States and natural hazards

[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]

Te ...:: L4OQMD
Th ~~F...
Council of iAam
State
gzovernments

IT sI

3 08
.C6
no.669

The Council of State Governments

The Council is a joint agency of all the state governments-
created, supported, and directed by them. It conducts
research on state programs and problems; maintains an
information service available to state agencies, officials,
and legislators: issues a variety of publications; assists in
state-federal liaison: promotes regional and state-local
cooperation; and provides staff for affiliated
organizations.

Headquarters Office
Iron Works Pike
Lexington, Kentucky 40578
(606) 252-2291

Eastern Office
1500 Broadway, 18th Floor
New York, New York 10036
(212) 221-3630

Midwestern Office
203 North Wabash Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60601
(312) 236-4011

Southern Office
3384 Peachtree Road, NE
Atlanta, Georgia 30326
(404) 266-1271

Western Office
165 Post Street, 5th Floor
San Francisco, California 94108
(415) 986-3760

Washington Office
Hall of the States, 444 North Capitol Street
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 624-5450

COASTAL ZONE I MOOG
INFORMATION CENTER

The States and

Natural Hazards

A-

7
:z

0 This study was sponsored by the Council of State Governments under Grant No.
PFR76-81112 with the National Science Foundation. The contents of this report
do not necessarily express the views of the National Science Foundation or the
Council of State Governments.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE NOAA
COASTAL SERVICES CENTER
2234 SOUTH HOBSON AVENUE
-HARLESTON, SC 29405-2413

'c property of CSC LibrarY

********** **
C. - m- ,
____ THE COUNCIL OF
., THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS
Lexington, Kentucky

Printed in the United States of America

RM-669
Price: $5.00

p ~Contents

Foreword ............................. v

Preface..............................vii
I .Introduction and Executive Summary ...............I
Introduction ..........................I
Executive Summary .......................4

2. A Base for Effective Natural Hazards Programs ...........10
A Shared Responsibility at All Levels of Government.........10
A Comprehensive Approach to Hazards Programs ...........1
National Leadership in Hazards Programs..............13
Assignment and Use of Executive Powers ..............14
Planning Not a Sometime Thing..................15
3. Assessment and Reduction of Natural Hazards............18
Identifying and Assessing a State's Natural Hazards..........18
Selecting and Appraising Hazard Reduction Measures ........25
4. Implementing a Comprehensive State Hazards Program........38
State Organization for a Comprehensive Hazards Program ......38
Authority and Assistance for Local Hazards Programs ........44
Legislative Authority and Legal Liability of State and
Local Officials.........................49
Personnel Resources for Planning Hazard Reduction Programs ....51
5. A Concluding Observation on Sharing ...............54
Special Section on Natural Hazards Common in the United States... . .55

Appendices:
A. Advisory Council and Special Committees ............84
B. Report of the Special Committee of the Council of State
Planning Agencies.......................85
C. Report of the Special Committee of the National Association of
State Directors for Disaster Preparedness.............87
D. Report of the Special Committee of the National Association of
Attorneys General.......................93

Foreword

Despite the known threat of natural hazards, few persons and communities
rate them high among the issues which need to get high-priority consideration
from their state and local governments. Although a number of these hazards are
of great concern to some, many Americans still think that they are something that
should be taken in stride.
On the other hand, every year Americans experience numerous problems
brought on by hundreds of natural disasters. Many persons are killed or injured.
Losses due to damage from disasters and funds expended for post-disaster
assistance and rehabilitation run into the billions. The amount of such losses and
the accompanying human suffering have increased greatly and can rise to even
higher levels as urban concentration increases, as the stability of the environment
becomes more critical, and as marginal lands and structures are utilized, often
without desired protection, by larger numbers of people, especially the elderly
and disadvantaged.
Through this publication, the Council of State Governments seeks to
acquaint state officials with new federal policies designed to place greater
emphasis on mitigating the risks and reducing the costs of natural hazards. The
report identifies basic elements and issues significant to the assessment and
development of effective programs by state and local governments dealing with
natural hazards.

William J. Page, Jr.
Lexington, Kentucky Executive Director
July 1979 The Council of State Governments

Preface

This report is the second of two publications on natural hazards produced
by the Council of State Governments in a two-year project financed by the
National Science Foundation.
As the project was first proposed, it was aimed primarily at identifying the
public policy issues which state governments may need to face as the science of
earthquake prediction makes anticipated advances. This was an objective of a
national conference held by the Council in November 1977, which led to the first
project report published by the Council late in 1978 (National Conference on
Earthquakes and Related Hazards) and disseminated widely to state officials and
others throughout the United States.
After funds for the project were first made available early in 1977, two
developments occurred in the federal government's approach to natural and
other hazards which had a significant impact on the Council's project. The
president proposed and Congress approved the creation of a new Federal
Emergency Management Agency concerned with mitigation, response, and
recovery efforts for a wide variety of natural and man-made hazards. Plans for
the new agency are now being implemented by presidential action and the
agency's new leadership. In addition, Congress enacted new legislation on
earthquake hazard reduction, mandating the development by the federal
government of plans to implement earthquake hazard reduction measures at
federal, state, and local levels of government.
These new federal developments, as well as views expressed by three
committees of state officials established to assist in the Council's project-
composed of state attorneys general, planners, and emergency services
directors-by scientists, and by program administrators from federal agencies
and academic institutions, led the Council to broaden its approach beyond
earthquakes to natural hazards in general. Not only was there more interest in
this approach by a greater number of states, but many knowledgeable hazards
specialists advised that the mitigation of earthquake hazards would more likely
benefit as part of hazard reduction efforts aimed at natural and possibly even a
broader range of man-made and other hazards. Many of the same or similar
policy and administrative problems were seen to have general application.
This report is a product of a Council staff effort headed by Hirst Sutton,
project director. Robert D. Kuzelka assisted him in project studies and in
developing this report. Consultants Charles M. Manning and James L.
Huffman, both attorneys, participated in matters involving legislative and legal
liability issues. An advisory council whose members had extensive experience in
various aspects of the project's considerations consulted with the project staff
and reviewed this report. The three committees of state officials identified above

vii

contributed greatly to the development of project content and recommendations
as did representatives from federal agencies, public interest bodies, and research
organizations. The Council welcomed the opportunity for a positive
interrelationship with the National Governors' Association's 1978 emergency
preparedness project, also in progress during the course of much of the Council's
undertaking. Council staff Margaret Schrader and Emily Adams assisted in
preparing material for this publication, and Ralph J. Marcelli edited this report.

H. Milton Patton
Associate Director for Environmental Resources

viii

1. Introduction and Executive Summary

INTRODUCTION
Natural hazards such as earthquakes, tornadoes, droughts, and floods are
responsible for the expenditure of billions of dollars and a great deal of human
suffering. The impact of these hazards can be lessened through effective
government programs aimed at comprehensive emergency management. This
approach requires assessing natural hazards and addressing the issues of
reducing the dangers and costs of natural hazards through hazard mitigation,
disaster response, and post-disaster recovery.
Public interest groups, professional associations, and public administrators
recognize that natural hazards occur frequently and have not always been given
adequate policy and management attention, especially in terms of readiness to
respond effectively when crises occur, in developing cost-effective and hazard-
reducing measures, and in implementing recovery programs that reduce or
eliminate risks from future hazardous events. They are also aware that natural
hazards present much greater risks as population density increases in critical
areas.
Recent federal actions reflect new attitudes toward comprehensive
emergency management. The establishment of a new federal agency in 1979, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, brings togethera number of functions
formerly in several different departments and identifies a broadened federal
disaster role encompassing mitigation and recovery measures as well as
preparedness for and actual response to emergencies when they occur. In
addition, the enactment of the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 and
development by the executive branch in 1977-78 of a National Earthquake
Hazards Reduction Program in implementation of the act emphasize that state
and local governments and the private sector have significant responsibility for
hazard reduction action.
Thus a new setting for programs which deal comprehensively with hazard
mitigation, disaster response, and post-disaster recovery has been effected by
recent federal actions. These actions offer the opportunity for more effective and
comprehensive emergency management at all levels of government, with the
expectation of even greater leadership from the federal government.
It is timely, therefore, that states and communities assess their roles and
responsibilities for strengthening their programs in a way that enhances public
safety and well being and reduces economic losses. This report seeks to point out
ways in which more effective and comprehensive natural hazard programs can be
attained.
Although the focus of this report is on natural hazards, a comprehensive
emergency management effort could also include emergencies brought about by

man-made and technological hazards and by enemy attack (civil defense). For
example, the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant incident resulted in
evacuation procedures similar to those that might be required in the event of a
natural disaster. However, whether a state chooses to have an individual
program for specialattention to certain hazards, ora comprehensive program for
all natural hazards, or an all-hazards comprehensive program, this report should
prove valuable. It points out ways in which more effective natural hazards
programs can be developed by state and local government, ways which are also
applicable to other hazards in emergency situations of many different kinds.

Background to This Report
In the 1949 program of Suggested State Legislation, the Council,
cooperating with the office of Civil Defense Planning in the National Military
Establishment, developed a Model State Civil Defense Act providing
organizational arrangements to deal with natural disasters as well as civil
defense.' Additional proposals were prepared for consideration of state
legislative sessions in 1953 incorporating a model compact for interstate
cooperation in emergencies and recommending appropriation of emergency
funds for a governor's use until regular appropriations could be provided.2
In 1972 the Council, recognizing that legislative provisions thought useful in
a civil defense context were not always well suited to meet other disaster
problems and that vulnerability to disasters was steadily increasing, developed an
Example State Disaster Act as an aid to state officials in strengthening their
disaster legislation.3 Two years later the Council published revisions to that act to
take account of the new federal Disaster Relief Act of 1974.4 At the request of the
Federal Disaster Assistance Administration the Council, from 1972 to 1976,
assisted legislators and legislative committees in a number of states to adapt these
acts for use in their states.
In 1976 the Council published a report on comprehensive emergency
preparedness planning in state government. That report, dealing with more than
just natural hazards, presented suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of
planning aimed at improving a state's capacity to handle emergency situations.5
The wide range of emergencies cited in that publication included those related to:
"international conflict, threat of nuclear attack, significant natural disasters,
endangering of the environment, economic distress, and resource or service
shortages." That Council report recognized, as does this one, that many of the
same policy and administrative issues and many of the same approaches and
mitigating measures have applicability to hazards of widely different origin.
Along with the 1976 report and related to it, Council staff presented an
unpublished memorandum to officials of the Federal Preparedness Agency and
the Office of Management and Budget. The memorandum stressed a need for
federal recognition that:
comprehensive state emergency preparedness planning encompasses: 1) readiness to deal with a full
range of potential emergencies, including natural disasters, other peacetiine emergencies, crises
occasioned by shortages of resources or services, and emergencies that could arise in event of war or

enemy attack on the United States; and 2) plans for prevention of emergencies and disasters to the
maximum extent possible, for reduction or mitigation of hazards, and for long-range recovery from
emergencies and disasters as well as for responding to emergencies when they occur.
In 1975, the National Academy of Sciences published a report of the
National Research Council's Panel on Public Policy Implications of Earthquake
Prediction.6 That report dealt with the consequences of predicting events which
can be the most sudden and severe of the natural hazards that threaten many U.S.
residents, and should concern most public officials. It was that report which led
the Council of State Governments to seek financial support from the National
Science Foundation to examine policy, legal, legislative, program, and
administrative issues related to the evolving technology of earthquake
prediction.
After receiving that support, the initial effort in the Council's project
concentrated on developing and conducting a National Conference on
Earthquakes and Related Hazards, designed to promote interchange of
information about those hazards among physical and social scientists and public
officials from federal, state, and local levels of government. The conference, held
in Boulder, Colorado, on November 16-18, 1977, was sponsored by the Council
with the cooperation of the Natural Hazards Research and Applications
Information Center of the University of Colorado's Institute of Behavioral
Science. It brought together 100 persons for informal presentations and
discussions which concentrated on the current status and future of earthquake
prediction technology, evaluation of earthquake predictions, issuance of
warnings and anticipated reactions to predictions and warnings, and measures
for hazard reduction. Inclusion of earthquake-related hazards brought into the
group's purview fires, floods, ground failures, and earthquake-induced sea waves
(tsunamis).
Two significant observations, among others, were made at the conference.
First, a comprehensive approach in disaster management can lend vital support
for mitigating hazards from earthquakes as well as other natural hazards.
Second, a case has not yet been made that it is cost beneficial in most states to
spend much time and money on hazard response mechanisms designed solely for
earthquakes; however, if these preparedness measures can help a community deal
with other problems as well, then a much stronger case can be made for them. The
Council's report on the conference was published in late 1978.7
Concurrently with planning the Boulder conference, the Council was
organizing and arranging meetings of three committees of state officials,
developed from and with the help of the National Association of Attorneys
General, the Council of State Planning Agencies, and the National Association
of State Directors for Disaster Preparedness. These three committees and their
associations have reflected special concerns in some states about earthquakes,
but they have also disclosed a general and anticipated reaction that most states
and communities are more interested in and have greater concern for natural
hazards which occur more frequently within their boundaries. The deliberations
of these committees have contributed to findings and recommendations in this
publication. Reports of these committees are included in the appendices.

Beginning in 1977, the National Governors' Association, in its research,
publications, and official actions, has encouraged a comprehensive approach to
emergency management. Included in this approach are natural hazards, civil
defense, man-made hazards, and other kinds of emergencies. Considered
essential to a comprehensive approach are mitigation and recovery as well as the
ability to respond to emergencies when they happen.'

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The initial objective of this report is twofold:
(I) To identify basic elements deemed significant to the provision of
effective programs dealing with natural hazards.
(2) To acquaint state officials and others with certain new federal
emergency management policies, as reflected in or related to (a) the
reorganization of federal emergency management functions and agencies
through the creation in 1979 of the new Federal Emergency Management Agency
and (b) the federal government's development of a program to implement the
Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977.

1. A Base for Effective Natural Hazards Programs
Five elements believed basic to the development and conduct of successful
natural hazards programs are identified. Summarized below, they call for
changed thinking about these programs by many public officials at each level of
government.

A Shared Responsibility
First is the recognition that the responsibility for public programs concerned
with natural hazards is one that is shared by all three levels of government-
federal, state, and local. This is a factor not adequately recognized or taken into
account by past policies and which creates an extremely complex set of
intergovernmental relationships that cannot be oversimplified and must be dealt
with in reaching decisions on responsibilities, funding, and conduct of public
services to contend with these emergencies.

Needfor Comprehensive Programs
Public natural hazards programs should be comprehensive in nature,
encompassing (a) a response to disasters when they happen, (b) pre-disaster
mitigation of hazards to enhance safety and reduce losses, and (c) recovery
measures that will also reduce damage and destruction should similar disasters
occur again at the same locations.

National Leadership
National leadership in shared programs for natural hazards should be
provided by the federal government. With 50 states and thousands of local
jurisdictions involved, there is an important central role. The federal government

already has assumed this role in many research, weather, geologic, civil defense,
and other services. Ways in which the federal government can contribute to the
effectiveness of state and local programs are subjects for exploration by the new
pFederal Emergency Management Agency.

Effective Use of Executive Powers
The pervasive nature of organizational arrangements for emergency
response, mitigation, and recovery programs at all three levels of government
and the large number of agencies involved at each level make it essential that
whatever organizational pattern adopted by the federal government, by each
state, and in local jurisdictions makes maximum use of the directional,
coordinating, and other management powers vested in their chief executives.
Lesser officials may assist, even at times act for, the president, a governor, or a
local chief executive, but they cannot be viewed as having inherent management
authority to direct actions by agency heads who are responsible to the chief
executive.

Continuing and Adequately Financed Planning
Planning for the mitigation, response, and recovery elements of a
comprehensive natural disaster emergency management program must be
viewed as a continuing function of management and must be adequately funded.
It, too, must make use of the directional and coordinating powers of the chief
executive, because many agencies are involved. Planning in the past too often has
been looked upon as a job of preparing "plans" for envisioned, potential future
emergencies-plans which too often have been found to be inadequate or
inapplicable if an emergency occurred.

2. Assessment of Natural Hazards and Determining Measures for Hazard
Reduction
In discharging natural hazards functions shared by the three levels of
government, states have a special responsibility to provide leadership in
addressing hazard threats facing their residents and, in doing so, to serve as a
catalyst for services provided by federal, state, and local agencies.
Tasks best assumed by states include:
* Identifying and assessing hazards which are a potential threat to their
residents and determining the applicability and possible usefulness of various
hazard reduction measures.
� Assuring that local jurisdictions have authority which they may need.
* Performing services best provided by state agencies (and in many states
these may well be the most critical services for establishing standards, mitigating
dangers, responding to many disaster events, and making plans for recovery from
the most serious disasters).
* Seeking information, advice, and help from federal sources when needed.
* Assuring cooperation with federal emergency programs and with other
states in instances where objectives reach beyond those affecting individual
states.

A state's analysts and planners can identify hazards of concern in a given
state, based on historical experience as to incidence as well as on known
geological and other factors. Such hazards should be assessed according to
hazard characteristics such as probability, magnitude, intensity, frequency of
duration, areas affected, speed of impact, number of locations, and patterns of
occurrence. Of special concern are the risk to critical public facilities and
locations and the potential social and economic impact of disaster events.
Measures to be utilized for reducing the impact of natural hazards by states
and their local communities include such well-known ones as land use planning
and management; use of effective building technology and regulation; lifelines
engineering (applicable particularly to utilities, transportation, and
communications systems); safeguarding critical facilities such as schools,
hospitals, correctional institutions, and others essential in disaster response
efforts; and maintaining a general readiness for response to potential hazards and
disasters, including issuance of warnings and promotion of public understanding
and knowledge. Other hazard reduction and protective measures can be based on
available insurance coverage, plans for long-range post-disaster recovery, and
use of a state's police power in dealing with protection of workers in hazardous
locations, environmental safeguards, promotion of conservation, and measures
for consumer protection.
The Special Section of this report summarizes general information relative
to 14 natural hazards most common in the United States, highlighting the
characteristics and incidence of each hazard and identifying possible hazard
reduction measures for each, along with a listing of sources of information and
recognized reference materials.
The feasibility of hazard reduction measures is an important determinant in
developing programs for hazard mitigation, as are appraisal of their effectiveness
in specific situations, reliability, social acceptability, environmental impact and
cost impact. Many elements of such appraisals move into the realm of
decisionmaking by appropriate political officials.
The report concludes its review of tasks to be undertaken by state
government by pointing out that development of balanced hazard mitigation
programs will be dependent on the use of systematic approaches for
programming desired hazard reduction measures and for budgeting, locating,
and allocating financial resources needed to implement those programs.
In addition to the general tasks of assessing hazards and determining hazard
reduction measures described above, three specific problems related to these
tasks are singled out for special attention by state government.
First are the recognized inadequacies of recording and reporting systems
relative to disasters and the need for a better system, uniformly utilized, in order
to provide information which can be helpful for hazard management planning
and analytical purposes.
Second, a special characteristic applicable to earthquakes is noted. There is
increasing expectation that scientific efforts will produce an ability to predict
earthquakes, possibly even substantially in advance of earthquake events.

Creditable scientific evaluation of predicted earthquakes presents different kinds
of difficulties and uncertainties, as well as opportunities for hazard reduction
measures to mitigate damage. The former can include undesirable social and
economic effects on individuals and communities, some of which can be allayed.
The latter can lead to decisions or actions to protect people and facilities.
Third, attention is directed to a current federal program, authorized in 1972
by the National Dam Inspection Act, under which the U.S. Corps of Engineers is
inspecting private dams and identifying those considered unsafe. Action to
correct deficiencies in these dams will fall to their private owners and will possibly
involve the states, inasmuch as corrective action and follow-up may necessitate
use of the states' police powers. The Corps of Engineers has recently reported that
only 20 states are believed to have a capability to administer their own dam safety
programs.

3. Implementing a Comprehensive State Hazards Program
In order to perform the tasks identified above, most all states will need to
face up to certain key implementation issues. Four are discussed in this report:
state organization for a comprehensive natural hazards program; a state's
relationships to hazard programs in local jurisdictions; issues affecting the
potential liability of state and local officials in the issuance of warnings and
taking (or not taking) other protective actions; and, finally, obtaining personnel
resources needed to plan and develop hazard reduction policies and programs.

State Organization for Hazards Programs
Because most states have generally limited their organizational
considerations to the response phase of disaster program management, they need
to take a different approach toward organizing for a comprehensive natural
hazards or emergency management job.
Three examples are cited. One deals with a state whose governor has legal
authority for control of at least most state agencies and officials and a reasonably
complete set of central staff agencies needed to help him manage the affairs of the
state government. A second describes a state with a cabinet-type government,
where the governor appoints secretaries for key state functions but, while he too
has central management agencies to assist him, lacks full legal control over many
state functions and agencies. A third example describes a state which has set up
special agencies concerned with a single hazard, in this case earthquakes (in
another state it could be hurricanes).
All three examples seek to provide an organizational framework for a
comprehensive natural hazards approach, with facilities to coordinate state
efforts in dealing with natural hazards and with a concern for mitigation,
response, and recovery elements of the program. Recognition is given to
maintaining effective interrelationships with federal and local governments,
cooperative working arrangements among central gubernatorial management
agencies, and continuing planning and policy/program development for
comprehensive emergency management programs.

Authority and Assistance for Hazards Programs of Local Jurisdictions
State government responsibilities to local jurisdictions are emphasized
because natural hazards do not respect jurisdictional boundaries; because few
local jurisdictions are self-sufficient in meeting service needs of their residents,
with state governments delivering or controlling many key services more or less
directly out of state agencies; and because state government provides essential
disaster program linkages with the federal government and with neighboring
states.
Difficulties which local governments face in administering natural hazards
programs are discussed, including recognition that a different perspective of
hazards problems exists at local levels, that grass-roots political pressures
handicap local officials in pursuing effective hazard mitigation measures, and
that some local governments are too small or lack needed skills to deal
comprehensively with hazards problems. A few exceptions are noted where
encouraging leadership and action have been taken by local jurisdictions and
officials.
The role of regional or substate planning agencies in the development of
hazard mitigation tools and programs is noted, but it is evident that the potential
of these agencies is far from being realized. This is a situation which can be
improved with state leadership.

Legislative A uthority and Legal Liability Issues
The need for states to assure the adequacy of their legislative authority to
meet present-day challenges and achieve effective comprehensive emergency
management for natural hazards is stressed, along with some of the problems
that state legislators face.
Special attention is given to issues involved in any liability uncertainty in
decisions to warn or not to issue a warning in the case of evaluated earthquake
predictions. The Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 assumes that
earthquake warnings will be issued by the governor of a state. This is not the way
in which warnings are issued for many other hazards, such as those coming from
the National Weather Service. Despite a lack of consistency in methods for
warning and instructing the public about impending dangers, considerations
noted in this report have applicability in regard to various elements of hazard
management programs, such as evacuation orders and other safety instructions
and suggestions.
Of special significance is a conclusion of a committee created by the
National Association of Attorneys General to work with the project of the
Council of State Governments-namely, that state legislatures should enact
legislation to expressly immunize both state and local officials from liability for
good-faith warnings issued as a consequence of an evaluated earthquake
prediction. A subsequent step to be considered is the possible development of
suggested state legislation to deal with this and other legal issues described in the
report.

Personnel Resourcesfor Planning Hazard Reduction Programs

New federal concern for hazard mitigation and possible new hazard
mitigation efforts in state, regional, and local agencies will find that there is a lack
of planning personnel experienced and trained for analysis leading to hazard
mitigation policies and programs.
Tenure (or merit system protection) is lacking for many such planning
positions-to be filled by employees whose long-range vision is so important-
even though state and local civil defense. disaster personnel partly financed by
federal funds are assured such protection.
These are obstacles which can handicap the development of effective state
and local programs.
Suggestions offered for consideration include projects to develop pertinent
curriculum and graduate-level education programs for planning personnel and
special training for planners and analysts now working in state, regional, and
local agencies.
Footnotes
1. The Council of State Governments. Suggested State Legislation Program for 1949
(Lexington, Ky.: 1948).
2. The Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation Program for 1953
(Lexington, Ky.: 1952).
3. The Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation. Special Report, Example
State Disaster Act of 1972 (Lexington, Ky.: 1972).
4. The Council of State Governments, Supplements to the Example State Disaster Act ofl972
(Lexington, Ky.: 1974).
5. The Council of State Governments. Comprehensive Emergency Preparedness Planning in
State Government (Lexington, Ky.: 1976).
6. National Academy of Sciences, Earthquake Prediction and Public Policy (Washington.
D.C.: 1975).
7. The Council of State Governments, National Conference on Earthquakes and Related
Hazards (Lexington, Ky.: 1978).
8. National Governors' Association, Comprehensive Emergency Management, A Governor's
Guide (Washington, D.C.: 1979). This publication lists other companion materials in the NGA State
Emergency Management Series, produced by the Association's 1978 Emergency Preparedness
Project.

2. A Base for Effective Natural Hazards

Programs

While the principal emphasis of this report is on the assessment of natural
hazards and their mitigation, many of the elements essential for administering
these programs are applicable to emergency management in a broader sense. It is
left to policymakers and practitioners in government to apply these
characteristics to their situations, taking into account the breadth of their
objectives and programs.
Five elements considered basic to the success of natural hazards programs
are singled out in this chapter. While interrelationships and overlaps among them
can be readily observed, each has basic relevance to the tasks and issues facing
state governments that are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.

A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY AT ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
Public responsibility for comprehensive disaster programs must be shared
by all levels of government. This recognition becomes more apparent in the
changed federal attitude toward emergency management.
There are very few natural disaster events which do not involve government
in some way, and many persons affected receive government financial help or
other public services. The more serious or damaging such events are or can be, the
more likely they are to move beyond local authorities and on up to state and,
subsequently, federal agencies. Almost any public response to disaster events by
state or local agencies involves personnel partly funded by dual-purpose civil
defense/disaster funds supplied by the federal government. If a presidential
emergency declaration is made, federal disaster aid funds are provided from
appropriations made by Congress to the president and, before the establishment
of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, administered by the Federal
Disaster Assistance Administration of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. Assistance from other federal agencies is also often provided.
Many factors support the concept that federal-state-local programs
concerned with natural hazards, and also with many other emergencies, should
be viewed as part of a continuing responsibility shared by the three levels of
government.
One of these factors is that many emergencies are created by regional,
national, or international policies or developments. Although these emergencies
are sometimes related to natural hazards, they are more often related to civil
defense, man-made hazards, and crises created by shortages of resources or
services, or by a combination of these situations. It is unrealistic to expect that
local and state governments can, without help, adequately plan for them or

finance needed actions even though they can and should participate in the
implementation of desired policies and activities.
Furthermore, if state and local governments perform disaster mitigation,
response, and recovery functions well, it is less likely that federal agencies need be
called on for staff participation. The nature of these shared responsibilities is
such that federal funds expended to assist state and local governments will
contribute to community effectiveness and will have a desirable chain reaction in
reducing federal involvement.
On the other hand, local officials point out that the more "invisible" a
problem is at the community level, the less likely it is that local public attitudes
will support use of community resources to deal with the problem and the more
likely it is that the problem will escalate to state and federal levels. Potential
disasters with unknown or uncertain probability are among such problems.
Another factor prompting recognition and acceptance of federal sharing of
responsibility for disaster programs is the constitutional or statutory balanced-
budget requirements applicable in state and local governments-requirements
not likely to be relaxed.' These requirements, along with mounting population
density in many hazardous areas and the increasing cost of disaster response
measures, undoubtedly have been key factors contributing to the sizeable
increase in federal funds spent for disaster aid.2
Federal recognition of the shared, intergovernmental nature of
responsibilities for programs concerned with natural disasters and other kinds of
emergencies is increasingly evident with the establishment of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency. That agency is expected to be a central force in
the implementation of comprehensive disaster programs at all levels of
government.
The federal government's role in these shared responsibilities is also evident
in the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program transmitted by the president to
Congress on June 22, 1978-a program which recognizes "the multiplicity of
responsibilities for hazards reduction throughout our society."3 The program
clearly states that it is based on a premise which emphasizes federal partnership,
stating that "actions taken by the federal government alone will have little effect.
State and local governments and the private sector have principal responsibility
for [hazard reduction] action."4 This philosophy is certainly not applicable only
to earthquake hazards.
Intergovernmental responsibility for disaster programs is further illustrated
by the federal government's enhanced recognition of its role in disaster
mitigation activities which are an essential element in comprehensive approaches
to disaster program management.

A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO HAZARDS PROGRAMS
A second element basic to successful natural hazards programs is that
governmental disaster programs will be more fully effective if they take a
comprehensive approach. This involves three stages: (I) plans and resources for
responding to disasters when they happen, (2) plans and programs for mitigation

of hazards and reduction of risks in order to enhance safety and reduce losses,
and (3) programs for recovery measures after disasters occur. Stage 3 consists of
two phases: short-range and long-range recovery. The latter phase is designed to
reduce damage and destruction should a similar event occur in the same
locations.5
Federal support for a comprehensive approach is demonstrated by the
president's statement to Congress transmitting Reorganization Plan Number 3
of 1978, which proposed the establishment of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency: "Federal hazard mitigation activities should be closely
linked with emergency preparedness and response functions."6
This presidential objective was given further emphasis by the Senate
committee on Governmental Affairs in its report on the president's
reorganization plan: "Mitigation ... has begun to achieve some recognition as a
more cost-effective approach to disaster management." The committee report
also stated that "the reorganization initiative ... [makes] clear the inherent
linkage that exists between disaster mitigation and response." The committee
urges that "the Federal Emergency Management Agency ... begin the
development of a rational, comprehensive national policy for [federal emergency
management and assistance] functions and programs." The committee
concluded one section of its report with a judgment that "these [proposed
organizational] transfers will ... materially contribute to the development of
disaster mitigation as an important area of federal activity."7
The National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program which the president
sent to Congress recognized the importance of natural disaster mitigation actions
as part of a well-balanced disaster program:
Each year the United States spends hundreds of millions of dollars in relief to victims of natural
hazards and the reconstruction of damaged communities. Much, but certainly not all, of this post-
disaster expense could be saved if mitigation actions were taken before the events occur. The nation
must strive to find the proper balance-a balance that is both compassionate and cost-effective-
between efforts to mitigate impacts of disaster and efforts to provide relief to victims.8
The significance of these statements may well represent a policy emphasis
that, if implemented, will have a much greater impact than will the new federal
organization for emergency manageiment. Assistance to state and local
governments for planning hazard mitigation programs has not been a significant
concern of federal disaster aid programs. Emphasis, rather, has been on
provision of post-disaster aid. Some federal civil defense and natural disaster
planning funds have been used by state and local governments for hazard
mitigation, most likely confined, however, to preparedness planning for
improved response to disasters. In addition, other hazard mitigation efforts have
been supported by federal categorical or project-type grants and programs and
by federally financed construction. But these funds and programs have not been
available on a basis that has encouraged or often even permitted a balanced
approach to state and local hazard mitigation efforts.
Similarly, federal involvement in phase two of the third stage of
comprehensive disaster management-long-range recovery of a disaster-stricken
area-has also been less evident in the past, due in part to the lack of action to

implement Title V of the Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1974. However, the
federal government has sometimes been involved with post-disaster recovery in
different ways authorized by other statutes, particularly those concerned with
economic development and small business assistance, but these actions have not
always been judged helpful to desirable hazard mitigation objectives.9
Greater attention to this phase of stage 3 for comprehensive disaster
management can likely be expected from the new Federal Emergency
Management Agency. The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, in its
report on Reorganization Plan Number 3, records one senator's emphasis that "it
is absolutely imperative that this agency do more to solve the long-term economic
problems that inevitably result from disasters." The director of the Office of
Management and Budget responded that this was another area "in which further
work needs to be done, and it is already within the purview of the new agency."'0

NATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN HAZARDS PROGRAMS
Because 50 states and thousands of local governmental units are involved in
disaster programs, with a great variety of interrelationships among them and
their agencies and with the federal government, need for this third basic element
of a successful natural hazards program is evident. National leadership to
facilitate balanced and effective emergency management is essential, and the role
of providing such national leadership necessarily rests with the federal
government. It is from the federal perspective that the national dimensions of
natural hazards can best be seen.
The administrative history of the federal government's many efforts to find a
satisfactory answer as to how it should be organized for emergency management
is replete with factors supporting concurrence with this third element. Most of
these efforts in the twentieth century have sought to strengthen the role of the
president and his executive office in dealing with civilian emergencies. They
include assigning emergency management functions to the president, involving
agencies in the executive office of the president and, as in the case of the new
Federal Emergency Management Agency, assigning coordinating and planning
functions by law or presidential delegation to the new agency director. These
efforts are backed up by a committee constituted of key officials or agencies in the
Executive Office of the President." The Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs has stated that it views this committee as a significant and necessary
element of the president's emergency management reorganization proposal.2
The president's leadership responsibilities related to disasters and other
emergencies come about not just because he is the chief executive of the federal
government but also in recognition of his position as the country's preeminent
national leader, a position with special relevance in severe emergencies.
The president's Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program listed the
provision of "national leadership" as the first step to be taken in "moving toward
a national [earthquake hazards reduction] program." The program states that "a
central focus is needed to stimulate and coordinate earthquake hazards reduction
activities within the federal government and throughout the Nation." The new

Federal Emergency Management Agency is scheduled to assume that role,
including "assisting state and local governments in planning and implementing
their own programs."3 Federal officials are among those who recognize the
importance of linking earthquake hazard reduction with mitigation efforts
applicable to other hazards.
This leadership role will call for steps to assure that the federal government
sets a good example by seeking to reduce existing or potential hazards in federal
installations and facilities and by incorporating reasonable hazard mitigation
policies in federal programs providing financial assistance to others. It should
also give heed to applicable advice from a committee of outstanding citizens who
a few years ago were recommending establishment of a Bicentennial Commission
on American Government. The committee's advice was that "one of the primary
emphases [of the proposed Bicentennial Commission] should relate to Federal
responsibility to improve the capability of other governments in carrying out
programs of shared concern."'4
A noteworthy example of leadership provided by the federal government in
one area of natural disaster management is the conduct and support of natural
hazards research by a number of federal agencies and their financing of a
clearinghouse for natural hazards research information. This clearinghouse
serves as an indispensable resource to users of that information in state and local
governments, a service which could not very well be provided by state and local
jurisdictions. The Federal Emergency Management Agency should join with the
National Science Foundation to assure continuance and further development of
such support and should seek out other ways of contributing to effective hazards
programs in this federal-state-local partnership arrangement.

ASSIGNMENT AND USE OF EXECUTIVE POWERS
Many agencies at each level of government are involved in preparedness for
natural disasters and other kinds of emergencies. In proposing the new federal
emergency organization, the president said that "wherever possible, emergency
responsibilities should be extensions of the regular missions of federal agencies,"
and added that "many... specific... emergency-related authorities... have to do
with department and agency responsibilities to plan for the performance of their
regular missions under emergency conditions."5 Similar reasoning applies to
state and local levels of government.
Because of the pervasive character of the organizational arrangements
applicable to emergency management, it follows that the directional and
coordination authority of the chief executive-vested in the president,
governors, and local executives-is the essential authority needed in seeking and
assuring effective direction and integration of agency efforts. These executives
are also the leaders to whom the public rightly looks for guidance in emergency
situations and are the ones to whom legislative bodies are most likely to assign
emergency powers.
Lesser officials do not have inherent authority to coordinate and direct
planning and actions by agencies whose heads are responsible to a chief

executive. They may be given specific authority by delegation, but it must be
recognized that they discharge it only on behalf of or in the name of a chief
executive. Many factors can inhibit their effectiveness if they obtain or exercise
authority in any other way.
A comment on emergency management is appropriate at this point. In
serious emergency situations-for example, following a severe disaster-across-
the-board cooperation from agencies which have roles to play and which can be
helpful in response efforts can usually be expected. This may not be the case in
connection with policies or actions under non-emergency conditions-for
example, in planning or implementing hazard mitigation measures. This
situation underlines the importance, in a comprehensive approach to emergency
management, that care be exercised in the way emergency powers are assigned
and that authorized arrangements assure effective use of all appropriate agencies,
in both emergency and nonemergency situations, under direction which fully
utilizes the powers of the chief executive.

PLANNING NOT A SOMETIME THING
A fifth characteristic which this report singles out for special attention is the
need that planning for each stage in disaster programs-mitigation, response,
and recovery-be viewed as a continuing function of management, receiving
continuous financial support and coordination. This special emphasis is given
because too much preparedness planning in the past was temporarily stimulated
by a recent emergency and has been directed to the preparation of plans that
ended up "on the shelf," often out of date by the time they were completed,
without means for assuring current effectiveness and helpfulness to management.
Preparedness planning is a subject treated in greater detail in the Council of
State Governments' 1976 publication, Comprehensive Emergency Preparedness
Planning in State Government. That report defined planning as "the organized
and continuous interaction of elements in the management process: goal
definition and problem analysis, policy development, program design, resource
allocation, and program evaluation, with coordination at various stages imposed
on participating units and levels of government."'6
In this context, planning is not a function of any single staff or operating
agency; it is all of the above elements of management performed in many
different places as part of a process that is relevant to current management
decisionmaking. Planning, like the stages of emergency management, is also
pervasive at each level of government, thus contributing to problems of
coordination and, again, necessitating constructive use of the chief executive's
powers in the coordination of the planning process.
Planning will not be possible without financial resources to support it. A
special symposium in the Public Administration Review of May-June 1977
points out that "Lack of resources for planning has beset the development of
policy analysis in states and communities from the very beginning. Even after the
federal government launched a major campaign for decentralized decision
making, neither federal aid adequate for the task nor sufficient state and local

appropriations has been forthcoming." What is needed, the article points out, is
"the design of a new structure of support that would encourage improvements in
state and local governance and decision making."'7
The Federal Emergency Management Agency, with support from the Office
of Management and Budget, may find it necessary to supply this lack of resources
by adopting a suggestion of the chairman of the National Governors' Association
subcommittee on disaster aid: "If only a very small percent of the amount now
budgeted by the federal government for post-disaster aid were made available for
hazard assessment and mitigation planning, it would be possible to save lives,
reduce social and economic losses and reduce federal disaster response
expenditures."'
Footnotes
I. California's Proposition 13 and the national significance of that action cannot be
overlooked when considering inhibitions applicable to state and local decisions on allocating
financial resources to disaster programs. There is current interest in amending the U.S. Constitution
to require a balanced federal budget. State and local budget balancing requirements are now law; a
federal requirement is not and may not be. Even if adopted in one form or another, indications are
that various options and special provisions are likely which would assure flexibility in meeting
emergency situations, even under a balanced federal budget requirement.
2. The federal budget for fiscal 1980 shows outlays of $241 million from the disaster aid funds
appropriated to the president. These appropriations for fiscal 1970 and succeeding years have
hovered around $200 million each year except for a peak of $440 million in fiscal 1978, occasioned by
severe drought conditions in many parts of the United States. These figures are to be contrasted with
appropriations in the late 1950s and early 1960s of $25 million to $50 million; the fiscal 1960 budget
called for no new appropriations, only the expenditure of $11.5 million from balances carried
forward. The National Governors' Association, recognizing that disaster aid from the appropriation
to the president is only part of the federal disasteraid provided to the states, estimates current annual
federal aid for presidentially declared disasters at $500 million.
3. Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President, Fact Sheet on
the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (Washington, D.C.: June 1978).
4. Executive Office of the President, The National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program
(Washington, D.C.: June 22, 1978), p. 3.
5. This report of the Council of State Governments subdivides comprehensive disaster
management into three stages: mitigation, response, and. recovery. The National Governors'
Association and some others add a fourth stage, "preparedness," falling between mitigation and
response, encompassing activities applicable to warning systems, stockpiling, resource inventory,
and certain hazard plans primarily related to disaster response. Optionally, these activities can be
viewed either as mitigation activities or as activities constituting a preliminary aspect of the response
stage; this report puts them in the latter category. The "recovery" stage of disaster management can be
divided into two parts, short-range and long-range; this report tends to look at most short-range
recovery as part of responding to a disaster event, with long-range recovery viewed as quite a different
kind of activity.
6. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Reorganization Plan
Number 3 of 1978, to Improve Federal Emergency Management and Assistance (Washington. D.C.:
June 19, 1978).
7. U.S. Congress, Senate, Report of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on
Reorganization Plan Number3 of 1978, Report N. 95-1141 (Washington, D.C.: August 23, 1978). pp.
13-14.
8. Executive Office of the President, The National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program.
p. 3.
9. U.S. Congress, Senate, Report of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. p. 11
(reference to testimony by George M. Elsey, President of the American National Red Cross, citing

conflict between Small Business Administration disaster loan regulations and the intent of the federal
flood insurance law).
10. Ibid. pp. 32-35.
1. The president's message transmitting the reorganization plan to Congress advised that the
committee would be established by executive order to comprise the Federal Emergency Management
Agency director as chairman; the assistants to the president for national security, domestic affairs and
policy, and intergovernmental relations; and the director of the Office of Management and Budget.
12. U.S. Congress, Senate, Report of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, p. 10.
13. Executive Office of the President, The National Earthquake Hazards Reduction, p. 8.
14. National Academy of Public Administration, Bicentennial Commission on American
Government (August 26, 1975), pp. 10-11.
15. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Reorganization Plan
Number 3 of 1978.
16. The Council of State Governments, Comprehensive Emergency Preparedness Planning in
State Government (Lexington, Ky.: 1976).
17. Selma J. Mushkin, "Policy Analysis in State and Community," Public Administration
Review (May/June 1977), pp. 245-53.
18. Governor Mike O'Callaghan, letter to Philip H. Smith, Assistant for Natural Resources and
Commercial Services. Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President
(April 17, 1978).

3. Assessment and Reduction of Natural

Hazards

Accepting the presumption that hazard mitigation is desirable-reducing
the dangers and costs of natural hazards-what role can state government best
play, in conjunction with federal and local agencies.
The federal government will continue to conduct important activities to that
end, apparently with stronger mitigation emphasis and leadership derived from
new plans and policies discussed in Chapter 2. Among these activities are the
prediction of storms and other natural hazard events; research leading to helpful
delineation of geologic, weather, and other hazards and to ways for mitigating
their harmful effects; provision of information regarding the incidence and
nature of potential disasters and risks; and provision of financial and technical
assistance to state and local governments and to various elements in the private
sector.
Local government can also take significant action to mitigate natural
hazards through its land use, building regulation, and other activities, but its
contribution is more limited if a jurisdiction is small or if the hazard is large and
mitigation complex.
State government can perform a special mission in this shared responsibility
for reducing natural hazards. Part of the mission is the provision of both
leadership to local jurisdictions and state residents and liaison with federal
agencies, part is the performance of specific services which are best conducted at
the state level, and part is serving as a catalyst for services provided by federal,
state, and local agencies. A state's tasks include leadership and services in (1)
identifying the natural hazards most likely to constitute a threat to the state's
communities and residents and assessing the risks which such hazards entail, and
(2) determining, sometimes in general terms and sometimes on a site-specific
basis, what hazard reduction measures can best prevent disasters or assure
reasonable levels of safety.
These two tasks are basic ones calling for attention from state government
officials and personnel, both directly and in concert with federal and local
governments. These are the tasks with which this chapter is concerned.

IDENTIFYING AND ASSESSING A STATE'S NATURAL HAZARDS
No state or area within a state is free from potential disaster due to natural
hazards. In order to develop a program for mitigation of those hazards which
present the greatest danger, the obvious initial step is to identify the natural
hazards which are likely to occur in the state. The second part of this task is
assessing the risk which each hazard presents and the potential damage it can
cause.

Identification of Natural Hazards
The natural hazards affecting a state can primarily be identified by historical
occurrence, as well as by a wide range of factors which make them a potential
source of danger.
This report considers 14 natural hazards as those most common in the
United States. They are:
Avalanche Storm surge
Coastal erosion Tornado
Drought Tsunami
Earthquake Unstable soil
Flood Volcano
Hurricane Windstorm
Landslide Winter storm
The Special Section of this report describes these 14 hazards. In that section
each of the hazards listed above is discussed and a number of maps of the United
States are included, with an indication of the incidence of the hazards in each of
the states.
Figure I illustrates that all states have high potential for some of these 14
hazards. States such as California, Oregon, and Washington may experience
disasters resulting from nine or more of the hazards. By contrast, Georgia and
Vermont will probably be affected to an appreciable degree by only one or two of
the hazards. The number of hazards shown for each state on the map is derived
from hazard maps presented in the Special Section. A hazard is counted in a state
only where there is reasonably high potential for disaster from that hazard, as
indicated by the information in the Special Section.
Natural hazards can also be categorized by their potential for economic
impact. One method is by an analysis of possible building losses, which the
J. H. Wiggins Company of Redondo Beach, California, did for nine hazards in 50
states. Figure 2, developed in that analysis, shows average annual loss from the
nine hazards as a percentage of a state's total building value for 1970 conditions.
These figures are derived from historic data and by projections over a 30-year
period from 1970 to 2000. Florida and Louisiana stand to suffer the greatest
percentage of such loss. The analysis concluded that "unless significant new steps
are taken, the cost of replacing or repairing buildings destroyed and damaged by
the nine natural hazards studied, during a typical year, are likely to increase more
than 85 percent in the 30-year period between 1970 and 2000."'
Of the 14 natural hazards listed above, several such as floods, windstorms,
and drought are common in varying degrees in all states. Another hazard
common to all states but virtually hidden and not well understood is unstable
soils. Annual damage to buildings from this hazard ranks second only to that
from floods and is tied with that caused by hurricanes and storm surges.
Many of the hazards are found only in certain states, sometimes limited to
specific areas within states; this is true of avalanches, tsunamis, and volcanos in
western and Pacific Coast states and hurricanes and storm surges in Atlantic and
Gulf Coast states. Four hazards-earthquakes, volcanoes, coastal erosion, and

Figure 1
DISASTER POTENTIAL OF STATES
FROM NATURAL HAZARDS*

[ 1-2

RI -34

. 7-8

* 9-10

*Sources: This figure is based on the number of different kinds of natural disasters experienced
in each state. The information used for arriving at the number of natural hazards came from Maps I
through 14 in the Special Section of this report. The specific criteria from the maps, by natural
hazards, was:
Avalanche-all indicated areas.
Coastal erosion-shorelines with > 10% critical erosion.
Drought arid and semiarid areas.
Earthquake-areas subject to potential major damage.
Floods-181 or more floods and flash floods from 1945-76.
Hurricane and storm surge-counted as one hazard for east and Gulf Coast states.
Landslide-all indicated areas.
Tornado-areas frequently experiencing tornadoes.
Tsunami-all west coast states, Alaska, and Hawaii.
Expansive soil-regionally abundant areas.
Volcano-all indicated areas.
Windstorm-all indicated areas.
Winter storm-areas of > 10 mean annual days with snowfall > 1 inch and > 90 days
below freezing.

landslides-are commonly considered to be a threat in geologically unique areas
but, except for volcanoes, they actually have a high potential for disaster in more
than 20 states. Tornadoes carry the highest probability in the central plains states
but have occurred in most of the states. The winter hazards of snow and ice

Figure 2
ANNUAL LOSS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL STRUCTURE
VALUE FOR NINE NATURAL HAZARDS*

Percentage

o~ T � g SAC!, :1 < 0.2
!,sD 0.2 < 0.3
%.o0 r 'D 03 < 05

> 0.5

*Source: J. H. Wiggins Co.. Building Losses from Natural Hazards: Yesterdav, Today and
Tomorrow (Redondo Beach. Calif.: forthcoming in 1979). The nine hazards are: earthquake,
landslide. expansive soil, hurricane wind/storm surge, tornado, riverine flood, local wind, local
flood, and tsunami.

storms cause an increasing number of disasters in many states because of the
fragile nature and the growing number of technologically dependent, densely
populated areas.
Often a natural hazard not only presents a problem in itself, but it also can
unleash or create additional hazards. Earthquakes are a major example of this
type of chain reaction because they may cause tsunamis, landslides, coastal
erosion, flooding, and fires. Floods precipitate landslides and increase coastal
erosion. Some hazards come in what can be described as a "family." Tornadoes
are almost always part of a storm system which includes wind, rain, hail, and
lightning. Hurricanes may spawn such storm systems. Additionally, and to an
increasing degree, many natural hazard events can trigger disasters from man-
made hazards through events such as dam failures from earthquakes, power
outages from ice storms, and release of toxic chemicals by earthquakes and
floods. Finally, the interrelated impact where different hazards occur at the same
time, as in the case of winter storms and energy shortages, has been amply
demonstrated in recent years.

A common feature of many disaster events caused by natural hazards is that
danger is created only by the presence of man and his settlements. Man's
tendency to establish communities near water has led many floods and much
coastal erosion to cause disasters due to the high damages inflicted upon such
communities. Recent settlement patterns resulting in higher population density
in formerly remote areas also have made many hazards an increasing threat.
Well-known examples include resort and permanent homes built to take
advantage of picturesque views along the San Andreas fault and the colorful
environment of Hilton Head Island; construction safeguards and adequate
means of evacuation may not accompany the habitation of such settlements.
The identification and assessment of natural hazards which present risks is
an undertaking handled by planners, who are used to accumulating data.
Planners from various state, substate, and local agencies can participate in and
contribute to this task; and state and local disaster response personnel have
special, applied experience which is useful in such undertakings. Federal
agencies, many of which are identified in the Special Section of this report, are
primary sources of needed data, as are universities, research and consulting
organizations, particularly those which have been the recipients of grants from
agencies such as the National Science Foundation, and entities which will
comprise the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Recent research, however, has shown that one of the gaps in disaster
program management throughout the United States is the lack of good records
on actual disasters. With assistance from the federal government, states are
encouraged, in concert with one another, to take steps to develop effective
disaster data recording and reporting systems and to require reporting and
assemblage of such information which can be helpful for planning and analytical
purposes.2

Assessment of Natural Hazards
In developing a program aimed at reducing disasters and losses from natural
hazards, an assessment of those hazards likely to be experienced is an important
step in order to determine which carry the most risk. Accordingly, it is a step to be
given high priority in mitigation efforts.
Planners and program developers will find it desirable to assess natural
hazards from at least these three points of view: (l) hazard characteristics, (2)
impact on critical facilities, and (3) social and economic impacts. Other analytical
factors are described in The Environment as Hazard, by lan Burton, Robert W.
Kates, and Gilbert F. White.3 Each of these factors must, of course, be related
to the specific areas or location chosen for analysis, although these very factors
may determine the location selected for analysis.
State, substate, and local government analysts will find many hazard maps
developed by federal agencies useful in delineating hazards and planning hazard
reduction measures, but such maps are not likely to be on a large enough scale for
site-specific needs. A fertile field for state and local planners is the development
of locally useful maps. A great deal of that work has been done by many state and

local agencies. Again, this is a kind of activity in which state, substate, and local
planners have had pertinent experience. Often maps which they have developed
for other purposes will have utility in hazard mitigation programs.

Hazard Characteristics
Probability. This characteristic identifies the probability of an area
experiencing a particular kind of natural hazard. Probability is, of course, a
factor related to the historic experience and any geographic, geological,
meteorological, or other data useful in determining that the hazard is one likely
to occur; thus, information contributing to the development of the map in Figure
I and those in the Special Section has special pertinence in this analysis.
A more refined delineation is necessary as the size of the area being
considered decreases and as the importance of probability determination
increases in the hazard assessment or hazard reduction planning process. The
delineation is always subject to differences resulting from the quality and
currency of the data and the methods used; the analysis accordingly must allow
for appropriate revision, especially as new data becomes available. A number of
such analyses have been done and examples of data assembled for them are
available to those undertaking these more refined delineations. The mapping of
floodplains illustrates a delineation process that identifies flood hazard
probability to a reasonably reliable degree. The analysis of "tornado alleys"
based on historical occurrence records is another example, though far less
refined. Admittedly, as previously indicated, better reports and records on actual
disaster events are needed, and improved systems can enhance the value of
probability and other assessments.
Magnitude. Magnitude has been defined as a natural hazard characteristic
which identifies a measure of size exceeding a common level. In the case of a
flood, it would be the maximum height reached by the flood waters or the
maximum discharge at a given point. Describing the magnitude of an event often
calls for the imaginative use of data obtained for other purposes or, in some cases,
the generation of a new type of data. Some hazards such as floods and
earthquakes have well-established measures of magnitude such as the height of
flood waters or the Richter scale for earthquakes. As to the latter, an upper limit
has not been defined, and the lower end reaches into a minus scale; a large
earthquake would register 6 and a great earthquake, 10 times more powerful, at 7
or more, with the largest earthquake on record registering about 8.9. The
magnitude of other hazards such as tornadoes or lightning are much more
difficult to measure.
Intensity. This characteristic differs from magnitude in the same way that a
light bulb has a certain magnitude when measured in watts and a certain intensity
when measured in lumens. Hazards often can be measured for both
characteristics. Earthquakes can be measured, for example, as to magnitude on
the Richter scale, which gives a measure of the energy released, and as to intensity
on the Modified Mercalli scale, which measures the observed effects of the
earthquake. The intensity measure is purely subjective, e.g., window shaking,

cracks in the ground, and other occurrences determined by observation. Such
effects, in many cases, are determined by the location, design, construction, and
age of a structure. It ranges in scale from I to XII (the latter being classed as
"complete destruction"). Floods can be measured for magnitude (water level)
and intensity (force of flow).
Other Characteristics. There are a number of other characteristics of natural
hazards that can be used in assessment, six of which are noted here. Frequency
indicates how often an event of a given magnitude may be expected to occur.
Duration refers to the length of time a hazard event may persist. Area covered
indicates whether a hazard is limited, like the path of a tornado, or broad, as with
most droughts. Speedrefers to the time between a hazard event's first appearance
and its peak. Number of potential locations indicates areas susceptible to a
hazard such as floods which occur in many locations and volcanoes which occur
in very few locations. Finally, pattern of occurrence refers to time frames when
hazards can be expected, such as volcanic eruptions with a random time
distribution and hurricanes a seasonal one.

Impact on Critical Facilities
Another basic assessment should analyze the possible risk that hazard
events may have for certain facilities particularly critical to public needs or which
affect large groups of people. This would include structures and facilities such as
schools and churches; others used for response and disaster assistance such as
police, fire, and medical facilities; those that affect energy such as generating
facilities and pipeline pumping stations; and those that if severely damaged can
trigger still different disasters such as dams and nuclear-powered generating
facilities.
Increased environmental concern has in recent years caused such facilities to
be located with greater care in order to reduce their disaster potential. However,
vast capital investment has been made during past years in facilities that were not
planned or constructed with disaster potential in mind. These existing sites and
facilities should be identified and considered in a comprehensive hazard
reduction program. Many of these facilities are owned and operated by public
bodies. State and local governments have a special responsibility as well as a
special liability in such instances.
Another critical facility is land and its uses. Of particular concern here are
uses of land which would be recovered slowly or not at all following a disastrous
event. Because of the relative durability of land, disaster events such as
earthquakes or extreme, accelerated coastal erosion are of great concern. Of
special concern, too, are lands devoted to agriculture, to human habitation, to
energy-related production, and to recreation. Therefore, comprehensive
emergency management must look to the best uses for land in relationship to the
natural hazards that the land could experience.
Bridges on evacuation routes and facilities that will be needed in disaster
response efforts acquire special significance in the assessment of hazard impact.

How much attention is given to this phase of the hazard assessment process
demonstrates the interlocking relationships and responsibilities among local,
state, and federal agencies. Many factors are beyond the scope of local
government responsibilities, and the concern of federal agencies may be remote.
Therefore, state government leadership may likely be the key ingredient, the
catalytic agent, especially in initiating actions aimed at hazard mitigation.
Further attention will be given to many of these critical facilities, beginning on
page 26.

Social and Economic Impacts
The social and economic impacts of natural disasters will, obviously, be
larger and of greater concern where population density is high, where buildings
are concentrated, and where the economic well-being of residents and
commercial organizations can be adversely affected. However, smaller
communities with weaker financial bases and few key facilities may suffer greater
relative social and economic impacts than larger urban areas if extensive damage
occurs and their few key facilities are destroyed.
Demographic information and socioeconomic data are important tools for
the analysts engaged in making such assessments of natural hazards. Behavioral
characteristics and reactions are also significant. For instance, one must consider
those populations that are made immobile for physical or social reasons. This
would include inmates of prisons and other detention facilities, residents of
hospitals and nursing homes, and students in educational institutions.
Populations dependent on public transit or limited-volume traffic arteries also
require special consideration. Locations where warnings will not give adequate
time for evacuation because the roads or bridges would restrict travel flow must
be acknowledged; Atlantic and Gulf coast areas face this possibility during
hurricane season. If earthquake prediction becomes a reliable science for short-
range predictions, could San Francisco be successfully evacuated in time? People
are very mobile, more so than most of their creations, but still they require space
and time to evacuate and relocate. Of course, in a comprehensive hazard
reduction program, hazard reduction would emphasize placing population
concentrations in areas of low risk.
The urbanization trends that accompany industrialization have resulted in
vast concentrations of buildings in relatively small areas. These areas become a
major concern in hazard reduction for a variety of reasons. Where such
concentrations have resulted in high population densities for residential,
commercial, or industrial purposes, the potential impact of disasters from
natural hazards should be determined. Of equal concern are those building
concentrations that have major economic or social importance. In some cases,
both density and importance may be factors for consideration, as in the
destroying or incapacitating of a major regional financial center.

SELECTING AND APPRAISING HAZARD REDUCTION MEASURES
When a state is aware of the natural hazards with which it will likely have to
contend and has assessed those hazards in terms of the risks which they present

and the impact they could have on the state's residents, it is better prepared to
determine which hazard reduction measures should be taken to lessen the
harmful impact of such hazards. This determination depends notjust on selecting
measures which can be effective, but also encompasses the promotion of safety by
setting standards or requirements applicable to hazard reduction measures
administered by local jurisdictions as well as state agencies. It also depends on
appraising how feasible hazard reduction measures will be; the latter appraisal
involves such issues as social acceptability and reliability. Finally comes the
implementing job of programming, prioritizing, budgeting, and accomplishing
desired reduction measures. The pay-off from a comprehensive natural hazards
program comes only through the development and implementation of a program
of effective hazard mitigation measures designed for the kind of hazards which
the state and its people should be prepared to face. The cost of such measures may
well be more than offset by reduction in losses of life and property which would
otherwise be sustained and by lessening the amount of public funds which would
be spent for post-disaster aid.

Measures for Reduction of Impact from Natural Hazards
Many hazard reduction measures-particularly those related to local land
use planning and regulation and to locally administered building codes, public
utilities, and protective services-are primarily dependent upon authority vested
in localjurisdictio ns by state constitutions and statutes. Because it is the state that
actually grants that authority, the state has the power to lay down conditions
under which that authority is to be exercised and to determine goals and
objectives which best serve the interests of the greatest number of state residents.
State government, indeed, should be concerned with evaluating local actions to
determine if those interests are well served. This can encompass oversight by the
legislature as well as administrative evaluations by state agencies.
However, state government will also encounter situations when, sometimes
even on a site-specific basis, it may best identify problems for attention either by
its own agencies or by local jurisdictions.

Land Use Planning and Regulation
One mitigation measure with hazard reduction potential is land use
planning, followed by effective regulation or management of land use. Yet this
approach to a diverse and complex problem has hardly begun to be effectively
applied. Management of land in the United States represents a historic and
continuing battle directly bound up in private and public rights. Economic forces
seek the highest return on use of the land. Tax systems and short-term investment
policies tend to minimize land use planning as an effective means of long-term
land management serving disaster mitigation purposes. In addition, state
government tends to be reluctant to manage land use either through zoning and
subdivision controls or through capital improvement planning. Worse yet, many
governments have not instituted effective disaster mitigation practices in the
management of public lands which they own.

Most state governments have passed on responsibility for traditional zoning
controls over land use management to local governments. Few guidelines have
been provided by the states. For instance, only 12 states set forth specific
guidance on the content of a local comprehensive plan. California requires
disaster mitigation-related elements in such a plan. However, land use
management is too important As a hazard reduction measure to be ignored.
Activities which can be undertaken include delineation of hazard zones (e.g.,
location of geologic hazards), development of hazard-reducing land use policies
consistent with safety or economic objectives determined by the state to be in the
public's best interests, modifying tax structures in order to provide an incentive
for desirable mitigation-related land use decisions, encouragement of public
finance policies that discourage new development and growth in hazardous
areas, and development of housing policy and regulations that will reduce hazard
vulnerability.
Natural hazard mitigation through land use policies should in some
instances be sought as a primary end-purpose of srch actions, particularly, for
example, in the case of certain floodplains orfault zones where public safety is the
prime objective. In other instances, hazard mitigation may be a secondary
purpose when land use measures are initiated for other reasons.
A number of states are increasingly concerned with land use problems.
Some states, recognizing the effects of "urban sprawl," inappropriate use of
marginal lands, efforts to increase public revenue bases via new developments
which create density exceeding the capacity of essential public services, land uses
which create undesirable environmental pollution, and other factors generating a
possible need for state land management action, have sought to regulate the
development of land by a variety of means. As stated in a Council of State
Governments' publication in 1974, "It is clear that the authority rests with the
states to legislate for the promotion of health, safety, and welfare of their citizens,
... there is no constitutional necessity for the delegation of all of the [police]
power to the local governments."4
The Council's 1974 report also points out that in recent years there has been
a greater number of measures asserting the rights of states to regulate
developments by exercise of their inherent sovereign police powers. The report
identifies states which are taking steps to regulate land utilization where critical
areas or uses are involved (e.g., coastal wetlands, shore land protections, location
of oil terminals and nuclear facilities, preservation of agricultural lands, and
developments affecting air and water quality). In 1974 the National Governors'
Association adopted a position supporting a need in the 1970s to face issues of
national and statewide land use planning and decisionmaking in a way that seeks,
among other objectives, quality environment, wise and balanced use of the
nation's land and water resources, and protection of scenic environmental and
cultural amenities.

Building Technology
Construction codes are a traditional approach requiring use of building
technology to assure both safety and value. Man-made structures are involved in

most of the losses caused by natural hazards. Advances in quality and
understanding of modern building materials and the behavior of structures have
contributed to the ability to construct disaster-resistant buildings. A 1972 report
of the Office of Emergency Preparedness stated that the greatest mitigation of
hazards will come through safe construction.
Building regulation authority rests basically on state government, but with
most responsibility for adoption and enforcement of building codes passed on to
local government. Over 5,000 local codes have been adopted in the United States,
based largely on four model codes developed by code organizations, each of
which tends to be oriented to and predominant in certain sections of the country.
Twenty-two states now have statewide building codes, most of which are
mandatory. Building codes generally include minimum safeguards for fire safety
and prevention of collapse, health standards, and electrical and sanitary as well
as structural aspects of construction.
The federal government has a significant impact on construction through
requirements specified for federally assisted construction; through construction
of its own buildings, dams, etc.; and through research and development of
performance criteria for improved building practices by the National Bureau of
Standards.
Hazard reduction is approached primarily through code requirements
applicable to new construction, with older structures subject to code
requirements only when major improvements are undertaken. It is not
economically feasible to apply new and safer standards to the large number of
existing structures which admittedly could benefit from those standards. Some
jurisdictions, however, have undertaken sensible approaches to problems of
older buildings by determining those presenting the greatest hazards and seeking
mitigation largely through voluntary compliance on a priority basis. Others have
sought to eliminate unduly dangerous features of old buildings, such as parapets
and cornices deemed unsafe in areas subject to seismic activity.
Professional organizations have influence. The American Institute of
Architects. the National Association of Home Builders Research Foundation,
and the American Society of Civil Engineers have given attention to improving
seismic safety in construction. The new National Institute of Building Sciences,
in the spring of 1979, held a conference on construction to enhance seismic safety.
The development and impact of this new institute may well contribute to
strengthening building standards and to greater uniformity in model building
codes.
Standard state codes bring with them both advantages and disadvantages.
On balance, standard codes, with mandatory application of minimum
requirements to local jurisdictions, appear to have merit, provided, (1)sufficient
flexibility is permitted so that added local requirements can be applied when local
conditions indicate their necessity, and (2) the codes are regularly modernized to
take advantage of new developments affecting safety and economy. In instances
where safety and economy have to be weighed against one another, not only
should careful professional analysis be given by such organizations as the

National Institute of Building Sciences and the National Bureau of Standards, as
well as by public policy officials, but again, flexibility should be assured so that
localities can establish higher standards than those prescribed by state codes.
The possibility of natural hazards damage has not always motivated the
strengthening of code provisions, and it is not surprising to find that suggested
model codes and codes adopted by state and local jurisdictions often fail to
include provisions specially designed to mitigate natural hazards. Technology
assuring greater seismic safety of structures in earthquake areas, protection
against wind damage, floodproofing, and the like is advancing. However, the
higher concentration of buildings and people in areas at risk emphasizes the
importance of these objectives. Here is a matter in which the new Federal
Emergency Management Agency may take an interest and stimulate incentives to
hazard mitigation.
Despite the need for building codes, state and local officials recognize that
codes based on those developed by model code organizations are not likely to
encompass steps to alleviate damage that many architects, engineers,
environmentalists, and others concerned with natural hazards and resources
would consider desirable in order to provide maximum individual as well as
public protection. Because the model codes necessarily consider a wide range of
issues and are the product of membership organizations, it is to be expected that
they will reflect compromises designed to meet divergent views.
The model codes will have their greatest impact in instances where public
health and safety are involved. They are less likely to affect the impact of hazards
on private property, where public risk is deemed not to be involved. In fact, the
extension of enabling authority to local governments may be restrictive in its
application to such property. Questions of public vs. private interests and the
incidence of damages and costs are valid issues of policy and legislative concern.
(The importance of costs in legislative considerations is referred to in Chapter 4,
page 49, and in Appendix D.)
Finally, it should be noted that building safety restrictions placed by
government jurisdictions on their own projects or by federal, state, or private
financing authorities may have greater impact on design and construction
standards than do those in building codes. Both legal and financial liability are
key factors in such instances. This does not imply, however, that similar
additional safeguards are not proper subjects for consideration in legislative
enactments having broader applicability.
The special responsibility of the states is to keep abreast of advancing
technology for the same reasons that the new technology is getting increased
attention from professional organizations and disciplines. The objective is to
strengthen the effectiveness of codes in dealing with hazards, and to assure
effective inspections meeting state as well as local needs and requirements. The
National Conference of States on Building Codes and Standards, an
organization of state building officials, can assist states in assessing these
objectives through its active participation in programs concerned with many
kinds of natural hazards. It also serves as a medium for calling states' attention to
technical and administrative developments related to code administration.

Lifelines Engineering
A community's lifelines, those systems for water, waste disposal, energy,
transportation, and communication, are prime candidates for protection against
natural and other hazards. They represent vast investments and in severe
disasters can be the Achilles' heel of a stricken area.
"Lifelines engineering" is a term primarily developed in connection with
dangers to these systems arising from possible earthquakes, but it also has
broader applicability to other hazards. The significant attention given to lifelines
engineering by the American Society of Civil Engineers with the creation of its
Technical Council of Lifelines Earthquake Engineering is evidence of increasing
professional concern which these systems are receiving.
There are three major lifelines problems that may be caused by disasters.
First, an area may suffer long-term disability through the loss of power,
disruption in energy sources, and disabled or destroyed transportation, sewer,
and water (including irrigation) networks. Second, a community's ability to deal
with disaster events can be seriously affected by loss of water to fight fires,
reduced effectiveness in aiding the injured because of damaged roads and
powerlines, and risks to health caused by damage to water and sanitation
systems, food supplies, etc. Finally, problems arise because of interagency and
intergovernmental coordination required for providing services through both
private and public ownership of lifelines sytems, the regulation of such facilities,
and determining the responsibility for safety of lifelines and of residents of
communities where key facilities are located. These present extremely complex
situations affecting achievement of hazard mitigation compatible with
community needs and other public services and systems. The recent example at
Pennsylvania's Three Mile Island is illustrative, even though it was not a natural
disaster.
With the increasingly fragile nature of our urban communities and the
advancing complexity of our lifelines systems, major disruptions in the services
they provide can create disastrous events in instances that once would have
produced only minor discomfort.
The technology for reducing the impact of natural hazards on lifelines
systems is available in many cases. It can be expensive, illustrated by the cost of
back-up equipment and "redundancy" desirable in certain facilities and often
urged by engineers. State government initiative may be needed to seek
application of safeguards, effective regulation, inspection and enforcement, and
other actions likely to be required at all three levels of government.

Safeguarding Critical Facilities
In addition to lifelines, other critical facilities-such as schools, hospitals,
dams, etc.--also present special challenges to hazard reduction planners. They,
too, often require a mix of private and public controls and actions which cut
across all governmental leveis. Many measures which can reduce the impact of
natural hazards on these critical facilities are now known to exist. Hazard
delineation and assessment, for example, can aid in the safe siting of many

facilities. Building technology, sometimes oriented to specific hazards which
have been experienced or can be anticipated, may help make them disaster
resistant. Other technological advances can help provide improved warning and
back-up energy generating systems.
A special word is warranted on behalf of state actions to assure the safety of
dams, particularly those on private property which may need to be dealt with by
use of police power vested in state and local jurisdictions.
In August 1972, a national program for inspection of nonfederal dams was
authorized when Congress passed the National Dam Inspection Act. The act
authorized the Department of the Army (through the Corps of Engineers) to
inspect nonfederal dams, generally those 25 feet or more in height and
impounding more than 50 acre-feet of water. An inventory of about 50,000 of
these dams was completed by May 1975, but funds for inspecting the dams were
provided with enactment of the 1978 Public Works Appropriation Act only after
several dam failures had occurred.
An inspection program was begun in 1978. During the first year, 354 out of
1,793 dams inspected were found unsafe; emergency actions were deemed
necessary in view of the possible failure of 26 of these dams. The cumulative total
of unsafe dams reported through March 1979 was 619.
The Corps of Engineers has concluded that a nationwide problem of unsafe
dams does exist; although 40 of the 53 states, commonwealths, and territories
have effective dam safety legislation, only 20 states have the capability to perform
or administer their own dam safety programs.5
States are concerned notjust with nonfederal dams but also with those of the
federal government located within their boundaries. Responsibility for planning
and coordinating dam safety programs rests with each of seven major federal
agencies involved in some aspect of dam construction, licensing, regulation,
financing, etc. The director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy was
asked by the president to review federal agency safety regulations and practices;
that office has done so and made a report.6 The dam safety coordination role
performed by the director's office is being assumed by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency.
The Secretary of the Interior has recommended that the Federal Emergency
Management Agency take leadership in identifying means by which states can be
encouraged to develop effective dam safety programs. He suggested that
legislative initiatives be considered as well as federal incentives for state
involvement. He also suggested that a mechanism be established in the Federal
Emergency Management Agency for monitoring and evaluating the continuing
effectiveness of state dam safety programs.7
The Secretary of Agriculture is urging the Corps of Engineers to support the
states in developing strong state programs and indicates that the Department of
Agriculture will provide assistance, probably through the Forest Service and the
Soil Conservation Service.8 The federal government recognizes that it has
historically fostered many private dams through various kinds of assistance, but
that it has failed to provide mechanisms necessary to assure their safety. The need

for such mechanisms is apparently a problem which state governments must face,
possibly with federal assistance.
A dilemma for the states is presented by the fact that private dam safety may
well be a problem, one where the federal inspection program will continue to call
the states' attention to dams believed to be hazardous and in need of state action.
But states are also faced with other hazards and other critical facilities which need
their attention. This demonstrates that states must determine priorities and
relationships among hazards and hazard-mitigation measures in developing
comprehensive hazard mitigation programs.
Preparedness for Response to Natural Hazards Disaster Events
Response readiness and responding to natural hazard disasters are the
phases of emergency preparedness to which states have given the greatest
attention. Mitigation of the impact of disaster events and contending with
emergency situations are, of course, the goals of these efforts. In fact, some state
officials, when describing their mitigative activities, mostly confine their
observations to efforts applicable to the response phase of emergency
management programs. This is a situation also noted in recent studies of the
National Governors' Association.
Preparedness and response planning has accordingly received more
extensive attention in state government than most other aspects of
comprehensive emergency management. It is a complex phase of disaster
program management because all three levels of government may be involved
and many federal, state, and local agencies conduct functions concerned with
disaster response and post-disaster assistance.
A prime key to maximizing effectiveness in this hazard-reducing effort is the
availability of predictions and forecasts. These govern both warnings issued and
suggestions made for community and individual protective actions. Yet states
must face the fact that the ability to predict disasters is ranked generally low for
most of the 14 natural hazards identified earlier in this chapter. Progress is being
made in the ability to predict some of these hazards and the increasing ability to
delineate hazards will being greater predictive capabilities. Efforts of the
National Weather Service, aided by its use of sighting volunteers and other new
developments, are contributing to improved prediction of floods, hurricanes,
tornadoes, windstorms, and winter storms. A tsunami warning system in the
Pacific is increasingly reliable. Geophysicists and other scientists engaged in
earthquake prediction foresee slowly evolving improvement in the prediction of
earthquakes. The U.S. Geological Survey is closely following earthquake
predictive progress in other countries, particularly China, Japan, and Russia,
and has stepped up the nation's efforts to better understand seismic activity in the
central and eastern sections of the United States, primarily where high magnitude
earthquakes have occurred before. Federal and state geologists largely use
historical and geological observations, and the U.S. Geological Survey has in the
past two years sought to create better arrangements in its communications with
the states. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has
cooperated in this effort.

There are many matters of special concern to those responsible for disaster
preparedness and response programs. Among these are warning systems and
facilities, communication systems, inventories of supplies and equipment needed
for response efforts, evacuation plans based on best-available facilities, response
plans to deal with unique requirements in certain kinds of disasters, and the
promotion of public understanding and knowledge of the effect of natural
hazards on communities and their residents.
Response plans must be closely linked with the planning required for other
phases of comprehensive emergency management which are more likely the
concern of other federal, state, and local agencies rather than those responsible
for the disaster response mechanism. Unless this relationship is close, response
efforts at the time of a disaster may not be as effective as they should be; in fact,
they may actually hamper longer-range, socially desirable objectives.
Disaster response officials also have need to keep abreast of new technology
applicable not only to their own efforts but also those for other hazard reduction
measures.
The role of state officials in evaluating the capabilities and the performance
of state and local agencies in disaster response is one where state responsibility
has not always been consistent. Disaster response planning has been undertaken
in all states, but such planning may not encompass the essential elements of a
complete planning effort, as identified in Chapter 2. Admittedly some of these
elements extend beyond the normal tasks of a state emergency servicesagency; it
is for this reason that each of the organizational alternatives discussed in Chapter
4 encourages participation and communication among the various agencies and
officials that play central roles in a comprehensive state emergency management
program.

Long-Range Recovery
Short-range recovery measures, likely to be taken after the occurrence of
disaster events, may re-create situations under which disaster events could be
repeated, with similar results.
Long-range recovery should, on the other hand, be based on more carefully
planned actions which would incorporate hazard reduction measures as a means
of avoiding similar loss and damage in the event future hazards visit the same
location. Such planning, deemed largely socioeconomic in nature, could bring
long-range benefits to areas whose future development merits basic
reconsideration if disasters bring great destruction. Some of the considerations
relate to opportunities for rebuilding in different ways, desirable resettlement,
new approaches to land use, and the like.
This phase of a comprehensive emergency management program was
singled out for attention in the report of the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs, mentioned in Chapter 2. It is to be hoped that further attention to long-
range recovery by the Federal Emergency Management Agency will help clarify
federal, state, and local roles in this phase of emergency management. All three
levels of government should benefit if soundly based recovery efforts can be

developed that will recognize the economic potential and usefulness of areas
which have often suffered the ravages of natural hazard disasters but have lacked
the economic base forachieving maximum future utility. Such an objective is one
likely dependent on basic reexamination and change.

Other Hazard Reduction Measures
There are many additional hazard reduction measures available for use by
state and local authorities. Some of these, such as federal flood insurance, are
obtainable under conditions of federal law; others no doubt will be developed or
extended as the value of hazard mitigation receives greater recognition and as
hazards continue to threaten more people and property.
Forbes Magazine (October 1, 1977) said that the federal flood insurance
program is "drowning in a sea of argument." A slow beginning and possibly an
uncertain future may face this program, but it admittedly has facilitated
improved floodplain management in communities obtaining eligibility for
federal flood insurance. Private insurance companies offer other protection,
ranging from coverage for fire and wind to earthquakes and tornadoes, although
some are not widely utilized. The effectiveness of these programs is variable and
uncertain, especially as more costly disasters create situations of higher
premiums and possible unavailability of coverage. One solution which has been
suggested would be the enactment of a federally subsidized disaster insurance
program, where the government would levy a surcharge on all property and
liability insurance premiums written in the country. Recognizing that such a
program is highly controversial, some claim it would, however, cost less than
taxpayers now spend for federal disaster aid. States could presumably move in
these directions even if the federal government does not.
The availability of insurance to cover losses from disasters may conceivably
expedite rebuilding or restoration of the same facilities in locations where
previous disasters have occurred. In the long run, this is a result which could be
disadvantageous. Similarly, insurance coverage has in some cases stimulated
occupancy of hazardous locations that otherwise would likely not have been
used.
It is also evident that complete relaxation of efforts to mitigate hazards by
hiding behind a wall of insurance protection would not be in the common
interest. A few may be provided with economic protection, but threats to life and
property would still remain. Furthermore, cost effectiveness is an issue to be
examined because insurance premiums, in an overall sense, will have to cover not
just the value of property losses but also interest, profits, and administrative and
overhead costs as well. The cost of such insurance can, in fact, be properly viewed
as a part of the loss attributed to hazards.
Other hazard reduction measures are possible, many of which could utilize
the police power of the states to protect the health and safety of workers and
others, to protect the environment, and to promote conservation. Such goals
carry higher objectives in government programs now than in former years.
Regulatory powers can conceivably be used, for example, to protect workers on

projects located in potentially hazardous areas, such as avalanche pathways,
areas of subsiding land, etc. Public responsibilities to look out for the well-being
of citizens through measures to assure air and water quality, protection of
animals and aquatic life, and safety of food supplies are not taken lightly. Hazard
mitigation measures in these categories may have greater applicability to man-
made hazards than to natural hazards.
Other hazard reduction measures could proceed from the desire of public
groups to protect consumers. Examples of this are requirements to assure that
purchasers of land and other property are aware of potentially dangerous soil
conditions and geologic structures that could lead to landslides and avalanches,
and possible damages in the event of earthquake tremors and flooding.

Appraising the Feasibility of Hazard Reduction Measures
It is one thing to identify potential hazard reduction measures such as those
described above, and another to effectively mitigate the impact of natural
hazards. Appraising the feasibility of mitigation measures raises somewhat
different questions involving matters such as effectiveness, reliability, social
acceptability, and environmental impact. These, too, are factors which both
analysts and decisionmakers must take into account.
Most of the hazard-reduction measures described above have been
recognized as ones which can be effective though each measure may not
necessarily be effective in every situation. For example, a dam or reservoir to help
control danger from flooding may encourage construction of housing and other
buildings on land that would be severely flooded if the dam failed due to an
earthquake or other geologic factors.
It is known that although certain so-called earthquakeproof or floodproof
structures have survived earthquake tremors of a given intensity or floods
reaching record flood stages, there may be bigger earthquakes and larger floods.
Determining how reliable a hazard reduction measure will be if two different
hazards occur simultaneously, possibly accompanied by human errors related to
essential facilities and services, are realistic conditions to be considered.
Social acceptability often does not support zoning restrictions on land use,
and it is this factor which so often influences elected officials who have to make
zoning decisions on property owned by persons who believe they have the right to
do whatever they wish with property which they own. Social acceptability, as
officials well know, works both ways in instances of this kind. Religious beliefs
which characterize natural disasters as "acts of God" often, in communities
where such beliefs are widely held, make it popularly or politically infeasible to
adopt restrictions that otherwise could reduce the destructive impact of natural
hazards. Social acceptability is also related to costs, and while cost-benefit
studies can be helpful, they do not necessarily provide politically acceptable
answers.
Environmental impact, thought by many persons to be an impediment to
progress, is nevertheless a factor to be appraised in evaluating hazard reduction
measures. It is evident in these days that many historically recognized flood

control measures such as concrete stream channels, other channelization of
streams, and many dams may now be considered environmentally unsound. On
the other hand, measures such as the use of seismically active areas for nature
preserves or parks may be deemed wise from an environmental point of view.
Consideration ofjudgmental factors such as those singled out above should
be part of an analysis of hazards and mitigation measures. They will affect
decisionmaking by both administrative and legislative decisionmakers and,
consequently, should be taken into account by planners and analysts concerned
with comprehensive emergency management. This does not imply that analysts
should make judgments which should properly be made by policy officials,
including those in the executive structure and those who are members of
legislative bodies. It is the job of the hazards analyst and program developer to
present alternative courses of action and information that will assist choices to be
made by those with the responsibility for making them. This kind of presentation
is the essence of the analysis and program assistance needed in the management
process described below.

Programming and Budgeting for Hazard Reduction
Many effective public administrators point out that public business is best
accomplished by the use of systematic approaches forgetting it done. Otherwise,
in state government, for example, gubernatorial leadership may lack the
opportunity for fulfillment of objectives; may be negative instead of positive;
state agencies may go "their own ways"; and public employees may behave in a
rudderless government, like the maligned "bureaucrats" they are often accused of
being.
If a governor wants to assert leadership in the mitigation of dangers from
natural hazards and avoid or minimize emergencies, a well-developed system for
fulfilling the objectives of a comprehensive emergency management program
may be needed.
It is for this reason that the organizational alternatives set forth in Chapter4
place emphasis on fixing responsibility for the development of annual or biennial
natural hazards programs, with the breadth and inclusiveness of such programs
to be determined.
Elements of a system for implementing hazard mitigation activities should
include, in addition to measures that can be effective in reducing injuries and
deaths and minimizing or preventing property damage and loss, steps to initiate
those activities. All of this must be budgeted, and appropriations enacted or
other sources of funds sought and obtained.
Hazard reduction programs and measures will include both operating
activities and capital improvements. States have different ways of developing and
approving budgets, also of obtaining funds. Decisions must be made on how to
combat emergencies in the light of other state practices.
Because fulfillment of the goals and objectives of emergency programs is
likely to include program and budget development by many state agencies,
special cross-cutting budget analyses and reviews, bringing together both

prospective operating and capital costs of such agencies. may be desirable in
order that comprehensive emergency program elements can be viewed in their
entirety and priorities can be more readily determined. Special budget review
sessions may be warranted, and special presentations may be desired for
gubernatorial messages to legislative bodies.
The administrative mechanism most suitable in each state depends on the
state. It may consist of the governor and his central aides in consultation with
legislators and their committees, possibly also with representatives of local
jurisdictions and federal agencies. Because major hazard reduction measures will
involve shared approaches, funds from various sources, and decisions at different
levels of government, states may find merit in ensuring that their administrative
procedures take these into account. The way in which a state organizes for goal
setting, programming, decisionmaking, and conduct of intergovernmental
arrangements is pertinent, as are the interrelationships among different kinds of
hazards, emergencies, and disaster management activities. The following chapter
seeks to consider some of these matters in a way that recognizes the complexities
and perspectives involved.
Footnotes
I. J. H. Wiggins Co., Building Losses from Natural Hazards: Yesterday, Todayand Tomorrow
(Redondo Beach, Calif.: 1978). The nine hazards encompassed in this report are earthquake,
landslide, expansive soil, hurricane wind' storm surge, tornado, riverine flood. local wind, local
flood. and tsunami.
2. Peter H. Rossi, James D. Wright, Sonia R. Wright. and Eleanor Weber-Burdin. "Are There
Long-Term Effects of Natural Disasters?" Mass Emergencies 3 (1978). p. 128.
3. lan Burton. Robert W. Kates,and Gilbert F. White, The Environmentas Hazard(New York.
N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1978).
4. The Council of State Governments. A Legislator's Guide to Land Management ( Lexington.
Ky.: 1974).
5. Department of the Army, Office of Chief of Engineers, Inspection of Non-Federal Dam's:
First Year's Progress (Washington, D.C.: 1978).
6. Office of Science and Technology Policy. Federal Dam Safety Report of the OSTP
Independent Reviewi Panel (Washington, D.C.: 1978).
7. Department of the Army. Inspection of Non-Federal Dams.
8. Ibid.

4. Implementing a Comprehensive State

Hazards Program

What are some of the things which a state government should consider in
seeking to achieve an effective state natural hazards program-one concerned,
comprehensively, with hazard mitigation, disaster response, and post-disaster
recovery? What issues need to be dealt with in developing a capability to
undertake tasks discussed in the preceding chapter of this report?
The first of several implementation issues considered below is that of
organizing state government to do the jobs that need to be done. Only through
the establishment of a workable organizational structure can responsibility be
fixed for each of the several stages in disaster program management. Provision
can then be made for necessary executive direction and coordination of the many
participants who will be engaged in those programs.
In addition to organizational structure, this chapter singles out three other
general issues relevant to a state's implementation efforts. First, the state's
relationships to its local jurisdictions and regional (substate) bodies should be
considered. The state should fulfill a leadership role in relation to local
jurisdictions within its boundaries. Reasons for this are similar to those which
call for national leadership by the federal government. In addition, local
jurisdictions derive their powers from state government.
The second issue, and one of major concern to state and local officials and of
increasing significance in the administration of many public programs, is the
potential liability of officials in the performance of their duties. These duties
relate to issuance of warnings, dissemination of data on potential hazards, and
taking or not taking actions concerned with hazard abatement and mitigation.
There may be needed, in these days of greatly increased litigation, legislation to
immunize officials so that they are not inhibited from taking measures for
protection of the public.
The final issue that will have to be faced by state and local governments is the
result of anticipated greater attention to hazard mitigation-namely, assuring
the availability and obtaining the kind of personnel resources that will be needed
to plan and develop hazard reduction policies and programs. This issue is one of
concern to the new Federal Emergency Management Agency.

STATE ORGANIZATION FOR A
COMPREHENSIVE HAZARDS PROGRAM
States need to take a fresh approach to organization in fulfilling the
objective of a comprehensive hazards program. In the past, most states have
limited their organizational considerations to the response phase of disaster
program management. This is no longer adequate ifa comprehensive program is

to be achieved, particularly if the federal government puts emphasis on disaster
mitigation as called for by its new policies.
This report does not contend that any single organizational structure can
best meet the needs of each state, territory, or jurisdiction. Alternatives are in
order in these considerations, and are presented below.
Based on factors discussed in Chapter 2, one generalization will be
respected-that whatever structure of organization is developed for a state's
natural hazards program, it should be one that maximizes the use of the powers
of the chief executive as a means of ensuring greatest organizational
effectiveness. Some states can do this more easily than others, depending upon
the administrative powers granted to the governor by state laws.
Also in accord with an earlier part of this report, it is recognized that states
as well as local jurisdictions and the federal government should adhere to the
concept that public functions under emergency conditions can usually be best
performed by whatever agencies handle these functions on a nonemergency
basis. Consequently, many state agencies will be involved in emergency
programs, and organizational arrangements should necessarily take this factor
into account.
To illustrate alternative approaches to organization, three hypothetical
cases follow. None of these arrangements may exist or apply exactly as described
in any one state. Numerous alternatives within and among these several
arrangements will be evident to state officials and others knowledgeable about
state government organization and functions.

State A (Most state functional responsibilities and appointive powers vested in
governor)
In this hypothetical state, the governor has an executive office, distinct from
his personal office, to which are assigned the managerial assistance functions that
help him lead the state as its chief executive. The executive office performs
functions related to organization and management planning, budgeting,
planning or policy development coordination, emergency services,
intergovernmental relations, finance and accounting, personnel management,
and possibly other general services (e.g., procurement and property
management, services related to general-purpose state buildings, and central
services of various kinds). These are functions which do not deliver services
directly to the public but which deal across-the-board with state management
and administration and with all or at least most operating agencies of state
government.
The governor also has in his personal office an aide whom he wants notified
immediately about any emergency or disaster which requires the governor's
personal attention or should at least be known to the governor when it is
impending or occurs.
Looking more specifically at natural hazards program management, the
governor's emergency services agency is charged with the job of maintaining
readiness to respond to natural disasters and of leading the state's response

efforts when a natural hazard event occurs. It is also concerned with
preparedness and response for civil defense and other kinds of emergencies. It
makes use of all state departments and agencies which have roles to play in any
emergency to which it may have to respond; it maintains contact with and assists
local jurisdictions in disaster response matters, making full use of the state's
community affairs agency; it operates a warning and communication system and
maintains various facilities and equipment, not otherwise available, used in
responding to disasters; and it handles applications to the federal government for
federal disaster aid when major disaster events occur.'
Recognizing that hazards mitigation is largely inseparable from the regular,
nonemergency missions of state departments and agencies, the governor has
assigned the job of providing central coordination on his behalf in the
development of hazard mitigation policies and programs to the state planning
office because it is this office to which he looks for coordination of policy
development and planning for state programs in general. He also looks to the
head of the planning office to provide leadership on his behalf in long-range
planning for post-disaster recovery programs; this is a kind of planning, strongly
economic in nature, which is not unlike other tasks of the state's planning office.
Land use and growth policy, economic development, building codes and
regulations, natural resources, public utilities, and environmental and other state
programs-and the agencies administering those programs-will all be involved
in both hazards mitigation and post-disaster recovery stages of the state's
comprehensive disaster program.
Several possible choices had been considered by the governor in selecting an
official who would represent him in seeking coordination of the many agencies
involved in administering the three stages of the state's comprehensive disaster
program-mitigation, response, and recovery. He could have chosen the staff
assistant in his personal office who keeps in touch with hazards events; but, for
institutional management reasons, consideration centered principally on the
director of administration and the planning office head. The latter was finally
chosen, and he was given the additional (ex officio) title of the Governor's
Liaison Officer for Emergency Management.2
The governor considered the emergency services director a less appropriate
choice for this role because, as the state's key civil defense official, he was
stationed at a fallout-hardened location not near the governor's office and, in
addition, he was not closely identified with the governor and his administration.
He is deemed by the governor more action-oriented, less planning-oriented and,
consequently, was not viewed as the best choice for a post closely identified with
tasks of coordinating planning and management functions for and on behalf of
the governor. The governor's planning office staff is regularly engaged in
analytical assignments involving coordination of state agencies and functions.
Tasks concerned with the coordination of natural hazard programs were deemed
similar to these other assignments.
In order to bring together the principal state officials who would be involved
in various aspects of the comprehensive emergency management program, the

governor also created an emergency preparedness program committee
comprised of his planning officer as chairman, the state budget director, the
emergency services officer, and the head of the state community affairs agency.
Because of the importance of federal grants in the committee's considerations,
the state's chief federal grants liaison officer also participates with the committee.
In addition, the governor directed that the committee, when considering matters
of special interest to local government, should be joined by three representatives
serving as contributors and observers from the state's municipal league, the
association of counties, and the association of substate planning organizations.
The governor indicated that the committee should give special attention to policy
and program recommendations for inclusion in annual or special gubernatorial
messages and in state budgets, and that he would meet with the committee if it
would be helpful to the policy formulation processes of his administration.

State B (A cabinet-type structure with limited functional responsibilities and
appointive powers vested in governor and his appointees)
The governor in this hypothetical state has less authority over many of his
state's departments and agencies than that of the governor in the previous
example. In his state the performance and management of department and
agency functions are vested by law not in the governor but in the directors of the
departments and agencies and sometimes in subordinate division heads within
departments. He also lacks authority to appoint officials responsible for
directing many departments and agencies, especially those with fixed terms or
those appointed to overlapping terms on multiheaded commissions.
He does have authority, however, to appoint secretaries for many broad-
ranging state functions (e.g., transportation, human resources, natural resources
and environmental services, public safety, and the like). These appointees advise
the governor on his administration's policies in their respective functional areas.
They have authority to request assistance from and are in communication with
the heads of departments and agencies carrying on activities related to the broad
general functions assigned to them. Each of the secretaries is looked upon as the
governor's man. Collectively they constitute a cabinet utilized by the governor in
exercising leadership on behalf of the chief executive.
The governor also has an executive office somewhat similar to that in the
previous example, but it lacks a planning.policy development agency, largely
because functional planning is undertaken in planning staff units established by
each of the several secretaries in his cabinet. The executive office is headed by a
secretary of administrative affairs and includes a state budget and finance officer
as well as other officials engaged in various statewide administrative services. The
executive office includes a federal grants officer and a community affairs agency.
The former maintains a close relationship with a small Washington-based federal
liaison staff as well as with state agencies heavily involved with grantsmanship.
The latter agency maintains relations with municipal and county governments in
the state, with substate planning organizations, and it provides a number of state
services conducted for the benefit of and to assist local jurisdictions.

The emergency services officer, responsible for traditional disaster response
and civil defense activities, heads an independent emergency services agency. He
looks to the governor's secretary of public safety for general guidance. He
maintains a liaison relationship with a designated aide in the governor's personal
office relative to imminent or existing disaster events.
The governor designates his secretary of natural resources and
environmental services to develop a comprehensive disaster management
program for his state and gives him the additional (ex officio) title of the
Governor's Liaison Officer for Emergency Management. As in the previous case,
the governor establishes an emergency preparedness program committee,
chaired by the secretary of natural resources and environmental services. The
committee's membership includes the state budget director, the emergency
services officer, the head of the community affairs agency, and the state's federal
grants liaison officer from the state office of federal-state relations. A planning
assistant to the secretary of natural resources and environmental services acts as
secretary to the committee and takes the lead role in staff work needed to develop
and compile a comprehensive state natural hazards management program. In
other respects the committee is not unlike that previously described.

State C (A state putting emphasis on a single natural hazard of special concern)
When the governor took office, he found a somewhat different setting for
natural hazards programs in this third hypothetical case. The legislature had
responded to the concern of many professional people, local officials, and
residents who believed the threat of major earthquakes justified special
organizational attention in state government. In recognition of the tectonic
structure of the earth's crust within the state and the state's seismic history, it had
created a Seismic Safety Commission comprised of members appointed by the
governor and confirmed by the state senate. Members were selected from the
state's legislative and executive branches; from the ranks of professional
geologists, engineers, and sociologists of universities in the state; and from
representatives of both local government jurisdictions and statewide citizen and
professional organizations.3 This commission, with an executive director and a
small staff, was serving primarily as the state planning agency for policy
development on seismic safety issues. The commission had thejob of advising the
governor and the legislature on goals and priorities for earthquake hazard
reduction and on related state agency budgets and programs. It sponsored
training, encouraged research, examined intergovernmental roles and
relationships and. with its own staff and members and representatives from other
state and local agencies, conducted studies of specific problems. Among these
were statewide hazard abatement, seismic safety of state-owned buildings, the
need for dam inundation mapping, nuclear power plant location, and local
government implementation of state earthquake hazard reduction legislation.
In addition to the Seismic Safety Commission, the governor's organization
includes an emergency services agency whose director is responsible directly to
the governor. This office, concerned with response readiness for natural hazards

of all kinds, also has a special staff and an advisory body concerned with
earthquakes. The state law specifically authorizes and requires certain action
with respect to earthquake events. These include pre-earthquake preparation and
warning, evaluation of post-earthquake operations, and recommending the
designation of areas to be included in any earthquake emergency proclamations
issued by the governor.
The state law places in the governor the responsibility of issuing warnings of
impending earthquakes to state residents, and this responsibility is one of
concern to the emergency services agency which assists him in these matters. It is
pointed out in the Special Section of this report that the prediction of an
earthquake can itself trigger an emergency situation meriting response by public
officials and, in fact, presents an opportunity to take mitigative actions which
otherwise might not be taken. As outstanding scientists have advised, progress in
the technology of earthquake prediction may well advance to the extent that a
"time-window," even up to several years, may be identified between the
prediction of an earthquake and the occurrence of an earthquake. The prediction
of a potential earthquake may signal a need that the governor issue an
earthquake warning to his constituents; the nature of the warning will vary
depending upon the "time-window."
To enable the governor to proceed with caution, the emergency services
agency in the state has established a state earthquake prediction evaluation
council chaired by the state geologist and including seismologists, geologists, and
geophysicists from universities and consulting organizations who are
knowledgeable about the state's geologic structure. This council and the
emergency services office have also established liaison arrangements with the
U.S. Geological Survey and its earthquake prediction council (proposed now to
become the National Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council) in order to
have access to the best information on earthquake precursor data, indicators,
and advice which can be obtained from other sources. It is the task of the state's
evaluation council to evaluate individual earthquake predictions and to advise
the governor as to their evaluation. Although the scientists may predict
earthquakes and may evaluate predictions made by scientists and others, it
remains the responsibility of government officials to issue warnings to the
populace, accompanied by whatever instructions are appropriate in order to
maximize community safety and to prevent injury, loss of life, and economic
damage. Ultimate responsibility is the governor's, even though chief executive
officials of local jurisdictions and officials of other state and local agencies may
well be involved.
In order to ensure that their efforts to reduce earthquake hazards are
effectively tied in with hazard mitigation efforts applicable to other natural
hazards and with other emergency management efforts in the state, the governor
asked his state planning officer to chair an emergency preparedness committee
having a mission similar to those of the committees discussed in the two previous
examples. The executive director of the state's Seismic Safety Commission serves
on the committee along with the emergency services officer, the state budget

director, and the head of its community affairs agency, with the federal grants
officer from the state planning agency sitting in on occasion. Planning aides in
the state planning agency give attention to policy development and coordination
for other potential hazards similar to that performed by the staff of the Seismic
Safety Commission in regard to earthquake hazard reduction. The planning
agency is also assigned the responsibility for developing a comprehensive
emergency management program.
Other organizational arrangements, involving the need for coordination of
state agencies and officials and for effective relationships with federal and local
levels of government, are much like those described previously.

Summary
This report may appear to put more emphasis on having an emergency
preparedness committee made up of state officials (perhaps with representatives
of local jurisdictions and substate agencies) than is warranted by the faith in such
committees commonly held by many practitioners of public administration.
Reliance on such committees may not be warranted despite the emphasis placed
by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on the committee created in the
federal government (see Chapter 2 of this report). Staff of the Council of State
Governments has not always found enthusiasm for such committees in the
executive branch of the federal government, and enthusiasm may not even be
shared by busy members assigned by the president to the new Federal Emergency
Management Committee. Also, there may not be enthusiasm among members of
similar committees established in state government.
However, suggesting the establishment of such committees carries a
significant message-coordination is needed that necessarily involves the
authority of the governor and, therefore, involves the aides who help him
discharge that authority. Even if such committees are not created and utilized,
there is the need that responsibilities be clearly assigned, accompanied by some
sort of systematic process and schedule that helps to assure their fulfillment.
There will also be need for consultation among the agencies, personnel, and
officials involved, whether or not there is a committee. Decisions on a
comprehensive natural hazards program or on a broader comprehensive
emergency management program should not be made in a vacuum. Appropriate
consultation and participation with and authorization and support from both
chief executives and legislative bodies are needed. For comprehensive hazard
programs, the results sought should be those which demonstrate that hazard
mitigation is a cost-effective, hazard-reducing substitute for post-disaster aid.

AUTHORITY AND ASSISTANCE FOR LOCAL HAZARDS PROGRAMS
Because the existence and the powers of localjurisdictions are dependent on
state law, state government has special responsibilities to those jurisdictions
within its boundaries. These responsibilities are especially acute in the case of
natural hazards and other emergencies which threaten the lives and property of
their residents.

State government is involved with its local jurisdictions in at least three
important aspects of hazards management.
First, natural hazards do not respect jurisdictional boundaries. Disasters
which can occur in one area may call for mitigation actions elsewhere. Even in
response and recovery efforts after disaster events occur, interaction among
jurisdictions may best be approached with the help of state government through
interstate compacts or intergovernmental agreements.
Second, few if any local jurisdictions are self-sufficient in meeting the needs
of their residents. While variations exist among the states, many essential services
which must be reckoned with in hazard mitigation planning and which are
utilized in emergency response situations are provided by state agencies or
financed in whole or in part from state and federal funds. This is particularly
applicable to many state health and other social services which not only have
general applicability to people who may be distressed in emergency situations but
which, along with income maintenance programs, have special relevance to
persons in low-income brackets, those likely to suffer most severely when
disasters occur.
Third, state government provides the essential linkage to the federal
government for those emergencies which have interstate, national, or
international origins or impacts.
State governments, through their emergency services and other state
agencies, provide continuing assistance to localjurisdictions in allocating federal
civil defense/ disaster funds to those jurisdictions. They also allocate federal pass-
through grants as well as state funds for local administration of key local
activities, some of a planning nature, others involving actual service delivery.

Hazards Mitigation in Local Government
County and municipal employees identified as civil defense/disaster
officials, partially financed by federal civil defense grants, are generally
concerned with response to disaster events and less concerned with disaster
mitigation or long-range recovery in stricken areas. Attention is more likely given
to mitigation and to post-disaster recovery at local government levels by those
officials concerned with land use planning, building regulation, public works,
utilities, and other relevant services.
At the Council's 1977 Conference on Earthquakes and Related Hazards. the
point was made that:
The traditional types of measures of preparedness (i.e., for responding to the event ofa disaster after it
occurs) are an important part of what will happen in the event a long-term (earthquake) prediction is
issued, but they are only a small part of an effective, comprehensive mitigation program.... Effective
hazard reduction measures are critical for emergency preparedness. City planning directors.
attorneys, and others will make as many of these decisions, likely more, than disaster directors.4
A leader among scientists who have examined socioeconomic implications
of earthquake prediction also echoed this point in testimony before the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, held on the bill which
became the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977:

Civil defense and sheriffs and police departments take the lead in emergency planning and emergency
response. Their emergency roles are designed to make good use of their skill and experience in
restoring order and responding to crises instantaneously. But hazard reduction in advance of a
predicted earthquake is remote from their usual role of activity. Planning departments and building
and safety departments, on the other hand, are accustomed and equipped to deal principally with
hazard control in the long range.5
State and federal assistance for local hazard mitigation and disaster
recovery efforts are generally limited to construction aid aimed at specified
purposes. Hazard mitigation is often only an indirect concern.
Although city and county planners can assist in determining hazard
mitigation policies and programs for their communities, few local planning
commissions and agencies have undertaken these activities. Most are more
concerned with zoning and subdivision regulations. Although some are
concerned with more comprehensive master plans, few of those plans encompass
hazard mitigation. California's mandate for inclusion of a seismic element in a
local government's "general plan" is an exceptional requirement, and the
accomplishments are inconclusive. Floodplain conditions are the most likely
element to be taken into account by local land use plans and here results are
spotty and inconsistent.
Impetus toward planning, programming, and budgeting systems (PPBS) in
the 1960s heightened awareness that cities and counties have a program planning
role as well as a role in planning for land use and capital improvements. New
federal approaches to Management-by-Objectives (MBO) and Zero-Base
Budgeting (ZBB), accompanied by similar efforts in many state and local
governments, have not yet adequately developed doctrine or defined roles and
relationships of planners and budget analysts or of processes for planning and
resource allocation. Evolutionary developments in these processes, however,
point toward a gradual delineation of management systems which may
ultimately be more universally useful in the development of state and local
natural hazards policies and programs. State and federal examples and
leadership can facilitate the development of such management systems which can
be useful to local government.
The most notable exception to a general lack of planned hazard mitigation
activity at local government levels may likely be that associated with seismic risk
concerns in a number of California's local governments. A recent effort by the
city of Los Angeles, heralded as the first comprehensive study on earthquake
prediction undertaken by a municipal corporation, produced a report to the
mayor covering many aspects of seismic safety.6 There have been other efforts in
some California municipalities; notable among these is Long Beach's
development of a program to identify its most hazardous buildings. But even in
jurisdictions that have experienced earthquakes, community support for
significant change in land use patterns has not been demonstrated.7
In many respects, the role of local jurisdictions in this shared partnership
with state and federal governments is the most difficult one. Chapter 1 noted the
lack of community support for allocating local financial resources to costly
measures for alleviating invisible or intangible risks. Of major significance are the

political realities involved in the hard decisions, basically made by elected
officials on city councils and county boards, on how land in private ownership
can be used and on what safety regulations, which would add to building costs,
should be mandated. Other observations on local hazard mitigation measures
were described in Chapter 2.
A University of Massachusetts study has pointed out: "policies designed to
deal with the national disaster problem and which appear to be rational and
effective from that viewpoint, may be seen as burdensome, irrational, inefficient,
and perhaps even counter-productive from the viewpoint of communities to
which they are applied." Citing the federal flood insurance program as an
example, the report said, "From a federal viewpoint, the program has much to
recommend it. From the viewpoint of a specific community whose memories do
not contain a hundred year flood, the policy may appear to be capricious and
inequitable. From the federal perspective, hundred year floods occur every three
months, with four or five such floods occurring each year over the nation as a
whole."B
Local public administrators have long recognized these problems. They
generally know the kinds of measures, if not the specific ones, which should be
taken. More than 50 years ago, with floods, earthquakes, landslides, and other
natural hazards in mind, Louis Brownlow, certainly one of the twentieth
century's most noted exponents of strengthening public administration, wrote:
To that I say that the community by its organized activities does not ignore these factors. It
endeavors ceaselessly to overcome them, postpone them, influence, modify, and mitigate them. The
Tokyo building code has an eye for the mitigation of the effects of earthquakes; Dayton rebuilt itself
spiritually as well as physically by attempting to prevent a recurrence of its flood disaster; and now we
see the levee system of the Mississippi that began with a communal dike at New Orleans, then grew
into state systems of levees.9
These views point to the importance of state and federal roles in achieving
hazard mitigation. Neither Dayton nor New Orleans solved their flooding
problems without state and federal assistance. Today, both the federal flood
insurance program's requirements, calling for land use controls in floodplains,
and California's Special Studies Zones Act, requiring delineation of hazardous
fault zones and establishing certain regulations governing approval of proposed
projects and disclosure relating to property being sold in such zones, are
examples of federal and state leadership which is producing effective hazard
mitigation at local levels, even though not always with wholehearted community
support. 10
From an administrative point of view, local government efforts on behalf of
hazard mitigation will be dependent, as they are at state and federal levels, on the
constructive use of executive powers to guide local agencies in the performance of
their regular functions. Even then only the larger cities and counties are likely to
have the technical skills to pursue such objectives.
In the final analysis, local government effectiveness may depend largely on
how well a city manager, a county executive, or a mayor recognizes and performs
the emergency aspects of his managerial responsibilities.

Use of Regional (Substate) Planning Agencies
Planning for the mitigation of natural hazards offers another avenue
whereby states can be of assistance to their counties and cities.
Regional or substate planning agencies exist in all but a few states. These
agencies often are better able to look at disasters and emergencies on a broader
geographical basis than can the localjurisdictions within their areas. In addition,
where counties or municipalities are too thinly populated or are too small to
warrant employment of the kind of technical personnel needed to deal with such
essential planning and service functions, regional bodies can, if so authorized by
law or requested by their member jurisdictions, meet this need.
The range of hazard mitigation activities in which some of these regional or
substate planning agencies in the United States have been engaged has been
impressive. Successful activities include planning for coastal zone areas,
provision of information and systems for control of upstream runoff into lower-
level floodplain areas, and development of regional natural hazard mitigation
programs. But it is evident that in most states the potential of these regional
agencies is far from being realized.
State leadership can improve this situation. In many states, state community
affairs agencies or others with similar functions may serve as a point of liaison for
provision of planning or other assistance by state government to regional
planning organizations as well as to counties and municipalities.

Summary
State government's leadership responsibility in a comprehensive state
emergency management program is to see to it that the intergovernmental
relations with subordinate jurisdictions are well established and understood by
state and local agencies as well as by the private sector which works with and
looks to these agencies. The time when disaster strikes is not a time when
establishment of these understandings can be effectively accomplished.
The state's responsibility must go further, however, if hazard mitigation,
response, and recovery efforts are to be effective and successful. The best
arrangements for mitigation planning, disaster response, and recovery
development must be determined and established, and needed standards and
regulations for public protection must be adopted. In addition, adequate and
continuing financial arrangements must be established in order to ensure that the
objectives of such programs can be accomplished.
Public education and information programs conducted by the state are
other examples of ways in which states can provide appropriate assistance on a
statewide basis. Technical information and advice from many state agencies,
particularly the state universities, can supply knowledge not otherwise available
at local levels. In many inst-r nces federal financial and technical assistance is best
arranged through state ag' cies, an arrangement very often preferred by federal
agencies since they cannot deal with hundreds of local bodies.

LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND LEGAL LIABILITY
OF STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS
Model state disaster legislation developed by the Council's Committee on
Suggested State Legislation in its 1972 program and revised in 1974 has been
utilized, adapted, and adopted by legislatures in more than 35 states. Every state
has legislation which in one way or another authorizes both state and local
programs for natural hazard preparedness. Each state also has inherent
sovereign police power, often delegated to local jurisdictions in varying ways,
which has great relevance in the case of actions taken before orafterdisasters for
promotion of public health, safety, and welfare.
States should take steps to assure that they have adequate legislative
authority to meet present-day challenges and achieve effective comprehensive
emergency management. This is advice consistent with recommendations of
recent National Governors' Association studies and reports as well as with
actions being taken by the federal government cited in Chapter 1. A sound
legislative base is needed if a state is to fulfill its natural hazard responsibilities as
outlined in this report.
Considerations of law and public policy, particularly those authorizing
public programs and defining public responsibilities, never take place in a
vacuum. A legislative body will always view such enactments in relation to the
threats perceived and the measures believed necessary to cope with them. Costs,
and where they are to fall, are always in the forefront of such legislative
considerations, and these are not just the costs to government but also those
affecting, directly and indirectly, communities and the people involved.
State legislative considerations are often dictated or heavily influenced by
federal and local laws, policies, and customs. This is especially true with
emergency preparedness matters, where a state legislature may be seeking to
conform to a requirement established by federal law and, by so doing, may be
establishing requirements to be met by its political subdivisions. Some of the
difficult issues state legislators must deal with when considering emergency
preparedness are how far the state should intrude into established local
authority; whether the state should set minimum standards; the extent of
financial aid and its sources; and whether, in what circumstances, and to what
extent state command authority will supersede that of political subdivisions. The
theme emphasized in this report is that responsibilities in emergency
management are shared by federal, state, and local levels of government. This
contributes to the complexities of related legislative considerations at all three
levels.
One example of these considerations is found in the recently enacted
Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977. This federal act assumes that
earthquake warnings will be issued by the governor of a state. State government
representatives testifying at congressional hearings leading to the passage of this
law did not object to this assumption. The president's Earthquake
Implementation Plan can be assumed to place the responsibility for earthquake
warnings on the states, with technical assistance in a state's evaluation of

earthquake predictions provided, at least in part, by instrumentalities of the
federal government.
In states which are exposed to seismic risk, illustrated in the case of the state
with a seismic safety commission described earlier in this chapter, their chief
executives face a new requirement. They must evaluate earthquake predictions
and have adequate authority and procedures for issuance of warnings,
accompanied by advice and instructions for maximizing public safety and
welfare.
As pointed out previously, progress in the science of earthquake prediction
is creating issues different from those presented by most other natural hazards.
But this is only partly so. In the case of earthquake prediction, differences in the
threat and in the time elements involved can create several different kinds of
problems, and new authority and arrangements for handling earthquake
predictions and warnings are desirable. However, some issues applicable to
release of hazard precursor information for other hazards and to liability of
public officials in release of such information and in taking hazard reduction
measures are not entirely dissimilar from that required for earthquakes.
The study on which this report is based gave specialattention to the liability
issue. An advisory committee was established by the National Association of
Attorneys General to participate in this study. It concluded that state legislatures
should expressly immunize both state and local officials from liability for good-
faith warnings issued as a consequence of an evaluated earthquake prediction
(see Appendix D).
The issues which confront state executive and legislative branches do not
stop with warnings of likely earthquake tremors; they also apply to other actions
of public officials designed to reduce hazards and respond to hazardous events.
The increasing incidence of courts holding state and local governments liable,
through their officials, for acts where "proximate cause" seems extremely remote
or where the links are several times removed, has generated some rather bizarre
results. This presents such questions as: Should state and local officials be
immunized for liability for good-faith actions taken as a consequence of a
warning? Should liability be limited? Should alternate arrangements such as
administrative claims procedures and liability limits be sought?
Accordingly, the chain set in motion spreads across all the mitigation,
response, and recovery acts to be taken by state and local officials. The state must
decide the extent to which it will establish minimum requirements in hazard
reduction measures involving land use management, safety and building
construction codes, and other hazard reduction actions, and the means of
implementing these measures and meshing the requirements with associated
hazard-mitigation measures.
Responses to warnings by state and local officials raise questions as to
whether state actions should override local authority in certain matters (for
example, ordering evacuation, establishing curfews, shut-down of dangerous
storage and utility facilities which are part of lifeline systems, and curtailment of
other activities). The extent to which federal, state, and local regulatory agencies

will be required to take these factors into account in their functions offers an
additional or alternative mode of approach, but again the questions which vex
the legislatures as to who pays and how must be faced. Court actions may also be
involved in these decisions.
In the long-range recovery phase following natural hazard disasters, does
the state authorize recovery programs prior to the event, does it provide
incentives to rebuild, and does it seek to coordinate federal, financial and other
assistance? Many states may not act upon recovery efforts until after a disaster,
then seek specific solutions to situations presented. States should, however,
examine their options and take those planned, long-range recovery actions
determined feasible in advance of an event in order to accelerate realization of
desirable recovery objectives.
State governments and the Council of State Governments have not gone so
far as to develop suggested state legislation dealing with many of thc issucs
described above. This may well be a next step warranting consideration by state
officials.

PERSONNEL RESOURCES FOR PLANNING
HAZARD REDUCTION PROGRAMS
This report, seeking to emphasize hazard mitigation as part of
comprehensive state hazards programs, has repeatedly stressed the need for
continuing, coordinated planning in order to reach that goal. The organizational
alternatives presented did so, pointing out that coordination of hazard reduction
planning performed in nonemergency situations can best be handled by those
aides to a governor concerned with coordination of planning and policy
development for regular state services.
Two advisory committees of state officials participated with the Council in
the study which led to this report-state planners and state emergency services
directors. Both committees recognized that state planners can play a key role in
achieving hazard mitigation. State planners supported the concept that hazard
mitigation is an objective of concern in comprehensive state planning.
Emergency services officials recognized that the major tools of mitigation--
growth policy, land use, economic policy, building regulation, and integration of
planning at state, substate, and local levels of government--lie in areas which
involve state planners. Neither group underestimated the important contribution
which emergency services personnel could also make to hazard mitigation
policies and programs.
There are obstacles to achieving the participation of state and local planners
in hazard reduction initiatives. For one thing, the potential of their role has not
been adequately recognized by many state and local chief executives, by some
planners, and even less by many lay members of local city and county planning
bodies.
But even if their role were clearly seen and fully appreciated, the lack of
planning personnel experienced in and trained for analysis leading to hazards
mitigation policy and program development could be a stumbling block. The

lack of such personnel resources may also turn out to be an impediment to the
Federal Emergency Management Agency in its efforts to implement new federal
policies in support of hazard mitigation.
Another potential obstacle, with implications extending to other aspects of
state administration, is the lack in many states of effective merit system
provisions to assure reasonable tenure for hazard mitigation planners. These
planners are engaged in work where their value in dealing with such long-range
problems is enhanced by skills, knowledge, and institutional memory acquired
over a period of years. It is antithetic that state employees engaged in disaster
programs who are paid partially or wholly from federal civil defense funds are
assured tenure and merit system protection by federal requirements, whereas
other state personnel in similar or related work may not have such protection.
These obstacles point to the need for steps to overcome them. The shortage
of hazard mitigation planners should, in particular, be moved high on the list of
problems to be solved.
Because this shortage is considered a nationwide problem, applicable to
activities of federal, state, and local governments, national leadership hopefully
will be provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The National
Science Foundation and the Office of Intergovernmental Personnel Programs of
the new federal Office of Personnel Management can also be helpful. So can
national associations of public officials and such organizations as the National
Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration, the American
Planning Association, and the National Training and Development Service.
Early steps, not unlike projects which have tackled similar problems in other
fields of public endeavor, might include action aimed at (1) developing model
graduate-level education programs for planners oriented to hazard mitigation,
including formulation of suggested curricula and the identification and
enlistment of schools around the country best equipped to offer such programs;
and (2) training state and local planners and policy analysts now working in state
government, regional planning agencies, and local jurisdictions in aspects of
natural hazard mitigation and crisis management to which they have had little
exposure. A few universities offer courses for urban and environmental planning
and could, perhaps more readily than others, adapt programs to meet these
needs. However, the complexities of hazard mitigation require persons
knowledgeable in analyzing and dealing with issues of general public policy and
affairs.
A cross-fertilization of various academic disciplines is particularly pertinent
in the development of these education and training programs. Physical and social
scientists have given attention to hazard reduction research, and a number of
academic institutions as well as the Natural Hazards Research and Applications
Information Center at the University of Colorado have sought to develop and
encourage interdisciplinary approaches in natural hazards research. An
increasing number of state and local public administrators have been among
participants in recent natural hazards research workshops held at the University
of Colorado. Only within the past few months has a first article on disaster

mitigation appeared in the Public Administration Times, a publication of the
American Society for Public Administration."
Implementation of new federal policies in support of hazard mitigation as an
effective deterrent to disaster losses can be expected to create a demand for
trained environmental planners from various disciplines. State governments
should be ready to join in constructive efforts to meet this need and should seek
and support national leadership from federal agencies whose programs also call
for planners oriented to the objectives of hazard mitigation.
Footnotes
I. This is the traditional disaster management role found in state governments and in this
alternative is so located that its director reports to the governor, as prescribed in the Example
Disaster Act developed in 1972 by the Council of State Governments. This differs from the
organizational location found in many states which places the emergency services assignment under
the state adjutant general, a location stemming from earlier emphasis placed on civil defense
functions when such functions were authorized during World War II and following enactment of the
Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950.
2. There is a precedent for such a title. The federal government's organization includes a
dormant agency carrying the title, "Office for Emergency Management." That office was established
by President Franklin D. Roosevelt primarily to provide a framework within which civilian World
War 11 agencies would be established. It was part of the Executive Office of the President. The Office
for Emergency Management was headed by the president, as was the Executive Office of the
President. The position of Liaison Officer for Emergency Management, suggested for use by state
government in this report, was established in the federal government to assist the president in
administering the Office for Emergency Management without removing his direct authority over key
wartime agencies.
3. Karl V. Steinbrugge, former and first chairman of the California Seismic Safety
Commission, recently served as chairman of a working group on earthquake hazards reduction
created by the federal government's Office of Science and Technology Policy. He observed that up to
eight states might create a separate state seismic safety organization. In other states, for example.
where hurricanes are considered a special danger, a separate state agency might be created to deal
with that perceived threat. Texas' 16-member Coastaland Marine Council, chaired by a state senator
from the Gulf Coast area, is a statutory body which supplements activities of the state's Division of
Disaster Emergency Services by giving special attention to flooding, evacuation needs, and other
aspects of hurricane preparedness-including measures applicable to hurricane-spawned and other
tornadoes. There is little evidence that states which create special agencies for certain hazards give
corresponding attention to mitigation measures for hazards other than those singled out for such
attention.
4. The Council of State Governments. National Conference on Earthquakes and Related
Hazards (Lexington. Ky.: 1978).
5. Statement of Ralph H. Turner, Professor of Sociology. University of California at Los
Angeles and formerly Chairman. Panel on Public Policy Implications of Earthquake Prediction.
National Academy of Sciences (April 20, 1977).
6. City of Los Angeles. Consensus Report of the Task Force on Earthquake Prediction (Los
Angeles, Calif.: 1978).
7. William Spangle and Associates, Inc., Research on Post-Earthquake Land Use Planning:
Alaska, Santa Rose and San Fernando (Portola Valley, Calif.).
8. Peter H. Rossi. James D. Wright. Sonia R. Wright, and Eleanor Weber-Burdin. "Are There
Long-Term Effects of American Natural Disasters'?," Mass Emergencies, vol. 3 (1978).
9. Louis Brownlow, Passion for Anonytmnitr, vol. 2 (Chicago. Ill.: University of Chicago Press,
1958), p. 241.
10. The Alquist Priolo Special Studies Zones Act, subsequently amended in 1974, 1975, and
1976 (December 1972).
II. Claire B. Rubin, "Disaster Mitigation: Challenge to Managers," Public Administration
Times (January 1979).

5. A Concluding Observation on Sharing

A reiterated perception that federal, state, and local governments in the
United States necessarily share responsibility for public policies and programs
dealing with natural hazards is the basic note on which this report should be
concluded. Sharing in a partnership arrangement must be continuously
recognized as the guiding theme, both in defining this responsibility and in
fulfilling it.
Because three levels of government and so many public agencies are
involved in this arrangement, comprehensive emergency management may well
call for as complex a matrix of intergovernmental relationships as can be found
among any public services. In some instances, plans will be developed to meet
different aspects of a single situation at all three levels of government and services
will likewise be delivered by federal, state, and local agencies.
The shared, intergovernmental nature of these responsibilities calls for
careful consideration of the way in which the sharing is financed and
accomplished. Oversimplification should be avoided. With regard to policy
determination and resource allocation aspects of the sharing, care should be
exercised to recognize the ways in which each level of government has an impact
on other levels and on the respective roles of policymakers and administrators at
each level, and on how desired results are to be achieved.
Administrative planning at executive levels and oversight by appropriate
legislative bodies, especially from the vantage point of Congress, can be helpful
and should not be neglected.
While there is need for national leadership and an active federal role is
considered essential, to the maximum extent possible decisions should be made
and services should be delivered close to the people affected. As the interests ofa
greater number of people become involved and as decisionmakers must take into
account state, regional, national, and even international concerns, decisions
necessarily should be made higher in the intergovernmental hierarchy. But this
should be done with desirable and appropriate consultation and participation,
with due regard to how needed services are to be provided.

Special Section on Natural Hazards

Common in the United States

Information in this section is adapted, to a large extent, from four recent
publications on natural hazards:
0 Gilbert F. White and J. Eugene Haas, Assessment of Research on Natural
Hazards (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1975).
0 Office of Coastal Zone Management, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Natural Hazard Management in Coastal Areas (Washington, D.C.: 1976).
0 J. H. Wiggins Co., Natural Hazards: A Building Loss Mitigation
Assessment: Final Report (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation,
1978).
* Ian Burton, Robert W. Kates, and Gilbert F. White, The Environment as
Hazard (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1978).
These sources list extensive references in their bibliographies and are
recommended to governmental planners concerned with natural hazards.
This section also includes supplemental information collected from other
sources.
The 14 hazards discussed here are, in their order of presentation: avalanche,
coastal erosion, drought, earthquake, flood, hurricane, landslide, tornado,
tsunami, unstable soil, volcano, windstorm, winter storm, and storm surge.

AVALANCHE

Characteristics
An avalanche is a moving mass of snow or ice accelerating as it flows down a steep
mountainside until a general gradient is reached. Avalanches are common in mountainous terrain
throughout temperate and arctic climates of the earth and may occur wherever snow is deposited on
slopes steeper than about 20 degrees. Avalanches often run in the same paths year after year, but
exceptional weather and man's intervention through such activities as timber removal or
development undertakings may alter these patterns or produce new ones. An avalanche can trigger
other natural hazards such as landslides, or in some remote circumstances destructive sea waves
(tsunamis). An avalanche coupled with unwise land management could result in a variety of man-
made disasters like pipeline ornuclear facility disruption. Avalanches are also frequently triggered by
other natural hazards such as earthquakes.

Incidence
Areas of incidence in the United States are in the western continental states, including the south
and southeastern regions of Alaska (see Map 1 ). Dangers of avalanches are increasing in the United
States as avalanche-prone areas become more heavily populated. Based on a reporting network
existing since 1971, such hazards occur in the United States more than 6,800 times a year, with a
relatively low annual death loss of seven. Property losses are estimated at an average of $500,000 a
year. Elsewhere losses have been much greater with at least 40,000 deaths resulting from avalanches in
the Alps from 1915-18. The largest death loss in this country from a single incident was 118 persons,
occurring in the Cascade region of Washington in 1910.

Hazard Reduction Measures
* Mapping of avalanche zones as an aid to public and private land management.
* Land use constraints on public lands; also for sites undergoing construction activities.
* Prevention through terrain modification.
* Triggering small avalanches to forestall larger ones.
* Disclosure of hazard potential in real estate transactions.
* Warning systems.
* Relief and recovery readiness effective for ice and snow conditions.

Sources and References
U.S. Forest Service, Department of Agriculture. Washington, D.C.
Daniel, Mann, Johnson. and Mendenhall. Geophysical Hazard Investigation. Report to the
City and Borough qf Juneau, Alaska. Portland, Oreg.: 1972.
International Association of Scientific Hydrology. International Symposium on Scientific
Aspects of Snow and Ice Avalanches, Publication #69. Gentbrugge, Belgium: 1966.
La Chapelle, Edward R. "Avalanche Forecasting-A Modern Synthesis," International
Symposium on Scientific Aspects of Snow and Ice Avalanches, Publication #69. Gentbrugge,
Belgium: 1966.
U.S. Forest Service. Snow Avalanches: A Handbook of Forecasting and Control Measures,
U.S. Department of Agriculture Handbook #194. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1968.

57
Map I
AREAS OF AVALANCHE HAZARD

!---7
? Xi X r

Sources: Gilbert F. White and J. Eugene Hass, Assessment of Research on Natural Hazards
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1975), p. 349; and adapted from Office of Coastal Zone
Management, U.S. Department of Commerce, Natural Hazard Management in Coastal Areas
(Washington, D.C.: 1976), pp. 11-68.
Data not available for Hawaii.

COASTAL EROSION

Characteristics
Coastal erosion is the set of processes by which more natural shore zone material is removed
than deposited. This may be accomplished by water, wind, gravity, or biological action. Prime agents
of erosion are waves and tides, but ice and drought can also act as agents. Man's actions along the
coast, ranging from construction and sand mining to forced land subsidence through depletion of
coastal groundwater and oil resources and removal of plant life, can exacerbate the natural erosion
and frequently may cause it. The severity of this natural hazard can be greatly increased beyond a
predictable norm at the time of a hurricane-induced or other storm surge. As the shore area of the
nation becomes more intensely developed, there is an increased potential that coastal erosion will
trigger man-made disasters as a result of actions such as improper siting of support facilities for
offshore oil development.

Incidence
Current population concentrations and growth rates on the coasts of the United States make the
natural hazard of coastal erosion a growing threat. Whereas an annual shoreline recession of 20 feet
may pose no problem on an unpopulated beach, a recession rate of one foot or less may produce
major damage and result in heavy financial loss on densely settled coasts. About one fourth or 20,500
miles of the national shorefront is subject to significant coastal erosion (see Map 2). Along 2,700 miles
of that shorefront, coastal erosion is a critical problem. Significant erosion occurs where erosion
processes and human activities conflict. Erosion is critical if it occurs where this conflict results in
high investment loss and possible loss of life. Current losses from coastal erosion, primarily to private
property and protective structures, amount to nearly $300 million a year, probably a conservative
figure.

Hazard Reduction Measures
* Coastal zoning to include land use controls.
* Shoreline permitting programs to protect critical areas.
* Building code restrictions.
* Public purchase of eroding shore lands.
� Structural installations, including stabilization by means of sea walls, etc.
� Land fill.

Sources and References
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. National Shoreline Study. Washington, D.C.: 1971.
Office of Coastal Zone Management. Washington, D.C. (Extensive resource material
including copies of state coastal zone plans.)
Clark. John. Coastal Ecosystems: Ecological Considerationsfor Management of the Coastal
Zone. Washington, D.C.: The Conservation Foundation, 1974.

59
Map 2
CRITICAL EROSION AREAS ON U.S. SHORELINES

A. . X.

Percentage of all shoreline
erosion considered to be critical

<5%

* >10%

Source: Adapted from map, "Severity of Shoreline Erosion" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Corps of
Engineers, 1971).

DROUGHT

Characteristics
Drought is one of the slowest-developing of the natural hazards. Agricultural production is the
most obvious recipient of losses caused by this hazard. Given enough time, drought will also attack
urban areas through domestic and industrial water shortages. A prolonged drought may result in
severe national economic impact because of this country's dependency on income from exporting
food and industrial products. Droughts are difficult to predict or forecast both as to when they may
begin and how long they will last. Increased pumping of groundwater and surface irrigation occurring
in drought periods can result in severe land subsidence problems.

Incidence
Almost all areas of the country are subject to direct impact from drought; vulnerability is shown
in Map 3. All areas may be subject to indirect impact of drought as it affects their water supply
systems. The most vulnerable regions are the arid southwest and the semiarid part of the
midcontinent, particularly the Great Plains. During the last 100 years, major sustained droughts have
occurred in these regions roughly once every 20 years. An estimated average annual production and
crop loss in the Great Plains is $700 million, but this is only part of the effect.

Hazard Reduction Measures
* Land use regulation especially applicable to drought-prone areas.
* Soil erosion controls.
� Improved agricultural cultivation practices.
* Regulated irrigation practices.
* Water supply protection and conservation.
* Improved drought prediction and forecasting.
* Stimulation of rainfall by weather modification (e.g., cloud seeding, etc.).
* Desalination of sea water.

Sources and References
Hess, Wilmot N. (ed.). Weatherand Climate Modification. New York, N.Y.: Wiley Press, 1974.
Palmer, Wayne C. and Lyle M. Denny. Drought Bibliography. NOAA Technical
Memorandum EDS 20. Silver Spring, Md.: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
1971.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Director, of Federal Droughi Assistance. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977.

61
Map 3
AREAS INDICATING DROUGHT VULNERAB!I,ITY

[ Arid, long droughts

'o I[ Semi- Arid, long & short droughts

ho -a~ ~' 'X "O Humid, short droughts

Humid, even with less than
average rainfall

Source: Gilbert F. White and J. Eugene Hass, Assessment of Research on Natural Hazards
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1975), p. 372.
Data not available for Alaska and Hawaii.

EARTHQUAKE

Characteristics
An earthquake combines a potential for great, sudden damage, both directly and through
triggering other hazards. Characteristics of earthquakes are that they are relatively infrequent and of
short duration, zones are relatively limited, the speed of impact is fast in a fairly concentrated area.
Among natural hazards, earthquake tremors have a high potential for extreme severity, augmented
by a wide range of very serious natural and man-made hazards. Of these, fire is a significant hazard.
Other offspring include tsunamis, avalanches, landslides, and land subsidence. Floods often result
due to failure of man-made structures. Other man-made disasters that can be triggered by an
earthquake include contamination of land, air, water, and food through spillage and rupture, failure
of structures and facilities due to poor construction standards, and destruction due to unwise
management of land.
The increasing expectation that scientific efforts will produce an ability to predict earthquakes,
possibly even substantially in advance of earthquake events, presents both difficulties and
uncertainties, as well as opportunities for hazard reduction measures to mitigate damage. The former
can have undesirable social and economic effects on individuals and communities, some of which can
be allayed. The latter can lead to decisions or actions to protect people and facilities, though likely
accompanied by uncertain cost-benefit indications.

Incidence
Seismic studies show that at least 39 states, in which approximately 70 million people live, are
subject to major or moderate earthquake hazards (see Map 4). The recorded history of this nation
shows that only 25 of the 50 states have been "virtually free" of direct or indirect impact from
earthquakes. The potential losses from a major quake range to billions of dollars in damage and tens
of thousands in fatalities. The nation's record of earthquake loss is one of good fortune rather than
low seismic risk. To reduce the threat of earthquakes an accurate and timely prediction system is
being sought. To have such a system, seismic zones must be better defined. This definition has been
best done at continental-oceanic plate margins, such as along the Pacific coast. It is less clear within
and along plate boundaries in the central and eastern part of the country, where much less is known
about potential seismic hazards. In recent years, research of seismic risk areas within the central and
eastern continental United States has been accelerated by the U.S. Geological Survey and others.

Hazard Reduction Measures
� Improved delineation of seismic risk areas.
� Earthquake resistant new construction.
� Steps to minimize damage to existing structures.
Land use management.
� Earthquake insurance.
� Seismic risk disclosure in property transactions.
� Advanced earthquake prediction technology, accompanied by state evaluation of
earthquake prediction.
* Reduction of associated hazards, with special attention to lifelines engineering and critical
facilities.
* Differentiation between measures related to advance prediction and those applicable to
disaster occurrences.

Sources and References
U.S. Geological Survey; especially in Reston, Virginia; Denver, Colorado; and Menlo Park,
California.
Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Berkeley, California.
National Academy of Sciences. "Predicting Earthquakes: A Scientific and Technical
Evaluation with Implications for Society," Panel on Earthquake Prediction of the Committee on
Seismology. Washington, D.C.: 1976.
� "Earthquake Prediction and Public Policy," Panel on the Public Policy
Implications of Earthquake Prediction of the Advisory Committee on Emergency Planning.
Washington, D.C.: 1975.

63
Map 4
SEISMIC RISK AREAS

Expected Damage

A � C [ Minor

g.~S J D Moderate

* Major

Source: National Science Foundation and U.S. Geological Survey, Earthquake Prediction and
Hazard Mitigation Options for USGS and NSF Programs (Washington, D.C.: 1976) pp. 6-7
(attributed to Algermissen, 1969, and Uniform Building Code, 1973).

. "A Program of Studies on the Socioeconomic Effects of Earthquake
Predictions," Commission on Sociotechnical Systems of the Committee on Socioeconomic Effects of
Earthquake Predictions. Washington, D.C.: 1978.
Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Microzonation for Safer Construction
Research and Application. Sponsored by the National Science Foundation, UNESCO, American
Society of Civil Engineers, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Seismological Society of
America, and Universities Council for Earthquake Engineering Research. San Francisco, Calif.:
November 26-December 1, 1978.
American Society of Civil Engineers. The Current State of Knowledge of Lifeline Earthquake
Engineering, Proceedings of the Technical Council on Life-Line Earthquake Engineering Specialty
Conference. Los Angeles, Calif.: August 30-31, 1977.
National Science Foundation. Earthquake Prediction and Hazard Mitigation Options for
USGS and NSF Programs. Washington, D.C.: 1976.
Office of Science and Technology Policy. Earthquake Hazards Reduction: Issues for an
Implementation Plan. Washington, D.C.: 1978.
National Bureau of Standards. Tentative Provisions for the Development of Seismic
Regulations for Buildings, Special Publication 510. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1978.
The Council of State Governments. National Conference on Earthquakes and Related
Hazards. Lexington, Ky.: 1978.

FLOOD

Characteristics
Floods represent the most common and best known of the natural hazards. They also
encompass the broadest range of characteristics among the natural hazards. Floods can occur
quickly, as in flash floods, or slowly, as with those caused by spring thaws. They can be of extreme
magnitudes in confined locations, such as canyons, or a costly nuisance, as in broad river valleys at
planting time. Because many of man's major settlements are on or near water, they are exposed to this
hazard. Many structural hazard reduction measures that are used against floods, such as dams and
river channelization projects, have increased rather than decreased the disaster potential from this
hazard. Floods are also a frequent "fellow traveler" with other hazards, such as snow, tornadoes, and
hurricanes.

Incidence
All states have the potential to experience some degree of flooding and the resulting damage
(see Map 5). Variations in the potential may be due to seasonal flooding or to severe and unusual
weather patterns. Annual losses vary considerably from less than $300 million in 1970 and 1971 to
more than $4 billion in 1972, when Hurricane Agnes floods devastated many parts of Pennsylvania
and other North Atlantic states. By any estimate it is a very costly hazard. According to the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, flash floods now rank as the major killers and destroyers
among weather-related disasters in the United States. Since 1968, the average annual death toll from
flash floods has risen to about 200, more than double the rate of the 1960s and more than triple the
rate of the 1940s. Property damage in 1978 was running at about $1 billion a year. The Federal
Disaster Assistance Administration reports that about 85 percent of all presidential declarations of
major disasters currently are associated with floods. The U.S. Water Resources Council predicts that
damage from floods will reach $3.5 billion annually by the year 2000 unless floodplain management is
improved.

Hazard Reduction Measures
� Land use management, with special attention to floodplains.
* Federal flood insurance.
� Building construction and codes.
� Warning systems.
� Control and protective works (e.g., flood proofing, damrns, reservoirs, levees, dikes, drainage
systems, etc.).

Sources and References
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Insurance Administration. Washington,
D.C. (Information on floodplain delineation and insurance.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Washington, D.C. (Information on flood control projects,
navigable waterways and dam safety.)
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service. NationalFlash
Flood Development Plan, FY 1979-84. Silver Spring, Md.: 1978.
Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Engineers. Inspection of Non-Federal Dams, 2
vols. Washington, D.C.: 1978.
Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering and Technology. Improving Federal
Dam Safety. Washington, D.C.: 1978.
Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President. Federal Dam
Sqfeny: Report of the Office of Science and Technology Policy Independent Review Panel.
Washington, D.C.: 1978.

65
Map 5
NUMBER OF FLOOD AND FLASH FLOOD EVENTS
1945-1976

X B ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~31-90
b~~~~~~~~~~E I 90o
91-180

L 181-300
390

Source: Adapted from map, "Flood and Flash Flood Events (Red Cross Reported) 1945-1976"
(Washington, D.C.: National Weather Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, undated).

HURRICANE

Characteristics
Hurricanes are severe tropical cyclones with winds spiraling counterclockwise toward a low-
pressure center known as the "eye." Wind speeds range from 74 miles per hour up to a high of 220
miles per hour in a narrow ring surrounding the eye. Picking up heat and moisture from the ocean, the
potential for heavy winds and rain is developed, with a possible hurricane diameter of 300 miles as it
crosses the coastline. At first traveling slowly, the speed of a hurricane picks up as it drifts northward.
In a major hurricane, very high gusts of wind are experienced, perhaps 100 miles from its center. With
the wind comes a storm surge, a rise of water above mean tide levels. Other natural hazards that
frequently accompany hurricanes and cause severe damage are flooding of streams caused by heavy
rainfall, accelerated coastal erosion, and severe storm systems. Disasters from man-made hazards
may also occur depending on man's lack of foresight in the design of facilities exposed to such storms.

Incidence
This threat annually hangs over 21 eastern and southern coastal states for three to six months,
from spring through fall (see Map 6). Loss of life has decreased in recent years, but property damage
from hurricanes has rapidly mounted due to accelerated population increases and development in
coastal areas. Average annual damage has risen from about $250 million in the 1960s to $400 million
in the 1970s. The threat is more acute in those states where there is a high population of elderly people,
increased use of mobile homes, and a high degree of urbanization accompanied by increased capital
investment.

Hazard Reduction Measures
* Cloud seeding and other hurricane modification techniques.
* Building code regulation for hurricane-force winds and for reasonable wave force.
* Mobile home anchorage requirements.
* Evacuation routes and facilities.
* Use of national flood insurance, also of insurance available for wind hazards.
* Land use controls adapted to local conditions.
* Use of flood and wind-proofing technology, especially in public facilities.
� Possible use of well-constructed high-rise evacuation centers.
� Preparedness, response, relief, and rehabilitation measures, including effective warning
capability.

Sources and References
National Hurricane Center. Coral Gables, Florida.
Texas Coastal and Marine Council. Austin, Texas.
Gentry, R. C. "Nature and Scope of Hurricane Damage," Hurricane Svmposium. American
Society for Oceanography, Publication #1. 1966.
National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce. Wind Loads on Buildings and
Structures. Proceedings of Technical Meetings, Building Science Series #30. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1970.
Simpson, R. H., and M. B. Lawrence. Atlantic Hurricane Frequency Along the U.S. Coastline.
NOAA Technical Memorandum NWS SR-58. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce,
1971.
Simpson, R. H. "Hurricane Prediction: Progress and Problem Areas," Science. 1973, pp. 899-
907.
Federal Disaster Assistance Administration. A Public Official's and Citizen's Guide to
Evaluating Local Hurricane Evacuation Plans. Washington, D.C.: 1979.

67
Map 6
TRACKS OF DEVASTATING HURRICANES
1938-1973

Source: Gilbert F. White and J. Eugene Hass Assessment of Research on Natural Hazards
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1975), p. 242.
Source: Gi l br F -. Whit andJ.EgnHasAsesetoRsarhnNtulHzrd
(CmrdgMs.:TeMI rs, 95, .22

LANDSLIDE

Characteristics
Landslides are characterized by a perceptible downslope movement of rock, debris or soil. Such
movements are categorized as falls, slides, slumps, and earth flows. Frequently they accompany other
natural hazards, particularly floods and earthquakes. Their relation to man-made hazards is limited
only by man's intelligent management of land.

Incidence
Increased settlement activity by man on marginal lands and in coastal areas which are
aesthetically desirable has resulted in increasing the threat from landslides. In 1970 all but eight states
had an annual building loss of over $1I million due to landslides-with 14 states having annual
building losses in excess of $10 million. Latest figures estimate direct and indirect losses from
landslides to exceed $1 billion annually. Areas of major severity include the west coast, the western
front of the Rocky Mountains, the central Mississippi Valley, and the Appalachian region (see Map
7).

Hazard Reduction Measures
* Land use management.
* Application of geologic engineering knowledge and practice to prevent or correct
landsliding.
* Strip mining regulation.

Sources and References
Redbruch-Hall, D. H., et al. "Preliminary Landslide Overview Map of Coterminous United
States." U.S. Geological Survey, MF-771, 1976. (Final version now in preparation.)
Schuster, R. L. "Landslides Analysis and Control." Transportation Research News, No. 80
(January-February 1979).
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service. Published surveys with
information on evidence of soils which are susceptible to landslides.
Schuster, R. L. and R. J. Krizck, eds. "Landslides-Analysisand Control," NationalResearch
Council Transportation Research Board Special Report, no. 176. Washington, D.C.: National
Academy of Sciences, 1978.

69
Map 7
AREAS OF MAJOR LANDSLIDE SEVERITY

fbf - '".
e ' 7- 1 1 - -I e -a 1, By

Source: Adapted from map, "Preliminary Landslide Overview Map of the Coterminous United
States" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Geological Survey, 1976).
Data not available for Alaska and Hawaii.

TORNADO

Characteristics
The tornado is characterized by a funnel cloud which reaches to the ground with wind velocities
within the funnel as high as 175 to 200 miles per hour and an interior air pressure of 10 to 20 percent
below that of the surrounding atmosphere. Its capacity for damage depends on the violence of its
winds. the length and width of its path, and the pressure differential. The typical length of path is 16
miles, but tracks of 200 miles have been reported. They come in the form of a single twister and in
families of numerous tornadoes which are part of a single major storm system. Tornadoes are the
most violent of the four hazards that are part of the meteorological hazard, the thunderstorm. These
are cloud masses that may be six or more miles across, eight miles high, and may contain up to
500.000 gallons of water and enormous amounts of energy. Other hazards in these storm systemsare
high winds, lightning, and hail. These hazards may trigger flooding, coastal erosion, landslides, and
avalanches. Power and communications failures are common among the many man-made disasters
that a thunderstorm and its allies can precipitate.

Incidence
Map 8 shows those areas in the United States subject to frequent, occasional, and very rare
occurrence of tornadoes. This natural hazard has a reputation of death and destruction throughout
the continental United States. but primarily in the states east of the Rocky Mountains. The states in
the midwest and southern Great Plains are under the greatest threat from spring through fall,
although tornadoes have occurred in all seasons. In 1978 some 788 twisters were reported. Damage
assessment due to tornadoes is difficult to determine. During the 1960-70 decades, property damage
from tornadoes was estimated at exceeding $50 million in each of six years. From 1920 to 1973 itwas
the biggest killer of all natural hazards, with 9,000 deaths from tornadoes compared to 5,000 from
floods and 4,000 from hurricanes. The tornado death rate has been declining, with 62 lives lost in
1978, compared with a 28-year mean death toll of I I per year. With severe tornadoes hitting the
Texas-Oklahoma "tornado alley" early in 1979, the current year destruction appears likely to exceed
that of recent years, with damage in that area alone already exceeding hundreds of millions of dollars
in property damage in addition to a large loss of lives.

Hazard Reduction Measures
Building codes, with provisions for high wind resistance, some of which may also apply to
other hazards.
� Warning systems.
* In-house shelters.
* Insurance.

Sources and References
Melvagno, M. G. Tornado Forces and Their Effects on Buildings. Manhattan, Kansas: Kansas
State University, 1968.
Sadowski, A. F. "Tomrnadoes with Hurricanes," Weatherwise 19 (1966).
Sims, John H. and Duane D. Bauman. "The Tornado Threat: Coping Styles of the North and
South," Science 176 (1972).
U.S. Department of Commerce, National Weather Service's Severe Storm Center. Kansas
City, Missouri.
Wolford, F. L. Tornado Occurrences in the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1960.

71
Map 8
AREAS WITH TORNADO FREQUENCY

-< - qc!, [L occasional

* frequent

Source: Gilbert F. White and J. Eugene Hass, Assessment of Research on Natural Hazards
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1975), p. 274.
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1975), p. 274.

TSUNAMI

Characteristics
Tsunamis are most closely associated with earthquake activity, but they can also result from
volcanic actions and other extreme movements of sediment into confined bodies of water, such as
those caused by avalanches and landslides. They can be seismic-generated wave systems, classified as
major, long-period waves that sweep out from an earthquake epicenter; also local, short-period
waves in relatively confined bodies of water, locally generated. The most severe tsunami waves can
move at speeds of hundreds of miles per hour in the open ocean and reach heights in excess of 100 feet
when they finally break on shore. The results of such a tsunami can be described best by the word
"devastating." They result in coastal erosion and flooding. They have the potential of triggering a
variety of man-made disasters as do other coastal natural hazards.

Incidence
Tsunamis pose a recognized threat to the western coast of the United States from Alaska south
and to the entire coastline of Hawaii (see Map 9). The potential for such seismic-caused activity exists
for the eastern coast as well, but receives little attention primarily due to lack of recorded experience.
The threat is probably greatest in bays and estuaries. Of course, the threat is heightened when man's
settlements spread into such areas. Tsunamis following the great Alaska earthquake in 1964 resulted
in 103 deaths and $80 million in damages in Alaska.

Hazard Reduction Measures
� Warning systems.
* Evacuation of threatened areas.
� Tsunami prediction.
* Education programs.
* Limited structural and land use controls.

Sources and References
Cox, Doak C. Performance of the Seismic Sea Wave Warning System, 1948-1967. Honolulu.
Hawaii: Institute of Geophysics, University of Hawaii, 1968.
Pacific Urban Studies and Planning Program. "Tsunami and Storm Wave Hazards and
Freshwater Flooding Hazards," Recommendation memo. Hawaii Coastal Zone Management
Program. 1975.
International Tsunami Warning Center, Honolulu, Hawaii.

73
Map 9
COASTAL AREAS HISTORICALLY SUBJECT
TO TSUNAMI

4 .

Source: Gilbert F. White and J. Eugene Hass, Assessment of Research on Natural Hazards
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1975), p. 320.

UNSTABLE SOIL

Characteristics
The term unstable soil as used in this report refers to the natural hazards both of expansive soils
and land subsidence. Expansive soils are those types of soil, primarily montmorillonite, that when
wetted absorb water and swell up to 15 times their dry volume rather than permitting the water to
drain. These same soils then skrink when drying. Land subsidence is characterized by a falling ground
level due to a relative increase in downward pressure, a decrease in the strength or volume of
subsurface materials, or a combination of both. Both of these hazards can precipitate other hazards
such as increased coastal erosion, flooding, and in extreme cases landslides and avalanches. Both can
trigger man-made disasters related to the weakening and collapse of structures such as highways and
pipelines. Finally, both may be caused as a result of man's activities such as altering normal water
conditions or extracting resources from the earth.

Incidence
All states are threatened to some degree by these twin natural hazards that lurk in the soil.
Expansive soils a re most widespread in about 19 states (see Map 10). The probable area of occurrence
for land subsidence is more difficult to establish because of the wide range of possible causes. A
majority of these causes are either man-induced or triggered by other natural hazards, especially
earthquakes and volcanos. As reported by studies of the J. H. Wiggins Co. (see Chapter 2), damage in
terms of annual dollar loss to buildings due to expansive soil ties with that from hurricane and
accompanying wind and storm surge for second place among America's most destructive natural
hazards.

Hazard Reduction Measures
* Land use management.
* Building codes.
* Grading codes.
* Policy requiring pre-construction control of soil moisture, soil density, and site drainage
control.
* Provision of soil analysis in real estate transactions.
* Injection of substitute fluids.

Sources and References
American Society of Civil Engineers, United Engineering Center. New York, New York.
(Several pamphlets on expansive soils.)
Cooke, R. V. and J. C. Doorkamp. Geomorphology in Environmental Management. Oxford,
England: Clarendon Press, 1974.
Jones, D. E., Jr. and W. G. Holtz. "Expansive Soils-The Hidden Disaster," Civil Engineering,
vol. 43, no. 8 (1973).
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Waterways Experiment Station. Draft maps showing
expansive soils in the United States. Vicksburg, Mississippi. 1978.
Varnes, D. J. and G. Kiersch (eds.). Reviews in Engineering Geology, vol. I I. Boulder, Colo.:
The Geological Society of America, 1969.

75
Map 10
AREAS CONTAINING EXPANSIVE SOILS

* Regionally abundant

Locally abundant

alp% oII o, [ Minor constituent of bedrock but may be
locally abundant in surficial materials

Source: Adapted from map, "Occurrence and Distribution of Potentially Expansive Materials
in the United States" (Vicksburg, Miss.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Waterways Experiment
Station, 1977).
Data not available for Alaska and Hawaii.

VOLCANO

Characteristics
A volcano is an eruption from the earth's interior of either the slower lava flow or the more
violent pyroclastic explosion which issues rock, gases, and debris. The area covered by either of these
eruptions can be limited to the geographic confines of the volcano or can range up to 100 miles on the
ground and much farther in theatmosphere. The resulting mudflows can move with speeds from 20 to
over 60 miles per hour. Volcanically generated natural hazards can include tsunamis, forest fires,
debris avalanches, landslides, and land subsidence. The pyroclastic eruption is most prone to result in
further disasters, such as contamination of water supplies.

Incidence
Three areas of the United States live with the threat of disasters that could be caused by volcanic
activity. These areas are, in lessening order of frequency, Hawaii, Alaska, and the Cascade Range of
the Pacific northwest (see Map II). However, recent settlement patterns in the Pacific northwest
present the greatest population-at-risk.

Hazard Reduction Measures
� Land use management.
� Possible lava flow controls.
� Prediction and warning systems.
� Evacuation routes.

Sources and References
Crandell, D. R. and D. R. Millineaux. "Appraising Volcanic Hazards of the Cascade Range of
the Northwestern United States," Earthquake Information Bulletin 6. Reston, Va.: U.S. Geological
Survey, 1974.
Hawaii Volcano Observatory. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, Hawaii
Civil Defense Agency. Honolulu, Hawaii.
Tazieff, H. "The Menace of Extinct Volcanoes," Impact 17, no. 2 (1967).
Warrick, R. A. Volcano Hazard in the United States: A Research Assessment. Boulder, Colo.:
Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, 1975.
Millineaux. D. R. "Preliminary Overview Map of Volcanic Hazards in the Coterminous U nited
States," Miscellaneous Field Studies, MF-786. Reston, Virginia: U.S. Geological Survey, 1976.

77
Map 11
AREAS SUBJECT TO VOLCANIC HAZARDS

Sources: Adapted from map, "Preliminary Overview Map of Volcanic Hazards in the 48
Coterminous United States" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Geological Survey, 1976); and Office of
Coastal Zone Management, U.S. Department of Commerce Natural Hazard Management in Coastal
Areas (Washington, D.C.: 1976), pp. 11-65.

WINDSTORM

Characteristics
Windstorms in many cases develop from hazards previously discussed in this section, such as
hurricanes and tornadoes. Additionally, there are down-slope windstorms in the mountains of
southern California and on the eastern Rockies, and as a result of extra-tropical cyclones (the large-
scale weather systems that march across the central United States to bring the familiar pattern of
alternating fair and stormy weather). These winds range in speeds up to 100 miles per hour. The
increased use of mobile homes and light-weight metal structures has increased the dangers posed by
this natural hazard.

Incidence
Most areas of the continental United States, including Alaska, are subject to the threat of
damage from winds with speeds in excess of 80 miles per hour. About 36 states suffer annual high
wind damage, as shown in Map 12. In an average year, there are about 800 severe local windstorms.
Average annual property losses over the past decade are estimated at $30 million to $300 million.

Hazard Reduction Measures
* Building codes.
* Mobile home tiedowns.
* Planting tree-shelter belts.

Sources and References
Thom, H. C. S. "New Distributions of Extreme Winds in the United States," Journal of the
Structural Division Proceedings of the American Society of Civil Engineers 94 (1968).
National Weather Service, Silver Spring, Maryland.

79
Map 12
AREAS OF HIGH WINDS

a tn 0e g Ad e Areas having a 50-year mean recurrence
interval of 80 mph winds {corresponding
to approx. 100 mph gust)

Source: Adapted from Gilbert F. White and J. Eugene Hass, Assessment of Research on Natural
Hazards (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1975), pp. 297-98.

WINTER STORM

Characteristics
This hazard includes snow and ice storms. The character of the hazards is determined by a
variety of meteorological factors: snowfall, rainfall, temperature, and wind. In many areas this
natural hazard can trigger extreme spring flooding. A high correlation exists between such storms
and energy shortages, with a need that preparedness measures take both into account as they impact
one another.

Incidence
Once blizzards and ice storms were viewed mainly as a threat to the livestock industry. Now, the
apparent increasing fragility of urban settlements has made this natural hazard an annual threat to 60
million persons in the United States (see Maps 13 and 14). The severity of threat is dependent upon
factors as varied as a community's level of preparedness for snow or ice storms and the urban area's
size and industrial mix.

Hazard Reduction Measures
* Prediction and warning systems.
� Response plans especially adapted to such events.
� Flexible scheduling of public events and activities.
� Alternate energy supply systems.

Sources and References
American Public Works Association. Three national workshops in 1979. Chicago, Illinois.
Rogers, W. J. and H. L. Swift. Frost and the Prevention of Frost Damage. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970.
Rooney, J. F., Jr. "The Economic and Social Implications of Snow and Ice." In R. J. Chorley
(ed.), Water, Earth and Man. London, England: Methuen, 1969.
National Weather Service, Silver Spring, Maryland.

81
Map 13
AREAS OF SNOWFALL

Mean annual days
with snowfall > 1 inch

Selected Alaska Stations >20

Source: Gilbert F. White and J. Eugene Hass, Assessment of Research on Natural Hazards
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1975), p. 312.

82
Map 14
AREAS AND PERIODS OF FREEZING

Mean annual days
below freezing

> cat >5,~ � (90

0)~ B~ >go90 <180
* 180 or more

Source: Gilbert F. White and J. Eugene Hass, Assessment of Research on Natural Hazards
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1975), p. 305.
Data not available for Alaska and Hawaii.

STORM SURGE

Characteristics
A storm surge is the influxofhighwaterdrivenbya hurricane orothersea storms ontoa coastal
area. It accounts for almost 40 percent of all damage associated with hurricanes.

Incidence
Storm surge will occur wherever hurricanes do, as well as in other locations normally subject to
damage by high tides. It strikes hardest in such low-lying coastal states as Florida, Louisiana, and
Mississippi, but has also occasioned extensive damage in the Carolinas, Delaware, Maryland,
Massachusetts, and other states. More than 6 million people are currently exposed to the storm surge
hazard. About 40 percent of them live in zones where hurricanes may be expected with a return
interval of one to 25 years, and more than one half of that population is located along the Gulf Coast.

Hazard Reduction Measures
* Special protection of structures and people against storm surge, especially as it returns to the
sea.
* See also those listed for hurricanes.

Sources and References
Friedman, D. G. The Storm Surge Along the Gulf and South Atlantic Coastlines. Hartford,
Conn.: The Travelers Insurance Company, 1971.
Nickerson, J. W. Storm-Surge Forecasting. Navy Weather Research Facility Technical Paper
#10-71. Norfolk, Va.: 1971.
See also those listed for hurricanes.

Appendix A

ADVISORY COUNCIL AND SPECIAL COMMITTEES

Advisory Council
George L. Jones, State Coordinator, Virginia Office of Emergency and Energy Services
Richard Rubino, Associate Professor of Urban and Regional Planning, Florida State University
Keith F. Mulrooney, Executive Director, American Society for Public Administration
Donald Nichols, Chief, Earth Sciences Applications Programs, U.S. Geological Survey
Robert Olson, Executive Director, California Seismic Safety Commission
Gilbert F. White, Director, Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center,
Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado

Special Committees of State Officials
National Association of Attorneys General
Slade Gorton, Attorney General, State of Washington, Chairman
Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts
David C. Eckstrom, Alternate to Attorney General Daniel McLeod, State of South Carolina
Leland D. Ford, Assistant Attorney General, State of Utah
Geoffrey Graybill, Deputy Attorney General, State of California
John G. Proudfit, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Eovironmental Protection
Bureau, State of New York
Louren R. Wood, Assistant Attorney General, State of Missouri

Council of State Planning Agencies
Robert D. Kuzelka, Nebraska, Chairman
Frank Beal, Illinois
John Halterman, Alaska
Rai Y. Okamoto, California (Director, San Francisco Department of City Planning)
Megan A. Takahashi, Utah
Henry G. Williams, New York
John Wilson, Tennessee

National Association of State Directors for Disaster Preparedness
Alex Cunningham, California, Chairman
Lee M. Epperson, Arkansas
Arnold W. Grushky, New York
James T. McClellan, Hawaii
Robert J. Gregory, Nevada
E. Erie Jones, Illinois
Betty McClelland, Washington

The Council of State Governments is also indebted to designated representatives from numerous
federal agencies and professional and public interest groups, some of whom served on project liaison
committees.

Appendix B

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY
CREATED IN COOPERATION WITH
THE COUNCIL OF STATE PLANNING AGENCIES

Members of the committee met on two occasions-first, during the National Conference on
Earthquakes and Related Hazards held by the Council of State Governments in Boulder, Colorado,
November 16-18, 1977; second, on June 5 and 6, 1978 in Seattle, Washington. preceding the annual
conference of the Council of State Planning Agencies.
The committee was in general agreement that state governments, primarily the governors, have a
responsibility to take action-i.e., issue warnings-when an earthquake is predicted. Such
predictions should be evaluated by the state in advance of issuing warnings, with such evaluation
applicable to four components: time, place, magnitude, and probability.
Committee members, mostly representatives from agencies which primarily serve the chief
executive officer-i.e., the governor-of a state, agreed that the governor had a prime responsibility
for a wide variety of hazards. Such responsibility was recognized to include (I) that the governor
should take a leadership role and, to the extent possible, prioritize mitigation measures for alleviating
vulnerability to both natural and man-made hazards; (2) that such leadership role called for placing
the coordination of hazard mitigation and recovery efforts close to the governor, either in his
immediate staff or his policy planning office; (3) that, in the case of earthquakes, the governor was
responsible for taking action at the time of a prediction, both to evaluate earthquake predictions and
to issue warnings.
State planning representatives on the committee agreed that the following responsibilities were
appropriate for assumption by state government:
* Assessing hazards and determining the most appropriate methods for limiting vulnerability
via mitigation.
� Specifying inclusion of hazard-reduction elements in local land use or general plans.
* Establishing uniform building and safety standards to issue maximum protection in structures
within the state against earthquakes and other hazards, with special attention to structures for critical
public services such as power plants, dams, electrical transmission systems, energy pipelines, and
other facilities of "lifelines systems."
a Seeking to bridge the gap between federal risk maps and data on natural hazards and the
larger-scale maps and data required for application by state staff and by local planners and officials.
The group saw various possibilities for assigning natural hazard mitigation responsibilities,
without agreement on any single way. For example, a state planning agency should have a role in
mitigation, but there were differences in terms of its being a policy-setting, planning, or coordinating
role. Because many other state agencies also have roles in hazard mitigation, the central role was seen
by some principally as one of coordination; and the concept of a family of plans to deal with
mitigation was also advanced.
The concept of a separate agency charged with comprehensive mitigation responsibilities was
rejected, and different opinions supported roles for the state emergency response agency, the
governor's policy staff, or a cabinet or subcabinet task force. Nor was there agreement on the state's
role in enforcement of land use regulations and building codes.
Such differences of opinion focused attention on the great variety of implementing potentials
and techniques appropriate for the 50 states.

Finally, members of the committee tended to agree on these aspects of the federal role in natural
hazards reduction:
* The federal government should increase both financial and technical assistance to the states
for natural hazard assessment and reduction activities.
* If earthquake warning risk insurance were to become a reality, federal assistance would be
required.
* The federal government should devote a greater share of its disaster aid resources to be used in
hazards mitigation.
An added suggestion was made that indirect costs might be funded by siphoning off funds from
appropriate grants received by line agencies to state planning agencies for use in planning
coordination activities.
It was reported that one state which has established a special agency for seismic safety programs
also established a committee which held regular meetings looking at all hazards, including
participants from the state seismic safety board, its emergency services agency, and the state planning
agency, with the planning agency taking the initiative.

Report submitted by
Robert D. Kuzelka, Nebraska
Committee Chairman

NOTE: This report is based primarily on the committee's lengthier meeting in Seattle on June 5 and 6,
1978,at which all members of thecommittee were not present. Robert H. Wise, staffdirector. Council
of State Planning Agencies, attended,as did representatives of the Council of State Governments. No
formal resolution was prepared as in the case of the two other committees whose reports are included
in this appendix, inasmuch as the Council of State Planning Agencies, unlike the two other
organizations, does not propose or adopt resolutions.

Appendix C

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EARTHQUAKES
OF THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE DIRECTORS
FOR DISASTER PREPAREDNESS

The special committee, formed by this Association to assist the Council of State Governments
in its examination of public policy issues arising from the increasing capabilities of scientists to
predict earthquakes and in the development of proposals to deal with such issues, met on July 10 and
11, 1978, in the Chicago metropolitan area. An initial meeting was held in November 1977 at Boulder,
Colorado, on the eve of the last day of the CSG-sponsored national conference at which many state
emergency service organizations as well as other state offices were represented.
The committee considered a variety of public policy issues with regard to earthquakes and
related hazards. Many of thesearose in the context of the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977
and the Implementation Plan developed by the Office of Science and Technology Policy and
submitted to the Congress by the President on June 22, 1978, also in connection with Reorganization
Plan No. 3 of 1978, for creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The agenda of the
committee's deliberations illustrates the scope of the inquiry, although the full nature of its
considerations are not reflected by recommendations in this report. Issues raised by the agenda are,
nevertheless, illustrative of some of the major concerns which members of the Association are likely
to be faced with in coming months (or over longer time spans) in their capacity as public officials
responsible for many aspects of disaster problems with which their states inevitably must deal.
The committee presents the following recommendations to the Association, and recommends
their adoption by the Association:
Recommendation 1. The Earthquake Hazard Reduction Implementation Plan submitted by
the President to the Congress (hereinafter, Implementation Plan) states: "Warnings and advice to
people are primarily functions of state and local government. State governments may decide to set up
their own advisory mechanism for evaluation of predictions." The committee believes it desirable that
such a state mechanism, advisory to the governor and appropriately related to a National Earthquake
Prediction Evaluation Council (expected to replace USGS's present evaluation council), be
established to evaluate any earthquake prediction of concern in the state, thereby assisting in the
governor's decision to issue or withhold a public warning. The deliberations of the proposed National
Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council established under the Implementation Plan can also
assist the states, but it is recommended that a state evaluation by a formal or informal organizational
arrangement, but using standardized procedures and seismic authorities who are knowledgeable
about the area, be established according to each state's need.
Recommendation 2. Each state should review existing legislation to ascertain the adequacy of
appropriate immunity from liability for the governor and other state or local officials engaged in
evaluation of predictions and issuance of public warnings, and appropriate recommendations should
be made to the legislature.
Recommendation 3. Each state should undertake an analysis of its statutes to ascertain the
exposure of state or local officials to liability for actions taken or not taken upon issuance by the
governor or local officials of an authorized public warning. Any statutory gaps or deficiencies should
be presented to the legislature for its consideration and determination as to possible legislative action.
Such consideration may also apply to the existence of precursor data known to be threatening but
with respect to which a warning has not been issued.
Recommendation 4. While recognizing that seismic hazard reduction or disaster mitigation
planning will be required, particularly affecting land use and construction regulation, state

governments, to the degree possible, should integrate such planning into a comprehensive emergency
preparedness planning program. Mitigation as well as long-range recovery planning should
preferably be coordinated for the governor by state planning or policy development offices,
appropriately assisted by other state operating agencies and substate and local bodies. Response and
immediate alleviation or recovery activities, as well as contributing to hazard reduction planning, are
properly areas of concern for members of the Association.
Recommendation 5. The Implementation Plan states, "National maps on degree of seismic risk
are needed to establish national priorities for earthquake hazard reduction activities; high priority
will be given by the U.S. Geological Survey to the production of such seismic risk maps." Regional
risk maps are also called forby the Implementation Plan. States must plan to (a) fill the gap from such
regional maps to those more detailed ones required at substate and local levels, (b) determine the most
appropriate methods for controlling vulnerability, and (c) establish priorities on measures to alleviate
vulnerability. Substate and local governments may be the primary planning or action agencies, with
maximum state assistance from community affairs and other appropriate agencies.
Recommendation 6. The Implementation Plan states: "State and local governments wishing to
explore approaches to problems of existing hazardous buildings may obtain federal assistance
through existing federal planning grant programs." Recent experience with federal planning grant
funds to states and local governments indicates that funding is now inadequate and growing steadily
smaller-not larger and more widely available. If state, substate, and local government efforts are to
be effective, additional planning grant funds are needed for the development of hazard mitigation
programs, in accord with recommendations supported by the Chairman of the Disaster Assistance
Subcommittee of the National Governors' Association.
Recommendation 7. In almost all instances local governments cannot, by themselves, plan for
or assure the safety of lifelines (water, waste disposal, energy and communications) in emergencies.
States must plan for, and provide appropriate assistance, in full collaboration, as necessary, with the
federal government. The federal government must assist states and their local jurisdictions in
planning for restoration of lifelines, providing material assistance where necessary.
Recommendation 8. The federal government should take the lead in assuring the dissemination
of hazard research results to state and local governments as well as other interested parties.
Attached to this report is a draft for the Association's consideration of a resolution which
covers the major points of the committee's deliberations.
The Special Committee urges the Association's approval of the committee report, and its
adoption of the draft resolution.

Respectfully submitted,
Alex Cunningham, California
Chairman of the Special Committee

PROPOSED NASDDP ASSOCIATION RESOLUTION
ADOPTING THE REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EARTHQUAKES

WHEREAS, the President has submitted Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978 to the Congress,
which establishes the Federal Emergency Management Agency and consolidates the principal
disaster assistance functions into the new agency; and
WHEREAS, the message transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 3 contemplates there is to be
an increased emphasis on disaster prevention and mitigation measures; and
WHEREAS, the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 calls for increased federal-state-
local interaction to reduce or mitigate hazards from potential severe earthquakes; and
WHEREAS, this Association has appointed a special committee to assist the Council of State
Governments in examination of public policy issues facing states arising from the increasing
capabilities of scientists to predict earthquakes;
NOW, THEREFORE, THE ASSOCIATION AT ITS ANNUAL MEETING ASSEMBLED
AT BURLINGTON, VERMONT, ON AUGUST 27-30, 1978, ADOPTS THE FOLLOWING
RESOLUTIONS:
RESOLVED, the report of the Association's special committee on earthquakes, and the
recommendations therein, are adopted as those of the Association: and be it further
RESOLVED, inasmuch as the President's Earthquake Hazard Reduction Plan states:
"Warnings and advice to people are primarily functions of state and local government. State
governments may decide to set up their own advisory mechanism for evaluation of predictions," each
state subject to seismic risk should establish a state prediction evaluation system, by a formal or
informal organizationalarrangement, using standardized procedures and seismic authorities who are
knowledgeable about the area, according to each state's need; and be it further
RESOLVED, each state should review existing legislation to ascertain the adequacy of
appropriate immunity from liability for the governor and other state and local officials engaged in
evaluation of predictions and issuance of warnings, with appropriate recommendations being made
to the legislature; and be it further
RESOLVED, each state should analyze its laws with respect to state or local officials' liability
for actions taken or not taken upon issuance by the governor or local officials of an authorized public
warning. Any statutory gaps or deficiencies should be presented to the legislature for its consideration
and determination as to legislative action. Such consideration may also apply to the existence of
precursor data known to be threatening but with respect to which a warning has not been issued; and
be it further
RESOLVED, state governments, to the degree possible, should integrate seismic hazard
reduction and mitigation into a comprehensive emergency preparedness planning program.
Mitigation as well as long-range recovery planning preferably should be coordinated for the governor
by state planning or policy development offices, appropriately assisted by other state operating
agencies and substate and local bodies. Response, immediate alleviation and recovery activities, as
well as contributing to hazard reduction planning, are properly areas of concern for state disaster
directors; and be it further
RESOLVED, national and regional seismic risk maps to be issued by the U.S. Geological
Survey will not be detailed enough for user agencies. States must plan to (a) fill the gap from regional
maps to the more detailed ones needed at substate and local levels, (b) determine the most appropriate
methods for controlling vulnerability, and (c) establish priorities on measures to alleviate
vulnerability. Substate and local agencies may be the primary action agencies, with maximum state
assistance required: and be it further
RESOLVED, recent state experience with existing federal planning grant funds to states (and
to local agencies as well) is that they are inadequate and shrinking-not larger, and more widely
available. If state, substate, and local mitigation efforts are to be effective, additional planning grant
funds are needed for the development of hazard mitigation programs, in accord with

recommendations supported by the Chairman of the Disaster Assistance Subcommittee of the
National Governors' Association; and be it further
RESOLVED, states must recognize local governments cannot, without assistance, plan for or
assure safety of lifelines (water, waste disposal, energy, and communications) in emergencies. States
must plan for and provide appropriate assistance, in collaboration with, as necessary, the federal
government. The federal government must assist states and their local jurisdictions in planning for
restoration of lifelines, providing material assistance where necessary; and be it further
RESOLVED, the federal government should take the lead in assuring the dissemination of
disaster research results to state and local governments, and to other interested parties; and be it
further
RESOLVED, that the Secretary of the Association is instructed to distribute copies of this
resolution to those recipients designated by the President of the Association.
Done at Burlington, Vermont, this 30th day of August, 1978, at the 1978 annual meeting of the
Association.

NASDDP ASSOCIATION RESOLUTION
ACCEPTING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON EARTHQUAKES

WHEREAS, the President has submitted Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978 to the Congress,
which establishes the Federal Emergency Management Agency and consolidates the principal
disaster assistance functions into the new agency; and
WHEREAS, the message transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 3 contemplates there is to be
an increased emphasis on disaster prevention and mitigation measures; and
WHEREAS, the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 calls for increased federal-state-
local interaction to reduce or mitigate hazards from potential severe earthquakes; and
WHEREAS, this Association has appointed a special committee to assist the Council of State
Governments in examination of public policy issues facing states arising from the increasing
capabilities of scientists to predict earthquakes;
NOW, THEREFORE, THE ASSOCIATION AT ITS ANNUAL MEETING ASSEMBLED
AT BURLINGTON, VERMONT, ON AUGUST 27-31, 1978, ADOPTS THE FOLLOWING
RESOLUTIONS:
RESOLVED, the report of the Association's special committee on earthquakes is accepted and
the following recommendations are adopted as those of the Association; and be it further
RESOLVED, inasmuch as the President's Earthquake Hazards Reduction Plan states:
"Warnings and advice to people are primarily functions of state and local government. State
governments may decide to set up their own advisory mechanism forevaluation of predictions," each
state subject to seismic risk should establish a state earthquake prediction evaluation system, by a
formal or informal organizational arrangement, using standardized procedures and seismic
authorities and authorize participation in multi-state or regional prediction systems, according to
each state's need; and be it further
RESOLVED, each state should review existing legislation to ascertain the adequacy of
appropriate immunity from liability for the governor and other state and local officials engaged in
evaluation of earthquake predictions and issuance of, or failure to issue, official public warnings, and
for immunity from liability for actions taken or not taken upon or in response to issuance by the
governor or local officials of an authorized public warning. Any statutory gaps ordeficiencies should
be presented to the legislature for its consideration and determination as to legislative action; and be it
further
RESOLVED, state governments, to the degree possible, should integrate seismic hazard
reduction and mitigation into a comprehensive emergency preparedness planning program. State
emergency preparedness and response planning should be coordinated with general planning
processes, including those of substate and local bodies, in order to assure linkage with other state
planning programs, especially those that contribute to the prevention and mitigation of hazards.
Disaster response, immediate alleviation and recovery activities, as well as contributions to hazard
reduction planning, are properly areas of concern for state disaster preparedness directors; and be it
further
RESOLVED, national and regional seismic risk maps to be issued by the U.S. Geological
Survey will not be detailed enough for user agencies. States should plan to (a) fill the gap from
regional maps to the more detailed ones needed at substate and local levels, and (b) determine the
most appropriate methods for controlling vulnerability; and be it further
RESOLVED, recent state experience with existing federal planning grant funds to states (and
to local agencies as well) is that they are inadequate and shrinking-not larger, and more widely
available. If state, substate, and local mitigation efforts are to be effective, additional planning grant
funds are needed for the development of hazard mitigation programs, in accord with
recommendations supported by the Chairman of the Disaster Assistance Subcommittee of the
National Governors' Association; and be it further
RESOLVED, states must recognize local governments cannot, without assistance, plan for or
assure safety of lifelines (water, waste disposal, energy, and communications) in emergencies. States

must plan for and provide appropriate assistance, in collaboration with, as necessary, the federal
government, which must assist states and their local jurisdictions in planning for restoration of
lifelines, and provide material assistance where necessary; and be it further
RESOLVED, the federal government should take the lead in assuring the dissemination of
disaster research results to state and local governments, and to other interested parties.

Hayden Haynes
President

Attest: Oran K. Henderson, Secretary

Appendix D

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL
ON EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION, WARNINGS AND PUBLIC POLICY

The Special Committee was formed during the term of the Honorable Slade Gorton as
President of the Association. The Committee met upon three occasions-in November 1977 at
Boulder, Colorado, in connection with a National Conference on Earthquakes and Related Hazards;
on February 6, 1978, in Los Angeles; and on October 30, 1978, in Seattle. Attorneys General from the
states of Washington, California, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, South Carolina and Utah
were represented on the Committee.
At least 22 states, according to the U.S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior, are
subject to some degree of earthquake hazard (42 FR 19292 et seq., April 12, 1977), although seismic
studies show at least 39 states, in which 70 million people live, are subject to major or moderate
earthquake risk. Committee representation sought a cross section of the degrees of risk to which the
states are subject in this regard. Because of the groundbreaking activities of the state of California on
measures intended to avoid or reduce hazards from earthquakes, the Committee, at its initial
meeting, determined that it would utilize or adapt, to the degree practicable, steps taken by that state.
Additionally, at the initial meeting of the Committee it was determined that consistent with the
Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977, warnings of an earthquake, based upon an evaluated
prediction, are properly a function of state government and that the warning itself should be issued by
the governor. The Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 expressly contemplates this will be
done.
Accordingly, the Committee recommends that each state subject to seismic risk enact
legislation to expressly immunize the governor, and other state and local officials, from liability for
discretionary activities in connection with earthquake warnings, including activities involved in
evaluation of predictions. The Committee also recommends that legislatures should consider
immunizing doctors, nurses, and other medical personnel from liability based on medical treatment
or care administered during an emergency caused by an earthquake.
The Committee's recommendation is based upon the several assumptions and reasons which
are summarized below:
ASSUMPTIONS:
1) That the ultimate purpose of state involvement in earthquake prediction and warning is the
mitigation of losses from earthquakes.
2) That the potential long-range savings resulting from an effective earthquake prediction and
warning program are significant.
3) That state government decisionmakers are cognizant of and influenced by the costs
associated with tort liability.
REASONS FOR IMMUNITY RECOMMENDATION:
1) Widespread uncertainty as to the extent of governmental liability places significant
restraints on government involvement in activities, such as earthquake prediction evaluation and
warning, where decisionmakers are unsure of their legal liabilities.
2) Because state earthquake prediction evaluation and warning programs are new and because
the science of earthquake prediction is in its infancy, existing legal uncertainties must be resolved if
earthquake prediction and warning programs are to develop their promise of significant loss
mitigation.
3) Sovereign immunity from liability and its attendant certainty in laws relating to earthquake
prediction and warning are essential to the development and use of that science.

4) The range of policy concerns which will be impacted by a state's liability are so diverse that
they will be better addressed directly than by the uncertain and possibly random consequences of any
statement of partial or total liability.
5) The potential savings in loss of life and property justifies the removal of disincentives to state
government involvement in earthquake prediction and warning. As the science of prediction
improves, states may wish to reassess the wisdom of a claim of total sovereign immunity.
COMMENTS:
In assessing the recommendation of the Committee, states are urged to consider the analytical
framework upon which the recommendation is based. That analytical framework involves the
consideration of seven possible approaches to state liability in view of eight broad policy
considerations which are likely to be concerns of all state governments. Appended to this report is a
paper by James Huffman who has served as a consultant to this Committee. The paper details the
rationale of the analytical framework and suggests how that framework can be applied in practice.
The table following his report summarizes these approaches and policy concerns, and suggests some
of the factors which states will want to consider.
Most of the analytical elements apply also to the further question of immunity from liability for
state or local officials for good faith actions, or failure to take action based upon warnings issued as a
result of evaluated predictions. State legislatures considering the tort liability of state and local
officials for such actions should find it a useful tool in their considerations of possible revision to tort
claim statutes.
The Committee was assisted in its considerations by the participation in its meetings by the
emergency services directors of the states of California and Washington, and by representatives of the
Association of (San Francisco) Bay Area Governments, which was conducting a study of potential
tort liability impact on decisions of local governments in earthquake situations. This participation
showed that earthquake mitigation measures cannot be undertaken in isolation but must be
integrated into an all-hazard approach, and that economic impact and where cost burdens fall will
always be major considerations.
A severe earthquake in a densely populated area is potentially the greatest natural hazard the
states face in terms of property damage and threats to life or severe bodily harm. The ideal long-range
solutions to the threat of earthquakes are design, construction, and safety requirements and land-use
management, which avoids creation of or mitigates the hazard. The Committee recommends that
states at seismic risk consider legislation providing effective tools for avoiding or minimizing harm
from earthquakes within cost-effective ranges.
As a part of this report, there is a proposed draft resolution, attached for the consideration of
the Association, which would adopt the recommendations in the report as those of the Association.
There is also attached a paper and chart on the ranges of options available, and the considerations
involved, for those state legislatures which may wish to take action on the subject. This material
provides some guidelines to assist in their deliberations.

Respectfully submitted,

Special Committee of the National Association
of Attorneys General on Earthquake Prediction,
Warnings and Public Policy

By: Slade Gorton, Chairman
Attorney General, State of Washington

ADOPTED RESOLUTION OF THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL ON
EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION, WARNINGS AND PUBLIC POLICY

RESOLUTION accepting the report of the Special Committee on Earthquake Prediction, Warnings
and Public Policy.

WHEREAS, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978, submitted by the President to the Congress,
which established the Federal Emergency Management Agency as a means of consolidating the
principal federal disaster assistance functions into the new agency (FEMA), has taken effect; and
WHEREAS, the President's message transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 3 contemplates
there is to be an increased emphasis on the part of the federal government on disaster prevention and
mitigation measures; and
WHEREAS, the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 calls forincreased federal-state-
local interaction to reduce or mitigate hazards from potentially severe earthquakes; and
WHEREAS, the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 contemplates that earthquake
warnings will be issued by the state, and the President's Implementation Plan submitted to the
Congress pursuant to the provisions of the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 specifies that
the states will perform the earthquake warning function; and
WHEREAS, this Association established a Special Committee on Earthquake Prediction,
Warnings and Public Policy to assist the Council of State Governments in its study of the questions
thereon;
NOW, THEREFORE, THE ASSOCIATION AT ITS ANNUAL MEETING ASSEMBLED
AT ASPEN, COLORADO, ON JUNE 17-20, 1979, ADOPTS THE FOLLOWING
RESOLUTIONS:
RESOLVED, the report of the Association's Special Committee on Earthquake Prediction,
Warnings and Public Policy is accepted and the following recommendations are adopted as those of
the Association; and be it further
RESOLVED, inasmuch as the federal government has placed the responsibility for earthquake
warnings upon the states and their governing officials, that each state legislature immunize the state,
its political subdivisions, and their officials, employees, and agents from liability for damage resulting
from discretionary acts connected with earthquake predictions or warnings issued by them; and be it
further
RESOLVED, that state legislatures evaluate the question of whether state and local officials
should be immunized for their own good-faith mitigatory actions taken in response to a prediction or
warning issued by the governor, such evaluation by the legislature to be assisted by the considerations
included in the attachment to this resolution prepared for and adopted by the Special Committee; and
be it further
RESOLVED, that land use management and construction and safety code requirements
constitute the most productive method of approach to reduce earthquake-related hazards and
preserve or protect lives and property in communities subject to seismic risk. Accordingly, state
legislatures should consider the extent to which revised or new state codes should be adopted for the
elimination, reduction, or mitigation of earthquake-related hazards; and be it further
RESOLVED, that the Association extends its appreciation to the Council of State
Governments for the support provided the Special Committee in its consideration of the subject
matter.

96
CONSULTANT'S REPORT:
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIABILITY ASSIGNMENT
IN EARTHQUAKE ISSUES

The memorandum and chart which follow were prepared by Professor James L. Huffman,
Director, Natural Resources Law Institute, Lewis and Clark Law School, at the direction of the
Special Committee on Earthquake Prediction, Warnings and Public Policy of the National
Association of Attorneys General. Professor Huffman served as a consultant to the committee.
The analysis is addressed to the issue ofthe state's liability for activities (or lack of them) arising
from state involvement in earthquake prediction, including its evaluation. The analysis applies with
equal force to public warnings of earthquakes issued by the state, with instructions by the state of
actions to be taken by the public.
The chart depicting the range of options available to a state relating to assignment of liability
for actions taken or not taken as a result of a public warning will also prove to be a useful tool for
legislative consideration in this area.
The Special Committee was unanimous in its recommendation that state and local officials be
immunized from liability for their actions in connection with earthquake prediction evaluation and
warning. Council staff believes the material will prove its value in legislative considerations on this
subject.

Several factors enter into a consideration of the appropriate state posture with respect to
liability for state earthquake prediction activities.
Among these factors are the impact of the liability assignment on the socialjustifiability of state
involvement in earthquake prediction, the nature of government behavior in response to alternative
liability assignments, and the impact of those alternative liability assignments on the state's policy
objectives. Those factors are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Central to a state's decision to become involved in any way with earthquake prediction must be
the determination that the welfare of the state's citizens will be improved by the state's involvement.'
The following analysis of the state liability issue assumes that the state's earthquake prediction
involvement will lead to a net gain in social welfare. It is important to bear in mind, however, that the
costs associated with the state of private liability are costs which must be incorporated into the
general cost-benefit analysis of earthquake prediction. Because some rules of liability are more
efficient than others, that is, they produce a particular social gain at less cost, thejustifiability of state
involvement in earthquake prediction will be impacted by the liability system in existence.
A simple example will illustrate the possible effect of liability assignment. Assume that a state
determines that the issuance of an accurate earthquake prediction which leads to the evacuation of a
high-risk area will result in avoiding $150 million in losses at a cost of $100 million, of which $90
million results from the economic dislocation of the evacuation. Further, assume that the prediction
is 50 percent accurate so that for every earthquake which occurs, there will have been two predicted
earthquakes resulting in the mitigation of$ 150 million in losses at a total social cost of $200 million. If
the state is liable for the injuries resulting from an inaccurate prediction, the state will pay the full $100
million in costs resulting from the inaccurate prediction. Although the private parties will suffer the
$90 million in economic dislocation costs from the accurate prediction, they avoid $150 million in
costs which they would have suffered if there had been no earthquake prediction. Thus, there is no
risk to private parties who comply with the evacuation. Either they avoid $150 million in loss at a cost
of $90 million or they are compensated for the $90 million if no earthquake occurs. The society as a
whole, however, has avoided $150 million in earthquake costs at an expense of $200 million.
If liability for the economic dislocation costs of an inaccurate prediction rests with private
individuals, they might seek to mitigate or eliminate those costs by permanent relocation or building
modification. Although there would be costs associated with such relocation or structure
reinforcement, they would occur only once, unlike the dislocation costs associated with evacuation.
Whether or not it would actually be more efficient to relocate or suffer periodic dislocation costs
would depend upon many factors, but they are factors which would be recognized in a situation of
private liability and may not be recognized when the state is liable.

The preceding example suggests the second general factor of concern in assigning liability for
harm resulting from state earthquake prediction activities-how government will act in the face of
alternative liability arrangements. Traditional liability theory is based upon an individualistic model
in which individuals respond to liability rules in accordance with their self-interest. The objective of
tort law is to minimize the costs which reuslt from one person's behavior impacting upon another
person's welfare. The standard rule for liability assignment, given their objective, was expressed by
Judge Learned Hand in the case of United States v. Carroll Towing Co.2 Hand argued that a
defendant should be guilty of negligence if the loss caused by the accident, discounted by the
likelihood of the accident's occurrence, is greater than the burden of the precautions that the
defendant would have had to take to avert the accident. In other words, we should not find a
defendant liable if his avoidance costs exceed the costs avoided.
Harold Demsetz has demonstrated that the assignment of liability will make no difference in
terms of resource allocation.3 But this is not always true unless it is assumed that transactions are
costless. Transactions are not costless, of course, and the implications of transaction costs are
important in the assignment of liability. In the words of Richard Posner, "Transaction costs are
minimized when the law ... places liability on the party who, if he had the right and transaction costs
were zero, would sell it to the other party."4 In terms of the assignment of liability for earthquake
prediction-related harm, this consideration is particularly important since many parties will be
impacted and transaction costs will accordingly be high.
But the usefulness of this traditional liability theory in the assignment of liability to government
is dependent upon the extent to which government behavior in response to rules of liability is similar
to individual behavior. Because the "self-interest" of government is not easily defined ordetermined,
it is not certain that government will act to optimize the welfare of the people it serves. Given this
uncertainty, we must either develop a new liability theory having application to government
behavior, or we must seek to guide government behavior so that it conforms to the individual
behavior pattern upon which traditional liability theory is based. Since we do not have empirical data
on government response to liability assignments, we are not in a position to develop a new liability
theory. Hence, the remainder of this analysis is based upon the assumption that government behavior
does or can be made to conform to the individualistic behavior upon which the liability theory
articulated above is based. It is very important to be aware of the possibility that government does not
fit the assumptions of traditional liability theory.
The table presented with this report outlines the relationship between alternatives for liability
assignment and various policy concerns of the states. The liability alternatives range from a claim of
total sovereign immunity to an affirmative declaration of state liability and includes three
mechanisms for state compensation independent of the operation of the judiciary. Although the
seven options identified appear to be independent alternatives, they may in fact be quite
interdependent. Many direct state compensation systems do not prevent the receipt of judicially
granted relief. Hence, no alternative should be viewed as exclusive of all others.
The policy concerns which are identified along the left hand side of the table are equally
interrelated. For example, the magnitude of private transaction costs will clearly have a direct impact
on the private decision to seek judicial or administrative relief and thus on the magnitude of private
losses and of state liability. The magnitude of state liability will directly influence the willingness of
the state to undertake earthquake hazard mitigation through issuance of an evaluated prediction. A
careful examination of the table will reveal many of these interrelationships, but the complexity
cannot be adequately demonstrated in a simple table. However, the table does define the main issues
which should concern a state legislature which is contemplating action to alter or define liability for
harm resulting from state earthquake prediction activities.

Footnotes
1. This objective would also exist if the state was involved in regulating private earthquake
prediction.
2. 159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947).
3. H. Demsetz, "When Does the Rule of Liability Matter," J. Leg. Studies 13 (1972).
4. R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 17, First Edition (1972).

THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE STATE ACTIONS WITH RESPECT
LEGISLATIVE PROVISION FOR JUDICIAL RELIEF
Problems _ Alternatives for Claim of total Selective waiver General waiver
which legislative legislative sovereign of sovereign of sovereign
action should address acionimmunity immunity immunity
MAGNITUDE Assuming the validity of the The magnitude of state lia- The magnitude of state lia-
OF doctrine of sovereign immun- bility would depend upon the bility would depend upon the
STATE ity, the state's liability would nature of the waiver (for what judicial application of com-
LIABILITY be zero. acts is liability assumed?), and mon law doctrines (causation.
the judicial application of com- negligence, etc.) to the state
mon law doctrines (causation, action for which relief is sought.
negligence, etc.) to the state The state cost is potentially
action for which relief is sought. high.
The state cost is potentially
high.
MAGNITUDE Assuming the validity of the The magnitude of private loss The magnitude of the loss will
OF doctrine of sovereign immunity, will depend upon the nature of depend upon the judicial appli-
PRIVATE private losses will fall upon the waiver (for what losses is cation of common law doc-
LOSSES those injured or upon those the state liable?), and the ju- trines (causation, negligence,
participating in insuring dicial application of common etc.) to the state action for
against such losses. law doctrines (causation, negli- which relief is sought. Private
gence, etc.) to the state action loss is potentially low or even
for which relief is sought. Pri- negative if collateral source re-
vate loss is potentially low or covery is not prohibited.
even negative if collateral
source recovery is not
prohibited.
MAGNITUDE Litigation and administrative Administrative costs will be Administrative costs will be
OF costs will be minimal or non- limited to administration of limited to administration of
GOVERNMENT existent. Some litigation of the judicially awarded relief Liti- judicially awarded relief. Liti-
TRANSACTION validity of the immunity claim gation costs will result from gation will result from private
COSTS may be expected. private suits and will be mag- suits and will be potentially
nified by need to define scope high.
of waiver. Those costs are po-
tentially high.
MAGNITUDE Private costs resulting from Private litigation costs will be Private litigation costs will be
OF transactions with government high because of the need to high, although the absence of
PRIVATE will be minimal, except for demonstrate injury resulting the issue of the extent of the
TRANSACTION those challenging the immunity from state action for which waiver of immunity will
COSTS claim. immunity has been waived. simplify litigation.

IMPACT OF State earthquake prediction Depending upon the nature of State earthquake prediction
LEGISLA TIVE activities will be unrestrained the immunity waiver, state activities may be restrained
ACTION ON because of no prospect of lia- earthquake prediction activities by the prospect of liability for
STATE CONDUCT bility for harm resulting from may be restrained by the pros- harm resulting from those ac-
those activities. spect of liability for some ac- tivities. The extent of the re-
tivities and unrestrained by the straint will depend upon ju-
prospect of immunity for other dicial determinations of causa-
activities. tion and negligence and upon
the magnitude of damages
awarded.
IMPACT OF Private individuals will have Depending upon the clarity There will be a degree of un-
LEGISLA lIVE total certainty that they will of the statutory waiver and the certainty about who bears
ACTION ON bear losses associated with availability of judicial interpre- earthquake prediction related
PRIVATE CONDUCT state earthquake prediction tation, private individuals will losses resulting from possible
activities. They will therefore have varying degrees of certain- variation in level of damages
take private action to minimize ty about where the costs will awarded. If damages are high.
those losses. fall. With increasing uncertain- private individuals may have
ty, there will be increasing dis- incentives to engage in activity
incentives to undertake private in which they would not en-
actions which might be neg- gage if they had to bear the
atively impacted. losses.
IMPACT OF To the extent that other gov- If uncompensated losses exist, Other governments are not
LEGISLA1 IVE ACTION ernments have incentives to other governments may engage likely to engage in relief un-
ON CONDI)UCT OF reduce private losses or to cor- in relief activities. If compen- less state-paid damages are
OTH ER GOVERN- rect for distributional conse- sation by state restrains its well short of compensatory.
MENTS quence. they will have induce- prediction activity, other gov- Because state prediction may
ments to provide compensa- ernments may be induced to be- be restrained, other govern-
tion for losses from state come involved in prediction. meints may become involved
earthquake prediction activity. in prediction.
Because of states being un-
restricted in prediction activity,
other governments will be less
inclined to become involved in
earthquake prediction.
DISTRIBUTIONAL. Although absolute losses are Losses may fall more heavily A general waiver is likely to
IMPAC TS OF likely to be higher for wealthy on low-income or high-income magnify distributional in-
LEGISLAt IVE and middle-income individuals, individuals depending upon equities due to the high cost of
AC IION the impact will probably be the nature of the immunity. initiating suit to recover dam-
relatively greater on low-in- The waiver may be mani- ages. This impact will be
come individuals who are un- pulated for distributional pur- minimized by the provision of
able to absorb even small poses, although there will be legal assistance to the poor.
losses. some constitutional constraints.
Unless legal assistance is pro-
vided low-income individuals
may be prevented from seeking
relief.

TO LIABILITY FOR STATE INVOLVEMENT IN EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION
DIRECT LEGISLATIVE OR A DMINISTRA TIE RELIEF
Authorizationfor Statutory schedule of
Affirmative declaration Legislative compensation administrative relief of relief for
of state liability for existing injurr prospective prospective injury
Common law doctrines would The magnitude of state lia- The magnitude of state lia- The magnitude of state liability
presumably be inapplicable. bility is dependent entirely bility will depend upon the will depend upon the injuries
The magnitude of state liability upon the losses compensated legislative definition of ad- for which compensation is pro-
would depend upon judicial and the size of the legislative ministrative discretion and the vided and the level of compen-
interpretation of the intended appropriations. the level of appropriation. The sation to be paid. The cost to
application of the declaration state cost is potentially high. the state is potentially high.
of state liability. The state cost
is potentially high.

Common law doctrines would The magnitude of private loss The magnitude of private loss The magnitude of private loss
be inapplicable. The mag- is dependent upon the losses will depend upon the extent will depend upon what injuries
nitude of private loss would compensated and the level of of administration discretion are compensated and the level
depend upon judicial interpre- the legislative appropriation. and the level of appropriation, of compensation to be paid.
tation of the intended scope The private losses are poten- Private losses are potentially
and level of private recovery. tially low for some or all in- low for some or all individuals
Private loss is potentially low dividuals. Collateral source Collateral source recovery may
or even negative if collateral recovery may result in a net result in a net gain.
source recovery is not pro- gain.
hibited.

Administrative costs will he Transaction costs are poten- Administrative costs will re- Assuming administrative ef-
limited to administration of tially very high. Costs will re- suit from the need to determine ficiency. transaction costs
judicially awarded relief. The suit from the legislative pro- eligibility for relief and from should be moderate in compar-
affirmative declaration of lia- cess and the associated political the administration of the relief. ison to more discretionary ad-
bility may encourage private transactions. Administrative These costs are potentially high. ministrative compensation
suits leading to very high liti- costs will result from determina- schemes. Eligibility and level
gation costs. tion of eligibility for relief and of relief should be easily
administration of that relief. determined.
Private litigation costs will Private costs associated with Some political costs may re- Private costs should be rela-
exist with respect to each in- influencing the legislature are sult if the administrative deter- tively low depending upon the
dividual claim and will be very potentially very high. Private mination is subject to influence. burden placed upon the up-
high in the aggregate due to the costs associated with relief Private costs associated with plicants for relief.
incentive to litigate which is administration are potentially relief administration are po-
likely to flow from an affir- low depending upon the bur- tentially low depending upon
mative declaration of liability. dens placed upon the applicants the burdens placed upon the
for relief. applicants for relief
State earthquake prediction If post-injury legislative relief The impact of post-injury ad- Because of the certainty as-
activities are likely to be is anticipated or has been ministrative relief on state sociated with a schedule of re-
severely restrained by an af- experienced, it will probably earthquake prediction activity lief benefits. states will be able
firmative declaration of govern- constrain state earthquake pre- will depend upon the extent of to anticipate the compensation
ment liability for harm resulting diction activity. particularly if administrative discretion and costs associated with earth-
from those activities. State the magnitude of past relief has the past or anticipated level of quake prediction and will there-
opposition to liability will be been large. legislative appropriation. fore be less constrained than in
difficult and damage awards a situation of less certainty.
are likely to be high.

An affirmative declaration of Private individuals will exper- Private individuals will have Private individuals will have a
state liability will induce pri- ience a high level of uncer- increasing certainty as they high degree of certainty and will
vate action which is high risk tainty since compensation for gain experience with the ad- act with respect to state earth-
in relation to possible injury losses resulting from state ministrative reliel process. The quake prediction activity in a
from state earthquake predic- earthquake prediction activity degree of certainty will be im- way which maximizes private
tion activity. Whether the in- will always be a political issue. pacted by the level of admin- gains and minimizes private
ducement remains will depend They will also have an incentive istrative discretion allowed by losses.
upon judicial application of the to invest in influencing the the statute and by the extent to
statute and the level of dam- legislative decision, which the administrative de-
ages awarded. cisionmaking varies over time.

Other governments are not The politics of state compen- Relief by other governments Other governments will know
likely to engage in relief unless sation and of compensation by will depend upon the adequacy in advance the adequacy of
court ordered damages to be other governments will be re- of state relief Other govern- state compensation and can
paid by state are not compensa- lated due to overlapping con- ments will have incentives to act accordingly. Reduced con-
tory. Because state prediction stituencies. If state prediction engage in earthquake predic- straints on state prediction
will be restrained, other gov- activity is restrained, there will tion to the extent the state is activity will reduce incentives
ernmcnts are likely to engage be incentives for prediction by constrained by the costs of for other governments to en-
in prediction activities, other governments. relief, gage in such activity.

An affirmative declaration of Legislative compensation could Because of the time lag be- Because of the anticipatory
liability will encourage suits for have the express objective of tween legislative authoriza- nature of the relief. vested in-
for damages which will be relieving distributional in- tion and relief administration. terests will have less incentive
brought by those financially equity although political pres- and because of the non-political to anticipate their own pos-
able to do so. The distributional sures will be brought by those Ito a degree) nature of the sible losses. However. the
result is likely to be greater in- who can afford to engage in administrative process. the specificity of the schedule will
equity. lobbying which could lead to possibility for relieving distri- encourage lobbying The dis-
legislative action resulting in butional inequity is good tributed impact will depend
greater inequity. upon the injuries for which
compensation is provided.