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HURRICANE EVACUATION STUDY sift diffif 0 V1 0 L. I.Ll cl, 0 co 02 llusvi f DI COCOA RO K- LEDGE COCOA BEAC" HV 635.5 PALM DAY A8 1984 c2 H U R R I C A N E E V A C U A T 1 0 N S T U D Y F 0 R E A S T C E N T R A L F L 0 R 1 0 A FINAL REPORT JUNE 1984 East Central Florida Regional Planning Council 1011 Wymore Road, Suite 105 Winter Park, FL 32789 The preparation of this report was primarily supported by a grant from the U.S. Office of Coastal Management, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; and the Florida Office of Coastal Management, Department of Environmental Regulation, through the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, as amended. Supplemental funding was provided by the Florida Department of Community Affairs. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 HAZARD ELEMENT Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 History of Hurricane Activity . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Hurricane Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Hazard Analysis Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 VULNERABILITY ELEMENT Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 41 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Levels of Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Evacuation Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Population-at-Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 BEHAVIORAL SURVEY ELEMENT Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Comparisons to Other Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 SHELTER ELEMENT % Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Shelter Inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Shelter/Medical Facility Surge Analysis . . . . . . . . 93 Shelter Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Shelter Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 Public Shelter Assignments o . . . . . . . . . . . 112 Alternate Shelters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) page TRANSPORTATION ELEMENT Introduction . . . o . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Study Approach o . . . . . o . . . . . . o 117 Methodology . . . . . o . 118 Transportation Modeling Input Assumpti;ns' 120 Evacuation Time Requirements . . . . . . . . . . o 135 WARNING ELEMENT Existing Warning System . . . . . . . . . . . o 141 Guide for Evacuation Decision-Making . . . . . . . . . 143 Public Behavior . . . . . . . . o . . . . . . . 145 Early Arrival of Heavy Rains . . . . o o . . . . 145 Actual Vs. Hypothetical Hurricane . o o . . . . . . 145 Public Information and the Media . . . . . . . . . . 146 APPENDICES List of Appendices . . . . . o . . . . . . . . . 147 LIST OF TABLES Number Title Page I Hurricanes Passing within 60 Nautical Miles of 28.37 N. 80.41 W., Titusville, FL., 1886-1981 . . . . 6 2 Freshwater Roadway Inundation Analysis - Summary .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 11 3 Hurricanes Simulated by SPLASH II . e . a 13 4 Hazard Analysis Concept . o . . . . . . . . . . 20 5 Storm Surge Heights at Selected Points (Normal Landfalling Hurricanes) . . . . . . . . . . . 26 6 Hurricane Hazards for Modeled Storms . . . . 31 7 Category of Hurricane/Level of Threat Conversion . . . 42 8 Evacuation Zones--Traffic Analysis Zones Brevard County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Volusia County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 9 Storm Evacuation Zone Boundaries Brevard County . . . . . . . o . o o 48 Volusia County . . o .. . . . . . . . . o . 49 10 Population & Vehicle Productions by Evacuation Zone & Destination (Brevard County) . . . . . . . . o 52 11 Population & Vehicle Productions by Evacuation Zone & Destination (Volusia County) . . . . . . . . . 53 12 Behavioral Survey Results . . . . . . .. . . . . 57 13 Com arison Matrix of Behavioral Surveys within Mrida . . . . . o . . . . . . . . . . 64 14 Shelter Inventory Volusia County, East . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Volusia County, West . . . . . . . o o 76 Brevard County, North o o . . . . . . . 79 Brevard County, Central . . . o . . . . . . 82 Brevard County, South o o . . o . . . . 86 15 Surge Vulnerability Analysis Brevard County Group Homes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Hospitals . o . o . . . . . . . . 94 Nursing Homes . o . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Public Shelters, North . . . . . 96 Public Shelters, Central 97 Public Shelters, South . . . . . . . . . 99 Volusia County Group Homes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Hospitals o o . . . . . . . . . . 104 Nursing Homes o . . . . . . 105 Public Shelters, East . . . . . . . . . . 106 16 Behaviorial Survey Response - Destinations . . . . . 110 17 Comparison of Behavioral Surveys within Florida . . . ill 18 Shelter Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 19 Alternate Shelter Analysis - Brevard Co. (Hotels/Motels) o 0 115 20 Transportation Modeling Regional Storm Scenarios . . . 121 21 Vehicle Productions Volusia County Category 1-2 Storm Situation . . . . . . . . 125 Category 3-5 Storm Situation . . . . . . . . 127 Brevard County Category 1-2 Storm Situation . . . . . . . . 129 Category 3-5 Storm Situation . . . . . . . . 130 22 Evacuation Routing Scheme Brevard County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Volusia County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 23 Transportation Evacuation Times Brevard County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 Volusia County . o . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 24 Regional Storm Scenarios (Required Time for Evacuation Order by County) . . . . . . . o 140 LIST OF FIGURES Number Title Page I Freshwater Roadway Inundation Analysis . . . . . . 12 2 Landfalling Hurricanes . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3 Crossing/Exiting Hurricanes . . . . . . . . . . 16 4 Paralleling Hurricanes . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5 Space-Time Plot of Coastal Surges . . . . . . . . 23 6 Storm Surge Envelope for Hurricane Displayed in Figure 5 . . . . . . . . . . . 25 7 Surge Profile -- Landfalling Hurricanes . . . . . . 27 8 Space-Time Plot of Coastal Wind Speed (Category 4, Normal Landfalling) . . . . . . . . 29 9 Surge Profile Crossing/Exiting Hurricanes . . . . 33 10 Surge Profile Paralleling Hurricane: 20 Miles Inland . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 11 Surge Profile Paralleling Hurricane: On Coastline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 12 Surge Profile Paralleling Hurricane: 20 Miles.Offshore . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 13 Surge Profile -- Paralleling Hurricane: 40 Miles Offshore . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 14 Surge Profile -- Paralleling Hurricane: 60 Miles Offshore . . . . . . . . . . 39 15 Estimation of Cumulative Demand (Behavioral Response Curves) . . . . . . . . .. . . . o 123 16 Hurricane Warning System . . . . . . . . . . . 142 INTRODUCTION The State of Florida is recognized as an area highly vulnerable to the destructive effects of a hurricane. The great length of the State's shoreline, characterized by low-lying coastal topography and numerous tidal inlets, offers little protection from the hazards produced by a major storm. This vulnerability is enhanced by the historically high probability of the State being subjected to a hurricane each year. As rapid development continues to occur along Florida's coast, the potential for a major disaster as a result of this vulnerability increases each year. Those areas most susceptible to the destructive forces of a hurricane--barrier islands--are also the areas most attractive to development and resulting population growth. It is estimated that over seven million persons reside in the coastal areas of Florida, the majority of whom have never experienced the effects of a hurricane. To reduce the potential for a major disaster along the State's coastal areas, the Florida Department of Community Affairs has undertaken a program to develop a series of coordinated hurricane evacuation studies throughout the State. These studies are regional in nature--in that they recognize that the destructive forces of a hurricane are not limited to one community or county, but extend regionwide. As such, regional planning councils encompassing coastal counties within their boundaries have been selected to prepare individual studies for their areas. The central issue to be addressed by each of these studies is the timing of issuing an evacuation order. There is a point in time relative to hurricane landfall when state and local authorities must order an evacuation of vulnerable areas if there is to be sufficient time available for residents to move to safety. In the past, when coastal areas were less developed and many areas still retained rural development characteristics, consideration of when an evacuation should begin was not a major concern. Most areas could complete their evacuation within the 12 hours of warning time provided by the National Hurricane Center. This may no longer be the case, however, for many of the rapidly development coastal communities in Florida. As the population along these areas continues to expand, the length of time needed for evacuation also expands, and the importance of quantifying and incorporating this variable into evacuation decisions increases. There are two major conditions influencing the parameter of time required for the evacuation of any given area. These are: 1. The volume of traffic that may be expected to utilize the evacuation routes and the capacity of these routes to accommodate the traffic within a certain time period. 2. The time in which the arrival of the storm surge and/or high winds may adversely affect the ability, of residents to safely evacuate vulnerable areas. Consideration of these two factors forms the basis for development of the hurricane evacuation studies. These studies should assist local governments in determining the probable impacts of a hurricane approaching their area and serve as a decision-making tool for local response to these conditions. They are meant to guide local disaster preparedness officials in determining when and to what extent evacuation must take place based upon information released by the National Weather Service as the hurricane approaches. The development of these studies is not intended to describe how an evacuation should be carried out or develop procedures for implementing the evacuation. That is a function of the local Civil Defense .offices and, as such, is beyond the scope of these work efforts. The Hurricane Evacuation Study for East Central Florida includes 13 work elements. These work elements provide a basis from which evacuation times may be measured by identifying and quantifying the major factors contributing to the hurricane vulnerability of the region. The major tasks accomplished as part of the program are as follows: Hazard Analysis A comprehensive analysis of the potential hurricane hazards to the East Central Florida coastal areas. Vulnerability Analysis An identification of the areas of Volusia and Brevard counties vulnerable to specific hurricane hazards. Population Data A systematic enumeration of the dwelling units and population within the identified vulnerable areas. Behavioral Data A statistically significant investigation of the probable tendencies of potential evacuees. 2 Surge Roadway Inundation Analysis An identification of low-lying roadways within vulnerable areas and an analysis of their susceptibility to storm surge inundation. Shelter Data An inventory of existing public shelter characteristics and shelter capacity analysis. Freshwater Roadway Inundation Analysis An identification of historically inundated roadways from rainfall flooding. Shelter/Medical Facility Surge Analysis An analysis of the geographic storm surge vulnerability of existing public shelter structures and hospital/nursing home structures. Evacuation Zones A delineation of the vulnerable areas into evacuation zones with common hazard vulnerability and common evacuation routes. Evacuation Routes The assignment of evacuation vehicle volumes from specific zones to specific routes to develop optimum intra- and inter-county routing strategies. Shelter Assignment The assignment of specific evacuation zones to specific shelters based on evacuation routing strategies and shelter capacities. Clearance Time The calculation of vehicle volume traveling times associated with the movement of the enumerated vulnerable population from specific vulnerable evacuation zones to specific evacuation destinations. Evacuation Time The formulation of recommendations for the timing of issuing evacuation orders based on all components of evacuation time analyzed. 3 HAZARD ELEMENT INTRODUCTION The first step in the development of the Hurricane Evacuation Study is to examine the expected hazards that would require the actual evacuation of residents in Brevard and Volusia counties. This section will identify and analyze the predicted hazards that may be expected to occur based on a number of hypothetical hurricanes which have been simulated by the National Hurricane Center for this Study. Included as part of this analysis are the following: a history of hurricane activity for the coastal areas of East Central Florida; hazards to be considered in the analysis; the methodology used to predict the hazards of probable hurricane events; concepts and assumptions to be utilized in quantifying the hazards; and results of the analysis. HISTORY OF HURRICANE ACTIVITY The basis upon which this Study is to be developed is to plan for the worst probable hurricane events that may impact the East Central Florida coast. As such, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to assign quantitative probabilities to the hypothetical hurricanes considered for analysis. However, the general probability considered in the selection of the hypothetical hurricanes by the National Hurricane Center was based on past historical hurricane activity in this region, in addition to what was found to be meteorologically probable. Such historical activity can be summarized in Table I which identifies 16 hurricanes as having passed within 60 nautical miles of the City of Titusville, the center point of the region's coast. The National Hurricane Center has officially designated the months between June through November as "hurricane season," when the ocean temperatures are at their warmest. Hurricanes will form only over tropical oceans where the water temperature exceeds 790F. In examining periods of hurricane activity, it should be noted that there are important seasonal changes in the areas of hurricane formation, due to large-scale atmospheric circulation patterns. These patterns include the Bermuda High and the circulation features at upper levels over the western Atlantic and Caribbean regions. Hurricane track charts compiled by NOAA indicate that the majority of the hurricanes formed in June and July develop in the Gulf of Mexico. During August and September, hurricane activity shifts to the Atlantic where most of the storms affecting Florida form east of the Caribbean and approach the State from the southeast. By September and October, weather patterns have shifted again--hurricane formation is focused in the western Caribbean and storms approaching Florida will do so from the southwest. As can be noted in Table 1, the period of greatest 5 TABLE I HURRICANES PASSING WITHIN 60 NAUTICAL MILES OF 28.37 N. 80.41 W. TITUSVILLE, FL., 1886-1981 Closest Point** Distance Starting Date Name* of Date at to Wind Speed*** Saffir Approach C. P . !C- C.T.A. (Knots per hr.) Timpson M.P.A.) Scale (Lat.T7-Lo n 8/15/1887 Not Named 28.6N 79.6W 08/20 49.NM 105 3 08/15/1893 Not Named 28.611 80.1W 08/27 .29.NM 105 3 09/25/1893 Not Named 28.5N 79.9W 10/12 34.NM 96 2 09/18/1894 Not Named 28.6N 81.5W 09/26 54.NM 84. 2 10/07/1896 Not Named 27.8N 80.OW 10/09 44.NM 74 1 08/03/1899 Not Named 28.4N 80.OW 08/14 27.NM 105 3 10/20/1921 Not Named 29.1N 80.7W 10/26 42.NM 82 1 11/29/1925 Not Named 28.7N 81.2W 12/01 41.NM 64 1 07/22/1926 Not Named 28.3N 80.6W 07/28 6.NM 82 1 08/03/1928 Not Named 28.ON 80.9W 08/08 32.NM 80 1 07/25/1933 Not Named 27.4N 80.5W 07/31 58.NM 67 1 08/07/1939 Not Named 27.7N 81-OW 08/12 48 NM 68 1 08/23/1949 Not Named 27.6N 81.2W 08/27 59:NM' 100 3 10/13/1950 KING 28-1N 81.3W 10/18 44.NM 71 1 08/20/1964 CLEO 28-3N 80-9w 08/28 19.NM 7g 08/25/1979 DAVID 28.4N 80.6W 09/04 5.NM 8 *Stoms were not formally named prior to 1950. "These columns give location and time of closest approach and distance of storm center to site. ***Maximum sustained wind speed near storm center while storm center is within specified distance from site. This is not necessarily the wind recorded at given site. frequency of hurricane a ctivity for East Central Florida is the three-month period of August to October. Of the hurricanes passing through this region, 81% have historically occurred during this period. HURRICANE HAZARDS The major characteristic associated with hurricanes is the exceptional amount of energy associated with this type of storm. This energy is capable of generating immense destructive forces that may threaten thousands of coastal residents and hundreds of miles of coastline as it approaches land. This study is primarily concerned with the three major hazards associated with hurricanes: storm surge; high winds; freshwater flooding. Each of these hazards constitutes a major destructive force which may require the evacuation of residents, as well as impede the ability of these residents to safely evacuate. Of these, storm surge has proven to be the most destructive in terms of loss of life. It is estimated that since 1900, 90% of all fatalities in major storms have occurred as a result of saltwater drowning. High winds are also a potentially devastating force, particularly to persons caught outside and to structures such as mobile homes that are not built to specific hurricane resistance codes. To a lesser extent, freshwater flooding from rainfall may also prove dangerous to residents and destructive to property. Heavy rainfall advancing with the hurricane may inundate poorly drained areas and effectively block evacuation routes. Storm Surge For coastal areas, an increase in the ocean's surface level resulting in the inundation of beach areas and low-lying inland areas is the main source of destruction during a hurricane. Storm surges have been recorded as high as 24 feet above MSL (Hurricane Camille, 1969) and extending over 50 miles along the coast. Combined with its breaking waves and the normal astronomical tide which is superimposed onto it, the storm surge acts like a giant bulldozer sweeping everything away in its path. The higher the surge grows over the sea, the more land will be inundated by the propagation of its waters over low-lying land. The storm surge is the creation of a number of factors occurring within and around the hurricane. Primarily, it is the result of the barometric pressure drop at the eye of the hurricane. The higher pressure exerted on the water surface outside the hurricane center forces water down and into the low pressure area, creating a dome of water. This dome of water is contained by the high winds on the forward side of the hurricane, producing a "damming effect" against the strong winds from the opposite side of the storm, The dome of water is carried with the hurricane as it moves toward land. 7 The storm surge in any given area is proportional to the pressure drop of the hurricane center. The greater the pressure drop, the higher tile storm surge that can be expected. A number of other factors, however, contribute to the propagation of the surge and may reduce it or increase it from what could be expected with the single consideration of pressure. These include: the size and intensity of,the storm; its forward speed; angle and position of the storm as it moves toward land; the offshore bottom conditions (depth and slope); the physical configuration of the coastline. Generally, shallow water off the coast where the hurricane comes ashore increases the surge height. Also, the closer to perpendicular the storm is to the coastline, the higher the expected surge height. Finally, increases in the size of the storm or its forward speed will increase the surge. As mentioned earlier, the wave setup and astronomical tide are superimposed on the surge and increase its flooding potential. "Wave setup" is a technical term used to refer to'the ocean waves generated by the storm. The height of the wave setup is a function of the relative height of the ocean, which is, in turn, a function of the storm surge and astronomical tide. The maximum invasion of the coast will depend not only on the surge heights, but on the daily and monthly tide cycle as well as any tide enhancement (tidal anomaly) resulting from the general disturbance caused by a hurricane. This relationship of the wave invasion to the tide cycle means that a greater threat would be posed by a hurricane which arrived during those portions of the month and the time of day when the gravitational tide is high. The sand dunes along the coast constitute the primary bulwark against tidal flooding. These dunes are highest in northern Volusia County and southern Brevard County and decrease to the south and north, respectively. Other mitigating factors include onshore vegetation and man-made alterations which contribute to "friction factors" that serve to decrease the areas affected by the flooding. The value in predicting expected storm surge heights in this Study is twofold. First, the extent of land inundation is primarily determined for the coastal area by the surge height. The movement of a significant surge into the nearshore areas will not only devastate low-lying terrain, but provide a base on which its high waters can be driven further inland by hurricane winds. Second, storm surges may inundate coastal roadways before the eye of the hurricane actually makes landfall. This would render such potential evacuation routes useless to vehicles attempting to leave vulnerable areas. High Winds Wind is the most commonly thought-of hazard associated with a hurricane. Wind speeds may exceed 200 mph, although there are relatively few measurements of sustained wind speeds above 150 mph since most equipment is 8 destroyed or becomes inoperative at extreme wind speeds. The highest wind speeds which have been reliably measured in Florida were those during the hurricane of September 1947. The maximum wind speed averaged over one minute was approximately 155 mph, and the highest five-minute average was 121 mph. Hurricane force winds are defined as those reaching or exceeding a sustained wind velocity of 74 mph. It should be noted, however, that an increase in force exerted by these winds is not proportional to an increase in the speed. While the wind speed may double, the force of the wind increases fourfold. As an example, Hurricane David had a recorded maximum wind speed of 55 mph over the region. Should a hurricane the strength of Camille impact the region with 220 mph winds, the force would be sixteen times that experienced with Hurricane David. A hurricane usually weakens very rapidly after moving inland. This weakening is due primarily to the removal of the energy source provided by the warm tropical oceans and the friction exerted by the land surface. With the weakening of the storm, winds are also reduced to the extent that a few miles inland from the coast, windspeeds may only be 60-70% of their speed at the open coast. Any time wind velocity exceeds 50 mph, damaging effects can be expected. In a high wind, severe damage can result not only from the wind itself, but also from flying debris. While the effects of these winds present a hazard to all residents, mobile home structures are the most vulnerable. A mobile home is necessarily of light-weight construction, with flat roof and sides. Because of these characteristics, high winds can easily destroy it or flying debris severely damage it and cause injury to persons inside. Consequently, the National Weather Service recommends that mobile home residents move to more sound structures prior to the onset of hurricane force winds. The hazard associated with high wind is not limited to its potential for destruction, but it must also be considered for its ability to interrupt evacuation efforts. Evacuation efforts cannot be safely carried out after the arrival of sustained gale force winds (40 mph). These winds generally arrive several hours before hurricane eye landfall and generally before the arrival of the storm surge. Freshwater Flooding Based on past history, it can be expected that approximately 6-12 inches of rainfall will accompany a hurricane, although no predictive tools are available for determining the rate and geographic distribution of such a phenomenon. While the event of rainfall itself may not necessitate an emergency evacuation of coastal residents, it is significant in two aspects. First, the amount of rainfall largely governs the water level in the Indian, Banana, and Halifax rivers. Extensive rainfall in the weeks 9 preceding a hurricane will result in a high water level in the river basins, requiring less water to overload them and resulting in flooding of lower elevated land areas. Second, in poorly drained areas such rainfall may cause the early inundation of evacuation routes. Intersections or points of major roadways in Brevard and Volusia counties which may experience significant freshwater roadway inundation are listed in Table 2 and illustrated in Figure 1. METHODOLOGY The major device utilized in this study in order to evaluate the potential hazards of a hurricane striking the coast of Volusia or Brevard County is the Special Program to List the Amplitudes of Surges from Hurricanes (SPLASH II). The SPLASH II numerical storm surge prediction model was developed at the Techniques Development Lab of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). SPLASH II is a dynamic computer model which estimates the potential amplitude, extent, and duration of hurricane- produced surges for an entire coastline, resulting from a series of hypothetical hurricane scenarios. A total of 74 hypothetical hurricane scenarios were developed and simulated by the SPLASH II model. The various storm characteristics, or parameters, which compose the scenarios were selected by surge forecasters and analysts at the National Hurricane Center. The selected parameters were based on actual past history of hurricane activity and are considered to be reasonable and probable predictions of future hurricane activity in Brevard and Volusia counties. The combination of the 74 scenarios which were modeled covers the full spectrum of any hurricane activity which could reasonably be expected to affect the coastline being studied. The parameters which comprise the scenarios include the location of direction of the hurricane track, the size of the hurricane (radius of maximum wind), the speed it is traveling, and the intensity of the hurricane measured by pressure drop and wind velocity. A listing of the 74 hypothetical hurricanes analyzed by.SPLASH II appears in Table 3. To ensure that all probable hurricane events were considered, three different hurricane movements were modeled: landfalling, exiting/crossing; and paralleling. These movements--as well as a representation of point of landfall, closest approach, and angle of approach--are graphically presented in Figures 2, 3, and 4. The output of the SPLASH II model provides three major types of data on the effects of the simulated hurricanes on East Central Florida. They are as follows: 10 TABLE 2. FRLStIWATER ROADWAY INUNDATION ANALYSIS - SUMMAPy Site Number' Jurisdiction Vulnerable Roadway Description BREVARD COUNTY 1 Cape Canaveral AlA at the intersection of Central Blvd. 2 Cape Canaveral AlA at the intersection of No. Atlantic Ave. 3 Brevard County Bennett Causeway (SR 528) on Merritt Islana (unincorporated) along Sykes Creek 4 Cocoa Beach AIA at the intersection of Meade Ave. 5 Brevard County Merritt Island Causeway (SR 520) between AlA (unincorporated)/ and Sykes Creek Pkwy. Cocoa Beach 6 Rockledge US I at the intersection of Bougainvillea Dr. VOLUSIA COUNTY I Orinond Beach AIA at the intersection of !@eptune Ave. 2 Ormond Beach US I at the intersection of Hernandez @-ve.,'Yunge St. 3 Ormond Beach AlA at the intersection of Bovard Ave. 4 Holly Hill US I at the intersec-tion of 6tn St. 5 Holly Hill Us I at the intersectior; of 6th St. 6 Holly Hill LIS I at the intersection of 2nd St. 7 Daytona Beach US I at the intersection of Mason Ave. 8 Port Orange western approach of Port Orange Bridge 9 Ponce Inlet AlA - 700' north of East Winds condominium 10 Ponce Inlet AlA between Katherine Ave. and Oceanview 11 Ponce Inlet AIA at the intersection of Inlet Harbor Rd. 12 New Smyrna Beach AlA between Lincoln Ave. and Florida St. 13 New Smyrna Beach AIA between 4th Ave. and 5th Ave. 14 New Smyrna Beach US I at the intersection of Lytle Ave. 11 FIGURE I FRESHWATER ROADWAY INUNDATION ANALYSIS 14 4r to Cj) 3 4 tOCOA KACM 00"" PUN DAY TABLE 3 HURRICANES SIMULATED BY SPLASH II (Special Program to List the Amplitudes of Surges from Hurricanes) Landfall/Exiting'Pt. Pressure Radius of Forward Direction or k Area Receiving Drop Max. Winds Spepd of Type* Number Cat. Closest Approach Max. Surge/Winds (Millibars) (Statute Mi.) (in mph) Storm" L RS 80 1 Daytona Beach Ormond-by-the-Sea 30 20 12 250 L RS 60 1 Mosquito Lagoon Daytona Beach 30 20 12 246 L RS 40 1 Canaveral Natl.Seashore New Smyrna Beach 30 20 12 241 L RS 20 1 Kennedy Space Ctr. Mosquito Lagoon 30 20 12 237 L LS 00 1 Melbourne Cape Canaveral 30 20 12 234 L LS 20 1 Sebastian Inlet Melbourne 30 20 12 230 L LS 40 1 Vero Beach Sebastian Inlet 30 20 12 225 L RS 80 2 Daytona Beach Ormond-by-the-Sea 40 20 12 250 L RS 60 2 Mosquito Lagoon Daytona Beach 40 20 12 246 L RS 40 2 Canaveral Natl.Seashore New Smyrna Beach 40 20 12 241 L RS 20 2 Kennedy Space Ctr. Mosquito Lagoon 40 20 12 237 L LS 00 2 Melbourne Cape Canaveral 40 20 12 234 L LS 20 2 Sebastian Inlet Melbourne 40 20 12 230 L LS 40 2 Vero Beach Sebastian Inlet 40 20 12 225 L RS 80 3 Daytona Beach Ormond-by-the-Sea 60 20 12 250 L RS 60 3 Mosquito Lagoon Daytona Beach 60 20 12 246 L RS 40 3 Canaveral Natl.Seashore New Smyrna Beach 60 20 12 241 L RS 20 3 Kennedy Space Ctr. Mosquito Lagoon 60 20 12 237 L LS 00 3 Melbourne Cape Canaveral 60 20 12 234 L LS 20 3 Sebastian Inlet Melbourne 60 20 12 230 L LS 40 3 Vero Beach Sebastian Inlet 60 20 12 225 L RS 80 4 Daytona Beach Ormond-by-the-Sea 80 20 12 250 L RS 60 4 Mosquito Lagoon Daytona Beach 80 20 12 246 L RS 40 4 Canaveral Natl.Seashore New Smyrna Beach 80 20 12 241 L RS 20 4 Kennedy Space Ctr. Mosquito Lagoon 80 20 12 237 L LS 00 4 Melbourne Cape Canaveral 80 20 12 234 L LS 20 4 Sebastian Inlet Melbourne 80 20 12 230 L LS 40 4 Vero Beach Sebastian Inlet 80 20 12 225 L RS 80 5 Daytona Beach Ormond Beach 100 12 12 250 L RS 60 5 Mosquito Lagoon Ponce Inlet 100 12 12 246 L RS 40 5 Canaveral Natl.Seashore Mosquito Lagoon 100 12 12 241 L RS 20 5 Kennedy Space Ctr. Canaveral Natl.Seashore 100 12 12 237 L LS 00 5 Melbourne Cocoa Beach 100 12 12 234 L LS 20 5 Sebastian Inlet Melbourne 100 12 12 230 L LS 40 5 Vero Beach Sebastian Inlet 100 12 12 225 E RS 80 1 Daytona Beach Flagler Beach 30 20 12 52 E RS 60 1 Mosquito Lagoon Daytona Beach 30 20 12 52 E RS 40 1 Canaveral Natl.Seashore New Smyrna Beach 30 20 12 52 E RS 20 1 Cape Canaveral Mosquito Lagoon 30 20 12 52 E LS 00 1 Melbourne Cocoa Beach 30 20 12 52 E LS 20 1 Sebastian Inlet Melbourne 30 20 12 52 E LS 40 1 Vero Beach Sebastian Inlet 30 20 12 52 E RS 80 2 Daytona Beach Flagler Beach 40 20 12 52 E RS 60 2 Mosquito Lagoon Daytona Beach 40 20 12 52 E RS 40 2 Canaveral Natl.Seashore New Smyrna Beach 40 20 12 52 E RS 20 2 Cape Canaveral Mosquito Lagoon 40 20 12 52 E LS 00 2 Melbourne Cocoa Beach 40 20 12 52 E LS 20 2 Sebastian Inlet Melbourne 40 20 12 52 E -LS 40 2 Vero Beach Sebastian Inlet 40 20 12 52 E RS 80 3 Daytona Beach Flagler Beach 60 20 12 52 E RS 60 3 Mosquito Lagoon Daytona Beach 60 20 12 52 E RS 40 3 Canaveral Natl.Seashore New Smyrna Beach 60 20 12 52 E RS 20 3 Cne Canaveral Mosquito Lagoon 60 20 12 52 E LS 00 3 Me bourne Cocoa Beach 60 20 12 52 E LS 20 3 Sebastian Inlet Melbourne 60 20 12 52 E LS 40 3 Vero Beach Sebastian Inlet 60 20 12 52 *Key: L - Landfalling Hurricane; E - Exiting/Crossing Hurricane "Degree Clockwise from North 13 TABLE 3 (cont.) P 1 20 Mi. West of KSC Cocoa Beach 30 20 12 160 to 1 P I Kennedy Space Ctr. Daytona Bch/Cocoa Bch 30 20 12 155 to 5 P 1 20 Mi. East of KSC - Canaveral Natl.Seashore 30 20 12 150 to 10 P 1 40 Mi. East of KSC Canaveral Natl.Seashore 30 20 12 147 to 15 P 1 60 Mi. East of KSC Canaveral Natl.Seashore 30 20 12 142 to 25 P 2 20 Mi. West of KSC Cocoa Beach 40 20 12 160 to I P 2 Kennedy Space Ctr. Daytona Bch/Cocoa Bch 40 20 12 155 to 5 P 2 20 Mi. East of KSC Canaveral Natl.Seashore 40 20 12 150 to 10 P 2 40 Mi. East of KSC Canaveral Natl.Seashore 40 20 12 147 to 15 P 2 60 Mi. East of KSC Canaveral Ntl.Seashore 40 20 12 142 to 25 P 3 20 Mi. West of KSC Cocoa Beach 60 20 12 160 to I P 3 Kennedy Space Ctr. Daytona Bch/Cocoa Bch 60 20 12 155 to 5 P 3 20 Mi. East of KSC Canaveral Natl.Seashore 60 20 12 150 to 10 P 3 40 Mi. East of KSC Canaveral NatI.Seashore 60 20 12 147 to 15 P 3 60 Mi. East of KSC Canaveral Natl.Seashore 60 20 12 142 to 25 P 4 40 Mi. E. of KSC Canaveral Natl.Seashore 80 20 12 147 to 15 P 4 60 Mi. E. of KSC Canaveral Natl.Seashore 80 20 12 142 to 25 P 5 60 Mi. E. of KSC Canaveral Natl.Seashore 100 12 12 142 to 25 *Key: P Paralleling Hurricane **Degree Clockwise from North 14 FIGURE LANDFALLING HURRICANES NZ VS vs wo NZ of ...0s vc. coot 0 c "0 15 FIGURE a CROSSING/EXITING HURRICANES MILO. ""Its to .sco 101. NZ ."Des VS I so 0,6@46 IV fj LD It VS VS bcZ 0 16 FIGURE 4 PARALLELING HURRICANES VALS-1. -LOA CL- L fl.QLl tevT o 1.1co oTc.0L. 'OLLL wAA. 11 vc. j ... *01A of, To *LA@dg L16 v"m CoIL-t- o.-Ol 0 j 0 0 '17. 0 a surface envelope of expected highest surges for the entire storm duration; 0 a space-time plot of surge heights along the coast; and 0 a space-time plot of coastal wind speeds. The results of the SPLASH II model will be used to analyze various factors pertinent to determining evacuation times. First, the envelope of expected surges will be used to determine the extent of probable flooding along the coast for each of the simulated hurricanes. Second, the space-time plot of surge heights (which depicts how high the surge is expected to be at specific locations and when the surge will occur relative to hurricane eye landfall) will be used to determine potential flooding of roadways. Third, the space-time plot of coastal wind speeds will indicate when specific locations can expect the onset of gale-force and hurricane-force winds and the duration of dangerously high winds. Concepts and Assumptions As with any evacuation planning effort that is concerned with the prevention of loss of life, this Study is based on identifying the potential effects resulting from the worst probable hurricane events that may be reasonably expected to impact the region's coast. The hypothetical hurricanes selected and simulated through the SPLASH II model are those which, in addition to being meteorologically probable, are of such an intensity and an angle of approach as to maximize the hazards considered by this Study. By analyzing the worst probable cases, hazards of any potential magnitude will be considered in the planning efforts at both the local and regional levels. The outputs resulting from the simulation of the worst probable storms provide a means of quantifying the effects of hurricane hazards. The use of these predictive tools begins to address the two primary concerns of this Study, which are: the extent of the areas threatened by a hurricane and requiring evacuation; and the time required for residents in a threatened area to safely evacuate before the life-threatening effects of the hurricane hazards arrive. Xn addition to the predictive tools of the SPLASH II model, two general assumptions must also be made to completely address these concerns. As mentioned previously, SPLASH II does not offer any information on the amount of rainfall expected to accompany a hurricane. In addition, the effects of the frictional drag on the velocity of winds as the hurricane moves inland cannot be determined from this model. Therefore, two assumptions to be used in this Study are as follows: 0 all mobile home residents should evacuate from the direct approach of a hurricane; and 18 0 the arrival of rainfall sufficient to flood evacuation routes will generally parallel the arrival of sustained gale force winds. To illustrate the concepts and assumptions of this Study, Table 4 has been provided which describes the effects of each hazard considered in this Study. It then lists the predictive tool or assumption used to address the effect, the action required to evacuate residents from the effect, and the contribution of each effect to evacuation time. This table is a general illustration of the hazard analysis concept used in the development of regional evacuation studies throughout the State. It has been modified to reflect the use of the SPLASH II computer model. Input Parameters As previously discussed, a number of meteorological parameters were selected by the National Hurricane Center staff for inputs into the SPLASH II model. These parameters were directly accessible and amenable to measurement and represent the major variables associated with a hurricane for predicting the storm surge amplitude. As can be noted in Table 3, the input parameters used to compose each hypothetical hurricane included: 0 barometric pressure drop (millibars) 0 storm size (radius of maximum winds) 0 forward speed (miles per hour) 0 direction and landfall/approach angle of track 0 Saffir/Simpson Scale category The principal parameter concentrated on by the National Hurricane Center in programming the SPLASH II model is the pressure drop of the storm. The peak surge value varies almost linearly with the pressure drop, so that the greater the pressure drop, the higher the expected surge value. As shown on Table 3 for each category of storm modeled, the pressure drop increased--ranging from 20 millibars for a Category 1 storm to 100 millibars for a Category 5 storm. Based solely on this consideration, with other parameters held constant, an increase in the intensity of the storm would be expected to generate a corresponding increase in the storm surge amplitude. An additional indicator of storm surge amplitude is the radius of maximum winds. This is a secondary consideration to pressure drop in predicting storm surge values, butis, nonetheless, an important factor. From Table 3 it can be noted that most of the hypothetical hurricanes simulated had a storm size of 20 statute miles representing what the National Hurricane Center forecasters considered to be probable for this area. However, the Saffir/Simpson Category 5 hurricanes were all simulated through SPLASH II as having a radius of maximum winds of 12 statute miles. The radius was reduced for this category of hurricane because, in general, Category 5 19 HAZARD RE ,@SPONSJ %Q 0 1 It(, @ @ACTERISTIC EFFECT TOOL OR ASSUMPTION EVACUATION ACTION CONTRIBUTION TO EVACUATION TIME Inundation of land and SPLASH 11 and Inland Flooding Evacuate all residents within Clearance time Extent of evacuation devastation of structures model: surface envelope of predicted path of stom surge highest surges above MSL STORM SURGE Timing of evacuation order Inundation of evacuation routes SPLASH Il and Inland Flooding Evacuate vulnerable residents Pre-landfall hazards time before eye landfall model : time histories of surges before predicted inundation of evacuation routes Extent of evacuation Devastation of structures Assumption: All mobile home Evacuate all mobile home residents Clearance time residents should evacuate from hurricane HIGH M WINDS C> Timing of evacuation order Arrival of sustained gale force SPLASH II: Time histories of Evacuate vulnerable residents Pre-landfall hazards time winds before eye landfall comouted wind speeds before predicted arrival of sus- tained gale force winds C-) M Extent of evacuation - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - RAINFALL kssumption: Torrential rainfall Evacuate vulnerable residents Pre-landfall hazards time ficient to inundate evacuation before predicted arrival of sus- Timing of evacuation order Inundation of evacuation routes Uutes ilI generally parallel tained gale force winds before eye landfall he arrival of sustained gale rrce winds storms are smaller in size with a more compact storm center. As can be seen in the discussion of the results of the SPLASH II analysis later in this chapter, this reduced storm size was a mitigating factor in the peak surge amplitude of a Category 5 storm. Forward speed of the storm was also considered in developing the parameters for the model. There exists a critical motion relative to the coast that generates the highest possible surge under any given set of conditions. The critical speed is generally greater than 30 mph. It will be less only with exceptionally small storms or in exceptionally shallow or wide basins. However, storms reaching land rarely attain a critical speed; thus, in order to simplify the model, the National Hurricane Center staff selected a constant speed for all of the hypothetical hurricanes. As shown on Table 3, a forward speed of 12 mph was used in each case, which represented a mean speed for all the hypothetical storms modeled. Another selection of input parameters focused on the angle of the track on which the hurricane is approaching the coast. Table 3 and Figure 2 show that the hypothetical landfalling hurricanes were simulated as approaching at an 800 angle clockwise from the north. While storm surge values would be maximized by a perpendicular (900) landfall angle, this track was determined not to be meteorologically possible for this region. The final parameter used in producing the hypothetical hurricanes was the intensity of the storm according to the Saffir/Simpson Scale. This scale defines storms according to the sustained speed of hurricane force winds and also describes the expected surge heights associated with each category of storm. Also from Table 3, a description of the categories of storms modeled for each storm movement is available. Briefly, landfalling storms were modeled for category 1-5 storms, exiting storms for category 1-3, and paralleling storms for different categories depending on the location of the storm in relation to the coast. The height of the storm surge is determined not only by the parameters of the hurricane itself, but also by the local topographic conditions of the area. As mentioned previously, factors involved in that determination include offshore bathymetry, coastline configurations, and astronomical tides. The offshore bathymetry, or ocean bottom topography, can have either a positive or negative effect on the expected storm surge height. Wide continental shelves with shallow depths of water, as found on the Gulf coast of Florida, will produce higher storm surges than those found on the east coast of Florida with its narrower shelf widths and deeper water. -Storm surge heights for different locations will vary somewhat with the surge values described by the Saffir/Simpson Scale due to these unique offshore characteristics. The surge height ranges listed in the Saffir/Simpson Scale are those expected for a "standard basin" which is considered a hypothetical mean for all basins on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. 21 Coastline configurations also have a determining effect on expected surge heights, but the effects are less well known. The impact of the two inlets along the East Central Florida coast cannot be determined by the SPLASH II model, although, due to their small size, it is not expected to be substantial. The land configuration of Cape Canaveral does produce a noticeable effect on the storm surge height, which is discussed later in this chapter. Lastly, astronomical tides can increase an already dangerous situation when both the peak meteorological and astronomical tides occur at nearly the same time. This situation generates larger total surges. As it is impossible to tell if these tides will occur simultaneously, for planning purposes, it is assumed that they will. These tides were superimposed onto expected surge heights in assisting to determine vulnerable areas. HAZARD ANALYSIS OUTPUT As noted earlier, the major outputs produced by SPLASH II include storm surge heights and time histories for surge and winds. For the purposes of this Study, the time histories have been grouped under pre-landfall hazard times which offer quantitative means of determining the amounts of time needed for evacuating threatened areas prior to hurricane eye landfall. The results of the SPLASH 11 model are provided for each movement modeled: landfalling, exiting, and paralleling. The surge heights and pre-landfall hazard times associated with each of these movements are presented in the discussion which follows. Landfalling Kurricknes Storm Surge Storms reaching land, traveling near normal to the coast, generate surge profiles that grow with time. The position of the highest surge on the profile remains stationary, eventually reaching its peak surge amplitude at approximately the time of landfall. The surge, however, builds and abates with time, with locations along the coast experiencing their highest surge at different periods. In addition, there are negative surges to the south of where the storm makes landfall. These characteristics are illustrated in Figure 5 which presents a space-time plot of coastal surges for a Category 4 hurricane landfalling 60 miles north of Melbourne (RS 60 on Figure 2). The space-time plot provides a snapshot of tide heights along the coast at half-hour intervals before and after landfall. To initially assess the inland flooding potential for a hurricane, it is necessary to quantify @he peak surge value for each location along the coast, irrespective of time. The curve made up of the highest surges at each point over the entire duration of the storm is provided by the SPLASH 22 FIGURE 5 SPACE-TIME PLOT OF COASTAL SURGES th 17 im :q 1.7 2.0 'S tT 4 2 2 P 1.0 A , j.? 7-- 2.1 P.S. 3.1 S.9 4 0.7 . ;.A St. @uqustifle q 10 6. 3 5.7 . U.1 1.9- .9 1.2 1.8 Inlet I . I A 4.7 b'q h-6 1-2 - 1-3 - 1 .2 ;4 . >.$I" 1 .0 a 5 S.9 7. 1 7.0 3.11 . I h , .0 .4 2.2 2.7 3 5.b 7.0 8.2 5. 7 3 2.6 1.2 1 t I I 1 0 .8 S ---I ri. I.; S.. I b 31 ." 1.1 4.2 Q.1 n b.h . . Q.;) I n S 5 1 .71 13 2 . 62..21, [email protected] 972 o 3To_ 1711 tT 5 9 q q R.4 11.6 P I A I A "_ @9. 7 a .5 2 2 . 1 4.9 b. 7 8.9 11.1 12.2 10.7 6.9 1 . 1 .6 :9 a .5 .2 71> . q it -, q.5 .9 .5 1.8 2.2;, b-1-4T 0--12 1-; 7 - -5 -;o Flagler Beich I h I . . IP ti . 7. b.1 q.7 11.. 14 _3-LLI . 1 Ift.2 R.6 .I e 3 - 2.1 @.7 S 7 5.2 7 1 D.S 13.7 12.5. . 7.e 1 7 4 5 U."I 5 $ 0.0 A9.9 5 .2 1 .4 1.1 2 . 1 5 0 D-I WyLina beach a 5--7-- s, -1 0 Sb zu q - - -1 ;0-- 1 ;2 1 .3 1 b 2.0 2.5. S. a Q's 7. 0 9.SQ 1 1.2 04 7.6 2.5- .9 2 1 ..2 ..4 n . I . I . 2 . qA 3 a I. > I. r . A . 1 7 . h . I 1 .0 1 .1 3 N- 'lllYI'lIJ 8-!dLh ...q 2.5 a S 3 S -.3 ..4 7 6 _,I_;9 I ;o Q1 .2 2.0 ?.7 3 5 9 35 1.4 .2 .6 b -.2 1 3 5 7 7 .h .7 .5 1.0 1 1 1-1-1 4@-@ a 0 - 2 -.hs -.5 S 7 -;S--- S 3 4 ' -* .4, . .. 11 - .11 .- . A- .-.111, -.7 I,I .9 b .7 .1 . fi * c 7 2 :7 . I . . n ..> .. -I . I *R'.1 . 7 Cipe Cwiveral ..0 ..2 -.5 1 o I- ' - I !, -1.9 - I. b. . 3 3_ x P n . , -.6 . I * %.-1 .0 - I I I - . 1 1. .3 .2 3 .2 -1- -1-. 0-- 3- --- --:7 S-@- IT 7-- 4---. 1 ..16 2:.2 .1 1 .. I%. T-T I. . . a. -3 1.5 7 .2. 3 ..q 4 C; - 43 Melbourne 2- .2- 2- .4 L ot .9 .2 .2 4 0 Veri Beich 1 .0 II model as a storm surge envelope. The example of this envelope for the hurricane displayed in Figure 5 is provided in Figure 6. In examining the storm surge envelope, several points are worth noting that are characteristic of all the landfalling hurricanes modeled. First, the highest surge value always occurs to the north of the point of landfall, due to the counter-clockwise motion of the storm. In the example used above, the storm L4RS60 landfalls just south of New Smyrna Beach but produces the highest -surge at Daytona Beach. Second, storm surge values increase rapidly to the south of eye landfall and fall off gradually to the north once again. This is the result of the counter-clockwise motion of the storm aided by the "damming effect" of the high winds within the hurricane. Third, as evident from the surge envelope, a hurricane will produce various peak surge values along the coastline. While a 15.1-foot surge can be expected at Daytona Beach for the particular storm mentioned above, the peak surge experienced at Cape Canaveral is less than 1 foot. The different surge values produced by a storm have a particular relevance to this Study. As a storm approaches land, it is necessary for disaster preparedness officials to be able to assess the impacts from a hurricane that may pass close by, but not directly over, their county. In the case of Brevard and Volusia counties, with their long coastlines, it is also necessary to determine what the effect of a storm striking one part of the county will have on the other part. Table 5 provides information on the expected surge levels that may be expected along the coastline for each of the landfalling hurricanes modeled. This table illustrates which storm tracks will create tidal flooding problems for particular sections along the region's coastal areas. As can be noted from Table 5, landfalling hurricanes simulated as approaching at an 800 angle (worst possible) resulted in a peak surge height of 15.5 feet at the worst single point for the worst probable storm event, a Category 5 storm. The more likely flooding, however, results from a Category I or 2 storm, producing a peak surge amplitude of less than 8 feet, A storm surge profile graphically illustrating the peak surge values predicted for each category of storm is provided in Figure 7. When compared to typical tidal flooding heights expected by the Saffir/Simpson Scale, values for storm surges in the region are similar, although they usually fall within the lower end of the Scale. This is particularly true for Brevard County. The lower values are explained by the relatively low shoaling factor along the East Central Florida coast, which ranges from 0.67 in south Brevard County to 0.85 in north Volusia County. The shoaling factor i-s a measurement of the slope of the offshore bathymetry and is a function of the width of the continental shelf. This shelf is relatively narrow along the region's coast when compared to the rest of the coastline along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. The shoaling factor also explains the noticeabl.e rise in storm surge values the further north a hurricane makes landfall. The continental shelf width 24 FIGURE 6 STORM SURGE ENVELOPE FOR HURRICANE DISPLAYED IN FIGURE 5 Nearest approach of storm to basin center is ----------- ill miles, on Thur " 9/2/82, at 12 hours The basin's center is located -------------------------- 0 miles to the left of Vero Beach Initial, closest approach & final pressure drops are --- 60.0 60.0 41 mbs, respectively Initial, closest approach & final storm sizes are ------ 20.0 20.0 25 statute miles, respectively Storm Storm Surge Heights (feet) Is S:q I bQ. 124OLSt b:3 ST AUG TNL, 120OLST 7:q 12noLST 1 20OLST 10:3 120OLST FLGCR BCH 1?'a 120. 12nOLST 120OL67 145 DT04A BCH 12nOLST 5K. fl :?-' N 5VYRNA 3 120OLST 3 1 10OLST 7:9 go. 1000LST Ln 5:0 100OLST a:2 090OLST 0:7 CP CANAVRL ISOOLST 0:6 1500LST :3 40. 160OLST :1 OEL&OURNE A000LS1 0:3 OOOOLSt 0:S OwLST o:3 0000LST -3 o ;ERG BEACH OOOOLST 004OLsT -F-T-PRe-+NL-- OODOLST 0,2 0 :2 200OLST 0:3 160OL3T 0 : 3-40. 1408E SGUNO 160OLSt 0 :5 IbOOLST 8:3 IbOOLST TABLE 5 STORM SURGE HEIGHTS AT SELECTED POINTS Normal Landfalling Hurricanes Sebastian Cape Mosquito New Smyrna Ormond HURRICANE Inlet Melbourne Canaveral Logoon Beach Daytona Beach By The Sea LIRS80 .2 .1 .5 1.3 2.7 4.8 5.5 LlRS60 .2 .2 1.0 2.8 5.1 5.4 5.0 LlRS40 .3 .3 2.2 5.1 5.3 4.8 4.1 LIRS20 .5 .6 4.8 5.0 3.7 2.5 1.8 LILSOO 1.1 2.6 4.5 2.7 1.9 1.4 1.2 LlLS20 3.6 4.7 3.2 1.6 1.2 .9 .9 LlLS40 4.5 3.3 1.5 1.0 .8 .7 .7 L2RS80 .2 .2 .6 1.7 3.5 6.5 7.4 L2RS60 .2 .2 1.2 3.7 6.9 7.3 6.8 L2RS40 .4 .3 3.0 6.9 7.1 5.5 4.6 L2RS20 .6 .8 4.0 6.7 4.9 3.4 2.5 L2LSOO 1.4 3.5 6.1 3.6 2.6 1.9 1.7 L2LS20 4.9 6.3 4.2 2.1 1.6 1.3 1.1 L2LS4O 6.1 4.4 2.6 1.4 1.1 .9 .9 L3RS8O .2 .2 .8 2.5 5.3 9.9 11.3 L3RS60 .3 .3 1.7 5.6 10.6 11.2 10.4 L3RS4O .4 .4 4.4 10.5 10.9 8.4 5.9 L3RS2O .9 1.0 9.9 10.4 6.3 4.4 3.8 L3LSOO 2.1 5.3 9.4 6.9 4.6 3.3 2.5 L3LS2O 7.5 9.6 5.1 3.3 2.5 1.9 1.7 LKS40 9.3 6.8 3.1 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.3 L4RS80 .3 .2 .9 3.2 7.0 13.3 15.2 L4RS60 .3 .3 2.2 7*'4 14.2 15.1 14.0 L4RS4O .5 .5 5.9 14.2 14.7 11.4 8.0 L4RS2O 1.0 1.4 8.2 13.9 10.2 7.0 5.0 L4LSOO 2.7 7.2 12.6 9.3 6.2 4.5 3.4 L4LS20 10.1 13.0 8.7 5.3 3.8 2.9 2.3 L4LS40 12.5 9.1 5.3. 3.4 2.6 2.1 1.8 L5RS80 .3 .5 .5 1.3 4.9 15.5 15.5 L5RS60 .3 .3 .5 3.1 15.0 14.5 10.4 L5RS40 .4 .5 1.7 15.1 13.1 7.9 4.9 L5RS20 .7 1.0 14.4 11.8 6.7 4.3 2.9 L5LSOO 1.5 8.5 13.1 5.7 3.5 2.4 1.7 L5LS20 11.6 13.6 8.1 2.9 1.9 1.4 1.2 L5LS4O 13.0 7.8 4.3 1.7 1.3 1.1 .9 FIGURE 7 SURGE PROFILE LANDFALLING HURRICANES E-C 0 U S.- to 4-W Ln C" ClQ en 0 Cl Flagler Cm Beach- Ormond- BY-The-Sea'- Daytona Beach- New Smyrna- Beach[- co Mosquito Lagoon- Kennedy Space Center- Cape Canaveral- Melbourne- Sebastian Inlet- Vero Beach- Ln Ln 'n (Feet ACove M.S.L.) 27 increases toward the north and is responsible for increasing the storm surge height almost 3 feet for a Category 4 hurricane. The effect of the shoaling factor is also evident in the values produced by storms landfalling near Cape Canaveral. The extension of the Cape into open water decreases the availability of shelf space, resulting in deeper water and less of a slope. This tends to decrease the surge amplitude in the Cape's vicinity. As discussed earlier, a small storm size (12 statute miles radius of maximum winds instead of 20 statute miles) was selected for the simulation of all Category 5 hurricanes. As shown on Figure 7, the step increase in surge heights from a Category 1, 2, 3, and 4 storm did not take place with a Category 5 storm. This resulted in a Category 5 storm producing a surge less than one foot higher than a comparable Category 4 storm. The divergence from the expected step increase is due to the existence of a critical storm size, for a given storm speed, that generates an upper maximum surge. The size is generally thought to be a radius of maximum winds of 30 miles. With all other storm parameters remaining constant, any storm size greater or less than this results in a decreased surge value. This explains why--when the storm speed is held constant--the surge values for a Category 4 storm with a radius of maximum winds of 20 statute miles were similar to the surge heights of a Category 5 storm having a radius of maximum winds of 12 statute miles. Pre-Landfall Hazard Times In general, the build-up of the storm surge heights along the East Central Florida coastline occurs gradually, followed by a rapid increase immediately preceding eye landfall. Peak surge heights are reached approximately at the time of landfall and then decrease rapidly. Categories 1-5 hurricanes analyzed by the SPLASH II model showed the arrival of significant surge heights to occur as follows: Hours before Landfall Category 1 1-2 hours Category 2 2-3 hours Category 3 3-4 hours Category 4 4-5 hours Category 5 3-4 hours These times were based on the rise of the ocean surface to 4 feet above MSL. It is assumed, due to the elevation of the coastline, that no significant flooding would occur prior to the increase in these heights. The other major output for the SPLASH 11 model consists of time histories of wind speed for selected points along the coast. As with the time histories of surges, the output affords a quantitative means of assessing pre-eye landfall hazard times. Figure 8 graphically illustrates the 28 'w ful c a j, FIGURE 8 SPACE-TIME PLOT 'o c. OF COASTAL WIND SPEED ft c a It- -4; v-11, "V Ar LA ko a @x 4 ul A u, oir Category 4 Normal Landfalling 4 ke W, lo- J" ci: T 1: L; 1; cl ck %r tr Ni ul tr r: cr 1: 1 r* w C a z 'n 4, "v In cl, :r o of, ,w- LA 1w -c Q 'D UP Lr w v 4 Ir -c elf kr6l c4ra- t ,A ln 'a z@'a al 4 'A, -j w w cl! 4 V% fr a a ls@ 0 o in A Ln ru. o w'@ W'iZ . .. ?. :11 A a N - a @ .1 w a v ,, 'd, in a a ;v n a W wi ON fu fu tu fu rl@ IV a :dO ew .01 um c a cr a a i* a f4 .. . . . . . .. . . . @rl ;@ -, & 'r 11 A Ir 17 L ft 4lo a I ej o cr -o 4p w %r rv w 4r A f% ml .'%! w w lu ca w ca 41 1.2 29 relation of hurricane force winds and gale force winds to the hurricane eye. The analysis of the SPLASH II histories for landfalling hurricanes revealed that sustained gale force winds could be expected to arrive at certain points along the coast up to 11.5 hours before eye landfall. This is well in advance of expected surge heights. For all storms modeled, the average arrival time for gale force winds was 8 to 10 hours prior to landfall. A Category 4 hurricane, because of its size, produces the earliest arrival of these winds. A full description of the pre-eye landfall wind times for each category of storm is provided in Table 6. Exiting Hurricanes Storm Surge Like landfalling hurricanes, exiting storms generate surge profiles that grow with time. However, as the storm is initially passing over land, there is only limited time to form the storm surge in the vicinity of the coast and, consequently, there is a lower potential to develop significant surges at the coast. The storm profile developed for exiting storms is provided in Figure 9. In referring to the profile it can be noted that the peak surges are substantially less than those produced by a landfalling storm. The maximum surge height generated by a Category 3 exiting storm is only 5.8 feet. Storms for categories 4 and 5 were not modeled, based on the assumption that storms of this magnitude striking the west coast of Florida would be of reduced intensity when reaching the east coast. Pre-Landfall Hazard Time With the smaller storm surge values associated with exiting storms, it is expected that the arrival of significant storm surge heights would occur almost simultaneously with the arrival of the storm center. The time histories of surge heights provided by the SPLASH II model seem to bear this out. These times are shown as follows: Hours Before Arrival of Storm Center Category 1 0 Category 2 0 Category 3 1-1.5 The analysis of the time histories of wind speeds for exiting storms revealed that the arrival of sustained gale force winds for exiting storms is similar to that of landfalling hurricanes. One importance difference, howeverD is that a Category 3 exiting storm produces gale force winds at the same time as a Category 4 landfalling storm--approximately 11.5 hours 30 TAB LE 6 HURRICANE HAZARDS FOR MODELED STORMS Page I of 2 DESCRIPTION MAXIMUM GALE FOR;E WINDS HURRICANE FORqE WINDS OF HURRICANE SURGE HEIGHT Extent lArrival Time* Extent Arrival Time* NORClRS080 5.4 120 miles 6 40 miles 2.5 NORCIRS060 5.4 140 miles 6 40 miles 2.5 NORCIRS040 5.3 120 miles 6 60 mil:s 2.5 NORCIRS020 5.0 120 mil:s 6.5 40 mil s 3 NORClLSOOO 4.5 120 mil s 7 40 miles 2.5 NORClLS020 4.7 120 miles 6 40 miles 2.5 NORCILS040 4.5 140 miles 6.5 40 miles 2.6 NORClLS060 4.2 140 mil:s 6 --- --- NORClLS080 3.6 160 mil s 6 --- --- NORMS080 7.3 120 miles 7.5 60 miles 3 NORC2RS060 7.3 140 miles 7.5 60 miles 3 NORC2RS040 7.1 160 miles 7.5 60 mil:s 3.5 NORC2RS020 6,7 160 miles 8 - 60 mil s 3.5 NORC2LSOOO 6.0 160 miles 8 60 miles 3.5 NORMS020 6.3 160 miles 7.5 60 miles 3.5 NORC2LS040 6.1 160 miles 7.5 80 miles 3.5 NORMS060 5.6 160 miles 7.5 --- NORC2LS080 4.8 160 miles 7.5 --- --- N0RC2LSl0O 3.6 160 miles 7.5 --- --- NORC3RS080 11.2 160 miles 9.5 100 miles 4.5 NORC3RS060 11.2 160 miles 9.5 100 miles 4.5 NORC3RS040 10.9 180 miles 9.5 140 miles 4.5 NORC3RS020 10.4 200 miles 10 100 miles 5 NORC3LSOOO 9.2 200 miles 10 100 miles NORC3LS020 9.6 200 nd I es 9.5 100 miles 4.5 NORC3LS040 9.4 200 miles 9.5 100 miles '4.5 NOROLS060 8.6 220 miles 9.5 100 miles 4.5 NORC3LS080 7.4 240 miles 9.5 NOROLS100 5.5 220 miles 9.5 --- NORMS080 15.1 180 miles 11 120 miles 5.5 NORMS060 15.0 180 miles 11 120 miles 5.5 NORC4RS040 14.7 200 m 11 140 miles 5.5 NORC4RS020 13.9 220 miles 11.5 120 miles 6 NORC4LSOOO 12.4 240 miles 11.5 120 miles 6 NORC4LS020 12.9 240 miles 11 120 miles 5.5 NORC4LS040 12.6 240 miles 11 120 mil:s 5.5 NORC4LS060 11.5 260 miles 11 120 mil s 5.5 NORC4LS080 10.0 240 miles 11 120 miles 5.5 NORC4LS100 7.2 240 miles 11.5 --- --- NORC5RS080 14.3 140 miles 8.5 100 mil:s 4 NORC5RS060 15.0 160 miles 8.5 80 mil s 4 NORC5RS040 15.1 180 miles 8.5 100 miles 4 NORC5RS020 13.8 180 miles 8.5 80 miles 4.5 NORC5LS00O 13.1 180 miles 9 100 Mil s 4.5 NORCKS020 13.6 180 miles 8.5 80 mil:s 4 NORMS040 13.0 180 miles 8.5 80 miles 4.5 NORCKS060 12.4 200 miles 8 100 miles 4 NORCKS080 9.1 200 miles 8 --- NORC5LSIOO 6.9 200 miles 8.5 CRSClRS080 2.7 140 miles 6.5 40 miles 2.5 CRSCIRS060 2.6 140 mil:ss 7 40 miles 2.5 CRSCIRS040 2.6 140 mil 7.5 40 miles 3.5 CRSClRS020 2.4 140 miles 7.S 40 miles 3.6 CRSClLSOOO 2.4 140 miles 6.5 60 miles 2.5 CRSCILS020 2.4 140 mil:s 6.5 40 miles 2.5 CRSC)LS040 2.2 160 mil s 7 --- CRSClLS060 2.1 160 miles 7.5 --- *number of hours before eye landfall 31 TABLE 6 (cont.) Page 2 of 2 DESCRIPTION MAXIMUM 1ALE FORCE WINDS HURRICANE FORCE WINDS OF HURRICANE SURGE HEIGHT Extent jArrival Time* Extent Arrival Time CRSC2RS080 3.7 160 miles 7.5 60 miles 3.5 CRSC2RS06O 3.7 180 miles 8.5 60 miles 3.5 CRSC2RS04O 3.6 160 miles 9 80 mil s 4.5 CRSC2RSO2O 3.4 160 miles 8.5 80 mil:s 4.5 CRSC2LSOOO 3.3 160 miles 8 60 miles 3.5 CRSC2LSO2O 3.3 160 miles 8 60 mil:s 3.5 CRSC2LS04O 3.1 200 miles 8.5 60 mil s 3.5 CRSC2LSO6O 2.9 200 miles 9.5 ... --- CRSC2LSO8O 2.7 200 miles 11 --- CRSC3RS08O 6.0 180 miles 10 100 miles 4.5 CRSC3RS06O 5.9 200 miles 10.5 100 miles 5 CRSC3RSO4O 5.8 220 miles 11 100 miles 5.5 CRSC3RSO2O 5.4 240 miles 10.5 100 miles 5.5 CRSC3LSOOO 5.3 220 miles 10 100 miles 5 CRSC3LSO2O 5.2 240 miles 10 100 miles 5 CRSC3LSO4O 4.9 240 miles 11.5 100 miles 5 CRSC3LSO6O 4.6 240 miles 13 100 miles 5 CRSC3LSO8O 4.2 220 mi I es 14 --- --- CRSC3LS1OO 3.1 200 miles 14 --- Max. Wind Speed PARCIRS060 1.2 / 49 mph 60 miles 1 PARCIRS040 2.0 / 65 mph 100 miles 3 --- --- PARClRS020 3.1 / 79 mph 120 miles 4.5 --- ... PARClLSOOO 3.0 / 85 mph 140 miles 5.5 20 miles 2 PARCILS020 2.4 / 85 mph 140 miles 5.5 2 PARC2RSO60 1.5 / 59 mph 100 miles 2.5 --- PARC2RSO40 2.8 / 77 mph 120 miles 4 --- --- PARC2RSO20 4.2 / 92 mph 140 miles 5.5 40 miles 1 PARC2LSOOO 4.3 / 98 mph 160 miles 6 80 miles 2 PARC2LSO2O 3.3 / 98 mph 160 miles 7 80 miles 3 PARC3RSO6O 2.5 / 74 mph 160 miles 5 PARC3RSO40 4.4 / 97 mph 120 miles 6 60 miles 1*5 PARC3RS020 6.7 / 108 mph 200 miles 7.5 80 miles 2.5 PARC3LSOOO 6.9 / 120 mph 220 miles 8 100 miles 3.5 PARC3LSO2O 5.1 / 120 mph 220 miles 9 100 miles 4 PARC4RSO40 6.0 / 115 mph 200 miles 8 80 miles 2 PARC4RSO60 3.4 / 87 mph 200 miles 7 40 miles with storm I penter arrival PARC5RS060 1.9 / 73 mph 120 miles 4 --- --- *number of hours before eye landfall 32 FIGURE 9 SURGE PROFILE CROSSING/EXITING HURRICANES 0 U S_ 4- ca 0 &_ 1-a 1-j pz mi ai CD FlagTer- Beach Ormond- BY-The-Sea Q CD Daytona Beach New Smyrna Beach' co Mosquito Lagoon- Kennedy C) Space Center- Cape Canaveral- Melbourne- C) Sebastian r4 Inlet- Vero Beach- L (Feet Above M.L.S) 33 prior to the arrival of'the storm's eye. This step increase in the times also holds true for Category I and 2 exiting storms. The arrival of gale force winds will occur at approximately the same time as Category 2 and 3 landfalling storms. This may be explained by the decrease in the storms' intensity as they cross land. It is assumed that a Category 3 exiting storm began as a Category 4 storm on the west coast. While the intensity of the hurricane was reduced by crossing land, the size of the storm--or, more specifically, the maximum extent of its winds--was not reduced. it would appear reasonable, then, that gale force winds sho(O-darrive earlier than would be normally expected for a Category 3 storm. The times of arrival for gale force winds are shown in the table below: Hours Before Arrival of Storm Center Category 1 6-7.5 Category 2 5-9 Category 3 7-11 Additional information on the winds produced by exiting storms is provided in Table 6. Paralleling Hurricanes Storm Surge A paralleling storm generates a smaller surge in comparison to a landfalling storm. However, because the storm moves along shore, hundreds of miles of coastline may be affected. Figure 10 presents a surge profile for a paralleling storm moving north, 20 miles inland. As can be noted, the peak surge values produced along the coast are similar to those of the exiting storms modeled by SPLASH II. A noticeable difference in the surge heights around the Cape Canaveral area occurs, which decreases for each category of storm. As mentioned previously, this is due to the decrease in the continental shelf width off the Cape. For a paralleling storm moving along the coast, as shown in Figure 11, the surge heights increase slightly but still remain well below those experienced by a landfalling storm. Once again, the Cape mitigates the surge produced in its vicinity. As paralleling storms move off the coast, the surge heights decrease. These are shown in figures 12 through 14, which illustrate expected peak surge heights for hurricanes 20, 40, and 60 miles offshore. The SPLASH II model computations are only valid along the open coast. That is, the model is not able to predict what storm surge heights may be expected within the tidal rivers or basins for the various storms modeled. It is important that this limitation be noted, for a major storm 34 FIGURE 10 SURGE PROFILE PARALLELING HURRICANE: 20 MILES INLAND E 0 u 4- Q) C93 (V 0 4.M CJ C-i Fla A 01 gler. C4 Beach Ormond - By-The-Sea-1, Daytona Beach New Smyrna Beach" Cp Go Mosquito Lagoon- Kennedy_ Space Center Cape Canaveral- Melbourne- 01 Sebastian Inlet- Vero Beach, C1 Ln 1 Ln r (.Fee-t4 Above M.S.C.) 35 FIGURE 11 SURGE PROFILE PARALLELING HURRICANE: ON COASTLINE 4- a) a)0 fj Cj Flagler C) C4 Beach- Ormond- BY-The-Sea- Daytona Beach- New Smyrna Beach 00 Mosquito Lagoon- Kennedy Space Center- Cape Canaveral- Melbourne.- Sebastian Inlet - Vero Beach, Ln Ln _T_T__T__T_ (.Ft. Zbove M.S.L.) 36 FIGURE 12 SURGE PROFILE PARALLELING HURRICANE.: 20 MILES OFFSHORE 010 Flagler Beach- Ormond-_ By-The-Sea CD Daytona Beach New Smyrna Beach- co Mosquito Lagoon- Kennedy Space Center- Cape Canaveral- Melbourne- Sebastian C4 Inlet- Vero Beach- r (Feet Above M.S.L.) .37 FIGURE 13 SURGE PROFILE PARALLELING HURRICANE: 40 MILES OFFSHORE M Flagler CD Beach- Ormond- By-The-Sea- Daytona Beach,- New Smyrna Beach-- co Mosquito Lagoon- Kennedy C) Space Center- Cape Canaveral- 0 Melbourne- Sebastian Inlet- Vero Beach,- Ln Ln CD (FeeCAbove M.S.L.) 38 FIGURE 14 SURGE PROFILE PARALLELING HURRICANE: 60 MILES OFFSHORE Flagler Beach- Ormond- By-The-Seal- Daytona Beach- New Smyrna Beach[- co .Mosquito Lagoon- Kennedy Space Center- Cape Canaveral- 0 Melbourne- Sebastian Inlet- Vero Beach.- C3 LA r4 (Feet Above M.S.L.) .39 paralleling the coastline may produce surge heights in excess of those computed along the coast. The increased surge heights within the tidal rivers are the results of winds produced from predominantly one direction for an extended period of time. A storm paralleling the Florida coastline produces northwesterly winds over the rivers for its entire track, causing the waters to be pushed along with it. This is known as a "tilted sea" and can occur in any closed or partially closed basin. This effect may be most notable in the northern reaches of the Indian and Banana rivers. Pre-Landfall Hazard Times For any given paralleling track, the arrival of the storm-generated surge will occurV on the average, approximately 2.0 hours before arrival of the storm center. This figure varies, depending on the category of storm considered but, on the average, is similar to the time histories of other stormns. The table below summarizes the expected arrival time of significant surge heights by category: Hours Before Arrival of Storm Center Category 1 .0.5 Category 2 1.0-1.5 Category 3 2.0-2.5 Category 4 2.5-3.0 Category 5 2.5-3.0 The time histories of arrival of gale force winds are provided in Table 6 and, as with other movements, arrive well in advance of the storm surge. 40 VULNERABILITY ELEMENT INTRODUCTION In the previous section, the hurricane hazards that may adversely impact the coastal areas of East Central Florida were identified and analyzed. This section will identify the areas of the region subject to the effects of those hazards. Included as part of this section are: methodology used in the identification of vulnerable areas; delineation of evacuation zones; identification of vulnerable geographic areas; and an estimation of the population-at-risk. METHODOLOGY The identification of the areas of the region vulnerable to a hurricane's storm surge is the most important criterion for determining those residents who must evacuate from various hypothetical hurricanes. As stated previously, the results from the SPLASH Il model provided the primary data by which these areas could be identified. This model produced peak surge values that could then be compared to the elevations of the land mass. As the SPLASH 11 model only produced such values along the open coast, a major limitation confronted in the use of the model was the lack of surge ffheight data for inland areas. This resulted in not having a clear indication of those inland areas to be flooded and also an absence of information on the effects of each hypothetical hurricane on the region's inlets and saltwater tide basins. To correct this deficiency, a number of other sources were utilized in the vulnerability analysis. These included: o National Ocean Survey Storm Evacuation maps o Federal Emergency Management Administration Flood Insurance rate maps o U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Flood Plain Information (Volusia Co.) o Past histories of storm surge inundations for Brevard and Volusia counties The application of the storm surge values to inland areas was completed with the assistance of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The engineering judgment provided by the Corps engineers allowed for a reasonable prediction of the potential flooding that may be expected to occur for each category of storm. Due to the limitations of the SPLASH II model in regard to inland flooding, identification of a threshold level which would require residents to evacuate was not appropriate. While the importance of not requiring residents in structurally sound homes experiencing only minimal amounts of flooding to evacuate is recognized, an accurate determination of these areas was not possible through the model. However, due to the small area in each county that would be required to evacuate and the short distance 41 required to travel to safety, the impact of persons on the outer edges of vulnerable areas not needing to evacuate is expected to be minimal. LEVELS OF VULNERABILITY Prior to the delineation of threatened areas, two major changes were made with regard to the identified levels of vulnerability in the study area. First, the five Saffir-Simpson categories of storms used during the modeling phase of the study were collapsed into two ranges for both Brevard and Volusia counties. This was done recognizing the similarities of storm surge heights for different intensities of storms and realizing the manner in which storms may change intensity over time. For both Brevard and Volusia counties, storms were grouped into Category 1-2 or Category 3-5. The second change to the vulnerability levels involved development of a level of threat concept for the study area. In reviewing the storm surge heights expected along the coastline for a particular storm, it is apparent that a storm event does not represent the same level of threat to every area on the coast. For instance, a category 3-5 storm landfalling at Melbourne may produce a 13.0-foot surge in that area, while producing only a 3.0-foot surge in Daytona Beach. To accommodate the range of surge heights that may be experienced by different areas from the same storm, it was necessary to use a standard measure based upon the height of the storm surge rather than category of storm. The correlation of category of hurricane to level of threat is shown below. This measure of hurricane threat is applied throughout the following chapters of the technical data report. TABLE 7 Category of Hurricane/Level of Threat Conversion Table Saffir-Simpson Category Storm Surge Level of Threat 1-2 3-8 ft. above MSL A 3-5 9-15+ ft. above MSL B 42 EVACUATION ZONES Development of evacuation zones is an essential element of the Hurricane Evacuation Study. By grouping areas of a county into zones, a particular area will be able to be identified as receiving a common level of storm surge and as using the same major evacuation route. Delineating zones will also allow residents to identify the zone in which they live, thereby assisting in the effort to inform residents of their immediate vulnerability to a storm and elicit the appropriate response. The delineation of evacuation zones was based on the Urbanized Area Transportation Study Traffic Analysis Zones (TAZ's) which have been established throughout the two-county study area. The extent of the area to be evacuated for each storm situation and the boundaries of each evacuation zone were determined by clustering TAZ's which would receive a common level of flooding. In combining TAZ's, consideration was also given to population densities and locations in relation to major east-west arterials. Table 8 presents a listing of evacuation zones for Brevard and Volusia counties and their corresponding urban area traffic analysis zones. Although efforts were made to include entire TAZ's into an evacuation zone, this was not always possible due to major differences between the simulated flood limits and zonal boundaries. A traffic analysis zone may therefore be listed beside more than one evacuation zone number, indicating a split TAZ. In addition, for Volusia County, TAZ's were only available for the coastal area. Therefore, in delineating evacuation zones for the inland portion of that county, census tract boundaries were used. Table 9 provides a description of the geographic limits of each evacuation zone for the two counties. These limits generally follow widely recognizable streets, highways, or unique geographic features. The vulnerability analysis resulted in the delineation of the study area into 19 zones in Brevard County and 43 zones in Volusia County which would require total evacuation under certain scenarios. Within the remaining evacuation zones, all mobile home residents would be required to evacuate for any type or intensity of storm approaching the coast. The evacuation zones are graphically depicted in the series of maps which follow. The maps also identify the predicted extent of evacuation for each level of threat based on the surge vulnerability analysis. The extent of evacuation required from a hurricane creating Level-of-Threat A is covered by a common color on each of the maps. Level-of-Threat B cumulatively includes the lesser-intensity colored areas indicated by the map legend. 43 TABLE 8 Evacuation Zones - Traffic Analysis Zones Equivalency Chart Brevard 'County Evacuation Zone Urban Area Traffic Analysis Zone BI 311, 312, 313, 314, 315. 323. 336 82 324, 325. 326, j38, 340, 341. 342, 343 B3 088, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173. 174, 175, 176. 177, 178. 179. 180, 181, 210, 220. 223 B4 166, 167 85 160, 161, 162, 163, 168, 169, 170. 183. B6 085, 159 B7 230, 235. 236, 237, 296, 298, 299, 318, 319, 322, 328 335 B8 253, 254, 297, 316, 320, 321 B9 222, 252, 310, 328, 327, 329, 330, 331, 334 BIO 199, 200 B11 001, 002, 003, 004, 005, 010, 011, 012, 013, 014, 015, 017, 018, 019, 021. 022, 023, 024, 026, 027, 028, 029, 031, 032, 033, 034, 035, 036, 037, 038, 039, 040. 041, 042, 043, 044, 045, 046, 047, 048, 049 B12 001', 003, 004, 011, 014 B13 001, 003, 004, 011, 061 B14 031. 032, 033, 034. 035 B15 050, 051, 232, 233, 234, 238, 239, 240, 332 B16 051, 232, 234, 238 817 224, 225, 244, 245. 246, 247. 248, 249, 251, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 265, 266, 267, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289. 290. 291, 292, 293, 294, 295 B18 224, 244, 263, 280, 282, 283, 284, 291, 292, 295 819 097, 098, 099, 100, 102, 102, 108, 218 B20 098, 099, 108 821 101, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113. 114, 115, 116. 117, 118, 119. 120, 121, 124, 130, 204, 207 B22 109, 110, 111, 112, 130 44 TABLE 8 (cont.) B23 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 131, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 182, 194 B24 131, 132, 138, 147, 152, 153, 155 B25 156, 157, 158 B26 156, 157, 158 B27 006, 007, 008, 053, 054, 068, 081, 903, 1009 B28 096, 226, 227, 228, 229, 250, 264 829 086, 089, 091, 092, 093, 094, 095, 185, 197, 198, 310, 902 45 TABLE 8 (cont.) Evacuati,on Zones - Traffic Analysis Zones Equivalency Chart Volusia County Evacuation Zone Urban Area Traffic Analysis Zone VI 001, 002, 003, 004, 006, 007. 008, 011, 012, 013, 015 V2 001, 002, 003, 004, 005. 007, 009, 010. 012, 013, 014 V3 001, 002, 003, 004, 005, 007. 009, 010. 012, 013, 014 V4 016, 020, 021. 028, 033 V5 017, 018, 019, 020, 023, 024, 026, 027, 029, 032 V6 017, 018, 019, 025, 027. 030, 031 V7 035, 041, 043 V8 034, 036, 039, 040, 042, 043 V9 037, 038. 044 V10 U45, 049, 05U, 054, 055 Vil 046. 048, 051, 053, 055 V12 047, 048. 051, 052, 055 V13 057. 060. 061, 062, 063 V14 057, 060, 061, 062. 063 VIS 056, 058. 059, 061, 062. 063 V16 087, 088, 089, 107, 110 V17 082, 083, 087. 088, 089. 090. 092, 107, 108 V18 111, 113, 114, 116, 117, 120, 138, 139 V19 117, 120, 137 V20 161, 162, 163. 164. 165, 166, 167 V21 137, 160, 170 V22 185 V23 168, 169, 185, 186, 187, 188, 190, 191, 203 V24 185, 188. 189, 192, 201, 202 V25 204, 209, 210 V26 204, 209, 210, 212 V27 214, 216 V28 078, 079, 080, 082, 083, 084, 085, 086, 091, 092, 093, 094, 095, 096, 097 V29 087, 088, 089, 107, 108, 109, 110 46 TABLE 8 (cont.) V30 098, 099, 100, 101, 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 111, 112 113 114, 115. 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123: 124: 125, 126. 127. 128, 129, 130. 131, 132, 133. 134 135, 136, 137, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146. 147: 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157. 158, 159, 160, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 189, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 199, 200, 283 V31 197, 205, 206, 207, 208, 211. 212, 213, 215, 216, 217 V32 064, 066, 067 V33 064, 065, 068, 069 V34 064, 065, 069, 225 V35 070, 071, 074, 075 V36 071, 074, 075 V37 072. 073, 075 V38 076, 077, 286, 289 V39 218. 219, 222, 223 V40 220 V41 221 V42 223, 224, 229, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 284 V43 226, 227, 245, 246, 251, 285 V44 226, 227, 245, 246, 251, 285 V45 252, 258, 288, 2B9 V46 252, 258, 288, 289 V47 228, 229, 230 V48 238 V49 226 227 236, 237, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243. 244, 247, 248: 249: 250, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 259, 285, 287 Evacuation Zone Census Tract V50 832 V51 901 V52 902, 907 V53 903 V54 904, 905, 906 V55 908 - V56 910 V57 909 47 TABLE 9 EVACUATION ZONE BOUNDARIES Brevard County_ Evacuation Zone Zone Description 81 From Port Canaveral southward to SR 520. B2 From SR 520 southward to northern limits of Patrick AFB. B3 From northern limits of Patrick AFB to Yacht Club Blvd. B4 From Yacht Club Blvd. southward to Pinetree Dr. B5 From Pinetree Dr. to unincorporated Floridana Beach. 86 From southern limits of unincorporated Floridana Beach southward to Sebastian Inlet. 87 From southern limits of Kennedy Space Center to SR 520; East of Indian River and west of Banana River, excluding that portion contained in Evacuation Zone B8. B8 From SR 524 southward to SR 520; East of SR 3 and west of Sykes Creek. 89 From SR 520 southward to Leslie Dr. B10 From Leslie Dr. southward to tip of Merritt Island. B12 From northern limits of Brevard County southward to US 1; East of Barcelona Dr. and west of SCL railroad. 813 From northern limits of Brevard County southwaH to SR 402; East of SCL railroad. B14 From SR 402 southward to NASA Cswy.; East of US 1. 816 From NASA Cswy. southward to SR 528; East of US 1. B18 From SR 528 southward to Wickham Rd.; East of US 1. B20 From Wickham Rd. southward to Parkway Dr.; East of US 1. B22 From Parkway Dr. to intersection of NASA Blvd. and US I (those areas east of US 1). B24 From intersection of NASA Blvd. and US 1 southward to southern limits of Malabar. B26 From southern limits of Malabar to southern boundary of Brevard Couhty. 48 TABLE 9 (cont.) EVACUATION ZONE BOUNDARIES Volusia County Evacuation Zone Zone Description North Coastal Area V1 From the northern limits of Volusia County southward to Bosarvey Dr.; East of Ocean Shore Blvd. (AIA) V2 From the northern limits of Volusia County southward to Bosarvey Or.; East of John Anderson Hwy. and west of Ocean Shore Blvdi (AlA) V3 From the northern limits of Volusla County southward to Willis Ln.; West of John Anderson Hwy. V4 From Bosarvey Dr. southward to Oak Ridge Blvd.; East of AIA. V5 From Bosarvey Dr. southward to Seabreeze Blvd.; East of Peninsula Dr. and west of AM V6 From Willis Ln. southward to Seabreeze Blvd.; East of Halifax River and west of Peninsula Dr. V7 From Seabreeze Blvd. southward to Silver Beach Ave.; East of Halifax River and west of Halifax Ave. (or Peninsula Dr. at southern one-third of zone) V8 From Seabreeze Blvd. southward to Silver Beach Ave.; East of Halifax (or Peninsula Dr.) and west of Atlantic Ave. (AIA) V9 From Oak Ridge Blvd. southward to Silver Beach Ave.; East of AIA. V10 From Silver Beach Ave. southward to Lantana St.; East of AIA. Vil From Silver Beach Ave. southward to Lantana St.; East of Peninsula Dr. and west of AIA. V12 From Silver Beach Ave. southward to Lantana St.; East of Halifax River and west of Peninsula Dr. V13 From Lantana St. southward to Ponce De Leon Inlet; East of Halifax River and west of Peninsula Dr. V14 From Lantana St. southward to Ponce De Leon Inlet; East of Peninsula Dr. and west of AM V15 From Lantana St. southward to Ponce De Leon Inlet; East of AM V16 From Tomoka State Park northern boundary southward to Division Ave.; East of N. Beach St. V17 From Old Dixie Hwy. southward to SR 40; East of US I and SR 5A; West of the Tomoka River tributary. V18 From Division Ave. southward to Fairview Ave.; East of S. Beach St. or Riverside Dr. V19 From Ilth St. southward to Fairview Ave.; East of Daytona Ave. and west of Riverside Dr. V20 From Fairview Ave. southward to Orange Ave.; East of Daytona Ave. or Palmetto Ave. V21 From Fairview Ave. southward to San Juan Ave.; East of Ridgewood Ave. and west of Daytona Ave. or Palmetto Ave. V22 From San Juan Ave. southward to Loomis Ave.; East of Ridgewood Ave. and west of Palmetto Ave. 49 TABLE 9 (cont.) V23 From Orange Ave. southward to Canal Rd.; East of Palmetto Ave. or, Ridgewood Ave. V24 From Loomis Ave. southward to Canal Rd.; East of Ridgewood Ave. or FEC RR line and west of Palmetto Ave. or Ridgewood Ave. V25 From Canal Rd. southward to Fleming Ave.; East of FEC RR line and west of Lafayette Ave. V26 From Canal Rd. southward to Commonwealth Blvd.; East of Lafayette Ave. V27 From Commonwealth Blvd. southward to Turnbull Bay; East of US 1. South Coastal Area V32 From Ponce De Leon Inlet southward to 5th Ave.; East of N. Atlantic Ave V33 From Surf St. southward to E. 3rd Ave.; East of Peninsula Ave. and west of N. Atlantic Ave. V34 From Ocean Dr. southward to E. 3rd Ave.; East of Riverside Dr. and*west of Peninsula Ave. V35 From E. 3rd Ave. southward to Hillside Dr.; East of Indian River and west of Saxon Dr. V36 From E. 3rd Ave. southward to Hillside Dr.; East of Saxon Dr. and west of S. Atlantic Ave. (AlA) V37 From 5th Ave. southward to Hillside Dr.; East of S. Atlantic Ave. (A1A) V38 From Hillside Dr. southward to Canaveral Nat). Seashore. V39 From Spruce Creek/Strickland Bay southward to Columbia St.; East of Robinson St. and west of Indian River. excluding Evacuation Zones 40, 41, and 42. V40 From Turnbull St. southward to South St.; East of Turnbull Creek and west of US 1. V41 New Smyrna Beach Municipal Airport. V42 From FEC RR and Columbia St. southward to Canal St.; East of Glencoe Rd. and west of US 1 and Faulkner St. V43 From Canal St. southward to Indian River Blvd.; East of Live Oak St. and US I and west of Magnolia Ave. and Riverside Dr. V44 From Canal St. southward to Indian River Blvd.; East of Magnolia Ave. and Riverside Dr. V45 From Indian River Blvd. southward to junction of US I and AIA; East of US 1 and west of Riverside Dr. V46 From Indian River Blvd. southward to southern limits of Volusia County; East of Riverside Dr. and AlA. 50 POPULATION-AT-RISK In order to calculate the times required to evacuate those areas identified as vulnerable, as well as determine resources needed in an evacuation, an estimation of the threatened population must be made. It is also necessary to enumerate all mobile home residents throughout the study area, even in areas not vulnerable to storm surge, because they must evacuate from hurricane force winds. Dwelling unit and population counts by traffic analysis zone, where applicable, were obtained from the county planning departments in the study area. As evacuation zones were generally composed of clusters of TAZ's, the appropriate TAZ counts were added, to result in the total population and dwelling units for each evacuation zone. Where TAZ's were split, census block data were used to arrive at the appropriate count. The population residing in each evacuation zone is presented in tables 10 and 11. It should be noted that the population figures presented in these tables exclude two major groupings. First, the tourist populations residing in hotels/motels or condominiums were excluded from the count under the assumption that they would elect to leave the area well in advance of an evacuation. They would therefore not place a demand on the transportation system or public shelter facilities in the immediate area. Secondly, military personnel at Patrick Air Force Base were also excluded, due to their planned advance evacuation of the area. 51 TABLE 10 Population & Vehicle Productions By Evacuation Zone & Destination Brevard County Population Vehicles Zone Cat. 1 2 3A 3B 4 1 2 3A_ 3B - 4 BI 11*"12 8,684 1,963 1,945 1,737 3,039 4,559 1,031 1,021 912 1,595 B2 1-2 10,006 2,261 2,421 2,001 3,502 5,253 1,187 1,177 1,051 1,838 B3 1-2 22,099 4,994 4,950 4,420 7,735 11,602 2,621 2,599 2,321 4,061 B4 1-2 13,136 2,969 2,942 2,627 4,598 6,896 1,559 1,545 1,379 2,413 B5 1-2 6,985 1,579 1,565 1,397 2,445 3,667 829 822 733 1,283 B6 1-2 690 156 155 138 242 363 82 81 72 128 B7 1-2 15,407 3,482 3,452 3,081 5,392 8,089 1,828 1,812 1,618 2,831 B8 3-5 7,250 1,639 1,624 1,450 2,537 3,806 860 853 761 1,332 B9 1-2 11,104 2,509 2,487 2,221 3,886 5,830 1,317 1,306 1,166 2,041 B10 1-2 1,107 250 249 221 387 581 131 131 116 203 Bll WIND 2,082 470 466 416 729 1.093 247 245 218 383 B12 3-5 59 13 13 12 21 31 7 7 6 11 B13 1-2 162 37 36 32 57 85 19 19 17 30 B14 1-2 1,483 335 332 297 519 779 176 174 156 272 B15 WIND 1,609 364 360 322 563 845 191 189 169 296 B16 1-2 964 218 216 193 @337 506 114 114 101 177 B17 WIND 1,852 419 415 370 648 972 220 218 194 340 B18 1-2 4,813 1,088 1,078 963 1,685 2,527 571 566 505 885 B19 WIND 868 196 194 174 304 456 103 102 160 B20 1-2 172 39 39 34 60 90 20 20 18 32 B21 WIND 1,949 440 437 390 682 1,023 231 229 205 358 B22 1-2 1,912 432 428 382 669 1,004 227 225 201 351 B23 WIND 4,305 973 965 861 1,507 2,260 511 507 452 790 B24 1-2 2,489 563 558 498 871 1,307 296 293 261 457 B25 WIND 3,739 845 838 748 1,309 1,963 444 440 393 686 B26 1-2 430 97 96 86 151 226 51 51 45 79 B27 WIND 42 9 9 8 15 22 5 5 4 8 B28 WIND 123 28 28 25 43 65 15 15 13 22 B29 WIND 76 17 17 15 27 40 9 9 8 14 Key: I = Total 2 = Public Shelter 3 = Friend/Relative (a--in county; b--out of county) 4 = Hotel/Motel 52 TABLE 11 Population & Vehicle Productions By Evacuation Zone & Destination Volusia County Population Vehictes ZONE CAT. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 V1 1-2 811 183 344 284 368 83 156 129 V2 3-5 10,510 2,375 4$1'456 3,679 4,765 1,077 2,020 1,668 V3 1-2 536 121 227 188 243 55 103 85 V4 1-2 901 204 382 315 409 185 173 143 V5 3-5 7s915 1,789 3,356 2,770 3,589 811 1,522 1,256 V6 1-2 1,425 322 604 499 646 146 274 226 V7 1-2 1,129 255 479 395 512 116 217 179 V8 3-5 4,535 IsO25 1,923 1,587 2,056 465 V9 872 719 1-2 218 50 92 76 99 23 42 34 vio 1-2 584 132 248 204 265 60 112 92 Vil 3-5 2,199 497 932 770 997 225 423 349 V12 1-2 lsl4l 258 484 399 517 117 219 181 V13 1-2 1,113 251 472 390 505 114 214 177 V14 3-5 2,109 07 894 738 956 216 405 335 V15 1.-.2 894 202 379 313 405 91 172 142 V16 1-2 578 131 245 202 262 59 V17 ill 92 3-5 3,412 771 1,447 1,194 ls547 350 656 541 V18 1-2 433 98 184 151 196 45 83 68 V19 3-5 ls709 386 725 598 775 175 329 271 V20 1-2 154 35 65 54 70 16 30 24 V21 3-5 859 194 364 301 389 88 165 136 V22 3-5 2,468 558 1,046 864 1,119 253 474 392 V23 1-2 4,491 1,015 1,904 1,572 2,036 460 863 713 V24 3-5 794 179 337 278 360 81 153 126 V25 3-5 0 0 0 0 V26 0 0 0 0 1-2 1,533 346 650 537 695 157 295 243 V27 1-2 1,201' 271 509 421 545 123 231 191 V28 WIND .520 118 220 182 236 53 100 93 V29 WIND 340 77 144 119 154 35 65 54 V30 WIND 7,342 1,659 3,113 2,570 3,329 752 1,412 1,165 V31 WIND 6,905 1,560 2,928 2,417 3,131 707 1,328 1,096 V32 1-2 387 87 165 135 175 39 75 61 V33 3-5 2,006 453 851 702 909 205 386 318 V34 1-2 1,032 233 438 361 468, 106 198 164 V35 1-2 582 132 247 204 264 60 112 92 Key: I = Total 2 = Public Shelter 3 = Friend/Relative 4 = Hotel/Motel 53 TABLE 11 (cont.) P6pulation Vehicles ZONE CAT. 1 2 3 4 1 4 V36 3-5 1,881 425 J98 658 853 193 362 298- V37 1-2 226 51 96 79 102 23 43 36 V38 1-2 307 69 131 107 139 31 59 49 V39 1-2 528 119 224 185 239 54 101 84 V40 3-5 880 199 373 308 399 90 169 140 V41 3-5* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 V42 3-:5 7,199 1,627 3,052 2,520 3,264 738 1 .384 1,142 V43 3-5 1,737 393 736 608 788 178 334 276 V44 1-2 459 104 194 161 208 47 88 73 V45 3-5 1,568 354 665 549 711 160 302 249 V46 1-2 545 123 231 191 56 105 86 V47 WIND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 V48 3-5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 V49 WIND 2,591 586 1,098 907 1,175 266 498 411 V50 WIND 129 29 55 45 58 13 25 20 V51 WIND 488 110 207 171 221 50 94 77 V52 WIND 1,540 348 653 539 698 158 296 244 V53 WIND 966 219 409 338 438 99 186 153 V54 WIND 82 19 34 29 37 9 is 13 V55 WIND 3,539 800 1,500 .1,239 1,605 363 680 562 V56 WIND 870 197 369 304 394 89 167 138 V57 WIND 841 190 357 294 381 86 162 133 Key: I Total 2 Public Shelter 22.63 3 Fr./Rel. 42.43 4 Hot/Mot 35.0 54 SECTION NORTH U52 U53 uso RUM 2 Z, U56 DPEVAAD RUN 3 @w o D27 323 LEM 9p= Do E M I . Z uj -@/.j AIA C01-1 SECTION I SCALE: 1" 2 @@JLES LEGEND MCUATION ZONES woftA @@k' IBM LEYEL OF URRY A BASIN LEUR OF UREAT 9 k RACUATIN ROUTES U28 Uls D ST, !,2 AVE. PLAZA R@ HAP IMP, PLAZA 'Luo' EUCLID VE, TY BLVD, UNIVE OLM MAIN S BROAD Y 21 ACH V30 uyZ \16 ulo ul X@23 AL 9 U25 DUN tNTON AVE. SECTIR 2 UU, "MORM ME L@U\j 0@ Ilk SCM: 1" 2 @MES LEGEND NES ts LEUR CV YMEhf h cv TM If -'s QcTi- lk /* - - TRINISUL Ali[ ,-47-- RAGL AIJ 1, U37 U43 U49 I'v A K k X ;IXY SECTION 3 RUE: I" - 2 2*LES LEGEND MH OF RIM), 9 MOW BREVARD CUUM LIONEL B ET ROCK Dil ARAE SA PAR H LAU LUHb JA TIGER DAIRY LAKE CA DEN TROPIC 1,6 sou 405 FOX LK SECTION 4 CPA[ oil SCRE: I" - 2 NILES NASA PKWY. f LEVEL OV YMUHT h YORM 3 LEVEL 2CUTES T1Cb CS HWY. P* IsL'AL5 A t@sm FAY cl CAMP tit S"ARPES OLD CANAVERAL CROVIS 1 -16 -Us JAMES 28 I Ju RAYBURN jig, OSENTINE ol DIXON 2 4 F E N N E p "RE ITT (7- ME ScHoo Ipm ETT PLUCIEBAUM N F E it V BARTON LEVITT uu@ Hirr SECTION 5 BARNES ul@"UlllMXUvv ME ,NX 2 N SCUE: I" - , ILES NES MCUATIO"l ZO, LIM OF TMUT h LEUR OF EMU a MCUUM ROMS WICKHAM @.o ----------------- 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - POST TARKWAY pi a LAKE WASHINGTON AURORA nONTR AL 321 k SARNO 34 22 ELLIS NASA NASA WERIDAN SR HIBISCUS EAU CALLIE IEDGE I HENRY WOOD AN D23 UNIVERSIly 29 FLORIDA IV, PALM BAY SECTION G U L PORT MALAG R TIL17MAN CANAL B23 HALL D Is SCM: 1" 2 @ALES LEGEND WACO EVACUATION ZONES LEVEL OF Tt LEVEL OF TOREAT 0 VAUARIA incumn ROUTES GRANT B6 925 BEHAVIORAL SURVEY ELEMENT INTRODUCTION There are many factors contributing to the hurricane-vulnerability of the coastal areas of East Central Florida. Previous sections of this report have identified and quantified a number of these variables which may be used as a basis for measuring the potential evacuation time of the coastal areas. However, besides defining hurricane hazards, determining their effects on the region, and identifying potential coastal evacuees, an essential type of data that must be examined in order to quantify evacuation time is the human factor of hurricane response. When and if threatened residents would evacuate, how many vehicles would be needed, the preplanned destinations of evacuees, and other behavioral tendencies are added elements in the time required for an evacuation of an area. One means by which these behavioral characteristics can be determined is through a survey of the threatened coastal area population. The East Central Florida Regional Planning Council employed the firm of H. W. Lochner, Inc., to conduct a statistically significant survey to determine the responses of the coastal population residents to an approaching hurricane. From this population, a random sample was drawn and a telephone survey conducted. The results of the survey were then tabulated and analyzed, forming the basis for making assumptions of the evacuation behavior of the entire threatened population. In conjunction with other background information collected, the survey results provided input to the process for determining evacuation times. METHODOLOGY The behavioral survey for Brevard and Volusia counties focused only on the population at risk. Since most residents of the study area will not be threatened and, consequently, not need to evacuate during a hurricane event, there was no need to determine their behavioral characteristics. For that reason, the survey was limited to, and a sample was drawn from, the region's coastal population. As with almost any survey, there were three major components involved with undertaking the behavioral survey for the coastal area of East Central Florida. These consisted of designing the survey questionnaire, drawing the sample, and administering,the survey. Besides those activities, the survey process also included tabulating the responses and analyzing the results. This section of the report discusses the methodology and presents the behavioral survey results (a copy of the consultant's report providing more details on the survey is available from the Regional Planning Council). 55 The sample, itself, was drawn from city directories of R. L. Polk and Company and the phone directories in the study area. Starting at a random point in these records, a skip interval was employed to identify residents to be surveyed, assuring not only that the sample would be random but also giving proportional representation in the survey to each of the counties in the study area. In drawing the sample, 20% more names than were needed were identified to ensure that the necessary 400 completed surveys would be obtained despite refusals and other potential problems. Since the survey was to be conducted by telephone, names and addresses of those persons chosen through the skip interval method were simultaneously verified in the phone directory. Only those residents listed in the directories were included in the sample. Survey Administration After the sample had been drawn, notification postcards were sent to all persons to be surveyed. Arriving one to three days before the scheduled interview, the postcards were to inform potential respondents of the survey, generally explain the purpose of the survey, and request their cooperation. At the same time, news releases explaining the Hurricane Evacuation Study program, in general, and the behavioral survey, in particular, were distributed to the media for publication. Telephone interviews were conducted from April 26, 1982 to May 15, 1982 by a team of professional interviewers. Calls were made during the day, in the evening, and on weekends, and up to four callbacks were made before abandoning a potential respondent. With only a 2.97% refusal rate, the necessary 400 surveys were completed by the interviewers. To ensure accurate results, interviewers were monitored during the surveying process, and completed surveys were examined for quality and consistency. Compilation Upon completion of the survey, the results were compiled and tabulated. Table 12 shows the results. For several of the questions, more information was obtained than was presented in this summary of the results. In the evacuation destination question, for example, respondents indicating that they would go to the home of a friend or relative or to a hotel/motel were asked to specify the county in which their particular destination was located, whi-le respondents indicating that they had experienced a hurricane were asked the date and location of the storm experience. This information was used for planning purposes and/or refining behavioral assumptions. Design of Survey Instrument One of the most important parts of the survey process was design of the survey questionnaire. As the primary tool for collecting behavioral information, the questionnaire had to address all the necessary issues, avoid ambiguity and bias, and be short and simple enough to facilitate 56 TABLE 12 BEHAVIORAL SURVEY RESULTS 1. Do you Live in a:singZe-fc2niZy home? Single-Family 74.6% t4.1% multi-fconiZy home? Multi-Family 22.4% t3.9% mobile home? Mobile Home 1.8% +-1.3% other?, Other 1.2% tl.O% 2. If you were ordered by a goverment Immediately: 64.7% 4.6% authority to evacuate, how soon Certain # of Hours: 27.5% 4.3% could you be ready, and when would Never: 7.8% @.6% you Zeave? 3. How many vehicles are there in your One Vehicle: 192 Households household? Two Vehicles: 170 Households Threa Vehicles: 53 Households Four Vehicles: Households a) How many vehicles would you use during evacuation? Vehicles to be used: 70.0% b) Would you need transportation, such as a bus or taxi? Yes: 1.6% +1.5% 4. How many people live in your home, including you? Average: 2.28 persons per household 5. Is there anybody who could not be + evacuated without help from outside Yes: 3.7% 1.8% your home? 6. After leaving, where would you go? To a Red Cross Shelter: 18.3% �3.7% To a Friend or Relative: 38.1% t4.7% To a Hotel or Motel: 30.6% �4.5% Don't Know: 13.0% �3.3% 7. Have you ever experienced a direct hurricane strike? Yes: 48.7% 4.8% 8. How old are you? Average age of respondents: 55.4 yrs. 9. what is your occupation? White Collar: 58.1% �4.7% Skilled Tradesman: 17.6% �3.6% Blue Collar: 24.3% 4.1% 57 administration by telephone. Only with these characteristics could the questionnaire produce acceptable results. The basis of the questionnaire consisted of the major behavioral issues associated with hurricane evacuation. These included evacuation time, vehicle use, special transportation needs, special assistance needs, planned destinations, prior hurricane experience, and perception of threat. Using other hurricane evacuation surveys as models, a set of questions incorporating all of these issues was developed. Along with these substantive issues, a set of questions to identify general socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the respondents was prepared. Besides the questionnaire itself, a notification postcard was also prepared. The purpose of the postcard was to maximize the cooperation by potential respondents and minimize the refusal rate. Both the survey instrument and the notification postcard were pretested on a group of 25 households of varying economic and educational backgrounds in different geographic areas. Based upon the results of the pretest, minor changes were made to both the questionnaire and the postcard, and a final version of each was developed. Drawing the Sample The primary objective of any survey is to assess the characteristics of the target population. To ensure that the survey is representative of that target population, it is necessary to draw a random sample which will produce results at the desired level of confidence with an acceptable range of error. This involves identifying the target population, determining sample size, and developing an-acceptable method for actually drawing the sample. For the Hurricane Evacuation Study, the segment of the population whose behavioral tendencies must be assessed is the,population threatened by hurricane conditions. According to the hazard analysis, there are almost 217,000 people in the two-county area who would be threatened by, and who should evacuate prior to the onset of, hurricane conditions. This target population, therefore, consists of coastal residents in Brevard and Volusia counties. After identification of the target population, sample size was determined. For planning purposes, it was determined that a 95% confidence level with a margin of error of plus or minus 5% was needed. This would provide results accurate enough to make assumptions to be used in the planning process. Based upon the size of the target population and the diversity of that population which was estimated through researching other similar surveys in Florida, it was determined that a minimum sample size of 400 was needed to ensure that the results corresponded to the desired confidence level and error margin. 58 As shown in Table 12, the results of each question are given as a percentage along with the margin of error. The 95% confidence level, which was used in this survey, signifies that the survey response, plus or minus the margin of error, produces a range within which responses from the target population would occur 95% of the time. In Question 2, for example, 64.7% of the respondents, plus or minus 4.6%, said that they would evacuate immediately. What this means is that if the entire target population (all coastal residents in the two-county study area) were questioned, it is 95% certain that between 60.1% and 69.3% of them would indicate that they would evacuate immediately if ordered to do so. ANALYSIS A survey of behavioral tendencies is useful for planning purposes only if the results can be used to make assumptions about the expected behavior of the threatened population during hurricane conditions. In order to use the survey results for this purpose, it was necessary to analyze the results, assess their validity, determine their significance, and compare them to similar surveys conducted in Florida. With only nine questions, half of which were to identify socio-economic or demographic characteristics of the respondents, the behavioral survey did not require extensive analysis. Several questions in the behavioral survey were particularly important to the Hurricane Evacuation Study planning process. These included the questions involving evacuation time, vehicle use, transportation assistance needs, evacuation destination, and prior hurricane experience. Based upon the survey results for these issues, plans were developed for evacuating and sheltering coastal residents of East Central Florida. Evacuation Time Probably the most important issue addressed in the behavioral survey related to evacuation. The specific aspects of evacuation behavior considered most important for the study were when and if most of the threatened population would evacuate. It was particularly important to determine how long it would take the threatened residents to begin evacuating if they were ordered to do so by governmental authorities. Since the coastal areas had recently experienced an evacuation for Hurricane David in 1979, it was expected that a significant percentage of the residents would choose not to evacuate. Hurricane David caused only minor damage to the coast, and it was thought that many residents might be hesitant to leave during a future hurricane. The results of the behavioral survey, however, showed this not to be the case. Instead of refusing to evacuate, the majority indicated that they would evacuate within two and a half hours of receiving an evacuation order. As shown on Table 12, over 64% of the respondents to the survey indicated in Question 2 that they would leave immediately if ordered to do so. This figure is less than the evacuation response time obtained in other hurricane evacuation surveys 59 conducted in Florida. Several explanations exist for this low response. It could be that the threatened coastal residents, having recently experienced evacuation, are aware of the time involved and responded accordingly. On the other hand, it could be coastal residents are willing to wait a few hours until they verify the need to evacuate through friends or neighbors. One other survey questions hurricane experience, which will be analyzed later in the report and may provide more of an explanation for these results. Responses to Question 2 also indicated that 27.5% of the threatened residents would evacuate within a certain number of hours. The mean evacuation response time for that group was found to be 2.17 hours. From the results of this question, then, it was found that almost 92.2% of the survey population would evacuate within a few hours if ordered to do so. However, 7.8% of the respondents indicated that they would not evacuate if ordered. This was higher than any area other than Southeast Florida and may reflect past evacuation experiences with Hurricane David. The major implication of the responses to this question related to transportation. Since the results of Question 2 showed that more than 64% of the threatened population would evacuate immediately and another 27% would leave shortly thereafter, the indications were most evacuees would be on the roads during the first few hours after the evacuation order was issued. That information--along with an estimate of 7.8% of the population presumably refusing to evacuate--was used in developing a viable evacuation plan, establishing a system of evacuation routes, and undertaking other planning activities. Hurricane Experience It would seem that there would be a positive correlation between hurricane experience and the willingness to evacuate to a place of safety. Respondents having experienced a direct hurricane strike and understanding the potential damage posed by such a strike would presumably be more inclined to evacuate than those with no hurricane experience. When considering hurricane experience, however, it is necessary to differentiate between actual hurricane experience and perceived hurricane experience. While many people feel they have experienced a direct hurricane strike, oftentimes they have only been exposed to the fringes of the storm. Since the results of Question 7 indicated that over 48% of the respondents had experienced a direct hurricane strike, the evacuation response derived from Question 2 does not follow. When information collected as part of this question relating to the date and place of the direct hurricanestrike was compared to actual hurricane information, however, it was found that only 10% of the respondents had actually experienced a direct hurricane strike and another 7.1% may have. This indicates that many more people think they have experienced the worst part of a hurricane when they actually have not. Hurricane David was not a hurricane over land, although many of the responses referred to that storm. Once again, those residents 60 evacuating from Hurricane David (which they perceived as a direct strike) may account for the low response rate for evacuation in a future storm. This shows the need for more public information on hurricane hazards. Transportation A major part of the entire evacuation issue is transportation. Not only is it necessary to know when people will respond to an evacuation order, it is also important to know the means of evacuation, the number of vehicles to be used, and how many households would need some type of assistance in evacuating. A series of questions in the survey attempted to address those issues. To adequately plan for a hurricane evacuation, it is necessary to know how many vehicles will be on the road. This could vary considerably, depending upon whether families would use only one car during an evacuation, whether they would use more than one car to prevent damage to a vehicle left in a vulnerable area, or whether they would use some form of transportation other than their car. Question 3a specifically addressed the issue of vehicle usage during a hurricane evacuation. According to the response to Question 3a, 70% of all registered vehicles owned by coastal residents would be used in an evacuation. This means that 30% of all the vehicles registered to coastal dwellers would be off the road during an evacuation. This percentage is consistent with vehicle usage rates obtained from other coastal surveys conducted in Florida. Besides vehicle usage, other transportation characteristics which are important to know for evacuation planning include the number of households which would need bus or taxi type of transportation to evacuate and the number who could not be evacuated without assistance from outside the household. These factors have implications for transportation planning in general and for disaster preparedness operating agencies in particular. Not only do these figures provide an indication of the number of emergency vehicles which will have to be used in an evacuation, they also provide an indication of the personnel who will be needed, Question 3b related to the need for bus or taxi transportation. According to the survey results, 1.6% of the respondents woul 'd need such transportation to evacuate. Because the margin of error for this factor was plus or minus 1.5%, there is a range of error of plus or minus 94% in the response. This means that the number of households needing bus or taxi transportation can be estimated to range from .1% to 3.1% of all households in the target population. While such a high rate of variation with small numbers would be unacceptable for detailed transit planning, these figures provided the general estimate needed for hurricane evacuation purposes. Like Question 3b, Question 5 addressed only a small part of the entire population. Responses to Question 5 indicated that 3.7% of the threatened population would need assistance from outside the household to evacuate. 61 As with Question 3b, *there is a high margin of error relative to the percentage answering "yes." At the 95% confidence level, the need for outside help in evacuating can be estimated to range from 1.9% to 5.5% of the target population. While that is a substantial variation, it does provide a general indication of the number of emergency personnel and vehicles required for evacuation. The implications of the results derived from this series of questions are significant. Since vehicle usage rates can be derived from the behavioral survey, total vehicle usage can be derived by applying these rates to vehicle registration information. When these estimates are added to shelter facilities, total demand on the region's transportation system during an evacuation can be estimated. Based upon these estimates, a viable inter- and intra-regional transportation plan can be developed. When transportation assistance needs derived from the behavioral survey results are incorporated in this process, a comprehensive transportation plan can be prepared. Destination For hurricane evacuation planning--and especially for this Hurricane Evacuation Study--it is necessary to know the preplanned destinations of the evacuating population. Question 6 in the behavioral survey addressed the destination issue. It asked respondents where they would go after leaving their homes during a hurricane. The responses to this question varied considerably from responses to a similar question asked in other hurricane evacuation surveys conducted in Florida. The primary difference related to the number of responses indicating a public shelter would be the destination. In the Hurricane Evacuation Study behavioral survey, 18.3% of the respondents identified a public shelter as their destination, while the same question included in a similar survey focusing on the inland area of East Central Florida produced a shelter usage response almost three times that identified in the coastal area of the region. Besides the public shelter response, 13% of the respondents indicated that they did not know what their destinations would be upon evacuation. This figure was lower than that derived from the Inland Shelter behavioral survey and fell between the high and low values for other coastal behavioral surveys. These results seem to indicate that there is more awareness of the possibility of a hurricane among coastal residents than among inland residents and they are more prepared in the event of one approaching their area. This may also indicate that due to previous evacuation experience during Hurricane David, individuals are not waiting to the last minute to decide where they will go in the event of an evacuation. Besides the 18.3% of the respondents who identified a public shelter as their destination after evacuating, and the 13% who indicated that they did 62 not know where they would go, Question 6 showed that 38.1% of the respondents would go to the homes of friends or relatives, while the remaining 30.6% would go to hotels or motels. For that friend/relative and hotel/motel response, the survey obtained additional information. The results showed that 67% of Volusia County residents and 53% of Brevard County residents having homes of friends/relatives or hotels/motels as destinations would stay in the same county, while the remaining would leave their respective county. These results have implications for developing an inter- and intra-regional transportation plan for hurricane evacuation. COMPARISONS TO OTHER STUDIES Several other studies have been conducted in Florida to assess the probable behavioral tendencies of threatened residents during a hurricane event. Several of these studies were referenced in the previous section for purposes of comparing the results of questions included in those studies with similar questions asked in the behavioral survey for the East Central Florida Inland Shelter Study. This section will examine those surveys in more detail while identifying some of the main similarities and differences between the Inland Shelter Study behavioral survey and the other surveys. The first major behavioral survey conducted as part of the recent hurricane evacuation planning activities undertaken in Florida was administered in the southwest Florida area as part of the "Lee County Flood Emergency Evacuation Plan" (SWFRPC, 1979). That survey was then used as a base for developing a similar survey for the Tampa Bay region, the "Behavioral Survey for the Tampa Bay Flood Emergency Evacuation Plan." After that, a behavioral survey, modeled after the Tampa Bay study, was undertaken in the Sanibel-Captiva area. Finally, the Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council undertook a survey in 1981 that was essentially an extension of the 1979 Lee County survey. Besides the behavioral survey of the coastal area of East Central Florida, several other surveys were conducted in the same general time frame as part of other Inland Shelter Study or Hurricane Evacuation Study projects. These include behavioral surveys for the inland area of East Central Florida, Southeast Florida coastal area, the Treasure Coast coastal area, the Central Florida inland area, and both the coastal and inland parts of the Withlacoochee area. Only the results of the Southeast Florida survey and the East Central Florida inland survey, however, are presented here. Table 13 shows the results of the substantive questions for selected behavioral surveys compared to the East Central Florida coastal area study. Since all of these surveys were based on the Lee County study, the similarity in questions facilitated comparisons of the results. The major differences among the surveys related to survey methodology. Specifically, the Lee County and Southwest Florida studies were voluntary surveys published in the newspaper, while the rest were telephone surveys. Because the Lee County and Southwest Florida studies were not scientific surveys, 63 TABLE 13 COMPARISON MATRIX OF BEHAVIORAL SURVEYS WITHIN FLORIDA East Central East central Lee Tampa Sanibel- South- South- Florida Florida County R.) y Captiva West east Inland Coastal Florida Florida EVACUATION RESPONSE Immediate 80.4% + 4.1% 64.7% + 4.6% N.A. 1 77.1% + 1.8% N.A. 69.2%4 Z + 1.3% Certain Number of Hours 15.3% + 3.7% 27.5% + 4.3% N.A. 17.2% + 1.7% 95.3% + 2.1% N.A. 4.5% 2 + 0.7% Never 4.4% + 2.1% 7-8Z + 2.6% N.A. 5.7% + 1.01 2.22 + 1.522 N.A. 26.3% 2 + 1.62 Average of the certain number of hours 2.05 2.17 N.A. 1.40 3.97 N.A. 2.3% VEHICULAR USAGE 81.9% 70.0% 81.0% 71.1% 77.3% 74.7% 70.2% NEED FOR TRANSPORTATION 2;1% + 1.5% 1.6% + 1.5% N.A. 4.0% + 0.6% N.A. N.A. 18.1% 2 + 0.2% NEED FOR SPECIAL HELP 6.6%+ 2.5% 3.7% + 1.8% N.A. 3.3% + 0.5% N.A. N.A. N.A. DESTINATION Shelter 45.6% + 5.1% 18.3% + 3.7% 21.0% 37.9% + 1.4% 8.12 + 2.92 24% 23.1% 2 + 1.52 Friend or Relative 18.2% + 4.0% 38.1% + 4.7% 25.8% + 1.3% 45.4% + 5.31 53.0% 13% 28.02 72+ 1.6% Hotel or Motel 14.6% + 3.6% 30.6% + 4.5% ig.8% + 1.1% 38.1% + 5-12 4223 10.22 2 + 1.1% Don't Know 21.6% + 4.2% 13.0% + 3.3% 26.0% 17.4% + 1.1% 8.4% + 2.92 212 11.2% 22+ 1.425 1N.A.: Not Available 2The missing 2.5 percent is included in another question. See survey 31ncludes "Leave the county" (34%). "Stay home" (2%) and "Motel" (4z). 41ncludes 20.6% + 1.5% who would leave before an evacuation order SNot evacuating: 26.82 + 1.4% their results could be considered suspect. In addition, the Southeast Florida study included a number of respondents not residing in vulnerable areas. All of the surveys found that more than 90% of residents in vulnerable areas would evacuate if ordered to do so. There were, however, differences among the studies as to the number who would leave immediately and those who would leave within a certain number of hours. For those noting that their evacuation response time would be a certain number of hours, the average times ranged from a low of 1.4 hours in the Tampa Bay survey to a high of 3.97 hours in the Sanibel-Captiva study. In all seven surveys, vehicle usage ranged from 70-80%. The highest vehicle usage rate was found in the East Central Florida inland area survey. Its 82% usage rate can be attributed to the high number of one- vehicle households in the study area. The need for public transportation was below 5% in all but Southeast Florida. In that study, it was found that 18.1% needed transportation. This high figure results from the fact that 16.1% of the surveyed households did not own an automobile. The other major transportation factor--the need for special transportation assistance--was found to be less than 10% of the threatened population in each study area based on the behavioral surveys. Predictably, the demand for shelter was lowest among the more experienced and relatively wealthy populations on Sanibel and Captiva islands and along the East Central Florida coast. These populations are experienced in the sense that the majority are both vulnerable and had either evacuated or come close to evacuating within the last few years. It appears that many of these people rethink their evacuation plans annually as hurricanes head north out of the Caribbean, and they often make preplanned non-shelter arrangements. This is reflected in the low percentage of respondents in those surveys identifying public shelters as their destinations as well as a low number indicating they do not know where they would go. A questionable aspect of the Sanibel survey is that 38% of the respondents think that they will find hotel/motel rooms. A follow-up question asking if the respondents had made prior hurricane contingency reservations at some mainland hotel or motel showed that virtually nobody had made such reservations. The implications of that finding are that some potential evacuees in all threatened areas may have planned destinations which will not be available at the time of an actual evacuation. The relationship of the results of the East Central Florida inland area survey to the observed responses in actual evacuations is extremely important. Actual evacuation behavior provides one means of assessing the validity of the survey results. One issue in which such a comparison is useful is shelter usage. It was found that the highest observed shelter usage in the United States for a given county population was 36% during 65 Hurricane Carla. This figure is well above the 18.3% shelter usage rate found in the East Central Florida coastal area survey and may lend a certain validity to that figure. Furthermore, it was found that shelter use increases with the geographic spread of devastation. The wider the path of destruction, the more an evacuee's friends and relatives are similarly impacted and, therefore, cannot be of help. In contrast to typical hurricanes, geographically compact hurricanes create almost no demand for shelters. Theoretically, a geographically compact category 5 hurricane would create less shelter demand than a more geographically diverse category 4 storm event. In addition, the research literature has also indicated that the public does not comprehend the fine distinctions of hurricane advisories, orders and other such terms. People frequently react to an advisory as if it were an order. Although there is no specific research on how quickly groups have responded to evacuation orders, certain delay factors have appeared. Specifically, residents will take the time after the order to seek confirmation of the danger through additional sources, including neighbors, friends and relatives. These delays to the order appear to be neither extended nor serious. Finally, for those persons who say they will not evacuate, the only viable alternative for public officials at this time is to further educate them. There is no documented case in the country in which such persons have been forcibly removed from their homes. Political reasons, tradition, the danger to enforcement officials, and the need for these officials in other pursuits have precluded such action. CONCLUSIONS The behavioral survey for the East Central Florida coastal area addressed a number of major issues and identified the probable behavioral tendencies of the threatened population in the study area during a hurricane event. Although the survey results have been discussed individually, the major conclusions are summarized below. Together with other research and background data, these results were used to develop a workable evacuation plan for the East Central Florida coastal area. o The vast majority of the households (92.2%) would respond either imediately or rather promptly.to an evacuation order. o Of the owned vehicles, 30% would not be used during an evacuation, thereby helping to reduce the traffic problem. 66 o While the needs for general (bus or taxi) and specialized (handicapped) transportation service are a small percentage, these demands could become a logistical problem involving thousands of persons within an already strained situation. The general transportation service problem, however, can be resolved through increased education, citizen cooperation and advance private arrangements. o The indicated shelter space needs exceed 31% of the sample population. This amount includes those who plan to use public shelters as well as those not having an evacuation destination, and the figure is most likely higher than what will be experienced during a hurricane. o A clear minority of the population has experienced the direct hit of a major hurricane, and some of the respondents have a misconception that they were in a major hurricane. 67 SHELTER ELEMENT INTRODUCTION The ability to shelter potential evacuees is a major objective of the disaster preparedness programs in Volusia and Brevard counties. Ongoing efforts by the respective Red Cross chapters have resulted in the designation of a substantial number of public buildings that may be used as shelters in the event of a hurricane striking the region's coast. This section will discuss the capability of this existing shelter inventory to absorb the projected number of evacuees expected to seek public shelter. Information developed as part of the study's Behavioral Survey has been used as a basis from which a comparison of shelter demand and shelter capacity may be made. The purpose in examining shelter preparedness is twofold. First, the information provided through the different work tasks will give local disaster preparedness officials an indication of the adequacy of the existing shelters to accommodate the predicted level of demand. In addition, these activities will facilitate the pre-planning required of officials to ensure that adequate resources are available at the shelters for the duration of the evacuees' stay. Second, the information generated has been utilized in the Hurricane Evacuation Study as part of the Transportation Modeling task to assist in the quantification of evacuation times. To accurately determine evacuation times, the expected vehicle volume movement must be accurately simulated in the model. This requires not only that the destinations of evacuees be known, but that the destinations be realistic in terms of their ability to accommodate the prescribed number of evacuees. By evaluating the capacity of the shelter inventory, shelter assignment and calculation of the time required to travel from the residents' homes to the shelters could be accurately determined. SHELTER INVENTORY Detailed information on the existing designated shelter structures was gathered for this study from the local Red Cross chapters and the local school boards in Volusia and Brevard counties. Table 14 presents the existing inventory of shelter facilities for each of the coastal counties in the region. The information provided in this table fncludesshelter location, type of structure, shelter capacity, and shelter facilities. Although the names, addresses, and telephone numbers for the shelter managers were collected as part of this work effort, they are not included in the information provided. Primarily, this is because personnel assignments are subject to frequent change and an out-of-date listing may 69 TABLE 14 S H E L T E R I.N V E N T 0 R Y SHELTER (Address/Phone) TYPE OF CAPACITY POWER WATER WASTEWATER FOOD CAPABILITY VULNERABILITY STRUCTURE FACILITY ANALYSIS VOLUSIA COUNTY -- EAST A- C7 cl Page I of 6. C.? 1. Burns-Oak Hill Elementary public school 468 x well septic yes 15' 1 I tank 104 Ridge Road Oak Hill 904/345-3453 2. Campbell Center public school 1997 x xI x x yes 10, 601 So. Keech St. I Daytona Beach I 904/253-1686 3. Chisholm Center public school 687 x x x x yes 8' 577 Ronnoc Lane Cat. New Smyrna Beach 3 904/428-2475 4. Daytona Beach Com. College college 2500 X X x yes 15' 500 Welch Blvd. Daytona Beach f (bldgs. 14, 16 25) 5. Edgewater Elementary public school 644 x X G x x yes 10, 550 So. Old Count Road Cat. Edgewater 4 *Althouqh various provisions have been made for providing food services. in qeneral, food will be brought Into the shelters from outside sources. C3 NOTE: Shelter capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a standard recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE 14 (cont.) S H E L T E R I N V E N T 0 R Y SHELTER (Address/Phone) TYPE OF CAPACITY POWER WATER WASTEWATER FOOD CAPABILITY VULNERABILITY STRUCTURE FACILITY ANALYSIS VOLUSIA COUNTY -- EAST Page 2 of 6. 'g, 6. Highlands-Hillcrest Elem. public schools 665 x X x X I Highlands, 1 25' 323 Heineman Street yes. Daytona Beach Hillcrest, 904/253-1891 no. Note: Medical Shelter cnly. 7. Holly Hill Elementary public school 839 x X x x yes 15' 1049.Ridgewood Avenue Holly Hill 904/252-6271 f x x x septic no 8. Holly Hill Junior High public school 1319 10, 1 1200 Center Street tank Holly Hill 904/252-0421 9. Hurst Elementary public school 767 x x x septic 10, 1340 Wright Street tank yes Holly Hill 904/255-3846 meeting hall 100 10. KrAghts of Lulumbus Hall x X I no 10, 509 No. Orange St. Cat. New Smyrna Beach 4 904/427-4211 vote: Medical Shetter Only. -Althouqh various provisions have been made for providing food services, in qeneral. food will be brought into the shelters from outside sources. Id, NOTE: Shelter capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a standard recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE 14 (cont.) S H E L T E R I N V E N T 0 R Y SHELTER (Address/Phone) TYPE OF CAPACITY POWER WATER WASTEWATER STRUCTURE FACILITY FOOD CAPABILITY VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS VOLUSIA COUNTY -- EAST % low lc@ Page 3 of 6. tv qj NO 11. Mainland Junior High public school 640 x X x x yes 215 Third Avenue 25' Daytona Beach Cat. 904/255-4561 3 12. Mainland Senior High public school 1354 x x x 125 So. Clyde Morris x yes 10, Daytona Beach 904/252-0401 N) 13. New Smyrna Jr. High public school 881 x x x x yes 100 Live Oak Street 10, New Smyrna Beach Cat. 904/428-5792 2 14.1 North Ridgewood Elementary public school 271 x x x x yes 365 No. Ridgewood Avenue 56 Daytona Beach Cat. 904/252-7322 2 15. Ormond Beach Elementary public school 373 x x I x x yes 100torbin Avenue 151 Ormond Beach 904/677-3611 'Although various provisions have been made for providing food services. in qeneral. food will be brought into the shelters from outside sources. NOTE: Shelter capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a standard recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE 14 (Cont.) S H E L T E R I N V E N T 0 R Y SHELTER (Address/Phone) TYPE OF CAPACITY POWER WATER WASTEWATER /FOOD CAPABILITY VULNERABILITY STRUCTURE / FACILITY ANALYSIS VOLUSIA COUNTY -- EAST W q-, Ad6 Page 4 of 6. IP/ (zp 1P 16. Ormond Beach Junior High public school 1413 x x X I x No 10, 151 Domicilio Avenue Ormond Beach 904/677-7110 17. Ormond Bch. ',f-. Citizens Ctr. meeting hall 150 x x Yes 10, West Granada Avenue Ormond Beach 904/677-0311, Ext. 23n L'ote: Medical Shelter onZ -4 10, W Ia. R. Patillo Elementary public school 680 x x x x Yes Cat. 300 6th Street I New Smyrna Beach 2 904/427-1392 1 x x Yes 101 1 g. Port Orange Elementary public school 331 x x Cat. 402 Ounlawton Avenue -3 Port Orange 904/767-0113 20. South Daytona Elementary public school 870 x x x x I Yes 10, 600 Elizabeth Place South Daytona )04/767-0221 'Alth u'h various provisions have been made for providing food services. in Q:nraj. food will be brought into the Shelters from outside sources. NOTE: Shelter capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a standard /411 'A recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE 14 (Cont. S H E L T E R I N V E N T 0 R Y SHELTER (Address/Phone) TYPE OF CAPACITY POWER WATER 14ASTEWATER VULNERABILITY STRUCTURE FACILITY /FOOD CAPABILITY ANALYSIS -41b VOLUSIA COUNTY -- EAST hp All Page 5 of 6. 21. South Ridgewood Elementary public school 214 x x x X Yes 10, 731 S . Ridgewood Avenue Cat. Daytona Beach 904/252-0592 2 22. Spruce Creek Elementary public school 368 x X x x Yes 25' 642 Taylor Road Port Orange 904/788-1341 23. Spruce Creek Senior High public school 2828 x x x X No 25, 1484 Taylor Road Port Orange 904/761-0220 24. Tomoka Elementary public school 1133 X x Yes 251 R.F.D. I Old Tomoka Road Ormond Beach 904/677-3822 25. Turie T. Small Elementary public school, 887 X X x x No 10, 300 South Street Daytona Beach 904 /252-4738 A /J" .@jthouqh various provisions have been made for providing food services. n qenera). food will be brought into the shelter% from outside sources. NOTE: Shelter capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a standard recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availabi-lity of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE 14 (cont. S H E L T E R I N V E N T 0 R Y WASTEWATER VULNERABILITY SHELTM(Address/Phone) TYPE OF CAPACITY POWER WATER FOOD CAPABILITY STRUCTURE / FACILITY ANALYSIS 4, Q1' VOLUSIA COUNTY -- EAST ,Zq 4, . /'g Page 6 of 6. 26. West Sid .e Elementary public school 1361 x x x X Yes 28' 1210 Jimmy Ann Drive Daytona Beach 904/253-1671 Ln provisions have been made for tproviding food services. hel ter ;n gener 1. food Wi I I be brought Into the shel ers from outside sources. NOTE: S capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a standard 4:@ recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE 14 S H E L T E R I N V E N T 0 R Y SHELTER (Address/Phone) TYPE OF CAPACITY POWER WATER WASTEWATER FOOD CAPABILITY VULNER@BILITY STRUCTURE FACILITY ANALYSIS A, VOLUSIA COUNTY WEST Q Aq, Page.1 of 3. -b 10 1. Boston Avenue public school 516 x X x x Yes 1 85' 340 No. Boston Avenue DeLand 904/734-2060 2. DeLand Senior High public school 1387 x x x x Yes 80- 800 No. Hill Avenue DeLand 904/734-1100 --j X x 850 3. Deltona Jr. High public school 1500 x x Yes 250 Enterprise Road Deltona 904/574-6626 4. Enterprise Elementary public school 1090 X X x x Yes 25' 211 Main Street Enterprise 904/668-8641 5. Fla. Lutheran Retirement Ctr. meeting hall 200 x x x X Yes 80, 431 No. Kansas Avenue DeLand 904/734-0603 ;ote: Medical Shelter only. @7 I thau gh various provisions have oeen nade for providing food services. n general. food will be brought into the shelters from outside sources. WATER b NOTE: Shelter capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a standard recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE 14 (Cont. S H E L T E R I N V E N T 0 R Y WASTEWATER VULNERABILITY SHELTER (Address/Phone) TYPE OF CAPACITY POWER WATER FACILITY FOOD CAPABILITY ANALYSIS STRUCTURE 'A@ VOLUSIA COUNTY -- WEST Q Page 2 of 3. C7 6. Long Lake Helen Elementary public school 187 x X x septic (satellite feeding) 65' - - - tank 307 South Lakeview Drive Lake Helen 904/228-2208 65' 7. Louise S. McInnis public school 544 x x well packagE yes Highway 17 plant DeLeon Springs 904/985-4812 j 8. George Marks Elementary public school 587 x x x septic yes 75' 1000 No. Garfield Avenue tank DeLand 904/734-0401 f 9. orange City Elementary public school 451 x x x septic yes 65' - - - 555 East University Avenue tank Orange City 904/775-3090 well septic yes 55' 10. Seville Elementary public school 375 x x tank Highway 17 Seville 904/749-2292 -Although various provisions have been made for providing food services. in general, food will be brought into the Shelters from outside sources. NOTE: Shelter capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a standard recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE 14 (Cont.) S H E L T E R I N V E N T 0 R Y SHELTER (Address/Phone) TYPE OF CAPACITY POWER WATER WASTEWATER FOOD CAPABI VULNERABILITY STRUCTURE FACILITY LITY ANALYSIS VOLUSIA COUNTY -- WEST cl -k 0 Page 3 of 3. C7 c;' NIZ, .0 N 0 NO x ;septic yes I]. Southwestern Center public school 933 x x 651 605 W. New Hampshire tank DeLand 904/734-7700 12. Starke Elementary public school 425 x X x x yes 351 730 So. Parson Street DeLand 904/734-6700 00 13. T. DeWitt Taylor High public school 300 x x well package yes 651 100 E. Washington Avenue plant Pierson 904/749-2223 14. Woodward Avenue public school 1120 x x x 'Package yes 651 1201 So. Woodward Ave. plant, DeLand 904/734-6176 4 1-- %j @1 C *Although various provisions have been made for providing food services, in general, food will be brought into the shelters from outside sources NOTE: Shelter capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a standard recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE 14 (Cont. S H E L T E R I N V E N T 0 R Y SHELTER (Address/Phone) TYPE OF CAPACITY POWER WATER WASTEWATER /FOOD CAPABILITY VULNERABILITY STRUCTURE FACILITY ANALYSIS BREVARD COUNTY--North (0 A. A Page I of 3. It> If ae r? 1. Apollo Elementary public school 350 X X I X Yes 25' 1 3300 Knox McRae Drive Titusville 305/267-7890 2. Astronaut High public school 1000 X I X X Yes 20' SOO War Eagle Blvd. Titusville 305/267-5500 _j 3. Coquina Elementary public school 400 X X X Yes 20' 850 Knox McRae Drive Titusville f 305/267-7014 4. Imperial Estates Elementary public school 300 X X X No 25' 5525 Kathy Drive Titusville 305/267-1773 5. Jackson Middle public school 450 X X X Yes 25' 1515 Knox McRae Drive itusville ,05/269-1812 =A -Although various provisions have been made for providing food services, in general, food will be brought into the shelters from outside sources. NOTE: Shelter capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a standard recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE 14 (Cont.) S H E L T E R I N V E N T 0 R Y SHELTER (Address/Phone) TYPE OF CAPACITY POWER WATER WASTEWATER VULNERABILITY STRUCTURE FACILITY /FOOD CAPABILITY ANALYSIS /I_N / .4 /f / / b BREVARD COUNTY--North IZ, Page 2 of 3. _4@1 4A C1 6. Madison Middle public school 416 X x X No 30' 3375 Dairy Road Titusville 305/267-4077 X 20' 7. Mims Elementary public school 300 well pckage Yes 2582 U.S. Highway I plant Mims 00 305/267-3344 CD 8. Oak Park Elementary public school 350 x x x Yes 201 3395 Dairy Road Titusville 305/269-3252 9. Pinewood Elementary public school 300 x well lpckage. No 201 3654 Lionel Road plant Mims 305/269-4530 10. Riverview Elementary public school 400 X x x No 251 3000 Jolly St. Titusville 305/269-2325 *Al though various provisim have been made for providing food services, 41 n S ;7-- in gener 1. food will be brought I to the heiters from outside sources. NOTE: Shelter capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a standard recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE 14 (Cont.) S H E L T E R I N V E N T 0 R Y WASTEWATER VULNERABILITY SHELTER (Address/Phone) TYPE OF CAPACITY POWER WATER ODD CAPABILITY STRUCTURE FACILITY /F ANALYSIS BREVARD COUNTY--North Page 3 of 3. T 11. South Lake Elementary public school 375 X x X I Yes 30' - - - 3755 Garden St. Titusville 305/269-1022 12. Titusville High public school 900 X x x Yes 301 Cat. 1850 So. Washington Ave. 3 Titusville 305/269-3561 00 13. Brevard Community College college 270 x E & Yes 251 North Campus igen- 1111 No. Washington Ave. era- tor. Titusville 305/269-5664 14. First Presbyterian Church church 186 x x x Yes 351 of Titusville 1300 Golfview Drive Titusville 305/267-2745 *Although various provisions have been nmde for providing food services. 'n general. food will be brought into the shelters from outside sources. NOTE: Shelter capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a standard recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE 14 (cont. S H E L T E R I N V E N T 0 R Y SHELTER (Address/Phone) TYPE OF CAPACITY POWER WATER WASTEWATER FOOD CAPABILITY VULNERABILITY STRUCTURE FACILITY ANALYSIS BREVARD COUNTY--Central 4@ 'd 4ti Q111 4 Cl (b Page 1 of 4. 1. Hans Christian Andersen Elem. public school 350 X x x No 25' 3011 South Fiske Blvd. Rockledge' 305/636-5610 1 2. Cambridge Elementary public school 350 x x x Yes 251 2000 Cambridge Drive Cocoa 305/636-3443 X 3. Clearlake Middle public school 350 x x No 201 1225 Clearlake Rd. Cocoa 305/636-4021 4. Cocoa High p9blic school 900 x x x Yes 201 2000 Tiger Trail Cocoa 305/632-5300 j 5. Fairglen Elementary public school 350 x x jpkage. Yes 251 plant '01 Indian Trail Cocoa 205/631-1993 "Altho h various provisions have been made for providing food services. U:ra food will be brought into the shelters from Outside sources. in ge. NOTE: Shelter capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a standard AST'WATE1 VU1 ACI T, TY ZL 74@ recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE -14 (Cont.) S H E L T E R I N V E N T 0 R Y SHELTER (Address/Phone) TYPE OF CAPACITY POWER WATER WASTEWATER FOOD CAPABILITY VULNERABILITY STRUCTURE FACILITY ANALYSIS BREVARD COUNTY--Central A Page 2 of 4. 6. Golfview Elementary public school 350 X x X No 25' 1530 So. Fiske Blvd. Rockledge 305/632-3880 public school 500 xI x Yes 25' 7. Kennedy Middle 2100 So. Fiske Blvd. Rockledoe 305/632-9500 1 00 public school 550 x 20' 8. Poinsett Middle 501 Poinsett Drive Cocoa 305/6 36-4982 x x x Yes 25' 9. Pineda Elementary public school 500 1 905 Pineda St. Cocoa 305/636-3545 Yes 25' 10. Rockledqe High public school 900 x x x 220 Rockledge Ave. Rockledge 305/636-3711 -Althouqh various Provisions have been made for providing food services. :n genera 1, food will be brought into the shelters from outside sources. lip NOTE: Shelter capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a standard recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE 14 (Cont,) S H E L T E R I N V E N T 0 R Y TYPE OF WASTEWATER VULNERABILITY SHELTER (Address/Phone) CAPACITY POWER WATER FOOD CAPABILITY STRUCTURE FACILITY ANAL SIS /I:@ / / / A@ / *1 b Aj BREVARD COUNTY--Central Page 3 of 4. IR", 11. Saturn Elementary public school 400 X X X Yes 1 15' 1 890 Range Road Cocoa 305/632-6161 12. Brevard Community College-- college 1070 X I E X No 121 Central Campus (lift 1519 Clearlake Road station Cocoa required) 305/632-1111, ext. 304/305 00 4@1- 13. Cocoa Presbyterian Church church 355 X X Yes 201 1404 Dixon Blvd. I Cocoa 305/636-9602 14. First Baptist Church of church 350 X X Yes 251 - - - Rockledge 1810 Cedar Street Rockledge 305/636-1493 15. First United Methodist Church church 166 X ISeptic Yes 151 Cat. of Cocoa tanks 825 Forrest Avenue (3) 1 3 Cocoa 305/636-14811 Z7@ -Although various Provisions have been iude for providing food services. in general. food will be brought into the shelters from outside sources. NOTE: Shelter capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a standard recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE 14 (Cont.) S H E L T E R I N V E N T 0 R Y TYPE OF PO',..'ER WATER WASTEWATER FOOD CAPABILITY VULNERABILITY SHELTER (Address/Phone) STRUCTURE CAPACITY FACILITY ANALYSIS BREVARD COUNTY--Central R, Page 4 of 4. c, q,- T 16. Hope United Church of Christ church 133 X X I Yes 1 15' 2555 So. Fiske Blvd. Rockledge 305/636-0250 17. Mt. Moriah AME Church--Cocoa church 300 X I E x Yes 20' 305 Magnolia Cocoa 305/636-0025 00 20' 18. St. Mary's Church church 100 x X I Yes 1132 So. Seminole Drive Rockledge 305/636-6834 'Although various provisions have been rude for providing food services. in general, food will be brought into the shelters from outside sources. NOTE: Shelter capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a standard c recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE 14 (Cont.) S H E L T E R I N V E N T 0 R Y SHELTER (Address/Phone) TYPE OF CAPACITY POWER WATER WASTEWATER VULNERABILITY STRUCTURE FACILITY FOOD CAPABILITY ANALYSIS BREVARD COUNTY--South C, Page I of 7. A. Koo a, Al 1. Central Jr. High pyblic school 575 X x x I Yes 250 West Brevard Drive Melbourne 20' - - - 305/254-4875 2. Creel Elementary public school 400 gen- Yes 1566 Palmwood Drive era- Melbourne Itor. 201 305/259-3233 00 cn 3. Croton Elementary public school 350 nen x X Yes 201 144� Croton Road era- Melbourne tor. 305/259-3818 4. Eau Gallie High public school 900 gen- x X Yes 25, 1400 Comodore Blvd. lera- Melbourne tor. 305/254-8421 5. Harbor City Elementary public school 350 (gen- x x Yes 1377 Sarno Road era- 20' Melbourne Itor. ,305/254-5534 Wthough various provisions have been made for providing food services. 'n general. food will be brought into the shelters from outside sources. WAS TEWAT/ER FACILITY AQ, NOTE: Shelter capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a standard recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE 14 (Cont.) S H E L T E R I N V E N T 0 R Y SHELTER (Address/Phone) TYPE OF CAPACITY POWER WATER WASTEWATER VULNERABILITY STRUCTURE /FOOD CAPABILITY FACILITY ANALYSIS BREVARD COUNTY--South Page 2 of 7. A 4@ q, 11P/ 'zi" '/4" 6. Johnson Jr. High public school 550 Igen- x X Yes 15, 2155 Croton Road era- I Melbourne itor. 305/259-3338 7. Meadowlane Elementary public school 300 f x x x No 20' Minton Road West Melbourne (305/723-6354 00 8. Melbourne High public school 1000 x x x I Yes 74 Bulldog Blvd. 25' Melbourne 305/723-4151 9. Palm Bay Elementary public school 350 x x X I Yes 515 Allamanda Rd. S.E. 1 251 - - - Palm Bay 305/723-1055 10. Palm Bay High public school 925 I Pirate Lane x x x Yes 251 f 'Ielbourne I 705/723-3031 -@Ithotjqh Ydrious provisions have been made for providing food services. inqenerdl, food will be brought Into the shelters from outside sources. NOTE: Shelter capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a standard recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions- regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE 14 (Cont.) S H E L T E R I N V E N T 0 R Y TYPE OF WASTEWATER SHELTER (Address/Phone) STRUCTURE CAPACITY POWER WATER FACILITY FOOD CAPABILITY VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 'k, A@' BREVARD COUNTY--South ell Page 3 of 7. b 11. Roy Allen Elementary public school 300 gen- X x No 25' 2601 Fountainhead Blvd. jera- Melbourne tor. 305/254-4496 1 12. Saba] Elementary public school 325 Igen- x x Yes 251 1400 Wickham Road era- Melbourne ltor. 305/254-7261 03 1 00 13. Sherwood Elementary public school ' 325 gen- x x Yes 201 900 Post Road era- Melbourne tor. 305/254-6424 1 14-. Stone Middle public school 650 x x x Yes 251 - - - 1101 East University Blvd. Melbourne 305/723-0741 15. Uni.versity Park Elementary public school 300 X x X I Yes 151 500 W. University Blvd. 11elbourne 305/723-2566 'AlthOUqh Various provisions have been made for providing food services. a ;n gen ral, food will be brought into the shelters from outside sources. /7_k_A@b NOTE: Shelter capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a standard recommended by the American Red cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE 14. (Cont. S H E L T E R I N V E N T 0 R Y SHELTER (Address/Phone) TYPE OF CAPACITY POWER WATER WASTEWATER 00 CAPABILITY VULNERABILITY STRUCTURE FACILITY /FO A NALYSIS If If If BREVARD COUNTY--South " / NA If If If If "Z@ If Qf Page 4 of 7. 4.1-15, If If 16. Brevard Community College college 2000 XIgen- Yes 1 20' South Campus era- 3865 N. Wickham Road tor. Melbourne 305/254-0305, ext. 203 17. Florida Institute of college 250 XIE No 15' Technology Country Club & University Park Blvd. 00 Melbourne 305/723-3701 18. Bethel Assembly of Good church 125 X septic Yes 25' 26 West Fee Avenue tank Melbourne 305/727-2606 19. Bowe Gardens Baptist church 166 Xgen- x Yes iera- 20' 2700 Sarno Road Melbourne tor. 305/254-5622 20. First Church of the Nazarene church 110 x x I septic Yes 20' tank L-745 So. Babcock St. Melbourne 0 in ge ral. food will be brought into the shelters from outside sources. *Alth 01h various provisions have been made for providing food services, NOTE: Shelter capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a standard "'e recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE 14 (Cont.) S H E L T E R I N V E N T 0 R Y SHELTER (Address/Phone) TYPE OF CAPACITY POWER WATER WASTEWATER FOOD CAPABILITY VULNERABILITY STRUCTURE FACILITY ANALYSIS / / / 'k, Q_1 BREVARD COUNTY--South Page 5 of 7. Q Q-1 church 575 x Yes 1 201 21. First United Methodist of Melbourne 110 E. New Haven Avenue Melbourne 305/723-6761 church ]Do X I well septic No 251 22. Free Will Baptist tanks 938 Lytton Road (2) Melbourne 305/254-7282 23. Harbor City Baptist church 287 x gen- x x Yes 25' Cat. 2740 No. Pineapple lera- 2 Melbourne tor. 305/494-4774 1 24. Palm Bay United Methodist church 133 X E x x Yes 251 702 S.E. Point Malabar Blvd. Palm Bay 305/727-8651 ugh various provisions have been made for providing food services. in :neral. food will be brought into the shelters from outside sources. NOTE: Shelter capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a.standard recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE.14 (Cont.) S H E L T E R I N V E N T 0 R Y WASTEWATER /FOOD CAP VULNERABILITY SHELTER (Address/Phone) TYPE OF CAPACITY POWER WATER FACILITY ABILITY ANALYSIS STRUCTURE I / BREVARD COUNTY--South cti Page 6 of 7. 25. St. Paul's United Methodist church 166 x I E I x X I Yes 1 20' 1 Cat. gen- 3 1591 Highland Avenue Melbourne era- 305/254-6363 Itor. -L I 26. United Church of Christ church 100 X I x I x Yes 25' Cat. U.S. 1 & Strawbridge Ave. I 1 3 Melbourne I 305/723-3575 1 27. Wesley United Methodist church 125 x I X septic Yes 20' 50 Minton Road tank West Melbourne 305/727-7585 28. Our Lady of Lourdes church/ 150 x x 25' 1710 So. Hickory Street hospital Melbourne 305/723-3636 ,Vo t e :for dialysis (kidney ,nachine)patients only. 827 1 x x x Yes 20' 29. Palm Bay Recreation Center recreation Port Malabar Blvd. center Palm Bay 305/727-7100 -Although various provisions have been made for providing food services. m general. food will be brought into the shelters from outside sources. NOTE: Shelter capacity was based oil 40 sq. ft./person, a standard b recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. TABLE -14 (Co6t.) S H E L T E R N V E N T 0 R Y SHELTER (Address/Phone) TYPE OF CAPACITY POWER WATER WASTEWATER VULNERABILITY STRUCTURE FACILITY / FOOD CAPABILITY ANALYSIS BREVARD COUNTY--South Page 7 of 7. C_j Cj 30. Trinity Towers senior 170 x x x Yes 15' 650 E. Strawbridge Ave. citizens Melbourne center 305/723-7512' Note: For handicapped only. 20. 31. Veterans of Foreign Wars veterans III x x I x septic Post #4206 organization tank 3201 So. Dairy Road Melbourne 305/724-4121 9" 'b' 4; .@'Althouqh various provisions have been made for providing food services, in general, food will be brought into the shelters from outside sources. NOTE: Shelter capacity was based on 40 sq. ft./person, a standard recommended by the American Red Cross and utilized by the local Red Cross chapters within the Study Area. Discussions regarding the availability of capacity reflect this standard. be confusing in a future emergency. Secondly, as the purpose of this study was to provide an overall framework for plan development, the designation of specific operational manpower was beyond the scope of this work effort. SHELTER/MEDICAL FACILITY SURGE ANALYSIS To determine the availability of shelter/medical facilities for use during a hurricane, a surge analysis was completed. Specifically, the intent of the analysis was to determine under what circumstances which facilities are subject to hurricane-induced storm surge and should not be used. In addition, medical and group homes subject to flooding were identified. Since residents of medical facilities and group homes suffer from a lack of mobility and may need continuous medical attention, their potential for special needs during an evacuation must be identified. The methodology used in determining the flooding potential of public shelters within the study area consisted of comparing the geographic location of a particular structure to the predicted level of storm surge inundation as identified in the Vulnerability Analysis. First, each structure was pinpointed on a set of vulnerability area maps, which have been included in the appendices. These maps identify each of the 63 shelters in Brevard County and 26 coastal shelters in Volusia County. The site location numbers found on the vulnerability area maps correspond to the public shelter number in Table .15. Fourteen additional Volusia County shelters are located considerably inland and, consequently, were not considered in the surge vulnerability analysis. Each of the 89 shelters was then identified in regard to its potential for flooding from various categories of storms. The surge vulnerability analysis of public shelters within the two-county study area identified five facilities vulnerable to a category 1-2 storm and 9 facilities vulnerable in a category 3-5 storm. Based on these determinations, recommendations to existing sheltering plans were forwarded to local disaster preparedness officials. The methodology used in determining the feasibility of public shelters was also used in analyzing group homes, hospitals and nursing homes. The surge vulnerability analysis on health care facilities, however, was conducted in regard to the special evacuation needs of the elderly/disabled; namely, transportation logistics and medical supervision. Facilities determined to be susceptible to hurrica 'ne-generated storm surge must develop operational plans for evacuating their patients/residents. Since there will be related demands for trained personnel and proper medical equipment, it is suggested that vulnerable health care facilities (risk facilities) evacuate to similar facilities which are not prone to storm surge inundation (host facilities). Thus, those health care facilities determined not to be located in vulnerable areas must also develop disaster preparedness plans, since they will be called on to accommodate displaced elderly and disabled evacuees. 93 TABLE 15 SURGE VULNERABILITY ANA?.YSIS pige 1. of 1. 5- INSTITUTION (address/phone) @LOOU HAZARD ANALNSIS BREVARD COUNTV Cate- Cate- Cate- Cat - Cite- Not vulnerable gory I gory 2 gory 3 gory 4 gory 5 to Surge (G,Eoup Homez) 1. Asbury Arms Apartments YX 1430 Dixon Blvd. Cocoa (305) 632-4943 2. Bethesda Baptist Retirement Home XX 748 Fordham Road Palm Bay (305) 723-3288 3. Brevard Hotel XX 112 Indian River Drive Cocoa (305) 636-1411 4. Titusville Tower XX 1405 Indian River Avenue Titusville (305) 269-2810 5. Tompkins Adult Congregate Home 100 Lee Road West Melbourne (305) 724-4950 6. Trinity Towers East 700 East Strawbridge Avenue Melbourne (305) 723-7511 7. Trinity Towers South XX New Haven Drive Mel bourne (305) 723-8620 8. Trinity Towers West XX 650 East Strawbridge Avenue Melbourne (305) 723-7512 9. Vereene's Love & Care Home XX 1304 East Gibbs Street Melbourne (305) 727-0708 (Ho6pi.taes) 10. Cape Canaveral Hospital XX 701 West Cocoa Beach Causeway Cocoa Beach (305) 783-7721 94 TABLE 15 (Cont.) SURGE VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS page _2 or 15 INSTITUTION (address/phone) FLOOD HAZARD ANALYSIS BREVARD COUNTV (continued) Cate- Cat e- Cate- Cate- Cate- Not Vulnerable gory I gory 2 gory 3 gory 4 gory 5 to Surge (Hoapi"--continued) 11. James H. Holmes Regional Med. Ctr. xx 1350 So. Hickory Street Melbourne (305) 727-7000 12. Jess Parish Memorial Hospital xx 751 No. Washington Avenue Titusville (305) 268-6111 13. Wuestoff Memorial Hospital xx 110 Longwood Avenue Rockledge (305) 636-2211 (Nuising Hoinez) 14. Adare Medical Center xx 1775 Huntington Lane Rockledge (305) 632-7341 15. Carnegie Gardens Nursing Home xx 1415 So. Hickory Street Melbourne (305) 723-1321 16. Florida Convalescent Home, Inc. 516 East Sheridan Road Melbourne (305) 727-0984 17. Medic-Home Health Ctr. of Melbourn xx 1420 So. Oak Street Melbourne (305) 723-3215 18. Merritt Manor Nursing Home xx 125 Alma Boulevard Merritt Island (305) 453-0202 19. Sunny Pines Convalescent Ctr.,Inc. xx 587 Barton Boulevard Rockledge (305) 632-6300 20. Titusville Nursing & Convalesc.Ctr. xx 1705 Jess Parish Court Titusville (305) 269-5720 95 TABLE 15 Con t.) SURGE VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS page 1--.of 15 INSTITUTION (address/phone) FLOOD HAZARD ANALYSIS Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Not Vulnerable BREVARD COUNTV (continued), gory I gory 2 gory 3 gory 4 gory 5 to Surge (Nu.uing Home.6- -continued) 21. West Melbourne Health Care Center XX 125 Alma Boulevard Merritt Island (305) 453-0202 (Pubtic Shettvus) - NORTH 22. Apollo Elementary XX 3300 Knox McRae Drive Titusville (305) 267-7890 23. Astronaut High XX 800 War Eagle Boulevard Titusville (305) 267-5500 24. Coquina Elementary XX 850 Knox McRae Drive Titusville (305) 267-7014 25. Imperial Estates Elementary XX 5525 Kathy Drive Titusville (305) 267-1773 26. Jackson Middle XX 1515 Knox McRae Drive Titusville (305) 269-1812 27. Madison Middle XX 3375 Dairy Road Titusville (305) 267-4077 28. Mims Elementary XX 2582 US Highway 1 Mims (305) 267-3344 29. Oak Park Elementary XX 3395 Dairy Road Titusville (305) 269-3252 30. Pinewood Elementary XX 3654 Lionel Road Mims (305) 269-4530 96 TABLE 15 (Cont.) SURGE VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS page -4 of 15 INSTITUTION (address/phone) FLOOD HAZARD ANALYSIS BREVARD COUNTV (continued) Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Not Vulnerable gory I gory 2 gory 3 gory 4 gory 5 to Surge (Pubtic ShetteAz - NORTH -- continued) 31. Riverview Elementary xx 3000 Jolly Street Titusville (305) 269-2325 32. South Lake Elementary xx 3755 Garden Street Titusville (305) 269-1022 33. Titusville High xx 1850 So. Washington Ave. Titusville (30S) 269-3561 34. Brevard Comm. College-North Campus xx 1111 No. Washington Avenue Titusville (305) 269-5664 35. First Presbyterian Church of Titusville xx 1300 Golfview Drive Titusville (305) 267-2745 (Pubtic Shettv,%s) - CENTRA 36. Hans Christian Andersen Elementary xx 3011 So. Fiske Boulevard Rockledge 636-5610 37. Cambridge Elementary xx 2000 Cambridge Drive Cocoa (305) 636-3443 38. Clearlake Middle xx 1225 Clearlake Road Cocoa (305) 636-4021 39. Cocoa High xx 2000 Tiger Trail Cocoa (305) 632-5300 40. Fairglen Elementary xx 201 Indian Trail Cocoa (305) 631-1993 97 TABLE 15 (Cont.) SURGE VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS page 5 of 15 INSTITUTION (address/phone) FLOOD HAZARD ANALYSIS BREVARD COUNTY (continued) Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Cat - Not Vulnerable gory 1 gory 2 gory 3 gory 4 gory 5 to Surge (Pubtic Shettm - CENML - continuedl 41. Golfview Elementary XX 1530 So. Fiske Boulevard Rockledge (305) 632-3880 42. Kennedy Middle XX 2100 So. Fiske Boulevard Rockledge (305) 632-9500 43. Poinsett Middle XX 501 Poinsett Drive Cocoa (305) 636-4982 44. Pineda Elementary XX 905 Pineda Street Cocoa (305) 636-3545 45. Rockledge High XX 220 Rockledge Avenue Rockledge (305) 636-3711 46. Saturn Elementary XX 880-Range Road Cocoa (305) 632-6161 47. Brevard Comm. College Central Campus XX 1519 Clearlake Road Cocoa (305) 632-1111, Ext. 304/305 48. Cocoa Presbyterian Church XX 1404 Dixon Boulevard Cocoa (305) 636-9602 49. Ist Baptist Church of Rockledge XX 1810 Cedar Street Rockledge (305) 636-1493 50. lst United Meth. Church of Cocoa XX 825 Forrest Avenue Cocoa (305) 636-4811 98 TABLE 15 (Cont.) SURGE VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS page 6 of 15 INSTITUTION (address/phone) FLOOD HAZARD ANALYSIS Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Not Vulnerable BREVARD COUMTY (continued) gory I gory 2 gory 3 gory 4 gory 5 to Surge (Pub,tic ShettvLA - fft4TRAL - continued) 51. Hope United Church of Christ xx 2555 So. Fiske Boulevard Rockledge (305) 636-0250 52. Mt. Moriah AME Church - Cocoa xx 305 Magnolia Cocoa (305) 636-0025 53. St. Mary's Church xx 1132 So. Seminole Drive Rockledge (305) 636-6834 (Pubtic Shetteu SOUTH 54. Central Jr. High xx 250 West Brevard Drive Melbourne (305) 254-4875 55. Creel Elementary xx 1566 Palmwood Drive Melbourne (305) 259-3233 56. Croton Elementary xx 1449 Croton Road Melbourne (305) 259-3818 57. Eau Gallie High xx 1400 Commodore Boulevard Melbourne (305) 254-8421 58. Harbor City Elementary xx 1377 Sarno Road Melbourne (305) 254-5534 59. Johnson Jr. High xx 2155 Croton Road Melbourne (305) 259-3338 60. Meadowlane Elementary xx Minton Road West Melbourne (305) 723-6354 99 TABLE 15 (Cont.) SURGE VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS page 7 of 15 INSTITUTION (address/phone) FLOOD HAZARD ANALYSIS BREVARD COUNTV (continued) Cate Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate Not Vulnerable gory 1 gory 2 gory 3 gory 4 gory 5 to Surge (Pubtic ShetteAA - SOUTH - continued) 61. Melbourne High xx 74 Bulldog Boulevard Melbourne (305) 723-4151 62. Palm Bay Elementary xx 515'Allamanda Road, SE Palm Bay (305) 723-1055 63. Palm Bay High xx 1 Pirate Lane Melbourne (305) 723-3031 64. Roy Allen Elementary xx 2601 Fountainhead Boulevard Melbourne (305) 254-4496 65. Sabal Elementary xx 1400 Wickham Road Melbourne (305) 254-7261 66. Sherwood Elementary xx 900 Post Road Melbourne (305) 254-6424 67. Stone Middle xx 1101 East University Boulevard Melbourne (305) 723-0741 68. University Park Elementary XX4 600 W. University Boulevard Melbourne (305) 723-2566 69. Brevard Comm. College-So.Campus xx 3865 No. Wickham Road Melbourne (305) 254-0305, Ext. 203 70. FL Institute of Technology xx Country Club & University Park Blvd. Melbourne (305) 723-3701 100 TABLE 15 (Cont.) SURGE VULNLRABILITY ANALYSIS page 8 of 15 INSTITUTION (address/phone) FLOOD HAZARD ANALYSIS Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Not Vulnerable BREVARD COUNTY (continuedl gory 1 gory 2 gory 3 gory 4 gory 5 to Surge (Pubtic She"eA,6 - SOUTH - continued) 71. Bethel Assembly of God xx 26 West Fee Avenue Melbourne -(305) 727-2606 72. Bowe Gardens Baptist xx 2700 Sarno Road Melbourne (305) 254-5622 73. lst Church of the Nazarene xx 2745 So. Babcock Street Melbourne (305) 723-3745 74. Ist United Methodist of Melbourne xx 110 E. New Haven Avenue Melbourne (305) 723-6761 75. Free Will Baptist xx 938 Lytton Road Melbourne (305) 254-7282 76. Harbor City Baptist xx 2740 No. Pineapple Melbourne (305) 494-4774 77. Palm Bay United Methodist xx 702 SE Point Malabar Boulevard Palm Bay (305) 727-8651 78. St. Paul's United Methodist xx 1591 Highland Avenue Melbourne (305) 254-6363 79. United Church of Christ xx US I & Strawbridge Ave. Melbourne (305) 723-3575 80. Wesley United Methodist xx 50 Minton Road West Melbourne (305) 727-7585 101 TABLE 15_"__('C0'nt.) SURGE VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS page 9 of 15 INSTITUTION (address/phone) FLOOD HAZARD ANALYSIS BREVARD COUAITY leontZnued) Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Not Vulnerable gory I gory 2 gory 3 gory 4 gory 5 to Surge (Pubtic ShetteAa - SOUTH - continued) 81. Our Lady of Lourdes xx 1710 So. Hickory Street Melbourne (305) 723-3636(Note: For dialysis (kidney machine) patients only) 82. Palm Bay Recreation Center xx Port Malabar Boulevard Palm Bay (305) 727-7100 83. Veterans of Foreign Wars xx Post #4206 3201 So. Dairy Road Melbourne (305) 724-4121 - - - - - - - - - - - - - F-8-1 Trinity Towers West xx 650 E. Strawbridge Ave. Melbourne (305) 723-7512 (Note: For handicapped only) 102 TABLE 15 (Cont.) SURGE VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS page 10 of 15 INSTITUTION (address/phone) FLOOD HAZARD ANALYSIS Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Not Vulne able VOLUSIA COUNTV gory I gory 2 gory 3 gory 4 gory 5 to Surge (Ckoup HomW 1. Beach Manor, Inc. XX 331 So. Ridgewood Avenue Daytona Beach (904) 255-2389 2. Big Tree Manor XX 1000 Big Tree Road Daytona Beach (904) 761-0690 3. Clark's Rooming House XX 545 magnolia Avenue Daytona Beach (904) 253-2139 4. Country Manor XX 1127 West Herbert Street Port Orange (904) 761-7678 5. Golden Days Rest Home XX 834 No. Halifax Daytona Beach (904) 253-6364 6. Lynn's Care Center, Inc. XX 1562 Garden Avenue Holl Hill (904@ 672-3135 7. Lynn's Care Center, Inc., Phase 11 XX 1529 Ridge Avenue Holl Hill (904@ 672-3966 8. Mae Walls Care XX 1218 Old Kings Road Holl Hill (904@ 255-9225 9. Martin Rest Home XX 1301 Pine Ridge Drive Holly Hill (904) 255-2455 10. Ocean View Manor XX 624 So. Atlantic Daytona Beach (904) 258-5116 103 TABLE 15 (Cont.) SURGE VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS page 11 of' 15 INSTITUTION (address/phone) FLOOD HAZARD ANALYSIS -VOLUSIA COUNTV (continued) Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Not Vulnerable gory I gory 2 gory 3 gory 4 gory 5 to Surge (G4oup Home-6 - continued) 11. Port Orange Elderly Guest Home, Inc. xx 414 Orange Avenue Port Orange (904) 767-5604 12. Rastelle Manor xx 934 So. Ridgewood Avenue Daytona Beach (904) 252-2627 13. Shady Oaks Rest Home xx 1208 Kennedy Avenue Daytona Beach (904) 672-9895 14. Signorelli's Elderly Care Home xx 158 Farmbrook Road Harbor Oaks (904) 767-1613 15. Sugar Lake Retirement Home xx 224 Mission Drive New Smyrna Beach (904) 427-2492 16. The Fair Haven xx 86 So. Ridgewood Ormond Beach (904) 677-1022 17. The Greater Love Retirement Center xx 1645 Center Street Holl Hill .(904@ 673-0957 18. Todd Boarding Home xx 522 Walker Street Daytona Beach (904) 252-5426 (Ho6pitafs) 19. Daytona Beach General Hospital xx 1340 Ridgewood Avenue Holly Hill (904) 677-5100 20. Daytona Coiimunity Hospital xx 400 No. Clyde Morris Boulevard Daytona Beach (904) 255-8192 104 TABLE 15 (Cont. SURGE VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS page 12 of 15 INSTITUTION (address/phone) FLOOD HAZARD ANALYSIS VOLUSIA COUNTV (continued) Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Not Vulnerable gory I gory 2 gory 3 gory 4 gory 5 to Surge WoApitat-6 - continued) 21. Fish Memorial Hospital XX 300 Lytle Avenue New Smyrna Beach (904) 255-8981 22. Halifax Hospital Medical Center XX Clyde Morris Boulevard Daytona Beach (904) 255-0161 23. Ormond Beach Hospital XX 264 So. Atlantic Avenue Ormond Beach (904) 672-4161 24. Ormond Memorial Hospital XX 875 Sterthaus Avenue Ormond Beach NN) F311-1700 25. Bowmdri's Nursing Center XX 350 So. Ridgewood Avenue Ormond Beach (904) 677-4545 26. Clyatt Memorial Geriatric Center XX 1001 So. Beach Daytona Beach (904) 255-3653 27. Daytona Beach Geriatric Center XX 1055 Third Street Daytona Beach (904) 252-3686 28. Daytona Manor Nursing Home XX 650 Reed Canal Road South Daytona Beach (904) 767-4831 29. Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc. XX 324 Wilder Boulevard Daytona Beach (904) 252-2600 30. Good Samaritan Nursing Center XX 325 So. Segrave Court' Daytona Beach (904) 253-6791 105 TABLE 15 (Cont.) SURGE VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS page 13 of 15 INSTITUTION (address/phone) FLOOD HAZARD ANALYSIS VOLUSIA COUNTV (continued) Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Not Vulnerable gor@ gory 2 gory 3 gory 4 gory 5 to Surge (NwtA@ng Home,6 - continued) 31. Holiday Care Center xx 1031 So. Beach Daytona Beach (904) 255-2453 32. Huntington Square Convalarium xx 100 Broadway Daytona Beach (904) 255-6571 33. Medic Home Health Ctr. of Ormond Bc xx 170 No. Kings Road Ormond Beach (904) 677-7955 34. Ocean View Nursing Home xx 2810 So. Atlantic Avenue New Smyrna Beach (904) 428-6424 35. Ormond Lutheran Manor xx P.O. Drawer 397 Ormond Beach (904) 677-9121 (Pubtic Sheeteu) - EAST 36. Burris-Oak Hill Elementary xx 104 Ridge Road Oak Hill (904) 345-3453 37. Campbell Center xx 601 So. Keech Street Daytona Beach (904) 253-1686 38. Chisholm Center xx 577 Ronnoc Lane New Smyrna Beach (904) 428-2475 39. Daytona,Bedch Comm. College xx 500 Welch Boulevard, Bldgs. 14,16,2i Daytona Beach 40. Edgewater Elementary xx 550 So. Old Count Road Edgewater (904) 427-5296 106 TABLE 15 (Cont.) SURGE VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS page 14 of 15 INSTITUTION (address/phone) FLOOD HAZARD ANALYSIS Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Not Vulnerable VOLUSIA County (continued) gory I gory 2 gory 3 gory 4 gory 5 to Surge (Pubtic ShetteA,6 - EAST - continued) 41. Highlands-Hillcrest Elementary xx 323 Heineman Street Daytona Beach (904) 253-1891 (Note: medical Shelter only.) 42. Holly Hill Elementary xx 1049 Ridgewood Avenue Holly Hill (904) 252-6271 43. Holly Hill Junior High xx 1200 Center Street Holly Hill (904) 2S2-0421 44. Hurst Elementary xx 1340 Wright Street Holl Hill (9U,l@ 255-3846 45. Knights of Columbus Hall xx 509 No. Orange Street New Smyrna Beach (904) 427-4211 Ajedi,@al Shelter only.) 46. Mainland Junior High xx 215 Third Avenue Daytona Beach (904) 255-4561 47. Mainland Senior High xx 125 So. Clyde Morris Daytona Beach (904) 252-0401 48. New Smyrna Jr. High Xx 100 Live Oak Street New Smyrna Beach (904) 428-5792 49. North Ridgewood Elementary xx 365 No. Ridgewood Avenue Daytona Beach (904) 252-7322 50. Ormond Beach Elementary xx 100 Cordin Avenue Onnund Beach (904) 677-3611 107 TABLE 15 (Cont.) SURGE VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS page 15-of 15 INSTITU11ON (address/phone) FLOOD HAZARD ANALYSIS Cate, 1gCate- Cate- Cate- Cate- Not Vulnerable VOLUSIA COUNTY (continued) gory ory 2 gory 3 gory 4 gory 5 to Surge (Pub,tic She.tteA-i - EAST - continued) 51. Ormond Beach Junior High XX 151 Domicilio Avenue Ormond Beach (904) 677-7110 52. Ormond Beach Senior Citizens Center XX 194 West Granada Avenue Ormond Beach (904) 677-0311, Ext. 256 (Note: Medical Shelter only.) 53. R. Patillo Elementary 300 Sixth Street New Smyrna Beach (904) 427-1392 54. Port Orange Elementary XX 402 Dunlawton Avenue Port Orange (904) 767-0113 55. South Daytona Elementary XX 600 Elizabeth Place South Daytona (904) 767-0221 56. South Ridgewood Elementary XX 731 So. Ridgewood Avenue Daytona Beach (904) 252-0592 57. Spruce Creek Elementary XX 642 Taylor Road Port Orange (904) 788-1341 58. Spruce Creek Senior High XX 1484 Taylor Road Port Orange (904) 761-0220 59. Tomoka Elementary XX R.F.D. I Old Tomoka Road Ormond Beach (904) 677-3822 60. Turie T. Small Elementary XX 800 South Street Daytona Beach (904) 252-4738 61. West Side Elementary XX 1210 Jimmy Ann Drive Daytona Beach (904) 253-1671 108 With the assistance of the East Central Florida Hospital Council, State Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, Civil Defense officers and other local officials, health care facilities within the study area were identified. The predicted surge heights provided through the SPLASH II model and the maps of flood-prone areas produced from the SPLASH II results allow for assessing the flooding potential of group homes, hospitals, and nursing homes. As with public shelters, each health care facility was identified in regard to its location within a vulnerable area. The flooding potential of group homes, hospitals, and nursing homes in Brevard and Volusia counties is summarized in Table 15. As Table 15 illustrates, there are two group homes vulnerable in a category 1-2 storm and seven vulnerable in a category 3-5 storm. This analysis also identified three hospitals vulnerable to storm surge in a category 1-2 storm and one vulnerable in a category 3-5 storm. Finally, nursing homes determined to be susceptible to storm surge included two in a category 1-2 hurricane and six in a category 3-5 hurricane. This information on surge-threatened health care facilities was also forwarded to local disaster preparedness officials and appropriate medical officials. It is.recommended that Table 15 be used in defining risk to host evacuation evacuation contingency plans for health care facilities. SHELTER DEMAND Residents identified as potential evacuees in the Vulnerability Analysis may seek various alternative forms of shelter at varying d'istances from their points of origin. These alternatives may include local public shelters, local hotels or motels, local friends' or relatives' homes, or destinations further inland outside the residents' county. The first step necessary in calculating public shelter demand is to quantify these various shelter preferences. The Behavioral Survey indicated that approximately 18.3% of the coastal residents sampled in the survey intended to utilize public shelter facilities. In addition,'another 13% responded that they did not know what their destination would be. It would not be expected that all of the respondents who have not made shelter plans would seek public shelter, although a substantial number undoubtedly would. Therefore, to arrive at possibly a "worst case" situation, one- third of the "do not know"*responses were combined with the public shelter- bound responses to provide a total percentage of the evacuation population predicted to seek public shelter. These combined percentages add up to 22.3% of the evacuating population. The balance of the evacuating residents would be expected to seek shelter at the homes of friends/relatives, in hotels/motels, or travel outside the county. This information is summarized in Table 16. For comparison purposes, the percentage of residents in other coastal areas of Florida seeking public shelter is,shown in Table 17. As can be seen, 109 TABLE 16- BEHAVIORAL SURVEY RESPONSE DESTINATIONS Destination: Shelter 18.3% Friend or Relative 38.1% Hotel or Motel 30.6% Do Not Know 13.0%. 110 TABLE 17 COMPARISON OF BEHAVIORAL SURVEYS WITHIN FLORIDA DESTINATIONS Ea,st Centuce Ea,6t Centwl Lee Tampa Sanibet- Southwe6t Southea,6t DESTINATION Ftokida Ftoxida County Bay Captiva FtoAida Ftokida Coa6tat Intand Shelter 18.3% 45.6% 21.0% 37.9% 8.1% 24.0% 23.1% Friend or 38.1% 18.2% 25.8% 45.4% 13.0% 28.0% Relative .53.0% Hotel or 30.6% 14.6% 18.8% 38.1% 42.0% 10.2% Motel Do Not Know 13.0% 21.6% 26.0% 17.4% 8.4% 21.0% 11.2% there is a relatively low demand among East Central Florid *a coastal residents for public shelter facilities when compared to other coastal areas. It has been hypothesized that since many of the Brevard and Volusia county residents had evacuated during Hurricane David in 1979, they may have made plans for future evacuations. These plans often involve making non-public shelter arrangements. By applying the percentages from the Behavioral Survey to the total number of persons threatened by an approaching hurricane, an assessment of total shelter demand can be made. SHELTER CAPACITY It would be expected that shelter usage would vary, depending on the intensity of the storm confronting the region and its point of landfall on the coast. The identification of vulnerable areas and the population-at- risk allows demand under various scenarios to be applied to the maximum amount of shelter space available under those same scenarios. In Brevard County, for a category 172 storm situation, there are currently estimated to be 26,679 spaces available to meet a projected demand of 26,733 persons--resulting in a deficit of 54 spaces. This deficit increases during a category 3-5 storm situation, where the capacity decreases to 25,347 spaces but the demand increases to 28,385. Within Volusia County, a sizable excess of shelter space is available during each of the storm scenarios. In a category 1-2 storm, 31,921 spaces exist to meet an anticipated demand by 10,599 persons, resulting in excess capacity of 21,322 spaces. For a category 3-5 storm situation, the excess capacity was calculated to be 7,218, resulting from a demand for 22,301 spaces and available spaces of 29,519. PUBLIC SHELTER ASSIGNMENTS For the purposes of this study, no formal assignment of shelters was made. This was done in response to current policy in both Brevard and Volusia counties, which discourages the designation of a particular shelter location for a particular area of the county. The reasoning behind this policy is that such a designation reduces the flexibility and options available to local officials in opening specific shelters to meet changing demands by limiting their ability to allocate limited manpower and resources on an as-needed basis. 112 TABLE 18 Shelter Capacity 1-2 Storm 3-5 Storm Brevard Co. Volusia Co. Brevard Co. Volusia Co. Shelter Capacity 26,679 31,921 25,347 29,519 minus Shelter Demand 269733 10,599 28,385 22,301 equals Shelter Capacity Deficit -54 -3,038 or Excess +21,322 +7,218 113 ALTERNATE SHELTERS Due to the deficit of public shelter spaces in Brevard County, an assessment of hotel/motel,units was made to determine if alternate shelter space was available to accommodate the additional evacuees. Information from the East Central Florida Regional Planning Council's Hotel/Motel Inventory was used to identify the number of units existing in the county, and information on seasonal occupancy rates was provided by Brevard County. The time frame for calculating the seasonal occupancy rates was June- November, the time period formally designated as hurricane season. According to information provided, Brevard County experienced a 63% occupancy rate during this period. The total number of hotel/motel units which could be expected to be available for shelter may be obtained by applying the 37% vacancy rates to the number of hotel/motel units in the county. In identifying possible alternate shelter capacities, the units considered for shelter use were only those situated outside the identified vulnerable areas in the inland portions of Brevard County. Generally, due to the format in which the information is collected, this meant that hotel/motel units lying east of 1-95 were not considered. In addition, the total number of units identified were delineated by size, double- or single-room occupancy. Following the general rule of thumb utilized in the Inland Shelter Study, 90% of the units will be double rooms accommodating four adults and 10% of the units will be single rooms accommodating two adults. From this information, the capacity of unoccupied hotel/motel rooms was calculated to be 8,561. In assessing the impact of the potential alternate shelter inventory on the shelter deficit that currently exists -in Brevard County, it is important to consider those evacuees whose original intention was to seek shelter in a hotel/motel. From the Behavioral Survey, 30.6% of the residents listed "hotel/motel" as their planned destinations. Adding one- third of the respondents who answered "do not know" increases the figure to 35%. Assuming half would attempt to do so within Brevard County, approximately 21,000 residents would seek alternate shelters and the existing capacity would not be sufficient to accommodate these evacuees. Consequently, a deficit in hotel/motel units would occur without considering the shelter demands of evacuees unable to find public shelter. Two conclusions can be reached for this assessment. First, provisions must be developed for "passing through" those evacuees unable to be sheltered in Brevard County to inland counties. Second, ongoing efforts should be made to identify and secure additional public shelters within Brevard County to alleviate the anticipated shelter deficit. 114 TABLE 19 ALTERNATE SHELTER ANALYSIS -- BREVARD COUNTY (Hotels/Motels) Alternate Shelter Capacity 8,561 Category 1-2 Category 3-5 minus Alternate Shelter Demand 20,702 21,980 equals Alternate Shelter Deficit 12,141 13,419 plus Public Shelter Deficit 54 3,038 equals Total Alternate Shelter Deficit 12,195 16,517 115 TRANSPORTATION ANALYSIS ELEMENT INTRODUCTION Previous sections of the report have discussed the background conditions which are to be used as the basis for estimating evacuation times. This background data was developed from three major tasks which included: a computer-based storm surge model defining the magnitude and extent of the threat to the region's coast; a statistically significant investigation predicting the probable behavior of coastal residents in a hurricane emergency situation; and an inventory and analysis of the facilities and resources available to local disaster preparedness officials to direct an evacuation. In performing these tasks, emphasis was placed on measuring as many of the variables as possible to permit construction of a series of quantitative evacuation scenarios. Each scenario developed represents a different situation which may occur in terms of the magnitude of a storm approaching the coast, the number of people affected, the availability of sheltering facilities, and public response during an evacuation. Based upon this information, traffic movements could then be developed which may realistically simulate a one-time movement of evacuating vehicles over the existing highway network. This section of the report will discuss the assumptions and procedures used in undertaking the transportation analysis and present an estimation of the times required to evacuate the threatened areas of the region's coastal counties. To provide local officials with a useful tool for making decisions, both clearance time and evacuation time estimates have been included as well as an explanatory text as to their significance to a safe evacuation of the coastal areas. Data developed as part of the transportation modeling effort has been included in the appendices. STUDY APPROACH The approach selected for conducting the transportation analysis was the result of investigations of similar studies previously completed in the State as well as a number of evacuation-related studies performed both in Florida and other states. Emphasis was placed on selection of a methodology which would not only provide a comprehensive investigation of selected traffic movements for different hurritane situations but also a methodology which could be packaged for future updating by local govern- ments as population and roadway network changes occur. A major criterion considered in this regard was development of procedures which did not require use of the FDOT main frame computer facilities. The objective of the transportation analysis is two-fold: first, to iden- tify the period of time that is required to complete the movement of traffic throughout the study area from locations of risk to areas of safety; second, to relate this time to the time available before hurricane 117 conditions pose a threat to evacuating residents. The information presented in this section provides both of these times which will allow local officials an opportunity to amend the times as a situation develops. METHODOLOGY The following methodology was followed in developing the clearance time estimates for the study. Establish Evacuation Road Network Activities performed for this work task focused on. developing a basic evacuation road network for the two-county area. Inventory Characteristics of Network Links This task involved an inventory of the evacuation road network links for input into the calculation of roadway capacities. Elements used in this calculation included roadway widths, number of lanes, horizontal and vertical alignment, intersection features such as green time to cycle length ratios, percent trucks, and peak hour factors. Features such as facility type and area type were also recorded for use in the calculations. Establish Capacities of Evacuation Road Network Using the data from the tasks above, calculations were made of the existing capacities of the road network. Capacities were based upon Level of Service D traffic conditions (as defined in the 1965 Highway Capacity Manual), since evacuation traffic involves high volume to roadway capacity' situations. It was uncertain whether the causeways/bridge@s leading from the barrier islands, or the intersections contained within the evacuation roadway network, created the most restrictive points of traffic flow. Therefore, roadway capacities inventoried in,the network links (above) were used to develop intersection approach capacities in addition to link capacities. This capacity determination assisted in developing alternative routing strategies as well as metering traffic at critical links to determine clearance times. Trip Generation This task involved the preparation of productions and attractions by: Evacuation Zone; Hurricane Scenario; and Destination. Socio-economic variables available through the 1980 Census data tapes were utilized to calculate total evacuation vehicles for each evacuating zone according to the selected storm scenario. These data were formatted by the proposed destination of evacuees. 118 Distribution Analysis This task distributed trips between evacuation zones (Productions) and shelter destinations (Attractions). The primary inputs for this task were the traffic generated by evacuation zones and probable destinations of evacuees by zone. This information was derived from previous tasks and material developed as part of Phase I of the ECFRPC's Hurricane Evacuation Study. Trip Assignment This task assigned trips developed in the previous task to the established evacuation road network. Vehicular trips, as opposed to person trips, were used as the basis for this activity. Critical Link Identification Based on the information developed through the previous work tasks, critical links of the evacuation network were identified. A series of volume to capacity ratios (V/C) were calculated to determine which roadway segments would be most congested in moving evacuation vehicles. The volumes calculated incorporated all traffic movements anticipated to occur on a roadway segment to ensure that all impacts were considered. The crit*ical links identified through this task were used to calculate clearance times for each assumed storm scenario and each tested behavioral response parameter. Clearance Time Analysis Utilizing the identified critical links, this task estimated the clearance times for each of the five regional scenarios. Traffic assignments developed previously were loaded onto the network in accordance with three public response distribution curves. Clearance time estimates involved three separate calculations. These included the time required to travel from the evacuation zone to the critical point in the link, movement through the congested point on the link, and travel to an acceptable shelter destination (or out of county). Arrival times were calculated based on travel distance and travel speed from the evacuating zone to the critical point on the roadway network. Floating car technique measurements taken during peak hour conditions were used to determine travel speed. In the identified critical links, the total assigned volume exceeds the link capacity, causing a queue to form. The queue will only dissipate at a rate approximately equal to the link capacity, requiring excess vehicles assigned to the link to wait until the following hourly interval. The sum 119 of the intervals requi-red to clear the link is the queuing delay --fi-m-e- experienced. In determining the queuing delay time for each of the critical links, two factors were considered. First, as the rate at which traffic enters the critical link dictates the amount of time in which it can be cleared, various arrival rates derived from the behavioral response curves were considered as well as each of the five hurricane scenarios. Second, background traffic influences the amount of congestion experienced at each critical link. Therefore, the arrival rate of this traffic was factored into the analysis. Link travel time, which is the time necessary to clear evacuation traffic from the critical link once past the critical point of congestion, was calculated based on travel speeds and distance to the most distant destination. TRANSPORTATION MODELING INPUT ASSUMPTIONS The transportation analysis provides clearance times based on a set of assumed conditions and behavioral responses. An actual storm approaching the Brevard and Volusia coastal areas will almost certainly deviate in some way from the scenarios used for this modeling effort. Considering the numerous variables involved in defining a hurricane--such as size, track, intensity and how it is perceived by residents--this should not be surprising. To accommodate the differences between the scenarios and what may actually occur, and to provide a useful tool for local officals, those variables having the greatest influence on clearance times were identified and then varied. This allowed for a range within which the true clearance time value might fall. Regional Storm Scenarios As mentioned in previous sections of the report, 74 hypothetical hurricanes were simulated using the National Hurricane Center's computer models. Storms were varied by point of landfall, Saffir-Simpson category, and general movement. Calculation of clearance times for all simulated storms, however, would be cumbersome and unusable for local emergency preparedness officials, and also inappropriate, given the limitations of current hurricane forecasting and storm surge simulation. Therefore, five regional storms were selected for use in the transportation analysis. Table 20 provides the regional storm number, the counties affected, and a brief description of each selected storm. These storms were chosen from the 74 storms modeled by selecting the storm tracks causing the greatest storm surge impacts on various portions of an individual county. A paralleling storm was included to examine the transportation impacts to the region resulting from a progressive evacuation of counties along the east coast of the State. 120 TABLE 20 TRANSPORTATION MODELING REGIONAL STORM SCENARIOS Regional Storm Number Storm Description Volusia Brevard I Category 1-2 landfalling x A storm at Melbourne 2 Category 3-5 landfalling A B sto.,@,m at Melbourne 3 Category 1-2 landfalling A x storm at New Smyrna Beach 4 Category 3-5 landfalling B A storm at New Smyrna Beach 5 Paralleling storm regionwide A A Key: X = no evacuation required A = Category 1-2 storm B = Category 3-5 storm 121 It is important to note t hat the five Saffir-Simpson categories of storms have been collapsed into two ranges for each county. This was done recognizing the similarities of storm surge heights for different .intensities of storms and realizing the manner in which storms change intensity over time. For both Brevard and Volusia counties, storms were grouped into Category 1-2 and Category 3-5. Population-at-Risk One of the key inputs to the transportation analysis was an identification of those residents who should evacuate for a particular storm situation. Through the hazard analysis, those areas subject to flooding from both storm surge and freshwater were delineated and the number of residents in those areas calculated. This allowed for an identification of those residents who must evacuate for each storm scenario as well as those residents who need not evacuate. The transportation analysis then produces clearance times which reflect only needed evacuation movements. Behavioral and Socio-Economic Assumptions To perform the transportation analysis, a number of assumptions were made concerning how the population-at-risk would respond relative to an evacuation order, how many of the available vehicles at residential locations would be used for evacuation, and what percentage of the evacuees would go to various catedories of destinations. A number of assumptions were made concerning dwelling unit and hotel/motel occupancies and number of persons per mobile home and hotel/motel unit. To determine the percentage of persons who would leave during each hourly interval of the evacuation, three behavioral response curves were developed for the region. One curve approximated a long lead time provided by the National Weather Service and a slow response by evacuees; a second curve reflected a situation with a short lead time and a quick response required by those choosing to evacuate; a third curve was similar to the response rate provided by the behavioral survey, with some adjustment made to fit between the first and second curves. Response curves define the rate at which evacuation vehicles load onto the street network at hourly intervals. By examining three different rates of response, reflecting responses reported during previous hurricane evacuations, a range of times may be provided into which-the-actual time of an evacuation will fall. The response curves used for this study are depicted in Figure 15, In addition to evacuating traffic, background traffic was added to the calculations to account for those persons traveling to stores or homes. Consistent with previous hurricane studies completed in the State, this 122 FIGURE 15 ESTIMATION OF CUMULATIVE DEMAND Behavioral Response Curves 100 90 Quick Resp(nse 80 W F= 70 0 \\.Slow Response 60 (A a) U 50 fo 4- 4J 40 Behavioral Survey S- Response 30 20 10 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 hours before evacuation hours after o order order rder 123 traffic was hypothesized to load onto street networks in an inverse manner relative to the behavioral response curves. As an example, two to five hours before an evacuation order is given when the first 20-30% of evacuees are leaving home, 70-80% of the background traffic will be loading onto the street network. Several other assumptions used in developing the transportation model included: A) 2 persons/household 1.9 persons/mobile home B) 1.5 vehicles per household .89 vehicles per person (Brevard County) .77 vehicles per person (Volusia County) C) 10% of vehicles will be used in an evacuation @1.905 persons/vehicles (Brevard County) 2.204 persons/vehicles (Volusia County) D) Due to adverse weather conditions, such as rain and wind, capacity of roads is reduced to about 84% of dry weather capacity. In developing these assumptions, the total number of vehicles by evacuation zone was derived from information provided by the Division of. Motor Vehicles on the number of registered vehicles in each county. This number was compared to the population of the county to arrive at a ratio of vehicles to people and then multiplied by the population of each zone. Roadway System and Traffic Control Assumptions In the selection of roadways to be used, an effort was made to include only those street facilities with sufficient elevations, little or no adjacent tree coverage, substantial shoulder width and surface, and those roadways already contained in existing county hurricane evacuation plans. An additional objective was to provide east-west arterials and bridge combinations that would afford the least disjointed traffic flow. In selecting roadways on the mainland, efforts were also undertaken to omit lengthy north-south movements which may interfere with traffic evacuating from the barrier islands. Relocation of the threatened population required the use of all major east- west routes in the two-county study area. The lack of alternative routing movements, in many instances, prevented the omission of a particular roadway which did not meet all of the established criteria. The major deficiency in this regard was the lack of sufficient elevation at points along a roadway which could prevent freshwater flooding. This was the case for roadways both on the barrier islands as well as on the mainland. 124 TABLE 21 Vehicle Productions Category 1-2 Storm Situation Volusia County Zone 1 2 3 4 A B vi 368 83 105 51 129 V2 -- -- -- -- -- V3 243 55 69 34 85 V4 409 185 116 57 143 V5 -- -- -- -- -- V6 646 146 184 90 226 V7 512 116 145 33 179 V8 -- -- -- -- V9 99 23 28 14 34 VIO 265 60 75 37 92 Vil -- -- -- -- -- V12 517 117 147 72 181 V13 505 114 143 71 177 V14 -- -- -- -- V15 405 91 115 57 142 VI 6. 262 59 74 37 '92 V17 -- -- -- -- -- V18 196 45 56 27 68 V19 277 175 220 189 271 V20 70 16 20 10 24 V21 -- -- -- -- -- V22 -- -- -- -- -- V23 2,036 460 578 285 713 V24 50 11 14 7 17 V25 -- -- -- V26 695 157 198 97 243 V27 545 123 155 76 191 V28 236 53 67 33 83 V29 154 35 44 21 54 V30 3,329 752 946 466 1,165 V31 3,131 708 889 438 1,096 V32 -- -- -- -- V33 -- -- -- -- V34 468 106 133 65 164 V35 264 60 75 37 112 V36 -- -- -- -- -- V37 102 23 29 14 36 V38 139 31 39 20 49 125 TABLE 21 (cont.) Zone 1 2 3 4 A B V39 239 54 68 33 84 V40 39 9 11 5 14 V41 -- -- -- -- -- V42 363 82 103 51 127 V43 37 8 11 6 13 V44 208 47 59 29 73 V45 385 87 109 54 135 V46 247 56 70 35 86 V47 -- -- -- -- -- V48 -- -- -- -- -- V49 1,175 265 334 164 411 V50 58 13 16 9 20 V51 221 50 63 31 77 V52 698 158 198 98 244 V53 438 99 124 62 153 V54 37 8 11 5 13 V55 1,605 361 456 225 562 V56 394 89 112 55 138 V57 381 86 109 53 133 Key: 1 Total Vehicle Productions 2 Public Shelters 3A Friend or Relative (in county) 3B Friend or Relative (out of county) 4 Hotel or Motel 126 TABLE 21 (cont.) Vehicle Productions Category 3-5 Storm Situation Volusia County Zone 1 2 3 4 A B V 1 368 83 105 51 129 V2 4,765 1,077 1,353 667 1,668 V3 243 55 69 34 85 V4 409 185 116 57 143 V5 3,589 811 1,020 502 1,256 V6 646 146 184 90 226 V7 512 116 145 72 179 V8 2,056 465 584 288 719 -V9 99 23, 28 14 34 VIO 265 60 75 37 92 Vil 997 225 283 140 349 V12 517 117 147 72 181 V13 505 114 143 71 177 V14 956 216 272 134 334 V15 405 91 115 57 142 V16 262 59 74 37 92 vi @, 1,547 350 439 216 541 V18 196 45 56 27 68 V19 775 175 219 108 271 V20 70 16 20 10 24 V21 389 88 110 55 136 V22 1,119 253 318 156 392 V23 2,036 460 578 285 713 V24 360 81 102 51 126 V25 -- -- -- -L -- V26 695 157 197 98 243 V27 545 123 155 76 191 V28 236 53 67 33 83 V29 154 35 44 21 54 V30 3,329 752 946 466 1,165 V31 3,131 707 890 438 1,096 V32 175 39 50 25 61 V33 909 205 259 127 318 V34 468 106 133 65 164 V35 264 60 75 37 92 V36 853 193 243 119 298 V37 102 23 29 14 36 V38 139 31 40 19 49 127 TABLE 21 (cont.) Zone 1 2 A 3 B 4 V39 239 54 68 33 84 V40 399 90 113 56 140 V41 -- -- -- -- -- V42 3,264 738 927 457 1,142 V43 788 178 224 110 276 V44 208 47 59 29 73 V45 711 160 .202 100 249 V46 247 56 70 35 86 V47 -- -- -- -- -- V48 -- -- -- -- -- V49 1,175 266 334 164 411 V50 58 13 17 8 20 V51 221 50 63 31 77 V52 698 158 198 98 244 V53 438 99 125 61 153 V54 37 9 10 5 13 V55 1,605 363 456 224 562 V56 394 89 112 55 138 V57 381 86 109 53 133 Key: 1 Total Vehicle Productions 2 Public Shelters 3A Friend or Relative (in county) 3B Friend or Relative (out of county) 4 Hotel or Motel 128 TABLE 21 (cont.) Vehicle Productions Category 1-2 Storm Situation Brevard County Zone 1 2 3 4 A B B1 4,559 1,031 1,021 912 1,595 B2 52253 1,187 1,177 1,051 1,838 B3 11,602 2,621 2,599 29321 4,061 B4 6,896 1,559 1,545 1,379 2,413 B5 3,667 829 822 733 1,283 B6 363 82 81 72 128 B7 8,089 1,828 1,812 1,618 2,831 B8 124 39 35 22 38 B9 5,830 1,317 1,306 1,166 2,041 B10 581 131 131 116 203 B11 1,093 247 245 218 383 B12 6 2 1 1 2 B13 85 19 19 17 30 B14 779 176 174 156 272 B15 845 191 1-89 169 296 B16 506 114 114 101 177 B17 972 220 218 M 340 B18 2,527 571 566 505 885 B19 456 103 102 91 160 B20 90 20 20 18 32 B21 1,023 231 229 205 358 B22 1,004 227 225 201 351 B23 2,260 511 507 452 790 B24 1,307 296 293 261 457 B25 1,963 444 440 393 686 B26 226 51 51 45 79 B27 22 5 5 4 8 B28 65 15 15 13 22 B29 40 9 9 8 14 Key: I = Total Vehicle Productions 2 = Public Shelters 3A = Friend or Relative (in county) 3B = Friend or Relative (out of county) 4 = Hotel or Motel 129 TABLE 21 (cont.) Vehicle Productions Category 3-5 Storm Situation Brevard County Zone 1 2 3 4 B1 4,559 1,031. 1,021 912 1,595 B2 59253 1,187 1,177 1,051 1,838 B3 11,602 2,621 2,599 2,321 4,061 B4 6,896 11,559 1,545 1,379 2,413 B5 3,667 829 822 733 1,283 B6 363 82 81 72 128 B7 8,089 1,828 1,812 1,618 2,831 B8 3,806 860 853 761 1,332 B9 5,830 1,317 1,306 19166 2,041 BIO 581 131 131 116 203 B11 1,093 247 245 218 383 B12 31 7 7 6 11 B13 85 19 19 17 30 B14 779 176 174 156 272 B15 845 191 189. 169 296 B16 506 114 114 101 177 B17 972 220 218 194 340 B18 2,527 571 566 505 885 B19 456 103 1.02 91 160 B20 90 20 20 18 32 B21 1,023 231 229 209 358 B22 1,004 227 225 201 351 .B23 2,260 511 507 452 790 B24 1,307 296 293 261 457 B25 1,963 444 440 393 686 B26 226 51 51 45 79 B27 22 5 5 4 8 B28 65 15 15 13 22 B29 40 9 9 8 14 Key: I = Total Vehicle Productions 2 = Public Shelters 3A = Friend or Relative (in county) 3B = Friend or Relative (out of county) 4 = Hotel or Motel 130 EVACUATION ROUTING SCHEME Brevard County Evacuation Evacuation Routing Scheme------ Zone(s) Route Intra-County Evacuation Leaving the County Bl AIA Exit west on SR 528 (Bennett Cswy/Memorial Continue west on SR 528. Cswy) using up to 3 lanes as directed. B2 AlA Exit west on SR 520 (Hubert Humphrey Brdg/ Continue west on SR 528. Merritt Island Cswy) using@jup to 3 lanes as directed. B3 AlA Exit west on SR 404 (Pineda Cswy) using up Take Wickham Rd. (SR 509) north to 1-95. to 3 lanes as directed. Head north on 1-95 to SR 520. Exit west on SR 520. B4 AlA & Patrick Exit west on SR 518 (Eau Gallie Cswy). Take Eau Gallie Blvd. west to US 1. Go Dr. south on US 1 to Sarno Dr. Head west on Sarno Dr. to John B. Rodes Blvd. (SR 511). Take SR 511 south to US 192. Exit west on US 192. rn B5 AIA xit west on US 192 (Melbourne Cswy). Continue west on US 192. B6 AlA Exit west on SR 510.(Indian River Co.). B7, B8 Courtenay Pkwy. xit west on SR .528 (Bennett Cswy.) using Continue west on SR 528. (SR 3) & up to 3 lanes as directed. Banana Dr. B9 Courtenay Pkwy. Exit west on SR 520 (Merritt Island Cswy/ Exit west on SR 520. (.SR 3), Hubert Humphrey Brdg.) using up to 3 lanes Tropical Trl. & as directed. New Found Harbor Dr. BIO Tropical Trl. Exit west on SR 404 (Pineda Cswy) using up Take Wickham Rd. (SR 509) north to 1-95. (SR 3) to 3 lanes as directed. Head north on 1-95 to SR 520. Exit west on SR 520. L EVACUATION ROUTING SCHEME Brevard Co. (cont.) Evacuation Evacuation Routing Scheme Zone(s) Route Intra-County Evacuation Leaving the County B12, B13 us I Exit west on SR 46. Continue west on SR 46. B14 us 1 Exit west on SR 50. Continue west on SR 50. B16 us 1 Exit west on SR 405 to SR 50. Continue west on SR 50. B18 Exit west on SR 520. Continue west on SR 520. B20 us I Exit west on Wickham Rd. (SR 509) Take Wickham Rd. (SR 509) north to 1-95. Head north on 1-95 to SR 520. Exit west on SR 520. B22 us I Exit west on Eau Gallie Blvd. Take Eau Gallie Blvd. west to US 1. Go south on US 1 to Sarno Dr. Head west on Sarno Dr. to John B. Rodes Blvd. (SR 511) Take SR 511 south to US 192. Exit west on :r- US 192. M M B24 us I Exit west on US 192. Continue west on US 192. Exit west on Malabar Rd. (SR 514) Take SR 514 to Minton Dr. (SR 509) Go 0 north on SR 509 to US 192. Exit west on US 192. B26 us I Exit west on Malabar Rd. (SR 514) Take Sk 51-4@to-,Ninton Dr. (SR 509) Go north on SR 509 to US 192. Exit west on US 192. EVACUATION ROUTING SCHEME Volusia County Routing Scheme Evacuation Evacuation,, Zone( Route Intra-Coun@y Evacuation Leaving the County V1, V2, V3 AIA & John Exit west on SR 40 (Ormond Bridge) Continue west on SR 40. Anderson Dr. V4, V5, V6 AIA & Halifax Exit west on Seabreeze Blvd. (Seabreeze Continue west On Mason Ave. to Williamson Dr. Bridge) using both lanes as directed. Blvd. Take Williamson Blvd. north to llth St. Head west on 11th St. to US 92. Exit west on US 92. V7, V8,,V9 AIA & Halifax Exit west on US 92 (Carlton Blank Bridge) Continue west on US 92. Dr. using up to 4 lanes as directed. V10, Vil, AlA & Halifax Exit west on Silver Beach Ave. (Memorial) Turn south on US 1 to Beville Ave. Head V12 Dr. Bridge) using both lanes as directed.. west on Beville Ave. to 1-4. Continue west on 1-4 V13, V14, AlA & Halifax Exit west on Dunlawton Ave. (.Port Orange Continue west on SR 415. V15 Dr. Bridge, SR 415) W rr V32-V38 AlA & Saxon Dr. Exit west on either the North Cswy (SR 40A:Continue west on SR 44. or South Cswy (SR 44). Note: SR 40A merges into SR 44. V16, V17 us 1 Exit west on SR 40. Continue west on SR 40. V18, V19 us I Exit west on Mason Ave.; or Continue west on Mason Ave. to Williamson Blvd. Take Williamson Blvd. north to Exit west on 11th St. llth St. Head west on llth St. to US 92. Exit west on US 92. V20, V21 us I Exit west on US 92. Continue west on US 92. V23 us I Exit west on Beville Ave. Continue west on 1-4. V24 us I Exit west on SR 415. Continue west on SR 415. V39, V40, US I& SR 40A Exit west on SR 40A. Continue on,SR 40A to SR 44. Continue V42 est on SR 44. EVACUATION ROUTING SCHEME Volusia Co."(cont.) Evacuation Evacuation Routing Scheme Zone(s) Route Intra-County Evacuation Leaving the County V43, V44 us 1 Exit west on SR 44. Continue west on SR 44. V 45, V46 us 1 Exit west on CR 442. Continue west on CR 422 to 1-95. Take 1-95 north to SR 44. Exit onto SR 44 and head west. V48 SR 44 Exit- west on SR 44. Continue west on SR 44. An important input into-the transportation model was the traffic control assumptions. In most cases, these assumptions were based upon the traffic control procedures currently in place in each of the two counties and outlined in each county's Peacetime Emergency Plan. Examples of the assumptions used include: intersections blocked off to allow only east- west traffic movements; light signalization, stationing of traffic control personnel to direct vehicle flow; and number of lanes available for evacuation. Several other assumptions were used for the transportation modelling. First, all bridges from the barrier islands to the mainland were assumed to be down and to remain down during a hurricane warning period. (U.S. Coast Guard Regulation 33-117-C and FDOT procedure 571-004, 6, p. 15, provide Civil Defense officials with the authority to implement this procedure.) Second, it was assumed that adequate manpower was available for assignment to critical intersections to allow for smooth traffic flow. Last, the transportation model assumed that vehicles breaking down on the roadways would be removed in such manner so as not to cause any significant delays in the movement of evacuating vehicles. Evacuation Travel Patterns For the purposes of this analysis, traffic movements associated with hurricane evacuation scenarios were identified. As in previous evacuation studies completed in the State, five general patterns were delineated: 1) in-County Origins to In-County Destinations Trips made from areas subject to both storm surge and freshwater flooding, and from mobile home units, in an individual county to destinations within the same county. These destina- tions may be Red Cross shelters, hotel and motel units, and friends or relatives living outside flooding areas. 2) in-County Origins to Out-of-County Destinations Trips made from areas as in (1) that enter a particular county from another county in the region. 3) Out-of-County Origins to In-County Destinations Trips made as in (1) that enter a particular county from another county in the region. 4) Out-of-County Origins to Out-of-County Destinations Trips passing through a county while traveling from another county within or without the region. 134 5) Background Traffic Trips made by people anticipating the arrival of hurricane conditions. These may be shopping trips to gather supplies and/or trips from places of work to home to gather the family for evacuation. This traffic also includes transit vehicles (buses) used to pick up auto-less evacuees. EVACUATION TIME REQUIREMENTS Evacuation Times by County As stated previously, the objective of the transportation analysis was to calculate clearance time (the time it takes to clear a county's roadway of all evacuating vehicles) and to relate that clearance time to an evacuation order (the time before hurricane eye landfall at which an evacuation order must be given to allow all evacuees to reach appropriate. destinations). With regard to clearance time estimates, the primary factor affecting the amount of time required was the rate by which people responded (evacuated) to a hurricane situation. This meant that the minimum times required to clear a county's roadway network were--depending upon the response curve applied during the analysis--5, 7, or 14 hours. The second most important factor that influenced the initial clearance time calculations was the extremely high vehicle to capacity ratio for certain links of the roadway network. While most roadways could accommodate evacuating traffic within a time approximating the response times tested, a few links greatly surpassed this time. This resulted in an increase of a county's total clearance time above what is actually required to evacuate a majority of a county's threatened population. A third influencing factor was the storm intensity of the various scenarios modeled. For Volusia County, in particular, a larger storm dramatically increased the numbers of persons affected and, therefore, loaded onto the transportation system. Table :23 provides ;the evacuation timing data calculated and developed for Brevard and Volusia counties. These tables have been formatted to show both pre-evacuation order clearance time and post-evacuation order clearance time. Post-evacuation order clearance time is calculated. by subtracting the pre-evacuation order time, as shown on the behavioral response curves, from total clearance time. Post-evacuation order clearance time is then added to pre-landfall hazards time to arrive at the time required for an evacuation order to be issued. The format of these tables has been developed to provide consistency between this study and previous studies conducted in the State. As a further explanation of the evacuation time components, the following definitions are provided: Clearance time: Clearance time is the time required to clear from roadways all vehicles evacuating in response to an approaching hurricane. Clearance time begins when the first evacuating vehicle enters the road network (in accordance with a hurricane evacuation behavioral response curve) and ends when the evacuating vehicle reaches its 135 TABLE 23 TRANSPORTATION EVACUATION TIMES BREVARD COUNTY Storm Pre-Evacuation Order Post-Evacuation Order Pre-Landfall Time Required for Category Clearance Time Clearance Time Hazards Time Evacuation Order Response Curve A: Quick Response/Short Lead Time 1-2 2 3-6 4-6 7-12 3-5 2 4-6 7-11 11-17 Response Curve B: Behavioral Survey Response 1-2 3 4-7 4-6 8-13 3-5 3 5-8 7-11 12-19 Response Curve C: Slow Response/Long Lead Time 1-2 6 8 4-6 12-14 3-5 6 8 7-11 15-19 TABLE 23 (cont.) TRANSPORTATION EVACUATION TIMES VOLUSIA COUNTY Storm Pre-Evacuation Order Post-Evacuation Order Pre-Landfall Time Required for Category Clearance Time Clearance Time Hazards Time Evacuation Order Response Curve A: Quick Response/Short Lead Time 1-2 2 3-5 4-6 7-11 3-5 2 3-6 7-11 10-17 Response Curve B: Behavioral Survey Response 1-2 3 4-6 4-6 8-12 3-5 3 5-8 7-11 1.3-19 Response Curve C: Slow Response/Long Lead Time 1-2 6 8-11 4-6 12-17 3-5 6 9-12 7-11 16-23 destination. Clearance time includes the time required by evacuees to secure their homes and prepare to leave, the time spent by evacuees traveling along the road network, and the time spent by evacuees waiting to clear points of congestion along the network. Clearance time does not relate to the time any one vehicle spends traveling on the road network. Pre-landfall hazards time: Pre-landfall hazards time is the time frame immediately before eye landfall within which evacuation should not be carried out, due to the adverse effects of the arrival of sustained gale force winds. Pre-evacuation order time: Pre-evacuation order time refers to a period of time prior to issuance of the evacuation order, in which a certain percent of evacuees have already left home and have entered the road network. This percentage is determined by the behavioral response curve used. Evacuation order time: Evacuation order time is the time in hours before hurricane eye landfall in which an evacuation order must be given to allow all evacuees to reach their chosen destinations. Brevard County During any given hurricane situation, in excess of 90% of the evacuating population in Brevard County will utilize the five bridges/causeways which span the Indian and Banana rivers. Those roadway links leading to the bridges, principally AlA, as well as the bridges themselves, were found to be the most critical in terms of their ability to handle the projected volumes of traffic. Two of the bridges, in particular, were found to experience large amounts of congestion for each of the response curves tested. In conducting the transportation analysis, initial clearance time estimates were made based upon the evacuation zone configurations previously discussed and traffic movements associated with these configurations. These traffic movements were similar to those currently outlined in the Brevard County Peacetime Emergency Plan which attempts to evenly distribute the traffic from the beachside evacuation zones among the county's five bridges/causeways. Utilizing these traffic movements, the Eau Gallie Causeway experienced the greatest queuing delay of any of the roadways tested. The following table shows clearance time estimates for the causeway for each response curve by storm situation. Storm Situation Res2onse Curve 1_2 3--5 Quick Response 12.63 hrs. 12.63 hrs. Behavioral Response 14.36 hrs. 14.36 hrs. Slow Response 16.10 hrs. 16.10 hrs. 138 These times greatly exceeded what was required to evacuate other areas of the barrier island--in many cases, doubling the time necessary to clear the roadways. Consequently, efforts were undertaken to redirect portions of the evacuation zonal population to other roadways experiencing less delay. .To reduce the number of vehicles using Eau Gallie Causeway, approximately 60% of the population was distributed to Pineda Causeway to the north and Melbourne Causeway to the south. This allowed for a reduction of the clearance times at Eau Gallie Causeway to that approximating the behavioral response curve lines, while having almost a negligible effect on the times for Pineda and Melbourne causeways. SR 520 also experienced an inordinate amount of congestion relative to the other bridges/causeways in the county. While not as critical as that found at the Eau Gallie Causeway, the congestion was sufficient to increase clearance times almost five hours above that of the behavioral response times. Therefore, an additional evacuation lane was added to the causeway, providing for an increase of 504 vhp. This allowed the time required for clearing the link to be reduced by approximately three hours. Volusia County The situation in Volusia County is almost the reverse of that in Brevard. Whereas the population centers in Brevard County are on the vulnerable barrier islands, the majority of Volusia County's population resides on the mainland. While most of these mainland residents would not be expected to evacuate during the hurricane, their presence as background traffic causes queuing delays to occur at several of the major intersections through which evacuating traffic from vulnerable areas must pass. It is the delay at these intersections which determine the county's overall clearance times. Efforts made by county officials to reduce the background traffic preceding and during,an evacuation would have significant effects on the time necessary to clear the county's roadways. Evacuation Times by Regional Storm Scenario Five regional storm scenarios were developed for transportation modeling purposes. As mentioned previously, each regional storm scenario involves a different storm track and/or intensity, thereby creating varying storm effects in each of the two counties. Using the evacuation times discussed previously, Table 24 has been developed to provide generalized evacuation order times by each regional scenario. The times are general in that the behavioral survey response curve time has been used. 139 TABLE 24 REGIONAL STORM SCENARIOS REQUIRED TIME FOR EVACUATION ORDER BY COUNTY Regional Time before Eye Landfall (Hrs.) Storm Number Storm Description Volusia Brevard I Category 1-2 Storm x 8-13 2 Category 3-5 Storm 8-12 12-19 3 Category 1-2 Storm 8-12 x 4 Category 3-5 Storm 13-19 8-13 5 Paralleling Storm Regionwide 8-12 8-13 X No storm surge; little to no evacuation required. 140 WARNING ELEMENT EXISTING WARNING SYSTEM The existing warning system is composed of several key entities of federal, state, and local governments. Each of these plays an important role in disseminating and interpreting hurricane hazard information as a storm approaches the State's coast. In the event of a hurricane threatening the coast of East Central Florida, the following entities would be involved in the warning process: National Hurricane Center (NHC) Florida Bureau of Emergency Management Daytona Beach Area--National Weather Service Area Coordinator/Florida Bureau of Emergency Management Volusia County Civil Defense Office Brevard County Civil Defense Office Municipal Disaster Preparedness offices Public Media (radio/TV) Figure 16presents a schematic of this warning system. The interpretation and dissemination of emergency information concerning an approaching hurricane by and between the government entities detailed above are geared to the particular characteristics of a storm and resulting conditions assigned to elicit specific and appropriate levels of readiness and response from the local areas placed under these conditions. The two primary conditions are the "hurricane watch" and "hurricane warning." These conditions are announced for a specific stretch of coastline as part of one of the advisories that are normally issued by the NHC every six hours during the approach of a storm. A Hurricane Watch condition placed on a specified area means that hurricane conditions are a real possibility in that area; a Hurricane Warning condition placed on an area (usually a 250-mile stretch of coastline, as opposed to a Watch condition area of 500 miles) means that hurricane conditions can be expected in that area within 24 hours. The time frame for warning activities is desribed below, with key warning system conditions and activities related to hurricane eye landfall. o 72-hour advisory -- Storm-assigned category number on Saffir-Simpson Scale by NHC. o 48 hours before projected eye landfall Local areas placed under Hurricane Watch condition by NHC. o 24 hours before projected eye landfall Local areas placed under Hurricane Warning condition by NHC. 141 Figure 16 HURRICANE WARNING SYSTEM (Federal) NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER (NHC) (State) FLORIDA BUREAU OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (Areawide) Area Offices of Area Coordinator NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE FLORIDA BUREAU OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (Local) Brevard Co. Civil Defense Public Media: Volusia Co. Civil Defense Radio Municipal Disaster Television Preparedness Offices 142 o 12-24 hours before projected eye landfall -- Local area advised to evacuate by NHC advisory or local National Weather Service office. o Chief elected official for particular county advised by Disaster Preparedness department to issue evacuation order for its jurisdiction. o Evacuation order issued. o Evacuation order disseminated to the public by public media and/or emergency response agencies. In discussing the existing warning system, two considerations should be noted- 1) Hurricane movement is difficult to predict beyond a certain time frame. 2) Evacuation decisions that are made without accurate information may have adverse effects. The first consideration often leads to the second. The average landfall point projection error in a 24-hour forecast is in the range of 100 nautical -miles. Within that "error" range, some areas will experience flooding conditions and others will not. This uncertainty about which areas will be affected leads to the dilemma facing decision-makers. Areas needlessly evacuating undergo the expense and potential hazards associated with a mass evacuation, while other areas failing to evacuate due to insufficient notice may face the threats to the public safety from the storm. The information made available through this technical data report provides local officials with an indication of the areas subject to tidal flooding and the steps necessary to carry out an evacuation. Consideration of the evacuation times presented in previous sections of the report are one part of the decision-making process, serving as a tangible basis against which the probabilities and impacts of a hurricane may be weighed before an evacuation order is issued. GUIDE FOR EVACUATION DECISION-MAKING Interpreting NHC hurricane information and implementing proper emergency preparedness measures by local officials require knowledge of the common data base set forth in this study. This data base will enable the coordination of evacuation decisions during a hurricane approach and comparison to SPLASH II computer runs of the actual approaching hurricane by the NHC. This, in turn, will provide local disaster preparedness officials with a high level of information from which the actual storm conditions and impacts may be interpreted. 143 There are several steps which can be taken by local officials as part of the decision-making process based upon the information contained in this study. These steps are identified and discussed below. 1) Identify Storm Characteristics Storms are generally assigned a Saffir/Simpson Scale category number by the NHC while the storm is 72 hours away from landfall. A situation may arise where the category changes during the lifetime of the storm, requiring the storm to be re-identified. The next step will be to eliminate various hurricanes simulated through the SPLASH II model based upon the type of track detected by the NHC for the actual hurricane. As the storm moves toward the State, its potential for approaching the region on a landfalling, paralleling, or exiting track may be more easily discerned. It is important to note that any elimination or focus of preparedness for particular hurricanes must be tentative because of the ability of any storm to rapidly change direction during its movement. 2) Identification of Evacuation Scenario Confronting the Region The next step in interpreting the expected local effects of an approaching storm is to identify the level of threat that would confront the counties if the actual hurricane continued its current approach. As the decision-maker focuses upon a certain scenario, the predicted surge heights and wind speeds associated with a probable storm can be identified. This identification may provide the disaster preparedness officials with the first indication of the level of population that must be evacuated, zones to be evacuated, and public shelters which should not be utilized for that particular scenario. 3) Identification of Evacuation Time Confronting the Region Based upon the preceding steps, it is possible to gauge the minimum time needed for a successful evacuation. This enables the decision- maker to know when an evacuation order must be issued in relation to eye landfall, so that the evacuation is safely completed prior to the arrival of hurricane hazards. These times are provided in the previous section of the report. 4) Adapt-ion to Actual Conditions The last step to be taken by officials is to adjust the evacuation time based on actual conditions. An adjustment to the times set forth 144 may be necessary due to one or more of the following conditions: a) Public behavior b) Early arrival of heavy rains c) Characteristic changes, forward speed, or conditions close to eye landfall PUBLIC BEHAVIOR Past studies have indicated--and investigations of evacuee behavior during hurricanes David and Frederick appear to confirm--that approximately 20% of the population threatened will leave prior to issuance of an evacuation order. This figure was common to each of the behavioral response curves tested in the study and helped determine the mobilization time periods used. The mobilization times represent the lower limit of time required to evacuate a county. For example, in a quick-response situation, the mobilization time was calculated at 3 hours. If a total time is less than 3 hcur,, due, to lot.. t-i-avel time to the shelter, a 3-hour minimum evacuation is still assumed The variable which must be closely monitored by local officials during actual hurricane Watch and Warning conditions is the percentage of evacuees leaving prior to the evacuation order. A decrease in this percentage will increase the mobilization time periods and, hence, the minimum amount of time required to evacuate. EARLY ARRIVAL OF HEAVY RAINS Pre-landfall hazard times range from 4 to 11 hours before eye landfall, when flooding or gale force winds might prevent evacuation from being carried out. Depending primarily on the forward speed of the storm, pre- storm rainfall may precede these pre-storm hazard periods. Instances of rainfall occurring as early as 20 hours before eye landfall have been recorded for several past hurricanes. Such rainfall would reduce roadway carrying capacity because of limited driving visibility and wet pavement. Recalculation of roadway capacities were made within this report to compensate for this factor. This capacity reduction was assumed for the entire length of the evacuation. Further adjustments, however, may be necessary should rainfall arrive earlier than the 4-11 hours estimated. ACTUAL VS. HYPOTHEriCAL HURRICANE The formulation of the evacuation times in this report were based on hypothetical hurricanes of probable characteristics. As mentioned previously, it is improbable that an actual hurricane will fit each of the characteristics used to develop a hypothetical storm. Two parameters which could significantly change expected pre-eye landfall hazards times if they are different are: 145 1) storm size (in statute miles of the radius of maximum winds); and 2) forward speed (in miles per hour). As the actual hurricane's characteristics are identified by the NHC, the pre-eye landfall hazard times should be adjusted if conditions warrant it. In all cases, however, local officials can use the "worst case" probable flooding maps as a basis on which to act. In order that the procedures identified in this section work, constant communication between decision-makers at all levels of government are required. It is also essential that the data base developed by this study be continually reviewed and updated by local disaster preparedness officials and staffs as local conditions change and populations increase. PUBLIC INFORMATION AND THE MEDIA The success of any warning system is dependent on the ability to communicate important information to the public in a timely manner. The public media--television, radio, and newspaper--is the primary means of reaching the public before, during, and after a storm. In order to effectively carry out the procedures discussed in this report, a public information mechanism needs to be developed to inform the public of vulnerability zones, the threats to each zone, evacuation routes, and actions needed to be taken during a storm event as well as general hurricane preparedness measures and precautions. As a result of this study, public information brochures will be developed providing the detailed information required to complete a successful evacuation. The brochure will consist primarily of an evacuation route map and identify and mark vulnerability zones to enable residents to identify their homes and monitor their vulnerability to various storm types. Additional information regarding shelter availability, both in coastal and inland counties, will be provided as well as general preparedness information. Additional public information materials will also be developed in the form of television and radio scripts for use by commercial stations during hurricane Watch and Warning periods. These scripts will be specific to the Watch and Warning periods and will detail actions needing to be taken at those times. Information provided in the brochure will be broadcast, either graphically or verbally, at these times. It is important that the public information brochures be updated regularly, to compensate for changes in evacuation routes or zonal boundary changes. 146 APPENDICES Page A Saffir/Simpson Hurricane Scale . . . . . . . 150 Level of Threat - A . . . . . . . . . 151 Level of Threat - B . .. . . . . . . . 152 B Pre-Landfall Hazards Time Adjustment Rates 154 C Procedure foe Breaking Wave Setup/Astronomical Tide Analysis . . . . . 156 D Shelter/Medical Facilities Location Maps . . . 159 E Transportation Analysis Carryover Analysis Methodology . . . . . . . . 174 147 APPENDIX A i@l 149 APPENDIX A SAFFIR/SIMPSON HURRICANE SCALE 1. Winds of 74 -95 miles per hour Storm surge 4 - 5 feet above normal 2. Winds of 96 - 110 miles per hour Storm surge 6 - 8 feet above normal 3. Winds of 111 130 miles per hour Storm surge 9 12 feet above normal 4. Winds of 131 - 155 miles per hour Storm surge 13 - 18 feet above normal 5. Winds greater than 155 miles per hour Storm surge greater than 18 feet above normal 150 LEVEL OF THREAT -- A Description of Forces Storm surge 4 to 8 feet above MSL accompanied by winds of 74 to 110 mph. Associated Hazards Principal threat resulting from hurricane force winds and accompanying tornado activity. Areas lying adjacent to the ocean or tidal rivers subject to flooding from storm surge. Low-lying causeways and roads (A1A) may be inundated several hours prior to landfall, impeding evacuation of barrier islands. Damage Potential Majority of damage to result from wind, principally to exposed mobile homes or poorly constructed homes. Considerable damage to signs, street lights, and trees. Buildings lying east of AlA on the barrier islands to suffer damage from rising water and wave action. Level of Evacuation Brevard County All residents of barrier islands (Evacuation Zones B1-B6) and portions of Merritt Island (B7, B9, B10) and mainland (B13). Evacuation of all mobile home residents within the county. Volusia County Residents of barrier islands (Evacuation Zones Vl, V3, V4, V6, V7, V9, V10, V12, V13, V15, V32, V33, V35, V37, V38) and mainland (V16, V18, V20, V23, V36, V27, V32, V34, V35, V37, V39, V44, V46). Evacuation of all mobile home residents within county. 151 LEVEL OF THREAT -- B Description of Forces Storm surge ranging from 9 to 18+ feet above MSL, accompanied by winds of 111 to over 155 mph. Associated Hazards Both flooding and winds will produce considerable threat to the area, along with associated tornado activity. Storm surge will cause major erosion of dune line, with the potential for overtopping of barrier islands at several points in Brevard County. Oceanfront and riverfront structures subject to considerable damage. Roadways on the barrier islands and low- lying causeways will be inundated three to seven hours before eye landfall. Extensive flooding around Tomoka Basin and Strickland Bay in Volusia County. Damage Potential Extensive damage to structures (roofs, windows, etc.) from high winds. Complete destruction of mobile homes. Major damage or destruction of oceanfront buildings from storm surge. Erosion of beachfront. Level of Evacuation Brevard County All residents living on barrier islands and Merritt Island (Evacuation Zones B1-B1O) and mainland residents residing adjacent to tidal rivers (B12-B26). Evacuation of all mobile home residents within county. Volusia County All residents living on barrier islands (Evacuation Zones V1-V15 and V32-V38) and mainland residents living adjacent to tidal rivers or bays (V16-V24 and V39-V47). Evacuation of all mobile home residents within county. 152 APPENDIX B I 1 153 PRE-LANDFALL HAZARDS TIME ADJUSTMENT RATES Storm Size (radius of maximum winds) Hypothetical Arrival of Actual Radius Adjusted Arrival Time Hurricane Gale Force Winds of Maximum of Gale Force Winds Radius of Max. Winds Time before Winds before Eye Landfall (statute miles) Eye Landfall (statute miles) (hours) (hours) 10 4.25 (-.75) 20 5.75 (+.75) rn 15 5 30 7.25 (+2.25) CO 40 8.75 (+2.75) Forward Speed Hypothetical Arrival of Gale Actual Forward Adjusted Arrival Time Hurricane Force Winds Speed of Gale Force Winds Forward Speed Time before (mph) before Eye Landfall (mph) Eye Landfall (hours) (hours) 6 12.0 (+7.0) 15 5 12 6.0 (+1.0) 18 4.0 (-1.0) APPENDIX C 155 APPENDIX C Procedure for Breaking Wave Setup/Astronomical Tide Analysis Figure Cl is a hurricane surge hydrograph along the East Central Florida coast. The figure shows a still water surge envelope from a SPLASH II computer printout (heavy black line). The SPLASH II results do not include the.astronomical tide level or breaking wave set. Also, it does not include the tidal anomaly produced by a hurricane movement over a body of water. However, because the anomaly is a constant..5 feet it is not included. Also shown on Figure C1 is the astronomical tide and wave setup being superimposed on top of the storm surge envelope. The astronomical tide level shown here is for mean high tide. Figure C2 is a nomograph of the breaking wave setup versus the breaker height of the significant wave published by the U.S. Army Coastal Engi- neering Center in 1973. This figure allows for the computation of wave setu@ @ased on the predicted tidal level (storm surge and astronomical tide in an area. The formula used in computing the wave setup is as follows: SW = 0.19 2.82 /Hb Hb @ @'T SW = Breaking wave setup Hb = Breaker height of the significant wave g= Gravitational acceleration T= Wave period The breaker height of the significant wave (Hb) can be determined from the following: Hb = 0.78 db db = Depth of water at the breaker point of still water level Astronomical tide levels were determined for the SPLASH 11 computer printouts. The range along the East Central Florida coast was approximately 4 feet. 156 APPENDIX C STORM SURGE HYDROGRAPH 21- 20 STORM SURGE 19 HIGH 18 TIDE WAVE ........... 17 SETUP 16 is, 14 FIf 13 cn 12.. 0 C4 LL. lo- 0 9 i -A- .j 8 Lu 7 6 4 dr 3 - 2 1 0 0800 0900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 TIME (HOURS) (eye landfall) 157 Figure C2 Breaking Wave Setup VS. Breaker Height of Significant Wave 2.8, -Nomograph 2.6 2Z 2.i- 177 2.0 1.8 M IA CO lu w 1.2 1.0- ,IN- Sw=O. 19 (1- 2. 82 dg@2) Hb 0.8 0.6 OZ Breaki.nq Wave Setup 3w) 0J, Versus Breaker Height of Significant Wave (HL; 31 41 5 6 7 a 9 10 11 12 _-TY_ 14 is 16 17 is 19 20 1 - . @l Hb (FEET) 7 APPENDIX D 159 95 A cs C3 I c; cm C2, 9 jxVA, VL i;, AIA 40 5A 7 95 49 0 DAYTONA BEACH 3 9 6- AlA 92 31 2 95 5A Ei CANA st 14 8 PONCE BE LEON INLET 95 40A 44 C AL SE BLACH 442 AIA Ca VOLUSIR Co. BREVARD CO. C7 P5 46 406 TITUSVILLE 405 WUL 50 sc; 50 405 4022 I N;:D L NASA CAUSEWAY ST. JOHNS RIVER 407 95 c; ca ca 528 524 01, 00 00 0 X-9 u6u u ATLANTIC OCEAN yq NAI 524 ?OCOA MERRITT ISLAND HUBERT HUMPHREY BRIDGE ROCKLEDGE i@s Q-A CID 95 rn vo U6 PATRICK AIR FORCE BASE lk SOUTH PATRICK SHORES AIA 10a; SATELLITE BEA INDIAN BAR AVRORA RD. 511 CANO EAU GALLIE INDIALANTIC 61 WIW HAVEN AVE. S4 7 MELBOURNE MELBOURNE BEACH CJI cc cc 507, PALM BAY AIA PALM BAY NO., 509 95 A MALABAR RD. 514 FLORIDA BEACH AIA BREVARD COUNTY. INMAN RIVER COUNU - - - - - - - - - - - APPENDIX E 173 APPENDIX E Transportation Analysis Carryover Analysis Methodology Calculation of traffic movements for the transportation analysis involved applying vehicle production numbers-to a particular roadway in accordance with a specified behavioral response curve. The hourly loading rates and resulting queuing delays then determined the number of hours required to clear a particular roadway link. An example of this analysis is shown with Bennett Causeway and S.R. 520 causeway, for a behavioral survey response during a 1-2 storm situation. The number of vehicles anticipated to utilize a particular roadway are identified by evacuation zones and a percentage of usage for each zone during each hourly interval calculated and totaled. The total number of vehicles originating from these zones each hour is then compared in the carryover analysis to the capacity of the roadway. If the number generated exceeds the capacity then a queue is formed which must be absorbed by the roadway during the next hour. By using this method the time required to clear a roadway link may be calculated. This method was also utilized in examining intersection delays. 174 APPLNDIX E (cont.) 1-2 Stomi Situation Beh. Survey Response BENNETT CAUSEWAY Capacity: 1470 VPHL (2L) ZONE Bl ZONE B7 TOTAL 4,559 x (.04) + 8,089 x (.04) 506 (.06) (.06) 759 (.10) (.10) 1,265 (.24) (.24) 3,036 (.35) (.35) 4,427 (.12) (.12) 1,518 (.09) (.09) 1,139 CARRYOVER ANALYSIS HOUR_ -.-QUEUE HOUR QUEUE 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 96 5 1,583 6 161 7 0 8 0 7.00 hours to clear link SR 520 CAUSEWAY Capacity: 504 VPHL (2L) ZONE B2 ZONE B9 TOTAL 5,253 x (.04) + 5,830 x (.04) 444 (.06) (.06) 665 (.10) (.10) 1,108 (.24) (.24) 2,660 (.35) (.35) 3,879 (.12) (.12) 1,330 (.09) (.09) 997 CARRYOVER ANALYSIS HOUR QUEUE HOUR QUEUE 1 0 2 0 3 100 4 1,752 5 4,632 6 4,954 7 4,943 8 3,935 9 2,927 10 11919 11 911 12 11.90 hours to clear link 175 -i --- -1 ------------I---------I------------ 1-1 .11121111milm I' - 3 -6668 14101 8772