chapter III

                 DATA COLLECTION AND COMMUNICATIONS



             DATA COLLECTION                                              Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite
                                                                          (GOES) information is available to WSFO San Juan
             Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands                               through the Satellite Weather Information System
                                                                          (SWIS).    Up to 200 of these images can be
             Surface observations throughout the Caribbean are            displayed on the SWIS which has animation and
             sparse. WSFO San Juan takes hourly observations              color enhancement capability. WSFO San Juan
             at the International Airport and receives hourly             received infrared, water vapor and daylight visible
             observations from three additional sites in Puerto           images with few interruptions during Hurricane
             Rico and one each from St. Croix and St. Thomas.             Hugo.
             During the height of the storm, observations were            Water vapor imagery is a relatively new tool.
             only available from the WSFO and the Navy base               When animated, water vapor images show
             at Roosevelt Roads. Attempts to assess peak winds            mid-tropospheric motion which affects the steering
             in the islands have been seriously hampered by the           of tropical storms even in cloud-free areas. No
             lack of surface observational data.                          images were transmitted from 1 to 2 AM each day
                                                                          because of the "eclipse" period in which the GOES
             WSFO San Juan radar is a WSR-74S band system                 is unable to recharge its solar cells. This system
             that is located on the International Airport                 functioned well throughout the storm. After the
             grounds. The radar signal is partially blocked from          storm was over, however, the SWIS had to be
             the east through the southwest by a mountain                 cycled on and off to prevent overheating. This
             range that extends east to west across Puerto Rico.          meant that continuous satellite imagery was not
             WSFO San Juan does not have a drop on the                    available after Hugo when Tropical Storm Iris
             Roosevelt Roads radar. Blocking, however, was not            threatened heavy rains.
             a problem during Hugo.
             The radar was in operation throughout the storm              A series of satellite precipitation estimates (SPEs)
             even when air conditioning was lost. Fans were               produced at the Synoptic Analysis Branch (SAB) of
             positioned to keep the console cool enough to                the National Environmental Satellite, Data and
             operate.                                                     Information Service (NESDIS) in Camp Springs,
                                                                          Maryland, were transmitted on Automation of Field
             Upper air observations were taken twice a day                Operations and Services (AFOS) while Hugo was
                                                                          over Puerto Rico. SPEs are rainfall estimates for
             until Sunday afternoon, September 17, when
             conditions deteriorated to a point where balloon             periods of an hour or more based on satellite-
             launching was too difficult. As the storm swept              observed cloud-top temperatures, cooling rates and
             across the northeastern portion of the island, the           movements of convective cells.
             radome was damaged and the doors were blown off              WSFO San Juan has access to an automatic rain
             the inflation shelter. Fortunately, the automatic            gauge network known as Automated Local Eval-
             radiotheodolite (ART) was not damaged. Launch-               uation in Real Time (ALERT) system. The system
             ings were resumed Tuesday evening following                  consists of 31 automated rainfall gauges
             recalibration of the equipment and installation of a         strategically located around the island with
             barrier created from a carport to keep winds away            information sent by radio to four base stations
             from the inflation area.                                     periodically on demand. Two of the gauges also
                                                                          are equipped with wind and temperature sensors.





                                                                    20









         These gauges are located at Puerto Rico's highest              region extends inland 50-100 miles. During the
         peak, La Punta, and at Maricao where the NWR                   height of the storm, several observations from
         transmitter for western Puerto Rico is sited. In               Charleston were not transmitted due to a problem
         addition to WSFO San Juan, the other three base                with the auxiliary backup terminal (ABT) which
         stations are located at the Commonwealth Office,               was being used in lieu of the AFOS system.
         the Department of Natural Resources and the U.S.               Otherwise, no significant data losses were reported
         Geological Survey.                                             for any stations.

         Several weeks before September 18, personnel of                The upper air station at Charleston sustained
         the Department of Natural Resources were per-                  damage to the inflation shelter during the storm
         forming field maintenance on the ALERT                         and was not able to perform the normal radiosonde
         equipment. Three of eight rain gauges had been                 release at 8 AM, September 22.            The Cape
         inoperative in the Rio Grande de Loiza Basin. Out              Hatteras site was unable to repair an electronics
         of 30 ALERT gauges across the island of Puerto                 problem that resulted in manual rawinsonde oper-
         Rico, 25 were operational.                                     ation that contained no wind data. Other upper air
                                                                        stations operated normally.
         The ALERT system functioned throughout the
         storm although the repeater for the Loiza River                In the southeastern mainland areas most affected
         basin failed on Sunday night, September 17.                    by Hugo, NWS operates network radars (10 cen-
                                                                        timeter (cm) wavelength WSR-57S) at Charleston,
         WSFO San Juan previously attempted to set up a                 Wilmington and Cape Hatteras, and inland at
         similar ALERT system in the Virgin Islands with                Athens, Georgia. Local warning radars (5 em
         financial support from FEMA. The Virgin Islands                wavelength WSR-74S) are located at Columbia,
         CD was unable to support the system so the project             Charlotte, and Augusta, Georgia.          The radar
         was never implemented.                                         systems performed well during the storm and were
                                                                        invaluable in tracking the storm inland during the
         Fifty-three river and rainfall gauges are available to         early morning hours.
         the WSFO through the GOES system. These func-
         tioned normally throughout the event. A number                 The plan position indicator (PPI) scope at Hatteras
         of amateur radio operators on the KP4 HAM net                  was inoperative beginning at 8 PM, September 20.
         provided rainfall reports to a base station at 7 PM            A spare part from Wilmington was shuttled to Cape
         daily. The reports were telephoned to WSFO San                 Hatteras by North Carolina Highway Patrol
         Juan.                                                          vehicles, and the radar was functional by 4 PM,
                                                                        September 21. The Charleston radar was out
                                                                        briefly when rain began leaking through the roof
         The    Carolinas                                               during the height of the storm.

         Stations reporting surface weather conditions over             WSFOs Raleigh and Columbia both had access to
         the southeastern United States are shown by the                SWIS and satellite products, such as satellite
         map (Fig. 3-1). Most of these stations operate on              precipitation estimates, throughout the storm.
         a 24-hour basis staffed by personnel of the NWS,               WSOs Charleston and Charlotte do not have any
         Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or Depart-               satellite image display capabilities.
         ment of Defense (DoD). Some of the stations with
         limited operating hours, such as McEntire Air                  A variety of river and rain gauges are available in
         National Guard Base (MMT), South Carolina,                     the Carolinas.       These include gauges from
         provided supplementary observations during                     cooperative programs with other Federal and state
         Hurricane Hugo. MMT was directly in the path of                agencies as well as automated systems, such as the
         the storm and estimated sustained winds of 58                  Integrated Flood Observing and Warning System
         MPH with a peak gust to 79 MPH. There are no                   (IFLOWS), in western North Carolina and NWS
         stations between Charleston and Myrtle Beach, a                gauges over the state. There were no significant
         distance of 90 miles, the segment of the coastline             outages of these gauges during the storm.
         most severely affected by Hugo. The data-void




                                                                  21









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          FINDING 3. 1: The density of surface observations            The Carolinas
          in the Caribbean and the Carolinas is extremely
          low.     This posed a significant problem to                 In South Carolina, AFOS at both Columbia and
          forecasters trying to obtain information during the          Charleston operated throughout the storm, but the
          storm.                                                       communications data line between the two offices
                                                                       was out for 6 hours beginning about 11:45 PM,
          FINDING 3.2: A dedicated connection to the                   September 21. During that period, HLSs normally
          Roosevelt Roads radar would ensure full radar                issued by the Charleston office were provided by
          coverage for WSFO San Juan.                                  Columbia.     No serious AFOS problems were
          FINDING 3.3: A fully operational ALERT system                reported at WSO Charlotte.
          for the Virgin Islands would assist the WSFO staff
          in preparing flood related warnings and assist               NOAA Weather Wire Service (NWWS)
          VITEMA in responding to flood situations.

                                                                       The primary external dissemination system for
          COMMUNICATIONS                                               National Weather Service products is NOAA
                                                                       Weather Wire. A national program is underway to
          Automation of Field            Operations and                upgrade the system to utilize satellite transmission
                                                                       capabilities for all NWWS products. Puerto Rico
          Services (AFOS)                                              and the Virgin Islands, however, still are served by
                                                                       the old weather wire, a land line system. Raleigh
          The main communications system for National                  and Columbia drive a NOAA Weather Wire for
          Weather Service offices is the AFOS system.                  their respective states and both systems have been
                                                                       upgraded to a satellite system. Both states are also
                                                                       served by a land line system until the full national
          Puerto Rico                                                  upgrade is completed.         NWS offices in the
                                                                       Carolinas can transmit directly onto the NOAA
          Basically, AFOS   functioned well during the storm           Weather Wire through AFOS.
          with only a minor loss late Friday evening,
          September 15, when the system went down for 2                The San Juan NOAA Weather Wire consists of two
          hours. This resulted in WSFO San Juan missing                separate circuits. The first circuit is bilingual and
          the 9 PM NHC hurricane advisory. Problems with               goes to the Puerto Rican Communications
          AFOS became pronounced after the storm due to                Authority which distributes it to the media and to
          excessive heat build-up in the office. Fans were             the Commonwealth CD. Only one television station
          placed throughout the work area and directed at              in Puerto Rico, Channel 11, has NOAA Weather
          graphic display modules (GDMs) which generated               Wire as does WKAQ radio (the EBS station) and
          most of the heat.                                            the San Juan CD. The Commonwealth CD fans
                                                                       out weather information to the 78 principal CDs.
          Finally, the GDMs were turned off to reduce heat
          build-up and the alphanumeric display modules                The other NOAA Weather Wire circuit to the
          (ADMs), which are used for message composition,              Virgin Islands is in English. Primary customers
          were cycled on and off to keep operating tem-                are VITEMA and marine radio station WAH in St.
          peratures at acceptable levels. Although these               Thomas. The NOAA Weather Wire functioned
          actions were taken, the hard disks developed                 throughout the storm in Puerto Rico and until
          problems that required an exhaustive software                shortly before landfall in the Virgin Islands.
          rebuilding effort over 3 days.










                                                                 23








             NOAA Weather Radio (NWR)                                         North Carolina escaped with no major interruptions
                                                                              and the NWR system performed well.
             NWR is the other primary means of distributing
             NWS products to emergency managers and the
             general public. NWR transmitters normally serve                  Hurricane              Hotline             Internal
             an area within 40 miles of the antenna.                          Coordination System
             In San Juan one console drives two transmitters                  The NWS uses a dedicated land line telephone
             that essentially cover the island. Broadcasts are                system in the eastern and southern U.S. for
             bilingual.                                                       conference calls. The system accommodates most
                                                                              WSFOs in these areas plus, NHC, NSSFC, National
             The transmitter for eastern Puerto Rico, including               Meteorological Center (NMC) and regional and
             the islands of Vieques and Culebra as well as                    national headquarters. On September 21, a late
             portions of the Virgin Islands, remained operational             morning malfunction of the hotline resulted in
             throughout the storm. The Maricao transmitter,                   NHC being unable to communicate with any office
             which covers western Puerto Rico, failed at 9:22                 other than NMC. The malfunction came at a
             PM Sunday and fluctuated in operation after the                  critical time; hurricane and tropical storm watches
             storm until early October.                                       were being extended further up the East Coast.
                                                                              The NMC duty forecaster, however, managed to
             The NWS has been working with marine radio                       patch the NHC forecaster through another phone
             station WAH in St. Thomas to begin broadcasts of                 system allowing other offices to hear NHC's
             NWR in English to the Virgin Islands. Software                   presentation. No two-way exchange was possible.
             problems at WAH have slowed implementation                       By afternoon, the malfunction was corrected.
             efforts. WAH was not broadcasting NWR infor-
             mation over the NWR frequency allotted to it                     WSFOs Raleigh and Columbia are on the Hurricane
             during the storm.                                                Hotline, and they both coordinated with NHC on
                                                                              this system throughout the period of the storm.
             In South Carolina, the network was exposed to                    Coastal Weather Service Offices are not included on
             extensive outages that began about midnight                      this circuit.    Coordination information must be
             Friday, September 22, and lasted from 6 hours to                 passed to these offices by their parent WSFO.
             a week. The transmitter at Mount Pleasant, South
             Carolina, which repeats WSO Charleston broad-                    WSFO San Juan is not included on the Hurricane
             casts, was destroyed.            Other transmitters              Hotline. Communications between it and NHC
             experiencing outages were Florence, Columbia,                    must be conducted over normal phone lines. The
             Sumter, Green Pond and Conway.                                   WSFO lost communication before noon Sunday,
                                                                              September 17.         As a result, no San Juan
             NWR broadcasts from WSFO Columbia were inter-                    information was available for formulating the
             rupted only Friday from 2 to 6 AM.                 These         official hurricane forecast track from that time on.
             interruptions resulted from sporadic failure of the
             WSFO emergency generator and the failure of
             commercial power at the transmitter site which is                National Warning System (NAWAS)
             collocated with South Carolina Educational
             Television (ETV) station. A 2 to 4 AM interruption               NAWAS circuit is not available in Puerto Rico or
             resulted from failures of power and the emergency                the Virgin Islands,        Accordingly, there is no
             generator at the WSFO. The ETV station has an                    dedicated hotline circuit connecting emergency
             emergency generator, but personnel must activate                 management officials with the WSFO.
             the generator manually. This was not done until
             6 AM, September 22, when ETV staff returned to                   All NWS offices in the Carolinas are on the
             work. WSFO Columbia was not made aware that                      NAWAS system, but there are separate circuits for
             there was no automatic switchover to backup power                the two states.       WSO Charlotte has recently
             for NVYR, an important requirement during a                      acquired a drop on the. South Carolina NAWAS
             weather emergency.





                                                                        24








           circuit, but it is not possible for South Carolina             An amateur radio operator was brought on station
           NWS offices to contact any other North Carolina                at Columbia Thursday evening, September 21, and
           office on the NAWAS system. This forces these                  remained through the night to receive and relay
           offices to rely on conventional telephone use for              storm reports and spotter information. The HAM
           warning coordination. Emergency management                     weather network in the state had been activated on
           and law enforcement officials near the North and               Thursday and was fully operational across the area
           South Carolina border cannot exchange severe                   by that afternoon.
           weather reports directly to the neighboring state
           NWS or emergency management offices on the                     At WSFO Raleigh and in North Carolina, the HAM
           NAWAS system.                                                  radio net was functioning with an amateur radio
                                                                          operator at many NWS offices in the state and in
                                                                          the state Emergency Operations Center (EOC) from
           Other Communications Systems                                   Thursday afternoon through Friday evening.

           Several other communications channels are                      FINDING 3.4: Limited NOAA Weather Wire drops
           available to WSFO San Juan for collecting and                  in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands resulted in
           disseminating     information.        The      Antilles        few emergency managers having hard copies of
           Meteorological Circuit links all of    the Caribbean           Weather Service products. This increased the need
           islands for surface observations. The circuit went             for coordination efforts at the local WSFO.
           down at 10:15 PM Friday, September 15, and
           remained down throughout the storm.                            FINDING 3.5: NWR reception is poor in the
                                                                          Virgin Islands.
           Direct radio links are maintained to the
           Commonwealth CD in San Juan and to VITEMA                      FINDING 3.6: WSFO San Juan and most coastal
           headquarters in St. Thomas. Both organizations                 WSOs are not on the Hurricane Hotline.
           relay information to their local CD offices. A direct          Accordingly, they cannot participate in routine
           radio link also is in place to the Puerto Rican                coordination calls with NHC, NMC and other
           Water Authority (Acueductos).                                  coastal WSFOs.
           Some communications systems in the Carolinas                   FINDING 3.7: Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands
           depended on microwave antennas. The force of the               have no dedicated coordination line between
           winds rotated these antennas, which are highly                 emergency managers and the WSFO.               In the
           directional, thus knocking out microwave reception             Carolinas, lack of NAWAS drops from adjacent
           at many locations.                                             states hampered coordination efforts across state
                                                                          boundaries.




























                                                                    25

































































                                                                                           Ag,

                                                                                          low

















                                                                             -Now






                       Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Emergency Operations Center.
                       Photo courtesy of Donald Wernly.


                                                              26







                Chapter IV

                AN EVALUATION OF THE PROCESSING, INTERPRETATION
                AND DISSEMINATION OF NWS INFORMATION



            NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER                                          centers of tropical cyclones over remote ocean
                                                                               areas. When storms approach islands or coastlines,
            01perations                                                        aircraft reconnaissance planes are employed.
            NHC has access to nine numerical models for pre-                   Satellite position estimates obtained from low
            dicting hurricane tracks. Data from up to four                     resolution infrared are within an average of 25
            models are available to the forecaster at any one                  miles of the reconnaissance position measurements
            time. Although each model has its own strengths                    for all tropical storm cloud pattern types
            and weaknesses, no one model consistently                          improving to 16 miles for storms which have eyes.
            outperforms another over the life of a storm.                      Differences between satellite estimates and
                                                                               reconnaissance measurements of 50 miles are not
            The numerical models may be broken into                two         uncommon, however, with occasional differences
            categories -- statistical and dynamical. Statistical               exceeding 100 miles. Satellite intensity estimates
            models, as their name implies, are based on                        are derived from the temperature difference
            statistical relationships and tend to perform best in              between the eye and the surrounding eye wall
            the deep tropics where storms tend to maintain a                   combined with an empirical cloud pattern recog-
            persistent track. Dynamical models, which attempt                  nition technique. Another empirical relationship is
            to model physical atmospheric processes, tend to                   used to estimate minimum sea level pressure and
            perform better at higher latitudes where storms                    maximum wind speed from these temperature
            recurve. This was born out in Hurricane Hugo                       differences.
            when NHC83, a dynamical and statistical model,                     An example of the differing capabilities of the two
            performed well overall while CLIPER, a                             methods; as Hugo approached the Leeward Islands,
            climatological/persistence model, worked best in the               satellite-based estimates of surface winds were 115
            tropics.                                                           MPH in contrast to the first aircraft penetration
            The predicted movement of Hugo was based on a                      that measured flight level winds of 165 MPH and
            combination of model output and forecaster                         surface wind speeds of 135 MPH.
            experience. It takes an experienced forecaster to                  Aircraft reconnaissance is especially valuable in
            decide on the per:ormance of each model before                     defining the wind fields of the storm -- a capability
            selecting a "future track" for each hurricane based                not yet present with satellites. Only aircraft can
            on how the models are initialized and whether each                 provide high density data on storm wind fields.
            run can handle the input data.                                     Asymmetries in the wind fields detected by aircraft
            The statistical models can supply track positions to               can be factored into the SLOSH model runs to
            NHC within 10 minutes after initialization, yet, the               assist in defining warning areas and the timing of
            Quasi-Lagrangian Model (QLM) takes approx-                         evacuations. Figures 4-1 and 4-2 illustrate the
            imately 6 hours to run. NHC83 and the statistical                  wind field data provided to NHC by NOAA
            tracking models are run every 6 hours.                 The         research aircraft in the Caribbean and off the
            dynamical models are run every 12 hours at                         Carolinas. During Hurricane Hugo, NOAA or Air
            standard observation times.                                        Force aircraft were monitoring the storm on an
                                                                               average of every 2.1 hours.
            Key ingredients needed by        the models are initial            Finall , SAB provides NHC forecasters with an
            storm position, motion and intensity,              Current                y
            satellite capabilities for assessing storm motion and              analysis of the steering currents in which the storm
            intensity do not equal the accuracy of aircraft                    is embedded. This product, the deep layer mean
            reconnaissance measurements. These parameters                      (DLM) steering wind, is derived primarily from
            can be measured by reconnaissance aircraft                         satellite imagery. It is a composite of GOES cloud
            penetrating the storm and can be inferred from                     motion, water vapor motion, VISSR atmospheric
            satellite imagery. The latter is used to track the                 sounder WAS) soundings and radiosonde wind data.

                                                                         27








                           Hikh'A (1989)       STM-RELATIVE COORDS                                                    700 MB
                           WIND BRRBS                                                                             (M  S*X-1)
                           09/17/89 20 UTC            09/18/89 6 UTC                                                  LVL-13
                           XYOCWL=( 0.42. 0.10)                             KBCTYP=(21.21.21.21)   XYBCWL=( O.q. O.q. O.q. 0.4)
                       ON  I I I I I I         I I I I       I I I I ?-*I I I             I I I I        I I I I        I I  I



                18.5



                18.0



                17.5



                17.0



                16.5



                16.0




                                        65.5 65.0 64.5                             64.0 63.5                                  Ow


                         D11/(HRD.POWELL.SPLMAP)5OEV.DAT



                Figure 4-1. Two dimensional wind field at 700 mb of Hugo as it approached Puerto Rico and the
                Virgin Islands. Direction of wind indicated by direction of wind barb. Speeds given as follows: flag
                           V
                           @Ir




























                50 meters/sec, large barb 10 meters/sec, small barb 5 meters/sec.





                                                                      28










                            HUGO (t9B9) STM-RELATIVE COORDS                                                  700 MB
                            WIND BARBS                                                                    M  S)K * - 1 )
                            09/21/89 22 UTC              09/22/89 8 UTC                                      LVL=t3
                            XYDCWL=( 0.53. O.q5)                  KBCTYP=(21,21.21.21)   XYBCWL=( 0.5. 0.5.  O.q. 0-q)

                                  P




                      34






                      33






                      32






                      31



                                                  b     t          I -A        I          I     I    I          I
                                     81                    80                     79                                ow


                            Dll/(HRO.POWELL.SPLMAP"@[email protected]


                Figure 4-2. Two dimensional wind field at 700 mb of Hugo as it approached Charleston, South
                Carolina.








                                                                      29









             The DLM is fed through a data line to NHC's VAS                  There was a left bias to the official forecasts for
             Data Utilization Center (VDUC) computer. An ex-                  the period when Hugo was turning from west-
             ample of the DLM for the evening of September                    northwestward to northwest. This occurred as
             21, which graphically illustrates the probable track,            Hugo reached Puerto Rico and continued for the
             is shown in Fig. 4-3.                                            following 2 days. This is a normal bias for NHC
                                                                              track forecasts in this area during recurvature
             FINDING 4. 1:        Aircraft reconnaissance is a                situations. There was a slight right bias for two
             necessary tool in hurricane forecasting.                         forecasts on Thursday, September 21, just before
                                                                              landfall. This caused the hurricane probabilities to
                                                                              peak at Myrtle Beach during that afternoon.
             NHC Forecasts
                                                                              This was also, a situation where a tropical cyclone
             Table 4-1 lists the official track forecast errors               went from a Category 2 to a Category 4 hurricane
             along with the errors of several guidance models.                on the Saffir-Simpson Scale during the 30 hours
             The official errors were quite small for Hurricane               prior to landfall. Forecasts of intensity changes
             Hugo. For example, the 24-hour average forecast                  proved particularly difficult while Hugo was
             error of 65 nautical miles during Hugo compares                  approaching the Carolinas.         For the 24 hours
             with the previous 10-year average official error of              beginning 5 PM Wednesday, September 20, the
             109 nautical miles. The 72-hour Hugo error of 154                highest sustained winds increased from 105 to 135
             nautical miles compares with the previous 10-year                MPH.      During this period, the wind forecast
             average of 342 nautical miles. It should be noted                contained in all of the public advisories was "little
             that some of the guidance models also had small                  significant change in strength is likely."            The
             errors.                                                          numerical model guidance contained no definitive
                                                                              information on potential strengthening. Satellite
                                  TABLE 4-1                                   imagery suggested intensification which would
                                                                              indicate decreasing central pressure which is
                     Hurricane Hugo Average Track                             usually accompanied by increasing winds. Actual
                    Forecast Errors (Nautical Miles)                          changes in storm intensity were gathered from
                                                                              aircraft reconnaissance data. It is important for
                                                                              users of NHC information to appreciate the
                          Forecast Period Hours                               limitations in tropical cyclone intensity forecasting.
                Model         12       24       36       48      72
                                                                              During Hugo, storm surges of up to 8 feet were
                Official      33       65       98     122     154            predicted for exposed coastal areas in the Virgin
                CLIPER        37       73       119    161     216            Islands and Eastern Puerto Rico. Storm surges of
                NHC83         38       61       88     106     178            6 feet were estimated on the south short of St.
                QLM           81       90       119    172     268            Croix and 4 feet on the north shore. Though no
                SANBAR        28       55       92     141     302            ground surveys were conducted on either St.
                                                                              Thomas or St. John, the bathymetry suggests
             Figure 4-4   is  a  graphical representation      of the         surges should have averaged no more than 4 feet.
             24-hour forecast position errors. From the        figure,        For Puerto Rico, estimates ranged from 4 to 8 feet
             one can discern the slowing of the storm as it                   on the northeast coast and 3 to 6 feet on the
             approached the islands and its acceleration as it                southeast coast with the maximum value of 8 feet
             approached the mainland. Biases in the forecast,                 occurring at Luquillo Beach on the northeast coast.
             either to the left or right of the actual track, can             Storm surge values of 7 to 8 feet probably occurred
             be noted.                                                        on the island communities of Vieques and Culebra
                                                                              especially at Ensenada Honda on the south side of









                                                                        30



































                                                                                                        10






















                                          20










             Figure 4-3. Deep Layer Mean flow streamlines (solid) and isotachs (dashed) in meters/sec. for 0000
              UTC, September 22, as Hugo was approaching the South Carolina coast.






                                                            31

















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           Culebra where the maximum wind on the east side               WEATHER SERVICE OFFICES --
           of the eyewall rushed seawater inland.                        LOCAL            STATEMENTS                    AND
           The forecast for the Carolina coast was for surges            WARNINGS
           from 14 to 17 feet. East of Charleston, surges of
           16 to 18 feet were measured with a high storm                 Puerto Rico/Virgrin Islands
           tide (storm tide is the storm surge plus the
           astronomical tide) of 20.4 feet.                              WSFO San Juan has no subordinate Weather
                                                                         Service offices. Therefore, the WSFO issues all
                                                                         HLSs for the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.
           Measured Higsh Water Levels                                   HLSs usually are issued immediately after NHC
                                                                         advisories. When a storm nears the coast, NHC
           Astronomical tides for the periods around landfall            advisories normally are issued every 3 hours.
           in the Charleston area indicated that high tide               During Hugo, NHC began to issue 3-hour interval
           would occur about 2 AM Friday, September 22.                  advisories at 9 PM Friday, September 15. WSFO
           With landfall expected around midnight, the                   San Juan followed suit by issuing 3-hour interval
           astronomical tide level at that time would be about           HLSs. To ensure that information was available as
           a foot above mean sea level (ASL).                            soon as possible, WSFO San Juan disseminated
           If Hugo made landfall over Sullivans Island, storm            NHC advisories on NWR in English and Spanish
           surges should have peaked to the right at approx-             immediately on receipt. Anticipating the first NHC
           imately the storm's radius of maximum wind.                   advisory, a draft HLS already had been prepared in
           Aircraft reconnaissance showed the radius of                  AFOS which then required only a limited editing
           maximum wind to be about 30 miles during most                 before dissemination in English and Spanish over
           of Thursday afternoon, September 21, but dropping             both NOAA Weather Wire and NWR.
           to some 20 miles just before landfall.                        The HLSs issued from San Juan contained
           With this radius of maximum wind, the highest                 numerous action-provoking statements. Starting at
           surges should have occurred in Bulls Bay, a                   midnight Friday, September 15, residents of the
           sparsely populated area between Charleston harbor             Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico were advised to
           and Cape Romain.                                              prepare to implement their action plans and to
                                                                         evacuate if advised by CD or other government
           After most major hurricanes, the Corps of                     agencies. Particular emphasis was placed on St.
           Engineers surveys high water marks caused by the              Croix.
           hurricane and maps areas inundated by salt water.
           Both the U.S. Geological Survey and the Corps                 Potential flooding, storm surge and beach erosion
           surveyed high water marks from Hugo's surge.                  also were highlighted. At 3 PM Sunday, September
                                                                         17, coastal flood warnings were issued for the
           Some preliminary high-water marks were obtained.              Virgin Islands and eastern Puerto Rico along with
           The tide gauge at Charleston measured 11.3 feet               a heavy surf advisory for the northern, southern
           mean low water (MLW), approximately 9.5 feet                  and eastern portions of Puerto Rico. Later that
           NGVD. This observation is questionable, however,              evening, coastal flood warnings and heavy surf
           since there was roughly a foot of water inside the            advisories were expanded even further.
           gauge-house. At the Custom House only a hundred               The midnight Sunday morning HLS urged Virgin
           yards or so away, a high-water mark of 11.5 feet              Islands residents to heed evacuation orders and to
           was measured. At McClellanville, high-water marks             contact VITEMA for more information about evac-
           of 16 to 18 feet were measured. The highest surge             uations.   This statement was included as MIC
           appeared to be at Awendaw, just a few miles                   Matos had just been in contact with VITEMA. He
           southwest of McClellanville, where a value of 20.4            stressed the need to begin preparations immediately
           feet was measured.       Figure 4-5 illustrates the
           spatial distribution of the storm tide while Figure           so that orderly evacuations could commence by
           4-6 shows the storm tide as estimated along the            us Department of commerce
           immediate coast.                                           EOAA coastal services center Library
                                                                      2234 south Hobson Avenue
                                                                      charleston, SC 29405-2413

                                                                    33



























                                                                      19.3   20.
                                                          154



                                                                                                                30
                                                                  1 .3










                                      I.3.6


                                    5.0







                     Figure 4-5. Spatial distribution of storm tides computed with the SLOSH model. The SLOSH model
                     was run with preliminary "best fit" track and storm parameters several days after Hugo. Some
                     preliminary high water marks are shown within triangles. All values of water level refer to National
                     Geodetic Vertical Datum (NGVD).








                                                                   34












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            sunrise. The 3 AM Sunday HLS urged Virgin                   Individuals were also encouraged not to use their
            Islanders to complete their emergency action plans          vehicles as roads would be impassable and their
            by the afternoon and mentioned that shelters would          presence could impede disaster relief efforts.
            open at 7 AM.
                                                                        WSFO San Juan's HLSs contained a high degree of
            In the same advisory, Hugo's track was compared             specificity to give users as much information as
            to Hurricanes San Felipe in 1928 and Betsy in               possible.  As mentioned in an earlier chapter,
            1956 both striking Puerto Rico.         San Felipe          however, the inclusion of potential hurricane land-
            severely affected the island. Both storms are well          fall areas for an island as small as Puerto Rico
            remembered and reinforced the urgency of taking             implied an accuracy greater than present forecast
            appropriate action.                                         capabilities allow. This could have posed a problem
                                                                        with local decision-makers had not the WSFO
            The 9 AM HLS       also gave information on the             coordinated so well with its users.
            opening of Puerto Rican shelters and contained
            vivid detail used to spur the public to action.
                                                                        South Carolina -- WSFO Columbia
                If the eye of Hugo moves across
                Puerto Rico as forecast, we can                         WSFO Columbia began highlighting the hurricane
                expect a 50-mile-wide path of                           watch in the public and marine forecasts at 6 PM
                extensive to extreme damage to occur.                   Wednesday, September 20, and to heighten aware-
                The storm surge will decimate the                       ness, a PNS was also issued. Shortly thereafter,
                coastal section where it comes                          the Governor's recommendation for a voluntary
                onshore. Then, hurricane-force winds                    evacuation was aired on NWR.
                will destroy wooden structures and
                uproot trees. Roofs could be removed                    A flash flood watch was posted for the coastal
                and loose objects will become lethal                    zones and the midlands of South Carolina at 4 AM
                airborne projectiles.                                   Thursday. A hurricane warning for the entire
                                                                        coast was included in the 6 AM public and marine
            Although NHC continued issuing advisories every             forecasts as well as in a 5 AM PNS while a high
            3 hours throughout the storm's passage over the             wind warning was issued for the midlands. At 8
            islands, WSFO San Juan switched to issuing HLSs             AM, a flood potential outlook for most of the state
            every 1 1/2 hours starting at midnight Monday,              was issued along with a PNS relaying the
            September 18. This effort, not trivial considering          Governor's evacuation order for the South Carolina
            that separate versions had to be prepared in both           coast. Just before 2 PM, the flash flood watch was
            English and Spanish, ensured that timely infor-             extended to include all of South Carolina.
            mation on the storm and current evacuation
            information were available to citizens of the Virgin        The WSFO began issuing HLSs approximately
            Islands and Puerto Rico.                                    every 4 hours beginning at 3 PM, Thursday,
                                                                        September 21, emphasizing high wind warnings and
            When WSFO San Juan        switched to 1 1/2 hour            the flood potential. The HLSs specified watches in
            releases, information on  the effects of the storm          effect at the time including tornado watches that
            were included.    Providing all this information            had been issued by the NSSFC.
            resulted in long statements and a concern that the
            specific action statements might be lost due to             At midnight, WSFO Columbia began issuing HLSs
            their length. Accordingly, two public information           for WSO Charleston following a power failure
            statements (PNSs) were issued before the storm              there. The WSFO continued to issue separate
            made landfall on Puerto Rico to ensure that critical        HLSs for both its own county warning area and
            information was readily available.                          that of WSO Charleston throughout the night.
                                                                        Emphasized were high winds and the dangerous
            Finally, persons were urged to stay indoors                 situation that existed with downed trees and power
            following the wrath of the storm as downed power            lines. Backup support to WSO Charleston also
            lines and mudslides would continue the threat.              consisted of preparing Charleston's HLSs as well as




                                                                  36








          relaying weather observations and providing                  lines remained in operation. The station had to
          supplementary radar surveillance.                            implement backup operations with WSFO
                                                                       Columbia. All other equipment was still operating
          WSFO Columbia provided quantitative precipitation            and the staff was able to phone observations to
          forecast (QPF) support to the River Forecast                 Columbia for entry into the AFOS system.
          Center (RFC) in Atlanta. In return, RFC Atlanta
          furnished contingency river forecasts to WSFO                Shenot maintained contact with emergency
          Columbia based upon its QPFs.                                management officials and the media as the storm
                                                                       approached the coast and continued so long as
                                                                       communications were available.
          WSO Charleston
          MIC Shenot began preparations for hurricane                  North Carolina -- WSFO Raleiah
          operations as early as Monday, September 18.
          Additional hydrogen for balloon runs and fuel oil            Amateur radio operators were alerted to begin
          for the generator were ordered. Supplies for the             regular operations at the Weather Service offices
          station, such as water, flashlights and batteries,           around the state and to set up the HAM network
          were checked. New telephone handsets were placed             on Thursday, September 21. The North Carolina
          on the NWR monitoring line and the upper air tele-           Division of Emergency Management assigned a
          phone line so they could be used as telephones               liaison to WSFO Raleigh for 48 hours before and
          when not needed for dedicated use.                           after the storm.

          On Wednesday, September 20, HAM operators were               WSFO Raleigh is responsible for providing QPF
          requested to set up operations while the office's            support to the RFCs at Slidell, Louisiana, and
          Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS) telephone                 Atlanta. These QPF amounts were based on pre-
          line was dedicated for incoming emergency calls.             vious hurricane tracks across North Carolina but
          Finally, the airport was notified to secure windows          were overestimated in the east when the track bore
          in the Weather Service Office. All preparations              further west than forecast by NHC. These QPFs
          were completed on Thursday as the station                    were also factored into contingency river forecasts
          switched to emergency power.                                 by the RFCs in WSFO Raleigh.

          WSO Charleston issued its first HLS at 6:30 PM               The Acting MIC and the Warning Preparedness
          Wednesday when the watch became effective. This              Meteorologist each worked 12-hour shifts as the
          was done primarily to provide information to resi-           WSFO hurricane coordinator for the state since
          dents of the area on actions needed to prepare for           both are familiar with the state hurricane plan.
          the storm later in the week. Additional statements           This coordinator was also responsible for contacting
          followed at 9:30 and 11:10 PM.                               the other two coastal offices and briefing them on
                                                                       the hurricane coordination calls with NHC. One
          The WSO began issuing HLSs        every 3 hours at           additional forecaster was scheduled to work all
          5:50 AM Thursday when the warning went into                  shifts to assist in disseminating information and in
          effect for the South Carolina coast. Statements              preparing analyses and forecasts. Two meteorology
          accentuated the need for action to prepare for               student volunteers from North Carolina State
          hurricane landfall in the next 12 to 24 hours. As            University worked at night to assist with tele-
          the day progressed, HLSs began to contain more of            phones and NWR.
          an urgent flavor and highlighted risks and types of
          hazards involved. The final two statements were              A flash flood watch was issued at 6 AM Thursday
          issued at 9 and 11:10 PM as the storm neared and             covering the state for that night and Friday. This
          crossed the coast.                                           was followed by a flash flood statement at 1:30 PM
                                                                       that also dealt with the possibilities of tornadoes
          Shortly after midnight, the dedicated AFOS                   and high winds over the state's central and south-
          telephone line went down, but all other telephone            eastern sections. Similar statements were issued at
                                                                       5:30 and 9:15 PM. A high wind warning was




                                                                 37








            issued at 10 PM for the east-central portion of the          threat. A number of additional statements were
            state again based on the forecast turn to the north.         issued to keep the public informed of the situation
            The high wind warning was extended at 3:15 AM                through the morning on a 1- to 3-hour basis.
            into the western sections of the state as it became
            obvious that the storm center was tracking further           The Mecklenburg County emergency management
            west than expected.                                          coordinator reported to the Emergency Operations
                                                                         Center at 3 AM, an hour after receiving the high
            Although the storm's center was tracked by radar             wind threat alert. The hour's lead time enabled
            at Columbia and Charleston, this equipment is a 5            the city to mobilize road crews, cancel school,
            cin surveillance (conventional) radar and is not             assign police to traffic control and dispatch power
            capable of determining radial velocity. In addition,         trucks to critical areas.
            the storm's track traveled through a data-sparse
            area of South Carolina. The high winds thus were             Wind gusts of more than 87 MPH and sustained
            not anticipated as far inland as they occurred.              winds of more than 65 MPH toppled trees over
            Figure 4-7 shows the path of Hugo through the                much of Charlotte. Damage was extreme as power
            Carolinas and the resulting damage swath.                    outages became widespread and roads blocked.
            Appendix E illustrates the direction of the                  Emergency management estimated $750 million in
            damaging winds across the Carolinas from Hugo as             damages in Mecklenburg County alone. The EBS
            determined from a post storm aerial survey by Dr.            failed shortly after 4 AM due to the high winds.
            Ted Fujita of the University of Chicago.                     Before this incident, warnings and statements were
                                                                         issued on EBS and NWR as well as NAWAS. NWR
            Had the planned NEXRAD been available, it could              was used extensively in disseminating warnings in
            have provided wind information on the storm as it            the county.
            moved through the Carolinas. ASOS planned for
            this area would have provided forecasters with
            continuous accurate rainfall, weather conditions and         Other North Carolina WSOs
            wind velocity observations on a real-time basis in
            data-sparse regions.                                         WSO Wilmington issued HLSs following the NHC
                                                                         bulletins. The staff briefed local coordinators and
            FINDING 4.2: NWS radars neither have the ca-                 provided information to coastal decision-makers.
            pability of measuring wind velocity nor can they
            integrate information horizontally and vertically in         Coastal area coordinators used NWR extensively to
            storms. This meant that much information had to              monitor the storm's progress. Several commented
            be inferred or was not available for the warning             that the amount of information broadcast on NWR
            process when Hugo moved over data-sparse areas.              compelled them to listen for long periods of time
                                                                         until they obtained the latest coordinates to be used
            WSO Charlotte                                                in their "decision are" techniques.
                                                                         WSO Asheville issued five flash flood and special
            OIC Kuhn contacted emergency management coor-                weather statements for high winds in its county
            dinators in his 11-county area of responsibility on          warning area. The staff also issued two flash flood
            Thursday. He alerted them to the possibility of              warnings for the several counties in the North
            high winds, heavy rains and tornadoes if the storm           Carolina mountains. Rains over 6 inches fell in
            tracked into North Carolina's southern Piedmont.             some areas resulting in several streams exceeding
                                                                         bankful and washing out several bridges. The
            Further, Kuhn advised officials to use a winter              warnings and the watch proved accurate and help-
            storm plan or winter storm contingency if there              ful in the mountain counties. There were reports
            were no specific plans for high wind warnings in             of several tornadoes in the mountains and wide-
            their counties. Coordinators received additional             spread trees down due to high winds.            WSO
            briefings shortly after 2 AM Friday to alert them to         Greensboro issued two urban and small stream
            high winds.     Special weather statements were              flood warnings' for the        northern mountains
            issued at 2 and 4 AM focusing on the high wind





                                                                   38







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           in its county warning area. A number of state-                 peak flows at a number of sites were exceeded.
           ments were issued on the high wind warning that                The Rio Fajardo (drainage area 15.9 square miles)
           covered most of the area Thursday night and                    probably peaked above the October 24, 1974,
           Friday.                                                        historical maximum of 19,600 cubic feet per second
                                                                          (cfs).
           Statements were issued by WSO Cape Hatteras
           frequently during the storm although there was no              Another gauge, the Rio Mameyes near Sabana
           serious threat to this area from Hugo. A few                   (drainage area 6.88 square miles), peaked at
           decision-makers used voluntary evacuation in some              approximately 20,000 cfs exceeding the September
           counties when northeast winds brought high waters              4, 1973, peak by about 200 cfs. Three other
           to several coastal communities Thursday afternoon.             stream gauging stations in the nearby basins of Rio
                                                                          Espiritu Santo, Rio Sabana and Rio Icacos had
                                                                          peak discharges that ranged between 38 and 90
           Floodin                                                        percent of former peaks of record. All of these
                                                                          rivers are located in northeast Puerto Rico just east
           Despite Hugo's fury that made it the most                      of San Juan (Fig. 4-9).
           damaging storm of this century, rainfall amounts               Flash flooding was reported along the Rio Pita
           were such that flooding was relatively minor.                  Haya and the Rio Espiritu Santo in northeastern
           Rainfall totals averaged between 4 to 9 inches both            Puerto Rico.
           in the Caribbean and over the U.S. mainland with
           isolated amounts in excess of 10 inches. Most                  A major killer in Puerto Rico is the mudslides
           major flood damage was inflicted on coastal areas              which can occur after heavy tropical rains.
           as a consequence of storm surges and not rainfall.             Although the potential for mudslides during
                                                                          Hurricane Hugo was great, none was reported.
           Puerto Rico/Virzin Islands                                     Advisories from NHC began highlighting the threat
                                                                          of 5 to 10 inches of rain at 6 PM Friday,
           Rainfall reports in Puerto Rico ranged from 5                  September 15.      By 6 PM the next day, the
           inches in Arecibo on the north coast to 10.6 inches            potential for large amounts over higher terrain was
           at Fajardo and to a maximum of 13.55 inches at                 mentioned.     The threat of flash floods and
           the Lower Rio Blanco gauge in the northeastern                 mudslides was introduced in advisories at 6 AM
           mountains (Fig. 4-8).        About 7 inches were               Sunday, September 17, and were slowly escalated
           measured at WSFO San Juan. The winds there,                    until, as the storm was making landfall, NHC
           however, were strong enough that the gauge may                 advisories targeted Hugo as presaging upwards of
           not have collected all of the rainfall.                        15 inches of rain and extensive flash floods and
                                                                          mudslides.
           Rainfall across the Virgin Islands was difficult to
           assess as many of the rain gauges were damaged or              Rivers in Puerto Rico are short, steep and prone to
           missing. Available data from cooperative observers             flash floods. Little more than 6 hours is needed for
           indicated rainfalls of 6 to 9 inches in the U.S.               a crest to develop in the mountains and reach the
           Virgin Islands with a maximum of 11.2 inches at                ocean.   Accordingly, no specific stage forecast
           Ham Bluff Lighthouse on the northwest coast of St.             values are generated as the crest would most likely
           Croix. Other significant amounts were 9.08 inches              occur before a specific forecast could be produced.
           at Caneel Bay Plantation in northwestern St. John
           and 5.2 inches at Water Isle off the south coast of            WSFO San Juan is not directly supported by an
           St. Thomas. The Water Isle reading appears to be               RFC. Accordingly, the WSFO must generate its
           an underestimate when viewing the radar imagery                own flash flood guidance values. The numerical
           for that area.                                                 model used to generate its flash flood guidance is
                                                                          run on a weekly basis. The flash flood guidance
           Concerning rivers in Puerto Rico, information from
           the U.S. Geological Survey showed that historical





                                                                    40























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          available to the office was run September 8. It                North Carolina
          indicated that most areas were saturated and that
          3 inches of rain in a 3-hour period would be                   Hugo entered North Carolina west of Charlotte
          sufficient to cause flash flooding.                            around daybreak on September 22.            It moved
                                                                         quickly northwest across the state, exiting over the
          Flash flood watches were posted about 7 hours                  northern mountains by noon.           Rainfall totals
          before heavy rains began in the Virgin Islands and             generally ranged from 1 to 2 inches in eastern and
          about 15 hours before heavy rains began in Puerto              western North Carolina to 3 to 5 inches in west-
          Rico. Flash flood warnings were timed to begin                 central North Carolina. Fig. 4-11 shows 48-hour
          shortly before the heavy rains moved over the                  rainfall totals for Hugo for the state.
          watch areas. After heavy rains persisted for 4
          hours or more, flash flood warnings were converted             Some individual rainfall totals, as measured by the
          to flood warnings. Mudslides were highlighted in               IFLOWS gauges, approached 7 inches. Boone,
          the statements although not to the extent NHC                  North Carolina (Watauga County), measured 6.91
          advisories did.                                                inches while Cone Ridge, North Carolina (Yancey
          The Loiza River, one of the larger rivers in Puerto            County), measured 6.23 inches.
          Rico, drains the northeastern sections of the island           There was no major river flooding in North
          and feeds the Carraizo Dam whose reservoir is San              Carolina from Hugo -- rainfall totals simply were
          Juan's water supply. After the ALERT systems'                  too small.     There was, however, some minor
          repeater failed, the WSFO staff maintained contact             flooding in the northern mountains of North
          with the Carraizo Dam personnel to keep them                   Carolina, east and north of Asheville.           Minor
          apprised of Loiza Basin rainfall from the gauges               highway flooding occurred in Allegheny, Wilkes,
          that remained available. As it was, water flooded              McDowell, Mitchell, Surry, Stokes and Watauga
          pumps that resulted in a loss of water to San Juan             Counties. Rises to near bankful occurred on the
          and the airport, including WSFO San Juan, for                  Roanoke River at Williamston.
          more than a week.
                                                                         Twenty-four hours before the storm's advent, a
                                                                         flash flood watch covered all of North Carolina.
          South Carolina                                                 WSOs Asheville and Greensboro issued flash flood
                                                                         warnings that emphasized the possibility of heavy
          Hugo came ashore at Charleston minutes before                  rainfall from Hugo and the flood dangers expected.
          midnight Friday, September 22. The storm moved
          quickly to the northwest, passing to the east of
          Columbia about 3 AM Friday and then just west of               Virginia
          Charlotte 3 hours later.
                                                                         In southwestern Virginia, small stream flood
          Rainfall amounts ranged from 6-plus inches near                warnings were issued for 12 counties in the WSO
          the south coastline to 2 to 4 inches over most of              Roanoke service area. Although the flooding was
          the rest of the state (Fig. 4-10). A maximum of                minor, the Virginia IFLOWS backbone commu-
          10.28 inches was recorded along the coast at Edisto            nications network for southwestern Virginia failed.
          Island. Charleston recorded 5.84 inches of pre-                The IFLOWS communications network piggybacks
          cipitation and Columbia recorded 2.98 inches.                  on    the    Virginia    State    Police     intrastate
                                                                         communications system. During the storm, one
          Flash flood watches were issued some 16 hours                  line-of-site repeater tower was toppled eliminating
          prior to landfall. Numerous HLSs, flood potential              communications both for IFLOWS and the State
          outlooks, river statements and flood forecasts were            Police. The Virginia State Police are investigating
          issued from early on September 21 through Sep-                 this incident to develop a fail-safe system.
          tember 26 alerting the public to the dangers of
          flooding and issuing forecasts for specific locations.






                                                                   43












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                                                                  1-   2     3     4-4 3           1 - .50
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                                                   FOR HURRICANE "HUGO"-                                                                       1
                                                  SEPTEMBER 21-23, 1989                                                                     2
                                                                   I
                                          SOURCE: NATIONAL CLIMATIC DATA CENTER                                                                         STA


                                                                                                                                        71'               7








            Local Office Working Conditions
                                                                           In both WSFO San Juan and in the Carolinas,
            Before, during and after the storm, NOAA                       hurricane duty meant working long hours without
            personnel set aside their personal concerns to                 a break. All available personnel reported for duty
            ensure that critical warning information was                   and stayed on station for the duration of the storm.
            available to local officials and the general public            Weather offices do not contain facilities or
            and that local offices and equipment remained                  sufficient area for sleeping so individuals rested or
            operational. This meant that they were away from               napped anywhere convenient. WSFO San Juan is
            their loved ones and property for an extended time             located within the airport hotel building. Rooms
            without information about their safety. This was               were provided for the staff during Hugo although
            especially so in the cases of WSFO San Juan and                no water, rest rooms or air conditioning were
            WSOs Charleston and Charlotte where personnel                  available. Shifts were frequently 12 hours or more
            were subject to considerable danger when high                  in length with no days off for up to 10 days. When
            winds and rain struck their respective areas.                  individuals returned to their homes, some found
                                                                           them in considerable disarray. Fortunately, no
            As the storm battered San Juan, rain was driven                employees or members of their families suffered
            through the hurricane shutters posing an electrical            serious injury.
            shock hazard from the equipment. Windows began
            to bow from the winds and file cabinets were                   FINDING 4.3: In all offices affected by the storm,
            pushed up against them to keep them in place.                  employees remained on duty with only a minimum
            The water supply failed shortly after the eye                  of food storage facilities, cooking and refrigeration
            brushed the coast causing a loss of air conditioning           capabilities and virtually no personal hygiene fa-
            and rest room facilities. This situation lasted for            cilities or temporary sleeping area. Most offices did
            more than a week and caused extremely difficult                not contain a safe and secure area for the pro-
            working conditions.                                            tection of employees from high winds.

            At WSO Charleston, the station experienced
            damage to the roof when the main fasteners gave                RESPONSE OF THE MEDIA
            way as the winds increased to hurricane force. The
            roof began to buckle and MIC Shenot asked em-                  Coverakre of NHC
            ployees and visitors in the office to remain in the
            interior hallways away from the upwind side of the             NHC responded to a multitude of requests for
            building.    Glass on the doors at the northeast               storm information from local, national and foreign
            corner of the building were bowing inward from the             electronic and print media. The initial wave of six
            wind pressure. It was feared that the glass would              television cameras and crews from the Miami area
            shatter and spray shards into the operations area.             grew to a flood of news interests that descended on
            When the eye passed over the station, it was                   NHC on Sunday, September 17, when Hurricane
            possible to observe the damage to the building.                Hugo smashed Guadeloupe and the British and
            The roof had buckled at many points.                The        U.S. Virgin Islands. All TV networks, along with
            inflation building was severely damaged and the                major news providers, were represented. Interviews
            door had been blown in. Winds shifted after the                were conducted at 5-minute intervals through a
            passage of the eye driving rain into the building              busy 18-hour period.
            through the weakened roof and into the operations              Dr. Sheets and key NOAA personnel called for a
            area of the office. The staff used plastic sheeting            local, regional and network pool that became
            to cover the radar and the AFOS equipment as well              effective by 5 AM Monday, September 18. Working
            as the forms and logs that were being maintained               smoothly and cooperatively, the pool ended when
            on station.                                                    Hugo dissipated inland late Friday night,
            Safe fresh water was not available and the lack of             September 22.
            water pressure disabled pressure-valve flush toilets
            in the office for several days after the storm.




                                                                      46









         During 8 days of coverage, a total of at least 700             In preparing for Hugo's arrival, the hub of activity
         spots originated from NHC. Dr. Sheets handled 70               was WSFO San Juan. Three TV channels dis-
         percent of them while the rest were handled by                 patched camera crews to WSFO San Juan while
         hurricane forecasters. Interviews were restricted to           one channel elected instead to send a crew to the
         5-minute segments with exceptions only for special             Commonwealth CD office. In addition, several
         network hurricane programs.                                    radio stations broadcast from the WSFO.             No
                                                                        camera or equipment pooling arrangements were
         Meriting special mention was coverage by Spanish-              made and interviews with the WSFO staff were
         language stations, WLTV-23 and WSCT-TV, serving                conducted on an as-needed basis. The office is
         Greater Miami and through their networks,                      short on space and lacks a good location to
         Univision and Telemundo, serving Spanish-language              accommodate the cameras and equipment for the
         stations throughout the country. Their effective               media. The spirit of cooperation between the two
         coverage was aided by the NHC in providing                     groups ensured amicable and effective operations.
         Spanish-speaking meteorologists whenever possible.
                                                                        About 150 interviews were conducted by the WSFO
                                                                        San Juan staff with media representatives
         LOCAL MEDIA COVERAGE                                           throughout the islands and on the U.S. mainland.
                                                                        MIC Matos and John Toohey-Morales, who were
                                                                        interviewed the most, stressed that errors up to 60
         Puerto Rico/Virgin Islands                                     miles were possible in the forecast track for Hugo.
                                                                        Their statements helped keep Puerto Rico and the
         While not equipped with as much           sophisticated        Virgin Islands at their highest readiness.
         equipment and weather information sources avail-
         able on the U.S. mainland, electronic and print                A significant EBS broadcast took place Sunday
         media organizations on Puerto Rico and the U.S.                around 11 PM. That broadcast included Rafael
         Virgin Islands provided extensive coverage of Hugo.            Hernandez Colon, Governor of Puerto Rico;
         Media concentrated all-out coverage 2 days before              Heriberto Acevedo, Commonwealth CD Director;
         the hurricane made landfall at St. Croix and Puerto            and MIC       Matos.        Matos presented the
         Rico.                                                          meteorological situation and introduced the
                                                                        Governor who urged all individuals to take the
         Television coverage was provided by the four                   warning information seriously. The Governor then
         stations on Puerto Rico and the four in the Virgin             introduced his CD Director who outlined the
         Islands. None has a professional meteorologist.                appropriate response actions.
         Most stations do not use NOAA Weather Wire
         relying mainly on the Associated Press (AP) and                The Governor's timely action reflected his faith in
         the United Press International (UPI) wires.                    the forecasts and information provided by the
                                                                        NWS. Coordination among the Governor, local
         With nearly 100 stations operating on Puerto Rico,             emergency management officials and the NWS
         radio played a key role in keeping citizens advised            resulted in one of the most successful evacuations
         on hurricane developments. WKAQ, which has                     ever conducted in Puerto Rico. Public response
         access to the NOAA Weather Wire, is designated as              was also heightened in the Virgin Islands due to
         the EBS station for the island and also covers the             EBS activation and live broadcasts by Alexander
         Virgin Islands. WSTX, St. Croix, and WVWI, St.                 Farrelly, Governor of the Virgin Islands and
         Thomas, also serve as EBS stations.                            William Harvey, Civil Defense Director.
         WKAQ, which must request EBS activation through                Most TV stations signed off around midnight
         the Commonwealth CD, did so eight times before                 Monday morning, but Channel 24 remained on the
         Hugo made landfall. Once activated, V*rKAQ's EBS               air with 15-minute updates until it went off the air
         broadcasts were broadcast by other radio stations.             at 7 AM Monday. WKAQ and two radio stations
         WKAQ provided timely and credible information to               broadcasting from WSFO San Juan stayed on the
         Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.                            air throughout the hurricane.         In the Virgin
                                                                        Islands, 24 hour coverage throughout the storm was





                                                                  47









             provided by radio station WSTA St. Thomas which              performances. His network services 57 stations or
             can be received in St. Croix.                                more than half of those in the state.


             Media representatives did not attempt to second              Educational Television (ETV) stationed camera and
             guess the NWS. NHC advisories and HLSs were                  crew at the Emergency Operations Center and used
             available to them, and they reported developments            NWS and NHC weather information extensively in
             without putting "a twist" or "a spin" on them.               their broadcasts and updates. It provided pool
             Media personnel relied heavily on telephone contact          coverage for the Governor's office and broadcast
             with the NWS staff. They regarded NWS at WSFO                the Governor's evacuation orders. Besides feeding
             San Juan and the NHC as authoritative and                    commercial TV, ETV operates eleven TV and seven
             reliable.                                                    radio transmitters.     News and Public Affairs
                                                                          Director Tom Fowler praised the quality of NWS
                                                                          weather information and noted that an ETV artist
             The Carolinas                                                used graphics prepared from NWS data for TV
                                                                          charting of Hugo's track.
             As South Carolina braced for Hugo's landfall, the
             broadcast media continued to air the NHC bulletins           In South Carolina, the NWS is authorized to
             but local stations began to shift emphasis more to           activate the EBS during weather emergencies.
             local NWS sources. HLSs, bolstered by NHC                    WSO Charleston activated the system at 5:52 AM
             advisories, were monitored carefully.                        Thursday, September 21. VVXTC in Charleston is
                                                                          the primary station and rebroadcasts to other
             There are four Charleston area commercial                    commercial outlets.
             television channels.      One employs its own
             meteorologist. Most media representatives were               MIC Shenot said normally there is only one
             assigned on the day of Hugo's landfall to                    activation. After that, stations receive weather
             Emergency Preparedness Headquarters which was                information through their usual channels and
             in constant communication with WSO Charleston.               broadcast at their discretion. Shenot said a major
             One TV channel camera crew aired storm coverage              development in the weather situation could lead to
             from WSO Charleston until less than 90 minutes               NWS activating this system again.          This was
             before Hugo's arrival.                                       unnecessary during Hugo.
             Media representatives were satisfied with the                Two events -- one national and the other local --
             quality of NWS weather information especially                departed from the otherwise excellent media
             noting. NOAA Weather Wire and NHC's use of                   coverage. An incident concerning Hilton Head
             hurricane probabilities. They reserved their most            Island drew the most criticism. A network evening
             eloquent praise for local Weather Service staff.             newscast portrayed island residents as dismayed
             This emphasis underscored their confidence in NWS            and frightened by lack of evacuation planning. A
             employees (who lived and worked in communities               local Hilton Head Island r*eporter dismissed the
             under Hugo's threat) as intrinsic to full and                account and noted that the evacuation was
             accurate coverage of the storm.                              successful and without incident.
             For example, News Director Jack Jones said the               The other event involved a TV channel in eastern
             South Carolina Radio Network relied heavily on               North Carolina where its meteorologist emphasized
             NWS information. He said the NWS and NHC                     the prediction of a more northward course for
             reports especially were important in covering Hugo           Hugo. Lower coast residents, responding to the TV
             since the network provides 5-minute broadcasts               presentation, pressured officials into opening public
             updated on the hour. Jones lauded NWS and NHC                shelters. Local officials described the unnecessary
                                                                          opening of the shelters as a good test of their
                                                                          sheltering capabilities.







                                                                    48










          RESPONSE OF THE EMERGENCY                                       tionship with CD in Puerto Rico allowed the
          MANAGEMENT COMMUNITY                                            dramatic inclusion of the Governor into the
                                                                          broadcast.
          Puerto Rico and Virein Islands                                  Active discussions with CD also ensured that timely
          All elected officials and emergency managers                    evacuation orders were formulated. Shortly after
          interviewed, including the Governor of Puerto Rico,             midnight Sunday, September 17, Matos advised
          the Mayor of San Juan and CD Directors of the                   Commonwealth CD that planning should begin then
          Commonwealth, San Juan and St. Croix, categor-                  to ensure an effective evacuation order by 6 AM.
          ieally stated that the coordination between them                Similarly, government officials on St. Thomas, St.
          and the WSFO San Juan was outstanding. This                     Croix and St. John were advised at 9:15 PM Satur-
          coordination ensured that local officials had the               day that evacuation needs should be addressed and
          information needed to make prompt, effective                    evacuations be completed by 10 AM Sunday. CD
          decisions. Properly informed leaders meant that                 Director Harvey stated that an evacuation order
          the public was provided authoritative information               was issued and that the people took it seriously.
          on appropriate procedures to safeguard their lives
          and property.                                                   Communications were maintained to all CD offices
          Both the Commonwealth CD and San Juan                           throughout the storm. Those to St. Croix, however,
          Municipio CD offices have NOAA Weather Wire                     were lost during the height of the storm shortly
          and N`WR. They also receive NWS broadcasts on                   after midnight Monday, September 18.
          their portable radios they carry with them in the
          field. Commonwealth CD Director Acevedo Ruiz                    The Carolinas
          also has NWR in his car.
          Most other municipio CDs do not have a drop on                  Key officials and emergency managers in the path
          the weather wire or on NWR. The city of Ponce                   of Hurricane Hugo received much of their weather
          on the south coast, however, is one of the few other            information through the NOAA Weather Wire,
          municipios that does have NWR. The Common-                      NWR and by monitoring broadcast news media.
          wealth CD office fans out weather information to                Direct personal contact coupled with the confidence
          the municipio CDs by a radio link.                              and trust that these local officials place in the
                                                                          NWS cannot be overstated. Emergency manage-
          VITEMA headquarters are located in Charlotte                    ment coordinators and most decision-makers lauded
          Amalie, St. Thomas, the capital. On St. Croix, the              actions of NWS offices and the Weather Service in
          Vice Governor and VITEMA offices are located in                 general. Among comments was that Hugo was the
          Christiansted. Information from NWR is relayed                  best-handled hurricane they experienced. South
          by radio to St. Croix from VITEMA headquarters                  Carolina's Adjutant General offered glowing praise
          in St. Thomas. NOAA Weather Wire is also                        as did the North Carolina State Emergency
          available.                                                      Operations Officer.
          During the storm, WSFO maintained frequent                      Starting Tuesday, September 19, WSFO Columbia
          telephone contact with the Commonwealth and San                 maintained regular contact with the State
          Juan CD offices and VITEMA headquarters. All                    Emergency Preparedness Division and briefed the
          CD officials interviewed by the survey team                     county EPD directors on Hugo's expected path.
          mentioned that direct contact with WSFO staff was               Thus, state and county officials could begin their
          most important in helping them to assess the                    own alert and planning processes. Further, WSFO
          impact of the storm on the area.                                Columbia notified the American Red Cross'
                                                                          Hurricane Watch District in Columbia.
          For the highly successful EBS broadcasts in Puerto              In North Carolina after initial briefings with the
          Rico, the WSFO had to request activation through                Governor's staff on September 20, WSFO Raleigh's
          the Commonwealth CD office. The working rela-                   acting MIC met separately with the Secretary of



                                                                    49










             Crime Control and Public Safety and Director of              (Charleston MIC) and he told me that the storm
             Emergency Management. Ultimately, the state                  was still coming at Charleston. I put my faith in
             emergency agency put a full-time liaison into                Dick Shenot's advice."
             WSFO Raleigh.
                                                                          In Charlotte, the County Emergency Management
             Emergency management agencies, in turn, used                 Coordinator pointed out the value of the Thursday
             NWS information to guide preparations tying them             phone call by Charlotte's OIC. His call on the high
             to evacuation planning, public information and               winds provided an hour's lead time so Charlotte
             decisions on when and where to open shelters, to             officials could mobilize. Further, the official said
             position police and National Guard troops on                 the forecast of heavy rains was used by the power
             evacuation routes and to make other assignments.             company to release water from the hydroelectric
                                                                          dam reducing flood risk in the area. Sue Myrick,
             One dramatic example of how the NWS worked                   the Mayor of Charlotte, also commented on the
             with elected officials and emergency managers was            importance of NWS weather information to her
             when MIC Palmer in Columbia talked with                      city.
             Governor Carroll A. Campbell, Jr., of South
             Carolina on Wednesday evening, September 20.                 The only known criticism from government officials
             During that discussion, he suggested that the                or emergency coordinators came from the Mayor of
             Governor call for a voluntaxy evacuation before the          McClellanville (the town which was swamped by a
             hurricane warning was posted. Palmer advised him             huge storm surge). Although many of the residents
             that the warning would be issued the next morning,           evacuated before Hugo hit, the Mayor wanted to
             that landfall would take place Thursday night and            know why NWS did not warn of the hurricane's
             that the hurricane probably would be higher than             danger. The Mayor is a member of the Local Area
             Category 2.                                                  Emergency Council but did not attend the meeting
                                                                          the night before the storm arrived.
             Acting on Palmer's advice, the Governor issued a
             voluntary evacuation recommendation for all South            The Mayor was among several hundred who took
             Carolina beach communities. He urged local                   shelter at the high school that was inundated by
             officials to help arrange voluntary evacuation and           storm surge waters. Unfortunately, this shelter --
             provided National Guard assistance. The Governor             as described previously -- was the one listed with
             also asked that persons in shelters closer to the            the erroneous elevation. Residents managed to
             coast be moved further inland since a high storm             remain above the waters until they subsided.
             surge was expected. These actions eased traffic              Several other shelters suffered roof and wall
             problems when the mandatory evacuation order                 damage.
             was issued the following morning.
                                                                          FINDING 4.4: The public receives most of its
             Emergency managers also attested to the value of             warning information from the media.            During
             how well the "decision arc" program worked in their          Hugo, both NHC and the local offices worked
             planning efforts.       However, most of them                exceptionally well with the media. This ensured
             commented that though objective methods such as              that timely, consistent and credible information was
             these were valuable, they still contacted their local        issued.
             NWS meteorologists to confirm their conclusions.
             When confronted by conflicting information,                  FINDING 4.5: In both the Caribbean and the
             whether from the objective schemes or from outside           Carolinas,    emergency managers coordinated
             sources, they turned to their local NWS office for           frequently with their local NWS offices. They
             guidance.                                                    initiated calls to gather additional information, to
                                                                          corroborate their own decisions and to receive
             A coastal community police chief in northern South           guidance.
             Carolina told survey team members, "Thursday
             afternoon, I heard on a North Carolina TV station            FINDING 4.6: NWS offices in the affected areas
             that the storm was coming ashore between Myrtle              served a most important role in saving lives. The
             Beach and Murrells Inlet. I called Dick Shenot               personnel of these offices knew local conditions and





                                                                     50









         local emergency managers. They interpreted for             broadcasts resulted from the close working relation-
         these emergency managers the implications of NHC           ship between the NWS office and the Governors'
         advisories and the appropriate local response. The         offices.
         best public response occurred where there was the
         strongest working relationship between the NWS             FINDING 4.7: The EBS in Puerto Rico can only
         and the local emergency management community.              be activated through the Commonwealth CD. In
         Participation by the Governors of Puerto Rico and          many other EBS areas, the local NWS office may
         South Carolina in the evacuation decisions and in          directly request activation of the EBS system for
                                                                    weather emergencies,
















































                                                               51


















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                                                                    Ik




                       Delivery of drinking water, Puerto Rico. Photo courtesy of Joseph Golden.










              Chapter V

              PUBLIC RESPONSE AND USER BENEFITS



          OVERVIEW                                                      local officials and emergency management agencies,
                                                                        people moved when told to do so. By and large,
          The successful public response during Hurricane               they found evacuation routes cleared and shelter
          Hugo is a result of efforts begun in 1974 when                facilities ready and available if they sought them.
          NWS created its disaster preparedness program                 In a life-saving sense, the NWS/emergency
          throughout the Nation. Together with the NOAA                 management relationship had come of age.
          Public Affairs Office, awareness materials in the
          form of brochures, films, slides and public service
          announcements were created and distributed                    PUBLIC RESPONSE
          widely. Annual preparedness meetings were con-
          ducted in coastal communities with local emergency            Puerto Rico/Virgin Islands
          managers, the media and citizens' groups. These
          activities, sponsored regularly over the past 15              Governor Colon of Puerto Rico, along with Hector
          years, were greatly responsible for public response           Luis Acevedo, the Mayor of San Juan, and Luis
          in evacuations as Hugo neared and, hence, for the             Island, the San Juan Civil Defense Director,
          low loss of life. Previous Category 4 hurricanes,             proclaimed the public's response to warnings for
          striking the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and the              Hugo as a success story. The NWS shared the
          U.S. mainland, have resulted in loss of life by the           evacuation burden with local emergency managers
          hundreds.                                                     both in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. At
                                                                        9:15 PM Sunday, September 17, WSFO San Juan
          The successful evacuations and low casualty rates             asked VITEMA to begin planning so evacuations
          reflect the growing sophistication and team efforts           could start at sunrise. Similar scenarios took place
          of the NWS and the emergency management com-                  in Puerto Rico with the Commonwealth CD and
          munity. Years of coastal planning and development             San Juan CD Directors.
          of SLOSH models and the building of evacuation
          plans around them have created a mutual trust and             The close association between WSFO San Juan and
          credibility. These cooperative efforts of NWS, the            local government was mirrored by the WSFO and
          Corps of Engineers, FEMA and regional and local               media relationship. A constant stream of weather
          groups have been buttressed by awareness cam-                 information was provided to the public and
          paigns and exercise drills, which have resulted in            decision-makers in both Spanish and English.
          the high degree of public responsiveness.                     Weather and official evacuation instructions and
                                                                        other pertinent information were issued by the
          A critical factor in the success of warning and               NWS, the Commonwealth CD and VITEMA to the
          evacuation efforts in both the Caribbean and the              media for public dissemination.
          Carolinas was the fact that Matos, MIC at San
          Juan, and Palmer, MIC at Columbia, were able to               Government and media representatives said the
          talk directly to the respective Governors and key             Hugo evacuation was the best coordinated weather
          aides as well as to state and county emergency                event they could recall. The fact that at least
          managers. As a result, they were able to provide              30,000 people evacuated in Puerto Rico, including
          the timely guidance needed for evacuation-related             areas such as San Juan's La Perla, is a credit to
          decision making.                                              everyone involved. Citizens obviously had been
                                                                        convinced of the danger. A total of 217 shelters
          Guided     by     timely,    understandable      NWS          were opened in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
          information, news media that did not second guess             An official Red Cross tally put shelter population at
          official information, and knowledgeable and credible          more than 161,000.


                                                                   53









               The Carolinas                                                    remains, she said of the NWS, "These people are
                                                                                alive because of you." Similar sentiments were
               As was so in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands,                 expressed by many other residents of storm-
               the combination of a timely and credible                         battered areas.
               forecast-warning system, coupled with close NWS
               cooperation with emergency managers, was cited as                Although Charleston coastal areas had not
               the key to successful evacuations in advance of a                experienced a major hurricane in at least a decade,
               powerful storm. The voluntary evacuation begun                   public reaction in evacuating so expeditiously was
               on Wednesday evening, September 20, was credited                 a tribute to the continuing awareness efforts of
               to Dr. Wayne Beam of the South Carolina Coastal                  WSFO Columbia's Preparedness Meteorologist and
               Council as saving lives on the vulnerable barrier                the MICs of Columbia and Charleston. It served
               islands.                                                         also as a tribute to the continuing awareness and
                                                                                preparedness efforts at the county EPD and local
               The result: thousands of people began moving                     Red Cross chapters.
               inland that evening more than 24 hours before
               Hugo's landfall. Charleston County EPD Director,                 Supporting public reaction to Hugo warnings was
               Dennis Clark, recalled that by midnight Wednesday,               a media-driven awareness of what the storm had
               a full day before the storm crossed the coast, an                done in the Caribbean and saturation warnings
               endless stream of headlights could be seen crossing              through the media.          An indicator of public
               the Cooper River Bridge into Charleston as people                acceptance of NWS and emergency management
               left coastal towns and barrier islands. They were                information supplied by the media is illustrated by
               responding both to the Governor's widely broadcast               the Public Hurricane Hotline (1-900-410-NOAA).
               statement and corollary official public information.             In 1985, Hurricane Gloria resulted in 587,000 calls.
                                                                                In 1988, Hurricane Gilbert produced 140,000 calls.
               At 6 AM Thursday when a hurricane warning was                    In contrast, Hurricane Hugo drew only 94,000 calls.
               posted for the South Carolina coast, the Governor's
               evacuation order for the barrier islands and the                 Generally, county emergency managers planned for
               coast became mandatory. Charleston County was                    the worst. Typically, they laid plans on the basis
               excepted. The Governor specified that evacuation                 of a storm a category higher than the one predicted
               be completed by 3 PM.                                            officially.

               More than 186,000 persons left their homes. Only                 At Myrtle Beach, people moved from one shelter to
               a few diehards stayed behind. Evacuations took                   another on higher ground long before the tidal
               place from Hilton Head Island to Myrtle Beach.                   surge arrived. If there was any criticism of the
               Only two persons were believed drowned in their                  warning information by emergency managers and
               homes, a remarkable fact considering the depth of                public officials, it was that, at one point, the
               the storm surge.                                                 probabilities for Myrtle Beach were higher than for
                                                                                Charleston and that the storm never did move
               Charleston residents actually responded to the                   north along the coast.
               voluntary evacuation of the Governor. A sub-
               sequent mandatory evacuation was issued by                       In both Carolinas, the response of emergency
               Charleston Mayor Joseph P. Riley, Jr. Fearing a                  managers and public officials was overwhelmingly
               tremendous storm surge, Riley ordered evacuation                 positive to NWS forecast information. Again, the
               of all one-story buildings.                                      emphasis on hurricane probabilities of Hugo's
                                                                                landfall was cited frequently as helpful. Working
               Survey team members visiting Sullivans Island and                relationships between state and local officials, and
               the Isle of Palms a week after Hugo's landfall                   the NWS were perceived as excellent. This per-
               found extensive damage. The surge had destroyed                  ception included many rural counties that obtained
               many houses and poured over the pews in the                      weather information through NOAA Weather Radio,
               Stella Maris Roman Catholic Church. A woman                      CD or the media rather than from personal contact
               who evacuated came back to see what was left of                  with NWS staff.
               her home. Looking at neighbors trying to salvage




                                                                          54










          The most vocal example of this working                           issuances of warning with longer lead times. Local
          relationship came from Charleston County EPD                     decision-makers must use hurricane probabilities in
          Director Clark. He told the survey team that he                  connection with their evacuation plans to determine
          accepted his job because of his belief in the support            when actions need to be taken. If their areas
          he would receive from Shenot, MIC at Charleston.                 require a long evacuation time, preparations for
          The Red Cross, for example, credited timely                      evacuations may have to be taken before a warning
          weather information with impelling its opening of                is issued. Local emergency managers rely heavily
          hurricane watch offices that coordinate responses of             on weather information from local NWS offices.
          local chapters. Ultimately, the organization opened              Modernization of NWS will ensure that areas
          397 shelters in the Carolinas accommodating some                 served by future NWS offices will have the
          80,000 evacuees for at least a night.                            technology and meteorological capabilities to
                                                                           provide even more site specific information directly
          The Charleston Port Authority, whose operations                  to emergency managers. This should enhance the
          were severely affected by the storm, was joined by               decision-making capabilities of public officials.
          other organizations in praising the NWS weather
          information. Included in issuing the plaudits were               Finally, although watches and warnings were timely
          the South Carolina Climatology Office which                      and information on the storm was readily available,
          assigned two staff members to act as weather                     some persons still could not fathom the magnitude
          liaison at EOC and the Governor's command post,                  of the danger. Even though storm surges of 12 to
          the South Carolina Coastal Council and the                       17 feet were forecast along the South Carolina
          military.                                                        coast, frequent responses from local residents were,
                                                                           "We didn't think it (Hugo) would be this bad!"
          Perhaps, the most telling comments came from two                 Regardless, most people understood that Hugo was
          South Carolina officials. Warren Tompkins, the                   going to hit their communities even if they did not
          Governor's Chief of Staff, said, "The information                anticipate its magnitude.
          we received was key to helping the Governor decide
          to urge early evacuation." Governor Campbell's                   FINDING 5.1: Even though much information is
          official evacuation statement was included in all                made available to the public, people still cannot
          subsequent NWS issuances. The State Adjutant                     adequately appreciate what the forecast conditions
          General, T. Eston Marchant, who commands the                     mean until they have lived through a storm.
          National Guard and Emergency Preparedness
          Department, said, "On a scale of 1 to 10, you are
          a 10. If the Governor hadn't made that decision,                 User Benefits
          we could have lost 3 to 5 thousand people.... The
          warnings and evacuation couldn't have been done                  As in other hurricane episodes, the greatest user
          any better."                                                     benefit from NWS was public safety. The storm
                                                                           was a potential killer of thousands.              Early,
          Several emergency managers and public officials                  informative advisories and serious public response
          remarked that, even with the successful evacuation,              nullified much of the storm's dangers to lives.
          there were problems in getting escape routes
          adequately policed and shelters supplied and staffed             In analyzing further the response to Hugo, it was
          in time for the first evacuees. They suggested that              evident that the continued fine-tuning of the NWS
          announcing a hurricane warning usually is the                    hurricane forecast process and the Weather
          action that triggers state and local evacuation                  Service's working relationship with emergency
          decision making (a voluntary evacuation in South                 managers, the media and the public produced the
          Carolina preceded the mandatory order) and urged                 eventual payoff when the hurricane came ashore.
          that NWS warnings be issued with longer lead                     The storm was in and the people were out -- out of
          times. These officials said this would permit more               danger.
          timely preparations for the evacuation.
                                                                           What began as a cloudy image on a satellite photo
          Unfortunately, the present state of the science is               had become a stream of headlights crossing
          such that hurricane forecast errors preclude the                 Charleston's Cooper River Bridge or leaving




                                                                     55









             low-lying areas of San Juan well before wind and            further planning and awareness efforts. Some day,
             heavy rain signaled it was too late.                        with improved building standards, land-use laws
                                                                         and regulations and continuing evacuation
             For the emergency management community, the                 planning, even fewer will perish when other
             success of Hugo evacuations set a new standard for          hurricanes cross our coasts.
























































                                                                    56





























                                                                                                      or@v

































                                                                                                 4t



                                                                                                                Is-

                        McClell anville fishing fleet, McClellanville, South Carolina.










                   Chapter V1

                   FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY CHAPTER



              CHAPTER II:                     SUMMARY              OF         FINDING 2.5: In two hurricane advisories, the
              PREPAREDNESS ACTIONS, INFORMATION                               addition of two significant changes without reasons
              AND WARNING SERVICES                                            for these changes created some problems for
                                                                              emergency managers and the media.
              FINDING 2. 1:           Errors in base elevation
              information on shelters or evacuation routes could              RECOMMENDATION 2.5: NHC should include in
              result in loss of life as evacuees move to unsafe               its advisories underlying reasons for significant
              shelters or through unsafe evacuation routes.                   forecast changes. Understanding what the forecast
                                                                              means and reasons underlying forecast changes
              RECOMMENDATION 2.1: Coastal offices should                      would increase the confidence of emergency man-
              encourage local emergency management officials to               agers and the media in the advisories used by
              verify periodically the elevation and structural                NHC, thereby, enhancing vital cooperation between
              soundness of shelters prior to the onset of the                 local NWS offices, local officials and the media. It
              hurricane season.                                               also would heighten public awareness to changes
                                                                              which require additional public response.
              FINDING 2.2: A comprehensive evacuation study
              has not been undertaken for Puerto Rico and the                 FINDING 2.6: The lack of emphasis in NHC
              Virgin Islands.                                                 public advisories for the Carolinas on inland high
                                                                              winds left the media and local officials with little
              RECOMMENDATION 2.2:                 A comprehensive             guidance on how to respond.
              evacuation study should be conducted for Puerto
              Rico and the Virgin Islands in concert with FEMA                RECOMMENDATION 2.6: NHC should include in
              and the Corps of Engineers.                Because of           its public advisories sufficient plain language
              bathymetry of the area, a wave study should be                  information on significant potential inland impacts
              part of this project.                                           contemplated to ensure a properly coordinated
                                                                              response by emergency managers and the media.
              FINDING 2.3: In         its HLSs, WSPO San Juan                 Bearing in mind that local coordination is the key
              referenced potential landfall sites with a degree of            to effective local response, the NWS should develop
              specificity that was   greater than current forecast            policy and provide guidance to NHC, other national
              capabilities allow. Frequent coordination calls with            centers and field offices on how to provide timely,
              users kept decision-makers from overly focusing on              adequate information on the inland affects of
              the forecast track.                                             hurricanes to WSFOs and to emergency managers.

              RECOMMENDATION 2.3: In preparing HLSs,
              WSFOs should ensure that references to potential                CHAPTER III: DATA COLLECTION AND
              landfall areas realistically reflect the uncertainties          COMMUNICATIONS
              involved.
                                                                              FINDING 3.1: The density of surface observations
              FINDING 2.4: In both the Caribbean and the                      in the Caribbean and the Carolinas is extremely
              Carolinas, hurricane probabilities were used in                 low. This posed a significant problem to fore-
              varying degrees by decision-makers to incorporate               casters trying to obtain information during the
              forecast uncertainties in their planning efforts.               storm.

              RECOMMENDATION 2.4: At annual workshops                         RECOMMENDATION 3.1:                 ASOS should be
              NHC should continue to emphasize to, emergency                  implemented as a part of the modernization and
              managers current forecasting capabilities and                   restructuring program to provide cost-effective,
              limitations.                                                    reliable observations in data-sparse areas.

                                                                         58









          FINDING 3.2: A dedicated connection to the                       emergency managers and the WSFO.                 In the
          Roosevelt Roads radar would ensure full radar                    Carolinas, lack of NAWAS drops from adjacent
          coverage for WSFO San Juan.                                      states hampered coordination efforts across state
                                                                           boundaries.
          RECOMMENDATION 3.2: The NWS should
          investigate acquiring a dedicated drop on the                    RECOMMENDATION 3.7:                The NWS should
          Roosevelt Roads military radar for WSFO San                      request FEMA to investigate the possibility of a
          Juan.                                                            communications system that would allow interstate
                                                                           as well as intrastate coordination between and
          FINDING 3.3: A fully operational ALERT system                    among NWS offices and emergency management
          for the Virgin Islands would assist the WSFO staff               agencies.
          in preparing flood-related warnings and assist
          VITEMA in responding to flood situations.
                                                                           CHAPTER IV: AN EVALUATION OF THE
          RECOMMENDATION 3.3: The NWS, in concert                          PROCESSING, INTERPRETATION AND
          with FEMA and VITEMA, should again explore the                   DISSEMINATION OF NWS INFORMATION
          establishment of an ALERT system in the Virgin
          Islands.                                                         FINDING 4. 1:         Aircraft reconnaissance is a
                                                                           necessary tool in hurricane forecasting.
          FINDING 3.4: Limited NOAA Weather Wire drops
          in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands resulted in                RECOMMENDATION 4.1: Aircraft reconnaissance
          few emergency managers having hard copies of                     should be continued until other sensing platforms
          Weather Service products. This increased the need                can provide data fields of equal accuracy and
          for coordination efforts at the local WSFO.                      density.

          RECOMMENDATION 3.4: The NWS should work                          FINDING 4.2: NWS radars neither have the
          with FEMA to explore funding of additional critical              capability of measuring wind velocity nor can they
          outlets on the upgraded NOAA Weather Wire in                     integrate information horizontally and vertically in
          Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.                              storms. This meant that much information had to
                                                                           be inferred or was not available for the warning
          FINDING 3.5. NWR reception is poor in the                        process when Hugo moved over data-sparse areas.
          Virgin Islands.
                                                                           RECOMMENDATION 4.2: The NWS should
          RECOMMENDATION 3.5: The NWS should work                          continue to develop and deploy the NEXRAD
          with other interests in the Virgin Islands to                    Doppler Radar.
          establish an English-language NWR transmitter to
          provide broadcasts for the Virgin Islands.                       FINDING 4.3: In all offices affected by the storm,
                                                                           employees remained on duty with only a minimum
          FINDING 3.6: WSFO San Juan and most coastal                      of food storage facilities, cooking and refrigeration
          WSOs are not on the Hurricane Hotline. Accord-                   capabilities and virtually no personnel hygiene
          ingly,   they cannot participate in routine                      facilities or temporary sleeping area. Most offices
          coordination calls with NHC, NMC and other                       did not contain a safe and secure area for the
          coastal WSFOs.                                                   protection of employees from high winds.

          RECOMMENDATION 3.6:                The NWS should                RECOMMENDATION 4.3: Construction of future
          explore replacing the current land line Hurricane                NWS offices in hurricane-prone areas should have
          Hotline with a satellite coordination system that                hardened hurricane-proofed areas for personal
          could link WSFOs, WSOs within 300 miles of the                   safety.    Reasonable amenities should also be
          coast and national centers.                                      provided including cots, limited shower facilities,
                                                                           kitchen facilities, refrigerators, emergency food
          FINDING 3.7: Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands                  supplies and backup toilet facilities.
          have no dedicated coordination line between






                                                                     59









             FINDING 4.4: The public receives most of its                    South Carolina in the evacuation decisions and in
             warning information from the media. During                      broadcasts resulted from a close working
             Hugo, both NHC and the local offices worked                     relationship between the NWS office and the
             exceptionally well with the media. This ensured                 Governors' offices.
             that timely, consistent and credible information was
             issued.                                                         RECOMMENDATION 4.6: The NWS should
                                                                             encourage local offices to maintain the close
             RECOMMENDATION 4.4: NWS offices should                          relationship with state and local emergency
             continue to work with the media to ensure that                  managers including the Governor and state staff,
             each has an understanding of the other's                        the Mayors and the local and area emergency
             responsibilities and requirements in the warning                management coordinators. NHC advisories and
             process.                                                        Hurricane Hotline discussions should encourage
                                                                             that mutual respect and trust which proved so
             FINDING 4.5: In both the Caribbean and the                      valuable during Hurricane Hugo.
             Carolinas, emergency managers coordinated
             frequently with their local NWS offices. They                   FINDING 4.7: The EBS in Puerto Rico can only
             initiated calls to gather additional information, to            be activated through the Commonwealth CD. In
             corroborate their own decisions and to receive                  many other EBS areas, the local NWS office may
             guidance.                                                       directly request activation of the EBS system for
                                                                             weather emergencies.
             RECOMMENDATION 4.5: Direct two-way links,
             that are not susceptible to outage during critical              RECOMMENDATION 4.7:                 WSFO San Juan
             weather situations, should be provided between                  should investigate the possibility of acquiring
             NWS and emergency management communications                     authority to request EBS activation directly.
             systems.
                                                                             FINDING 5. 1: Even though much information is
             FINDING 4.6: NWS offices in the affected areas                  made available to the public, people still cannot
             served a most important role in saving lives. The               adequately appreciate what the forecast conditions
             personnel of these offices knew local conditions and            mean until they have lived through a storm.
             local emergency managers. They interpreted for
             theme emergency managers the implications of NHC                RECOMMENDATION 5.1:                The NWS should
             advisories and the appropriate local response. The              continue to work with other agencies, the media
             best public response occurred where there was the               and the private sector to increase the impact of
             strongest working relationship between the NWS                  hurricane awareness program by vividly portraying
             and the local emergency management community.                   the devastating power of hurricanes and how to
             Participation by the Governors of Puerto Rico and               survive a hurricane.




















                                                                        60
























                                                                                                                                41


                                                                                                                               Ni.

                                                                                                           -NI



















                     Trees falling on homes were the major cause of damage in Charlotte, North Carolina.









           Appendix A

           SUMMARY OF RECORDED AND ESTIMATED SURFACE WIND
           SPEEDS IN HU.MICANE HUGO



           Recorded Surface Wind Speeds



           Roosevelt Roads Naval Station, PR
                  Date = Sept. 18
                  Anemometer Ht. = 23 ft.
                  Peak Gust = 120 mph @ 7:58 AM
                  Max. Sustained Speed = 98 mph
                  Max. 10-Min Mean Speed = 76 mph @ 9:20 AM

           WSFO San Juan, PR
                  Date = Sept. 18
                  Anemometer Ht. = 20 ft.
                  Peak Gust = 92 mph @ 7:52 AM
                  Max. Sustained Speed = 77 mph @ 7:50 AM
                  Max. 10-Min Mean Speed = 61 mph @ 7:50 AM

           Charleston Naval Station, SC
                  Date = Sept. 21-22
                  Anemometer Ht. = 118 ft.
                  Peak Gust = 137 mph @ 11:30-11:45 PM, Sept. 21
                  Max. Sustained Speed = N/A
                  Max. 15-Min Mean Speed = 74 mph @ 1 AM, Sept. 22

           Charleston (City Site), SC
                  Date = Sept. 21
                  Anemometer Ht. = 25 ft.
                  Peak Gust = 108 mph @ 11:40 PM
                  Max. Sustained Speed = 87 mph @ 11:30 PM

           WSO Charleston Airport, SC
                  Date = Sept. 22
                  Anemometer Ht. = 20 ft.
                  Peak Gust = 98 mph @ 12:59 AM
                  Max. Sustained Speed = 78 mph @ 1:03 AM
                  Max. 10-Min Mean Speed = 59 mph @ 1:10 AM

           Myrtle Beach AFB, SC
                  Date = Sept. 22
                  Anemometer Ht. = 15 ft.
                  Peak Gust = 76 mph @ 1:55 AM
                  Max. Sustained Speed = 52 mph @ 1:55 AM





                                                       A-1










              Shaw AFB, SC
                     Date = Sept. 22
                     Anemometer Ht. = 15 ft.
                     Peak Gust = 109 mph @ 2:46 AM
                     Max. Sustained Speed = 67 mph @ 2:55 AM

              WSFO Columbia, SC
                     Date = Sept. 22
                     Anemometer Ht. = 20 ft.
                     Peak Gust = 70 mph @ 3:27 AM
                     Max. Sustained Speed = 48 mph @ 3:50 AM
                     Max. 10-Min Mean Speed = 46 mph @ 3:20 AM

              WSO Charlotte, NC
                     Date = Sept. 22
                     Anemometer Ht. = 20 ft.
                     Peak Gust = 87 mph @ 5:20 AM
                     Max. Sustained Speed = 46 mph @ 5:51 AM
                     Max. 10-Min Mean Speed = 38 mph @ 6:20 AM

                                             Courtesy of
                                                R. D. Marshall
                                                Research Structural Engineer
                                                National Institute of
                                                  Standards and Technology































                                                        A-2












                                              ESTIMATED SURFACE WIND SPEEDS



                                         Estimated as a reduction of aircraft observations and
                                                  700 mb analyses to surface values and
                                                 inferred speeds due to damage patterns

                      Location                            Sustained (MPH)                         Gusts (MPH)


                      St. Croix                                   132                                 161
                      Sts. Thomas/John                            98                                  121
                      Vieques                                     109                                 132
                      Culebra                                     121                                 150



                                                                  Courtesy of
                                                                     Joseph Golden
                                                                     Senior Meteorologist
                                                                     Office of the Chief Scientist
                                                                     NOAA







                                              ESTIMATED SURFACE WIND SPEEDS



                      Location                            Sustained (MPH)                              Gusts

                      14o31'N,54o35'W                             160,                                  N/A
                        (East of Guadeloupe)

                      Bulls Bay                                   135*2                                 N/A
                        South Carolina



                                                                  Courtesy of
                                                                     Robert Sheets
                                                                     Director, National Hurricane Center
                                                                     NOAA









                      Estimated using step frequency micro wave radiometer aboard NOAA Research Aircraft.

                 2    Estimated from a reduction of observed flight level winds and the empirical pressure wind relationship.





                                                                       A-3









            Appendix B

            SAFFIR-SIMPSON HURRICANE SCALE



            This can be used to give an estimate of the potential property damage and flooding expected along the
            coast with a hurricane.



            Catego          Definition -- Effects

            ONE             Winds 74-95 MPH or storm surge 4-5 feet above normal. No real damage to building
                            structures. Damage primarily to unanchored mobile homes, shrubbery and trees. Also,
                            some coastal road flooding and minor pier damage.

            TWO             Winds 96-110 MPH or storm surge 6-8 feet above normal. Some roofing material, door
                            and window damage to buildings. Considerable damage to vegetation, mobile homes
                            and piers. Coastal and low-lying escape routes flood 2-4 hours before arrival of center.
                            Small craft in unprotected anchorages break moorings.

            THREE           Winds 111- 130 MPH or storm surge 9-12 feet above normal. Some structural damage
                            to small residences and utility buildings with a minor amount of curtainwall failures.
                            Mobile homes are destroyed. Flooding near the coast destroys smaller structures with
                            larger structures damaged by floating debris. Terrain continuously lower than 5 feet
                            ASL may be flooded inland 8 miles or more.

            FOUR            Winds 131-155 MPH or storm surge 13-18 feet above normal. More extensive
                            curtainwall failures with some complete roof structure failure on small residences.
                            Major erosion of beach areas. Major damage to lower floors of structures near the
                            shore. Terrain continuously lower than 10 feet ASL may be flooded requiring massive
                            evacuation of residential areas inland as far as 6 miles.


            FIVE            Winds greater- than 155 MPH or storm surge greater than 18 feet above normal.
                            Complete roof failure on many residences and industrial buildings. Some complete
                            building failures with small utility buildings blown over or away. Major damage to
                            lower floors of all structures located less than 15 feet ASL and within 500 yards of the
                            shoreline. Massive evacuation of residential areas on low ground with 5-10 miles of
                            the shoreline may be required.

















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            Appendix C

            FUJITA TORNADO INTENSITY SCALE



            Categrory       Definition -- Effects


            (FO)            Gale tornado (40-72 MPH): Li-aht damage. Some damage to chimneys; break branches
                            off trees; push over shallow-rooted trees; damage sign boards.

            (FI)            Moderate tornado (73-112 MPH): M2derate damage. The lower limit is the beginning
                            of hurricane wind speed; peel surface off roofs; mobile homes pushed off foundations
                            or overturned; moving autos pushed off the roads.

            (F2)            Significant tornado (113-157 MPH): Considerable damage. Roofs torn off frame
                            houses; mobile homes demolished; boxcars pushed over; large trees snapped or uprooted;
                            light-object missiles generated.

            (F3)            Severe Tornado (158-206 MPH): Severe damaize. Roofs and some walls torn off
                            well-constructed houses; trains overturned; most trees in forest uprooted; heavy cars
                            lifted off ground and thrown.

            (F4)            Devastating tornado (207-260 MPH): Devastating dama . Well-constructed houses
                            leveled; structure with weak foundation blown off some distance; cars thrown and large
                            missiles generated.

            JF5
                            Incredible tornado (261-318 MPH): Incredible dama . Strong frame houses lifted off
                            foundations and carried considerable distance to disintegrate; automobile sized missiles
                            fly through the air in excess of 100 yards; trees debarked; incredible phenomena will
                            occur.








































                                                              C-1










             Appendix D

             SLOSH MODELING


             Most segments of coastline have experienced few, if any, landfalling hurricanes. Intense hurricanes
             are rare. During this century, only two Category 5 hurricanes made landfall in this country -- the
             1935 Labor Day Hurricane in the Florida Keys and 1969 Hurricane Camille which made landfall at
             Pass Christian, Mississippi. Massive devastation occurred in each area. What could happen in an area
             like Charleston from a major hurricane? How much flooding could be experienced? How far inland
             would flooding extend? These are some of the questions that can be asked of a numerical model.

             The first step of a SLOSH simulation study is to choose representative hurricanes. The climatology
             of hurricanes that came within 50 nautical miles of Charleston was examined to choose representative
             hurricane characteristics, directions and forward speeds. Hurricane track directions were chosen as
             west, north, northwest and northeast. For each track direction, a series of parallel tracks were
             determined making landfall approximately 15 to 20 miles apart along the entire coast. One forward
             speed was selected for each of the track directions. For example, a 12 MPH forward speed was chosen
             for hurricanes moving in a northeasterly direction. Hurricanes of Saffir-Simpson Scale Categories I
             to 5 were simulated in the study. A total of 214 hurricanes were simulated in the Charleston
             simulation study.

             The SLOSH model creates a large volume of data from each "forecast" of a hurricane. In order for
             the model's results to be useful and practical, the massive amounts of data generated by a simulation
             run needed to be condensed. One such way is to composite the output from several similar SLOSH
             runs forming one "output" or map from many individual runs. This was done by producing MEOW
             maps. This composite is formed as the highest surge height at each SLOSH grid-square generated by
             any of the composited runs. Typically, a MEOW is created for all runs of a given category and track
             direction. For example, a MEOW is created from all northerly tracks of Category 2 moving at 20
             MPH. The result is an overestimate for the flooding of any single hurricane of these characteristics
             but represents the potential flooding from this type of hurricane.

             The MEOW concept has proven extremely useful in evacuation planning. When evacuation decisions
             need to be made -- roughly 18 to 24 hours in advance of the storm's landfall -- the NWS's forecast
             position has an average error of roughly 100 miles. NWS cannot say with precision that, in the next
             24 hours, a hurricane will strike Charleston, Savannah or Myrtle Beach. The MEOW concept now
             takes on great significance. By evacuating for the MEOW, or potential flooding, the emergency
             manager is relatively certain that the proper segment of coastline is evacuated.

             In reality, either of two conditions is examined to determine when an evacuation should be completed:
             when winds get to tropical storm force (40 mph) or when roadways become flooded. Tropical storm
             force winds are typically the cutoff for moving vehicles (especially those with large cross-sections) over
             bridges. The second condition -- flooding -- poses an obvious threat to vehicles moving through water.
             In most instances, tropical storm force winds are encountered first.













                                                                D-1









                 Appendix E



                                               Direction of Damaging (All) Winds

                                                                                   N so              11,       HURRICANE HUGO (1989)
                                               MECKLENBURG//              I --                     - 11.1
                                                                                                         1  0    10
                                                                                                                     2P    1P  @o  So
                               ORK                                                                                                      60  7o   so   go  look.
                     -35                                      UNION                            RICHMOND                                                ongli
                               444A" 'PAP                                    ANSON   +                   31S:f0     lb      26    k      46      56      6b-l"
                                          I'..                                                           I I  @Ist WIND     -2@d WIND
                                      Mw                                                                                        7`6
                                   4444                                                                  SCOTLAND


                                                                                                                          ROBESON
                            CHESTER                  LANCASTER            CHESTERFIELD                                                        BLADEN
                                                                                                 MARLBORO



                          A   FAIRFIELD
                                                                                                             DILLON
                                                       KERSHAW                      DARLING"ON
                                                                   I                                                                               Q)
                                                                                                                                        COLUMBUS
                                         44 4 44444 0
                                               4   L4'
                                               44  4                   LZE
                                                                 tI@-; .           z
                                                         - k                                             J-NIARION
                                                                          -V%O.
                                               &RICHLAND                                                                    MORRY                   BRUNSWICK
                                               4    N444         0                             FLORENCE    1
                                                                                       47@                                      +
                            LEXINGTON                              JISUMTER                          16* -a.."         4.
                                                                  All!                        Ale-
                                                                                         /4,
                                                                                                          49-     Ao.

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                                                                           r

                      BARNWELL
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                       ALLEN DALE
                      33                                                       4
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                                     114.
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                         \@HATHAM
                                                                                     8.0

                                                                Based on serial mapping and Photography on Sep.27                              Oct.2, 1989



                                                                                        E-1



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