[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]







                STAT OF CO
                      N4,





                    01



            Natural Disaster Survey Report

            Hurricane Marilyn
            September 15-16, 1995










                                      4N,







            U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
            National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
            National Weather Service, Silver Spring, Maryland

   QC
   945
    U642
   H87
   1996























































             Front Cover: NOAA Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite image of
             Hurricane Marilyn taken at 1:45 p.m., AST, September 15, 1995, as the storm approached
             the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.











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           Natural Disaster Survey Report


           Hurricane Marilyn
           September 15-16, 1995









           January 1996
                                     Property of CSC Library












           US  'DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
           Ronald H. Brown, Secretary

           National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
           Dr. D. James Baker, Administrator

           National Weather Service
             A"'     S%I-I
































           Dr. Elbert W. Friday, Jr., Assistant Administrator

                                  US Department of commerce
                                  NOAA Coastal services Center Library
                                  2234 South Hobson Avenue
                                  Charleston, SC 29405-2413










                                                  Preface


            Hurricane Marilyn wreaked havoc in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. This was
            just a week after Hurricane Luis posed a major threat to the same islands. Much the
            same region was devastated in 1989 by Hurricane Hugo. It is a tribute to the people of
            the region that they are rebuilding once again. Our thoughts and prayers reach out to
            each person who has survived these ordeals and is forging ahead. Furthermore, I
            congratulate all of those in the National Weather Service (NWS) who provided excellent
            services even in the face of a significant threat to themselves and their families. Their
            dedication and professionalism are an inspiration for all of us.





                                                            Dr. Elbert W. Friday, Jr.

                                                            January 1996
                                                            Dr. Elbert W@Fri@day, @Jr










                                                  Foreword


              This report on Hurricane Marilyn was prepared by the Disaster Survey Team (DST) after
              4 days of visits to the affected areas, including interviews with a number of individuals
              who experienced the full fury of the storm on St. Thomas. The team also visited the NWS
              offices that provided the warning, watch, and forecast services to Puerto Rico and the
              U.S. Virgin Islands and spoke with Fedetal, Commonwealth, and local officials in the
              impacted areas.

              The team is grateful to the many officials who took time from their duties in support of
              the recovery efforts to share with us their impressions of the events before and during the
              onslaught of the hurricane. The evaluations and insights they provided form the basis of
              the many findings and recommendations contained in this Report. We also appreciate the
              patience of the numerous citizens who spoke with us while still dealing directly with
              repairing the damage done to their personal lives.

              In carrying out our assignment, we were impressed with the dedication and resolve of all
              of those dedicated in the response. We gratefully applaud each of the individuals
              involved. They can be proud of what they accomplished in preparing for the storm, in
              responding to the devastation resulting from the passage of Hurricane Marilyn, and in
              mitigating the impacts of future hurricanes.




                                                              The Disaster Survey Team









                                    The Disaster Survey Team


             Hurricane Marilyn struck the U.S. Virgin Islands and the eastern portions of Puerto Rico
             on September 15 and 16, 1995. As is frequently done after major weather events, the
             NWS formed a DST on September 18 for the purpose of reviewing NWS performance
             during Marilyn.

             Those services were provided by the National Hurricane Center (NHC), located in Miami,
             Florida, and the Weather Service Forecast Office (WSFO) in San Juan, Puerto Rico.
             Consequently, the DST visited both of those offices. One team member also visited the
             Hydrometeorological Prediction Center (HPQ of the National Centers for Environmental
             Prediction (NCEP), located outside Washington, D.C. NCEP is the parent organization of
             NHC, and the HPC provides backup for NHC and assistance in determining the forecast
             track of each tropical cyclone. The data all team members gathered during their visits as
             well as follow up contacts forms the basis of this Report.

             The team members and their affiliation are listed below.



                                                Team Members

             Team Leader, Donald Wernly, NWS Office of Meteorology, Chief, Customer Service,
             Silver Spring, Maryland.

             Team Technical Leader, Kevin C. McCarthy, NWS Office of Meteorology, Tropical
             Cyclone Program Leader, Silver Spring, Maryland.

             Subject Matter Specialist, Gary Woodall, NWS Southern Region Headquarters (SRH),
             Regional Warning Coordination Meteorologist (WCM), Ft. Worth, Texas.

             Subject Matter Specialist, Stephen Harned, Meteorologist in Charge (MIC), WSFO
             Raleigh, North Carolina,

             Subject Matter Specialist, Reggina Garza, Hydrologist, Southeast River Forecast
             Center (SERFC), Atlanta, Georgia.

             Subject Matter Specialist, Matt Stout, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
             Administration (NOAA) Office of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.

             Outside Consultant, Dr. Kevin A. K7oesel, Associate Professor of Meteorology, Florida
             State University, Tallahassee, Florida.

             Technical Editor, Linda Kremkau, Office of Meteorology, Customer Service, Silver
             Spring, Maryland.




                                                         iv










                                             Table of Contents

                                                                                                   Pagre


              Preface    ...........................................................                   ii


              Foreword    ..........................................................                   iii


              The Disaster Survey Team      ............................................               iv

              Acronyms and Abbreviations     ............................................              vi

              Executive Summary      .................................................                vii

              Major Findings and Recommendations       ...................................             ix

              Chapter 1          The Event and Its Impact    ...............................            1

              Chapter 2          Hydrometeorological Analysis   ............................           19

              Chapter 3          Preparedness Activities  .................................            21

              Chapter 4          User Response   .........................................             25

              Chapter 5          National Weather Service Performance    .....................         31

              Appendix A         Listing of Deaths Directly Associated with Hurricane Marilyn   ...  A-1

              Appendix B         Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale   ............................       B-1

              Appendix C         Report on Aerial Survey of Damage from Hurricane Marilyn     .....  C-1

              Appendix D         Preliminary USGS River Gage Heights and Discharges during
                                 Hurricane Marilyn    ....................................           D-1

              Appendix E         Description of NHC Forecast Procedures and Forecast Errors
                                 Associated with Hurricane Marilyn   ........................        E-1

              Appendix F         Fiscal Year 1995 Preparedness Activities of
                                 WSFO San Juan, Puerto Rico     ............................         F-1

              Appendix G         Sample Products from NHC      ..............................        G-1

              Appendix H         Sample Hurricane Local Statements and Short Term Forecasts
                                 from WSFO San Juan      ..................................          H-1





                                                           v









                        Acronyms and Abbreviations


         AP           Associated Press
         ASOS         Automated Surface Observing System
         AST          Atlantic Standard Time
         AVN          Global Spectral Model for Aviation
         CD           Civil Defense
         CPCS         Common Program Control Station
         DST          Disaster Survey Team
         EAS          Emergency Alert System
         EBS          Emergency Broadcast System
         FEMA         Federal Emergency Management Agency
         FFA          Flash Flood Watch
         FFG          Flash Flood Guidance
         FFW          Flash Flood Warning
         HLS          Hurricane Local Statement
         HPC          Hydrometeorological Prediction Center
         kt           knot
         MAR          Modernization and Associated Restructuring
         mb           millibar
         MIC          Meteorologist in Charge
         mph          miles per hour
         NCEP         National Centers for Environmental Prediction
         NGWLMS       Next Generation Water Level Measurement System
         NHC          National Hurricane Center
         nm           nautical miles
         NOAA         National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
         NOS          National Ocean Service
         NOW          NWS Identifier for the Short Term Forecast
         NWR          NOAA Weather Radio
         NWS          National Weather Service
         NWWS         NOAA Weather Wire Service
         PSA          Public Service Announcement
         RFC          River Forecast Center
         SAB          Synoptic Analysis Branch
         SERFC        Southeast River Forecast Center
         SRH          Southern Region Headquarters
         TCD          Tropical Cyclone Discussion
         USDA         U.S. Department of Agriculture
         USGS         U.S. Geological Survey
         VITEMA       Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Management Agency
         WCM          Warning Coordination Meteorologist
         WSFO         Weather Service Forecast Office
         WSR-88D      Weather Surveillance Radar-1988 (Doppler)




                                         vi









                                            Executive Summary


               Marilyn was the first hurricane to strike the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico since
               Hugo devastated the islands, almost to the day, 7 years earlier. Although Marilyn was
               not as intense, its effects were still dramatic. Eight deaths occurred, mostly on
               St. Thomas, mainly as a result of persons trying to ride out the storm on their boats.
               Preliminary damage estimates from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
               totaled $2.1 billion with a majority of that centered on the city of Charlotte Amalie on
               St. Thomas. This figure does not include indirect costs, such as the loss of tourism.

               The tropical depression that became Hurricane Marilyn formed just east of the Windward
               Islands on September 12, 1995. The depression rapidly increased to tropical storm
               strength (i.e., maximum 1-minute sustained winds between 39 and 73 miles per hour
               [mph]) later that same night and to hurricane force (i.e., 74 mph or greater) late on
               the evening of September 13. Initial computer model forecasts projected the storm to
               move west across the northern Windward Islands and into the central Caribbean Sea.
               Succeeding forecasts adjusted the track of the storm to a more northwesterly course until
               the northern Leeward Islands and Puerto Rico were forecast to be affected. Overall,
               official forecast track errors were dramatically less than the 10-year average which is an
               exceptionally good performance by NHC (see appendix E).

               A hurricane watch was issued by the NHC for the U.S. Virgin Islands at 8 a.m., Atlantic
               Standard Time (AST), Thursday, September 14. This watch was extended to include
               Puerto Rico at 11 a.m., AST. The watch was in effect 33 to 38 hours prior to landfall in
               the U.S. controlled islands. The hurricane watches were upgraded to hurricane warnings
               at 5 p.m., AST, Thursday, which provided 24 hours advance warning for St. Croix and
               30 hours advance warning for St. Thomas and Puerto Rico. This included nearly a full
               daylight period for the U.S. Virgin Islands which is NHC's goal for planning warning
               issuances.


               Marilyn's eye passed across the east end of St. Croix where an amateur radio operator
               reported an unconfirmed wind gust of 127 mph around 5 p.m., AST, Friday, September
               15. The eye then passed between St. Thomas and Culebra with the most devastating
               portion of the eyewall moving across the west part of St. Thomas. Here, both storm surge
               and wind caused widespread destruction. The Automated Surface Observing System
               (ASOS), located at the St. Thomas airport, recorded sustained winds of 104 mph with a
               maximum gust to 129 mph around midnight, September 15-16. These are the strongest
               recorded winds associated with Marilyn. Wind gusts approaching 140 mph were
               estimated from an aerial damage survey conducted soon after the hurricane's passage.
               Heavy rains, mudslides, and strong winds pounded Culebra and Vieques where damage
               was also considerable. Marilyn did not severely impact the main island of Puerto Rico
               although some strong winds and heavy rains did affect the island.

               The WSFO in San Juan has warning and forecast responsibility for all of Puerto Rico, its
               associated islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The office has moved to its new quarters
               as part of the NWS modernization but has not yet had its Doppler weather surveillance
               radar (WSR-88D) installed. The radar installation is scheduled for February 1996.

                                                            vii











             The WSFO was very proactive in preparing all of the emergency managers, the media,
             and the general public. There were a variety of activities conducted by the WSFO staff in
             1995. Those activities ranged from a training workshop in hurricane preparedness for
             emergency managers and the media, to a hurricane awareness week for Puerto Rico in
             June 1995 in cooperation with the Puerto Rico Civil Defense (CD) Agency, to numerous
             individual school visits and presentations.

             The effectiveness of these contacts was directly reflected in the interviews by the DST
             with the emergency managers and media. Those interviews were all extremely positive
             with literally each of the interviewees giving high praise to the local NWS staff for their
             efforts, availability, and hard work before, during, and after the passage of Marilyn.
             Perhaps even more telling of the effectiveness of the preparedness efforts by the WSFO
             staff was the extraordinarily low death toll in relation to the magnitude of the devastation
             in the U.S. Virgin Islands and the islands off the eastern tip of Puerto Rico.

             Although warnings and watches from NHC were issued well in advance and releases from
             the WSFO were timely and highly detailed, the media, emergency managers, and the
             public did not expect the storm to be as strong or as devastating as it was. Many of those
             interviewed attributed this to the perceived small size of Hurricane Marilyn as compared
             to Hurricane Luis which had threatened them the previous week. Similarly, many local
             officials and residents did not appreciate that the hurricane was forecast to increase in
             strength overnight from its category 1 intensity on the Saffir-Simpson scale that was
             observed Thursday night, September 14, and early Friday, September 15. This suggests
             that the NWS should explore additional means to communicate the effects of storms in
             their products and services.






























                                                          Vfii









                          Major Findings and Recommendations


              Finding 1-1 NHC advisories only contain forecasts for surface winds at standard
              anemometer heights (33 ft) even though stronger winds occur at higher elevations within
              hurricanes.


              Recommendation 1-1: To enhance their public advisories, NHC should adopt specific
              wording related to stronger winds at higher elevations for use in the Caribbean where
              elevation frequently increases rapidly close to the coast.


              Findina 3-1 WSFO San Juan conducted an aggressive preparedness education
              campaign with local emergency managers and the media in both Puerto Rico and the
              U.S. Virgin Islands.

              Recommendation 3-1: The WSFO staff should continue these excellent efforts, with
              the WCM and MIC leading an areawide campaign.

              Finding 3-2 VITEMA officials were not able to attend the FEMA-funded training in
              hurricane preparedness that was conducted at NHC in January 1995. This training
              would have been useful in responding to the threat of Marilyn.

              Recommendation 3-2: The NWS and FEMA should encourage VITEMA officials to
              take advantage of future training opportunities.

              Findina 3-3 The coordination between NWS Headquarters and FEMA, prior to
              Marilyn's landfall, assisted FEMA in the prepositioning of recovery personnel and
              equipment.

              Recommendation 3-3: Direct involvement of NHC and WSFO San Juan would have
              further enhanced FEMA's efforts with less potential for inconsistencies. NWS
              Headquarters should develop a formal plan for coordination between FEMA and the NWS
              field offices for implementation prior to the next hurricane season.


              Findine 4-1 The NWWS is not affordable in the Caribbean with the result that there
              are very few drops in the region. Some NWS products, most notably the Short Term
              Forecast (NOW), were not broadcast by the media and were only available over NVTR.

              Recommendation 4-1: The NWS should work with emergency management officials,
              the media, and the private sector to explore additional opportunities for the delivery of
              critical weather information in the region.






                                                        ix










            Findina 4-2: There were too few playback decks on the San Juan old technology NWR
            console. This caused difficulty in preparing broadcast text and keeping the program up to
            date. Many emergency management officials and media outlets noted that the NWR
            Spanish broadcasts were not timely.

            Recommendation 4-2: WSFO San Juan should be provided with a digital NWR console
            to improve the flexibility and reliability of the NWR programming system.

            Findina 4-3: The WSFO staff was invited to participate in the Governor's press
            conferences which were held at a considerable distance from the WSFO. Although these
            press conferences were highly effective, they placed an additional burden on the staff.

            Recommendation 4-3: Plans should be developed for using the WSFO multipurpose
            room as a media center with video-teleconferencing capabilities to provide briefings and
            conferences with local officials. Puerto Rico Civil Defense and the media have expressed a
            willingness to share costs in establishing this capability.

            Finding 4-4: The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Civil Defense allows concerned agencies
            to directly coordinate with each other, regarding EBS/EAS activations, rather than forcing
            all coordination through the Emergency Operations Center. Except for the San Juan
            CPCS-1 station, however, broadcast stations in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands
            were not ready for the implementation of the new EAS.

            Recommendation 4-4: The NWS should continue to work vigorously with the Federal
            Communications Commission and FEMA to establish the EAS in Puerto Rico and the
            U.S. Virgin Islands.

            Finding 4-5: On St. Thomas, both VITEMA and the public felt that they were not
            adequately apprised of what Marilyn's intensity would be once she made landfall.

            Recomm e*ndation 4-5: NHC and WSFO personnel must continue to work with users to
            determine the best way to communicate intensity changes.


            Findina 5-1: NHC's track forecasts for when Marilyn affected the U.S. Virgin Island.6
            and PuertoTRico were highly accurate with errors less than one-third the usual
            magnitude.

            Findinjg 5-2- The NHC telephone system became overloaded during storms when up to
            1,200 calls an hour were received. At these times, the NHC staff could not make vital
            coordination calls.


            Recommendation 5-2: A separate phone system should be provided to handle the
            recorded advisories. Isolating the NHC operational staff from that system will facilitate
            coordination and data collection.


            Findinir 5-3: In the event that NHC loses operational capabilities, the HPC of the
            NCEP may not be adequately prepared to provide immediate operational backup for NHC
            since the Backup Hurricane Operations Plan has not been fully tested.


                                                         X











              Recommendation 5-3: The Backup Hurricane Operations Plan should be tested at
              least twice a year.

              Finding 5-4 A revised method of depicting both the official hurricane position and
              forecast track is needed to convey the radius of influence of the storin and the uncertainty
              in the forecast.


              Recommendation 5-4: The NWS should work with its customers to identify new
              methods of representing both the radius of damaging winds and forecast track
              uncertainty.

              Finding 5-5 Some users,focused on several model scenarios presented in the TCD and,
              despite the reasoning presented in the products, made their own interpretations of the
              official NHC forecasts.


              Recommendation 5-5: In order to discourage this practice, the TCD should convey first
              and foremost the official forecast track, with a discussion of forecast uncertainty due to
              differences between numerical models.


              Findina 5-6 The entire WSFO San Juan staff showed great devotion to duty and
              exhibited the highest level of professional performance during Hurricane Marilyn.

              Recommendation 5-6: The NWS should provide appropriate recognition for the WSFO
              San Juan staff.


              Finding 5-7 The WSFO San Juan's HLSs were too long which made it difficult for
              users to find specific information.

              Recommendation 5-7: WSFO San Juan should segment their HLSs to ensure
              customers can quickly locate desired information.

              Finding 5-8 Although the WSFO issued effective short-term forecasts to complement
              their HLSs and provide additional details on Marilyn, further specificity would have been
              available if the WSR-88D was installed.


              Recommendation 5-8: The WSR-88D should be installed, accepted, and commissioned
              as soon as possible.

              Finding 5-9 The hydrologic data collection network in the WSFO area of responsibility
              is insufficient. This hampered efforts to determine how much rain fell throughout the
              region during Marilyn. In the past, the WSFO has provided warnings with only
              qualitative data reports.

              Recommendation 5-9: The hydrologic data collection network should be expanded,
              taking into consideration (a) required density of gages, (b) adequacy of maintenance of
              gages, and (c) reliability of the communications link to the WSFO.





                                                         xi









                                                   Chapter I

                                      The Event and Its Impact


               The number of deaths directly related to Marilyn was eight with most of those occurring
               on St. Thomas and mostly as a result of people trying to ride out the storm on their
               sailboats. The total death toll was remarkably low considering the severity of the
               damage. This was perhaps a testimony to the quality of the forecasts and preparedness
               activities that took place before the storm. See appendix A for a listing of the deaths
               directly related to Marilyn. The preliminary damage estimates have been set by FEMA at
               $2.1 billion with the city of Charlotte Amalie and the rest of St. Thomas suffering the
               major part of the destruction.

               Most of the damage to the U.S. Virgin Islands was the result of wind except for the storm
               surge along the immediate coast. This included 21,000 homes damaged or destroyed,
               5,800 utility poles damaged, desalinization plant on St. Thomas inoperative, and repair of
               two sewage treatment plants required.

               In contrast, most of the damage in Puerto Rico was the result of flooding. Ten
               municipalities on the mainland of Puerto Rico were declared disaster areas due to the
               flooding-Aguas Buenas, Barranquitas, Canovanas, Carolina, Fajardo, Juncos, Loiza,
               Naguabo, Ceiba, and Comerio. Two other municipalities, San Lorenzo and Ciales, were
               declared eligible for infrastructure help only. Damage estimates for Puerto Rico,
               including Culebra and Vieques, were set at $10 million.

               Tropical Depression Fifteen formed just east of the Windward Islands on Tuesday,
               September 12, 1995. The depression rapidly increased in intensity to tropical storm
               strength and was named Marilyn late that same night. Marilyn was further upgraded to
               a hurricane Wednesday afternoon, September 13. Computer models of the atmosphere
               initially projected Marilyn to move west across the northern Windward Islands and into
               the central Caribbean Sea. This was reflected in the official forecasts prepared by NHC.
               Succeeding forecasts adjusted the track of the storm to the right or on a more
               northwesterly course until the northern Leeward Islands and Puerto Rico were forecast to
               receive a direct strike from the hurricane.


               A hurricane watch was issued by NHC for the U.S. Virgin Islands at 8 a.m., AST,
               Thursday, September 14. This watch was extended west to Puerto Rico at 11 a.m., AST,
               that same morning. The watch was in effect 33 to 38 hours prior to landfall in the U.S.
               controlled islands. Even before the hurricane watch was posted, WSFO San Juan alerted
               the emergency management officials in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, other
               government officials, and the media to'the threat posed by the developing tropical cyclone.
               Through these agencies and media, word of the approaching storm was relayed to the
               general public in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and preliminary preparations
               were begun. It should be noted that this'was just 1 week after the area was threatened
               by a category 4 hurricane-Hurricane Luis. See Appendix B, Saffir-Simpson Hurricane
               Scale. Notifications and preparations increased from the WSFO once the hurricane watch


                                                           1









            was placed into effect. The hurricane watches were replaced by hurricane warnings at
            5 p.m., AST, Thursday, September 14, or about 24 hours in advance of landfall of the eye
            on St. Croix.


            Tropical storm-force gusts accompanied by heavy rain were felt on the U.S. Virgin Islands,
            beginning Friday morning, September 15. Winds increased steadily throughout the day,
            and gusts to hurricane force were first felt on St. Croix about 4 p.m., AST, causing power
            outages, communications failures, and widespread devastation to the islands. Amateur
            radio operators were in contact with the Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Manage-
            ment Agency (VITEMA) officials on St. Croix and St. Thomas as well as with the civil
            defense officials in Puerto Rico. As other communications failed, the amateur radio
            operators became the only means of gathering information from the islands. Much of this
            information was relayed to the WSFO in San Juan. The radio operators reported
            sustained winds over 50 mph and gusts to 91 and 97 mph shortly after 4 p.m., AST. A
            report from VITEMA-St. Croix estimated the sustained winds near 90 mph at 4:40 p.m.,
            AST, and at about the same time there were several gusts reported over 100 mph. The
            highest reported wind gust on St. Croix was 127 mph at about 5:15 p.m., AST, but this
            report is unconfirmed. The eye of Hurricane Marilyn passed across the east end of the
            island near 6 p.m., AST, September 15.

            Figures I-1a and I-lb show wind speed and air pressure traces from the U.S. Department
            of Agriculture (USDA) equipment located on the western part of St. Croix. These
            readings are considered unofficial since they had not been calibrated recently. In addition
            to the winds from the hurricane, the island also had to contend with the storm surge and
            torrential rains that fell for hours at a time.

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                            4     8    12    16   20    24    4    6     12   L6    20 24HR
                                    9-15-L995

                             Figure 1-1a. USDA Wind Speed Record from St. Croix.


                                                       2


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                              4     8    12   16    20    24    4     6    12    L6   20   24HR
                                      9-15-L995                         9-16-1995

                               Figure 1-1b. USDA Air Pressure Record from St. Croix.

              Measurements of the storm tide by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) on St. Croix found
              most areas had heights of 5-6 feet, but there was one location on the north coast that was
              hit with a storm tide of 11.7 feet. Figure 1-2 shows National Ocean Service (NOS)
              measurements versus the astronomical prediction of the water level from its Next
              Generation Water Level Measurement System (NG0VV6TMS) at Limetree Bay on the south
              coast of St. Croix. See figure 1-3 for USGS storm tide height measurements on St. Croix.
              Rainfall of almost 12 inches was measured on St. Croix at Annaly, located on the west
              side of the island.



                    7?51401 LIMETREE BAY, U.I,           NGWLNS
                    4441401 LIMETREE BAY, U. I ,         PREDICTED
                             Height in Feet         Time in UTC


             36.00 -








             234.00 -                                                                                  4-



             33.00 01     ' '    1 1 1     1 1 i     I  I I I     I I I     i I    I I    I I I    I   6i
                9850/ 9/13 80                985/ 9/15 80                 95/ 9/17 80                9250/ 9/19



                          Figure 1-2. NOS NGW36LMS Record from Limetree Bay, St. Croix.

                                                          3
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                                   04050'                             4W__


                                                          70







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                      Fvad Noted


                                          0 1 a 3  KILOMETERS          (9-s')
              17040'                                  '1 MILES
                                          0'          4



                            Figure 1-3. USGS Storm Tide Measurements on St. Croix.


            As frightening as it must have been and as badly as the island was damaged, it was much
            less than St. Croix had experienced with the passage of Hurricane Hugo in 1989. This
            was because the island was largely on the left side of the storm, and typically that side is
            not as strong as the front right quadrant of a tropical cyclone and because Hugo was at
            least one Saffir-Simpson category stronger. Changes in construction code were made
            following Hugo, and these likely lessened the damage on St. Croix as well.

            St. Thomas was not as fortunate, however, as Hurricane Marilyn continued on a
            northwest course and gained some strength during the evening hours. The eye passed
            between St. Thomas and Culebra with the most destructive part of the eyewall moving
            directly across the west part of St. Thomas, causing near total devastation.

            By 7 p.m., AST, September 15, gusts to 75 mph were reported on St. Thomas. Conditions
            continued to deteriorate throughout the evening hours. Electric power was lost across the
            island about 8 p.m., AST, and measurements of the winds were no longer possible in most
            locations. Traces of the air pressure and wind speed from meteorological equipment at
            the University of the Virgin Islands are contained in figures 1-4a and 1-4b. They show
            that the pressure was still falling and winds increasing at the time the record ceased.
            Hurricane-force winds blew out all of the windows of the airport control tower around
            midnight. The ASOS at St. Thomas' Cyril E. King Airport recorded maximum sustained
            winds of 104 mph at 11:52 and 11:53 p.m., AST, and was followed soon after by the peak
            gust for the storm of 129 mph. This site also recorded the lowest official barometric
            pressure in the U.S. Virgin Islands. A reading of 956.7 millibars (mb) was recorded at
            1-2:22 a.m., AST, Saturday, September 16. WVWI Radio reported unofficial sustained
            winds of 150 mph on its anemometer, but this is not confirmed. There were also
            unsubstantiated reports of wind gusts estimated at 175 mph from an unknown location on
            St. John.






                                                         4











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                                  4     8    12    16   20    24     4     a    12    L6   20   21HR
                                           9-15-L995                         9-16-1895


                               Figure 1-4a. USDA Wind Speed Record from St. Thomas.



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                          20






                                  4     8    12    16   20    24     4    8     J2    L6   20   2+M
                                           9-15-L995

                               Figure 1-4b. USDA Air Pressure Record from St. Thomas.


                                                             5











           Each of these reports may be a result of several factors. It is a common occurrence for
           reports of extraordinary winds to be received after the passage of a hurricane simply
           because few people have any experience with hurricane-force winds and do not have any
           reliable means of estimating strong winds accurately. It is also possible that winds higher
           than those forecast by NHC did occur over higher terrain areas. This would be due to
           funneling effects of the terrain and the higher elevation of the station. NHC wind
           forecasts are for 1-minute sustained winds at the surface (near sea level), and it is known
           that winds increase with elevation in a hurricane.


           Finding 1-1: NHC advisories only contain forecasts for surface winds at
           standard anemometer heights (33 ft) even though stronger winds occur at
           higher elevations within hurricanes.

           Recommendation 1-1- To enhance their public advisories, NHC should adopt
           specific wording related to stronger winds at higher elevations for use in the
           Caribbean where elevation frequently increases rapidly close to the coast.

           An anecdotal report of 100 mph sustained winds in the Charlotte Amalie Harbor was
           relayed from an unknown sailboat riding out the storm in the harbor. The Coast Guard
           vessel Point Ledge was also attempting to ride out the storm in the harbor while tied to a
           6-ton mooring anchor with at least one additional anchor and its engines engaged to
           relieve some of the strain from the mooring system. The mooring anchor began to drag,
           however, and the Point Ledge abandoned the mooring and attempted to power to safety.
           Unfortunately, it was carried onto the harbor bulkhead by the winds and waves
           (figure 1-5). Storm tide heights on the shores of St. Thomas (figure 1-6) were 6-7 feet
           Rainfall reports were as much as 10 inches but few gages survived the storm, and it is
           likely that there were greater amounts at some locations. Figure 1-7 depicts the NOS tide
           gage measurements in Charlotte Amalie Harbor. It shows that the storm tide rapidly
           rose about 3 feet between 10 p.m., AST, Friday, September 15, and 1 a.m., AST, Saturday,
           September 16.

           Perhaps the most effective means of conveying the power of Marilyn and the devastation
           it brought to St. Thomas is through pictures of the aftermath. See figures 1-8 to 1-15.
           Figure 1-16 shows the areas of wind damage on St. Thomas. A full description of the
           wind damage in the U.S. Virgin Islands and across the islands east of the main island of
           Puerto Rico is contained in appendix C.















                                                       6






























              Figure 1-5. Coast Guard vessel Point Ledge on the bulkhead in Charlotte Amalie Harbor.
                                           (Photo courtesy of Matt Stout)





                                           65 0001                   0

             16024'-







                                                          Charlotte
                                                          Ama
             18020' -


                          0   2 3 4 KILOMETERS
                                                            @?W      7
                                 2 41  4 MIL:5
                                                                    @7,

                            Figure 1-6. USGS Storm Tide Measurements on St. Thomas.


                                                         7















                  7751639 CHARLOTTE AMALIE, ST THOMAS, U.I, NGWLNS
            -
               .004441639 CHARLOTTE ANAL
            fi'                            IE, ST THOMAS, U,I, PREDICTED


             9.00 -





             7.00


             6.00


             S.00


             4.00
               95/ 9/13 0            95/ 9/1S 0             95/ 9/17   0           95/ 9/19



                   Figure 1-7. NOS Water Level Measurements in Charlotte Amalie Harbor.



















                                                                             NWOM


                      Figure 1-8. Broken palm trees and damaged homes on St. Thomas.
                                       (Photo courtesy of Matt Stout)


                                                    8





























                         Figure 1-9. Sailboats washed ashore and buildings damaged along
                                              Charlotte Amalie Harbor.
                                           (Photo courtesy of Brian Smith)











                                                                                     -tip
                                                                                              I T-

                                                               W"
                    J



                                                                         WOO







                                             soft
                                                                   -V


                  Figure 1-10. Damaged commercial building along the Charlotte Amalie Harbor.
                                            (Photo courtesy of Matt Stout)


                                                          9





















                                                                                IWL






                                                          -iL    I

                                                                                                  /jt@'


                                                                                                                                          I W-t

                                               Figure 1-11.         Destroyed apartments in Charlotte Amalie.
                                                                   (Photo courtesy of Brian Smith)









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                         w                                                                      C r
                                                                           Y  -@-t


                                       l
                                            ail
                                         it


                                                                                                     ;@W-



                                                                  "':"16 jPQ
                                                vp,


                                              Figure 1-12. Another sailboat brought ashore by Marilyn.
                                                                    (Photo courtesy of Matt Stout)


                                                                                          10















                        77 _7 I




























                                  Figure 1-13. Residential damage on St. Thomas.
                                           (Photo courtesy of Brian Smith)





















                              Figure 1-14. Apartment buildings damaged by Marilyn.
                                          (Photo courtesy of Brian Smith)




                                                         11







































                                                               @s












                                                                                   4k



                              Figure 1-15. More damaged homes on St. Thomas.
                                        (Photo courtesy of Brian Smith)
















                                                      12









                      DAMAGE OF ST THOMAS FROM HURRICANE MARILYN,                                                                                                                                          SEP




                                                                                                                                                      Atlantic Ocean







                                                                            elf                 W                                  Larkenlun
                                                                                                                                                          6REAT NORTH SIDE



                                                            tk

                                                                                                        Ai pc-,

                                                                                                                              A
                     The First Wind
                                                                                                                                            Comf
                                 65-M,
                    -0'22@                                                                                                                             t
                                                                                                                                                                                                   "RED
                                                                                                                                                                                                     HOOK
                                                                                                                                                                      FRENCHMANS             0 M&r
                                                                                                                                                                             BAY




                      The  Second Wina
                                                                                                                              Caribbean                Sea



                                                                                                                                          2

                                                                                                                                         3k,.



                                                                                                           6-0,                           6-75 e                           645@                            64-
                                                                                                                                                                                                             .52,

                                                                                                   -v c   ... -.d      S.11-, @-20. 139-




                                                                        Figure 1-16. Map depicting the distribution of strong winds on St. Thomas.
                                                                                                             (Map prepared by Brian Smith)










           The small islands of Culebra and Vieques are located off the east end of the mainland of
           Puerto Rico. Each island was heavily damaged by the passage of the hurricane, but the
           strong winds began a bit later than on St. Thomas. An amateur radio report at
           10:40 p.m., AST, Friday, September 15, told of sustained winds of 66 mph on Vieques
           with power out. About midnight, the winds were reported to be sustained at 100 mph.
           By I a.m., AST, on Saturday, September 16, Culebra was bearing the brunt of the
           strongest winds with the local civil defense reporting sustained winds in excess of
           100 mph. These extreme winds persisted for nearly an hour on Culebra. The difference
           in the winds on Culebra and Vieques from those that impacted St. Thomas was that they
           were from the west rather than the northeast. This indicated that the eye was to the
           north of Culebra when the strongest winds occurred.

           There were no recordings of rainfall on the island of Culebra, but the mayor reported that
           it rained heavily from 8 p.m., AST, Friday, September 15, until about 7 a.m., AST,
           Saturday, September 16. The result was flash flooding and mudslides on the island. The
           most affected areas were at both sides of the airport, where runoff from the hills
           transported mud toward the runway area, leaving homes full of mud all the way to the
           bay. The mayor pointed out that these same areas have had flooding problems in the
           past. Figures 1-17 to 1-20 depict examples of the wind and flooding damages on Culebra.



















                                                         0
                                                           k






                             Figure 1-17. Homes destroyed on Culebra by Marilyn.
                                       (Photo courtesy of Kevin McCarthy)




                                                       14






















                                                     if




















                                                                       -4@
                                                                        Z@
                                                     "44 @n,
                                                                o-I
                                                                                        5"


                        Figure 1-18.  Home washed off its footings by flash flooding on Culebra.
                                             (Photo courtesy of Don Wernly)













                                                    Ail


                                                                       jJIMP, ff








                                       Figure 1-19.  Home flipped off its pilings.
                                           (Photo courtesy of Reggina Garza)


                                                           15


















                                                                                        ,-A A'ft


                                                                    Olt




                                                                                            Al"


                            Figure 1-20.  Eroded streambed alongside airport on Culebra.
                                            (Photo courtesy of Don Wernly)


             The main island of Puerto Rico was not severely impacted by Marilyn although some
             strong winds and heavy rains did affect the island. The highest recorded wind gust was
             58 mph at the U.S. Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, located at Ceiba on the extreme east
             end of the island. The Naval Station also had the lowest pressure in Puerto Rico with a
             reading of 996.5 mb at 2 a.m., AST, Saturday, September 16. Rainfall storin totals for the
             main island of Puerto Rico ranged from 3 to 7 inches. The maximum official rainfall
             amount was 7.2 inches at Toro Negro in the western interior section of the island. A
             higher unofficial report of 8.81 inches of rainfall was recorded at Rio Hcacos near Naguabo
             at a USGS site.


             The heavy rainfall over Puerto Rico ended by late afternoon on Saturday, September 16.
             Daily rainfall records show that most of the rain occurred on Saturday, except for the
             upper part of the Rio Grande do Loiza Basin where the maximum 24-hour precipitation
             was highest on Friday, September 15. Numerous mudslides were reported particularly in
             the eastern half of the island. See figure 1-21 for locations of mudslides.








                                                           16




















                                                                                                                                           SAN JUAN


                                                                                                                  AIU
                                                                                                                        TC. @t.



                                                                 LAAES


                                                                                                                          coepo
                                          .-GUEZ                                                      OP000"'s
                                                                                                                                                                  "80 2

                                                0AMOU600S                                                              LW-'W

                                               5" 06                                  CWA 1-YI                Co. IQ              YEI
                                         C
                                         C"o                                P6.41AS
                                         'W
                                         A=               G"'04
                                                                                          3
                                                                                                            .&@SEL






                                   Figure 1-21. Hatched areas show general locations of mudslides on Puerto Rico.
                                                                                 (Map prepared by Eloy Colon)


                          Along the northeast coast, the onshore wind flow led to reduced outflow from the rivers
                          and resulted in some lowland flooding in that area. Flooding did not exceed any previous
                          records but was significant in the east part of the island. See Appendix D, Preliminary
                          USGS River Gage Heights and Discharges during Hurricane Marilyn. Only three
                          locations registered heights exceeding flood stage-one in the Rio Grande de Manati Basin
                          and two in the basin of the Rio de la Plata.



























                                                                                                          17









                                                     Chapter 2

                                   Hydrometeorological Analysis


              General Background

              The 1995 Atlantic Basin hurricane season was, the most active since 1933. By early
              September, 14 tropical depressions had formed, with 12 of these strengthening to tropical
              storm status. Of these 14, most originated as tropical waves coming off the Afhcan coast.
              Appendix E contains a description of the NHC models and the general process used at
              NHC in preparing tropical cyclone advisories.


              The Development of Marilyn

              In early September, the tropical waves did not significantly strengthen on or before
              moving off the African coast. Instead, strengthening was delayed until the tropical waves
              reached the central Atlantic. On September 10, 1995, the Synoptic Analysis Branch
              (SAB), located at the NCEP, noted a cloud system associated with a tropical wave
              centered near 9AN, 34.7W. Over the next 2 days, this wave moved west and intensified
              as it came under the influence of an anticyclone aloft just east of the Leeward and
              Windward Islands. At 6 p.m., AST, Tuesday, September 12, the NHC issued the first
              advisory on Tropical Depression Fifteen, located at latitude 11.9N and 52.6W. The
              maximum sustained winds were estimated to be 35 mph, and the minimum central
              pressure was estimated at 1008 mb. Although a depression, this system was
              strengthening, and a tropical storm warning was issued for Barbados, while tropical
              storm watches were posted for St. Vincent, St. Lucia, the Grenadines, and Grenada.

              At 11 p.m., AST, Tuesday, September 12, the depression was upgraded to Tropical Storm
              Marilyn, located at 12.1N, 53.9W, with estimated maximum sustained winds of 40 mph
              and a central pressure of 1005 mb. At this time, the Tropical Analysis and Forecast
              Branch at NHC and the SAB were using satellite imagery for classification of cyclone
              position and intensity. In each satellite observation, it appeared that Marilyn was moving
              nearly due west along latitude 12N. The final advisory without the benefit of aircraft
              reconnaissance data was issued at 11 a.m., AST, on Wednesday, September 13. At that
              time, the center of Marilyn was estimated near 11.7N, 56.2W, with maximum sustained
              winds near 50 mph and a minimum pressure of 999 mb.

              At 11:54 a.m., AST, Wednesday, September 13, the first reconnaissance data on Marilyn
              indicated that the positions estimated by satellite were south of the actual circulation
              center. The center of Marilyn was repositioned to 12.5N and 56.5W. In addition, the
              minimum central pressure was determined to be 990 mb, or lower than in the previous
              satellite estimate. The relocation of the center, and the finding that the storm was more
              intense than had been estimated 4 hours earlier, meant that the computer models were
              initialized with a model storm that was too far south and probably too weak. The timing


                                                            19











            of this information was such that it was not until 8 p.m., AST, that evening that this new
            information could be incorporated into the global models that serve as initial conditions
            for the dynamical models run for NHC. The continued strengthening and northward shift
            in initialized position prompted the issuance of hurricane warnings at 5 p.m., AST,
            Wednesday, September 13, for Barbados, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and the Grenadines. A
            hurricane watch was issued for Dominica at the same time.

            At 11 p.m., AST, Wednesday, September 13, while located at 13.1N, 58.6W, Marilyn was
            upgraded to a hurricane with maximum sustained winds of 75 mph and a minimum
            central pressure of 987 mb. The hurricane watch for Dominica was upgraded to a
            hurricane warning.

            As Marilyn neared Barbados early on Thursday, September 14, hurricane wanings were
            issued for Martinique and recommended for Guadeloupe. At this time, the official forecast
            track of Marilyn was shifted more toward the west-northwest and then northwest in
            response to a weakness in the subtropical ridge over the central Atlantic. Marilyn
            continued to slowly strengthen. During the afternoon and evening of September 14, the
            storm passed 45 nautical miles (nm) north of Barbados, then just north of Martinique,
            over Dominica, and southwest of Guadeloupe. The maximum sustained winds observed
            on Dominica were 59 mph with gusts to near 85 mph. The island of Guadeloupe
            experienced extremely heavy rains with Saint-Claude measuring 20 inches in a 12-hour
            period.

            Marilyn continued moving to the northwest and strengthened to a category 2 hurricane
            before hitting the island of St. Croix Friday afternoon, September 15, During this period,
            hurricane hunter aircraft reported hail, an unusual occurrence for a tropical cyclone, and
            noted a 20 nm diameter eye. The western portion of the eye crossed the eastern tip of
            St. Croix which placed the strongest winds offshore. Unfortunately, the strongest portion
            of the eastern eyewall moved across St. Thomas as Marilyn approached category 3
            intensity. The gradual strengthening of Marilyn from a category 1 to near category 3 may
            have been due to the influence of an upper level low positioned to the west and northwest
            of Marilyn. This feature appeared to enhance the upper level outflow as determined by
            satellite imagery analysis.

            After passing through the U.S. Virgin Islands, the island of Culebra was also heavily
            damaged. Marilyn passed just east of the main island of Puerto Rico early on Saturday,
            September 16. Upon passing to the north of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands,
            Marilyn was again over the Atlantic Ocean. The storm reached its peak intensity of
            949 mb with sustained winds of 100 knots (kt) at 5 p.m., AST, on September 16, while
            moving north away from Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Hurricane hunter
            aircraft found evidence of concentric eyewalls about this time, and as the interior eyewall
            disintegrated, dramatic weakening was observed.

            Marilyn ceased generating deep convection late on September 21 after passing within
            150 nm of Bermuda on September 19. The tropical cyclone was classified extratropical on
            September 22, and the remnants of the storm meandered in the central Atlantic for
            another 10 days before being absorbed into a frontal system.




                                                       20









                                                     Chapter 3

                                         Preparedness Activities


               Internal

               NWS offices continually test their readiness through internal training and drills.
               WSFO San Juan conducted a number of drills during 1995, covering a wide variety of
               topics. These drills included hurricane operations, flood and flash flood services, and
               emergency operations during communications failures. The objective of these drills was
               to ensure that all office staff were familiar with emergency operations policies and to
               identify any areas that might have needed revision or enhancement.


               External

               In addition to ensuring their own readiness, a major function of each WSFO is to assist
               in the readiness and preparedness of the officials and general public in its area of
               responsibility. The San Juan WSFO takes this responsibility extremely seriously and
               conducts a highly aggressive and effective preparedness program. Each year, the WSFO
               MIC or the WCM contacts each emergency management director in the Commonwealth
               and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

               For 1995, the WSFO assembled hurricane drill packages for Puerto Rico and the
               U.S. Virgin Islands for a March 13-14 exercise, "CARIBEX95." This drill included
               representatives from the 2nd Army and FEMA as well as the emergency management
               community. FEMA!s requirement to move Hurricane Shelia at 60 mph was not as
               realistic and practical from the NWS operational perspective although it proved to be
               a healthy challenge in which to test the readiness and response activities of other
               organizations. Additionally, the WCM conducted two separate 3-day seminars on
               St. Croix and St. Thomas, covering hurricane planning, coordination, preparedness,
               operations, and tropical meteorology. The MIC also met with VITEMA representatives
               from St. Thomas and St. Croix to discuss hurricane forecasting issues and the NWS
               modernization and associated restructuring (MAR).

               At the beginning of each hurricane season, the WSFO and the Puerto Rico Civil Defense
               collaborate to host a Commonwealth Hurricane Conference. The Conference was held in
               Caguas on June 14, 1995. The Conference was attended by about 400 emergency
               managers as well as other local government and Federal agencies. Main points of
               emphasis in the Conference included review of the previous hurricane season, hurricane
               preparedness, etc. This year, the WSFO also presented inf6rmation on changes at NHC.

               The WSFO organized a variety of preparedness activities throughout the year geared for
               school-age children and the general public. Members of the WSFO staff regularly
               participate as judges in island-wide science fairs. The staff also operated a hurricane


                                                            21











            information booth at the Plaza Las Americas shopping center. The booth was one of the
            WSFO's more successful campaigns as nearly 10,000 people received valuable hurricane
            safety information. In all, WSFO San Juan conducted 48 public safety presentations
            during the year, with most of these presentations discussing hurricanes. A total of
            15,785 people attended the programs. The programs conducted by WSFO San Juan were
            highly successful. See appendix F for a listing of the major preparedness programs that
            were conducted by the WSFO or in which they participated in the year prior to Marilyn.

            All of the concerned agencies were familiar with the WSFO operations and the hurricane-
            related products issued by NHC and the WSFO during times of threatening weather.
            Local media and government officials knew who the primary contact points were at the
            WSFO. This knowledge and coordination likely contributed to the relatively small loss of
            life as Marilyn impacted the area.

            Finding 3-2.- WSFO San Juan conducted an aggressive preparedness education
            campaign with local emergency managers and the media in both Puerto Rico
            and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

            Recommendation 3-1.- The WSFO staff should continue these excellent efforts,
            with the W     and IC leading an areawide campaign.

            A final aspect of the WSFO hurricane preparedness activities for 1995 was the
            participation in the annual NHC workshops. Each year, NHC hosts a series of 1-week
            workshops funded by FEMA for local and state emergency managers. The workshops
            feature discussions of NHC operations and products, hurricane tracking and forecasting,
            the effects of hurricanes, including storm surge, evacuation decisions, and evacuation
            exercises geared toward the home areas of the emergency managers. In 1995,
            representatives from Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin IsJands were invited to attend one
            of these workshops. Figure 3-1 shows attendees at the NHC workshop. Approximately
            15 people attended from Puerto Rico.

            Findina 3-2: VITEMA officials were not able to attend the FEMA-funded
            training in hurricane preparedness that was conducted at NHC in January 1995.
            This training would have been useful in responding to the threat of Marilyn.

            Recommendation 3-2: The NWS and FEMA should encourage VITEMA officials
            to take advantage     future training opportunities.

            Discussions with the FEMA Region II Caribbean Desk Director revealed that the FEMA
            personnel could benefit from weather training as much as the emergency managers. The
            WSFO staff should pursue this opportunity to develop even closer bonds with FEMA.

            NWS Headquarters has similarly developed an increasing working relationship with the
            FEMA national headquarters staff during the past several years. During Marilyn, NWS
            Headquarters personnel participated in FEMA-led coordination calls that included the
            director of FEMA, FEMA Region IV staff, Emergency Response Team members, and the
            local emergency manager in the affected islands.




                                                     22




























                            A,











                                                  '40



                                 Figure 3-1. NHC training class participants,
                     showing WSFO San Juan and Puerto Rico Civil Defense staff members.
                                    (Photo provided by WSFO San Juan)



            Findinst 3-3: The coordination between NWS Headquarters and FEMA, prior to
            Marilyn's landfall, assisted FEMA in the prepositioning of recovery personnel
            and equipment.

            Recommendation 3-3: Direct involvement of NHC and WSFO San Juan would
            have further enhanced FEMA's efforts with less potential for inconsistencies.
            NWS Headquarters should develop a formal plan for coordination between
            FEMA and the NWS field offices for implementation prior to the next hurricane
            season.



            Local Non-NWS Preparedness Campaigiis

            Several of the emergency management and media officials in the affected areas conducted
            their own preparedness activities near the start of hurricane season. Some of these
            campaigns were coordinated with the WSFO while others were independent of the NWS.

            Many of the media outlets in the San Juan area attended the pre-season hurricane
            preparedness conference conducted by the WSFO. The media used the information


                                                    23










             distributed at this conference to prepare public service announcements (PSA), special
             reports, and other materials describing hurricane preparedness. Several of the San Juan
             television stations produced hurricane preparedness videos (with some assistance from the
             WSFO), while others translated private sector videos into Spanish. Several of the
             weathercasters provided preparedness talks to schools, focusing on huryicane terminology
             (watch versus warning, the difference between a hurricane and a tropical storm, etc.) and
             safety.

             On the U.S. Virgin Islands, public preparedness campaigns were conducted by VITEMA
             and the local media. Local newspapers produced safety articles and brochures, and
             newspapers and television stations prepared and distributed hurricane tracking maps.
             Other radio stations prepared PSAs for periodic broadcast during the hurricane season.







































                                                        24









                                                   Chapter 4

                                               User Response


               Introduction

               WSFO San Juan communicated information, regarding Marilyn, in a variety of ways.
               The primary means of dissemination was NOAA Weather Radio (NWR) and the NOAA
               Weather Wire Service (NWWS). Local media and civil defense/emergency managers in
               the impacted area also took an active role in providing information to the citizens.
               Dissemination methods outside of the NWS ranged from facsimile transmissions to live
               television and radio broadcasts.


               Findina 4-1 The NWWS is not affordable in the Caribbean with the result that
               there are very few drops in the region. Some NWS products, most notably the
               Short Term Forecast (NOW), were not broadcast by the media and were only
               available over NWR.


               Recommendation 4-1: The NWS should work with emergency management
               officials, the media, and the private sector to explore additional opportunities
               for the delivery of critical weather information in the region.


               Response in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

               The San Juan NWS office has one NWR console with six playback decks. The console
               drives two transmitters, one located near San Juan and the other near Maricao. The
               limitation in playback deck space severely affected NWR programming during Marilyn.
               Since products were broadcast in English and Spanish, long tapes containing both
               versions needed to be prepared. The time involved in preparing these tapes led to a delay
               in broadcasting the updated information. Also, the lack of deck space limited San Juan's
               flexibility in preparing the NVY'R broadcasts.

               Findina 4-2 There were too few playback decks on the San Juan old
               technology NWR console. This caused difficulty in preparing broadcast text and
               keeping the program up to date. Many emergency management officials and
               media outlets noted that the NWR Spanish broadcasts were not timely.

               Recommendation 4-2: WSFO San Juan should be provided with a digital NWR
               console to improve the flexibility and reliability of the NWR programming
               system.

               The Puerto Rico Civil Defense received weather information via NWR and NWWS. NWR
               was so valued by the Puerto Rico Civil Defense Headquarters in San Juan that they
               placed it on their telephone system for broadcast to persons on hold. Information from


                                                           25











           NWWS is relayed to each of the nine regional civil defense offices. The Commonwealth
           Civil Defense communicated with local emergency management offices by radio network,
           facsimile transmission, and telephone. As Hurricane Marilyn approached, the
           Commonwealth Civil Defense and the Governor of Puerto Rico held press conferences
           updating citizens on the storm's status. The press conferences were broadcast by most of
           the local media.

           Finding 4-3: The WSFO staff was invited to participate in the Governor's press
           conferences which were held at a considerable distance from the WSFO.
           Although these press conferences were highly effective, they placed an
           additional burden on the staff.


           Recommendation 4-3: Plans should be developed for using the WSFO multi-
           purpose room as a media center with video-teleconferencing capabilities to
           provide briefings and conferences with local officials. Puerto Rico Civil Defense
           and the media have expressed a willingness to share costs in establishing this
           capability.

           The media outlets in Puerto Rico were well prepared to handle the flow of information
           related to Marilyn. WKAQ radio, the Puerto Rico Common Program Control Station
           (CPCS-1) for the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS), had already upgraded to the
           Emergency Alert System (EAS). The EAS was activated four times during Marilyn, and
           all but one of the EBS stations on the island participated in the activations. The WSFO
           has been actively meeting and working with the EBS stations in the U.S. Virgin Islands
           to assist them in upgrading to the EAS. For example, a meeting was scheduled for the
           Monday following the passage of Marilyn but was canceled due to the widespread
           destruction.


           Finding 4-4: The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Civil Defense allows concerned
           agencies to directRy coordinate with each other, regarding EBSAFAS activations,
           rather than forcing all coordination through the Emergency Operations Center.
           Except for the San Juan CPCS-1 station, however, broadcast stations in Puerto
           Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not ready for the implementation of the
           new EAS.

           Recommendation 4-4: The NWS should continue to work vigorously with the
           Federal Communications Commission and FEAU to establish the EAS in Puerto
           Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

           The direct coordination and activation of the EBS/EAS allowed time-critical weather
           information to be broadcast in a very efficient manner. This was perhaps a lesson learned
           from Hurricane Hugo when central control of the EBS by the civil defense delayed
           weather products in Puerto Rico.

           Several of the local media outlets from Puerto Rico sent representatives to the WSFO and
           to the Commonwealth Civil Defense. The reporters stayed on-site at the WSFO for up to
           38 hours. WSFO and civil defense staff provided frequent interviews during the event-
           as often as every half-hour during the most critical periods. Very few of the media outlets
           have NWWS so most of them were dependent on private vendors (WSI, Accu-Weather,


                                                    26











               etc.) and local authorities for their information. Although a few outlets attempted to
               "hype" the approach of Marilyn and added their own speculation regarding the storm's
               forecasts, most were responsible and provided only official information.

               Local government officials noted that the citizens of Puerto Rico responded well to the
               threat posed by Hurricane Marilyn. Publicity from the media, the Governor's press
               conferences, and the island's recent near-n-dss from Hurricane Luis helped raise the
               public's awareness of the threat and spurred them to make appropriate preparations as
               the storm approached.


               Response in the U.S. Virgin Islands

               0 St. Thomas


               NV,TR broadcasts are available on St. Thomas through a service contract with radio station
               WAH. The relationship between the NWS and WAH arose from a need to provide
               St. Thomas with NVY'R programming while expending a minimum of NWS funds on the
               operation. WAH receives information from WSFO San Juan via NWWS with telephone
               facsimile used as backup. WAH employees then prepare and broadcast the NVITR
               programming. WAH's NV-TR transmitter operates at 100 watts, and it is sufficient for
               covering St. Thomas and St. John, but it is not powerful enough to reliably reach
               St. Croix. After the storm struck, WAH was off the air for several days while repairs
               were made to its antenna.

               The St. Thomas office of the VITEMA has the U.S. Virgin Islands' NWWS drop provided
               by the NWS. The system was operational until late Friday evening. The VITEMA-
               St. Thomas office was also in frequent telephone contact with the WSFO. Coordination
               calls were made twice a day, beginning on Wednesday, September 13.

               Overall, the VITEMA-St. Thomas staff were not satisfied with the information they
               received during the event. They felt that the forecast track information was good, but
               that the intensity was significantly under forecast. St. Thomas was impacted by
               Hurricane Hugo in 1989 and had recently had a close encounter with Hurricane Luis;
               both were large, powerful hurricanes. Marilyn caused damage on St. Thomas that was
               much more than the residents and officials expected. They apparently focused on an
               earlier description of Marilyn as a small category 1 hurricane and were not prepared for a
               direct hit from an intensifying storm. In fact, the 11 a.m., AST, Friday, September 15,
               NHC public advisory stated clearly that Marilyn was a category 2 hurricane. This
               issuance was about 12 hours prior to the hurricane striking St. Thomas. The headline
               from that advisory was "MARILYN APPROACHING THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AS A
               CATEGORY 2 HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE." Stronger terminology
               was included in the Tropical Cyclone Discussion (TCD) issued 7 to 8 hours before
               Marilyn's closest approach to St. Thomas which suggested Marilyn could become a
               categor-y 3 before exiting the Caribbean, with the strongest winds spreading across
               St. Thomas. See Appendix G, Sample Products from NHC.

               In spite of the claimed shortcoming of the forecasts and advisories, VITEMA was more
               proactive than during Hugo, with its hurricane action plan in operation a day before


                                                           27











            Marilyn moved through the islands. It was noted that the products from NHC and the
            WSFO indicated that Marilyn was expected to continue to strengthen as it moved through
            the region.

            Findin,q 4-5: On St. Thomas, both VITEMA and the public felt that they were
            not adequately apprised of what Marilyn!s intensity would be once she made
            landfall.


            Recommendation 4-5: NHC and WSFO personnel must continue to work with
            users to determine the best way to communicate intensity changes.

            The St. Thomas media outlets' reaction was similar to that of the local officials. They also
            assumed that since Marilyn was a compact storm, much smaller than Hugo or-Luis, it
            would be a fairly minor event. Very few of the St. Thomas stations subscribe to NWWS;
            most receive their weather information from the Associated Press (AP) wire service and
            the VITEMA office. The media felt that the forecast data they received was timely, and
            they began preparing for the storm as early as Wednesday. As with the VITEMA staff,
            though, they were not expecting such an intense storm.


            0 St. Croix


            As described earlier, NWR is not reliably available on St. Croix. Thus, officials and
            residents on the island relied on VITEMA and local media for information on Hurricane
            Marilyn. The St. Croix VITEMA office also made direct contact with the WSFO in San
            Juan for information. While some aspects of dissemination and response were similar to
            those on St. Thomas, there were some noteworthy differences.

            The VITEMA-St. Croix office does not have NWWS. They depend on the St. Thomas
            office to relay pertinent NWWS information to them via telephone facsimile. This system
            is generally acceptable, but if St. Thomas loses telephone, electric, or NWWS (as
            happened during Marilyn), then the information does not get to St. Croix. This had a
            considerable impact on VITEMA-St. Croix's operations. They were able to contact the
            WSFO via telephone, but the staff refrained from this whenever possible due to the time
            and workload demands at both offices.

            VITEMA-St. Croix began activating their hurricane action plan about 2 days before the
            stornes arrival. The VITEMA deputy director notified the Governor and worked with the
            WSFO and local media early in Marilyn's development. Overall, VITEMA-St. Croix was
            satisfied with NWS products and services. VITEMA staff felt that the track forecast was
            slightly inaccurate, but they understood the errors inherent in tropical cyclone forecasting.
            There were a few questions about Marilyn's intensity forecast, but this issue was much
            less widespread than on St. Thomas. Interestingly, the VITEMA-St. Croix staff remarked
            that before Hugo, it had been 100 years since the island received a direct strike from a
            major hurricane. They had hoped that the 100-year cycle would continue; obviously, it did
            not.


            The media on St. Croix handled the event much differently than on St. Thomas. Many of
            the media outlets dramatized the approaching storm and described the potential impacts


                                                      28













              of the hurricane on the island. Some local officials viewed the media as overzealous and
              "hyping" the storm. However, this may have had the effect of spurring people on in their
              preparedness activities. WSTX Radio is the CPCS-1 station for St. Croix, and WSVI-TV is
              the primary television station for the island. Neither of these stations, nor any of the
              other media outlets on St. Croix, receive information via NWWS. Rather, they use the AP
              wire and the local VITEMA office as sources of weather data. The media were generally
              satisfied with the information they received, but some representatives expressed a need
              for more frequent (hourly) updates when hurricane landfall is imminent. WSFO San
              Juan issued short-term forecasts that would have met this need. However, without
              availability of NWWS, these were not received by many who needed them. Some of the
              media outlets broadcast hurricane safety rules in English and Spanish. However, all of
              the forecast and advisory information, regarding Marilyn, was broadcast only in English.


















                                                    cA

                                                            P
                                                       Al

                                                                                    7 1




                              Figure 4-1. WS7X radio's tower collapsed during Marilyn.
                                            (Photo courtesy of Matt Stout)











                                                         29








                                                  Chapter 5

                          National Weather Service Performance


              Operations at NHC and HPC

              The initial NHC forecast track when Marilyn was a tropical storm moved the cyclone on a
              generally west track into the central Caribbean. Further forecasts (see figure 5-1),
              starting with the one issued at 6 p.m., AST, Wednesday, September 13, moved the track
              to the right of the original track or on a more northwest course. This northwesterly
              course was closer to the actual track that Marilyn followed over the next 3 days before
              exiting the Caribbean Sea north of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The eye of
              Hurricane Marilyn moved over the east part of St. Croix near 6 p.m., AST, Friday,
              September 15, and between St. Thomas and Culebra around 11 p.m., AST. See figure 5-2
              for the NHC "best" track of Marilyn.

              Findina 5-1 NHC's track forecasts for when Marilyn affected the U.S. Virgin
              Islands and Puerto Rico were highly accurate with errors less than one-third
              the usual magnitude.

              The 36-hour forecast issued when the watch was posted was off by 46 nm compared to the
              long-term average of 150 nm. The 24-hour forecast issued when the warning was raised
              was off by only 8 nm compared to the long-term average of 100 nm. Corresponding
              intensity forecasts were about 10-15 kts too low which is slightly better than normal
              intensity forecast errors for a strengthening hurricane.


                                        OFCL.
                                     OR. L
                                          L







                                           FCL

                                 47 ..                IV .                         20N

                                           C
                                      0 L
                                      OF




                             j    z                       VY             1Nwi    i

                        Figure 5-1. Composite of NHC forecast tracks associated with Marilyn.
                                              (Chart provided by NHQ


                                                         31












                                                                                       MARILYN

       40@
                                                                                -Hurricane
                                                                                    Tropical Storn
                                                      !T"O+
                     AL,                                                            Tropical Derv.
                                           OOOP                                 + + Extratropicag
                                                                                A A SUIAT-opical st"
                                                          4                     A A Subtropical Dep
                                                         4                  4-
       35                                                                       0 Posit ion La L2 UTC
                                                                                0 Psn/Vate a so UTC
                                      21'
                                                                                PrP Min. Pres. Cnb)'

                                                           O@WW
                                                          +r-
                                                            -26







       25--
                         19









                                  )6Z


                              -V-N
               pe       75       78        65       so       55        5a       45       40       35



                             Figure 5-2. NHCs "best" track of Hurricane Marilyn.
                                           (Chart provided by NHQ


           NHC issued a hurricane watch for the U.S. Virgin Islands at 8 a.m., AST, Thursday,
           September 14, providing 33 hours of lead time. The hurricane watch was extended west
           to Puerto Rico and its islands at 5 p.m., AST, September 14. This provided 36 hours of
           preparation time for Culebra and Vieques. Hurricane warnings were issued for the
           U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico at 5 p.m., AST, September 14. This was 24 hours
           and 30 hours advance warning for the respective locations, including nearly a full daylight
           period for the U.S. Virgin Islands as is the NHC's goal in planning the issuance of
           warnings.

           NHC coordinated closely with WSFO San Juan on the areas to be included and the timing
           of the warnings and watches and gave full weight to the WSFO suggestions. This
           coordination was facilitated by the use of the Hurricane Hot Line that was installed at
           WSFO San Juan after Hurricane Hugo struck the region in 1989. Additionally, the


                                                      32










              coordination between NHC and HPC of the predicted positions was extremely smooth
              during Marilyn and reflects the increased cooperation apparent during the 1995 season.

              There are several enhancements to the NHC operations that could improve the efficiency
              of the procedures in use for coordination and forecast communication to users.

              Finding 5-2: The NHC telephone system became overloaded during storms
              when up to 1,200 calls an hour were received. At these times, the NHC staff
              could not make vital coordination calls.


              Recommendation 5-2: A separate phone system should be provided to handle
              the recorded advisories. Isolating the NHC operational staff from that system
              will facilitate coordination and data collection.

              Findina 5-3: In the event that NHC loses operational capabilities, the HPC of
              the NCEP may not be adequately prepared to provide immediate operational
              backup for NHC since the Backup Hurricane Operations Plan has not been fully
              tested.


              Recommendation 5-3: The Backup Hurricane Operations Plan should be tested
              at least twice a year.

              Despite the training provided by the WSFO, VITEMA-St. Thomas placed too much
              emphasis on the track and initial intensity of Marilyn when making preparations for the
              storm. Consequently, even though the storm moved very near to the forecast track and
              increased in intensity as forecast, the officials and populace were not prepared for the full
              fury of the storm.

              Finding 5-4: A revised method of depicting both the official hurricane position
              and forecast track is needed to convey the radius of influence of the storm and
              the uncertainty in the forecast.

              Recommendation 5-4: The NWS should work with its customers to identify new
              methods of representing both the radius of damaging winds and forecast track
              uncertainty.

              Finding 5-5: Some users focused on several model scenarios presented in the
              TCD and, despite the reasoning presented in the products, made their own
              interpretations of the official NHC forecasts.

              Recommendation 5-5: In order to discourage this practice, the TCD should
              convey first and foremost the official forecast track, with a discussion of
              forecast uncertainty due to differences between numerical models.








                                                        33









           M teorological Operations at WSFO San Juan
            .-e

           Findine 5-6: The entire WSFO San Juan staff showed great devotion to duty
           and exhibited the highest level of professional performance during Hurricane
           Marilyn.

           Recommendation 5-6: The NWS should provide appropriate recognition for the
           WSFO San Juan staff.

           Shortly after Marilyn formed on Tuesday, September 12, the office began coordination
           with the emergency management community and immediately began to provide
           interviews for the media, describing the potential peril. As the threat increased, the
           MIC and the WCM led a proactive and effective coordination effort with emergency
           management, media, and government officials. The MIC participated in several live
           telecast news conferences with the Governor of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth Civil
           Defense director, the FEMA regional director, and several Commonwealth agency heads.
           This was a most effective way to inform the public of the impending threat. The
           effectiveness was amply demonstrated to the DST when the MIC was repeatedly
           recognized by many people while he escorted team members during the survey.

           Following coordination with the WSFO, NHC included the U.S. Virgin Islands in the
           hurricane watch issued Thursday morning. This gave the U.S. Virgin Islands several
           additional hours to prepare for the hurricane. The WSFO action logs showed strong,
           proactive. phone coordination was conducted with VITEMA at 4:30, 4:40, and 5: 10 a.m.,
           AST, Friday, September 15. This reinforced the warning information contained in NHC
           and WSFO products.

           The WSFO prepared excellent Hurricane Local Statements (HLS). Three of note were
           issued at 2:45, 5:40, and 8:45 p.m., AST, Friday, September 15, and are contained in
           appendix H. These included specific information for St. Croix, St. Thomas, St. John,
           Culebra, Vieques, and extreme east Puerto Rico, concerning the timing of the beginning of
           hurricane conditions. Although the information contained in the HLS was excellent, they
           were cumbersome because they were all-inclusive. As discussed in chapter 4, this was
           caused in part by the need to have a single message for use on the old technology NVTR
           console in use at the WSFO.


           Findine 5-7: The WSFO San Juan's HLSs were too long which made it difficult
           for users to find specific information.

           Recommendation 5-7: WSFO San Juan should segment their HLSs to ensure
           customers can quickly locate desired information.

           Some of the products issued by the WSFO during Marilyn were not necessary. For
           example, coastal flood and heavy surf information should be highlighted in HLS only and
           offices should not issue separate products. This policy is outlined in Weather Service
           Operations Manual Chapter C-43, "Coastal Flood Program."

           As the effects of Marilyn were being felt over the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, the
           WSFO prepared NOWs to complement their HLS. This was the first year for this policy,


                                                     34











             and the San Juan office proved the effectiveness of this concept. Several of the NOWs
             contained particularly timely and powerful information to those at peril from Marilyn. An
             excellent example of the use of the NOW was the issuance at 10:05 p.m., AST, Friday,
             September 15, that indicated hurricane conditions were occurring across St. Thomas and
             St. John and rainfall rates exceeding 3 inches an hour were occurring. Appendix H also
             contains the San Juan NOWs issued between 6:50 and 10:05 p.m., AST, Friday,
             September 15.

             The most significant problem discovered with the NOW program was that few of the
             mass media disseminators relay the NOW to users. It appears that cable television, i.e.,
             The Weather Channel, was the only dissemination vehicle for this effective product in the
             Caribbean region. This may also be true in other locations around the country. All
             WCMs need to conduct aggressive education programs to ensure that all users/customers
             of NWS products are aware of the NOW product.

             Finding 5-8: Although the WSFO issued effective short-term forecasts to
             complement their HLSs and provide additional details on Marilyn, further
             specificity would have been available if the WSR-88D was installed.

             Recommendation 5-8: The WSR-88D should be installed, accepted, and
             commissioned as soon as possible.

             WSFO San Juan used the HURRTRAK software, designed to display tropical cyclone
             positions and forecast information, and a laptop computer to conduct briefings for
             Commonwealth and local government officials. The HURRTRAK software, which was
             provided by SRH, allowed the MIC and WCM to develop detailed, high resolution briefing
             materials centered on Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.


             Hydrological Operations at WSFO San Juan

             As already noted, the hurricane watch for the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico was
             upgraded to a hurricane warning on Thursday evening, September 14. That advisory
             indicated that 5 to 8 inches of rain were possible along the path of the hurricane. Flash
             flooding and the possibility of mudslides over mountainous terrain were major concerns at
             the WSFO. Therefore, at 5:30 p.m., AST, Thursday, September 14, the WSFO issued a
             flash flood watch (FFA) for the U.S. Virgin Islands. As Marilyn continued on a course
             that would impact the region, the WSFO issued a flash flood warning (FFW) for all of the
             U.S. Virgin Islands at 9 a.m., AST, on Friday, September 15.

             For Puerto Rico and the islands off the eastern tip of the mainland, a FFA for all of
             Puerto Rico was released at 2:30 p.m., AST, Friday, September 15. As the hurricane
             tracked closer and based on the rainfall reports from the area plus the response of the
             rivers on the main island of Puerto Rico, a FFW was issued for the east half of Puerto
             Rico, including Vieques and Culebra at 5:15 p.m., AST, on Friday,'Septemb& 15. See
             figure 5-3. At 9:23 a.m., AST, Saturday, September 16, the warning was extended to
             include the northwest part of the main island as it was being impacted by the spiral
             bands from Marilyn. See figure 5-4. Although this warning applied to a large area and
             several rivers were involved, retrospective data showed that only two of them went above


                                                        35










            flood stage: Rio Grande de Manati and Rio de la Plata. See Appendix D, Preliminary
            USGS River Gage Heights and Discharges during Hurricane Marilyn. Rio de la Plata
            crested about 22 hours after the FFW for that area had been issued, while for the area
            drained by the Rio Grande de Manati, the FFW was issued 3 hours before it crested.
            Figure 5-5 shows the rainfall distribution from Marilyn across Puerto Rico.






                                                              7
                                                  N39


                       -29






                           19




               Figure 5-3. Map showing FFW areas effective 5:15 p.m., AST, Friday, September 15.
                                       (Map courtesy of WSFO San Juan)






                                                              7

                                                                           I.
                                                                  5              17
                                      9




                                                                          7      25


                                     23                   3.
                            19
                                                           I



              Figure 5-4. Map showing FFW areas effective 9.23 a.m., AST, Saturday, September 16.
                                       (Map courtesy of WSFO San Juan)




                                                       36



























                  Figure 5-5. Map showing rainfall distribution from Marilyn across Puerto Rico.
                                (Map courtesy of Reggina Garza, using USGS data)


              Hydrologic data collection at WSFO San Juan is accomplished through a variety of
              systems. For example, in Puerto Rico, the civil defense contracted with private industry
              to provide, through the Automated Local Evaluation in Real Time system, rainfall and
              river gage readings for many locations in Puerto Rico. The USGS has a separate system
              spread across Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Siting and maintenance
              requirements of the systems not under the control of the WSFO make it difficult to get
              sufficient data density throughout the WSFO area of responsibility. Therefore, while
              much of the hydrologic data was valuable during Marilyn, there was some question about
              the specific values from certain gages. Those responsible for operation of the USGS gages,
              however, were quite responsive before, during, and after Marilyn and provided valuable
              assistance to the WSFO.


              Finding 5-9: The hydrologic data collection network in the WSFO area of
              responsibility is insufficient. This hampered efforts to determine how much
              rain fell throughout the region during Marilyn. In the past, the WSFO has
              provided warnings with only qualitative data reports.

              Recommendation 5-9: The hydrologic data collection network should be
              expanded, taking into consideration (a) required density of gages, (b) adequacy
              of maintenance of gages, and (c) reliability of the communications link to the
              WSFO.


              The WSFO was scheduled to begin using the NWS hydrologic data collection system,
              HYDROMET, for access and collection of rainfall and river gage information in December
              1995. This should help to improve the data availability, allow the WSFO to quality
              control the data in real-time, and at the same time reduce the cost to collect the data.

              Once each week, the WSFO in San Juan prepares their own Flash Flood Guidance (FFG).
              At most other locations in the NWS, this is a responsibility of the servicing River Forecast


                                                        37











            Center (RFC). RFCs generally update the FFG on a daily basis. In Puerto Rico, on
            September 15, the conditions used to generate the FFG were from September 8 and
            indicated saturated soils in most of Puerto Rico.


            It is unlikely that the WSFO would not have issued a FFA with a hurricane approaching.
            However, under the eNisting system of local preparation of the FFG, it was likely that the
            program did not reflect current conditions as well as it would have if the FFG were
            updated daily. The WSFO, SRH, and the SERFC were aware of the need to update the
            San Juan FFG system prior to the occurrence of Marilyn, but due to the busy hurricane
            season, planned trips to the WSFO by SRH and SERFC personnel were postponed. The
            computer program used to generate FFG for Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands was
            being further evaluated at the time of the preparation of this Report in order to speedily
            improve the entire hydrologic guidance system.







































                                                       38










                                             Appendix A

                                        Listing of Deaths
                    Directly Associated with Hurricane Marilyn


                       Sex             Age               Location              Cause

                       Woman           48                St. John              Drowning
                       Man             40                St. Thomas            Drowning
                       Man             62                St. Thomas            Drowning
                       Man             50                St. Thomas            Drowning

                       Man             50                St. Thomas            Head Trauma

                       Man             65                St. Thomas            Drowning

                       Man             53                Culebra               Drowning
                       Man             60                St. Croix             Drowning




















                                                   A-1










                                                  Appendix B

                                 Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale*


               Qategroj:y           Definition-Likely Effe%-.+..-.

               ONE                  Winds 74-95 m1ph No real damage to building structures. Damage
                                    primarily to unanchored mobile homes, shrubbery, and trees. Also,
                                    some coastal road flooding and minor pier damage.

               TWO                  Winds 96-110 m1ph Some roofing material, door, and window
                                    damage to buildings. Considerable damage to vegetation, mobile
                                    homes, and piers. Small craft in unprotected anchorages break
                                    moorings.

               THREE                Winds 111-130 mph Some structural damage to small residences
                                    and utility buildings with a minor amount of curtainwall failures.
                                    Mobile homes are destroyed. Flooding near the coast destroys
                                    smaller structures with larger structures damaged by floating. debris.
                                    Terrain may be flooded well inland.

               FOUR                 Winds 131-155 mph More extensive curtainwall failures with some
                                    complete roof structure failure on small residences. Major erosion of
                                    beach areas. Major damage to lower floors of structures near the
                                    shore. Terrain may be flooded well inland.

               FrVE                 Winds areater than 155 mph Complete roof failure on many
                                    residences and industrial buildings. Some complete building failures
                                    with small utility buildings blown over or away. Major damage to
                                    lower floors of all structures near the shoreline. Massive evacuation
                                    of residential areas may be required.





                 In operational use, the scale corresponds to the 1-minute average sustained wind speed
               as opposed to gusts which could be 20 percent higher or more.







                                                           B-1









                                                   Appendix C

                               Report on Aerial Survey of Damage
                                         from Hurricane Marilyn


                Introduction

                After Hurricane Marilyn passed across the U.S. Virgin Islands on September 15-16, 1995,
                NWS Headquarters requested an aerial damage survey. On September 19 and 20, an
                aerial survey was conducted using a Puerto Rico National Guard UH-1 Huey Helicopter.
                Brian E. Smith, WCM, WSFO Omaha, Nebraska, led the survey and was accompanied by
                Rafael MoJica, WCM, of the San Juan WSFO; two employees of the USGS; and a
                cameraman from the Puerto Rico Public Broadcast television station, Channel 6. Total
                flight time on these 2 days was around 16 hours.

                More than 800 photographs were taken over damage areas of the islands of Culebra,
                Vieques, St. Thomas, St. John, and St. Croix. The following describes the destruction
                encountered on each island.



                0 Culebra


                The island of Culebra is located approximately 20 miles east of the east tip of Puerto Rico
                and about 15 miles west of St. Thomas. Hurricane Marilyn moved between Culebra and
                St. Thomas. Thus, Culebra would have had winds from the north or northeast (first
                wind) as the hurricane moved east and southeast of the island. These winds shifted to
                the northwest (second wind) as the hurricane moved northeast of Culebra. From the
                aerial survey, Culebra was struck by both the first and second winds. But the second
                wind, coming out of the northwest was the most prevalent. This could either be the result
                of strengthening of the storm as it was nearing St. Thomas or because the island was
                physically closer to the damaging winds from the storm. Much of the island is rural and
                mountainous, with much of the population living in the town of Dewey, located on the
                southwest portion of the island. This is where the bulk of the wind damage occurred.

                Damage was also noted over the northeast part of the island, especially with structures on
                peaks or ridge lines. The majority of damage to structures was due to the loss of roofs.
                Some structures did sustain outer wall failures, but some of these were most likely from
                substandard construction. In the town of Dewey, damage was also primarily limited to
                roof failure. Also at the airport, aircraft were flipped over. Peak gusts on Culebra appear
                to be in the upper F1 range (around 100 mph) on the Fujita Tornado Intensity Scale. (See
                table at the end of this appendix for a description of the Fujita scale.)






                                                            C-1











               Vieques

             Vieques is another island that is located 10 miles to the southeast of the mainland. The
             major town is Isabel Segunda, which is located on the north side of the island. Some
             damage from northwest winds was noted at Isabel Segunda, but it was minimal.
             Unfortunately, because of restricted airspace, we could not survey the east half of the
             island which probably sustained damage similar to the island of Culebra.


             n St. Thomas


             By far, the worst damage from Hurricane Marilyn was on the island of St. Thomas.
             Nearly 75 percent of all buildings sustained damage. Maximum damage appears to be on
             the high end of F2 (115-157 mph). It is estimated that peak gusts on the island reached
             around 140 mph. Besides structural damage, much of the island's trees were defoliated.
             The center of Marilyn's track moved from south St. Thomas to just west of the island.
             Because of this, the island was subject to two major winds. The first wind occurred when
             the center of Marilyn was south of the island after crossing St. Croix. The main wind
             affecting St. Thomas at this time was a northeast wind. Because of the east-west
             mountain ridge line that runs across much of the island, primarily the north side of the
             island felt the effects of this wind. Several areas on the north side did reach F2 winds,
             perhaps with gusts to 120 mph. The most severe damage to residences occurred between
             Mandal and Frydendal. Numerous roofs of homes were blown off and some buildings
             were flattened.


             As Marilyn moved north-northwest, the storm slowed down. This allowed the second
             wind from the south to pound St. Thomas for a long period of time. This time, winds
             were predominately confined to the south side of the island. There were some exceptions,
             such as the area between Mandal and Frydendal on the north side, which was affected by
             both the first and second wind. This was due to the mountain ridge line splitting on the
             east side of the island and a major valley in the Red Hook area. The south wind flowed
             up the valley to the northeast side of the island. Again, winds reached F2 strength and in
             some cases a strong F2 (approximately 140 mph). Funneling effects from the wind were
             quite evident in the Nadir region. Winds funneled up this valley and produced strong F2
             damage to residences. Other vulnerable areas were exposed structures built along ridge
             lines that bore the full brunt of the winds. Some areas on the east side of Charlotte
             Amalie also had severe damage. Some factory buildings were severely damaged and some
             homes were torn apart. The west side had damage as well, but some structures were
             protected by Hassel Island and Water Island.

             Another area which had extreme destruction was just east of the airport. Large oil
             storage ta'nks had their tops peeled off by the winds. Several residential complexes on the
             south side of the West End had lost roofs or outer walls. The Air Traffic Control radar on
             top of lKlok Hill on the West End was torn off of its tower.

             In final analysis, topography played a key role in damage on the island. Unfortunately,
             topography, in some cases, enhanced the wind damage. Building construction probably
             also played a key role in determining whether a structure was damaged severely or not.



                                                         C-2




                                                     I






               It is uncertain what building codes or standards are on St. Thomas, but stringent codes on
               construction, hurricane clips, or bracing would have helped save some of the structures.



               0 St. John


               St. John is located immediately to the east of St. Thomas (approximately 3 miles). Much
               of the island is very mountainous. The eastern two-thirds of the island are a national
               forest with few structures. The majority of the population lives in the town of Cruz Bay,
               which is located on the western tip of the island. Damage was not as severe as on
               St. Thomas. Estimates of peak gusts were on the high end of F1 (100-110 mph). Some
               buildings in Cruz Bay were sheltered by the high winds. However structures on ridge
               lines and hill peaks had the worst damage. Another area where damage was severe to
               buildings were on points. Since points of land were relatively unobstructed, the full force
               of the wind buffeted the buildings.

               Identifiable damage extended to eastward for about 2 1/2 miles along the south coast.
               The north side of the island received little damage except for some defoliation of trees.



               m St. Croix


               The island of St. Croix is located about 50-60 miles southeast of the eastern tip of Puerto
               Rico. This island has two major cities, Christiansted, located on the north-central part of
               the island, and Frederiksted, located on the west side. Although the island is primarily
               mountainous, there is a large plain area on the south and west sides. Damage on the
               island appeared to be scattered, with some structures having considerable damage and
               others not. Improvements in building construction since the island was devastated by
               Hurricane Hugo in 1989 may have played a role in limiting the damage on the island.

               From the aerial survey, the eye of Marilyn appears to have crossed the island just east of
               Christiansted. Radar data from San Juan also supports this. Much of the western part of
               the island was affected by a west or northwest wind, while the area east of Christiansted
               had southeast and northeast winds as the eye moved north across the island. Much of the
               damage was in the F1 range. Some structures that were hit hard were substandard
               construction, such as Kingshill, a poorer area of the island.

               However, some structures survived the wind which had gusts up to 110 mph. Another
               area which sustained damage was east of Frederiksted. This area is a flat region with
               little trees to obstruct the wind flow. The airport also sustained damage as hangers were
               severely damaged and several small aircraft were flipped.


               Conclusions and Acknowledgements

               Hurricane Marilyn inflicted severe damage to the U.S. Virgin Islands and the island of
               Culebra as it moved across the eastern side of St. Croix to west of St. Thomas. The
               hurricane strengthened while it was located in the Caribbean Sea south of St. Thomas,
               which was severely impacted by an extended period of damaging winds. Construction


                                                            C-3











              practices as well as topography played an important role in the amount of destruction
              that took place.

              I would like to thank Skip Wright and Bobbie Palmer from the Office of the Federal
              Coordinator for Meteorological Services and Supporting Research in assisting with
              necessary arrangements for the survey. I would also like to thank Israel Matos, MIC, and
              Rafael Mojica, WCM, of the San Juan WSFO for their support in obtaining maps,
              helicopter, and ground transportation for the survey team. I wish to thank the entire
              WSFO San Juan staff for their gracious help during my stay in San Juan. Also, a hearty
              thanks to the Puerto Rico Army National Guard for supplying the Huey helicopter and
              their excellent crews we had during the survey. Finally, many thanks to Don Wernly,
              NWS Headquarters, for making this survey possible.



                                          Fujita Tornado Intensity Scale*


                Catemoly       Definition-Effectiire

                (FO)           Gale tornado (40-72 mph): Liftht damaLre. Some damage to chimneys;
                               break branches off trees; push over shallow-rooted trees; damage sign boards.

                (FI)           Moderate tornado (73-112 mph): Moderate damage The lower limit is
                               the beginning of hurricane wind speed; peel surface off roofs; mobile homes
                               pushed off foundations or overturned; moving autos pushed off the roads.

                (F2)           Sfignificant tornado (113-157 mph): Considerable damage Roofs torn
                               off frame houses; mobile homes demolished; boxcars pushed over; large trees
                               snapped or uprooted; light-object missiles generated.

                (F3)           Severe tornado (158-206 mph): Severe damage Roofs and some walls
                               torn off well-constructed houses; trains overturned; most trees in forest
                               uprooted; heavy cars lifted off ground and thrown.

                (F4)           Devastating tornado (207-260 mph): Devastatinjg damage Well-
                               constructed houses leveled; structure with weak foundation blown off some
                               distance; cars thrown and large missiles generated.

                (F5)           Incredible tornado (261-318 mph): Incredible damage Strong frame
                               houses lifted off foundations and carried considerable distance to disintegrate;
                               automobile sized missiles fly through the air in excess of 100 yards; trees
                               debarked; incredible phenomena will occur.


                  Note that this scale was developed in the U.S. Midwest and is based on the building practices and codes in effect
                there.











                                                              C-4











                           Appendix D

             Preliminary USGS River Gage Heights and
               Discharges during Hurricane Marilyn



























                               D-1





                                          Summary of gage heights and discharges during Hurricane Maril                                ;yn floods of September 15-16, 1995 at selected
                                                U.S. Geological Survey streamflow gaging stations throughout Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands

                                                                                                                      MAXD"PREVIOUSLY                                                          DURING
                                                                                                                         RECORDED                                                 SEPT. 15-16.1995 FLOOD
                                                                                        DRAINAGE       PERIOD                GAGE        DISCHARGE        RECURRENCE         D   GAGE I        DIS ROB
                 -=ON
                                         STATION NAME                                      AREA          OF       DATE       HEIGHT                         U47ERVAL         A   HEGIITF
                 ,MMER                                                                     ffa         RECORD                 ft       ftl/,.c                 Yru           Y    11 1    ftU-   IMI-1W21
                 50010500      Rio Guajamca at Lam PR                                      3.16      1969-95     10107/90    2130      5300                              16      10.10    282
                 50014600      Rio Carnuy at Tres Pueblos Sinkhole, Lares PR               ND        1990-95     10/31/91    12A2      1030      ND                      16      10.78    671      ND
                 50014800      Rio Carnuy nr Bayaney, PR                                   ND        1984-95     10/07185    17.66     6450      ND                      16      11.96    2220     ND
                 50015700      Rio Carnuy nr Hatillo, PR                                   ND        1994-95     10/07/85   -27.75     10700     ND                      16      18.48    4650     ND
                 50021700      Rio Grande de Arecibo abv Utuado, PR                        36.0                                                                          16      11.25    S.O.

                 50025155      Rio Saliente at Coabey nr Jayuya, PR                        9.25      1989-95     06/02194    13.92     5900                              16      11.41    2690
                 50027750      Rio Grande de Arecibo aby Arecibo. PR                       200       1982-95     05/18/85    1822      45800                             16      12.32    8240
                 50028000      Rio Tanamd nr Utuado PR                                     18.4      1960-95     05/18/85    17.45     12200
                 S002M         Rio Tanand at Charco Hondo PR                               57.6      1969-95     05/18185    17.95     15000
                 50030460      Rio Orocovis at Orocovis PR                                 5.03      1981-95     01/05/92    11.53     2320                              16      11.14    1020

                 50031200      Rio Grande de Manatf nr Morovis PR                          55.2      1965-95     05/18/85    17.89     48000                             16      5.90     2830
                 50034000      Rio Baum nr Orocovis PR                                     16.7      1969-95     10/09170    21.90     17800                             16      11.68    1650
                 50035000      Rio Grande de Manatf at Ciales PR                           128       1946-95     10109no     24.00     125000                            16      8.59   12400
                 W038100       Rio Grande de Manatf at Hwy 2 nr Manaff PR                  197       1970-95     10/07/85    33.79     97200                             16      31.17  35000
                 50038320      Rio Cibucc, blw Corozal PR                                  15.1      1969-95     11/07f79    19.80     13600                             16      8.90     1410
                 50039500      Rio Cibuco at Vega Baja PR                                  99.1      1973-95     04/12/87    19.10     34000                             16'     14.83    2770
                 50043000      Rio de la Plata at Proyecto La Plata PR                     63.0      1960-95     01/05/92    36.39     73600                             16      13.39    9610
                 50043800      Rio de la Plata at Cornerio PR                              109       1989-95     01/05/92    29.22     127000                            16      11.71  11600
                 50044830      Rio Guadiana at Guadiana PR                                 9.19      1990-95     01/05/92    13.36     6670                              16      7.89     1270
                 50045010      Rio de la Plata blw La Plata Darnsite PR                    173       1989-95     01/05192    34.76     127000                            16      17.24  20300

                 50046000      Rio de la Plata at Hwy 2 at Tba Alta PR                     208       1960-95     01105192    26.39     118000                            16      19.60  25400
                 50047560      Rio de Bayarn6n blw Lago de Cidra PR                        8.31      1991-95     07ill/93    16.56     2090                              16      8.80     18
                 50047850      Rio de Baywn6n nr Bayam6n PR                                41.8      1964-95     10/09/70    20.20     28000                             16      10.00    2880
                 50049770      Rio Piedras at El Seftorial PR                              7.49      1988-95     08/24/88    16.08     4680                              16      7.54     518
                 50049100      RioPiedras at Hato Rey PR                                   15.2      1972-95     06/17/70    20.77     8640                              16      11.81    1800

                 50050900      Rio Grande de Loiza at Quebrada Arenas PR                   6.00      1978-95     11/05/83    14.78     11700                             16      7A3      1190
                 50051150      Quebrada Blanca at El Jagual PR                             3.25      1994-95     05/17/85    14.58     7400                              16      620      215
                 50051180      Quebrada Salvatierra nr San Lorenzo PR                      3.74      1984-95     05/17/85    17.10     9320                              16      6.89     594
                 50051310      Rio Cayaguas at Cerro Gordo PR                              10.2      1977-95     08/31179    9.44      13200                             16      5.99     182
                 50051800      Rio Grande de Loiza at Hwy 183 San Lorenzo PR               25.0      1990-95     01/05/92    27.36     28200                             16      11.79    2280

                 50053025      Rio Turabo abv Borinquen, PR                                7.14      1990-95     01/05192    14.37     3590                              16      10.83    973
                 50055000      Rio Grande de Loiza at Caguas PR                            89.8      1960-95     09106160    31.17     71500                             16      13.61    9400
                 50055100      Rio Caguitas nr Aguas Buenas PR                             5.30      1990-95     09118/93    1828      2290                              16      12.95    596
                 50055170      Rio Cagaitas nr Caguas PR                                   8.27      1992-95     09/18/93    26.101    3010                              16      21.32    347







                                          Summary of gage heights and discharges during Hurricane Marilyn floods of September 15-16, 1995 at selected
                                                 U.S. Geological Surveystreamflow gaging stations throughout Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands

                                                                                                                    MAXD"PREVIOUSLY                                             NW(IM[UMDURING
                                                                                                                        RECORDED                                               SEPT 15-16.1995 FLOOD
                                                                                       DRAINAGE       PERIOD                GAGE      DISCHARGE         RECURRENCE       D    GAGE       DISCHARGE
                  STAnON                  STAMON NAME                                     AREA          OF       DATE I                                   WrERVAL        A    HEIGHT
                                                                                          mi2                                      _;1Tw0ft31&0,
                  NUMBER                                                                              RECORD                .,a.                            Yrs          Y     ft       Wleoc ft31s=t&a2

                  50055225      Rio Caguitas at Villa Blanca-at Caguas PR                 11.71     1991-95    01/05/92     19.91  13400.                              16     11.27     1010
                  50055390      Rio Bairoa at Bairoa PR                                   5.08      1991-95    01/05/92     12.32    1580                              16     8.13      286
                  50055750      Rio Gurabo, blw El Mango PR                               22.3      1990-95    11/08/91     17.38    5870                              16     15.32     3070
                  50056400      Rio Valenciano nr Juncos PR                               16.4      1971-95    12108/87     25.63  40000                               15     8.09      1990
                  50057000      Rio Gurabo at Gurabo, PR                                  60.2      1960-95    09/06/60     27.70  74600                               16     15.36     4660

                  50058350      Rio Caftas at Rio Caftas PR                               7.53      1990-95    10/17/90     20.55    3830                              16     13.01     545
                  50059050      Rio Grande de Loiza blw Damsite PR                        209       1987-95    11/27/87     39.57  124000                              15     20.25   22004
                  50061000      Rio Grande de Loiza at Carolina PR                        243                                                                          15     19.13     S.O.
                  50061900      Rio Canovanas nr Campo Rico PR                            9.84      1967-95    09/13182     13.10  15000                               15     9.75      1960
                                Quebrada, Sonadora nr El Verde PR                         1.01      1983-95    12107/87     9.42     2230

                  50063500      Quebrada Toronjo at El Verde PR                           0.064     1983-95    08/13/90     2.61     101                               16     1.64      14
                  50063800      Rio Espiritu Santo nr Rio Grande PR                       8.62      1966-95    08/13/90     15.74  19200                               16     6.29      1760
                  50064200      Rio Grande nr El Verde PR                                 7.31      1967-95    09/16/75     15.50  17400                               15     8.68      947
                  50065500      Rio Mameyes nr Sabana PR                                  6.88      1967-95    09/18/89     13.91  20500                               16     5.05      1180
                  M7000         Rio Sabana at Sabana PR                                   3.96      1980-95    01/05/92     19.74    9600                              16     12.08     1460
          tj
                  50071000      Rio Fajardo nr FajardoPR                                  14.9      1961-95    09/18/89     20.00  23500                               16     6.07      2120
                  500r74950     Quebrada Guaba nr Naguabo, PR                             0.05      1992-95    05/01/93     10.11      64                              15     8.65      0.55
                  50075000      Rio Icacos nr Naguabo PR                                  1.26      1945-95    04121183     8.96     2860                              16     3.89      335
                  50081000      Rio Humacao at Las Piedras PR                             6.65      1974-95    09/06/60     34.40  20800                               16     2.66      304
                  50090500      Rio Maunabo, at Lizas PR                                  5.38      1971-95    09/20/94     17.46    9950                              16     6.42      434

                  50092000      Rio Grande de Patilla nr Patillas PR                      18.3      1966-95    01/05/92            30900                               16     7.56      1340
                  50100200      Rio Lapa nr Rabo, del Buey PR                             9.92      1988-95    01/05/92     17.82  15700
                  50100450      Rio Majada at La Plena PR                                 16.7      1973-95    01/05/92     17.19    1520
                  50106100      Rio Coamo at Coarno PR                                    43.5      1987-95    09/06/60     34.40  20800                               16     5.83      196
                  50108000      Rio Descalabrado nr Los Llanos PR                         12.9      1966-95    10/07/85     24.37  30000

                  50110900      Rio Tba Vaca abv Lago Tba Vaca PR                         7.64      1989-95    01105/92     13.24    8700                              16     7.64      1880
                  50111500      Rio J=iguas at Juana Diaz PR                              49.8      1984-95    10/07/95     29.42  40000                               16     5.99      62
                  50112500      Rio Inab6n at Real Abajo PR                               9.70      1964-95    10/07/85     25.30  19000                               16     5.05      311
                  50113800      Rio Cerrillos abv Lago Cerrillos nr Ponce PR              15.4      1989-95    01/05/92     9.65     8140                              16     5.15      1620
                  50114000      Rio Cerrillos blw Lago Cerrillos nr Ponce PR              17.8      1991-95    01/06/92     6.07     1100                              16     3.57      175

                  50114390      Rio Bucand at Hwy 14 Bridge nr Ponce PR                   24.9      1987-95    10/07/85     13.48  17400                               16     7.95      137
                  50115000      Rio Portugues nr Ponce PR                                 8.82      1964-95    10/07/85     20.20  21000                               16     5.68      779
                  50124200      Rio Guayanilla nr Guayanilla PR                           18.9      1981-95    09/12/82     20.40  14700                               15     5.78      < 10







                                   Summary of gage heights and discharges during Hurricane Marilyn floods of September 15-16, 1995 at selected
                                         U.S. Geological Survey streamflow gaging stations throughout Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands

                                                                                                            MAXIIAM PREVIOUSLY                                       KAMdUMDURING
                                                                                                                 RECORDED                                            SEPT. 15-16.1995 FLOOD
                                                                                  DRAINAGE      PERIOD              GAGE      DISCHARGE        RECURRENCE      D   GAGE       DISCHARGE
                 STATION               STATION NANE                                 AREA          OF      DATE      HEIGHT                      INTERVAL       A   HEGHT
                 NUNMER                                                             mi2         RECORD                ft     folc  ft3/..*i1       Ym          y     ft      ffl/sec fflhoctmi2

                 50131990     Rio Guanajibo at Hwy 119 at San GermAn PR             34.6      1991-95    01/06/92   13.23    6610                            16    8.66      1510
                 50136400     Rio Rosario nr Hormigueros'  PR                       18.3      1986-95    68/24/88   13.64    7480                            16    6.33      844
                 50138000     Rio Guanajibo nr Hormigueros PR                       120       1973-95    09116t75   28.50  128000                            16    17.10     1090
                 50144000     Rio Grande de Aflasco nr San Sebastian PR             134       1963-95    09/16175   33.90  140000                            16    9.40      7830
                 50147800     Rio Culebrinas at Hwy 404 nr Moca PR                  71.2      1967-95    091105     36.60   69000                            16    16.53     2980

                 50232000     Quebrada La Mina nr Esperanza, Vieques PR             0.68                                                                     16    9.11      S.O.
                 50252000     Bonne Resolution Gut at Bonne Resolution,             0.49      1963-95    04/18/83   7.00     1650                            15    328       164
                                       St. Thomas USVI
                 50274000     Turpentine Run at Mt. Zion, St Thomas USVI            2.33      1963-95    05/23/69   5.00*    5415                            16    10.76     4580
                 50295000     Guinea Gut at Bethany, St. John USVI                  0.37      1963-95    04/19/93   5.33     946                             15    3.52      269
                 50333500     River Gut at Golden Grove, St. Croix USVI             5.40                                                                     16    97.00     S.O.

                 50333700     River Gut at Fairplains, St. Croix USVI               5.89                                                                     16    90.18     12
                 50334500     Bethlehem Gut at Fairplains, St. Croix USVI           4.11                                                                     16    99.26     24
                 50345000     JoUy Hill at Jolly Hill, St. Croix USVI               2.10      1964-95    11/07/94 4.33   0   491                             15    15.38     936






                 ND - Not determined
                 S.O. - Stage only
                   Datum then in use







                                                  Appendix E

                         Description of NHC Forecast Procedures
                                 and Forecast Errors Associated
                                        with Hurricane Marilyn


              The forecast process applied to tropical cyclones is one of conveying the critical concept of
              uncertainty to a general public in search of pinpoint accuracy in, quite possibly, a life and
              death situation. NHC is tasked with forecasting the location, motion, maximum sustained
              winds, maximum wind gusts, and radii of 34 kt, 50 kt, and 64 kt; winds for each tropical
              cyclone in its area of responsibility. In addition, information on cyclone intensity, storm
              surge, precipitation, and possible tornadic activity are included in each advisory.

              To accomplish these tasks, the NHC hurricane specialist must assimilate all the available
              data (satellite, reconnaissance aircraft, surface and upper air observations, radar, etc.),
              and combine this information with the numerical atmospheric computer model
              information available from an array of models. The purpose is to use all of this
              information in creating a forecast of the storm's track and intensity and then to warn the
              individuals in the path of the storm through the issuance of warnings and watches in
              coordination with NWS field offices. In the Caribbean, this is further complicated by the
              need to coordinate the warning and watch issuances with foreign governments as well.
              Discussion at NHC indicated that this requirement can be extremely time consuming.

              In preparing the forecasts of track and intensity of tropical cyclones, NHC uses a variety
              of numerical models. The three types of models are: statistical, dynamical, and
              combination (statistical and dynamical). Statistical models forecast future track and
              intensity using current information about the storm and comparing it to historical
              knowledge of the behavior of similar storms. Dynamical models use the physical
              characteristics of the storm and the surrounding environment to forecast future intensity
              and motion. Combination models attempt to capitalize on the strengths of each of the
              other two types: combining knowledge of historical storms with current and forecast
              atmospheric flow characteristics. Each of the three types of models are designed to take
              advantage of the variety of data acquisition zones (data sparse to data rich) which occur.

              The available numerical guidance is reviewed by the NHC specialists for consistency with
              the synoptic-scale atmospheric flow pattern. Satellite imagery designed to sense mid- and
              upper-tropospheric moisture content is the primary method to ascertain background flow
              conditions where little surface or upper air observations are available as is typical over
              oceanic regions. If the model in question is consistent with the synoptic-scale pattern, it
              becomes useful guidance. Furthermore, the performance of the model must be assessed
              based on the size and strength of the particular tropical cyclone. Each model handles
              cyclone initialization differently, and the hurricane specialist must be aware of the
            ,./behavior and tendencies of each of the models. Large-scale models, such as the aviation
              model (AVN), are used to, diagnose trends in the large-scale flow field, then the individual
              hurricane forecast models are studied relative to these fields.

              Once the specialist has compared the previous official forecast track to the new model
              guidance and observational data, decisions are made concerning the new official forecast

                                                          E-1









                track. If the new guidance is similar to the previous forecast track, it is relatively simple
                to update the previous forecast and make small adjustments to the track, warnings,
                watches, etc. Occasionally, the hurricane specialist will make a "consensus" forecast using
                several models with similar solutions. This approach takes advantage of the strengths of
                each model. There are times, however, where the specialist's knowledge and experience
                cause them to reject all of the models and prepare a forecast independent of the numerical
                model guidance. The decision process is even more complex if the new information differs
                drastically from the previous forecast. In this latter scenario, emphasis is placed on
                population centers for warning and watch purposes, and typically the specialist will
                compromise between the previous track and new forecast track. A complete switch to a
                "new" track will not be made unless there is compelling evidence to abandon the previous
                track. A "windshield wiper" effect, whereby NHC drastically shifts the official forecast
                track (and associated warnings and watches) back and forth, would result in a lack of
                confidence and respect for NHC.

                Shown below is a summary of the forecast errors related to Hurricane Marilyn. Track
                errors were computed for all forecasts associated with Marilyn (i.e., for the tropical storm
                and hurricane phases of the tropical cyclone). Note that the NHC official forecast track
                error at 72 hours averaged 222 nm (and 93 nm in the vicinity of the Caribbean Sea).
                These errors were considerably smaller than the 1985-1994 average error of 296 nm. This
                was an exceptionally good performance for the NHC.


                                 PreRiminary Forecast Evaluation For Hurricane Marilyn
                                                  (Number of forecasts in parenthesis)

                                                      Average Error by Length of Forecast (nm)
                        Model     Type            12hr        24hr           36hr           48hr           72hr

                        GFDI                   38(37)       71(37)         91(35)          112(33)        189(29)
                        GFDL*         d        39(19)       64(19)         91(19)          102(18)        155(16)
                        VBAR*         d        40(37)       75(37)         107(36)         151(35)        210(31)
                        AVNI          d        40(38)       86(38)         141(36)         158(32)        306(28)
                        BAMD          d        48(39)       91(39)         144(37)         205(35)        335(31)
                        BAMM          d        47(39)       87(39)         126(37)         168(35)        268(31)
                        BAMS          d        52(38)       95(38)         130(36)         161(35)        261(31)
                        A90E          C        47(39)       94(39)         143(37)         200(35)        284(31)
                        CLIP          s        49(39)       105(39)        167(37)         218(35)        323(31)

                        NHC Official           38(39)       71(39)         102.(37)        142(35)        222(31)

                        NHC Officia? (for northeastern Caribbean from 14/06-18/00 Coordinated Universal Time)
                                               21(16)       36(16)         48(16)          65(16)          93(16)

                        NHC Official (1985-94 10-year average)
                                               50           98                             194            296


                            GFDL output not available until after forecast issued. VBAR output sometimes not
                            available until after forecast issued.
                        @ For the period associated where Marilyn affected the. U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.







                                                                     E-2









                                                       Appendix F
                            Fiscal Year 1995 Preparedness Activities
                                     of WSFO San Juan, Puerto Rico

                                 Location
            Date                 Visited           Topics                                 Comments


            Puerto Rico


            January 9-13         NHC, Miami        Hurricane planning                     PR CD & Univ. of PR
                                                                                          participated

            February 14          San Juan CD       Hurricane brochure                     Translation to Spanish

            April 7              Rio Piedras       EAS implementation                     Spanish-English discussed

            April 22             WSFO              Open House                             Earth Week

            April 22             Radio 11Q         General preparedness                   Talk show

            June 2               Ponce             Climate, heat stress                   Medical conference

            June 3               Radio 11Q         Hurricane preparedness                 Talk show

            June 14              Caguas            Annual CD Hurricane Conference

            June 19              Rio Piedras       Hurricanes & flash flooding            Univ. of PR staff

            June 20-22           San Juan          Hurricanes, flash flooding, NWR        Environmental week

            June 20              WSFO              Hurricane training                     Part of series for media

            June 21              Rio Piedras       Hurricane preparedness                 Dept. of Housing, joint radio
                                                                                          interviews


            June 27              Manati            Hurricane preparedness                 DuPont Electronics

            July 9               Carolina          Hurricane preparedness                 National Guard Unit

            July 17              WSFO              Hurricanes, EAS, NWR                   Interview

            July 19              San Juan          1995 hurricane season &                TV show
                                                   preparedness

            July 26              WSFO              Hurricane Workshop for TV              SRH & NHC participants
                                                   weathercasters





                                                                 F-1














                               10CEtiom
          Date                 Visited            To]Rics                                 Comments



          July 31              San Juan           1995 hurricane season &                 Public Broadcast Station
                                                  preparedness                            talk show w/CD director

          August 5             WSFO               2995 hurricane season &                 Interview for later
                                                  preparedness                            broadcast

          August 6             San Juan           1995 hurricane season &                 Preparedness w/CD & FEMA
                                                  talk show


          August 7-13          San Juan           Hurricane preparedness                  Safety Fair at mall,
                                                                                          10k people

          August 9             San Juan           Hurricane preparedness,                 AP office
                                                  dissemination, MAR

          August 30            WSFO               General preparedness                    San Juan Star paper

          August 30            San Juan           Iris aftermath                          Training video for CD

          August 30            Carolina           General preparedness                    CD Zone IX


          U.S. Virgin 18@szsdz

          September 23         St. Croix          MAR, EBS/EAS, gen. preparedness         Semi-annual meeting

          October 26           St. Croix          NWS'operations/products, KAR            VITEMA

          November 11          St. Croix          Hurricane preparedness, MAR             "Ist Annual Congress on
                                                                                          Disaster Prep."

          May 16-19            St. Croix          Hurricane planning/evacuation,          New VITEMA managers
                                                  NHC SJU hurricane products,
                                                  Hugo-based exercise

          May 23-24            St. Thomas         Same as above                           Met new director

          June 7               St. Thomas         Hurricanes, flash floods, MAR           New managers

          August 15            St. Thomas         Hurricanes                              Annual meeting








                                                               F-2








                                             Appendix G

                                 Sample Products from NHC



            ZCZC MIATCPAT5
            TTAA00 KNHC 150847
            BULLETIN
            HURRICANE MARILYN ADVISORY NUMBER 12
            NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE MIAMI FL
            5 AM AST FRI SEP 15 1995


            ... HURRICANE MARILYN CONTINUES MOVING NORTHWESTWARD ACROSS THE LEEWARD
            ISLANDS...


            HURRICANE WARNINGS CONTINUE IN EFFECT FROM GUADALOUPE NORTHWARD AND
            NORTHWESTWARD TO PUERTO RICO INCLUDING THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AND THE BRITISH
            VIRGIN ISLANDS. FRENCH OFFICIALS HAVE ISSUED A HURRICANE WATCH FOR ST.
            BARTHELEMY AND THE FRENCH PORTION OF ST. MARTIN. THE WARNINGS FOR GUADALOUPE...
            ANTIGUA ... BARBUDA ... MONTSERRAT ... NEVIS AND ST KITTS WILL BE LOWERED SHORTLY.


            AT 5 AM AST ... 090OZ ... THE CENTER OF MARILYN WAS LOCATED NEAR LATITUDE 16.9 NORTH...
            LONGITUDE 63.2 WEST OR ABOUT 120 MILES ... 190KM ... EAST SOUTHEAST OF ST CROIX. THIS
            POSITION IS ALSO ABOUT 95 MILES ... 155 KM ... WEST OF ANTIGUA.


            MARILYN IS MOVING TOWARD THE NORTHWEST NEAR 13 MPH ... 20 KM/HR...AND THIS MOTION IS
            EXPECTED TO BRING THE HURRICANE NEAR THE VIRGIN ISLANDS AND PUERTO RICO LATER
            TODAY.


            MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS ARE NEAR 85 MPH ... 140 KM/HR ... OVER A SMALL AREA NEAR THE
            CENTER. SOME STRENGTHENING IS POSSIBLE DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS.


            HURRICANE FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARD UP TO 30 MILES ... 45 KM ... FROM THE CENTER...
            AND TROPICAL STORM FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARD UP TO 90 MILES ... 150 KM.


            ESTIMATED MINIMUM CENTRAL PRESSURE IS 978 MB ... 28.88 INCHES.


            RAINFALL TOTALS OF 5 TO 8 INCHES ARE LIKELY ALONG THE PATH OF THE HURRICANE ... WITH
            THE THREAT OF FLASH FLOODING AND MUD SLIDES OVER MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN.


            STORM TIDES OF 2 TO 4 FEET ... ALONG WITH BATTERING WAVES ... CAN BE EXPECTED NEAR THE
            CENTER OF MARILYN.


            REPEATING THE 5 AM AST POSITION ... 16.9 N... 63.2 W. MOVEMENT TOWARD ... NORTHWEST NEAR
            13 MPH. MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS... 85 MPH. MINIMUM CENTRAL PRESSURE... 978 MB.


            AN INTERMEDIATE ADVISORY WILL BE ISSUED BY THE NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER AT 8 AM
            AST FOLLOWED BY THE NEXT COMPLETE ADVISORY ISSUA14CE AT 11 AM AST.


            LAWRENCE










                                                    G-1













               ZCZC MIATCDAT5
               TTAAOO KNHC 150836
               ... FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL USE ONLY...
               HURRICANE MARILYN DISCUSSION NUMBER 12
               NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE MIAMI FL
               5 AM EDT FRI SEP 15 1995


               INITIAL MOTION ESTIMATE IS 310/11 ... THE SAME AS THE PREVIOUS ADVISORY AND MARILYN
               SEEMS TO BE ON THE FORECAST TRACK. THE VARIOUS GUIDANCE MODELS ARE IN GOOD
               AGREEMENT SHOWING A CONTINUATION OF THE INITIAL MOTION WITH SOME DECELERATION
               THROUGH 72 HOURS. THE OFFICIAL TRACK FORECAST GOES ALONG WITH THIS AND IS SIMILAR
               TO THE PREVIOUS ADVISORY. THE CIRCULATION WHICH IS THE REMNANT OF TROP DEP
               FOURTEEN IS SHOWN BY THE AVIATION MODEL TO MOVE WESTWARD TO NEAR FLORIDA IN
               72 HOURS ... THIS FEATURE CONTRIBUTES TO THE DECELERATION AND COULD ULTIMATELY
               CAUSE MARILYN TO MOVE NORTHWARD.


               LATEST RECON REPORTED 978 MB CENTRAL PRESSURE ... 96 KNOTS AT 700 MB AND A 15 N MI
               DIAMETER EYE. SO THE HURRICANE APPEARS TO BE INTENSIFYING A LITTLE. THE INITIAL
               WIND SPEED IS INCREASED TO 75 KNOTS AND FORECAST TO 85 KNOTS IN 24 HOURS IF NOT
               SOONER.


               LAWRENCE


               FORECAST POSITIONS AND MAX WINDS


               INITIAL       15/090OZ  16.9N  63.2W     75 KTS
               12HR VT       15/180OZ  181N   64.7W     80 KTS
               24HR VT       16/160OZ  19.7N  66.5W     85 KTS
               36HR VT       16/180OZ  21AN   67.8W     85 KTS
               48HR VT       17/060OZ  22.5N  69.OW     85 KTS
               72HR VT       18/060OZ  25.ON  70.5W     85 KTS






               ZCZC MIATCMAT5
               TTAA00 KNHC 150837
               HURRICANE MARILYN FORECAST/ADVISORY NUMBER 12
               NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE MIAMI FL
               090OZ FRI SEP 15 1995


               HURRICANE WARNINGS CONTINUE IN EFFECT FROM GUADALOUPE NORTHWARD AND
               NORTHWESTWARD TO PUERTO RICO INCLUDING THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AND THE BRITISH
               VIRGIN ISLANDS. FRENCH OFFICIALS HAVE ISSUED A HURRICANE WATCH FOR ST.
               BARTHELEMY AND THE FRENCH PORTION OF ST. MARTIN. THE WARNINGS FOR GUADALOUPE...
               ANTIGUA ... BARBUDA ... MONTSERRAT ... NEVIS AND ST KITTS WILL BE LOWERED SHORTLY.


               HURRICANE CENTER LOCATED NEAR 16.9N 63.2W AT 15/090OZ
               POSITION ACCURATE WITHIN 20 NM


               PRESENT MOVEMENT TOWARD THE NORTHWEST OR 310 DEGREES AT 11 KT


               ESTIMATED MINIMUM CENTRAL PRESSURE 978 MB
               EYE DIAMETER 20 NM
               MAX SUSTAINED WINDS 75 KT WITH GUSTS TO 90 KT
               64 KT ....... 25NE 25SE OSW ONW`
               50 KT ....... 50NE 50SE 25SW 25NW
               34 KT ....... 80NE 80SE 50SW 50NW
               12 FT SEAS.. 80NE 80SE 50SW 50NW
               ALL QUADRANT RADII IN NAUTICAL MILES


                                                               G-2












              REPEAT ... CENTER LOCATED NEAR 16.9N 63.2W AT 15/090OZ
              AT 15/060OZ CENTER WAS LOCATED NEAR 16.5N 62.8W


              FORECAST VALID 15/180OZ 18. 1N 64.7W
              MAX WIND 80 KT ... GUSTS 95 KT
              64 KT ... 25NE 25SE OSW ONW
              50 KT ... 50NE 50SE 25SW 25NW
              34 KT ... 80NE 80SE 50SW 50NW


              FORECAST VALID 16/060OZ 19.7N 66.5W
              MAX WIND 85 KT ... GUSTS 105 KT
              64 KT ... 25NE 25SE 25SW 25NW
              50 KT ... 50NE 50SE 50SW 50NW
              34 KT ... 10ONE 100SE 100SW100NW


              FORECAST VALID 16/180OZ 21AN 67.8W
              MAX WIND 85 KT ... GUSTS 105 KT
              64 KT ... 25NE 25SE 25SW 25NW
              50 KT ... 50NE 50SE 50SW 50NW
              34 KT ... 10ONE 100SE 100SWIOONW


              STORM TIDES OF 2 TO 4 FEET ... WITH BATTERING WAVES ABOVE ... CAN BE EXPECTED NEAR THE
              CENTER OF MARILYN. SMALL CRAFT IN THE WARNED AREA SHOULD REMAIN IN PORT.


              REQUEST FOR 3 HOURLY SHIP REPORTS WITHIN 300 MILES OF 16.9N 63.2W

              EXTENDED OUTLOOK ... USE FOR GUIDANCE ONLY ... ERRORS MAY BE LARGE


              OUTLOOK VALID 17/060OZ 22.5N 69.OW
              MAX WIND 85 KT ... GUSTS 105 KT
              50 KT... 50NE 50SE 50SW 50NW


              OUTLOOK VALID 18/060OZ 25.ON 70.5W
              MAX WIND 85 KT ... GUSTS 105 KT
              50 KT... 50NE 50SE 50SW 50NW


              NEXT ADVISORY AT 15/150OZ


              LAWRENCE


              STRIKE PROBABILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ADVISORY NUMBER CAN BE FOUND UNDER
              AFOS HEADER MIASPFAT5 AND WMO HEADER WTNT75 KNHC.




              MIATCPAT5
              TTAA00 KNHC 151450
              BULLETIN
              HURRICANE MARILYN ADVISORY NUMBER 13
              NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE MIAMI FL
              11 AM AST FRI SEP 15 1995


              ... MARILYN APPROACHING THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AS A CATEGORY 2 HURRICANE ON THE
              SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE...


              HURRICANE WARNINGS CONTINUE IN EFFECT FROM ST. EUSTATIUS NORTHWESTWARD
              THROUGH PUERTO RICO INCLUDING THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AND THE BRITISH VIRGIN
              ISLANDS ... EXCEPT FOR ST. BARTHELEMY AND THE FRENCH PORTION OF ST. MARTIN WHERE
              FRENCH OFFICIALS HAVE ISSUED A TROPICAL STORM WARNING. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
              DOMINICAN REPUBLIC HAS ISSUED A HURRICANE WATCH FOR THE NORTHEAST COAST OF THE


                                                          G-3













            DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FROM CABRERA TO CABO ENGANO    ... EFFECTIVE AT 11 AM AST ... 150OZ.
            THE WARNINGS FOR GUADELOUPE ... ANTIGUA ... BARBUDA ... MONTSERRAT ... NEVIS AND ST. KITTS
            HAVE BEEN DISCONTINUED.


            PREPARATIONS IN THE WARNED AREA SHOULD BE RUSHED TO COMPLETION.


            AT 11 AM AST ... 150OZ ... THE CENTER OF MARILYN WAS LOCATED NEAR LATITUDE 17.2 NORTH...
            LONGITUDE 63.9 WEST OR ABOUT 70 MILES ... 110 KM ... EAST-SOUTHEAST OF ST. CROIX.


            THE FORWARD MOTION OF MARILYN HAS DECREASED A LITTLE ... TO NORTHWEST NEAR
            10 MPH ... 17 KM/HR. THIS MOTION IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE THROUGH TONIGHT AND WILL
            BRING THE CENTER OF MARILYN ACROSS THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AND TO THE VICINITY OF
            PUERTO RICO.


            MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS HAVE INCREASED TO NEAR 100 MPH ... 160 KMfHR...WITH HIGHER
            GUSTS. SOME ADDITIONAL SLOW STRENGTHENING IS POSSIBLE DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS.


            HURRICANE FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARD UP TO 30 MILES... 45 KM ... FROM THE
            CENTER ... AND TROPICAL STORM FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARD UP TO 115 MILES ... 185 KM.


            LATEST MINIMUM CENTRAL PRESSURE REPORTED BY RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT WAS
            972 MB ... 28.70 INCHES.


            RAINFALL TOTALS OF 5 TO 10 INCHES ARE LIKELY ALONG THE PATH OF THE HURRICANE ... WITH
            THE THREAT OF FLASH FLOODING AND MUD SLIDES OVER MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN. A FLASH
            FLOOD WARNING IS IN EFFECT FOR THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS.


            STORM TIDES OF 3 TO 5 FEET ... ALONG WITH BATTERING WAVES ... CAN BE EXPECTED NEAR THE
            CENTER OF MARILYN.


            REPEATING THE 11 AM AST POSITION ... 17.2 N... 63.9 W. MOVEMENT TOWARD ... NORTHWEST NEAR
            10 MPH. MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS ... 100 MPH. MINIMUM CENTRAL PRESSURE... 972 MB.


            AN INTERMEDIATE ADVISORY WILL BE ISSUED BY THE NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER AT 2 PM
            AST FOLLOWED BY THE NEXT COMPLETE ADVISORY AT 5 PM AST.


            RAPPAPORT


            STRIKE PROBABILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ADVISORY NUMBER CAN BE FOUND UNDER
            AFOS HEADER MIASPFAT5 AND WMO HEADER WTNT75 KNHC.




            MIATCDAT5
            TTAA00 KNHC 151453
            ... FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL USE ONLY...
            HURRICANE MARILYN DISCUSSION NUMBER 13
            NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE MIAMI FL
            11 AM EDT FRI SEP 15 1995


            MARILYN HAS SLOWED DOWN TO ABOUT 9 KNOTS OVER THE PAST 10 HOURS AND THE TRACK
            HAS EASED A SMIDGEN TO THE LEFT ... TO 300/305 DEGREES. GIVEN THE TROUGH ALOFT SEEN
            IN WATER VAPOR IMAGES TO EXTEND NNE FROM EASTERN CUBA ... THIS IS MORE LIKELY A
            SHORT-TERM WOBBLE THAN A THE START OF A PROLONGED MOVE TO THE WEST. IN EITHER
            CASE ... THE THREAT TO THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AND PUERTO RICO IS INCREASING. CENTRAL
            PRESSURE IS AROUND 972 MB. PEAK FLIGHT-LEVEL WINDS WERE 105 KNOTS AND ESTIMATED
            ONE-MINUTE SURFACE WINDS ARE NOW 85 KNOTS.


            THE TRACK FORECAST HAS NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES. IT FOLLOWS THE GFDL AND
            STATISTICAL-DYNAMICAL MODEL WHICH ARE IN CLOSE AGREEMENT ... ESPECIALLY THROUGH


                                                    G-4












                36 HOURS ... WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE GUIDANCE. THE SUITE OF TRACKS ALSO SHOWS A
                NW MOTION THROUGH 72 HOURS ... BUT THE 06Z AVNX AND THE OOZ MRFX SUGGEST A PROBABLY
                TEMPORARY WESTWARD BEND AFTER PASSING PUERTO RICO. THE NAVY NOGAPS MODEL EVEN
                HINTS AT A STALL NORTH OF THAT ISLAND.


                RAPPAPORT


                FORECAST POSITIONS AND MAX WINDS


                INITIAL        15/150OZ 17.2N   63.9W     85 KTS
                12HR VT        16/OOOOZ 17.9N   65.OW     85 KTS
                24HR VT        16/120OZ 19.ON   66AW      90 KTS
                36HR VT        17/OOOOZ 20.2N   67.6W     90 KTS
                48HR VT        17/120OZ 21.5N   68.6W     90 KTS
                72HR VT        18/120OZ 25.ON   70.5W     90 KTS




                MIATCMAT5
                TTAA00 KNHC 151452
                HURRICANE MARILYN FORECAST/ADVISORY 13
                NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE MIAMI FL
                150OZ FRI SEP 15 1995


                HURRICANE WARNINGS CONTINUE IN EFFECT FROM ST. EUSTATIUS NORTHWESTWARD
                THROUGH PUERTO RICO INCLUDING THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AND THE BRITISH VIRGIN
                ISLANDS-EXCEPT FOR ST. BARTHELEMY AND THE FRENCH PORTION OF ST. MARTIN WHERE
                FRENCH OFFICIALS HAVE ISSUED A TROPICAL STORM WARNING. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
                DOMINICAN REPUBLIC HAS ISSUED A HURRICANE WATCH FOR THE NORTHEAST COAST OF THE
                DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FROM CABRERA TO CABO ENGANO              ... EFFECTIVE AT 11 AM AST ... 150OZ.
                THE WARNINGS FOR GUADELOUPE ... ANTIGUA ... BARBUDA         ... MONTSERRAT ... NEVIS AND ST KITTS
                HAVE BEEN DISCONTINUED.


                HURRICANE CENTER LOCATED NEAR 17.2N 63.9W AT 15/150OZ
                POSITION ACCURATE WITHIN 20 NM


                PRESENT MOVEMENT TOWARD THE NORTHWEST OR 305 DEGREES AT 9 KT


                ESTIMATED MINIMUM CENTRAL PRESSURE 972 MB
                EYE DIAMETER 20 NM
                MAX SUSTAINED WINDS 85 KT WITH GUSTS TO 105 KT
                64 KT .......  25NE 25SE OSW ONW
                5o KT .......  75NE 50SE 25SW 25NW
                34 KT ....... 100NE 80SE 50SW 100NW
                12 FT SEAS.. 10ONE 80SE 50SW 10ONW
                ALL QUADRANT RADII IN NAUTICAL MILES

                REPEATXENTER LOCATED NEAR 17.2N 63.9W AT 15/150OZ
                AT 15/120OZ CENTER WAS LOCATED NEAR 16-9N 63.5W


                FORECAST VALID 16/OOOOZ 17.9N 65.OW
                MAX WIND 85 KT ... GUSTS 105 KT
                64 KT ... 25NE 25SE OSW ONW
                50 KT ... 75NE 50SE 25SW 25NW
                34 KT ... 100NE 80SE 50SW 10ONW








                                                                 G-5












             FORECAST VALID 16/120OZ 19.ON 66AW
             MAX WIND 90 KT ... GUSTS 110 KT
             64 KT ... 25NE 25SE 25SW 25NW
             50 KT ... 75NE 50SE 50SW 50NW
             34 KT ... 10ONE 100SE 100SW 100NW


             FORECAST VALID 17/OOOOZ 20.2N 67.6W
             MAX WIND 90 KT ... GUSTS 110 KT
             64 KT ... 25NE 25SE 25SW 25NW
             50 KT ... 75NE 50SE 50SW 50NW
             34 KT ... 100NE 100SE 100SW 10ONW


             STORM TIDES OF 3 TO 5 FEET ... WITH BATTERING WAVES ABOVE ... CAN BE EXPECTED NEAR THE
             CENTER OF MARILYN. SMALL CRAFT IN THE WARNED AREA SHOULD REMAIN IN PORT.

             REQUEST FOR 3 HOURLY SHIP REPORTS WITHIN 300 MILES OF 17.2N 63.9W

             EXTENDED OUTLOOK .... USE FOR GUIDANCE ONLY ... ERRORS MAY BE LARGE


             OUTLOOK VALID 17/120OZ 21.5N 68.6W
             MAX WIND 90 XT ... GUSTS 110 KT
             50 KT... 75NE 50SE 50SW 50NW


             OUTLOOK VALID 18/120OZ 25.ON 70.5W
             MAX WIND 90 KT ... GUSTS 110 KT
             50 KT... 75NE 50SE 50SW 50NW


             NEXT ADVISORY AT 15/210OZ


             RAPPAPORT


             STRIKE PROBABILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ADVISORY NUMBER CAN BE FOUND UNDER
             AFOS HEADER MIASPFAT5 AND WMO HEADER WTNT75 KNHC.




             MIATCPAT5
             TTAAOO KNHC 152040
             BULLETIN
             HURRICANE MARILYN ADVISORY NUMBER 14
             NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE MIAMI FL
             5 PM AST FRI SEP 15 1995


             ... HURRICANE MARILYN STRIKES U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS...


             HURRICANE WARNINGS CONTINUE IN EFFECT FROM ST. EUSTATIUS NORTHWESTWARD
             THROUGH PUERTO RICO INCLUDING THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AND THE BRITISH VIRGIN
             ISLANDS ... EXCEPT FOR ST. BARTHELEMY AND THE FRENCH PORTION OF ST. MARTIN WHERE
             FRENCH OFFICIALS HAVE ISSUED A TROPICAL STORM WARNING. A HURRICANE WATCH IS IN
             EFFECT FOR THE NORTHEAST COAST OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FROM CABRERA TO -CABO
             ENGANO.


             PREPARATIONS IN THE WARNED AREA SHOULD BE RUSHED TO COMPLETION.


             AT 5 PM AST ... 210OZ ... THE CENTER OF MARILYN WAS LOCATED NEAR LATITUDE 17.8 NORTH...
             LONGITUDE 64.6 WEST OR NEAR ST. CROIX.


             MARILYN IS MOVING TOWARD THE NORTHWEST NEAR 12 MPH ... 19 KM/HR ... AND THIS MOTION IS
             EXPECTED TO CONTINUE INTO SATURDAY. ON THIS COURSE.-THE CENTER OF MARILYN WILL



                                                         G-6












              MOVE ACROSS THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AND NEAR THE EASTERN TIP OF PUERTO RICO
              TONIGHT.


              MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS ARE NEAR 100 MPH ... 160 KM/HR ... WITH HIGHER GUSTS. WIND
              GUSTS TO 82 MPH OCCURRED EARLIER AT THE ST. CROIX AIRPORT. SUBSEQUENT AMATEUR
              RADIO REPORTS OF 97 MPH GUSTS ON THAT ISLAND HAVE BEEN RECEIVED. SOME ADDITIONAL
              SLOW STRENGTHENING IS POSSIBLE AND MARILYN COULD INTENSIFY FROM A CATEGORY 2 TO
              CATEGORY 3 HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE TONIGHT OR SATURDAY.


              HURRICANE FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARD UP TO 30 MILES ... 45 KM ... FROM THE CENTER...
              AND TROPICAL STORM FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARD UP TO 115 MILES ... 185 Km.


              LATEST MINIMUM CENTRAL PRESSURE REPORTED BY RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT WAS
              970 MB ... 28.64 INCHES.


              RAINFALL TOTALS OF 5 TO 10 INCHES ARE LIKELY ALONG THE PATH OF THE HURRICANE...
              WITH THE THREAT OF FLASH FLOODING AND MUD SLIDES OVER MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN. A
              FLASH FLOOD WARNING IS IN EFFECT FOR THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS.


              STORM TIDES OF 3 TO 5 FEET ... ALONG WITH BATTERING WAVES...CAN BE EXPECTED NEAR THE
              CENTER OF MARILYN.


              REPEATING THE 5 PM AST POSITION ... 17.8 N... 64.6 W. MOVEMENT TOWARD ... NORTHWEST NEAR
              12 MPH. MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS ... 100 MPH. MINIMUM CENTRAL PRESSURE... 970 MB.


              AN INTERMEDIATE ADVISORY WILL BE ISSUED BY THE NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER AT 8 PM
              AST FOLLOWED BY THE NEXT COMPLETE ADVISORY AT 11 PM AST.


              RAPPAPORT


              STRIKE PROBABILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ADVISORY NUMBER CAN BE FOUND UNDER
              AFOS HEADER MIASPFAT5 AND WMO HEADER WTNT75 KNHC.




              MIATCDAT5
              TTAA00 KNHC 152050
              ... FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL USE ONLY...
              HURRICANE MARILYN DISCUSSION NUMBER 14
              NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE MIAMI FL
              5 PM EDT FRI SEP 15 1995


              ALTHOUGH UPPER-LEVEL OUTFLOW IS COMPRESSED E-W ... MARILYN REMAINS A CATEGORY 2
              HURRICANE MOVING ON A COURSE TOWARD 305/10 KT. AN EYE HAS APPEARED ON SATELLITE
              PICTURES AND HURRICANE HUNTERS REPORTED A CENTRAL PRESSURE OF 969 MB AND THEN
              970 MB THIS AFTERNOON WITH FLIGHT-LEVEL WINDS AGAIN AS HIGH AS 105 KT. ESTIMATED
              SUSTAINED SURFACE WINDS ARE 85 KT. MARILYN COULD STRENGTHEN ENOUGH...
              10-15 KNOTS...OVER THE NEXT 12 HOURS TO REACH CATEGORY 3 BEFORE EXITING THE
              CARIBBEAN.


              MARILYN IS FORECAST TO CONTINUE NORTHWESTWARD FOR THE NEXT 36 HOURS. THE
              CENTER IS NEAR ST. CROIX AND WILL PASS NEAR THE EASTERN TIP OF PUERTO RICO. THE
              STRONGEST WINDS ARE IN THE N AND NE PART AND COULD SPREAD OVER THE ST. THOMAS
              AREA.


              BY 48 HOURS ... THE STEERING FLOW AHEAD OF THE LEAD VORTICITY MAXIMUM WITHIN THE
              DEVELOPING U.S. LONGWAVE TROUGH IS EXPECTED TO TURN MARILYN MORE TOWARD THE
              NNW OR N ... AROUND 70W. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH ALL 12Z GUIDANCE.


              RAPPAPORT


                                                     G-7












               FORECAST    POSITIONS AND MAX WINDS


               INITIAL        15/210OZ   17.8N   64.6W      85 KTS
               12HR VT        16/060OZ   18.7N   65.7W      95 KrS
               24HR VT        16/180OZ   20AN    67AW       95 KTS
               36HR VT        17/060OZ   21.6N   68.2W      95 KTS
               48HR VT        17/180OZ   23.5N   69AW       95 KTS
               72HR VT        18/180OZ   28.ON   69.5W      95 KTS




               MIATCMAT5
               TTAAOO KNHC 152054
               HURRICANE MARILYN FORECAST/ADVISORY NUMBER 14
               NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE MIAMI FL
               210OZ FRI SEP 15 1995


               HURRICANE WARNINGS CONTINUE IN EFFECT FROM ST. EUSTATIUS NORTHWESTWARD
               THROUGH PUERTO RICO INCLUDING THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AND THE BRITISH VIRGIN
               ISLANDS ... EXCEPT FOR ST. BARTHELEMY AND THE FRENCH PORTION OF ST. MARTIN WHERE
               FRENCH OFFICIALS HAVE ISSUED A TROPICAL STORM WARNING. A HURRICANE WATCH IS IN
               EFFECT FOR THE NORTHEAST COAST OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FROM CABRERA TO CABO
               ENGANO.


               HURRICANE CENTER LOCATED NEAR 17.8N 64.6W AT 15/210OZ
               POSITION ACCURATE WITHIN 15 NM.


               PRESENT MOVEMENT TOWARD THE NORTHWEST OR 305 DEGREES AT 10 KT


               ESTIMATED MINIMUM CENTRAL PRESSURE 970 MB
               EYE DIAMETER 20 NM
               MAX SUSTAINED WINDS 85 KT WITH GUSTS TO 105 KT
               664 KT ....... 25NE 25SE 25SW 25NW
               5o KT .......  75NE 50SE 30SW 30NW
               34 KT ....... 10ONE 100SE 50SW 50NW
               12 FT SEAS.. 100NE 100SE 50SW 50NW
               ALL QUADRANT RADII IN NAUTICAL MILES

               REPEAT ... CENTER LOCATED NEAR 17.8N 64.6W AT 15/210OZ
               AT 15/180OZ CENTER WAS LOCATED NEAR 17.5N 64.2W


               FORECAST VALID 16/060OZ 18.7N 65.7W
               MAX WIND 95 KT ... GUSTS 115 KT
               64 KT ... 25NE 25SE 25SW 25NW
               50 kT ... 75NE 50SE 50SW 50NW
               34 KT ... 10ONE 100SE 75SW 75NW


               FORECAST VALID 16/180OZ 20AN 67AW
               MAX WIND 95 KT ... GUSTS 115 KT
               64 KT ... 25NE 25SE 25SW 25NW
               50 KT ... 75NE 50SE 50SW 50NW
               34 KT ... 100NE 100SE 75SW 75NW


               FORECAST VALID 17/060OZ 21.6N 68.2W
               MAX WIND 95 KT ... GUSTS 115 KT
               64 KT... 25NE 25SE 25SW 25NW
               50 KT ... 75NE 50SE 50SW 50NW
               34 KT ... 100NE 100SE 75SW 75NW





                                                                   G-8












             STORM TIDES OF 3 TO 5 FEET ... WITH BATTERING WAVES ABOVE ... CAN BE EXPECTED NEAR THE
             CENTER OF MARILYN. SMALL CRAFT IN THE WARNED AREA SHOULD REMAIN IN PORT.


             REQUEST FOR 3 HOURLY SHIP REPORTS WITHIN 300 MILES OF 17.8N 64.6W

             EXTENDED OUTLOOK ... USE FOR GUIDANCE ONLY ... ERRORS MAY BE LARGE


             OUTLOOK VALID 17/180OZ 23.5N 69. 1W
             MAX WIND 95 KT ... GUSTS 115 KT
             50 KT... 75NE 50SE 50SW 50NW


             OUTLOOK VALID 18/180OZ 28.ON 69.5W
             MAX WIND 95 KT..GUSTS 115 KT
             50 KT... 75NE 50SE 50SW 50NW


             NEXT ADVISORY AT 16/030OZ


             RAPPAPORT


             STRIKE PROBABILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ADVISORY NUMBER CAN BE FOUND UNDER
             AFOS HEADER MIASPFAT5 AND WMO HEADER WTNT75 KNHC.



















































                                                      G-9









                                                       Appendix H

                                Sample Hurricane Local Statements
                                                              and
                          Short Term Forecasts From WSFO San Juan


                1. HLS Issued at 245 p.m., AST, Friday, September 15,1995.

                BULLETIN - IMMEDIATE BROADCAST REQUESTED
                HURRICANE MARILYN LOCAL STATEMENT
                NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE SAN JUAN PR
                245 PM AST FRI SEP 15 1995


                ... HURRICANE WARNINGS IN EFFECT FOR U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AND PUERTO RICO...
                ... SMALL CRAFT IN THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AND PUERTO RICO SHOULD REMAIN IN PORT...
                ... FLASH FLOOD WARNING IN EFFECT FOR U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS...
                ... FLASH FLOOD WATCH IN EFFECT FOR PUERTO RICO...
                ... COASTAL FLOOD WARNING IN EFFECT FOR U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS...
                ... COASTAL FLOOD WATCH IN EFFECT FOR EAST AND SOUTH COASTS OF PUERTO RICO FROM PUNTA PICUA
                TO PUNTA GUAYANILLA INCLUDING CULEBRA AND VIEQUES...
                ... HEAVY SURF ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS...
                ... HEAVY SURF ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR THE NORTH AND EAST COASTS OF PUERTO RICO...


                AT 200 PM AST THE CENTER OF HURRICANE MARILYN WAS LOCATED NEAR LATITUDE 17.6 NORTH...
                LONGITUDE 64.2 WEST ... OR ABOUT 30 MILES EAST-SOUTHEAST OF ST CROIX ... OR ABOUT 100 MILES
                SOUTHEAST OF ST THOMAS ... 80 MILES SOUTHEAST OF VIEQUES ... AND ABOUT 130 MILES SOUTHEAST OF SAN
                JUAN PUERTO RICO.


                MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS ARE NEAR 100 MPH WITH HIGHER GUSTS. SOME ADDITIONAL SLOW
                STRENGTHENING IS POSSIBLE DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS AS MARILYN MOVES THROUGH THE LOCAL
                AREA. HURRICANE FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARD UP TO 30 MILES FROM THE CENTER ... WITH TROPICAL
                STORM FORCE WINDS EXTENDING OUT TO 100 MILES FROM THE CENTER. THE LATEST MINIMUM CENTRAL
                PRESSURE REPORTED BY THE HURRICANE HUNTER AIRCRAFT WAS 972 MB, OR 28.70 INCHES OF MERCURY.

                HURRICANE FORCE WINDS AND HIGHER GUSTS IN SQUALLS ARE EXPECTED TO PRODUCE SEAS NEAR
                12 FEET WITHIN 100 MILES NORTH AND EAST OF THE CENTER. IN ADDITION ... A STORM SURGE OF 3 TO
                4 FEET CAN BE EXPECTED. BATTERING WAVES ON TOP OF THIS MAY PRODUCE COMBINED STORM TIDES OF
                4 TO 6 FEET ACROSS EAST AND SOUTH FACING COASTS AND BAYS ACROSS THE VIRGIN ISLANDS ... AND
                EASTERN SECTIONS OF PUERTO RICO. A COASTAL FLOOD WATCH REMAINS IN EFFECT FOR THE U.S. VIRGIN
                ISLANDS AND THE EAST AND SOUTH PARTS OF PUERTO RICO FROM RIO GRANDE TO PONCE. A HEAVY SURF
                ADVISORY IS IN EFFECT FOR THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AND THE NORTH AND EAST COASTS OF PUERTO
                RICO.


                AT 200 PM AN OUTER RAINBAND ASSOCIATED WITH MARILYN WAS MOVING ACROSS THE EASTERN SECTIONS
                OF PUERTO RICO ... WITH A SOLID AREA OF RAIN AND SHOWERS SPREADING ACROSS THE ENTIRE VIRGIN
                ISLANDS. HURRICANE FORCE WINDS WILL LIKELY MOVE INTO ST CROIX BEFORE 400 PM AND THEN ACROSS
                THE REMAINDER OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS AROUND 600 PM. MARILYN APPEARS TO BE ON A STEADY COURSE
                AND SHOULD THUS BRING ITS FULL FORCE TO THE VIRGIN ISLANDS ... AND LIKELY TO THE NORTHEAST
                COAST OF PUERTO RICO LATER THIS EVENING.


                MARILYN APPEARS TO BE A POTENTIAL HEAVY RAIN MAKER FOR OUR ISLANDS. RAINFALL TOTALS OF 5 TO
                8 INCHES SHOULD BE EXPECTED ALONG THE PATH OF THE HURRICANE ... WITH FLASH FLOODING AND
                MUDSLIDES VERY POSSIBLE OVER MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN.

                RESIDENTS OF ST THOMAS ... ST JOHN ... AND ST CROIX ... VIEQUES AND CULEBRA SHOULD BE SECURE IN
                SHELTERS OR INDOORS AT THIS TIME. PREPARE YOURSELF TO SETTLE IN AND WAIT OUT THE HURRICANE.
                THE GREATEST AND MOST IMMINENT THREAT THAT MARILYN POSES FOR OUR ISLANDS IS FROM THE



                                                                H-1












             INITIAL STORM SURGE AND RELATED COASTAL FLOODING ... THEN FROM FLASH FLOODING DUE TO
             CONTINUED VERY HEAVY RAINFALL. RESIDENTS IN COASTAL LOCATIONS OF LOWER ELEVATIONS SHOULD
             HAVE ALREADY MOVED TO HIGHER AND SECURE SHELTER. BE ALERT TO RISING AND RUSHING WATER
             NEAR YOUR SHELTER LATER THIS AFTERNOON AND TONIGHT. RESIDENTS OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS SHOULD
             BE AWARE THAT THE EYE MAY PASS OVERHEAD. DO NOT BE FOOLED BY CALM WINDS IN THE CENTER OR
             EYE OF MARILYN. REMAIN IN SHELTER!


             RESIDENTS OF PUERTO RICO SHOULD HAVE COMPLETED HURRICANE PREPAREDNESS AT THIS TIME.
             RAINBANDS PRODUCING GUSTS ABOVE 30 MPH ARE ALREADY AFFECTING THE EAST HALF OF THE ISLAND.
             INCREASING SHOWERS ... SQUALLS ... AND WIND SHOULD BE EXPECTED BEFORE 500 PM. FINALIZE
             PREPARATION FOR YOUR HOME AND PROPERTY NOW. STAY TUNED TO NOAA WEATHER RADIO OR OTHER
             MEDIA SOURCES FOR THE LATEST INFORMATION ON HURRICANE MARILYN. THE NEXT STATEMENT FROM
             THE SAN JUAN OFFICE WILL BE ISSUED AROUND 600 PM THIS AFTERNOON.


             STRIPLING



             2. HLS Issued at 540 p.m., AST, Friday, September 15,1995.

             BULLETIN - IMMEDIATE BROADCAST REQUESTED
             HURRICANE MARILYN LOCAL STATEMENT
             NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE SAN JUAN PR
             540 PM AST FRI SEP 15 1995


             ... HURRICANE MARILYN STRIKES U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS...
             ... HURRICANE WARNINGS IN EFFECT FOR U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AND PUERTO RICO...
             ... SMALL CRAFT IN THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AND PUERTO RICO SHOULD REMAIN IN PORT...
             ... FLASH FLOOD WARNING IN EFFECT FOR U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS...
             ... FLASH FLOOD WARNING IN EFFECT FOR THE EAST HALF OF PUERTO RICO...
             ... FLASH FLOOD WATCH IN EFFECT FOR THE WEST HALF OF PUERTO RICO...
             ... COASTAL FLOOD WARNING IN EFFECT FOR U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS...
             ... COASTAL FLOOD WARNING IN EFFECT FOR EAST AND SOUTH COASTS OF PUERTO RICO FROM PUNTA
             BORINQUEN TO BAHAI JOBOS AND FOR THE SOUTH COAST FROM SALINAS EAST...
             ... COASTAL FLOOD WATCH IN EFFECT FOR SOUTH COAST OF PUERTO RICO FROM GUAYANILLA EAST TO
             SALINAS...
             ... HEAVY SURF ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS...
             ... HEAVY SURF ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR THE NORTH AND EAST COASTS OF PUERTO RICO...


             AT 500 PM AST THE CENTER OF HURRICANE MARILYN WAS LOCATED NEAR LATITUDE 17.8 NORTH...
             LONGITUDE 64.6 WEST ... OR ALMOST ON TOP OF ST CROIX...OR ABOUT 35 MILES EAST-SOUTHEAST OF
             ST THOMAS ... OR 50 MILES SOUTHEAST OF VIEQUES AND ABOUT 100 MILES SOUTHEAST OF SAN JUAN
             PUERTO RICO.


             MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS ARE NEAR 100 MPH WITH HIGHER GUSTS. SOME ADDITIONAL SLOW
             STRENGTHENING IS POSSIBLE DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS AS MARILYN MOVES THROUGH THE LOCAL
             AREA. HURRICANE FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARD UP TO 30 MILES FROM THE CENTER ... WITH TROPICAL
             STORM FORCE WINDS EXTENDING OUT TO 115 MILES FROM THE CENTER. THE LATEST MINIMUM CENTRAL
             PRESSURE REPORTED BY THE HURRICANE HUNTER AIRCRAFT WAS 970 MB OR 28.64 INCHES OF MERCURY.


             MARILYN WAS MOVING TOWARD THE NORTHWEST AT NEAR 12 MPH AND THIS MOTION IS EXPECTED TO
             CONTINUE INTO SATURDAY. THIS TRACK WILL BRING THE CENTER OF MARILYN ACROSS THE U.S. VIRGIN
             ISLANDS AND TO NEAR THE EASTERN TIP OF PUERTO RICO TONIGHT. HURRICANE FORCE WINDS HAVE
             ALREADY BEEN RECORDED AT ST CROIX. THIS INCLUDED HAM OPERATOR OBSERVATIONS OF WIND GUSTS
             TO 127 ... 110 ... 107 ... 97 AND 91 MPH BETWEEN 4 AND 515 PM. SIMILAR GUSTS ARE EXPECTED ACROSS
             CULEBRA ... VIEQUES ... ST THOMAS AND ST JOHN BY 7 PM. RESIDENTS OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS ... CULEBRA
             AND VIEQUES SHOULD ALREADY BE IN A SHELTER. RESIDENTS OF MAINLAND EASTERN PUERTO RICO
             SHOULD BE ENTERING THEIR SHELTERS NOW.

             HURRICANE FORCE WINDS AND HIGHER GUSTS IN SQUALLS ARE EXPECTED TO PRODUCE SEAS NEAR
             12 FEET WITHIN 100 MILES NORTH AND EAST OF THE CENTER. IN ADDITION ... A STORM SURGE OF 3 TO
             4 FEET CAN BE EXPECTED. BATTERING WAVES ON TOP OF THIS MAY PRODUCE COMBINED STORM TIDES OF
             4 TO 6 FEET ACROSS EAST AND SOUTH FACING COASTS AND BAYS ACROSS THE VIRGIN ISLANDS AND
             EASTERN SECTIONS OF PUERTO RICO.


             AT 530 PM ... AN OUTER RAINBAND WAS MOVING ACROSS CENTRAL PUERTO RICO. A SECOND RAINBAND WAS
             MOVING ACROSS VIEQUES AND CULEBRA. THEY WILL SPREAD TORRENTIAL SHOWERS AND NEAR ZERO


                                                         H-2











               VISIBILITIES TO EASTERN PUERTO RICO INCLUDING VIEQUES AND CULEBRA. DURING THE EVENING...
               HURRICANE GUSTS AND PERSISTENT HEAVY SHOWERS IN THE WALL CLOUD SURROUNDING THE
               HURRICANE EYE WILL AFFECT THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS. THESE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS CONDITIONS
               WILL SPREAD TO EASTERN PUERTO RICO INCLUDING THE SAN JUAN METROPOLITAN AREA LATER TONIGHT
               AND OVERNIGHT. MARILYN WILL ALSO BE A HEAVY RAIN MAKER FOR OUR ISLANDS. RAINFALL TOTALS OF
               5 TO 10 INCHES SHOULD BE EXPECTED ALONG THE PATH OF THE HURRICANE ... WITH FLASH FLOODING AND
               MUDSLIDES IMMINENT TONIGHT ... ESPECIALLY OVER MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN.


               RESIDENTS OF ST THOMAS ... STJOHN ... AND ST CROIX ... VIEQUES AND CULEBRA AND THE EAST HALF OF
               PUERTO RICO SHOULD BE SECURE IN SHELTERS OR INDOORS AT THIS TIME. PREPARE YOURSELF TO
               SETTLE IN AND WAIT OUT THE HURRICANE. THE GREATEST AND MOST IMMINENT THREAT THAT MARILYN
               POSES FOR OUR ISLANDS IS FROM THE INITIAL STORM SURGE AND RELATED COASTAL FLOODING ... THEN
               FROM FLASH FLOODING DUE TO CONTINUED VERY HEAVY RAINFALL. RESIDENTS IN COASTAL LOCATIONS
               OF LOWER ELEVATIONS SHOULD HAVE ALREADY MOVED TO HIGHER AND SECURE SHELTER. BE ALERT TO
               RISING AND RUSHING WATER NEAR YOUR SHELTER LATER THIS AFTERNOON AND TONIGHT. RESIDENTS OF
               THE VIRGIN ISLANDS SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THE EYE WILL LIKELY PASS OVERHEAD. DO NOT BE FOOLED
               BY CALM WINDS IN THE CENTER OR EYE OF MARILYN. REMAIN IN SHELTER!


               RESIDENTS OF PUERTO RICO SHOULD HAVE COMPLETED HURRICANE PREPAREDNESS AT THIS TIME.
               RAINBANDS PRODUCING GUSTS ABOVE 30 MPH ARE ALREADY AFFECTING THE EAST HALF OF THE ISLAND.
               INCREASING SHOWERS ... SQUALLS ... AND WIND SHOULD BE EXPECTED THIS EVENING AND THEN OVERNIGHT.
               FINALIZE PREPARATION FOR YOUR HOME AND PROPERTY NOW.


               STAY TUNED TO NOAA WEATHER RADIO OR OTHER MEDIA SOURCES FOR THE LATEST INFORMATION ON
               HURRICANE MARILYN. THE NEXT STATEMENT FROM THE SAN JUAN OFFICE WILL BE ISSUED AROUND
               900 PM THIS EVENING.


               3. HLS Issued at 845 p.m., AST, Friday, September 15, 1995.

               BULLETIN - IMMEDIATE BROADCAST REQUESTED
               HURRICANE MARILYN LOCAL STATEMENT
               NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE SAN JUAN PR
               845 PM AST FRI SEP 15 1995


               ... EYE OF MARILYN CROSSES ST. CROIX WITH GUSTS TO 129 MPH-
               ... HURRICANE WARNINGS IN EFFECT FOR U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AND PUERTO RICO...
               ... SMALL CRAFT IN THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AND PUERTO RICO SHOULD REMAIN IN PORT...
               ... FLASH FLOOD WARNING IN EFFECT FOR U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS...
               ... FLASH FLOOD WARNING IN EFFECT FOR THE EAST HALF OF PUERTO RICO...
               ... FLASH FLOOD WATCH IN EFFECT FOR THE WEST HALF OF PUERTO RICO...
               ... COASTAL FLOOD WARNING IN EFFECT FOR U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS...
               ... COASTAL FLOOD WARNING IN EFFECT FOR EAST AND SOUTH COASTS OF PUERTO RICO FROM PUNTA
               BORINQUEN TO BAHAI JOBOS AND FOR THE SOUTH COAST FROM SALINAS EAST...
               ... COASTAL FLOOD WATCH IN EFFECT FOR SOUTH COAST OF PUERTO RICO FROM GUAYANILLA EAST TO
               SALINAS...


               AT 800 PM AST THE CENTER OF HURRICANE MARILYN WAS LOCATED NEAR LATITUDE 17.9 NORTH ...
               LONGITUDE 64.8 WEST ... OR JUST NORTH OF ST CROIX ... OR ABOUT 25 MILES SOUTH OF ST THOMAS ... OR
               350 MILES EAST SOUTHEAST OF CULEBRA OR 40 MILES SOUTHEAST OF VIEQUES AND ABOUT 95 MILES
               SOUTHEAST OF SAN JUAN PUERTO RICO.


               MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS ARE NEAR 100 MPH WITH HIGHER GUSTS. SOME ADDITIONAL SLOW
               STRENGTHENING IS POSSIBLE DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS AS MARILYN MOVES THROUGH THE LOCAL
               AREA. HURRICANE FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARD UP TO 30 MILES FROM THE CENTER ... WITH TROPICAL
               STORM FORCE WINDS EXTENDING OUT TO 115 MILES FROM THE CENTER. THE LATEST MINIMUM CENTRAL
               PRESSURE REPORTED BY THE HURRICANE HUNTER AIRCRAFT WAS 968 MB OR 28.48 INCHES OF MERCURY.


               MARILYN WAS MOVING TOWARD THE NORTHWEST AT NEAR 12 MPH AND THIS MOTION IS EXPECTED TO
               CONTINUE INTO SATURDAY. THIS TRACK WILL BRING THE CENTER OF MARILYN ACROSS THE ST THOMAS
               AND ST JOHN DURING THE NEXT TWO HOURS ... NEAR THE EASTERN TIP OF PUERTO RICO BY 1030 PM AND
               NORTH OF SAN JUAN BY I AM. HURRICANE FORCE WIND GUSTS UP TO 129 MPH WERE FELT AROUND 515 PM
               AT ST CROIX. ST THOMAS REPORTED 75 MPH EARLIER THIS EVENING. GUSTS EXCEEDING 100 MPH ARE
               EXPECTED AT ST THOMAS MOMENTARILY. SIMILAR GUSTS ARE EXPECTED ACROSS CULEBRA AND VIEQUES
               BEFORE MIDNIGHT AND POSSIBLY EASTERN PUERTO RICO DURING THE PREDAWN HOURS. RESIDENTS OF



                                                            H-3












                 THE VIRGIN ISLANDS ... CULEBRA AND VIEQUES AND EASTERN PUERTO RICO SHOULD ALREADY BE IN A
                 SHELTER.       q


                 HURRICANE FORCE WINDS AND HIGHER GUSTS IN SQUALLS ARE EXPECTED TO PRODUCE SEAS NEAR
                 12 FEET WITHIN 100 MILES NORTH AND EAST OF THE CENTER. IN ADDITION ... A STORM SURGE OF 3 TO
                 5 FEET CAN BE EXPECTED. BATTERING WAVES ON TOP OF THIS MAY PRODUCE COMBINED STORM TIDES OF
                 5 TO 7 FEET ACROSS EAST AND SOUTH FACING COASTS AND BAYS ACROSS THE VIRGIN ISLANDS AND
                 EASTERN SECTIONS OF PUERTO RICO.


                 AT 830 PM ... A LARGE AREA OF HURRICANE FORCE AND TORRENTIAL RAINS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EYE WILL
                 MOVE ACROSS THE NORTHERN U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS ... CULEBRA AND VIEQUES DURING THE NEXT FEW
                 HOURS. THIS WILL PRODUCE WINDS IN EXCESS OF 100 MPH ... FLASH FLOODING ... COASTAL FLOODING AND
                 MUDSLIDES. RAINFALL RATES EXCEEDING 3 INCHES WILL AFFECT THE NORTHERN VIRGIN ISLANDS
                 THROUGH 10 PM.


                 TROPICAL STORM CONDITIONS WILL SPREAD TO -EASTERN PUERTO RICO INCLUDING THE SAN JUAN
                 METROPOLITAN AREA DURING THE LATE EVENING AND THEN INTO THE OVERNIGHT HOURS. IF THE STORM
                 TAKES A MORE WESTWARD WOBBLE THE HURRICANE FORCE WINDS AND HEAVIEST RAINS FOR THE SAN
                 JUAN AREA WILL OCCUR BETWEEN 1 AM AND 5 AM SATURDAY MORNING.


                 MARILYN WILL ALSO BE A HEAVY RAIN MAKER FOR THE ISLANDS. RAINFALL TOTALS OF 5 TO 10 INCHES
                 SHOULD BE EXPECTED ALONG THE PATH OF THE HURRICANE ... WITH FLASH FLOODING AND MUDSLIDES
                 IMMINENT TONIGHT ... ESPECIALLY OVER MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN,


                 STAY TUNED TO NOAA WEATHER RADIO OR OTHER MEDIA SOURCES FOR THE LATEST INFORMATION ON
                 HURRICANE MARILYN. THE NEXT STATEMENT FROM THE SAN JUAN OFFICE WILL BE ISSUED AROUND
                 1145 PM LATE THIS EVENING.



                 4. NOW Issued at 650 p.m., AST, Friday, September 15,1995.

                 SHORT TERM FORECAST FOR PUERTO RICO AND THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS
                 NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE SAN JUAN PR
                 650 PM AST FRI SEP 15 1995


                 .NOW...
                 ... HURRICANE WARNING IN EFFECT...
                 ... FLASH FLOOD WARNING AND COASTAL FLOOD WARNING FOR U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AND PARTS OF PUERTO
                 RICO...


                 RESIDENTS ON THE NORTH COAST OF ST CROIX ... ST THOMAS ... ST JOHN AND THE ADJACENT ISLANDS
                 SHOULD PREPARE FOR A 3 TO 5 FOOT STORM SURGE WITH BATTERING WAVES ON TOP ... DURING THE NEXT
                 HOUR.


                 AT 640 PM ... RADAR ... SATELLITE AND SURFACE REPORTS INDICATED THAT THE EYE OF HURRICANE MARILYN
                 WAS PASSING OVER THE EASTERN PART OF ST CROIX. AN UNOFFICIAL WIND GUST OF 129 MPH WAS
                 REPORTED BY A HAM RADIO OPERATOR NEAR THE CENTER OF ST CROIX AT 602 PM.




                 WRIGHT/SEELEY



                 5. NOW Issued at 806 p.m., AST, Friday, September 15,1995.

                 SHORT TERM FORECAST FOR PUERTO RICO AND THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS
                 NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE SAN JUAN PR
                 806 PM AST FRI SEP 15 1995


                 .NOW...
                 ... HURRICANE WARNING IN EFFECT...
                 ... FLASH FLOOD WARNING AND COASTAL FLOOD WARNING FOR U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AND PARTS OF PUERTO
                 RICO...






                                                                            H-4














               HURRICANE CONDITIONS ARE OCCURRING ACROSS ST THOMAS ... ST JOHN AND THE ADJACENT ISLANDS.
               FLASH FLOODING ... COASTAL FLOODING AND MUDSLIDES ARE LIKELY. THE HURRICANE FORCE WILL BE
               ACCOMPANIED BY A STORM SURGE OF 3 TO 5 FEET WITH BATTERING WAVES.


               PERSONS IN VIEQUES AND CULEBRA SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR SIMILAR CONDITIONS BY 1000 PM. AT
               800 PM ... RADAR ... AND SATELLITE INDICATED THAT THE EYE OF HURRICANE MARILYN WAS MOVING
               NORTHWEST THROUGH THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AT 12 MPH.





               WRIGHT/DICKMAN



               6. NOW Issued at 830 p.m., AST, Friday, September 15,1995.

               SHORT TERM FORECAST FOR PUERTO RICO AND THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS
               NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE SAN JUAN PR
               830 PM AST FRI SEP 15 1995


               .NOW...
               ... HURRICANE WARNING IN EFFECT...
               ... FLASH FLOOD WARNING AND COASTAL FLOOD WARNING FOR U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AND PARTS OF PUERTO
               RICO...


               HURRICANE CONDITIONS ARE OCCURRING ACROSS ST THOMAS ... ST JOHN AND THE ADJACENT ISLANDS.
               THESE ISLANDS WILL EXPERIENCE THE FULL BRUNT OF THE STORM DURING THE NEXT FEW HOURS WITH
               WINDS IN EXCESS OF 100 MPH...FLASH FLOODING ... COASTAL FLOODING AND MUDSLIDES LIKELY.


               RAINFALL RATES EXCEEDING 3 INCHES AN HOUR WILL MOVE INTO THE NORTHERN VIRGIN ISLANDS
               DURING THE NEXT HOUR. HURRICANE FORCE WINDS WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY A SURGE OF 3 TO 5 FEET
               WITH BATTERING WAVES.


               PERSONS IN VIEQUES AND CULEBRA SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR POSSIBLE SIMILAR CONDITIONS BY
               1000 PM. AT 800 PM ... RADAR ... AND SATELLITE INDICATED THAT THE EYE OF HURRICANE MARILYN WAS
               MOVING NORTHWEST THROUGH THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AT 12 MPH.




               DICKMAN


               7. NOW Issued at 900 p.m., AST, Friday, September 15,1995.

               SHORT TERM FORECAST FOR PUERTO RICO AND THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS
               NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE SAN JUAN PR
               900 PM AST FRI SEP 15 1995


               .NOW...
               ... HURRICANE WARNING IN EFFECT...
               ... FLASH FLOOD WARNING AND COASTAL FLOOD WARNING FOR U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS ... AND NORTH AND
               EASTERN PUERTO RICO...


               THE FIRST MAJOR RAINBANDS ASSOCIATED WITH HURRICANE MARILYN ARE MOVING ACROSS THE EAST
               AND NORTHEAST COASTS OF PUERTO RICO. DURING THE NEXT HOUR VERY HEAVY RAINFALL AND GUSTING
               NORTHEAST WINDS OF 40 MPH WILL AFFECT ALL OF NORTHEAST PUERTO RICO AND MUCH OF THE EAST
               COAST. THIS WEATHER WILL SPREAD TO THE SAN JUAN AREA BY 1000 PM THEN TO THE INTERIOR.


               THE CENTER OF MARILYN IS NOW DUE SOUTH OF ST THOMAS AND ST JOHN. HURRICANE FORCE WINDS AND
               SQUALLS WITH GUSTS ABOVE 80 MPH WILL REACH THESE ISLANDS BY 945 PM. RESIDENTS SHOULD NOW
               PREPARE FOR THE BRUNT OF THE HURRICANE.




               STRIPLING





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             8. NOW Issued at 1005 p.m., AST, Friday, September 15,1995.

             SHORT TERM FORECAST FOR PUERTO RICO AND THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS
             NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE SAN JUAN PR
             1005 PM AST FRI SEP 15 1995


             .NOW...
             ... HURRICANE WARNING IN EFFECT...
             ... FLASH FLOOD WARNING AND COASTAL FLOOD WARNING FOR U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS ... AND NORTH AND
             EASTERN PUERTO RICO...


             HURRICANE CONDITIONS ARE OCCURRING ACROSS ST THOMAS ... ST JOHN AND ADJACENT ISLANDS.
             HURRICANE CONDITIONS IMMINENT AT CULEBRA AND VIEQUES IN EASTERN PUERTO RICO.

             ALL OF THESE ISLANDS WILL EXPERIENCE THE FULL BRUNT OF THE STORM DURING THE NEXT FEW HOURS
             WITH WINDS IN EXCESS OF 100 MPH ... FLASH FLOODING ... COASTAL FLOODING AND MUDSLIDES LIKELY.
             RAINFALL RATES EXCEEDING 3 INCHES AN HOUR WILL MOVE INTO THE CULEBRA AND VIEQUES DURING
             THE NEXT HOUR. HURRICANE FORCE WINDS WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY A STORM SURGE OF 3 TO 5 FEET
             WITH BATTERING WAVES. PERSONS IN EASTERN MAINLAND PUERTO RICO SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR
             POSSIBLE SIMILAR CONDITIONS SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT. AT 800 PM ... RADAR ... AND SATELLITE INDICATED
             THAT THE EYE OF HURRICANE MARILYN WAS MOVING NORTHWEST THROUGH THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AT
             12 MPH.





             DICKMAN























































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                                                                                                        DZUE DUE


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                                                                                     GAYLORDINo. 2333                                  PRINTED IN U.S.A.








































































































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