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                Natural Disaster Survey Report


                Hurricane Andrew:
                      South Florida and Louisiana
                     August 23-26, 1992

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                U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
                National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
                  'ational Weather Service, Silver Spring, Maryland

       QC945
        .H862
        1993





























































              Cover: Left photograph-Houston's WSR-88D, 0107 UTC, August 26, 1992; Right photograph-
              Melbourne's WSR-88D; 0106 UTC, August 24, 1992.










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                ENT



          Natural Disaster Survey Report


          Hurricane Andrew:
             South Florida and Louisiana
             August 23-26, 1992







          November 1993












          U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
  Q--     Ronald H. Brown, Secretary

          National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
          D. James Baker, Administrator

      4"  National Weather Service
      IV',
      C*  Dr. Elbert W. Friday, Jr., Assistant Administrator    LIBRARY
                                                               NOAA/CCEH
                                                            1990 H013SON AVE.
                                                           CHAS. SC
                                                                    2,c)408--9623










                                          ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


              The outstanding efforts of our National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
              employees ensured the safety of millions of citizens in the path of this country's most
              destructive storm. The National Weather Service (NWS) staff throughout south Florida, and
              later in Louisiana, worked long hours under physically and emotionally stressful conditions.
              I am deeply moved by the dedication of those most affected, specifically those in and around
              south Dade County. Many of our people lost all or part of their homes and their personal
              belongings, and some were displaced for months after the storm. Yet they, as well as other
              Federal, state, and local employees, remained at their post in the worst of conditions, putting
              the public welfare ahead of their own safety.

              Once again, I congratulate those who made NOAA!s response to this powerful storm a success
              story. You are an inspiration to us all.

                                                                  (:Z                              k@-
                                                                 Dr. Elbert W. Friday, Jr.

                                                                 November 1993










                                                   PREFACE


             The primary purpose of this disaster survey has been to evaluate the performance of the
             NWS in fulfilling its mission of providing timely warnings and accurate forecasts for
             Hurricane Andrew. The responsibilities of NOAA, the parent agency of the NWS, are
             broader. The NWS' products and services are key to severe storm preparedness and the
             mitigation of its impact: its SLOSH (Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes)
             models are used by emergency evacuation planners; its wind speed measurements are used
             to develop building codes and to design buildings; and its warnings and forecasts are
             instrumental to placing a timetable on implementing preparedness actions and response
             efforts. But NOAXs partnership role with states in managing the Nation's coastal zone,
             NOAA's trustee responsibility for marine resources, and other agencywide concerns compel
             NOAA to step outside of the traditional NWS format in this preface to comment on Hurricane
             Andrew's consequences in south Florida and Louisiana.

             NOAA and the NWS are dedicated to a continuing improvement in warnings and forecasts,
             thereby allowing emergency management officials lead time to take lifesaving action. But,
             if disastrous consequences are to be mitigated, the coastal zone and other areas at risk must
             be managed in recognition of the awful threat to life and property that hurricanes pose.

             Hurricanes, of course, are natural meteorological events. In the absence of people and their
             property, hurricanes expend their force against marine and terrestrial ecosystems that adapt
             to the storm's destruction. People and their property, unfortunately, are not as resilient as
             damaged ecosystems. Hurricanes frequently have caused significant loss of life and massive
             damage to property and natural resources at tremendous cost both to public and private
             sectors. Until the past 30 years, however, areas vulnerable to hurricanes have been
             relatively undeveloped; vacation beach houses were "beach shacks" or "cottages," easily
             rebuilt after a storm. Urban and suburban development was confined to relatively few areas,
             often limited in its landward spread by wetlands.

             The rush to the sun belt in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s fundamentally changed Coastal
             Plains demographics. Beach cottages were replaced by million dollar dwellings, and
             suburban and urban development became more extensive along the coast and extended much
             further inland. Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew have been the most costly storms in history
             largely because there is now more development in place to damage and destroy. Given
             current development patterns and trends along the coast, we can anticipate both damages
             and costs to increase with future storms. We would do well to heed the warnings that
             population growth and land use practice in the Nation's Coastal Plains have set a stage for
             a series of hurricane disasters and associated economic consequences of unprecedented
             proportions. For example:

                 Populations have grown explosively in coastal areas over the past 30 years. This growth
                 has created the obvious logistical problems associated with warning and safely
                 transporting ever-increasing numbers of residents out of harm's way or to adequate
                 shelters. This inordinate burden is leading to evacuation times in some areas of the


                                                           iii









                  country that are double the effective warning times that the National Hurricane Center
                  (NHC) can provide. There are other difficulties as well: there are significant coastal
                  populations which have not experienced a hurricane and may be less able to prepare for
                  one and respond properly before, during, and after the event. In urban and suburban
                  areas, even the best organized government response may be unable to meet needs for
                  shelter, food, and water.

              ï¿½   Development has been concentrated on barrier islands and in coastal flood plains. Such
                  development almost never relates to natural geographic or geomorphic limits of areas
                  vulnerable to hurricanes. In most places, infrastructure is designed and subdivisions are
                  approved without reference to the need to evacuate low-lying areas quickly. Coastal
                  construction setbacks, where they exist, often are inadequate to accommodate the storm
                  surge of a major hurricane. Structures employ architectural designs, materials, and
                  techniques that cannot withstand hurricanes. In booming communities vulnerable to
                  hurricanes, local building departments often are unable or unwilling to keep pace with
                  code enforcement-even if there is an adequate code to enforce.

              ï¿½   These problems are exacerbated by continued destruction of and interference with
                  natural protective features: beaches, dunes, tidal wetlands, mangroves, and the like.
                  Many state and local planners and emergency managers now understand the importance
                  of a healthy beach/dune system and maintaining it by limiting so-called "hard" erosion
                  control structures and following regular maintenance programs; many others do not.


              Hurricane Hugo

              In 1989, Hurricane Hugo foreshadowed the scale of hurricane disasters yet to come. After
              dealing a serious blow to the Caribbean, including Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, the
              major force of the storm hit the mainland United States at Cape Romain National Wildlife
              Refuge, then Francis Marion National Forest before wreaking havoc for many miles inland.
              Despite heavy damage to Charleston and its environs, the city largely was spared-at least
              compared to the devastation it would have suffered had Hugo's eye come ashore 20 miles
              further south. The sight of once beautiful vacation homes reduced to wind and water-borne
              debris along Charleston County's barrier islands obscured the fact that Hugo's wind effects
              could have been far more significant had they struck a more populated area.

              In the wind damage along the South Carolina coast, Hugo also provided a glimpse of building
              code and engineering issues. Myrtle Beach was well north and east of the storm's major
              effects, but structures there that had been designed to withstand winds significantly greater
              than those actually experienced performed poorly. Other areas suffered because South
              Carolina had no statewide building code or hurricane resistance standards (and does not to
              this day) or because local building codes were not enforced adequately. The almost complete
              destruction of mobile homes in the path of the storm served notice once more that mobile
              homes are no place to be during severe weather.







                                                           iv









              Hurricane Andrew

              Andrew defines the current problem: the majority of the damage was inland, outside of the
              primary storm surge areas where emergency preparedness and response officials usually
              focus their attention. Much of the coastal development in the past 30 years has been outside
              hurricane surge zones but well within wind zones.

              Although Andrew caused significant flooding damage immediately adjacent to the coast, wind
              damage caused most of the devastation. Water, in the form of storm surge and flooding, still
              poses the greatest threat to public health and safety as local authorities must be able to
              evacuate the population at risk in time. After all, had the topography of Cutler Ridge not
              impeded the storm surge, it would have affected areas much further inland. Still, Andrew
              likely will prove the norm for future storms rather than the exception: winds will pose a very
              significant threat to life and safety and cause a major percentage of property damage.

              In densely populated areas, it is all but impossible to evacuate for wind. Forecasters cannot
              yet predict wind fields accurately, and the large numbers of residents that would need to be
              evacuated to ensure an adequate margin of safety would overwhelm roads and shelters
              almost immediately. On the other hand, given extensive development in vulnerable areas
              inland, no longer can public officials afford to perceive hurricanes as merely flood/storm surge
              events. Instead, emergency preparedness officials and land use planners must consider
              hurricanes as much broader "wind/flood/storm surge" events affecting areas many miles
              inland. New approaches and building codes must be developed to protect the public. All of
              Florida, for example, must be considered vulnerable to the effects of hurricanes, regardless
              of how far from the coast. All of its communities should implement hurricane preparedness
              and mitigation policies.


              Land Use Management

              Advances in technology may improve long-range forecasting, and Weather Surveillance
              Radar-1988 Doppler (WSR-88D) is helping to improve short-term warning and forecasting,
              but it is unlikely that lead times can be increased significantly in the near future. Current
              lead times cannot provide enough warning in many heavily populated areas to evacuate
              threatened residents effectively.

              NWS warning capabilities are only one side of the equation for reducing threats both to
              public health and safety and to property. The other side is state and local government
              actions that control development in hurricane-prone areas and plan for and carry out
              evacuations. Redefined as wind/flood/storm. surge events, hurricanes present state and local
              planners with five areas of focus in addition to ongoing efforts.

                  Emergency planners' primary priority must be to evacuate residents at risk from storm
                  surge and other types of flooding, regardless of the extent of a hurricane's potential wind
                  damage. These residents remain the most vulnerable to hurricanes. Planners must
                  continue to reduce evacuation times in areas vulnerable to flooding from storm surge.
                  In regions where development densities and patterns have outstripped the capacity of
                  the area's infrastructure to handle evacuations, the best that can be hoped for is to



                                                             v









                   minimize the number of residents in surge areas when the storm hits and to provide
                   refuges of last resort.

              ï¿½    Officials need to ensure that adequate building codes are in place and that they are
                   vigorously enforced. Building codes in coastal areas nationwide should be revised based
                   on the Andrew experience. Because many structures were destroyed when door or
                   window failures allowed wind pressure to demolish roofs from the interior codes need
                   to emphasize appropriate door and window storm covers. Even areas well inland must
                   have hurricane resistance codes. Such codes should be enforced throughout the State of
                   Florida.


              ï¿½    Regulations should be promulgated to require that new structures contain "hardened"
                   interior rooms to provide in-place hurricane shelters and require that, at a minimum,
                   mobile home parks have hardened sheltering for all residents.

              ï¿½    State and local officials need to devise programs to retrofit existing buildings to provide
                   in-place hardened sheltering and to bring substandard housing into compliance with a
                   hurricane-resistant code.


              ï¿½    State and local officials need to revise land use planning, subdivision approval, and
                   permitting processes to consider the potential effects of severe storms.

              Hurricane Andrew has given lessons to NOAA, too. For its part, in addition to continuing
              to improve NWS warning and forecasting capabilities, NOAA will continue to work to make
              Federal hurricane preparation and mitigation programs consistent. NOAA programs, with
              relevance to coastal hazards mitigation, must work together more closely to provide better
              services to state and other Federal agencies. As a beginning, the National Ocean Service
              (NOS) currently is working to develop a response plan to provide needed immediate and
              longer term products and services to states after coastal disasters. NOS also is developing
              new protocols consistent with the Federal Response Plan. Finally, NOAA will seek
              improvements both in its support for state coastal management programs and in the
              programs themselves.

              To address the frightening potential consequences of increased hurricane activity, NOAA
              seeks a new partnership with states. State and local governments, through natural resource
              agencies, boards, and building inspectors, must work in collaboration with insurance
              companies, building industries, and other private sector groups to minimize the general
              population's exposure to the threats of hurricanes.












                                                             vi










                                                 FOREWORD


             This report on Hurricane Andrew was prepared by the DST after weeks of interviews and
             visits to the damaged areas with Federal, state, and local officials in Florida and Louisiana.
             Significant input also was provided by citizens in the affected areas.

             The DST is particularly grateful to the NOAA employees in the affected areas for their
             assistance, despite the extreme hardship endured by so many of the NOAA family. We are
             grateful to the state and local officials and representatives of relief agencies who took time
             from urgent duties to provide their impressions of the events during and after the storm's
             onslaught. We deeply appreciate the willingness of many citizens who shared their
             experiences with the DST, despite the complete devastation of all their worldly possessions.

             We commend the dedication and professionalism displayed by the NOAA staff as well as
             other Federal, state, and local employees who remained at their post under the most extreme
             of conditions, putting the public welfare ahead of their own safety. While this document is
             not intended to chronicle the entire history of the storm and its aftermath, it assesses
             NOAA's performance and recommends where improvements are needed.

             We acknowledge, with admiration and gratitude, the many people whose individual and
             collective efforts saved the lives of their fellow human beings. To all whose participation
             made the response to Hurricane Andrew an overwhelming success, thank you.





                                                                The Disaster Survey Team

















                                                           vii









                                       TABLE OF CONTENTS


                                                                                                  Page

              Acknowledgments        .................................................                 ii

              Preface    ..........................................................


              Foreword   .........................................................                   vii


              Acronyms      ........................................................                   X

              Disaster Survey Team      ..............................................               )dii

              Executive Summary       ................................................               xv

              Summary of Findings and Recommendations             ..........................        Xvii

              Hurricane Andrew: The Event and Its Impact           .........................           1



              PART I: SOUTH FLORIDA


              Chapter I.A       Background    ..........................................             15

              Chapter I.B       Summary of Preparedness Actions      ........................        19

              Chapter I.C       NWS Contingency Planning and Backup Arrangements         ........    25

              Chapter I.D       Summary of NWS Watches, Warnings, and Advisories        .........    29

              Chapter I.E       Summary of Information and Warning Services and
                                Response Actions by Ernergency Management and Media       .......    37

              Chapter I.F       Public Response  .......................................             47

              Chapter I.G       Processing, Interpretation, and Dissemination of NWS
                                Information   ..........................................             51

              Chapter I.H       Communications     ......................................            61

              Chapter I.I       Data Collection   .......................................            67






                                                         viii










            PART II: LOUISIANA


            Chapter ILA         Background    .........................................             79

            Chapter ILB         Summary of Preparedness Actions      .......................        81

            Chapter II.C        NWS Contingency Planning and Backup Arrangements         .......    87

            Chapter ILD         Summary of NWS Watches, Warnings, and Advisories        ........    91

            Chapter ILE         Summary of Information and Warning Services and
                                Response Actions by Emergency Management and Media        ......    97

            Chapter ILF         Public Response    .....................................          107

            Chapter II.G        Processing, Interpretation, and Dissemination of NWS
                                Information   .........................................           111


            Chapter ILH         Communications     .....................................          115

            Chapter ILI         Data Collection  ......................................           121



            Conclusion      .......................................................               129



            APPENDICES


            Appendix A          Summary Tables     .....................................          A-1

            Appendix B          Florida Deaths Directly Attributable to Hurricane Andrew
                                August 1992    ........................................           B-1

            Appendix C          Hurricane Andrew "Best Track" Summary:
                                August 16-28, 1992   ...................................          C-1

            Appendix D          Andrew's Toll on Louisiana   .............................        D-1

            Appendix E          Louisiana Damage Description     ..........................       E-1

            Appendix F          Interagency Coordinating Committee on Hurricanes
                                (ICCOH)    ...........................................            F-1

            Appendix G          Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale   ..........................       G-1



            Afterword





                                                        ix









                                   ACRONYMS



          AFB            Air Force Base
          AFOS           Automation of Field Operations and Services
          AOC            Aircraft Operations Center
          AOML           Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory
          AP             Associated Press
          ASOS           Automated Surface Observing System
          AVN            Aviation Model
          AWIPS          Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System
          BAM            Beta Advection Model
          BMS            Bahamas Meteorological Service
          CARCAH         Chief Aerial Reconnaissance Coordination for all Hurricanes
          CDT            Central Daylight Time
          CLIPER         CLImatology-PERsistence hurricane tracking model
          CPA            Closest Point of Approach
          CPCS           Common Program Control Station
          CWA            County Warning Area
          DEM            Division of Emergency Management
          DIFAX          Digital Facsimile
          DMSP           Defense Military Satellite Program
          DST            Disaster Survey Team
          EBS            Emergency Broadcast System
          EDT            Eastern Daylight Time
          EM             Emergency Management
          EOC            Emergency Operations Center
          ET             Electronics Technician
          FAA            Federal Aviation Administration
          FEMA           Federal Emergency Management Agency
          ft             Feet
          FTS            Federal Telephone System
          GDS            Graphic Decision System
          GOES           Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite
          GOES-Next      GOES-Next Generation Satellite
          HF             High Frequency
          HLS            Hurricane Local Statement
          HPP            Hurricane Preparedness Program
          HRD            Hurricane Research Division
          ICCOH          Interagency Coordinating Committee on Hurricanes
          kts            Knots
          LALETS         Louisiana Law Enforcement Telecommunications System
          LMRFC          Lower Mississippi River Forecast Center
          MARS           Military Affiliate Radio System
          mb             Millibars
          MEOW           Maximum Envelope of Water
          Meteosat       Meteorological Operations Satellite


                                          x








         MIC              Meteorologist in Charge
         MOU/A            Memorandum of Understanding/Agreement
         mph              Miles per hour
         MSL              Mean Sea Level
         NAWAS            National Warning System
         NDBC             National Data Buoy Center
         NESDIS           National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service
         NEXRAD           Next Generation Weather Radar
         NFD              National Forecast Division
         NGVD             National Geodetic Vertical Datum
         NGVvTLMS         Next Generation Water Level Measurement System
         NHC              National Hurricane Center
         NHC90            NHC 1990 Hurricane Computer Forecasting Program
         NLETS            National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System
         nm.              Nautical miles
         NMC              National Meteorological Center
         NOAA             National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
         NSSFC            National Severe Storms Forecast Center
         NVVrR            NOAA Weather Radio
         NOS              National Ocean Service
         NWS              National Weather Service
         NWSO             NEXRAD Weather Service Office
         NWWS             NOAA Weather Wire Service
         OEM              Office of Emergency Management
         OES              Office of Ocean and Earth Sciences
         OIC              Official in Charge
         OSF              Operational Support Facility
         PC               Personal Computer
         PUP              Principal User Processor
         QLM              Quasi-Lagrangian Model
         Rmax             Radius of Maximum Wind
         RFC              River Forecast Center
         RTA              Remote Terminal to AFOS
         SAB              Synoptic Analysis Branch
         SELS             Severe Local Storms Branch of NSSFC
         SHIFOR           Statistical Hurricane Intensity Forecasting Model
         SLOSH            Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes
         SRH              Southern Region Headquarters
         SWIS             Satellite Weather Information System
         SWODY1           Severe Weather Outlook-Day 1
         SWODY2           Severe Weather Outlook-Day 2
         SWOMCD           Severe Weather Outlook-Mesoscale Convective Discussion
         TCD              Tropical Cyclone Discussion
         TCM              Tropical Cyclone Marine Advisory
         TCP              Tropical Cyclone Public Advisory
         TCU              Tropical Cyclone Update
         TDL              Techniques Development Laboratory
         TROPAN           Tropical Regional Analysis Facsimile Circuit
         TSAF             Tropical Satellite Analysis and Forecast


                                            xi









UGC				Universal Generic Code
UPI				United Press International
UPS				Uninterruptable Power Supply
USACE				U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAFR				U.S. Air Force Reserve
USCG				U.S. Coast Guard
USGS				U.S. Geological Survey
UTC				Coordinated Universal Time
VHF				Very High Frequency
WCM				Warning Coordination Meteorologist
WMO				World Meteorological Organization
WPM				Warning Preparedness Meteorologist
WSFO				Weather Service Forecast Office
WSO				Weather Service Office
WSR-57			Weather Surveillance Radar-1957
WSR-74(C,S)			Weather Surveillance Radar 1974 (C-band, S-band)
WSR-88D			Weather Surveillance Radar 1988 Doppler
WWAMKC			SELS Severe Local Storm Watch Status Report
























































































								xii










                               DISASTER SURVEY TEAM


          SURVEY TEAM LEADER

                 Jennifer Joy Wilson-Assistant Secretary and Deputy Administrator, NOAA,
                 U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.

          SURVEY TEAM COORDINATOR

                 James P. Travers, Meteorologist-Director, Operations Division, Weather Service
                 Headquarters, NOAA, Silver Spring, Maryland.


          Florida Team

                 Team Leader, W. Stanley Wilson, Oceanographer-Assistant Administrator for
                 Ocean Services and Coastal Zone Management, National Ocean Service, NOAA,
                 Washington, D.C.

                 William 0. Alexander, Mesoscale Meteorologist-Office of Meteorology, Weather
                 Service Headquarters, NOAA, Silver Spring, Maryland.

                 E. Jay Baker, Social Scientist and Associate Professor-Department of Geography,
                 Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida.

                 Bernard Palmer, Meteorologist in Charge-Weather Service Forecast Office,
                 NOAA, Columbia, South Carolina.

                 X. William Proenza, Meteorologist-Deputy Director, National Weather Service
                 Southern Region Headquarters, NOAA, Fort Worth, Texas.

                 Kathy Sullivan, Oceanographer-Chief Scientist-Designate, NOAA, Washington,
                 D.C.


                 Herbert Lieb, Public Affairs Consultant-National Hurricane Center, NOAA,
                 Coral Gables, Florida.

                 William M. Frank, Meteorologist-Department of Meteorology, The Pennsylvania
                 State University, State College, Pennsylvania.

                 David McKinnie, Program Analyst-National Ocean Service/Office of Ocean and
                 Coastal Resource Management, NOAA, Washington, D.C.





                                                   xiii









                    Timothy Goodspeed, Geographer-National Ocean Service/Office of Ocean
                    Resources Conservation and Assessment, NOAA, Washington, D.C.

                    Mark Jacobsen, Living Marine Resources Specialist-National Ocean
                    Service/Office of Ocean Resources Conservation and Assessment, NOAA,
                    Washington, D.C.



             Louisiana Team


                    Team Leader, Ned A. Ostenso, Geophysicist-Assistant Administrator for
                    Oceanic and Atmospheric Research, Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research,
                    NOAA, Washington, D.C.

                    Rainer Dombrowsky, Meteorologist-Office of Meteorology, Weather Service
                    Headquarters, NOAA, Silver Spring, Maryland.

                    Jerry McDuffle, Meteorologist in Charge-Weather Service Forecast Office,
                    NOAA, Los Angeles, California.

                    Thomas H. Grayson, Meteorologist-Chief, Systems Operations Division,
                    National Weather Service Southern Region Headquarters, NOAA, Fort Worth,
                    Texas.


                    Wilson Shaffer, Atmospheric Scientist-Office of Systems Development, Weather
                    Service Headquarters, NOAA, Silver Spring, Maryland.

                    Christopher R. Adams, Social Scientist, Consultant-Cooperative Institute for
                    Research in the Atmosphere, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado.

                    Patrick J. Slattery, Public Affairs Specialist-National Weather Service Central
                    Region Headquarters, NOAA, Kansas City, Missouri.

                    Scott Kroczynski, Hydrometeorologist-Office of Hydrology, Weather Service
                    Headquarters, NOAA, Silver Spring, Maryland.

                    Mark Handel, Tropical Meteorologist, Consultant-Cambridge, Massachusetts.














                                                      xiv










                                       EXECUTIVE SUNEMIARY


             The tropical disturbance that grew into Hurricane Andrew developed in the central tropical
             Atlantic Ocean on August 16, 1992. Eventually a category 4 storm on the Saffir-Simpson
             Scale, Andrew went on to inflict more dollar damage than any natural disaster in United
             States history. Upon its Florida landfall at 5 AM Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on August
             24, wind from Andrew was a sustained 145 mph with gusts over 175 mph. Over a narrow
             area, the storm surge reached more than 14 feet, with storm tides attaining nearly 17 feet
             (storm tides comprise the sum of storm surge and astronomical tides).

             Andrew traversed south Florida and entered the Gulf of Mexico just 4 hours after impacting
             the east coast of Florida. After weakening to a category 3 over land, the storm quickly
             reintensified to a category 4 as it moved across the gulf. Prior to its landfall in Louisiana at
             4:30 AM EDT on August 26, Andrew again weakened to a category 3. Its maximum
             sustained winds in Louisiana were estimated at 120 mph with higher gusts.

             The devastation left in Andrew's wake over south Florida was immense. Total damage
             estimates of about $25 billion cannot convey the profound impact of the storm. According to
             insurance industry leaders, the total economic impact of Andrew will reach $35-40 billion by
             1995. Moreover, the fabric of organized society was shredded in south Dade County, Florida.
             A total of 126,000 houses were destroyed or damaged and 9,000 mobile homes were
             destroyed. Andrew left at least 160,000 people homeless in Dade County alone. Perhaps
             years will be required to rebuild the original infrastructure. The municipal electric power
             grid in Homestead and Florida City was destroyed. Banking, and therefore much of society's
             ability to function, came to a halt. Businesses were unable to reopen because their employees
             were homeless and struggling to shelter, clothe, and feed themselves and their families. A
             total of 86,000 people lost their jobs. The National Guard provided tent cities and the
             essentials to live, but many chose to remain in what was left of their homes for fear of
             looting.

             The damage from Andrew across Louisiana was overshadowed by what occurred in south
             Florida, but the storm still had a profound effect. Damages from Andrew in Louisiana are
             estimated to exceed $1 billion. Some small businesses were lost and many suffered some
             damage. Much of the estimated losses were insured: about 3,300 single family, multifamily,
             and mobile homes were destroyed. Over 18,000 units received some damage. As in south
             Florida, the National Guard quickly took control, protecting the hardest hit areas from
             looting. The storms effect on Louisiana public utilities was minimal. Quick action by local
             and Louisiana state officials promoted both a rapid response to the disaster and immediate
             launching of a coordinated recovery effort.

             Despite the severe physical damages and crippling monetary losses, human casualties were
             surprisingly few. In Florida, 15 deaths were directly attributed to the storm, with another
             29 fatalities indirectly related. Those indirect fatalities were caused by electrocutions,
             cleanup accidents, fres, and other incidents associated with recovery. In Louisiana, 8 direct
             and 9 indirect fatalities occurred. Indirect fatality totals depend on the broadness of
             definition and vary greatly. For example, one major newspaper reported 85 indirect south


                                                           xv








              Florida fatalities. Those numbers include persons killed in motor vehicle accidents where a
              stop sign was down due to Andrew. The number of indirect fatalities the disaster survey
              team uses (29 in south Florida and 9 in Louisiana) are those for which the county medical
              examiner or parish coroner determined the storm to be a contributing factor.

              Even before the Presidential Declaration of Disaster, NOAA/NWS assembled a Disaster
              Survey Team. The DST was responsible for assessing the performance of NOAA and the
              hazards community prior to and during the hurricane. The hazards community consists of
              all Federal, state, and local governmental entities, as well as the mass media and volunteer
              organizations, involved in the distribution and dissemination of weather information for the
              protection of life and property. Following the assessment, the DST was responsible for
              providing any necessary recommendations for improvements.

              The DST found that NOAA performed exceptionally well both prior to and during Hurricane
              Andrew. The hurricane forecast track error was 30 percent less than average. Lead times
              on hurricane watches and warnings were 3 to 6 hours better than average. Hurricane
              watches were issued with 36 hours of lead time in south Florida and 43 hours in Louisiana.
              Hurricane warnings were issued with 21 hours lead time in south Florida and 36 hours in
              Louisiana. Throughout the event, NWS personnel, despite enormous personal hardship,
              supplied timely, high quality information to the public via NOAA Weather Radio (NWR),
              NOAA Weather Wire Service (NWWS), direct links with emergency management, and the
              mass media. To assure this flow of vital information, contingency plans were activated for
              backup of the NHC and for the Weather Service Forecast Office (WSFO) at Miami should
              they have become unable to function. Those plans were not needed for the NHC, but WSFO
              Atlanta and Weather Service Offices (WSO) at Tampa Bay and West Palm Beach provided
              forecasting issuance and backup warnings, respectively, for WSFO Miami.

              State, county/parish, and local emergency management agencies, working in concert with law
              enforcement and based on information supplied by the NWS, coordinated some of the largest
              evacuations in United States history. In south Florida, as well as Louisiana, literally
              hundreds of thousands of people left their homes.

              The DST found that the collection and dissemination of information, through appropriate
              warnings and statements, need improvement. In particular, hurricane local statements
              (HLS) need to be shortened and reorganized to provide more timely and specific information
              pertaining to the local area. The DST found also that WSOs and WSFOs need to address
              storm-scale events occurring within hurricanes by using appropriate severe weather warnings
              and statements, including tornado warnings. Additionally, Andrew re-emphasized the need
              for improvement in hurricane intensity forecasting. Finally, the DST found that wind, not
              storm surge, was the major cause of direct deaths in Andrew. Still, these statistics need to
              be kept in perspective: 12 of the 15 deaths directly attributed to Andrew in Florida were
              caused by wind as compared to the potential for hundreds of fatalities that could have
              occurred from storm surge. The reality is that evacuation from wind would involve far too
              many people to be accomplished; alternative shelter may be necessary.







                                                           xvi










                                             SLTAEVLARY OF
                        FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS


            PART I

            Chapter LB

            Finding LBA: The NHC is charged with a national focus on hurricane readiness, but it
            dominates the NWS hurricane preparedness program in south Florida.

            Recommendation I.B.1: The NWS should staff WSFO Miami with a Warning Coordination
            Meteorologist (WCM) as soon as possible to enhance the WSFO's preparedness/hazard
            awareness program.



            Finding I.B.2: This was the first time that the NHC (and the collocated WSFO Miami)
            facility had been directly affected by a major hurricane. The impact of Andrew proved the
            vulnerability of NHC to the effects of extreme wind.

            Recommendation LB.2: Better protected, self-contained facilities should be provided to the
            NHC and all NWS coastal offices. This is even more critical to National Centers, such as
            NHC, for which full backup procedures are extremely difficult to implement.


            Finding I.B.3: Hurricane Andrew was characterized by devastating effects of strong inland
            winds in addition to powerful storm surges. The devastation that eventually occurred over
            south Florida heightened the awareness in other vulnerable areas to the significant inland
            wind damage which can accompany a hurricane.

            Recommendation I.B.3: The NWS should provide technical assistance for a much more
            concerted preparedness and awareness effort by state and local emergency management and
            such other cognizant organizations as state coastal zone management agencies in areas of
            high vulnerability.


            Finding LBA: Since the lead time for evacuation may be no more than 24 hours, it may not
            be practical or even possible to evacuate all inland residents in the path of a hurricane
            eyewall.

            Recommendation LBA: The NWS should work with FEMA, state, and local emergency
            planners in exploring the potential of developing a "refuge of last resort" methodology, as
            appropriate, for occasions when critical saturation points are reached in the now of
            evacuation traffic.




                                                       xvii







                Chapter LC

                Finding I.C.1: The detailing of two hurricane specialists to the National Meteorological
                Center (NMC) is not sufficient to provide adequate continuous backup to NHC operations.

                Recommendation I.C.1: The NWS should adopt a plan that would increase the number
                of forecasters capable of acting as hurricane specialists during an emergency brought on by
                a hurricane threatening NHC. There must be adequate staffing at both NHC and the backup
                site. One plan would be to provide hurricane forecast training to a select group of forecasters,
                possibly from NMC, who could fly to NHC as replacements for hurricane specialists
                dispatched to staff the backup center.


                Finding I.C.2: When NHC staff is drawn down to implement the backup at NMC,
                insufficient staff remains at NHC to handle advisories of multiple tropical cyclones properly.

                Recommendation I.C.2: See Recommendation I.C.1.



                PindinLr I.C.3: Facilities for interacting with the media are very limited at NMC.

                Recommendation I.C.3: The NMC should formulate a plan for handling the extensive
                interactions with the media that are required when a hurricane is threatening the United
                States coastline. Since NMC is the logical site for the backup forecast center, plans should
                be made to accommodate the large number of media personnel who will descend upon the
                backup center, especially if it is required to take over the primary forecast mission.


                Chapter LD

                Findina I.D.1 NHC watch and warning lead times during Hurricane Andrew were longer
                than average for landfalling hurricanes. That extra margin of safety was at least partially
                responsible for allowing hundreds of thousands of people to evacuate safely from south
                Florida.


                Recommendation I.D.1: NOAA and the NWS should work toward increasing watch/
                warning lead times by supporting efforts to enhance our understanding of tropical systems,
                improving numerical models, providing greater data availability to feed the models, and
                enhancing operational forecast methodologies. A significant step in this direction would be
                the collocation of the Environmental Research Laboratory's Hurricane Research Division
                (HRD) with NHC to allow for the synergism of research and operations.


                Finding I.D.2: HLSs from WSO/WSFOs tend to be too lengthy, too infrequent, tend to
                reiterate NHC advisories too much, and tend not to include enough specific information about
                local conditions.


                Recommendation I.D.2: The NWS should explore options to make HLSs more effective.
                This should include use of the "Short Term Forecast" concept and its relationship to HLSs


                                                              Xviii









            and hurricane advisories. Furthermore, coastal offices should re-evaluate the manner in
            which data are collected and used to create HLS products. Emphasis should be made on use
            of on-station software, emergency management information, and remote sensing data to
            create a highly specific, current product.


            Chapter LE

            Finding LEA: Concern was expressed by two emergency managers over the tone set by
            NHC on Friday afternoon when a "Have a good weekend ... tune back in on Sunday or
            Monday" message was given to emergency management. Some officials felt that message
            could have promoted a less-than-serious attitude and that it could have caused them not to
            pay close attention to storm information during the weekend.

            Recommendation LEA: Although NHC is extremely concerned about how information is
            presented, care must continue to be exercised not to send unintended messages.


            Finding LE.2: Many coastal emergency managers do not understand the scientific reasoning
            involved in designating hurricane watch and warning areas. They want to evacuate either
            all or none of their coastal surge vulnerable area rather than parts of counties.

            Recommendation LE.2: There needs to be better dialogue between NHC and emergency
            management involving the designation of hurricane watch and warning areas. Conference
            calls following or preceding a watch or warning issuance always should contain a thorough
            explanation for the choice of the end points of the areas. NHC also should explore the
            feasibility of including this information in the tropical cyclone discussions. Courses offered
            at NHC for emergency managers should include a segment on the subject of designating
            watch and warning areas.


            Finding LE.3: One critical aspect of hurricane forecasting-the intensification of storms-
            lags far behind the balance of the science. SHIFOR, the computer model used to forecast
            hurricane intensification, is old and ineffective. It does a poor job of handling rapid
            intensification.


            Recommendation LE.3: NHC, NMC, and HRD should redouble their efforts to develop
            models and operational techniques to forecast tropical cyclone intensity changes more
            effectively. In turn, NOAA should support research efforts at understanding and predicting
            cyclone intensity changes.


            Finding LEA: Some emergency managers could have made greater use of hurricane strike
            probabilities and personal computer (PC) software in their decision-making process.

            Recommendation LEA: Emergency management needs to use all the tools available to
            them to provide information for their decision-making processes, including PC-based software
            specifically designed for that purpose. The NWS should work with FEMA to support more



                                                          Nix








               workshops for coastal emergency managers. This should include instructions on how to use
               these tools effectively.


               Findina LE.5: As a result of increased anxiety caused by Hurricane Andrew, many south
               Florida residents indicated they would evacuate for future major hurricanes. Indeed, if this
               was the case, evacuation times for a category 4 or 5 hurricane striking the Florida Keys
               would increase from the pre-Andrew level of 37 hours to 70-80 hours, depending on the
               percentage of residents evacuating.

               Recommendation LE.5: NWS and FEMA should work in concert to develop response
               options as outlined in Recommendations I.B.4 and I.F.2.


               Findine LEX: The link between the NWS, emergency management, and the broadcast
               media is critical to any community warning system. A partnership developed to coordinate
               NHC information through a broadcast "pool" enabled a large number of media outlets to
               receive broadcast footage from NHC without crowding the facility and compromising the
               operational setting.

               Recommendation LEA: NWS should support development of similar broadcast pools at
               local offices along the hurricane-prone coasts, as well as at NMC, should backup for NHC be
               required.


               Finding LE.7: Television meteorologists were instrumental in encouraging evacuation from
               the threatened areas. Many of the television broadcasts were simulcast on AM and FM radio.
               This was particularly useful since many residents received lifesaving advice through their
               battery-operated radios when television transmitters were knocked off the air.

               Recommendation LEJ: NWS offices along hurricane-threatened areas should continue to
               encourage proactive, weather-conscious media who will provide that essential link with the
               public to convey lifesaving information.


               Finding LES: Efforts of the NWS, in conjunction with state and local emergency
               management and the news media, resulted in clear and motivating messages to the general
               public. Those messages resulted in a superb public response, except for some residents of
               Miami Beach, and may have saved countless lives.

               Recommendation LES: NHC and WSFO Miami should work with the local media to
               target those populations in Miami Beach where the response was deficient.









                                                            XX









            Chapter LF

            Finding I.F.I: NHC and NWS representatives, when making a case for refuges of last
            resort, may have contributed unintentionally to the problem of public resistance to evacuation
            by stressing the danger of being caught trying to evacuate.

            Recommendation I.F.I: NWS and NHC representatives need to stress to the public the
            importance of referring to appropriate state and local emergency management directives
            about evacuation orders.



            Finding I.F.2: If residents of the hard hit Naranja Lakes area had not evacuated because
            of the storm surge threat, more deaths likely would have resulted from the effects of wind.

            Recommendation LF.2: Since in many cases evacuation is not a viable option, the NWS
            and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should work together to encourage
            the concept of engineered in-residence shelters to protect from severe wind without invoking
            evacuation procedures.


            Finding I.F.3: Many residents whose houses began to disintegrate during the storm
            followed "tornado safety rules" and went to the interior part of their house away from
            windows and outside walls.


            Recommendation LF.3: NWS and emergency management agencies should make "tornado
            safety rules" a standard component of hurricane awareness efforts, especially for strong
            storms. The public also should be better educated about the kinds of construction and
            building designs which are most vulnerable in strong hurricanes.


            Chapter LG

            Finding LGA: Small errors in the track forecast produced by the Aviation Model were
            impressive for this small sample of forecasts.

            Recommendation LGA: NOAA should continue to support development of such models.
            In order to use these models most effectively, methods need to be explored to gather better
            data in and around tropical cyclones. The Omega dropwinsonde experiment should be
            conducted to evaluate the potential of this capability.


            Finding I.G.2: The storm surge impacted a relatively small area of coastline, but the
            SLOSH model accurately depicted the surge in south Florida.

            Recommendation I.G.2: Refinements to the SLOSH model should continue. Also, training
            of NWS offices and emergency managers in its use should be emphasized. The SLOSH model
            should be validated in cooperation with the NOS/Office of Ocean and Earth Sciences (OES)
            and others to further continued improvements in the model. A greater effort should be made


                                                          xxi









               to document its physics and the validation efforts thatjustify its use. NOS should assist with
               such a documentation.



               Findina I.G.3 On-station computers at WSOs and WSFOs are inadequate to run storm
               surge and applications programs.

               Recommendation I.G.3: Coastal NWS offices should be provided sufficient PC hardware
               and software to display SLOSH MEOW (Maximum Envelop of Water) data as well as to run
               surge applications and hurricane decision-making programs. The Advanced Weather
               Interactive Processing System (AWIPS), under development for future NWS Weather
               Forecast Offices, should be able to support these programs.


               Chapter LH

               Finding I.H.1: Despite the extensive commercial media coverage of Andrew, both the
               NWWS and NWR were well received and were utilized as official and timely sources of NWS
               information regarding the event.

               Recommendation LHA: The NWS should continue strong encouragement of the
               widespread use of NWWS and NWR as official sources of NWS information. High priority
               should be placed on planned NWR upgrades and more wind-resistant transmitters, featuring
               voice synthesis, to improve the quality and efficiency of NWR dissemination during major
               weather events. The NWS should develop partnerships with FEMA and other organizations
               to increase NWR coverage as well as the broadcasting of critical pre- and post-event
               information.



               Finding I.H.2: NHC made effective use of the Florida National Warning System (NAWAS)
               circuit to communicate with Florida emergency managers and Florida WSOs on important
               hurricane information.


               Recommendation I.H.2: FEMA, NWS, and state emergency management offices should
               develop procedures to use the national NAWAS circuit for multistate conference calls so that
               NHC can brief all appropriate emergency management officials on the network during a
               hurricane threat.



               Finding I.H.3: Excessive heat build-up contributed to the failure of the IBM mainframe
               computer at the NHC during the hurricane. This was the most serious communications
               failure at NHC because of the IBM's role in driving the McIDAS VDUC, a principal source
               of interactive satellite data for the NHC staff. In addition, other important circuits failed
               which depended on the IBM.

               Recommendation I.H.3: The NWS should install a stand-alone air-conditioning system for
               the NHC independent of leased commercial facilities. This would greatly minimize the
               heating problem of critical communications and computer equipment.



                                                            xxii








             Chapter 1.1

             Finding 1.1.1: Satellite imagery is the only source of information over data-sparse oceans,
             except for ships which generally avoid rough weather.

             Recommendation LIJ: NOAA must make every effort to ensure that the GOES-Next
             (Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-Next Generation Satellite) program
             remains on schedule. Meanwhile, No-GOES plans need to be tested routinely.


             Findina LI.2: Aircraft reconnaissance is a necessary and vital tool for measuring storm
             intensity, for defining wind fields, and for calibrating satellite estimates of storm intensity.
             However, the current airframes are aging and provide limited range and performance
             characteristics.


             Recommendation 1.1.2: Aircraft reconnaissance of tropical cyclones must continue. In
             order to provide high quality data on the storm and its environment, NOAA should explore
             cost-effective options on future sensors and airframes. This must be done now if we are to
             make effective use of next generation models for tropical cyclone intensity and track
             forecasting.


             FindinLr 1.1.3: The precision, range, and refinement offered by the WSR-88D allowed for
             precise location not only of the eye but also, long before landfall, of stronger elements in the
             spiral bands. The ability of the WSO at Melbourne to observe and report on these small but
             significant features enabled them to allay public fears about a potentially approaching
             hurricane.


             Recommendation 1.1.3: Efforts by the NWS, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
             and the Department of Defense (DOD) to deploy the WSR-88D nationwide must continue.
             In addition, NOAA needs to assure staffing of its NWS Doppler radar equipped offices with
             properly trained personnel in order to take best advantage of this powerful data source.


             Finding LIA: Wind observations are taken at varying heights and with different sampling
             strategies, making the determination of winds during a severe storm difficult to assess.

             Recommendation LIA: The Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology should
             continue to work with the various Federal agencies to ensure that wind observation
             adjustments are standardized for height and sampling interval variations to ensure
             consistency of data.


             Finding LIZ: Many wind observation sites failed not because of a failure of the instrument
             but because of the manner in which the support hardware was constructed and assembled.

             Recommendation 1.1.5: The NWS and FAA need to inventory their F420 anemometer
             installations in hurricane-threatened areas. The NWS and FAA should consider retrofitting
             suspect F420 sites with a locking cross arm prior to the 1994 hurricane season. Furthermore,


                                                           xxiii









               the NWS Automatic Surface Observing System (ASOS) program office should investigate the
               potential for failures in the ASOS wind mast and sensors during high wind episodes.


               Findina 1.1.6: Valuable wind and pressure observations were lost when the data-gathering
               systems were powered down or removed before Andrew's landfall.

               Recommendation 1.1.6: Agencies with meteorological data-gathering equipment in the path
               of a hurricane should be encouraged to continue the data collection process throughout the
               event.




               PART 11

               Chapter ILB

               Finding II.B.1: There is an insufficient supply of safety and preparedness materials in
               support of NWS field offices, local emergency preparedness officials, and the public.

               Recommendation II.B.I: NOAA and the Department of Commerce should increase their
               support for developing, printing, and distributing high quality preparedness and awareness
               materials. Present cooperative efforts with other agencies and the private sector to develop
               and distribute awareness and preparedness materials should be increased.


               Finding II.B.2: The local print media is more reactive in community preparedness than
               proactive. Historically, in south Louisiana, the print media has not actively participated in
               preseason hurricane preparedness efforts, such as awareness campaigns. On the other hand,
               during the 72 hours prior to Andrew, they were extremely effective in providing their
               readership with detailed preparedness information.

               Recommendation II.B.2: NWS offices in south Louisiana need to develop stronger
               cooperative relationships with the print media to enhance their involvement in the hazards
               awareness and mitigation program.


               Findine II.B.3: Local emergency managers in south Louisiana were very proactive, taking
               the early initiative in dealing with Hurricane Andrew.

               Recommendation II.B.3: The NWS must continue working closely with local emergency
               managers to ensure that together they promote a unified awareness program which elicits
               the desired public response.









                                                           xxiv









             Chapter ILD

             Finding II.D.1: Users of NWS products would like more specific, technical information to
             assist them in their decision-making process.

             Recommendation II.D.I: The NHC should work with users to define what additional
             information is required and to develop a means of communicating that information to them.


             Finding II.D.2: Hurricane local statements were too closely tied to the issuance of hurricane
             advisories. As a result, the dissemination of critical information concerning tornadic events
             was delayed.

             Recommendation II.D.2: The issuance of hurricane local statements should be event
             driven, rather than tied exclusively to routine NHC issuances.


             Finding II.D.3: During the peak period of tornado activity, several reports of tornadoes
             were highlighted in the HLSs. One of these reports proved to be erroneous. Rather than
             issue a corrected HLS, the WSFO issued a special weather statement to acknowledge the
             error. This could have caused confusion and loss of precious time for users during a period
             of rapidly changing events.

             Recommendation II.D.3: NWS field offices should follow established NWS formats for
             issuing corrections.


             Chapter ILE

             Finding ILEA:        FEMA/NWS-sponsored Hurricane Response and Decision-making
             Workshops are conducted only a few times each year. These workshops are incapable of
             reaching sufficient numbers of emergency officials. This limits the effectiveness of the
             hurricane preparedness program.

             Recommendation ILEA: FEMA and the NWS should increase the number of annual
             hurricane workshops to train coastal emergency management officials.


             Finding II.E.2: Due to the close proximity of the WSFO, an agreement with the city allows
             for a dedicated meteorologist to be dispatched from the WSFO to the local Emergency
             Operations Center (EOC) during hurricane events which may threaten the city.

             Recommendation II.E.2: Appropriate NWS staff should be dedicated to work with
             emergency management officials during major hazardous weather events.


             Finding II.E.3: Formal evacuation clearance studies for southwest Louisiana have yet to
             be completed.



                                                         xxv








               Recommendation II.E.3: FEMA and the USACE, with NWS support, should accelerate
               their efforts to complete evacuation studies for all hurricane-prone coastal areas.


               Findinst ILEA: In general, coastal residents know that they have a potential storm surge
               problem. However, in some highly populated areas, such as Greater New Orleans, there are
               preliminary evacuation studies but no proven orderly plan for the safe and timely evacuation
               of the entire metropolitan area. Furthermore, the scope of these studies does not address
               regional complications which can compromise orderly evacuation.

               Recommendation ILEA FEMA, in concert with the NWS, should ensure the completion
               of local evacuation studies and integrate them into a comprehensive regional evacuation plan.


               Findine ILEA The emergency management community of southeast Louisiana felt strongly
               that the fear of looting was partially responsible for a smaller than expected number of
               evacuees.


               Recommendation ILEA Local governments, with NWS and FEMA assistance, need to
               educate residents to alleviate these inaccurate perceptions.


               Finding ILEA There were a few instances where one local television station presented
               forecast track scenarios that conflicted with official NHC forecasts. That caused some
               problems for local parish and NWS officials.

               Recommendation ILEA The local NWS offices in Louisiana should make a renewed effort
               to impress upon the local media that providing consistent information to the public is critical
               during emergency situations.


               Chapter ILF

               Finding ILFA: Many southeast Louisiana residents did not understand the full extent of
               danger from storm surge.

               Recommendation II.F.1: The NWS needs to work more closely with FEMA, as well as
               state and local officials, to develop more effective preparedness information about storm
               surge. Presentations tailored to local areas could provide information about situations to
               which residents could better relate.



               FindinLr 11.F.2: Some south Louisiana residents interviewed commented that they had
               evacuated highly vulnerable areas only to find themselves threatened by other liurricane
               dangers.

               Recommendation II.F.2: The NWS, in concert with local emergency management officials,
               should ensure that evacuation studies are up to date and accurate. Given widespread
               distribution, the results of these studies can direct the public to appropriate shelter.


                                                            Xxvi










             Finding II.F.3: Despite the efforts of the NWS and state and local emergency managers,
             not all residents heeded the various evacuation requests even though their lives may have
             been in jeopardy had the storm made landfall further east along the Louisiana coast.

             Recommendation II.F.3: The NWS and FEMA need to increase their efforts to educate and
             train the public. Each agency needs to consider expanding their training capabilities to
             overcome the public's denial of the threat from hurricanes.


             Findina II.F.4: Some residents of Greater New Orleans who evacuated and later returned
             to their homes felt that local officials overreacted in their evacuation recommendations
             especially since Andrew made landfall further west than projected.

             Recommendation II.F.4: The NWS needs to work closely with the emergency management
             community in convincing this most skeptical segment of the population that the advantages
             of evacuating far outweigh the disadvantages of remaining in place.


             Chapter II.G

             Finding ILGA: WSFO Slidell, being collocated with the Lower Mississippi River Forecast
             Center (LMRFC), had access to RFC PCs and was able to run SLOSH MEOW and other
             hurricane decision-making applications.

             Recommendation II.G.1: See Recommendation I.G.3.


             Chapter ILH

             Finding II.H.I: The Universal Generic Codes (UGC) were incorrectly entered in several of
             the products disseminated by south Louisiana offices.

             Recommendation II.H.I: NWS offices should perform more on-the-spot quality control of
             products prior to their public release. The use of software, such as version 6.0 of SRWarn,
             would help eliminate many of these errors.


             Finding II.H.2: Currently, not all coastal WSOs have access to the hurricane hotline.

             Recommendation II.H.2: NOAA needs to expand the hurricane hotline to all coastal WSOs
             in hurricane vulnerable areas.



             Finding II.H.3: The use of Army MARS (Military Affiliate Radio System) within the
             Louisiana emergency communications system was very successful.

             Recommendation II.H.3: The NWS and FEMA need to coordinate with Army MARS to
             ensure that these capabilities can be extended to other locations.



                                                        xxvii









               Findina ILHA: The State of Louisiana, Division of Emergency Management, currently does
               not have a fully automated information redistribution system.

               Recommendation ILHA: The NWS and FEMA should encourage the State of Louisiana
               to explore options for providing a fully automated communications system to law enforcement
               agencies and local emergency operating centers. Once in place, the NWS should arrange to
               link with that system allowing two-way communication of critical warning information
               between the NWS and the emergency management community.


               Chapter ILI

               Findina ILIA: The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has decided to remove all large navigational
               buoys and replace them with other, smaller types of buoys. The replacement buoys are too
               small to be fitted with meteorological instruments. Loss of the current buoys, in the near
               future, will mean the loss of hourly data from stations along the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico
               coasts.


               Recommendation 11.1.1: The NWS, through its National Data Buoy Center, should ensure
               that sufficient capabilities are present to maintain hourly observations along the Atlantic and
               Gulf of Mexico coastal waters.



               Finding 11.1.2: The implementation of service maintenance fees has resulted in the removal
               of meteorological equipment from gulf oil platforms, and a significant loss of data has
               occurred.


               Recommendation 11.1.2: NOAA must review its position on charging oil platforms a service
               fee to maintain meteorological equipment.


               Findina 11.1.3: Although Andrew did not move into WSO Houston's effective Doppler range,
               the WSR-88D radar did provide extremely detailed reflectivity data on the storm.

               Recommendation 11.1.3: See Recommendation 1.1.3.






















                                                           xxviii































                   This tranquil scene was taken at Sewell Park in Florida located on the mouth
                   of the Miami River on a normal day.


























                   This is Sewell Park just after daybreak on August 24-water is still elevated.



                                                       xxix














                                                                       77
                                                                       .1                      AP,

                                                                              'Ir






                                                                   Al,
                                                                                                    -_ 71k,
                                                   E0                       4e-


                                                                                   JI
         owl

                              n-@





              00,










                    Aerial photo of the marina "Gables by the Sea" located near Gables Estates,
                     Florida. Numerous boats were forced ashore by the 9- to 16-ft storm surge.
                                                                                        anew





















































                                                        xxx









                                       HURRICANE ANDREW:
                                 THE EVENT AND ITS IMPACT


            The intense winds accompanying Hurricane Andrew caused massive damage in southern
            Dade County and rendered it the costliest storm in United States history. The mind-
            numbing statistics of Andrew include 126,000 single family houses destroyed or damaged and
            9,000 mobile homes destroyed. Officials ordered entire complexes bulldozed because there
            were no salvageable structures. Mobile home parks were cleared to make room for temporary
            housing. Andrew left 160,000 people homeless in Dade County alone. A total of 86,000
            residents lost jobs, many permanently. Still, Florida was spared from an even larger
            disaster. Andrew was a compact, fast-moving, relatively dry storm. Had it been larger,
            slower, or carried more rain, its consequences would have been even more devastating.
            Further, and more significantly, Andrew's track minimized the damage to Dade County.
            Had the eye of the storm crossed the coast just 10 miles further to the north, it would have
            devastated downtown Miami, probably causing greater loss of life and tens of billions of
            dollars more in property damage. Andrew would have affected not only south Florida but the
            global economy since Miami is a very prominent world banking center.

            Andrew was the third strongest landfalling hurricane in the United States this century. The
            estimated central pressure at landfall in Florida was 922 millibars (mb). The storm was
            classified at the upper threshold of category 4 on the Saffir-Simpson intensity scale (see
            appendix G). After raking Dade County, Andrew continued rapidly westward across south
            Florida and remained an intense storm as it traversed the Gulf of Mexico. Coincident with
            its landfall in Louisiana, it caused further significant damage. Although lives were lost both
            in Florida and Louisiana, the number of deaths was small considering the magnitude of
            destruction to property. That low number of fatalities was due partially to accurate forecasts
            and effective preparations and partially to the limited effect of storm surge. In Florida, 15
            deaths are directly attributable to Andrew (29 indirect, including post-event electrocutions,
            cleanup accidents, heart attacks, and the like). In Louisiana, 8 fatalities are directly related
            to the storm and another 9 indirect.

            In Louisiana, preliminary data for the 36-parish disaster area indicated that 3,301 single,
            multifamily, and mobile homes were destroyed, and 18,247 units received major or minor
            damages. Data compiled by a consortium of state agencies and groups with specific
            responsibilities in agriculture indicated that estimated agricultural losses would exceed $288
            million. Sugarcane yield losses were estimated at $128.4 million, cotton losses at $68.2
            million, and forestry-related losses at $38.6 million. The consortium also estimated losses
            of $13.2 million for the soybean crop, $12.7 million for corn, and $9.1 million for rice.


            History of the Storm

            Andrew formed from a tropical wave that moved off the African coast on August 14, 1992.
            The "best track" analysis of the storm's track is shown in figure 1. ("Best track" is a term
            used by the NHC to describe the closest post-event approximation possible on the track of a


                                                            1
















                                                                                                                                                                                             47
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          tropical system, based on satellite imagery, surface and ship observations, and any other data
          available.) Since the system was still outside of air reconnaissance range, satellite imagery
          was used exclusively to monitor the movement and structural changes to the developing
          system. By 2 PM EDT on August 16, the system had developed spiral cloud bands with wind
          speed estimated at 30 knots (34 miles per hour [mph]). The best track analysis indicates that
          the storm became a tropical depression at about that time.

          On August 17, Andrew was classified as a tropical storm. It moved along a west-
          northwesterly track until August 22. The storm formed and intensified in an environment
          of weak easterly vertical wind shear. Large-scale processes that lead to tropical cyclogenesis
          are not well understood, but both observational and numerical modelling studies consistently
          show that cyclones can form and intensify readily in conditions of weak vertical shear, or
          sometimes in regions of moderate easterly shear. However, significant westerly shear over
          the top of a tropical cyclone is usually unfavorable for intensification or even maintenance
          of the storm.


          During August 19-20, Andrew moved into a region with strong upper-level southwesterly
          winds associated with an upper-level low pressure system situated northwest of the storm.
          The resulting vertical shear is the probable cause of the observed filling of the central
          pressure to about 1015 mb. During this period, aircraft reconnaissance found that the storm
          circulation at lower levels was poorly organized, and satellite imagery showed only
          intermittent deep convection in the core region.

          During August 21, the upper level low moved away from the storm, and Andrew was once
          again in an environment with vertical shears favoring intensification. It also turned west
          and accelerated to about 18 mph as high pressure north of the storm intensified,
          strengthening the easterly flow within which Andrew was embedded. The storm then
          followed an almost due westward track until it crossed Florida. Andrew rapidly deepened
          and reached hurricane intensity by 8 AM EDT on August 22. By 2 PM EDT on August 23,
          Andrew possessed a central pressure of 922 mb. It was at the upper end of category 4
          strength (on the Saffir-Simpson scale) when its eye passed over the northern part of
          Eleuthera Island in the Bahamas on August 23 and the southern Berry Islands on August
          24. Extensive damage occurred in these regions. Eleuthera experienced a high-water level
          (storm surge and waves) of 25 feet (ft) at the town of The Current.

          Andrew weakened briefly on August 24, then rapidly reintensified. Once again, it deepened
          to have a minimum central pressure of 922 mb as it crossed the coast near Homestead Air
          Force Base (AFB), Florida, at 5:05 AM EDT, August 24. That pressure estimate was
          substantiated by pressure readings from barometers near the landfall, several of which were
          pressure chamber tested for accuracy following Andrew.

          The storm was unusually compact. An aircraft penetration less than an hour before landfall
          showed that hurricane-force winds were confined to a region approximately 30 nautical miles
          (nm) in radius, with peak observed winds of 162 knots (kts) (186 mph) at a night level of
          10,000 ft (figure 2). The maximum sustained 1-minute surface (10-meter elevation) winds
          over southern Florida were approximately 125 kts (144 mph).

          The most severe damage occurred along the swath of the eye and in the surrounding eyewall.
          Unofficial estimates of the pressure gradient in the eyewall on the north side of the storm


                                                         3


















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             indicate that it may have been as large as 10 mb per nm. This is indicative of the extreme
             winds largely responsible for the tremendous damage.

             Andrew was by far the most expensive natural disaster in United States history in terms of
             property loss (approximately $25 billion). In defiance of the conventional wisdom on
             hurricane effects in the United States, most of the damage was caused by the severe winds
             rather than the storm surge. The damage in Louisiana was substantial, over $1 billion, with
             about $300 million agricultural impact. The tornado at La Place was by far the most
             damaging Andrew-related element to manmade structures in Louisiana.

             Hurricane Andrew continued westward across the southern tip of the Florida peninsula and
             exited on the west coast about 4 hours after it made landfall. The storm remained intense
             as it crossed the Gulf of Mexico, with surface pressure filling only to about 950 mb. During
             the 48 hours prior to landfall in Louisiana, two cycles of reintensification occurred, both the
             result of interactions between high pressure to the northeast and a mid-latitude trough to the
             northwest. As the high weakened, the influence of the mid-latitude trough became dominant.
             Steering winds across the northern gulf were altered; Andrew turned to the west-northwest
             and slowed its forward motion to 10 mph.

             Andrew weakened prior to landfall, skirting Louisiana's coastline for about 10 hours before
             coming ashore near Point Chevreuil, about 20 nm west-southwest of Morgan City, Louisiana.
             The storm made landfall at 4:30 AM EDT on August 26. With an estimated landfall central
             pressure of 956 mb and sustained winds of 120 mph, Andrew struck the sparsely populated
             portion of south-central Louisiana as a category 3 hurricane. It filled very rapidly, weakening
             to tropical storm strength by early afternoon and to a depression by evening. On August 28,
             the remnants of Andrew merged with a cold front and were no longer considered a tropical
             weather system.


             Wind Distribution

             Intense, compact storms, such as Andrew, are infrequent but not rare.                They are
             characterized by extremely strong pressure gradients and resulting intense winds in and near
             the eyewall. Figure 3a is a preliminary analysis of surface winds of Hurricane Andrew OVER
             WATER near the time of landfall. The wind analyses at flight level were reconstructed from
             available data sources and empirically adjusted to estimate surface values over water, using
             correction factors appropriate for over-water conditions. Sustained winds over land are
             typically weaker than surface winds over water, but surface winds over land tend to have
             larger gust factors than over-water surface winds. Superimposed on the wind estimates of
             figure 3a is a map of the region of southern Florida where Andrew made landfall, to give the
             scale of the storm and of the likely regions of intense winds. Note that the strongest winds
             were ahead and to the right side, with respect to storm motion, of the storm and, therefore,
             approximately coincided with the regions of maximum damage discussed elsewhere in this
             report. It is possible that the radius of maximum winds might have been a few miles smaller
             at the surface than is shown in these analyses since the analyses do not take into account
             outward sloping of the eyewall with height.

             Figure 3b is a preliminary estimate of the over-water surface winds at the approximate time
             that Andrew made landfall on the coast of Louisiana. A map of the region is overlaid for


                                                            5
















                            NOAA Hurricane Research Division Surface Wind Analysis
                      Hurricane Andrew 0831 UTC 24 August, 1992, data from 0410 - 1300 UTC
                           Recon adjusted to sfc. from 3000 m altitude by __PBL or__ empirical
                        
                        



              Figure 3a - Preliminary estimate of the surface winds OVER WATER just before Hurricane
              Andrew made landfall in Florida. These winds are estimated empirically from flight level
              analyses using correction factors appropriate for over-water conditions only. A map of
              southern Florida is superimposed for reference. (M. Powell, personal communication)                                   6














                   Hurricane Research Division Surface Wind Analysis
                          Hurricane Andrew 0624 August 26 1992
                 Data from 1700-0900 UTC Air Force Recon Adjusted empirically from 10,000 ft.
                            




                     Figure 3b - As in figure 3a but for landfall in Louisiana. (M. Powell, personal
                     communication)


                                                        7








              scaling reference. Note that figures 3a and 3b are drawn on different scales. Once again, it
              is emphasized that the wind values shown are not valid over land: hurricane surface winds
              over land vary from those over water due to a variety of factors, including orography, surface
              roughness, and stability of the boundary layer.


              Hurricane-spawned Tornadoes

              There were no confirmed sightings of tornadoes over either the Bahamas or Florida. A few
              unconfirmed funnel clouds were reported in western Florida after sunrise. There were
              14 confirmed tornadoes in association with Andrew's landfall on the Louisiana coast,
              including one that killed two persons at La Place, Louisiana. In Mississippi, 27 tornadoes
              were confirmed, and at least two damage-producing tornadoes were confirmed over Alabama.
              Damaging tornadoes in Georgia on August 27 and in Delaware and Maryland on August 27
              and 28 may have been associated with the remnants of Andrew.

              In south Louisiana, tornadoes ranged from F-0 to F-3 on the Fujita tornado intensity scale
              (figure 4). A tornado of F-3 intensity touched down near the subdivision of Belle Pointe, near
              the city of Reserve located in St. John the Baptist Parish. The tornado skipped along a 9-
              to 10-mile path between Reserve and La Place on the evening of August 25. The best
              estimate of tornado inflicted damage is in excess of $20 million. Table E.1, appendix E,
              provides a breakdown of the tornado damage inflicted upon St. John the Baptist Parish.







                        NLAX WINDS          PATH LENGTH                    PATH WIDTH.
                          (MPH)                    (MI)              (YDS)                 (MI)



                         F-O < 73             PLO < 1.0             PWO<18              <.01


                         F-1 73-112           PL1 1.0-3.1           PW1 18-55             .01-.03


                         F-2 113-157          PL2 3.2-9.9           PW2 56-175            .03-.09


                         F-3 158-206          PL3 10 - 31           PW3 176-556           .10-.29


                         F-4 207-260          PL4 32 - 99           PW4 557-1584          .30-.90




                                        Figure 4 - Fujita tornado intensity scale.






                                                             8








             Rainfall and Flooding

             The hydrologic impact of Hurricane Andrew, throughout the entire life of the system, was
             generally minimal. While copious amounts of rain fell at some locations, there were no
             reports of major flooding.

             As Hurricane Andrew passed over the Bahamas and Florida, the storm was compact and
             moved relatively rapidly. This movement limited the duration and amount of rainfall.
             Heaviest observed rainfall in Florida occurred inland across northwestern Dade and
             southwestern Broward Counties, where amounts ranged up to 8 inches (all rainfall amounts
             are storm totals; see appendix A, tables A. 1 and A.2, for rainfall observations). Virtually no
             river flooding was reported across Florida in association with Andrew's rains, mainly due to
             the fact that the heaviest rains fell to the south and east of west-central Florida's liver basins
             and instead occurred over the marshlands of the Everglades region. Some localized urban-
             type flooding did occur at several locations across south Florida.

             In Louisiana, Hurricane Andrew's rainfall pattern was actually quite similar to past
             hurricanes striking the central gulf coast region-that of Hurricane Betsy (Louisiana,
             September 1965) and Hurricane Camille (Mississippi, August 1969). In the cases of
             Hurricanes Betsy and Camille, the heaviest rains were generally along and to the east of the
             paths of the hurricanes. Likewise, based on preliminary data, the heaviest rainfall associated
             with Hurricane Andrew was also along and to the right of the path of the hurricane although
             the rainfall pattern with Hurricane Andrew was somewhat more widespread than with Betsy
             and Camille. Additionally, maximum observed rainfall amounts were also similar for all
             three hurricanes. The maximum observed single rainfall from Hurricane Andrew occurred
             at Hammond, Louisiana, located in Tangipahoa Parish in east-central Louisiana, where
             11.92 inches fell (see appendix E, figure E.2, for Louisiana rainfall analysis). Also,
             9.30 inches of rain was recorded near Sumrall, Mississippi, located in south-central
             Mississippi, near Hattiesburg.

             Still, despite the heavy rainfall, very little in the way of significant flooding developed in
             Louisiana and surrounding states. This was primarily due to the fact that hydrologic
             conditions prior to Hurricane Andrew's arrival were quite dry. Most rivers were at their low,
             mid-summer stages, and soils across much of the Lower Mississippi Valley were very dry.
             As an indication of the dry conditions, several calculations were done at the NWS's LMRFC
             which compared the volume of rainfall with runoff passing forecast points in both Louisiana
             and Mississippi. Those calculations indicated that only 25 percent or less of the volume of
             rain that fell actually move into the rivers as runoff. The remaining 75 percent was absorbed
             by dry soils or plants or it evaporated. Minor to moderate flooding did develop along portions
             of several Louisiana and Mississippi rivers, including the Tangipahoa, Bogue, Tickfaw,
             Tchefunta, Pearl, Little Tallahatchie and Tombigbee Rivers. The most spectacular river rise
             occurred along the Tangipahoa River at Robert, Louisiana, where a rise of 11 feet in the river
             stage occurred, resulting in a crest of 18.8 feet, or 3.8 feet above flood stage. This rise
             resulted from a concentrated 8 to 11-inch rainfall associated with one of Andrew's feeder
             bands moving across the Tangipahoa Basin. The flooding inundated some liver camps,
             recreational areas, and adjacent flood plain farmland, but damages were generally minor.
             In general, the flooding across Louisiana and Mississippi could be described as small stream
             and urban type, causing the closure of some nearby roads.



                                                             9









               As the remnants of Hurricane Andrew continued inland and headed northeast, there was
               considerable concern within the NWS that copious amounts of rainfall would be deposited
               across portions of the Appalachians due to orographic effects. Similar situations have
               occurred with other decaying tropical systems, including Camille (1969) and Agnes (1972),
               the result being widespread and devastating flooding, coupled with deadly mudslides.
               However, once the remnants of Hurricane Andrew made the turn towards the northeast, the
               system again accelerated its forward motion, thus limiting the duration of and amount of
               rainfall. The system tracked across the Tennessee River Valley, the southern and central
               Appalachians, and then through the mid-Atlantic region. While moderate-to-heavy rainfall
               amounts of generally 2 to 5-inches did fall, flooding was minimal and limited to stream and
               urban-type flooding.

               Along the entire length of the inland path of the remnants of Hurricane Andrew, NWS offices
               were sufficiently prepared for a much larger hydrologic impact than actually occurred. NWS
               offices were very aggressive in their treatment of the decaying tropical system and were very
               cognizant of the potential for excessive rainfall and subsequent flooding.


               Stor Surge

               In Florida, Andrew caused a storm tide that reached a maximum of 16.9 feet a few miles
               north of Homestead AFB, a record for storms in southeastern Florida. Fortunately, the
               maximum surge hit a portion of the coastline not as heavily populated as numerous nearby
               communities. Also, Cutler Ridge, a topographic rise of between 8 and 24 feet mean sea level
               (MSL) caused by an ancient coral reef, blocked inland progression of the storm surge.

               In Louisiana, the highest storm surge mark was recorded at Luke's Landing along East Cote
               Blanche Bay, where 8.2 feet was observed at a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) water
               level gauge. Several other gauges recorded surge heights over 6 feet during Amdrew. Lake
               Pontchartrain was raised to a level of approximately 4.5 feet NGVD (National Geodetic
               Vertical Datum). Fortunately, these surge heights occurred shortly before the occurrence of
               normal (astronomical) high tide. In the area impacted by Andrew, this would have added
               about 1 foot to the observed readings. Tidal traces indicate that prior to Andrew's landfall,
               water was being forced away from the coastline by offshore winds, resulting in depressed
               water levels (below MSQ. As the eye passed and the winds shifted to onshore, water levels
               rose rapidly and reached their observed peaks.


               Impact on Fisheries and Wildlife

               Louisiana's legendary fisheries received a severe blow when Andrew slid along the Louisiana
               coast before making landfall. While the numbers of marine fishes killed did not expect to
               impact greatly the coastal recreational fishing, biologists estimate conservatively that the
               coastal sports industry will have suffered a loss of $12 million during September and October
               of 1992. Louisiana's marine recreational fishing industry depends on the accessibility to
               coastal waters and the availability of marine facilities. These have both suffered greatly due
               to the effects of Andrew. (Specific details can be found in appendix E.)



                                                             10








              Impact on the Petroleum Industry

              The petroleum industry plays a large role in the economy of Louisiana. The gulf coast from
              Texas to Mississippi is dotted by numerous submerged wells and oil well structures
              (platforms), including appurtenances, such as satellite wells and oil pipes. The largest
              concentration of oil platforms, satellites, and drilling rigs are located off the Louisiana coast.
              The total number of oil platforms and satellites is approximately 3,800, with about 150 oil
              drilling rigs. These facilities are extremely vulnerable to hurricanes. Their destruction poses
              a major threat to the ecology of the gulf.

              Best estimates bring the total losses from the repair of damaged equipment, replacement of
              equipment, and clean-up costs to exceed $250 million.


              Commercial and Recreational Boating

              In Florida, the ferocity of Andrew from Dinner Key to Coconut Grove south was such that
              when boats landed they were sunk, holed, or left full of oil, mud, or seaweed. Estimates are
              that one third of the 45,000 registered boats in Dade County, Florida, were damaged. Nearly
              20 percent of these were total losses. Damage estimates to boats are as high as $250 million,
              more than twice the dollar losses from Hurricanes Bob and Hugo combined, and could reach
              $500 million. Hardest hit areas were Key Biscayne and Coral Gables. On Florida's west
              coast, minor damage was reported, except for two marinas on Marco Island that were hit
              hard as Andrew exited into the gulf.

              Andrew affected an unknown number of commercial ships, recreational vessels, and barges
              throughout the Mississippi basin and the northern gulf coast. Documentation as provided
              by U.S. Coast Guard, District Eight, revealed that a number of ships were lost, and rescue
              efforts had to be conducted.


              Louisiana fared much better than south Florida since Andrew missed the major boating areas
              north and east of New Orleans. Many boat owners also had enough advance warning and
              moved their vessels out of the path of the storm up into one of Louisiana's many bayous,
              where they had more protection. To date, no formal estimate of monetary loss has been
              computed for commercial and recreational marine interests as the result of Hurricane
              Andrew.

























                                                                      Irk
                                                          Att
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                                        @4 11410




                       Naranja Lakes homes destroyed by Andrew's devastating winds.


























                   A combination of hurricane-force winds and storm surge dragged this
                   sailboat well inland. This photo was taken south of Homestead AFB.


                                                      12








               PART I:


           SOUTH FLORIDA

















































                   A piece of wind-driven plywood piercing the trunk of a royal palm near
                   Homestead, Florida.
                                                                         AP&




                                                     14










                                               CEMPTER LA


                                              BACKGROUND


            Description of the Disaster Area

            Florida is largely a lowland peninsula comprising 54,100 square miles of surface area
            bounded on three sides by the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico. Numerous shallow
            lakes account for approximately 4,400 square miles of additional inland water area. No point
            in the state is more than 70 miles from salt water, and the highest natural land elevation is
            only 345 feet above sea level. Elevations in south Florida are even lower; natural elevations
            over 20 feet are rare. Coastal areas are low and flat and are indented by many small bays
            and inlets. Countless barrier islands are scattered along Florida's shoreline.

            The region most affected by the passage of Hurricane Andrew was located in the extreme
            southern section of the state. The counties most affected were Broward, Dade, Monroe, and
            Collier. This "tip of Florida" includes the Everglades National Park, a sparsely populated
            region to the southwest, and the more populated areas to the east. The chain of islands,
            known as the Florida Keys, extends along the eastern seaboard from Miami southwest to Key
            West. The four counties affected encompass the Florida Keys, the Everglades National Park,
            the Big Cypress National Preserve, Biscayne National Park, John Pennekamp Coral Reef
            State Park, Bill Baggs Cape Florida State Park, the Miccosukee Indian Reservation, a portion
            of the Big Cypress Seminole Indian Reservation, and the cities of Naples, Fort Lauderdale,
            Miami, Homestead, and Florida City.


            Population

            The State of Florida has experienced tremendous population growth over the past 4 decades.
            With 12.9 million persons in the state in 1990, Florida has grown from the Nation's 20th
            most populated state in 1950 to the fourth most populated state. Dade County, where
            Hurricane Andrew struck the hardest, is Florida's most populated county. In 1980, the
            population of Dade County exceeded that of sixteen states and the District of Columbia. The
            sheer number of residents, coupled with the annual summer influx of tourists, enhance the
            potential for disaster.


            Climate


            The climate of south Florida is characterized as subtropical marine in Broward, Collier, Dade,
            and mainland Monroe Counties, and tropical maritime in the Keys. The region is strongly
            influenced by the adjacent marine environment. The Florida current, which becomes the Gulf
            Stream, affects the climate of the region. The Gulf Stream runs parallel to the east coast at
            an average distance of 3 miles, helping to maintain the tropical and subtropical regimes.


                                                          15








               South Florida experiences two seasons-rainy from May to October and dry from November
               to April. During the rainy season, precipitation averages 6.24 inches a month. The dry
               season averages 1.97 inches a month. The rainy season coincides with the hurricane season.


               Topography

               The region is essentially a flat, low-lying limestone plain. Elevations are typically highest
               along the coastal ridge, which extends in a north-south direction several miles inland from
               the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico. The highest point in the region is 53 ft. above
               MSL. To the west of the coastal ridge, elevations gradually decrease to just slightly above
               sea level in the Everglades Basin. To the east of the ridge, elevations decrease as well,
               sloping down gradually to Biscayne Bay and other estuaries. Because of its low elevations,
               south Florida is particularly vulnerable to the hurricane threat.

               The Intracoastal Waterway traverses the length of Dade and Broward Counties as a series
               of bays and channels. A continuous series of barrier islands east of the Intracoastal
               Waterway separates much of the mainland peninsula from the Atlantic Ocean. The coastal
               barrier islands are typically long and narrow with low elevations. The Florida Keys are an
               archipelago that sweeps for more than 100 miles in a southwesterly direction from Dade
               County. The islands of the Keys are composed of fossilized coral and limestone foundations.
               Elevations in the Florida Keys are rarely greater than 10 feet above MSL.


               Hurricane Vulnerability

               Hurricane activity in the southern peninsula of Florida has a long and varied history. Based
               on information gathered from NHC, the first hurricane to affect this area this century was
               a category 1, making landfall on September 11, 1903. In the intervening years, an additional
               27 hurricanes have affected the south Florida region. Hurricane Andrew, the most costly of
               all natural disasters in United States history (approximately $25 billion) is the 28th
               hurricane.


               While Hurricane Andrew has had a profound effect on south Florida, the same was said of
               a number of past hurricanes. The hurricane of 1928, a category 4, made landfall around
               Palm Beach and then moved across Lake Okeechobee, driving all the water to one side of the
               lake. This, in combination with normal storm precipitation, resulted in flooding which took
               1,836 lives. This 1928 hurricane is considered the most catastrophic for Florida in regard to
               total lives lost. A dike was constructed around the lake as a result of this hurricane,
               protecting nearby communities from all but the most intense hurricanes.

               The Labor Day Hurricane of 1935, a category 5 that struck the Florida Keys, resulted in the
               loss of 408 lives and $50 million in damage. The storm surge with that hurricane piled water
               to a height of 20 feet in some portions of the Keys.

               In September of 1960, Hurricane Donna crossed the Florida Keys and then moved
               northeastward across the state from the Fort Myers area to near Daytona Beach. Although
               not the deadliest, it is thought to be financially the most destructive hurricane ever


                                                            16








             experienced in south Florida prior to Andrew, causing an estimated $305 million in damages.
             Donna claimed 13 lives in Florida.


             The vulnerability of the state to hurricanes varies with the progress of the hurricane season.
             Early and late in the season (June and October) hurricane activity predominates in the Gulf
             of Mexico and the western Caribbean. Most of those systems that affect Florida approach the
             state from the south or southwest, entering the Keys or along the west coast. Mid-season
             (August and most of September) tropical cyclones normally approach the state from the east
             or southeast.


             Other relevant statistics which reflect Florida's hurricane vulnerability and disaster history
             have been collected by NHC.

                 ï¿½   More than one in three of this century's major United States landfalling hurricanes,
                     those with winds above 110 mph (categories 3, 4, and 5), have struck Florida.

                 ï¿½   Florida's hurricanes are among the most intense-of the 17 United States landfalling
                     category 4 and 5 hurzicanes since 1900, 5 of the 7 most intense affected Florida.

                 ï¿½   September has been Florida's cruelest month. Twenty-three storms, 41 percent of the
                     total Florida landfalls, have struck during the month. Fourteen struck during the
                     first 2 weeks of September alone. October trails with 17 landfalls. The Atlantic and
                     Gulf of Mexico reach their warmest temperatures during September and October,
                     providing more moisture and energy to power developing storms.

                 ï¿½   Nearly half of all Florida hurricanes this century have struck between 1920 and
                     1950. In the 1940s, Florida recorded ten hurricanes. The last major hurricane to
                     strike south Florida before Andrew was Hurricane Betsy-27 years ago. Only seven
                     have struck since 1970. The last, Hurricane Floyd, was a mild storm that struck the
                     Florida Keys in 1987.

             The extent to which Florida coastal areas have been developed, coupled with the frequency
             with which hurricanes have impacted, suggests that a disaster of unprecedented magnitude
             was inevitable.





















                                                           17

























                                                                                                                                        I WIF

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                                                  10


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                           Levitz furniture warehouse, west of Whispering Pines, Florida, shows extensive
                           wind damage.













                                                                                    18










                                             CHAPTER 1.13


                    SUMMARY OF PREPAREDNESS ACTIONS


           To assure timely and appropriate public response to hazardous weather events, a community-
           wide hazardous weather preparedness program is necessary. Such a program requires years
           to develop. Foundations of communication, understanding, education, and skills development
           are necessary for interagency coordination. The focal point of that effort usually is the NWS
           local office. The NWS office generally is the instigator of coordination and communication
           among Federal, state, local, and volunteer organizations involved directly with distribution
           and dissemination of weather information. The NWS is responsible for assuring that people
           involved in that process, including the public, possess an appropriate knowledge of weather
           hazards. To be successful, all involved agencies must provide continued support to the effort.
           The following summarizes that level of involvement among the principal members of the
           hazards community.


           Weather Service Forecast OfficestWeather Service Offices
           (WSFO/WSO)

           WSO Melbourne


           The WCM at WSO Melbourne has spearheaded comprehensive preparedness and educational
           programs with major emphasis on hurricanes and the modern technologies to deal with them.
           These programs touched a wide variety of weather information users in the Melbourne area
           of responsibility. For example, the WCM gave a hurricane awareness presentation to the
           Annual Convention of Transportation Maintenance Engineers. In early June, he spoke at the
           Daytona Beach Hurricane Conference attended by over 200 people. He also developed
           customized hurricane scenarios for use in drills by county officials and water management
           districts. Other preparedness activities included presentations or meetings with numerous
           schools, aviation groups, a marine association, the American Red Cross, and many media
           outlets.


           WSO West Palm Beach


           On the Thursday before Hurricane Andrew reached Florida, the WSO West Palm Beach
           Meteorologist in Charge (MIC) gave a detailed hurricane preparedness presentation to
           amateur radio operators and emergency managers from Palm Beach, St. Lucie, and Martin
           Counties. A category 5 hurricane scenario was discussed. On August 10, a similar
           presentation was given to emergency managers, the American Red Cross, and the Florida
           Power and Light officials at Ft. Pierce. WSO West Palm Beach also worked with the Palm
           Beach Emergency Operations Center at a preparedness meeting in May 1992, covering such
           topics as storm surge, hurricane strike probabilities, and evacuation lead time related to
           storm category. Earlier in the year, WSO West Palm Beach participated in hurricane drills


                                                        19








               coordinated by WSFO Miami. Finally, WSO West Palm Beach provided preparedness talks
               at schools, local municipalities, agricultural and marine associations, civic groups, and
               supplied radio/television interviews.

               WSO Tampa Bay

               WSO Tampa Bay maintained an aggressive hurricane preparedness program during 1992 for
               their county warning area (CWA). That large area includes Fort Myers and the responsibility
               for the old WSO Fort Myers CWA. During the winter of 1991-92, the WSO Tampa Bay MIC
               attended three hurricane planning/preparedness sessions of the Southwest Florida Regional
               Planning Council. On April 14, 1992, the MIC and his staff hosted a workshop at WSO
               Tampa Bay for emergency management officials, representing Sarasota, Lee, and Charlotte
               Counties, and a representative from WBBH-TV in Fort Myers, to explain the functions and
               services of WSO Tampa Bay and WSO Fort Myers during hurricanes.

               WSO Tampa Bay was involved in three meetings with area radio stations during the spring,
               the purpose of which was to strengthen the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS). Five
               meetings were held with amateur radio groups within WSO Tampa Bay's CWA to coordinate
               communications and train storm spotters.

               A planning session for a newspaper hurricane supplement for the St. Petersburg Times was
               attended by the WSO Tampa Bay MIC. In attendance were representatives from the
               newspaper, the American Red Cross, the Florida Power Company, and Citrus, Hernando,
               Pasco, Manatee, Pinellas, and Hillsborough Counties. Other activities included preparedness
               talks to various business/civic groups and radio interviews.

               On March 19, 1992, the MIC briefed the Manatee County Division of Public Safety on
               hurricane preparedness. On April 7, 1992, the MIC and Lee County emergency management
               officials gave a hurricane preparedness seminar to the Sanibel Island Condominium
               Association. On April 20, 1992, the MIC briefed the USCG Search and Rescue Office on
               NWR and provided them with a Bearcat Weather Radio. On May 21-22, 1992, the NOAA
               WP-3 aircraft was used for a static display at Clearwater/St. Petersburg and
               Sarasota/Bradenton airports. Over 700 people attended. On May 28, three hurricane
               preparedness seminars were given in Charlotte County to over 1,600 new residents. On
               June 4-5, 1992, the Florida Governor's Hurricane Conference was held in Tampa. The Area
               Manager and MICs from WSO Tallahassee, WSO Melbourne, and WSO Tampa Bay gave
               presentations and answered questions on the WSO/WSFO role both now and in the future
               in regards to hurricanes.

               WSO Key West

               The WSO Key West MIC performed several hurricane preparedness presentations in the
               spring and summer of 1992. One such presentation was made to a local Catholic elementary
               school and another was to the local public high school. Still another presentation was given
               to 380 local Coast Guard personnel and their dependents.

               Regular contacts were made between the WSO Key West MIC and the Monroe County
               emergency management director during the summer updating of the county's absolutely vital
               hurricane evacuation plan.


                                                            20










            WSFO Miami


            WSFO Miami complements the NHC preparedness program (see below) with additional
            outreach activities and oversees the preparedness programs of the Florida WSOs. Finding
            I.B.1: The NHC is charged with a national focus on hurricane readiness, but it
            dominates the NWS hurricane preparedness program in south Florida. Dr. Sheets
            and the WSFO have agreed that only one voice representing the NWS be utilized in
            preparedness programs over south Florida. This assures that no mixed message is presented.
            Very little media attention is given to the WSFO in a preparedness context; both print and
            electronic media focus their attention on the NHC. Still, during 1992, WSFO staff conducted
            eight hurricane and severe weather preparedness programs across their county warning area,
            three of which were done with storm spotters. These were accomplished by the MIC, the
            Deputy MIC, and the Storm Data focal point. There is no dedicated Warning Preparedness
            Meteorologist (WPM) at WSFO Miami. In addition, Area Manager Paul Hebert accompanied
            Dr. Sheets on the annual hurricane preparedness (WP-3 Reconnaissance Aircraft) tour in late
            May. Recommendation I.B.1: The NWS should staff WSFO Miami with a Warning
            Coordination Meteorologist (WCM) as soon as possible to enhance the WSF01s
            preparedness/hazard awareness program.


            National Hurricane Center

            The NHC Director and his staff are traditionally involved in a heavy schedule of
            pre-hurricane season preparedness activities. These are aimed at sensitizing decision
            makers, special interest groups, and the general public to the dangers of a hurricane. In
            recent years, the NHC has sponsored the popular and highly effective tour by the NOAA
            WP-3 Reconnaissance Aircraft at many coastal sites along the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico.
            These tours are usually combined with meetings emphasizing public awareness of hurricane
            dangers and the NOAA operations to counteract these hazards. The 1992 tour visited sites
            along the gulf coast. The meetings used a "Town Hall" fonnat, involving the general public
            and vendors of hurricane preparedness supplies. Often featured were displays set up by the
            American Red Cross, emergency medical services, the military, law enforcement groups,
            emergency management, and the media.

            The NHC director, deputy director, and other staff members participate in a Speakers'
            Bureau comprised of many NOAA professionals. Members of the Bureau are engaged in a
            variety of outreach activities focusing on hurricane preparedness.          These include
            presentations to schools, career programs, numerous media interviews, workshops for public
            officials, and talks to special interests, such as hospitals and insurance groups. In 1992,
            similar interviews were conducted with local Miami media, and several programs were given
            by NHC staff at various civic meetings.

            Annually, the NHC, in association with FEMA and state emergency management agencies,
            conducts hurricane awareness training at the NHC. The training is for emergency managers
            and their staff and includes information on how to use and interpret SLOSH data, the basics
            of how the NHC tracks and forecasts hurricanes, and elements of the public hurricane watch
            and warning program. Emergency managers from each of the affected Florida counties have
            received this training during the past few years.



                                                        21









               Increased Preparedness Through Improved and Integrated Facilities

               The NHC and WSFO Miami were extremely fortunate that they were able to continue many
               critical services during the hurricane, despite some power outages and communications
               failures. Finding I.B.2: This was the first time that the NHC (and the collocated
               WSFO Miami) facility had been directly affected by a major hurricane. The impact
               of Andrew proved the vulnerability of NHC to the effects of extreme wind.
               Recommendation I.B.2: Better protected, self-contained facilities should be
               provided to the NHC and all NWS coastal offices. This is even more critical to
               National Centers, such as NHC, for which full backup procedures are extremely
               difficult to implement. Such a facility should have an independent air-conditioning system
               and other stand-alone utilities. In addition to offering a safer working environment for the
               staff during a major storm, this would increase the chances for proper cooling of computers
               and uninterrupted communications. Of course, backup procedures should be in place to allow
               other NWS units to take over if necessary. Feedback from the public, the media, and many
               other interests indicates that there is a psychological boost in knowing that the NHC is still
               functioning during such a major storm.


               Local Emergency Management

               During the last two major hurricanes in the United States, the storm surge threat has been
               adequately addressed by the hazards community and understood by the public. This is due
               largely to the great emphasis on the dangers of the storm surge and the success of the
               SLOSH computer models to predict the surge. To address that threat, evacuation studies
               have been accomplished throughout the Florida coast, jointly by the U.S. Army Corps of
               Engineers (USACE) and FEMA, in coordination with state and local emergency management.

               Annually, state and local emergency management, in coordination with the NWS, conduct a
               statewide preparedness drill. This drill is done during the NWS Hazardous Weather
               Awareness Week in the spring.

               Finding I.B.3: Hurricane Andrew was characterized by devastating effects of strong
               inland winds in addition to powerful storm surges. The devastation that eventually
               occurred over south Florida heightened the awareness in other vulnerable areas
               to the significant inland wind damage which can accompany a hurricane.
               Recommendation I.B.3: The NWS should provide technical assistance for a much
               more concerted preparedness and awareness effort by state and local emergency
               management and such other cognizant organizations as state coastal zone
               management agencies in areas of high vulnerability.

               Refuge of Last Resort

               In an attempt to prepare better for these hazards in future storms, the NHC and emergency
               managers want to consider a concept called the "refuge of last resort."

               Findina LBA: Since the lead time for evacuation may be no more than 24 hours,
               it may not be practical or even possible to evacuate all inland residents in the path
               of a hurricane eyewall. Recommendation LBA: The NWS should work with FEMA,

                                                             22









            state, and local emergency planners in exploring the potential of developing a
            "refuge of last resort" methodology, as appropriate, for occasions when critical
            saturation points are reached in the flow of evacuation traffic. Local emergency
            planners could invoke this last refuge concept once a critical saturation point is reached in
            the flow of evacuation traffic. Otherwise, the evacuation traffic pattern could lead to the
            infamous "gridlock" where evacuees are trapped on the road while attempting to flee a
            hurricane.


            It is better to get out of an area subject to hurricane winds or at least be protected by a
            substantially built structure; but if this isn't possible, a local refuge center should be
            available. Furthermore, consider the scenario where warning lead time is drastically cut due
            to an unforeseen change in the forward speed, direction, or intensity of a storm. In such
            cases, many residents may be prematurely cut off from evacuation routes, and a designated
            "refuge of last resort" would be essential.


            Preparedness by the Media

            Television's role in preseason specials and spot announcements helped to educate the
            citizenry in the appropriate responses to the hurricane threat. Local newspapers in the Keys,
            Miami, Fort Lauderdale, and West Palm Beach featured preseason special editions and
            covered the storm's advance in the Sunday editions. Also, they provided safety advice and
            shelter openings that enhanced the public's evacuation. Newspaper coverage at the NHC also
            was provided by the Associated Press (AP), United Press International (UPI), USA Today,
            the Los Angeles Times, and several regional news outlets. Both English and Spanish
            language newspapers and electronic media provided accurate and timely information to the
            large non-English speaking south Florida community.

            Through the past few years, the NHC has entered into a partnership with the broadcasters
            to enable all members of the television media to provide threatened residents of the Atlantic
            and gulf coasts with live, up-to-the-minute reports directly from the NHC. The non-
            competitive pool coverage is divided into local, regional, and network pools when a tropical
            storm or hurricane threatens a particular area.


















                                                          23

























                                VIP,
                                         VOR 6



                            "AW
                                               -41t
                                                                               @.7



                                                                  -of'               00
                                                                     ;0@



                 Aerial view of Cutler Ridge,  Florida, on the right and adjacent subdivision with
                 obviously superior construction.













                                                        24











                                             CEL&PTER I.C


                        NWS CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND
                                 BACKUP ARRANGEMENTS


            Weather Service Forecast Offlices/Weather Service Offices
            (WSF0/WS0)

            WSO Melbourne


            WSO Melbourne took specific actions to respond operationally for the hurricane. On Friday,
            August 21, the WSR-88D was taken down for maintenance to a potential diode stack and
            voltage problem. WSO Melbourne coordinated with NWS Southern Region Headquarters
            (SRH) and the Operational Support Facility (OSF) in Norman, Oklahoma, to secure extra
            parts and to deploy a Westinghouse technician to help with the problem. This turned out to
            be a critically important decision since it enabled the WSR-88D to operate smoothly and
            provide radar coverage of the hurricane after the Miami radar failed.

            WSO Key West

            WSO Key West coordinated with NWS Southern Region Meteorological Services Division and
            WSFO Miami regarding staffing. It was determined that the WSO was adequately staffed,
            and no supplemental staffing was provided for the event.

            WSO West Palm Beach


            In support of the potential threat from Andrew, the WSO West Palm Beach staff was
            augmented by meteorological technicians from WSOs Corpus Christi and Lake Charles. In
            addition, procedures and instructions from NWS SRH dictated that WSO West Palm Beach
            was to assume network radar responsibility and county warning responsibility for Dade and
            Broward Counties prior to Andrew's landfall.

            WSO Tampa Bay

            WSO Tampa Bay, in cooperation with NWS SRH and the Lee County Emergency
            Management Agency, temporarily reassigned operational staff to open WSO Fort Myers. The
            Fort Myers WSO is routinely operated at the Lee County EOC during periods of hurricane
            threat.


            WSFO Miami


            Backup Procedures. The WSFO, in accordance with procedures established by NWS SRH,
            invoked emergency backup procedures as Hurricane Andrew bore down on south Florida. In


                                                        25








               anticipation of the potential for complete failure of the WSFO, WSFOs Atlanta and Sterling
               were assigned public/aviation and marine forecast responsibilities for Miami's forecast area,
               respectively. Exact times when the hand-offs were accomplished is not certain, but WSFO
               Atlanta was on standby or actually doing Miami's public and aviation forecasts from 5 AM,
               August 24, through 6 PM, August 25 (all times EDT). WSFO Sterling performed the same
               function with Miami's marine forecasts during the same period. Just prior to landfall,
               warning responsibility for WSFO Miami's five-county warning area was assigned (mistakenly)
               to WSO Tampa Bay. At mid-morning of August 24, Dade and Broward Counties were
               reassigned to WSO West Palm Beach. WSFO Miami resumed county warning responsibility
               at noon August 31. Prior to that time, the area manager did not feel the forecast office had
               sufficient personnel and data collecting capability to handle warning responsibility.


               Southern Region Headquarters, Fort Worth, Texas

               Well in advance of the hurricane season and any hurricane, SRH on April 23, 1992, reviewed
               the Region's Hurricane Readiness Plan. Staffing and equipment status for all coastal offices
               was reviewed. Contingency plans were made for detailing staff in the event of a hurricane
               threat.


               During the week of August 16, the progress of the tropical depression (which would become
               Andrew) was monitored. On Friday, August 21, a meeting was held at SRH to assess the
               situation (Andrew was tropical storm strength at the time). The support staff were identified
               and alerted for possible dispatch during the weekend.

               The Southern Region Hurricane Watch Office opened at 4 PM Central Daylight Time (CDT)
               on August 22, and then maintained 24-hour-a-day operations until the hurricane was well
               inland on August 26. On Sunday, August 23, when it became evident that the main threat
               was the Miami area, contingency plans for south Florida were initiated.


               National Hurricane Center


               NHC Backup Procedures

               Since the NHC is located in Miami, Florida, it is occasionally in harm's way when hurricanes
               approach the Florida coastline. The NHC has emergency backup procedures that are
               implemented when a storm threatens the NHC. These procedures were implemented when
               Hurricane Andrew approached Miami. Five backup personnel from NHC were sent to the
               NMC on August 23. Their immediate task was to take over dissemination of several NHC
               aviation and marine forecast products, allowing NHC to focus on the primary forecast
               mission. The other main task of the backup team was to take over as the primary hurricane
               forecast center should NHC become unable to maintain operations due to the effects of the
               storm.


               Hurricane Andrew provided a severe test of the backup system. As a category 4 storm, it
               severely affected NHC, and then it moved quickly into the Gulf of Mexico threatening other
               portions of the United States coastline. Throughout the event, NHC remained operational
               due largely to the valiant efforts of NHC personnel who stayed at their posts and managed

                                                            26









             to keep their computer and communications systems functional despite wind damage and loss
             of crucial air-conditioning systems. Finding I.C.1: The detailing of two hurricane
             specialists to the National Meteorological Center (NMC) is not sufficient to provide
             adequate continuous backup to NHC operations. Recommendation LCA: The NWS
             should adopt a plan that would increase the number of forecasters capable of
             acting as hurricane specialists during an emergency brought on by a hurricane
             threatening NHC. There must be adequate staffing at both NHC and the backup
             site. One plan would be to provide hurricane forecast training to a select group of
             forecasters, possibly from NMC, who could fly to NHC as replacements for
             hurricane specialists dispatched to staff the backup center. The backup functions at
             NMC were executed without significant mishaps although several procedural changes are
             being implemented to update the backup plan.

             Two of the personnel sent from NHC to NMC were hurricane specialists (Jerry Jarrell and
             Miles Lawrence). This left NHC understaffed, particularly since the storm remained a major
             forecast problem days after its landfall in south Florida. 'Finding I.C.2: When NHC staff
             is drawn down to implement the backup at NMC, insufficient staff remains at NHC
             to handle advisories of multiple tropical cyclones properly. Recommendation I.C.2:
             See Recommendation I.C.I. This normally will be the case for hurricanes striking Miami
             so the backup plan should be amended if possible to keep NHC at full strength. The problem
             would have been much worse had there been other hurricanes active at the same time. (As
             many as six were active simultaneously during September 1992. According to NHC
             administrative staff, they could not have handled the extreme workload of six tropical
             cyclones with two forecasters detailed to NMC.) Further, two hurricane specialists are not
             enough to staff the backup center in the event that it should have to take over the primary
             forecast mission. One specialist would be busy essentially full time dealing with the media,
             leaving only one person to handle the actual forecasting. During Andrew, a third experienced
             hurricane forecaster was brought in to NMC, and another former NHC forecaster was on
             standby.

             Findina I.C.3: Facilities for interacting with the media are very limited at NMC.
             Recommendation I.C.3: The NMC should formulate a plan for handling the
             extensive interactions with the media that are required when a hurricane is
             threatening the United States coastline. Since NMC is the logical site for the
             backup forecast center, plans should be made to accommodate the large number
             of media personnel who will descend upon the backup center, especially if it is
             required to take over the primary forecast mission.














                                                           27










                                                CHAPTER LD

                     SUMMARY OF NWS WATCHES, WARNINGS@
                                           AND ADVISORIES


             National Hurricane Center


             Products


             NHC disseminates information about specific tropical weather systems through three basic
             products: the Tropical Cyclone Public Advisory (TCP), the Tropical Cyclone Marine Advisory
             (TCM), and the Tropical Cyclone Discussion (TCD). These products supply data about storm
             location, intensity, trends, and forecasts. Hurricane and tropical storm warnings and watches
             are issued through these products. The TCP is the least technical, being a public advisory,
             but it is the most lengthy. Probability forecasts for landfall appear at the end of the TCP and
             TCM. TCMs are designed to supply a mixture of technical and non-technical information to
             users who are primarily in the marine and emergency management communities. The TCM
             features initial and forecast positions, wind radii for the storm out to 72 hours, and a very
             brief mention of current trends. The TCD is a technical discussion the audience of which
             includes the sophisticated users, such as the NWS, the private consultants, the emergency
             management community, and other technical concerns.              The TCD describes storm
             characteristics and controlling factors.

             TCPs, TCMs, and TCDs are disseminated concurrently at 6-hour intervals. Additional
             intermediate TCPs are issued at either 2- or 3-hour intervals when land is threatened. Those
             TCPs are not accompanied by TCMs or TCDs. Special information about a tropical system
             may be described by a tropical cyclone update (TCU). The TCU is useful for passing along
             information about changes to the storm system, such as the formation of an eye, a location
             change, or a change in intensity. Special advisories and other products also may be issued
             by the NHC.

             The tropical disturbance that eventually became Andrew was first treated by an advisory at
             11 PM EDT, August 16. Forty-seven advisories, along with intermediate advisories beginning
             on August 22, were used to describe the system.

             Watches and Warnings


             A hurricane watch is issued when NHC determines that a coastal area is at risk of hurricane
             conditions within 36 hours. A hurricane watch was issued in Advisory Number 24 for coastal
             Florida at 5 PM EDT, August 22. The watch extended from Titusville on the Atlantic coast
             southward through the Florida Keys to include the Dry Tortugas. A hurricane warning is
             issued when the NHC determines that hurricane conditions are likely along a coastal area
             within 24 hours. The hurricane warning for Florida was issued at 8 AM EDT, Sunday,
             August 23, and extended from Vero Beach south through the Florida Keys. At the same


                                                           29









              time, a hurricane watch was issued for the Florida west coast, from just north of Bayport to
              north of Flamingo. This included the Tampa Bay area. At the time the hurricane warning
              was issued, a tropical storm warning/hurricane watch was issued that bounded the hurricane
              warning area (the tropical storm warning included only the Florida east coast from Titusville
              south to Vero Beach). A comprehensive listing of all watches and warnings is provided in
              appendix A as table A. 6.

              Watch and Warning Lead Times

              A critical aspect of the value of hurricane/tropical storm watches and warnings is the amount
              of time people have to respond to the oncoming threat. Lead time is defined as the time
              between watch or warning issuance and the onset of hurricane conditions. Sufficient lead
              time is very important for a timely and orderly evacuation. NHC's goal for lead time for
              hurricane watches is 36 hours (slightly less from watch to onset of hurricane winds). In
              south Florida, the time between watch and the time that hurricane-force winds arrived was
              36 hours. The average lead time for a hurricane warning is 19.5 hours, and southeast
              Florida received the warning 21 hours before hurricane-force winds (see figure 5).

              Finding I.D.1: NHC watch and warning lead times during Hurricane Andrew were
              longer than average for landfalling hurricanes. That extra margin of safety was at
              least partially responsible for allowing hundreds of thousands of people to evacuate
              safely from south Florida. Recommendation LDA: NOAA and the NWS should work
              toward increasing watch/warning lead times by supporting efforts to enhance our
              understanding of tropical systems, improving numerical models, providing greater
              data availability to feed the models, and enhancing operational forecast
              methodologies. A significant step in this direction would be the collocation of the
              Environmental Research Laboratory's Hurricane Research Division (HRD) with
              NHC to allow for the synergism of research and operations.

              Utility of Advisories

              Content of the advisories is as important to their value as timing and frequency of issuance.
              The manner in which they are written and the emphasis on certain forecast parameters
              reflect on NHC's impression of the hazard. It is very important to the way the users perceive
              the threat.


              NHC advisories were well worded from Andrew's development through its trek across south
              Florida. When the storm was being sheared by strong southwesterly upper winds and its
              future intensification and track was uncertain, those uncertainties were reflected in the
              advisories. As the storm became very strong, comments highlighted that threat and warned
              of specific phenomena within the storm's domain. For example, in the hours preceding the
              south Florida impact, Andrew was referred to as "extremely dangerous," and specific
              references about storm surges of 10 to 14 feet were provided. Additionally, forecast rainfall
              totals of between 5 and 8 inches were cited. Although no tornadoes were observed in south
              Florida, that threat also was noted.






                                                           30





                        Hurricane Andrew WatchesMarnings


                        Lead Time (Hrs)
                      50
           CD
                                      43

                      40 ......           ........
                                           36
                                                              @6 .......

                                                                                   Bahamas
           CD               30       11 .... . ....I
                      30                        ........... ..   ......
           DD                                                                   [IS. Florida
                                                    24             24
                                                         2                         Louisiana
                      20
                                                                                   Ideals


           CD
                      10



                       0-
                                 Watch                   Warning








               National Meteorological Center

               NMC is responsible for generating and interpreting forecast models on the synoptic and sub-
               synoptic scales. They coordinate routinely with NHC via the hurricane hotline during periods
               of tropical cyclone threat. A number of other entities also contribute to that coordination
               effort, including the United States Navy in Norfolk, NWS Southern Region and Eastern
               Region Headquarters, selected NWS forecast offices, various state agencies, and Weather
               Service Headquarters. During the coordination calls which take place approximately 1 hour
               prior to the issuance of NHC advisories, NHC reviews its forecast reasoning and announces
               its forecast positions. NMC also generates forecast positions and shares their thinking at this
               time. The final authority on the forecast belongs to NHC.

               Once Andrew moved away from inhibiting factors, it was well behaved and tracked
               consistently. Except for the period of storm shearing when Andrew nearly died, there was
               little difference in forecast tracks between NHC and NMC.



               National Severe Storms Forecast Center (NSSFQ

               Guidance Products


               NSSFC has the primary responsibility to issue guidance and watches for severe local storms
               in the continental United States. Tropical cyclones often generate conditions which favor
               severe local storms (especially tornadoes) in addition to their tropical characteristics of high
               wind, heavy rainfall, and storm surge. When a tropical cyclone threatens NSSFC's area of
               responsibility, its effects are integrated into their forecast reasoning.

               Severe weather forecast guidance products from NSSFC are generated by the Severe Local
               Storms (SELS) Branch. SELS provides 24-hour (SWODY1) and 48-hour (SWODY2) severe
               weather outlooks. Both products are provided in narrative and graphic format. The day-one
               outlooks detail the risk of severe weather as:


                     APCHG - approaching severe storm criteria
                     SLGHT - slight risk of severe storms
                     MDT        - moderate risk of severe storms
                     HIGH       - high risk of severe storms.

               The SWODY2 outlook provides only the area of severe weather threat. Beginning August 22,
               SELS began mentioning south Florida as an area of severe weather threat. The SWODY2
               outlook narrative issued at 2 PM EDT, August 22, introduced a chance for severe weather
               across south Florida in the latter half of the valid period which would have been between
               8 PM EDT, August 23, and 8 AM EDT, August 24. The threat was based on approaching
               outer spiral bands in the right front quadrant of the hurricane. As the storm continued to
               approach south Florida, its potential effects were addressed by the SWODY1 guidance. The
               SWODY1 issued at 1 AM EDT, August 23, included a slight risk over south Florida. The
               outlook was based on a destabilizing airmass and surface convergence ahead of Andrew.
               Updates issued at 11 AM EDT and 2 PM EDT on August 23 reiterated the slight risk, citing
               increasing low level wind shear in the climatologically favored northeast quadrant of the
               storm. The 11 AM EDT, August 23, outlook stated that the primary threat would be for a

                                                              32









             few tornadoes, and that the biggest threat would be after 11 PM EDT on August 23.
             Subsequent outlooks noted that Andrew was moving across south Florida and mentioned
             some tornado threat lingering until the rain bands moved offshore midday on August 25.
             SELS then began focusing on the northern Gulf of Mexico coast.

             SELS also generates discussion products on an as-needed basis. The products, called
             SWOMCD (mesoscale convective discussions), give insight about convective trends during the
             past 2 hours and for the forthcoming 2- to 4-hour period. As Hurricane Andrew approached
             south Florida, SELS provided a detailed evaluation of convective trends and severe
             thunderstorm potential. At 8:59 PM EDT, a SWOMCD indicated that one spiral band was
             moving onshore in east-central Florida and that another was 40-50 miles offshore and would
             cross the coast around 11 PM EDT. SELS, in coordination with NHC, noted that a severe
             weather watch would be issued with the 11 PM EDT, August 23, hurricane advisory.
             Another mesoscale discussion was issued at 6:31 PM EDT on August 24 as Andrew moved
             into the Gulf of Mexico. The 6:31 PM EDT issuance targeted the Florida Panhandle as prime
             for damaging thunderstorm winds due to a line of thunderstorms with forward motion around
             50 knots.


             Severe Weather Watches


             Watches that advise of the potential for severe thunderstorms or tornadoes also are the
             responsibility of SELS. When conditions favor severe thunderstorms possessing hail at least
             3/4-inch in diameter or wind gusts at least 50 knots (58 mph), SELS will issue a severe
             thunderstorm watch for the favored area. Should the potential also include tornadoes, a
             tornado watch will be issued instead. As Andrew approached south Florida, Tornado Watch
             No. 763 was issued at 9:56 PM EDT, August 23. The watch was for that part of the state
             along and 70 statute miles either side of a line from 15 miles west of Avon Park to 50 miles
             south-southeast of Miami. The watch was valid from 11 PM EDT, August 23, through 11 AM
             EDT, August 24. It is unusual for a severe storm watch to be valid for more than 6 hours.
             In this situation, however, the lengthy watch made physical sense due to the protracted
             hurricane conditions. Those conditions included the outer rain band approach, the passage
             of the storm core, and the trailing rain band passage. As the first watch expired, Tornado
             Watch No. 764 issued at 10:11 AM EDT, August 24, took its place. It shifted the area
             slightly further west, i.e., 80 statute miles either side of a line from 30 miles north-northwest
             of Avon Park to 70 miles southwest of Miami. It was valid until 8 PM EDT on August 24.

             Status Reports

             While severe weather watches are in effect, SELS provides status reports (product
             WWAMKQ to inform about trends. A number of status reports were provided while the
             tornado watches were in effect over south Florida. The principal concern was of mesocyclones
             in the spiral bands. As a band of convection approached the coast at 12:46 AM EDT on
             August 24, SELS used a WWAMKC to describe the details about timing and location.
             Specific mention of recent observations in the WWAMKC of 1:12 AM EDT, August 24, i.e.,
             "PBI ERYR HAD HVY TSTM Q49..." (contraction for "West Palm Beach Airport earlier had
             heavy thunderstorm with squall to 49 knots"), supply excellent detail to emergency
             management and media about severe weather potential.




                                                             33








               Hurricane Andrew produced no known tornadoes as it moved across south Florida. There
               have been unsubstantiated reports about tornado-like vortices within the eyewall based on
               post-event aerial surveys of damage.


               Weather Service Forecast Offices/%Veather Service Offices
               (WSFO/WSO)

               Hurricane Local Statements (HLS)

               HLSs are designed to provide information about a hurricane's anticipated effects on the CWA
               of the issuing WSO/WSF0. They are intended to consolidate information from the NHC,
               from local authorities, and from WS0/WSF0 resources. That information should include in
               order of appearance:

                  ï¿½   a brief statement about the current location of the storm;
                  ï¿½   a forecast of expected weather conditions during the next hour or two;
                  ï¿½   a brief review of watches/warnings that include the CWA;
                  ï¿½   an assessment of storm surge and tides for local area;
                  ï¿½   a review of how conditions will impact commerce and society, i.e., road closures,
                      power failures, recommendations from emergency management; and
                  ï¿½   a very brief call to action.

               An HLS should not be a rewrite of the latest NHC advisory. Rather, it should stand on its
               own. It is very important to keep the HLS fresh and brief. Most HLS products issued during
               Andrew were issued in response to the issuance of NHC advisories. When a watch is in effect
               for the local area, HLS frequency should be at least once every 3 hours. When a warning is
               in effect, the frequency of product issuance should be increased.

               All affected WSOs and WSFO Miami (with the exception of WSO Fort Myers, a part-time
               office) issued HLSs throughout the Andrew event in south Florida. Although NWS offices
               in south Florida have good working relationships with their respective county emergency
               management agencies, interaction between the NWS and emergency managers was markedly
               different from county to county during Andrew. WSO Key West reported evacuation
               procedures and instructions in great detail in HLSs, and WSO Tampa Bay contacted county
               emergency management offices regularly for updated information to be used in HLSs. HLSs
               issued by WSO West Palm Beach had less emergency response information than others but
               provided all possible details that were made available to them. Both the Palm Beach County
               Emergency Management (EM) and the WSO indicate that their communication was excellent
               during the event. Early Sunday morning, August 24, Collier County faxed statements to
               WSFO Miami regarding evacuation operations, but they were not included in Miami's HLSs.
               Since the facsimile machine is located in an administrative office at the WSFO (which is
               closed up over weekends), the information never was received by those forecasters on duty.
               Collier County EM did not telephone the WSFO to advise them of the facsimile transmittals.

               Finding I.D.2: HLSs from WSO/WSFOs tend to be too lengthy, too infrequent, tend
               to reiterate NHC advisories too much, and tend not to include enough specific
               information about local conditions. Recommendation I.D.2: The NWS should


                                                          34









          explore options to make HLSs more effective. This should include use of the "Short
          Term ForecasVI concept and its relationship to HLSs and hurricane advisories.
          Furthermore, coastal offices should re-evaluate the manner in which data are
          collected and used to create HLS products. Emphasis should be made on use of on-
          station software, emergency management information, and remote sensing data to
          create a highly specific, current product. Most HLSs reiterated NHC information, such
          as the entire watch/warning layout, listings of all counties in the CWA, details on "current"
          position (which was sometimes 3 or 4 hours old), recommendations directed toward
          emergency management, and broad storm surge, rainfall, and tide information.

          By focusing on the local environment and deleting information that does not concern the
          CWA, much of the unneeded data could have been deleted. Detailed, local meteorological
          information is available from remote sensing equipment, such as radar and satellite, and
          from surface observations as well as data extracted from on-station PC software, such as
          GDS4.0 (Graphic Decision System for Hurricanes), Tides, and SLOSH. This would have
          enhanced specific information about local effects of storm surge, astronomical tides, and
          periods of extreme wind or squalls. This, coupled with information on road closures from
          local officials, would have made a more useable product.


































                                                       35






















                                                                   I
                                                                       Zv-
                                                                   F




                                                                                            -AL

                                                                                         14




                                                                               IVC





                                                     41



                                                                                                                             IAV


                                                                                                                        low


                                           V*-4-7.








                              This is the Dadeland Mobile Home Park following Hurricane Andrew.











                                                                     36










                                                CEUPTER LE


                            SUMMARY OF INFORMATION AND
                                    WARNING SERVICES AND
                         RESPONSE ACTIONS BY EMERGENCY
                                   MANAGEMENT AND MEDIA


             Non-NWS Products Available to Emergency Management (EM)

             Software


             All coastal county emergency managers in the affected region and the Florida Division of
             Emergency Management (DEM) received marine advisories from NHC as well as public
             advisories, HLSs, and tropical cyclone discussions. Use of these products varied greatly from
             county to county. All of the coastal counties and the state also have PC-based software into
             which marine advisory forecasts are entered. The software calculates how close the center
             and tropical storm-force winds are forecast to come to the user's location and when those
             events are forecast to occur. The times are then compared to lead times necessary to begin
             evacuation to help officials determine when a decision point has been reached.

             All of the coastal counties have a commercially available program entitled Enhanced
             Graphic Decision System (GDS), which the counties purchased individually. Palm Beach,
             Broward, Dade, and Monroe Counties also have a program named HURREVAC, primarily
             funded by FEMA. In addition to the basic forecast implications referred to above, GDS has
             the added feature of helping users account for forecast uncertainties. It not only displays
             NHC probabilities but also draws probability ellipses around forecast positions and calculates
             the closest point of approach (CPA) and timing implications of the forecast being wrong by
             NHC average error margins. HURREVAC, in addition to performing the basic calculations
             described in the preceding paragraph, also features an atlas of map screens displaying the
             areas which could be flooded in various storm scenarios and lists data about shelters. Most
             counties used their computer software, but the extent of that use is unclear. The impression
             is that in some instances the software was used more as a tracking device.

             Vendors


             Some of the counties receive NWS radar and other specialized products from vendors. At
             least one county (Lee) contracts with a private meteorological firm for forecast information
             and counsel. This information was consistent with that contained in NHC/NWS products.







                                                           37








               Interaction Between NWS and Emergency Management

               Virtually all south Florida counties appeared to have good working relationships with their
               respective NWS offices and reported varying degrees of interaction with NWS offices during
               Andrew. WSO Key West, followed by WSO Tampa Bay, had the most contact with
               emergency management in Andrew. WSO Key West reported evacuation procedures and
               instructions in great detail in HLSs. WSO Tampa Bay contacted county emergency
               management offices regularly. HLSs issued by WSO West Palm Beach had less emergency
               response information than others although the WSO and EM both state that the
               communication was nevertheless excellent. (In fact, WSO West Palm Beach was in
               continuous direct contact with emergency management from Palm Beach, Martin, and St.
               Lucie Counties.) WSO Tampa Bay dispatched two of its staff to WSO Fort Myers where they
               were stationed in the Lee County EOC. Lee County officials indicated that their presence
               was helpful. County hurricane evacuation plans in southwest Florida (Collier County
               northward to the Tampa Bay area) are interdependent. Emergency management officials
               regularly held joint meetings and communicated with one another as Andrew approached.
               Collier County reported that it faxed statements to WSFO Miami regarding evacuation
               operations (but they were not included in Miami's HLSs as discussed in chapter I.D). Monroe
               County officials said they requested that WSFO Miami include evacuation information
               regarding the upper Keys in its NWR broadcasts, but apparently this was not done.

               Monroe and Dade County emergency management are in a unique situation during hurricane
               threats. Due to the proximity of NHC, they interact directly with NHC staff more than with
               WSFO Miami. Monroe County EM Director, Billy Wagner, was present at NHC on Friday
               and was joined there by the Dade County EM Director, Kate Hale, on Saturday. The State
               of Florida pays for a telephone line to NHC so that information can be relayed directly to the
               state EOC. This is in addition to the NAWAS line and the hurricane hotline.


               The Monroe County EM director felt that he learned of information on Saturday afternoon
               regarding a previously unforeseen increase in forward speed and intensity which led to his
               taking actions before the 5 PM forecast package was released and the watch was posted.
               Florida DEM officials indicated that they were not made aware of the upcoming forecast
               changes by NHC, but an emergency management representative present at NHC notified
               them of the likelihood of such an event. According to Florida DEM, the agency phoned NHC
               to inquire about upcoming changes in the forecast, but an NHC forecaster could not confirm
               anything which had not been included in the 11 AM EDT advisory. NHC Director,
               Dr. Robert Sheets, indicated that he and the NHC forecasters always are willing to discuss
               whatever information is at their disposal and believes there must have been a
               misunderstanding about what was being requested.


               Impact of Watches, Warnings, and Probabilities

               Finding LEA: Concern was expressed by two emergency managers over the tone
               set by NHC on Friday afternoon when a "Have a good weekend ... tune back in on
               Sunday or Monday" message was given to emergency management. Some officials
               felt that message could have promoted a less-than-serious attitude and that it could
               have caused them not to pay close attention to storm information during the
               weekend. Recommendation LEA: Although NHC is extremely concerned about

                                                            38









            how information is presented, care must continue to be exercised not to send
            unintended messages. At least two emergency management officials expressed concern
            over Dr. Sheets' comments. Because the emergency managers got such a message, city and
            county employees that were needed to implement an evacuation were released for the
            weekend and became less accessible. When that broadcast was made, Tropical Storm Andrew
            was slowing down as the models suggested, and the probability for landfall in Miami by 2 PM
            EDT Monday was only 7 percent. According to Dr. Sheets:

                 "What I basically said to the emergency managers was that there was a low
                 probability of threat over the weekend to the Florida east coast but to tune in
                 Sunday and Monday because we were forecasting the storm to strengthen to
                 hurricane strength and threaten the Florida coast early in the week. I made
                 similar comments to the public, saying'enjoy your weekend,'but I added the usual
                 caveat that it was hurricane season and any time you have a storm east of us, you
                 payattention. I also added that this 'enjoy your weekend' comment assumed that
                 you had done all the things you should have done at the beginning of the hurricane
                 season and were prepared to act promptly if the need arose."

            This situation reinforces the fact that our ability to predict the timing and intensity changes
            of tropical cyclones needs further improvement. This suggests that every effort must be made
            to maintain a heightened level of awareness when a potential threat exists.

            During NOAA DST interviews with emergency management officials, not one emergency
            management person mentioned the use of probabilities or GDSs forecast error computations
            as they described their preparedness actions. Interviewers did not press the issue, and it is
            likely that most officials weighed the probabilities in some manner even if they didn't refer
            to them explicitly. Nevertheless, despite having been trained by NHC in the use of marine
            advisories and other products, most emergency management officials still appear to depend
            mainly upon watch and warning designations to trigger their evacuations. Only Monroe
            County initiated any evacuation activities before a warning was issued. Dade County
            managerial officials (above the emergency management level) apparently believe they take
            some sort of greater financial risk in ordering evacuations before a warning is issued. Thus,
            Dade County, as well as the Florida DEM, was critical of NHC for waiting until 8 AM EDT
            Sunday to issue a warning, rather than including it in the 5 AM advisory. However, Dade
            County Emergency Management Director, Kate Hale, stated that her actions would have
            been no different had the warning been issued at 5 AM or, for that matter, at 2 AM.

            The northern extent of the warning area on the east coast was Vero Beach, which meant that
            only the southern third of Indian River County was under a warning. Officials there said
            that having part of the county in and part outside of the warning area created difficulties.
            Their desire was to evacuate all or none of their coastal surge vulnerable areas since the time
            required for evacuation and the shelter capacities needed are based upon the assumption that
            all of the county is evacuating. Also, they felt that the public would become confused as to
            why part of the county needed to evacuate and part did not. Other emergency managers
            disagreed and saw nothing wrong with evacuating part of a county. NHC bases warnings on
            meteorological and geographical information, tempered by the desire to keep overwarning to
            a minimum. Finding LE.2: Many coastal emergency managers do not understand
            the scientific reasoning involved in designating hurricane watch and warning
            areas. They want to evacuate either all or none of their coastal surge vulnerable


                                                          39









               area rather than parts of counties. Recommendation I.E.2: There needs to be
               better dialogue between NHC and emergency management involving the
               designation of hurricane watch and warning areas. Conference calls following or
               preceding a watch or warning issuance always should contain a thorough
               explanation for the choice of the end points of the areas. NHC also should explore
               the feasibility of including this information in the tropical cyclone discussions.
               Courses offered at NHC for emergency managers should include a segment on the
               subject of designating watch and warning areas.


               Impact of Forecasts and Forecast Errors

               As noted above, all of the county and state emergency management offices received marine
               advisories which included position and intensity forecasts. Officials also had tools available
               to help them assess the response implications of the forecasts. The track forecasts in Andrew
               were exceptionally good, but two other forecast components complicated response actions.

               The forward speed of the storm is important information for emergency management because
               it indicates when response actions need to begin. There were three forecast periods when the
               forecast speed was notably off, the most important one being Saturday morning. The 11 AM
               EDT forecast Saturday morning indicated that tropical storm-force winds would arrive in
               West Palm Beach in 53 hours; the 5 PM forecast said tropical storm-force winds would arrive
               in Fort Lauderdale in 35 hours. In 6 hours, emergency management lost 18 hours of
               response time (12 more than anticipated). From Miami's perspective, tropical storm-force
               winds had been forecast at 11 AM to reach their closest point of approach in 58 hours, which
               changed to 36 hours at 5 PM-a 22-hour difference. Thirty-six hours still provide ample time
               to respond to a category 2 or 3 storm and should be enough to respond to a category 4 as
               well. It did, however, put officials on a decision "bubble," so to speak.

               People evacuating out of the region in a category 2 or 3 storm require 25 hours, and with
               nightfall approaching at 5 PM EDT Saturday, either the evacuation would need to begin at
               night or end at night. Most emergency managers try to avoid nighttime evacuations. Only
               Monroe County elected to have part of its population begin moving on Saturday night.
               Monroe officials were able to begin preparations before the 5 PM advisory because of
               information gained by being present at NHC earlier Saturday afternoon. Between 5 PM and
               11 PM EDT, another 9 hours of response time were lost (3 more than anticipated). NHC was
               forecasting a category 3 at landfall, but because of forecast uncertainty, they cautioned
               officials by phone to plan for a category 4. That turned out to be good advice.

               Figure 6 depicts the predicted versus actual sustained winds for eight 24-hour forecast
               periods, beginning Friday. Throughout most of the period, NHC forecasts were too low by
               a category. Finding I.E.3: One critical aspect of hurricane forecasting-the
               intensification of storms-lags far behind the balance of the science. SHIFOR, the
               computer model used to forecast hurricane intensification, is old and ineffective.
               It does a poor job of handling rapid intensification. Recommendation I.E.3: NHC,
               NMC, and HRD should redouble their efforts to develop models and operational
               techniques to forecast tropical cyclone intensity changes more effectively. In turn,
               NOAA should support research efforts at understanding and predicting cyclone
               intensity changes. The 5 AM EDT Sunday forecast was the best, off by only 5 kts. This,


                                                             40









            however, did not reflect the temporary but
            unanticipated intensification up to 130 kts.     24-Hr Predicted vs. Actual Winds
            (NHC now believes surface winds at 5 AM                     Hurricane Andrew: August 21-23
            EDT Monday were actually 125 kts, but the              Knots
            120 kt figure from the advisory was used in           140
            the graphic for consistency.)             Some        120
            observers have pointed out that the forecast         100
            was good during the critical period 24 hours         so
                                                                                                     EPredicted
            preceding landfall; however, the critical            60                                  MActual
            period for a category 4 is 36 hours, not 24.
                                                                 40

                                                                 20
            In impending hurricane situations,
            emergency managers are warned by NH                   0 21/11 21/5 p, 21/11 p, 2M 2-1 2V6 M2VI I
            about the uncertainty in intensity forecasts                  Dayrrinne Forecast Issued
            and told to plan for events stronger than        Figure 6 - 24-hour predicted vs. actual
            forecast-the rule of thumb being to add a        winds.
            category. The GDS software in possession
            of all the counties in south Florida indicates
            the likelihood of intensities exceeding various values based upon past forecast error
            distributions. Just as making the warning area too large or too small has economic and
            safety implications, so does evacuating too large or too small an area within a community.
            Finding I.E.4: Some emergency managers could have made greater use of
            hurricane strike probabilities and personal computer (PC) software in their
            decision-making process. Recommendation LEA: Emergency management needs
            to use all the tools available to them to provide information for their decision-
            making processes, including PC-based software specifically designed for that
            purpose. The NWS should work with FEMA to support more workshops for coastal
            emergency managers. This should include instructions on how to use these tools
            effectively.


            Evacuation Conditions

            The warning on the Florida east coast extended from Vero Beach southward through the
            Florida Keys and included part of Indian River County and all of Dade, St. Lucie, Martin,
            Palm Beach, Broward, and Monroe Counties. The watch on the east coast extended
            northward to Titusville and encompassed almost all of Brevard County. On the west coast
            of Florida, the warning went from Flamingo in the south to Venice in the north and included
            Monroe, Collier, Lee, Charlotte, and part of Sarasota Counties. The warnings also applied
            to the counties bordering Lake Okeechobee, primarily Glades and small parts of Hendry and
            Okeechobee Counties on the west and the north shores of Palm Beach and Martin on the
            east. The watch on the gulf coast went as far north as Bayport in Hernando County and also
            affected Pasco, Pinellas, Hillsborough, and Manatee Counties.

            Although numerous Florida counties were threatened and had to make response decisions
            in Andrew, the counties of greatest concern were Palm Beach, Broward, Dade, and Monroe.
            Andrew posed the greatest threat to these counties, and they have the largest populations
            at risk and/or require the longest times to evacuate (table 1).



                                                           41










                                                          Table I


                              Evacuation Data for Southeast Florida Counties






                                    Storm             Evacuating                 Clearance Time
                  County            Category          Population            W/I Region       Out of Region

                  Palm Beach        1-2                133,000                 7 hrs           15.5 hrs
                                     3                 207,000                11 hrs             25 hrs
                                    4-5                227,000                13 hrs             37 hrs

                  Broward           1-2                187,000              12.5 hrs           15.5 hrs
                                     3                 300,570              17.5 hrs             25 hrs
                                    4-5                426,680                23 hrs             37 hrs

                  Dade               1                 227,210                12 hrs           15.5 hrs
                                    2-3                408,740                12 hrs             25 hrs
                                    4-5                589,000                12 hrs             37 hrs

                  Monroe            1-2                  62,665               18 hrs
                                    3-5                  73,290               27 hrs



                L-




                Palm Beach, Broward, and Dade Counties all have dense populations on barrier beaches that
                would be affected by surge even in category 1 storms. In Palm Beach and Dade Counties, the
                beaches are on barrier islands; whereas in Broward, they are separated only by a narrow,
                dredged intracoastal waterway. Much of the Broward and southern Palm Beach County
                "mainland," bordering the intracoastal waterway, consists of highly vulnerable dredge-and-fill
                finger canal developments. The mainland topography in the region is such that flooding in
                category 2 and 3 storms extends only a few blocks inland in most areas of all three counties.
                Category 4 and 5 storms cause flooding only within a mile or less of the intracoastal
                waterway in most parts of the counties. The most notable exception is southern Dade
                County, where category 2 and 3 storms can inundate areas as much as 10 miles inland, and
                flooding from category 4 and 5 storms can extend inland even further. The most densely
                populated parts of Dade County are well north of this area, however. If the three counties
                evacuate for a category 4 rather than a category 3 storm, more than 300,000 additional
                people are affected.




                                                               42









             Most evacuees are anticipated in evacuation plans to go to destinations within their own
             county or to one of the adjacent counties. The times required to evacuate those people are
             given in table 1 under Clearance Time Within Region. Broward requires more time than
             Palm Beach and Dade, especially for a category 4 or 5 storm.

             Evacuation plans are designed in the anticipation that a third or fewer of the evacuees will
             leave the region, going to points north of Palm Beach County and/or inland. Doing so
             requires that most evacuees use either the Florida Turnpike or 1-95, both multilane limited
             access highways. Transportation models indicate that congestion will be extreme on both
             roads north of Palm Beach County. The times required to evacuate safely are listed in
             table 1 under Clearance Time Out of Region. The times are the same for all three counties
             because the congestion is occurring north of Palm Beach County so all three counties are
             affected equally. For these evacuees, a category 3 storm requires 25 hours to evacuate and
             a category 4 or 5 storm requires 37 hours.

             Monroe County consists mainly of the Florida Keys, a chain of islands extending from just
             south of the Dade County coast southwestward more than 100 miles, terminating at Key
             West. Most of the islands are flooded in category I or 2 hurricanes, and a category 3, 4, or
             5 storm floods virtually all of the Keys. The two-lane roads link the Keys to the mainland.
             Plans anticipate that most evacuees will go to destinations in Dade County. Although a
             category 3 or greater storm affects only 9,000 more people than a category 1 or 2 storm, most
             are in Key West, and the clearance time increases from 18 to 27 hours. Evacuating only the
             middle and upper Keys (excluding Key West) requires 12 to 23 hours.

             Emergency management officials attempt to complete their evacuation before the arrival of
             tropical storm-force winds. Therefore, the initiation of evacuation must reflect not only the
             clearance time but also the number of hours which tropical storm-force winds precede the
             arrival of the hurricane's eye.


             Evacuation Actions by Local Emergency Management

             Table 2 summarizes evacuation actions taken by coastal counties in Andrew. In Florida, both
             state and county governments have the authority to order (i.e., compel) evacuation. Failure
             to comply is a misdemeanor offense. Most counties exercised their authority to order
             evacuation, but a few, mostly on the west coast, only recommended evacuation. St. Lucie
             County recommended evacuation at 8 AM Sunday and then issued an evacuation order at
             noon. Although Lee County was one which used a recommendation rather than an order, the
             notice was worded so as to enhance compliance. Lee County was concerned about liability
             issues if police were unable to secure and protect property in areas from which residents were
             forced to leave.


             Most counties issued press releases and held press briefings to announce the evacuations.
             Some faxed messages to NWS offices to be included in HLSs, and some had call-down
             systems to automatically notify specific groups, such as hospitals, municipal governments,
             and so forth. In most municipalities, the evacuation notices were disseminated by police
             driving through neighborhoods and using loudspeakers. All counties had plans to help
             evacuate people with special needs. State law requires that nursing homes have evacuation
             plans (including transportation and sheltering). The special needs evacuations worked to


                                                           43









                                                           Table 2

                                    Evacuation Actions by Coastal Counties




                    County                                 Action                               Time

                    St. Lucie                     Evacuated for Cat. 3                   4:00 PM Sunday

                    Martin                        Evacuated for Cat. 3                   3:00 PM Sunday

                    Palm Beach                    Evacuated for Cat. 3                   3:00 PM Sunday

                    Broward                       Evacuated for Cat. 4/5                 8:15 AM Sunday

                    Dade                          Evacuated for Cat. 3                   8:15 AM Sunday
                                                  Evacuated for Cat. 4/5                 9:15 AM Sunday

                    Monroe                        Evacuated non-residents
                                                    for Cat. 3/4/5                       3:00 PM Saturday
                                                  Evacuated Ocean Reef
                                                    for Cat. 3/4/5                      10:00 PM Saturday
                                                  Evacuated Middle and
                                                    Upper Keys for Cat. 3/4/5            6:00 AM Sunday
                                                  Evacuated Lower Keys                  11:00 AM Sunday

                    Collier                       Evacuated for Cat. 1                   8:15 AM Sunday

                    Lee                           Evacuated for Cat. 1                   2:30 PM Sunday

                    Charlotte                     Evacuated for Cat. 1                   3:00 PM Sunday







               varying degrees; there were numerous examples of nursing homes "dumping" patients at
               public shelters. A number of hospitals elected to stay in place rather than attempt
               evacuation.


               The most interesting and innovative response actions were in Monroe County. Officials
               implemented a phased evacuation, then forcibly terminated the evacuation out of the Keys,
               and finally opened refuges of last resort. Since the storm occurred on a weekend, there were
               numerous visitors from south Florida in the Keys. Officials decided to have as many visitors
               as possible leave early so that if it became necessary to evacuate residents, the visitor


                                                                44









            population would not add to the time needed to evacuate. Between 2 and 3 Saturday
            afternoon, before a watch was issued but as Andrew began to increase in forward speed,
            Monroe County emergency management officials requested that state parks and recreation
            areas be closed and urged non-residents to leave. At 6 PM EDT (after the watch was issued),
            visitors were ordered out. At 10 PM EDT, Ocean Reef, a resort development of approximately
            3,000 people near the northern end of the Keys, was ordered to evacuate. Early Sunday
            morning, around 5 AM EDT, when the storm was first forecast to reach category 4 strength,
            the middle and upper Keys were ordered to evacuate. This included all of the Keys east of
            the Seven-Mile Bridge and excluded Key West, plus a few islands immediately east of Key
            West. When it appeared to officials that traffic was moving well throughout Sunday morning,
            the lower Keys were ordered to evacuate at 11 AM EDT.

            One critical "choke point" for evacuation of the Keys is the two-lane segment of Route 1.
            Although some traffic from the upper Keys is shunted over the toll bridge, Route 997, most
            travel over Route 1. Both routes merge into Route 1 at Florida City. Shortly beyond the
            merge point, the Florida Turnpike bears off from Route 1. Most of the Keys' traffic heads
            north on the Florida Turnpike. All people evacuating from the Keys must eventually travel
            into Dade County; there is no alternative. Designated evacuation shelters for Keys'residents
            are located on the campus of Florida International University. Many evacuees bypassed the
            evacuation shelters and traveled further north along the turnpike. Since many Dade County
            residents also were evacuating along this route, massive traffic jams occurred.

            A current concern in southern Florida is that most residents will attempt to evacuate,
            whether they live in a surge zone or not. FEMA funded a post-Andrew assessment of the
            increased number of evacuees on evacuation times. Their study shows that Finding I.E.5:
            As a result of increased anxiety caused by Hurricane Andrew, many south Florida
            residents indicated they would evacuate for future major hurricanes. Indeed, if
            this was the case, evacuation times for a category 4 or 5 hurricane striking the
            Florida Keys would increase from the pre-Andrew level of 37 hours to 70-80 hours,
            depending on the percentage of residents evacuating. Recommendation I.E.5: NWS
            and FEMA should work in concert to develop response options as outlined in
            Recommendations I.B.4 and I.F.2. Evacuees would be better off in their homes rather
            than risking being caught on the highway in their cars.


            Response by the Media

            The electronic and print media in south Florida played a crucial role in enabling the public
            to respond to the approaching hurricane. The print media maintained a steady stream of
            hurricane-related information, including the latest reports and forecasts as well as emergency
            response information. The electronic media, including radio and television, augmented the
            print media with the latest updates enhanced by color graphics and satellite photo-imagery.
            The response of the media to this impending disaster provided response information to an
            audience that otherwise the NWS would not have been able to reach.


            The NWS recognizes the integral role that the news media and, in particular, the broadcast
            media plays in disseminating weather warnings and vital information to the general public.
            The link between the NWS, emergency management, and the broadcast media is critical to
            any community warning system. Never before, however, has the NWS-media alliance been


                                                          45









              more effective than during the hours preceding Hurricane Andrew's landfall in Dade County.
              The NHC, collocated with WSFO Miami, historically has utilized the electronic media as an
              indispensable element of the warning system.

              Finding LEX: The link between the NWS, emergency management, and the
              broadcast media is critical to any community warning system. A partnership
              developed to coordinate NHC information through a broadcast "pool" enabled a
              large number of media outlets to receive broadcast footage from NHC without
              crowding the facility and compromising the operational setting. Recommendation
              LEX: NWS should support development of similar broadcast pools at local offices
              along the hurricane-prone coasts, as well as at NMC, should backup for NHC be
              required.

              In the case of Andrew and in accordance with the pool agreement, the television stations
              covering Dade and Broward Counties were notified that a local pool would be established at
              NHC and the Dade County EOC beginning at 5 PM EDT, Saturday, August 22. Kate Hale,
              Dade County EM, and Billy Wagner, Monroe County EM, were present at NHC at that time
              and began systematic notifications and early planning of necessary evacuations.

              All six local television stations, including two serving the Spanish-speaking community,
              responded by sending producers and technicians to NHC. In addition, NBC, CBS, ABC, and
              CNN all were notified and dispatched personnel. Beginning at 5 PM on Saturday, live
              broadcasts featuring NHC staff (mainly Director Robert Sheets) were conducted at 5-minute
              intervals for the duration of the event. In all, more than 600 interviews were broadcast.

              Meanwhile, television meteorologists and the staffs of the major television stations provided
              round-the-clock coverage of the hurricane's progress and provided listeners with hurricane
              safety advice. They were instrumental in encouraging evacuation from the threatened areas.
              Finding LE.7: Television meteorologists were instrumental in encouraging
              evacuation from the threatened areas. Many of the television broadcasts were
              simulcast on AM and FM radio. This was particularly useful since many residents
              received lifesaving advice through their battery-operated radios when television
              transmitters were knocked off the air. Recommendation LE.7: NWS offices along
              hurricane-threatened areas should continue to encourage proactive, weather-
              conscious media who will provide that essential link with the public to convey life-
              saving information. Many of the television stations were simulcast on AM and FM radio.
              This was particularly useful since many residents received lifesaving advice through their
              battery-operated radios when television transmitters were knocked off the air.

              Finding LE.8: Efforts of the NWS, in conjunction with state and local emergency
              management and the news media, resulted in clear and motivating messages to the
              general public. Those messages resulted in a superb public response, except for
              some residents of Miami Beach, and may have saved countless lives.
              Recommendation LE.8: NHC and WSFO Miami should work with the local media
              to target those populations in Miami Beach where the response was deficient.





                                                           46










                                              CHAPTER IX


                                        PUBLIC RESPONSE


            Andrew's approach and the flow of information from the NWS through the media and
            emergency management agencies strongly elevated public awareness. In fact, the convective
            rain bands over the Melbourne area caused much concern until it became apparent that the
            main thrust of the hurricane would pass further south. The devastation which eventually
            occurred over south Florida heightened the awareness in other vulnerable areas to the
            significant inland wind damage which can accompany a hurricane.

            The general impression of most observers is that the evacuation of the general public went
            very well, with some notable exceptions along the beaches (see Evacuation Rates below).
            Times required to clear the evacuating population appeared close to the times projected in
            evacuation studies (see table 1). Traffic congestion that caused evacuees leaving south Dade
            County at noon Sunday, August 23, to arrive in Orlando at 4 AM EDT Monday, August 24,
            was anticipated by officials. There were unnecessary queuing delays on the Florida Turnpike
            as toll booths continued operating, but the problem was eventually corrected. A draw bridge
            in the Keys became stuck in the "up" position early Sunday morning but was fixed in less
            than an hour. Subsequently, all bridges in the region were locked down for the duration of
            the evacuation. Success in evacuating special facilities varied.

            In January and February of 1993, Florida State University, with funding from the National
            Science Foundation, conducted a survey with 1,100 residents of Broward, Dade, and Monroe
            Counties to document public response to the threat.


            Evacuation Rates

            The percentage of residents who evacuated (i.e., left their homes to go someplace they
            believed would be safer) in Andrew varied by proximity to the shoreline. In Broward County,
            69 percent left from the Category 1-2 surge zone; and in Dade County, 71 percent left from
            the Category 1 area. In the Broward Category 3 and Dade Category 2-3 zones, 63 percent
            evacuated; and in Category 4-5 zones, 46 percent left from Broward County and 33 percent
            left from Dade County. In both counties, 13 percent evacuated from inland areas beyond the
            Category 4-5 surge limits. Had Andrew's track been slightly farther north, a significant
            number of homes would have been flooded with their occupants in them.

            Evacuation from the Florida Keys (Monroe County) decreased from north to south and was
            lower than that from the Broward and Dade County high-risk areas. In the upper Keys,
            62 percent left, compared to 45 percent in the middle Keys, 40 percent in the lower Keys
            north of Key West, and 25 percent in Key West. If Andrew's track had been farther south,
            many homes in the Keys also would have been flooded with their occupants still in them.



                                                        47








                Although only 70 percent evacuated from the high-risk areas of Broward and Dade Counties
                in Andrew, many residents (44 percent in Broward and 28 percent in Dade) said they didn't
                hear from officials that they were supposed to leave. Of those who said they did hear officials
                say that they were to evacuate, only slightly more than half believed the notice was
                mandatory. Overall, only 32 percent in Broward Category 1-2 and 42 percent in Dade
                Category 1 evacuation zones believe they were ordered to evacuate.

                Of those who indicated that officials told them to evacuate, 80 percent did compared to only
                52 percent of those who said they weren't told to leave. Of those who understood that they
                were ordered to leave, 87 percent did so, and of the respondents who said that officials
                actually came into their neighborhood making announcements that they must evacuate,
                89 percent left.


                Evacuation Timing

                Ten percent of the evacuees from the Dade and Broward County high-risk areas said they
                had already left when the watch was issued. Few others left during Saturday evening and
                night, so that when a warning was issued the following morning, less than 15 percent of the
                eventual evacuees had left. At that time, officials in both Broward and Dade Counties issued
                evacuation orders. The evacuation rate clearly began to increase around 8 AM Sunday, and
                by 2 PM that afternoon, slightly more than half the evacuees had left. By 6 PM, over
                90 percent of the evacuees had left. Response curves for lower risk areas of Broward and
                Dade Counties were comparable but lagged slightly behind the curve for the highest risk
                zones.


                As indicated in greater detail previously, the evacuation was phased in the Florida Keys.
                Although most residents weren't told to leave until early Sunday morning, many were aware
                of the other evacuation activities going on earlier and some were probably influenced.
                Twenty percent of the evacuees said they had already left when the hurricane watch was
                issued, and another 10 percent left by Sunday morning when the general evacuation order
                was issued for the upper Keys. The response curve began to increase sharply at that time,
                and by 9 AM, 50 percent of the evacuees had left. By 5 PM, 90 percent of the evacuees had
                left, and officials halted evacuation out of the Keys from the upper Keys at 6 PM. Response
                curves for the middle and lower Keys were similar but somewhat later.

                The lower Keys and Key West, in particular, are perceived by Monroe County officials as
                presenting a special response problem. Studies project that up to 40 percent of the residents
                there would refuse to leave if so ordered. At least part of the reluctance to leave is attributed
                to a concern that evacuation is impossible and that those attempting to leave could be
                trapped on roads and bridges as the storm arrived. Finding I.F.I: NHC and NWS
                representatives, when making a case for refuges of last resort, may have
                contributed unintentionally to the problem of public resistance to evacuation by
                stressing the danger of being caught trying to evacuate. Recommendation I.F.1:
                NWS and NHC representatives need to stress to the public the importance of
                referring to appropriate state and local emergency management directives about
                evacuation orders.





                                                               48









             In the region overall, and perhaps beyond, most residents appear very willing to leave in the
             future. In fact, many who would not be included in evacuation notices say they intend to
             leave rather than stay behind and experience the sort of wind-borne destruction caused by
             Andrew in southern Dade County. If all those who said they will leave in the future
             attempted to do so and if they attempted to leave the region (as most say they would), the
             evacuation would need to begin more (perhaps much more) than 48 hours before the arrival
             of the storm. Such intentions are notoriously poor predictors of actual behavior, however, and
             officials would take actions designed to curtail the shadow evacuation effect. Nevertheless,
             this will be an added complication to evacuations in the region in the near future.

             An interesting phenomena occurred in the Naranja Lakes area where damage was extreme.
             As an area subject to potential storm surge, evacuation was recommended due to that threat.
             Most residents did so, but several who did not lost their lives. However, those fatalities were
             the result of wind-borne missiles, not storm surge. Finding I.F.2: If residents of the hard
             hit Naranja Lakes area had not evacuated because of the storm surge threat, more
             deaths likely would have resulted from the effects of wind. Recommendation I.F.2:
             Since in many cases evacuation is not a viable option, the NWS and the Federal
             Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should work together to encourage the
             concept of engineered in-residence shelters to protect from severe wind without
             invoking evacuation procedures. Had those who evacuated not done so, many more lives
             would have been lost.


             Findina I.F.3: Many residents whose houses began to disintegrate during the storm
             followed "tornado safety rules!' and went to the interior part of their house away
             from windows and outside walls. Whether this was an obvious sort of adaptive response,
             whether there was a background level of awareness about what to do as learned from tornado
             awareness efforts, or whether people were being instructed over radio and television to do so,
             the response was good. In response to the success of this action, Lee County has already
             begun to develop instructions, complete with sketches, to be included in telephone books.
             Recommendation I.F.3: NWS and emergency management agencies should make
             "tornado safety rules" a standard component of hurricane awareness efforts,
             especially for strong storms. The public also should be better educated about the
             kinds of construction and building designs which are most vulnerable in strong
             hurricanes.





















                                                           49







               Iem               J"

                                                                     00











                    Intense winds associated with Andrew caused the shearwall to fail on the lee
                    side of this multifamily structure.

























                    This stack storage facility at Black Point Marina, Dade County, collapsed
                    under Andrew's intense winds. One-third of the 45,000 registered boats in
                    Dade County were damaged.
                                                              '74 7- - @`M














                                                        50










                                               CHAPTER LG


                            PROCESSING@ INTERPRETATION9
                 AND DISSEMINATION OF NWS INFORMATION


           Utilization of Hurricane Forecasting Models by NHC and NMC

           The overall performance of the track prediction models used by NHC was very good during
           Hurricane Andrew. In particular, the Aviation (AVN) model delivered an extremely good
           performance. NHC's forecast operations had access to seven (7) numerical models for track
           prediction. These models included both statistical and dynamical types with some
           incorporating both concepts in their design. Although NHC depends heavily on the use of
           these model outputs, it is always the forecaster's judgment and experience that ultimately
           determines NHC's official track forecast.


           Statistical models provide forecasters with calculated storm movements within minutes after
           initialization, while the dynamical models may take up to 6 hours to run. Therefore, the
           statistical models always are available to the forecaster while the dynamical models, such as
           the Aviation (AVN) and the Quasi-Lagrangian Model (QLM), are run every 12 hours.

           The vital data ingredients for these models include the storm's direction and speed of
           movement (translation), storm intensity, storm geographical location, and date. These data
           can be most accurately assessed by aircraft reconnaissance and, as the Melbourne WSO's
           WSR-88D proved in Andrew, by modern radar. Satellite imagery, although vital for tracking
           cyclones over more remote ocean areas, does not consistently provide the degree of data
           accuracy needed when storms threaten coastlines.

           There is only one operational model that is specifically used to predict the rate of
           strengthening, the SHIFOR (Statistical Hurricane Intensity Forecast) model. Although the
           model underestimated the rate of strengthening of Andrew particularly during its rapidly
           deepening period, the hurricane warning lead time was not impeded.

           The NHC issued 37 official track forecasts during the time Hurricane Andrew existed as a
           tropical cyclone; one forecast every 6 hours. Using the best available data on the storm, an
           official "actual best track" is determined for comparison and verification purposes of all
           official forecasts.


           Table A.5 in appendix A lists the official average track errors in nautical miles for various
           model guidance during Hurricane Andrew. The track errors for Andrew are considerably less
           than the 10-year average but not as small as the forecast errors for Hurricane Hugo. The
           CLIPER (CLImatology-PERsistence) errors are useful as a measure of forecast difficulty: the
           larger the CLIPER errors, the more difficult is the forecast. The Andrew CLIPER errors
           were much larger than the Hugo CLIPER errors, indicating that the Andrew track was a
           more difficult one to forecast. All of the models are verified on the same set of forecast cases.


                                                           51








                The Aviation model, with its new synthetic data system, had the smallest errors at 36, 48
                and 72 hours, while the QLM had the smallest errors at 24 hours, and CLIPER and NHC90
                (NHC 1990 Hurricane Computer Forecasting Program) were tied for the smallest errors at
                the short range of 12 hours. Finding LGA: Small errors in the track forecast
                produced by the Aviation Model were impressive for this small sample of forecasts.
                Recommendation LGA: NOAA should continue to support development of such
                models. In order to use these models most effectively, methods need to be explored
                to gather better data in and around tropical cyclones. The Omega dropwinsonde
                experiment should be conducted to evaluate the potential of this capability.


                SLOSH Model Performance

                For more than 12 years, the NWS has been modelling hurricane storm surges with the
                SLOSH model. This numerical computer model calculates hurricane storm surges in a given
                area (or basin) based on hurricane track, size, and intensity. It does not incorporate the
                effects of wave action. The model has been applied to all of the eastern and gulf coasts of the
                United States. SLOSH was designed originally to compute storm surges in real-time as a
                hurricane threatened the coast. More recently, the model has been run in a "simulation
                study" mode, where hundreds of hypothetical storms are simulated with the flooding data
                from each stored. These data form the "hazard" basis of comprehensive hurricane evacuation
                planning.

                Hurricane Andrew significantly affected four United States SLOSH basins as well as the
                Bahamas SLOSH basin. The four United States basins were Biscayne Bay (Miami), Florida;
                Florida Bay, Florida (Keys); Charlotte Harbor (Ft. Myers), Florida; and Vermilion Bay,
                Louisiana. Simulation studies were completed in both Biscayne Bay and Charlotte Harbor;
                only the Vermilion Bay area had no completed study.

                The Bahamas


                Early in 1990, Mr. Arthur Rolle of the Bahamas Meteorological Service (BMS) worked with
                the NWS's Techniques Development Laboratory (TDL) adapting the SLOSH model to parts
                of the Bahamas. Their efforts focused on extracting bathymetry and topographic features
                needed by the model as well as learning about the model itself. The Bahamas basin coverage
                is shown in figure 7. After completing the model, Mr. Rolle worked with NHC conducting a
                SLOSH simulation study. In such a study, hurricanes of various landfall directions with
                differing landfall points, categories, and forward speeds are chosen as storms possible in an
                area's climatology. In total, 1,225 hurricanes were used as input to the SLOSH model. A
                total of 67 composites called Maximum Envelopes of Water (or MEOWs) were formed from
                this massive amount of surge data by choosing the maximum surge at each model grid square
                from a "family" of similar storms. These MEOWs are extremely useful for emergency
                managers in making evacuation decisions and form the "hazards" portion of hurricane
                evacuation planning.







                                                              52
















                                                                  I








                                                                 991 @b


                                                                 973 ft
                             CD                   b
                             -4                                                                New Orleans
                             I          Vermilion Bay       955 @b                            SLOSH coverage
                                        SLOSH coverage
                                                              OOUTC 26                          Charlotte Harbor
                             0                                    937 ft        941 b            SLOSH coverage
                                                                                                                                                    Biscayne Bay
                                                                                        946 @b                                                          SLOSH coverage                  Bahamas

                                                                                                    94a b
                                                                                                              943 b                                       G- Bb.-           G
                                                                                                                                                                            Aba- 1,.

                                                                                                         OOUTC 25 A.g                 51                                 0 UTC 24 A@q qe@
                 CA                                                                                                         947 b                                       11 1
                 co                                                                                                                                  937 @b           936'@b                    933
                             (D                                                                                                                                           N-
                             0                                                                                                                                          PmAd,nce
                             C-F
                             CD
                                                                                                                                                                               It\   \c-         S.. S.
                                                                                                                  Florida Ba
                                                                                                                    SLOSH coverage                                          E- I-,-



                                                                                                                                                        Cuba


                             (D








               This simulation study was completed well in advance of Hurricane Andrew although a full,
               comprehensive hurricane evacuation plan has not been done. In addition to having the
               SLOSH data in its raw form, the SLOSH graphics display program developed by TDL also
               was available to the BMS. This program allows the rapid recall of MEOWs and presents the
               data on a map background. When Andrew began to threaten the Bahamas, Mr. Rolle was
               in contact with the storm surge experts at NHC regarding the possible impact of the
               hurricane. At 11 AM EDT on August 22, the Bahamas'government issued a hurricane watch
               for the northwestern Bahamas. At 5 PM EDT that afternoon, the watch was upgraded to a
               warning for the northwestern Bahamas, including the islands of Andros, Eleuthera, Grand
               Bahamas, and Great Abaco. Storm surges of 8-10 feet above normal and dangerous wave
               action were expected, according to the forecast.

               Andrew continued to intensify. Forecast surge levels were raised to 10 to 12 feet at 11 PM
               EDT, August 22, then further increased to 10 to 14 feet in the 5 AM EDT, August 23,
               advisory. Andrew continued to intensify and was referred to as a "dangerous category 4"
               storm in the 11 AM EDT, August 23, NHC advisory. That advisory pointed out that up to
               18 feet of surge was possible for the northwest portion of Eleuthera.

               Andrew passed over northern Eleuthera about 5 PM EDT on August 23 and was located
               approximately 25 miles north of Nassau at 8 PM EDT on August 23. High water marks
               measured on Eleuthera ranged to 25 feet above local mean sea level in the town of The
               Current. One storm surge drowning occurred in Lower Bogue where a water level of 18 feet
               was observed. (With these values for water level, storm surge is not separated from wave
               run-up.)

               South Florida


               The first mention of surge levels along Florida's coastline was in the 8 AM EDT, August 23,
               advisory-8 to 12 feet of surge near where the center makes landfall. In the 11 AM EDT,
               August 23, advisory, the forecast was made more specific: 7 to 10 feet along the Florida east
               coast, with 9 to 13 feet possible in Biscayne Bay.

               In 1988, NHC completed a simulation study for hurricane storm surges in the Biscayne Bay
               SLOSH basin. A similar study had been completed for the Florida Keys the year before.
               Information concerning storm surge flooding was passed along to the U.S. Army Corps of
               Engineers and FEMA as well as to state and local officials involved with hurricane
               evacuation planning. A comprehensive evacuation plan for metropolitan Dade County was
               distributed in May 1991, which incorporated the surge hazard as depicted by SLOSH.

               Throughout past hurricane evacuation planning, the policy has been to evacuate all people
               living within the area of potential surge flooding. For Dade County, a threat from a category
               4 hurricane would mean that all areas east of Cutler Ridge, the entire Homestead area, and
               Miami Beach would need to be evacuated. Cutler Ridge is an ancient coral ridge that extends
               southward from Miami through the town of Cutler Ridge. In Miami, the ridge has an
               elevation of about 22 feet. Elevations decrease to about 14 feet at the town of Cutler Ridge
               and to roughly 8 feet around Homestead. Miami Beach, with its large population of elderly
               people, presents special problems for the emergency managers since many of these elderly
               people would need to rely on public transportation. All of these areas were told to evacuate
               preceding Hurricane Andrew.


                                                             54









             Initial reports of storm surge flooding indicated only a few feet and were based on gauges in
             and around the Miami area. However, these gauges were too far north to capture the peak
             levels of surge flooding, especially considering Andrew's compact size. Almost immediately
             following the storm, the USACE and U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) entered the disaster area
             and flagged high water marks. The observer described each mark's location and its
             immediate surroundings. These marks were later surveyed, tying the elevations back to
             known benchmarks. At the request of the NWS, observations were made inland to determine
             the extent and distribution of flooding.

             The highest storm tide mark was found at the Burger King World Headquarters building-
             16.9 feet NGVD (the reference datum used on USGS quadrangle maps). Several other high
             water marks nearby confirm that this level was reasonable. At the Deering Estate, a level
             of 16.5 feet was measured. This mark was inside the building, inside a closet, under a
             stairwell. In such a location, a good "stilling well" effect, damping out wave action, is
             expected.

             Peak storm tide values over 16 feet occurred in a very localized area. Flooding dropped off
             quickly on either side of the maximum. Figure 8 shows the distribution of storm tides as
             measured by the USGS and USACE.

             The NOS's Office of Ocean and Earth Sciences operates one Next Generation Water Level
             Measurement System (NGWLMS) gauge in the Miami area, located at Haulover Pier.
             Although the gauge recorded water levels of only about 4.5 feet North American Vertical
             Datum, corresponding to storm tide levels of only about 2.6 feet, the station structure
             suffered major damage from Andrew.

             NWS's SLOSH model was run for hurricanes similar to Andrew during the simulation
             studies. One storm surge product available to NWS forecasters is a MEOW which closely
             matches Hurricane Andrew: category 4 hurricanes moving west, figure 9. The maximum
             surge possible is about 14 feet. This particular MEOW was run with a forward speed of
             12 mph; Andrew was moving at about 20 mph. Since faster forward speeds generally produce
             larger storm surges, a slightly larger surge could be expected. In addition, the initial water
             level of the simulation study was 1 foot. Observed water levels were running about 1 foot
             above the predicted astronomical tide for the day prior to Andrew. Adding to this water level,
             Andrew arrived at roughly the time of high astronomical tide.

             Andrew's storm surge impact along the west coast of Florida was (relatively) minimal.
             Andrew's eye passed to the south of Marco Island, exiting over the Everglades. Several high
             water marks were measured in the populated areas near Marco Island. However, USGS and
             USACE survey crews could not locate any reliable high water marks to the south in the
             Everglades.

             Finding I.G.2: The storm surge impacted a relatively small area of coastline, but
             the SLOSH model accurately depicted the surge in south Florida. Recommendation
             I.G.2: Refinements to the SLOSH model should continue. Also, training of NWS
             offices and emergency managers in its use should be emphasized. The SLOSH
             model should be validated in cooperation with the NOS/Office of Ocean and Earth
             Sciences (OES) and others to further continued improvements in the model. A
             greater effort should be made to document its physics and the validation efforts
             that justify its use. NOS should assist with such a documentation.


                                                          55























                                                                                                          LO



                                                  0
                                                   L                                                               q    5.7
                                                                 Miles
                                                                                                                       5.
                                                                                                                               Miami
                                                                                                                               Beach




                                                         Kand&U Dr.        sw 88 SL                   9.3                 Key
                                                                                                                          Biscayne
                                                                                                                   7.6
                                                                                                   9.3
                                                         Coral Reef Dr.
                                                           Metrozoo*     SW 152 St,            6.5 Charles Deering Estate

                                                                                             16.9 Burger King Hdqtro

                                                                                   Saga     4.
                                                                                      y             Biscayne
                                                                                        10.            Bay

                                                                       Home tea                                               Path of Eye
                                                                       Air Fo ce Base


                                                                                       6.7
                                     Florid               meste@d                                               Elliott
                                             a                                        Turkey
                                         City                                         Point                     Key





                                                                               v
                                                                                                Key Largo
                                                                                                        /E
                                                                                                  v












                       Figure 8 - High water marks in Dade County, south Florida, during Hurricane Andrew.



                                                                                         56











                                                                                                                                  MIAMI                                          Miami
                                                                                                                                                                                 Beach






                                                                                                                                                                      Key
                                                                                                                                                                      Biscayne



                                                                                                                          12               10
                                                                                            ..........                                                     8
                                                                                            ..........

                                                                                                 .................
                                                                                            .........................
                                                                                            ...........
                                                                                            ............
                                                                                                                    Biscayne
                                                                               ..........................
                                                                                                                                   B
                                                                                                                                             y
                                                                                                                                         a


                                                                             . ....................
                                                                            ......................
                                                                         ... *. ..................
                                                                       ....... .............
                                                                     ......... ..........        I...
                                                                     ............................
                                                                   .............................
                                                                ..............................
                                                                    ........... ................


                                                      ......................... ..............
                                                      ....... ......... *.".* ........... ....                                                           Elliott
                                                      ........ .............
                                                                       .............. ...........
                                                           .... ..... ..                    .... ..........
                                                      .........   ....                      ...... ..........
                                                                   %*  ...................  :..........                                                   Key
                                                      ...........                                              Furkey
                                                                               ............. ...                 oint
                                                      . ............. ......................
                                                                ....... ............................
                                                                     .. ...........         I...............
                                    V1.1-1. :.V.      ....'.......:................... ...  .............. ....,.
                                       ... .......... ............... ..........            I..............
                                       ........................... . .........................

                                                      ..........................
                                         ................................                   .................

                                                      ..................................    .............

                                   .......................................................
                                ..................................        .............................

                                                                                ...........................                         ...


                                    ..... ......
                                           .....      .....
                                ..................         ..
                                .....................                        .............
                                          ...............       ...............             ....
                                                                                                           C7
                                                      ... ....        .......                                                 Key Largo


                                .................                      ......
                                ..................    %'.1-11111.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.* ......





                                      Figure 9 - SLOSH run for westward-moving category 4 hurricanes, making
                                      landfall where Andrew did in Biscayne Bay.



                                                                                                                 57










               Hurricane Andrew was simulated in the Charlotte Harbor basin with the SLOSH model
               using the best available information to identify the storm. Highest surges computed in this
               simulation is shown in figure 10 with high water mark information superimposed. Winds
               were offshore to the north of the storm's track until after the eye's passage. At the time of
               eye passage off the coast, the winds turned, generating the observed highest surges. South
               of the track, winds were consistently onshore during the storm and generated storm surges
               of up to 7 feet. Again, no observations could be made in this area to verify the computed
               storm surges.


               Utility of Other PC Software

               Products Available to the NWS


               Three major PC-based software packages are available to NWS offices along Florida
               coastlines: SLOSH, GDS4.0, and Tides. NWS personnel from the WSOs and WSFO Miami
               were questioned regarding their use of this software during the days and hours preceding the
               landfall of Hurricane Andrew. Unfortunately, due to lack of available hardware, most offices
               did not make active use of this software.


               In most WSOs and even some WSFOs, PC use generally is limited to (1) an SRWarn
               Computer and (2) a Micro-Arts PC for compiling and disseminating surface observations.
               Finding I.G.3: On-station computers at WSOs and WSFOs are inadequate to run
               storm surge and applications programs. Limitations to these PC-type computers mean
               that resident programs are terminated while applications programs are run. This is
               cumbersome and ineffective. In some WSFOs, additional computers are on station for use
               by management and support staff. These PCs, however, are not routinely available to
               operational staff. In order to utilize the above software, the operational staff would have had
               to terminate resident programs, such as the surface observation program and SRWarn. This
               was determined to be inordinately cumbersome. AFOS does not have the capacity to serve
               as an alternative. Recommendation I.G.3: Coastal NWS offices should be provided
               sufficient PC hardware and software to display SLOSH MEOW (Maximum Envelop
               of Water) data as well as to run surge applications and hurricane decision-making
               programs. The Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System (AWIPS), under
               development for future NWS Weather Forecast Offices, should be able to support
               these programs.















                                                             58





























                                              6





                                                       C\

                                                4      6
                                                    5



                                                               3






















                               Figure 10    South Florida west coast storm surge.




                                                       59










                                               CHAPTER LH


                                          COMMUNICATIONS


             Automation of Field Operations and Services (AFOS)

             The NHC and WSFO Miami share and use many of the same communications systems.
             However, they are separate AFOS node sites with each AFOS mainframe containing identical
             data bases for reciprocal backup purposes. Both the NHC and WSFO Miami AFOS systems
             functioned throughout Andrew. It was not necessary to invoke any backup for these systems.
             Due to eventual failure of the air-conditioning system, the ambient temperature around
             AFOS reached approximately 100 degrees Fahrenheit. Excessive heating was avoided by
             turning off some unused components. WSFO Miami also called on WSFO's Sterling and
             Atlanta for backup of products in anticipation of the heat problems with AFOS.

             AFOS also worked well at WSO Melbourne as did the Remote Terminal to AFOS (RTA) at
             WSO Palm Beach. On Sunday, August 23, a Melbourne electronics technician arranged an
             AFOS link to WSO Fort Myers, where a temporary NWS detail had been set up at the local
             EOC for taking calls and briefing the EOC. Melbourne also performed an AFOS dial test
             with WSO West Palm Beach on Sunday evening to ensure that West Palm Beach could link
             with AFOS through their RTA system in the event that the Miami AFOS became disabled.
             The AFOS communications link between NHC/WSFO Miami and WSO Key West failed at
             5:15 AM on August 24 as Andrew was making landfall in south Dade County. The AFOS at
             WSO Key West worked well during Andrew, but the office was out of contact with the state
             and national AFOS network for the duration of the communications outage which lasted for
             just over 49 hours.


             NOAA Weather Wire Service (NWWS)

             NHC and WSFO Miami have separate satellite-driven NWWSs with distinct uplink and
             downlink antennae, all of which failed just prior to hurricane landfall. This was probably due
             to misalignment of the antennae caused by strong winds and/or corrosion and bending of the
             receiver horns. However, their respective uplink backups worked well (WSO Tampa Bay and
             the National Forecast Division [NFDJ), and all NWWS products were successfully
             transmitted.


             The NWWS uplink antenna at WSO Tampa Bay was damaged by lightning prior to the
             hurricane threat. NWS Southern Region Headquarters had difficulty in getting the
             maintenance contractor, GTE-CONTEL, to repair the system to ensure dependable NWWS
             backup. Weather Service Headquarters intervened, and the problem was corrected in time
             for the Tampa Bay NWWS to function properly. This turned out to be critical since the
             Tampa Bay backup was needed by WSFO Miami.



                                                           61









               The NWWS receivers for both NHC and WSFO Miami were restored Monday afternoon,
               August 24, about 12 hours after failure. Both transmitting antennae were restored the next
               day after new parts were installed. In contrast to some states, Florida has a large number
               of NWWS subscribers as a result of an aggressive promotional campaign several years ago.
               These subscribers include many emergency managers, the media, utility companies,
               agricultural and aviation interests, and large corporations, such as Walt Disney World/Vista
               United. In view of such a diverse group of subscribers, it appears that the NWWS is an
               important method of NWS dissemination in Florida.

               Neither WSO Melbourne nor WSO West Palm Beach drive an NWWS. Instead, their
               products are normally uplinked through the WSFO Miami system. In both cases, all
               hurricane-related products were successfully uplinked through WSFO Miami or the WSO
               Tampa Bay backup antenna once Miami's antenna failed.


               NOAA Weather Radio (NWR)

               WSFO Miami operates one NWR console which drives a single transmitter. This NWR failed
               about the time of landfall on August 24 due to wind damage to the UHF antenna at the
               WSFO that links the console signal to the main transmitter. The main transmitter remained
               intact since it was located on a multi-use commercial facility, the Gannett Tower, well north
               of peak hurricane winds near the Dade-Broward County line. An emergency generator
               supports the transmitter at the Gannett Tower. Until early August, the transmitter had been
               located on a commercial television transmission tower in Homestead which was destroyed by
               the hurricane. The damaged UHF antenna was repaired, and the NWR broadcast resumed
               during the early evening of August 25 after about a 36-hour outage.

               There was, of course, an abundance of pictorial and detailed updates on Andrew provided by
               the commercial media. Nevertheless, there was widespread acceptance and use of NWR in
               the greater Miami area by marine and agricultural interests and the general public. They
               were served well by the WSFO Miami NVM which aired a complete suite of warnings,
               statements, and forecasts related to the hurricane until the UHF antenna failure near time
               of landfall. Finding LHA: Despite the extensive commercial media coverage of
               Andrew'  both the NWWS and NWR were well received and were utilized as official
               and timely sources of NWS information regarding the event. Recommendation
               1.H.1: The NWS should continue strong encouragement of the widespread use of
               NWWS and NWR as official sources of NWS information. High priority should be
               placed on planned NWR upgrades and more wind-resistant transmitters, featuring
               voice synthesis, to improve the quality and efficiency of NWR dissemination during
               major weather events. The NWS should develop partnerships with FEMA and other
               organizations to increase NWR coverage as well as the broadcasting of critical pre-
               and post-event information.

               NWR consoles and transmitters worked well at both WSO Melbourne and WSO West Palm
               Beach, and all pertinent hurricane products were broadcast.






                                                            62








             National Warning System (NAWAS)

             NAWAS remained functional except in the Keys where it, along with all other land-line
             communications, failed at 5:15 AM on August 24. Many local and state agencies have drops
             on NAWAS in Florida, with only two Florida counties not on the system. The Florida
             NAWAS also serves all emergency managers, most law enforcement offices, and the NWS
             offices. During Andrew, as in other recent hurricanes, the Director of NHC used the state
             NAWAS circuit to good advantage in briefing emergency managers and the WSOs on the
             latest NHC thinking and in receiving questions and comments. This helped to ensure that
             local decision makers were in the direct loop of critical information. 'Finding I.H.2: NHC
             made effective use of the Florida National Warning System (NAWAS) circuit to
             communicate with Florida emergency managers and Florida WSOs on important
             hurricane information. Recommendation I.H.2: FEMA, NWS, and state emergency
             management offices should develop procedures to use the national NAWAS circuit
             for multistate conference calls so that NHC can brief all appropriate emergency
             management officials on the network during a hurricane threat.


             Hurricane Hotline Internal Coordination System

             The hurricane hotline worked well during Andrew although in other hurricanes this
             dedicated telephone land line sometimes failed. The hurricane hotline is an internal system
             used primarily by coastal WSFOs, military weather offices, and national and regional NWS
             offices. The WSOs do not have a drop on the hotline. Any advance or internal coordination
             given to the WSOs was initiated by the WSOs over regular telephone lines. The WSOs were
             not included in the roll calls over NAWAS. NAWAS is not a secure circuit for discussing
             "internal" NWS information, as The Weather Channel has access and did a pre-release watch
             and warning information to the public.


             IBM Mainframe Computer

             The most serious communications problem at NHC was the failure of the IBM 4381
             mainframe computer. This computer drives the McIDAS VDUC, which ingests and displays
             real-time interactive satellite, gridded, and lightning data. Due to excessive heat build-up,
             the IBM underwent an orderly power down. When restoration was attempted, a mechanical
             failure occurred. In addition, there was serious damage to the antenna which receives the
             GOES and Meteosat-3 (Meteorological Operations Satellite) data for display on the McIDAS.
             Finding I.H.3: Excessive heat build-up contributed to the failure of the IBM
             mainframe computer at the NHC during the hurricane. This was the most serious
             communications failure at NHC because of the IBM's role in driving the McIDAS
             VDUC, a principal source of interactive satellite data for the NHC staff. In
             addition, other important circuits failed which depended on the IBM.
             Recommendation I.H.3: The NWS should install a stand-alone air-conditioning
             system for the NHC independent of leased commercial facilities. This would greatly
             minimize the heating problem of critical communications and computer equipment.
             Although the IBM 4301 mainframe and NHC-based satellite antennas failed, a backup
             system through work stations linked with the VDUC system at NMC continued to operate.


                                                           63








              This system provided a basic set of satellite imagery on NHC systems. Also, satellite data
              continued to be received through SWIS (Satellite Weather Information System), micro-SWIS,
              and the Unifax, all of which remained functional during the storm.


              Telephone Systems

              NHC has an Eagle electronic telephone system for use with external agencies and the public.
              The UPS (Uninterruptable Power Supply) battery backup system for these telephones failed.
              However, the phones were still useable after being connected into some dedicated Federal
              Telephone System (FTS) lines originally designed for data collection. In addition, other
              dedicated lines, such as the FAA hotlines, were used in lieu of the failed conventional
              telephones. Telephone lines from the Florida WSOs worked well, but telephone service into
              the NHC was cut offjust prior to landfall. Communication between the WSOs and NHC was
              maintained through NAWAS.


              Land Lines Versus Satellite

              Many communications problems at NHC were due to failed satellite antennae on top of the
              NHC building. South Florida has a dependable, well constructed, land-line system which,
              in general, fared better than many of the modern satellite links, the antennae of which were
              badly damaged by the hurricane-force winds. Thus, most land-line circuits at NHC remained
              operational, including the radio fax circuit to marine radio station WLO in Mobile, the
              Tropical Regional Analysis Facsimile Circuit (TROPAN) circuit to Cape Canaveral and others,
              and two circuits to Jamaica and Haiti, the only source of NWS hurricane information to these
              countries. By contrast, the Digital Facsimile (DIFAX) failed. DIFAX is a receive-only
              satellite link between NMC and WSFO Miami for relay of aviation weather data. Similarly,
              the Chief Aerial Reconnaissance Coordination for All Hurricanes (CARCAH) reconnaissance
              military circuit failed due to wind damage to the receiving antenna. Thus, aircraft
              reconnaissance data had to be routed via the backup system through Keesler Air Force Base,
              Mississippi, to NWS Central Flow Computer Facility in Washington, D.C., and finally to the
              S-140 computer at NHC.


              Amateur Radio

              The Dade County Amateur Radio Public Service maintains close ties with NHC and had VHF
              (Very High Frequency) voice, VHF packet, and HF (High Frequency) sideband antennae at
              the NHC office. This equipment was checked out by amateur radio operators on Saturday,
              August 22. Their usual role is to communicate with the Florida Keys and other offshore
              areas damaged by tropical cyclones. Since Andrew did relatively little damage in the Keys,
              the radio operators who normally coordinate with NHC to aid the Keys decided that their
              services would not be needed. By late Sunday, when it was determined that they might well
              be useful at NHC for emergency communications, the operators were already committed for
              other emergency tasks and/or concerned about their own safety. Thus, no amateur radio
              personnel were present at NHC during the storm, but their assistance would have been



                                                           64








            limited because, like so many others, their antennae were also destroyed atop the NHC
            building.


            The Emergency Broadcast System (EBS)

            The primary Common Program Control Station (CPCS)-l EBS station for the Miami area is
            WINZIAM, transmitting at 50,000 watts. On Saturday evening, August 22, the chief engineer
            of WINZ called a meeting of his radio staff to alert them to the potential urgency of the
            situation. At that time, he assigned an additional operator to master control. According to
            their procedures, WINZ initially received the 8 AM EDT August 23 hurricane warning for
            south Florida via the WSFO Miami NVTR which is carried through a dedicated phone line to
            a voice box at the radio station. They activated EBS after verifying the warning through
            hard copy receipt from AP. The chief engineer estimated that from 3 to 5 minutes elapsed
            between initial NWR receipt of the warning and EBS tone activation by WINZ. The range
            of WINZ is from Lake Okeechobee to the Florida Keys. They voluntarily sounded the EBS
            tone and broadcast the warning again at noon. This station is also linked to many state and
            county emergency managers through a VHF radio net that allowed them to receive and
            broadcast Governor Lawton Chiles' state of emergency and evacuation order at 3 PM EDT
            on Sunday, August 23.

            WINZ stayed on the air throughout the storm. For about 2 weeks after the hurricane, WINZ
            requested and was granted a Federal Communications Commission waiver to continue
            24-hour a day service at 50,000 watts. During this time, they rebroadcast "radio recovery"
            information from the military regarding locations of food, supplies, etc., for the hurricane-
            stricken area.


            WQBA, the primary EBS station for Latin American residents in Miami, did not activate
            EBS. The chief engineer at WQBA explained that EBS is normally activated for short-fuse
            emergency conditions for which the public has little or no warning. The station decided not
            to activate because the hurricane threat to the area was already well known, and all relevant
            information was being widely disseminated. Except for a couple of minutes near time of
            landfall, WQBA stayed on the air, suspended regular programming, and broadcast emergency
            information as a public service. They were able to continue broadcasting because they
            anticipated the power failure at the studio and made arrangements to broadcast temporarily
            directly from their transmitter site.



            Other Communications at the Florida WSOs

            A packet radio link was set up by amateur radio personnel between WSO Melbourne and
            NHC. This would have allowed NHC to download a text file (e.g., an advisory) via radio to
            Melbourne who, in turn, could enter the product into AFOS. As it turned out, the link was
            never needed. WSO West Palm Beach had amateur radio links to EOCs in their area, and
            a ham operator was present at the WSO to manage this network. External users of the
            WSR-88D at Melbourne were served with no problem through either dedicated or dial-up
            lines. WSFO Sterling also dialed into the Melbourne Doppler to get data needed for their
            marine forecast backup of WSFO Miami.


                                                         65

























                     :=47








                                                               ZAP-









                    An aerial view of the World Headquarters for Burger King, site of a 16.9-foot
                    storm surge. Note the windows blown out by Andrew's intense winds.










                                                                                   7-F











                                                              'lop.
                                                                4




                                    14f
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                                               AR










                    This photo depicts wind damage to the top floor of the Burger IUng World
                    Headquarters building.


                                                       66










                                                CEUPTER 1.1


                                          DATA COLLECTION


            Data used in assessing and forecasting Atlantic basin tropical cyclones is acquired using both
            remote sensing equipment and direct observation. The remote sensing methodology includes
            satellite imagery and radar, while the direct observation methodology includes aircraft
            reconnaissance, surface observations (both human and automatic), and unofficial public
            reports. All of these potential sources were used prior to and during Hurricane Andrew.
            What follows is an assessment of the performance of those information sources.


            Satellite Imagery

            The most reliable manner of examining the physical characteristics of a tropical cyclone, e.g.,
            its wind and pressure fields, banding, and overall structure, is by direct measurement. When
            a storm is too far from land to be reached by reconnaissance aircraft, direct measurement is
            not possible. Finding LIJ: Satellite imagery is the only source of information over
            data-sparse oceans, except for ships which generally avoid rough weather.
            Recommendation 1.1.1: NOAA must make every effort to ensure that the GOES-Next
            (Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-Next Generation Satellite)
            program remains on schedule. Meanwhile, No-GOES plans need to be tested
            routinely.

            During Hurricane Andrew, the NHC used two primary satellite data feeds to view the
            tropical system that became Andrew: the European owned Meteosat-3 which was moved into
            position on loan backup to the GOES-7. The Meteosat was used as the storm began its trek
            across the Atlantic, and the GOES data became valuable as the storm reached the central
            Atlantic. Additionally, high resolution 1-km polar orbiter data were obtained as the storm
            approached the Bahamas and south Florida. The Defense Military Satellite Program (DMSP)
            high resolution data was not utilized by the NHC. Complex down-loading procedures from
            Air Force Global Weather Headquarters at Offutt AFB through the NMC and then to NHC
            make it unavailable for NHC in real-time. The imagery, from which valuable wind and
            rainfall data can be obtained, is received from Offatt at NMC and is obtained via Ethernet
            at NHC. This results in about a 2-hour delay.

            The first evidence of a developing tropical disturbance was obtained using satellite imagery
            from Meteosat-3. On August 14, a tropical wave was detected as it moved off the western
            coast of North Africa. That system was monitored continuously as it migrated west at about
            15 knots (18 mph), passing south of the Cape Verde Islands on August 15. At that time,
            meteorologists from the NHC Tropical Satellite Analysis and Forecast (TSAF) unit and the
            National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS) Synoptic Analysis
            Branch (SAB) found the wave sufficiently developed to begin detailed, quantitative
            evaluation.



                                                           67








               In addition to examining the local environment of the tropical disturbance, satellite images
               were used to assess large-scale patterns. For example, soon after Tropical Storm Andrew was
               born on August 17, the approach of an upper level trough in the westerlies began to shear
               the system. The approach of the trough and its interaction with Andrew was observed using
               visual, infrared, and water vapor satellite imagery.

               Once Andrew survived its nearly fatal interaction with the upper level trough, it grew rapidly
               into hurricane status. Satellite imagery, in consonance with aircraft reconnaissance, was
               critical to determining the character of Andrew. The intensity and rate of intensification, the
               convective strength and fluctuation, and spiral banding are basic features examined by
               satellite, especially at night when aircraft reconnaissance is not done.


               Aircraft Reconnaissance

               An essential data gathering tool in tropical cyclone evaluation for NHC is aircraft
               reconnaissance. The Air Force Reserve aircraft reconnaissance was extremely valuable. The
               NHC uses satellite imagery, but upon approach of a tropical cyclone to land, its prime data
               gathering mechanism is in situ monitoring by aircraft. Without aircraft derived data, it is
               doubtful that NHC would have realized the gravity of the developing situation during
               Andrew's approach to south Florida. Finding 1.1.2: Aircraft reconnaissance is a
               necessary and vital tool for measuring storm intensity, for defining wind fields, and
               for calibrating satellite estimates of storm intensity. However, the current
               airframes are aging and provide limited range and performance characteristics.
               Recommendation 1.1.2: Aircraft reconnaissance of tropical cyclones must continue.
               In order to provide high quality data on the storm and its environment, NOAA
               should explore cost-effective options on future sensors and airframes. This must
               be done now if we are to make effective use of next generation models for tropical
               cyclone intensity and track forecasting. The aircraft data showed reintensification after
               the Bahamas in the pressure measurements, a phenomena that was not detected in real-time
               by any other means. The reconnaissance continued until landfall and resumed promptly
               upon Andrew's entry into the Gul@ of Mexico.

               The use of NOAA!s Step Frequency Microwave Radiometer and Doppler radar capabilities to
               measure wind fields could have been a powerful tool to confirm the magnitude of the pending
               disaster as well as to reduce the subsequent debate about Andrew's wind speeds.
               Unfortunately, the Aircraft Operations Center (AOC) was forced for safety reasons not to
               utilize their aircraft around the time of landfall due to increasing turbulence and vertical
               mixing caused by the storm's interaction with land. One of the aircraft was available to take
               the NHC emergency backup team to NMC. In fact, AOC does not fly reconnaissance at night
               with named storms near land due to the level of risk.


               Radar Imagery

               As Hurricane Andrew moved to within 200 nm of the south Florida coast, it came into range
               of the NWS Weather Surveillance Radars (WSR) at Miami, West Palm Beach, and
               Melbourne. Prior to that time, the Doppler radar aboard the NOAA VVTP-3 Hurricane Hunter


                                                             68









            aircraft were critical to evaluating the Right level (10,000 feet) wind fields surrounding the
            storm.


            WSR-57 at Miami


            The WSR-57 radar at Coral Gables was a network radar operated by WSFO Miami. Its data
            was readily available to the NHC staff. The WSR-57 operated flawlessly prior to the arrival
            of Andrew and provided coverage until 4:54 AM EDT, August 24. Shortly thereafter, the
            region just outside of the northern edge of the eyewall brought winds gusting to 142 knots
            (164 mph), and those winds sent the radar dish and support structure tumbling from its
            mount onto the roof. The WSR-57 will not be rebuilt.


            WSR-74S at West Palm Beach


            The local warning radar at WSO West Palm Beach remained operational throughout the
            hurricane. The 74S was very useful to the NHC, particularly after the Miami WSR-57 was
            lost. The NHC maintained a continuous plot of their eye center fixes as opposed to accessing
            the radar and making fixes locally.

            WSR-74S at Key West

            The network radar located at Key West also was valuable after the WSR-57 was lost at
            Miami. Center fixes were tabulated from its observations, similar to that which was done
            from the West Palm Beach radar. After Andrew's landfall, a communications outage
            prevented remote viewing of the imagery.

            WSR-88D at Melbourne


            The new Doppler radar at WSO Melbourne was an important tool for WSFO and NHC
            operations during Andrew. Finding 1.1.3: The precision, range, and refinement offered
            by the WSR-88D allowed for precise location not only of the eye but also, long
            before landfall, of stronger elements in the spiral bands. The ability of the WSO at
            Melbourne to observe and report on these small but significant features enabled
            them to allay public fears about a potentially approaching hurricane.

            As the hurricane eyewall moved ashore, however, the WSR-88D data was used even more.
            Once the WSR-57 failed, WSFO and NHC used the Principal User Processor (PUP) drop to
            the WSR-88D (located in NHC) to monitor the storm's progress. The WSR-88D also provided
            valuable information otherwise unavailable to NHC on powerful eyewall characteristics. It
            tracked the eye continuously from 9:56 PM EDT, August 23, through 4:27 PM EDT,
            August 24 (figures 11 through 14).

            ,Recommendation 1.1.3: Efforts by the NWS, the Federal Aviation Administration
            (FAA), and the Department of Defense (DOD) to deploy the WSR-88D nationwide
            must continue. In addition, NOAA needs to assure staffing of its NWS Doppler
            radar equipped offices with properly trained personnel in order to take best
            advantage of this powerful data source.




                                                          69







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               Rawinsonde Observations

               Three special 'rawinsonde observations were requested by NHC during Hurricane Andrew at
               WSOs West Palm Beach, Key West, and Tampa Bay. The soundings were released at
               1800 UTC (Coordinated Universal Time) (2 PM EDT) on August 23, 0600 UTC (2 AM EDT)
               August 24, and 1800 UTC (2 PM EDT) August 24.


               Surface Observations

               Surface observations are taken at a wide variety of heights above the surface and are
               reported in a variety of formats. Observation heights vary from as little as 2 meters above
               the surface to as high as 40 meters above the surface. Also, they may be instantaneous
               readings, they may be averaged over a minute, or they may be up to 10-minute averages.
               Normalizing these data is requisite to any interpretation.            Finding LIA:        Wind
               observations are taken at varying heights and with different sampling strategies,
               making the determination of winds during a severe storm difficult to assess.
               Recommendation 1.1.4: The Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology
               should continue to work with the various Federal agencies to ensure that wind
               observation adjustments are standardized for height and sampling interval
               variations to ensure consistency of data.

               Observations of wind, pressure, rainfall, and tides were collected from a wide variety of
               sources prior to and during Andrew. The National Data Buoy Center (NDBC) operates an
               array of C-MAN platforms and data buoys in the coastal waters east and west of Florida.
               Numerous tide gauges are located along Florida's east and west coast. Manual surface
               observations are taken both from official NWS sites in Florida and from unofficial locations,
               such as emergency management facilities, airport sites, and other municipal installations.
               The official observations were available in real-time but acquiring many of the unofficial
               observations required a call for data. The HRD of the Atlantic Oceanographic and
               Meteorological Laboratory (AOML) made such a request, through the auspices of the NHC,
               and collected a variety of data (see appendix A, tables A.1 and A.2). When analyzing the
               data, they used standard methods to correct for sampling variation. It is important to note
               that these data, although acquired in real-time, are not available to NWS offices in real-time.


               Surface Observations from NWS Offices

               The NWS routinely collects official surface observations in south Florida at WSOs in Key
               West, West Palm Beach, and Tampa Bayi Official observations for the Miami area are taken
               at Miami International Airport. Except for Miami, surface observations were recorded
               without interruption throughout Andrew. However, many instruments in the Miami area
               failed. Miami International Airport observations were not reliable due to instrument failure.
               Wind speeds were estimated. In fact, two NWS/FAA maintained anemometers failed during
               Hurricane Andrew: at NHC and at Tamiami Airport. Out of 23 known anemometers from
               the local and Federal government (5 NWS/FAA), industry, and university sectors, complete
               records were obtained from 2, partial records were available from 17, and no records from 4.
               Four sites were disabled in advance of the storm, nine lacked recording capability or


                                                             74









            experienced recording failures, three had cross-arm problems as described below, three had
            guy wire/mast failures, and two lost power.

            Finding 1.1.5: Many wind observation sites failed not because of a failure of the
            instrument but because of the manner in which the support hardware was
            constructed and assembled. At the NHC and Tamiami Airport sites, the cross arm
            conduit pipe had no locking coupling to prevent it from unthreading from the main tower
            coupling during high winds. This is especially disturbing because of the large installed data
            base of similar F420 style anemometers throughout the NWS and FAA. It is believed that
            a low cost retrofit solution may exist by using commonly available conduit hardware.
            Recommendation LIZ: The NWS and FAA need to inventory their F420 anemometer
            installations in hurricane-threatened areas. The NWS and FAA should consider
            retrofitting suspect F420 sites with a locking cross arm prior to the 1994 hurricane
            season. Furthermore, the NWS Automatic Surface Observing System (ASOS)
            program office should investigate the potential for failures in the ASOS wind mast
            and sensors during high wind episodes.

            At NHC in Coral Gables, an anemometer is located on the roof. That instrument, which
            recorded wind gusts to 142 knots (164 mph) just before 5 AM EDT, August 24, was damaged
            at 5:17 AM and failed completely at 5:45 AM. Since the instrument is not at a standard
            height, its measurements may not be considered reliable before being statistically reduced
            to standard height. A complete listing of all observed meteorological extremes from Andrew
            is supplied as appendix A, tables A. 1 and A.2.


            Other Surface Observations


            Wind and Pressure


            Observations of wind and pressure were collected from two sites in the Bahamas: Harbour
            Island and Nassau. The Harbor Island site was very near the landfall of Andrew as it
            migrated across the northwest Bahamas. The lowest observed pressure was 935 mb. At
            that time, a wind of 120 knots was observed for an unknown duration. Both wind and
            pressure were likely more extreme since the wind instrumentation failed shortly thereafter
            and observation of the barometer was not constant. When the storm made landfall in south
            Florida, no fewer than a dozen observations were available, half on the east coast and half
            on the west coast. Several other observations were made available post-event. The extremes
            from each of those sites are documented in appendix A, table A.2.


            C-NUN and Buoy Observations

            C-MAN and buoy data were collected routinely until many of the sensors failed under
            extreme conditions. The most prominent of these observations came from the Fowey Rocks
            C-NUN-latitude 25.6'N, longitude 80.1*W. Its last observation at 4 AM EDT, August 24,
            included an 8-minute average wind of 123 knots (141 mph) with a gust of 147 knots
            (169 mph). Shortly thereafter, the equipment became inoperable. It was discovered with its
            mast bent over at a 90' angle. Since the lowest observed pressure was 967.5 mb when failure


                                                         75







               occurred, even though the eye of Andrew passed about 10 miles south of Fowey Rocks, there
               remained another 10 to 15 mb of pressure fall during which wind was not recorded. The
               wind measurements were made on a mast 43 meters (141 feet above the water). When
               converted to a WMO-standard (World Meteorological Organization), 10-meter height for the
               2-minute standard, the NDBC used a figure of 108 knots (124 mph) for this site.


               Unofficial Reports

               Unofficial weather reports are provided in appendix A, table A.2. The process of screening
               these data for accuracy, especially the wind and pressure data, is still in progress. Wind
               instrumentation from Perrine was wind tunnel tested at Clemson University for accuracy.
               After accounting for a 16.5 percent error, a peak wind gust of 154 knots (177 mph) was found.
               Instruments recording the lowest south Florida pressure readings were pressure chamber
               tested. Analysis of that data indicates that 922 mb was the lowest verified south Florida
               landfall pressure from Andrew.

               Some sites that could have provided valuable wind and pressure observations failed to do so.
               These sites are situated at the location of the eye landfall. One such observation site,
               Homestead AYB, performed a total power-down prior to evacuating the base. Similarly,
               AOML removed the wind equipment prior to the storm's landfall because of its adjacency to
               an atrium skylight. Had the skylight failed, the interior of the facility would have been at
               great risk. Finding 1.1.6: Valuable wind and pressure observations were lost when
               the data-gathering systems were powered down or removed before Andrew's
               landfall. Recommendation 1.1.6: Agencies with meteorological data-gathering
               equipment in the path of a hurricane should be encouraged to continue the data
               collection process throughout the event.


               Storm Tide and Storm Surge Observations

               Two terms, "storm tide" and "storm surge," often are used in measuring the increase in water
               level. Storm surge is water height above normal tide level. Storm tide is the water height
               relative to NGVD, the mean sea level of 1929. In the Bahamas, a maximum storm tide of
               about 25 feet was measured at Current Island, with probable wave effects superimposed.
               Along the coast of south Florida, there were several reliable data collection sites each
               measuring storm tide. In fact, literally hundreds of high water marks were measured by
               USACE and FEMA. Figure 8 combines many of those for representative values. The highest
               storm tide measured in south Florida was 16.9 feet at the Burger King World Headquarters
               in East Perrine.



               Rainfall Observations

               Despite powerful winds, many rain gauges in south Florida survived and provided reliable,
               representative data. Although Andrew was fast moving and, therefore, a fairly "dry" storm
               precipitation-wise, it generated rainfall totals of more than 7 inches in some locales across
               south Florida. The highest totals in south Florida included 7.79 inches (site-124 in Broward
               County) and 7.41 inches (site-21A in Dade County). Most other totals were between 2 and
               5 inches. Flooding was not a major problem with Andrew in south Florida.


                                                            76









                PART II:


               LOUISLANA










                                              CHAPTER ILA


                                             BACKGROUND


            Description of the Disaster Area

            The State of Louisiana is bordered on the east by the Mississippi and Pearl Rivers and on
            the west by the Sabine River and Texas. The southern part of the state is situated entirely
            within the Gulf Coastal Plain. Louisiana covers an area of about 49,000 square miles,
            approximately 16 percent or 7,400 square miles of which is covered by water in the form of
            lakes, sloughs, bayous, and wetlands.

            South-central Louisiana, where Andrew made landfall, was most affected by the storm.
            Fortunately, the hurricane began to weaken just prior to landfall southwest of Morgan City.
            The damage was far less dramatic in Louisiana than what was seen in Florida, but the
            damage was severe nevertheless.


            Population

            The affected parishes cover almost the entire southern half of Louisiana. The population of
            this area is more than 1,600,000 of which nearly 500,000 reside in Orleans Parish.

            The economy of the affected area is typical of the state as a whole, being highly diversified
            with emphasis on petro-chemical production, a mix of light and heavy manufacturing,
            commercial fishing, timber and forestry-related products, and agriculture.


            Climate

            The entire State of Louisiana is subject to severe, frequent flooding. Heavy rains may occur
            at any time of the year but are more likely in April and May or October and November as a
            result of warm, moist air from the Gulf of Mexico overriding cooler, drier air.

            From June through September, slowly moving tropical storms and hurricanes can move
            inland and deposit excessive rain over large areas. Louisiana is crisscrossed with numerous
            large and small streams, bayous, and other watercourses emptying into its major river
            systems. The runoff from these systems eventually discharges into the Gulf of Mexico. The
            relatively flat terrain is not conducive to rapid runoff so any inundation may be protracted
            and severe.


            Average annual rainfall varies from about 44 inches in the northern sections to more than
            64 inches along the coast. Most precipitation is from thunderstorms, although of short-



                                                         79








               duration, high intensity non-thunderstorm rains occur when tropical cyclones form in or move
               into and across the Gulf of Mexico to affect Louisiana.


               Topography

               Louisiana is most renowned for its bayous and waterways which account for much of the
               state's southern topography. Numerous barrier islands punctuate the coastline but are
               utilized primarily as game refuges.

               The terrain of Louisiana is flat to gently rolling, ranging in elevation from sea level in the
               south to more than 500 feet above sea level in the north. Much of southeast Louisiana,
               notably the Greater New Orleans area, is at or below sea level. This densely populated
               region of the state is protected by a network of levees. If ever breached, the entire area
               would be temporarily reclaimed by the gulf.


               Hurricane Vulnerability

               Statistics compiled by NHC show that Louisiana ranks third behind Florida and Texas with
               respect to hurricane vulnerability. Louisiana is most susceptible to major hurricanes during
               the months of August and September. Louisiana has been struck by hurricanes 25 times
               since 1899; 12 of these were classified as major. About one-third of the most deadly
               hurricanes to strike the United States have directly or indirectly struck the state.

               The following are some of the more prominent statistics about Louisiana hurricane
               climatology.

                       The last major hurricane (category 3 or greater) this century was Carmen in 1974.

                   ï¿½   The deadliest hurricane this century to strike Louisiana was Audrey in 1957, killing
                       390 persons in Louisiana and Texas. The deadliest storm to strike Louisiana was the
                       Cheniere Caminada storm of 1893 (near Grand Isle) which killed between 1,500 and
                       2,000 people.

                   ï¿½   Betsy (1965) and Bob (1979) were the last deadly hurricanes to strike Louisiana.
                       Betsy also proved to be one of the most costly in the Nation, ranking third behind
                       Andrew and Hugo. Curiously, Andrew followed a track with some similarities to
                       Betsy.












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                                              CEM,PTER ILB


                     SUMMARY OF PREPAREDNESS ACTIONS


            Weather Service Forecast Offices/Weather Service Offices
            (WSF0/WS0)

            WSFO Slidell


            WSFO Slidell is respected by local parish officials and the media throughout their parish
            warning area of responsibility. They conduct a comprehensive warning and preparedness
            program. Under the direction of Area Manager Bill Crouch, the WSFO conducts numerous
            preparedness classes, training exercises, and annual coordination meetings with local
            officials, the media, and volunteer groups. During the 6 months preceding Hurricane
            Andrew, the 'ATM focal point provided state DEM and parish Offices of Emergency
            Management (OEM) with emergency planning assistance. In addition to conducting
            awareness seminars, the WPM focal point provided technical assistance. The WPM focal
            point installed SLOSH software at several parishes OEMs and trained key OEM staff on its
            proper use.

            The first of these events occurred during Severe Weather Awareness Week, February 10-14,
            1992. During that week, various aspects of the severe weather warning program were
            reviewed and tested by the NWS, the local emergency management officials, and the media.

            Prior to the 1992 hurricane season, the WSFO coordinated the joint visit of Dr. Robert
            Sheets, Director NHC, and Harry Hassel, Director Southern Region, NWS. This visit was
            part of Dr. Sheet's annual hurricane preparedness tour. Dr. Sheets presented a press
            briefing to the New Orleans news media. In addition, Dr. Sheets and Director Hassel, and
            Meteorologist in Charge, Bill Crouch, appeared with Brian Giddings, Orleans Parish OEM
            Director, on cable television discussing hurricane preparedness.

            A second campaign promoted hurricane awareness. Historically, hurricanes have been the
            most devastating natural hazard to affect the state. The WSFO staff, led by WPM Focal
            Point Michael Koziara, worked closely with Louisiana's DEM to coordinate Hurricane
            Preparedness Week, May 18-24.

            An integral part of these campaigns is the ability to make an adequate number of awareness
            and preparedness brochures available to local emergency officials and the public. Currently,
            NWS offices do not have access to adequate numbers of brochures. Finding ILBA: There
            is an insufficient supply of safety and preparedness materials in support of NWS
            field offices, local emergency preparedness officials, and the public. Both local NWS
            officials and local emergency managers feel that the limited number of available brochures
            restricts their overall effectiveness within their respective preparedness programs. In an
            effort to help offset these limited brochure resources, NWS offices have sought out other ways


                                                          81









               of acquiring additional supplies of publications. One approach used by NWS offices was to
               provide negatives of brochures that could be reprinted by either public or private sector
               groups. Unfortunately, these efforts have met with only limited success. Recommendation
               11.B.1: NOAA and the Department of Commerce should increase their support for
               developing, printing, and distributing high quality preparedness and awareness
               materials. Present cooperative efforts with other agencies and the private sector
               to develop and distribute awareness and preparedness materials should be
               increased.


               During the 6 months preceding Hurricane Andrew, the WSFO provided the state DEM and
               parish OEMs with emergency planning assistance. In addition to conducting awareness
               seminars, WSFO staff provided technical assistance. WSFO staff installed SLOSH software
               at several parish OEMs and successfully trained key OEM staff in its proper use.

               The major event of Louisiana's 1992 Hurricane Awareness Program was a hurricane exercise
               called "Malinda." The WSFO staff provided technical assistance in developing weather and
               hurricane forecast and track data for the exercise. The Hurricane "Malinda" exercise
               provided Louisiana's OEM a means for testing and evaluating southeast Louisiana's
               hurricane preparedness and response capabilities. A deficiency that was evident in both
               awareness campaigns was the lack of participation by the print media during these events.

               This hurricane exercise proved very beneficial both to the NWS and the Louisiana OEM. It
               showed that a new level of commitment had been achieved. New coordination capabilities
               were fully tested and evaluated, and a realistic evaluation of southeast Louisiana's
               evacuation needs and capabilities was performed.

               The Hurricane "Malinda" exercise identified weaknesses in the communications and
               dissemination capabilities of Louisiana's OEM. During periods of high density data traffic,
               the OEM had difficulty redistributing information in a timely manner. Although identified
               as a problem, not enough funding or time was available for any correction action prior to
               Hurricane Andrew.


               The evacuation simulation also confirmed that portions of southeast Louisiana are not
               capable of efficiently evacuating. One obvious problem is the need for lead times in excess
               of 50 hours for some southeast Louisiana parishes. The current state of the science in
               hurricane forecasting does not allow for such warning lead times with a high degree of
               confidence. Other problem areas included transportation choke points and the inability of
               northern parishes to accommodate evacuees from southern parishes.

               The WSFO also meets with groups that are highly vulnerable to hurricanes, such as the
               petrochemical industry. WSFO staff addressed several awareness and preparation meetings
               for offshore oil companies prior to Hurricane Andrew. These meetings supplied general
               hurricane information dealing with preparedness and evacuation. Other groups which the
               WSFO routinely supports are the U.S. Coast Guard and the American Society of Military
               Engineers. The WSFO staff gives periodic hurricane awareness presentations. These
               presentations are part of coordination meetings which provide a forum to review
               preparedness plans and exchange information and ideas.




                                                           82








          As Andrew approached the east Florida coast, WSFO Slidell's warning and preparedness staff
          were made available to the media for interviews and presentations. These interviews gave
          the public a steady stream of information about Hurricane Andrew and its potential effect
          on Louisiana.


          WSO Baton Rouge

          WSOs performed their warning and preparedness responsibilities in an exemplary manner.
          At many offices, the local MIC or Official in Charge (OIC) is the focal point for preparedness
          activities within the WSO county or parish warning area (CWA). John Moseley, MIC, WSO
          Baton Rouge, conducts all preparedness efforts. Mr. Moseley did make himself available for
          coordination visits to parishes within his CWA prior to the huriicane season. The Disaster
          Survey Team felt that more preparedness work could have been accomplished outside of
          Baton Rouge Parish. Interviews with parish officials indicated that it was not totally clear
          as to the availability of the NWS during major weather events. The perception that the WSO
          would be too busy during major weather events caused some parishes to feel that it would
          have been an imposition on their part to call the WSO. One parish chose to post their own
          warning for this very reason and never contacted the WSO. This decision prompted the
          activation of the local siren warning system. The local parish officials stated that many
          residents responded by making use of available sheltering in response to the tornado threat.

          Having only a limited number of available staff hours, WSOs must make the best use of their
          available time. Any scheduled meetings must be extremely well coordinated. It is imperative
          that all groups and agencies that participate in any local warning or preparedness programs
          be present. Participants at these coordination meetings typically include the various media
          outlets, sheriffs officials, local city or parish police officials, spotter and amateur radio
          network representatives, and parish emergency preparedness officials.

          The frequency of these coordination meetings is dependent upon the number of parishes
          within the office's warning area of responsibility. Typically, these coordination meetings are
          held annually, but in some instances, groups may meet several times during the year. At
          these meetings, NWS officials provide a review of local hurricane climatological information
          and an outlook for the upcoming hurricane season. They also pass on information pertaining
          to NWS program changes which might affect local warning and preparedness programs.
          Ultimately, this group reviews and evaluates communication and dissemination capabilities,
          the readiness of parish spotter networks, the need for NWS training support, and issues
          concerning community preparedness and evacuation.

          During the days prior to Andrew's making landfall in Louisiana, Mr. Moseley made himself
          available to the various local media outlets. These contacts continued through the events of
          Andrew and proved to be extremely beneficial in preparing the local populace for the impact
          of Andrew.


          WSO Lake Charles

          The Lake Charles WSO has a very active warning and preparedness program. The WSO also
          does not have a dedicated warning preparedness specialist. All preparedness efforts are
          accomplished, as time permits, by the MIC or his representative. In addition to routine



                                                        83








               presentations and annual coordination meetings, MIC David McIntosh is very proactive in
               southwest Louisiana natural hazards efforts.

               In the months following Louisiana's Severe Weather Awareness Week, a table top exercise
               was developed which involved the WSO. The exercise took place May 11, 1992, and was a
               first for the WSO. This table top exercise focused on the hazards of tornadoes, ultimately
               evaluating NWS and local community plans and capabilities during such events.

               The WSO also coordinated the visit of Dr. Robert Sheets, NHC Director, to the Southwest
               Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Conference.              More local officials and media
               representatives attended this year's event than ever before. The collective efforts of
               Dr. Sheets, David McIntosh, and Harry Hassel (Director, NWS Southern Region) were
               rewarded by the presentation of keys to the city of Lake Charles.

               Parishes of southwest Louisiana, with assistance from the state DEM, have established the
               Southwest Louisiana Hurricane Task Force. This Task Force was developed to provide the
               citizens of southwest Louisiana with a comprehensive and coordinated effort in hurricane
               mitigation and response. Mr. McIntosh was asked to chair the Evacuation Committee of this
               Task Force. This affirms the confidence that local officials have in the Weather Service and
               its local officials. In addition, Mr. McIntosh has been active in the Sabine Basin Task Force,
               which addresses issues concerning flooding.

               Each of these NWS offices have come very near to achieving their goal of being the official
               technical resource for their communities in matters dealing with natural hazards. Part of
               the NWS's modernization and restructuring effort includes the new Warning Coordination
               Meteorologist position. This position will provide a full time warning coordination and
               hazard awareness liaison for the NWS to the community.


               Preparedness by the Media

               Print Media


               The print media were extremely active during Andrew, providing their readership with not
               only general information on Andrew but also preparedness information. The print media
               across south Louisiana worked closely with NWS and EM officials in providing the public
               with detailed and updated information.

               As it became more evident that Andrew would be a major event for the Louisiana coast,
               proclamations and declarations were headlined in local newspapers. An excellent example
               of how the print media responded to the hurricane threat can be seen in the approach taken
               by the Daily Iberian. The paper responded to the ordered evacuation by headlining the
               parish council's decision, "Iberia Parish Evacuation Urged." In the article that followed, the
               Iberian's readership was provided with the latest information on Hurricane Andrew, details
               of what the effect of Andrew could be, various preparedness and safety tips, and evacuation
               information.

               Findino II.B.2 The local print media is more reactive in community preparedness
               than proactive. Historically, in south Louisiana, the print media has not actively

                                                             84








            participated in preseason hurricane preparedness efforts, such as awareness
            campaigns. On the other hand, during the 72 hours prior to Andrew, they were
            extremely effective in providing their readership with detailed preparedness
            information. Recommendation H.B.2: NWS offices in south Louisiana need to
            develop stronger cooperative relationships with the print media to enhance their
            involvement in the hazards awareness and mitigation program.

            Electronic Media


            The electronic media played an enormous role in preparedness efforts. The DST felt that the
            graphic images of south Florida hurricane damage provided gulf residents with a clearer
            picture of Andrew's destructive potential. It was felt that had Andrew not made landfall in
            south Florida, the public response in the gulf might not have been as great. Specials prior
            to the hurricane season and spot announcements helped educate the local populace in hazard
            mitigation, preparedness, and response. Each NWS office has developed their own special
            partnership with local media outlets, providing the ample coverage and personal interviews
            as Andrew moved through the gulf toward Louisiana. The NWS should continue to nurture
            the cooperative relationships which were in place during Andrew.

            WSOs Baton Rouge and Lake Charles provided numerous television interviews prior to and
            during hurricane Andrew's approach. These interviews were conducted at the local studios
            or, as in the case of WSO Baton Rouge, some broadcasts were done from the parish EOC.

            On August 24 after Andrew had ravaged Florida, local offices were asked to participate in
            expanded segments of local news and weather broadcasts throughout the evening. These
            presentations provided details of Andrew's effect on Florida and its potential for Louisiana.
            As Andrew approached the Louisiana coast, the MICs or their representatives made
            themselves available for interviews on both radio and television.


            The smaller media markets, such as Baton Rouge, took advantage of the NWS presence
            within their local area. As the threat of Andrew became more of a reality, these media
            outlets began to focus on preparedness and response. They began conducting interviews"from
            the parish EOC. During these sessions, both the NWS and local EMs provided viewers
            information on Andrew and how to prepare for Andrew's landfall. Proper evacuation
            procedures were reviewed and evacuation recommendations broadcast. Similar interviews
            and broadcasts were disseminated via radio and cable.


            In larger media markets, such as Greater New Orleans, local affiliates made vast use of their
            station's meteorological support staff. Although most were done with their local staff, some
            interviews were conducted with the Slidell office.


            Local Emergency Management

            Local emergency management officials throughout south Louisiana actively prepare for each
            upcoming hurricane season, always assuming that the next hurricane could be the "Big One."
            This heightened level of awareness to the hurricane threat has prompted the development
            of hurricane task forces that practice and prepare for a major hurricane.


                                                          85








               Finding II.B.3: Local emergency managers in south Louisiana were very proactive,
               taking the early initiative in dealing with Hurricane Andrew. Some south Louisiana
               parishes have special lead time requirements for safe evacuation. Since today's hurricane
               forecasting capability does not allow for such long lead times with a high degree of confidence
               for the evacuation of these parishes, emergency managers must understand that they need
               to initiate evacuation well before watches and warnings are issued by the National Hurricane
               Center. Comprehensive hurricane evacuation plans are currently in place for southeast
               Louisiana which aid local EMs in making well thought out decisions. Tools, such as the
               SLOSH computer display and various hurricane tracking programs, were actively used by
               managers prior to Andrew. These products gave managers the information necessary to
               make decisions to open shelters, to call on various hurricane response resources, or to
               evacuate. Recommendation II.B.3: The NWS must continue working closely with
               local emergency managers to ensure that together they promote a unified
               awareness program which elicits the desired public response.









                    ek -h
                                                                                                             4











                                                                2-0















                                    Garden City, Louisiana, community relief efforts.



                                                             86










                                               CHAPTER ILC


                         NWS CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND
                                   BACKUP ARRANGEMENTS


            Weather Service Forecast Offices/Weather Service Offices
            (WSFO/WSO)

            WSO Lake Charles

            As Hurricane Andrew made its way into the Gulf of Mexico early on the morning of
            August 24, WSO Lake Charles'weather support activities were stepped up. Duty schedules
            were modified from 8-hour shifts to 12-hour shifts, and staffing for each shift was increased.

            Generators used as a backup to the office's commercial power supply were tested and readied
            for use. These generators would ensure that the limited weather instrumentation and office's
            full complement of communications equipment would remain operational. The electronics
            technicians (ET) also checked and calibrated all weather instruments during the hours prior
            to Andrew's landfall. In fact, the electronics staff worked 12-hour shifts and provided 24-hour
            support as Andrew tracked across the gulf and into Louisiana.

            Once Andrew moved into the gulf, NHC requested that gulf region field offices participating
            in the NWS rawinsonde program begin launching intermediate balloon releases. Beginning
            August 24 at I PM CDT, Lake Charles began launching rawinsondes every 6 hours. This
            schedule remained in place through 7 PM CDT, August 27.

            Approximately 18 hours prior to Andrew's landfall in Louisiana, the WSO activated their
            local spotter and amateur radio networks. The primary purpose for activating the amateur
            radio network was to ensure that a means of communication remained available to the WSO
            throughout the event.

            WSO Baton Rouae

            The WSO Baton Rouge response was similar to that of Lake Charles. Once the Louisiana
            coast was placed under a watch, the office stepped up their level of support. WSO Baton
            Rouge modified their operational shift rotation from three 8-hour shifts to three 12-hour
            shifts. These new 12-hour shifts were staggered to allow for overlapping. This approach
            helped preserve operational continuity during shift changes.

            The WSO Baton Rouge electronics staff conducted preventative maintenance routines on all
            meteorological equipment. This ensured that all equipment was properly calibrated and
            operationally ready well before Andrew's landfall.




                                                          87









                Although unsuccessful, WSO Baton Rouge made every effort to secure additional generators
                to back up meteorological equipment not connected to their office backup system. It is
                evident through these actions that these WSOs were prepared for almost any situation.
                Every effort was made to secure necessary resources and to have the appropriate procedures
                in place prior to Andrew's landfall.

                WSFO Slidell


                Backup Procedures. As in Miami, WSFO Slidell, in accordance with procedures
                established by NWS Southern Region Headquarters, invoked emergency backup procedures
                as Hurricane Andrew bore down on the Louisiana coastline. In anticipation of a possible
                complete failure of the WSFO, appropriate offices designated as their backup were alerted
                to prepare for such a possibility.

                As Andrew entered the gulf on August 24, WSFO Slidell initiated shift changes that included
                increasing tours of duty from 8 hours to 12 hours. In addition, two meteorologists were
                added to each of the two shifts to support a dedicated hurricane forecast desk. All questions
                and interviews dealing with the issues concerning Hurricane Andrew were handled by these
                meteorologists. In addition, extra staff was brought in to provide operational support to the
                marine and public service programs.

                In support of the office's data-gathering responsibilities, the office began releasing
                rawinsondes every 6 hours to supplement the ongoing reconnaissance of aircraft, satellite,
                and radar. Meteorological technicians also worked 12-hour shift rotation for a number of
                days prior to Andrew. During Andrew, the need for increased radar surveillance was
                realized, and each shift had an extra radar operator assigned. The WSFO placed a
                meteorologist at the Greater New Orleans EOC during Hurricane Andrew. The NWS is not
                now, nor is it projected to be, staffed for such an arrangement. This meteorologist provided
                the New Orleans EOC with technical assistance. This support was well received by city and
                parish officials operating from the EOC and should be maintained in some form. The WSFO
                should work with the city to create an arrangement similar to the one used by Dade County
                and NHC/WSFO Miami. This should, if available, include space in the WSFO for media and
                local officials to be routinely briefed. Additionally, a coordination hotline should be installed
                so that EOC officials can interact with NWS staff and officials.


                The electronics staff at the WSFO was activated to 24-hour status, and at least one ET was
                on site at all times. During Andrew, ETs worked 12-hour shifts. Prior to Andrew's landfall,
                all equipment and backup equipment was checked and calibrated.

                As Andrew moved toward south Florida, the WSFO began an active informational campaign
                notifying local and state emergency management officials of the potential threat this storm
                might have on Louisiana. The WSFO began these messages during the day on Saturday,
                August 22. Soon after Andrew had made landfall on the Florida coast, Bill Crouch, MIC,
                WSFO Slidell, coordinated with General Stroud, Director, Louisiana's DEM, to organize a
                meeting of south Louisiana parish officials well in advance of Andrew's Louisiana landfall.
                This meeting provided parish officials with the latest information on Andrew and served as
                the first of several coordination meetings to formulate a coordinated preparedness and
                recovery effort in response to the storm. Follow-up coordination calls between the WSFO



                                                               88









          hurricane coordinator and state and local officials continued throughout the events of
          Hurricane Andrew.


          Southern Region Headquarters (SRH) and the River Forecast
          Center (RFC)

          Southern Region Headquarters, Fort Worth, Texas

          Early on Monday, August 24, as the hurricane was moving across the southern tip of Florida,
          actions were taken to begin adding staff to the middle gulf coast offices where the next threat
          was anticipated. Gulf coast offices were provided additional temporary staff support as
          follows:


                  Victoria, TX             -   2 meteorological technicians
                  Galveston, TX            -   1 meteorologist and
                                               1 meteorological technician
                  Beaumont, TX             -   2 meteorological technicians
                  Mobile, AL               -   1 meteorological technician
                  Houston, TX              -   1 electronics technician
                  Fort Worth RFC, TX       -   1 hydrologist

          River Forecast Center Slidell


          The RFC overlapped their staff so that they could access data as it became available and
          provide the necessary support to the various weather offices within their region for hydrologic
          responsibility. Twenty-four-hour support by the RFC was not immediately implemented. It
          was not until the evening before Andrew's landfall that expanded hydrologic support was
          initiated. On the evening of August 25, RFC staff began and maintained a 24-hour
          hydrologic watch over the region for which they have responsibility. This expanded support
          continued through August 27. During this period, at least two hydrologists were on station
          at all hours of the day.

          Contingency Planning A question which was revisited was "Are NWS field sensors and
          field offices built to the specifications needed to ensure their survivability in a major
          hurricane?" During Hurricane Hugo, the roof of the Charlotte Weather Service Office was
          nearly lost. A similar question may be asked in Miami. Could the minimally hardened
          facility of the WSFO and NHC have survived a direct hit from Andrew? Indeed, how
          survivable are most gulf coast NOAA/NWS facilities? NOAA/NWS structures and remote
          sensing equipment are currently not designed to survive the pounding from a major
          hurricane. Many are cinder block structures and are susceptible to wind damage from aerial
          projectiles. As the NOAA/NWS moves forward with its modernization and restructuring
          efforts and builds new facilities and installs its next generation of remote sensors, they must
          not compromise facility survivability or employee safety to cost considerations.







                                                          89












                                                                     11M



                                                                                       AOL

                                                                                   AO*







                  Ar@



                                                                                     '7t ix














                      This damage at the Petroleum Transfer Depot, Cocodrie, Louisiana (located
                       south of Dulac), was caused by the combination of wind and surge.













                                                          90










                                                CHAPTER ILD

                      SLUVMARY OF NWS WATCHES, WARNINGS,
                                             AND ADVISORIES


              National Hurricane Center


              Watches and WarninErs

              As soon as Andrew crossed south Florida, NHC began to focus on the next possible landfall.
              The first advisory to mention a possible landfall on the northern gulf coast was issued at
              8 AM CDT, Monday, August 24. The advisory stated that a hurricane watch was posted from
              Mobile, Alabama, to Sabine Pass, Texas. By this issuance, residents had 43 hours of lead
              time prior to Andrew making landfall (figure 5). Hurricane Andrew Advisory Number 35,
              issued at 5 PM EDT, August 24, upgraded that area from Pascagoula, Mississippi, to
              Vermilion Bay, Louisiana, to a warning. Table A.6 of appendix A lists all watches and
              warnings posted for the northern gulf coast.

              In several situations, the strike probability tables provided sufficient guidance and confidence
              to initiate a fast response. The ability to launch an early response allowed emergency
              managers time to conduct preparedness and, if necessary, evacuation activities. Landfall
              strike probabilities were used by nearly all state and local agencies and were considered one
              of the most important elements of their decision-making process.

              Watch and Warnine Lead Times

              The 43 hours of watch lead time exceeded the NHC desired minimum lead time target of
              36 hours by about 14 percent. This ultimately gave decision makers additional time to
              evaluate the threats posed by Hurricane Andrew. The hurricane warning for the northern
              gulf coast was issued with Hurricane Advisory Number 35, giving local officials 36 hours of
              lead time.


              The most significant changes in Andrew's track were well anticipated, and the forecast tracks
              lie close to the best track shown in figure 1. Overall, the NHC forecast errors for Andrew
              were 30 percent smaller than the current 10-year average. In part, improvement in both
              watch and warning lead times reflect the smaller than average forecast errors.

              Utility of Advisories

              As Andrew moved through the gulf toward Louisiana, advisories remained focused on the
              storm track and the projected changes in direction and forward speed. The hurricane
              warning was posted at 5 PM CDT, Monday, August 24, for a portion of the northern gulf
              coast. This first advisory made no mention of storm surge, tornado potential, or flood
              potential for the area under the warning. Information of this type did not appear in an


                                                             91








              advisory until the following morning in Intermediate Advisory Number 37A. Although
              mentioned in the body of the text, the mention of these threats lacked sufficient detail and
              failed to express any true sense of urgency. However, as the events of Andrew unfolded, the
              utility of advisory information increased markedly.

              Finding ILDA: Users of NWS products would like more specific, technical
              information to assist them in their decision-making process. During user interviews,
              many comments were made reflecting the need for more detailed information similar to that
              which is given in mesoscale discussions provided by NSSFC supporting the severe weather
              program. Users felt that such an approach would provide greater utility and would enhance
              their level of confidence in NHC advisories. Recommendation II.D.1: The NHC should
              work with users to define what additional information is required and to develop
              a means of communicating that information to them.


              National Severe Storms Forecast Center (NSSFC)

              Severe Weather Watches and Status Reports

              As Hurricane Andrew moved into the Gulf of Mexico, NSSFC began issuing discussions and
              outlooks for the potential of severe weather along the northern gulf coast. NSSFC began
              focusing especially on the tornado threat to the northern gulf coast early on the morning of
              August 25.

              The first mention of the potential for severe weather affecting the northern gulf coast was
              in the second day Severe Weather Outlook issued at 2 AM CDT, August 24, meaning that it
              was expected on August 25. NSSFC provided the field offices and the National Centers with
              a constant flow of discreet information. The mesoscale discussion issued at 4:30 AM CDT,
              August 24, detailed the features being monitored for possible severe weather potential.
              Subsequent discussions and outlooks suggested that Andrew's interaction with the coastline
              created a more volatile situation.


              Over the next 48 hours, NSSFC issued and updated various tornado watch areas in response
              to Andrew's track. As tornado activity increased, NSSFC introduced stronger language into
              the text of its posted watches: "THIS IS A PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS SITUATION
              WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF VERY DAMAGING TORNADOES. ALSO DANGEROUS
              LIGHTNING AND DAMAGING THUNDERSTORM WINDS CAN BE EXPECTED."
              Statements such as this heightened the awareness of both the emergency management
              community and the public to the urgency of the situation.

              Throughout Andrew, NSSFC guidance was extremely proactive. Noteworthy mesoscale
              discussions and timely watches were issued during Andrew. These products were well
              written and provided the reader with a heightened sense of urgency. The overall feeling of
              the Disaster Survey Team was that NSSFC did an exceptional job in providing severe
              weather guidance support to NHC, NMC, and NWS field offices along the gulf coast and
              inland.






                                                          92









             Weather Service Forecast Offices/Weather Service Offices
             (WSFO/WSO)

             Severe Weather Warnings and Statements

             There is no doubt that reports of tornadoes early Tuesday evening and throughout the night
             caused concern and confusion just as Andrew was making landfall. The additional threat of
             tornadoes added to an already frightening situation for the residents of South Louisiana.

             NWS offices in south Louisiana dealt well with the overall effects of Andrew, but their initial
             response to the tornado threat was considered to be slow and reactive in nature by some local
             parish officials. Such a perception is understandable since the primary focus of the NWS was
             on the overall event of the hurricane. NWS offices in south Louisiana were placing the
             greatest emphasis and attention to those elements deemed most likely to occur with a
             tropical cyclone. This placed the emphasis on the elements of storm surge, copious rainfall,
             and hurricane-force winds. The strong focus on these elements may have contributed to the
             perception that NWS offices were too slow in responding to the subsequent severe weather
             events.


             One parish official felt that, for whatever reason, the NWS was unable to post a timely
             warning for the parish during the tornadic outbreak preceding Andrew's landfall. Based on
             information being passed between local parish law enforcement agencies, this official called
             for the activation of the parish siren system. This alerted residents to the imminent danger
             of nearby tornadoes. Parish officials stated that because of their actions many residents were
             alerted to take shelter immediately. This event occurred shortly after the La Place tornado.

             NWS offices rely heavily on spotter reports to support the warning decision-making process.
             This is especially true during the early stages of tropical severe weather outbreaks. Spotter
             networks are crucial to the NWS warning process, especially in data-sparse areas such as
             Louisiana.


             Tornadoes proved to be a major factor of Andrew's impact on southern Louisiana and
             neighboring Mississippi. During Andrew, Louisiana experienced 14 confirmed tornadoes and
             numerous funnel cloud and unconfirmed tornado reports. In neighboring Mississippi, the
             severe weather impact was even greater with 25 confirmed tornadoes and a comparable
             number of funnel cloud reports and unconfirmed tornado reports.

             A post-event review of tornadoes associated with Hurricane Andrew (Kuhn, WSO Lake
             Charles, March 1993) was consistent with previous studies (Novlan and Gray, 1974) in
             showing that a majority of tornadoes occurred after the eye of Andrew moved 50 miles inland.
             It was during this period that the affected NWS offices issued the majority of their warnings.
             The La Place tornado was the lone exception, occurring prior to the landfall of Andrew.

             Observed parameters critical to the predicting of severe weather includes rapid storm filling
             as occurs with landfalling tropical cyclones. Recent studies cite this as important to tornado
             development. The entire gulf region is considered data sparse which seriously impacts the
             ability to monitor the changes involved with a filling storm. This can significantly impede
             a field office's initial response capability. Available data networks are further limited by
             frequency of sampling. In addition, operational limitations of existing conventional radars

                                                            93









               also contributed to the perception of a slow response. The new WSR-88D radar network with
               its Doppler capabilities will overcome some of the limitations inherent to conventional radars
               operating in tropical environments. Strong vertical wind shear in the first kilometer or two
               is characteristic of tornadoes associated with hurricanes. Post-storm review has shown that
               this characteristic was associated with the tornadoes spawned by Hurricane Andrew. Had
               the remote sensing capabilities of wind profilers and the WSR-88D been in place, forecasters
               may have been able to provide more timely information.

               The threat of severe weather, such as tornadoes, was mentioned early Tuesday, August 25.
               The mention of this threat first appeared in early morning HLSs and carried forward in
               subsequent statements. On Tuesday evening as the outer fringes of Andrew approached
               landfall, spiral rain bands began to advance into south Louisiana, increasing the likelihood
               of tornadoes. Although a legitimate concern, no mention of this increased threat to south
               Louisiana residents was made in any local statement or NHC advisory, despite having this
               information available to field offices through the NSSFC mesoscale discussion issued at 4:25
               AM CDT, Tuesday morning.

               At approximately 9:10 PM CDT, Tuesday, August 25, a tornado struck the adjacent areas of
               La Place and Reserve, Louisiana, in St. John the Baptist Parish. Two people were killed,
               32 injured, and 60 families left homeless. Prior to this time at 7:11 PM CDT, a possible
               tornado had been reported to WSO Baton Rouge near the Sunshine Bridge in Ascension
               Parish, just west of St. John the Baptist Parish. Throughout Tuesday night and into
               Wednesday morning, August 26, various tornado reports were received by the Baton Rouge
               office. The HLSs issued by WSFO Slidell and WSO Baton Rouge did not appear to
               adequately heighten the threat posed by tornadoes. This was true even after the offices
               received additional tornado reports.

               Although the WSFO highlighted the occurrence of the La Place tornado in its 10:30 PM CDT
               HLS issuance, no warnings or severe weather follow-up statements were issued. The HLS,
               issued at 12:30 AM CDT, Wednesday, August 26, for the first time mentioned the increased
               chance for further tornado development across southeast Louisiana as Andrew interacted
               with the land and slowly weakened. However, it was not until the 7 AM CDT HLS that
               Slidell went a step further and noted that tornadoes would be likely across southeast and
               south-central Louisiana, some distance from the storm. It was also stated that these
               tornadoes would be short lived and difficult to detect by conventional radar. During the
               18 hours following the La Place tornado, a total of eight severe weather warnings were posted
               by the Baton Rouge and Slidell offices. Other than through the issuance of HLSs, as follow-
               up to posted warnings, there was little additional documentation of these events.
               Furthermore, the HLSs that followed these events did not adequately perform their intended
               function as follow-up statements to posted warnings. Finding II.D.2: Hurricane local
               statements were too closely tied to the issuance of hurricane advisories. As a
               result, the dissemination of critical information concerning tornadic events was
               delayed. Recommendation II.D.2: The issuance of hurricane local statements
               should be event driven, rather than tied exclusively to routine NHC issuances.

               During the 18 hours following the La Place tornado, the Baton Rouge office of the NWS
               issued three tornado warnings, and the Slidell office issued one severe thunderstorm and four
               tornado warnings. The text of these warnings indicated that most of these warnings were
               issued on the basis of public and trained spotter sightings. Many of the warnings issued


                                                            94









           lacked one or more of the elements deemed necessary for a complete warning. Some
           warnings lacked reference to the speed of movement, while others lacked the important
           element of "pathcast." A "pathcast" alerts the user to the projected path being taken by the
           storm and identifies which cities or locations are in harm's way. The NWS offices could have
           provided users with more frequent follow-up statements to the warnings.

           Hurricane Local Statements (HLS)

           The hurricane is one of nature's largest and most complex weather events. It possesses a
           number of threats both to life and property which makes it one of the most difficult events
           to describe. The HLS is the NWS product which is used to accomplish this task. Its purpose
           is to complement NHC advisories and to provide detailed, tailored information on local
           conditions. Review of HLSs issued during Hurricane Andrew revealed a lack of detail and
           tailoring which led to a large degree of redundancy. Many of the HLSs issued failed to
           achieve their full purpose.

           The HLS format used by WSFO Slidell provided a means of summarizing critical information
           near the beginning of the text. However, as the Andrew event became more complex, this
           became less effective. Gradually, data became buried within the HLS text, making it more
           difficult to access critical information quickly. Most HLSs issued by the gulf coast NWS
           offices during Andrew became too lengthy with time. The HLSs released early in the event
           were more effective. These early releases provided better local resolution of the problems
           posed by Andrew. They were short, precise, and made relevant local information available
           to the users. As the event progressed, HLSs became less effective due to excessive reiteration
           of NHC, NSSFC, and RFC information. The most notable change to the effectiveness of the
           HLS was the loss of specificity with respect to the impacts that Andrew would have on the
           local county/parish warning area. Offices did follow the prescribed format and content as
           described in Weather Service Operations Manual Chapter C-41, Hurricane Warnings, but the
           HLS as described in C-41 does not fulfill the desired intent of the product and should be
           reviewed for needed changes.

           Despite these difficulties, the HLSs issued by WSFO Slidell and WSO Lake Charles early on
           were effective and gave brief summaries of critical information at the beginning of the
           messages. Although not consistent with the HLS format as described in C-41, the HLSs
           issued by these offices, especially early on during the storm, provided a much more efficient
           means of communicating significant information to their local users. Coastal NWS offices
           should re-evaluate the manner in which data and information are collected and used in the
           writing of HLS products. Emphasis should be placed on the use of on-station software,
           emergency management information, and remote sensing data to create a highly specific
           public product.

           More details could have been incorporated into the body of the HLSs which were apparently
           used as follow-up statements during the peak period of severe weather activity. Such
           enhancements would have provided the details necessary for the HLS to adequately
           substitute as a follow-up statement for severe weather statements following severe weather
           warnings.





                                                         95








                Corrections to HLSs during Andrew were rarely needed. However, on one occasion, an HLS
                was corrected. Finding II.D.3: During the peak period of tornado activity, several
                reports of tornadoes were highlighted in the HLSs. One of these reports proved to
                be erroneous. Rather than issue a corrected HLS, the WSFO issued a special
                weather statement to acknowledge the error. This could have caused confusion
                and loss of precious time for users during a period of rapidly changing events. In
                this case, the use of a special weather statement did not follow NWS correction procedures.
                Also, it did not provide adequate assurance that users would take note of the error. The most
                effective way to issue a correction is to identify the error and correct it using the proper
                product. Recommendation ll.D.3: NWS field offices should follow established NWS
                formats for issuing corrections.





                                                                                        -, 1 Z.,7
                                                                              k!'@ 4K,











                       Tangled remnants of what was once a radio tower along U.S. 90, south of
                       Centreville, Louisiana.



                                                             96









                                              CHAPTER ILE


                           SUMMARY OF INFORMATION AND
                                   WARNING SERVICES AND
                        RESPONSE ACTIONS BY EMERGENCY
                                  MANAGEMENT AND MEDIA


            Non-NWS Products Available to Emergency Management

            All coastal county emergency managers in the affected region and the Louisiana DEM
            received marine advisories from NHC as well as public advisories, HLSs, and tropical cyclone
            discussions. Use and timeliness of these products varied greatly from parish to parish.
            Nearly all southeast coastal parishes and the state DEM have PC-based software into which
            marine advisory forecasts are entered. The southwest coastal parishes have yet to be
            upgraded. About half the coastal parishes have GDS4.0, which parishes purchased
            individually. Prior to Hurricane Andrew, parishes did not have access to a program named
            HURREVAC. Since Andrew, nearly all southeast Louisiana parishes have been provided
            with and been trained in the use of HURREVAC.


            The use of these software packages is taught to emergency managers in two ways. One
            technique is to have the local NWS WPM or WCM provide assistance and technical training
            to emergency management officials. The most desired approach for local officials and their
            staffs is to participate in the FEMA/NWS-sponsored Hurricane Response and Decision-
            making Workshops. Annually, a number of week-long courses are conducted at NHC. These
            workshops provide emergency management officials with the background information needed
            to use the PC software more effectively. Finding ILEA: FENLAINWS-sponsored
            Hurricane Response and Decision-making Workshops are conducted only a few
            times each year. These workshops are incapable of reaching sufficient numbers of
            emergency officials. This limits the effectiveness of the hurricane preparedness
            program. Due to the limited number of workshops presented annually, it has become
            incumbent on the local NWS offices to provide the necessary training. Despite these efforts,
            local officials do not fully utilize the tools and information made available through local
            offices, such as WSFO Slidell. Recommendation ILEA: FEMA and the NWS should
            increase the number of annual hurricane workshops to train coastal emergency
            management officials.


            Interaction between NWS and Emergency Management

            Virtually all south Louisiana parishes appeared to have excellent working relationships with
            their respective NWS offices and reported varying degrees of interaction with the NWS
            during Andrew. The problem of receiving and answering the flood of calls from various
            governmental agencies, the media, and the public made it extremely difficult for NWS offices


                                                         97








               to maintain an effective interaction with emergency managers. WSOs have limited staff and
               a limited number of available telephone lines. In addition to coordinating with various state
               and local law enforcement agencies, the WSFO provides direct warning support to 16
               parishes and a resident population exceeding one million. WSOs Baton Rouge and Lake
               Charles support 13 parishes and a host of local users with less staff and phone lines.
               Coordination with the various parish officials, state officials, law enforcement agencies, and
               the media can quickly saturate local NWS telephone systems. During events such as
               Andrew, this could severely hamper the NWS's ability to interact effectively with state and
               local officials when short-fused events occur within a major event. In fact, this was part of
               the problem which prompted the response of the parish official described in chapter ILD,
               paragraph two, of the "Severe Weather Warnings and Statements" section.

               Nevertheless, during Andrew, parishes did an excellent job of coordinating with their local
               NWS office. Evidence of this exchange of information and coordination appear within the
               text of the HLSs issued during Hurricane Andrew. These statements include reports of
               severe weather, flooding, and evacuation information-much of which was provided by the
               emergency management community. Local NWS and EM telephone logs also documented the
               interaction which took place between the various governmental agencies, the NWS, and the
               media.


               The city of New Orleans, Orleans Parish, is in a unique situation which benefits local parish
               officials during hurricane events threatening New Orleans. Finding II.E.2: Due to the
               close proximity of the WSFO, an agreement with the city allows for a dedicated
               meteorologist to be dispatched from the WSFO to the local Emergency Operations
               Center (EOC) during hurricane events which may threaten the city. This interaction
               is very similar to the interaction between Dade County, Florida, and NHC. The primary
               difference between these arrangements is that in Florida, the county officials perform out of
               NHC; whereas in Louisiana, the WSFO assigns a meteorologist to the EOC. In Louisiana,
               this form of interaction, although limited in scope, is lauded by emergency managers for
               providing a stabilizing influence on the EOC. The ability of the assigned meteorologist to
               interpret weather information and control rumors was of utmost importance to state and city
               officials during Andrew. Recommendation II.E.2: Appropriate NWS staff should be
               dedicated to work with emergency management officials during major hazardous
               weather events.



               Impact of Watches, Warnings, and Probabilities

               During Disaster Survey Team interviews with emergency managers, nearly all coastal
               emergency managers mentioned the use of probabilities or GDSs forecast error computations
               as they described their preparedness actions. Parish and emergency management officials
               periodically received training either by NHC staff or local NWS staff in interpreting and
               using marine advisories and other hurricane-related products. However, the emergency
               managers still do not make the best use of local NWS meteorologists and the various
               computer aids mentioned.

               Emergency management officials depend heavily on NHC marine advisories and the
               probabilities of landfall strike. Watch and warning issuances typically act as the triggering
               mechanism for initiating some evacuation response. Due to the longer evacuation clearance


                                                            98









            times in some Louisiana parishes, there exists a keen interest in public safety and
            evacuation. Many parishes initiated some form of evacuation request or activity well before
            any warning was issued.


            Impact of Forecasts and Forecast Errors

            As noted above, all parish and state emergency management offices received marine
            advisories which included position and intensity forecasts. Officials had the tools available
            to help them assess the response implications of the forecasts. The track forecasts turned
            out to have been the most valuable.


            Andrew's forward speed was of concern because models implied that Andrew would begin an
            unusually rapid slowing of its forward speed-from 18 mph to 8 mph. The magnitude of the
            slowing varied greatly between models and was a major concern for NHC and NMC in their
            decision-making process. This was difficult to resolve and may have contributed to some of
            the timing error of Andrew's landfall in forecast periods beyond 24 hours. Early forecasts
            were too slow in bringing Andrew onshore. Even so, local emergency managers had adequate
            response time.

            As in Florida, the hurricane intensity forecasts contained the greatest error. NHC intensity
            forecasts alerted local officials to the possibility of a category 4 hurricane rather than a
            rapidly diminishing category 3. Andrew's landfall in Louisiana was weaker than expected.
            All indications from satellite and final aircraft reconnaissance flights prior to landfall were
            that Andrew remained a category 4 hurricane. Andrew's interaction with an approaching
            upper trough and the Louisiana coastline likely had a much greater impact on its intensity
            than expected. Andrew eventually made landfall over south Louisiana as a category 3
            hurricane and continued to weaken rapidly as it proceeded inland. Despite these intensity
            errors, the information provided was well received and afforded emergency managers the
            information necessary to conduct their decision making. Had the hurricane's intensity
            forecast been underforecast, the results might have been more devastating for Louisiana.
            The NWS's ability to accurately forecast intensity changes of hurricanes continues to be a
            weakness. The NWS needs to focus more research and development on producing a more
            reliable hurricane intensity forecast model.


            Evacuation Conditions

            The warning posted for the northern gulf coast extended from Pascagoula, Mississippi, west
            to Vermilion Bay, Louisiana. The watch area extended east from Pascagoula to Mobile,
            Alabama, and west from Vermilion Bay to Sabine, Texas. Table 3 lists the counties and
            parishes for which watches and warnings were posted.

            As in Florida, numerous counties and parishes were threatened. Local and state emergency
            management had to make response decisions as Andrew took aim on the Louisiana coastline.
            Initially, the parishes and counties of greatest concern were located immediately along the
            southeast Louisiana coastline, including parishes adjacent to Lake Pontchartrain and the
            three coastal counties of Mississippi. The parishes of southeast Louisiana have some of the


                                                          99










                                                          Table 3

                        Watch and Warning Status During Hurricane Andrew*



                            Parish/County                       Watch                 Warning

                            Cameron, LA                             X
                            Vermilion, LA                                                 X
                            St. Mary, LA                                                  X
                            Terrebonne, LA                                                X
                            Lafourche, LA                                                 X
                            Jefferson, LA                                                 X
                            Plaquemines, LA                                               X
                            St. Bernard, LA                                               X
                            St. Charles, LA                                               X
                            St. John the Baptist, LA                                      X
                            Hancock, MS                             X
                            Harrison, MS                            X
                            Jackson, MS                             X



                            * This table depicts only coastal watch/warning areas.






               largest populations at risk and require some of the longest evacuation clearance times
               (table 4). Finding II.E.3: Formal evacuation clearance studies for southwest
               Louisiana have yet to be completed. Recommendation II.E.3: FEMA and the
               USACE, with NWS support, should accelerate their efforts to complete evacuation
               studies for all hurricane-prone coastal areas.

               Finding ILEA: In general, coastal residents know that they have a potential storm
               surge problem. However, in some highly populated areas, such as Greater New
               Orleans, there are preliminary evacuation studies but no proven orderly plan for
               the safe and timely evacuation of the entire metropolitan area. Furthermore, the
               scope of these studies does not address regional complications which can
               compromise orderly evacuation. Despite having a regional plan for the evacuation of
               New Orleans, the effectiveness of the plan remains in question. Several problems, such as
               an adequate number of efficient evacuation routes, continue to resurface following each
               exercise. These issues must be resolved before local officials can be confident of their ability
               to safely evacuate the population of Greater New Orleans.


                                                             100










                                                                                                                                   Table 4


                                                                                        Southeast Louisiana Regional Clearance Times


                                                                                                                                                                                                 Clearance
                                                                                         Storm                                   Evacuating                                                          Time
                                           County                                     Category                                   Population                                        Off Peak                 Peak Period*

                                           Orleans                                         1-2                                        19,300                                            5 hrs                    12 hrs
                                                                                           4-5                                      441,400                                           44 hrs                     50 hrs

                                           Jefferson                                       1-2                                        33,635                                            5 hrs                    12 hrs
                                                                                           4-5                                       371,435                                          44 hrs                     50 hrs

                                           Plaquemines                                     1-2                                        16,410                                            5 hrs                    12 hrs
                                                                                           4-5                                        24,135                                          44 hrs                     50 hrs

                                           St. Bernard                                     1-2                                        10,275                                            5 hrs                    12 hrs
                                                                                           3-5                                        60,355                                          44 hrs                     50 hrs

                                           St. Charles                                     1-2                                          6,415                                           6 hrs                      9 hrs
                                                                                           3-5                                        37,410                                          13 hrs                     14 hrs

                                           St. John the Baptist                            1-2                                          4,910                                           5 hrs                    10 hrs
                                                                                           3-5                                        31,325                                          35 hrs                     38 hrs

                                           St. James                                       1-2                                          3,560                                           5 hrs                    10 hrs
                                                                                           3-5                                        17,920                                          35 hrs                     38 hrs

                                           Lafourche                                       1-2                                        28,640                                            6 hrs                      9 hrs
                                                                                           3-5                                        72,395                                          13 hrs                     14 hrs

                                           St. Tammany                                     1-2                                        32,465                                            5 hrs                    12 hrs
                                                                                           3-5                                        98,320                                          44 hrs                     50 hrs


                                                                 Background traffic conditions with a peak period condition include a normal work to home movement in addition to the movement of evacuating vehicles.








               The Greater New Orleans area, which includes Orleans, St. Tammany, St. Bernard,
               Jefferson, St. Charles, St. John the Baptist, and north Plaquemines Parishes, has the highest
               population density along the gulf coast and is one of the most vulnerable. The Greater New
               Orleans area physically sits 5 to 10 feet below sea level and is protected by a network of
               levees. It is estimated that the existing levee system would protect the Greater New Orleans
               area from category 1 and 2 hurricanes. The levee system is rated to survive most category
               3 storms and some select category 4 storms but no category 5 storms. Areas outside of the
               levee system are easily flooded. The degree of inundation is dependent on storm strength and
               landfall approach. Most evacuees are anticipated in evacuation plans to go to destinations
               within their own parish, to a northern adjacent parish, or, time permitting, to a parish well
               north of the endangered area.

               Evacuation plans anticipate that a third or fewer of the evacuees will leave the region, going
               to points north or inland. Doing so requires that most evacuees use either US 61, 1-10, or
               1-55, all multilane, limited access highways. Transportation models indicate that congestion
               will be extreme on both US 61 and 1-55, exiting north from the Greater New Orleans area.
               Areas west would use 1-49, US 171, or US 165, also multilane highways. Clearance times
               required to evacuate residents and seasonal visitors safely are listed in Table 4, Southeast
               Louisiana Regional Clearance Times. These longer evacuation clearance times reflect the
               limited number of evacuation routes from the Greater New Orleans area and the need for
               many coastal residents to evacuate through New Orleans. Despite the fact that New Orleans
               was within the warning area, its evacuation response was poor considering the potential
               threat for loss of life.


               Ideally, emergency management officials attempt to have all evacuation requirements
               completed prior to the arrival of gale-force winds and the flooding of roadways. Therefore,
               the initiation of evacuation must reflect not only the clearance time but also the number of
               hours which tropical storm-force winds precede the arrival of the hurricane's eye. The
               average additional time required is about 6 hours. Recommendation ILEA: FEMA, in
               concert with the NWS, should ensure the completion of local evacuation studies
               and integrate them into a comprehensive regional evacuation plan. It is hoped that
               the results of such a regional study would provide local officials with new response options
               that would reduce overall evacuation clearance times.


               Evacuation Actions by Local Emergency Management

               The state, parish, and city governments have the authority to order evacuation in response
               to any imminent threat. Failure to comply, however, carries no penalty.

               Over the past 20 years, the State of Louisiana has worked slowly toward the development
               of an effective hurricane preparedness program. Their progress was very evident in Andrew.
               The Adjutant General for the State of Louisiana oversees the state's DEM. The Adjutant
               General's staff has been overseeing the DEM for slightly more than a year prior to Andrew.
               Despite this short tenure, the General's staff was aware of the pending situation, in part due
               to the excellent on-going working relationship between NWS and DEM officials. As part of
               a coordinated effort between the DEM and the NWS, Adjutant General Stroud called a
               meeting of NWS, parish, and state officials well before Andrew's entry into the gulf-a full


                                                             102









             5 days before landfall in Louisiana. Similar planning and coordination sessions would
             continue through Andrew.

             Local parish officials were aggressive in securing access to the various media outlets.
             Voluntary evacuation of area residents in nearly all coastal parishes started 2 days prior to
             landfall. The second tier parishes, those adjacent to coastal parishes, were not far behind in
             calling for voluntary evacuations since they wanted residents to take the threat seriously and
             take every precaution, including possible evacuation. Most parishes of south Louisiana
             initiated actions similar to those conducted by Iberia Parish.

                  The first phase initiated by local parish officials was to call together elected officials
                  to review the situation. The decision was made to call for a Voluntary
                  Evacuation of-


                  - low-lying areas.
                  - areas prone to flooding from heavy rains or storm surge.
                  - all mobile homes.
                  - anyone with easy access to safe shelter.

                  As it became more apparent that the parish was to be affected, a second meeting
                  was called, and phase two was initiated and a call for a Recommended
                  Evacuation of-


                  - all mobile homes.
                  - the area of Iberia Parish south of US 90 and southeast of Louisiana
                       Highway 14.
                  - the town of Delcambre.

                  Approximately 24 hours prior to landfall, elected officials again met, and the
                  decision was made to call for a Mandatory Evacuation of

                  - the area of Iberia Parish south of US 90 and southeast of Louisiana
                       Highway 14.
                  - the town of Delcambre.


             To some degree, this sequence of events was played out in many of the first and second tier
             coastal parishes of south Louisiana as noted in table 5.

             Since Hurricane Andrew, it has been estimated that anywhere between 20 and 40 percent
             of the local population evacuated following the issuance of warnings and ordered evacuations.
             The DST interviewed local emergency management officials from the affected parishes over
             the months following Hurricane Andrew. Finding II.E.5: The emergency management
             community of southeast Louisiana felt strongly that the fear of looting was
             partially responsible for a smaller than expected number of evacuees. It was noted
             that, through their contacts with parish residents, they sensed a sincere fear of having their
             homes looted should they evacuate. Parish officials felt that the issue of looting should be
             addressed within the scope of hurricane preparedness. Local parish officials have conducted




                                                             103










                                                         Table 5


                                        Parish Evacuations for Andrew



                                                                                           Estimate
                    Parish                    Recommended            Ordered               of Evacuees


                    St. Bernard               Yes                    No                    3,000
                    Orleans                   Yes-East Bank          Yes-West Bank         Unknown
                    Jefferson                 Yes-West Bank          No                    Unknown
                    St. Tammany               Yes                    No                    Unknown
                    Plaquernines              Yes-North Half         Yes-South Half        18,000
                    Lafourche                 Yes-North Half         Yes-South Half        Unknown
                    Terrebonne                Yes-North Half         Yes-South Half        33,000
                    St. Charles               Yes                    No                    Unknown
                    St. John the Baptist      No                     No                    Unknown
                    St. James                 Yes                    No                    5,000
                    Assumption                Yes                    No                    Unknown
                    St. Mary                  No                     Yes                   42,000
                    St. Martin                No                     Yes-Lower Half        650
                    Iberia                    No                     Yes                   35,000
                    Cameron                   No                     Yes                   10,000
                    Vermilion                 Yes                    No                    37,000
                    Calcasieu                 Yes                    No                    20,000
                    Acadia                    No                     No                    Unknown
                    Lafayette                 Yes                    No                    17,000
                    Jefferson Davis           No                     No                    Unknown


                                Evacuation estimates provided by Parish Emergency Management Officials







               surveys which indicate that the threat from looting during evacuation is no higher than, and
               usually lower than, local burglary crime rates. Recommendation ILE.5: Local
               governments, with NWS and FEMA assistance, need to educate residents to
               alleviate these inaccurate perceptions.

               The premise behind coastal evacuations continues to be-move people out of flood-prone and
               surge-prone areas prior to a hurricane making landfall. Andrew did not fit this prototype.
               Its damaging winds were the primary cause of life and property loss. The NWS and various
               preparedness agencies need to examine the need for and feasibility for the development of
               an evacuation plan in response to the adverse effects of hurricane-force winds.



                                                            104









             Response by the Media

             The electronic and print media in the gulf region played a crucial role in enabling the public
             to respond to the approaching hurricane. The print media maintained a steady stream of
             hurricane-related information, including the latest reports and forecasts as well as emergency
             response information. The electronic media, including radio and television, augmented the
             print media with later and more frequent updates enhanced by color graphics and satellite
             photo-imagery. The media performed a tremendous service to the residents of the gulf coast.
             The ability to provide real-time, graphic pictures of the devastation wrought upon south
             Florida added to achieving the desired local government and public response. Undoubtedly,
             had the NWS relied solely on its own capabilities without the efforts of the media, awareness
             and response information would not have reached an audience of the size that it did.

             The NWS recognizes the integral role that the news media and, in particular, the broadcast
             media played in disseminating weather warnings and vital information to the general public.
             The link between the NWS, the emergency management, and the broadcast media is critical
             to any community warning system. As in south Florida, the performance of the NWS-media
             alliance has never been more effective than during the hours preceding Hurricane Andrew's
             landfall in south Louisiana. The electronic media were in place and awaiting Andrew,
             providing on-site reporting which proved to be an indispensable element of the warning
             system. The NWS must continue to nurture these strong partnerships and working
             relationships with the media. Local media, the NWS, and local governments need to re-
             evaluate their roles in this partnership routinely, ensuring that its goal of public warning and
             preparedness is achieved most effectively.

             To take fullest advantage of the media's capacity to disseminate information to a wide
             audience, a partnership was developed to coordinate NHC information through a broadcast
             11pool" as described in chapter I.E.

             Findina ILEX: There were a few instances where one local television station
             presented forecast track scenarios that conflicted with official NHC forecasts. That
             caused some problems for local parish and NWS officials. In these instances, the
             media interviewed some of the more flamboyant hurricane "experts" in the area. On occasion
             during these interviews, these supposed experts would differ markedly from the forecasts
             issued by the NHC. Following these interviews, questions and concerns over the official NHC
             forecast would briefly inundate NWS and EOC offices. These episodes were few in number
             and did little harm but placed additional workload on already overworked NWS and EOC
             staffs. Recommendation ILEX: The local NWS offices in Louisiana should make a
             renewed effort to impress upon the local media that providing consistent
             information to the public is critical during emergency situations.











                                                            105






























                                                                                                     A,@





















                                                                    AW





                                         V6


                     Significant tree damage north of Avery Island, Louisiana, home of the world
                     famous McHilheny Tabasco Sauce.













                                                        106










                                               CHAPTER IIX


                                          PUBLIC RESPONSE


            Background

            The State of Louisiana does not have a mandatory evacuation policy. Although the governor
            possesses authority to call for an evacuation, these decisions are usually deferred to city and
            parish officials in coordination with their local emergency management staff. Public response
            to requests for evacuation are voluntary in nearly all situations despite the reference to an
            "ordered" or "mandatory" evacuation. Failure to comply carries no penalty.


            Local Response

            There are nine Louisiana parishes situated along the coastline. An additional eleven
            parishes lie adjacent to the north. Much of the area covered by these parishes is near sea
            level and, therefore, highly vulnerable to storm surge. The degree of vulnerability is
            dependent upon both storm track and storm intensity. In response to Andrew, a northwest-
            moving category 4 hurricane, all of the 20 vulnerable parishes recommended some level of
            evacuation. The parishes are listed in table 5 along with best estimates of the number of
            evacuees.


            During Andrew's advance toward the Louisiana coast, emergency managers initiated a
            phased approach to evacuating coastal and second tier parishes. A concern of some parish
            officials was that there would be some resistance to evacuation due to a fear of looting,
            largely a myth. This was a major concern to the public in south Florida but not as much of
            a concern in Louisiana. Statistics on burglaries during and shortly after natural disasters
            as compared to normal other times show no significant increase in crime rates. The myth
            of the looting threat, largely media-perpetuated, needlessly endangers lives during
            hurricanes.


            The first phase of evacuation called for voluntary evacuation. These were initiated at least
            48 hours prior to landfall. This approach worked especially well in areas where the
            evacuation clearance times are long due to inadequate transportation networks. This
            approach also works well in areas with higher degrees of vulnerability. Areas, such as
            barrier islands, usually have over 80 percent of the residents evacuate voluntarily. Offshore
            oil rigs experience 100 percent evacuation. In less vulnerable areas, these numbers fall off
            to 20 percent or less. Many residents who evacuate less vulnerable areas are the infirm, the
            elderly, and those who require greater time to evacuate. During Hurricane Andrew, the most
            vulnerable areas, the barrier islands and oil platforms, did evacuate as expected, but the
            actual evacuation response in less vulnerable areas has not been ascertained. Perceptions
            are that the response was significantly less than expected.



                                                          107









                Depending on the time needed, the next phase-recommended evacuation-is initiated. By
                the time this stage is reached, most of the highly vulnerable coastal areas have been
                evacuated, and the last few depart. In addition, another 20 percent of those who ultimately
                leave do so from second tier parishes.

                Usually coincident with the issuance of a hurricane warning, Louisiana parishes will order
                evacuation. This typically occurs about 24 hours prior to landfall. In most instances, highly
                vulnerable areas have achieved nearly 100 percent evacuation. Barrier islands and offshore
                oil stations are such areas. A final 30 to 40 percent of those who evacuate second tier
                parishes do so only when the local parish government declares an ordered evacuation. These
                ordered evacuations are executed through the issuance of parish proclamations or emergency
                declarations. Such documents better define the urgency of the situation for those people who
                wait until the last possible moment to leave.

                Nearly all coastal and second tier parishes recommended voluntary evacuation as Andrew
                approached. Table 5 lists these parishes and whether or not they recommended or ordered
                evacuation. The table also provides a rough estimate of the number of evacuees based on
                shelter information provided by the parishes.

                Less than 30 percent of the entire population of south Louisiana actually evacuates under
                these circumstances. This low number concerns the NWS and the local officials. An
                additional concern surfaced during interviews with residents of some coastal communities.
                Finding II.F.1 Many southeast Louisiana residents did not understand the full
                extent of danger from storm surge. In interviews with residents of Cocodrie, it was
                discovered that many evacuated north to Houma. Houma is about 25 miles north of Cocodrie.
                The change in highest elevations in Cocodrie, about 5 feet NGVD, increases to near 10 feet
                NGVD in Houma. This would not have provided safe refuge from forecast storm surges of
                10 to 15 feet. One could speculate that had a 10- to 15-foot storm surge occurred, a number
                of lives might have been lost. Recommendation 1l.F.1: The NWS needs to work more
                closely with FEAM as well as state and local officials, to develop more effective
                preparedness information about storm surge. Presentations tailored to local areas
                could provide information about situations to which residents could better relate.

                Finding 11.F.2 Some south Louisiana residents interviewed commented that they
                had evacuated highly vulnerable areas only to find themselves threatened by other
                hurricane dangers. Some residents of New Orleans, highly vulnerable to storm surge and
                flooding, evacuated to Baton Rouge. They had no idea that Baton Rouge would be in the
                direct path of Andrew. Although these individuals felt secure in the fact that they had safely
                avoided the storm surge threat, they did not fully realize that they were not clear of the wind
                effects of Andrew. The public needs to be made more aware of the multiple threats a
                landfalling hurricane presents and how to monitor the storm's progress better.

                In Iberia Parish, two schools housing evacuees lost part of their roof due to wind gusts of
                70 mph. Had Andrew not weakened as rapidly, the damage sustained to these structures
                would have been significantly greater, possibly injuring or killing scores of people. The
                selection of these wide-span structures almost proved to be disastrous for those sheltered.
                Evacuees were gathered in the school gymnasiums, an area of high risk, rather than their
                interior hallways-areas usually much safer. Wide-span structures, such as a school
                gymnasium, tend to fail more often during high wind situations and should not have been


                                                             108









             utilized as shelters. Recommendation II.F.2: The NWS, in concert with local
             emergency management officials, should ensure that evacuation studies are up to
             date and accurate. Given widespread distribution, the results of these studies can
             direct the public to appropriate shelter.

             In general, most parishes reported no significant problems with the evacuation process.
             However, it continues to be speculated that this was in part due to the small numbers
             evacuating. Initial estimates of 1.3 million people evacuating south Louisiana are believed
             to be greatly overestimated. Social scientists continue gathering data in hopes of formulating
             a best estimate of the number of evacuees. There were a few minor cases of gridlock reported
             on northbound routes exiting coastal areas for the central sections of Louisiana. Many of
             these were easily resolved once the problem was identified. One choke point was identified
             on Interstate 10, west of New Orleans. Road construction choked off exiting traffic, causing
             gridlock throughout the area. The state should monitor all construction projects and
             anticipate their potential impact should a hurricane threaten the area. If a construction
             project is significant enough to be deemed as a problem for evacuation, alternatives should
             be defined and made ready rather than risking lives through avoidable gridlock.

             Find               Despite the efforts of the NWS and state and local emergency
             managers, not all residents heeded the various evacuation requests even though
             their lives may have been in jeopardy had the storm made landfall further east
             along the Louisiana coast. During post-Andrew interviews with local emergency
             managers, it was noted that in many cases they were unsure of the actual numbers of
             residents who evacuated. This left parish officials, especially second tier parishes, with the
             feeling that the number that actually evacuated was rather small. Evacuation surveys were
             not conducted on the parish level after Andrew; therefore, no reliable estimate as to the
             number of evacuees currently exists. The USACE and FEMA have contracted for a survey,
             as part of their Louisiana version of a Hurricane Andrew assessment, to better define the
             actual number of evacuees during Andrew. Preliminary results indicate that of the three
             areas evacuated-Chalmette, New Orleans, and Norco-all experienced evacuation rates of
             less than 35 percent. The lowest was New Orleans-12 percent. When asked why they did
             not evacuate, the two most common responses were that they felt that there was little chance
             of the storm hitting southeast Louisiana. The other most common response was the storm
             wasn't severe enough to necessitate their evacuation. Recommendation II.F.3: The NWS
             and FEMA need to increase their efforts to educate and train the public. Each
             agency needs to consider expanding their training capabilities to overcome the
             public's denial of the threat from hurricanes.

             Parish officials suggested two possibilities regarding the low evacuation rates. Either the
             evacuation went so well that there were few problems, or so few residents had actually
             evacuated that there were too few evacuees to create problems. One case supporting the
             latter was in the city of Lafitte where only about half of the residents evacuated. Most of
             them sought refuge within the levee system. About half of the town lies outside of the
             protective levee system. Had Andrew made landfall further east and moved north, that
             portion of the town outside of the levee system would have been inundated, and the levy
             system may have been overtopped by storm surge. Local officials feel that persons who reside
             within and outside the levee system have over the years developed a false sense of security
             about the levees. Much of this can be attributed to the fact that the majority of residents



                                                           109









              have never experienced a major hurricane. In fact, very few residents have ever experienced
              the maximum storm surge from a major hurricane.

              Although yet to be confirmed, many emergency managers felt that not all residents heeded
              the various evacuation recommendations and orders for evacuation, especially in the parishes
              that make up Greater New Orleans.

              Findina ILFA: Some residents of Greater New Orleans who evacuated and later
              returned to their homes felt that local officials overreacted in their evacuation
              recommendations, especially since Andrew made landfall further west than
              projected. Local emergency managers fielded numerous complaints concerning overreaction,
              but felt that under the circumstances there was no alternative.            Given the same
              circumstances today, they stated that they would have reacted in a similar manner.
              Recommendation ILFA: The NWS needs to work closely with the emergency
              management community in convincing this most skeptical segment of the
              population that the advantages of evacuating far outweigh the disadvantages of
              remaining in place.





















                                                                                  7i,










                     North of Cocodrie, Louisiana, home in the background was removed from its
                     foundation by a combination of storm surge and wind.


                                                           110










                                               CHAPTERILG

                             PROCESSING, INTERPRETATION,
                 AND DISSEMINATION OF NWS INFORMATION


            Utilization of Hurricane Forecasting Models by NHC and NMC

            A comprehensive description of the hurricane forecasting models run by NMC and NHC is
            provided in chapter I.G. The general performance of the models remained consistent with
            the trend established through the Atlantic and across Florida. The greatest confidence was
            placed in the AVN (Aviation) model which remained the most consistent throughout the
            entire event. The various BAM (Beta Advection) models were less reliable and given less
            credibility during the event. The storm track through the gulf was generally well forecast.

            The greatest weakness in tropical cyclone forecasting remains in the inability of existing
            computer models to project and anticipate storm intensity changes accurately. This was
            evident in both Louisiana and south Florida. The SHIFOR model does not resolve short-term
            rapid intensity changes. Fortunately for Louisiana, the storm did weaken rapidly, resulting
            in less significant damage to the region which experienced landfall. The overforecasting of
            intensity at landfall resulted in an overestimation of the storm winds at landfall. The
            forecasting of tropical cyclone intensity changes continues to be the most difficult element of
            a hurricane to accurately predict. Additional research is greatly needed in the area of
            tropical cyclone intensity forecasting. NOAA should continue to support development of new
            models and methods to better gather data in and around tropical cyclones to more effectively
            evaluate and accurately project intensity changes within tropical cyclones.


            SLOSH Model Performance

            Forecast surge height values for the Louisiana coast were predicted to reach values of 10 to
            15 feet. Actual surge height values measured from 5 and 8 feet. Compared to other forecast
            cases, this could be considered a significant error.

            Past experience with the SLOSH model indicates that coastal Louisiana would have
            experienced the 10- to 15-foot storm surge if the storm made landfall as a category 4
            hurricane. However, the storm decreased in intensity rapidly just prior to landfall. The
            storm's central pressure was 937 mb at 7 PM CDT on August 25. The storm filled to 955 mb
            6 hours later and to 973 mb by 7 AM CDT on August 26. At the same time that the storm
            was weakening, there is evidence that the diameter of the storm's eye also had decreased.
            The radius of maximum winds (Rmax) decreased from approximately 25 miles to 14 miles
            during this period.

            Such changes in a hurricane's characteristics are beyond current forecasting capabilities.
            NHC has little skill in forecasting hurricane intensity changes, other than to forecast


                                                          ill









              decreasing intensity as a storm moves inland. In general, NHC assumes constant Rmax and
              storm intensity until landfall, then increases the Rmax and weakens the storm intensity
              following landfall. This is consistent with past observational data studies and is applied
              when forecasting storm surges or in the preparation of storm surge studies.

              To understand why storm surges were about half of their predicted height, the SLOSH model
              was run with an interpolation of the "best fiV1 track developed by NHC for Andrew's landfall
              in Louisiana. Table 6 lists the "best fit" values for the Louisiana portion of Andrew's storm
              track, including central pressures and the radius of maximum winds along that segment of
              its track. For this particular run, a Rmax of 14 miles was used. Highest observed surge
              heights are presented in figure 15. They were obtained from data gathered by the New
              Orleans office of the USACE. Within the figure, squares are used to depict the highest gauge
              levels; circles are used to identify observed high water marks. Generally, gauge levels are
              much more reliable and have less error than high water marks.



                                                        Table 6


                                       Hurricane Andrew (Louisiana)
                           Best Track Data Interpolated For Use in SLOSH



                                                                                   P-Drop         Rmax
                          Date           Time          Lat           Lon           (mb)           (Mi)


                          AUG 24         0400          25.4          79.3            65            14
                                                       25.6          81.2            65            14
                                         1600          25.8          83.1            65            14
                                                       26.2          85.0            65            14
                          AUG 25         0400          26.6          86.7            65            14
                                                       27.5          89.0            65            14
                                         1600          27.8          90.05           65            14
                                                       28.84         90.92           60            14
                          AUG 26         0400          29.63         91.58           54            14
                                                       30.5          91.7            35            14
                                         1600          31.2          91.4            20            14
                                                       31.5          91.1            15            14
                          AUG 27         0400          32.1          90.5            13            14

                L












                                                           112






















































                                  Figure 15    Louisiana coastal storm surge.






                                                      113









               These data were taken from the NHC best track, interpolated to intermediate times. The
               model uses "landfall" at 4 AM CDT on August 26. Within the SLOSH model, the size of the
               hurricane is parameterized by the Rmax and the intensity by the pressure drop (ambient
               pressure outside storm minus the storm's central pressure). Rmax was held constant at
               14 miles for this model run.


               Agreement between observed and computed surges generally was good although values far
               to the east of the track appeared higher than the values indicated in the model run. It is
               likely that the storm's Rmax wind was larger than 14 miles prior to landfall, then diminished
               as Andrew made landfall. Tests of these hypotheses will be done by the NWS's Techniques
               Development Laboratory in the near future.


               Utility of Other PC Software

               As in Florida, three major PC-based software packages were available to the various NWS
               offices along the gulf coast: SLOSH display, GDS4.0, and Tides. Similar to Florida WSOs,
               WSOs Lake Charles and Baton Rouge had little available time or hardware to make use of
               this software.


               Findina ILGA: WSFO Slidell, being collocated with the Lower Iffississippi River
               Forecast Center (LAMFC), had access to RFC PCs and was able to run SLOSH
               MEOW and other hurricane decision-making applications. The ability to use these
               software packages allowed WSFO Slidell to keep state and local officials better informed.
               The ability to run the full SLOSH model on NOAA!s mainframe computers was available to
               the WSFO through the RFC. This capability was lost early on in Andrew due to software
               problems. The capability of running SLOSH was very beneficial to WSFO Slidell. The staff
               felt that the loss of this capability was a major blow to their ability to support local
               emergency management officials on issues of storm surge.

               PC availability is limited at most NWS offices to one or two-a computer dedicated to
               SRWarn and network backup use, and a Micro-Arts PC used for compiling and disseminating
               surface and rawinsonde observations. In order to operate SLOSH display, GD84.0, and
               Tides, other resident programs had to be terminated. Recommendation 11.G.1: See
               Recommendation I.G.3.




















                                                           114









                                            CHAPTERILH


                                       COMMUNICATIONS


          Automation of Field Operations and Services (AFOS)

          WSFO Slidell operates as the AFOS node for the State of Louisiana. They host the primary
          data base in support of the collocated LMRFC and WSOs Baton Rouge, Lake Charles, and
          Shreveport. AFOS performed efficiently during the event. Early interviews with the media
          and emergency management agencies revealed that some product transmissions were
          missing. Not all missing products were the result of an AFOS problem. Most were traced
          to improper or missing Universal Generic Coding, necessary for proper and timely relay of
          data to users.



          NOAA Weather Wire Service (NWWS)

          The satellite driven uplink for the NWWS is located at WSFO Slidell. It did not have any
          problems during Hurricane Andrew.

          Two local jurisdictions, Jefferson and Orleans Parishes, experienced periodic difficulties with
          their NWWS during Andrew. In addition, two vendors of weather information discovered
          that some NWS products were periodically missing. Finding 1I.H.1: The Universal
          Generic Codes (UGC) were incorrectly entered in several of the products
          disseminated by south Louisiana offices. The AFOS relay system relies on these codes
          for automatic product distribution and purging of products at predetermined expiration times.
          During Andrew, it was noted that for an 8- to 12-hour period, a few offices were incorrectly
          entering the UGC or providing an incorrect expiration time. Most of these error relay
          problems were caught and corrected at the data relay point in Washington, D.C.
          Recommendation ILHA: NWS offices should perform more on-the-spot quality
          control of products prior to their public release. The use of software, such as
          version 6.0 of SRWarn, would help eliminate many of these errors.

          The State of Louisiana currently has 40 NWWS drops. Table 7 lists the various subscribers.
          The two state agencies that have drops on the NWWS are the state police and the state
          DEM. Both the state DEM and law enforcement agencies relay critical forecast products to
          local and state officials. The news media rely primarily on other wire services, e.g., AP, UPI,
          and commercial data vendors, such as Weather Services Incorporated and Kavouras
          Incorporated, for receipt of NWS products.







                                                        115










                                                          Table 7


                                Louisiana NOAA Weather Wire Subscribers





                            Media                                            Government


                            Cable TV                      2                  Federal
                            Television                    8                  State                 2
                            AM Radio                      4                  Local                 7
                            FM Radio                      2
                            AM/FM Stations                -                  Utilities             8
                            Newspaper                     2
                            Wire Services                 I                  Other                 3


                            Total                        19                  Total                 21

                  L




                Family of Services

                NWS forecast products and data are distributed to the electronic media via private sector
                vendors through the Family of Services. This indirect method probably was the most
                important factor in evacuating southern Louisiana effectively and rapidly prior to Andrew.


                NOAA Weather Radio (NWR)

                This radio broadcast system uses nine transmitters to cover the entire coastal area of
                Louisiana. All local officials interviewed by the survey team monitored NVTR during the
                approach and impact of Andrew. Many officials noted that they acquired more specific
                information from direct contacts with NWS officials or from copies of NOAA Weather Wire
                products, however.

                Much of the NWR system in Louisiana remained on air throughout Andrew. The only
                exceptions were Morgan City and Lafayette, where hurricane-force winds toppled
                transmission towers several hours prior to landfall. In addition to the loss of the tower at
                Morgan City, the facility which houses the electronics suffered structural damage. Wind-
                driven rain damaged much of the equipment within the facility. Both systems were either
                partially or fully operational within weeks following Andrew.




                                                            116








            National Warning System (NAWAS)

            NAWAS remained functional throughout the storm. As in Florida, the Louisiana link to
            NAWAS serves as an emergency communications link among the NWS, a limited number of
            emergency management offices, and law enforcement offices. NAWAS provides the NWS an
            additional means of contacting nine state police offices, the Louisiana DEM, and several of
            the larger local emergency management offices. NAWAS provides its users a means of
            exchanging emergency information critical to the decision-making process. This system,
            however, remains relatively unused by the groups who have access.


            Hurricane Hotline Internal Coordination System

            The hurricane hotline remained functional and worked well during Andrew. The only
            problem encountered was with voice quality at several sites along the Texas and Louisiana
            coasts. This created a minor inconvenience for NHC and other offices who relied on this
            system for information. These offices had to repeat elements of their transmissions several
            times before a message was completely understood. Finding II.H.2: Currently, not all
            coastal WSOs have access to the hurricane hotline. Recommendation II.H.2: NOAA
            needs to expand the hurricane hotline to all coastal WSOs in hurricane vulnerable
            areas.



            The Emergency Broadcast System (EBS)

            Through interviews with emergency management officials, it was discovered that because of
            the national and local news media coverage of Hurricane Andrew, there was no perceived
            benefit to activating the EBS. As Andrew approached the Florida coast, it was the news
            story. The attention of the residents of Louisiana was firmly fixed upon Andrew as it
            devastated south Florida.


            Telephone Systems

            Routine telephone service between the WSFO and the WSOs remained operational.
            Understandably, access to coastal parishes was limited following the landfall of Andrew. In
            those instances where communication was not possible via land line telephone systems, other
            methods of communication were utilized.



            Amateur Radio

            Amateur radio operators were instrumental in providing valuable information both to the
            NWS and local officials. They pass on warnings and exchange information between the NWS
            and EM officials. Several severe weather spotter networks and base stations were activated
            during Andrew. There were no documented instances of any difficulties.




                                                        117







               Army Military Affiliate Radio System (MARS)

               The Army Military Affiliate Radio System (MARS) provided communications support to the
               State of Louisiana during Hurricane Andrew. Army MARS affiliates maintain an extensive
               HF/VHF communications network throughout the continental United States with long-range
               HF relay capabilities (voice/digital) to military and civilian MARS units assigned to stateside
               and overseas commands. The primary mission of MARS is to provide DOD-sponsored
               emergency communications support on a local, national, and international basis to military,
               civil, and disaster officials during periods of emergency. Finding II.H.3: The use of Army
               MARS (Military Affiliate Radio System) within the Louisiana emergency
               communications system was very successful. Since Andrew, the State of Louisiana has
               formulated a memorandum of understanding/agreement (MOU/A) with Army MARS that
               integrates Army MARS operationally into the State of Louisiana emergency communications
               system. Recommendation II.H.3: The NWS and FEMA need to coordinate with Army
               MARS to ensure that these capabilities can be extended to other locations.


               Telephone Facsimile Transmissions

               The Louisiana OEM pays for a drop on NWWS. They retransmit severe weather warnings
               and selected forecast products to all affected state and local emergency management agencies.
               This system works but is very time consuming, taking up to 15 minutes to transmit a product
               to only a few users during small-scale weather events. During major events, such as Andrew,
               the system becomes extremely congested as the event unfolds. In some instances, it was
               taking 30 minutes to an hour to receive critical information. The overall effectiveness of this
               form of dissemination was questioned by all parish officials interviewed. An alternative
               system to warning and forecast dissemination should be pursued.

               Telephone facsimile transmissions from the NWS offices to state and local government offices
               are available. Although this service gives additional technical support and may save lives,
               it can drain personnel resources. This technique was used early during Andrew to keep local
               emergency managers as informed as possible.


               Louisiana Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (LALETS)

               The Louisiana State Police operates LALETS as the statewide telecommunications system.
               It also is linked to the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS). The
               NWS provides a drop on NWWS to the Louisiana State Police. The system is programmed
               to disseminate all warnings and selected weather forecast products automatically to affected
               state police troopers and local law enforcement agencies. During Andrew, this system was
               one of the most reliable and efficient means of disseminating information to state and local
               law enforcement agencies. Finding ILHA: The State of Louisiana, Division of
               Emergency Management, currently does not have a fully automated information
               redistribution system. The Louisiana DEM should look into taking advantage of this
               existing communications system to facilitate the widespread communication of severe weather
               and flood warnings, watches, and statements to local officials. Recommendation ILHA:
               The NWS and FEMA should encourage the State of Louisiana to explore options for


                                                             118









            providing a fully automated communications system to law enforcement agencies
            and local emergency operating centers. Once in place, the NWS should arrange to
            link with that system, allowing two-way communication of critical warning
            information between the NWS and the emergency management community.


            Personal Briefings

            The MICs from WSO Baton Rouge, Lake Charles, and WSFO Slidell provided detailed
            briefings to state and local officials at meetings called to coordinate emergency preparedness
            for Hurricane Andrew. These meetings proved very beneficial. In addition, a meteorologist
            from the WSFO was detailed to the New Orleans EOC to coordinate information and provide
            technical assistance to local officials. This was done in accordance with an existing
            agreement between the city of New Orleans and the NWS as part of the move to Slidell.


            Communication With Users

            There are numerous direct and indirect ways the NWS disseminates its forecast products to
            users. In spite of these point-to-multi-point dissemination systems, many officials still do not
            receive timely or complete information and, in many cases, have extreme difficulty in
            contacting their local NWS office directly. Most local emergency managers stated that a more
            efficient and technically advanced method of communication is long overdue.

            Many users find that visual imagery provides greater confirmation of an impending threat,
            making the forecast more credible. The NWS needs to consider providing products and
            information in a visual format rather than purely written or verbal. The New Orleans Coast
            Guard Office is one agency that is interested in receiving plots of track forecasts in graphical
            form. The only current means of conveying this information is by facsimile.






















                                                           119










                                              CHAPTER ILI


                                        DATA COLLECTION


           National Data Buoy System

           The path of Hurricane Andrew through the Gulf of Mexico and across south-central Louisiana
           brought the storm within approximately 100 nm of seven weather stations operated by the
           NDBC (see figures 16 and 17).

           The only failure in the gulf, as a result of the storm, was a sea temperature thermistor at a
           station on the Louisiana coast.       These units provide extremely valuable data, but
           unfortunately there are not enough of them available. Figures 16 and 17 depict the C-MAN
           network density. The network is rather sparse along the Louisiana coast and the gulf coast,
           in general. South Florida has a more dense network but that is still not totally adequate.

           Aircraft reconnaissance information is combined with nearby C-AIAN observations to estimate
           wind data in and near a hurricane. Andrew's track took it between three C-MAN sites:
           C-MAN S-2 (Sabine, Texas) on the westernmost portion of the Louisiana coast, and C-MAN
           S-6 (Grand Isle, Louisiana) and C-NLAN S-3 (Southwest Pass, Louisiana) on the east end of
           the Louisiana coast. Hurricane Andrew was many miles from any C-AIAN station. Wind
           estimates made from data derived through aircraft reconnaissance and compared to distant
           C-MAN sites are not deemed helpful for estimating maximum landfall winds.

           Some significant changes are occurring in the moored buoy and C-AL4,N networks. Finding
           11.1.1: The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has decided to remove all large navigational
           buoys and replace them with other, smaller types of buoys. The replacement buoys
           are too small to be fitted with meteorological instruments. Loss of the current
           buoys, in the near future, will mean the loss of hourly data from stations along the
           Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coasts. In many coastal regions, there is a lack of important
           wind, rain, tide, and other hydrometeorological instrumentation.          The lack of fully
           instrumented buoys significantly affected the computer models due to the paucity of data.
           Recommendation 11.1.1: The NWS, through its National Data Buoy Center, should
           ensure that sufficient capabilities are present to maintain hourly observations
           along the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coastal waters. An enhanced program would
           greatly benefit the NWS in its assessment of storms.

           As seen in figures 16 and 17, many coastal regions lack important wind, rain, tide, and other
           hydrometeorological measuring devices. This contributed to a lack of data describing current
           conditions as Andrew was making landfall. This further highlights the importance of a
           comprehensive data buoy network.






                                                        121









             NDBC Moored Buoy Stations
                 ATLANTIC BASIN
                     Category
               9 Permanent - NWS
               E LNB/ELB - NWS
               A Other Agencies
               o Developmental - NDBC                             0
               L Directional Waves

        0
        0



        to
    to  0
        0


        C+


        0




                         90.


                                         800

                                                          700















                                                W-5 0 OW-1

                                                             W-2
                                                W-6                                                                                             C-4

                                                                                                                                            C-1
                                              W-3                                                                                                    C-5                       E-1
                                            W-7        NO.   STATION                           NO.  STATION                                 C-2                              E-15 E-16
                                                       W-1   SMITH ISLAND, WA                  S-1  CAPE SAN BLAB, FL                                                               E.3
                                                       W-2   WEST POINT, WA                    S-2  SABINE, TX                                                                E-1
                                                       W-3   NEWPORT, OR                       S-3  SOUTHWEST PASS, LA
                                                       W-4   PO .INT ARGUELLO, CA              S-4  PORT ARANSAS, TX                            C-3
                                                       W-5   TATOOSH ISLAND, WA                S-5  ST. AUGUSTINE, FL
                                                       W 6   DESTRUCTION ISLAND, WA            S-6  GRAND ISLE, LA
                                                       W-7   CAPEARAGO,OR                      S-7  MOLASSES REEF, FL                 NO.   STATION                   E-2
                                                       W-8   POINT ARENA, CA                   S-8  SAVANNAH L.S., GA                                                             E-1 4
                                         W-8                                                   S-9  VENICE, FL                        E-I   DUNKIRK, NY
                                          8-2          B-I   PORTLAND, ME                      S-10 SETTLEMENT POINT, GBI             E-2   SOUTH BASS ISLAND, OH
                                                       B-2   SAN FRANCISCO, CA                 S-11 DAUPHIN ISLAND, AL                E-3   GALLOO ISLAND, NY
                                                       9-3   NANTUCKET,MA                      S-12 SOMBRERO KEY, FL                  E-4   FOLLY ISLAND, SC
                      0                                B-4   DELAWARE SAY, DE                  S-13 FOWEY ROCKS, FL                   E-5   CHESAPEAKE L.S., VA
                      p                                B-5   FIVE FATHOM, NJ                   S-14 SAND KEY, FL                      E-6   MOUNT DESERT ROCK, ME
                      rA                                     BOSTON,MA                         S-15 DRY TORTUGAS, FL                  E-7   ISLES OF SHOALS, NH
          co
                                            W-4                                                S-16 LONG KEY, FL                      E-8   MATINICUS ROCK, ME
                                                                                               S-17 LAKE WORTH, FL                    E-9   FRYING PAN SHOALS L.S., NC
                                                                                                                                      E-10  CAPE LOOKOUT, NC
                                                                                               C-1  ROCK OF AGES, MI                  E-11  DIAMOND SHOALS L.S., NC
                                                                                               C-2  DEVILS ISLAND, WI                 E-12  AMBROSE L.S., NY                           E-4
                                                                                               C-3  SHEBOYGAN,Wl                      E-13  BUZZARDS BAY L.S.. MA
                                                                                               C-4  PASSAGE ISLAND, WI                E-14  THOMAS POINT, MD                       es-8
                                                                                               C-5  STANNARD ROCK, Ml                 E-15  THOUSAND ISLAND BRIDGE, NY
                                                                                                                                      E-16  ALEXANDRIA BAY, NY
                                                                                                                                      E-17  SUPERIOR SHOALS, NY
                      (D                                                                                                                                                              S-5


                                                                                                                                                           S-11     S-1
                                                          NO. STATION                                                                 S-2         S-6 S-3                  S-9        S-17
                                                          A-1   FIVE FINGER, AK
                                                                                                                              S-4               E - EASTERN                       S-16  *S-7
                                                                                                                                                S - SOUTHERN               S-1 51&,&*
                                                                                                                                                C - CENTRAL                       S-14 S-12
                                                                                                                                                W -WESTERN
                                                                                                    PERMANENT NWS                               A - ALASKAN
                                                                                               A OTHER AGENCIES                                 B - LNB/ELB









              A supplemental data source that complements the Data Buoy Network is a fixed remote
              meteorological network mounted on selected oil platforms. For years, this network has
              provided the NWS with supplemental hydrometeorological information by filling many of the
              data gaps between data buoys along the gulf coast. Due to the high cost of maintenance,
              NOAA has been forced to assess a servicing fee for oil companies. The oil companies have
              been either unable to or unwilling to pay the service fee, ultimately opting to have all
              meteorological equipment removed from their oil platforms. Finding 11.1.2: The
              implementation of service maintenance fees has resulted in the removal of
              meteorological equipment from gulf oil platforms, and a significant loss of data has
              occurred.


              The events of Hurricane Andrew continually point to the need for not only more data but
              more accurate data. Recommendation 11.1.2: NOAA must review its position on
              charging oil platforms a service fee to maintain meteorological equipment.


              NWS Radars-WSR-57, WSR-74C, and WSR-88D

              This complement of radars was used to track the progress of Andrew over portions of the gulf
              and on to its eventual landfall in Louisiana. The data provided by these systems
              complemented aircraft reconnaissance and satellite data by giving NWS offices an accurate
              indication of Andrew's position and movement.

              These vintage radar systems performed admirably during Andrew with no recorded
              equipment failures. These coastal radars provided hourly fixes of Andrew, verifying Andrew's
              position and track.

              The WSR-88D Doppler radars have recently been installed and placed in operation at only
              a few sites along the gulf coast. None have been installed in Louisiana, but the system in
              Houston was operational during Andrew. Finding 11.1.3: Although Andrew did not
              move into WSO Houston's effective Doppler range, the WSR-88D radar did provide
              extremely detailed reflectivity data on the storm. The consensus following Andrew was
              that the performance of Houston's WSR-88D provided the NWS with a glimpse of its
              operational capabilities. Recommendation 11.1.3: See Recommendation 1.1.3. Examples
              of the Houston WSR-88D conventional display capabilities are provided as figures 18 and 19.


              Aircraft Reconnaissance

              Reconnaissance off the Louisiana coast was conducted by U.S. Air Force Reserve (USAFR)
              aircraft. At their peak, reconnaissance flights were conducted every 2 hours, providing NHC
              with data critical to NHC and NMC forecast models.

              The reconnaissance missions flown during Andrew were conducted through DOD aircraft,
              dispatched by the USAFR. Department of Commerce aircraft were not employed during
              Andrew. Utilization of these aircraft was coordinated through NHC and CARCAH.
              Hurricane track and intensity forecast errors are highly dependent on the accuracy of initial
              conditions and on the ability of the forecast model to predict the future state of the


                                                           124









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                                                                                                     08/26/92 10:01
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            atmosphere. Over oceans, where hurricanes originate, inadequate observations make a major
            contribution to analysis errors and are, therefore, a formidable obstacle to improved forecasts.

            Recent research has proven that supplemental observations around hurricanes can result in
            large improvements in hurricane track forecasting. This was evidenced in the resulting track
            forecasts during Hurricane Andrew and supported by the results of a study conducted by the
            Hurricane Research Division of AOML. Ultimately, aircraft reconnaissance of tropical
            cyclones must continue in order to make effective use of next generation models for tropical
            cyclone track and intensity forecasting.

            The Hurricane Research Division collected reconnaissance aircraft data off the Louisiana
            coast and combined them with data from land stations, automated coastal platforms, moored
            buoys, and ships and assimilated into a composite representation of the storm. Some of these
            data were collected and processed in real-time, but most of the final composites were
            compiled during post-storm analysis efforts but show promise for real-time application. The
            data composites are in a storm-relative coordinate system over a period of several hours in
            order to provide a field of sufficient data density for analysis. Due to the limited remote
            sensing data available along the Louisiana coast, the resulting wind composites for Louisiana
            were less accurate than over Florida. All wind data are converted to produce estimates of
            sustained winds at the standard 10-meter (33-foot) height over a standard terrain exposure.
            This approach provides a snapshot of the hurricane's wind field.


            Satellite Observations

            GOES satellite platform information provided NWS offices with details on storm track,
            forecast model initialization, and variations within the storm's structure.                 Satellite
            information was frequently referenced in NSSFC mesoscale discussions and local office
            forecast discussion. The use of satellites remains an integral element of the NWS's remote
            sensing program but must be complemented by other remote sensing equipment. This last
            satellite of the GOES 7 era has for the past year been experiencing a decaying of its orbit.
            Had this last remaining satellite failed, the "No-GOES" backup plan would have been
            implemented. This raises the question of whether under the No-GOES plan the NWS could
            adequately address the problems of hurricane tracking and forecasting. Periodic testing of
            the No-GOES plan should ensure its implementation readiness and effectiveness.


            Storm Tide and Storm Surge

            Increases in water level are measured by two methods, storm tide and storm surge. Both are
            described in chapter I.I. Along the Louisiana coast, there were scores of measurements taken
            by the USACE and USGS. Figure 20 depicts many of these measurements. Note that most
            of these observations were taken from tide gauges rather than high water marks. Gauges
            are much more reliable than high water mark observations.







                                                            127



























                                                                     "J
                                                                                                                            12     @D
                                        High Water Mark                                                                   MUM
                               00--
                                                                                                  CA

                                                                                                                                        01
                               Ele-     Gage Observation
                                                                                       1-12
                                                                                                                           4.6
                                                                                                          4.2
                                                                        Rouge                                                                 00

                                                                                                               4.4
                             Lafayette                                                                    Lake            3.6     3.9
                                                                                                       Pontchart ain                               D
                                                                                                                       3.8    ew          3.4
                                   New                                                         11L          enne            eans
                                  Iberia                                              ISSks                                       Lake Borgne
                                                  90                                                                  3.5               4.9
                                                         Morgan    5.2
                          Vermillio,             6.2      city
                                      ay                                                                               4.2                   5.0
                                                                                      Hou- 5.0 P67                                                Bretton
                                           8.2                  7.4                       p             5.6                        4p               oun
                                                                                         0       64                      BaraLa
                                                                               Pea-                           ---e       --B-
                                                                                                                   5.6      0
                                                                                    Cocodrie                                                      3.7
                                                      7.6                                                                   Grand W.


                                                                                              8.0





                                                             Path of
                                                                  Eye                      Gulf of Mexico




                                               Figure 20 - High water marks along the Louisiana coast
                                                                       during Hurricane Andrew.










                                                                                        128










                                                 CONCLUSION


             Its inconspicuous beginning as a weak tropical disturbance in the central Atlantic gave no
             indication of Andrew's ultimate destiny as "The Hurricane" to change the fabric of south
             Dade County society. Nevertheless, the damage left in Andrew's wake has become a
             monument to the potentially profound impact that a powerful hurricane can have on a
             modern coastal community. Collectively, we among the hazards community should regard
             Andrew as an ominous wake-up call-a call to mitigate as it were.

             As terrible a disaster as Hurricane Andrew was, the economic impact of the storm, had it
             moved on a path just 20 miles further north, would have been much, much worse. Evidence
             (figures 21 and 22) suggests that a direct hit on Miami would have cost not $25 billion but
             $60 billion. Continuing the more northerly track across south Florida to Fort Myers, then
             across the Gulf of Mexico to New Orleans, compounds the incredible devastation that very
             easily could have occurred. The difference between the actual track and the one we have just
             conjectured, from a forecast model standpoint, is in the noise level of resolution.

             The substantial change in population distribution along our hurricane vulnerable coastlines
             dictates that we confront the reality that is the hurricane threat. Major hurricanes possess
             arsenals that include flash flood producing-rainfall, killer storm surges, and devastating
             winds. The latter element was the prime cause of damage during Andrew, and those winds
             swept well inland far from areas evacuated because of the storm surge threat.

             If Andrew taught us nothing else, it conveyed the reality that hurricane winds constitute a
             major threat not only along the immediate coastline but for many miles inland. Preparing
             for the possibility of extreme inland winds, in addition to the threat of tornadoes, flash floods,
             riverine flooding, and storm surge, is necessary for private citizenry and emergency planners
             alike. That another "Andrew" will occur is not conjecture, it is a certainty. Our ability to
             respond to that reality hinges on how we answer the call to mitigate.



















                                                            129















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           APPENDICES










                    APPENDIX A


                  SUNULARY TABLES







                                                       Appendix A, Table A.1

                                        Hurricane Andrew Selected Surface Observations
                                                              August 1992

                                     Minimum Sea-level     Maximum Surface Wind Speed
                                         Pressure                       (kt)
                                                                                             Storm        Storm           Rain
                                    Pressure Date/Time      1-Minute   Peak Date/Time        Surge'        Tideb     (Storm Total)
            Location                   (mb)      (UTC)       Average    Gust    (UTC ) a      (ft)         (ft)           (in)



           Bahamas

              Harbour Island           935.Oc    23/2100                 12 0c,d 23/shortly after 2100
              Nassau                   999.0c    24/0000       80        100    24/0025
              Current Island                                                                   23
              Lower Bogue (1  n mi inland)                                                     16

           Florida East Coast and Keys

              Tamiami (TMB)            988. 0c,d               11 oc,d, i       24/0848F
              Miami WSFO/NHC           982 . 0c,d 24/0900      looc,d,e  142 c, d, e24/0850
              NOAA/AOML                984.0                             s-7c,d
              Miami I. Arpt. (MIA)     992.6     24/0900       75e       100    24/0950                                  2.04
              Miami Beach DARDC                                65c       92c    24/0816
              Haulover NOS NGWLMS    1004.0                    58c       115    24/0900
              Fort Lauderdale (FLL)                                      53c
              Palm Beach (PBI)       1010.8      24/0259,0420  43        51     24/1033
              Palm Beach ASOS                                  42               24/1036
              Key West WSO (EYW)     1010.1      24/1400       25        37     24/1614                                  0.33
              Patrick AFB (COF)      1016.2      24/0955       22        31     24/0735
              Melbourne (MLB)        1016.3      24/0950       15        21     24/1151
              Orlando (MCO)          1016.9      24/0950                 30     24/1850
              NASA Shuttle (X68)     1016.9      24/0955       11        23     24/1149
              Titusville (TIX)       1017.9      24/1053       8         14     24/1149                                  0.80c
              East Perrine                                                                                16.9

            Florida West Coast

              Collier County EOC                                         87e    24/
              Captiva Fire Station                                       63
              Fort Myers (RSW)       1010.2     24/1347,1446 30          45     24/1446,1547                             0.56
              Cape Coral
              Glades County EOC                                          44     24/btwn 1100 and 1200
              Clrwtr./St. P. Arpt.                             30        4D     24/1625
              Goodlana                                                                                     6.09
              Everglades City                                                                              6.09








                                                                  Appendix A, Table A. 1

                                                Hurricane Andrew Selected Surface Observations
                                                                           August 1992

                                             Minimum Sea-level        Maximum Surface Wind Speed
                                                  Pressure                            (kt)
                                                                                                                Storm          Storm              Rain
                                            Pressure Date/Time          1-Minute     Peak Date/Time            Surge  b         Tideb       (Storm Total)
              Location                         (mb)        (UTC)         Average      Gust     (UTC ) a          (ft)           (ft)              (in)



              Florida West Coast (cont.)

                 Fort Myers Beach                                                                                               2.0
                 Venice                                                                                                         1.8
                 Anna Marie Island                                                                                              1.5
                 Homosassa                                                                                                      1.5
                 Gulf Harbors                                                                                                   1.5
                 Indian Rocks     Beach                                                                                         1.0

              Louisiana

                 Morgan City      (P42)                                     8V         941
                 Baton Rouge      (BTR)        996.5       26/1427          42         61       26/1452                                          5.70
                 New Orleans      (MSY)       1006.6       26/0805          39         57       26/0950                                          5.70
                 Bayou Bienvenue                                                                                                                 6.28
                 Salt Point AMOS (P92)                                      40         72       26/0728
                 Lafayette (LFT)               990.5       26/1250          46         62       26/1057                                          5.51
                 Lake Charles (LCH)           1008.8                        21         34       26/2152                                          0.05
                 Berwick Fire Stn.                                          83e        104 e
                 Jeanerette                    975.0                        71         78c
                 Jeanerette                                                 67         75       26/0845
                 Near Brusly                   990.2       26/1337          69         90C      26/1310                                          5.05
                 Lafayette Courthouse                                                  goe
                 Mooring 17
                    (29.20N 92.OOW)            994.9       26/0930
                 Cocodrie                                                                                                       8.0
                 Burns Point (St. Mary Parish)                                                                                  6.8 h
                 Bayou Dupre                                                                                                    6.5
                 Bayou Bienvenue                                                                                                6.3
                 NWS HANDAR east     N. Orleans                                                                                 5.6
                 Port Fourchon                                                                                                  5.  oh
                 N end of causeway                                                                                              4.9
                 Industrial canal                                                                                               4.4
                 Marina                                                                                                         4.3
                 Rigolets                                                                                                       4.2
                 Grand Isle                                                                                                     3.5 h








                                                                  Appendix A, Table A.1

                                                Hurricane Andrew Selected Surface Observations
                                                                           August 1992

                                             Minimum Sea-level        Maximum Surface Wind Speed
                                                  Pressure                            (kt)
                                                                                                                Storm          Storm              Rain
                                           Pressure Date/Time           1-Minute     Peak   Date/Time           Surge b         Tide@       (Storm Total)
              Location                        (mb)         (UTC)         Average     Gust      (UTC)a           (ft)            (ft)               (in)


              Alabama

                 Huntsville (HSV)            1000.3        27/2250          22         36       27/1742                                          0.92
                 Birmingham (BHM)            1001.7        27/2215          19         35       27/1640                                          1.77
                 Montgomery (MGM)            1008.8        27/2045          23         31       27/2307                                          1.55
                 Mobile (MOB)                1010.1        27/2051          26         35       25/1844                                          0.64
                 Mobile State Docks                                                                                2.6          3.5
                 Dauphin Island                                                                                                 6.0

              Georgia

                 Atlanta (ATL)               1005.4        28/0400                     39       27/2039

              Mississippi

                 Jackson (JAN)                 998.6       26/0750          28         49       27/0219                                          4.79
                 Tupelo (TUP)                                               24         36       27/2000                                          1.86
                 Meridian (MEI)              1004.4                         25         48       27/0945                                          5.29
                 State Port (Gulfport)                                                 39       27/1951
                 Bay St. Louis                                                                                                  4.5f

              Texas


                 Port Arthur (BPT)           1011.5        26/1000          22         30       26/1953
                 Sabine Pass                                                                                                    1.1              1.3

              Ship reports

                 OYGK2 (29.50N 80.60W)                                      60                  25/1200
                 ELLE2 (19.40N 56.60W)       1013.5        19/1500          35                  19/1500
                 C6KD    (28.10N 79.20W)     1015.5        24/0600          35                  24/0600








                                                    Appendix A, Table A. 1

                                      Hurricane Andrew Selected Surface observations
                                                           August 1992

                                   Minimum Sea-level   Maximum Surface Wind Speed
                                       Pressure                     (kt)
                                                                                        Storm       Storm          Rain
                                  Pressure Date/Time    1-Minute   Peak Date/Time       Surge'       Tideb     (Storm Total)
            Location                (mb)       (UTC)     Average   Gust    (UTC)a        (ft)        (ft)          (in)


            Gulf of Mexico platforms(c,@)

             SS 198G (28.20N 92.OOW)                        78       100    26/0330
             EC 83H (28.20N 92.OOW)                         46       49     26/0330
             EC 42B (29.50N 92.80W)                         38       88     26/0430
             SM 136B (28.20N 92.OOW)                        38       44     25/2230


            a Time of 1-minute wind speed unless only gust  is given.
            b Storm surge is water height above normal tide level.   Storm tide is water height relative to National Geodetic
              Vertical Datum (NGVD) which is defined as mean sea level in 1929.
            c A more extreme value may have occurred.
            d Equipment became inoperable after this measurement.
            e Non-standard elevation.
            f Estimated.
            9 Above Mean Low Water.
            h Above Mean Water Level.
              Subsequent laboratory tests at the NHC indicate that the needles on the two windspeed dials at Tamiami Airport
              "peg" at about 104.6 and 108.1 knots, respectively.







                                        Appendix A, Table A.2

                           Selected Rainfall Totals Associated with
                                           Hurricane Andrew
                                              August 1992

           Location                                                          Total Rain (in)



           Florida

             S-124  (Broward County)                                              7.79
             S-21A  (Dade County)                                                 7.41
             S-20G  (Dade County)                                                 5.19
             S-37A  (Broward County)                                              5.14
             S-39   (Broward/Palm Beach Counties)                                 5.12
             S-80   (Martin-St. Lucie)                                            4.94
             Everglades Park (Collier County)                                    *4.50
             S-18C (Dade County)                                                  4.48
             Marco Island                                                        *3.50
             S-20F  (Dade County)                                                 4.12
             S-308  (Lake Okeechobee area)                                        3.47
             Cudjoe Key                                                           2.02

           Louisiana


             Hammond                                                             11.92
             Robert                                                              11.02
             Amite                                                               10.36
             Morgan  City                                                         9.31
             Manchac                                                              8.75
             Jeanerette                                                           7.96
             Butte La Rose                                                        7.90
             Ponchatoula                                                          7.54
             Mt. Herman                                                           7.50
             Franklin                                                             7.03
             WSFO Slidell                                                         5.06
             Jena 4WSW                                                            4.42


           Alabama


             Aliceville                                                           4.40
             Tuscaloosa                                                           3.60
             MRGAl  Morgan                                                        3.46
             MRZAl  Mount Roszell                                                 3.21
             CDCA1  Red Bay Creek                                                 2.90
             WRTA1  Wright                                                        2.89
             CBTAl  Colbert                                                       2.75
             AKDAl  Lexington                                                     2.66
             OAKA1  Oakland                                                       2.62


           Georgia

                    Hurst                                                         5.24
                    Mountain City                                                 4.60
                    Burton                                                        4.31
                    Clayton                                                       4.30
                    Nacoochee Pwr                                                 3.83
                    Helen                                                         3.40
             SCHG1  Suches G. Creek                                               3.32
             TUSG1  Titus                                                         3.13
                    Tallulah                                                      3.05
                    Jasper                                                        2.67
             BRDG1  Blue Ridge Dam                                                2.65
             EPWG1  Epworth H. Store                                              2.64


              Indicates estimate.


                                                    A-5







                                            Appendix A, Table A.2

                               Selected Rainfall Totals Associated with
                                                Hurricane Andrew
                                                   August 1992

              Location                                                              Total Rain (in)



              Kentucky

                BLWK2                                                                    2.56

              Mississippi

                Sumrall                                                                  9.30
                Pelahatchie (gauge)                                                      8.20
                Yazoo City                                                               7.63
                Crystal Springs                                                          7.24
                Pelahatchie (co-op)                                                      7.07
                Collins                                                                  7.04
                Union Church                                                             7.04
                Brookhaven                                                               7.02
                Mize                                                                     6.71
                Rockport                                                                 6.36
                Monticello                                                               6.36
                Booneville                                                               6.30
                Good Hope                                                                6.14
                Vicksburg                                                                5.95
                McComb                                                                   5.93
                Ofahoma.                                                                 5.82
                Bay St.  Louis                                                           5.72
                White Oak                                                                5.65
                Forest                                                                   5.59
                Liberty                                                                  5.59
                Goshen Springs                                                           5.52
                Port Gibson                                                              5.51
                Meadville                                                                5.45
                Tylertown                                                                5.38
                Columbia                                                                 5.32
                Philadelphia                                                             5.06

              North Carolina

                HDSN7 Highlands                                                          4.68
                WLGN7 F-Wallace    Gap                                                   2.73
                RMNN7 Rosman                                                             2.62


              Tennessee

                ELKTI   Elkton                                                           3.80
                WNBTl   Waynesboro                                                       3.64
                GEOT1   Georgetown                                                       3.43
                IRCT1   Iron City-S.C.                                                   3.33
                BGLTl   Big Lick                                                         3.25
                CBOT1   Crab Orchard                                                     3.07
                CLLTl   Collinwood                                                       3.07
                PSKT1   Pulaski                                                          3.03
                LNVT1   Lynnville                                                        2.97
                PICT1   Pickwick Dam                                                     2.95
                CLET1   Cleveland                                                        2.91
                CLBT1   Columbia                                                         2.80
                DYNT1   Dime                                                             2.74
                LEWTI   Lewisburg                                                        2.58
                CSV     Crossville Arpt.                                                 2.57
                PKVT1   Pikeville                                                        2.50



                                                         A-6








                                       Appendix A, Table A. 3

                         Hurricane Andrew Selected NDBC Observations
                                             August 1992

                                     Minimum Sea-Level            Maximum Wind Speed
                                           Pressure                        (kt)


            Platform/                Pressure Date/Time                    Peak   Date/Time
            Location                    (mb)       (UTC)       Average'    Gust      (UTC)


            Fowey Rocks C-MAN          967 . 5b,c  24/0800        123 b, c 147 b, c24/0800
            FW`YFl/ 25.60N 80.10W

            Bullwinkle Platform        998.5       25/2300        52       63b     25/2225
            BUSLl/ 27.90N 90.90W

            Molasses Reef C-MAN        998.5       24/0900        48       59      24/1000
            MLRFl/ 25.OON 80.40W

            Eastern Gulf Buoy          997.4       25/0400        45       63      25/0250
            42003/ 25.90N 85.90W

            Grand Isle C-MAN          1005.2       25/2300        48       73      25/2200
            GDILl/ 29.20N 90.OOW

            Southwest Pass C-MAN      1006.1       25/2200        56       80      25/2100
            BURLl/ 28.90N 89.40W

            Sombrero Key C-MAN        1007.7       24/1100        34       42      24/1130
            SMKF11 24.60N 81.20W


            Lena Platform C-MAN       1007.7       25/1600
            LNELl/ 28.20N 89.10W

            Eleuthera Buoy            1007.9       23/2040        29       35b     24/0040
            41016/ 24.60N   76.50W

            Sand Key C-MAN            1010.2       24/1100,1400   30       43      24/1600
            SANFl/ 24.50N   81.90W

            Settlement Point C-MAN    1012.7       24/0600        38       47      24/0500
            SPGF1/ 26.70N 79.OOW

            Buoy                      1013.5       25/2250        30       46      25/1850
            42007/ 30.10N 88.80W

            Dauphin.Island C-MAN      1016.1       26/0000        32       46      25/2100
            DPIAl/ 30.20N 88.10W


            a NOAA buoys report an 8-minute average wind. C-MAN station reports are 2-min.
              average winds at the top of the hour and 10-min. averages at other times.
              Contact NDBC for additional details.

            b A more extreme value may have occurred.

            C Equipment became inoperable shortly after observation.








                                                   A-7








                                          Appendix A, Table A.4

                     Initial Estimates of Casualties and Damages Incurred
                                in Association With Hurricane Andrew.



                                                Deaths                      Damage
                                          Direct       Indirect           ($Billion)



              Bah-nas                        3             1                   0.25

              Florida                        15a           29             26-25

                Dade  County                 15            25             20-25
                Broward County               0             3                   0.1
                Monroe County                0             1                   0.131
                Collier County               0             0                   0.03

              Louisiana                      B&            9                   1


                St. J. the B. Parish         2
                Offshore                     6
                Lafayette Parish                           2                   0.017
                Vermilion Parish                                               0.001
                Iberville Parish                           1
                Terrebonne Parish                          3
                Orleans Parish                             1
                Plaquemines Parish                         1
                Iberia Parish                              1

              Georgia                                                          0.001




              Total                          26            39             20-25


              a Total includes missing individuals presumed dead.








                                               Appendix A, Table A.5

                           Hurricane Andrew Average Track Forecast Errors
                                 (Nautical miles), Non-homogeneous Sample

                                                               Forecast Period (Hours)

                      Model                             12         24         36       48         72


                      official                          33         65       106        141        243
                      (no. of cases)                    (37)      (35)      (33)       (31)       (27)

                      CLIPER                            35         81       148        233        437
                                                        (37)      (35)      (33)       (31)       (27)

                      AVNO                              60         75         89         97       132
                                                        (15)      (15)      (14)       (13)       (11)

                      BAMD                              45         93       141        182        268
                                                        (37)      (35)      (33)       (31)       (27)
                      BAMM                              40         81       121        151        229
                                                        (37)      (35)      (33)       (31)       (27)

                      BAMS                              39         77       114        135        197
                                                        (37)      (35)      (33)       (31)       (27)

                      QLM                               39         64         93       130        192
                                                        (19)      (18)      (17)       (16)       (14)

                      NHC90                             35         77       135        197        330
                                                        (37)      (35)      (33)       (31)       (27)

                      VBAR                              32         60         93       138        287
                                                        (23)      (23)      (23)       (23)       (23)

                      GFDL                              36         71         93       117        209
                                                        (9)        (9)        (9)        (9)        (7)






                                                           Appendix A, Table A.6

                                                       Watch and Warning Summary
                                                                Hurricane Andrew




                        Date/Tirne(UTC)/Action


                          22/1500 Hurricane Watch                                   Northwest Bahamas from Andros and Eleuthera Islands
                                                                                    northward through Grand Bahama and Great Abaco


                          22/2100 Hurricane Warning                                 Northwest Bahamas from Andros and Eleuthera Islands
                                                                                    northward through Grand Bahama and Great Abaco


                          22/2100 Hurricane Watch                                   Florida east coast from Titusville southward through the
                                                                                    Florida Keys including the Dry Tortugas


                          23/0600 Hurricane Warning                                 Central Bahamas including Cat Island, Great Exuma, San
                                                                                    Salvador, and Long Island


                          23/1200 Hurricane Warning                                 Florida east coast from Vero Beach southward through the
                                                                                    Florida Keys to the Dry Tortugas including Florida Bay


                          23/1200 Tropical Storm Warning                            Florida east coast north of Vero Beach to Titusville


                          23/1200 Hurricane Watch                                   Florida west coast south of Bayport including the greater
                                                                                    Tampa area to north of Flamingo


                          23/1800 Hurricane Warning                                 Florida west coast south of Venice and Lake Okeechobee


                          23/1800 Tropical Storm Warning                            Florida west coast north of Venice to Bayport


                          24/0900 Hurricane Warning discontinued                    Bahamas except for Bimini and Grand Bahama


                          24/1300 Hurricane warning discontinued                    Remainder of the Bahamas


                          24/1300 Hurricane Warning discontinued                    Florida except for Lake Okeechobee and the west coast
                                                                                    south of Venice to Flamingo


                          24/1300 Tropical Storm Warning and                        Florida east coast from Vero Beach to Titusville
                                  Hurricane Watch discontinued                      and Florida west coast from Venice to Bayport


                          24/1300 Hurricane Watch                                   Northern gulf coast from Mobile, Alabama, to Sabine Pass,
                                                                                    Texas


                          24/1800 Hurricane warning discontinued                    Remainder of Florida


                          24/2100 Hurricane Warning                                 Northern gulf coast from Pascagoula, Mississippi, to
                                                                                    Vermilion Bay, Louisiana


                          25/0900 Hurricane  warning                                Vermilion Bay, Louisiana, to Port Arthur, Texas


                          25/0900 Hurricane  watch                                  West of Port Arthur through High Island, Texas


                          25/1500 Hurricane  Warning                                West of Port Arthur through the Bolivar Peninsula, Texas


                          25/1500 Hurricane  watch                                  west of the Bolivar Peninsula to Freeport, Texas


                          26/0700 Hurricane  warning discontinued                   East of Grand Isle, Louisiana


                          26/0700 Hurricane  Watch discontinued                     west of the Bolivar Peninsula


                          26/1100 Hurricane  Warning discontinued                   West of Port Arthur, Texas


                          26/1300 Hurricane  warning discontinued                   West of Cameron, Louisiana


                          26/1700 Hurricane  Warning discontinued                   Remainder of gulf coast


                                                                          A-10






                                       Appendix A, Table A.7

                 Watch and Warning Lead Times for Landfall Sites during
                 Hurricane Andrew. Lead Time Refers to Time Lapsed From
                                       Advisory to Landfall.


                     Location                      Type              Lead Time (hours)



                Northwest Bahamas            Hurricane Watch                  30
                                             Hurricane Warning                24

                Southeast Florida            Hurricane Watch                  36
                                             Hurricane Warning                21

                South-central Louisiana      Hurricane Watch                  43
                                             Hurricane Warning                24






















































                                                   A-11






                                       Appendix A, Table A.8

                 Chances of the Center of Hurricane Andrew Passing within
              65 Miles of Listed Locations by Date and Time (EDT) indicated,
                  Probabilities in Percent With X for Less than 2 Percent



            Advisory Issue Time:     16/11PM    17/5AM    17/11AM    17/5PM   17/11PM
            Probability End Time:    19/8PM     20/2AM    20/8AM     20/2PM   20/8PM

            SVMG 11ON 640W               4          5         7          6        X
            TTPP 106N 614W               7          8         9          6        X
            TTPT 112N 608W               8        10        11           8        X
            TGPY 120N 618W               8        10        11           9        X
            TBPB 131N 595W             11         14        15         14         4


            TVSV 131N 612W               9        11        14         12         3
            TLPL 138N 61OW             10         12        15         14         5
            TFFF 146N 61OW             10         12        15         15         8
            TDPR 153N 614W             10         12        15         15       10
            TFFR 163N 615W             10         12        16         16       13

            TAPA 171N 618W               9        11        15         16       15
            TKPK 173N 627W               8        10        14         15       14
            TNCM 181N 631W               8          9       14         14       14
            TISX 177N 648W               6          7       12         12         9
            TIST 183N 650W               6          7       11         12       10

            TJPS 180N 666W               4          5         9        10         6
            TJSJ 184N 661W               4          5       10         11         8
            MDSD 185N 697W               X          X         5          5        X
            MDCB 176N 714W               X          X         2          3        X
            MTPP 186N 724W               X          X         2          2        X

            TNCC 122N 690W               X          X         3          2        X
            MDPP 198N 707W               X          X         3          4        X
            MBJT 215N 712W               X          X         2          3        X
            MYMM 224N 730W               X          X         X          2        X
            ST CROIX VI                  6          7       12         12         9

            ST THOMAS VI                 6          7       11         12       10
            SAN JUAN PR                  4          5       10         11         8
            PONCE PR                     4          5         9        10         6


            Advisory Issue Time:     18/5AM     18/11AM   18/5PM     18/11PM 19/5AM
            Probability End Time:    21/2AM     21/8AM    21/2PM     21/8PM   22/2AM

            TBPB 131N 595W               4          3         X          X        X
            TVSV 131N 612W               3          3         X          X        X
            TLPL 138N 61OW               6          6         2          X        X
            TFFF 146N 61OW               9          9         4          2        2
            TDPR 153N 614W             11         13          7          4        3

            TFFR 163N 615W             15         18        13           8        6
            TAPA 171N 618W             18         21        17         14       10
            TKPK 173N 627W             16         20        17         14       10
            TNCM 181N 631W             17         21        19         19       17
            TISX 177N 648W             12         16        14         14       12

            TIST 183N 650W             13         17        16         16       15
            TJPS 180N 666W               8        13        12         12       11
            TJSJ 184N 661W             10         15        14         14       14
            MDSD 185N 697W               3          6         7          8        8
            MDCB 176N 714W               X          2         3          3        3

            MTPP 186N 724W               X          2         3          3        3
            MIDPP 198N 707W              3          6         8          8        9


                                                    A-12







                                      Appendix A, Table A-8

                Chances of the Center of Hurricane Andrew Passing within
            65 Miles of Listed Locations by Date and Time (EDT) Indicated,
                Probabilities in Percent With X for Less than 2 Percent



          Advisory Issue Time:        18/5AM    18/11AM   18/5PM     18/11PM 19/5AM
          Probability End Time:       21/2AM    21/8AM    21/2PM     21/8PM   22/2AM

          MBJT 215N 712W               3         7         8          9       11
          MYMM 224N 730W               X         4         5          6        8
          MYSM 241N 745W               X         2         3          4        6


          MYEG 235N 758W               X         X         2          2        3
          MYNN 251N 775W               X         X         X          X        2
          ST CROIX VI                 12        16        14         14       12
          ST THOMAS VI                13        17        16         16       15
          SAN JUAN PR                 10        15        14         14       14


          PONCE PR                     8        13        12         12       11



          Advisory  Issue Time:    19/11AM    19/5PM    19/11PM    20/5AM   20/11AM
          Probability End Time:    22/8AM     22/2PM    22/8PM     23/2AM   23/8AM

          TAPA  171N 618W              2         X         X          X        X
          TKPK  173N 627W              4         X         X          X        X
          TNCM  181N 631W              7         3         X          X        X
          TISX  177N 648W              6         3         2          2        2
          TIST  183N 650W              9         5         3          3        3


          TJPS  18ON 666W              7         5         4          4        4
          TJSJ  184N 661W              9         6         4          4        4
          MDSD  185N 697W              6         7         6          6        6
          MDCB  176N 714W              3         4         3          3        4
          MTPP  186N 724W              3         6         4          4        5


          MDPP  198N 707W              8        11         9          9        9
          MBJT  215N 712W             11        16        13         13       12
          MYMM  224N 730W              8        14        11         12       11
          MYSM  241N 745W              6        14         9         10       10
          MYEG  235N 758W              3        10         6          6        7


          MYNN  251N 775W              X         8         3          4        5
          MUGM  20ON 751W              X         6         3          3        4
          MUCM  214N 779W              X         3         X          X        2
          MYAK  241N 776W              X         7         3          3        5
          MTCA  183N 738W              X         4         3          3        3


          MYGF  266N 787W              X         6         2          2        4
          ST CROIX VI                  6         3         2          2        2
          ST THOMAS VI                 9         5         3          3        3
          SAN JUAN PR                  9         6         4          4        4
          PONCE PR                     7         5         4          4        4


          MARATHON FL                  X         2         X          X        X
          MIAMI FL                     X         3         X          X        2
          W PALM BEACH FL              X         4         X          X        2
          FT PIERCE FL                 X         3         X          X        2
          COCOA BEACH FL               X         3         X          X        X


          DAYTONA BEACH FL             X         2         X          X        X
          MARCO ISLAND FL              X         2         X          X        X
          BERMUDA                      X         X         3          X        3





                                                A-13






                                        Appendix A, Table A.8

                  Chances of the Center of Hurricane Andrew Passing within
              65 Miles of Listed Locations by Date and Time (EDT) indicated,
                   Probabilities in Percent With X for Less than 2 Percent



             Advisory Issue Time:     20/5PM    20/11PM   21/5AM     21/11AM 21/5PM
             Probability End Time:    23/2PM    23/8PM    24/2AM     24/8AM   24/2PM

             MDSD 185N 697W              4         X          X         X         X
             MDCB 176N 714W              2         X          X         X         X
             MTPP 186N 724W              4         X          2         2         2
             MDPP 198N 707W              7         3          3         3         6
             MBJT 215N 712W             12         6          8         6         6

             MYMM 224N 730W             13         7          9         8         8
             mysm 241N 745W             13         8         12         11       12
             MYEG 235N 758W             10         5          8         9        10
             MYNN 251N 775W              8         3          7         9        10
             MUGM 20ON 751W              5         X          3         4         3

             MUCM 214N 779w              4         X         2          5         5
             MYAK 241N 776W              7         2          6         8         9
             MTCA 183N 738W              3         X          2         2         X
             MYGF 266N 787W              6         2          6         9         9
             MUHA 230N 824W              X         X          X         3         3

             MKJS 185N 779W              X         X          X         2         2
             MWCG 193N 814W              X         X          X         2         X
             MUCF 221N 805W              X         X          X         4         4
             MUSN 216N 826W              X         X          X         2         2
             MARATHON FL                 2         X          X         5         6

             MIAMI FL                    3         X          2         7         7
             W PALM BEACH FL             4         X          3         7         8
             FT PIERCE FL                3         X          3         7         8
             COCOA BEACH FL              3         X          3         6         7
             DAYTONA BEACH FL            2         X          2         6         6

             MARCO ISLAND FL             2         X          X         5         6
             BERMUDA                     2         6          3         2         2
             MYRTLE BEACH SC             2         X          3         4         4
             WILMINGTON NC               2         2          4         3         4
             MOREHEAD CITY NC            3         3          5         3         3

             CAPE HATTERAS NC            2         3          5         3         3
             CHARLESTON SC               2         X          3         4         4
             NORFOLK VA                  X         X          3         2         2
             OCEAN CITY MD               X         X          2         X         X
             SAVANNAH GA                 X         X          2         4         4

             KEY WEST FL                 X         X          X         5         5
             JACKSONVILLE FL             X         X          X         5         6
             FT MYERS FL                 X         X          X         5         6
             VENICE FL                   X         X          X         5         5
             TAMPA FL                    X         X          X         5         5

             CEDAR KEY FL                X         X          X         4         4
             ST MARKS FL                 X         X          X         3         3
             APALACHICOLA FL             X         X          X         X         3
             PANAMA CITY FL              X         X          X         X         2
             GULF 29N 85W                X         X          X         X         2

             GULF 29N 87W                X         X          X         X         2





                                                   A-14






                                      Appendix A, Table A.8

                Chances of the Center of Hurricane Andrew Passing within
            65 Miles of Listed Locations by Date and Time (EDT) indicated,
                 Probabilities in Percent With X for Less than 2 Percent



           Advisory Issue Time:     21/11PM   22/5AM    22/11AM    22/5PM   22/11PM
           Probability End Time:    24/8PM    25/2AM    25/8AM     25/2PM   25/8PM

           MBJT 215N 712W              3         2         X          X        X
           MYMM 224N 730W              6         6         5          X        X
           MYSM 241N 745W             11        13        17         27       35
           MYEG 235N 758W              9        10        12         15       11
           MYNN 251N 775W             11        13        17         27       35


           MUGM 20ON 751W              3         X         X          X        X
           MUCM 214N 779W              4         5         6          7        2
           MYAK 241N 776W              9        11        14         22       27
           MYGF 266N 787W             11        13        17         24       24
           MUHA 230N 824W              4         5         8          14      16


           MWCG 193N 814W              X         X         X          4        X
           MUCF 221N 805W              X         X         X          4        X
           MUSN 216N 826W              2         3         6         10        9
           MUAN 219N 850W              2         3         5          9       11
           MMCZ 205N 869W              X         X         3-         5        5


           MARATHON FL                 6         8        12         19       23
           MIAMI FL                    8        10        14         21       23
           W PALM BEACH FL             9        11        15         20       20
           FT PIERCE FL                9        11        15         18       16
           COCOA BEACH FL              9        11        14         16       13


           DAYTONA BEACH FL            8        10        12         13       10
           MARCO ISLAND FL             7         9        13         19       21
           BERMUDA                     2         X         X          X        X
           MYRTLE BEACH SC             6         6         5          X        X
           WILMIMGTON NC               5         5         4          X        X


           MOREHEAD CITY NC            5         5         3          X        X
           CAPE HATTERAS NC            4         4         2          X        X
           CHARLESTON SC               6         7         6          3        2
           NORFOLK VA                  2         2         X          X        X
           SAVANNAH GA                 6         7         7          5        4


           KEY WEST FL                 5         7        11         18       21
           JACKSONVILLE FL             7         8         9          9        7
           FT MYERS FL                 7         9        13         18       19
           VENICE FL                   6         8        12         17       17
           TAMPA FL                    7         9        11         15       14


           CEDAR KEY FL                6         8        10         13       11
           ST MARKS FL                 4         6         8         10        9
           APALACHICOLA FL             4         5         7         11       10
           PANAMA CITY FL              3         5         6         10        9
           GULF 29N 85W                4         6         8         12       11


           GULF 29N 87W                2         4         6         11       11
           PENSACOLA FL                2         3         5          9        8
           MOBILE AL                   2         X         4          8        7
           MMD 21ON 897W               X         X         2          3        5'
           GULFPORT MS                 X         X         3          8        7


           BURAS LA                    X         X         3          8        9
           NEW ORLEANS LA              X         X         3          7        7
           NEW IBERIA LA               X         X         2          5        6
           GULF 28N 89W                X         X         4         10       11


                                                 A-15






                                           AppendiX A, Table A.8

                    Chances of the Center of Hurricane Andrew Passing within
                65 Miles of Listed Locations by Date and Time (EDT) indicated,
                     Probabilities in Percent With X for Less than 2 Percent



              Advisory Issue Time:       21/11PM    22/5AM     22/11AM    22/5PM    22/11PM
              Probability End Time:      24/8PM     25/2AM     25/8AM     25/2PM    25/8PM

              GULF 28N 91W                   x         x           2          7          9


              FREEPORT TX                    x         x           x          2          4
              PORT 0 CONNOR TX               x         x           x          2          3
              PORT AUTHUR TX                 x         x           x          3          4
              GALVESTON TX                   x         x           x          3          4
              GULF 28N 93W                   x         x           x          5          7


              GULF 28N 95W                   x         x           x          3          5
              GULF 27N 96W                   x         x           x          2          4
              BROWNSVILLE TX                 x         x           x          x          3
              CORPUS CHRISTI   TX            x         x           x          x          3
              GULF 25N 96W                   x         x           x          x          4


              Advisory Issue   Time:     23/5AM                23/11AM              23/5PM
              Probability End Time:      26/2AM                26/8AM               26/2PM

              MYSM  241N 745W              26                     13                     x
              MYEG  235N 758W              12                      2                     x
              MYNN  251N 775W              51                     68                   99
              MYAK  241N 776W              34                     34                   17
              MYGF  266N 787W              36                     43                   61

              MUHA  230N 824W              18                     15                   10
              MUCF  221N 805W              10                      5                     x
              MUSN  216N 826W                9                     5                     x
              MUAN  219N 850W              11                      9                     6
              MMCZ  205N 869W                5                     4                     x

              MARATHON FL                  30                     32                   37
              MIAMI FL                     34                     40                   56
              W PALM BEACH FL              30                     33                   47
              FT PIERCE FL                 23                     23                   28
              COCOA BEACH FL               11                     10                     9

              DAYTONA BEACH FL             11                     10                     9
              MARCO ISLAND FL              28                     31                   42
              CHARLESTON SC                  x                     x                     x
              SAVANNAH GA                    3                     2                     x
              KEY WEST FL                  27                     28                   31

              JACKSONVILLE FL                7                     6                     x
              FT MYERS FL                  25                     27                   37
              VENICE FL                    21                     22                   29
              TAMPA FL                     17                     17                   20
              CEDAR KEY  FL                13                     12                   13

              ST MARKS FL                  10                     10                     9
              APALACHICOLA    FL           12                     12                   12
              PANAMA CITY FL               12                     11                   11
              GULF 29N 85W                 14                     14                   15
              GULF 29N 87W                 14                     14                   15

              PENSACOLA FL                 11                     11                   11
              MOBILE AL                    10                     11                   11
              MMMID 21ON 897W                5                     5                     x
              GULFPORT MS                  10                     11                   12


                                                       A-16







                                         Appendix A, Table A.8

                  Chances of the Center of Hurricane Andrew Passing within
              65 Miles of Listed Locations by Date and Time (EDT) indicated,
                  Probabilities in Percent With X for Less than 2 Percent



            Advisory Issue Time:      23/5AM                23/11AM              23/5PM
            Probability End Time:     26/2AM                26/8AM               26/2PM

            BURAS LA                     12                    13                   14
            NEW ORLEANS LA               11                    12                   13
            NEW IBERIA LA                 9                    11                   13
            GULF 28N 89W                 14                    16                   17
            GULF 28N 91W                 12                    14                   16
            FREEPORT TX                   7                     9                   12


            PORT 0 CONNOR TX              6                     8                   11
            PORT AUTHOR TX                7                    10                   12
            GALVESTON TX                  7                    10                   12
            MMSO 238N 982W                2                     3                    X
            MMTM 22N 979W                 X                     2                    X


            GULF 28N 93W                 10                    12                   14
            GULF 28N 95W                  7                    10                   12
            GULF 27N 96W                  6                     9                   11
            BROWNSVILLE TX                4                     6                    8
            CORPUS CHRISTI  TX            4                     7                    9
            GULF 25N 96W                  4                     7                    8



            Advisory Issue  Time:     23/11PM    24/5AM     24/11AM    24/5PM
            Probability End Time:     26/8PM     27/2AM     27/8AM     27/2PM

            MYGF 266N 787W               60         30          X          X
            MUHA 230 N 824W               4          2          X          X
            MUAN 219N 850W                3          3          X          X
            MMCZ 205N 869W                X          2          X          X
            MARATHON FL                  53         62          X          X


            MIAMI FL                     71         99          X          X
            W PALM BEACH FL              42         73          X          X
            FT PIERCE FL                 14          8          X          X
            COCOA BEACH FL                7          4          X          X
            DAYTONA BEACH FL              5          3          X          X


            MARCO ISLAND FL              50         83         99          X
            CHARLESTON SC                 X          X          X          X
            SAVANNAH GA                   2          X          X          X
            KEY WEST FL                  41         37          X          X
            JACKSONVILLE FL               4          3          X          X


            FT MYERS FL                  37         67         94          X
            VENICE FL                    26         46         62          X
            TAMPA FL                     16         19          6          X
            CEDAR KEY   FL               10         10          4          X
            ST MARKS FL                   8          8          6          6


            APALACHICOLA  FL             11         12          9          8
            PANAMA CITY FL               10         11         11         10
            GULF 29N 85W                 13         15         13          9
            GULF 29N 87W                 14         16         25         23
            PENSACOLA FL                 10         12         15         16


            MOBILE AL                    10         12         17         18
            MMMD 21ON   897W              3          3          X          X
            GULFPORT MS                  11         13         19         21
            BURAS LA                     13         16         24         26


                                                     A-17






                                          Appendix A, Table A.8

                   Chances of the Center of Hurricane Andrew Passing within
               65 Miles of Listed Locations by Date and Time (EDT) indicated,
                    Probabilities in Percent With X for Less than 2 Percent



             Advisory Issue Time:       23/11PM    24/5AM     24/11AM    24/5PM
             Probability End Time:      26/8PM     27/2AM     27/8AM     27/2PM

             NEW ORLEANS LA               12         14         21         23
             NEW IBERIA LA                12         14         20         21
             GULF 28N 89W                 16         19         33         36
             GULF 28N 91W                 15         17         26         28
             FREEPORT TX                  10         11         13         13
             PORT 0 CONNOR TX             10         10         11         10


             PORT ARTHUR TX               10         12         16         17
             GALVESTON TX                 11         12         15         15
             MMSO 238N 982W                5          3          X          X
             GULF 28N 93W                 13         15         19         19
             GULF 28N 95W                 11         12         13         13


             GULF 27N 96W                 10         10          9          8
             BROWNSVILLE TX                8          6          4          3
             CORPUS CHRISTI   TX           9          8          7          6
             GULF 25N 96W                  9          7          4          4
             MMTM 222N 979W                3          X          X          X


             MMTX 21ON 974W                2          X          X          X


             Advisory Issue   Time:     24/11PM    25/5AM     25/11AM    25/5PM   25/11PM
             Probability End Time:      27/8PM     28/2AM     28/8AM     28/2PM   28/8PM

             FT PIERCE FL                  2          X          X          X         X
             COCOA BEACH FL                2          X          X          X         X
             DAYTONA BEACH FL              3          X          X          X         X
             MARCO ISLAND FL               2          X          X          X         X
             CHARLESTON SC                 2          X          X          X         X


             SAVANNAH GA                   3          X          X          X         X
             JACKSONVILLE FL               4          X          X          X         X
             FT MYERS FL                   2          X          X          X         X
             VENICE FL                     3          X          X          X         X
             TAMPA FL                      4          X          X          X         X

             CEDAR KEY   FL                6          X          X          X         X
             ST MARKS FL                   9          5          X          X         6
             APALACHICOLA  FL             11          7          6          4         6
             PANAMA CITY FL               13          8          7          6         7
             GULF 29N 85W                 11          6          5          4         5

             GULF 29N 87W                 21         15          9          6         6
             PENSACOLA FL                 16         13         11          9        11
             MOBILE AL                    18         16         14         13        11
             GULFPORT MS                  20         20         18         16        15
             BURAS LA                     23         32         50         44        64

             NEW ORLEANS  LA              21         25         36         37        66
             NEW IBERIA LA                19         23         38         50        76
             GULF 28N 89W                 37         68         99         99         6
             GULF 28N 91W                 24         40         63         99        99
             FREEPORT TX                  11         16         17         15         5

             PORT 0 CONNOR TX              9         13         13         10        .2
             PORT ARTHUR TX               14         18         24         28        30
             GALVESTON TX                 13         17         20         19        11


                                                      A-18







                                    Appendix A, Table A. 8

               Chances of the Center of Hurricane Andrew Passing within
            65 Miles of Listed Locations by Date and Time (EDT) indicated,
                Probabilities in Percent With X for Less than 2 Percent



          Advisory Issue Time:    24/11PM   25/5AM    25/11AM   25/5PM   25/11PM
          Probability End Time:   27/8PM    28/2AM    28/8AM    28/2PM   28/8PM

          MMSO 238N 982W             X          3        X         X        X
          GULF 28N 93W               17       21         21        22       8


          GULF 28N 95W               12       16         14        11       3
          GULF 27N 96W               8        12         9         6        X
          BROWNSVILLE TX             4          7        5         2        X
          CORPUSCHRISTI TX           6        10         9         6        X
          GULF 25N 96W               4          7        4         X        X


























































                                               A-19










                                            APPENDIX B


                FLORIDA DEATHS DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE
                                 TO HURRICANE ANDREW
                                           AUGUST 1992



            AGE RACE SEX               CAUSE OF DEATH            CIRCUMSTANCE



            47    BLACK MALE           ASPHYXIA DUE TO           TREE FELL ON CAMPER
                                       CHEST COMPRESSION


            12    WHITE FEMALE         BLUNT HEAD TRAUMA         STRUCK BY BEAM FROM ROOF WHILE
                                                                 IN HER HOME


            25    WHITE MALE           MASSIVE HEAD TRAUMA       ROOF OF HOME CAVED IN


            74    WHITE MALE           MULTIPLE INJURIES         TRUCK TRAILER WITHOUT WHEELS
                                                                 (BEING USED AS A SHELTER)
            49    WHITE MALE           CRANIOCEREBRAL TRAUMA     ROLLED OVER AND COLLAPSED
                                                                 (ELEVEN OTHERS SURVIVED)

            32    WHITE MALE           DROWNING                  ABOARD ANCHORED BOAT AT TIME OF
                                                                 STORM; LATER FOUND FLOATING IN
                                                                 CANAL


            62    WHITE MALE           MECHANICAL ASPHYXIA       TRAILER COLLAPSED AND ROLLED OVER


            67    WHITE MALE           POSITIONAL ASPHYXIA       TRAPPED UNDER DEBRIS FROM CEILING
                                                                 THAT COLLAPSED


            80    WHITE FEMALE         MECHANICAL ASPHYXIA       REFUSED EVACUATION; BURIED LINDER
                                                                 DEBRIS WHEN TRAILER COLLAPSED


            46    WHITE MALE           MULTIPLE BLUNT TRAUMA     FOUND IN RESIDENCE DESTROYED BY
                                                                 STORM


            49    WHITE MALE           MULTIPLE BLUNT TRAUMA     LEFT HOME WHEN IT BEGAN TO
                                                                 COLLAPSE; KILLED BY FLYING DEBRIS
                                                                 OUTSIDE HOME


            67    WHITE FEMALE         MULTIPLE PENETRATING      TOWNHOUSE COLLAPSED
                                       INJURIES


            54    WHITE MALE           MULTIPLE BLUNT TRAUMA     ROOF COLLAPSED


            37    WHITE MALE           BLUNT CRANIOCEREBRAL      STRUCK BY FLYING OBJECT ABOARD
                                       TRAUMA                    BOAT, AND FELL OVERBOARD DURING
                                                                 STORM; LATER WASHED ASHORE ON
                                                                 ISLAND


            56    WHITE MALE           DROWNING                  WASHED OVERBOARD (BODY NEVER
                                                                 RECOVERED)






                                                      B-1










                     APPENDIX C


      HURRICANE ANDREWBEST TRAC11V'SUMMARY.-
                  AUGUST 16-28, 1992



                                                                             Appendix C
                                          Hurricane Andrew "Best Track" Summary: August 16-28, 1992

               Date/Time               Location              wind            Pres       Stage              Movement       Remarks
                   (UTC)              (lat/long)             (kts)           (mb)                          (spd/dir)
                                                                                                              (kts)


               16/1800                10.8    35.5           25              1010       Depression         280/18
               17/0000                11.2    37.4           30              1009                          280/18
               17/0600                11.7    39.6           30              1008                          280/20
               17/1200                12.3    42.0           35              1006                          285/22
               17/1800                13.1    44.2           35              1003       Tropical Stm.      285/20         Dvorak 2.5
               18/0000                13.6    46.2           40              1002                          290/18
               18/0600                14.1    48.1           45              1001                          285/18
               18/1200                14.6    49.9           45              1000                          285/20
               18/1800                15.4    51.8           45              1000                          285/20         Pulsating deep convection
               19/0000                16.3    53.5           45              1001                          290/17
               19/0600                17.2    55.3           45              1002                          295/16
               19/1200                18.0    56.9           45              1005                          295/18         Upper low shearing system
               19/1800                18.8    58.3           45              1007                          295/18         Wind 63 kts at flight lvl
               20/0000                19.8    59.8           40              1011                          295/18
               20/0600                20.7    60.0           40              1013                          305/14         Ill-defined center
               20/1200                21.7    60.7           40              1015                          305/14
               20/1800                22.5    61.5           40              1014                          310/09         Sustained 54-kt wnd @ 5, 000
               21/0000                23.2    62.4           45              1014                          310/10         Recon unable to f ind center
               21/0600                23.9    63.3           45              1010                          315/12         Pk wind 64 kt 65 nm E of ctr
               21/1200                24.4    64.2           50              1007                          310/10         Better organization
               21/1800                24.8    64.9           50              1004                          300/09         Shear decreasing
               22/0000                25.3    65.9           55              1000                          300/09         Strong ridge N of storm
               22/0600                25.6    67.0           60              994        Hurricane          290/09         Sust. 83-kt wnd FL/Eye forms
               22/1200                25.8    68.3           70              981                           275/12         Max. 99-kt wnd FL/stg eyewall
               22/1800                25.7    69.7           80              969                           270/13         Hcn. watch NW Bahamas/S. Fl.
               23/0000                25.6    71.1           90              961                           265/12
               23/0600                25.5    72.5           105             947                           270/14         Recon Pk wnd 121 kts.
               23/1200                25.4    74.2           120             933                           270/14         Hcn. warning S. Florida
               23/1800                25.4    75.8           135             922                           270/14         Eye 8 rmi./LF Eleuthera 23/21z
               24/0000                25.4    77.5           125             930                           270/14         Concentric eye/LF SBay 24/01z
               24/0600                25.4    79.3           120             937                           270/16         Landfall S.Fl. 24/09z--922mb
               24/1200                25.6    81.2           110             951                           275/14         Hcn. watch NW gulf coast
               24/1800                25.8    83.1           115             947                           275/16         Clear eye MLB WSR-88D
               25/0000                26.2    85.0           115             943                           280/16
               25/0600                26.6    86.7           115             948                           280/15
               25/1200                27.2    88.2           115             946                           290/15         Hcn. watch expanded west
               25/1800                27.8    89.6           120             941                           300/15         Concentric eye
               26/0000                28.5    90.5           120             937                           300/14         2nd min pres 25/21z--932 mb
               26/0600                29.2    91.3           115             955                           310/11         La Place tornado 26/0010z
               26/1200                30.1    91.7           80              973                           320/10         LA Landfall 26/0830z-956 mb
               26/1800                30.9    91.6           50              991                           010/07         {At least 10 tornadoes LA
               27/0000                31.5    91.1           35              995        Tropical Stm.      010/07         &: 27 MS, 26/1930z-27/0030z)
               27/0600                32.1    90.5           30              997        Depression         030/07
               27/1200                32.8    89.6           30              998                           050/08
               27/1800                33.6    88.4           25              999                           050/08
               28/0000                34.4    86.7           20              1000                          050/08
               28/0600                35.4    84.0           20              1000                          050/08         Dissipated










                                                 "PENDIX D


                               ANDREW'S TOLL ON LOUISIANA


             Death and Injury Toll

             Hurricane Andrew's track was well forecast and public health officials had adequate time to
             prepare. The Epidemiology Section of Louisiana@s Office of Public Health established an
             injury reporting procedure. Hospital emergency rooms and coroners' offices in 19 parishes
             were asked to report hurricane-related health problems. The period of surveillance (August
             24 through September 21) included all injuries or illnesses related to the hurricane, including
             pre-storm preparation and post-storm recovery and cleanup efforts.

             The efforts of the state's health department's epidemiological section incorporated the services
             of 21 hospitals, 1 public utility, and 5 coroner's offices. In total, they reported 462 hurricane-
             related events, including 17 deaths. Of the 17 documented deaths, 8 were directly attributed
             to Hurricane Andrew (see appendix D, table D.1). Table D.2 of appendix D lists and
             describes the 9 deaths indirectly attributed to Andrew.

             Of the non-fatal events, 383 of 445 (86 percent) were injuries and 62 of 445 (14 percent) were
             illnesses. Only 17 percent of these cases occurred during Hurricane Andrew; the large
             majority (79 percent) occurred during the aftermath. High percentages such as this have
             been documented in numerous other hurricanes.


             Most events happened in or around the home. The most common non-fatal injury was a
             cuttlaceration/puncture wound, followed by a sprain/strain (appendix D, table D.3).

             St. Mary, St. John, and Iberia Parishes incurred the highest injury rates (appendix D,
             figure D.1). Figure DA depicts the rates of injury and illness by parish. Note the
             relationship of the hardest hit parishes to their relative position to Andrew's landfall point
             and the eye-wall region.

             Future planning for hurricanes should take into account the high rate of lacerations,
             particularly during the cleanup phase of the recovery. Based upon projected landfall, areas
             should prepare well in advance of landfall for the potential of significantly higher rates of
             incidence.


             Property and Resource Losses

             Preliminary data for the 36-parish disaster area indicated that 3,301 single, multifamily, and
             mobile homes were destroyed, and 18,247 units received major or minor damages. Data
             compiled by a consortium of state agencies and groups with specific responsibilities in
             agriculture indicated that estimated agricultural losses would exceed $288 million.


                                                            D-1








                Sugarcane yield losses were estimated at $128.4 million, cotton losses at $68.2 million, and
                forestry-related losses at $38.6 million. The consortium also estimated losses of $13.2 million
                for the soybean crop, $12.7 million for corn, and $9.1 million for rice.


                Commercial and Recreational Boating

                Andrew affected an unknown number of commercial ships, recreational vessels, and barges
                throughout the Mississippi basin and the northern gulf coast.

                Documentation, as provided by U.S. Coast Guard, District Eight, revealed that a number of
                ships were lost and rescue efforts had to be conducted. Despite efforts by the NWS, local
                emergency management, and state officials, many persons were slow to respond or failed to
                heed warnings.

                Louisiana fared much better than south Florida since Andrew missed the major boating areas
                north and east of New Orleans. Many boat owners also had enough advance warning and
                moved their vessels out of the path of the storm up into one of Louisiana's many bayous
                where they had more protection. To date, no formal estimate of monetary loss has been
                computed for commercial and      recreational marine interests as the result of Hurricane
                Andrew.























                                         . . . . . . . . . . . .











                                                    -WNW






                       F-3 tornado damage to the communities of La Place/Reserve located 30 miles
                       west of New Orleans, Louisiana.


                                                             D-2












                                    Appendix D, Table D.1

                Deaths Directly Attributable to Hurricane Andrew (Louisiana)
                                         August 1992
                                   (Source: Centers for Disease Control)



             AGE RACE       SEX      CAUSE OF DEATH            CIRCUMSTANCE


             32    ASIAN MALE        DROWNING                  COMMERCIALFISHING
                                                               LOST DURING ANDREW
                                                               IN INTERNATIONAL
                                                               WATERS (GULF OF
                                                               MEXICO) WITH FIVE
                                                               OTHERS


             33    ASIAN MALE        DROWNING                  (SAME AS ABOVE)


             26    ASIAN    MALE     DROWNING                  (SAME AS ABOVE)

             30    ASIAN    MALE     DROWNING                  (SAME AS ABOVE)

             44    ASIAN    MALE     DROWNING                  (SAME AS ABOVE)

             99    ASIAN    MALE     DROWNING                  (SAME AS ABOVE)


               2   WHITE    FEMALE   HEMORRHAGESECONDARY       INJURED WHEN
                                     TO FRACTURES OF HEAD,     HURRICANE-RELATED
                                     NECK, AND TORSO           TORNADO STRUCK
                                                               HOME


             63    WHITE MALE        CRUSHING INJURIES         (SAME AS ABOVE)
                                     TO HEAD AND NECK
























                                             D-3











                                      Appendix D, Table D.2

                 Deaths Indirectly Attributable to Hurricane Andrew (Louisiana)
                                           August 1992
                                     (Source: Centers for Disease Control)



              AGE RACE       SEX      CAUSE OF DEATH            CIRCUMSTANCE


              ??     VTHITE MALE      MULTIPLE TRAUMATIC        MOTOR VEHICLE
                                      INJURIES                  ACCIDENT DURING
                                                                EVACUATION


              50     WHITE FEMALE     MULTIPLE BLUNT FORCE      MOTOR VEHICLE
                                      TRAUMA                    ACCIDENT; BECAME
                                                                DISORIENTED WHILE
                                                                DRIVING DURING THE
                                                                STORM


              34     WHITE MALE       ELECTROCUTION             CLEARING YARD DEBRIS
                                                                WHEN CAME IN CONTACT
                                                                WITH LIVE ELECTRICAL
                                                                POLE


              42     WHITE MALE       CRUSH INJURIES TO         FALL FROM TREE WHILE
                                      TORSO                     CUTTING TREE FROM
                                                                HOME


              33     WHITE MALE       POSSIBLE ELECTROCUTION    WOREING ON ELECMCAL
                                      AND CARDIOPULMONARY       POLE
                                      ARREST


              79     WHITE MALE       CARDIAC ARREST            COMPLAINED OF
                                                                SHORTNESSOFBREATH


              86     BLACK MALE       ASPHYXIATION              (NO INFORMATION)

              44     BLACK MALE       CARDIAC ARREST            (NO INFORMATION)


              65     WHITE MALE       CARDIAC ARREST            COMPLAINED OF CHEST
                                                                PAIN














                                                D-4











                                               Appendix D, Table D.3

                                     Nature of Hurricane Andrew-related
                                         Injury and Illness in Louisiana
                                          August 24-September 21, 1992
                                             (Source: Centers for Disease Control)


                                                          Deaths                     Injury/Illness
                         Nature                         Frequency M                  Frequency M

                         Cut/laceration/puncture             0                          184 (41)

                         Sprain/strain                       0                          49 (11)

                         Contusionlimpact                    3  (19)                    46   (10)

                         Insect bite/sting                   0                          23   (5)

                         Rash                                0                          23   (5)

                         Fall                                1    (6)                   23   (5)

                         Crush                               1    (6)                   15   (4)

                         Burn                                0                          10   (2)

                         Anxiety                             0                           8   (2)

                         Drowning                            6  (37)                     0

                         Dog bite                            0                           1   (.2)

                         Asphyxiation                        1    (6)                    0

                         Electrocution                       2  (12)                     1   (.2)

                         Other                               3  (19)                    62   (14)

                         TOTAL                               17(100)                    445(100)









                                                               D-5





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                                                APPENDIX E


                           LOUISIANA DAMAGE DESCRIPTION


             Wind and Tornadoes

             Most storm-related damage was caused by wind, wind-blown rain, and tornadoes. Post storm
             summaries compiled by WSFO Slidell confirmed 14 tornadoes. There were numerous
             additional reports of small tornadoes and funnel clouds. In Mississippi, 27 tornadoes were
             confirmed with numerous tornado and funnel cloud reports received.

             In south Louisiana, tornadoes ranged from F-0 to F-3 on the Fujita Tornado Intensity Scale,
             Figure 4. A tornado of F-3 intensity touched down near the subdivision of Belle Pointe near
             Reserve in St. John the Baptist Parish. The tornado skipped along a 9- to 10-mile path
             between La Place and Reserve on the evening of August 25. The best estimate of tornado
             inflicted damage is excess of $20 million. Table E. 1 of appendix E presents a breakdown of
             the tornado damage inflicted upon St. John the Baptist Parish.

             St. Mary and Iberia Parishes received widespread wind and wind-blown rain damage. In all
             areas, mobile homes were the most susceptible to damage or destruction. Many mobile
             homes fell victim to extreme wind loads and airborne debris caused by Andrew. Even in the
             coastal areas where mobile homes were "cradled" and elevated, the cradled foundations
             remained intact, but the mobile homes mounted to these foundations were often heavily
             damaged or destroyed. Other minor to moderate wind damage occurred throughout much of
             the declared disaster area (Disaster Declaration Map, Appendix E, Figure E.1), including
             damaged building roofs and windows.


             Flooding

             Although Andrew's rainfall pattern (see figure E.2, appendix E) in Louisiana was similar to
             other hurricanes making landfall in the central gulf coast region both in terms of magnitude
             and distribution, very little in the way of significant flooding developed in Louisiana. This
             was primarily due to the fact that hydrologic conditions prior to Hurricane Andrew's arrival
             in Louisiana were quite dry. Minor to moderate river flooding did develop along portions of
             several rivers in Louisiana, but damages caused by the flooding were limited. Instead, the
             flooding caused mainly nuisance-type problems, such as road closures, minor urban flooding,
             and agricultural flooding.








                                                          E-1








               Storm Surge

               The majority of flood damage caused by Hurricane Andrew was storm surge related and
               occurred in Lower Terrebonne Parish. Damage, in general, was minimal as surge values
               were half their expected levels in the vicinity of Cocodrie (7-9 ft), Dulac and Chauvin (4-5 ft),
               and Montegut (2-4 ft). Even so, a high percentage of older homes and businesses in Cocodrie
               suffered extensive damage.

               The highest recorded storm surge mark was recorded at Luke's Landing along East Cote
               Blanche Bay, where 8.2 feet was observed at a USACE water level gauge. Several other
               gauges recorded surge heights over 6 feet during Andrew. Lake Pontchartrain was raised
               to a level of approximately 4.5 feet NGVD. Fortunately, these surge heights occurred shortly
               before the occurrence of normal (astronomical) high tide. In the area impacted by Andrew,
               this would have added about 1 foot to the observed readings. Tidal traces indicate that prior
               to Andrew's landfall, water was being forced away from the coastline by offshore winds,
               resulting in depressed water levels (below MSQ. As the eye passed and the winds became
               onshore, water levels rose rapidly and reached their observed peaks.

               Impact on Fisheries and Wildlife

               Louisiana's legendary fisheries received a severe blow when Andrew slid along the Louisiana
               coast before making landfall. Fresh water fish kill estimates have been estimated at nearly
               $160 million. Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries biologists estimate that, of this
               total, nearly 5 million were large mouth bass valued at $21 million. In the Atchafalaya
               Basin, it has been estimated that nearly 182 million fresh water fish have died. Saltwater
               fish biologists have compiled fish kill counts at beaches and bays in south Terrebonne Parish,
               where Andrew was most brutal. They calculated that 9.4 million fish suffocated as of August
               31. The loss of fish native to this area is estimated at $8 million.

               While the numbers of marine fishes killed is not expected to impact greatly the coastal
               recreational fishing, biologists estimate conservatively that the coastal sports industry will
               suffer a loss of $12 million during September and October of 1992. Louisiana's marine
               recreational fishing industry depends on the accessibility to coastal waters and the
               availability of marine facilities. These have both suffered greatly due to the effects of
               Andrew.


               The commercial fishing industry also is expected to be heavily impacted for months.
               Louisiana harvests 3.5 million pounds of seafood during September and October at an
               estimated retail value of $210 million. It was estimated that the industry would experience
               an immediate loss of $54 million. This figure does not reflect direct physical damage to
               shoreside support facilities or the loss of markets. Similar losses were inflicted on wildlife
               resources, furbearers, and alligators.

               The total monetary loss to the state based on these studies, including losses to natural
               resources, impacts on industry, and impacts on the department, is nearly $266 million. The
               total is expected to rise even higher. The above figures were provided by the Information and
               Education Division of the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries.




                                                              E-2










                                         Appendix E, Table E.1

                                      St. John the Baptist Parish
                                          Damage Assessment
                                   (Source: St. John the Baptist Parish)



                       PRIVATE SECTOR

                         Housing                   $6,726,250
                         (Homes/Mobile Homes)
                         Business/Commercial       $3,428,500          $10,154,750

                       PUBLIC BUILDINGS                                $1,957,500

                       AGRICULTURE

                         Sugar Cane                $ 1,000,000
                         Soy Bean                  $ 100,000           $1,100,000

                       ELECTRICAL UTILITY                              $1,500,000


                       TOTAL FOR THE PARISH                            $14,712,250

























                                                     E-3






























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                                                                        STATE OF
                                                                     LOUISIANA
















                                                                                                                                                                                                                       Hurricane Andrew


                                                                                                                                                                                                           Louisiana Rainfall (inches)
                                                                                                                                                               2
                                                                                                                                                                                                        4
                                                                                                               0.14                                                                                     4i51      August 24                                   28, 1992
                                                                                          0.20                                               O.p   17
                                                                                                                                             1.00                                        .64
                                                                                                                                             yQ4                                                        is
                                                                                                              0..34
                                                                  .04                          0..2                                                                                      S.S8
                                                                                                                                                                                                        6.59


                                                                                          .15 .2.96


                                                                                                             O@25                                                            4.66
                                                                                                                                                                                         %-56
                                                                                                                                 .315
                                                                                          0.58

                                                              0.07                                                                           .53
                                                                        OP4                                               5                  4.74
                                                                            0.11                 0.!0                            ..61                                                                                                 6
                                                                                                                     1.7                                                                 8
                                                                                                                  2.04        3.1            2..0        .47                                                      7.59                         5o.4
                                                                                    0.15                                                     3;19                            5.74        .76
                                                                            0.25o                           a 1.39                                                                                                             667                            4
                                                                            0.35.                                                            .60                                                                                            6.26.
                                                                            0.35.                                                                                                        .08                           I@r@61           6.45                  .56
                                                                                          OA                                                                                             5.16                                      A'2
                                                                                                          1.444%    .60                                                 5.19                                      6.41'           .50
                                                                                                                                 2j95                                                                   68        z. 6
                                                                                    0;.07              1.36                                    6                      2.                                          '10
                                                                                                                                                                                         .9f 5..        .6                        5         .5                    4
                                                                                                                                             7                  6.                                      4.5.                                           .09
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  7.                   36
                                                                                                                                                                                                        .44 4.2                          .54 4,
                                                                                                                                             3.6                                         t9
                                                                                    0.08                                                     4           7A6                             .9             7.66              4                        .61        -6.25
                                                                         0.09.      6.06                   08.                                                                           5.09-                                                    4.98
                                                                                                                    .90                      .6                                          7.3            5.4
                                                                                          7                                                              11         .4                                  7                          4.82      .73
                                                                                                                                             1.5                                         6.1                           5.6             Is                     4
                                                                         0..31                                                   2415                    96 S.   .91                                                           .3 6.          3 174
                                                                                                     010                                                                                                61        5.7


                                                                                                                                                                                                        6.82.                                   .3.60
                                                                                                                                                                      6.92.                                              %65                                       4
                                                                                                        1                                    4 6                                                                                                              4jP0
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            .00     6
                                                                                          Miles                                                                                          8


                                                                            0             20            40










                                                                                          Figure E.2                             Louisiana Rainfall Totals and Analysis
                                                                                                                                             for Hurricane Andrew.


                                                                                                                                                               E-5









                Impact on the Petroleum Industry

                The petroleum industry plays a large role in the economy of Louisiana. The gulf coast from
                Texas to Mississippi is dotted by numerous submerged wells and oil well structures
                (platforms), including appurtenances, such as satellite wells and oil pipes. The largest
                concentration of oil platforms, satellites, and drilling rigs are located off the Louisiana coast.
                The total number of oil platforms and satellites is approximately 3,800, with about 150 oil
                drilling rigs. These facilities are extremely vulnerable to hurricanes. Their destruction poses
                a major threat to the ecology of the gulf. Appendix E, table E.2, is a summary of hurricane
                damage as a result of Andrew.




                                                  Appendix E, Table E.2

                                                   Summary of Damage
                                       (Source: NWS Lower Mississippi River Forecast Center)



                                              Platforms Toppled                        14
                                              Platforms Leaning                        4
                                              Satellites Toppled                       31
                                              Satellites Leaning                       82
                                              Structural Damage                       112
                                              Pollution Incidents                      7
                                              Fires                                    2
                                              Drift                                    5




                In addition to platforms damaged, 309 pipelines were damaged. Damage also was inflicted
                on oil storage tanks both onshore and offshore. The Ship Shoal and South Timbalier areas
                suffered the most damage to their pipeline network (appendix E, figure E.3). The damage
                inflicted upon the various petroleum networks is congruent to the region along Andrew's
                track where the greatest damage would be expected. The various petroleum companies
                operating in the gulf have as yet not provided damage estimates from Andrew. The
                petroleum industry estimates a one-half billion dollars in losses due to the damaged
                equipment and the interruption of operations caused by the storm.

                The U.S. Coast Guard, District Eight, reported working as many as 79 reports of pollution
                or lost oil as a result of Andrew. Spill emanated from a variety of sources, with
                approximately two-thirds offshore in Federal and state waters. Most spills were considered
                minor, but one ruptured pipeline released between 300 and 500 barrels of oil.

                Considering the number of wells and pipelines, the petroleum industry fared very well. This
                can be attributed to the safety efforts employed by the industry and the efforts that they put
                into their awareness and preparedness programs.


                                                               E-6












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                                                   APPENDIEK F


                                INTERAGENCY COORDINATING
                         COMMITTEE ON HURRICANES (ICCOH)


             Background

             The ICCOH consists of a group of agencies brought together to broaden the areas of
             cooperation between the agencies in matters dealing with hurricane-related activities. The
             primary agencies involved are NOAA, FEMA, USACE, and the American Red Cross.

             Following Hurricane Hugo, great interest was placed on the National Hurricane Program.
             Unfortunately, the Loma Prieta earthquake redirected this interest to the National
             Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program. Subsequently, great strides were realized in the
             Earthquake Preparedness Program. Following Andrew, the most devastating natural
             disaster in American history, the ICCOH toured the devastated area and came to the
             conclusion that a formal national hurricane preparedness program was needed that
             emphasized evacuation but had funding to actively pursue mitigation activities.


             Finding

             When a tropical cyclone strikes, the combination of wind, rain, and storm surge can cause
             enormous sociological, economical, and ecological damage. It threatens the lives and
             livelihood of all who lie in its path. Although a tropical cyclone can move across an area in
             only a few hours, billions of dollars in property can be lost and many deaths and injuries can
             occur. The sociopolitical infrastructure, including highways, communications systems, power
             grids, and pipelines can be decimated. The amount of time necessary to recover fully from
             such a catastrophe may require years.

             The United States coast from Brownsville, Texas, to East Port, Maine, is subject to the
             ravages of hurricanes as are the Hawaiian Islands and the United States protectorates in the
             Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea. Today, there is a growing awareness in the United States
             that hurricanes are a national threat, both economically and sociologically. Moreover, the
             direct, localized effects of a major hurricane does not fully define the full scope of its effects.

             Balancing the risks of the Nation's hurricane threat are technology and understanding which
             can mitigate much of the damaging effects of hurricanes. Modern hurricane forecasting and
             hurricane evacuation planning have dramatically reduced the loss of life in recent hurricane
             events. Methods have been developed which, when fully implemented, will reduce further
             the effects of storms both to life and property. Presently, several Federal agencies are
             engaged in hurricane impact mitigation activities. Still, a cooperative, interagency program
             to develop such activities is not in place.



                                                             F-1









               The principle cooperative, multiagency hurricane activity is the Federal Hurricane
               Preparedness Program (HPP). The HPP, through its Hurricane Evacuation Study program,
               has been extremely effective in reducing loss of life caused by storm surge drowning.
               However, to date it has done relatively little to address the need to mitigate structural
               damage caused by hurricane-induced wind. The enormous damage caused by Hurricane
               Andrew is compelling evidence that the present Federal hurricane program is inadequate.
               It presents strong argument to create a comprehensive hurricane program which recognizes
               the need to reduce future loss of life and property from all effects of hurricanes, including
               wind.



               Recommendation

               In recognition of the need for such a comprehensive Federal hurricane hazard mitigation
               program, the ICCOH proposes establishing a National Tropical Cyclone Hazard Reduction
               Program, comparable to the earthquake mitigation program which gained greater prominence
               and support after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake.


































                                                           F-2










                                                 APPENDIX G


                          SAFFIR-SIMPSON HURRICANE SCALE



             Category              Definition-Effects

             ONE                   Winds 74-95 mph No real damage to building structures. Damage
                                   primarily to unanchored mobile homes, shrubbery, and trees. Also,
                                   some coastal road flooding and minor pier damage.

             TWO                   Winds 96-110 mph Some roofing material, door, and window damage
                                   to buildings. Considerable damage to vegetation, mobile homes, and
                                   piers. Coastal and low-lying escape routes flood 2-4 hours before arrival
                                   of center. Small craft in unprotected anchorages break moorings.

             THREE                 Winds 111-130 mph Some structural damage to small residences and
                                   utility buildings with a minor amount of curtainwall. failures. Mobile
                                   homes are destroyed. Flooding near the coast destroys smaller
                                   structures with larger structures damaged by floating debris. Terrain
                                   continuously lower than 5 feet ASL may be flooded inland 8 miles or
                                   more.


             FOUR                  Winds 131-155 mph More extensive curtainwall failures with some
                                   complete roof structure failure on small residences. Major erosion of
                                   beach areas. Major damage to lower floors of structures near the shore.
                                   Terrain continuously lower than 10 feet ASL may be flooded requiring
                                   massive evacuation of residential areas inland as far as 6 miles.


             FrVE                  Winds greater than 155 mph: Complete roof failure on many
                                   residences and industrial buildings. Some complete building failures
                                   with small utility buildings blown over or away. Major damage to
                                   lower floors of all structures located less than 15 feet ASL and within
                                   500 yards of the shoreline. Massive evacuation of residential areas on
                                   low ground within 5 to 10 miles of the shoreline may be required.











                                                           G-1










                                               AFTERWORD

                              OUTSIDE CONSULTANT'S SUPPLEMENT
                              TO THE DISASTER SURVEY REPORT ON
                                           HURRICANE ANDREW
                           SUBMITTED TO THE NOAA ADM[INISTRATOR


                    NOTE: The views and opinions expressed in the following commentary
                    do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions ofN0AA, the National
                    Weather Service, or any of the other outside consultants involved in the
                    Hurricane Andrew Disaster Survey Report.


             Natural Disaster Surveys performed after catastrophic weather events call for the
             participation of a consultant outside the government. While serving in that role in Louisiana
             during the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew (and later in Hawaii, following Hurricane Iniki),
             I was struck by the uniformly high regard for the National Weather Service expressed by the
             public, the emergency management community, and local governmental officials. Though
             there was an occasional crack that the Weather Service is unable to get the daily forecasts
             right, there was uniform trust in NWS pronouncements on the hurricane threat.
             Very few agencies of the Federal Government are viewed so positively by the public
             and state officials as the National Weather Service.


             NWS Staffing Issues

             Local emergency managers' trust of NWS personnel is largely the result of regular contact
             over a long period of time preceding the hurricane threat, often several years. During the
             preparation for Hurricane Andrew, emergency managers did not question the competence of
             the NWS. In interviews, they explicitly attributed this to the long-standing relationship
             between the NWS offices and their local community. Emergency managers and municipal
             leaders in Louisiana also noted that they trusted the local NWS offices to evaluate
             information coming from the National Hurricane Center to be sure that it was appropriate
             for their locale before passing it on.
             Plans should be made to maintain the high level of individual contact between the
             NWS staff and local emergency managers, despite the reduction in number of
             offices scheduled under the modernization plan.                   Furthermore, multiple
             simultaneous changes in senior personnel at local NWS facilities should be avoided
             unless that office has lost the trust of its community.

             The emergency managers also based their trust of NWS on the expertise of their regular
             NWS contacts. In particular, several emergency managers spoke of increased confidence from
             the fact that they received information directly from NWS personnel involved in making
             forecasts, rather than from individuals whose responsibilities had been limited to
             preparedness issues and communications.









              The individuals responsible for liaison with emergency managers, regardless of
              their titles, should have regular forecasting duties. With the scheduled reduction
              in the number of offices, this may require that more than one individual per office
              have outreach responsibilities to the emergency management community,
              especially if the amount of contact is not to be reduced.

              The public's trust in the NWS was significantly greater than that placed in media
              meteorologists, even when media personnel were actually meteorologists and notjust weather
              readers. Concern was expressed to us that private providers of weather information have a
              vested interest in magnifying threats and leaving issues unsettled for the purpose of keeping
              the public coming back to them for more information. The NWS was viewed as having no
              goal except that of ensuring public safety.       Continually larger amounts of weather
              information are wholesaled by the government and then further disseminated by commercial
              sources.
              The government needs to be careful that privatization of services does not result
              in decreased trust in the information provided, particularly when public safety is
              involved.



              Disaster Survey Management

              The procedures for Natural Disaster Surveys following catastrophic events specify a disaster
              survey team of at least six individuals, with at least two of them from NOAA but outside
              NWS (including the team leader) and one of them from outside the government. However,
              there appears to be confusion within NWS headquarters over whether disaster survey reports
              should be largely NWS staff-authored exercises, with some outside advice, or an objective
              review combining opinions of the NWS staff, other NOAA staff, and outsiders. To encourage
              objectivity in disaster surveys of NWS activities,
              NOAA should affirm that disaster surveys are a team process organized by NOAA
              and not subject to control by NWS headquarters.

              The NOAA members of the Disaster Survey Team were fairly unforgiving in their evaluation
              of their fellow NOAA employees and honest in their evaluation of the efforts of the NWS and
              NOAA. Also, the NWS employees we interviewed were quite candid in describing and
              evaluating their own performance. This is to be commended. The large number of NOAA
              employees on the Team, chosen for their broad range of expertise, were able to examine NWS
              and NOAA activities much more efficiently than a team largely composed of outsiders could.
              However, in making recommendations within this report, NOAA staff on the Team were not
              fully able to disentangle themselves from their positions.          This sometimes led to
              recommendations that were limited by concern for the internal response to those
              recommendations, to possibly more conservative recommendations than outsiders would have
              made, and to recommendations that occasionally seemed designed mostly to promote ongoing
              or proposed NOAA programs.

              Although the total Disaster Survey Team for Hurricane Andrew had four members who were
              not NOAA staff, the team largely functioned as two disconnected parts (one for Florida and
              one for Louisiana), each with only two outsiders. Furthermore, one of those assigned to each
              state had very strong ties to NOAA. This left only two true outsiders, who then had no
              opportunity to interact since they were dispatched to different states. A stronger group of









            outside consultants might be more able to provide useful recommendations to NOAA on its
            preparedness and response to severe weather events. However, obtaining outside consultants
            on the extremely short notice available for assembling disaster survey teams is admittedly
            difficult.
            For at least one Disaster Survey Team each year, strong efforts should be made to
            have at least three members without strong ties to NOAA.

            While contributing to this report, as well as to the one on Hurricane Iniki, this outside
            consultant has been frustrated by some of his interactions with the team member assigned
            from NWS Headquarters. The problems appear to be related to how disaster survey reports
            are viewed by NWS management, rather than to the personalities of the individuals. The
            transmittal memorandum for the procedures on Natural Disaster Surveys notes that "Reports
            are normally written through a cooperative effort of team members." However, the technical
            leader at NWS Headquarters, through dual roles as team member and report coordinator, has
            far too great control over the final product. The model for report preparation used by the
            National Research Council, where the responsible staff member is knowledgeable in the field
            but not an author of the report, prevents staff from overly controlling the results without
            losing the value of their expertise.
            In setting up Disaster Survey Teams, NOAA should continue to make at least one
            member of NWS Headquarters available. However, this individual should serve
            only as staff for the Team, not as a member.

            There is great interest in the response of NOAA, as well as the responses of more local
            agencies discussed in disaster survey reports, to hurricane threats. Disasters provide
            perhaps NOAA!s best chance to evaluate the success and resilience of NWS operations. Still,
            it has taken a long time to prepare this report, largely because it was not part of anyone's
            regular responsibilities, much less their primary focus.
            Preparation of disaster surveys should be given higher priority. NWS or NOAA
            Headquarters should budget more time for staff to assist in producing disaster
            surveys. In particular, some of the responsibilities for the staff member in charge
            of coordinating production must be shifted if a report of high quality is to be
            produced in a timely manner.

                                                       Respectfully submitted,



                                                       Mark David Handel, Sc.D.

























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