[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]
OCS Study
MMS 92-0052
Technical Report No. 155
Contract No. 14-12-0001-30300
Property of CSC Library



Social Indicators Study of Alaskan Coastal Villages






IV. Postspill Key Informnant Summaries

Schedule C Communities, Part 2
(Kenai, Tyonek, Seldovia, Kodiak City, Karluk, Old Harbor, Chignik)



U.S- DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NOAA
COASTAL SERVICES CENTER
2234 SOUTH HOBSON AVENUE
CHARLESTON, SC 29405-2413


Submitted to:

U.S. Department of the Interior
Minerals Management Service
Alaska OCS Region
Anchorage, Alaska
rV0
13--
Human Relations Area Files
May
1993
'-10



1-  , _
v-,
0-
C,

Tlis report has been reviewed by the Minerals Management Service and
approved for publication. Approval does not signify that the contents
necessarily reflect the views and the policies of the Service, nor does mention
of trade names or commercial products constitute endorsement or
recommendation fruse.








Alaska OCS Environmental Studies Program


Social Indicators Study of Alaskan Coastal Vi'llages
IV. Postspill Key Informant Summaries. Schedule C Communities, Part 2.




Human Relations Area Files
New Haven, Connecticut









Prepared by Joanna Endter-Wada, Jon Hofmneister, Rachel Mason, Steven McNabb, Eric
Morrison, Stephanie Reynolds, Edward Robbins, Lynn Robbins, and Curtiss Takada Rooks.
Joseph Jorgensen was the principal investigator and project manager. The authors
appreciate the efforts of the Minerals Management Service technical editors in Anchorage
who helped edit this report.
May 1993

Table of Contents
Table of Contents...........................v

Acronyms ..............................xi

Glossary ..............................xiv

VOLUMEI I
included the following sections:

Introduction

Mixed Communities
Valdez
Effects of the Exxon.Valdez Spill on Cordova

Periphery Native Communities
Tatitlek

VOLUME II
Map of Schedule C Communities ....................437

1COOK INLET COMMUNITIES

Cook Inlet Hub Comnmunity: Kenai

KENAI

I. Historical Context........................447
A. History..........................447
B. Kenai Native Community....................449
C. Kenai Peninsula Borough and the City of Kenai...........455
D. Natural Resources......................461

HI. Impacts of the 'Exxon Valdez Oil Spill .................469
A. Impacts on the City of Kenai..................483
B. Impacts on Businesses and Households..............488
C.  Impacts on Commercial Fishermen and Fish Processors........496
D. Impacts on Community Relations.................504
E. Summary and Conclusions...................507

References Cited ..........................511
V

I
I
Table of Contents (continued)

Cook Inlet Periphery Native Communities:

TYONEK AND SELDOVIA

Background and Historical Context ..................
A. The Natural Setting ..........................
B.   Historical Context and Dena'ina Ethnohistory ......
C. Historical Periods ...........................
Displacement of Indigenous Society (1778-1895) .....
Commercial Expansion (1895-1960) ..............
Land Claims and the Oil Economy (1960-Present)
I
I
I
I
522
522
523
529
529
530
531
I
II. The Effects of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill ...............
A.   The Context of the Spill: The Contemporary Villages
B. Reactions to the Oil Spill .......................
Immediate Effects .............................
Subsequent Effects ............................

IlL. Conclusions ......................................

References Cited .....................................


KODIAK AREA COMMUNITIES

Kodiak Area Hub Community: Kodiak City

THE KODIAK REGION

Preface .............................................

I. Historical Context .................................
A. Prehistory and Early Contacts ....................
B. The Russian Period ............................
C.  The Early American Period (1867-1939) ............
D. World War II and the Post-War Period .............
....... 533
....... 533
....... 535
....... 537
....... 538
I
I
542
545
I
I
I
I
I
560
561
561
562
565
567
I
iI.
Population and Demography ......................
A.   Overall Population and Net Changes through Time  .
B. Ethnic, Gender, and Age Profiles ...............
............... 571
............... 571
............... 576
vi
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Table of Contents (continued)

THE KODIAK REGION
Im. Community Organization and Economy .......
A. Government ......................
Political Representation ..............
Land Status and Management .........
Resource Management ...............
Infrastructure and Administrative Services
B.  Commerce and Industry ..............
Economic Diversification .............
Native Corporations ................
Economic Indicators ................
Consumer Prices ...................
C.  Health, Education, and Social Services ...
Health ...........................
Education ........................
Social Services .....................
. . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . . . . . . ..
580
. 580
. 580
. 582
. 585
. 592
. 599
. 600
. 611
. 613
. 616
. 626
. 626
. 629
. 631
. 636
. 639
. 639
. 645
.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

,.....

,.....


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......


......
......
.. .
.. .
.. .
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.. .
.. .
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.. .
.. .
.. .
.. .
.. .
.. .
D. Sodalities, Associations, and Community Activities
E.   Trends of Political-Economic and Social Change .
The Fisheries ...........................
Declining State and Federal Revenues .........
II
IV.  Household Organization and Kinship ............
A. -Kinship Organization ....................
B.	Household Structures and Economic Functions
C.	Socialization ..........................

V. Ideology .................................
A. Religion .............................
B.	Worldviews and Values ..................
C.	Ethnicity and Tribalism ..................

VI.  Effects of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill ............
A.  Results of the 1989 Research ..............
Institutional Responses and Impacts .........
Economic Impacts ......................
Social, Cultural, and Psychological Impacts ....
647
647
648
652

654
654
656
660

663
663
665
675
681
...................
...................
...................
...................
....................

...................

...................
....................


....................
....................
....................
....................
vii

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Table of Contents (continued)

THE KODIAK REGION
I
VI. Effects of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (continued)
B.  Results of the 1991 Research ....................
Short-Term Effects ..... .....................
Long-Term Effects ............................

References Cited .....................................

Kodiak Area Periphery Native Communities:

KARLUK
693         1
694
703
I
709





729
.............
.............
.............
I.  Historical Background ................
735         I
735
738
740         3
II.  The People .......................
A. Impressions After the Spill ........
B. Household Organization and Kinship
C.  Social Activities ................
.........
. . .. . . .. .




.........




.........
. .... .




.. ... .




. ... ... . .




. . . ...
g
I
I
IIm.  The Village ...........................
A.	Village Government  ................
B.	Human and Social Services ...........
C. The School .......................
D.   Associations and Organizations ......
. 742
. 742
. 749
. 749
. 749
o,..oooooo,ï¿½o.o.oo.oo.
......................
......................
......................
......................
IV. The
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
Economy ................
Housing ................
Subsistence ..............
Commercial Fishing ........
Wage Labor .............
Tourism ................
Future and Planning .......
750
750
751
753
754
755
756
I
I
..............
..............

..............




..............
............
. ..... ....
............
............
........... .
I
V. Ideology and Influences of Change .......

VI. Effects of the 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill .
757
I
761
I
References Cited ...........................
......................   768
I
...
Vlii
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OLD HARBOR
I. Historical Background ...................
The Setting ...........................
775
776
II. The Village .777
A. The People .............................................. 778
B. Household Organization and Kinship ........................... 781
C. Social Activities ........................................... 781
D. Associations and Organizations ............................... 782
E. The School .............................................. 782
F. Social Services ............................................ 783
M. Village Government ..........................
A. City Government ........................
B. Old Harbor Tribal Council ................
C. Old Harbor Village Corporation ............
784
784
788
789
.....**.*
..*oo         790
............... 790
............... 791
............... 793
................ 794
IV. The
A.
B.
C.
D.
Economy .................................
Basic Economy and Employment ...............
Subsistence ...............................
Tourism .................................
Economic Future ...........................
V. Ideology and Influences of Change .....
794
VI.  Effects of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill .........................
A. Effects on Households and Individuals ....................
B.   Effects on Subsistence and Commercial Fishermen ...........
C. Effects on Village Institutions ..........................
796
797
800
805
VII. Conclusion .................................................... 807
References Cited ...................
809
Appendix A: Old Harbor Claim Summary
811
ix

Table of Contents (continued)

CHIGNIK

I. HiEstorical Background......................821

11. The Setting ..........................822
Inl. The people...........................823
A. Dual-Residence Famiilies....................825
B. Household Organization and Kinship ...............827

IV. The Village...........................828
A. The Regional Government ...................828
B. The Village Government...................829
C. Social Services and Schools...................831
D. Associations and Organizations .................832
V. The Economy .........................834
VI. Ideology............................837
VIII. Effects of the 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill................838
A. Closure of the Fishery.....................838
B. Economic Consequences for Fishermen ..............840
C. Social Consequences .....................843
D. institutional Impacts .....................845

VIII. Conclusion ...........................847

References Cited ..........................849
x

Acronyms
AANHS
ABE
ACES
ADCRA

ADF&G
ADH&SS

ADOC
ADOT&PF
Alaska Area Native Health Service
Adult Basic Education
Alaska Community Engineering Services
Alaska Department of Community and Regional
Affairs
Alaska Department of Fish and Game
Alaska Department of Health and Social
Services
Alaska Department of Corrections
Alaska Department of Transportation and
Public Facilities
Alaska Department of Labor
Alaska Eslimo Whaling Commission
Alaska Federation of Natives
Areas Meriting Special Attention
Administration for Native Ame rican
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
Alas'ka National Wildlife Refuge
Alaska Outer Continental Shelf Social Indicators Study
Alaska State Housing Authority
Arctic Slope Regional Corporation
Association of Village Council Presidents
Arctic Women in Crisis
Bristol Bay Area Health Corporation
Bristol Bay Housing Authority
Bristol Bay Native Association
Bristol Bay Native Corporation
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Land Management
Bering Straits Native Association
Bering Straits Native Corporation
Bering Strait School District
Bethel Village Native Corporation
circa
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
Community Health Aide
Capital Improvements Program
Cook Inlet Regional Citizens Advisory Council
Crisis Intervention Response Team
Coastal Management Corporation
ADOL
AEWC
AFN
AMSA's
ANA
ANCSA
ANILCA
ANWR
AOSIS
ASHA
ASRC
AVCP
AWIC
BBAHC
BBHA
BBNA
BBNC
BIA
ELM
BSNA
BSNC
BSSD
BVNC
ca.
CETA
CHA
CIP
CIRCAC
CIRT
CMC
Id

I
Acronyms (continued)
I
Consumer Price Index
Coastal Resource Service Area
Cook Inlet Spill Prevention and Response, Inc.
U.S. Department of Labor
driving while intoxicated
Economic Development Admini'stration
Environmental Impact Statement
Emergency Medical Services
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
Federal Aviation Administration
Fisheries Conservation Zone
Full-time equivalent
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
Fiscal Year
Health, Education, and Social Services (Task Force)
High School
Housing and Urban Development (U.S.)
Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope
Indian Child Welfare Act
Indian Health Service
Indian Reorganization Act
Institute of Social and Economic Research
Kodiak Area Native Association
Kodiak Council on Alcoholism
Kuskokwim Community College
Kikiktagruk Development Corporation
Key Informant
Kikiktagruk Inupiat Corporation
Kenai Native Association
Kodiak Tribal Council
Kodiak Village Services Network
Minerals Management Service
Marine Spill Response Corporation
Northwest Arctic Borough
Northwest Alaska Native Association Corporation
Net Operating Losses
North Slope Borough
Norton Sound Health Corporation
Northwest Arctic School District
Northwest Tribal Council
Outer Continental Shelf
CPI
CRSA.
CISPRI
DOL
DWI
EDA
ELS
EMS
F.I.R.E.
FAA
FCZ

FWS
FY
HESS
HS
HUTD
ICAS
ICWA
IHS
IRA
ISER
KANA
KCA
KCC
KDC
KI
KIC
KNA
KTC
KVSN
MMS
MSRC
NAB
NANA
NOL's
NSB
NSHC
NWASD
NWTC
OCS
I
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I
xii
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Acronyms (continued)
OED	Office of Economic Development (U.S.)
OEDP	Overall Economic Development Plan
OPA	Oil Pollution Act of 1990
P.L.	Public Law
PHS	Public Health Service
QI	Questionnaire Informant
REAA	Rural Education Attendance Area
RELI	Resident Employment and Living Improvements
(program)
S.A.F.E.	Safe and Fear-Free Environment
SIC	Standard Industrial Classification
SOS	State-Operated School
SRC	Social Rehabilitation Center
SWAMC	Southwest Alaska Municipal Conference
U.S.	United States
U.S.S.R.	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UIC	Unemployment Insurance Compensation
UIC	Ukpeagvik Inupiat Corporation
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
USDOI	United States Department of the Interior
VECO	VECO, Inc.
VPSO	Village Public Safety Officer
XCED	Cross-Cultural Education Development
(program)
YKHC                             Yukon-Kuskokwim Health Corporation
o*
ii

I
Glossary
I
Affines
Kin who are related through marriage; "in- -
laws" without a blood-relationship.
I
Avunculate
A privileged relationship with an uncle (often
including residence in an uncle's home).

A non-lineal kinship system in which the
families of the mother and father are not
differentiated, nor are the children of brothers
and sisters.

In social science terminology, a group of
persons who comprise a distinct sample defined
by properties such as age.
I
Bilateral
I
I
Cohort
I
Colaterals
Siblings of core members of a kinship group
(such as a nuclear family) and children of one's
own siblings.
I
Kin who are related by blood (in contrast to
affines).
Consanguines
I
I
Deme
An intermarrying population that forms a
sociopolitical unit.
I
Dendrogram
A "tree diagram" that depicts relative degrees of
relatedness and distance.
I
Emic
Refers to facts that are defined in terms of
their cultural classifications.
I
Endogamy
Intermarriage within one's own bounded social
group.
a
Etic
Refers to objective facts whose reality is
independent of cultural classifications.
I
Exogamy
Marriage outside one's own bounded social
group.
I
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Glossary (continued)
A technique for dating divergence of languages
or dialects, based on rates of retention of
common words.
Glottochronology
An Eskimo mens' house, usually used also for
ceremonial purposes; this term is associated
with Yup'ik societies (the Ifiupiaq variant is
usually rendered as qargi).

A group of persons related to a common ego in
a coanatic descent system; such persons are not
all related to one another inasmuch as they are
defined in terms of their relationship to a single
person (i.e., such a system is ego-focused as
opposed to ancestor-focused systems).

A unilineal descent (kinship) system that
defines relatedness and group membership by
common descent through females.
Kashim




Kindred






Matrilineal
Matrilocal


Neolocal
Post-marriage residence with or close to a
woman's mother's kin.

Unrestricted post-marriage residence (i.e.,
spouses may reside where they choose).
Inflammation of the middle ear.
Otitis media
A corporate descent group, usually named,
often consisting of several lineages and jointly
controlling property and/or privileges, defined
by common descent through males.
Patriclan
Patrideme
An intermarrying population that forms a
sociopolitical unit organized around patrilineal
kin groups.
xv

I
Glossary (continued)
I
A unilineal descent (kinship) system that
defines relatedness and group membership by
common descent through males.
Patrilineal
I
Postmarriage residence with or close to a man's
father's kin.
Patrilocal


Sodality



Syncretic


Virilocal
I
An association or society (note: society in lay
or generic terms, not society in social science
terms).

Refers to the merging or fusion of differing
concepts, principles, or philosophies.

Postmarriage residence with or close to
husband's kin.
I
I
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I
I
I
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I
I
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I
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- m  m    -    - -                -       -
SCHEDULE C COMMUNITIES

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KENAI


Lynn A. Robbins, Ph.D.

KENAI

Table of Contents

I. Historical Context .......................447
A. IHistory ........................447
B. Kenai Native Commnunity .................449
C.  Kenai Peninsula Borough and the City of Kenai..........455
D. Natural Resources.....................461

II.  Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill ................469
A.	Impacts on the City of Kenai.................483
B.	Impacts on Businesses and Households.............488
C.	Impacts on Commercial Fishermen and Fish Processors.......496
D.	Impacts oni Community Relations...............504
E. Summary and Conclusions..................507

References Cited ..........................511


List of Tables

1.    Prices of 24 Marketbasket and Other Consumer Items in Three Stores in Kenai,
August 1989..........................458

2.    Prices of 24 Marketbasket and Other Consumer Items in Tlree Stores in Kenai,
April 1991 ..........................459

3.	A Sample of Labor Costs in Kenai, August 1989............460

4.	A Sample of Labor Costs in Kenai, April 1991.............460
Kenai - page 445

Kenai - page 446

KENAI
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
I.A. History
When Captain James Cook navigated his namesake inlet in 1778, the Dena'ina
occupied the inlet and its major tributaries from Kachemak Bay to' Tyonek near what is
now Anchorage. There were at least 14 villages and 3,000 Dena'ina in the Cook Inlet
area when the Europeans arrived. The Dena'ina have played a major role in the
heritage and traditions of the Kenai Peninsula. At contact and for long thereafter the
Dena'Ina traced their descent through the female line, practiced polygamy (a man having
more than one wife), and embraced anuni'stic beliefs (spi-rits, good or malevolent, are
inherent in all things). They had powerful shamans who communicated with the world of
spirits and were greatly respected and occasionally feared because of their special
powers. 'Me Dena7ina hunted large land mammals and birds, fished for salmon and
steelhead, and harvested plants. They saw themselves as partners with nature in their
displays of respect for living and inanimnate beings. The "potlatch," in which a noted
person receives and redistributes goods as part of an annual ceremony, was a key
element in the winter cycle of Dena'ina life. Feuding has been noted. Although most
of the an cient Dena'ina traditions have disappeared or greatly changed, some practices
and beliefs remain; and the Dena'ina, who make up about 3 percent of the population of
Kenai, maintain important roles in resource management, politics, and civic activities.
Captain Cook made few contacts with the Dena'ina during his 1778 joumney. In
1786 two British ships visited the Cook Inlet on a trading venture; the captains traded a
few goods for some furs with the Dena'ina, and several other ships representing the
English visited, each trading on a modest scale and each captain noting the high
character and honesty of the Dena'ina.
Russians settled at Saint George, now known as Kasilof, in the Kenai area in 1786;
in 1791 they established the tiny settlement of Saint Nicholas, where the city of Kenai is
now located. In 1793 a Russian named Baronoff brought 30 criminals to teach the
Dena'ina people agriculture. Hostilities between the Russians and the DenaIna soon
Kenai - page 447

broke out as Russian Orthodox priests attemnpted to suppress the Dena'ina practices of
polygamy, shamnanismn, and anim'ism. (One of the main historical attractions in Kenai is3
the Russian Orthodox Church of the Assumption built in 1895.) A smallpox epidemiic
struck the Dena'ina in 1838, causing many deaths and reducing morale. The indigenous3
Dena'ina culture began to decline mnarkedly, unchecked by the transfer of the Territory
of Alaska to the United States in 1867 (Osgood 1976:19).3
The opening of the American era was marked by the establishment of 13 fur
trading companies, the most successful of which were headquartered in Seattle and San3
Francisco. By 1883 the far trade collapsed, but resource extraction was only beg'nig
In 1882 a salmon cannery was built at the mouth of the Kasilof River; and by 1929, 233
canneries operated in Cook Inlet. Several canneries--most of theni on the Kenai River--
remain today.3
In 1991 Kenai was the largest city on the Kenai Peninsula, with a population of
about 6,500 (16% of the estimated peninsula population of about 45,000). The city's3
economy is based on fossil fuel extraction (natural gas and oil in Cook Inlet);
commercial fishing; Federal, State, and local government offices; retail and wholesale3
businesses; tourismn (chiefly fromn the Anchorage metropolitan area); and an important
level of the harvest of renewable subsistence resources for household use (game and
fish).
Kenai has a major airport that serves the entire peninsula; many tourist attractions3
in its vicinity; and economically progressive city, borough, and Native institutions as well
as effective voluntary commercial and service organizations (Alaska Department of3
Commerce and Economic Development 1988).
The city experienced its first energy boom in 1957, when oil and natural gas were1
discovered in the area in State lands and waters. These local resources resulted in
construction of two oil refineries, a major chemical plant for production of liquefiedI
natural gas for the City of Tokyo and some cities on the U.S. West Coast, a chemical
plant for production of fertilizer for agricultuiral uses, and nine offshore oil and naturalI
gas production platforms. In early 1990, the fossil fuel industries accounted for about


Kenai - page 4485

one-half of borough property taxes ($1 .5 million), an estimated 550 direct jobs, and total
annual revenues of $50 million (Little 1990). Kenai had an annual budget of $8 miillion
(Fiscal Year 1990-199 1) with a (surplus) fund balance of $8 million. Its population base
in that budget year was 6,546. The city council and mayor were trying to keep the
surplus at no less than $8 million. Kenai was in the top 10 percent among U.S. cities as
measured by the percentage of money on hand in proportion to its budget (income). For
this reason, the mil rate was comparatively low. The city is bonded to $7 million; but if
it wished to do so, it could bond itself to $140 million. The city also received a relatively
modest sum from the State budget because of its stable and healthy finances.
The city's airport la-nd system had $26 million on hand--,an important contribution
to the city's fiscal position. There were about 120,000 emplanements--commercial and
private--from, and to Kenai in 1991. The City of Soldotna, located about 11 miles from
Kenai and roughly the same size, considered having cornmercial flights--a point of
earnest competition between the two cities.
In 1991 the Kenai Peninsula Borough population increased and there was pressure
on the financial and capital resources of cities on the peninsula. Eighty percent of
borough bonds were paid by the State of Alaska and 20 percent by the borough.
In 1991 the State reduced its borough funding level to 70 percent; and there was an
expectation on the part of various officials that the new gubernatorial administration
would reduce the State's contribution even further. This caused considerable alarm
becau se of the rising need for more education monies. The borough's single school
district was not doing well financially in 1991 because of State funding cuts and rising
school enrollments.
I.B. Kenai Native Community
In the 1930s Kenai was still a small village. Two canneries supplied primarily by
local set-net fishermen operate d on the Kenai River. A few non-Native homesteaders
raised livestock and vegetables, mainly for home consumption. A few small stores sold
basic supplies and staples.
Kenai - page 449

Kenai began to change fundamentally, demographically, economically, and socially
with construction of the Wildwood Air Force Base during World War II and the highway
to Anchorage. Homesteaders wanted better services, more stores, and roads.
Construction at Wildwood brought wage income and more retail stores to the3
community. Homesteading did not develop beyond self-sustaining meager production,
but it did provide land for the early residents. Many people abandoned their3
homesteads in the early period of homesteading because of isolation and hardships. The
homesteading mystique has faded with time, but there are a few early residents who3
vividly recall their experiences; and they take a very special pride in having been among
the first homesteaders. Many of the leading families in North Kenai, Kenai, and i
Soldotna are descendants of or are homesteaders. They are fond of the cooperation,
generosity, and friendships they experienced; and although they appreciate those times,3
they would not want to return to them.
The population of Kenai remained stable in the 1930s and 1940s, although3
construction of a gravel airstrip during World War II began a period of increasing
involvement with the outside world. In 1947, homesteading by non-Natives began in the3
Kenai River area when three townships in the Kenai National Moose Range were
opened to entry as the result of intense demand for land after World War II. i
A right-of-way for a new highway to connect the Kenai Peninsula with Anchorage
was plotted parallel to an old wagon trail from Moose Pass on the Alaska Railroad toj
placer gold claims at Cooper's Landing. Veterans and some residents of Kenai claimed
land in the Kalifonsky Beach, Soldotna, Kenai Spur, and Sterling areas. By 1949 the new3
road between Seward and Kenai was usable in good weather. The road provided access
to homesteads in the Sterling and Soldotna areas, and by 1950 about 170 residents
occupied isolated homesteads near Kenai. The Kenai population was then 320.
In 1950 the Kenai area was about 50 percent Native, but since then non-Native
migrants in search of employment in the oil and gas industries, commercial fishing,
government, and busines's far outstripped the Dena'ina population. The NativesI
comprise only about 3 percent of Kenai's population.I


Kenai - page 4505

The Kenaitze people, a branch of the Dena'ina, maintain a distinct cultural identity
despite major economic, technical, political, and demographic changes in the Kenai area.
Key places and institutions for the Kenaitze are the Russian Orthodox church in Kenai;
Wildwood, a former World War II Air Force base acquired under the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA); the. Native Kenai Village corporation; the Kenaitze
Tribal government; and the for-profit Kenai Native Association (KNA). These
institutions and places, in conjunction with strong family ties, facilitate the maintenance
of strong cultural roots and common identity. Kenaitze fishermen use set and drift nets
for salmon fishing from the Kasilof area to the Kenai River. This occupation, which has
long been important to the Kenaitze, also maintains, social and tribal solidarity as many
families and friends fish together.
T'he KNA was established to represent the 170 people who enrolled in the historic
village of Kenai under the terms of ANCSA. This urban people was entitled to set up a
23,040-acre estate. When the U.S. Defense Department announced its intention to close
Wildwood Air Force Base in Kenai, the KNA, through negotiations with the Federal
Government, received title to the land and buildings in 1972. The KNA established its
Wildwood Indian Action Progranm4 under grants from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, to
provide vocational training (mechanical, clerical, building maintenance) for Native
students from villages throughout Alaska. The KNA also formed three oil service
businesses--a roustabout service, a wireline company, and a Kenai-Anchorage
Constr-uction Company.
Salamatof is a historic Native village north of Kenai with over 150 enrollees. It was
recognized as a Native village corporation under ANCSA and has 92,160 acres in the
Kenai area. These lands, selected by the Salamatof Village Corporation Association for
their commercial value, are leased as commercial and recreational lots. The Salamatof
Village Corporation also selected lands overlying gas fields in the Kalifornsky area that
may be leased or developed by Cook inlet Region, Incorporated.
As the Kenai population continued to increase, so too did needs for basic services.
In the late 1950s the residents of Kenai voted against city incorporation on two
Kenai - page 451

occasions, but a third effort succeeded and in 1960 the town became a first-class city
chartered under the State of Alaska. Land values and taxes increased to pay for city
services.
Tle oil and gas boom began in the Kenai area in 1957 when oil was discovered on3
land in the Swanson River area northeast of Kenai. There was great anticipation of this
strike and jubilation when it came through. The few who held mineral rights,
homesteaders under whose property some oil deposits were found, were disallowed
financial benefits because of laws affecting homesteaders and oil leasing.3
The discovery of oil caused land values to rise, rapidly as owners speculated on
increases in population, further oil exploration, and greater demands for land in general.3
Kenai grew in population as it served with Soldotna as one of two supply and service
centers for the oil wells and related developments several miles from the city. Oil
workers took up residence in the two towns and in trailer courts and rental units
scattered along the highway system. These workers were from the oil-producing states of3
Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, and California. These early oil field workers were usually
unmarried and transient, and they rarely attached themselves to the communities in the
area. Those who brought their families remained largely transients; their children
attended local schools, but the parents rarely bec ame involved in school or other social f
and civic affairs. These workers were rough-cut. According to Kenai residents, they
drank hard and were often racially prejudiced. There was strain in Kenaitze/non-Native
relations in the late 1950s and 1960s during the oil and gas boom when workers from
Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and California manifested prejudice toward Natives in3
schools, businesses, and other aspects of life in the city. Those prejudices are waning,
although hard feelings over Kenaitze subsistence fishing are common between the3
Kenaitze and non-Natives. With a few notable exceptions, relations between the
Kenaitze and the non-Natives of the Kenai area are generaly cordial.
The amenities brought by the oil developments in turn brought desired and
undesired changes to Kenai, and residents still debated about economic growth and3
infrastructure development (schools, roads, services, and entertainment). Growth and
Kenai - page 452

development was eventually preferred over stagnation or a possible return to conditions
prior to the opening of tie oil fields.
Oil and gas development expanded with construction of a marine terminal in the
late 1950s/early 1960s, the Standard Oil refinery at Nildski in 1963, and discoveries of
large offshore deposits of oil and gas in Cook Inflet between 1963 and 1965. New oil
service industries were established in the Kenai and North Kenai areas. The North
Road out of Kenai became the site of many prefabricated steel buildings. These were
the preferred locations for these buidings and worker housing because of the ease of
travel and because the maintenance of back roads would have been very expensive.
Between 1965 and 1968, 10 permanent offshore drilling platforms were placed in
the State waters of Upper Cook Inlet, each with a crew of from 50 to 60 workers;
construction of each offshore pipeline required from 100 to 200 workers. In 1968 and
1969, three petrochemical plants were built in the Nildiski area. These new energy
facilities necessitated a large support network of roads, businesses, services, and homes in
the North Kenai area.
Population and employment increased rapidly with the growth of the oil industry.
The period of greatest increase occurred from 1965 to 1968 and, obversely,
unemployment rates declined. Employment dropped by 1,300 jobs upon completion of
the construction of wells, pipelines, and refineries; and unemployment rates went up.
Around 1970 the industry went into its exploration and development phases in Upper
Cook Nlet. Employment and unemployment stabilized at levels below their previous
peaks in the late 1960s.
The population of the Kenai Peninsula increased from 6,000 in 1960 to more than
14,000 in 1970. Kenai's population quadrupled and Soldotna's tripled during this period.
In 1970 about 50 percent of the Kenai Peninsulas population lived in the Kenai area.
The many migrants to the area were newcomers to Alaska who did not have strong ties
to the communities. The common social and economic problems created by rapid
growth were a feeling of estrangement and decline in a sense of community
neighborliness and a loss of privacy among the long-term residents--the Kenaitze and
Kenai - page 453





others, increases in prices, traffic congestion and accidents, dust, noise, and shortages of1
housing, goods, and medical care (MSNW/HRPI, 1976). Long-term residents also were
dissatisfied about employment opportunities because they were not able to gain highly
paid jobs at the new oil and gas facilities. In addition, they found the architecture of3
trailer courts, prefab buildings, new businesses, and many new homes characterless and
bland. In 1976, the average length of residence in the Kenai and Soldotna areas was 6
years. This average includes long-te-rm Kenaitze residents and the early non-Native
homesteaders.3
Most residents had lived in the area less than 5 years. For comparison, the average
duration of residence in Seward for 1976 was 14 years (Green et al 1977). Many of the5
long-term residents benefited from the boom from better roads, more services and stores,
higher wages, more business opportunities, and more diverse types of work.I
Another building spurt occurred between 1975 and 1978, when a second
petrochemical plant was built, creating hundreds of construction jobs and related3
econoinic enterprises and services.
In a 1976 survey (sample size unspecified), 50 percent of the respondents favoredj
further development of oil and gas over other possibilities. The three most favored
economic activities were petrochemical industry, fisheries, and tourism. Respondents3
believed that further development of these sectors of the economy would bring three
desired results for residents of the area: more job opportunities, higher wages, and
general economic improvement. Support for these courses of action was accompanied by
several caveats about undesired rapid population growth, pollution, and damage to the3
beauty and natural resources of the area. Most of the respondents urged slow growth
with high-paying jobs that would last 10 years or more (Green et al. 1977).5
Rapid growth and a preponderance of newcomers in the Kenai and Soldotna areas
from the late 1950s to the late 1970s created an open social structure in which3
newcomers are free to participate. Many social relations outside of inimediate family
members were loosely organized around common interests and friendships. Many                      f
voluntary associations and organizations were formed. These included, among others,
Kenai - page 454

the Elk and American Legion, women's groups, and square dancing groups. Churches,
schools, restaurants and bars, and sporting events become especially important.
Occupations provided the determinants of many social networks. Oil and gas
workers, professionals, businessmen, construction workers, and commercial fishermen
formed tightly organized subcultures or sodalities. Construction and oil workers formed
one of the subcultures in the 1970s. This occupational culture has flourished in Kenai
and Soldotna since the late 1950s and persists in the 1990s. Construction and oil
workers comprised about 20 percent of the workforce in Kenai in 1976. Many of these
workers took employment on the Alaka North Slope, to wbich they commuted on work
schedules that allowed them reasonable periods of time with their families. Other
workers continued to work in oil and gas extraction in Cook Inflet. Some worked in
short-term construction, others in petroleum processing, and still others returned to the
Lower 48 states after the major construction projects were completed. Many invested in
homes and land in the Kenai and Soldotna areas.
The oil industry has been the principal multiplier of economic growth in Kenai,
paving the way for professionals in business, services, and govermnment (teachers, dentists,
doctors, managers, planners, insurance agents, realtors, retailers, bankers, lawyers) who
enjoy relatively high pay and the beauty and recreational opportunities provided by the
area. Many professionals participate frequently in civic affairs and show a certain degree
of sensitivity to the natural environment. This group has the greatest political influence
of all occupational gro-ups that lobby in Juneau, Anchorage, and Washington, D.C.
Although commercial fishermen make up only about 5 percent of the work force, their
political and economic leverage played important roles in fish and game management,
political representation, and participation in community events.
I.C. Kenai Peninsula Borough and the City of Kenai
The Kenai Peninsula Borough was established to execute powers given to it by the
Alaska State Legislature. IThese powers are divided into two spheres--areawide and
nonareawide. The Legislature has areawide power over education, assessment, and
collection of taxes for the borough and for the cities within the borough, planning and
Kenai - page 455





zoning, solid waste disposal, senior citizen funding, 911-emergency communications, and1
general administrative services. Nonareawide powers, as directed by the voters in service
areas, include hospital (2 service areas), fire protection, and emergency medical (6
service areas), recreation (I service area), ports and harbors, and road maintenance and
co-nstruction services (4 service areas).
The borough assembly has 16 members. The borough govemrnment received the
Distinguished Budget Presentation Award from the Governmnent Finance Officers
Association of the United States and Canada for its Fiscal Year 1988 budget. The
borough mayor and his staff were instrumental players in the establishment and
operation of the Oiled Mayors Co-uncil, which coordinated efforts to assist in the cleanup3
of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, provided commiunications, worked toward settlements with
the Exxon Corporation, and addressed other matters vital to mnitigation.3
Kenai was incorporated in 1960 and has a mayor and council system of government
with a city manager. The population of the Kenai Peninsula Borough has increased1
about 4.5 percent during each of the decen-nial census periods since 1960: the
population increased from 9,053 in 1960 to 40,802 in 1990.1
Ile city is supplied with water from artesian sources. The average daily use was
1,500,000 gallons in 1989, and the Water supply is chlorinated. Sewer and garbage               '
services are provided for over 5,000 of the 6,300 (1990) residents. Electricity, natural
gas, telephone facilities and services, fire-fighting and police services, and local radio andI
newspaper media are available. The city is 93 feet above sea level, and precipitation is
about 20 inches per annum; in comparison with mnost of Alaska, the weather is mild with3
mean January temnperatures at + 12.7 'F, and + 53.5 'F in July.
There were 779 studen ts in the elementary grades, 210 in the junior high school           f
grades, and 489 in the high school grades. For health care, there are several physicians
in Kenai and a 46-bed hospital in Soldotna, 11 mailes from Kenai. Kenai boasts5
numerous indoor and outdoor recreational facilities and opportunities, as well as historic
sites. There also are several National and, State parks on the Kenai Peninsula. There is5
a theater, museum, the Fort Kenai Historical Site, the Russian Orthodox Church


Kenai - page 456                                             f

National Shrine, an 80-acre campground and park, slding, fishing, skating, hiking,
boating, snowmobiling, hunting, a hockey rink, drag strip, five baseball fields and a
professional baseball team (the Peninsula Oilers), four softball fields, one footbal field,
four tennis courts, and an 18-hole golf course. There is a recreation center with three
racquetball courts, exercise room, saunas, and a gymnasium with a weight-lifting room.
Kenai has six air services at its regional airport. Water transport consists of barge
service for ocean-going vessels. Six truck transport companies are represented in the
city, as are two taxi-cab services and three car rental operations. Paved highways cross
the peninsula, connecting communities to Anchorage and the Alaska Hfighway. In 1989
there were 500 acres for commercial siting within the city, including waterfront, heavy
industrial, and airport and light industrial sites. Outside the city considerable acreage is
available for commercial development.
With a population of 6,327 in 1990, Kenai was the seventh largest city in Alaska,
composed of 5,604 whites, 535 Alaskan Natives, 176 Hispanics (predominantly Filipinos
with Hispanic surnames), 96 Asians and Pacific Islanders, 55 of unknown ethnic or racial
background, and 37 Blacks.
The cost of living was 13 percent above the national average in 1989. Average
housing costs were as follows: two-bedroom apartments rented for $350/month, three-
bedroom for $450/month, and two- and three-bedroom houses rented for $550 and
$750/month, respectively. A one-to-two bedroom house sold for $67,560 and a house
with three or more bedrooms sold for $75,935. Food costs ranged from $56.54/week for
a household of two adults to $95.53 for a family with two elementary-school-age children.
Tables I and 2 compare the 1989 prices of 24 marketbasket items in Kenai with
similar information recorded in 1991, and Tables 3 and 4 compare 1989 labor costs with
1991 information. Prices are slightly higher in 1991 than in 1989, reflecting inflation.
There are no obvious inflationary consequences from the Exxon Valdez oil spill to
marketbasket items in Kenai in 1989. If inflation had dramatically influenced prices in
1989, they would have been closer to the 1991 prices than they are.
Kenai - page 457

I
I
Table 1

PRICES OF 24 MARKETBASKET AND OTHER CONSUMER ITEMS
IN THREE STORES IN KENAI, AUGUST 1989


Store 1               Store 2           Store 3


Food

10 lb flour                       $	2.99	$2.69	$2.99
12 oz evap. milk	.59	.57	.73
1 lb onions (yellow)	.69	.33	.39
48 oz cooking oil	2.87	3.65	4.37
6-pack cola	2.99	2.99	2.05
10 lb sugar	4.49	4.39	4.69
18 oz corn flakes	2.25	2.15	2.39
24 oz bread	2.29	2.29	2.35
1 lb bacon	1.99	1.09	.99
3 lb coffee	9.69	10.56	9.33a
1 lb butter	1.97	1.79	2.03
12-qt powdered milk	4.89	5.39	5.49
22 oz punch	2.75	3.09	2.97

Other

Pampers 12 pack	4.97	4.73	4.99
Coleman lantern	89.00	nab	na
2-D batteries	1.25	1.15	1.25
1 gal Blazo	4.89	4.89	4.99
1 gal gasoline	1.39	1.49	1.39
1 qt motor oil	1.49	na	na
35-hp outboard	2,471.00	na	na
16-ft skiff	1,995.00	na	na


Source: Robbins, 1989.
Normed for per-unit prices to gain comparability.
b
na = not applicable.




Kenai - page 458
I
I
I
I


1

I
'
I
r
i
I
I
I
I
I

Table 2
PRICES OF 24 MARKETBASKET AND OTHER CONSUMER ITEMS
IN THREE STORES IN KENAI, APRIL 1991

Store 1                Store 2           Store 3


Food

10 lb flour                          $	3.89	$	3.21            $ 3.89
12 oz evap. milk	.63	55.79
1 lb onions (yellow)	.79	.59	.59
48 oz cooking oil	2.87	3.31	3.75
6-pack cola	3.19	3.19	3.19
10 lb sugar	5.19	4.59	5.33
18 oz corn flakes	1.89	2.29	2.25
24 oz bread	2.29	2.29	2.29
1 lb bacon	2.89	2.89	2.89
2.7 lb coffee	8.69	8.89	8.69a
1 lb butter	2.89	1.69	2.25
12-qt powdered milk	7.29	7.75	7.29
22 oz punch	3.37	2.99	2.57
Other
Pampers 32 pack                        11.99                  11.99              11.99a
(Pampers per unit =)
Coleman lantern	49.95	naC	na
2-D batteries	1.27	1.25	1.27
1 gal Blazo	5.95	6.39	na
1 gal gasoline	1.40	1.36	na
1 qt motor oil	2.50	1.77	1.89
35-hp outboard	3,200.00	na	na
16-ft skiff	4,136.00b	na	na


Source: Robbins Field Survey, 1991.
a Normed for per-unit prices to gain comparability.
b No 16-foot skiffs were available.
c na = not applicable.
Kenai - page 459

I
A
Table 3

A SAMPLE OF LABOR COSTS IN KENAI, AUGUST 1989
I
I
Labor Category
Wage

I
$25/hr
.$10-25/hr
$10-25/hr
$10-25/hr
$10-25/hr
$10-25/hr
Net hanging
Rough carpentry
Electrical
Engine repair
Welding
Plumbing
I
a

Source: Laborers Union, Local No. 341, Kenai, Alaska, 1989.



Table 4
A SAMPLE OF LABOR COSTS IN KENAI, APRIL 1991


Labor Category	Wage


Net hanging	$25.00/hr
Rough carpentry	$10.66/hr--
Nonunion
$23.95/hr--Union,
plus $5.95 benefits
Electrical repair                                             $11.00/hr--
Nonunion
Engine repair	$7.00/hr
Welding	$16.71/hr
Plumbing	$15.57/hr
I
I
i
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Source: Alaska State Employment Office, Kenai, Alaska, 1991.




Kenai - page 460
1
I
I

I.D. Natural Resources
Game was plentiful in the Kenai area in 1991, although the peninsula had changed
ecologically in recent decades. Before the turn of the century, caribou were common
and moose were comparatively rare. Human-caused fires in the late 1800s and in 1947
converted caribou-lichen habitat into low-growing deciduous shrubs and other plants
suitable for moose. This change was especially pron'ounced in the Homer area, where
caribou were once numerous. According to most of the respondents, moose had recently
come under threat by a.myriad of human activities (housing, roads, road kills, noise,
some indiscriminate shooting), mainly those that altered the animals' habitats. Caribou
were re-introduced a few years ago in the Kenai area; and there was a small, stable herd
in 1991.
A longtime resident of Kenai who was a hunter and a fisherman said that ducks,
geese, and king salmon had declined significantly in numbers in the past 30 years. He
also said, with some irony, that "There are many moose and they are all in the Kenai city
limits." He said that there were residents who would "hunt out" all of the moose in the
area if there were no game regulations,.and there were those who would not care if the
moose disappeared because these people, considered the moose to be a dnerous
nuisance. This person, whose knowledge of peninsula wildlife was extensive, expressed
gratitude to the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G) for having brought
wolves back onto the peninsula and for having planted game fish for sport fishermen in
Skilak Lake. A final comment from this person: Dall sheep were being harvested in
their Cooper Landing habitat faster than they could replace their losses.
A majority of persons interviewed thought that moose, seagulls, ducks, geese,
beaver, ptarmigan, owls, grouse, and brown and black bears were plentiful. About half
regarded the number of caribou available as adequate.
When asked about Dall sheep, less than half of the respondents had an opinion. It
is evident that a large proportion of the respondents gave no answer to many of the
questions because they were~ ignorant about resource abundance.
Kenai - page 461





When discussing resources, some personis said quite pointedly that seagLulls wereI
important in the local food chain because they do a lot of "cleaning up." And although
more brown bears were harvested in the Kenai area, black bears were numerous--whichI
pleased many respondents. Brown bears also were present in appreciable numbers, and
none of the respondents believed this animal was threatened on the peninsula. A fewI
caribou were harvested each year by ADF&G to keep the numbers in balance with the
habitat on which the animals depended.I
Attitudes about the relative abundance of salmon species underscored some of the
conflicts and worries over these important resources. About as many respondents
thought that king, red, and silver salmon were available in adequate quantities as thought
the opposite. Below, we address conflicts over salmon by various user groups and about
the anger expressed by many persons over foreign open-sea drift-net fishing boats
unlawfully taking large numbers of salmon incident to their hauls of target species (squid,
in particular).3
Pink and chum salmon, neither of which was of central importance as commercial
or game species in Cook Hnet were considered to be more than adequate in numbers.
Ile inlet and its feeder streams were not      piehabitat for these species. Halibut, pike,
Dolly varden, char, smelt, cod, grayling, herring, clams, and berries were considered to
be in adequate numbers biologically and for humnan uses by most persons who believed
they knew enough to give informed opinions.
There was a clear recognition in the community that wild creatures were forced
into smalier and smaller areas on the peninsula as the human population continued toI
rise, and that all species should have been managed with greater care than was present
in 1991. As for management, three in fouT persons said that State or Federal agencies
should continue managing wild species, although there should be local influence on that
management. Only a little over half of my respondents actually thought local residents
influenced ADF&G decisions.
Individuals without institutional restraints would, in the words of some respondents,3
"hunt out the moose" and needlessly exploit marine and freshwater fish resources as well,


Kenai - page 462

according to the prevailing attitude about management of wild resources. Further, most
of the persons interviewed had well-considered opinions on game nianagement. Some
persons stated that despite their knowledge, the Kenaitze did not, nor were they Likely to,
have the equipment and personnel to manage game. To explain this point further, one
person said `[the Kenaitze] ... have the right ideas [values] but they ... do not have the
authority or the means [equipment, trained personnel, funds] to manage game and fish in
the region." This same person added that, in his opinion, the Kenaitze managed the
bio ta completely and with care before other races came to the peninsula; they insured
that resources were not abused, and even though the Native population was relatively
small and there were opportunities to squander resources, the Natives restrained
themselves from doing so. One man said, "in all of my nine years in Alaska, I have come
to the conclusion that Native Americans should have more say in the management of
biological resources." Another point about attitudes toward the Kenaitze potential for
wise game management was that most people did not believe Natives under 50 years of
age were more capable and knowledgeable than other ethnic groups.
The Salamatof Native Corporation planned to develop a tourist facility on its lands
in the Elephant Lake area, where there were many wolves, bears, and moose. Several
persons said that this plan demonstrated to them that Native American institutions were
interest groups, a few among many that must be restrained and regulatedb publc
agencies in their pursuit of self-interest and personal gain and pleasure.
As to who possessed the greatest amount of accurate records about the biological
and physical environment, most of my informants replied that scientists do. Many
persons commented on the word "Native," which I used frequently when posing protocol
topics to them, such as "who do you think knows more about. .. ?" They asserted that
anyone who knew local conditions and circumstances was in conduct a "Native," and
many non-Native American persons knew the land, water, weather, and living resources
as well or better than some of the Native Americans who lived on the peninsula. These
were not bigoted statements; they were matter-of-fact observations about uses of terms.
When interviewees were asked about local control and knowledge of local conditions,
Kenai - page 463





they frequently lumped all persons together, Native Amnericans and otherwise, in theirI
comments abouit local control over fish and game management.
Discussions of local control of fish and game were always qualified. Some personsI
believed that more local influence was called for on the condition that it be achieved
with great care and considerable planning among local and State groups. The Alaska
Fish and Game Board was praised by some persons for taking local suggestions seriously
in fish and game management. Other persons felt the board too often favored sport
hunters and fishermen from outside the peninsula. A cornmercial fishermnan insisted that
more fish hatcheries were needed to enhance stocks of king, sockeye, and silver salmon.
He feared that these species would decline without such action. The sockeye remainedI
numerous. The harvest of sockeye was once as low as 1.7 million in the 1970s, but the
imposition of a 200-mile offshore national Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the 1970s3
temporarily restricted foreign fishermen from fishing within 200 miles of the U.S. shore
and helped to raise the average annual catch in the 1980s to about 4 million fish. TheI
same man also said that an industry might come along that would have to treat Kenai
River water, which would be a round-about way of improving water quality for KenaiI
and Soldotna residents.
Most of my informants thought a person needed 6 or more years to get to know the3
local area well enough to harvest local resources well and in comparative safety. A third
of the informants thought that a person never knows enough--there is always more to
learn about pursuing game, fish, and plants, and otherwise getting around on land and
water; a larger fraction thought I to 5 years were sufficient to gain the knowledgej
needed to move about safely and to competently harvest wild resources. Some
respondents were particularly knowledgeable about fish and game; and their households3
harvested at least some animals, plants, and fish from all available harvestable species in
the region. For example, one household reported harvesting moose; silver, king, and3
sockeye salmon; halibut; cod; crab; shrimp; scallops; clams; and several species of
berries.I
Kenai - page 464

My informants who had resided in Kenai for 11 or more years, nearly two-thirds of
my sample, possessed many important memories and stories about places on the
peninsula that they enjoyed telling to family and friends.
A typical opinion about game management in Kenai was encapsulated by a
womnan's comTnent, " .. . any resource that is important to local special interests is
subject to considerable local political pressure." This statement, and many comments in
a similar vein, were directed primarily at the sport hunters, fishermen, guides, and
outfitters, and their influence on the Alaska Fish and Game Board. Trophy-seeldng
fishermen and hunters were looked upon with contempt and anger by most of the
respondents. They were often referred to as "screamers," meaning that they were the
loudest squeaky wheel in the body politic. These expressions of displeasure also were
voiced by commercial set-net fishermen who often saw themselves at odds with sport
fishermen.
Although ADF&G was favored over other parties as the preferred manager of
game and fish in Alaska, there were some misgivings about the agency. Some persons
charged that ADF&G listened to sport hunting and fishing guides, and that it heeled to
their lobbying over the wishes of local hunters and fishermen (commercial, sport, and
subsistence). One person said, "Subsistence was favored by the State of Alaska, but now
sport hunting and fishinig are given emphasis and locals are subordinate to outsiders in
ADF&G policies." A second person said, "Subsistence was favored by the State of
Alaska, but now sport fishermen and hunters have the governor's ear." On the same
subject, a third person said, "Most of the serious conflicts in Kenai are between Kenai
River guides and everyone else."
To add to the grievances registered about sport fishermen and river guid es, a
person who lived near the Kenai River and who could see a considerable stretch of the
river from his home said that he had counted as many as 100 boats across from his
residence on the river during the king salmon season. He asserted that kidng salmon
were not well counted to monitor reproduction, and that he rarely saw spawned-out kings
in the river--in contrast to the 1970s, when it was common to see many kidngs that had
Kenai - page 465






laid their eggs. He went on to say that about 10 to 15 percent of the kings that wereI
hooked and released died soon after--an atrocious waste, in his view.
Despite some favorable attitudes about Federal management of fish and wildlife,I
many persons registered strong opposition. Their most frequent complaint was that
Federal agencies did not know local people and local circumstances, and they favored
interests outside of Alaska. It was comTmon in Kenai for residents to believe that
Federal agencies would impose undesired policies and regulations on local communities.
Many persons who set up new residences in Kenai did so to escape the physical3
confinements, economic limitations, and otherwise distasteful environmnental quality of
their former communities. They also hoped to get away from further restrictions placed f
on their freedom by various public agencies. As one person said, "Alaska is distinct with
its wilderness. What pertains to it does not pertain to the Lower 48."
Another source of controversy over fisheries was centered on the conduct of a few
members of the Kenaitze Tribe who asserted what they believed to be the right of allj
Alaska residents to harvest wild foods whenever there was a need for them. The Tribal
Chairwoman disapproved of this position on wildlife harvests. Most of the tribalj
members, along with most of the other residents of Kenai, realized that the human
population was too large for a heavy reliance on local subsistence resources. Rules andI
regulations governing commercial, sport, and subsistence interests and clamming were
clearly called for; and most persons, both tribal and nontribal, preferred that ADF&G3
manage resources. A small minority of my informants said that subsistence resources
should be available to those in need, regardless of the season and game and fish3
regulations.
The Alaska Supreme Court granted the Kenaitze Tribe the right to conduct
subsistence fishing on the Kenai River as a result of a case brought before the court by
some members of the tribe. The right was granted with the stipulation that it must be3
connected with Persistence of cultural traditions; thus, fishing must be undertaken to
teach members of the tribe the importance of subsistence fishing in the Kenaitze culture,I
past and present: the term for this was "educational subsistence fishing." The court's


Kenai - page 466                                               1

decision was a bright spot in the lives of many members of the tribe and a source of
resentment among many non-Native Americans in Kenai. Despite this resentment,
however, the tribe sponsored Indian dances in the Kenai High School that were attended
by hundreds of peninsula residents. The dances fostered trust and goodwill between
Native Americans and other people on the peninsula, according to several informants.
Several informants commented about the management of salmon, observing that
wild fish stocks and their harvest were in jeopardy because of the global tendency toward
hatchery production. They stated that the fisheries of the future seemed to be heading
in this direction, just as certain wild animals, birds, and plants were ultimately
domesticated and managed by humans. They said that State agencies did not want to
acknowledge this fact, repeatedly applying the term "aquaculture" only to hatchery
salmon. The officials continued to promote fisheries dependent on wild stocks in sport
and commercial enterprises. The agencies excluded other products, such as shellfish and
kelp, from endorsement and development of aquaculture projects. It was important for
State residents to recognize that Federal recreation taxes brought in significant sums of
money and that hatcheries played an important role in this.
The Cook Wnet Aquaculture Association (CIAA) on the peninsula was supported
by a 2-percent commercial fish tax on drift-net. fishermen and by State funds. In 1991,
the director of the peninsula's aquaculture association insisted that the State could have
greatly expanded its aquaculture products in variety and volume to compete with Japan,
Norway, and other nations that were taling larger shares of the marine products market.
Such action would have increased State tax revenues from sport fishing, a substantial
source of income for the State. Marketing salmon, also could have been more stable and
could have competed with producers in other states and countries.
There was a $3 million fish ladder on the Paint River near Homer, Alaska, for
which all contracts and permits had been obtained by the CLAA, the organization
undertaling the project. In compensating fishermen for their losses caused by the 1989
E-xxon Valdez oil spill, Exxon included this fee in its settlement with commercial
fishermen; but it did not convey the funds directly to CLAA, an action that disappointed
Kenai - page 467






CLAA officials. Exxon representatives said that giving the monies directly to fishermenI
was justified in that these expenses were a normal part of the cost of rnmning a drift-net
operation.I
A local group of citizens challenged the Paint River fish ladder project on the
grounds that fish stocks for the project would be taken from the Katmai and McNeil
Rivers. The proj'ect required compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) of 1970, which the project managers indeed took i nto account; but they did not
believe that the project threatened riverine stocks.
Threats to the kidng salmon were exacerbated by the presence of as miany as 600
drift-net fishermen using drift nets up to 1.5 miles long. Despite these pressures on kidng
sahmon, a majority of persons believed those fish to be well managed. (The kidng salmon
has a 4-5 year cycle from the time it is hatched in freshwater, mligrates to the ocean, and3
returns to spawn.) Silver salmon, according to an experienced river fishermen, were
harvested with greater intensity on the Kenai River because guides fished for this species
over the 2-month silver salmon season.
Many persons said that local residents were less and less able to afford hunting for
moose and Dali sheep because of ADF&G's regulations on where game could be
harvested. They had to travel farther to hunt these animals than in the recent past, to
areas where hunting was permitted. Overnight stays and special equipment were
required, both of which incurred considerable expense. Thus, some kinds of hunting5
were less accessible to local persons. Fishing on the Kenai River also had been more
restrictive for local persons because of the large number of guides (more than 300 in3
summer 1990). The ADF&G attempted to impose a limit on the number of guides on
the Kenai River to about 200, but this was stalled by legal appeals in 1991.
One of the most important aspects of the tourismn industry was king salmon sport
fishing. Fishermaen usually were allowed to keep their catch; but because of dimfinishing3
stocks, ADF&G permitted only catch-and-release during the 1990 run. The adverse
effect was that motel reservations were canceled, a-nd there was a noticeable decline in
business throughout Kenai. The ADF&G policy caused considerable consternation in


Kenai - page 468

the city; for many parties, its consequences were as adverse as the Exxon Valdez oil spill
was to drift-net fishermen. For example, two professional sports teams, the Kansas City
Royals and the Los Angeles Lakers, canceled reservations at one motel during the 1990
fishing season, a blow to the motel owner and staff. In 1991, the catch-and-release policy
was again imposed until after the king run in 1991.
One commercial fisherman said that fishing boats should have been taxed by the
State to achieve some equity in reso-urce use. He also said that all management
decisions should have been based on biological processes, rather than on political
considerations, so that resource stocks would be adequately protected.
One of the few specific subjects on.fish and game management was about beavers,
which had set up a colony near the Kalifonsky Beach Road across the Kenai River from
the City of Kenai. A large beaver pond formed by the colony had undermined the road,
prompting ADF&G to move the animals elsewhere. There were people who deeply
resented this action, while others believed it was warranted. Beavers were not as
numerous as they once were, and some Kenai residents took pride in both seeing and
protecting them. There also were instances of domestic rabbits that had escaped from
their pens and survived in the wild. Another local resident commnented: "Gulls love
development."
1I. IMPACTS OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL
This section examines some of the social and economic consequences of the Exxon
Valdez oil spill on Kenai residents. Here I draw from persons in the key-informant
sample, but also from more than 35 officials in various capacities, local press releases,
and various documents.
The words of one respondent sum up many persons' attitudes on the Exxon Valdez
oil spill: "I sit here by myself and fume and turn red. I am thoroughly disgusted.
Reaction to the spill was dilatory and the cleanup inadequate. Exxon has done
responsible things, but they made money on increased prices [for some of their products]
and tax deductions. There was terrible destruction. The captain was at fault and so was
Exxon."
Kenai - page 469





Another person moved from one of the Lower 48 states to Valdez in 1989 to get aI
job during the height of the social, ecological, and economic effects of the Exxon Valdez
oil spill. She said, "I had trouble getting a place to stay and the place was so ugly andI
filthy, I moved to Kenai because I was told there was work there, and [because] I like
small towns. I got a job in Kenai and I do not regret my decision to come here."I
Tlese and other comments tell some of the story of the effects of the oil spill on
people's lives. Many people said emphatically that the oil spilled by the Exxon Valdez
should have been burned shortly after the spill occurred and that the Alaska DEC and
the USCG were reluctant to approve of burning the spilled oil because they feared
adverse public reaction.
One drift-net fisherman was so determined to receive compensation from Exxon
that he claimed he dragged his drift nets up and down Cook Inlet to oil them so he3
could qualify for compensation. He reported that he encountered no oil, going on to say
the closure of drift-net and some set-net fishing in the inlet was the result of "media3
hype."
Another drift-net fisherman was upset with the compensation he received fromU
Exxon. He said Exxon compensated fishermen at a price of $1.60 to $1.70 per pound for
sockeye when they should have been paid $2.50 per pound. He seemed to be in the5
mninority on this point--most fishermen interviewed for this study were satisfied with their
monetary compensation. Their suffering came in the uncertainties that they, theirI
families, and crews experienced. Boat captains insisted that captains and crew ifile
separate clainis so that crew members would be treated fairly and so that captains could3
not shortchange their crews. Both parties received full compensation.
One of the long-term consequences of the Exxon Valdez oil spill was evident in the3
information media of the State of Alaska. The VECO Corporation, which directed most
of the cleanup efforts and earned substantial profits in doing so, purchased The
Anchorage Times--a newspaper known for its conservative, pro-business posture--to
counter the more liberal Anchorage Daily News. Many peninsula residents referred to3
The Anchorage Times as "The VECO Times." VECO's spill-cleanup windfall meant


Kenai - page 470p

ownership and partial control of one of two major newspapers in Alaska (VECO sold
T'he Anchorage Times to the Anchorage Daily News in 1992).
Other unexpected impacts involved workers on offshore oil platforms in Cook Inlet
who earned more in 1989 than -usual. Shortly after the spill, platform workers put in
more time at their jobs because the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) a-nd Alaska
Department of Environmenta Conservation (DEC) imposed new regulations on rig
operators and more frequent monitoring at the platforms, and there was an increased
emphasis on worker safety, all of which required more worldng hours.
In the regulatory realm, DEC continued its close watch on water quality and other
potential environmental impacts of energy industries in Cook Inflet during the 1990
surmmer season--another beneficial side-effect of the oil spill. Many more site visits were
made than before 1989. These DEC actions included added precautions in
envirornmental protection, such as moving underground fuel tanks farther from onshore
zones of potential water contamination. These measures did not impose a heavy cost on
fish processors, although energy industries did pay more for environmental safeguards.
One person summed up a majority opinion about Federal, State, and Exxon
Corporation responses to the Exxon Valdez oil spill as a quagmire of institutional
procrastination, confusion, timidity, and buck-passing by saying that these institutions
should have complied with the following dictum: "Lead, follow, or get the hell out of the
way." This person also said, in reference to the consortium of oil companies in Prince
William Sound and the companies offshore--the companies with the spill-response plan:
"If you let a two-year-old do what he wants to do, he will mess up." The Federal-State
spill-response plan was vitiated and ignored.
According to one person, the Exxon Valdez oil spill occurred, in part, because spill
prevention and response were in the hands of the oil industry. He stated that "You
shouldn't let them have that much responsibility." This man said that Exxon, not the
captain of the ship, was at fault. He believed that the State of Alaska .. was lulled
into complacency, and big money glossed over the problems."
Kenai - page 471





I asked mny informants whether they thought that Exxon and the State and FederalI
Governnments were tnithful with the public about the spill. Most did not believe that any
of the institutions were truthful; a few persons pointed out that some hedging of the
truth by all three was understandable and excusable to avoid misunderstandings. A little
subterfuge was permissible, in their opinion.
Some respondents said that Federal agencies seemed to have been interested
mainly in visual impacts from spills rather than scrutinizing the effects of the spills. This
may have been so because the Federal Government was not as affected by the spill as
local residents were. Tlese comments also asserted that the State of Alaska's hands
were tied in its attempts to respond to the spill because it was constrained to act in
concert with Federal agencies.
A majority of the respondents believed that there will be more spills in Alaska andU
elsewhere in the world. (The several major oil spills that had occurred'since 1989 were
cited by many persons.) Almost all of my informants cited specific examples of
improvements in the safety measures instituted since 1989 in Prince William Sound and
Cook Inlet. Because of these measures, most of the respondents felt reassured by
government and industry that there would be less likelihood of a spill in Prince William
Sound of a magnitude and duration similar to the Exxon Valdez spill. However, most
persons believed that large spills were inevitable, somewhere in the world, Alaska being
no exception, and that some spills were unavoidable or were likely simply because of
human error that one must more or less expect. The majority of respondents believed
that a large spill in Cook Inflet could not possibly be cleaned up because the tides were
swift and strong and winds were frequent. Most of the respondents also believed that
fuirther oil and gas exploration in Cook Inlet would have an adverse reaction on the
waters and land. About 60 percent of the respondents were satisfied with the condition
of the land and waters; 40 percent were not.
Oil Pollution Act of 1990
One of the most important changes in the lives of peninsula residents was
implementation of the 1990 Oil Pollution Act (OPA). The OPA was passed to remedy


Kenai - page 472

the problems and oversights that contributed decisively to the Exxon Valdez oil spill.
The OPA calls for outfall testing, prevention measures, safe operation of tankers,
biological baseline studies, atmospheric-information collection, and testing to determine
if standards are met. There~ will be 4-year contract agreements to conduct these tests
and studies, and the General Accounting Office -will conduct audits of the activities each
year. Prince William Sound residents were the main source of pressure on Congress to
establish OPA. Since then, Alyeska had spent over $50 million to comply with OPA's
provisions as applied to Prince William Sound. The OPA also established the Cook
Inlet Regional Citizens Advisory Council (CIRCAC), which was in charge of monitoring
companies' performances in the extraction and transport of crude oil, natural gas, and
other fossil fuels and their derived products. The CIRCAC worked closely with the
Cook Inlet Spill Prevention and Response, Inc. (CISPRI), an organization funded--by
Federal mandate--by Cook Inlet fossil-fuel production and processing companies whose
purpose was to improve spill-prevention and response measures. The CISPRI also
provided monies for CLRCAC. In 1991, the two organizations were worling together
under a 1-year agreernent; CISPRI provided $600,000 for each of the first 2 years of
CIRCAC's operations. The members of CIRCAC apparently were sensitive to the
financial burdens imposed on industries and mindful of this in establishing the first 1-
year agreement and subsequent renewal for a second year.
The nation has been watching Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet to see how
OPA will be implemented. According to the Acting Director of CIRCAC, citizen input
results in the best kidnd of ind-ustry oversight and results in the best industrial
performance in environmental protection. The Bush Administration pledged support of
OPA. Some industry employees had observed that water quality monitoring in the
deeper parts of the' inlet channel acros s from Nildsli might be warranted, because there
was a possibility that some industry-deposited wastewaters might cause some adverse
environmental effects. As of December 1991, the DEC had not insisted on monitoring
this part of the inlet.
Kenai - page 473






In the 1980s, it was "sexy," according to one inter viewee, to "knock the DEC."I
While most State agencies received budget increases, DEC held about even in
appropriations, partly because many legislators were indifferent or hostile to the agency.
During this same decade, there was a persistent erosion of support for the spill-
prevention-and-response system established by Alyeska, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG),
and DEC in the 1970s (Davidson 1990; Keeble 1991). Tle Exxon Valdez oil spill and5
Federal passage and implementation of OPA changed these circumstances.
Public and Congressional outrage over revelations about oil transport safety and3
control of pollution from vessels and onshore facilities was further heightened when
operations in Prince William Sound were compared with those at the Scottish port ofI
Sullom Voe in the Shetland Islands under jurisdiction of the local county government.
The port at Sullom Voe handled 6 million barrels of North Sea crude oil each day, and
the majority owner was British Petroleum--the majority owner of Alyeska Pipeline
Service Company. Some Alaskans invited representatives from Sullom Voe to visit3
Prince William Sound and share information about port operations. The contrasts
between operating practices in Prince William Sound and Sullom Voe were startling.
Comparisons of these two management systems were presented to Congressional
committees, and OPA was fashioned on a model of environmental protection taken
largely from Sullom Voe. In Out of the Channel: The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in Prince
William Sound (1991:156), John Keeble states::
Unlike the Alyeska terminal, Sullom Voe had reels of boom
permanently deployed at sensitive areas, random helicopter
surveillance of tanker traffic, full radar coverage, a perman ent on-U
site pollution response team, regular drills, pilots who rode tankers
to the open seas, regular inspections of tankers, more tugs used for
berthing and backup assistance for major spills available within 24
hours. Sullom Voe has not had another major spill since
institution of its plan.3

Sullom Voe had a serious oil spill in the 1970s. The county government requested
broad enforcement powers from the Scottish Parliament to establish the plan brieflyI
described above. Just as the county received the powers it requested, a vocal and


Kenai - page 4743

indignant segment of the residents of Prince Williamn Sound and Cook In1let sought and
received legislative support from Congress in a process reminiscent of the Sullom Voe
experience.
The OPA brought many beneficial changes in Cook Wnet. The Exxon Valdez oil
spill was followed by 20 major effects studies and 40 new Federal regulations. More
than 20 crucial tasks were spelled out by legislators and witnesses before Congressional
committee s. However, there had been little progress on the tasks and the legislation as
of 1991. For example, two tasks central to legislation were rules requiring identification
of who pays for cleanup and how much cleanup equipment the industries must place in
different ports in the country. As a penalty for not obeying such rules violators would be
prohibited from transporting oil in U.S. waters. (Some companies, such as those
affiliated with Dutch Royal Shell, threatened a boycott of the rule because, they claimed,
the liability standards were too expensive for them.)
Not only did OPA require double hulls on ships by the year 2010--one of the
regulations for which the Act has become famous, it also called for tug escorts, tighter
standards for pilot qualifications, dollar values on oiled wildlife, limits on the number of
shift workhours on tankers, and new standards for sbip licensing. The OPA also had
more stringent rules on tanker-safety systems, the -number of officers on the bridge of a
tanker entering a port, studies on cleanup technologies, deepwater ports, tanker
personnel, vessel-traffic services, ship construction, navigation rules, foreign-tanker
standards, inspections, and crew training.
The 182-page OPA made tanker owners very nervous. Studies revealed that more
than 15 percent of the oil released in a spill was rarely recovered, and it was not clear if
the new Federal regulations would require a rate of recovery larger than this. It was
possible, according to prevailing speculation, that Federal rules might demand that a
certain proportion of spilled oil be recovered each day following a spill. These rules
could ignore weather conditions that have much to do with opportunities for recovery. It
also was not clear which techniques would be mandated: biodegradable chemicals,
skimmers, burning the oil, or a combination of these.
Kenai - page 475






Another provision of OPA -calls for. -creation of the Marine Spill ResponseI
Corporation (MSRC), a nonprofit organization established by 22 major U.S. oil
transporters and producers. The MSRC must purchase sixteen 210-foot spill-response
ships that shall be equipped and online by February 18, 1993. This is the
Congressionally mandated date when major oil companies must be prepared to respond
to the worst-case spill. Each spill-response ship is expected to cost about $185 niill ion
and serve five regional centers--near Seattle, Washington, in Puget Sound; Port
Hueneme, near Santa Barbara, California; Lake Charles, Louisiana; Mfiami, Florida; and
New York City Harbor. There will be 22 depositories of spill-response equipment
throughout the U.S. at a cost of an estimated $400 million. The annual MSRC budget is
expected to be about $100 million, with approximately 400 full-time employees.
In September 1991, Alaska DEC officials requested that MSRC establish a regionalI
center in Alaska. The MSRC had two objections to the request: (1) State spill liabilities
were stiffer than Federal; and (2) Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet industries and.
communities had taken special actions to prevent and clean spills in the past so could be
expected to be prepared for the future. No action on the request had been taken as of
September 1991. The Alaska State Legislature in its 1991 session requested the Citizens
Oversight Council on Oil and Other Hazardous Substances to examine statutes onI
immunity a-nd make recomTmendations on changes that might be needed. In the
meantime, draft regulations were prepared to establish and implement the State of
Alaska's 1990 spill-contingency legislation--a law separate from immunity statutes
(Enders 199 1).
On August 15, 1991, the oil industry, the Alaska DEC and Division of Emergency
Services, the Kenai Peninsula Borough, the USCG and CISPRI participated in a
simulated 45,000-barrel spill of North Slope crude oil for the Tesoro Alaska Petroleum
Corporation. On August 17, 1991, a second drill was conducted for the Unocal facility at
Nikiski. The simulated spill occurred 1.5 miles from the Kenai Pipeline dock in Nikisld.
T'he fictional tanker Kamishak Eay struck "an unidentified submerged object" at 6:10 a.m.
T'hree of the 18 holding tanks in the hypothetical, 300,000-barrel, double-hulled vessel


Kenai - page 476

were punctured. The CISPRI conducted the cleanup using contracted equipment and
personnel.
A representative from the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company was present to learn
from the simulated spill and responses to it. By 9:00 a.m. the spill had formed a 4-
square-mile slick 2 miles east of Nikisld. The CISPRI crews used controlled burning,
chemical dispersants, skimmers, and booms to contain the crude oil. Other crews placed
booms across the mouth of the Kenai River and on the west side of the inlet to protect
beaches. By 2:00 p.m. Tesoro employees estimated that 4,000 barrels had been dispersed
or burned. Apparently no oil-spill-response exercises had been conducted in Prince
William sound before the Exxon Valdez oil spill. These important exercises in Cook
Wnet taught those involved many important lessons about commnunications and
coordination. The participants said that one missing aspect of an actual spill was the
presence of media representatives in large numbers with many questions to ask and the
need to respond to public reactions. These two additional factors might have slowed
progress or altered decisions. Frank Mullen, the then-Acting Director of CIRCAC
responded by saying, "It's hard to be critical of a drfll. ... You've got to make sure they
[spills] don't happen in the first place" (Brown 1991f).
The two oil-spill drills were considered to be successful, according to observers.
However, flaws were noted by Townsend Environmental of Otis, Oregon, a consulting
firm that prepared an evaluation for CIRCAC. The DEC received the most criticism:
the agency was ". . .plagued by a lack of planning and inexperienced and untrained
personnel." The oil industry was praised for its performance in the simulated spills and
responses. Two companies, Tesoro and Unocal, participated in the drills. The CIRCAC
received similar praise. The report said about these parties, "Training for spill response
obviously has been very good... 1" and "In fact, the training was so thorough that we did
not see a single instance of anyone referring to the contingency plans or technical
manuals" (Brown 1991f). The drills were staged for 12-hour responses and were, in this
respect, limited. There were several other specific oversights and errors in the spill-
response drill noted in the report:
Kenai - page 477






ï¿½	Problems with the communications network.
*	CIRCAC and the borough were not notified of the spill drills.
*	Dispersants and burning were applied too soon.
ï¿½	The companies were not prepared to accomamodate the number of volunteers.
*	Tesoro's recovery and rehabilitation of wildlife were delayed.
*	The unified-command-plan approach was difficult for Tesoro, and there was no
communications component for the contingency plan.
*    Efforts to place booms across the Kenai River failed, and the boom for burning
was deployed improperly.
*	Tlere were difficulties for Unocal in its administrative efforts.3
*	There needed to be a better description of CIRCAC's role in spill response.
*	The USCG's role was difficult to evaluate because it did little in the drills.3
Industry officials did not take exception to this eval-uation. CISPRI director, Bill Stilling,
said that the report was a fair account of the limnitations of the performance of various3
organizations in the drills. He believed that improvements in the shortcomings noted in
the report would be made in forthcomin  drills.3
Coincidentally, there was a spill of 4,300 gallons of diesel fuel frorn a dock at
Nikisli on August 13, 1991. Less than 44 gallons of the spilled fuiel were collected
according to DEC officials. This rate of recovery was very disappointing to DEC.
Weather conditions and the very thin, filmy consistency of the fuel hampered clean,up3
efforts. Spills of petroleum products violate Federal and State laws, and the owner of
the vessel can be fined. No attempts to impose a fine by Federal or State agencies had
been announced by mid-September 1991, although the State's attorney general was
reviewing the case and the USCG also was conducting an investigation. Response to the3
spill was prompt. The ARCO Corporation rapidly sent a vessel with a boom to the spill,
and CISPRI also promptly deployed equipment. Although diesel fuel is less toxic to
marine organisms than crude oil and gasoline, the spill could have added to the
cumulative effects of previous fael and fuel-stock spills in the inlet, according to one
DEC official (Brown 1991ld,e).


Kenai - page 4783

A frozen pipeline ruptured at the Kenai Pipe Line Company at Nikiski on January
4, 1992 (Brown 1992), releasing about 171 barrels of oil into Cook Inlet (the oil formed
a 1,006-barrel mixture with water). The spill was initially reported to have been 17,000
gallons, which would have made it one of the largest in Alaska's history. The Kenai Pipe
Line Company claimed that only 171 barrels (about 7,200 gallons) were released.
According to DEC, skimmers retrieved only 16 barrels or about 9 percent of the spilled
oil, while company representatives said that about 70 barrels (40%) were cleaned up.
Meanwhile, CIRCAC approved a 1991-92 budget of more than $1.6 million in mid-
September 1991 (Brown 1991c). The money, if available, would come from CISPRI, the
spill-response organization made up of oil industries working in Cook Inlet. An
additional $200,000 over the $1,459,000 requested from CISPRI was to be sought from
other sources. The CISPRI board objected to paying more than the $1 million annual
sum required of CISPRI under the Federal law that set up the two organizations. The
CIRCAC received $600,000 for its 1990-91 budget, and its. officials believed that the
balance ($400,000) should be applied to the 1991-92 budget. The chairperson of
CIRCAC's Environmental Monitoring Committee said that the watchdog group would
ask for as much as possible and see what happens.
The proposed budget called for $777,000 for Environmental Monitoring Committee
projects; $490,798 for administrative costs; $293,000 for Prevention, Response,
Operations, and Safety Committee projects; and $86,200 for meetings and council
members' expenses. The largest sum for projects, $500,000 would be spent for ongoing
monitoring research to assess environmental effects on Cook Inlet. This includes a
sediment and water program at discharge points at industry facilities, determination of
toxicity levels for shellfish and anadromous fish, and calculation of releases of
contaminants into the inlet. The monitoring work and administrative costs were
expensive and, according to council members, comparatively large sums were needed to
fulfiU	the mandates of OPA. In all, CIRCAC proposed 15 projects. Among these were:
ï¿½	$100,000 for measurement and assessment of environmental effects of
bioremediation, mechanical cleanup, burning, and dispersants.
Kenai - page 479






* $50,000 to study the effects of fog, ice, winds, waves, and extreme temperatures onU
vessels.
* $50,000 to gather information for managing spills on such subjects as biologically
sensitive areas.
*    $50,000 to find out about the structural features and resilience of Cook Inlet oil
facilities.
*    $30,000 to make recommendations to Federal and State agencies on changes made
in navigation and piloting, standards.3
CIRCAC members were studying altemnatives to this plan if faUl funding was not
available.3
In a later development in late fall 1991, the CIRCAC budget was held to about
$600,000 by the CISPRI board--to the objection of CIRCAC. It seemed that the Federal
Department of Transportation would have to intervene through court injunction to
restore monies to CIRCAC to bring the budget to the mandated $1 millon.3
Cook Inlet oil and gas development will continue to be a source of prospective
economic activity as reserves of oil on the North Slope diminish. ARCO made a strike
in Cook Inflet north of Nildsld in summer 1991. The yield was about 1,100 barrels per
day with prospects for increased output. This strike was greeted with enthusiasm3
throughout the peninsula. There also were more efforts to lease acreage near Kachemak
Bay, near Homer.  The State planned to sell leases in Sale 74 on September 24, 1991,1
for gas and oil exploration on 606,000 acres in and near Cook Inlet.
The former manager of the Chevron plant at Niliski said that spill-prevention and3
cleanup expenses should be bomne by the public and under public control. He went on
to say that companies were over-regulated and that regulations were based on too many3
hastily and ill-conceived perceptions and generalizations. He also asserted that there
were too many reporting requirements. He averred that Cook Hnet could be a moreI
suitable site for new refineries than large urban centers in California because fewer
people would be exposed to the pollution generated; air and water pollution regulationsI
could continue to be as rigorous in Cook Inlet as in southemn California and the San


Kenai - page 4803

Francisco Bay area. He also stated emphatically that Cook Inlet energy industries
contributed an important measure of Alaska's self-sufficiency. He said that if there were
no oil shortages on the West Coast, the Alaska market would be ignored. Apparently
the West Coast ran out of jet fuel during the Gulf War and purchasers bought fuels from
the Chevron Refinery in Cook Inflet to make up some of the shortfall.
The former plant manager said. that everythiing in the industry had been made into
a poisonous snake, so to speak. He preferred that scientific investigations and
generalizations become the basis for laws and regulations, and that universities could
play an important role in this process. He also believed that media coverage lacked
balance and that there should have been less emphas'is on disaster and more on well-
considered evidence.
Some respondents stated that the Exxon Valdez oil spill was not as ecologically
harmful as many persons had expected. According to one of these persons, nature can
handle single, large episodes of pollution. To support this assertion, he stated that pink
salmon fingerlings survived the spill and returned in record numbers. He spoke with
some misgivings and some irony in saying that "all the fever" over the spill had since
become law. He also said that the Chevron.plant, before its June 1991 closure, was
expected to pay $400,000 per year on spill-prevention measures and that had the plant
remained opened, it would have had to pay as much as $1.5 million per year for this
purpose in forthcoming years. The former plant manager regarded this cost as
prohibitive, since the plant showed a consistent, modest annual net profit of $4 to $6
nillon for its various products. He said that the.Nikiski energy facilities owned by
several multinational corporations and the Alaska-based Tesoro Alaska Petroleum
Corporation were expected to pay up to $10 million annually into the.OPA co-op to fund
spill prevention and cleanup equipment and to train personnel. Tle co-op was
vulnerable to possible collapse if just one of its members withdrew. (Tesoro probably
did not have a net wealth of more than $500 million, a small sum compared with the
large multinationals. Yet it was expected to pay 43% of CISPRI's operating costs.)
Kenai - page 481





Furthermore, Tesoro and other Cook Inflet fossil fuel industries that transport andI
receive North Slope crude oil from Alyeska's pipeline terminal in Valdez were expected
by Alyeska to carry up to $1 billion in liabil'ity insurance, a burden Tesoro offic'ials
believed well beyond their company's reach. This requirement was announced by
Alyeska when Tesoro was planning to upgrade its Nikiski plant. By June 1991, however,
Alyeska revised its plan on liabilities; it now allows companies to operate in Cook Inlet
and Prince William Sound without having to pay large insurance prermiums.
A misgiving about the spill and OPA registered by one person was that it had given3
industry a quasi-go.vernmental role: OPA could be interpreted to involve more corporate
interference and decision-maling powers in local governance. Large corporations
involved in resource extraction and processing have played major roles in government
since the arrival of large salmon canneries in Cook Inlet in the late 1800s. Despite the
possible expansion of corporate powers, OPA had brought benefits to local voluntary
groups. Citizens' groups help to scrutinize corporate conduct and the actions of the3
USCG, according to several respondents. As a counter to this assertion, one person said
that the citizens' groups had become organs of special interests; for this reason, he was3
very suspicious of them. He expanaded his cautionary commnent by adding that special
interests of any kidnd work against the general welfare and that checks on them should be
insured. Scientific knowledge of high validity and integrity was the least partial
instrument of decision-making.3
The Exxon Valdez oil spill -caused plans for exploration activities in the Alaska
National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) to come to a halt, and it contributed in fall 1991 to3
Congressional rejection of oil exploration there. According to one person, the Prince
Vi'lliam Sound oil spill and cessation of corporate oil and Federal pla-ns to drill in3
ANNR resulted in more fossil fuel exploration in Cook Inlet than at any other time in
the past 8 to 10 years. The stepped-up activity had caused a small economic boom in
the Nildski-Kenai-Soldotna area, attracting many persons from the recession-ridden
Lower 48 states.I




Kenai - page 4823

The June 1991 closure of the Chevron facility at Nildski probably was not,
according to several persons, the result of the Alyeska-imnposed liability or the provisions
of OPA, requiring expenditures for CISPRI and CIRCAC. Rather, the plant shutdown
was a decision made by Chevron officials in California who regarded the facility as
outmoded, in need of considerable renovation, and insufficiently profitable in the overall
accounting of corporate performance; and rebuilding, which was certainly needed for the
40-year-old plant, would have been an unsound financial move. On the other hand, the
former plant manager believed that costs incurred by OPA played an important role in
the corporate decision to stop production of oil product at the plant.
Several persons in the fossil fuel industries asserted that the Federal Government
and the DEC had hurried too fast to impose new regulations on oil companies. The
pace of enforcement should have been slowed, they said. And another person speculated
that the oil facilities in t~1e inlet were aging--all but one of the 15 platforms were at least
15 years old; and the safety requirements under OPA, and lessons that miight be learned
from the Kuwait oil-pollution disasters of the Persian Gulf War, would result in
improvements in oil-spill prevention and cleanup.
II.A. Impacts on the City of Kenai
To place some of the other economic effects of the spill on Kenai in an intelligible
perspective, a brief recent history of some economic trends in the city is helpful here.
Kenai, like many towns in Alaska, grew rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s when oil revenues
from North Slope developments created prosperity, services, and facilities on an
unprecedented scale. From 1986 until 1988, however, Kenai experienced a decline in
economic activity, so much so that the city lost some of its population to outmidgration as
oil prices on international energy markets dropped from $34 in 1986 to $10 in 1987.
Business- and residential-occupancy rates fell 10 percent in about a year's time. Overall,
the 1989 business year in Kenai was not comparably a bad one; it actually showed an
increase over 1987 and 1988, which were years of recession following the slump in oil
prices.
Kenai - page 483






Kenai has experienced several business cycles during its recent history, and long-U
term residents have adjusted to these ups and downs. One person noted that a general
consequence of each boom-bust cycle was that "newcomers did not dare ride out the
downturn, unlike long-term residents." In 1975, for example, the economy declined in
productivity and einployment after the North Slope oil boom and completion of
construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. The next recession occurred in the mid 1980s
with the plunge in oil prices. Tle Exxon Valdez oil spill was the harbinger of an
increase in economic activity, even as the rest of the nation was deeply Mired in a3
protracted recession.
Incidents of crimes in Kenai declined in surmmer 1989, in part because many3
recidivists went to work on the cleanup, according to one law enforcement official.
Furthermore, some former and potential offenders (those well-known to the local police)
went to work in the canneries. Their jobs were arduous and the. hours long, so much so
that, in the words of the law enforcement officer, "They were too tired to commit crimes3
during the summer," or "to steal their way out of town." Local residents who left to work
on the cleanup returned to Kenai. From 1988 to 1989 incidents of assaults decreased
from 167 to 159, burglary from 70 to 67, larceny from 286 to 253, vandalism from 183 to
165, possession of dr-ugs fromn 49 to 44, and DWI's from 120 to 98. The total number of3
criminal offenses recorded by the Kenai City Police Department in 1988 was 2,091; in
1989 the figure was 1,882, a 10-percent decrease. Arrests declined from 977 in 1988 to3
682 in 1989. The 1990 figures showed a substantial (23%1) increase in criminal offenses
from 1,882 in 1989 to 2,307 in 1990. Arrests rose from 1,682 in 1989 to 1,953 in 19903
(Kenai City 1991). 'Me law enforcement official stated that an increase in transient men
and women in search of jobs in 1990 accounted for increases in law enforcement cases.3
During the summer, outsiders looling for work set up their tents near the mouth of
the Kenai River. Kenai residents routinely expect these make-shift communities to3
form--the migrants take any jobs they can. However, in summer 1989 tent-dwellers in
pursuit of work did not appear. Most likely they worked on the spill cleanup or on3
renovation of the Unocal natural gas liquefaction plant at Nildsli, in the less skilied part


Kenai - page 4843

of the project, to bring it up to date on environmnental compliance. Plant renovation was
itself a result of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The EPA and DEC hastened their
timetables for compliance and made more frequent inspections of fossil fuel facilities.
In addition to the effects on employment observed by Kenai residents, there were
other effects that might have been less obvious but that were of considerable
consequence to some persons. These persons believed that the Exxo  Valdez oil spill
hurt the peninsula's image. The former image, and a reasonably accurate one according
to some persons, was of a clean, abundant, scenically grand environment. The oil spill,
at least temporarily, resulted in a much-tarnished image.
Community leaders were asked about local community control and decision-maling
influence in the operations of oil-related activities in the Kenai area. Responses varied
greatly, as one would expect. The then-new editor of the Peninsula Clarion said, "The
more local involvement, the more local independence. Industries' problemns are locals'
problems. Is there ever enough control?"
A second community leader said that increased local control over oil-related
developments might involve little more than adding needlessly cumbersome and
numTerous local regulations to existing State and Federal regulations. He added that the
various advisory councils formed to oversee Cook Wnet fossil fuel industries .. wasted
action; the bigger the committees, the less the positive action." And yet this respondent
was quick to recognize that creation of a cou-ncil was necessary because the public was
greatly aroused over the spill.
A third person commented that the oil spill and its aftermath did not change fossil-
fael-consumption habits in Alaska or the other 49 states, nor had the U.S. Government
changed its energy policy. She said that people were much more inclined to blame
industry for problems associated with the use of fossil fuels than to work on amending
national energy policy.
Moreover, the Exxon Valdez oil spill had not daunted the Kenai Chamber of
Commerce from endorsing oil exploration in ANWR. Some persons who supported
ANWR development noted with self-humor and irony that endorsing ANWR exploration
Kenai - page 485






brought no direct liabilities to peninsula residents and that the NIMfBY (Not-in-my-I
backyard) phenomenon was alive and well in Kenai. In March 1991, the Kenai Chamber
of Commerce launched a grassroots camnpaign by sending 6,000 letters to Chambers of
ComTmerce throughout the U.S. urging support for opening .AN-WR (Peninsula Clarion,
March 16, 1991). Furthermore, Governor Hickel said that he had wanted to spend State
monies to campaign nationwide for ANWR development.
Ile City of Kenai did not experience a decline in sales tax revenues in 1989
compared with 1988. Indeed, there was a sniall increase in 1989 over 1988 (Impact3
Assessment 1990:B-11).
One Kenai City councilperson said that the City received $300,000 on a total of3
$2.5 million in sales taxed by the city as a result of spending by cleanup workers. In
addition to th'is income, the city received compensation for the loss of about $45,000 in
dock fees when the drift-net fishermnen were not allowed to fish in Cook Inlet during
summer 1989. Another unexpected benefit was that public awareness of the dangers of3
oil transport greatly increased, and the oil industries received considerable related
publicity that scrutinized all aspects of their operations.
T'here were naany institutional conflicts in the aftermnath of the spill, but ultimately
institutional relations improved among governments on the peninsula compared with3
conditions prior to the spill. In the first few months after the spill, many institutions
were not certain of their jurisdictional, legal, and regulato-ry boundaries. There was a3
great deal of confusion and several turf battles among towns, the borough, the State of
Alaska, and Federal agencies. All of these matters needed clarification, and many3
officials made corrections and settled problems as they decided who was responsible for
what. Most of these problems Were solved. One person noted that one of the3
unpredictable and beneficial effects of the spill was that governments achieved a better
understanding of their respective roles a-nd authorities.3
The city was experiencing a small economic boom in spring 1991, created by public
sector spending by the city government--a boom likely to continue for at least a year or
two. Several projects accounted for this increase in economic activity. A new visitors'


Kenai,- page 4863

center costing about $1.6 million would be constructed in summer 1991; thlere would be
a $1 million overhaul of the city sewer system to comply with EPA regulations on clean
water. The airport would receive a $1 million expansion, an. action that would require
an environmental impact statement--which would require fturther expenditure of city
finds. With a combination of State and municipal monies, the city would build a $7
million senior center. Several businesses would expand in consonance with these
projects: an existing restaurant would expand, a new restaurant would be constructed,
and a large motel once closed due to a recession would be reopened.
Commuting by air to Anchorage was relatively inexpensive. One could travel for
as little as $80 round-trip, which for some persons who needed to make a few trips to
Anchorage each month was much faster and safer than the 3.5-hour drive. Cheapfae
offered by commuter airlines stimulated Kenai's'economy and prompted the mayor to
refer to Kenai as a "b~edroom community of Anchorage." In 1990, 85,000 persons went
through the Kenai airport. Kenai was served by United Parcel Service, DHL Worldwide
Express, and Federal Express--all of the major rapid-servce carriers--and by all of the
national car rental companies.
.In April 1991 the City of Kenai employed 84 persons--about the same number as in
1989--whose salaries ranged from about $20,000 to about $50,000 per annum. According
to the mayor of Kenai, none of the employees left her or his job to work on the Exxon
Valdez oil-spill cleanup.
The Kenai Womein's Resource and Crisis Center was the only service facility to
report a loss of staff or an i'ncr'ease in demand for services. Two of the 17 staff
members and most of the 35 volunteers quit their jobs to work on the spill cleanup.
Some of the volunteers returned after their work in Prince William Sound was finished;
one of the permanent staff did not return. Occupancy at the shelter increased 30 to 40
percent during the summer and fall of 1989, much of which, according to staff members,
seemed to have been the result of stress caused by husba'nds not being allowed to drift-
net fish.
Kenai - page 487






The Cook Inflet Council on Drug and Alcohol Abuse (CICDA) provides services forU
Soldotna, Kenai, and outlying communities and has a branch in Homer. The CICDA
facility in Kenai provides an education series for abusive individuals, a drinking and
driving seminar, a treatment and outpatient program, and an Alcohol Safety Action
Program. The staff at the Kenai facility reported no noticeable impacts from the oil spill
(Impact Assessment 1990). Moreover, the Central Peninsula Hospital, which had run a
chemical dependency program since 1986, was also unaffected by the spill, according to
staff members.3
II.B. Impacts on Businesses and Households
Many businesses were adversely affected, including remodeling and construction3
firms that already were doing poorly in 1989 because of a downturn in the economy that
began in 1986. Tlere was a loss of work that normally would have come from drift-netI
fishermen who remodeled and rebuilt their homes with proceeds from a good fishing
season. The fishermen were forced to cancel or delay projects. Heavy machinery was3
difficult to rent or hire because most of the larger construction companies were hired by
Exxon and VECO. River guides were forced to halt services on the Kenai River; when3
ADF&G closed the Kenai, one person said "The smaller the community, the more
effective the response to the spill" and thus the more widespread the economic downturn.3
Suppliers of fishing equipment and fishing-gear repairs lost a great deal of business
from the drift-net fishermen as of August 1989. One person observed that the fisheries3
and related businesses lost an entire cycle of purchase and repair business from drift-net
fishermen. In 1989, fishermen planned to repair or replace boats, engines, and other3
equipment in anticipation of a more normal fishing year. These fishermen did not fish
and very few rented their vessels for cleanup work; thus, one entire cycle of replacementI
and repairs was missing. Exxon-compensation income obviated any need for fishermen
to make routine annual expenditures. They did not require loans, fishing permits,
repairs, new equipment, or crew members. Indeed, at one point some of the fishermen
put pressure on the Kenai Peninsula Borough to ensure some fairness or equalI




Kenai - page 4883

distribution of boat hires by VECO. According to one person, few, if any, Kenai boat
owners were hired.
Field researchers received very few comments about the purchases made by set-net
fishermen from oil-spill-cleanup earnings. The few comments made were largely
speculative. There was little information collected about the difference between local
and absentee fishermen and their relative effects on the local economy.
In August 1989, the information available about the spending patterns of cleanup
crews was anecdotal. It was known that the unemployment rate in Kenai had dropped
precipitously, from about 10 percent to 3 percent. From this figure many persons
concluded that workers hired at VECO's Anchorage office were erstwhile unemployed
persons. Although VECO did not hire on the peninsula, applicants went to Anchorage
to seek placement on the cleanup. These workers, so some further speculation went,
were paying overdue bills; and some with surplus cash intended to buy land and houses.
The reduction in unemployment adversely affected many businesses because some
skilled persons (welders, mechanics, and others) left their regular jobs for higher paying
cleanup work. One obvious result was that businesses and households suffered from a
shortage of handymen. Wages at fish plants rose from about $6.00 to $8.00 per hour and
persons looling for work in Kenai expected salaries starting at about $10.00 per hour--a
sum considerably above the customary average.
The loss of personnel at the Kenai McDonald's restaurant was a major example of
stess and financial loss from the direct and indirect effects of the spill on a community
that lost--rather than gained--population and workers. The franchise holder and
manager of the restaurant (and a second one in Soldotna, 11 miles from Kenai) was
unable to hire a fiull staff because recent high school graduates and others had taken
work on the cleanup. She often worked from 6 a.m. to 8 p.m., taldng only 3 days off in
several weeks' time. Her business was shorthanded, but because she did not want the
quality of her service to decline, she worked longer hours. Regardless, the restaurant's
business fell off by 10 to 15 percent because there were fewer fish processing workers.
The processors who normally placed 20 or more large orders of $450 or more each~ day,
Kenai - page 489






placed only three such orders in August 1989. She made large, personnel-wage-labor
subsidies to her business by putting in many hours and she also had difficulty fi-nding
assistant managers because of competing cleanup wages. She also paid higher-than-
normal wages at the restaurant.3
By mid-July, the owner of the McDonald's franchise was able to convince some
school teachers, who would not otherwise have taken a summer job, to work for her.u
Tle b-usiness survived, but the franchisee said that she did not believe she could endure
a similar ordeal. She remarked, with some irony, that the news media placed far too3
much emphasis on wildlife losses from the spill and much too little on the people who
suffered mental and physical stress.3
The borough mayor and his staff mobilized their resources, worldng many extra
hours and making a trip to Washington, D.C., to seek assistance, according to aI
respondent who was a borough assemblyperson. During this time, the borough routinely
publicized reports on effects of the spill and actions taken to reduce the worst effects.3
As the McDonald's owner said, "The Mayor damned near killed himself from work."
About the spill she said that "I do not want an outside force to determine my future."I
She further coTnTented that economic cycles in Alaska were less and less predictable. In
the past 5 years, Kenai has experienced (1) a drop in oil prices, (2) a brief, mild3
recovery, and (3) the oil spill. Each cycle created its special anxieties.
The real estate market was hurt by the spill, according to available anecdotal3
evidence. Some insurance agents who normally sold commercial real estate to drift-net
fishermen had to shift to home insurance sales because of a decline in the usual3
purchase patterns. This change in business emphasis was difficult for some agents.
More jobs were lost (450) than gained (400) because of the spill. These figures are3
evidence of considerable, economic effects of the spill on Kenai's work force and
businesses; as many as 22 percent of the jobs were affected by the spill-10O favorably andI
12 unfavorably. Furthermore, only 7 percent of our key informants said that they gained
income because of the spill, while 12 percent said they lost money. One i'n 10 persons mi3
the 1991 sample of key households gained employmnent as a result of the Exxon Valdez


Kenai - page 4903

oil spill. About half of these jobs were in the oil-spill cleanup. Other jobs taken were in
bus'inesses in Kenai and other communities whose work opportunities increased after the
spill--motel, airport, car-rental service, and oil workers were hired to replace persons
called away to the spill. Interpolating from our sample, it is likely that 100 persons left
the City of Kenai to work on the spill, and about 300 persons acquired jobs in sectors of
the Kenai economy affected by the spill.'
A negative consequence of the spill was that just over 12 percent of the persons
interviewed reported that they, or one or more persons in their households, lost their
jobs. One person was forced to relocate because she lost her job as a result of the spill.
Five percent of the key informants in 1991 lost some property to the effects of the
spill; we do not know how many gained property because we did not ask about property
gains. We know that new jobs created by the oil spill allowed a few persons to purchase
land, housing, and other properties. We have no systematic data on property acquisition
for the entire sample.
Five persons who said they experienced financial losses as a consequence of the
spill believed that they were not adequately compensated, and one person said that
compensation was adequate. Most of these respondents were drift-net fishermen. Those
fishermen who were dissatisfied said that Exxon made determinations of compensation
without consultations with individual fishermen and that psychological miseries, some of
which were considerable, were not part of the settlements.
T'he spill also caused reduced environmental monitoring in Cook Inlet. The EPA,
DEC, USCG, and ADF&G employees were kept busy in Prince William Sound
preparing a cleanup and monitoring program during the first few months following the
spill. However, by summer 1989, EPA, DEC, and USCG were maldng frequent, surprise
visits to Cook Inlet oil and gas industrial facilities and vessels to monitor environmental
performance.


These estimates are based on the assumptions that the Kena i labor force had about 4,800 persons on average
from 1989 to 1991, that unemployment was about 10 percent, and that about 10 percent of the jobs were
dependent in one way or another on the many effects of the oil spill.
Kenai - page 491






Fish processors found the plentiful supply of labor in 1990 in great contrast to theI
1989 season, when erstwhile cannery workers either did not go to Alaska--thinking the
spill had badly harmed all Alaskan fisheries--or went to Anchorage or Prince William
Sound to hire on with the VECO cleanup. Obtaining an adequate labor supply was
difficult for processors that depended on local labor, in contrast to processors in the
Seattle area that had a reasonably steady labor supply among whom they advertised each
spring.
The labor market in Kenai was uneven for employers in 1990. The McDonald's
restaurant, which was short of workers in summer 1989, continued to experience
difficulties in recruiting a sufficient number of employees well into 1990. The laborI
supply improved in late 1990 and continued to improve into early spring 1991. The
franchisee raised wages $.45 above the State's mniirmum to $4.75 per hour during the oil-3
spil-cleanup period. In order to attract qualified persons, she raised wages again to $5.75
in June 1990. Prices at the restaurant also were raised--without customer complaints.3
During summe'r 1990, the restaurant enjoyed its largest sales volume in its 6 years of
operation. Ile franchise holder attributed her success to excellent weather despite a3
poor commercial fisbing season.
From November 1990 to February 1991, an increase in gasoline prices from $1.39I
to $1.80 per gallon and unusually bad weather combined to reduce traffic to Kenai. It is
also possible that anxieties over the Persian Gulf war caused a decline in the traffic to3
Kenai. The consequence was a downturn at McDonald's restaurant from November
1990 to February 1991, at which time the Kenai manager-owner reduced wages to $5.253
per hour.2 The restaurant had 47 employees; some worked as little as 8 hours (I day)
each week, while the majority put in between 30 and 40 hours each week. Job1
applications increased, during this period and on through the spring despite the reduced
wage rate because there were many newly arrived, unemployed job seekers from the3



2The downturn in business is not speculative, but the cause may be bercause McDonald's franchises throughoutI
Alaska experienced a downturn during the winter of 1990.


Kenai - page 492

Lower 48 states. Peninsula schools gained 500 in enrollments, requiring 25 more
teachers to alleviate the burden on the teaching staff. The McDonald's franchisee said
that her Soldotna restaurant was one of the most successful in the corporate region
(including Oregon, Idaho, Montana, WaIshington, and Alaska). She also said that
business slumps hit Kenai before Soldotna because Soldotna had a larger proportion of
professionals and was less prone to economic swings, especially those dependent on the
oil industry.
One reason for the slow recovery in the labor supply after the Exxon Valdez oil
spill was that some of the oil-spill-cleanup workers qualified, for and used their
unemployment privileges, and there were some former cleanup workers who left Kenai.
In both instances erstwhile workers were removed from the local labor supply. In mid-r
March 1991 there were only 47 jobs, all nonprofessional, posted in the State Employment
Office in Kenai.
The spill year, 1989, saw serious labor s'hortages for lower-paying wage work; 1990
was, ultimately, the opposite of this. Businesses contacted for interviews reported about-
average numbers of applicants in March and April 1991. Two circumstances created this
condition: there was little oil-spill cleanup and the peninsula was the destination of
many persons from the Lower 48 states who were looking for work--many of whom had
heard from kinspersons, friends, acquaintances, and strangers of an increase in jobs in
Cook Inlet energy industries. Some of these job seekers were out-of-work loggers from
the Pacific Northwest; many persons had heard that Governor Hickel favored
constraction of a natural gas pipeline from the North Slope to Valdez, and this had
prompted some persons in the Lower 48 to move to the peninsula.
Many seasonal workers and some of the oil-spill workers returned to their
hometowns in the Lower 48 states, where they extolled the beauty and majesty of the
Kenai Peninsula. This word-of-mouth means of conveying to others the grandeur of
Alaska attracted many newcomers. Many of these job seekers were stranded in Kenai
and Soldotna without work, and a record high number of persons in both communities
used local food banks. Furthermore, there were about 1,000 HUJD homes for sale in
Kenai - page 493

Alaska in 1989; and because of the economic slump at that time, HUTD reduced the salesU
prices. Some of these houses could be purchased for as little as a $100 down paymient.
In late 1990 housing prices fell in the Anchorage area and on the peninsula. This also
might have been another incentive for people from the Lower 48 to migrate to Alaska.
Unions played a central role in oil pipeline work and State politics during
construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, and apparently they experienced a temporary
surge in membership during the spill cleanup. A union official said that the Exxon
Valdez oil-spill cleanup brought many new members into Laborers Local No. 41 inj
Kenai and into locals in other parts of Alaska. They worked for VECO, and the unions
set the wage scale at from $10.00 to 18.00 per hour with overtime, per diem, and fringe3
benefits. Some of the new union members returned from the cleanup to take jobs in
VECO operations other than the cleanup. The nonunion-wage scale was $16.69 perI
hour with overtime and per diem but no fringe benefits. The unorganized workers would
have received union fiinge benefits had they requested them because Exxon was willing3
to pay for them.
During the second year of the cleanup, the Laborers' Local did not place members3
on the job. Cleanup wages were $12.00 per hour, and VECO hired only about 200
workers. Exxon had a reputation for not yielding to unions, according to one union3
official. This circumstance was, in the union official's words, "One of those things. This
all points out how powerful oil companies axe." The union official also said that Exxon3
could have paid higher wages in summer 1990 without financial hardship. Unionized
cleanup workers spent their income on home improvements, new housing, vacations, and3
sundry other expenditures.
One respondent estimated that income from the oil-spill cleanup was spent within3
12 months of the clean-up period. Many Kenai residents believed that there would be a
second lengthy cleanup period in 1990, but this did not happen and unemploymentI
benefits received by cleanup workers who had not taken new employment had expired by
spring 1991. Furthermore, some of the cleanup workers who had moved to Kenai from3
other parts of Alaska (many of whom had joined the Laborers Local) st ayed on in Kenai


Kenai - page 4943

in hopes of obtaining employment in the forthcoming city and private-business-
construction projects. These projects had not started as of spring 1991, and several were
not scheduled to begin for a year or longer.
Several Kenai organizations had the specific goals of economic planning and
promoting economic growth. Those contacted in August 1989 were the Kenai Chamber
of Comimerce, Kenai Peninsula Borough Economic Development District, Kenai Native
Villa ge Corporation, Salamatof Native Corporation, and Kenai Bicentennial Convention
Bureau. These organizations promoted tourism, real estate, and mineral development
and were competent and determined to rejuvenate and expand the peninsulas economy.
Their representatives placed considerable emphasis on development, although they
expressed regrets about the oil spill and believed that it was the result of negligence on
the part of all parties concerned. One of these persons said, "Captain Hazelwood poured
the gasoline, someone else lit the match." Representatives of organizations supporting
further economic development stated that spills in general were inevitable, but they also
believed that more energy development was desirable for Cook Inlet. Fifty-five percent
of our key informants believed that Exxon and the Federal and State Governments were
to blame for the.Exxon Valdez oil spill. Twenty percent believed that Captain
Hazelwood alone was at fault.
Tourism overall had shown a steady increase on the peninsula, although the pattern
of spending and visits had changed. The Kenai Chamber of Commerce visitor
registration book had about 16,000 signatures by August 25, 1991--down 1,000 from 1990,
the record year. On August 28, 1991, the Kenai Chamber of Commerce had recorded
5,584 visitors, compared with 6,927 by the same date in 1990. This decline was expected
by chamber officials due to theirmposition of ADF&G's catch-and-release recreational
fishing policy on the Kenai River; the start of Operation Desert Storm, which occurred
when many Lower 48 families were planning their vacations; and the subsequent increase
in gasoline prices. The Kenai Chamber of Commerce conducted a huge effort to
promote tourism during the 1991 bicentennial year of Russian settlement on the
Kenai - page 495


I
peninsula by mailing 38,000 pieces of to-urism information, and chamber officials believedI
the tourist year would have been worse without this effort.
In September 1991, the Kenai Peninsula Economic Development District released a
report prepared under contract to Fox Practical Marketing and Management, a private
research corporation, on tourism on the Kenai Peninsula. The report was revealing and
important to peninsula residents. Fox estimated that 250,000 visitors annually spent
about $96 million on the peninsula, supporting about 2,000 peninsula jobs. Roughly
180,000 of the 250,000 visitors were from points in Alaska, the majority from Anchorage            I
(Lewis 1991c). Tourists from out of State spent about $20 million and State residents
$76 million. In-State visitors made an average of 4.3 trips to the peninsula during the            I
year (in this case 1990-1991, July to July). From 1985 to 1989, there was a steady
increase in non-Alaska tourists: 5 percent in the Kenai-Soldotna area, 6.8 percent in
Homer, and 9.3 percent in Seward. These visitors spent an average of 17 nights on the
peninsula (1991), compared with 3 nights in 1987. They spent $8.7 million in the Kenai-            3
Soldotna area (more than any other area on the peninsula).
II.C. Impacts on Commercial Fishermen and Fish Processors                                          I
The United Cook Inlet Driftnet Association (UCIDA) is one of the major resource
institutions in Cook Inlet. Two of its officers were interviewed in April 1991. The                I
UCIDA had between 350 and 450 of the 585 drift-net fishermen in Central Cook Inlet.
The UCIDA officials said that drift-net permits sold for about $180,000 in 1991.
Commercial fishing with drift nets required about 3 years to learn and several additional
years to earn a steady profit. Set-net permits were valued at $70,000 to $80,000 in the
same year. This method of commercial fishing also required several years to learn and
to earn a reasonable,profit. Drift-net fishermen experienced some of the most serious
adverse effects from the oil spill. These fishermen, in contrast to most of the set-net
fishermen who work the shoreline and riverline, were closed out of fishing during 1989
by ADF&G. The actions by ADF&G were taken only after extensive consultations with
fishermen when oil was discovered in the central channel of the inlet. Set-net fishermen
were not allowed to fish in Cook Inlet from Anchor Point on the south to as far north as


Kenai - page 496
I

Kasilof. There are about 700 commercial set-net fishermen in Upper Cook Inlet.
Nonetheless, the set-net fishermen caught about 5 million salmon, chiefly the
commercially valuable sockeye in one of the richest harvests on record. The harvest was
fortuitous in that it had nothing to do with the spill. Had drift-net fishermen been
allowed to fish they too would have enjoyed the record year. The scattered oily
remnants from the original pool of oil had not harmed adult sockeyes so far as anyone
was able to deternine.
Drift-net fishermen met repeatedly with ADF&G representatives before and during
the fishing season, hoping that an opening would be announced; but none came. The
ADF&G followed a zero-tolerance policy to ensure a clean harvest and preserve the
favorable reputation of Alaska commercial and recreational salmon. The fisherinen
largely followed this policy without serious protest, but they suffered emotionally and
financially. Some boat owners were saved from financial ruin because there was a spill
and they were compensated by the Exxon Corporation for the fish they could not catch.
And some cleanup workers earned enough money to purchase businesses in Kenai.
Cannery workers who lost time also were compensated (from $200 to $1,000 per worker).
For the most part, fishermen in our sample and others with whom we spoke seem to
have been satisfied with the Exxon payments made to them in the summer and fall of
1989.
People who went into commercial fishing hoped to achieve some measure of
independence. In the words of one person, the Glacier Bav and Exxon Valdez oil spills
...saddled them with all that crazy work." Some fishermen signed releases after the
Glacier Bay spill simply ....to get away from the problem." There had been divorces
that were in part the result of the Glacier Bay and Exxon Valdez spills, and some
fishermen resumed drinkidng and smoldng because of the pressures on them in summer
1989.
One person said that the 1989 summer commercial fishing season was crucial to
hirm and his children. The man said he couldn't wait to fish with his son and daughter,
who were then 12 and 14, respectively. The three were expected to fish that year, and
Kenai - page 497





the man said "My kidds will never be that age again; and although this might seem lie a3
small thing, but fishing together that year would have been very important to us." He
said it was ". ., hard to quantify, but it is the biggest loss to me" (of all the adversities
caused by the Exxon Valdez oil spill]. He added that fishing provided individual
meaning to many fishermen. He had seen tough, rough-cut, individualistic men "come
down"' as a result of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. According to this respondent, between
30 and 40 percent of the fishermen were professionals in occupations other than fishing;
another 30 to 40 percent had skills they routinely put to use outside of fishing; and 10 to
50 percent had no other occupation other than fishing, and they spent their timne
repairig and maintaining their equipment and were fully immersed in their craft. Most3
fishermen had close kin, usualy their immediate families, as their fishing crews.
Oil spills had shaped much of UCIDA's recent financing and activities. TheI
UCIDA was established in the late 1970s. Its purpose was to help members with
marketing their salmon harvests--the major furnction of the organization in 1991. OtherI
goals emerged in time. One of them was to lobby as one of 23 member organizations
with the United Fishermen's Association (UFA) in the Alaska State Legislature to3
preserve natural salmon stocks. Salmon hatcheries were seen as a threat to UFA.
Equally important were threats from oil spilIls--there were three in Cook Inlet during theI
.1980s. The first was an accident in 1987 that caused the 774-foot tanker Glacier Bay to
spill between 33,000 and 202,000 gallons of North Slope crude oil about 2 miles from the3
mouth of the Kenai River in the central Cook Inflet fishing district during the largest
return of Sockeye in early July. 'This was the largest oil spill in Alaska's water up to thatI
time. Some fishermen were stopped from fishing while the oil dissipated. This event
placed new burdens on UCIDA and created new roles for it. Before the Glacier BaY3
spill, annual dues were $100; but the spill imposed new legal demands on the UCIDA
and the members voted to raise annual dues to $200--the sum members paid as of spring
1991.
The Glacier Bay oil spill permanently changed the lives of some of the drift-net3
fishermen who did not resolve their spill litigation until 1991. Exxon was much more


Kenai - page 4983

responsible and prompt in compensating the parties harmed by the Exxon Valdez oil
spill than was the Trinidad Shipping Company, which owned the.Glacier Bay and had
since filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Several owners of the oil carried by the Glacier
Bay also were involved in litigation. The economic, social, and legal impacts of the
Glacier Bay spill were enormously complex, time-consuming, and confuising. Fishermen
had to file extremely detailed claims, among other fiustrating and painful actions such as
long, anxious waits for resolution of compensation. These events exemplified the
difficulties experienced by everyone affected by a spill involving a relatively small and
obscure company tangled in multiple ownership. Furthermore, the Glacier Bay spill
might have contributed to a drop froin $1.60 to $1.40 in the per-pound price of salmon
sold by fisherinen, whereas the Exxon Valdez oil spill did not influence prices one way or
the other.
Litigation over the Glacier Bay oil spill continued into 1991. In September 1991, a
Federal District Co-urt jury in Anchorage ruled in favor of Tim Keener and 15 other
Cook Inlet commercial fishermen (set giUlnetters) in the amount of $2.55 million--after
more than 4 years of effort to receive compensation for lost fishing time and fish.
Keener operated a fishing site near the mouth of t-he Kenai River. The plaintiffs
charged that processing plants dropped their per-pound price for sockeye salmnon, the
major Cook Inlet commercial species, from $1.70 before the spill to $1.40 after the spill
(Huber 1991ic). The plaintiffs also clainied that they were prevented fromn harvesting
about 3 million sockeye salmon valued at roughly $12.00 each. Keener said, "tFinally, the
sun has come out."
Compensation to Cook Inlet fishermen was expected to reach $15 million and was
to be distributed among 109 other fishermen who had earlier refused payment of about
one-third the sum of the court judgment offered by Trinidad Shipping. This settlement
was expected to financially compensate the fishermnen in the months after a very poor
summer 1991 fishing season (the worst compared to the previous decade). However, an
appeal of the Federal District Court's decision could delay payment.
Kenai - page 499






In summer 1991 commercial fishermen harvested 7 million salmon on their way to
the mouth of the Kenai River. About 80 percent of the 700 compensatory-damage
claims filed against Trinidad in 1987 were settled. The next court case related to the
Glacier Bay spill sought punitive damages involving Trinidad and 29 other defendants--3
including Tesoro Alaska--that owned the oil. Punitive damages are generally larger than
compensatory damages. The Glacier Bay settlement could have a substantial influenceg
on the punitive-damage cases carried by lawyers for 800 drift-net fishermen in the
forthcoming claims against Exxon (Huber 1991c).3
In 1988 another spill--of unknown origin--occurred in Cook Inlet. Considerably
smaller in magnitude than the Glacier Bay an   xo adz spills, it nonetheless3
caused additional worries among fishermen and fa-rther misgivings about the oil-transport
industry. Some UCIDA members work in the oil and natural gas industries in the inlet,I
and they wanted to help guarantee compatible uses of fossil fuels and fish. The UCIDA
officially supported AN-WR oil exploration and has tried to work with Kenai Peninsula3
sport fishermen.
Oil from the March 24, 1989, Exxon Valdez oil spill reached Cook Inlet withinI
weeks of the accident. By that time the peninsula communities of Homer, Seldovia, and
others had been affected by the oil. Within the first few days after the spill occurred, the
Ke-nai Peninsula Borough took quick and firm action to contain the oil and alert
communities of its inevitable arrival.3
The closure of drift-net fishing caused the organization and allocation of the fishing
sector of the economy to be greatly affected, with some set-net fishermen receiving
unexpectedly large incomes while drift netters were left idle, or left to work for set
netters or wait for Exxo-n to compensate them justly for their losses. In most years, drift3
netters accounted for 50 to 85 percent of total commercial fish hauls.
Upper Cook Inflet had about 750 set-net fishermen and 600 drift-net fishermen in
1990. The drift-net gillnet fishermen in the Upper Cook Wnet were to receive
compensation for a harvest level of 5.9 milion sockeye salmon (Peninsula Clarion,I
March 8, 1989) at $1.70 per pound. Fishermen were to be compensated based on their


Kenai - page 5003

average catch for 1986 and 1988. UCIEDA, representing most of the drift-net fishermen,
asked compensation for an additional 200,000 fish, claiming that this figure was closer to
what the fishermen would have harvested had the closure not occurred. This amounted
to 6.1 nmillion fish for 1989, a figure UCIDA arrived at by adding the 4.9 million sockeye
caught by set-net fishermen and a 1.2-niillion Kenai-River overescapement. The
ADIF&G had predicted a harvest of about 2.5 million fish; but the rnm was much larger
than this, and the set-net fishermen hauled in 4.9 million fish--testimony to the ability of
set-net fishermen to harvest large catches (Peninsula Clarion, October 9, 1989).
The record-high sockeye run in the Kenai River and its tributaries occurred
because the central portion of the Cook nl3et channel was closed to commercial fishing
and the sockeyes were at the high-run part of their cycle. The record run of about 6.1
rnillion sockeyes was about double the usual number. Dip-net fishing for local household
consumption also was permitted on an unprecedented scale. Tourism increased
throughout 1988 once travelers learned that Cook Inflet streams had not been
contaminated by the oil spill.
The UCIDA members emphasized that human beings had been fishing in Cook
nl3et for about 10,000 years; and they wanted to ensure that one of the oldest hurnan
enterprises continued. One of their worries was that industries extracting nonrenewable
resources treated Alaska as a frontier, a place where industries could do as they pleased
without regulatory interference or a larger responsibility to society and nature.
Employment at fish processing plants was adversely affected by the Exxon Valdez
oil spill. Canneries had difficulty getting enough employees in sumimer 1989, several
months after the spill, because many of the people who usually worked for them had
been scared off by graphic media reports on th'e adverse envirommental effects of the oil
spill. These erstwhile workers believed that Cook hilet fisheries had been ruined for the
season. Tley either stayed out of Alaska, or they went to Prince William Sound to work
on the cleanup for wages far sirpassing those they would have earned by processing fish.
This absence of the customnary pool of cannery workers left processors short-handed, and
Kenai - page 501





pla-nt managers were forced to take unorthodox and occasionally drastic measures to getI
through the season.
The manager of Kenai's Salamnatof fish processing plant, who had been in
commercial fishing since 1949, said his company and the drift-net fishermen his company
worked with were treated efficiently and effectively by Exxon after the Exxon Valdez oil
spill. Compared with the problems the fishermen and his company had over the Glacier
Bay spill, worldng with Exxon presented no serious problems. The plant's employees
who lost work time also were well compensated. The plant manager, who was satisfied3
with Exxon' s compensation, said that settling with Exxon was very simple. Exxon made
one visit to the plant and agreed to a settlement once the Exx on lawyers realized that
Salamatof was serious about pursuing compensation. The plant manager added that a
spill involving another company would have been a disaster for those who eventually5
were compensated by Exxon; restitution would have been much more difficult, if not
impossible.3
The manager went on to say that oil spills were inevitable, but that they should be
avoided as much as financially feasible. Fishermen always faced uncertainties and risks--I
oil pollution among them. He also commented that fish processors did not communicate
with each other and that each made settlerment with Exxon on its own.3
One observer said that fishermen who worked on the spill cleanup came from
several locations--Cook Inlet, other parts of Alaska, and the Lower 48 states. Those who3
earned the greatest sums (for boat rentals and other cleanup work) were buying new
equipment for their fishing operations in the inlet (as of spring 1991). Very few of the3
fishermen, according to this and other sources, were entirely dependent on commercial
fishing for their i-ncome; niany of them were property owners a-nd professionals of one3
kind or another, and few of them were in arrears on permit payments.
Some processors had to ship fish at great cost to plants in Kodiak because theyI
lacked employees to keep up with the numbers of fish brought in by set-net fishermen.
One plant manager said that processors did not turn away the set-netters because they3




Kenai - page 5023

needed them as steady suppliers from year to year. These observations followed on the
heels of the worst effects from the spill.
The 1990 commercial fishing season in Cook inlet was poor. For comparison, one
fish processor who had been in the inlet many years processed only 800,000 pounds of
sockeye salmon in 1990 compared with the spill year (1989), when 2.45 million pounds
were processed. The poor year might have been related to the.Exxon Valdez oil spill,
but it also could have been a low year in the cycle of sockeye arrivals in the inlet; and
perhaps effects could be attributed to other causes yet to be determiined. This company
needed to process about 1.5 million pounds in a season to break even: 1990 was a year
of loss, and apparently all species of salmon were low in nunibers in 1990 with the price
of sockeye at about $1.55 per pound. One fish processor said there were so few fish to
process that "We got to know them by their nanmes." Sockeye runs are low every 4 to 6
years.
In 1990, the ADF&G allowed an escapement of 400,000 sockeye before opening
the commercial season; and that number had not been reached as of late July, the period
of highest sockeye counts on the Kenai River. Only about 240,000 fish had been counted
with sonar devices at the mouth of the river. Subsistence fishing also had been stopped.
Fish processors had no more than a few days of faul shifts for workers; and the cannery
workers, cannery managers, and comm.ercial fishermen were greatly distressed over the
situation (Huber 1991a).
Processors did not depend solely on sockeye. The p rocessing season begins in the
inlet with herring, followed by black cod, halibut, salmon, and, in October., shortly before
the yearly shutdown, halibut again. Workers who stay throughout the season earn a
bonus; and students, the bulk of the workforce during summer months, earn about $4,500
for a faul season at a wage of about $6.00-6.50 per hour. Some processors supply housing
and dining facilities for seasonal workers.
Data on the Upper Cook Wnet 1991 fishing season showed for the second year in a
row that fishermen, especially those in commercial sales, had a distressing year. Only 2.8
million salmon were harvested in 1991. Tle catch was 2 million less than 1989 and I
Kenai - page 503

I
I
I
million less than 1990. From an expected 1991 harvest of about 3.8 million, exactly 2.2
million sockeye--the prime commercial species in the inlet--were harvested by set-netters
(39% of the total) and drift-netters (61%). Other species and quantities harvested were
16,200 pink, 8,500 chum, 368,000 coho, and 13,900 chinook--all less than forecasted.
Several conditions contributed to the dismal 1991 fishing season--a small return of
salmon to spawn, low prices, a strike by the fishermen against low prices, dismay and
confusion over subsistence-fishing regulations, continuing strife between commercial and
sport fishermen, and a controversy between an ADF&G fish biologist and Alaska's
Governor Hickel.
Commercial per-pound prices were about 60 percent below 1990 prices (between
$1.00 and $1.20). Many fishermen did not earn enough money to pay their seasonal
fishing expenses. The economic and social consequences were expected to be dire for
the peninsula economy into 1992. Tle Kenai Peninsula Fishermen's Association
expected to seek new markets for Cook Inlet salmon during the off-season, to include
aquaculture as well as wild stocks of fish. (The 1992 king salmon sport season was
successful and the sockeye commercial harvest was large.)
Sport fishermen harvested about 18 percent of the 1991 king salmon escapement
(7,000 of 34,300). Set-netters took about 13 percent. An estimated 87 percent of the
total kidng salmon run reached the Kenai River for escapement (reproduction upstream)
and for subsistence- and sport-fishermen harvest. Set-netters released most of the kings
they caught, and many of them donated money from their king harvest to the Kenai
River King Salmon Fund set up in 1991. The kidng salmon subsistence harvest was
stopped by the State of Alaska when commercial harvest of the species was closed due to
lack of escapement. This source of controversy was to be resolved in court.
II.D. Inipacts on Community Relations
There were some hard feelings among some local persons between those who did
and those who did not work on the spill cleanup. These parties exchanged harsh words
on certain occasions and some family relationships and friendships were under enormous
stress. Some people who had not worked on the spill viewed some of the local cleanup

I
Kenai - page 504

workers as opportunistic, self-serving, and slightly cynical--willing to trade on the
misfortunes of others. Those most harmed financially were the drift-net fishermen; those
who gained most financially were the set-net fishermen and persons who worked on the
spill cleanup.
If there was a, critical point at which a person left his/her job for work on the oil-
spill cleanup, it eluded my investigation. It was evident that jobs paying under $10.00
per hour were vacated. Jobs that provided full-time employment, benefits, and good pay
were not absented. One person who quit a job and went to Prince Williamn Sound for
employment with VECO worked for an annual wage of $24,000. This person left to
work on the spill with little interest in or expectation of being allowed to return to his
original position. The cleanup job lasted from May 1991 to September 1991. Upon his
return to Kenai he had no luck in getting a new job. But this hardy, independent person
was not worried about getting work. He commented that the cleanup was not
particularly helpful in achieving its publicly stated goal, but E-xxon's effort.. quieted
many people and got rid of oil on top of rocks."
Another respondent affected by the oil spill said that she was teaching college
courses in Cordova when the spill occurred. Within a few weeks, she lost 85 percent of
her students. She claimed that the students left because their parents earned enough
money on the cleanup to purchase homes outside of Cordova and move away
pernianently. The woman moved with her husband and children to Kenai, where the
family purebased a house they could afford (in contrast to the Cordova housing
opportunities at the time). Her husband taught in Cordova and traveled to his Kenai
home as often as possible while the woman watched over the house and children.
Tlere was some animosity toward oil workers when the energy industry was young
on the peninsula; but as one person pointed out, "The industres brought produce and
fresh fruit to Kenai." In addition to the benefits already cited, the industry brought other
benefits--albeit unintended ones--to the natural environment. The roads and other
facilities constructed by companies increased public access to wild areas for a cross-
Kenai - page 505





section of interest groups that led, on occasion, to more interest and involvement inI
resource management.
Furthermore, some persons lauded the energy industries for restoring some of the
lands they cleared. Groundwater and some surface waters, however, were often regarded
as damaged beyond remedy. There were frequent complaints about new DEC
appointees who seemed to know very little about environmental processes and3
measurement of the degree of harm that certain substances cause.
There were conflicts between oil companies and environmentalists over toxicI
wastes. For example, the Greenpeace flagship Rainbow Warrior docked at the Drift
River oil terminal on the westemn shore of Cook Inlet on Tuesday, July 23, 1991. WhileI
taling sediment samples there, the crew raised a flag with the words "Valdez. Perth.
Your Coast Next. Clean Energy Now," which referred to a July 21 6-million-gallon oilU
spill that occurred off the coast of Australia. The Greenpeace crew wanted to get a
message to local people about threats from fossil fuiel industries. The GreenpeaceI
Northwest Office media coordinator said, "We're planning a nonviolent protest. The oil
industries are blatantly involved in dumping heavy metals and al kinds of pollutants into3
the inlet, and they've got to be held responsible for cleaning up.
On the following day, one crew member hung a banner from the Unocal dock inI
Nikisli that read, "Break the toxic cycle. Don't spOlIL Alaska," and "Industry regulates
itself and -no one knows what's going into the water. We feel there's a chronic toxicj
release problem [in Cook Inlet]. We call it the 30-year spill." In support of Greenpeace,
a drift-net fisherinan said that he did not know much about Greenpeace,. and he had notI
protested against the conduct of oil companies; but on July 24, he said "I've lived here
my whole life. I've never, never clashed with the oil industry ... but they've pushed meI
to the limits of my emotional balance. I'm not an anti-oil kind of guy. I'm anti-
irresponsibility" (Lewis 1991la). One person on the beach near the Unocal dock shoutedï¿½
obscenities at the demonstrators.
The chairperson of the peninsula-based Public Awareness Committee for the3
Environment (PACE), headquartered in Kenai, was quoted in the Peninsula Clarion as
Kenai - page 506

saying, 'We hope to keep [Cook Wnet] from becoming another Chesapeake Bay, Saint
Lawrence River, Great Lakes, or Columbia River" (Lewis 199 ib).
PACE had become an important force on the peninsula: in 1991 it had 75
members and the number was steadily increasing. The organization had five major
purposes:
ï¿½	Ed-ucate the local commuinity on environmental subjects;
*	Advocate proper and viable uses of Alaska's natural resources;
*	Provide informati on and support to victfims of pollution;
ï¿½ Provide information and support to other environmental organizations; and
ï¿½ Help in restoring the environment of the Kenai Peninsula and the entire State
(PACE 199 1).
II.E. Summary and Conclusions
The Exxon Valdez oil spill, and subsequent efforts by the Exxon and VECO
corporations to remove oil, drew an estimated 300 persons from Kenai to Prince William
Sound. Some of these migrants vacated lower-paying jobs in Kenai, those which paid
about $5.00 to $7.00 per hour; for this reason many small businesses were left short-
handed. Independent repairpersons, mechanics, equipment operators, fish processors,
and others quit their Kenai employment to search for the high-paying spill-cleanup work
that paid well over $1,500 per week. Others who sought work were unemployed persons
who would not have otherwise gained employment during the summer period. Some
business owners and managers had to work extra hours to fill in for employees who left
the community. Fish-processing plants also were shorthanded, either because their
customary workers stayed away from Cook Inlet--thinking it was seriously contaminated
with oil--or to work on the spill cleanup. Processors, not wanting to lose steady
suppliers, purchased the fish brought to them; but because some of them were short of
laborers, a certain quantity of fish could not be processed. Crimes declined in frequency
in 1989 because many habitual troublemakers also pursued jobs on the cleanup.
The 1989 sockeye run was huge, with about 5 million fish harvested under ADF&G
management. The drift-net commercial fishing season was closed by ADF&G because
Kenai - page 507





oily reimnants of the spill were found in the central channel of Lower Cook Inlet', theI
section of the inlet where drift-net fishermen harvest fish. Although Exxon eventually
compensated these fishermen for their losses, and although most of the 600 or more
fishermen were pleased with the sums they received, there was a period of great anxiety
and uncertainty during which the fishermen did not know if the season would be opened
and whether they would receive settlement from Exxon.
On the one hand, UCIODA expressed pleasure, for the most part, with Exxon's
timing and levels of compensation: fish processors acknowledged prompt and justI
compensation soon after meetings between the processors' attorneys and Exxon
representatives. On the other hand, the set-net fishermen who work the shores of the3
inlet were allowed to harvest salmon in 1989: they brought in record hauls and record
incomes. This anomalous circumstance created some bitterness and controversy between3
drift-net and set-net fishermen, some of whom were in the same family and the same
friendship networks. Moreover, there were some hard feelings between drift-net5
fishermen and their friends and families, and persons who worked on the spill cleanup.
The fishermen believed that their misfortune was callously used to others' advantage.3
Anger also was expressed against fossil-fuel-industry employees and their families, the
impression being that these persons were part of a monolithic entrepreneurial presence3
that had no feelings for -peo-ple and nature. Businesses that ordi-narily supply the drift-
net fishenrmen with equipment and loans and sell properties to them suffered from lackj
of business. In all, there was a feeling of despair and fiitility among many drift-net
fishermen. A sense of the inevitability of oil contamination of Cook Inlet was in wide
evidence throughout Kenai. This attitude stemmed, in part, from experience. For
example, in 1987 the vessel Glacier Bay spilled between 33,000 and over 100,000 gallonsI
of oil at the mouth of the Kenai River during the drift-net commercial fishing season;
and many fishermen were still processing claims from that accident. (In December 1991,5
applicants received compensation from the companies involved in that spill.)
Ile City of Kenai filed for and received compensation for loss of about $45,000 at3
its loading dock, where some business had been lost during the closure of drift-net
Kenai - page 508

fishing. Kenai city officials estimated that the city's economy received an infusion of
about $2.5 million from monies spent by cleanup workers who returned to the
community. This increased consumer spending earned the city about $300,000 in taxes.
Furthermore, unlike many small businesses, the city and other private and public
institutions whose employees earned well and received generous fringe benefits did not
lose employees to cleanup work.
T'he 1989 tourist season was very busy as many sightseers, having seen television
ads jointly paid for by the State of Alaska and Exxon explaining that most of the State
was untouched by the spill, came to enjoy the Kenai Peninsula and to sport fsh frthe
sockeye that were in abundance. Some sportfishing guides rushed rinfration to their
steady customers informing them that the spill had not harmed the inlet fisheries. After
an initial scare, these businesses thrived in 1989. They did not do as well during the
1990 and 1991 king and sockeye salmon seasons. The 1992 season, however, was
productive for sport and commercial fishermen. There was an abiding fear over the
destruction of spawning sites (redds) caused by an abundance of spawning salmon during
the 1989 salmon run. The results of this destruction will not be known until the mid-
1990s.
The Laborers Union local office placed members at cleanup jobs, but activity was
relatively slow because hiring was done in Anchorage. The union local in Kenai gained
a few new members as a result of employment at the spill. In the 1990 cleanup season
only about 100 persons from Kenai were employed, and this number did not affect union
membership in a substantial way.I
Kenai, its sister-city Soldotna 11 miles away, and Nikiski have many families that
are dependent on oil and gas extraction and processing in the Cook Inlet energy industry.
These sources of employment pay considerable wages and taxes (the Kenai Peninsula
Borough received about 25% of its income from the energy industry in the inlet). The
13 offshore drilling platforms, many of which predate major national environmental laws,
are a permanent part of peninsula life and are pointed to with considerable pride by
many residents. Kenai Peninsula College, located between Kenai and Soldotna, features
Kenai - page 509

an academic program in oil and gas extraction and processing. For this reason, many
North Slope employees have permanent homes in Kenai. As one might expect, many of
the leaders in Kenai promote farther oil and gas exploration.
The Kenai Chamber of Commerce sent letters to chambers throughout the United
States urging them to put pressure on Congress to approve industry plans to drill for oil
in sections, of ANWR. Oil from Valdez also is transported to the inlet for processing; I
this is a source of concemn about environmental protection for many persons, including
some of the oil and gas employees, many of whom are also commercial fishermen. ThusI
the community is a blend of (among other economic activities) fossil fuel extraction and
processing and fish harvesting and processing. This mix fosters, in general, tolerance andI
accomTnodation between these two essential economic activities. This attitude is
reflected in the official stand made by UCIDA in its endorsement of oil exploration inI
ANWR.
On the Federal level, the oil spill resulted in passage of the Federal OPA of 1990.3
The OPA profoundly altered institutions on the Kenai Peninsula that play a role in
environmental quality, and it created wholly new organizations. CIRCAC was
established under OPA to work with and be funded by the industry group, CISPRI.
Disputes over funding levels have caused some serious deadlocks between industry and
CIRCAC.
Kenai - page 510

References Cited

Alaska Department of Commerce and Economic Development
1988 Kenai: An Alaska Community Profile. Division of Business Development.
Juneau, AK.

Brown, C.
1991a "Borough Residents Want It All." Peninsula Clarion, June 7, 1991. Kenai,
AK.

1991b "Tesoro, Borough Disagree Tax Bill." Peninsula Clarion, September 4, 1991.
Kenai, AK.

1991c "CIRCAC Budget To Grow?" Peninsula Clarion, September 17, 1991. Kenai,
AK.

1991d "Diesel, Inlet Made It Tough." Peninsula Clarion, September 19, 1991.
Kenai, AK
1991e "Inlet Spill Caused by Pilot Error." Peninsula Clarion, August 15, 1991.
Kenai, AK
1991f "Drill Motto: Be Prepared." Peninsula Clarion, August 16, 1991. Kenai, AK.

1991g "Suit Filed to Block Lease Sale." Peninsula Clarion, September 10, 1991.
Kenai, AK.
1992 "DEC Figures: 16 Barrels of Oil Picked Up." Peninsula Clarion, January 22,
1992. Kenai, AK

Davidson, A.
1991 In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez: The Devastating Impact of the Alaska Oil
Spill. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books.

Dixon, M.
1978 What Happened to Fairbanks? Colorado Springs, CO: Westview Press.

Enders, J.
1991 "Alaska Wants More Spill Response Equipment." Associated Press.
September 5, 1991. Kenai; AK.
Kenai - page 511

I

Green, G.H., R.L. Ender, D.R. Hitchens, and M. Bennett                                          I
1977 A Profile of Five Kenai Peninsula Towns: An Analysis of the Demographic
Characteristics and Attitudes Towards Services and Community Development in
Kenai, Soldotna, Seward, Seldovia, and Homer. Kenai Peninsula Borough
Planning Department, Soldotna, AK.

Huber, T.                                                                                       I
1991a "Upper Inlet Closed to All Sockeye Fishing." Peninsula Clarion, July 26, 1991.
Kenai, AK.

1991b "River Guide Reduction Plan Hits Snag." Peninsula Clarion, September 19,
1991. Kenai, AK.                                                                          3

1991c "Glacier Bay Plaintiffs Net $2.55 Million." Peninsula Clarion, September 10,
1991. Kenai, AK.

1991d "Nature Conservancy Considers Kenai Project." Peninsula Clarion, September
24, 1991. Kenai, AK.                                                                      j

Human Relations Area Files, Inc.
1992 Social Indicators Study of Alaskan Coastal Villages, I. Key Informant                  S
Summaries, Vol. 2: Schedule B Regions (Bristol Bay, Kodiak, Bering Straits).
(OCS Study MMS 92-0032).

Impact Assessment, Inc.
1990 Economic, Social and Psychological Impact Assessment of the Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill. Prepared for Oiled Mayors Subcommittee, Alaska Conference of
Mayors. Anchorage, AK.

Johnson, B.                                                                                     j
1991 "Effects of Summer's Fishing to be Felt in Months to Come." Peninsula
Clarion. September 6, 1991. Kenai, AK.

Jorgensen, J. G.
1989 Alaska OCS Social Indicators System: Results of the KI Protocol Analysis--
Schedules A and B, 1987-88. Human Relations Area Files, USDOI, Minerals
Management Service, Alaska OCS Region, Anchorage, AK. (Draft manuscript.)

1990 Social Indicators System for Coastal Villages in Alaska. Human Relations               I
Area Files, USDOI, Minerals Management Service, Alaska OCS Region,
Anchorage, AK. (Draft manuscript.)                                                        3
i
Kenai - page 512                                           1i
I

Keeble, J.
1991 Out of the Channel: The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in Prince William Sound.
New York: Harper Collins Publishers.

Kenai City
1991 Kenai City Policy Activities Report, 1988-1990. Kenai, AK. 1991

Laborers Union, Local No. 341
1976 Mathematical Sciences Northwest, Inc. and Human Resources Institute, Inc.
(MSNW/HRPI). A Social and Economic Impact Study of Offshore Petroleum and
Natural Gas Development in Alaska. Phase I. Prepared for the Department of
the Interior, BLM.
Larson, S.
1991 "Greenpeace Protests, Then Hosts Potlock." Peninsula Clarion, July 24, 1991.
Kenai, AK.
Lewis, T.
1991a "Greenpeace Campaign Targets 30-Year Spill." Peninsula Clarion, July 25,
1991.
1991b "Mayor: City's Main Challenge Keeping Kenai River Healthy." Peninsula
Clarion, July 25, 1991. Kenai, AK.
1991c "Peninsula Attracts 250,000 Visitors Annually." Peninsula Clarion,
September 3, 1991. Kenai, AK.
Little, J.
1990 "Shallow Quakes Rattle Cook Inlet Volcano." Peninsula Clarion. September 4,
1991. Kenai, AK.

Peninsula Clarion
1989/1991 March 8, 1989, p. 1; October 9, 1989, p. 1; March 16, 1991, p. 1. Articles
on Kenai Borough taxes, commercial fish harvests and Kenai Chamber of
Commerce conducts a letter-writing campaign urging chambers nation-wide to
support ANWR oil exploration. Author(s) unlisted.
Portney, P. R. (editor)
1990 Public Policies for Environmental Protection. Washington, D.C.: Resources
for the Future.

PACE (Public Awareness Committee for the Environment)
1991 Public Awareness Committee for the Environment Operating Plan. Kenai, AK.
Kenai - page 513

I
I
Robbins, L.
1989 Social Indicators Project: Key Informant SummTary, City of Kenai. Personal
flednotes.

Smith, J.
1991 "Kenai Officials Say Bicentennial Helped to Boost Slow Year." Peninsula
Clarion, September 3, 1991. Kenai, AK.








































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Cook Inlet Periphery, Native Communities:

T~yonek and Seldovia





Steven McNabb

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TYOKEK AND SELDOViA
Table of Contents
I. Background and Historical Context ............................... 522
A. The Natural Setting ...................................... 522
B.  Historical Context and Dena'ina Ethnohistory .................. 523
C. Historical Periods ....................................... 529
Displacement of Indigenous Society (1778-1895) ................ 529
Commercial Expansion (1895-1960) .......................... 530
Land Claims and the Oil Economy (1960-Present) ............... 531

II. The Effects of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill .......................... 533
A.    The Context of the Spill: The Contemporary Villages ............ 533
B. Reactions to the Oil Spill ................................. 535
Immediate Effects ....................................... 537
Subsequent Effects ...................................... 538

IH. Conclusions ................................................. 542

References Cited .................................................. 545
ï¿½Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 519

TYONEK AND SELDOVIA

List of Tables

1. Resources Harvested in the Cook Inlet/Kenai Peninsula Area .............. 523

2. Dena'ina Linguistic, Social, and Subsistence Divisions .................... 527

3. Population Estimates, 1910-1990 .................................... 533

4. Retail Price Comparisons, Tyonek and Seldovia, 1989 and 1991 ............. 536


List of Figures

Figure 1. Population Pyramid, Tyonek Alaska Natives, 1991 .................. 534


List of Maps

Map I ........................................................... 521
Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 520

mm -  -  mm -   mm -   m    - m m - - m -





Map Location











.:* Lake Clark   Crescent Rive  Polly
-"Lake Clark Ce
National Park
m~~~~~~~~~~~~~~x :ni Bay
and
o~~~~~Peev Chisik Island
Preserve

9. ~   ~~~~ .'" ..   ..    .* .
cr~~~~:.."-
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COOK INLET PERIPHERY. NATIVE COMMUNITIES:I
TYONEK AND SELDOVIA
I.  BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL CONTEXTI
I.A. The Natural Setting

The Cook Inlet area, which contains three Schedule C study sites (Kenai, Tyonek,
and Seldovia), is classified as a Pacific coastal and rain forest geographic region (Racine
and Young 1978:1). The area is a transition zone between the Pacific Northwest rain
forests and the shrubland and tundra of the Alaska.Peninsula. Pacific coastal forests of3
Sitka spruce occur here near their northwestemn limit in North America. Spruce forests
are sparse and interrupted by extensive areas of alder shrubland, and alder thickets cover
most of the uplands. The deep bays and arms in the area (Tuxedni, Kamishak,
Kachemak, and Chinitna Bays and Turnagain Arm) have large tidal fluctuations and
glacial outwash that tend to form estuarine saltmarshes, with adjacent coastal beach
vegetation and intertidal communities (Racine and Young 1978:1, 28). Map I depicts
the general study area.
The climate of the Cook Inet area at lower elevations is maritimne subarctic.
Summer temperatures are moderately warm, averaging above 50 'F for one or more
months of the year. Winters are moderately severe, but permafrost is rare. Along the3
Cook Inlet coast, January mean minimum temperatures are about 10 'F. Common
precipitation along the Cook Inlet coast is 60 to 80 inches, and snow accumulations may
reach 10 feet or more. High precipitation often is accompanied by strong wvinds, low
clouds, and fog (Racine and Young 1978:8-9).
Resource harvest and use patterns are poorly understood in Cook Inlet, due
la-rgely to the fact that the metropolitan areas that dominate Cook Inlet (such as3
Anchorage and Kenai) are complex and contain a dizzying range of special-interest and
sport, recreational, commercial, and subsistence users. Because the road system that
connects most Cook Inlet communities permits great. mobility and access throughout the
area, use patterns and zones of customary activity are poorly associated with specific3
communities. For example, the author's current and as yet unpublished analysis of


Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 522

resource uses on the western coast of Cook Inlet shows that no significant differences are
detectable based on residence. Existing documents do, however, describe the key species
that generally are harvested by residents of Cook Lnlet/Kenai Peninsula communities;
these are listed in Table 1.
Table 1
RESOURCES HARVESTED IN THE COOK INLET/KENAI PENINSULA AREA

Fish	Mammals	Birds	Shellfish	Other


Halibut	Moose	Waterfowl	Clams	Firewood
Salmon	Caribou	Ptarmigan	Crabs	Coal
Trout	Elk	Grouse	Shrimp	Mushrooms
Herring	Beaver	Mussels	Seaweed
Eulachon	Hare	Greens
Cod	Black bear	Berries
Mtn goat
Porcupine
Source: Schroeder, Andersen, Bosworth, Morris, and Wright (1987:571).
I.B. Historical Context and Dena'ina Ethnohistory1
The first systematic archaeology in the Cook Inlet area began in the early 1930's
with Frederica de Laguna's efforts to determine the regional prehistoric chronologies of
Eskimo culture and Dena'ina Athabascans (or Tanaina, following now obsolete spelling
conventions). The Pacific Eskimo culture that may underlie some Dena'ina sites is
associated with the "Kachemak Tradition," dated in Cook Inlet from around 1,000 B.C. to
500 A.D. The origins and directions of influence of archaeological traditions that
converge here from the south and west, and possibly from the Norton Eskimo culture to
the northwest, are unclear and subject to some debate. Further details concerning the
Kachemak and related traditions in the general area are found in Clark (1966, 1970,




1 This section is based loosely on McNabb and Petrivelli (n.d.).
Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 523





1981, 1984), de Laguna (1934), Dixon (1980), Reger (1977), Workman, Lobdell, andI
Workman (1980), and Workman (1980).
Archaeological research has not yet detected the beginning of the Dena'ina
presence in the Cook inlet region, and Pacific Eskimo occupation of the Middle Inlet is
better documented (see Reger 1977 for the Soldotna area, for instance). Dena'ina sites
are found on the Kenai Peninsula as far south as Seldovia and on the west side of Cook
hilet as far south as Chinitna Bay. Some researchers have attempted to integrate
ethnohistory with differing archaeological theories about the transition dates between the
Kachemak and Dena'ina presences in the Cook Inflet area (Braund and Behnke 1980:46-
153; Fall 1981:49-53), but the fundamental questions remain unanswered: when did3
Pacific Eskimo occupation of the area terminate, and did Dena'ina displace Eskimos or
enter an abandoned territory?3
The Denaima are a regional and linguistic subdivision of Northern Athabascan
Indians. Like most Athabascans in Alaska and many others outside Alaska, the Dena'ina3
are matrilineal and hence trace descent through females. Those persons claiming
common descent comprised "sibs," or "clans." Persons of the same generation and3
descended through the same female were, in effect, "siblings" and were proscribed from
marrying due to incest prohibitions. Named clans (or sibs) were the principal social3
units among the Dena'ina, though the clans were organized into moieties.2 The clans
and moieties were exogamous, so one married only into the opposite moiety--and, as a3
consequence, into a different clan. Among the Dena'ina, these moieties were not
named. Both moieties would be evident wherever the Dena'ina lived (due to the fact3
that one must marry into the opposite moiety), but not all clans would be evident in
every settlement. Clans often were associated with particular sites or areas, which is3
common for many Alaska Native societies with descent groups, including non-Athabascan
groups such as the Tlingit; see. Fall 1981; Osgood 1966; Townsend 1965, 1981. The clans




2A moiety is dual social organization of two sets of clans, with reciprocal obligations and responsibilities
to one another in terms of marriage recruitment, mortuary practices, and memorial services for the dead.3


l'lyonek and Seldovia - Page 5243

can therefore be considered local descent groups. Dena'ina and Ahtna moieties contrast
with other Alaska Athabascan phratries (which entail three groups of clans); and
moieties also are common to the Tlingit, who lived directly to the east of the Ahtna and
Dena'ina.
Dena'ina society was not clearly stratified, but members were ranked on the basis
of prestige and wealtb. Rank was closely related to clan membership, inasmuch as some
clans were highly placed in particular locales; and, all other things being equal,
individuals tended to assume the rank of their clan. In addition, because clans were
associated with particular sites or locales, local resources--and hence wealth--might be
linked to those clans. Often, clans also were associated with qualities or reputations such
as hunting prowess, wealth (see above), and spatial orientation (such as "inland' and
"coastal," which restates their ties to specific territories). Origin stories, color symbolism,
and facial painting styles also may be prerogatives of specific clans (see Fall 1981:230).
Wealth, prestige, and kinship were integrated; for instance, prestige was achieved
in part through generosity, which in turn required wealth or the ability to mobilize
wealth through the descent group. Males who occupied a leadership position called
"fqeshqa"' were senior clansmen who controlled wealth and exercised nominal authority in
a settlement. In practical terms, they had little real power over persons outside their
descent groups. The close kinspersons of those men comprised the aristocracy, the
highest ranked group. Commoners (those who lacked affiliations with the highly placed
clan) comprised a second and lower group (see Fall 1981; Osgood 1966; Townsend 1965,
1981).
Settlement patterns followed the model termed "Central Based Wandering" in
some literature (see VanStone 1974). This model entails seasonal movement from and
to a relatively stable core area, often containing fixed village sites. In this respect, the
Dena'ina are less nomadic than most interior Athabascans. Although ethnohistoric
sources and oral histories suggest that the Dena'ina prefer inland hunting (perhaps due
to relatively recent relocation from mountainous inland areas), their indigenous
economic cycle is well adapted to marine resources as well as riverine and inland
. Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 525






resources (see Osgood 1966). The Dena'ina are unique among Alaska AthabascansI
because of their adaptations to the coastal environment of Cook Inlet; they have adopted
Eskimo marine-oriented traits, such as using skin boats, hunting seals, and whaling. The
Dena'ina engaged in trading relationships with other Athabascan groups (mainly with the
Ahtna and bordering groups in the interior to the north) and in wars with Pacific Eskimo
groups on the more southemn edges of Kenai Peninsula and Alaska Peninsula, Prince
William So-und, and Kodiak Island.
Fall has considered the challenge of classifying Alaska Athabascans, noting that3
"Until recently there was no political organization transcending individual bands or
villages. Few sharp sociocultural or linguistic boundaries exist ... [but] language is3
perhaps the best criterion for designating regional groups. These can then be subdivided
by territorial, cultural and social criteria" (Fall 1981:17). Some possible classifications
are presented in Table 2, based on several criteria.and authors. Special notes regarding
Table 2are as follows:3
0      The dialects form two principal groups, Upper and Lower Inlet, and the latter is
fturther subdivided.
0      Townsend's "societies" are classified on the basis of similarities in sociopolitical
organization, intergroup interaction, and resource use.3
n      Osgood's "food areas" classify common species, subsistence routines, climate, and
land and marine characteristics.
n      Because the accessibility of marine resources diminishes as one moves north
toward the Knik, Matanuska, and Susitna watersheds and because climate3
extremes also vary over the north-south dimension, a loose continuumn of "food
areas" is established: more inland and riverine resources to the north, more3
marine resources and a more moderate climate to the south.
Beginning with spring, the seasonal subsistence cycle starts with the return of3
migratory waterfowl and open-water sea mammal hunting. The Dena'ina hunted
waterfowl in estuaries, lakes, and coastal tidal flats in spring and then later in fall as they3
left staging areas and began flying south. They often hunted seals by clubbing them on


Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 5263

Table 2
DENA'INA LINGUISTIC, SOCIAL, AND SUBSISTENCE DIVISIONS

20th-Century
Village	Dialects	Societies	Food Areas


Knik	Upper Inlet	Susitna	Upper Inlet
Susitna	Upper Inlet	Susitna	Susitna
Tyonek	Upper Inlet	Susitna	Middle Inlet

Kustatan	Lower Inlet (Outer Inlet)	Susitna
Kenai	Lower Inlet (Outer Inlet)	Kenai Lower Inlet
Seldovia	Lower Inlet (Outer Inlet)	Kenai	Lower Inlet

Pedro Bay	Lower Inlet (Iliatuna)	Interior	Iliatna
Old Iliamna	Lower Inlet (1liamna	Interior	Iliamna

Nondalton	Lower Inlet (Inland)	Interior
Lime Village	Lower Inlet (Inland)	Interior


Sources: Karl (1975), Townsend (1981), and Osgood (1933).
beaches, which were approached from the ocean by hunters who swam ashore; and they
generally harpooned belukha whales from skin boats and then speared the whales after
they became exhausted or drowned, although they occasionally used hunting platforms to
to hunt belukha at narrow channels. The Dena'ina harvested all five species of Pacific
salmon from about mid-May through October; they collected berries and greens late in
the summer; they hunted or trapped inland game (moose, caribou, sheep, bear, and small
mammals) from mid-August through October; and they periodically hunted moose, bear,
and small game throughout the winter. During midwinter, the moose, bear, and small
game were subject to greater hunting emphasis because they were then a primary source
of fresh food. By April, the Dena'ina shifted the emphasis to migratory waterfowl and
marine fish and mammal species. They harvested freshwater fish year-round (Fall 1981;
Fall, Foster, and Stanek 1984).
Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 527






On the basis of linguistic evidence, James Kari (1988) proposes the followingI
explanation for the entry of the Dena'ina into the Cook Inlet area:
It is suggested that the headwaters of the upper Stony andI
upper Mulchatna rivers west of the Alaska Range is the most
ancient home of the Dena'ina. The Dena'ina moved in a
southerly direction on two fronts, into Iliamna-Lake Clark
and into Cook Inlet basin. Movement into upper Cook Inlet
basin preceded other movements into middle and lower, Cook5
Inlet (Kari 1988:319).

The degree of dialect divergence between Upper Inlet
Dena'ina and the Lower Inlet dialects has led me to posit
that the first band to depart from an earlier Dena1na
homeland on the westemn slopes of the southern Alaska3
Range may have entered the Upper Inflet area through the
complex of passes in the Rainy Pass area. This may have
been 1,500 to 2,000 years ago....
I have suggested that a Dena'ina band migrated from the
western piedmont through Merrill and Telaquana Passes toI
Kustatan ... . My guess is that they have been there for 700
to 900 years .... From there the group crossed the Inflet to
East Foreland and then occupied the Swanson and KenaiI
Rivers, and the Kenai Mountains--gradually moving south
down the Kenai Peninsula to Kachemak Bay. The arrival of
the Dena'ina in Kachemak Bay may be as recent as 250-300I
years ago (Kari 1988:332-334).
The physical terrain and habitation patterns are not uniform in this area, and it is3
likely that the southwestern coast of Cook Inlet was inhabited intermittently or on a
more seasonal basis. Based on documents from the Russian explorations, we know that1
the Dena'ina were evident at Kamishak Bay (the largest southwest bay opposite the tip
of the Kenai Peninsula) in 1796; and the overland portage from this bay to Iliamna Lake3
was used frequently. But this coastal portion of Cook Wnet is flanked by steep
mountains, and very little flat terrain at the coast is available. There is no evidence of3
stable year-round villages in this area, whereas to the north and east there were such
villages, most linked by networks of trade.3




Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 5283

The historical Dena'ina period begins after 1778, when Captain James Cook
encountered the Dena'ina for the first time. Subsequent explorations made contact with
the Dena'ina in 1786, 1788, and 1794. The first Russian settlement in Cook Inlet
Dena'ina territory was established near Kasilof in 1786. In 1805, Lisiansky estimated
3,000 Dena'ina in Cook Inlet in 14 villages; Wrangell estimated 1,299 in 1821;
Veniaminoff estimated 1,628 in 1839; and Petroff counted 739 in the 10th Census of
1880 (Osgood 1966).
I.C. Historical Periods
Disnlacement of Inditenous Societies (1778-18951: Immediately after Russian
contact, the indigenous population and aboriginal economic patterns shifted dramatically.
First, the indigenous population declined precipitously, mainly as a consequence of
introduced disease (smallpox, diphtheria, and influenza). Second, Russian military and
trading posts were established at English Bay, Kenai, Iliamna, and Tyonek; and, in
accordance with a Russian model of entrepreneurship and political manipulation used in
the Aleutian Islands and Kodiak, trading compacts and brokering arrangements were
established to set up permanent exchange relationships. The Russians instituted the
concept of "toyen" or "doyen," sometimes translated as "chief," but functionally equivalent
to "middleman" or "trade liaison" because the main roles of the person so designated
were economic and diplomatic. The Dena'ina had no tribes or chiefs, and the "qeshqa"
role was merged with this Russian invention. In fact, the qeshqa continued to act in
accordance with traditional expectations, but with additional roles subsequent to Russian
intervention (Fall 1981).
But a new economic and political pattern soon emerged as a consequence of the
large volume of trade and the results of decimation due to disease. Whereas villages
were once sets of families clustered around a nucleus of matrikin, the abandonment of
old villages and aggregation of the surviving populations created new and larger villages
that were composed of distantly related or unrelated kin groups. Because the indigenous
system had few means to integrate several semiautonomous, independent clan segments
(each with acknowledged qeshqa) together on a sustained basis, aboriginal social
Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 529







organization began to decay. Among other things, the Russians would not recognize all
qeshqas in a settlement whereas the Dena'ina would; and to some extent this introduced
3~~~~~~~
disequilibrium in the political balance of power.3
Some conflict and bloodshed between Russians and Dena'ina occurred during this
earliest stage but diminished after 1800. The Russian Amnerican Company was formed in
1799; explorations continued, chiefly on the Susitna River, and Ninilchik was founded in
1835. The single most critical event of this era occurred between 1836 and 1840, when a
smallpox epidemic killed half of all the Dena'ina. More recent events, such as the
founding of the Russian Orthodox Church at Kenai (1845), the Treaty of Cession (1867),
the establishment of the first cannery at Kasilof (1882), and the discovery of gold along3
Turnagain Arm (1888-1894) are significant but secondary in importance. After the
Treaty of Cession, the American Commercial Company took over operations.of the
Russian American Company and established its first Cook Inlet outpost at Tyonek.
Tyonek was briefly a staging area for gold prospectors in the Turmagain Arm area, but3
Anchorage quickly eclipsed Tyonek in that role after 1914.
Commercial ExDansion (1895-1960): Inniigration after 1895 increased population3
size, opened up larger consumer markets, and eventually resulted in more diverse
economic opportunities. The far industry, an important source of cash to many3
Dena'ina, faltered in 1897 and collapsed by the time of the Great Depression. The Cook
Inlet area was explored in greater detail by U.S. Geological Survey teams after 1898,3
construction of the Alaska Railroad started at -Seward in 1903, a-nd by 1914 the site of
Anchorage was being surveyed for an eventual town. The Alaska Railroad reached Knik3
Ann in 1918, thereby connecting a major enclave of the Dena'ina with the growing
metropolis, and in the same year the global influenza epidemic struck the Dena'ina3
population and killed many if not most of the oldest Denaeina generation (Fall 1981).




3A similar situation occurred on the Northwest coast, principally in British Columbia, where competitiveI
potlatches developed after populations were consolidated. Here too the interaction between multiple and
incompatible hierarchies led to instability.3


T'yonek and Seldovia - Page 5303

After the 1920's, economic opportunities generally expanded but were increasingly
centralized as urbanization began. Federal Indian legislation mandated services,
facilities, benefits, and rights for Natives; and this body of law was systematically
extended to Alaska. This period is marked by the establishment of Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) schools, health facilities, the Mount Edgecumbe school, Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA) councils, IRA cooperatives, BIA Native allotments, and
specific protections and regulations affecting administration, social services, laws, health,
and education of and for Alaka Natives. One of the study sites, Tyonek, was designated
an Executive Order Reserve in 1915, which permitted the Bureau of Education to lease
and administer lands there "for the benefit of Natives." (In this case, land was leased for
a cannery. )4
The urban and Caucasian population of Alaska doubled over the war years (1940-
1950). Village sites were abandoned, populations merged, and to a great extent
Anchorage became a regional hub for regional Dena'ina. By the end of this period,
Anchorage dominated the economy of the entire State. Localized economic
developments, such as Swanson River/Kenai-area oil exploration and development,
provided opportunities outside the metropolitan hub. It is likely that by 1960 most of the
Dena'ina lived in cities (Anchorage, Kenai, and Homer) in which they were minority
populations.
Land Claims and the Oil Economv (1960-Present): Tyonek was one of the first
Alaska Native communities to successfauly challenge Federal policy during the early
years of the land claims struggle. The Federal Court sided with Tyonek in its argument
that the BIA could not lease village land without permission of the IRA council (the BIA
had sought to control leasing of Native land to oil companies for petroleum exploration).
Subsequent to this decision, in 1965 the Tyonek IRA council negotiated $12.9 million in
drilling rights.





4 About 150 such reserves were created in Alaska. See Case (1984:86).
Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 531





The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1971 created 12 regionalI
Alaska Native corporations, a 13th out-of-State corporation, and about 200 village
corporations. The ANCSA also provided a land and cash settlement of approximately 44
million acres and $1 billion. Cook Inlet Region, Incorporated (CIRI), is the regional
ANCSA corporation that represents most of the Dena'ina today. Chugach Alaska
Corporation comprises the coastal portions of Prince William Sound and the eastern,
southern, and southwestern portions of the Kenai Peninsula. Although most
shareholders are Alutiiq or Pacific Yupik, some Dena'ina or mixed Dena'ina-Alutiiq
shareholders live in the vicinity of Seldovia, English Bay, and Port Graham. The Tyonek
Native Corporation (TNC) is entitled to 112,500 acres under ANCSA, most of which has3
been conveyed. The ANCSA revoked the Executive Order Reserve at Tyonek, but
Tyonek's historical reservation status is even now influencing judicial proceedings. A3
landmark lawsuit that tests Tyonekes claim to sovereign authority on its land was decided
in Tyonek's favor in 1992 by the 9th Circuit Court, reversed on appeal, and now is again3
under appeal. The Seldovia Native Association is entitled to about 100,000 acres under
ANCSA, most of which has been conveyed.3
Tle most pressing issues in the post-ANCSA period for both Seldovia and Tyonek
are identical: economic viability under conditions of uncertainty, with declining State3
and Federal revenues and few options for sustained economic activity. The CIRI is by
all measures the most successful regional ANCSA corporation, with a net income more3
than three times greater than the second-ranked corporation (Sealaska) and a 1990
equity of over $357 million (Colt 1991). Chugach Alaska Corporation, on the other3
hand, is now undergoing Chapter 11 reorganization and probably will sell its fish-
processing and timber operations before the end of 1992. Although there are modest3
pro-spects for future development of coal reserves and possible on- or offshore oil
development in the vicinity of Tyonek, the residents have never registered strong support3
for such activities. The Seldovia Native Association has deliberated with State officials
for years over land sales in the Seldovia area, but no agreements have ever been3
finalized in what most observers perceive as a bitter negotiation with no end in sight.


Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 532I

II. THE EFFECTS OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL
II.A The Context of the Spill: The Contemporary Villages
In contrast to most of the larger and more cosmopolitan hubs in southcentral
Alaska such as Anchorage and Valdez, both Tyonek and Seldovia are by local standards
very old communities. Although Seldovia was not the site of an early Russian
settlement, English Bay (about 30 kilometers away) was, and the outer portion of
Kachemak Bay where Seldovia is located was exploited heavily by early Russian
entrepreneurs. Both Seldovia and Tyonek can be accurately considered sites of original
Russian influence in the New World.
Decennial census reports from 1890 on tabulate residents for both communities,
and Table 3 depicts populations for these villages since 1910. Over this interval, Tyonek
posted a net growth rate of about 44 percent, whereas Seldovia grew by about 83 percent
despite a drop in population after 1970 because of reductions in cannery operations.
Table 3

POPUIATION ESTIMATES, 1910-1990
(20-Year Intervals)

Community                   1910	1930	1950	1970	1990


Tyoneean	78	132	232	154
Seldovia                    173	379	437	437	316


Source: U.S. Census (1910, 1930, 1950, 1970, 1990).
aThe 1990 Tyonek figure compares to a 1989 count of 171 and a 1991 count of 152 by
Jon Hofmeister, who conducted Social Indicators Study field research there.
b The 1900 population was 107. Tyonek was not enumerated in 1910.

The total school enrollments for Tyonek and Seldovia, respectively, were 44 and
101 in 1989 and 43 and 102 in 1991. A comparison of their school enrollments and total
Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 533

I

populations suggests that                                                                          i
Population PyramidI
Tyonek has fewer                           Tyonek Alaska Natives, 1991
I
resident children than(Source: Hofmeister field notes)
would be expected             7o0
65-69I
otherwise and that some      60-84
55-59
Tyonek families with         5o-54
46-49                                                                I
children are now living      4049
40-44ï¿½
outside the community.                     - m        *          m
30-34
25-29                 mmmmmmm
Many informants 20m2
confirmed that numerous      15-19
10-14          *
Tyonek families live           5-9m
0-4
outside thetown,                  14 12 10  8  6  4  2  0  2  4  6  8  10 12 14
principally in Anchorage
(the Tyonek tribal         Figure I
enrollment totals 489 in
1989, hence about 300 Tyonek Natives live outside Tyonek). In fact, both Seldovia and
Tyonek have unusual demographic characteristics. In Seldovia, some dozens of seasonal
residents arrive in the summer and then depart in the fall. Note that these are not
transient workers common to many fishing towns, but long-term seasonal residents with
homes in town. Figure 1 presents a population pyramid for Tyonek. Males are heavily
over-represented, and the population is concentrated in the adult age intervals. This
pattern is consistent with outmigration (temporary or permanent) of young families and
females.
The employment base is extremely narrow in both communities. In 1989, Jon           r
Hofmeister counted 17 full-time, year-round jobs in Tyonek (tribal government, 4;
school, 6, not including teachers; Tyonek Native Corporation, 2; Chugach Electric
Association, 2; village store, 2; post office, 1). The village store also accounted for 1
part-time job; VECO hired 23 residents for oil exploration and oil-spill-cleanup work on
a temporary basis; 13 seasonal jobs were offered through the Cook Inlet Tribal Council


Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 534
I

during the summer; and 2 temporary positions were supported by Job Training
Partnership Act (JTPA) grant funds. Wages are low by southcentral Alaska standards--
most jobs pay less than $12.00 per hour. Blue collar skilled and semiskilled hourly rates
for plumbing, construction, electrical, and related labor range from $8.00 to $11.00 in
Tyonek and $20.00 to $40.00 in Seldovia. According to KI's in Tyonek, hourly rates for
labor have declined somewhat since 1989 for unknown reasons. One KI whose agency
works with both villages contrasted the communities in this way: "Seldovia and Tyonek
are different villages. Seldovia has more of an economic base than Tyonek. Tyonek is
struggling more, economically." Another KI responded to questions about economic
needs in Tyonek in this manner: "Village needs? Jobs for people. We need industry in
Tyonek. Without it Tyonek will continue to slide."
Local prices are high by southcentral standards. Most goods bound for Tyonek are
shipped out of Anchorage, and Homer is the staging point for shipments to Seldovia.
Based on marketbasket surveys conducted in both towns in 1989 and 1991 (see Table 4),
Tyonek prices were an incredible 47 percent higher than Seldovia's in 1989 and were 28
percent higher in 1991. Although we cannot put exact figures to our calculations, our
hunch is that these prices in Seldovia were only a few percentage points above those in
Homer and even those in Anchorage. In 1991, prices for our marketbasket of goods
were 16 percent higher than 1989 in Tyonek and 33 percent higher than 1989 in
Seldovia. The marketbasket totals (foods only, for goods available all years in both
communities) in Tyonek were $60.97 for 1989 and $70.76 for 1991. In Seldovia, they
were $41.59 for 1989 and $55.22 for 1991.
II.B. Reactions to the Oil Spill
The effects of the Exxon Valdez oil spill on the residents and institutions of
Tyonek and Seldovia can be arbitrarily but usefully divided into two categories:
(1) immediate disruptions and displacements and (2) subsequent effects that resulted
from these disruptions and displacements. We avoid the dichotomy of "direct" and
Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 535

I
I
Table 4

RETAIL PRICE COMPARISONS, TYONEK AND SELDOVIA, 1989 AND 1991


Commodity                                   Tyonek                     Seldovia
1989	1991	1989	1991


10 lb flour	$7.59	$8.15	$4.09	$4.45
12 oz evaporated milk	1.09	1.25	.75	.89
1 lb onions	.89	.89	.50	.75
48 oz oila	5.36	6.25	4.35	3.69
6-pack cola	4.25	4.55	3.99	4.19
10 lb sugar	8.95	9.55	6.89	8.05
18 oz corn flakea	1.59	3.75	na	2.69
24 oz bread	1.95	1.99	1.99	2.19
1 lb bacon	2.93	4.75	2.59	3.69
39 oz coffee	11.35	13.35	11.25	10.49
1 lb butter	2.85	2.69	2.79	2.59
12 qt powdered milk	9.27	12.45	7.55	9.99
22 oz punch mix	4.49	4.89	1.95	4.25

2-D batteries	4.69	4.69	4.49	2.79
1 gal gasoline	naC	2.30	1.00	1.71
Pampersb	18.05	24.60	12.50	12.69
1-gal Coleman	na	na	na	5.95
ax handle	na	na	4.19	10.39
1 qt motor oil	2.49	3.25	1.35	2.05
Coleman lantern	na	na	31.99	31.99


Source: Social Indicators Study field notes.
a Adjusted prices for various sizes.
b 32-count Huggies in Seldovia, 44-count Huggies in Tyonek.
c The abbreviation na means not available.






Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 536
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"indirect" because indirect often carries the connotations of "obscure" or "remote," neither
of which are warranted in this analysis. "Primary" and "secondary' are valid categories,
but they may connote rank of importance or severity; and, again, these are not warranted
meanings. "Immediate" and "subsequent" specify sequence and draw attention to chain
reactions of effects. An example of an immediate effect would be diversion of municipal
staff from customary duties to oil-spill activities; subsequent effects would be costs of
overtime salaries to deal with customary duties, shortfals due to unbudgeted
expenditures related to those costs, and hidden costs of delayed business (penalties, lost
contracts, inefficiency, deviations from fixed schedules, and so on).
Immnediate Effects:
T~yonek: Within days of the 1989 oil spill, many residents of Tyonek feared
that the Upper Cook Inlet area could be oiled, and they anticipated environmental
damage and tainted fish (which would affect both subsistence and commercial harvests).
According to all reports from villagers and agencies alike, however, oil never reached
Upper Cook Inlet, and marine resources were not affected. Commercial fishing was
never prohibited or restrained in the Upper Cook Inlet area, so commercial restrictions
did not diminish anticipated seasonal incomes in Tyonek. By all accounts, the
subsistence fishery was not affected, and residents did not fear contamination once the
initial concerns were dispelled. Tyonek officials organized a clearinghouse effort to sort
applications for cleanup employment from villagers and then submit the applications to
VECO. However, VECO did not take advantage of these efforts; and, according to
Tyonek KI's, VECO ignored Tyonek efforts to secure employment, at least initially.
Seldovia: Although little oil reached Seldovia,5 oil-spill imnpacts were
more immediate and intense here than those in Tyonek. Residents and their institutions
reacted within days of the spill to mobilize a mitigation plan, 150 residents volunteered
to help in a locally initiated cleanup effort, and the Director of Public Works was
assigned to liaison duties with the Homer-based Multi-Agency Coordinating Comimittee



5Morse Cove and Tukca Bay near Seldovia were "heavily oiled' (Impact Assessment, Inc. 1990b:172).
Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 537






(Impact Assessment, Inc. 1990b:172-173). This effort occurred in relative isolationI
inasmuch as State agencies and private industry responded first in the vicinity of the spill
in Prince William Sound. The schools were closed and the students were dismissed so
that they could assist other residents in building booms to protect the shoreline. Initial
concerns focused on the physical hazards of the spill itself (principally on the potential
damage to marine resources and the regional ecosystem); but by summer 1989, local
officials were staging meetings to discuss related and subsidiary issues, such as (1) the
economic stability of the town itself, which hosts a modest tourism industry that might be3
affected by the spill and (2) impacts related to spill mitigation, such as the potential
hazard of human exposure to granular and liquid fertilizer used to promote degradationI
of petroleum products on the shore. Many Seldovia residents were eventually hired to
work on the cleanup effort; during 1989, monthly cleanup employment ranged from 13 to3
110 Seldovia residents (Impact Assessment, Inc. 1990c:17).
Subseauent Effects:I
Tyonek: Several clear oil-spill impacts in Tyonek followed closely on the
heels of the immediate effects described above. First, Tyonek subsistence fish harvests3
were unaffected, but Tyonek residents knew that residents of other communities, such as
Tatitlek and Chenega Bay, curtailed their harvests due to fears of contamination.3
Tyonek residents initiated a subsistence sharing prograIl, administered by village
officials, to transport Tyonek salmon to affected villages in Prince William Sound.I
Tyonek planned to donate about 600 king salmon to those~ communities; the size of the
eventual distribution is unknown. According to local Ki's, VECO finally responded to3
entreaties for oil-spill cleanup work in Tyonek after the subsistence fish-donation
programn became public knowledge. Tyonek residents were viewed as generous and3
selfless, and so VECO began hiring residents as a goodwill gesture. According to our
records, between 23 and 30 reside-nts worked on the spill-cleanup effort in 1989 and3
1990.
But second, the fish-donation program and subsequent VECO employment resulted3
in other effects. Residents who were hired were diverted from other community jobs;


Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 5383

and some community maintenance and administrative work was delayed, with unknown
costs. Some jealousy and antagonism was generated by the hiring, inasmuch as some
persons who were not hired felt deprived of economic benefits that they believed,they
deserved. (Some KI's minimized this complaint, observing that everyone who signed up
was hired; hence, malcontents who didn't apply merely regretted their choices in
retrospect.) Also, some persons who took cleanup work did not have a significant
opportunity to fish, thereby giving up either (1) incomes that may have been higher than
their cleanup wages or (2) subsistence harvests, or (3) both. (Some residents worked for
a very short period--e.g., some workers terminated after minor injuries--and earned little
but nonetheless were unable to fish commercially.) .But this observation was not
validated by all KM's; according to some, the residents who took cleanup jobs typically
fished the least.
Some residents also deferred personal cornmercial fishing efforts until after the fish
donations were completed and then were unable to recoup their expected commercial
earnings. The fish-donation prograni and cleanup work therefore introduced
unanticipated opportunity costs. Nonetheless, subsistence and commercial harvests were
judged acceptable overall, though fish prices were judged low, and some respondents
considered the harvests low as well.
Finally, institutional actions at the time of the spill caused subsequent impacts in
Tyonek. After the spill, regulations for transporting fuel changed. Fuel could not be
transported by air, and most barges in Cook Inlet were diverted to the cleanup. This
resulted in a fuel shortage in Tyonek and higher costs for those residents who bought
from expensive alternative sources.
Seldovia: 'Me immediate impacts in Seldovia were organizational (i.e.,
institutional) and occuational (i.e., employment-related), as described above. Most of
the subsequent effects clearly stemmed froni these immediate impacts; other effects are
dffficult to trace to their origins.
Seldovia residents and institutions were quick to mobilize grass-roots mitigation
efforts and so-ught to maintain a continuing role in this mitigation; but by all local
Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 539






accounts, this effort was displaced by VECO as soon as a coordinated, regionwideI
cleanup commenced. Some local KI's went so far as to say that VECO "prevented"
trusted and knowledgeable residents from exercising any serious role. 'Me existing
organization of persons and agencies that evolved over the shortterm in Seldovia was not
used by VECO, who made decisions about Seldovia from a distance. After VECO (and
Exxon) assumed control of the cleanup effort, bureaucratic constraints were institutedI
that tended to impede the cleanup; a resident stated that "once VECO took over it took
2 weeks to get the same items, because of the paperwork you had to fill out" (Impact
Assessment, Inc. 1990b:173). Although the existing network of persons and institutions
created new and positive leadership opportLuiities by opening avenues of participation to3
a broad coalition of residents, that network was disempowered by VECO. 'Me Save Our
Sound (SOS) coalition that formed in several communities was and is active in Seldovia,3
and persons affiliated with that grass-roots organization are still active in city and
regional affairs related to the spill.3
Social service and public safety officials initially (in 1989) predicted and then
confirmed that caseloads and emergency activities increased as a consequence of the spill
(chiefly as a result of neglect of children during the cleanup, stress related to dislocation,
and instability caused by an influx of outsiders), yet those effects are hard to assess and3
validate. For instance, few outsiders came to Seldovia for any extended visits for work,
and in retrospect some KI's said that I or 2 years later the apparent emergency wasI
worse than the reality. The chief of police specifically noted that disruptions were nmild
or nonexistent, despite his earlier fears. Social service workers asserted that caseloads3
increased and that domestic abuse and alcohol-related disruptions were severe.
However, no frequency data were made available to us for an assessment of these3
problems, especially in comparison with other years. A physician stated that some recent
divorces were related to oil-spill stress.6 Also, there is evidence of domestic dislocation3


6Impacts of recent events are very difficult to assess using indicators such as divorce, mental healthI
counseling caseloads, and so on. Since psychiatric disorders and domestic disruptions can be related to an
(continued...)

T'yonek and Seldovia - Page 5401

related mainly to absences of parents or other caretakers for long periods. Parents
would "dump" their children at locations such as the library because there were few
alternative sources of childcare (see Impact Assessment, Inc. 1990a:77).
The hidden costs of deferred institutional business--caused by displacement of staff,
overwork, inefficiency, and shifting priorities--probably were severe in Seldovia. The spill
delayed public-works projects, jeopardized fanding as a result of scheduling slowdowns,
and caused the staffing of existing projects to fall below optimum levels after teenagers
were hired to replace adults who were working on the cleanup. Staff burnout was said to
be high in most institutions. The membership of the city council turned over completely
between the first and second field visits (1989, 1991), and another study found "increased
factionalism" and "widespread disruption"' in municipal affairs after the spill (Impact
Assessment, Inc. 1990b:174-175). In order to deal with unexpected expenses, unbudgeted
payments stripped existing financial resources and forced further work delays. One study
places the dollar value of these spill-related expenses at $154,200 in Seldovia (Impact
Assessment, Inc. 1990a:103). We do not know if any part of these expenditures has been
reimbursed yet, but to our knowledge efforts have been made to collect from Exxon.
Members of the Seldovia Native Association allege that the spill has made it more
difficult to sell its land for recreational purposes, which may not change the land's book
value but may influence the eventual sale prices.
Cleanup jobs provided employment in the community, but our observations
(confirmed by Kf's) suggest that this employment provided different money but not more
money than would have been earned in conventional occupations had the spill not
occurred. ComTnercial fishing was restricted in the Lower Cook Inlet area duriig 1989,



6( ... continued)
indefinite range of factors and are only very rarely related to specific causes, it is hard to determine how great
the role of the spill was. For instance, domestic disruptions, including divorce, often have some sort of economic
component (economic insecurity, disagreements over resource allocations in the household, etc.). But if a divorce
occurs, how is it possible to identify the specific economic impulse that put the individual(s) "over the edge"?
Furthermore, domestic disruptions and divorces usually have historic antecedents and seldom erupt
spontaneously. This makes it difficult to attribute these problems to discrete events.
Tyronek and Seldovia - Page 541





and tourism came to a virtual halt. In fact, tourists could not have been acconmmodated
due to the diversion of resources (including personnel and facilities) to the spill.
III. CONCLUSIONSI
The communities of Seldovia and Tyonek both have deep historic roots in Cook
Inlet and share a great reliance on renewable marine resources. Their principal
differences lie in the ethnic composition of their populations and the bases of their
economies. The Tyonek population is largely Alaska Native, while Seldovia is a nmixed
community; and the Tyonek economy is based on government transfers, commercial
fishing, and subsistence harvests, whereas the Seldovia cash economy is somewhat more
diversified by limited tourism and timber sales.3
Also quite different for these communities is the sequence of events played out
during and after the oil spill, despite some strong parallels. For example:I
ï¿½   In both communities, local organizations developed plans to respond to the spill,
and in both communities the organizations were ignored and displaced by VECO5
and Exxon.
*   The roles sought by community organizations were quite different: in Tyonek, the3
Tribal Council focused on employment issues; in Seldovia, multiple institutions
developed joint plans to address virtullOy every facet of the spill.3
*	The level of displacement in Tyonek was very low; in Seldovia, it was very high.
*	Tyonek residents and institutions contributed subsistence fish to affected3
communities; in contrast to Seldovia, Tyonek made efforts to help other
cornmunities in ways that provided no benefit whatsoever for local residents.I
*   Residents from both communities were hired for cleanup work; but relatively few
were hired fromi Tyonek, and even those hirings came about only after VECO or3
Exxon perceived the gesture to be a public relations advantage.
Domestic and individual impacts on mental health and social adjustment may have5
varied dramatically across the commuinities. We have no re~'cord of such problems
related to the spill in Tyonek. Many claims of such impacts were made in Seldovia, but3
they are very hard to interpret. In both Tyonek and Seldovia, however, gloom and


Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 542

disillusionment were common responses to the spill. It is possible that persons from
Tyonek who w orked on the cleanup suffered these effects more than their neighbors who
stayed at home, suggesting that an individual's exposure to the spill itself, even if away
from home and working wholly in a mitigative (and hence "~positive"1) role, had negative
effects. One Tyonek respondent summed up his feelings by uttering the common
wordplay "Val-disease" (as opposed to "Valdez") to refer to the chaos, disappointment,
and frustration that workers associated with the town closest to the spill.
In Seldovia, direct financial costs to institutions were caused by the spill. Tyonek
may have incurred some costs, but they probably are so minimal that no officials there
have calculated them. Tyonek residents faced somne costs due to higher fuel prices, and
other indirect costs probably occurred; but Seldovia paid far higher direct and indirect
costs. Commercial-fishing restrictions were severe in Lower Cook Inlet, so impacts in
this category were pronounced in Seldovia but did not occur in Tyonek.
It is obvious that some impacts of the oil spill were fairly uniform or at least were
caused by fairly uniform effects that should not have caused unique impacts on only
some communities. Higher fuel costs due to diversion of barges to t-he spill and new
restrictions on transportation of fuel are a case in point. Tyonek, for example, was not
uniquely positioned to sustain impacts, though it did indeed experience them.
Cornmercial fishing in the Tyonek area was not curtailed, and in fact their harvests may
have been improved somewhat by the fact that boats farther south were grounded. But
any community in the Upper Cook Inlet area would have faced similar circumstances.
It seems that the most significant variable in distinguishing between these
communities is answered by this question: what did Exxon and VECO choose to do?
Decisions and assumptions on the part of Exxon and VECO seemed to determine the
trajectory and scope of most of the iminediate and subsequent impacts of the spill.
Where VECO or Exxon exercised a uniform policy (i.e., displacement of existing
institutions), impacts were fairly uniform. Where Exxon and VE-CO spent more time,
social and economic effects were pronounced. Where E-xxon and VECO introduced new
levels of bureaucracy, responses and decisions slowed down. Where Exxon or VECO
Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 543





appropriated community facilities (such as buildings), resources were diverted from otherI

This conclusion may seem to merely restate a now common adage in Alaska: theI

impacts of the spill cleanup were worse than the impacts of the spill itself. But that
interpretation is misguiided because it seems to allege that remedies are worse than theI
affliction. The cleanup effort--a unique event with a particular organization,
administrative frame of reference, set of operating assumptions, and tacit goals--was a
product of interactions between Exxon, some other private-sector businesses, and some3
State and Federal agencies. Tlere is no compelling reason to think that this cleanup was
like any other that might have evolved under independent circumstances. In fact, thereI
is good reason to conceive of it as an exceptional case that is a product of specific times,
places, and actors. These impacts, in other words, are not inevitable in general terms,
though they may be inevitable once the specific players and situations interact. This
seems to be the view of activists in regional comnmunities who now seek to prevent the5
"inevitable" decay of real restoration efforts. 7




7~~~~~~~~~~~~









The first $90 million payment from Exxon to the State to cover spill damages will mainly reimburse the
government for studies and legal expenses. Only $9.6 million will be left for restoration, and most of that will
go for restoration studies. Over $7 million of the first payment will be spent strictly on overhead for
administering the payment. Local officials and organizers are fearful that history will repeat itself and that Exxon
will discharge its debt while local communities pay the costs and receive few if any benefits. See Anchorage
Daily News (1992).3


Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 544

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Braund, S. and S. Behnke
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Case, D.
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1966 Perspectives on the Prehistory of Kodiak Island. American Antiquity 31(3):358-
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1981 Prehistory of the Westemn Subarctic. In Handbook of North American Indians.
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Colt, S.
1991 Financial Performance of Native Regional Corporations. Alaska Review of
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de Laguna, F.
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Dixon, G.
1980 The Moose River Site, 1978. In Archaeological Survey Projects, 1978. History
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Fall, J.
1981 Pattemns of Upper Inet Tanaina Leadership, 1741-1918. Ph.D. dissertation,
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Fall, J., D. Foster and R. Stanek
1984 The Use of Fish and Wildlife Resources in Tyonekc, Alaska. Technical Paper
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Subsistence.

Impact Assessment, Inc.                                                                       I
1990a Economic, Social, and Psychological Impact Assessment of the Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill. Final Report prepared for the Oiled Mayors Subcommittee, Alaska
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1990c Public and Private Sector Economic Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill.
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Kari, J.
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1988 Some Linguistic Insights into Dena'ina Prehistory. In R.D. Shaw, R.K. Harritt3
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McNabb, S. and P. Petrivelli
n.d. Lake Clark National Park and Preserve: Historic Uses of Cook Inlet NaturalI
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Osgood, C.I
1933 Tanaina Culture. American Anthropologist 35(4):695-717.
1966 The Ethnography of the Tanaina. Yale University Publications inI
Anthropology No. 16. New Haven, CN: Yale University Press.





T'yonek and Seldovia - Page 546

Racine, C.H. and S.B. Young
1978 Ecosystems of the Proposed Lake Clark National Park, Alaska. Contributions
from the Center for Northern Studies No. 16. Wolcott, Vermont: Center for
Northern Studies.

Reger, D.
1977 An Esldmo Site Near Kenai, Alaska. Anthropological Papers of the University
of Alaska 18(2):37-52.

Schroeder, R., D. Andersen, R. Bosworth, J. Morris and J. Wright
1987 Subsistence in Alaska: Arctic, Interior, Southcentral, Southwest, and Western
Regional Summnaries. Technical Paper No. 150. Juneau, AK: Alaska Department
of Fish and Game, Division of Subsistence.

Townsend, J.
1965 Ethnohistory and Culture Change of the lliamnna Tanaina. Ph.D. dissertation,
Department of Anthropology, University of California, Los Angeles. Ann Arbor,
MI: University Microfilms.

1981 Tanaina. In Handbook of North American Indians. Vol. 6 (Subarctic).
Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution.

USDOI, National Park Service
1984 General Management Plan and Environmental Assessment. Lake Clark
National Park and Preserve. Washington, D.C.: National Park Service, Department
of the Interior.

VanStone, J.
1974 Athapaskan Adaptations. Chicago, IL. Aldine.

Workman, W.
1980 Continuity and Change in the Prehistoric Record from Southern Alaska. In Y.
Kotani and W. Workman (eds.). Alaska Native Culture and History. Senri
Ethnological Series No. 4. Osaka, Japan: National Museum of Ethnology. Pp. 49-
101.

Workmnan, W., J. Lobdell and K. Workman
1980 Recent Archaeological Work in Kachemak Bay, Gulf of Alaska. Arctic
33(3):385-399.
Tyonek and Seldovia - Page 547

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i ~~~~~~~~~Joanna Endter-Wada

I                                           Rachel Mason
Joanne Mulcahy
Jon Hofmeiser
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THE KODIAK REGION

Table of Contents
Preface ...........................................
............. .560
I. Historical Context ............................................
A.	Prehistory and Early Contacts ..............................
B.	The Russian Period ......................................
C.	The Early American Period (1867-1939) ......................
D.	World War II and the Post-War Period .......................
II. Population and D emography ...........
A.    Overall Population and Net Changes through Time ..............
B. Ethnic, Gender, and Age Profiles ..........................
561
561
562
565
567

571
571
576
mI. CommuniWty Organization and Economy .........
A. Government ......................
Political Representation ..............
Land Status and Management .........
Resource Management  ..............
Infrastructure and Administrative Services
B.  Comrnmerce and Industry ..............
Economic Diversification .............
Native Corporations ................
Economic Indicators ................
Consumer Prices ...................
C.    Health, Education, and Social Services ...
Health ..........................
Education .......................
Social Services .....................
D.	Sodalities, Associations, and Community A
E.	Trends of Political-Economic and Social CI
The Fisheries .....................
Declining State and Federal Revenues ...
.............	580
.............	580
.............	580
.............	582
.............	585
.............	592
.............	599
.............	600
.............	611
.............	613
.............	616
.............	626
.............	626
.............	629
.............	631
.............	636
.............	639
.............	639
.............	645
I.........



.........




.........



.........

.e......
........

. .

........I
........I
. .. .. .. ..
........I
.........I

ctivities..
hange  ...
. . .. .. ...
. . .. .. ...
IV.   Household Organization and Kinship ...................
A.	Kinship Organization ..........................
B.	Household Structures and Economic Functions ......
C.	Socialization
........... 647
...........	647
...........	648
........... 652
The Kodiak Region - Page 555

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THE KODIAK REGION

Table of Contents (continued)
I
V. Ideology................
A. Religion .............
B.	Worldviews and Values........
C.	Ethnicity and Tribalism........
654
654
656
660
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
a
I
VI. Effects of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill................
A.  Results of the 1989 Research ................
Institutional Responses and Impacts..............
Economic Impacts ....................
Social, Cultural, and Psychological Impacts ...........
B.  Results of the 1991 Research ................
Short-Term Effects....................
Long-Term Effects....................

References Cited..........................



























The Kodiak Region - Page 556
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663
665
675
681
693
694
703
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THE KODIAK REGION

List of Tables

1.    Historic Population Trends in the Kodiak Region, 1880-1960,
20-Year Intervals........................572

2.    Kodiak Island Borough and Kodiak City Population by Year, 1940-1990,
Decennial and Annual Changes ..................574

3.	Population of Kodiak Region Sample Villages, 1970-1990 .......575

4.	Ethnicity Structure of the Kodiak Region, 1980 ............576

5.	Gender Structure of the Kodiak Region Population, 1980.........578

6.	Median Ages of the Kodiak Region Population, 1980...........578

7.	Land Status in the Kodiak Island Borough, 1989............582

8.	Kodiak Area Native Association Sources of Revenue, 1979-1988 ......598

9.	Kodiak City Employment by Economic Sector, 1988...........600

10.	Ex-Vessel Value of Marine Species, Port of Kodiak, 1988.........601

11-A. Retail Food Prices in Kodiak City, 1988 ...............617

11-B. Retail Food Prices in Kodiak City, 1989 ...............618

11-C. Retail Food. Prices in Kodiak City, 1990................619

11-D. Retail Food Prices in Kodiak City, 1991 ...............620

12-A. Retail Nonfood Prices in Kodiak City, 1988..............621

12-B. Retail Nonfood Prices in Kodiak City, 1989..............622

12-C. Retail Nonfood Prices in Kodiak City, 1990..............622

12-D. Retail Nonfood Prices in Kodiak City Specialty Stores, 1990........623

12-E. Retail Nonfood Prices in Kodiak City, 1991..............623
The Kodiak Region - Page 557

THE KODIAK REGION

List of Tables (continued)

12-F. Retail Nonfood Prices in Kodiak City Specialty Stores, 1991 .

13-A. Labor Rates in Kodiak City, 1988 ....................

13-B. Labor Rates in Kodiak City, 1989 .......... ..........

13-C. Labor Rates in Kodiak City, 1990 ....................

13-D. Labor Rates in Kodiak City, 1991 ....................

14.   Village School Enrollments in the Kodiak Island Borough
School District, 1989-1990 ..........................

15.   Average Household Size in the Kodiak Region, 1980 ......
............	624

............	624

............ 625

............	625

............	626


............	630

............	649
List of Maps
Map of Region .................................................... 559
The Kodiak Region - Page 558

_! ._ '_ i-  ,l _ ' '_ '' A m -M    mm  _ a  m mm t _ am O
m







f-f>                                                             ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A chor
Map Location

N~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~








~Af,















Bristol Bay
Ul  <<5  4-O t,>>tHarbor
SCHEDULE C COMMUNITIES
KODIAK REGION





PREFACE                ~~THE KODIAK REGION

This Key informant (KI) Summary was first drafted during 1988 subsequent to the

first Schedule B field season. It was edited and revised during 1989, 1990, and 1991 to
incorporate data and discussions of changes over this interval. Field research was
conducted by senior researchers in 1987 and 1989 in Schedule A sites, and in 1988 and
1990 in Schedule B sites.
The seven regions of the Social Indicators Study were divided into two groups
based on concerns related to research design and efficiency of project administration.             f
These groups are termed schedules; as the term suggests, these groups represent not only
sample portions but sampling agendas. Schedule B, of which this region is one part, alsoI
includes the Bering Straits and Bristol Bay regions. Subsequent to the Exxon Valdez oil
spill in 1989, the scope of the Social Indicators Study was expanded; and a new sampleI
of Cook Inlet, Prince William Sound, and Kodiak area villages was developed. This
group then comprised Schedule C. These terms and their meanings in the overall f
research design are introduced more fully in the KL Summary Introduction and are
explained fully in another project document entitled Social Indicators Project 11:
Research Methodology: Design, Sampling, Reliability, and Validity.
This report suTmmarizes KI and institutional data for the Human Relations Area5
Files Social Indicators Study (or AOSIS: Alaska Outer Continental Shelf Social
Indicators Study) in Kodiak, following research conducted between February 7 and
March 7, 1991. The 1991 summary builds on the reports submnitted by study researchers
in 1988, 1989, and 1990. Most of what follows is a revision and update of Joanna
Endter's 1989 report.
The ethnohistory section was essentially left i-ntact, as were several sections
dealing with Kodiak's goverrnment and economy. Discussions of Key Informants'
protocol responses were revised to include 1991 data. In addition, new issues in Kodiak5
have been incorporated in the portions of the report dealing with trends of political-
economic and social change.t






The Kodiak Region - Page 560

A new section that deals with the effects of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill on
Kodiak City has been added. This portion of the summary is based on ethnograhic data
and data collected from Ki's and institutional respondents during late summer 1989 and
spring 1991. Since Kodiak is the one study region of Schedules A and B that was
significantly and directly affected by this oil spill, discussions of the spill are necessary in
this chapter.
I.	HISTORICAL CONTEXT
I.A.	Prehistory and Early Contacts
Archaeological evidence indicates that since human habitation of the Kodiak
Island Archipelago was established around 8,000 years ago (KANA 198T7), several
distinct cultural traditions have resided on Kodiak Island. The earliest known occupation
of the islands was by people of the Ocean Bay tradition, which was divided into two
stages: Ocean Bay I (4000 B.C. to 2500 B.C.) and Ocean Bay II (2500 B.C. to 1500
B.C.). These stages were followed by people of the Kachemak tradition (1500 B.C. to
1100 A.D.).
A blending of the Kachemak tradition with cultural traits diffused from the Bering
Sea region and Cook Inlet and Prince William Sound areas resulted in the formation of
the Koniags around 1100 A-D. (Clark 1984a; Clark cited in USFWS 1987:109-110). The
Koniags, inhabitants of the Kodiak Archipelago when the Russians first arrived, were a
distinct ethnic group. They spoke a Pacific Yupik language related to the Central
Yupik' language of Bristol Bay and the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta (KANA and ADF&G
Subsistence Division 1983:5; Clark 1984b).
The Koniags achieved a rich and complex society through the leisure generated by
the surpluses of a maritime hunting culture. The Pacific Eskimos are noted for their
development of two-hatch kayaks ("baidarkas") and their long-term adaptation to the sea
(Clark 1984b:189). They migrated between sedentary winter and summer fish camps,
living from the natural abundance of fish, whales, and other marine/sea mammals



1 We will use the term "Yupik" without diacritics to refer to all Yupik peoples and dialects, although we
recognize that some conventions use diacritics, as in "Central Yup'ik."
The Kodiak Region,- Page 561


I
(Davydov 1977; Holmberg 1985). Their semisubterranean, multiroom sod housesI
("barabaras") housed up to 20 people (Lisianski 1814:200). The winter villages were
autonomous, headed by a chief ("toyon") whose status was inherited. Fighting between             t
villages was frequent. Koniag society was inegalitarian with ascribed status. Warfare,
raids, and slavery as well as trade were used to redistribute wealth and mark social status
(Black 1977:91-92; Davydov 1977; Holmberg 1985). The Koniags' complex culture
included highly developed ceremonialism; knowledge of lancing and other surgical
techniques, human anatomy, and mummification; and representational art and elaborate
ornamentation such as labrets (Clark 1984b; Davydov 1977; Fortuine 1975; Holmberg
1985; Lisianski 1814). The Alaska Native people who presently live in the Kodiak area,
as well as in some villages in Prince William Sound, lower Cook Inlet, and the Chignik
area on the Alaska Peninsula, are the descendants of the Koniags. The Pacific Yupik              I
language spoken by this group is today known to its speakers and to scholars as Alutiiq.
The term "Alutiiq" has been increasingly used to refer not only to a language but to a           I
distinct ethnic group with a common history and culture (see Sec. V.C, Ethnicity).
I.B.  The Russian Period
Following the explorations of Vitus Bering in the early 18th century, independent
Russian merchants known as "promyshlenniki" were attracted to the Kodiak region by              5
reports of the abundance of sea otters, fish, and seals. A party under the direction of
Stepan Glotov reached the shores of Kodiak Island as early as 1763, but the Koniags
skillfully resisted their efforts to land.  The first Russian settlement on Kodiak was
established by Gregorii Shelikov in 1784 at Three Saints Bay on the southwestern end of
Kodiak, near the present-day village of Old Harbor. Shelikov, leader of a company of
Siberians organized to explore the economic possibilities in Alaska, began what
developed into a lucrative fur trade in the North Pacific. Shelikov established, operated,
and eventually expanded the Shelikov Company's holdings on Kodiak.
Once the Russian Government took notice of Alaska's potential, Alexander
Baranov, a successful Irkutsk businessman, was appointed director of the growing
company. Baranov held this position for 25 years. He established the regional primacy
of the Russian-American company, which became a state monopoly in 1799. Over the

The Kodiak Region - Page 562
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following two decades, colonization of America by the Russian-American Company
extended southward to Sitka and California. Between 1819 and 1867, the company
further expanded its activity to other Pacific Northwest regions and Hawaii and into the
interior of Alaska (Afousky 1977:5). Russian settlement of Alaska affected the lives and
culture of the Koniag people. Russian wars of conquest against Natives, coupled with
the introduction of diseases, dramatically reduced, the Native population: 8,000 people
residing in 65 villages inhabited the region when the Russians arrived in 1784 (Clark
1984b: 187). Eight years later, the population had been reduced by nearly 20 percent.
Nevertheless, there were 6,500 Koniags, making them the largest Eskimo group at that
time (Oswalt 1967). Between 1840 and 1844, surviving Natives were consolidated into
seven main resettlement sites. These sites are the location of present-day villages (Davis
1979:39; KANA 1987a:8). Tle first United States (U.S.) census of Alaska in 1880
counted 2,05 6 people in the Kodiak region. Of these, about I percent were non-Native,
33 percent were Creole, and 66 percent (or 1,354) were Native (Davis 1979:49-5 1). In
one century the Native population of Kodiak Island decreased by 83 percent.
Under Russian rule the subsistence economy of Native communities was altered,
and the nature of production was reorganized. The initial clashes between Russian fur
traders and the Koniags resulted in labor exploitation--essentially enslavement--of the
Natives. Not only were Natives forced to work for the Russians, men were often
separated from their families and relocated to work elsewhere in the expanding Russian
empire. In a more benign fashion, Natives also were drawn into trading relations with
the Russians and eventually became locked in indebtedness to Russian merchants (Davis
1979:43).
Upon establishing permanent colonies in the Kodiak region, intermarriages
between Russians and Natives occurred, creating a Creole population. The biological-
cultural admixture spawned additional cultural and ideological change amnong Native
people. The degree of cultural mixing in the Kodiak region was greater than in any
other part of Alaska except for the Aleutian-Pribilof Islands. A large Creole group was
prominent in the settlement of Saint Paul (the site of the present city of Kodiak), where
the main colony of the Russian-American Company had been moved in 1792, and on
The Kodiak Region - Page 563






Afognak Island. An American lieutenant visiting Afognak in 1869 commented thatI
linearly all the Creoles are children of Creoles or of Russians and Creoles. . ." (Huggins

1981). The most frequent contact, the most numerous intermarriage, and the greatest
amount of cultural change occurred in the northemn villages, especially Afognak and
Kodiak. 'Me southern villages were less affected (Davis 1979).
Native culture and ideology also were altered by the introduction of the Russian
Orthodox religion. Shelikov had written as early as 1784 that the Natives were willng to
accept Chrstianity; a decade later, a ship carrying eight monks and two novices arrivedï¿½
at Saint Paul (Afonsky 1977:16). The influence of the Russian Orthodox Church,
established under Baranov's rule, continues on Kodiak to this day. Strong tensions
occurred between the Russian-Amaerican Company and the early miissionaries when the
latter attempted to stem the exploitation of the Native population. The Russian
Orthodox Mission established a school in 1802 that encouraged the use of the Native
language and helped to create a literate Creole class.5
In contrast to other missionary activities in Alaska, the Russian Orthodox Church
claimis to have actively encouraged the synthesis of the Native and Russian cultures.3
Some historians dispute these claims, particularly since R-ussian rule led not only to
forced relocation and social reorganization but also to a restructuring of Native9
worldview to conform with Westemn religious concepts. One Russian Orthodox historian
has countered that the Native identity of all the Pacific Eskimo groups as "Aleut" isI
actually a synthesis of Native worldview and the essential elements of Russian Orthodoxy
(Oleksa 1982, 1987).1
Despite these disagreements, there is general consensus that the Russian
Orthodox Church is one of the lasting legacies of the Russian era in Alaska (DavisI
1970). The position of the church is confirmed in oral tradition, particularly among
Kodiak elders who were raised in the Russian Mission (Mulcahy 1988). The alterations
in Native ideology brought about by the church continue to influence the worldview of
Kodiak Natives.




The Kodiak Region - Page 5641

I.C. The Early American Period (1867-1939)
By the late 1850's, the Russian enterprise in Alaska had become unprofitable and
impractical. In 1867, Alaska was sold to the U.S. The Treaty of Cession in 1867, which
transferred ownership of Alaska, also placed Alaska under the War Department. About
10 years later Alaska was admini stered by the Customs Department. Although Alaska
Natives were to receive the same services and privileges afforded other Native groups
under U.S. jurisdiction, general neglect of Alaska Natives marked the period.
Disease and epidemics introduced by the Russians (including smalpox, influenza,
and tuberculosis) continued unabated under U.S. jurisdiction. Prior to 1867, the
Russians built a hospital and vaccinated Natives against smallpox. Health services all
but disappeared during the early period of U.S. ownership. One historian notes:
"T'hroughout the Russian period and into the American era... .despite the fact that -a
primitive system for health services existed, it really did not touch the lives of most
natives. ... Whatever health services were available were provided in the old way by
family members or native healers" (Fortuine 1975:8). Tuberculosis, a particularly
devastating disease, claimed 1,302 of 100,000 Alaska Native lives in the early 20th
century, when the rate for Whites in the lower 48 states was 56 of 100,000 lives (Fortuine
1975:13).
The Alaska Territorial Governument also was remiss in attending to educational
needs. Schools were poorly staffed and the teachers often provided both medical and
educational services (Huggins 1981). In 1908, letters from teachers in Afognak village
record the use of the old Russian church as a school and lament the shortage of supplies
and a proper facility.
Despite lack of funds and services, the Department of the Interior managed to
imnpose assimilationist policies on Kodiak Natives through government programs and the
establishment of Protestant missions. Attempts to "civilize" the Natives are evident in
elders' memories of punishment administered for spealdng Alutiiq or for any blatant
display of Native practices under the schools' English-only policies. The "civilizing"
worldview of the U.S. Government included emphasis on patriotism,4 Christian morality,
temperance, and the Protestant work ethic. As Chance has pointed out, U.S. policies
The Kodiak Region - Page 565





reflected the still dominant theory of social Darwinismn, according to which Natives wereI
at a lower level of evolutionary development (1984:648).
In 1893 the Baptists opened a mission and orphanage on Woody Island directly
across from Kodiak. While they began providing social services that continue today, they
did so with an agenda of winning converts. The Baptists' proselytizing activities came
into direct conflict with the Russian Orthodox clergy, who were still dominant in KodiakI
Native life until well after the turn of the century (Will 1981:61-64). Baptist missionary
activities began in Old Harbor in 1952 (Befu 1970:39).3
The' most far-reaching changes in the early American period were brought abo-ut
by the development of commercial fishing and other extractive industries. Some
American commercial activities in Alaska began during the Russian period. The
American whaling fleet operated in the Kodiak area from 1835 until 1869 (KANA and1
ADF&G 1983:5). Sea otter hunting continued into the late 19th century; and American
hunters, like their Russian predecessors, brought the sea otter to the edge of extinction.5
Sea otter hunting was officially banned only after near decimation of population stocks
and a Congressional investigation in 1911 (Will 1981:69).
In the late 1800's and early 1900's, canneries. were built on Kodiak Island to
process fish. Their operation was made possible by technological innovations, especially5
improved storage, canning methods, and transportation. The canneries first developed
the long-recognized potential of the salmon fishery, particularly in the rich waters near
the present villages of Karluk and Larsen Bay. Tle first cannery was built on Karluk
Spit in 1882. The industry expanded rapidly in the late 1880's, and canneries were
started in other parts of the Kodiak region. This expansion led to declines in salmon
runs, consolidation of various operations, and eventual domination of the industry by a
few large companies. The 1912 eruption of Mount Katmai on the Alaska Peninsula
disrupted the industry for several years through destruction of many salmon spawning
streams, including some on Kodiak Island. By the early 1900's, halibut, herring, and cod
supplemented salmon as commercial fisheries resources (see Roppel 1986 for a3
comprehensive history). These economic developments drew Natives further into wage
labor and trade. Most households came to depend on commercial fishing for cash3
The Kodiak Region - Page 566

income and credit. The development of the canneries also increased the numbers of
outsiders moving into Kodiak, particularly in the early years when some canneries
exclusively used imported labor (Roppel 1986). The influx of non-Native fishermen,
primarily Scandinavians who settled in the area and married Natives, influenced
significant changes to Native social organization and work ethics.
In addition to its economic impact, the Mount Katmai eruption affected cultural
patterns on Kodiak Island. Temporary relocation of Alaska Peninsula Koniags to
Kodiak after the Katmai eruption of 1912 and their subsequent resettlement at the new
village of Perryville on the Alaska Peninsula resulted in social and marriage ties between
Koniag descendants in the Chignik-Perryville area and Koniags on Kodiak Island (Davis
1979:53).
Several other industries formed in the Kodiak region during this period. Fox
farmfing was developed around the turn of the century, and trapping continued into the
1920's. Small-scale niining interests were started in the late 1890's, and even tourism
began to take hold (Will 1981:74-76). These changes affected the overall economy and
the town of Kodiak far more than the Native villages, which continued to integrate
subsistence pursuaits with increasing involvement in commercial fishing.
Prior to the eruption of Mount Katmai, cattle and sheep also had been introduced
on Kodiak Island; and although the cattle industry was affected, it recovered. As a result
of bear predation of livestock, government hunters were brought in to control the bear
population. In turn, this action prompted concern for the welfare of the brown bear,
leading in 1941 to the establishment of the Kodiak National Wildlife Refuge for the
purpose of preserving the brown bear and other wildlife (USFWS 1987). The cattle
industry subsequently declined.
I.D. World War 11 and the Post-War Period
The increased Federal Government presence during the war years dramatically
changed Kodiak. Economic activity quickened as a growing non-Native population,
largely military and miilitary-related, moved in. Because of its strategic location, Kodiak
served as the Aleutian Campaign Command Center during World War HI. In 1938 and
1939, conceem over Japanese expansion in Indo-China and Russian expansion in Siberia
The Kodiak Region - Page 567





led Congress to appropriate $350 million for Navy bases in Sitka, Dutch Harbor, and
Kodiak. A Navy submarine base and air station was constructed at Women's Bay, about
10 miles from the toWn of Kodiak. Fort Greeley Garrison, beside the Buskin River, and
the Fort Abercrombie observation and defense post also were constructed during the5
war.
Kodiak's population increased with the influx of military personnel and
construction workers. Kodiak's economy boomed, primarily due to the increase in
construction. Natives, who had far less access to developing economic resources, gainedI
sporadic employment, usually temporary, from growth in construction and other
industries.3
In response to demands for services, Kodiak incorporated as a first-class city in
1941. Public infrastructure was built; and public services such as police and fireI
protection, utilities, and a hospital were organized (Payne 1980:34). Access of villagers
to Western medical care increased following the 1955 transfer of health-service authority5
from the Bureau of Indian Affairs to the Public Health Service. As a consequence, the
incidence of tuberculosis was drastically reduced (Fortuine 1975:26). Many of the villageI
women who served as volunteer "chemo-aides" to combat tuberculosis were later
incorporated into the Comm-unity Health Aide Program.
The level of economic activity and modernization remained high after the war,
fueled in part by the growth in the 1950's of the shellfish industry, which broughtI
diversification to Kodiak's fishing industry. By 1960, crabbing predominated, although
few villagers participated in this new industry because it required large initial capital5
investment and because villagers, particularly Natives, had little access to capital (Davis
1979:54). The shrimp fishery began in 1958 and peaked in 1971 (Payne 1980:66).R
Scallops were a big industry in the 1960's. This diversification to shellfish was in part a
response to lean years in the salmon harvest during the 1950's (Roppel 1986).
In 1960, villagers in Old Harbor had come to depend on a mixed economy in
which they gained food from naturally occurring resources, cash from commercial fishing
and cannery work, and cash and supplies from government subsidies. Most Old Harbor
residents fished or worked for the Kadiak Fisheries Company cannery at Shearwater inI

The Kodiak Region - Page 568

Kiliuda Bay, north of Old Harbor. Poor fishing in the 1950's meant that only some of
the canneries on the island were in operation each year; and when the Shearwater
cannery was closed, people from Old Harbor went to work in other canneries on the
island. The basis of Old Harbor subsistence continued to be foods extracted locally,
including fish, seals, sea lions, beaxs, ducks, gull eggs, octopus, butter clams, sea urchins,
and sea slugs (Befu 1970).
The Great Alaskan Earthquake in 1964 was a major disruption in the lives of all
Kodiak residents. In Kodiak City, nearly 40 percent of Kodiak's business district and
three of the town's four processing plants were destroyed. The quake was particularly
disruptive for the villages destroyed in its wake: Old Harbor and Kaguyak were almost
totally devastated, while Afognak and Ouzinkie suffered major damage (Davis 1979).
Old Harbor and Ouzinlde were rebuilt in the same locations; but the residents of
Kaguyak were relocated to Akhiok, and Port Lions--a new village--was constructed to
house the people of Afognak.
Tle 1964 earthquake, coming on the heels of several years of modest salmon
harvests, altered the economies of Kodiak villages. The Shearwater cannery near Old
Harbor and the Ouzinlie Packidng Company cannery in Ouzinkie were destroyed, along
with 30 vessels at Shearwater and 20 vessels in Old Harbor (Roppel 1986:115, 269-270,
275-279). The Shearwater and Ouzinlde canneries were never rebuilt. Other companies
closed canneries in outlying areas during the early 1960's and seafood processing became
concentrated in Kodiak City (Roppel 1986). Under several Government programs, loans
were made to fishermen to recover losses resulting from the earthquake. Most of these
loans went to fishermen from Kodiak, Old Harbor, and Ouzinlie (Roppel 1986:115).
In addition to this social and economic reorganization, there were significant
consequences from the agency involvement and economic rebuilding of Kodiak after the
earthquake (Davis 1979:54). The 1960's saw an increase in the role that the Federal and
State Governuments played in the local area through programs for earthquake
reconstruction and social services (Davis 1979). The reconstruction of Old Harbor
resulted in many new infrastructural facilities. The reconstruction experience aided
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residents in dealing with governent agencies throughout the remainder of the 1960'7sU
and 1970's in applying for and receiving programs and facilities (Davis 1979).
While the 1950's and 1960's brought population and economic growth to Kodiak,
the benefits for. Natives were indirect and somewhat peripheral. The effect of greater
agency intervention into village life in the 1960's was more marked. The 1964
earthquake coincided with President Johnson's "War on Poverty" legislation, which
spurred the creation of Federal programs such as Vista, Community Action, Headstart,
and others to serve poor or rural areas (Dixon et al. 1983:115). Natives became involved
in the administration and policy-maling of health, economic, and social service programs.
In 1968, the Community Health Aide Program was funded, formalizing the role of3
village-based health care workers.
The most significant postwar changes in the lives of Native people occurred with
the passage in 1971 of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) and the
political organizing that took place in regard to it. 'Me Kodiak Area Native Association3
(KANA), formed in 1966, was active along with, Statewide organizations such as the
Alaska Federation of Natives in seeldng land claims from the Federal Government.3
With the passage of ANCSA, KANA's role as a nonprofit regional corporation that
provided services and tribal leadership became further defined.
Two other pieces of legislation were important for Native people during this
period. KAN4A's ability to provide improved health, educational, and social services was3
facilitated by the passage of the 1975 Indian Self-Determination and Education Act.
This law gave Native corporations the right to contract for services formerly provided by
Federal agencies such as the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health Service.
Additional monies were made available through the passage in 1976 of the Indian Health3
Care Improvement Act, which emphasized a policy of Native self-determination and
culturally appropriate solutions to social problems (Dixon et al. 1983:115). This
legislation, in combination with ANCSA, began a period of cultural renewal and
movement toward autonomy for Kodiak Natives.
Several important economic changes that affected all Kodiak residents occurred
during the 1970's and 1980's. Kodiales commercial fishing sector expanded and wasI
The Kodiak Region - Page 570

transformed. Growth in the number -and size of vessels in Kodiak's fishing fleet and
growth in the island's processing capacity made Kodiak City one of the top fishing ports
in the nation. Diversification of Kodiak's fisheries occurred in the late 1970's in
response to several factors, including the Magnuson Act, expanding markets, changes in
stock abundance, and technological advances in the industry. The Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act, passed in 1976, gave preferential allocation of
catches to U.S. fishermen and led to the Americanization of Alaskan fisheries; many U.S.
fishing vessels port in Kodiak. In 1978, the U.S. territorial limit was extended to
200 miles offshore. This new boundary increased the availability of fish to Americans by
reducing foreign competition. A number of State and Federal programs aimed at
modernizing the American fishing fleet enabled Kodiak fishermen to become financially
independent from the canneries and enabled some of them to invest in fish processing
(Langdon 1986:118-119).
Since the late 1970's, foreign investment in Kodiak's shore-based processing plants
has increased (Caltural Dynamics 1986; Roppel 1986). During the 1980's the groundfish
industry grew dynamnically. With the decline of joint fishing ventures between American
fishermen and foreign processing vessels, competition intensified among Alaskan and
other U.S. fishermen in Alaskan waters.
II. POPUIATION AND DEMOGRAPHY
IL.A. Overall Population and Net Changes through Time
Because. of seasonal fluctuations, it is difficult to accurately count Kodiakes
population. While official figures show that Kodiak's population has increased over the
past several decades, it is unclear whether they are based on censuses or estimates. The
growth has been a consequence of inmigration, which is a consequence of employment
opportunities. Because employment growth has provided some stability in the public
sector and in fishing-relate.d industries, natural increase also has been considerable since
the early 1970's (Cultural Dynamics 1986:236-237).
The population on Kodiak Island is concentrated in Kodiak City and the "road-
connected area"--the parts of northeastern Kodiak Island that are connected by road to
Kodiak City. The road-connected area goes from Monashka Bay on the north to
The Kodiak Region - Page 571





Pasagshak Bay on the south and includes the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Base and theI
sizable commaunity of Bells Flats on Women's Bay. The rest of the population is
concentrated in several smaller villages around the island that are accessible only by air
or water.
Table I illustrates historic population trends in the Kodiak region. At the time of
the first census, Afogpak was the largest village and Karluk had a growing population,
primarily because both were cannery sites (Roppel 1986). Although not listed here, in
1890 Karluk reached a peak population of 1,123 when salmon processing was at its3
height in that area. By 1920, the community of Kodiak had become the regional
population center. From 1940 to 1960, Kodiak and Old Harbor experienced the greatest3
rates of population growth among villages on the island. Five village populations either
declined or remained stable.

TablelI

HISTORIC POPULATION TRENDS IN THE KODLAK REGION, 1880-1960
(20-year Intervals)

1880	1900	1920	1939	1960


Kodiak City	288	341	374	864	2,628
Akhiok	114	a	.86	82	84
Old Harbor	160	a	84	109	193
Karluk	302          470	192	189	129
Larsen Bay	b            b	b	88	72
Ouzinlde	45	n.d.	168	253	214
Afognak-Port Lions	339	305	298	197	190


Sources: Davis 1979; Payne 1980.
a No data available.
bAlthough some residents of Uyak, at or near the location of the present-day Larsen
Bay, were counted in early censuses, there was no village named Larsen Bay until after
1920.


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Table 2 shows Kodiak Island Borough and Kodiak City population trends from
1950 through 1990. Except for 1989 estimates showing a 0.1-percent population decline
and the 1990 preliminary U.S. census figure that Kodiak Island Borough officials said did
not represent a true decline, Kodiak Island and Kodiak City populations have increased
continually since the 1940's. It may be tempting to see the Kodiak decline from 1989 to
1990 as a consequence of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill; but this conclusion cannot be
justified because figures from 1982 through 1989 are based on State estimates rather
-than actual counts. The Kodiak Island Borough challenged the 1980 U.S. census, saying
that figures were too low because, for example, they did not account for persons living in
transient bousing such as boats or bunkhouses. In 1982, the borough conducted a special
census in Kodiak that was certified by the State Demographer. Populations for
subsequent years through 1989 were estimated using a State-certified formula. Kodiak
City's growth spurt began after World War II with the increase in military personnel, first
with the Navy Base and more recently with the USCG Base. According to a 1982
Kodiak Island Borough Special Census, the USCG represented about 1,195 residents, or
9 percent of the population, at that time. Despite the economic downtumn in fishing in
the early 1980's, the total population of Kodiak Island Borough and Kodiak City in-
creased dramnatically in response to several large public works projects. The population
subsequently leveled off but increased again in 1988, primarily due to personnel
increases at the USCG Base.
Recent population trends within the villages are harder to discern because of
discrepancies in the most recent figures, as indicated in Table 3. In the early 1980's,
Davis noted a trend that Karluk, Akhiok, and Ouzinkie were relatively stable, losing
some Native persons to the neighboring communities of Larsen Bay, Old Harbor, and
Port Lions. The latter three villages also were growing from non-Native inniigration
(Davis 1986:250).
Discussions with interviewees, school personnel, and public officials in Kodiak and
Old Harbor indicated that some of these trends have continued in the late 1980's and
early 1990's. Karluk and Akhiok are generally recognized as declining. Port Lions is
growing and Ouzinlie appears to be stable or growing slightly. It is uncertain what is
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Table 2
KODIAK ISLAND BOROUGH AND KODIAK CITY
POPULATION BY YEAR, 1940-1990
DECENNIAL AND ANNUAL CHANGES


Kodiak Island                        Kodiak City

Decennial	Decennial
Year            Population   % Change             Population	% Change


1940	864
1950	6,264a	1,710	+97.9
1960	7,174a	14.5	2,628	+ 53.7
1970	9,409a	+31.2	3,798	+44.5
1980	9,939a	+ 5.6	4,756	+ 25.2
1990	13,309a	+ 33.9	6,365	+ 33.8

Annual	Annual
% Change                          % Change

1981	10,790b	+8.6	5,754	+30.0
1982	12,714c	+17.8	5,873	+2.1
1983	13,079b	+2.9	6,072	+3.4
1984	13,389	+ 2.4	6,469	+ 6.5
1985	13,748	+ 2.9	6,602	+ 2.1
1986	13,952b	+ 1.5	6,668	+ 1.0
1987	14,127b	+ 1.3	6,681	+ 0.2
1988	15,575b	+ 10.2	6,774	+1.4
1989	15,558b	-0.1	6,797	+ 0.3
1990	13,309a	-14.5	6,365	-6.4
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Sources: Kodiak Island Borough 1988a, 1990b; Kodiak Chamber of Commerce 1989;
U.S. Census 1980 and 1990.

a U.S. Census 1990 (figures are preliminary).
b State estimate.
C Results of a joint 1982 borough/city special census certified by the State Demographer.




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Table 3
POPULATION OF KODIAK REGION SAMPLE VILIAGES, 1970-1990

1970	1977	1980	1985	1988	1989  Iggoa

Akhiok	115	69	105	102	123	93	77
Old Harbor	290	298	348	337	380	322	284
Karluk	98	98	96	91	82	71
Larsen Bay	109	118	168	178	169	149	147
Ouzinlie	143	204	173	165	204	204	209
Port Lions	227	251	215	243	296	300	222
Sources: Davis 1979; U.S. Census 1990.
a1990 populations are preliminary figures of the 1990 U.S. Census. Population figures
for the years 1980-1989 were supplied by the Alaska Department of Community and
Regional Affairs.

happening in Larsen Bay. In Old Harbor, several residents including the school principal
named people who had died or left and thought the community had declined in
population. The study sample lends support to this view, since several of the
respondents selected during the first research wave in 1988 subsequently moved to
Kodiak City or elsewhere.
The general trend is that former residents of small villages move to Kodiak City,
Anchorage, or Seattle. Our informants attributed the outmigration to successful fishing
seasons that provide sufficient funds for relocation, poor fishing seasons that require a
search for employment elsewhere, or the pursuit of better services, particularly schools,
for families and children.
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II.B. Ethnic, Gender,2 and Age Profiles
Table 4 shows ethnicity by community for 1980. Kodiak City residents are
predominantly non-Native, while village residents are primarily Native. The relatively
small Native population in Kodiak City remained stable between the 1970 estimate of 12
to 13 percent (see Payne 1980) and 1980 (14%). Larsen Bay and Port Lions have the
greatest number and percentage of non-Natives, primarily because of their long history of
involvement with the commercial fishing industry. While its residents are primarily
Native, Old Harbor historically experienced considerable inmigration (Befu 1970); many
Natives who were born in other villages reside there.

Table 4

ETHNICITY STRUCTURE OF THE KODIAK REGION, 1980


Native	Percent	Non-Native	Percent


Kodiak City	666	14.0	4,090	86.0
Akhiok	101	96.2	4	3.8
Old Harbor	315	92.6	33	7.4
Karluk	96	100.0	0	0
Larsen Bay	120	71.4	48	28.6
Ouzinkie	163	94.2	10	5.8
Port Lions	158	73.5	57	26.5
Source: U.S. Census 1980.

The changing ethnic composition of Kodiak's population is reflected in the
preliminary figures of the 1990 census. In addition to Euroamericans, the non-Native
population in Table 4 includes the "new immigrants"--Filipinos, Hispanics, Samoans,
Vietnamese, Koreans, and other Southeast Asians who have come to Kodiak in the last


2At the request of the Minerals Management Service, the word "gender" is used in place of "sex," the more
common term in demography. This convention will be used in all Ea summaries.
The Kodiak Region - Page 576

two decades seeking work in the fishing industry. This segment has grown considerably.
In the 1990 census, 63 percent of Kodiak City's population of 6,365 were identified as
VWhte, 13 percent Native American or Alaskan Native, 20 percent Asian or Pacific
Islander, and 6 percent ffispanic (U.S. Census 1990).
Filipinos are the largest group of new immigrants, although estimates of the
number vary considerably--from 500 to several thousand--because many have no legal
status. Many Filipinos have obtained their citizenship and have brought other family
members over from the Philippines. Some of them have moved from employment in the
canneries to local retail stores, banks, and the post office. Some Filipinos have bought
or leased taxicabs, a-nd two Filipino-owned restaurants opened in Kodiak in 1990. An
increasing number of Mexicans and other Hispanics have moved to Kodiak in the past
decade, and many of them work in the cannery jobs that were until recently held by
Filipinos.
Age and gender profiles of Kodiak City reflect the influence of the fishing
industry. As in much of Alaska, the population is younger and has a higher proportion
of males to females than the national average (Payne 1980:24) (see Tables 5 and 6).
Village profiles also.show the dominance of fishing. In the communities that have
attracted new members with the fishing industry, the percentages of non-Natives and
males are higher (see Tables 4 and 5). While many of the inmigrating members are
single men, in some communities they are marrying into the Native population with
increasing frequency. Port Lions, for example, with the highest non-Native and male
population, also had the highest number of mixed marriages in 1985 (Davis 1986:228).
Finally, the low median age in the villages, particularly among Natives, reflects
primarily the growing birth rate but also some outmhigration of elders, who often feel that
their needs can be more effectively met in Kodiak City or Anchorage (see Table 6).
II.C. Population Transience
The population of Kodiak Island exhibits considerable transience. Of the 32 KI's
interviewed in 1991, 27 (84%) were born outside the subregion where they now reside.
Only three were born and reared in Kodiak, and two others were born elsewhere and
reared in Kodiak. Since the 1950's, people have migrated to Kodiak from all parts of
The Kodiak Region - Page 577

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Table 5

GENDER STRUCTURE OF THE KODIAK REGION POPULATION, 1980


Males           Percent         Females           Percent


Kodiak City                 2,568	54.0             2,188	46.0
Akhiok	59	56.2	46	43.8
Old Harbor	173	50.9	167	49.1
Karluk	51	53.1	45	46.9
Larsen Bay	94	55.2	74	44.8
Ouzinkie	94	54.3	79	45.7
Port Lions	123	57.2	92	42.8


Source: U.S. Census 1980.


Table 6

MEDIAN AGES OF THE KODIAK REGION POPULATION, 1980


Total	Native
Population	Population


Akhiok	23.0	20.1
Old Harbor	25.0	20.9
Karluk	20.7	20.7
Larsen Bay	27.0	14.5
Ouzinkie	27.0	21.5
Port Lions	26.0	24.8
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Sources: U.S. Census 1980; General Population Characteristics.







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the country (Befa 1970; Davis 1986; Roppel 1986), particularly from the West Coast, the
Great Lakes region--especially Mfinnesota, and rural areas of the Intermountain West.
Two 1991 KI's were born and reared in the Philippines.
While the actual amount of transience in Kodiak is difficult to measure, the
following evidence from 1988 and 1989 provides indications of that transience:
(1) Among the 49 people selected at random for the AOSIS pretest sample in
1988, 33 (67%) were residing in the same community 1 year later. Several of these
persons had moved within their community. Thirteen (27%) had moved from the
communities in which they resided in 1988, but 3 of those respondents (6%) had
relocated within the Kodiak region. Three persons (6%) were spending the winter
outside the Kodiak region. In 1990 we selected an additional 38 persons at random.
Upon returning in 1991, it was possible to locate 26 (68%) of those respondents. Thus,
the attrition was about 32 percent each year.
(2) Several community officials mnentioned the transience and noted that about
one-third of Kodiak residents are long-term, another third have resided there 5 to
10 yeaTs, and one-third turns over every year or two. Our data provide some
confirmation for Davis' (1979:110-111) classification of the Kodiak population into
oldtimers, new immigrants, and transients.
Kodiak City's population is transient for several reasons. Uppermost is seasonal
fluctuation due to the fishing industry. The seasonal influx of workers for the processing
plants declined somewhat in the past 15 years with the transition to year-round fishing.
Many of the processing workers began establishing permanent residences in Kodiak in
the late 1970's (Payne 1980). Yet the seasonal transience between Kodiak City and
villages on Kodiak Island and the upper Alaska Peninsula, which also quickened in the
late 1970's (Davis 1979:111-112), seems to have increased in the 1980's, with more
villagers wintering in Kodiak and returning to their villages for each summer's fishing
season. The USCG Base adds transience to the local population, with about a third of
the base personnel and their dependents turning over annually. Several large construc-
tion projects (Terror Lake hydropower project; cannery expansion projects) have been
completed by Anchorage firms that brought in their own employees.
The Kodiak Region - Page 579





The transience of Kodiak's population also has been a source of long-term growthI
for the community. Many of the people who have established permanent residence in
Kodiak originally camne to work in the fishing industry, construction, or the USCG andI
liked it enough to stay or retumn. Partly because of the diversification of fisheries,
Kodiak's economy has fared better than some other areas of the State during the oil-I
revenue decline of the past few years; and some people continue to come to Kodiak
seeling jobs or economic opportunity.
III. COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AND ECONOMY
LIll.. Government
Local, borough, State, and Federal Governments make decisions influencing the
Kodiak Island region, as do Native corporations--profit and nonprofit, regional and
village. Land and natural resources are administered by each form of government in
their respective domains. Tle same is tiue for construction and maintenance of
infrastructure and for administration of public servces. The government sector, second3
only to the fishing'industry in terms of regional employment, provides most of the
initiative and financing for community and regional development.3
Political Renresentation: Alaska's two senators and sole member of the House of
Representatives represent the entire State. At the State level, Kodiak belongs to House3
District 27, which also includes the East Alaska Peninsula. The current representative,
Cliff Davidson, is from Kodiak City. Kodiak is, pa-rt of Senate District N, which includes3
House Districts 27 as well as 26, the House District for Bristol Bay and the Aleutian
Chain. Fred Zharoff, also from Kodiak, represents Senate District N.3
The Kodiak Isla-nd Borough, incorporated on September 24, 1963, encompasses
the entire Kodiak Island Archipelago. It is a second-class borough with an elected strong3
mayor-and-assembly form of government. The borough is recognized by the State and
Federal Governments as a legal entity that may represent the interests of the region's3
residents (Alaska Department of Community and Regional Affairs 1988c). The Kodiak
Island Borough qualifies for a broad range of State and Federal financial assistance and3
also has bonding authority to gain access to revenues produced in the borough.


The Kodiak Region - Page 580

Six cities on Kodiak Island obtan their authority under Alaska State law. Kodiak
City, incorporated in 1940, is a home-rule city with an elected mayor and council that
employs a city manager. Old Harbor, Port Lions, Ouzinkie, Akhiok, and Larsen Bay are
all incorporated as second-class cities that have elected city councils of six or seven
members, from which a mayor is elected. Karluk remains an unincorporated village.
Each of the six Native villages on Kodiak Island has an Indian Reorganization Act
(IRA) government or a traditional council. Tlese Native governments, incorporated as
nonprofit,- administer local affairs and have access to various Federal services and grants.
Karluk's original tribal government was formed under the IRA in 1939 so that Natives
could protect their fishing and trapping rights along the productive Karluk River against
encroachment by non-Natives (Roppel 1986:87-9 1). The ANCSA dissolved that
government. The new IRA was formed in compliance with ANCSA nonprofit
corporation provisions. AUl other Kodiak area villages formed traditional councils
pursuant to ANCSA. Like the IRA councils, they provide nonmunicipal services to their
members, have access to Federal services and grants, or delegate this authority to
KANA, Kodiak's regional Native nonprofit corporation.
Natives in Kodiak City are seeking Federal recognition for their own tribal
government. The Kodiak Tribal Council (KTC) is a nonprofit corporation that was
organized in 1987 and had 821 members in March 1991. The KTC has been enrolling
members--one prerequisite for Federal recognition--and acting as a tribal council to
represent the interests of its members. 'For example, as an advocate of traditional uses
of resources, the KTC has fought the ADF&G proposal to restrict Native use of sea
otters. The KTC also has sought to improve health and human services for its members.
The KTC sponsors a dance troupe, the Shoon' aq Dancers, who have performed in and
out of Alaska. In 1991, the KTC sought a joint agreement with an airline to sponsor a
tour package in Kodiak that would feature demonstrations of Native dancing and crafts
and Native Youth Olympics performances. The council received a $20,000, economic
development grant from t he State to build a '"barabara" (traditional house) for exhibit on
the tour. The KTC also is cooperating with KANA to market Native arts and crafts.
The Kodiak Region - Page 581

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Land Status and Management: Prior to the annexation of March 1989, which by
petition to the State Boundary Commission appropriated additional land and water to
the borough, the Kodiak Island Borough encompassed the entire Kodiak Archipelago
and included all land within the Kodiak Island group from the Trinity Islands on the
south to the Barren Islands on the north. The estimated size of the borough was
5,000 square miles. of land and 4,565 square miles of water. The annexation of land on
the Alaska Peninsula and of water areas in the Shelikof Strait added 2,130 square miles
of land and. 10,700 square miles of water to the borough. Tle total area under the
borough's control was more than doubled by that annexation (discussed more in
Sec. IIIE, Political-Economic and Social Change).
Control over land within the borough prior to the annexation is indicated in
Table 7. A final settlement of land titles has not occurred.


Table 7

LAND STATUS IN THE KODL4AK ISLAND BOROUGH, 1989


Controlling                         Acres
Entity	Controlled	Percentage


Federal Government	1,680,000	52.5
Native Corporations	935,480	29.0
State of Alaska	482,580	15.1
Local Government	70,000	2.2
Other Private            32j,Q00	1.0

TOTAL                         39200,060	99.9 a
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Source: Kodiak Chamber of Commerce 1989. Compiled
Department of Community Development.
aDoes not equal 100 percent due to rounding.
by the Kodiak Island Borough,
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The largest portion of Kodiak land is federally controlled. Ile Kodiak National
Wildlife Refuge encompasses two-thirds of Kodiak Island, all of Uganik and Ban islands,
and part of Afognak Island. The USCG Base controls an additional 23,000 acres of land
in Women's Bay. Land selections by Native village corporations, the State of Alaska,
and the Kodiak Island Borough have been a source of conflict. These selections have
created complex land inholding patterns within the wildlife refuge, mostly involving lands
selected by or conveyed to the Native village corporations (Kodiak Island Borough
1988b; USFWS 1987). This has exacerbated conflicts between different resource user
groups and has caused access, trespass, and resource management difficulties. For
example, Koniag, Inc., the Native regional for-profit corporation, received land in
Women's Bay. When Koniag has attempted to develop that land for marine-related
uses, it has encountered opposition from the USCG (Kodiak Island Borough 1988b).
T'he limited availability of land held by private ownIers or by local government has
limited the space available for housing(Hill 1986:372), municipal and industrial
development, storage for shipping operations and fishing gear, and expansion of borough
landfills. It also has increased tensions between Natives and non-Natives in Kodiak.
The State and the borough have sold some land to private interests but primarily in
more remote areas and not within the vicinity of Kodiak City.
Selecting land under ANCSA's provisions was particularly difficult for Koniag, Inc.
ANCSA withheld from the regional corporations subsurface rights to national refuge
la-nds and granted "in-lied' subsurface selection rights to land on the Alaska Peninsula
across from Kodiak. Koniag made in-lieu land selections on the Alaska Peninsula but
was not able to obtain fulfl mineral rights to those lands. In 1980, Congress approved a
land exchange whereby Koniag would give up land on the Alaska Peninsula for surface
and subsurface estate in lands located on Afognak Island. As part of that exchange,
Koniag agreed to the formation of the Afognak Joint Venture Corporation, of which
Koniag would become a major shareholder and to which it would convey ownership of
those lands. Eleven village corporations on Kodiak Island participated in the Afognak
Joint Venture, but two have since given notice to partition from it. Selection of lands on
The Kodiak Region - Page 583






Afognak Island that are rich in timber resources brought the Native corporations intoU
conflict with several non-Native interests.
Koniag is to receive Iand, including the surface and subsurface estate, of
approximately 629,000 acres and title to subsurface estate rights only on approximately
1,098,000 additional acres pursuant to ANCSA. By 1988, Koniag had received interim
conveyance or patent to 160,092 acres of surface estate and 477,895 acres of subsurface
estate. Koniag also owns about 180,000 acres of surface estate around Karluk and
Larsen Bay because of its merger with those villag'e corporations. These lands, which are3
important for bear habitat and for management of the Kodiak National Wildlife Refuge,
are the focus of the land exchange being negotiated between Koniag, Inc., and the3
Federal Government (discussed more in See. III.B).
Old Harbor Native Corporation was entitled to select 115,200 acres of Federal
land or the equivalent of five townships. Three townships could be selected in the
Kodiak National Wildlife Refuge, and two had to be chosen elsewhere. In 1979, the3
corporation received patents to 475.29 acres of land and interim conveyances to 101,536
acres of land. When Old Harbor Native Corporation merged with Koniag, Inc., in 1980,3
the merged corporation obtained title to the Old Harbor Native Corporation's land. The
two corporations were de-merged in 1984, and the village corporation regained control of3
the surface estate of the lands it had originally selected (Kodiak Island Borough
1989:6-7).1
The Federal Government manages the lands under its control. Federal
management of the Kodiak National Wildlife Refuge,is governed by several international3
migratory bird and conservation treaties, Federal laws, and USFWS policies and resource
management decisions. This restricts some activities that could occur on those la-nds3
(USFWS 1987:6-8). Native lands within the refuge are subject to ANCSA Section 22(g),
which stipulates that refuge lands conveyed to Native corporations remain subject to the
laws and regulations governing use of the refuge. The public participates in reviewing
refuge policies, but the decisions on how the refuge will be managed reside with the
USFWS. The Federal Goverrnment imposes additional regulations on the USCG Base
and other lands under its control.I

The Kodiak Region - Page 5843

Kodiak Island Borough land use controls apply to borough, Native, and private
lands. The borough's land use regulations are included in the Comprehensive Plan,
Kodiak Island Borough Zoning Ordinance, and Subdivision Regulations. The Kodiak
Island Borough gained greater control over local land use and over State and Federal
actions in the area under the Kodiak Island Boro-ugh Coastal Management Program.
The Coastal Management Plan is a coordinated effort of local, State, and Federal
Governuments and the private sector to manage coastal resources. This plan covers
virtually all land in the Kodiak Archipelago--no coTnTnunity is more than 15 miles from
the coast. The plan promotes compatible, multiple use of coastal la-nds and water. The
Kodiak Island Borough Community Development Department reviews proposed private
and local government activity to determine consistency 'with the plan. Federal and State
agency actions must be consistent with the plan, but determinations of consistency reside
with the State of Alaska. The Kodiak Island Borough is pursuing changes to the Alaska
Coastal Management Program to place authority for all consistency determinations at the
local level (Kodiak Island Borough 1988b).
Resource Management: Kodiak Island has a variety of habitats in a small area
that make it home to numerous species of saltwater, freshwater, and terrestrial plant
species; saltwater and freshwater fish; marine invertebrates; marine mammals; land
mammals; and bird species. Salmon, halibut, herring, bottomfish, crab, shrimnp, and
scallops are the principal seafoods that are harvested commercially. The main marine
mammal species found near Kodiak include sea lion, harbor and fur seals, sea otter,
harbor -porpoise, and gray and humpback whales. Kodiak Island is home to land
mammals such as the Kodiak brown bear, fox, and land and river otters. Deer, elk,
mountain goat, and rabbits have b'een introduced in the 20th century. There are
approximately 120 species of birds, including ducks, geese, puffins, loons, cormorants,
terns, murres, ptarmigan, and bald eagles (Kodiak Island Borough 1989; USFWS 1987;
KANA and ADF&G Subsistence Division 1983).
The State manages fish and garne on all lands, regardless of ownership (Federal,
State, or private). Congress -transferred management of these resources to the State
under the Statehood Act. The State manages commercial fisheries from shore to 3 miles
The Kodiak Region - Page 585





out for all sp ecies except halibut. The Alaska Board of Fisheries and the Board ofU
Game regulate resources managed by the State. The ADF&G's westward regional office
and a Fish and Wildlife Enforcement Division of the Alaska Department of Public Safety
are located in Kodiak.
The U.S. Government reserves the power to direct states in the management of
resources covered under international treaties or laws passed by Congress. Tle
Internatio-nal Halibut Commission and the International North Pacific Fishery
Commission manage halibut and groundfish under such treaties. In 1976, the Magnuson
Act created the North Pacific Fishery Management Council--the regional Federal
regulatory body responsible for managing fishery resources in the fisheries conservation3
zone from 3 to 200 miles from shore. The North Pacific Fishery Management Council
has the authority to set seasons, gear, and other regulations to manage the fishi-ng
industry (Langdon 1986:7,17).
Resource management is an important issue in a State where the economy is
almost entirely dependent on the extraction of renewable and nonrenewable resources.
This issue was a focus of the El interviews in 1989, 1990, and 1991. The differences in5
the Key Informants' views of resource management between 1989 (before the Exxon
Valdez oil spill) and 1991 indicate that there was increasing opposition to Federal3
Government and Native management of resources..
All 1989, 1990, and 1991 Kodiak AOSIS KI interviewees (100%) believed that3
resources can be managed by institutions. Moreover, they believed that institutions need
to manage resources to prohibit resource depletion and to mediate the competition for1
those resources. Several interviewees complained that resource management is "too
political," meaning that management is too vulnerable to local, special-group, or even3
personal interests. Tlese respondents said that there is a need to "get the politics out of
it," implying that institutions are inherently neutral arbitrators of conflicts between3
different interest groups. Some interviewees commented that government provides
equity, balance, and insurance that all community memnbers follow the rules.I
Most 1989 Kodiak KI interviewees (57%) favored resource management by the
State of Alaska or (43%) by a combination of State, Federal, and/or local (includingI
The Kodiak Region - Page 5863

Native) agencies. In 1991, 66. percent of KI's thought ADF&G was the institution best
equipped to manage most or all resources. Other Ki's favored combined management
by ADF&G and Natives or by ADF&G and "local people"; one KI wanted a
comnbination of "everyone but the Feds." The KI's believed that State agencies best
understand the situation in Alaska and are more responsive to local needs and concerns.
Some Kodiak interviewees even wanted the State to have control over marine mammals,
which are currently managed under Federal law. They thought that the Federal
Govemnment was too far away and was generally more responsive to Seattle-based fishing
interests. Yet Kodiak interviewees recognized the need for strong Federal enforcement
against foreign encroachment in U.S. territorial and Alaskan waters. In this regard,
some of them felt that Federal agencies are understaffed.
Among 1991 KI's there was a definite bias against resource management by the
Federal Government. For species that occur in several states or internationally, such as
halibut, marine mammals, or migratory birds, KI's conceded that imanagement interests
go beyond the State; but generally they had the most trust in the State to have an
objective understanding of local needs.
In 1991, reasons for opposition to Federal manaeement were related to recent
increased Federal intervention in both subsistence and comTnercial harvesting in Alaska.
As a result of the Alaska Supreme Court McDowell v. Alaska decision of December 22,
1989, which ruled that the rural preference maintained in Alaska's current subsistence
law was unconstitutional (ADF&G 1990), the Federal Government assumed
management of some subsistence harvests. In commercial groundfishing, State observers
were replaced in early 1990 by observers worldng under Federal contract. One KI--a
commercial fisherman--said that, in general, "They should have the state dote
surveying, not the Feds." In sprfing 1991, several Kodiak residents also expressed concern
about the Federal North Pacific Fishery Management Council's proposed imposition of
an individual fish quota system on the sablefish and halibut fisheries.
Kodiak interviewees expressed a desire for more local and Native input into
resource management -decisions, but few wanted local or Native control over resource
management. In 1989, over 70 percent of the Kodiak interviewees felt that ADF&G did
The Kodiak Region - Page 587






a better job of managing natural resources than Native organizations would; 30 percentI
thought that the State's ability to manage resources is equivalent to Natives' ability to do
so. None--not even those who thought that Natives understand the resources better than
non-Natives--felt that Natives would do a better job of managing all resources than3
would the State.
In 1991, in response to the question about whether ADF&G did a better or worseI
job of managing resources than Natives could, 66 percent of KL's thought ADF&G did a
better job. These KI's thought ADF&G was more objective than Natives and had better3
access to the means to do scientific studies. One person said, "We're not dealing with
just Natives using it. It's in a commercial industry, too." No Ki's wanted Natives to3
manage all resources; but some thought Natives should manage some resources, such as
marine mammals or birds, for noncommercial use only. One non-Native KI commented,
"The p2eople should manage. The Natives got enough control, and I'm not wild about
Fish and Game." Some KI's found it difficult to compare ADF&G management with3
that of Natives, saying that their interests were in different places.
Interviewees in 1989 offered several reasons for their opinion that Native3
management of resources would not be better than State management. Some
interviewees, primarily non-Natives, identified Natives as just one interest group and3
feared that Natives would manage resources for their own benefit. Others said that
Natives are not as well educated and would not be able to conduct the research that
ADF&G does. Some recognized the political realities--that Natives would have trouble
governing non-Natives and that Natives do not have the funds necessary to control andI
enforce regulations. Even though many interviewees admitted that Natives managed
resources well in the past through values that admonished waste or use of resources for3
personal gain, they saw younger Natives as less knowledgeable and more greedy. Some
interviewees thought that the only resources Natives should manage are subsistenceI
resources (e.g., walrus or seals), upon which primarily Natives depend.
In 1991, even though KI's did not have much confidence in Natives' ability toI
manage resources (one person said, "Natives have gut feelings but no management
skills."), they did credit Natives with a better grasp of both knowledge and use ofI

The Kodiak Region - Page 5883

resources than scientists. Many KI's agreed that Natives and scientists both had
knowledge but in different areas. The KI's said that Natives' knowledge was based on
long tradition, contin-ued practical use of resources, and their stake in the perpetuiation of
species. A non-Native hair salon operator said, "I get a lot of the older Native gals in
here. They've been here 70 or 80 years; they've been doing it all their lives. They know
what their grandmother used to do with these things. Scientists would laugh at that stuff.
Those scientists learn from a book."'
As in past years, some 1991 KIC's were careful to specify that some Natives, i.e.,
those "still embedded in their culture" or those who do a lot of hunting and fishing, were
more knowledgeable than others. Other KI's thought Natives knew about some species
but not others: "Deer and stuff have been introduced by Fish and Game. But bears,
Natives understand those better." Or: "Sea mammals--so many are close to being
extinct. [It's] more of a study for scientists than for Natives."
One of the reasons that people in Kodiak prefer State resource management is
because they believe Kodiak has political influence over ADF&G decisions. Kodiak KI
interviewees in 1989 were quite optimistic about their degree of political- influence on
resource management. Nearly 64 percent responded that local people frequently
influence ADF&G decisions, and none responded that they had no influence. Some
interviewees identified the Kenai Peninsula and Cook Inlet as areas having greater
political influence, primarily in regard to sports fishing issues, because of the influence of
wealthy doctors, lawyers, and politicians who fish there. In 1991, almost all KI's (94%)
thought local people had at least some influence over ADF&G decisions. One person
thought that although there was oportunity for frequent influence, people in Kodiak did
not use the opportunity well.
When asked how people in Kodiak exercise influence over ADF&G policies, 1989
interviewees mentioned local participation in meetings, committees, 'and fishermnen's
organizations, and on the State Board of Fisheries and Board of Game. Examples were
cited of personal connections between some Kodiak residents and State officials and of
"knowing the right people." Kodiak's Representative Cliff Davidson co-chairs the
Resources Conimittee of the Alaska House of Representatives, and Kodiak's Senator
The Kodiak Region - Page 589





Fred Zharoff sits on the Alaska Senate's Resources Commlittee. One interviewee relatedI
that in the previous summer (1988), the State closed the Shelikof Strait because people
from Cook Inlet areas complained that Kodiak fishermen were intercepting their fish.
Kodiak people protested and the strait was reopened within a week. It is clear that
people in Kodiak have a sophisticated understanding of the political process and how to
use it. Kodiak fishermen's organizatio-ns have a history of being involved in State and
Federal politics and of successfully defending their interests (Langdon 1986:88).
'The KI's in 1991 also suggested several methods by which Kodiak residents could3
influence fish and game-board policy. Several KI's emphasized that it was important to
make one's views known. One said, "They're obviously looking for opinions. I getI
surveys all the time." Other comTnents were: "You have to be up on the regulations to
get into the systen"; "If you make enough noise, they'll do what you want"; "Call Fish andI
Game, bug them, report violations." The KI's also suggested that people should attend
fish and game-board mieetings, and "watch who they elect."I
There was some cynicism, however, about the informal approach to influencing
~the fish and game boards. One KI said, "Those guys will say 'Yes, youre right' and then3
do the opposite of what they say." Another said that the fish and game boards listen to
people about game animals more than they do about sea life. These Ki's thought a3
more formal approach was necessary, although one said, "I myself would never sit on a
board." Two KI's specifically referred to the formation of lobbying groups or to workingI
within those that already exist.
Some KI's mentioned a "good-old-boy" network in Kodiak that allowed some3
powerfLil figures to influence fish and game board decisions. One person observed wryly
that investi-ng in a processing plant probably would ensure getting some political clout.3
However, there was respect for those who had put years into working in the fishing
industry in Kodiak: "Those who have been here all these years have fought for a lot."3
In terms of knowledge about resources, 1989 Kodiak KI interviewees gave the
most recognition to scientists' understanding and the least to Natives' understanding,I
although mnost respondents recognied that both groups had some understanding of
resources, albeit of a different nature. This may be due partly to the small percentage of

The Kodiak Region - Page 5903

Native respondents in the sample but probably has more to do with the fact that Kodiak
is a center for marine research. This research is conducted by personnel of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); the University of Alaska's Fishery
Industrial Technology Center, Cooperative Extension, and Marine Advisory Program;
and the regional offices of the USFWS and ADF&G. Local residents are very aware of
these research efforts, particularly because this research is geared toward aiding the
fishing industry.
In terms of understanding resources by use, 1989 respondents gave ADF&G the
most credit and Natives the least credit of any AOSIS region. Respondents tend ed to
interpret use in terms of comTnercial fishing and species conservation, and ADF&G was
considered most knowledgeable because it is in charge of managing resources for these
purposes. The complaints that interviewees had about ADF&G dealt with allocation of
fisheries resources. Several respondents felt that local people, but not necessarily
Natives, knew best how to use these resources.
In 1991, KIC's credited scientists with more unbiased knowledge than Natives. One
comment was, "Natives understand how it balances their lives, but not what the water is
made up of. Scientists are into the hatcheries. Natives are not involved with building
the species." Typically, KI's thought understanding of use was quite different from simply
having knowledge; and most Ki's credited Natives with better understanding of use.
In terms of acquiring knowledge about an area, Kodiak KI's generally thought it
took less time than did people in other AOSIS regions. In 1989, most of the Kodiak
respondents (64%) thought it took less than 5 years, or enough time to "live through
several seasons" as some of them said. Only 21.4 percent thought it took the
accumulated experience of a lifetime. In 1991, 22 percent of KI's said it would take
about 1 year, 44 percent thought it would take 1 to 5 years, 28 percent thought it would
take 6 to 20 years, and 6 percent thought it would take a lifetime. None said that a
person would never get to know an area.
T'here may be several reasons for these responses. Most people on Kodiak Island
live in the road-connected areas and generally do less hunting and fishing than people in.
small villages, and that which they do is usually closer to their homes. Also, the increase
The Kodiak Region - Page 591





in technology that has accompanied the high capitalization in the Kodiak fishing industryI
has meant a reduction in the amount of knowledge and skill perceived as necessary to
engage in this occapation. Older fishermen give more credence to the accumulation of
knowledge and tell stories that poke fan at relying too heavily on technology or at feeling
too confident at sea.
Some 1991 KI's specified that it wasn't enough just to ibe in a place for a certain
amount of time; one had to actively seek knowledge. For example, one KI said that
learning about an area would take "years and years... .that's with wanting to and paying
attention to oldtimers. You could also learn by book or whatever." Another person said
that while it would take only a year to be able to harvest, it would take 15 to 20 years to3
be really knowledgeable.
Infrastructure and Administrative Services: The road-connected area of Kodiak
Island has a well developed infrastructure. Infusion of Federal and State monies for
infrast ructure development occurred during World War 1I, after the 1964. earthquake,3
and after oil monies started flowing to the State in the 1970's. Governmient funding for
improvement projects in Kodiak has focused on providing facilities and services that3
support the fishing industry. Several large public constr-uction projects were undertaken
in the early 1980's, even as the fishing industry entered a relatively depressed state (HillI
1986:354). Kodiak wants additional infrastructure to increase its role as a regional
support center in order to profit from the activities that bave increased at alarming speed3
during the 1980's with Southwest Alaska's bottomfish boom.
Most of the infrastructure that the Federal Government directly maintainsI
supports the fishing industry and commerce in the North Pacific Rim. Kodiak Island is
home to the worlds largest USCG Base, which, in 1971, took over the U.S. Navy Base3
built during World War 11. This 23,000-acre complex employs about 1,155 personnel
with 1,500 dependents and is home port to four USCG cutters (Kodiak Chamber of3
Commerce 1989). The USCG Base has expanded considerably since the early 1970's
(Hill 1986:358). The USCG patrols the seas, enforces fishing regulations, conductsI
search and rescue missions, aids navigation, and inspects and registers ships (Payne
1980:79). Kodiak has a NOAA office that monitors and researches the weather and

The Kodiak Region - Page 5923

fisheries, and a Federal Aviation Administration air traffic control facility. The Alaska
District of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers has been involved in harbor and port
developments on the island.
The State of Alaska also has provided support for Kodiak's fishing industry. The
University of Alaska Fairbanks School of Fisheries and Ocean Sciences maintains the
Fishery Industrial Technology Center in Kodiak. The center's mission is to provide
scientific and technical support to Alaska's seafood industry. The center's current
activities include research on minimizing incidental catch, developing energy conservation
measures to make seafood processing more cost effective, developing altemnative product
forms for the area's abundant pink salmon, utilizing seafood-processing wastes more
profitably, optimizing protein retention in the surimi-manufacturing process, and
identifying sources of microbial contamination to help processors meet seafood quality
standards.
The State of Alaska has funded several large infrastructure projects in Kodiak
over the last decade. Tle Terror Lake hydroelectric power project was bait between
1982 and 1984 to reduce energy costs on the island and provide electric power for indus-
trial expansion. The limited availability of low-cost energy and adequate freshwater
supplies were two of the main constraints on the fish processing industry. With
completion of the Terror Lake hydroelectric project, energy prices were no longer tied to
increasing fuel costs (USFWS 1987:122).
The Saint Herman (Dog Bay) Boat Harbor, on Near Island, was built with State
funding in 198 1-1982. This harbor more than doubled the moorage capacity for small
boats in Kodiak. Construction of this new boat harbor was followed by construction of
the Near Island Bridge, which provides access to Dog Bay Boat Harbor and to 275
additional acres of city-owned land on Near Island. This land is being developed for
industrial, institutional, and recreational use (Near Island Task Force 1987). A new
Fishery Industrial Technology Center opened on Near Island in early 1991, and KANA is
preparing to build a museum there. A breakwater project, scheduled to go out to bid in
September 1991, was funded with $10 million from the State legislature in 1991 and an
anticipated $2 million from the City of Kodiak (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 6-4-91:1).
The Kodiak Region - Page 593


The State of Alaska also assists Kodiak,with transportation, courts, public safety,I
and parks. The State maintains the highways and airport through the Department of
Transportation and Public Facilities and the ferry terminal through the Marine Highway
System. The Alaska State Court System handles all civi and criminal cases, the Alaska
Department of Law provides Kodiak with a District Attorney, and the Alaska
Department of Corrections administers adult probation and parole. Through the AlaskaI
Department of Public Safety, Kodiak is provided with the services of the Alaska State
Troopers, Search and Rescue teams, patrol vessels, and the Protection Division of the3
USFWS. The Southwest District Office of the Department of Natural Resources, Parks
Division, maintains three parks on the Kodiak road system: Fort Abercrombie, Buskin3
River, and Pasagshak (Kodiak Chamber of Commerce 1989).
The Kodiak Island Borough and Kodiak City provide general municipal services
in the road-connected area. The second-class borough has assumed area-wide powers of
assessment and taxation, education, health, and plang and zoning. Nonarea-wide3
powers assumed by the borough include parks and recreation; animal control; solid-waste
collection and disposal; and service districts for road, water, sewer, and fire protection.3
These services are administered by the borough's 12 departments (Kodiak Island
Borough 1988a).3
The Kodiak Island Borough assesses real property taxes of 4.5 mills, personal
property taxes of 4.5 mils, and various road and fire service district taxes, but no sales or
visitor's room tax. Kodiak Island Borough taxes are among the lowest in the State
(Alaska Departmnent of Community and Regional Affairs 1988c:22-23), and the mill levyI
has stayed virtually level for 7 years in spite of considerable decreases in Federal and
State fundi-ng during the last 4 years (Kodiak Island Borou'gh 1991).3
The City of Kodiak provides various municipal services. Marine facilities include
a ferry dock, city dock, container termiinal, two small boat harbors, and mooring buoys in3
Saint Paul and Saint Herman harbors--all administered by the harbormaster. The city
supplies water and sewer services in and around the city and operates a small municipal3
airport with a gravel runway and no tower services. The Kodiak City Police Department,
in addition to the Alaska State Troopers and Village Public Safety Officers, provides

The Kodiak Region - Page 5941

police protection for the island. Kodiak City provides fire protection along with Bayside
Fire Department and the Women's Bay Fire Department, both operated by the borough,
and also joins the borough in providing animal control services. The city also maintains
a public library, nine developed public parks, an outdoor amphitheater, and a
campground with shower and restroom facilities. Taxes assessed by the City of Kodiak
include a property tax of 2.0 mills, a sales tax of 5 percent, and a lodg-
ing/ accommodation tax of 5 percent. Of the city sales tax, I percent is devoted to roads
and sewer and water, another I percent to harbor and port improvementg, and 3 percent
to general city operations. The city assesses tariffs on goods transferred over the
municipal docks and user fees for dockage, which help finance port improvements and
maintenance.
Much of the focus of local government has been on providing docks, ports,
support facilities, services, and marketing for the seafood industry. As one local public
official said, "We see our role as providing a platform for private business." The borough
has conducted a study to determine whether it should develop airport terminal facilities
to encourage more air carriers to provide service to Kodiak Island, "as a transportation
hub for Southwest Alaska" (Kodiak Island Borough 1991). This would aid in marketing
fresh seafood. At present, air carriers provide their own terminal facilities and there is
little competition in air service. Borough officials consider airport facilities equally as
important as dock facilities or water and sewer facilities, which have been provided for
seafood harvesters and processors.
A pressing local problem is the rate at which the Kodiak Island Borough Sanitary
Landfill is filling up. Waste disposal has been a major problem for Kodiak fish
processors and Kodiak must accept waste from ships that stop in port. In 1990,th
Kodiak Island Borough implemented a recycling program for aluminum, paper, and glass
in order to extend the life of the landfill. Recycling may not prove to be economically
feasible beca-use recyclable items must be shipped to Seattle, although paper recycling
has been assisted by Sealand and Alaskans for Litter Prevention and Recycling. The
borough recently hired an environmental engineer to develop a solid waste management
plan (Kodiak Island Borough 1991).
The Kodiak Region - Page 595





Following are two recent examples of -how local government underwrites a largeI
portion of fishing industry costs. First, the Kodiak Island Borough spent $55,454 in 1989
as part of its economic development program to contract NOAA's National Marine
Fisheries Service to conduct site-suitability studies for possible rehabilitation and
enhancement of king crab (Kodiak Daily Nlirror, 11-29-89:9). The final report was
expected in Ju-ne 1991. Second, the City of Kodiak sold $5 million worth of general
obligation bonds to add 400 feet of dock space to Pier 2 to accommodate the largest
trawlers and crab boats operating in Alaska. Indirectly related to the fishing industry,
the newest and largest city development is on Near Island, where road, sewer, and water
services are being extended to Saint Herman's Harbor. The land benefitted by this3
infrastructure is owned by the city and will be used primarily for fishing-related industries
and commerce. The City of Kodiak gave 16 acres of land on Near Island to theI
University of Alaska for the new Fishery Industrial Technology Center--another public
contribution to the fishfing industry.3
Infrastructure and administrative services in Kodiak villages are quite different-
from those in Kodiak City and the areas connected to it by roads. For the past 25 years,3
rural communities on Kodiak Island have concentrated on rebuilding basic
infrastructure--housing, schools, roads, water and sewer systems, utilities, andI
-communication systems--destroyed in the 1964 earthquake (KANA 1985). All Kodiak
villages have airports, but only Port Lions has public docks. Village infrastructure3
generally is limited. Some facilities have deteriorated because of meager funding for
maintenance. Most canneries located in or near the villages that were destroyed in theI
earthquake were not rebuilt, while some were relocated to Kodiak (Roppel 1986). Thus,
Kodiak villages suffer from little private-sector development and employment. The main3
issues cuzTently confronting the villages are employment, transportation, port facilities,
and economic development.3
Most of the assistance provided to Kodiak villages has come from the State and
Federal Governments; and much of this has been funneled through KANA,, a regional3
nonprofit corporation formed in 1966. The KANA, the dominant public-sector
institution for the Kodiak area, administers a wide range of Federal and State contracts3

The Kodiak Region - Page 5963

and grants to provide services to Kodiak Natives. Traditional councils recognized by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs as the official tribal governing bodies for the villages have
assigned their Federal contracting authority to KANA. The KANA assumes other quasi-
governmental functions, providing advocacy, development, planning, training, and
technical assistance to Natives.
The KANA is comprised of four departments: Community Development, Culture
and Heritage Programs (discussed in Sec. V.C below), Health and Social Services
(discussed in Sec. ULlC below), and Finance. The Community Development Department
was reorganized i-n 1987 and now includes economic development, tribal government,
and education programs. In 1988, KANA received a planning grant from the Economic
Development Administration for Native communities to develop plans for capital
improvements. A goal was to assist Native communities in attracting businesses.
One of KANA's economic development projects pursued under the 1988 planning
grant was the Village Mariculture Project to determine the feasibility of developing first
scallop and, later, oyster farming in the villages. The project received financial support
from State and Federal Governments and the Japanese Overseas F ishery Cooperation
Foundation. Economic development projects initiated prior to the 1988 grant were the
Agriculture Program to promote subsistence gardening and the Karlik River Study to
plan for tourism development in Karluk. The KANA also assists traditional councils
with administration, tribal enrollment, community development, and grant proposals
(KANA 1985, 1986, 1988).
KANA funding has come primarily from the Federal Government. While the
total amount of Federal funding 'for KANA increased over the past 10 years, the
proportion of revenue from the Federal Governmnent has declined since the early 1980's
under the Reagan and Bush administrations. Increased Federal spending for defense
oc.curred at the expense of domestic social programs, including Native institutions such as
KANA. State and other (primarily fee-for-servce) revenues have assumed a greater role
in supporting the organization, as shown in Table 8.
The Kodiak Region - Page 597

I
I
Table 8

KODIAK AREA NATIVE ASSOCIATION
SOURCES OF REVENUE, 1979-1988

Percent	Percent	Percent	Total
Federal	State	Other	Revenue


1979	95.5	0	4.5	$2,116,605
1980	94.1	0	5.9	2,780,339
1981	86.4	3.2	10.4	3,607,844
1982	79.4	7.3	13.3	3,241,818
1983	72.8	14.7	12.5	3,261,990
1984	75.5	10.8	13.7	3,390,475
1985	74.5	14.5	11.0	3,921,044
1986	71.8	16.9	11.3	4,133,459
1987	72.5	10.7	16.8	4,130,580
1988	75.2	13.1	11.7	5,086,626
I
I
I
Kodiak Area Native Association, Directory of Services,
Source:
Report.
and 1988 Annual
I
I
The State provides most assistance to Kodiak villages--either directly to their city
councils or through the Kodiak Island Borough. Kodiak communities depend on State
support derived from revenue sharing, municipal assistance, capital improvement grants,
or contracts for services. State revenues also have declined in the 1980's, and these
declines have had the greatest impacts on Alaska's smaller communities. Lack of a
strong private sector and little taxable property make it difficult for these communities to
raise revenues locally (Alaska Department of Community and Regional Affairs 1988b).
The decline in State revenues has not impacted Kodiak villages as badly as it has
communities in the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta, Bering Straits region, Northwest Arctic
Borough, and the Doyon region (Alaska Department of Community and Regional Affairs
1988b). Since Kodiak Island villages are part of the Kodiak Island Borough, the borough
performs some functions for these communities that the State performs in

The Kodiak Region - Page 598
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I
I
I
I
I
I
I

umninorporated areas of the State. The Kodiak Island Borough administers schools in al
of the villages and controls planning, platting, and zoning through the Comrnunity
Development Department. The borough helps villages with grant applications; and it
also manages some of the grants awarded to villages and includes their Capital
Improvement Project (CIP) lists with those of the borough. The borough performs other
public services for the villages, such as preparation of comprehensive plans and
assistance with CIPs, which include fuel delivery, electrical systems, water and sewer
systems, roads, landfills, and community buildings and schools.
The disparities between community improvements in Kodiak City and the
deterioration of infrastructure in the villages lends credence to complaints often heard
from village residents that the borough has not been looldng out for their needs.
Economic conflicts between the villages and the borough were mentioned by several
interviewees, and reference to these conflicts is occasionally made in letters to the editor
published in the local newspaper. Problems between villages and the city and borough
also were highlighted during the oil-spill cleanup, when village residents objected to their
lack of participation in or control over the Kodiak area oil-spill response.
III.B. Commerce and Industry
Kodiak City differs from most other communities in the Social Indicators Study in
terms of its size and level of development. Kodiak is Alaska's fifth-largest city (after
Anchorage, Fairbanks, Juneau, and Ketchikan) and its most diversified fishing port.
Because of its location in the western portion of the Gulf of Alaska, Kodiak provides a
commercial link between the Pacific Northwest and the Far East. It is the hub of
transportation and shipping routes in the Gulf of Alaska and is a service b ase from
which many vessels fish the Gulf of Alaska and the Bering Sea (Kodiak Chamber of
Commerce 1989).
The private-sector economy is well developed in and around Kodiak City and is
related in one'way or another to the fishing and tourist industries. While the private
sector is related in many ways to the public sector, including the USCG, Kodiak City is
less dependent on public-sector revenues than cities in other regions; thus, it has not
The Kodiak Region - Page 599

I
I
been as heavily impacted by declining State and Federal revenues as communities in
many other areas of Alaska. This is not true, however, for Kodiak villages.
Economic Diversification: Even though Kodiak City is primarily a fishing port, it
has a diversified economic base. Kodiak City's emIployment in 1988 was distributed
among various sectors of the economy, as.indicated in Table 9.

Table 9

KODIAK CITY EMPLOYMENT BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 1988
I
I

Number	Percentage of
Industry                                         Employed	All Employed


Construction	180	4
Manufacturing (includes fishing)	1,479	30
Transportation, Communications, Utilities	230	5
Trade	842	18
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate	116	2
Services	848	18
Government	1,112	23
Federal	(193)	(4)
State	(248)	(5)
Local	(670)	(14)
I
Source: Alaska Department of Labor 1989.


Fishing is the main sector of the local economy. It accounts for nearly all of the
manufacturing employment and affects most other sectors of the economy. According to
a local saying, "Everyone in Kodiak is affected by fishing in one way or another." During
the 1980's, Kodiak was consistently among the top three U.S. ports in terms of the value
of fish landed, ranking second in 1987 and first in 1988 (Southwest Alaska Municipal
Conference 1989:12). Kodiak is home port to over 800 commercial fishing vessels, while
about 120 additional vessels are moored in communities close to Kodiak. Salmon seiner
boats are the largest part of Kodiak's fleet; 387 seine permits are avaiable in the area.

The Kodiak Region - Page 600
I
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I
I
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Kodiak also is the center for Alaska-based large-trawl, longline, and crab vessels. Nearly
120 of the vessels in Kodiak are 80 feet or larger (Kodiak Chamber of Commerce 1989).
Between 1977 and 1987, the ex-vessel value of seafood deliveries to Kodiak's 11
seafood-processing plants averaged $96.3 niillion. The 1988 ex-vessel value of various
marine species for the Port of Kodiak is listed in Table 10 (Kodiak Chamber of
Commerce 1989).
Table 10

EX-VESSEL VALUE OF MARINE SPECIES
PORT OF KODIAK, 1988

Ex-Vessel Value	Percent
Species	($ million)	of Value


Salmon	$ 99.36	57.7
Groundfish	25.35	14.7
Crab	21.94	12.7
Halibut	21.60	12.5
Herring	3.14	1.8
Other	.77	.4

TOTAL                     $172.16	99.8a
Source: City of Kodiak and Kodiak Island Borough Community Profile, prepared by the
Kodiak Chamber of Commerce for the Southwest Alaska Municipal Conference.
a Does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.


The salmon harvest has been a steady contributor to Kodiak's economy both by
average value and by weight, and salmon is the most researched and managed resource.
King crab and shrimp are still scarce following their decline in the 1980's and show few
signs of recovery. However, in November 1990, there was a brief king crab fishery in
Kodiak for the first time since 1982; the quota was filled in 12 days. Greater importance
has been placed on groundfish (sablefish, pollock, cod), halibut, herring, and opilio
The Kodiak Region,- Page 601





tanner crab in recent years (Langdon 1986). By 1991, the value of groundfish had
increased considerably above 1988 levels reported in the preceding table. In fact,
groundfish trawling mnay be the main reason why the king crab fishery has not beenI
restored--beca-use of the trawlers' damage to seafloor ecology and incidental crab catches
in trawl nets.
In 1989, Kodiak's fishing economy was generally doing well following the slump
earlier in the decade (Payne 1986:406-407; Southwest Alaska Municipal Conference
1989), at least prior to the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The recovery was based on further3
diversification within the fishing industry as fishermen and processors responded to
changes in fishery stocks. With the transition to groundfish, fish harvesting andI
processing have become year-round activities in Kodiak. Herring, halibut, and crab have
added other fishing seasons in the past; but the transition from these low-volume, high-3
priced fish to high-volume, low-priced groundfish has truly established the year-round
nature of Kodiak's fish processing operations and brought greater stability to Kodiaks3
economy (Alaska Business Monthly, March 1990:57).
Kodiak now has two surimi-production plants that process groundfish. In 1985,3
Alaska Pacific Seafood, a subsidiary of Seattle-based North Pacific Processors, Inc., was
the first Alaskan processor to produce surimii--an odorless, tasteless, jelly-like product3
made primarily from pollock and used in imitation seafood. In October 1988, Westemn
Alaska Fisheries became the city's second and the State's fourth surimi producer (Alaska3
Business Monthly, March 1989:36).
Government is the second-largest sector of the Kodiak economy, with local, State,I
and Federal Governments contributing to employment in that descending order. Local
government i-ncludes employees of the Kodiak Island Borough, Kodiak City, Kodiak3
Island Borough School District, and Kodiak Island Hospital. Several regional offices for
State and Federal Government agencies are located in Kodiak. The USCG does not3
appear in the Kodiak City employment figures listed in Table 10, so the Federal
Government's role is understated. The USCG has been a stable economic factor in3
Kodiak, even if the transience of its personnel has added instability to Kodiak's
population a-nd social structure. USCG spouses also have added to the labor force in

The Kodiak Region - Page 6023

Kodiak. Kodiak, along with Anchorage and Fairbanks, benefits most from military
spending in the State (Griffin 1989b). As part of the Federal Government's cost-cutting
procedures, services at the USCG Base (mess hall, cleaning, etc.) recently were
contracted to a private firm, which reduced the number of jobs on the base.
Timber and tourism. expanded in the 1980's, adding fuirther diversification to
Kodiak Island's economy. Logging takes place on Afognak Island, which is
approximately 700 square miles and contains substantial stands of virgin old-growth Sitka
spruce and high-grade hemlock timber. Afognak has two logging operations--Koncor
Forest Products and Ben A. Thomas--that are exporting logs to the Pacific Rim
(primarily Japan, China, Korea, and Taiwan) and developing markets in other countries.
Each operator is harvesting about 25 million board feet per year, with annual gross sales
revenues ragn between $8 and $30 million. Koncor Forest Products is a joint venture
of several Native corporations (Ouzinlde Native Corporation, Natives of Kodiak,
Chenega Native Corporation, and Yak-Tak Kwaan). Koncor not only harvests its own
timber but also contracts to harvest and market timber for other corporations. Ben A.
Thomas is a contract logger for the Afognak Native Corporation (Kodiak Island Borough
1989; Alaska Business Monthly, March 1989:37).
In spring 1991, there was increased concern among Kodiak fishermen and
conservation groups that proposed logging around the Kitoi Hatchery on Afognak Island
would cause damage to salmon. Representatives of the Native corporations contracting
with the two timber companies saw these concerns as "aesthetic" or "moral" and pointed
to their record of clean logging, including voluntary compliance with the 66-foot buffer
zone around salmon streams stipulated by the Forest Practices Act. They also pointed
out that salmon rnms are good in the Karluk and Red Rivers, both located in the treeless
southern part of Kodiak Island.
At the instigation of the Kodiak Environmental Network, a public foram held in
March 1991 included representatives of the timber companies and Native corporations;
regulatory agencies; the Kitoi Hatchery manager; and a member of the Coastal
Coalition, an environmental group that has worked to forestall logging in parts of
Kachemak Bay by proposing to buy timber lands with Exxon settlement money. Only
The Kodiak Region - Page 603






Ben A. Thomas, the timber company under contract to Afognak Native Corporation,I
took part in the forum; Koncor declined to participate.
Several representatives of regulatory agencies (ADF&G and the U.S. Forest
Service) presented data on other areas but admitted that they did not yet know what the3
effects of logging would be around the Kitoi Hatchery. At the forum, the Afognak
Native Corporation land manager said the corporation would not shut the door on
proposals to buy the land. More recently, the Afognak Native Corporation, with
Afognak Joint Venture, has investigated the possible sale of timber lands to the StateI
and Federal Governments (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 5-31-91:1). State officials have
approved Koncor's planned loggin opeains aro-und the Kitoi Hatchery, but there are3
unresolved conflicts between Koncor and the hatchery manager (Kodiak Daily Mirror,
6-4-91:1).3
Another sector of Kodiak's economy is to-urism. The visitor industry is expanding
rapidly and becoming one of the major industries on the island. Tourism literature callsI
Kodiak the "Emerald Isle: Alaskas Brightest Jewel." The Kodiak Island Archipelago is
.a major State recreation and tourist attraction. Kodiak Island has astounding natural3
beauty, with rugged mountains, miles of rocky and picturesque shoreline, and stretches of
deep green forests and tundra. The island supports a wide variety of wildlife, includingI
fish and migratory birds. Founded in 1792, Kodiak City--Alaska's oldest community--has
scenic and historic charm. All of these factors make Kodiak popular for hunting, fishing,3
camping, boating, sightseeing, and other outdoor recreation. The Kodiak Chamber of
Commerce and the Kodiak Island Convention and Visitors Bureau have actively3
promoted tourism. They anticipated reaping the rewards from several years of concerted
marketing effort duTing summer 1989 (inquiries were up 30% from the previous year),3
but the oil spill negatively impacted the local tourist industry.
Trade and services are the other two main sectors of Kodiak's economy. There3
are a large number and variety of marine-related businesses and service providers that
support the fishing industry. The tourist industry on the island is served by severalI
hotels, bed and breakfast facilities, national car rental agencies, sporting goods stores, air
taxi services, fishing and hunting guides, lodge operators, and taxidermists.

The Kodiak Region - Page 6043

Private retail businesses located in Kodiak City include several large grocery
stores (including Safeway, a national chain); gas stations; car dealers; lumber and
building suppliers; furniture, computer, office supply, clothing, and book stores; florists;
art galleries; and specialized gift and jewelry shops. There are numerous restaurants and
bars and a fast food establishment. A wide range of services and productive businesses
are available, including local beauticians, travel agents, accountants, attorneys, insurance
brokers, real estate agents, contractors, construction companies, consultants, banks and
credit unions, and private health professionals (physicians, dentists, optometrists).
Kodiak City has businesses that are nonexistent in almost all Alaskan villages--such as
1-hour photo developing, computer stores (sales, service, consulting), and a Nautilus
fitness center. ,Servces available in Kodiak are used not only by the permanent
population (about 6,400 in 1991) but also by thousands of other people from surrounding
villages, or by people who travel from outside the region or State to work seasonally in
Kodiak.
Construction employment has declined since 1983, whe-n several major
government projects were being built. At that time, there were nearly 400 more
construction workers in Kodiak than in 1988; and construction constituted 12 percent of
Kodiak employment. This peak in construction activity coincided with the decline in
fisheries but did little to offset the impacts, because these large construction projects
were built by contractors from Anchorage and from out of State who used primarily
nonlocal labor (Hill 1986:354-359).
The economic situation in Kodiak villages is quite different from that in Kodiak
City and the areas connected to it by roads. Village residents are highly dependent on
subsistence activities and Federal, State, and Native corporation transfers of all kinds.
They obtain income from commercial fishing, fish processing jobs, and welfare programs
(Alaska Department of Community and Regional Affairs 1988b). Village economnies are
more vulnerable to low fishing harvests and to "booms and busts" in the seafood market
because they are not very diversified. Centralization of the canneries and fish processors
in Kodiak City decreased employment opportunities in the villages. Aside from activities
related to fishing, there is little private-sector development in the villages.
The Kodiak Region - Page 605





People in the Kodiak region agree that fishing should continue to be theI
foundation of the local economy (Kodiak Island Borough 1988b:1-6). Local politicians
have become increasingly active in fishing issues (Payne 1986:454). They recently
lobbied for,greater allocation of various fish species for Kodiak Island fishermen. They
were actively involved in responding to the Exxon Valdez oil spill and in representing the
interests of Kodiak's fishing community to public and corporate officials.
Despite the emphasis on fishing, many Kodiak residents are interested in other
options for future economic diversification and development (Kodiak Island Borough5
1988b:Section 1.3). In 1989, Kodiak bid against Seward to become an Alaskan home
port for two Navy frigates. Kodiak City and the Kodiak Island Borough both passed5
resolutions in favor of pursuing a Navy home port. In October 1989, the majority of
Kodiak Island Borough residents showed their support for this development when an
initiative that would have prohibited the borough from pursuing a Navy home port was
defeated. The business community and retired Navy and USCG people were mostI
supportive of the idea. However, the initiative itself, the public debate about it, and the
votes it did receive indicated that not all segments of the Kodiak population were in
favor of a Navy home port.
T'he arguments for and against the Navy home port were interesting for what theyI
revealed about people's values and conceems. Those in favor argued that the Navy had
built Kodiak (roads, radio and TV, first airfield for commercial air transportation, fire3
protection) and had assisted with security and rescue after the 1964 earthquake.
Proponents appealed to people's sense of patriotic duty; they emphasized the potentialI
economic benefits and the fact that the Navy Base would be comnplementary to the
already large USCG Base. Those against the Navy home port were concerned that theI
growth associated with military personnel would destroy the city's ambience, lead to
increased crime, and negatively impact fishing (commercial, subsistence, and sport).I
They cited environmental abuse by the Navy in the past (e.g., polychlorinated biphenols
[PCB's] poisoning on Long Island, Kodiak Harbor, or discarded fuiel barrels in Kodiakes
Women's Bay). They resented the State of Alaska having to pay close to $100 million to
bid for the home port and thought this was a wasteful and unnecessary pork barrelI
The Kodiak Region - Page 606

project (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 10-2-89). In 1991, institutional and key informants thought
the Navy was now a "dead issue"; the Navy is no longer pursuing establishment of an
Alaskan home port.
Offshore oil development is a possibility around Kodiak Island. In 1981, the
Federal Government leased 13 offshore oil and gas tracts in the Lower Cook
Inlet/Sheilkof Strait area known as Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Lease Sale 60
(USFWS 1987:112). Wbile oil and gas companies have been interested in exploring for
reserves in the Shelikof Strait, no leasing for exploration or development has been
proposed or allowed on land within the Kodiak National Wildlife Refage.
Views concerning OCS development near Kodiak Island have changed over the
past 15 years. In the late 1970's, OCS activities evoked strong opposition, particularly
from fishermen concerned about potential threats to the fisheries and to the community
of Kodiak (Payne 1980). But early in the history of OCS leasing (mid-70's), there was
some mixed support for potential development, even in Kodiak villages (Davis 1979). In
the mid-1980's, Payne perceived that the attitudes he had observed in. Kodiak in the late
1970's had. changed: people in Kodiak were more willing to talk about and cooperate
with potential OCS development. Payne attributed this to (1) local peoples' 1982
experiences in worldng with Chevron to coordinate seismic tests with fishing in the
Shelikof Strait, (2) greater familiarity between local residents and oil company
representatives, (3) the downturn in the fisheries, and (4) erosion of interest in the issue
(Payne 1986:423-431).
Tie 1988 and 1989 AOSIS KI data (pre-Exxon Valdez oil spill) reveals that
Kodiak interviewees were the most optimistic about the local benefits that could accrue
from OCS developments. They did not anticipate having control over those
developments, but they believed that OCS activities would provide jobs for local people
and boost the Kodiak economy. Kodiak residents were not concemned about the possibly
harmful effects that oil and gas development could have on the environment.
Respondents felt that oil and gas development would have either no impact (57% of
respondents) or both.good and bad impacts (43% of respondents) on the environmaent.
Their level of optimism was not shared by any other region in the study, making it ironic
The Kodiak Region - Page 607





that Kodiak was the AOSIS community in the original (pre-spill) samnple most impactedI
by the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Local attitudes were radically altered by the spill.
The optimism that Kodiak residents expressed about OCS development just priorI
to the oil spill seemed unwarranted for several reasons. One would expect that Kodiak's
dependence on fishing would make residents more concemned about potential imnpacts on
that industry. The large construction projects that took place on Kodiak Island during
the early 1980's used primarily nonlocal labor (Hil 1986:354-359), so one would expect
greater doubt about local job benefits from a similar large-scale project. In addition, the
fishing economy had rebounded from its depressed State of a few years earlier; and one
would expect people to be less interested in economic alternatives.I
There are several factors that help to explain AOSIS KI respondents' views.
Kodiak informants had faith in a capitalist democracy and in technology. Among theI
reasons that respondents gave for their lack of concern about potential oil development
was their belief that oil industry technology had been perfected and that the risks were3
not that great. Concern for the environment was perceived as a trade-off for economic
benefits, improved transportation, greater availability of goods and services, and better3
medical facilities. These views are, in part, a response to the oil industry's concerted
image and media campaigns of the past decade. These views also are influenced by theï¿½
pro-development stance taken by the majority of local residents and the animosity felt by
some local residents toward environmentalists--synonymously labeled "anti-development,"3
of which there was an identifiable contingent in Kodiak even before the oil spill. A few
people responded that "every Alaskan is in the oil business" and pointed out the3
contradiction in Alaskans accepting Permanent Fund-dividend checks and oil-generated
State revenues while opposing OCS development.3
Part of the explanation for support of OCS development in Kodiak lies in the
residents' past experiences with oil and gas developments. Kodiak has a strong laborï¿½
union history dating back to the years of World War 11 construction and later earthquake
reconstruction. Many construction workers and skilled craftsmen from Kodiak obtained3
Trans-Alaska Pipeline jobs in the 1970's and thus have greater confidence in the
potential job benefits from oil and gas development. The greater diversification of

The Kodiak Region - Page 608

Kodiak's economy (particularly with a large, private service sector), greater dependence
on wage labor, and less dependence on fishing and subsistence harvesting make
community residents, on the whole, more receptive to oil and gas development.
For Kodiak Natives, the prospects of being involved in oil and gas development in
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (AN-WR) and obtaining revenues for their regional
and village corporations makes them supportive of oil and gas development in general.
Several potential staging sites for oil and gas activities--including one near Old Harbor--
have been identified on Native lands within the Kodiak region.
In 1991, 2 years after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Kodiak KI's were less positive
about the prospect of oil development than were KI's in previous years. Tleir increased
concerns about the potentially harmful effects of oil development may be largely
attributed to their experience of the spill. In response to the protocol question about the
effects of hypothetical oil projects on resources, none of the 1991 KI's thought any aspect
of oil development would have a uniformly beneficial effect on any resource. Fifteen
(47%) thought the effects would be mixed; seven (22%) thought there would be no
effects, with one adding "unless they spill it." Another EJ commented, "The effects that
are there are deleterious. But there's not a lot of effects." Ten KI's (3 1%) thought the
effects would be uniformly harmful.
In response to the question about local and outside benefits of oil development,
sixteen KF's (50%) thought the benefits would be mainly external to the Kodiak
community: "They'd probably bring their own people." Eight respondents (25%) thought
there would be local benefits but external control. Three (99%) thought local and
external control would be equal, and four (13%) said the benefits would be mainly local.
Many KI's thought that there would be some local financial benefit from a hypothetical
project but that the biggest profit would go outside. One El pointed out, "In fishing the
profit goes outside the community, and the same would be true for oil development."
There was feeling that some local people would benefit and others would not:
"Benefits would come to the local power structure. Some few token people would be
hired but probably mostly from Texas." Ki's had specific ideas about groups that would
benefit from oil development. One said that retail and real estate businesses in Kodiak
The Kodiak Region - Page 609






would do well. Another person, referring not to Kodiak. but to the possible opening of
ANWYR, said, 'The real money is in the royalties. The primnary benefit will go to
stockholders of Native corporations. Next will be royalties to State and Federal
Government."
There were many comments about the potential social impact of an. oil
development project on the Kodiak community. Several Ki's said there would be an
increase in population, one complaining, "It's too big already." They noted that there
would be a need for more schools. One said, `[A] boom town itself has an effect on the5
environ-ment," and another, "Thbe more people using the resources, the more negative
effect it would have."I
T'here was concemn that oil development would bring more social problems, such
as alcohol abuse, drugs, and crime, especially if there were an additional transient
population. (One woman asked, "Have you noticed how most of the crimnes here now
are caused by transients?") One KI said there would be a need for additional resources3
"to cope with people whose lives are unstable." Another thought the problem would
stabilize in a few years: "The first people who come in and do the drilling are a rough
and transient bunch. After that it settles into a normal Alaskan community; they're
committed to maldng a home and settling here."5
Two KI's mentioned that there would be opposition in Kodiak to oil development
in the area. In regard to the social effects of a hypothetical project, one said, "Probably3
beneficial--except they'd have a big fight in this community." In regard to the "fight," this
KI was referring to the environmnentalists who have become- stronger and more vocal in3
Kodiak since the oil spill.
The Kodiak Environmental Network (KEN), organized in early 1991, is an5
outgrowth of the Crude Women, a loosely defined group that formed in summer 1989
following the spill and served variously as a support and political activist group. TheI
KEN is more formal, having as its purpose the dissemination of information to the public
and the provision of a forum for discussion of local environtmental issues. A subgroup of5
KEN, the Forest Practices Group, has done research on logging practices on Afognak.


The Kodiak Region - Page 6103

In March 1991, KEN sponsored a public forum to discuss the issue of logging around the
Kitoi Hatchery. Another forum on waste management in Kodiak was held in May 1991.
Native Cornorations: Koniag, Inc., the Kodiak regional for-profit corporation, is
one of 13 Native regional for-profit corporations established under the requirements of
the ANCSA. Of its approximately 3,400 shareholders, about one-third are residents of
the Kodiak Island area, one-third live on the Alaska mainland, and one-third reside
elsewhere, mostly in the U.S.
Koniag's major asset is the land it received under ANCSA, but conveyance of this
land is not yet complete. As a result of its merger with several village corporations,
Koniag obtained some critical bear-habitat-land holdings within the Karluk and Sturgeon
River drainages of the Kodiak National Wildlife Refuge. These lands are subject to
ANCSA Section 22(g) which gives the U.S. right of first refusal in the event the lands are
sold and stipulates that those lands will "remain subject to the laws and regulations
governing use or development of such refuge." Thus, although Native village corporation
lands conveyed under ANCSA are privately owned and no longer part of the refuge,
FWS retains control over the use and development of those lands (USFWS 1987).
Because of Federal restrictions on its refuge lands, Koniag has attempted to
exchange a portion of the affected lands for lands with greater economic potential
elsewhere. The corporation has pursued a land exchange with the U.S. Department of
the Interior wherein the corporation would trade the surface estate to 112,000 acres of
critical-bear-habitat lands it owns within the Kodiak National Wildlife Refuge for oil and
gas interests in ANWR. Koniag, not the only Native corporation to pursue such an
exchange, has been joined by two village corporations in the Kodiak region--Old Harbor
Native Corporation and Akhiok-Kaguyak, Inc.--and by Doyon Limited; Gana-a'Yoo
Limited (a Doyon region village corporation); and the Native Lands Group (comprised
of Cook Inlet Region, Inc., Aleut Corporation, and 11 village corporations) (USFWS
n.d.). The total amount of land included in these Native corporation exchanges is
891,000 acres.
The ANWR land exchange has been approved by Koniag's shareholders but needs
to be ratified by Congress and executed by the Secretary of the Interior. The exchange
The Kodiak Region - Page 611





is conditional on Congress opening ANWR for oil and gas development. However, thisR
land exchange caused controversy among Native shareholders because of the different
ways in which people perceive land and the uses to which it is put. Some shareholders
did not want to exchange lands on which they have extracted their subsistence resources
for generations. To these Natives, these lands were their spaces--areas in which they
gained their livelihoods and to which they had assigned significant symbols. Tle Native
corporations negotiated a stipulation in the ANWR exchange agreements that they would
never lose subsistence rights on the refuge land that they were exchanging. Yet even
with these assurances, some shareholders preferred that the land remain in Native
ownership.I
Koniag has worked to establish a national constituency of political and
environmental support for the land exchange. Efforts to open ANWR had gainedg
legislative momentum and bills were before Congress when the March 1989 Exxon
Valdez oil spill occu-rred. The prospects of ANVWR being opened for oil and gasI
development and the land exchanges being approved were very unlikely soon after the
1989 oil spill (Alaska Business Monthly, August 1989). However, the Persian Gulf war,
which was occurring at the time the February 1991 research was conducted, again raised
discussion of opening ANWR. Koniag has continued to pursue the ANWR land ex-5
change and to develop support for it in Congress.
In terms of investing the funds it received from the Alaska Native Fund, Koniag3
has been unsuccessful, as have all but 2 of the 13 regional for-profit corporations. In the
late 1970's, Koniag owned a fishing and navigation equipment store, 2 construction3
companies, an accounting firm, and a helicopter, and was part of a consortium with other
regional corporations in a shipping company and petrochemical venture (Davis 1979:63).3
In 1979, Koniag entered into a partnership with 4 Native regional corporations and a
major oil company and successfulfly bid on various oil lease tracts in the Beaufort Sea.j
Koniag took a loss and got out of this venture in 1988. The corporation also had
interests in -a seafood processing and marketing operation, a merchandise sales3
operation, and commercial properties in Kodiak, all of which were discontinued or sold
between 1982 and 1986.3
The Kodiak Region - Page 612g

Koniag suffered huge operating losses in the early 1980's that were compounded
by costly legal s-uits. In 1980, Koniag merged with 6 of the 13 ANCSA village
corporations; but 4 of those corporations subsequently sued Koniag and de-merged in
1984. Koniag is still party to 2 lawsuits in connection with agreements negotiated during
the time of its merger with these village corporations and also is confronted with
arbitration demanded by Sealaska Corporation that involves whether an energy lease
option Koniag received is subject to ANCSA Section 7(i) sharing provisions.
Koniag has been rebuilding its financial position, has reported profits since 1985,
and has even begun distributing small dividends to shareholders. Since 1985, its major
souarce of income has from the sale of some of its net operating losses (NOLs) to
companies interested in purchasing tax benefits. A provision of the 1986 Tax Reform
Act allows ANCSA corporations to m ake their NOLs available to third parties that can
use the losses to offset current or future earnings. Another major source of income has
been energy-resource-option payments from certain oil companies for lease rights on
ANWR property for which Koniag is negotiating the land exchange. Koniag also
receives income from other regional corporations according to ANSCA Section 7(i) and
from interest on investments..
Natives of Kodiak, the Native profit corporation for Kodiak City, was classified as
an'urban corporation, under ANCSA. It has 620 shareholders, one-third of whom reside
locally and two-thirds in other places. Natives of Kodiak has followed a conservative
investment strategy: maajor assets include a portfolio of liquid assets, investments in
timber resource management (the corporation owns 25 percent of Koncor Forest Prod-
ucts Company), and 23,040 acres of land in the vicinity of Kodiak City, mostly near the
USCG Base.
Economnic Indicators: Kodiak is prosperous compared to other regions in Alaska.
According to the 1988 and 1989 KI data, Kodiak had the highest overall annual
household incomes of the seven regions included in the Social Indicators Study. In 1988,
68 percent of Kodiak KI households made over $40,000; in 1989, nearly 50 percent did
so; and in 1991, 66 percent. In both 1988 and 1989, nearly 75 percent of KI households
made over $30,000; and in 1991, 81 percent did so. None of the 1991 Kodiak KIT's had
The Kodiak Region - Page 613

an annual household income under $10,000, and only 6 percent had an income underI
$20,000. There is little dependence on government sources of earned income; and
incomes are, for the most part, stable or predictably seasonal.
The Kodiak economy, buoyed by stable salmon harvest levels and high prices and
by the growth in bottomfishing, had been good for several years before the.Exxon Valdez
oil spill. The city's port ranked in the top four U.S. ports in dollar value of product
landed (Alaska Business Monthly, 1990:58). The Kodiak unemployment rate is one of
the lowest in the State, and service industries must pay higher than minimum wage to
attract workers (Alaska Department of Community and Regional Affairs 1988a:35). The
Kodiak real estate market was robust in 1988, the strongest it had been since the king f
crab fishery crashed. Housing sales were strong, with prices slowly increasing. Apart-
ment and rental housing was almnost completely occupied in 1987, 1988, and 1989. Retailj
and office space had zero percent and 5 percent vacancy rates, respectively, throughout
1988 (Alaska Business Monthly, March 1989:42-43) and 1989 (Alaska Business Monthly,3
March 1990:61).
There are several other signs of prosperity in Kodiak. One of the processing
plants and many of the fishing boats, including several of the largest trawl vessels, are
owned by local residents. Housing and other physical structures are generally in good5
repair, with some very nice homes in and around Kodiak City. The particular mix of
products and services available in Kodiak reveals that the local population has a goodj
deal of disposable income. For example, there is a local gold, silver, and platinum
dealer; several hot tub stores; and a number of jewelry stores and art dealers. High-3
priced cocaine is purported to be available. Travel agents report that many local
residents take fairly extensive and expensive vacations.I
Yet there are economic disparities in Kodiak, both within Kodiak City and
between Kodiak City and the outlying villages. The AOSIS KI income data indicate that
there is a segment of low-income earners on the island who tend to be wage workers in
fish processing and the service sector and people from the villages. There also are3
disparities in terms of standard of living, with the range of housing accommodations
being one obvious indicator.

The Kodiak Region - Page 614

Housing in Kodiak has been a problem since the early 1970's due to the lack of
land for development, inadequate financing, and limitation of the city water and sewer
systems (Payne 1980; HUIl 1986:372). The higher percentage of condominiums, duplexes,
four-plexes, and apartments is related not only to these factors but is partly explained by
transience and income disparities. The situiation of many people living in one apartment
that Payne noted in relation to Filipinos (1980:129) appears to extend to other segments
of the population as well, e.g., cannery and construction workers. There are several large
government-subsidized housing projects for low-income households.
Homelessness is a problem in Kodiak C ity. Kodiak has had problems with "street
people"; Kodiak was the end of the ferry line and a hope for a new beginning for many
of them. Public building lobbies are closed at night to probibit transients from sleeping
in them. The lack of housing has forced transient workers to live in World War 11 Army
bunkers and abandoned structures, vans and tents, and other makeshift housing, and to
squat on public and private land (Payne 1980; Hill 1986:378). The Gibson Cove
campground, created by Kodiak City and the Kodiak Island Borough to serve the needs
of transient workers and summer visitors, became permanent living quarters for a
number of people (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 11-10-89). It was closed during the winter of
1990-1991.
Kodiak Island villages primarily rely economically on the salmon fisheries and
resemble Bristol Bay communities more than Kodiak City. The fishery is more seasonal
and more vulnerable to variations in the salmon stock. Natives concentrate on the
salmon fishery because it is conducted from smaller boats that fish closer to shore. Ile
high price of salmon in recent years has driven up the price of limited-entry salmon
fishing permits, especially in Southwest Alaska; and many fishermen have been alienated.
The number and percentage of limited-entry sahmon permits held by Natives living in
Kodiak villages has declined since initial distribution, primarily due to permit sales to
non-Natives, with some migration (of the permit holders) contributing to the rural
decline (Langdon 1986:54-78).
Problems that confront fishermen in general have had particularly dire
consequences for Kodiak villagers who are less able to compete with the increasingly
The Kodiak Region - Page 615

large commercial fishing operations and the spiraling costs of maintaining vessels and
equipmient (KANA 1985). High energy costs and transportation problems (few carriers,
small planes) limit their marketing potential. Village fishermen generally have earned
less than Kodiak City fishermen, particularly in the crab fisheries.
Consumer Prices: The cost of living in Kodiak is generally high. The housing
market is tight and the most expensive among the AOSIS sample communities. A two-
bedroom house costs between $75,000 and -$ 135,000; a house with three or more
bedrooms averages $125,000 to $185,000 (Kodiak Chamber of Commerce 1989). A one-
bedroom apartment rents for $500 to $600 per month, a two-bedroom apartment for
$850 to $950 per month, and an apartment with three or more bedrooms for $950 to
$1200 per month. USCG personnel receive a housing allowance for living in town, which
fLurther reduces housing availability and inflates prices. Landlords reportedly prefer toj
rent to USCG people because landlords know they will pay and be there for 2 to 3 years,
thereby guaranteeing more tenant "stability."5
In the past, consumer prices and the cost of living in Kodiak City have been
higher than prices in Anchorage, Seattle, and the U.S. in general. Prices in Kodiak
villages have been even higher, alt'hough detailed price data documenting these
comparisons is limited (Hill 1986:388-394). In 1983, KANA personnel estimated that
food prices in the villages were about 20 percent higher than in Kodiak based on a
comparison of bread, flour, coffee, meat, eggs, canned- vegetables, and sugar for a familyj
of four for one meal. In 1985, construction costs were estimated at $90 per square foot
in the villages and $60 per square foot in Kodiak (KANA 1985). Energy prices are alsoI
particularly high in Kodiak villages (Kodiak Island Borough 1998b:3-8). The differential
in energy prices between Kodiak City and Kodiak villages increased after construction of
the Terror Lake hydroelectric power project reduced the costs paid by residents of the
road-connected areas. Port Lions is the only village that receives power from Terrorj
Lake.
Tables 11 through 13 provide price data collected in Kodiak in the spring of 1988,3
1989, 1990, and 1991 for the AOSIS project. Tables 11-A, 11-B, 11-C, and 11-D
compare retail prices of food items for these 4 years. These tables indicate that food
The Kodiak Region - Page 616

Table 11-A
RETAIL FOOD PRICES IN KODIAK CITY, 1988


Commodity	Store A	Store B	Store C


White flour, 10 lb	$ 3.99	$ 3.45	$ 4.30
Evaporated milk, 12 oz	.75	.81	.78
Onions, 1 lb	.89	.59	.59
Cooking oil, 48 oz	3.19	3.93	3.94
Cola, 6-pack	2.69	2.69	2.69
Sugar, 10 lb	4.49	5.23	4.59
Cornflakes, 16 oz	2.25	2.39	2.91
White bread, 18 oz	1.55	1.55	1.49
Bacon, 1 lb	2.69	2.69	2.98
Coffee, 3 lb	9.59	10.05	9.46
Butter, 1 lb	2.99	2.97	2.19
Powdered milk, 12 qt	5.59	6.75	7.23
Punch mix, 24-26 oz	2.79	3.19	3.14a

Total Cost	$43.45	$46.29	$46.29
Source: Field data 1988.
a The 39-oz price adjusted to 24 oz. This figure was used in computing the total for
this store.
The Kodiak Region - Page 617

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Table 11-B

RETAIL FOOD PRICES IN KODIAK CITY, 1989


Commodity	Store A	Store B	Store C


White flour, 10 lb	$ 3.29	$ 3.35	$ 4.98
Evaporated milk, 12 oz	.63	.63	.67
Onions, 1 lb	.59	.79	.59
Cooking oil, 48 oz	3.09	2.79	3.85
Cola, 6-pack	1.99	2.99	2.79
Sugar, 10 lb	4.59	5.67	5.41
Cornflakes, 18 oz	2.45	2.35	2.75
White bread, 22-24 oz	1.55	.99	.99
Bacon, 1 lb	1.49	1.89	2.49
Coffee, 3 lb	8.59	9.65	9.15
Butter, 1 lb	2.15	1.85	2.19
Powdered milk, 12 qt	5.59	7.29	7.23
Punch mix, 24-26 oz	3.09	3.19	3.61

Total Cost	$39.09	$43.43	$46.70
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Source: Field data 1989.
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The Kodiak Region - Page 618
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Table 11-C
RETAIL FOOD PRICES IN KODIAK CITY, 1990


Commodity	Store A	Store B	Store C


White flour, 10 lb	$ 3.85	$ 3.75	$ 5.30
Evaporated milk, 12 oz	.63	.75	.75
Onions, 1 lb	.99	.99	.69
Cooking oil, 48 oz	3.09	2.93	4.07
Cola, 6-pack	1.89	2.99	2.79
Sugar, 10 lb	4.99	5.01	5.60
Cornflakes, 18 oz	1.95	2.61	2.85
White bread, 22-24 oz	1.09	1.69	1.39
Bacon, 1 lb	1.89	1.69	2.09
Coffee, 3 lb	10.33a	10.18a	10.11a
Butter, 1 lb	2.43	1.69	2.19
Powdered milk, 12 qt	5.69	8.07	8.12
Punch mix, 24-26 oz	3.19	3.43	3.72

Total Cost	$42.01	$45.78	$49.67


Source: Field data 1990.
a The 39-oz price adjusted to 48 oz.
The Kodiak Region - Page 619

I
Table 11-D
RETAIL FOOD PRICES IN KODIAK
CITY, 1991

Commodity	Store A	Store B	Store C


White flour, 10 lb	$ 3.39	$ 3.89	$ 5.31
Evaporated milk, 12 oz	.69	.73	.71
Onions, 1 lb	.99	.99	.79
Cooking oil, 48 oz	3.49	3.75	3.07
Cola, 6-pack	1.89	3.19	2.99
Sugar, 10 lb	4.99	5.15	5.99
Cornflakes, 18 oz	2.19	2.69	2.91
White bread, 22-24 oz	1.09	.99	1.09
(.69)b
Bacon, 1 lb	1.89	2.19	2.29
Coffee, 3 lb	8.60 a	10.77a	10.33a
(9.35)b	(8.92)"
Butter, 1 lb                           2.45	2.79           2.19
(2.59)b
Powdered milk, 12 qt	6.91	6.59c	5.22c
Punch mnix, 24-26 oz	3.99	4.23	3.58

Total Cost	$42.56	$47.95	$46.47
I
Source: Field data 1990.
a The 39-oz price adjusted to 48 oz.
b Sale price. Total costs do not include sale prices.
c The 20-qt price adjusted to 12 qt.


prices in Kodiak decreased by approximately 5 percent from 1988 to 1989, then increased
by approximately 6 percent from 1989 to 1990. The decrease probably was due to
increased competition between stores after the opening of a Safeway in Kodiak in 1987.
It may also have been due partly to increased competition from large warehouse stores
in Anchorage (such as Price Savers or Costco) that ship to rural areas, or to the
introduction in Kodiak of lower-priced brands of some items. The increase in prices
The Kodiak Region - Page 620

from 1989 to 1990 probably is attributable to local supply and demand factors resulting
from the Exxon Valdez oil spill. There was little change in prices from 1990 to 1991;
some residents thought that prices were inflated in Kodiak following the oil spill and had
never come down.
Tables 12-A, 12-B, 12-C, and 12-E compare the retail prices of nonfood items
available at the same stores checked for food items. Few of these nonfood items are
available at Stores A, B, and C; however, unavailable items generally can be found in
specialized local hardware, camping, or boating stores (see Tables 12-D and 12-F).
Different items are included in the tables displaying nonfood-commodity prices in the
first 2 years (1988 and 1989) and the last 2 years (1990 and 1991) of AOSIS research,
because nonfood items were priced in specialty stores only in 1990 and 1991.
Tables 13-A, 13-B, 13-C, and 13-D present data on labor rate comparisons for
Kodiak in 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1991. These tables show that each type of labor service
is available in Kodiak, and there is a market price for that labor.


Table 12-A

RETAIL NONFOOD PRICES IN KODIAK CITY, 1988


Commodity	Store A	Store B         Store C


D-batteries, 2 pk	$2.79	$	4.07	$3.75
Blazo fuel, I gal	n/aa	5.99	n/a
Outboard, 40 hp	n/a          2,740.00	n/a
Pampers, 12 pk	5.49	5.23	5.29
Axe handle	n/a	7.00	n/a
Gas, reg., 1 gal	n/a	2.50	n/a
Motor oil, 1 qt	.59	n/a	1.49
Source: Field data 1988.
a "n/a" means the item was not available at that store.
The Kodiak Region - Page 621

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Table 12-B
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RETAIL NONFOOD PRICES IN KODIAK CITY, 1989


Commodity	Store A	Store B	Store C


D-batteries, 2 pk	$1.79	$2.07	$3.75
Blazo fuel, 1 gal	n/ab	6.03	n/a
Pampers, 12 pk	3.32a	3.37a	3.24a
Motor oil, 1 qt	1.09	1.64	1.39


Source: Field data 1989.
a Price for the 48 pk adjusted to 12 pk.
b "n/a" means the item was not available at that store.



Table 12-C

RETAIL NONFOOD PRICES IN KODIAK CITY, 1990


Commodity	Store A         Store B	Store C


D-batteries, 2 pk	$2.46	$2.13	$3.75
Pampers, 12 pk	5.59	5.55	4.47a
Motor oil, 1 qt	1.53	1.63	1.69

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Source: Field data 1990.
a Price for the 16 pk adjusted to 12 pk.







The Kodiak Region - Page 622
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Table 12-D
RETAIL NONFOOD PRICES IN KODIAK CITY SPECIALTY STORES, 1990
Price
Commodity
$   1.48a
4.69
2,648.00
48.99
8.25
7,000.00
Regular gas, 1 gal
Blazo fuel, 1 gal
Outboard engine, 30 hp
Coleman lantern, 1 mantel
Axe handle for 2.5 lb axe
Skiff, 16-ft

Source: Field data 1990.
a Rounded to nearest cent.


Table 12-E

RETAIL NONFOOD PRICES IN KODIAK CITY, 1991


Commodity	Store A	Store B	Store C


D-batteries, 2 pk	$1.99	$3.49	$3.59
Pampers, 12 pk	3.19a	5.10b	3.87b
Motor oil, 1 qt	1.89	n/ac	1.49
(1.69)d
Source: Field data 1991.
a Price for the 18 pk adjusted to 12 pk.
b Price for the 14 pk adjusted to 12 pk.
c "n/a" means the item was not available at that store.
d Sale price
The Kodiak Region - Page 623

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Table 12-F

RETAIL NONFOOD PRICES IN KODIAK CITY SPECIALTY STORES, 1991
I
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;
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Price
Commodity

Regular gas, 1 gal                   $	1.39a
Blazo fuel, 1 gal	4.69
Outboard engine, 30 hp               2,454.00
Coleman lantern, 1 mantel	48.99
Axe handle for 2.5 lb axe	7.29
Skiff, 16-ft                         1,994.00


Source: Field data 1991.
a Price in June 1991; all others in March 1991.


Table 13-A
LABOR RATES IN KODIAK CITY, 1988


Labor Category	Rate


Motor repair	$40/hr
Net hanging, 50 fathoms	$200
Spot-welding	$48/hr
Rough carpentry                                $10-$18/hr;
$24/hr (union)
Plumbing	$40/hr
Electrical	$50/hr
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Source: Field data.
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The Kodiak Region - Page 624
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Table 13-B
LABOR RATES IN KODIAK CITY, 1989
Labor Category
Rate
Motor repair
Net hanging, 50 fathoms
Spot-welding
Rough carpentry
Plumbing
Electrical
$40_$50/hra
$200
$48-
$53/hrb
$25-$35/hrc
$45-$50/hr
$40-$60/hr?
Source: Field data.

This charge varies depending on whether it is a boat, car, or plane engine. This price
is for cars and some boats.
b This charge varies according to whether the service is in or out of the proprietor's
shop. Out-of-shop repairs cost more.
The lower rate is for residential construction and the higher rate is for commercial
construction; both are union scale.
d Range of prices quoted by different contractors.

Table 13-C
LABOR RATES IN KODIAK CITY, 1990
Labor Category
Rate
Motor repair
Net hanging, 50 fathoms
Spot-welding
Rough carpentry
Plumbing
Electrical
$45-$48/hra
$10-$3 1/hr
$48-$53/hr-
$25-$35/hrb
$45/hr
$25-$50/hrd
Source: Field data.
a The lower charge is for small engines; the higher is for automobiles.
b Range of prices quoted by different contractors.
C The lower rate is for in-shop repairs; the higher is for out-of-shop repairs.
d The lower rate is for an electrical apprentice; the higher is for a journeyman.
The Kodiak Region - Page 625

Table 13-D
LABOR RATES IN KODLAK CITY, 19915


Labor Category                                        Rate5


Motor repair	$48/hr
Net hanging, 50 fathoms	$31/hr
Spot-welding	$50/hr
Rough carpentry	$354$41/hra
Plumbing	$45-$50/hra
Electrical                                         $50/hri


Source: Field data.3
aRange of prices quoted by different contractors.


III.C. Health, Education, and Social Services
Health: Public and private health care services are available on Kodiak Island5
through various facilities and programs. Kodiak has a local hospital, several clinics, and
a number of private medical practices. Health care is supported by the Federal, State,5
and borough Governments. The health care professionals that provide these services
reside locally and include physicians, chiropractors, dentists, optomnetrists, pharmacists,j
registered nurses, public health employees, and various kinds of therapists. Most health
concerns can be treated in Kodiak, but specialized surgeries and nonemergency hospitalj
care for Natives and military personnel still require trips to Anchorage or Seattle.
Kodiak Island Hospital is owned by the Kodiak Island Borough and operated
under a management contract by The Lutheran Hospitals and Homes Society of America
management company (Kodiak Island Borough 1990b). The hospital is a 25-bed, acute-
care facility with obstetrics, emergency care, surgery, and intensive and coronary care. A
19-bed intermediate-care facility connected to the hospital offers 24-hour nursingI
services. The hospital serves the entire region and treats Natives and military personnel,


The Kodiak Region - Page 6263

who have access to clinics and government hospitals, on an emergency basis. Ile
hospital treats indigents and also houses inebriates overnight when no other facilities are
available.
The Kodiak Island Borough has sought funding from the State legislature to build
a new hospital facility with a hypothermia unit and greater radiology, surgical, outpatient,
and records-storage capacity. A site on Rezanof Drive was purchased, and site work and
design of the facility have been completed; construction of the building can begin on
receipt of State funding. The new hospital is the number one project on the borough's
CIP list (Kodiak Island Borough 1991). The borough wants the State to contribute
$14 million toward the estimated total cost of $18 million (Kodiak Daily Nirror,
1-3-90:3). The borough has proposed to convert the old hospital into a Pioneer Home--a
State facility for elderly people who have lived in Alaska for 25 or more years (Kodiak
Daily Mlirror, 1-3-90:11).
Tle Kodiak Island Mental Health Center, a direct service agency of the borough,
has 26 fuilltime employees who provide out-patient counseling and training,
psychotherapy, crisis intervention, referral and treatment plans, community education,
and in-patient emergency service through the Kodiak Island Hospital. By 1989, the
average monthly case load had increased more than 400 percent in a 7-year period
(Kodliak Island Borough 1990b).
Following the Exxon Valdez oil spill, several respondents cited estimates that the
demand for services at the mental health center had increased by as much as 700 percent
(Hofimeister field notes 1990). An analysis based on caseload statistics provided by the
mental health center reveals that during the 12 months preceding the oil spill (April 1988
through March 1989), 1,245 clients (10 3.50 per month average) visited the clinic a total
of 4,609 times (384.08 per month average). Of these 1,245 clients, 521 were new, for an
average of 43.42 new clients per month. During the 12 months following the spill (April
1989 through March 1990), a total of 2,176 clients (181.33 per month average) visited the
clinic a total of 6,103 times (508.58 per month average). Of these 2,176 clients, 553 were
new, for an average of 46.08 new clients per month. In a comparison of the postspill
period with the prespill period, the number of individual clients increased 78.4 percent,
The Kodiak Region - Page 627

visits increased 32.4 percent, and new clients increased 6.1 percent. While the number of
clients increased significantly after the spill, the number of visits per client decreased
from 3.6 to 2.8. Nearly 75.0 percent of the postspill clients were returnees, suggesting
that mental health problems predating the spill were exacerbated by the spill.
Data on emergency use of the facility are even more revealing. During the year
preceding t,he oil spill, 259 clients (21.58 per month average) were treated on an
emergency basis a total of 505 times (42.08 per mouth average), whereas for the year
following the oil spill, a total of 636 clients (53 per month average) visited 1,112 times
(92.67 per month average). The number of emergency clients and visits thus increased
145.6 percent and 120.2 percent, respectively, in the course of I year. Although these
data do not support the higher percentages popularly circulated, they do substantiate
respondents' claims that the Exxon Valdez oil spill increased emotional tensions in the
community.
Mental health services also are provided by KANA. The Kodiak Alliance for the
Mentally III works to promote better education, more services, and advocacy and
research for the mentally ill (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 10-4-89:6).
Tle KANA, which contracts with the Federal Government through the Indian
Health Service to provide health care for Natives in Kodiak and outlying villages,
receives both Federal and State grants. The KANA operates the Alutiiq Enwa Medical
and Dental Clinics in Kodiak, which support a regional health care network of six village
clinics staffed by community health practitioners and aides. In addition, KANA
administers various other health-related programs for the villages, including Community
Health Services (which has helped several villages get grants for suicide prevention
projects), the Me-ntal Health Programi, and the Alcohol-Outreach Program (with a Drug-
Free Schools component). A Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) Program and Senior
Citizens Program administered by KANA help to meet nutritional.needs in village
communities. The KANA is continuing efforts to subcontract for local implementation
and -management of the Indian Child Welfare Programs and the Community Health
Representative Programs.
The Kodiak Region - Page 628

Through the Alaska Department of Health and Social Services, the State operates
the Kodiak Health Center, a public clinic. Through this center an itinerant public health
nurse travels to Kodiak Island villages to provide prevention and education services. The
Federal Government operates a medical and dental clinic and a pharmacy on the USCG
Base for military personnel.
Education: The Kodiak Island Borough School District operates public schools
throughout the Kodiak Island Archipelago. Located in Kodiak are one senior high
school (Grades 9-12), one junior high school (Grades 6-8), and three elementary schools
(Grades K-5), one of which includes preschoolers. The district operates village schools
in Port Lions, Larsen Bay, Karluk, Akhiok, Ouzinkie, Chiniak, and Old Harbor. There is
a one-room school at Danger Bay on Afognak Island, the site of a logging camp.
During the 1988-1989 school year, district student enrollment in Grades K through
12 was 2,294; 2,101 students attended schools on the road system, and 293 attended
village schools (Kodiak Chamber of Commerce 1989). Total enrollment for the first
quarter of the 1989-1990 school year was 2,388 in Grades Pre through 12, with 294
students enrolled in village schools (Kodiak Island Borough School District 1990). In the
first quarter of the 1990-1991 school year, total enrollment was 2,473, with 290
students in village schools. Table 14 shows the breakdown of village school enrollment
by village and class size.
The school district sponsors a strong basic skills program, and vocational
offerings also are extensive. The KANA has been worldng with the district to implement
an Alutiiq Studies curriculum. Japanese is offered as a foreign language in recognition
of Kodiak's growing commercial connections with Japan. The district also has language
programs to assist students who do not speak English.
School district funding comes primarily from the State of Alaska. Of $14,704,667
in revenues for the 1987-1988 school year, State funding of $12,610,444 accounted for
86 percent of revenues, local funding of $1,902,728 was 13 percent of revenues, and
Federal funding of $191,495 was I percent of revenues. Declining revenues from the
State necessitated increased school funding from the borough. Total projected revenues
for the 1988-1989 school year were $15,571,370. The State contributed $12,170,500,
The Kodiak Region - Page 629

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Table 14

VILLAGE SCHOOL ENROLLMENTS IN THE KODIAK ISLAND BOROUGH
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 1989-1990

Grades	Grades
Village	K-8	9-12           Total



Akhiok	21	2	23
Chiniak	26	3	29
Danger Bay	12	a	12
Karluk	16	2	18
Larsen Bay	21	8	29
Old Harbor	60	23	83
Ouzinkie	28	14	42
Port Lions	38	18	56

Total	222	70	292


Source: Kodiak Island Borough School District 1990.
a Grades 9-12 not offered at Danger Bay.


while the local government contributed $3,150,870 and the Federal Government
contributed $250,000 (Kodiak Island Borough School District 1989). Although
enrollments increased by nearly 100 students, the district budget for the 1989-1990 school
year was $15,481,264--$90,000 less than for 1988-1989 (Kodiak Island Borough School
District 1990). A $16,100,000 budget for 1990-1991 sought to keep pace with continued
increased enrollment. This included a State contribution of $12,429,000, local funding in
the amount of $3,275,000, and a Federal contribution of $329,000 (Kodiak Island
Borough 1991).
In addition to public education for Grades K through 12, the State maintains
Kodiak College, a local campus of the University of Alaska-Anchorage, where students
may obtain 2-year associate degrees. There are several private, church-operated schools
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The Kodiak Region - Page 630

in Kodiak, including Kodiak Christian School (Grades K-7), a Seventh Day Adventist
school (Grades 1-8), and Saint Mary's Catholic School (Grades 1-8). Saint Herman's
Theological Seminary, the graduate educational institution of the Alaska Russian
Orthodox Church, trains Russian Orthodox church leaders--mostly Alaska Natives--from
all over the State.
According to AOSIS KI data, most Kodiak interviewees (86%l in -1989 and 56% in
1991) think there is a strong association between formal schoolinig and success. This may
be due partly to the fact that, as reported by some community officials, Kodiak has a
well-educated population. Many interviewees reported that they stress "getIting a good
education" with their children. Several interviewees commented that having an
education is more important now than in the past and that a person needs more
knowledge to be a comnmercial fisherman. Yet even those who said education.is
important for success often cited examples of successful fishermen who have little formal
education. Some interviewees said that book learniing needs'to be accompanied by
common sense and "hands-on experience." It appears that people also recognize and
respect the skills and knowledge that are acquired through work and through life in
general.
Fewer 1991 KI's thought there was a strong association between education and
success than was true in 1989. There was even an educator among the KI's who thought
there. was only an occasional association. One person said that informal education was
more important, and another that everyone needs a basic education buat beyond that it
depends on the individual. Two KI's said that education probably was less important
than it used to be. Another said that what a person needs to learn is to "buy low and
sell high." Despite the apparent decrease of confidence in the value of "a lot of'-
education, however, 1991 IC comments indicated that most had high respect for both
formal and informal education.
Social Services: Divorces, domestic violence, alcohol and drug abuse, and mental
health problems are not new phenomena in Kodiak (Payne 1986:437-447). Several
explanations have been offered for these problenis. Relationship problems are thought
to be linked to the disproportionate numbers of males to females, to the high degree of
The Kodiak Region - Page 631





transience, and to the dependence/independence problems associated with fishingU
communities and lifestyle (Payne 1980). Reasons given for alcohol and drug abuse
include social interaction patterns associated with fishing (i.e., bars are places to obtain
jobs, celebrate fishing success, or relax after long and intense periods at sea),
involvement in high-risk occupations, and the high-risk consequences of prosperity (e.g.,
cocaine abuse). Mental health problems have been associated with depression, anxiety
and personal crisis, isolation, long periods of inclement weather, and fluctuations in the
economy (Alaska Consultants 1979; Payne 1986:437-438; Cultural Dynamics 1986).g
Alcohol and drug abuse continue to be the major social problems in Kodiak. The
Kodiak police chief estirmated that 80 percent of the department's requests for service,
excluding niinor traffic violations, are alcohol-related (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 11-29-89:1;
see also the 4-part series on Kodiak public inebriates, Kodiak Daily Mirror, 11-29-89:1,
12-1-89:1, 12-6-89:1, 12-8-89:1).
Kodiak City and the Kodiak Island Borough have sought to establish a5
detoxification center for public inebriates as part of the Kodiak Council on Alcoholism's
(KCA's) program (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 12-27-89:1). Initially, the detox center was to be
placed in the Saint Francis homeless shelter now under construction. Currently the KCA
is worling to obtain approval from the borough's planning and zoning office to open the
facility in one of its existing buildings in downtown Kodiak (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 6-4-
91:3).3
One 1989,interviewee, who had lived and worked in Kodiak for years, indicated
that there is a good deal of dr-ug traffic in Kodiak and said, "The money isn't in the fish,5
it is in the drugs." Several interviewees thought that cocaine use had increased as a
direct result of shorter fishing openings, which require a more intense and nonstop work
effort for the entire opening (often 36 or 48 hours). Recovering alcoholics and drug
users are often encouraged to stay away from fishing because of the associations with
alcohol and drug use, although use of these substances is not limited to the fishing
segments of the Kodiak population.U
Domestic violence, divorce, mental illness, and other social indicators of stress
also are present in Kodiak. One interviewee commented that Kodiak suffers from some               *
The Kodiak Region - Page 632

of the problenis associated with port towns throughout history and that it has its share of
people who are "on the run, either running from the law or froni themselves." Another
interviewee described Kodiak as "Mayberry by day, Lower East Side by night" (which fits,
in a way, with Payne's earlier description of Kodiak as a town of extremes [Payne
1980:79]).
The wide variety of social services available to Kodiak residents is, in part, a
response to these various social problems. These services are well publicized through
brochures, newspaper articles and advertisements, and radio announcements. Most of
the service providers have permanent offices in Kodiak and are quite visible.
There are several alcohol and druig treatment programs in Kodiak. The KCA is a
city agency that receives grants from the Alaska Department of Health and Social
Services and the Federal Government. The council operates Hope House, a 30-day
residential treatment program that provides counseling and assistance for people with
alcohol and drug problems, and "Wings," a residential youth treatment program (Kodiak
Daily Mirror, 9-19-89:10). The KCA is the official referral agency for the courts and the
police. South Central Area Alcohol Training (SCAAT), housed at Saint Hermans
Seminary, provides substance-abuse-counselor training and educational workshops in
Kodiak and villages in the region. An alcobol program is administered by KANA, and
alcohol counselig also is available through local churches. Self-help groups in Kodiak
include Alcoholics Anonymous, Al-Anon, Narcotics Anonymous, Adult Children of
Alcoholics, and Alateen. The Dry Dock club, a place for recreation and relaxation in a
nonalcoholic atmosphere, has been operated by volunteers since early 1990.
A sobriety movement on Kodiak Island gained momentum in 1988 and 1989
among some segments of fishermen and in some of the villages. Several study
participants reported that some owners were hiring only sober people. The sobriety
movement in the villages was spurred, in part, by a conference held by elders from the
Alkali Lakes Program and the Four Worlds Development Conference, a Ntv
American alcohol recovery program based in Alberta, Canada. The sobriety movement
has suffered some setbacks since the March 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill; for example,
some thought that in Akhiok the stresses caused by the spill cleanup, combined with the
The Kodiak Region - Page 633





inf lux of a great amount of money, had contributed to some residents' slipping out of
sobriety.
In response to the problem of homelessness, the community of Kodiak is working
to establish a Brother Francis Shelter in Kodiak. The Catholic and Baptist Churches
have been instrumental in getting the shelter started, but it has become a community-
wide project. The shelter will be funded by Catholic Social Services, a volunteer
organization that sponsors money-raising activities. In March 1989, according to a
Brother Francis Shelter board member, a site had been selected, $90,000 had already
been raised or committed, and a grant application for $100,000 was pending. By
February 1991, the building was nearing completion.5
Two local organizations specifically serve the needs of women. The Kodiak
Women's Resource and Crisis Center is a non-profit membership corporation begun in
1976 and dedicated to the prevention and elimination of domestic violence and sexual
assault. The center provides emergency shelter, counseling, assistance, information, and
referrals to women and children who are victims of violence. The center sponsors
community outreach and education programs, a 24-hour Crisis Line, a Mothercare
Program, and a library. The other organization, the Kodiak Crisis Pregnancy Center,
offers pregnancy testing and counseling.
Special services are available for senior citizens. Senior Citizens of Kodiak, Inc.,
a nonprofit organization that operates the Kodiak Senior Center, coordinates activities3
and services for senior citizens and supports seniors' needs for health care, nutrition,
homemaker and chore services, housing, transportation, information and referral services,         /
and recreation. Senior Citizens of Kodiak, Inc., was instrumental in obtaining funding
for the 54-unit Bayview Te-rrace apartmnent building for seniors that is located -next to the
senior center. The KANA operates a senior citizen program in the villages that includes
a meals program and activities.I
The KANA administers several service programs for Natives in addition to health
care, discussed previously. These programs include Village Public Safety Officers,
Johnson O'Malley education assistance funds, Job Training Partnership, housing
improvement (through the Department of Housing and Urban Development), andU

The Kodiak Region - Page 634

various education and employment programs. Family services are provided through
funding from an Indian Child Welfare Grant and a social services contract. The KANA
assists Natives with social service enrollments and contracts with Alaska Legal Services
to provide legal assistance for Natives.
AOSIS Ed data indicate that residents are generally famifliar with the goals and
availability of the various service programs. (Differences between 1988, 1989, 1990, and
1991 in the distribution of NJ responses to AOSIS Question K35 relate to administration
of this question and the programs about which people were queried.) More residents
avoided using social services altogether or used fewer services than in other regions
included in the Social Indicators Study. Some Kodiak City KI's said they did not use
service programs because of eligibility requirements that are tied to income or ethnic
identity. In addition, use of social services may be generally lower because of the
importance placed on self-reliance (Payne 1986:444).
Of the social services utilized, Kodiak residents rely less on public health services
than people in other regions, probably because a smaller percent age of residents are
eligible for health services through KANA, the Native nonprofit organization, and
because there is more private health care available in Kodiak. However, Kodiak
residents rely more on family and social services than people in other AOSIS regions.
While this does not necessarily mean that Kodiak residents have more problems, at least
it indicates a greater willingness to seek institutional help. This is understandable with a
more transient population that is less connected through kinship with other members of
the community to whom they might otherwise turn for help. The figures concerning
reliance on financial services are incomplete due to variations in reporting the receipt of
energy assistance, subsidized housing, and State loans (primarily for boats).
.Most (69%) of the 1991 K1t's thought that social services in Kodiak were locally
controlled. One woman even saw the services of the women's crisis center as "personal
rather than local" (i.e., personal rather than impersonally pro'fessional). Some Ku's
cormmented that although funding is external, control over the services provided is local.
One person said, health, we have very little control. We bave some influence, but very
informal. There's no formal process like [for] Fish and Game."
The Kodiak Region - Page 635





It is interesting that although no 1991 KI's said they presently use Native healers,I
38 percent (including 3 of the 4 Native respondents) said they would go to a Native
healer if one were available. One non-Native woman had actually been looking for one
and had called KANA, with no success. Another non-Native KI specified that he would
try Native herbal remedies but not a shaman.
III.D. Sodalities, Associations, and Community Activities
in addition to the service organizations mentioned in the preceding section,
Kodiak City has many voluntary organizations that distinguish it from most of the
communities in the Social Indicators Study. Most of these organizations are active and
community. residents have a fairly high rate of participation in community affairs. Of the
AOSIS KI interviewees, nearly 57 percent of the 1989 households and 50 percent of the
1991 households had two or more sodality memberships (1989 data). Many householdsI
had multiple memberships.
Several community organizations are geared toward promoting and advocati-ng the5
economic interests of Kodiak islanders. Kodiak has a very active and organized
Chamber of Cornmerce that in 1991 had 285 members (individuals and businesses),
representing about 25 percent of the business community., Tle chamber markets Kodiak
as a travel destination for tourists and conventioneers and targets opportunities for
international trade and investment. It supports development of Near Island and
additional harbor and port facilities, use of Kodiak as a Tustumena (ferry) change portI
or refueling/supply port, and shorebased processing preference. Several community-wide
events held annually in Kodiak are sponsored by the Kodiak Chamber of Commerce:
CorniFish, the largest commercial fishery trade show in Alaska (1990 was its 10th year);
the Home Show (1990 was its 6th year); and the Crab Festival (1990 was its 40th year).3
The chamber also organizes commnunity beautification projects, sponsors a scholarship
program, and hosts a lunchtime fonum twice a month that features guest speakers who
address topics of interest to the business and professional community (Kodiak Chamber
of Commnerce 1989).5
The Kodiak Island Convention and Visitors Bureau, which shares a building
downtown near the docks with the Kodiak Chamber of Commerce, is funded largely byI
The Kodiak Region - Page 6365

an annual allocation from the Kodiak Island Borough and a portion of the bed tax
collected by Kodiak City. Its main goal is to bring off-island dollars into the local
economy. The bureau estimates that in 1989, more than $330,000 was brought into the
local economy (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 1-5-90:5). In 1989, membership in the bureau had
grown 25 percent and the schedule of conventions to be held in Kodiak was up
20 percent. Kodiak ranked fourth or fifth in the State in terms of local bureau
membership. The director of the Kodiak bureau is on the Board of Directors of the
Statewide Alaska Visitors Association.
Tie Kodiak Island Borough belongs to the Southwest Alaska Municipal
Conference (SWAMC), a regional organization founded in 1986 that represents
municipalities, nonprofit organizations, school districts, and businesses of Bristol Bay, the
Aleutians, Kodiak Island, the Alaska Peninsula, and the Pribilof Islands. The Kodiak
Island Borough mayor was president of the SWAMC in 1989 and 1990. The goal of the
organization is to promote policies that lead to healthy and sustainable resource yields,
lobby for Federal and State funding for the region, and ensure orderly economic
development. Ile SWAMC assesses markets for new business ventures, acts as a
clearinghouse for information on the region, and represents municipal concerns in
political debates over public policy issues.
The Kodiak Island Borough, Kodiak City, Larsen Bay, Old Harbor, Ouzinkie, and
Port Lions also participate in the state-wide Alaska Municipal League, a voluntary,
nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that provides a forum for local government officials
to assist each other in solving municipal problems and to express their common concerns
to State and Federal officials. Both the Kodiak Island Borough mayor and clerk have
held office in this organization.
There are many organizations in Kodiak that represent local fishermen. Most of
these organizations lobby politically for fishermen's interests, represent their members in
marketing negotiations, and/or provide group ins-urance and vessel coverage. These
groups include the United Fishermen's Marketing Association, Alaska Draggers
Association (formerly the Alaska Shrimp Trawlers Association), Kodiak Halibut
Fishermen's Association, Kodiak Island Setnet Association, Kodiak Longline Vessel
The Kodiak Region - Page 637






Owners Association, Moser Bay-Olga Bay Setnetters Association, and Alaska CoastalI
Community Alliance. The Alaska Groundfish Data Base works on behalf of trawlers.
The interests of Native fishermnen are sometimes represented through KANA (Langdon
1986:90). Tle Fisheries Industry Network is an organization for communication between
fishermen's organizations in Kodiak.
The Alaska Fishermen's Union represents fish processing workers and the Kodiak
Seafood Processors Association represents the processors. Other fishing organizations
include the Kodiak Fishermen's Wives Association and the Women's Fisheries Network- f
Kodiak Chapter. Thbe Kodiak Seiners Association was organized in response to the
Exxon Valdez oil spill and has continued bevond its origi-nal task of securing Exxon3
charters for seiners to work on issues affecting the seine fleet.
Kodiak has several local chapters of national fraternal, service, and nonprofit3
organizations. Included among these are the American Legion Post No. 17 and
American Legion Auxiliary, Elks Lodge No. 1772, Kodiak Jaycees, Kiwanis, Lions Club,
Masonic Temple, Order of Eastern Star, Rotary International, Veterans of Foreign Wars,
American Association of University Women, American Heart Association, Audubon
Society, Daughters of the Arnerican Revolution, Ducks Unlirmited, American Red Cross,
Pioneers of Alaska, Salvation Army, Special Olympics, Young Life, Youth Scouting
Programs, and 4-H.
Commnunity, social, and cultural organizations in Kodiak are the firefighters'
associations, dance groups, various outdoor and sports associations, and Kodiak Crime
Stoppers. The Kodiak Arts Council produces the historical drama "Cry of the Wild3
Ram," which has been performed every summer since 1966. The council also annually
sponsors several concerts and stage plays that are held in Kodiak's beautiful, large
auditorium--a State Capital Improvements Project constructed next to the high school in
Kodiak. The Kodiak Historical Society is responsible for maintaining the BaranovI
Museum--Alaska's oldest non-Native structure--owned by the City of Kodiak. The
society saved the building from demolition and had it declared a National HistoricI
Landmark by the Secretary of the Interior on June 13, 1962. The Baranov Museum
houses a collection of Russian and Native artifacts.I

The Kodiak Region - Page 6383

In contrast to Kodiak City, Kodiak villages have few organized sodalities or
associations. Community life in most villages centers around activities of the Russian
Orthodox Church, the public schools, and the senior citizens' group. Because of the high
degree of familiaTity among local residents, community interaction is high but not
patterned around formal organizations. For instance, residents frequently engage in
fishing and hunting; but they do not join sportsmen's clubs.
III.E. Trends of Political-Economic and Social Change
The main trends of sociopolitical change in Kodiak at the present time have to do
with the following: (1) changes in the nature of the fishing industry; (2) responses to the
decline in Federal and State aid to local communities; and (3) impacts from the March
1989.Exxon Valdez oil spill.
.The Fisheries: The major concern in Kodiak is the status of the fisheries and the
effect this has on the local economy. Tle nature of the Kodiak fishery has changed
dramatically in the last decade, largely in response to Americanization of the Alaskan
fishing fleet, a rapidly evolving international seafood market, and changes in the resource
stocks. As a consequence, the Kodiak fishing industry has become more diversified,
competitive, and capitalized.
The Kodiak fishermen who survived the king crab crash in the early 1980's did so
by diversifying their operations in two ways. First, some fishermen changed fisheries.
Those with larger crab boats became groundfish trawlers and/or salmon tenders and
engaged in joint-venture fishing. Diversification has been somewhat easier for the small-
to medium-sized catcher-processor vessel owners, some of whom have switched to
halibut, sablefish (black cod), and Pacific cod (grey cod or "cod"). This fleet has grown
with more fishermen, newer and bigger boats, and greater financial independence from
the processors due to State and Federal loan programs instituted after passage of the
Magnuson Act (Langdon 1986:118-119). Kodiak fishermen are unique in their ability to
switch fish stocks and use the same size boats because, due to the nature of the
continental shelf in the Kodiak Archipelago, they can fish near the shore. Tlis has
allowed them to stake more of a claim in bottom fishing than other Southwest Alaska
communities (Griffin 1989a:32).
The Kodiak Region - Page 639






The second way in which Kodiak fishing has become more diversified is that someI
Kodiak fishermnen move around to different areas in an attempt to piece together a year-
round income. Those with larger, more mobile vessels now harvest in the Gulf of
Alaska, the Chignik and Dutch Harbor areas, Bristol Bay, and the Bering Sea (Langdon
1986:113,116). Negotiations are currently underway between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union for American access to U.S.S.R. waters for crab and groundfish. One alternative
proposed for conducting this fishery would use U.S. catcher vessels to deliver to U.S.
mother processing ships. Kodiak fishermen hope to capitalize on this possibility, which
would give them even greater geographic diversification.
Kodiak also has become a highly competitive domestic fishery. With the decline3
in joint ventures, competition within Alaskan waters has become more intense between
domestic gear types and between different American user groups. The rapid growth of
the Seattle-based factory-trawler fleet has meant increased competition for Kodiak
fishermen. Some of Kodiak's larger catcher boats have lost their markets,, and the
current surplus of catching power (trawl and longline fishermen) has increased
competition between them. Some have returned to crab fishing while others have left3
Alaska and returned to their original fisheries off the Washington, Oregon, or California
coasts (McGinley 1989).3
Kodiak seafood processors also face increased competition. In the early 1980's,
there was a whirlwind of investment in seafood processing as bottom fishing became the3
-Pacific Northwest growth industry. Millions of dollars were spent on factory trawlers and
investment in onshore plants in Kodiak and other ports. Harvesting and processing
capacity has been expanding at a time when pollock stocks (the main commercial
groundfish species) are declini-ng.3
Alaskan shorebased processors fear they are losing out in the competition with
factory trawlers and with other ports. In a westward shift in Alaskan seafood processing3
over the years, the center of the industry has moved from Petersburg to Sitka to the Gulf
of Alaska to Kodiak and now down the Aleutian Chain. The current building boom in3
Dutch Harbor and Unalaska has Kodiak processors concerned that those communities
will get more of the seafood from other areas (Bristol Bay, Bering Sea, Chignik)I

The Kodiak Region - Page 6403

currently being processed in Kodiak (Langdon 1986:91-92). This increased competition
has been. offset partly by foreign investment in Kodiak's onshore processing operations,
primarily by Japanese, and by the virtual elimination in 1989 of foreign-joint-venture
processing in Alaskan waters.
Kodiak -seafood processors have confronted this competition in several ways. The
processors have lobbied for special protection, such as a quota system that will guarantee
a portion of the catch to shorebased plants. Kodiak's city and borough governments
support such efforts because it is in their interest to protect shorebased fisheries.
Kodiak's Eagle Fishery attempted to.develop other resources by rnmning a
prototype flatfish operation (rex, flathead, rock, and dover sole) to see if flatfish
processing in Alaska was feasible (Pleschner 1989). Unfortunately, the plant went
bankrupt in 1990. Most seafood processing in southwest Alaska stops at the "primary
level," with finishing and packaging done in Seattle or other places (Southwest Alaska
Municipal Conference 1989:11). Kodiak processors are interested in expanding into
more of the final processing.
Kodiak fish harvesters and processors together face two other sources of
competition. The first is high seas interception, or the illegal taking of Alaska-bound
salmon on the high seas, principally by Asian (Japanese, Taiwanese, and Korean) squid
boats. Some Taiwanese fish merchants have been heavily involved in trading immature
salmon caught on the high seas in international markets. Increased foreign catches from
the "donut hole," an area of international water in the North Pacific surrounded by
various nations' 200-mile limits, have heightened suspicions of poaching in U.S. waters.
Domestic fishing interests have demanded increased surveillance of incursions into U.S.
waters (Alaska Commnercial Fisherman, 5-24-9 1:16).
The other source of competition is the explosive growth in aquaculture around the
world, which is cutting into the demand for wild fish stocks. Norway and Japan, leaders
in this trend, are raising various stocks including salmon, bivalve shellfish, cod, halibut,
flounder, tuna, and lobster. In the U.S., aquaculture is a large business in Washington
and Oregon. However, aquaculture (except for raising bivalve shellfish from wild-caught
juveniles to market-size adults) is illegal in Alaskan waters; and the State has shown no
The Kodiak Region - Page 641'





interest in it (Southwest Alaska Municipal Conference 1989). There is considerableI
opposition to "farmed fish" amnong Kodiak salmon fishermen.
Diversification and competition in the fisheries has been accompanied by
increased capitalization. Vessel owners who engage in various fisheries have had to
invest in different types of gear. As ADF&G attempts to conserve threatened stocks,
openings in certain fisheries have become shorter and more intense, particularly for cod
and halibut. This has fueled capital investment, since vessel owners are forced to be
highly efficient during openings. Harvesting technology within the groundfish sector of
the industry has become so advanced that there is concemn that the ability to harvest
Alaskan groundfish will soon outstrip the ability of the resources to be sustained3
(Southwest Alaska Municipal Conference 1989:17). Over-capitalization is particularly
high in groundfish and halibut harvesting. The major cause of the halibut-stock decline
is the increase in bycatch by the trawl fleet in Alaska. This problemi, along with the king
salmon bycatch and the issue of sea lions caught in trawl nets, has exacerbated conflicts3
between trawlers and other gear-type operators.
Kodiak processors have invested heavily in the technology necessary to process3
different species of fish. They are now under pressure to maintain consistent, year-long
deliveries of product to pay for their investments and to keep their work forces3
employed. Kodiak processors have become very flexible; they can get orders, send out
boats, change over, and deliver within a day or two. As one local person described the3
situation, "The fishing industry in Kodiak has become a fast-paced, hard-edged game. It
is a higbly capitalized industry, the debts are high, and people are pressured just trying to3
stay in the industry."
Intense competition has fractionalized the domestic fishing industry. Political3
alignments based on specific issues have increased and become more complex, adding to
traditional divisions among fishermen based on gear type' fishery, size, or geographic3
area. These divisions within the domestic fishing industry have prevented agreements
that would freeze harvesting and processing capacity and forestall the depletion ofI
certain fish stocks.


The Kodiak Region - Page 6423

These trends are lead'n toward various measures to limnit the fishing effort in
Alaskan waters. The North Pacific Fishery Management Council is considering ways to
institute some form of limited entry in the Gulf of Alaska/Aleutian Islands groundfish
fisheries, particularly with halibut. The council has discussed (1) license limitations,
which gaarantee certain people the right to fish; (2) individual transferable quota
systems; and (3) annual fishing allotments.
Some fishermen support some version of individual transferable fishing quotas,
which could reserve a portion of the resource for specific communities and reduce the
cost of entry into a fishery by allowing the purchase of incremental quantities of the
quota. At present, quotas are set for a particular fishery or district. Factory trawlers
from Seattle often take the whole quota before locals have much chance to fish, and
then the fishery is shut down.
In spring 1991, the council supported a proposal to establish transferable
individual quotas to sablefish and halibut fishermen based on past deliveries. There is
considerable opposition to this proposal in Kodiak. Small boat fishermen say the result
would be that large boats or corporations would buy up all the quotas. They also are
concerned that the proposed 20-percent "open-access" part of the allotted Kodiak region
fish would all go toward trawler bycatch.
Many Kodiak fishermen fear that limited entry would force out the small
operators and limit their flexidbility in a rapidly changing industry (Kodiak Daily Mirror,
11-24-89:1). They feel that license limitation would benefit primarily Seattle interests.
Some fishermen support gear, season, and hull restrictions to manage groundfish
harvesting instead of limited entry.
The Kodiak fishing industry generaly supports proposals aimed at inhibiting over-
capitalization and maintaining control of the fisheries in the hands of local fishermen
and processors. They are fighting for measures that give preference to local fishermen
and shorebased processors as a way to get factory trawlers out of the area. One such
measure is promoting full resource utilization (e.g., using the by-products, like carcasses
from roe-stripping), since shorebased processors are better able to engage in this type of
processing than factory trawlers, which tend to be the most wasteful. Another measure is
The Kodiak Region - Page 643






a domestic-observer program that would place observers on U.S.-based factory trawlers,I
as was done with foreign-joint-venture ships. This would enable the inonitoring of
bycatch and increase the amount of information available for research and management.
Some Kodiak fishermen have voluntarily fished in ways that reduce bycatch and have
allowed observers on their boats to show that Kodiak fishermnen are more concerned
about conserving the resource.3
The changing nature of the Kodiak fishery has had several social repercussions.
Ile trend, pointed out by Payne, toward increased competition and conflict between
different processors and different segments of the fishing commuuity within Kodiak has
continued. Payne also found an association between the economic downturn in the3
fisheries in the early 1980's and stress-induced social problems in Kodiak, such as
substance abuse or domestic violence (Payne 1986:440). The types of stress Payne noted
have remained high, and they appear to be related to pressures associated with the
increased competition within the fishing industry.3
By 1989, Kodiak fishermen were being forced to take greater risks in an already
high-risk occupation. With diversification to other species, especially to species for which3
high volume makes up for low prices, fishermen began working for longer periods of
time and at greater distances from home (Payne 1986:411-4 15). Pressures to make boat3
payments, combined with shorter openings, have meant fishing in ever more dangerous
conditions. Several AOSIS KI interviewees complained about financial pressures and the3
failure of ADF&G to adjust openings to account for bad weather. The AOSIS
researcher arrived in Kodiak in March 1989 during an extremely bad storm in which fourU
boats were lost. Some interviewees commented that fishermen never used to go out in
weather like that. Several older fishermen thought that the increased size of boats with3
more computerized technology had given some fishermen a false sense of security and
allowed boat owners to hire people with less experience and skill, which contributed toI
more fishing accidents in recent years. There is increasing concern, particularly about
bad weather during the pre-set 24-hour halibut openings that force halibut fishermen to3
fish under conditions that usually would deter them.


The Kodiak Region - Page 6443

Increased occupational risks have led to greater stress and tension within families
and within the community of Kodiak. Part of the stress is related to underlying tensions
within the Kodiak fishing industry between those who see fishing as a lifestyle versus
those for whom fishing is a highly capitalized business venture. These tensions are very
similar to those that have afflicted small family farmers throughout the Midwest, a
subject of much media attention several years ago. Letters to the editor have appeared
in the Kodiak Daily Mirror addressing the concerns of small fishermen, or the "Alaskan
family-fishing operat ions" and often denouncing the fact that the fishing industry is
becoming dominated by bankers rather than fishermen. One such letter closed with an
appeal to preserve a unique lifestyle, "which is as important as conservation of a fish
species" (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 3-7-1,989:3).
Declininty State and Federal Revenues: Another main trend of sociopolitical
change affecting Kodiak comrmunities is the decline in State and Federal revenues. All
Kodiak communities--particularly the smaller villages--depend heavily on this type of
funding. These reductions have forced Kodiak communities to find ways of generating
more revenue locally, for example through fish taxes, or to reduce services offered to
local residents. Several of Kodiak's smaller villages have been forced to reduce services,
which has contributed to recent population movement to the larger vilages or Kodiak
City.
The Kodiak Island Borough and Kodiak City have responded to declining
revenues in two ways. First, in March 1989, the Kodiak Island Borough annexed a long
strip of land on the Alaska Peninsua and the Shelikof Strait, thereby more than doubling
the total area of land and water under control of the borough. The annexation would
enable the borough to raise more raw-fish-tax revenues and exercise more regulatory
control (through licensing and other means) over Seattle-based catcher and processor
vessels that frequent the rich fishing grounds of Shelikof Strait. It also would enable the
borough to have more say in the management of spawning streams on the Alaska
mainland. Borough officials believe it would give local fishermen a better chance to
harvest in their own backyard and keep more money in the local economy. Tle borough
The Kodiak Region - Page 645





al so would have taxing authority over potential m3ineral and gas developments in thisI


ae.The motivation for Kodiak's annexation petition was that the Lake and PeninsulaI
Rural Education Attendance Area (Upper Alaska Peninsula) was in the process of
forming a new borough that wanted to tax fish at the point of catch along the coast of
the Alaska Peninsula across Shelikof Strait from the Kodiak Archipelago. There are no
communities along this coastline, which is an area normally fished by people from
Kodiak's fleet. The Kodiak Island Borough argued that since Kodiak City services that
fishing fleet (e.g., trash and waste oil come back to Kodiak), and since the area is on the
boundary of Kodiak's fishing district and related to Kodiak's economy, it should be
included in the Kodiak Island Borough. The State Boundary Commaission approved
Kodiak Island Borough's petition.
The Kodiak Island Borough annexation is part of a general trend toward borough
formation occurring in Southwest Alaska. In 1987, the Aleutians East Borough was3
incorporated. In 1989, the Lake and Peninsula Borough was formed. The impetus for
this trend comes from the decline in State funding for CIP projects at a time when
Southwest Alaska communities are trying to improve their infrastr-ucture in order to
capitalize on the America-nization of Alaska's fishery and the boom in bottom fishing.3
The Southwest Alaska region missed out on the oil monies~ that financed port, airport,
and other infrastructure improvements in other parts of Alaska (Griffin 1989a). Now3
they are pressed to find funding for projects that are necessary if they are to keep more
of the money that flows to Seattle within the region. A University of Alaska study of3
Alaska's commercial fishing industry indicated that Southwest Alaska's income multiplier
is the lowest in the State, indicating that much of the economic activity that takes place3
there does not benefit the region (cited in Griffin 1989a). The boroughs have taxing and
regulatory power over economic activities that occuur within their jurisdictions, such as3
commercial fisheries and oil wells from which revenue can be generated.
The second response of the Kodiak Island Borough and Kodiak City to declining3
State and Federal revenues has been to look into various options for government
consolidation. In 1987, a nine-member Consolidation Committee was set up to exploreI

The Kodiak Region - Page 646

the issues involved in revamping Kodiak's government. Tle committee investigated the
effect of consolidation on government efficiency, taxing abilities, and delivery of services
to determine potential savings (Kodiak Consolidation Commnittee 1989). The commirttee
found several areas where savings could be obtained after the initial transition period,
but found the total amount of savings dffficult to quantify. They recormmended that the
issue be placed before the voters. Two consolidation questions were to appear on the
October 1989 ballot but were withdrawn due to a conflict between the borough and the
city over extension of a service district (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 12-13-1989:1). The issue of
combining the Kodiak City and Kodiak Island Borough Governments was raised back in
1978, but at that time proposed. government consolidation was defeated in a ballot
proposition (Payne 1980:52). The issue of government consolidation was addressed again
in the 1990 election, and voters again rejected it.
IV. HOUSEHOLD ORGANIZATION AND KINSHIP
IV.A. Kinship Organization
Early sources report that the Koniag had matrilineal descent with temporary
matrilocal postnuptial residence (Davydov 1977:182; Merck 1980:108). In Old Harbor in
the mid-1980's, Davis observed matrilineal-like features of present-day household
compositions, crew compositions, and childrearing practices, particularly the importance
of the mother's brother to his sister's children (Davis 1986:186). There is no clear
pattern of matrilocality, as about equal numbers of men and women have married and
moved into Old Harbor (Davis 1986:182).. This also is true in other Kodiak villages,
although in the early 1960's, Taylor (1966) noted there was a pattemn of female
outmigration in Karluk that left a number of unmarried men in the village.
One of the dominant features of Kodiak villages is the extensive and complex
kinship relations between community members. In 1960, Befu observed of Old Harbor
that "There is scarcely anyone in the village who is not related to someone else there by
blood, marriage, or adoption. In fact, most villagers are related to one another in more
than one way" (Befu 1970:36). Befu also pointed out that the Russian Orthodox
practices of not selecting close relatives as godparents and of parents and godparents
forming fictive kinship relations strengthened the weaker bonds between distant kin or
The Kodiak Region - Page 647





nonlin. He noted that the Russian Orthodox Church also religiously endorsed "crossI
siblingship,t" a fictive kinship relation that could be contracted between individuals (Befu
1970).
Davis has documented not only the extensive kinship connections within,but also
between Kodiak villages, and between the southemn villages on Kodiak Island and the
Pacific Coast side of the Alaska Peninsula (Davis 1986). Because of this inter-
relatedness, most marriages in Old Harbor are exogamous, with one spouse from Old
Harbor and the other from outside (Davis 1986:182). In contrast, there are few3
extensive kinship relations among Kodiak's non-Native population.
IV.B. Household Structures and Economic Functions3
According to AOSIS KI data (1988 and 1989), the nature of Kodiak households
differs in some respects from other regions included in the study. Kodiak households3
have the least number of members of any region and are among the most stable.
Household heads are generally older than in any other region.3
The mean age of 1991 KI's was 40 years. None were under 25, 44 percent were
25 to 40, 53 percent were 41 to 55, and only one (3%) was .56 or over. The average
household size was 3.7 people. Forty-four percent of KJ's lived in households of 1.0 to
3.0 people, 50 percent in households of 4.0 to 6.0, 6 percent in households of 7.0 or 8.0,1
and none in households of over 8.0.
The age and household-size profiles of the 35 questionnaire respondents randomly
selected in 1991 were somewhat different. The mean age was similar (42); but among
respondents, 14 percent were under 25, 46 percent were 25 to 40, 20 percent were 41 to3
55, and 20 percent were 56 and older. Four of the new respondents were in their 70's.
The mean household size was 2.6 people, with 74 percent living in households of 1.0 to3
3.0 (9.0 people lived alone), 26 percent in households of 4.0 to 6.0, and no households of
over 6.0 people.3
The discrepancy between the samples may be partly explained by reference to the
nature of the Kodiak population. The 1991 KI's had been contacted at least once before
in previous years of the study. Young or elderly people living alone or with one other
person represent some of the most transient or seasonal segments of the KodiakI

The Kodiak Region - Page 6483

population. The people most available to be contacted again were people in their 30s
and 40s who had been established in Kodiak for a number of years and were likely to
live with spouses and children in permanent households.
There is a wide variety of household structures in Kodiak City and Old Harbor.
Nuclear families are the dominant household form. Extended and intergenerational-
family households are more -common among Natives in the villages and among the
Filipino population in Kodiak City. Because of th e demand for housing and the high
price of the housing that becomes avaiable, a significant number of households in
Kodiak City are composed of persons unrelated to one another. Single-member
households are not uncommon in Kodiak City. Table 15 shows the average household
size for each Kodiak community.


Table 15

AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD SIZE IN THE KODIAK REGION, 1980


Persons per
Community                                   Household


Kodiak Borough	3.01
Kodiak City	2.97
Akhiok	3.89
Karluk	4.57
Larsen Bay	3.51
Old Harbor	3.86
Ouzinlde	3.04
Port Lions	3.26


Source: U.S. Census 1980.


Native households are more fluid than non-Native households, and there is more
fluidity of households in the villages than in Kodiak City. Village residents often stay
The Kodiak Region - Page 649





with relatives in Kodiak or Anchorage for extended periods of time. Many chidren inU
Kodiak villages live with or are adopted by relatives, and personnel at the Old Harbor
school commented on the pervasiveness of this phenomenon. Teachers reported that
they had often been asked if they would like to adopt village children.
There are distinct patterns of sharing that connect households to one another and
are influenced primarily by length of residence in the community and ethnicity.u
"Newcomers" reported more often than long-term residents that there is more sharing
now than in the past, but this pertained to their household as they became more3
integrated into the community. The more long-term residents, however, indicated that
there is less interhousehold sharing at present than in the past. Some attributed this to3
"the different type of people" that have come to Alaska in recent years. One interviewee
related the change to the pipeline years, "when people came to Alaska to earn money3
and take it home and had more of an 'all for me' attitude." Some of the older' Natives
attributed this change to the younger generation not adhering to traditional values.3
There is fairly widespread sharing arnong households on Kodiak Island,
particularly with resources and labor. Part of this has been attributed to the nature of3
living in smaller, isolated communities where there is a greater degree of familiarity and
people come to depend on each other more than'in u'rban areas (Payne 1986). Many3
Kodiak non-Natives, who migrated to Alaska as adults, have few or no kin in Kodiak but
place a high value on sharing and exchange with friends and neighbors. Yet there are
discernable differences between Native households and non-Native househiolds in the
nature of their sharing.3
Among Native households, traditional kinship ties continue to inform economic
pattern for harvesting resources. Our resea-rch supports the findings of other studies3
that interhousehold and intervillage sharing of resources and labor, and traditional
distributive miechanisms persist (Barsch 1985; Davis 1979, 1986; KANA and ADF&G3
Subsistence 1983:57-75). In Karluk, for example, five or six households were responsible
for most of the deer harvest and only one household went without in 1985 (Barsch
1985:35).


The Kodiak Region - Page 6503

There aTe other distinctive characteristics of Native sharing. Native sharing often
involves subsistence resources or preferred foods that are hard to procure; thus, the giver
is parting with something that is scarce and of great value. In addition, sharing between.
Natives frequently involves "redistribution," wherein someone receives part of what the
giver received from someone else. There are few defined expectations of return with
Native sharing. The. Native pattern of sharing is distinct enough from the non-Native
pattern that in every AOSIS KI interview in which a non-Native's description of his/her
sharing practices seemed to fit the "Native pattern," it was discovered that the spouse was
Native. The main way in which non-Native sharing differs from Native sharing is that
there are more defined expectations of return with non-Natives. Non-Natives tend to
view sharing as exchange and often talk about it that way, referring to what they
swapped with one another.
In 1991, non-Native KI's also referred to exchanges of equipment or labor as
"trade-offs." One man said, "I've been offered to do it, but never got into sharing labor."
Going hunting or fishing together was not usually considered sharing labor. Examnples
people gave of their sharing included loaning someone else a truck in exchange for
firewood, helping someone with a job in their house for help in return, or exchanging
babysitting favors. Non-Native interviewees gave various indications that they view
sharing as exchange: they tend to agree verbally with others on their expectations; they
remember who still owes them a favor; they voice some displeasure when reciprocity has
not been received; and they share with people who have done favors for them in the
past.
Even when non-Natives do not view their sharing as exchange, they seem to give
more out of a desire not to waste when they have more than they can use than out of
recognition of responsibilities toward others. They give out of abundance, not out of
scarcity. Non-Natives show bumanitarian and civic concern for others, engage in
neighborly and friendly gifting, but are less involved in "communitarian"' sharing with
extended kidn and elders.
Non-Native sharing also tends to be more institutionalized than Native sharing.
For examples, non-Natives' response to homeless people is to build a shelter for them.

The Kodiak Region - Page 651





There are no homeless people in Native villages. Several non-Native intervieweesI
perceived.their offerings to the church as sharing of income. Older people are referred
to as senior citizens, not as elders; and when asked about the concern that is shown forI
their needs, non-Native older people almost invariably refer to the senior center, the
housing, the health care, and the activities and se rvices that are provided for them
through government programs. Interviewees also mentioned benefits that people over 65
receive, such as not having to paylproperty or sales taxes; paying less for water, sewer,
and garbage; enjoying senior entertainment discounts; and receiving the Alaska
Longevity Bonus.
In 1991, Native and non-Native KI's mentioned several sharing patterns that can3
be seen as typical of Kodiak. Many regularly send fish and other wild foods to relatives
outside Alaska. Some people said they regularly receive items from relatives outside3
that cannot be purchased in Alaska, e.g., apples and raspberries from Washington or
sausage from Pennsylvania.3
Some 1991 KI's also give financial support to relatives outside Alaska, usually to
children or ex-spouses. The two Filipino households included in the sarnple regularly3
send money to family members in the Philippines. One man, a member of an
evangelical religion, supports 'a niece in the Philippines who is studying for the ministry.3
A Native woman said she gives loans of money to relatives in emergencies, and three
other KI's said they give occasional emergency loans. One man said he gives "loans" to3
relatives that are really gifts.
JY.C. Socialization3
In traditional Kodiak Native society, children were raised permissively but were
taught stoicism. Gender distinctions were reinforced in their upbringing. The avanculate3
was not a formally developed institution but boys learned to hunt under related adults,
usually an uncle (Clark 1984b:192). Women were sequestered during menarche and, in3
pre-contact periods, tattooed on the chin to signal puberty (Merck 1980:103). According
to oral tradition, confinement during menarche and postpartum periods continued untilI
several decades ago. Stories continue to be told about the polluting power of


The Kodiak Region - Page 6523

menstruating women on fishing boats and their responsibility for poor fishing seasons
(Mulcahy 1988).
Some traditional childrearing a-nd adoption practices persist, although little
documentation of adoption rules exists. Through oral tradition, people continue to tell
stories about the importance of listening to the elders and watching the natural world,
revealing an integrated worldview not immediately apparent to outside observers
(Mulcahy 1988). Davis (1986) noted the continuing importance of a woman's brother in
the raising and training of her sons, particularly in the southern Kodiak villages.
Native parents often treat their children with permissiveness or indulgence. It is
not uncommon for Native children to exercise their own prerogative and change
households, which they oftentimes do in an effort to seek out the most permissive
environment. This adds to the fluidity of Native households. Old Harbor parents have
complained to school personnel that they do not know what to do with their children.
Non-Native school personnel are often surprised by the lax nature of Native child-rearing
practices, by what they, see as impudence on the part of Native children, and by the
amount of independence that even very young children exercise.
In recent times, formal institutions such as the Russian Orthodox Church and the
schools have become important in the socialization process. Through KANA's cultural
programs, the schools have recently, served to transmit traditional skills and knowledge
previously passed through extended kidn networks. In several villages, elders are regularly
invited to the classrooms to share stories and arts and language skills. Some non-Native
teachers have taken the initiative in innovating traditional craft programs, such as kayak
building. This sometimes has been a point of tension because lack of Native role models
in the schools is a major problem on Kodiak. While there are a number of Native
teachers' aides on Kodiak Island, there are only two Native teachers--one in Kodiak and
one in Akhiok.
Perhaps the most imnportant context for traditional socialization practices is
through subsistence activities. One Native KI interviewee took exception, to these
activities being called subsistence, which implies that their importance lies in people's
dependence on the foods that they procure. This person explained that "Subsistence is

The Kodiak Region - Page 653






not just having something to live on but having the foods that we prefer." I-e said thatI
he would take seal meat over a T-bone steak any day. He went on to explain that "the
process, not just the product, is important." As he sees it, engaging in subsistence
activities is an important timne for a family to be together and work together, and for
children to learn the skills necessary to continue living as their people have always lived.
To him, "subsistence" is an important way for Native people to maintain their culture and
social organization. Among the significant cultural values attached to subsistence that
were identified in a 1979 KANA report (cited in Davis 1979:172-176) was that success at3
hunting or fishing is based on skills learned in the village and that there is a great deal
of independence associated with a subsistence way of life.3
V.	IDEOLOGY
V.A.	Religion3
In the City of Kodiak, many religious denominations have proliferated during this
century. There are currently over 17 active churches representing many denominations3
and a diversity of religious faiths. Tlese include Russian Orthodox, Catholic, Baptist
(several different ones), Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Episcopal,3
Evangelical, Lutheran, Assembly of God, Baha'i Faith, Christian Science, Church of the
Nazarene, Kodiak Bible Chapel, Kodiak Community Church, Seventh-Day Adventist,3
Pentecostal, and Unification. Most of these churches support full-time clergy.
The numerous divisions of Baptists together form the religious group to which the3
greatest number of people in Kodiak belong. The Catholic Church has the most Filipino
adherents, and Russian Orthodoxy has the most Native adherents. The Russian Orthodox3
Church retains a place as the most historically significant and symbolically important
religion in Kodiak. It is, for example, the Russian Orthodox priest who blesses the3
fishing fleet during the annual Crab Festival. The letterhead design on the Kodiak
Island Borough stationery, in which a Native profile is juxtaposed against the onion dome3
of the Russian Orthodox Church, also indicates the church's symbolic place in Kodiak
life.3
The Russian Orthodox Church's critical role since the arrival of the first Russian
monks in 1794 has been well documented (Afonsky 1977; Davis 1970, 1979, 1986; SmithU
The Kodiak Region - Page 6543

1980; Oleksa 1982, 1987). As already discussed, Native Orthodoxy has developed as a
synthesis of traditional religious and distinctly Native practices and beliefs. There are
Orthodox churches in every village, and holidays are celebrated according to the
Orthodox calendar, marked by festivities such as "starring" (a syncretic Russian/Native
caroling tradition). Services are infrequently conducted by traveling priests and more
commonly by Native lay readers, a role increasingly held by women in Kodiak's villages
(Mason 1988). Since the establishment of Saint Herman's -Theological Seminary on
Kodiak in 1974, there has been a resurgence of interest in and attendance at services in
the villages (Davis 1986:355).
Despite the Russian Orthodox Church's importance, other denominations have
gained converts among the Native population. The Baptist Church has held a central
place since the establishment of a mission on Woody Island in 1893. Further, these two
churches have maintained a symbiotic and sometimes tense coexistence in Ouzinkie since
1896. Other Christian denominations, such as the Bible Chapel in Port Lions, are strong
in certain villages.
Wlhile a majority of Native elders are Russian Orthodox, some younger people
influenced by the recently emergent Native consciousness are questioning and
reinterpreting religious beliefs. For themi, Russian Orthodoxy is more of a tradition than
a religion. There have been greater changes in religious attitudes as more mixed
(Native/non-Native) marriages occur. Several Native KI respondents in Kodiak City
who had married non-Natives and who were raising their children as Christians idiae
that Orthodoxy had become part of "tradition" for them (Mulcahy field notes 1988b).
Ministers and priests from the local churches pairticipate in the Mfinisterial
Alliance, formed to coordinate religious response to issues of community concern. The
Russian Orthodox Church is trying to adjust to recent problems on Kodiak, among them
village suicides (in 1988). Priests cannot serve funerals or give full burial rights because
of church teachings against suicide; however, they have tried to offer counseling and
support to victims' families.
The Kodiak Region - Page 655






V.B.  Worldviews and ValuesU
T'he AOSIS KI data (1988 and 1989) suggest that, in general, Kodiak Island
residents have the most westernized viewpoint of the seven regions included in the study.
Kodiak KI interviewees placed the greatest emphasis on personal responsibility for
attainment and the least emphasis on sharing with a wide circle of kin and neighbors.
The greatest number of 1991 KI informants (44%7) thought a person was primarily
responsible for his or her own success, with success often defined as happiness, self-
respect, or independence., However, most KI's also thought the family and others shared3
responsibility for teaching or showing by example the value of personal attainment.
Several KI's professed to believe in self-reliance, but in practice they gave much to their3
children and other relatives and depended on them in retumn. Some KI's, especially
those who were very involved in church activities, saw service to the community as anI
important indicator of an individual's success.
In terms of placing greater emphasis on competition versus cooperation,I
63 percent of the 1991 Kodiak interviewees responded that it depends on the
circumstances. Most said that cooperation was more important but thought that both3
cooperation and competition have a purpose. One man said he had been raised to be
competitive, but he wished that he had learned cooperation instead. Two KI's3
comnmented that there is more emphasis on competition in a fishing community like
Kodiak.3
Western enculturation and gender distinctions are practiced by the greatest
percentage of households (88% of 1991 KI's). Several KI's said they were raising their3
children in essentially the same Way they had been brought up, although one man said,
"I'm louder than my -parents were." Some KI's considered themselves "traditional"I
parents, by which they meant that they were strict and directive. One woman said that
she was nondirective with her children but that, especially since she has stopped drinking,I
she has found it necessa-ry to set rules of behavior.
Prior to 1991, Kodiak interviewees were much more apt than persons in other3
regions to view the environment and resources in commodity terms, with no intervewees
viewing the environment primarily in spiritual terms. However, most posttest KI's in

The Kodiak Region - Page 6563

1991, as well as most re-interviewees, were loath to view the environment as purely
commodity-based. They were quick to point out their spiritual ties to the environment.
Fifty-three percent of KM's said they had a combined spiritual and commodity view.
Typically KIC's said they had no problem with the use of resources as commodities, as
long as they were used wisely or managed properly. Several commented that a
commodity view does not contradict a spiritual view. One man said that even commodity
uses have a spiritual quality: "Even that part is interconnected." One woman said that
she believed we are "caretakers of the planet, here to take care of it and not deplete it.
My church goes along with that, too." Some KI's said that commodity use of resources is
something that has to take place. They thought environmentalists were too extreme in
their opposition to development. A Native woman said, `[It's] naive to think that
something can stay 100 percent pristine." As an example of s'iritual and commodity
views coming into conflict, two KI's mentioned the current controversy over logging on
Afognak.
For the most part, values held by people in Kodiak are shaped by comimercial
fishing and the lifestyle associated with that occupation. In general, Kodiak fishermen
have a strong work ethic and abhor laziness. Most Kodiak fishermen are small
entrepreneurs, and many have worked hard and saved their money in order to buy their
own boats. Kodiak fishermen can be described as ambitious, aggressive, innovative,
politically astute, adaptable, straightforward, and self-reliant (Payne 1980).
Kodiak fishermen are independent, yet interdependent. Their occupation requires
cooperation, yet it entails fierce competition. People say that members of fishing
communities are drawn closer together and cooperate more because of the shared
tragedy and high risk that are part of the nature of their occupation. Commercial fishing
is a high-risk venture, not only because it is physically dangerous but because it is an
economic gamble. And in the economic gamble, people generally believe that
competition is good because it motivates people to achieve.
Kodiak Natives have the longest history of contact, trade, and cultural mixing with
non-Native (Russian and European) peoples. Even early ethnographers noted the
decline in Native religion and beliefs (Davydov 1977; Hohmberg 1985). Kodiak's Native
The Kodiak Region - Page 657





culture was disparaged by many as having been "decimated." VWhile there has been aI
tragic loss of knowledge of certain traditions and of the Kodiak Alutiiq language, the
persistence of less visible Native values has been recognized by some people.
In 1970, Befu observed that Old Harbor Eskimnos did not identify with American
society and its value systenm4 even though they had participated in a capitalistic economic
system, had been exposed to white man's education and values, had their materialu
culture changed, and had Native beliefs supplanted by the Russian Orthodox Church.
He wrote (Befu 1970:4 142):3
In short, these Eslimos participate in a Westemn economic
market without the requisite values and attitudes necessary
for its successful operation. The point I wish to make is that3
the Ainerican concepts of money, payment, debt, etc., as
social concepts are not completely internalized by the
Natives, although they understand what these entail asI
economic concepts. Nor do they cherish the ideas of thrift
and industry in the way Americans do. ... It is because the
Natives have a different orientation toward money, saving,I
thrift, social mobility and related values so important for the
majority American that they prefer their way of life. In the
final analysis, then, we may conclude that Eskimos of OldI
Harbor recognize themselves as Eskimos and not as
Americans, and that this self-identification is based upon a
value orientation toward life which is fundamentally differentI
from that of the majority American.


Values of traditional Koniag culture and the moral strictures of Russian
Orthodoxy continue to inform village life and socialization processes. These values3
include respect for authority and elders, modesty, noncompetitive attitudes, and working
for the benefit of a social group. These values continue to cause conflicts for villagers3
who are attempting to maintain traditional values and to accommodate the pressures of a
global economy ruled by a competitive ethos. While families continue to try and3
inculcate traditional values at home, Western patterns of individual success and greater
assertiveness are stressed in the schools and larger social arenas. This is particularly3
marked on Kodiak Island because of the lack of Native teachers as role models.


The Kodiak Region - Page 6583

Further, as intermarriages with other religious groups increase, shifts from the Native
values integrated with Russian Orthodoxy are occurring.
In terms of values about the environment and its resources, Kodiak non-Native
residents attach some symbols to the environment; but they generally do not attach many
symbols that have accumulated over two or more generations. This is understandable
given the more transient nature of the population. It may be another indicator of the
transience of the Kodiak population that only one Ed, a Native, said her family had
accumulated many significant symbolic places over generations. Three KI's (9%) had
many special places, 24 (75%) had a few special places, and 4 (13%) had none. One of
those who responded "none" said, "We just like to go out a lot," i.e., drive around on the
road system or go out in a rubber raft. Most of those who had favorite places said they
were originally shown them or told about them by other people in Kodiak. One person
said he had some favorite recreation places that are different from those he goes to with
his wife. The places usually mentioned were beaches, coves, streams, or Kodiak
landmarks, such as Barometer Mountain. Typicaly, Mi's went to these places for
hunting, fishing, picnicldng, hiking, or camping.
People have several identifiable perspectives about the environment. There is the
"mariner's viewpoint," wherein people who live and die by the sea learn its landmarks
and signs. The significance they attach to various aspects of the environment are
practical. They need to learn and know where the bays are in which they can find
shelter and hide until bad weather improves, where the best places to fish are, where the
reefs to avoid are, and so forth.
One old fisherman talked about how seamen used to keep intricate logs of points,
landmarks, and lighthouses, and about how mariners have passed on knowledge through
navigation charts. There are remnants of spiritual meanings that the earth may have
held for these people in figures of speech (e.g., "that sea, she is unforgiving"). Several
other fisherman talked about people who have computerized boats that hardly require
looking out the window and do not involve manual steering. It appears that t echnology
has taken much of the skill and experience out of being a ship's sldpper. If this is the
The Kodiak Region - Page 659





case, over time technology also may reduce the significance that boat captains attach toI
aspects of the environment.
There also is the commercial fisherman's viewpoint. Some fishermen reported
that certain areas have special meaning for them because that is where they usually find
the most fish or because that is where they go fishing. This meaning is tied to'the
economic value of the resources in a given location.
Finally, there is the "aesthetic or environmental viewpoint." Many people like a
certain area, or Kodiak in particular, because it is peaceful, pretty, uncrowded,3
picturesque, etc. Kodiak has a recognized group of environmentalists and also a good
number of artists who live there because of the values they place on the environment.3
One woman said that she likes Kodiak because of its historic significance as the first
Russian settlement in Alaska.3
V.C. Ethnicity and Tribalism
Several features need to be considered in any analysis of ethnicity and tribalism in3
the Kodiak region.. First, Kodiak has been a juncture of cultural and commercial
exchange and clashes for centuries because of its strategic location.. Contact with otherI
Native groups and the gradual integration of Russian, Scandinavian., and American
influences have marked Kodiak Native identity. While this pattemn is not unlike other3
regions of Alaska, what distinguishes Kodiak are the shifts in emic and etic definitions of
Native identity that continue to the present time. Ethnicity has been a fluid and evolvingI
feature of identity among Kodiak Natives.
While scholars group the Koniag with the Pacific Esldmo, local Natives refer to3
themselves as Aleuts, adopting the term the colonial Russians applied to all Pacific
Eslimos in the mid-l9th century. Since the 1970's and implementation of the ANCSA,3
attempts to differentiate Kodiak Natives from other groups have led to the use of
alternate terms, including Sugpiaq, Koniag, and Alutiiq (Clark 1984b:196). "Alutiiq" is3
now the term preferred by linguists and anthropologists. Even today, however, many
Kodiak Natives continue to consider themselves Aleuts and want to be called Aleuts by3
.other Natives and non-Natives. In a recently implemented RURALCAIP (Rural Alaska


The Kodiak Region - Page 660

Community Action Program) project, Port Lions was selected as the representative
"Aleut" village. "Aleut" is the term of self-reference that persists throughout the island.
Second, and perhaps linked to the categorical confusion surrounding Native
identity, there is a paucity of previous documentation. Historical ethnographies provide
fragmented information, but no complete ethnography of the region exists. Most current
ethnographic work was conducted for government projects (see especially Davis 1979,
1986; Payne 1980). Even government-funded work on the Kodiak region has been sparse
compared to work on other areas of the State.
Lastly, the revitalization movements that have been documented for other areas
of the State emerged more recently on.Kodiak (see McNabb 1987; Fienup-Riordan
1983), perhaps due to the widely held perception of the Kodiak Native culture as "lost."
This cultural renewal is an impo'rtant feature of a newly reformed Native identity. The
restructuring of KANA under new leadership in the past decade and the role it has
played in increasing awareness of Native culture has contributed to the rise in Native
consciousness on Kodiak.
In addition to providing health and social services and educational and economic
assistance to the villages, KANA is dedicated to promoting pride on the part of
indigenous people of the Kodiak Island area in their cultural heritage and traditions and
to preserving Native language, customs, foilore, and arts. The KANA has engaged in
efforts to reclaim the Native cultural heritage because many of its leaders believe that
the disintegration of traditional cultures'is linked to the social problems (e.g., alcohol
abuse, domestic violence, suicides) that are devastating Alaskan villages, and that
Natives' sense of identity and self-esteem is part of the solution to these problems.
The Adaq'wy Cultural Heritage Program, developed by KANA to preserve the
Native culture of Alutiiq-speaking people, is directed by a Culture Committee and
administered by the Culture and Heritage Program Coordinator. The program has
several project. The Oral History Project is trying to preserve the rich knowledge of
Native lifeways still possessed by Native elders through taping and transcribing
interviews. The Alutiiq Language Project, which grew out of the oral history project, is
recording and preserving Kodiak's Native language and producing educational materials

The Kodiak Region - Page 661





for the schools. The Culture Heritage Library is building a collection of books onI
Alaska and Native history. The Educational Outreach Project is educating the public
about Native culture and producing educational materials to share with other villages in
the Alutiiq-speaking culture area. Finally, the Village Anthropologist Program is traiin
local villagers to oversee their cultural resources and is coordinating the visits of outside
researchers.3
The KANA and the Alaska Humanities Foram sponsored the first Kodiak Island
Culture and Heritage Conference on March 28-30, 1988. Forty scholars from the U.S.,
Canada, Finland, Great Britain, Sweden, Germany, and the U.S.S.R. participated in this
intemnational conference, which was devoted to Native culture of the Kodiak Island Area.3
In 1989, KANA sponsored a second conference focused on kayaks and has plans to
sponsor future conferences.3
The KANA is worldng to construct a 17,000-square-foot Native Museum and
Culture Center in Kodiak to serve as a repository for art and artifacts and as a research3
and educational center. In 1987, Koniag, Inc., donated land to be traded with the City of
Kodiak for a 2.5-acre parcel on Near Island. The KANA is securing funding for theI
museumi's construction and for a trust fand to support operating expenses. In 1986,
KANA entered into a joint venture to form Lucky Strike Bingo in Anchorage, funds1
from which will go to benefit the construction and operation of the museum.
The KANA and the Kodiak Tribal Council are trying to start Kodiak Native3
Crafts, a nonprofit corporation, to provide employment and vocational rehabilitation to
Kodiak Island Natives. The aim is to provide Native people with something culturally1
relevant to do and to create profitable work that can be done in homes. Kodiak Native
Crafts would market this work. The KANA and the Kodiak Tribal Council are seeldngI
startup funds from State vocational rehabilitation and private enterprise (Kodiak Daily
Mirror, 10-4-89:3).3
Filipinos in Kodiak have an organization dedicated to working in their interest.
The Filipino American Association was started in -1983 but has existed under different5
names since 1972. The purpose of this group is to give assistance to its rmembers and
organize social activities for the Filipino community. The organization became politically3
The Kodiak Region - Page 662

active after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, representing the interests of the many Filipinos
that work for the processors. The head of that organization was elected to the Kodiak
City Council in October 1989.
VI. EFFECTS OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL
The Kodiak Archipelago was one of the areas most affected by the Exxon Valdez
oil spill. The oil slick that drifted southwest from Prince William Sound began washing
up on Kodiak beaches on April 17, 1989, within 3 weeks after the oil tanker Exxon
Valdez struck Bligh Reef and spilled nearly 11 million gallons of crude oil. Much of the
oil that drifted out of Prince William Sound passed through Shelikof Strait between
Kodiak and the Alaska Peninsula, which bas rich fishing grounds frequented by members
of the Kodiak fishing fleet. All of the communities in the region experienced economic,
social, cultural, and institutional'imnpacts as a result of the oil spill.
VI-4. Results of the 1989 Research
The research on which this section is based took place in September 1989, over 5
months after the oil spill had occurred and during the time that Exxon was winding down
its cleanup operations and puffing its representatives out of Kodiak. Even though the
delay in getting into the field hampered our ability to document and record impacts as
they occurred, our research team had several advantages. Data that had been gathered
in Kodiak over the previous two years as part of the Social Indicators Research Project
provided useful baseline information. Dr. Joa-nna Endter spent the first 2 weeks of
March 1989 in Kodiak and completed the second wave of this research just 10 days prior
to the oil spill. One member of the research team, Ms. Rachel Mason, lived in Kodiak
and had been able to observe firsthand the community's response to the spill over the
course of the succeeding 5 months. Dr. Endter subscribed to the local newspaper, which
provided good coverage of events having to do with the oil spill and which started a
special "Oil Watch" column soon after the Exxon Valdez oil spill occurred. All three
members of the research team--Dr. Endter, Ms. Mason, and Mr. Jon Hofmneister--spent
several weeks in Kodiak during September 1989 conducting in-depth interviews with
community residents and public officials. During this time, community residents were
The Kodiak Region - Page 663

preparing for Exxon's withdrawal, working on winter cleanup proposals, and summarizingU
their experiences to date in dealing with impacts from the oil spill.
The previous chapters of this report provide a backgroun'd for understanding the
impacts that the oil spill had on the Kodiak region and the responses of local residents.
Kodiales experi'ence with the oil spill can be understood partly in terms of its history.
Kodiak was impacted by two major natural disasters in the past--the eruption of Mountg
Katmai in 1912 and the Great Alaskan Earthquake in 1964. Memories and stories of
these disasters, of the reconstruction that followed, and of the way in which communities3
united to respond to these disasters remain alive. The Exxon Valdez oil spill was not the
same. Uncertainty about the extent of oil-spill imnpacts and when they would cease made
it difficult for local residents to overcome the disaster and put their lives back together.
E-xxon's actions inhibited community mobilization similar to that which took place after3
the previous natural disasters. Furthermore, the oil spill was a manmade disaster that
people believe could have been avoided, which resulted in deep anger that was not easily3
dissipated.
The trends of political, econormic, and social change already occurring in the
community also are important to an understanding of the Kodiak region's experience
with the oil spill. The entire region had long been dependent on natural resource-based3
economic activities (fishing, timber production, tourism) and on government programs
that aided these industries and managed and regulated natural resource use. Faced with
increased national and international competition, particularly in fishing, and with
declining State and Federal revenue sharing, Kodiak communities were attempting to1
position themselves to be better able to compete and to capture more local economic
benefits fromi these extractive industries. Kodiak City was fighting to maintain its3
position as one of the top U.S. fishing ports and as a major regional shore-based fish
processing center. The fishing industry generally had become more diversified,3
competitive, capitalized, and risky. These changes had increased the divisions among
fishermen and had increased the disparities within and between communities of theI
region. The oil spill exacerbated the existing pressures on and tensions in the Kodiak
region.I

The Kodiak Region - Page 6643

In addition to understanding the existing conditions in Kodiak, we must
understand the way in which the oil-spill response unfolded. 'Me effects of the oil spill
occurred later in Kodiak than in coastal areas more proximnate to the spill. IBy the time
oil reached Kodiak, Exxon already was attempting to limit its responsibilities, cleanup
costs, and liabilities. Exxon's handling of the oil spill response resulted in diffe-rential
impacts on individuals and segmnents of the Kodiak population, which led to some
internal community factionalism. Exxon's control over the oil-spill cleanup and the way
it responded to Kodiak area residents' concernis added to local frustrations and inhibited
community involvement and cooperation in responding to the oil spill.
Institutional ResDonses and ImDacts: Kodiak benefitted from the disaster plans
already put in place by the Emergency Services Council that was formed after the 1964
earthquake. The council consisted of the Kodiak City mayor, the Kodiak Island Borough
mayor, the Kodiak City manager, and the local USCG commander. Ile council was
activated on April 3, 1989, when oil approached the archipelago.
The Emergency Services Council directed initial community efforts and
mobiliztion to respond to the spill. They initiated contingency planning for deflection
booming in the event that the oil slick reached Kodiak, started identifying the most
critical hatcheries and tributaries, and sought finding to help finance oil- spill-cleanup
preparations. They worked with local representatives of the USFWS, ADF&G, and the
Alaska Department of Natural Resources to determine priorities on which sites to save.
Parks, preserves, fish hatcheries, commercial fishing areas, subsistence beaches, and other
key sites were identified on a map; and then practicality and judgmnent calls were used to
determine priorities.
The Emergency Services Council remained active in oil-spill response throughout
the summ,er . It kept Kodiak residents informed through public oil-spill meetings held
daily at first and later three times a week, through public-radio broadcasts, through
tellevision coverage of all the public meetings, and through FAX communications with
the six outlying villages. Kodiak City was the only community impacted by the Exxon
Valdez oil spill that held ongoing public meetings through September 1989.
The Kodiak Region - Page 665





Kodiak residents also mobilied before the oil spill hit. People worked toI
document baseline conditions on Kodiak beac hes (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 4-7-89:1).
Fishermen began transporting boom material to critical bays. Others assembled a
volunteer armada that attacked the leading edge of the oil slick as it approached
Resurrection Bay on April 11, 1989 (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 4-6-89:1; 4-11-89:1). A group
of people began the "Typar Project," which produced a geotextile boom that was to be
used in getting oil out of the water.
Federal agencies and the Exxon corporation--without offices in Kodiak--were not3
as quick to respond. The Bureau of Land Management "incident command team' did
not arrive until the fifth day after oil actually had hit Kodiak beaches, and Exxon3
representatives were not there until the tenth day. Initially, Exxon had no plans to help
Kodiak, believing that the slick would dissipate before reaching the archipelago (Kodiak3
Daily Mirror, 4-5-89:1). After Exxon did arrive, however, Exxon and the USCG took
over control of the cleanup operations, and local governunental entities were put in aI
reactive position.
According to local public officials, Exxon thereafter directed the cleanup effort byj
controlling the purse strings. Cleanup expenditures had to be justified to Exxon's
representatives, who decided which costs the corporation would assume. Local3
governments first had to present Exxon with cleanup plans that it could approve or
reject, and then had to assume the financial costs of responding to the oil spill andI
submit claims to Exxon for reimbursement. Oftentimes Exxon rejected cleanup
s-uggestions from local people, citing safety, health, liability, and coordination as reasons3
for not doing more. As one interviewee remarked, the irony of the situation was that
Exxon was responsible for the oil spill, yet people had to beg them for the money toI
clean it up (Endter 1989).
Many interviewees thought the Federal Government made a mistake by notI
federalizing the cleanup and sending Exxon the bill. Others were not so sure that the
Federal Government would have been any more responsive. It appeared to many local5
residents that the USCG was lenient with and sympathetic to Exxon. Yet some people
felt that 'at least dealing with Exxon was better than dealing with another oil companyI

The Kodiak Region - Page 6663

that may have walked away or may not have had the same financial capabilities to
respond to a spill of the magnitude of the Exxon.Valdez.
Burdens Placed on Local Governments: The three major burdens placed
on local governments as a result of the Exxon Valdez oil spill were adverse financial
impacts, disruption of existing programs, and strain on local public officials..
Adverse Financial Imuacts: Kodiak Island Borough communities
were forced to expend additional time and money on oil-spill response, which became
the immediate priority of their staff in the spill's aftermath. Public employees had to
handle correspondence and billings to Exxon and other spill-related documentation,
which took time away from normal community and borough business. Virtually every
department of the Kodiak Island Borough was affected. Exxon would -not reimburse
communities for straight (regular) timne put in on spill-related activities--only for overtime
put in on spill-related activities (Endter 1989). Some people left their public jobs due to
strain caused by oil spill response or to accept higher paying cleanup jobs--a cost to
communities in terms of valuable staff experience and training.
The Kodiak Island Borough and its communities were affected financially in other
ways, according to local officials. For example, these communities lost tax revenues from
various sources, including raw fish tax, income tax shares, and property tax revenues due
to decreased property values. Borough revenues decreased due to reduced water and
sewer usage beca-use most of the fish processors--the major consumers of those services--
did not operate during summer 1989. The Kodiak Island Borough lost interest when it
had to use some of its long-term investments to pay spill-related bills. These lost
revenues were not compensated by Exxon but had to be documented and become part of
the borough's and communities' claims against Exxon.
All Kodiak Isla-nd communities experienced increased costs in community and
social service programs as a result of the sudden increase in local unemployment and the
rapid in-migration of oil-spill-cleanup workers. Police, mental health agencies, and social
service providers were strained in their attempts to meet the increased need and demand
for services.
The Kodiak Region - Page 667






Disruution of Existing! Programs: During spring and summer 1989,3
Kodiak communities had to substitute oil-spill-response activity for community
improvement projects. Spring and summer are normally the time when Alaskan
communities undertake major infrastructure and construction jobs, such as roads, bridges,
docks, buildings, and water and sewer projects. Such projects have been crucial for
Kodiak's competition in the rapidly evolving international seafood trade. Most of theg
projects Kodiak had planned for 1989 were put on hold because people were occupied
with oil-spill cleanup. Sufficient labor was not available to work on community3
improvement projects, and govermnment officials did not want to bring in contract labor
from outside the region.
T'he offices of State and Federal agencies located in Kodiak were similarly
affected. ADF&G and USFWS personnel and resources were deployed to assist with3
oil-spill activities, causing many exidsting programs to be placed on hold or cut back. The
existing programs of these agencies primarily aid the fishing and recreation industries,3
which are the backbone of Kodiales economy.
Community improvements and, services provided to Kodiak villages already had.i
been declining, for several years. Regional fish processing had become concentrated in
Kodiak City, and funding of facilities and support services for the fishing industry was
hard for villages to obtain. The oil spill exacerbated this trend and increased the
disparities between Kodiak City and the outlying villages (Endter 1989).3
Strain on Local Ofricials: The oil spill was a tremendous strain on
Kodiales public officials. Dealing with the oil spill required a great deal of time and3
energy over an extended period of time. These officials were constantly attending
meetings and tTaveling, which made it difficult for them to mai-ntain a normal home life.3
While representatives for Exxon and the State of Alaska were rotated in and out of
Kodiak, local officials never had a break from the pressures of dealing with the oil spill.3
By the end of the summer, several of the mayors and city council members from other
impacted communities in southcentral Alaska had resigned from their positions. Most of3
Kodiak's public officials remained in office. By the time they were interviewed as part of
this research in September, the strain that they had been under was clearly visible.I

The Kodiak Region - Page 6683

The public meetings that Kodiak officials chaired throughout surnmer 1989
became a mechanism for releasing anger and expressing grief, which increased the strain
on these local officials. Kodiak residents were united on the need to do something, but
they were frustrated with not being able to do much. Having little or no control over
Exxon or the involved State and Federal agencies, their anger was vented on local
officials. One Kodiak public official admitted that he dreaded the public meetings, but
he said they kept holding them because Exxon representatives hated the meetings even
more than the local officials and it was a way to keep Exxon accountable and the public
informed (Endter 1989).
Part of the strain on local public officials was due to differences of opinion within
Kodiak communities on how to deal with Exxon. Community residents were angry with
E-xxon; but because Exxon was in charge of the spill cleanup, local officials had to find a
way to work with Exxon representatives. Several local officials reported that they were
accused of being traitors and themselves became objects of community criticism.
Local-Governmnent Difficulties in Dealinty with Exxon: Local communities
faced numerous dffficulties in dealing with Exxon during the course of the cleanup. The
problems most often mentioned by Kodiak officials who were interviewed concerned
defining the problemn, obtaining uniform treatment from Exxon, and preventing Exxon
from circumventing environmental reguilations and processes.
Defining the Problem: A major dffficulty local governments had in
dealing with Exxon was defining the problenm4 both the geographic extent of the oil spill
and the nature of the impacts. At first, Exxon tried to limit its sphere of responsibility
through denying problems in areas outside of Prince William Sound. In early May, the
Commissioner of Alaska's Department of Environmental Conservation called Exxon
"reluctant and myopic, characterized by stalling techniques, disinformation, and a refusal
to pay real attention to damage outside of Prince William Sound"t (Kodiak Daily Mirror,
5-8-89:4).
Once the oil spill spread and Exxon was forced to admit the obvious impacts,
Kodiak residents felt Exxon was slow to respond. As oil approached Kodiak Island and
the Alaska Peninsula, residents of various communities asked for assistance to protect
The Kodiak Region - Page 669





critical areas before oil actually hit the beaches. Exxon was reluctant to expand cleanup
efforts and did not respond until areas actually were oiled. For instance, Exxon and
VECO ignored pleas from residents of Larsen Bay for assistance as oil approached that
commnunity. These people tried to contain incoming oil with boom and began cleaning
their beaches without help from Exxon (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 5-11-89:1; 5-12-89:7). As
oil approached the Chignik area communities, local residents were told that preparationsg
for the arrival of oil were "premature" and the community should remain "on hold."
Chignik residents then tried to obtain funds from the State Department of3
Environmental Conservation so they could initiate their own cleanup efforts (Kodiak
Daily Mirror, 5-1-89:1).5
Kodiak governm'ent officials reported that they continually had to counter Exxon's
reports about the extent of oil-spill impacts (Endter 1989). For instance, in late May3
1989, Charles Sitter, Senior Vice-President and spokesperson for Exxon, was interviewed
on the National Public Radio show "AUl Things Considered." He stated with authority1
that the. effects of the oil spill had been overestimated and that only 300 oiled birds had
been collected to date. That same day the Kodiak Daily Mirror reported that the dead-j
bird count had reached 8,465 (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 5-25-89:7). This minimization of the
impacts outraged Kodiak residents and prompted a response from the Kodiak Island3
Borough and Kodiak City mayors. In responding to Charles Sitter's statement, the
Kodiak mayors noted that not only was the environmental damage far worse than SitterI
admitted, but "people's livelihoods had been put in jeopardy, their families' futures were
at peril, and their mental health had been disrupted" (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 5-25-89:2).3
Another problem was that Exxon would recognize only immediate environmental
and direct economic impacts. The corporation would not recognize social or indirect3
impacts from the oil spill and was even more reluctant to look at the potential long-term
impacts. Exxon paid for some spill-related needs of Kodiak communities, such as extra
police, garbage, and medical personnel; but they would not pay for other costs such as
costs associated with extra mental health, alcohol, and drug services; child care for3
cleanup workers; direct economic-impact damage studies; and mitigation of labor
shortages (Kodiak Daily Mirrow, 7-27-89:2). Exxon rejected the Kodiak Island Borough's
The Kodiak Region - Page 670

proposals and requests for reimbursement of additional costs in these areas. Local
officials reported that they had to fight even to get Exxon to pay for the oil-spill-related
costs that the company acknowledged. According to one local official, "We have had to
drag Exxon forward. kicldng and screaming" (Endter -4989).
Exxon also fought with the State and local communities over definitions of what
constituted a clean beach. After a while, the term "clean" was no longer used to describe
a beach; beaches where cleanup crews had worked were considered "treated" or "cleared"
(Kodiak Daily Mirror, 6-5-89:2; 6-23-89:4). Exxon continually focused on the amount of
debris taken (bag counts), the amount of area covered (miles of beach), and the amount
of money spent instead of the amount of oil that remained or reappeared after beaches
had been treated. Beginning in late July, Exxon started scaling back Kodiak cleanup
operations in preparation for a mid-September departure date and these definitional
battles were important for justifying its reduced efforts. By the time Exxon pulled out,
they declared that the beaches, were "nearly free of oil" and "environmentally stable"
(Kodiak Daily Mirror, 9-15-89:7).
Despite Exxoin's claims, surveys conducted by the Department of Environmental
Conservation indicated that recoverable oil remained on most impacted beaches while
wildlife deaths and fisheries damage continued. The department criticized Exxon's plans
to pull out without a firm commitment to continue addressing the impacts, and criticized
its winter cleanup plan (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 8-21-89:8; 8-25-89:8; 9-7-89:1).
Local residents and cleanup workers also testified that there were' still significant
amounts of oil around the island toward the end of the summer. They criticized Exxon's
plans to scale back the cleanup operations, saying it was more of a public relations effort
than anytbing else. They claimed that E-xxon was concerned about meeting quotas on
the number of beaches "cleared," but the quality of the cleanup was bad. Oil left on the
beaches was being camouflaged by wind and waves that covered it with sand and gravel;
people could not see the oil from the air. Thus, VECO cleaned onfly the surface without
addressing the buried oil. Some workers, many of them fr,om the Lower 48 states, said
that VECO supervisors actually discouraged themn from doing a mnore thorough cleanup
job (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 6-5-89:2)
The Kodiak Region - Page 671





Once Exxon pulled out of oil-spill cleanup in September 1989, local governmentsI
had to search for other souTces of reimbursement for expenses incurred as a result of the
oil spill. They sought altemnative means to fund fall and winter cleanup programs, such
as through the State of Alaska's Department of Community and Regional Affairs grant
program and Trans-Alaska Pipeline contingency funds.II
ObtaininLy Uniform Treatment from Exxon: Another problem that
local commuinity officials had in dealing with Exxon was obtaining what they considered
uniform and fair treatment. Exxon attempted to deal with communities on an individualI
basis, resulting in significant differences in how each impacted community was treated.
For example, one Kodiak public official reported that initially the Kenai PeninsulaI
Borough received a $2 million grant from Exxon, while the Kodiak Emergency Services
Council received only a $500,000 reimbursement contract (Endter 1989; Kodiak Daily3
Mirror, 5-5-89:1). In Prince William Sound, Exxon hired all comnmunity residents who
were willing to work on the cleanup; but in the Kodiak region, Exxon chartered only with5
some vessel owners and limited the number of people hired for beach-cleanup crews.
When the mayors from nearly two dozen communities that suffered consequencesI
from the Exxon Valdez oil spill leamned of discrepancies in Exxon's treatment, they
formed an organization that became known as the "Oiled Mayors." This organizationI
attempted to negotiate with Exxon in a united manner and became an important fonrum
for local community officials to discuss similar problems and frustrations (Kodiak Daily3
Mirror, 5-5-89:1). Kodiak City assumed administrative responsibilities for the Oiled
Mayors, which met every 2 weeks. Kodiak City was in a better position to do this than1
other communities because of the administrative str-ucture provided by the Emergency
Services Council, the fina-ncial resources Kodiak City had as one of the nation's largestI
fishing ports, and the political influence that the region previously had been able to exert
in State politics.3
The Oiled Mayors engaged in a number of activities aimed at protecting the
interests of communities affected by the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Most importantly, they
fought what they perceived to be Exxon's "divide-and-conquer strategy" and negotiated
with E-xxon for a formal reimbursement plan that would provide equal treatment to
The Kodiak Region - Page 672

impacted communities (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 5-26-89:1; 6-6-89:2; 6-19-89:3). This was
not an easy task because up until their departure, Exxon representatives continued trying
to negotiate informally and individually with each community (Endter 1989). In addition,
the Oiled Mayors distributed information to impacted communities, lobbied for State
and Federal legislation that would provide more local input for oil planning decisions
and greater protection against future disasters, and sought State assistance once Exxon
pulled out in September 1989. In October 1989, Alaska's Oiled Mayors traveled to
France, where they met with officials from the communities that had been impacted by
the 55-million-gallon Amoco Cadiz oil spill nearly a decade before.
Within the Kodiak region, there were discrepancies between Exxon's dealings with
Kodiak City and the Kodiak Island Borough and its dealings with the six outlying
villages. For instance, while Exxon representatives dealt daily with Kodiak City and
Kodiak Island Borough officials, they were slow to involve the villages in spill-response
operations and did not contact the tribal councils in those communities (Kodiak Daily
Mirror, 4-20-89:3). The wages offered to villagers for cleanup work were lower than
those paid in other areas, and villagers had to fight for equal pay (Kodiak Daily Mirror,
5-12-89:7; 6-8-89:1).
Boat charters were a source of inequity and contention. As Exxon reluctantly
expanded cleanup operations, they hired Kodiak vessels first and sent them to do
cleanup near the villages, angering village boat owners (Kodiak Daily Mirror,. 5-1-89:1; 5-
12-89:7; 6-8-89:5). Chignik fishermen fought to obtain local charters but were offered
substantially le'ss than Kodiak boat owners were getting and had to seek legal assistance
from the Bristol Bay Native Association to obtain equal contracts (Kodiak Daily Mirror,
5-5-89:4). At one point, Exxon attempted to reduce all vessel contracts by about 25 to 50
percent from those originally developed by Exxon and the Kodiak Emergency Servces
Council. Exxon claimed that it wanted to make contracts throuaghout the oil-impacted
areas consistent and competitive and used the argument that it had a fiscal responsibility
to its stockholders to reduce cleanup costs. When Kodiak fishermen fought the
reduction, Exxon tried to get Kodiak fishermen to back down on their demands by
The Kodiak Region - Page 673





threatening to bring in cleanup people from outside the area (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 6-27-1
89:1; 6-29-89:1).
The Kodiak Island Borough and the Kodiak Area Native Association (KANA)I
tried to moderate the issues and unite regional communities in dealing with Exxon. For
instance, the Kodiak Island Borough provided villages with legal counsel on the winter
cleanup contracts Exxon was trying to negotiate (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 9-5-89:1) and
submitted a joint proposal for State fanding of winter cleanup covering all the
communities. Exxon had dealt with each village individually, offering them $70,000 toI
conduct their own winter cleanup operations; but those communities would have had to
accept the liability that went along with overseeing the operations. KANA and theI
Kodiak Island Borough worked together to keep Exxon from putting a wedge between
the Native and non-Native population of the region when it proposed to distribute3
canned salmon to replace lost subsistence foods.
Preventing! Exxon from Circumvenfing7 Environmental Regyulations:5
According to one Kodiak official, Exxon not only violated environmental regulations by
failing to be prepared to respond to an oil tanker accident, it also attempted toj
circumvent 'environmental regulations in its cleanup operations. Exxon officials admitted
that environmental laws probably would need to be bypassed to burn or bury sludgeI
recovered in cleanup operations (Kodiak Daily Mirror 5-2-89:1). The prime example in
the Kodiak region was Exxon's attempt to locate an incinerator near the community of 1
Port Lions.
Exxon claimed that it needed a way to dispose of accumulated oil and trash and
that disposal problems were hampering cleanup operations. The corporation attempted
to get two offshore floating incinerators approved to burn spill waste; one was to be3
located in Viekoda Bay near the village of Port Lions. Advanced Environmental
Technology from Louisiana had been a low bidder on the project and was going to 1
operate the incinerator. Exxon, Alaska's Department of Environmental Conservation,
and Advanced Envirornnental Technology claimed that the incinerator was state of the
art and safe; but Kodiak area residents were not convinced.
The Kodiak Region - Page 674

Kodiak officials clamed that there was no waste disposal problem. Exxon had
been shipping spill waste to Oregon, and these officials thought that Exxon wanted a
local incinerator in order to save money. Kodiak Island residents opposed the
incinerator, voicing conceems at public meetings and -holding protests in front of the
Exxon Command Center in Kodiak. Kodiak residents were particularly upset that they
had not been consulted and that the incinerator had been moved from Kukak Bay under
pressure from the U.S. National Park Service over wildlife concerns, only to be located 8
miles from the community of Port Lions and 3 miles from the origin of its watershed
(Kodiak Daily Mirror, 8-15-89:1; 8-18-89:1; 8-29-89:1).
Approval of the incinerator was delayed, and Exxon and the Department of
Enviromnmental Conservation exchanged allegations about who was holding up the
process. Kodiak public officials were angered at the way Exxon played to the media;
Exxon claimed that it was doing its best to clean up the oil spill and blamed the State for
hampering its progress. According to these local officials, Exxon never held public
hearings or consulted with the people who were going to be affected by the incinerator.
One interviewee reported that Exxon representatives wanted to do things their own way
and acted as if they did not need to follow any r-ules in trying to clean up their mess
(Endter 1989).
Advanced Environmental Technology finally received a permit from the State to
operate the incinerator, but the State had failed to allow the Kodiak Island Borough to
hold public hearings and to prepare a consistency determination as required by its
Coasta Management Plan. The Kodiak Island Borough eventually held hearings, local
residents objected to the incinerator, and the borough passed a resolution calling for the
Department of Environmental Conservation to void the incinerator permiit, which it
finally did (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 9-8-89:1; 9-11-89:1). One local public official said,
"Exxon thinks it is above the law and above a silly, local permit process. It has been a
nightmare dealing with them"' (Endter 1989).
Economic ImDacts: Some general points need to be niade about the economic
impacts of the Exxon Valdez oil spill on the Kodiak region before the specific effects on
various sectors of the economy are discussed. First, the economic impacts were
The Kodiak Region - Page 675





unequally distributed: some people experienced financial losses while others experiencedI
a short-term boom. There were several reasons for these discrepancies. First, not all of
the fisheries were closed, and some businesses that normally support the fishing industry
were able to service the oil-spill-cleanup operations instead. Second, by the time cleanup
operations got under way in Kodiak, Exxon was already trying to minimiize its costs and
thus limited the number of vessels it chartered and people it hired to work on the
cleanup. Third, some people were adequately compensated for their losses while others
were not. The claims process lagged behind actual need. Several groups of people "fell
through the cracks" and were not eligible for claims despite the fact that they had been
impacted.3
A second general point is that Exxon's required documentation of adverse
economic impacts and claims procedures focused on short-term effects on individuals.5
Of primary concern to many Kodiak residents were general, long-term impacts that
would be hard to document but that could have serious impl ications for the future of the
Kodiak economy. One of these was the impact of the oil spill on the future reputation
of wild Alaskan salmon, which already faced fierce competition from pen-reared salmon.j
Another was the lasting effect of the oil spill on bottoiiifishing, southwest Alaska's
growth industry, should the o.il sink because little was known about the effects of sinldng
oil on fishery resources (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 6-12-89:1). Such impacts threatened
Kodiak City's ability to maintain its position in the international seafood trade and its5
long-term growth potential.
Fisheries: Kodiak's salmon and herring fishermen were the hardest hit bya
the oil spill. The entire Kodiak salmon management area was closed to fishing, except
for two districts at the southemn tip of the island that were opened to setnetters (Kodiak
Daily Mirror, 3-23-90:10). The herring fishery opened on April 15, 1989, only to be
closed later that day in some sections due to the presence of oil (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 4-1
17-89:3). The herring fishery was closed on May 8, 1989, for the rest of the season.
As mentioned previously, salmon seiners constituted the bulk of Kodiak City'sI
fishing fleet and nearly all of the fishermen in the outlying villages. Salmon was the
largest contributor to Kodi ak's processing, sector in termns of both weight and marketI
The Kodiak Region - Page 676

value. Numerous meetings were held throughout the spring to discuss potential sahmon
management scenarios for the 1989 season. The ADF&G and Exxon pushed to have a
salmon season. For liability reasons, the State needed to demonstrate an "appreciable
likelihood" that fishing gear and fish would become contaminated or that it would be
impossible to operate an orderly fishery before it could shut the fishery down (Kodiak
Daily Mlirror, 6-14-89:3). Some interviewees felt Exxon wanted the salmon fishery to
open in order to reduce losses and potential claims against the corporation. Alaska's Lt.
Governor suggested Exxon had shifted to a "litigation posture" and was seeking "ways to
avoid paying fishermen for losses as a result of the spill" (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 6-14-
89:3).
Fishermen and processors were against opening the fishery, primarily out of equity
considerations and because of concern about altering consumers' perceptions of Alaskan
seafood and losing established markets. Claims procedures against Exxon reportedly
would be simplified if there were no fishing season (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 6-12-89:1; 6-
14-89:3). "Kodiak fishermen wanted to take their chances in court rather than risk losing
credibility on the market" (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 6-14-89:3)
The salmon fishery was finally closed for several reasons. First, there were
concerns about contamination. Fishermen feared contaminating their boats and gear
and worried abo-ut the additional time that would have been required to deliver
contaminated fish to separate tenders. The problem of what to do with contaminated
fish 'was never solved. The main proposal was to grind it up and dump it 3 miles from
shore, but this coiild have had negative impacts on the crab and halibut grounds.
Second, quickly changing conditions in regards to the movement of spilled oil made it
hard to determine which areas could be fished. Third, there were insurmnountable
difficulties entailed in trying to manage a very competitive fishery involving several
different gear types in more limited areas when it had already taken decades to develop
the current management regime and arrive at some equity between the gear types
(Kodiak Daily Mirror, 5-23-89:1; 5-30-89:7; 6-5-89:1; 6-15-89:1).
Fishermen and processors who had diversified their operations in recent years
were not affected as adversely. Those fishermen and processors who had diversified into
The Kodiak Region - Page 677

other fish stocks benefitted from the fact that the cod, halibut, and groundfish fisheries
were opened in the Kodiak area. Fishermen who had diversified by increasing the size
and mobility of their vessels were able to leave Kodiak and either fish in areas that were
unaffected or charter with Exxon to work on oil-spill cleanup in Prince William Sound.
Differences in the impacts on fishermen were exacerbated by the manner in which
E-xxon negotiated charters with boat owners. Initially, larger boats were chartered by
Exxon. These generally were owned by fishermen who had more diversified operations
and had less to lose from the closing of the salmon and herring fisheries. Salmon and
herring fishermen had to prepare to fish in case these fisheries were opened in order to
be eligible for compensation and, thus, were unable to charter with Exxon until the
decision was made to close those fisheries. It took longer for some groups of fishermen,
such as salmon purse seiners and setnetters, to negotiate cleanup work with Exxon.
These fishermnen were thus left without a fishing season, without cleanup work, and
without certainty about compensation from Exxon.3
Kodiak Island residents had similar experiences with obtainiing work on beach-
cleanup crews. Even though Exxon and VECO had promised to hire local people first,3
people from outside the area ended up working on beach cleanup. Kodiak setnetters
had to convince Exxon to establish the Kodiak setnetter beach-cleanup program, which f
concentrated on cleaning beaches between Kupreanof and Karluk (Kodiak Daily Mirror,
5-24-89:1; 9-29-89:17). In the villages, Exxon hired only a certain number of individuals--3
not all who were willing to work.
Compensation was dffficult to obtain for several groups of people who were f
nonetheless adversely affected. One such group consisted of able-bodied crew for whom
the claims documentation pTocess was much harder if they had not been attached to a f
specific vessel in the past and had not signed on with a captain for the 1989 season.
Some captains did not hire crew in 1989 because they were not sure of having a fishing
season, or they hired family members to avoid having to share their compensation
(Endter 1989; Kodiak Daily Mirror, 7-17-89:1). Another group of people who "fell
through the cracks" consisted of boat owners and operators who did not own a Limited
Entry pernlit but who generally were partners with a permit owner for the fishing season.

The Kodiak Region - Page 678

These people lacked adequate documentation of past participation in the fishery because
fish harvests were recorded against the limited Entry permit (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 8-8-
89:2). Cannery workers, particularly those who worked at Eagle Fisheries, a bottomfish
processor, were another group that had to fight for compensation. Exxon claimed that
Eagle Fisheries' workers had not been affected by the oil spill since bottomfishing
remained open, yet two of the four draggers under contract to that cannery stopped
fishing to work on oil-spill cleanup (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 7-26-89:1; 7-28-89:1; 7-31-89:1).
Crew, boat operators without permits, and cannery workers were less likely to be
adequately compensated because they were generally more transient and because final
settlement was, most likely, years away.
Fishermen generally were concemned about the long-term impacts of the oil spill
on the fishing industry. When fishermen lose a season, they hope to make up for it the
next year; but the oil spill threatened numerous future seasons. Kodiak fishermnen were
concerned about the biological effects of the oil spill on the resource base, yet they also
were concemned about the reputation of Alaskan seafood and about maintaining market
share in an increasingly competitive environment. The oil spill put the fishermen in a
double bind. As some of them pointed, their attempts to prove that Alaskan seafood
was unaffected in order to protect their markets could favorably enhance E-xxon's legal
position.
Tourism: The tourism and convention business, which the Kodiak
Chamber of Commerce.and the Kodiak Island Convention and Visitors Bureau had been
building up for several years, was directly impacted by the oil spill just when strategi
advertising looked like it was about to pay off. Inquiries about Kodiak had increased
300 percent from the previous year. After the oil spill, many people who had made
summer reservations with local lodges, guide services, and summer camps canceled
(Kodiak Daily Mirror, 5 -24-89:6).
For people still wanting to visit Kodiak, there were few hotel rooms, rental cars,
chaTter planes, and vessels available because VECO had contracted to use most of them
for the cleanup operations. Lodges and guides had difficulty transporting clients and
obtaining fuel and supplies. Hotel rooms were so scarce that several local people set up
The Kodiak Region - Page 679

~~~~~~~II


temporary bed and brealfast operations in their homes to deal with the housing shortageI
(Kodiak Daily Mirror, 5-24-89:6; 8-11-89:1; Endter 1989).
Several of the villages had tried in recent years to attract more sport fishermen
and hunters in order to help diversifyr their economies and lessen dependence on
commercial fishing. For instance, KANA had been working with Karluk to develop
tourism. Karluk had, in recent years, provided some of the best sport fishing in Alaska.g
Soon after the oil spill, cancellations from sport fishermen already had cost the
community thousands of dollars (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 5-12-89:1), and Karluk's
development efforts were set back.
Service and Surnnort Industries: Most of Kodiak's private-sector economy5
is tied in one way or another to the fishing and tourist industries. Businesses that service
or support fishing and tourism were indirectly affected by the oil spill in varying ways. In
terms of sales, some businesses such as grocery and retail stores, hotels, or car rentals
did a booming business in 1989 in connection with the oil-spill cleanup. Other                      3
businesses that were more directly tied to fishing or tourism per se, like guides and net
menders, were adversely affected.
Many businesses suffered from disruption of the labor market in Alaska coastal
communities due to the bigh wages paid by Exxon and VECO for cleanup workers
(Kodiak Daily Mirror, 4-20-89:12). Beach-cleanup-crew members could earn $17 per
hour, so many people left their existing jobs. Fish processors, restaurants, fast-foodj
establishments, gas stations, and other labor-intensive businesses had trouble finding and
retaining enough help. Air taxis had trouble keeping pilots. The help that these
businesses were able to get was generally less experienced and less efficient. Several
restauarants in Kodiak reduced their hours of operation or closed altogether due to lackI
of employees.
State loans were made available to assist business, such as retail suppliers who3
were indirectly affected by the oil spill. Under State law, Exxon was not required to
compensate people for indirect damage. To establish an oil-spill claim, a person had to
show that he or she suffered a loss or damage due to the oil spill or a net loss of incoine.


The Kodiak Region - Page 6803

Fishermen, spotters, processors, crew, and suppliers were among the potential claimants
(Kodiak Daily Mirror, 4-18-89:1).
The overall impact of the oil spill on the Kodiak economy was hard to discern
due to the infusion of cash from oil-spill cleanup, which was referrd to as the biggest
boom since the Trans-Alaska Pipeline (Kodiak Daily Mirror 4-20-1989:12). Exxon and
VECO purchased supplies and leased equipment from local businesses and sal es tax
revenues reportedly were up from the previous year. Local bank officials were generally
optimistic and pointed to signs of economic stability and growth, such as new housing,
the fact that the fuel and garbage company bought new equipment, and construction of a
small mall. They reported that some people had money and were paying off their loans.
Bank deposits were up and the banks were continuing to make consumer loans.
The infusion of cash into the local economy had an inflationary effect. Prices rose
and some commodities were in short supply or not available. Kodiak's housing market
became even more tight and expensive than it had already been prior to the oil spill
(Endter 1989).
Social. Cultural. and Psvcholo2ical ImDacts: The social, cultural, and
psychological impacts of the Exxon Valdez oil spill are harder to document than
instituitional and economic impacts. Yet the disruption of daily lives and the emotional
toll caused by the oil spill were the most pervasive themes running through the
interviews with local residents and the newspaper accounts of events. Kodiak City, being
on e of the nation's largest fishing ports, was accustomed to population fluctuations and
transience, to cycles of boom and bust in the fisheries, and to many of the p-roblems
associated with high-risk occupations, such as fishing. Bu t the residents of Kodiak City,
as well as the other communities in the region, had dffficulty dealing with the oil spill
due to the nature of the disaster itself, the way in which cleanup was handled, and the
pressures and strains people already were under because of changes occurring in the
fishing industry.
Conflict and Cooveration: One of the most serious problems faced by
people in the Kodiak region as a result of the oil spill was community factionalism
caused by the way in which Exxon controlled the cleanup operations and dealt differently

The Kodialk Region - Page 681






with various segments of the population. Spill-related circumstances in Kodiak justified aI
massive cleanup effort; but as the oil spill spread to Kodiak and other areas outside
Prince William Sound, Exxon attempted to limit cleanup costs. Instead of putting everyU
vessel on charter as they did in Prince William Sound, Exxon hired only a limited
number of boats and people for cleanup in the Kodiak region.
As mentioned previously, Kodiak residents had started mobilizing on their own
before the oil reached the shores of the archipelago. Kodiak fishermen had assembled a
volunteer armada to fight the approaching oil slick as soon as it seemed likely that theI
area would be impacted (Kodiak Daily NMirror, 4-6-89: 1; 4-11-89: 1). Villagers started to
clean beaches before they were hired by VECO. People wanted to clean up the oil as
soon as possible to limit economic and environmental impacts. After Exxon took over
the cleanup operations, volunteers' hands were tied. Instead of allowing or encouragingj
these types of community response efforts, Exxon inhibited them. Anger, which for some
people could have been dissipated by working to ameliorate the situation, wasI
intensified.
In response to the outpouring of volunteer efforts, Senator Frank Murkowski
proposed that Exxon be required to buy back oiled debris collected on designated
beaches. This would enable more cleanup by local people other than employees andI
contractors of Exxon and VECO and ensure that they were compensated (Kodiak Daily
Mirror, 6-8-89:4). But Exxon continually declined to consider a bounty program that
would have paid anyone willing to participate in the cleanup effort for work
acconiplished. Exxon cited concerns about safety, liability, and waste materialI
accumulation and stated that they thought an organized effort was best (Kodiak Daily
Mirror, 6-20-89:1).1
People were upset about the inequities in local hiring practices and about the
hiring of people from outside the State. Some tensions were reported between local
people and Norcon (the union arm of VECO) workers from Texas and Louisiana.
Because residents did not feel they had equal opportunity for cleanup work, jealousies3
and resentments between Kodiak residents resulted. The system also appears to have
increased and exacerbated existing economic differentiation within Kodiak communities.3

The Kodiak Region - Page 682

While cleanup work helped to ease the economic disaster that confronted Kodiak, many
people thought it had been a bandaid and had left residents fighting among themselves.
Ouzinide's Native Corporation President said, "We've witnessed what Exxon has done to
our communities. They've turned friend against friend, village against village" (Kodiak
Daily Mirror, 8-29-89:1).
One reason obtaining cleanup work was so acrimonious was due to the increased
competition within the fisheries in recent years. Those who lost the fishing season and
did not obtain cleanup work were angered to see others make big money, buy new boats,
and come back better able to compete in the fisheries in the future.
Another reason for the tension was that the cleanup work violated the local
people's sense of fairness . Fishermen generally believe that the way to get ahead is by
working hard, taldng risks, and developing sldlls. But these were not the criteria used to
get cleanup jobs. Many of the people hired for cleanup work were considered almost
unemployable in the fishing industry, and some unemployed people obtained cleanup
jobs. Fishermen perceived cleanup work as typical of work in the oil industrya--
characterized by ease, big money, good food, and few personal expenses.
Despite the conflicts generated by Exxon's cleanup program, there were instances
in which groups coalesced to have representation before Exxon and to fight for their
interests. Salmon seiners formed the Kodiak Seiners Association, which proposed a
program that would incorporate them into cleanup efforts. When Exxon agreed to
charter 20 seiners o-ut of a list of 85, this association figured out a way to avoid rift
through democratically rotating the work allocated to the seine fleet. The Filipino-
American Association, which had been a social group, became politicized and negotiated
for compensation for fish-processing workers. The president of that association was
elected to the Kodiak City Council in fall 1989. A crewman's association also coalesced
and organized to press for compensation from Exxon. Some crew members had received
a portion of their captains' compensation monies while others did not.
Subsistence: The oil spill disrupted traditional subsistence activities,
particularly in Kodiak villages. The toxic effect of oil on subsistence foods was of
particular concern to Alaskan Natives and village residents. People were not prohibited
The Kodiak Region - Page 683





fromi obtaining subsistence foods, but skepticism about the safety of doing so significantlyI
reduced subsistence activities. Some people said that they would never again eat food
from oiled beaches. Villagers were very concerned about the loss of their subsistence
and their destroyed livelihoods (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 4-17-89:1; 5-12-89:1; 6-27-89:4; 8-4-1
89:1).
Alaska Natives expressed several concerns over the loss of subsistence resources.
Subsistence offered security in the villages where commercial fishing operations generally
were small-scale and not diversified and where there were few jobs. Natives feared andj
resented returning to the dependency of the Bureau of Indian Affairs days. They also
were concerned that the inability to engage in subsistence activities, even for a few
seasons, would impair the transmission of subsistence skils to younger generations. As
noted in Section IV.C, s-ubsistence activities provide one of the most important contexts3
for traditional socialization practices in Native communities.
Some people felt that the overall significance of subsistence losses was minimized.3
Not only are subsistence foods particularly important to the livelihoods of Native people,
subsistence activities also help strengthen cultural identity, self-esteemn, family and
community ties, and cooperation. These activities also provide spiritual sustenance and
enjoyment for Native people. As one interviewee put it, "The process, not just theI
product, is important"' (Endter 1989). Native people missed the joy of catching, cleaning,
and smoking fish; they missed going -upstream, taking their farmilies, setting their nets,3
and helping each other to split and dry and preserve. Oil-spill work did not provide the
same level of satisfaction, family and community unity, or cooperation and sharing as did
subsistence activities. Instead, it fostered competition for high-paying jobs and
exacerbated petty jealousies and rivalries among villagers (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 8-4-1
89:1).
Local residents perceived biases in Exxon's compensation procedures. SomeI
interviewees pointed out that whereas cormmercial losses from the oil spill were
compensated, compensation for subsistence losses was dffficult to claim and was notI
forthconung. People had few written records of subsistence catches, which were
necessary to make a claim. This same bias toward written documentation had guided theI
The Kodiak Region - Page 684

distribution of Limited Entry salmon permits in the 1970's. Additionally, the claim
procedures did not account for the cultural value of the lost subsistence experiences.
Toward the end of the summer, Exxon and village leaders worked out an
agreement to hold a special subsistence fishery to harvest salmon in Olga Bay and the
upper end of Karluk Lagoon. Several boats harvested the fish. All Alaska Seafoods,
Inc., fresh-froze 30 percent of the catch and Alaska Pacific Seafoods, Inc., canned the
remaining 70 percent (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 9-1-89:1). Exxon requested that KANA
distribute this subsistence fish, but KANA and village leaders consented to have the
Kodiak Island Borough handle the distribution because not all subsistence users were
Native and the borough represented all of the people on the island. KANA feared that
if it accepted responsibility for distributing the fish, this subsistence compensation would
become a Native/non-Native issue, and it wanted to avoid further community divisions in
the Kodiak region. The borough worked out a plan to distribute salmon--first to the
infirm and elderly--in all six villages (Talbe 1, Sec. ll.A.) and Kodiak City (Kodiak Daily
Mlirror, 9-12-89:1).
Disruntions in Customarv Habits and Patterns of Behavior: In a number
of different ways, the oil spill disrupted people's normal rhythms and caused changes in
the social processes that structured and pattemned Kodiak life.
The oil spill disrupted the existing patterns of interaction among fishermnen. As
one interviewee put it, there was suddenly a "new game, new rules, and new players"
(Endter 1989). instead of the normal competitive fishing game, people had to compete
in a new realm where they did not understand the rules. The common occupational
status that many residents shared as fishermien, which cut across the divisions based on
gear and size, was no longer a binding community force in the context of oil-spill
cleanup.
The natare of the fishing enterprise and of captain-crew relationships was altered.
The Internal Revenue Service alerted Kodiak fishermen that in leasing their boats to
assist with oil-spill cleanup, they were engaging in a new business. If their contract
stipulated that they had to provide the crew, they became an employer, which was
different than paying crew members with a share of the catch. Fishermen were
The Kodiak Region - Page 685






instructed that they must obtain an Employer Identification Number, withhold taxes,I
make Federal tax deposits, and, among other things, file different tax return forms
(Kodiak Daily Mirror, 5-11-89:4). In addition, fishermen and crew members were used
to getting paid at the end of the summer, after which they would pay their debts and use
the rest of their money to get through the winter. Those who went to work for VECO
received weekly paychecks, and some blew their money before the end of the summer.
Another disruption had to do with the fact that the corporate culture of Exxon
clashed with the culture of Kodiak's fishing community. One Kodiak official said that
Exxon's formal, inflexible, corporate hierarchy was not successful at dealing with a small
rural community of independent business people. The two groups have very differentU
ways of doing business and different approaches to purchasing and spending. As another
person explained, "If the oil industry wants something money is no object, because they
know they will get it back later. Expediency is what is important. Fisherme-n are more
calculated in spending and think over their purchases for a long time. Credit is carefully
arranged through long associations and loyalties to canneries" (Endter 1989).
During the cleanup operations, Exxon tried to spread money around to various
businesses in affected communities; but it apparently was not prepared to deal with all
the paperwork. Exxon was used to dealing with a limited amnount of vendors, placing
large-scale orders, and having 90-day invoicing periods. The corporation's paperwork
procedures included a myriad of requisitions, purchase orders, and invoices, which was
cumbersome for maling many small purchases and was not the way in which people do
business in Kodiak. VECO had spent about $35 million in Kodiak within 2 months, but
payment was very slow; a lot of local businesses had to take out loans to make their
payme-nts while they waited for payment from VECO (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 6-22-89:2).3
People wondered why Exxon and VECO, two large corporations, seemed unable to get
their act together and pay their bills.I
Spring and summer are normally busy and exciting times for members of fishing
communities as they prepare for, anticipate, and engage in fishing activities. Being
outdoors and getting exercise are particularly important for Alaskans who are less active
through long, dark winters. Kodiales normal, seasonal activities and rhythms wereI

The Kodiak Region - Page 686

disrupted by the oil spill (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 8-3-89:1). Interviewees repeatedly
stressed that life was not normal. Fishermen were unsettled and uncertain. Community
residents missed beachcombing and walkidng along the beach with children and pets,
which they were unable to do because of the oil and concerns about health effects. One
person wrote in the Kodiak paper, "Some things you cannot put in a claim for because
money won't buy missed moments and the serenity of uninterrupted lives" (Kodiak Daily
Mirror, 5-26-89:12).
Emotional Imuacts And Stress-Related Disorders: Residents of Kodiak
communities affected by the Exxon Valdez oil spill experienced an increase in stress-
related behaviors and dysfunctions in the aftermath of the spill. There was an increase
in mental-health, drug, alcohol, and domestic-violence service needs. The Kodiak Island
Mental Health Center reported a 700-percent increase in crisis-intervention cases over
the previous year (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 8-3-89:1). Counselors with the Kodiak Council
on Alcoholism, Inc., saw many clients who were fearful and anxious about the
nonexistent fishing season (Kodiak Council on Alcoholism 1989). The Kodiak Women's
Resource and Crisis Center reported that ma-ny famnilies were experiencing stress from
the sudden change in income and lifestyle and from the disruption in seasonal activities.
The Kodiak Police Department reported an increase in the number of domestic
disturbance cases--from 150 by the end of July 1988 to 230 by the end of July 1989, with
141 of those 230 cases occurring after April 1, 1989 (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 8-3-89:16).
There were six suicides of young men in Kodiak between ages 18 and 31 in April and
May 1989. Although the media did not connect them directly to the oil spill, local
officials admitted this was quite unusual.
People living in Kodiak's outlying and primarily Native villages were particularly
hard hit by-the oil spill, because they depend primarily on subsistence resources and
comTnercial fishing for their livelihoods. The KANA Alcohol Outreach Program
experienced a significant increase in requests for alcohol-prevention and -intervention
services from all six villages after the oil spill. Several of those villages had made
progress in dealing with alcoholism and experienced some setbacks after the oil spill
(Kodiak Daily Mirror, 9-21-89:1). Local tribal governing bodies expressed concern about
The Kodiak Region - Page 687





problems with youth due to the absence of parents who were working on the oil-spill
cleanup and about increases in assaultive behavior related to intercommunity animosity
between individuals who were worling and others who were not working on cleanup
activities (KANA Village Alcohol Outreach Program 1989).
The oil spill affected other aspects of people's personal behavior that were not
documented in case-load statistics. For instance, individuals and families had difficulty
planning for the future. Tleir perceptions of spill-related risks to their health and their
livelihoods made decisions concerning whether to stay in the community or invest in
bomes, businesses, or property more difficult. Kodiak became, for many people, a less
desirable place to live.3
The emotional impact that the oil spill had on people was related to a number of
factors. People felt uncertain about their economic future and about the long-term
nature of the spill's impacts; fear and concern were high. Fishermen, in particular,
feared losing their independence and beconming dependent; they generally preferred to
wor'k instead of drawing claims money. Kodiak residents also experienced feelings of
helplessness and futility as the magnitude of the spill became known and they realized
that their own skills were of no use in controlling it. In the words of one fisherman, "We
are a community used to dealing with the worst nature can throw at us. We perform the3
nation's most dangerous occupation in the world's worst weather. But we feel fearful
and.inadequate in the face of the advancing oil from the Exxon spill" (Kodiak Daily
Mirror, 4-14-89:2).
Part of the emotional stre ss that people felt had to do with being confronted with3
environmental degradation and death. The Exxon Valdez oil spill had a tremendous
impact on people who are used to living by the sea and who assign many intrinsic values3
to their environment. Interviewees often talked about experiencing the losses. People
missed hearing the familiar sound of birds and seeing fish and sea mammals in the bay.I
They reported being shaken up after running across dead birds and animals. The weight
of the death they were surrounded with was obvious. Many local residents, and theI
community as a whole, went through a grieving process that involved denial, anger,
depression, and, finally, wanting to do something about the oil spill.I
The Kodiak Region - Page 688

The oil spill evoked feelings of rage in some Kodiak residents. One interviewee
said that Kodiak's environment was "like a beautiful painting that had been destroyed by
black ink," and he likened his feelings to the outrage people express when a priceless
work of art is destroyed (Endter 1989). During the 1989 annual Crab Festival, an
estimated 1,200 to 1,500 people marched and staged a rally to protest Exxon's slow
cleanup efforts. Many of the marchers wore black to symbolize their mourning and
carried anti-Exxon placards. An effigy of the tanker Exxon Valdez was tarred and
feathered at the end of the march (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 5-30-89:4). Exxon closed its
Kodiak command post for several days after one of its representatives received a
threatening note (Kodiak Daily Miirror, 5-026-89:1). The anti-Exxon graffiti that
appeared in numerous public places during the months after the spill was another
indication of local anger.
Sorme residents expressed despair and fatigue as areas that had already been
cleaned were hit again with "mousse" (emulsified oil) or had oil percolate up from below.
"It's like taldng ground again and again in a battle," remarked one resident (Kodiak
Daily Mirror, 6-8-89:2). Others likened cleanup operations to a guerrilla war, where
puffs of smoke come up and then disappear, only to reappear somewhere else. Indeed,
the oil-spill headquarters operated like command posts. Said one National Park Service
employee, "We keep hoping for some kind of closure, some sign that this is all the
damage that we have and we can deal with it. But we can't. The oil disappears one day
when the waves clean a beach only to wash up on another beach the next day" (Kodiak
Daily Nlirror, 6-23-89:4).
Another aspect of emotional stress had to do with the fact that Kodiak residents'
experience with the oil spill violated community values. Residents of Kodiak, many of
whom are small, independent fishermen and business people, place tremendous value on
hard work and, individualism. Fishermen believe that the way to work oneself up in the
fishery is through hard work. The oil-spill-response efforts violated that value. People
who had connections, or people who were not considered very employable within the
fishing industry, were the ones who often obtained spill-related work. After several
fisheries were closed, idleness was a problem for many fishermnen.
The Kodiak Region - Page 689






Inherent in the world view of fishermen is the belief that they bave a certainI
amount of control over their own destiny and that fishermen all have a somewhat equal

chance against the sea or nature. Government interference and foreign competition is
often blamed for the exNisting inequalities. The Exxon Valdez oil spill resulted in
fishermen experiencing a loss of control over their destiny. In general, the Kodiak
commnunities wanted and fought for more local control over the decisions being made.
In mid-September, as Exxon was pulling out of Kodiak, the Kodiak Village
Services Network sponsored a community mental health and social healing activity with
the theme "Kodiak Renewal: Going Forward." The purpose of the community gathering
was to provide information on how crises affect communities and to have people share3
their feelings and experiences in order to help residents recover from the emotional
strains of dealing with the spill. The celebration followed "Black Friday," a day when3
people were "encouraged to wear black as a sign of mourning for the losses suffered
from the oil spill" (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 9-14-89:4).
Stress in Deainie with Exxon: Exxon's handling of the oil-spill response
itself caused significant impacts on Kodiak communities. Dealing with Exxon was aU
major source of emotional strain and stress.
Kodiak residents' initial frustration in dealing with Exxon stemmed fromn their
perceptions that Exxon wa's responsible for the oil spill, did not have adequate cleanup
technology or contingency plans in place, and was inexcusably slow in responding to the3
spill and formulating a cleanup plan. As cleanup operations proceeded, Kodiak area
residents criticized Exxon for slow payments, for not paying boats as agreed to under
contract, for unkept promises to the villages, for lack of communication and information,
and for frequent turnover of representatives in the area (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 5-10-3
89:8). People were particularly angry with what they believed was Exxon's mishandling
of the cleanup; they were upset that as the oil on the beaches increased, Exxon's
presence did not. They claimed that Exxon's original promises of cleaning up all of the
oil and maling everyone "whole" were not kept.I
A second major problem in dealing with Exxon concerned the fairness and
complications of the claims process. After the oil hit Kodiak, Exxon established a claimsI
The Kodiak Region - Page 6903

center in Kodiak City. In general, people were upset when Exxon representatives
responded to their concerns with "file a claini," when what they really wanted was
cleanup. Most community residents would have preferred to engage in their normal
occupations. As some interviewees remarked, people did not like being on "the Exxon
claims dole." Later, people felt that Exxon's claim that "we will make you whole" turned
out to be "buzz words." The Kodiak Daily NMirror reported that one fisherman, who had
spent a lIfetime dealing with fish sharks, called them goldfish in comparison to E-xxon (6-
29-89:1; 3-23-90:10).
The claims paperwork alone presented problems. Claimants had to prove they
had suffered a loss or damage, which usually involved providing records of previous
involvement in the fisheries. People had to present their case to adjusters who lacked
knowledge of the fishing industry. The partial release agreement form that the Exxon
claims office first used had wording in it such that individuals might unknowingly give up
rights to future claims by signing it. Alaska Legal Services urged local residents to use a
substitute "Acknowledgement of Receipt of Monies" form that did not admit liability or
waiver of claims (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 4-24-89:1). A new claims form that was more
acceptable to fishermen was later used by the E-xxon office. Tle new form noted receipt
of payment without having fishermen give up future claims and stated that the payment
was considered a credit toward future claims (Kodiak Daily Mirror, 5-15-89:4).
Tle perceived arrogance with which Exxon management treated members of
impacted communities was a third major aggravation. L-ocal officials reported that
Exx on dealt with people in Kodiak as if they knew nothing. This insulted Kodiak
residents, who are generally well-educated and choose to live in Kodiak because they
value the lifestyle. One public official commented that Exxon execuivs hdte attiue
that Alaskans were not knowledgeable and, consequently, they did not trust local
information. For instance, Kodiak officials requested that Exxon use only double-engine
helicopters to fly across Shelikof Strait. Local air charters use onl y double-engine planes
to fly across that strait for safety reasons. Yet Exxon claimed that local people were just
tryfing to increase Exxon's costs and that such precautions were unnecessary.
The Kodiak Region - Page 691






Public officials also reported that they tried to get Exxon to do certain thingsI
based on their knowledge of the area and the community. However, local
recommendations and proposals were often rejected and decisions were made inI
Houston or Valdez. According to respondents, Exxon ended up making "stupid mistakes"'
and community residents had to sit and listen to Exxon's local representatives defend
those mistakes. When Exxon finally realized that their company's plans did not work,
they went back to local officials to. find out what was wrong. These local representatives
felt like they were continually bailing E-xxon out of errors that could have been avoided.
Kodiak public officials admitted that Exxon had a few good representatives who
tried to understand the local situation and did their best to get things done for the3
community. Frustrations mounted when these Exxon representatives were rotated out of
the area. Some Kodiak residents said they developed sympathy for these Exxon
representatives after seeing that they were caught in a system over which they had little
control. After dealing with Exxon for over 5 months, one Kodiak official commented3
about Exxon' s huge and inflexible bureaucracy, "Decisions are made at the top; they do
not even listen to their own people, and they do not let local representatives make3
independent decisions, always citing legal and policy reasons" (Endter 1989).
A fourth major stress in dealing with Exxon conceemed the way in which oil-spill3
response became a media campaign. In the words of one Kodiak public official, "We
wanted technical people and they [Exxon] sent us public relations people" (Endter 1989).3
Kodiak residents said they were upset with Exxon's attempts to minimize the extent of
the impacts, deflect attention from the oil spill, and placate people with rhetoric. Ibey3
resented Exxones focus on the amount of money spent and.on attempts to save otters,
birds, and wildlife instead of on how much still needed to be done and on the impacts on3
coTmmunities. It was not that local residents felt wildlife did not deserve the attention
that it got, but that people also deserved more attention. They did not believe there was3
enough attention to the impacts on areas outside Prince William Sound. Kodiak
residents were particularly upset when the oil spill started disappearing from national3
attention while they were still in the midst of battling it.


The Kodiak Region - Page 692

Dealing with Exxon and the oil spill wore people out. Kodiak residents
desperately wanted life to get back to normal. Even though the cleanup was not
complete in September, people were relieved when Exxon left. They were generally
weary from dealing with Exxon and tired of Exxon's control over the situation and the
purse strings. Tley were glad that Exxon was leaving because they perceived Exxon as
being a divisive force, and they thought that Exxon's departure would give the
community a chance to unite and would help eliminate some of the confusion and
conflict.
In September 1989, Kodiak residents were in the process of summarizing their
experiences so f-ar with the oil spill. People acknowledged that Exxon took responsibility
for the spill, made advance payments on claims to keep people going, and financed
cleanup operations. Yet local people felt that they had to pressure Exxon and that its
response was too little and too late. They resented that Exxon would not listen to local
people; they thought that they could have saved Exxon time, money, and effort. Some
Kodiak residents felt that local people could have done a more effective cleanup job
with the nearly $2 billion that was spent. Local people--even some of those who profited
from the cleanup--were upset at the waste and inefficiencies. People said that Exxon's
story was that they had spent lots of money, picked up tons of debris, and done the job;
and they wanted credit for that. People conceded that Exxon won the media battle. In
September 1989 the local perception was that no beach was clean, oil was still hitting
Kodiak beaches, and Exxon had gone home.
VI.B. Results of the 1991 Research
In spring 1991, the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound and the
cleanup efforts that took place in summer 1989 were still considered mnajor disruptive
events by Kodiak residents. However, by 1991, niany residents saw the oil spill as a
historical event rather than a continuing influence on the town's socioeconomic climate.
When asked about the oil spill, people in Kodiak tended to refer mainly to their memory
of the short-term effects of the spill; and some found it difficult to identify the long-termn
effects.
The Kodiak Region - Page 693





This report summarizes the views of Ki's and institutional respondents interviewedI
in February and March 1991 about the effects of the.Exxon Valdez oil spill on the
Kodiak community. In keeping with the respondents' categorization of oil-spill impacts,
the suTmmary is divided into two sections--short-term effects and long-term effects. Each
section includes discussion both of social and psychological effects and of the effect of
oil-spill-related events on Kodiak institutions.
Short-Term Effects:
Social/Psvcholol!ical Effects: Oil from the Exxon Valdez first reached
Kodiak Island about a month after the March 26, 1989, oil spill. Before the oil reached
Kodiak, the city's and borough's Emergency Services Team began to hold daily pu blic3
meetings that included city and borough officials, State and Federal agency
representatives, and Exxon representatives. The meetings were videotaped and played3
back on the local television station, and the Kodiak Daily Mirror and two radio stations
frequently covered cleanup progress. Kodiak's initial response to the oil spill thus tookU
place in a very public forum. One institutional respondent, a social service provider, said
that during summer 1989 everybody talked about nothing but the oil spill, but she never3
tired of talling about it.
In 1991, Kodiak residents remembered how angry and helpless they felt after the
oil hit the shores of their island. Exxon was perceived as the enemy. Part of the
problem was that Exxon representatives were seen not to care about the damages their
company had caused to Kodiak shores and waters. Exxon seemed unresponsive to the
opinions and feelings of community residents. I
When asked whether they thought that Exxon provided trustworthy information to
the public, Kodiak KI's usually interpreted the question in reference to ExxonU
communications during summer 1989, when most of the cleanup took place. Eleven KI's
(34%) thought that Exxon gave trustworthy information, while 16 (50%) thought that the
corporation did not. One KI said that Exxon gave information that company officials
thought was correct at the moment, and another said that there just wasn't that much
information available. One respondent said that media watchdogs prevented Exxon from
hiding information.

The Kodiak Region - Page 6943

Others were more critical of Exxon, saying that the company tried to give the
impression that th e damages were minimal and the cleanup was successful. A fishenrman
said that Exxon's communications were '\vritten by PR people for consumption in the
Lower 48," and another KI said that Exxon representatives provided only the information
they had to. One person said that it took too much time for Exxon's information to
come out. Examples of "cover-ups" cited by KI's included the number of dead birds, the
effects on sea life, and the proposed local burning of oily waste. A man said that he had
been at the places Exxon was reporting about and had seen that what they said wasn't
true.
Institutional informants also pointed to Exxon's manipulation. A social services
director said that Exxon did an excellent job of implementing standard social-
psychological strategies: "They let people vent their anger while they maintained total
control." Confrontation with the huge Exxon corporation, or working for it on the
cleanup, was difficult for Kodiak fishermen whose occupational self-image was one of
freedom from bureaucratic controls. According to a local businessman, "Fishe'rmen
found out how little control they had over their own lives. They weren!t as independent
as they thought they were.''
Some institutional respondents commented favorably on the benefits of the
Kodiak Emergency Services Team's efforts to include the community in public meetings
with Exxon and government agencies. Tley praised Kodiak local government officials'
advocacy for the community, e.g., the mayors' negotiations with Exxon to get claims for
cannery workers. A Native corporation manager said, `[The city mayor] did an excellent
job of responding to the community's desires. ... Solve problems first and wonry about
finger-pointing later." However, in retrospect, a member of the Emergency Services
Team said, "I was disappointed in the way some people acted. Some were able to
channel their emotions [and others weren't]. They had no control over Federal, Exxon,
or State officials, so they lashed out at city officials. ... There were a lot of meetings to
go through, tying up both the mayors." This public official thought the events of the
summer were beneficial to relationships between local govemnment and the USCG, while
The Kodiak Region - Page 695





there was some "fallout" with the State Department of Environmental Conservation:I
fiThey were asked to do a job they had no expertise in."
Many people in Kodiak noticed that there had been unfortunate splits between
fishermen as a result of the spill, especially between those who worked for Exxon and
those who did not. Again, in response to questions about disputes in Kodiak that were
caused by the oil spill, KI's referred mainly to disputes that occurred during summer
1989. Most 1991 KM's (75%') thought the oil spill had caused many disputes between
fishermen. Only one person (3%11) thought the spill caused no disputes, and 19 percent
thought the spill caused very few disputes between fishermen. Many examples of
disputes given by respondents were variants of "Who gets the money?" For fishermen,3
this meant jealousy of those who got charters and bad feelings between the haves and
the have-nots. One KI said, "A very few made a lot of money, and the rest went hungry."3
Another said that Exxon and VECO didn't hire the people who really needed the work.
A bank officer said that the greatest financial benefit of the oil spill went to3
fishing vessel owners, especially those who received an extra income from Exxon
employment. This resulted in the purchase of bigger boats, more gear, "all types of3
gyrations in that area." He said that there were people who could buy homes free and
clear with their spill-generated income. On the other hand, he added, some fishermen3
conscientiously did not enter into the competition for spill employment at all: "They
sacrificed themselves income-wise."3
Despite many references both to the large infl-ux of Exxon money in Kodiak and
to the economic losses incurred by the spill, most 1991 KI's (56%) did not report any3
change in their income as a result of the oil spill. Twenty-five percent reported a
decrease, while 13 percent reported an increase. Those whose households included3
salmon fishermen said their incomes had dropped. One person pointed out that her
teenage son, who usually fishes, couldn!'t work for VECO because he wasn't yet 18. Two3
men who worked in canneries in 1989 said they experienced a decrea'se in income. One~
of them said he should have put in a claim, but he had not.3
Several KI's commented that prices in Kodiak went up as a result of the spill.
They mentioned increases in the price of groceries, gas, and supplies. One KI, however,

The Kodiak Region - Page'696

denied that there had been any change in prices in Kodiak. A comparison of average
food prices in 1989, 1990, and 1991 shows that prices rose 6.4 p'ercent between March
1989 and February 1990; and although food prices dropped slightly by March 1991, they
were still 6.0 percent higher than pre-spill prices in Kodiak (see Sec. lIH.B. above).
Some KI's said that there were disputes about the amount of damage caused by
the spill. A Native KI said that the older, established fishermen had bad disastrous years
before and were more philosophical about the oil spill: "The Johnny-come-latelies were
the first ones in there to get their claims. They were screaming about the environment
and all." Ile KI's reported that some fisbermen got more upset than others about the
damages to the future fishing resources and about the time taken to accomplish the
cleanup.
Respondents thought pre-existing conflicts between seiners and setnetters, or
between salmon fishermen and trawlers or longliners, were exacerbated by the oil spill.
Some disputes between those who couldn't fish and those who could were reported. It
was thought to have been hard on the seiners, whose fishi-ng was closed for the summer,
while trawlers, longliners, and some salmon setnet fishermen were able to fish. One KI
said, "[Some] people went to their fish sites and collected from Exxon. Others fished and
had to work harder for it instead of sitting waiting for checks from Exxon."
Some KI's mentioned moral compromise as the cause of disputes. These
respondents expressed disappointment in the amount of greed shown by Kodiak
fishermen. A grocery store employee said she was disgusted by the luxurious quality of
the groceries some fishermen bought when Exxon was paying the bills. She added, "A
lot of it went to stock households." Another KI commented that the fishermen didn't
want. to work, they just wanted to collect big checks. Echoing a sentiment also expressed
by several others, one person said that Exxon wasted money hiring boats to sit and do
nothing.
Public officials, service providers, and businessmen mentioned family disruptions
and divorces after the 1989 oil spill that wouldn't have occurred otherwise. One KI
respondent blamed her divorce on the spill, saying that because her husband did not go
salmon fishing, she had to sell their home and go on welfare. A minister said he did a
The Kodiak Region - Page 697





lot of counseling after the oil spill because marriages were fragmented and people feltI
helpless and hopeless. There also was concern about the residual effects of the oil spill
on children.
Remembering the end of the summer cleanup efforts in 1989, some respondents
thought Kodiak residents did well to get, away from dealing with the oil spill. The
director of mental health said, "After the cleanup crews left, people left town if they
could, or forgot about it--that was healthy. There was some anxiety last spring before
people knew how the herring and salmon were going to be." She had noticed that as
soon as' Kodiak people saw that fishing in 1990 was going to be normal, they were more
relaxed. For her, this was an indicator of the characteristic resilience of the Kodiak3
community.
Effects on Institutions: Financial institutions were impacted by the oil spill3
largely because of the influx of cash in Kodiak. The same bank officer quoted above
said that, in 1989, the volume of lending was over and above that for 1990. There were3
new loans for larger vessels. He pointed to a number of new warehouses in Kodiak that
didn't exist before the spill; these were postspill investments with excess fands. In3
addition, "Some of my customers paid off their debts, which impacted my loan portfolio."
The bank did not alter its lending structures at the time. However, because some
Kodiak fishermnen and some other businesses experienced a loss of revenue, "We were
lax if we didn't get payments." The bank officer said, "The 1989 year weighs heavily in5
loans. But we throw that year away. We're not going to count it. In mid-1990 we got
back to where we were pre-oil spill. We've only had one boat foreclosure in 5 years.3
We didnt foreclose on any because of the spill." The KI respondents commnented that
people in Kodiak enjoyed the money generated by the oil spill. One pointed out that3
while a lot of people got new boats, now they had to make payments on them. There
was pressure to generate money from the new investments.
During the oil-spill cleanup, businesses had a problem finding and keeping
employees because VECO paid much higher wages to cleanup workers than the norm3
for labor in Kodiak. A State Job Service representative said, "Employers called with
their openings and couldnt get anybody. They had to raise their wages from 5 or 6I

The Kodiak Region - Page 6983

bucks an hour to $8 an hour." A school district official said that the problem of
employing custodians and aides in schools in Kodiak villages continued into the fall.
This was especially true in Karluk and Akhiok. He felt that the impact of oil-spill money
was particulaTly high in villages where there is low participation in commercial fishing.
There were several miscellaneous comments about the short-term impacts of the
spill on institutions:
o The school district rented the use of its auditorium for oil-spill meetings and
VECO employee meetings. While the use of the facilities generated revenue, some
graffiti damage appeared in the area. A school district official thought it might have
been done by disgrnmtled would-be VECO workers.
* Two managers of Native corporations contracting with timber companies
working on Afognak reported that their organizations had assisted in. the oil-spill-
response effort by supplying log booms to protect key commnercial or subsistence fishing
areas. They were later reimbursed by E-xxon. Neither of these respondents thought that
the oil spill or oil cleanup had significantly hindered the normal operations of the timber
companies.
* A KANA representative had concern about damage to archaeological sites in
the Kodiak Island area that occurred because of cleanup activity: "The word is out to
pot hunters." However, another KANA employee said that, in 1989, Exxon-sponsored,
archaeological reconnaissance work had helped to identify sites that would not otherwise
have been found.
When Ki's were asked whether Native institutions were usefal in assisting
comnmunity members, KANA was the institution that usually came, to mind. Koniag, Inc.,
the regional for-profit Native corporation, has its mnain office in Anchorage and does not
maintain an important presence in Kodiak. A Koniag officer contacted in Anchorage
said that the corporation was not damaged in any way by events related to the oil spill,
nor did Koniag experience any unusual pressures from shareholders, Exxon, or
government agencies beca-use of the spill.
Forty-four percent of KI's said that Native, institutions had been helpful, while
31 percent thought that they were not helpful. Eight respondents (25%), all non-Native,
The Kodiak Region - Page 699





said that they didn' t know enough about Native institutions to give an opinion. TheU
main way in which KL's thought Native institutions provided assistance to Natives in the
oil spill was as advocates or spokesmen for Native people. Many KI's assumed that the
help offered by KANA was primarily to Natives living in Kodiak area villages. The KI's
commented: 'They raised enough hell, complained enough to get some action for the
villages." "They made sure their areas were skiffed and boomed." "KANA pretty much
got all their guys to work." "KANA helped villages deal with Exxon, got the money and
canned fish, helped them deal with stress." Ironically, although two El's mentioned the3
formal distribution of subsistence salmon as one of KANA's helpful activities, the project
was actually coordinated by the borough and the Alaska Department of Community and3
Regional Affairs; KANA had declined a role in distributing the fish. One person said
that Native institutions had helped to create a new awareness of the need for subsistence
foods.
Some KI's thought that Native institutions had tried to help but were ineffective.3
There were complaints (from non-Natives) about Native spokespersons who claimed to
represent the whole Native community but did not. According to one, "There were wildI
sto-ries about inequalities, the whole lifestyle changing. It was something new to
complain about." A Native woman said, "The Native instituitions caused more problems--
[they] tried to get more money, taldng advantage of the situation. Some of the things
KANA was getting money for were ridiculous. ... [They had] good intentions but they3
didn't end up helping anybody." A non-Native man said he didn't think that KANA had
been helpful, ". .. but I think they do danin little anyway."3
What Native institutions should have done, according to one KI,1 was help Native
people to realize more positive awareness and, actions. A Native woman thought KANA5
could have offered more guidance to village providers, such as Commnunity Health Aides
and Village Public Safety Officers. Another KI said that Native institutions should have
provided cultural awareness. A non-Native man married to a Native suggested, "The
best thing they could do would be an education about concemn for the environment.3
That starts with school kids. It would have more credibility coming from KANA, from
an elder program or something."I

The Kodiak Region - Page 7003

When asked about assistance to the Kodiak community from social agencies other
than Native institutions, many M's responded that they had heard that counseling, from
the mental health clinic or the KCA, was available after the oil spill to help people with
stresses caused by the oil spill. The Key Informants' comments indicated that they
recognized a need for such counseling. A minister who did pastoral counseling said,
"Some people were depressed and suicidal. Even nonfishermen felt somebody had
broken in and entered their house. [There was a] terrible feeling of rape, violation."
Only one person volunteered that,she had received counseling for oil-spill-related
probl ems. She thought it should have been free, but she had to pay for it. One man
thought that support groups (or self-help groups) were more helpful than agencies
because they were "outside of the purview of bureaucracy." One KI said, "KCA put an
ad in the paper for counseling. I don't think anybody responded." However, other KI's
thought that the mental health clinic and KCA must have been very busy dealing with
oil-spill problems.
As was true of Native institutions, some U's said that they didn't know anything
about the services provided by other social agencies. One said, "None of them. are
usefuil, period. Not in the oil spill, either." Neither of the two Filipino KI's thought that
social services or Native institutions had been of assistance to the community after the
oil spill. One of them said, "Nobody I know received any assistance."
Institutional informants at KANA, lie the KI's, saw KANA's role during the
aftermath of the oil spill as one of advocacy for Native people against Exxon. For
KANA, the results of worldng in an adversarial position to Exxon were not all negative.
A respondent at KANA reported: "There was some camaraderie and strengthening of
KANA. It strengthened tribal governments in a commnon effort. [KANA was needed to]
get resources to help them." However, he said, the oil-spill summer "killed off grant
opportunities" for KANA and village govermnments, because of the all-enicompassing
necessity of dealing with the oil spill. KANA's former oil-spill coordinator commented
that among the short-term pressures on employees of that institution, there was stress
and burnout. KANA received extra funding from Exxon for work generated by the oil
spill, but there was no mutual support among program managers, who all had to compete
The Kodiak Region - Page 701





and lobby for oil-spill money within KANA. Long-time employees were upset at theI
people who had been hired with Exxon money.
Social service agencies, unlike KANA, were not called on to serve as spokesmenI
or advocates for the community. They did prepare for and, in most cases, experienced
an increase in requests for services. The mental health clinic, KCA, and the Kodiak
Women's Resource and Crisis Center received State fuinding, later reimbursed by Exxon,
to cover extra work as a result of the spill.'
In regard to the mental health clinic's activities in the months following the oil
spill in Kodiak, a mental health professional said, "All we did was emergency. Ongoing
treatment got put on a burner. We've never been able to catch up with that. The big3
increase in case load hasn't slacked off." She said that among the mental health staff,
there was a high level of real stress. During the oil spill, the clinic started having staff3
meetings twice a week. According to the director, the partial fuinding mental health
received to deal with extra work in the aftermath of the oil spill came far too, late to beU
used most effectively.
Tle director of KCA said, "The oil spill didn't create drinking problems. Initially,3
yes. Once the work got started, no. Then immediately following the cleanup, yes.
Everybody partied for a while." Because of the'late receipt of fuinds to deal with extra3
work generated by the oil spill, the new person hired by KCA contracted with an outside
group to do community team-building. The session went well, the KCA director said,I
but the group didn't continue to meet after the initial encounter.
T'he Women's Resource Center did not have its anticipated n'se in requests for3
services until January or February 1990. However, other social service agencies
experienced an increase in case load duri-ng summer 1989. Generally, there was little to3
support Key Informants' ideas that counseling "about the oil spill" was available to
directly help people with problems related to the spill. However, social service providers3
were able to identify a general increase in community disruptions occurring after the
Exxon Valdez accident, and it was to these problems that they had been called upon to3
respond after the spill. Social service providers thought that assistance had been


The Kodiak Region - Page 7023

provided to the community, but that it was less direct than was suggested by Key
Inormants' perceptions.
Lonff-Term Effects:
Social-/Psvchological Effects: In spring 1991, institutional respondents were
more likely than KI's to see continuing social and psychological effects of the oil spill in
Kodiak. A KANA official said that following the first disruption of community life
because, of the inconsiderate way the cleanup was managed, there remained an
inordinate amount of mental health problems, family disorders, and other socia
disruption in the Kodiak area. A city official said that while conflicts had receded
among fishermen, he personally had felt stress and strain in the past year, including
continued time away from his family. He said that enemies formed because of the oil
spill had lasted long after the initial imnpact. A social-service-agency director
commented, "Some people will be living off the oil-spill income for the next 10 years.
They did real well. The most prominent people in the community made out real good."
One KI said that worldng with people and getting to know them was a positive
effect of the spill. A social service provider said that the enhanced sense of community
in Kodiak, one of the benefits of the oil spill, had faded. However, she said, "People
who weren't well-known in the community had their strengths emerge." She pointed out
as a positive sign that Nike Milligan, who had been an outspoken advocate for the
comm-unity in public oil-spill meetings, was elected to the borough assembly in fall 1990.
Several institutional respondents mentioned that the oil spill made people less
reticent to be vocal, since they now saw a new possibility of influencing public policies.
One example wa's a controversy in February 1991 over the city council's choice of a new
city manager. When the top candidate was discovered to have spent time in jail last
summer for his participation in marijuana sales, a Kodiak radio station held a call-in so
the public could voice its criticism. The mayor found this an inappropriate use of the
media as a public forum for local government decision-making.
The oil spill was thought to have accelerated environmental thinldng in Kodiak,
and to have brought on more environmental scrutiny in Alaska and elsewhere in the U.S.
One KI said, "Maybe now people will put their foot down on offshore drilling."
The Kodiak Region - Page 703





Kodia,k people mentioned that now the schools are incorporating environmentalI
issues in the curriculum. A school district official said that even before the oil spill, the
schools had been doing a lot with the environment, e.g., employing an annual Sea Week
curriculum. Now, he said, several teachers are doing things with recycling.
The Kodiak Borough now had a recycling program and had hired a borough
environmental engineer. Since the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the borough has dealt with
two small oil spills in Kodiak--one in the boat harbor, attributed to a leaking tank from a
nearby store, and one in Potato Patch lake, caused by the hospital. Some KITs and
institutional interviewees hoped that fishermen had changed their habits and become
more environmentally responsible. A KI noticed that there were more ads warning3
against throwing plastics in the ocean. A school district official, a former fisherman, was
skeptical about fishermen's changed behavior, wondering whether fishermen continued to3
disregard the consequences of putting bilge oil or detergent ("Do you realize how much
Joy is sold in Kodiak?") into the water.3
Some Kodiak residents thought that by spring 1991, the new environmental
awareness had subsided along with people's initial indignation and self-righteousness3
about the oil spill. A social service provider said, "There's an absence of followup from
the environmental groups that protested so loudly. Who's boycotting Exxon now?I
Environmental concern is less when they wave $1,000 bills in front of your face." A city
official said, "It's hard now to find people to devo te the time. People want somebodyI
else to get out there doing it."
Possibly, some residents thought, Kodiak would now be better prepared for3
another disaster. "We would respond faster," said a Native corporation manager. A KI
respondent said that with the "potential lesson to be learned" there are now better3
regulations and enhanced awareness of hazards.
In summer 1989, people in Kodiak recalled, there were more transient people in3
town than usual. Some thought that not all the new people left Kodiak after the
cleanup. A school district official noted that Kodiak City had been growing and the3
villages losing population even before the oil spill. However, he said, the spill caused a
loss of enrollment in village schools when some residents of those communities left inI
The Kodiak Region - Page 7043

the fall for Anchorage or Kodiak. Also, during the year after the oil spill, he said, there
were some school-age youngsters iving in substandard conditions in the city-rnm
campground at Gibson Cove.
According to a mental health provider, in February 1991 there were no continuing
direct effects of the spill in Kodiak. "There's so much else going on in the fishing
industry that it's hard to attribute to the oil spill. The past salmon year was not
impacted by oil. People here are so busy getting on with things. The spill is 2 years ago.
If it's not something you can do something about, they get on with other things." She
said that the frustrations felt right after the spill had turned to positive energy after the
cleanup crews left.
Effects on Institutions: At the beginning of 1991, the Kodiak City and
Borough governments still were involved in the oil spill in several ways. According to
the city mayor, Exxon still hadn't paid $200,000 in raw fish ta it owed to the city.
Impact Assessment, Inc., a consulting firm commissioned by the Oiled Mayors Task
Force to study local effects-of the spill, was subpoenaed to give up its data and the
names of informants to Exxon's attorneys; the mayors opposed this action. Li tigation
against Exxon by commercial fishermen and Native. groups was still pending.
There were continuing impacts on Native institutions. The for mer KANA oil-spill
coordinator said that people in Kodiak villages were still highly concerned about
contamination of subsistence resources: "They're eating the foods but wondering about
mutations in the next generation of fish. They want to see maps of where the
contamination is." The former coordinator agreed with another KANA official that
people were still worried about carcinogens in the shellfish and finfish. At a recent
teleconference wlith the State On-Scene Oil-Spill Coordinator, the former coordinator
reported that four out of six village mayors participated and expressed concern about
contamination of resources. This KANA employee was a member of the Oil Spill
Health Task Force, which was now meeting less frequently than pr'eviously. She said
people are tired of dealing with Exxon and with the spill in general: "Nothing was ever
established as far as a contingency plan for the villages."
The Kodiak Region - Page 705





Other institutional respondents were more skeptical about fears of damage to theI
resources. A mental health provider said she didn't hear a lot of concern about
contamination, or about something amiss in the environment, in the course of her work;
but she said that she probably wasn't a good person to ask. A N4ative corporation land
manager said, 'Ile biological and economic effects are tremendously exaggerated at this
stage." He said that he was not an admirer of village leaders (one in particular) who
concentrated on how best to extract profit from the oil spill.
During the oil spill, KANA had difficulties in supervisin village employees and3
worling as an advocate for villagers. KANA-supervised persons who were village service
providers (VPSO'.s, Community Health Aides, Community Health Representatives) quit3
their jobs to work on the spill or were unable to devote attention to their usual jobs
because of new spill-cleanup responsibilities. Tribal councils and city government also3
were affected by members' spill employment. In spring 199 1, a KANA employee said
that there is still disruption in Native governments: "Tribes are dysfunctional a lot, but3
the oil spill contributed more problems." Since the oil spill, there has been a turnover of
al the VPSO's except one. She said that the villages are still thinking in terms of Exxon3
wages. "Now they call KANA looking for money, even though the budget's a little
tighter now and KANA can't send people to extra... .training."
Exxon had a plan to help rebuild tribal governments. KANA requested money
from Exxon for this purpose, but Exxon worked on it as well. A person at KANA said,5
"Basically they're buying off the villages. There were clauses on the forms that prevented
it from happening." The same respondent at KANA felt that Exxon was very self-serving3
and deliberately tried to make for disunity and discord. Exxon wanted to pit KANA
against the villages. "They're highly talented, they have the resources of an entire3
European country. People were disappointed in KANA. We got money from Exxon, but
we were guaranteed that it made us look like jerks." Another Kodiak social serviceI
provider shared this view of Exxon: "Exxon had been prepared for this idnd of disaster
for a long time. [Their philosophy was,] if you've got an enemy, put him on your3
Payroll."


The Kodiak Region - Page 706

In March 1991, there were continuing pressures on the former KANA oil-spill
coordinator. She is not now paid to deal with the oil spill, and she doesn't have time for
it. Her regular duties are to oversee the VPSO's and work on tribal operations. Still,
other agencies continue to call her about oil-spill issues instead of dealing directly with
the villages.
A respondent at the Women's Resource Center said that the Kodiak Village
Services Network (KVSN)--village-based teams of service providers including Community
Health Aides, Community Health Representatives, and Village Public Safety Officers
who work together to respond to emergencies--crystalized during the oil spill. This year,
Larsen Bay did not request KANA's services; this provider saw this as a positive sign
that the spill encouraged village self-determnination.
At the Women's Resource Center, requests for services increased in January and
February 1990. By spring 1991, they had slowed down. According to an employee of the
center, half the crisis calls have been from men, starting With the oil spill. While female
callers typically say, 'I don't want to put up with this anymore," male callers were more
likely to say things like, "I'm the slipper. I'm responsible for these people." During the
spill, the crisis line also would get calls from people who were depressed about the
environmental damage.
In spring 1991, the mental health center continued to have a heavier case load
than before the spill. The director thought it could be that during the spill people made
more use of the center. It is also possible, she said,  that the community is generally
faster-paced and that this is reflected in an increased demand for mental health services.
However, mental health case-load figures showed that there was a marked increase in
use of services after the oil-spill (see Sec. IlI.C, Health).
Ile director of KCA said, "We have more DWI [driving while into.icated] clients
now, but I don't know if it's because of increased enforcement or increased drinldng.
When people don't have money they go to the bars and we see them more." The KCA
administered oil-spill-impact surveys to incoming clients between December 1989 and
November 1990. Of 102 outpatient clients, the director estimated, 60 percent said they
were directly impacted by the oil spill, 15 percent said they had experienced an indirect
The Kodiak Region - Page 707

impact, and 5 percent said they were not impacted at all. These figures do not reflect
whether outpatient clients had ever sought belp from KCA prior to the oil spill. "If's
hard to know how valid it is. Yes, the individual didn't work. He may not have gotten a
job anyway. Definitely there's an increase in court-referred clients. It's gone from 60
[%] to 70 [%]. There are more villagers in." This institutional respondent thought the
oil spill wiped out an established system of sobriety in Akhiok and that village response
teams fell apart after the spill.
IWhen asked about assistance provided by Native institutions to deal with the
effects of the oil spill, KI respondents thought in terms of short-term assistance rather
than assistance with the continuing effects of the oil spill. They seemed to think that3
there would not at present be anything more that Native institutions or other social
agencies could do for the community. Institutional respondents were better able to3
identify continuing impacts of the oil spill, but they also pointed to more general
socioeconomic changes in the community that might have caused changes in pressure on3
local agencies.
Filipinos in Kodiak have an organization dedicated to working in their interest.
The Filipino American Association was started in 1983 but has existed under different
names since 1972. The purpose of this group is to give assistance to its members and3
organize social activities for the Filipino community. Tle organization became politically
active after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, representing the interests of the many FilipinosI
that work for the processors. The head of that organization was elected to the Kodiak
City Council in October 1989.3













The Kodiak Region - Page 708

References Cited
Afonsky, Bishop Gregory
1977 A History of the Orthodox Church in Alaska (1794-1917). Kodiak, AK: Saint
Herman's Theological Seminary.

Alaska Business Monthly
1989 ANWR: Prince William Oil Spill Inflames the Debate. 5(8):18-28.

1990 Consequential Kodiak. 6(3):56-63.

Alaska Commercial Fisherman
1991 NMFS Pulls Another Salmon Sting. 3(10):16.

Alaska Consultants
1979 Northern and Western Gulf of Alaska, Local Socio-economic Baseline.
Technical Report No. 12. USDOI, MMS, Alaska OCS Region, Social and Economic
Studies Program.
Alaska Department of Community and Regional Affairs
1988a Regional Government Study. January 1988.

1988b Impacts of Declining Revenues on Alaska's Smaller Communities. March
1988.

1988c Regional Government in Alaska. August 1988.
1989 An Update. Impacts of Declining Revenues on Alaska's Smaller Communities.
March 1989.

Alaska Department of Fish and Game
1990 Alaska Supreme Court Says Subsistence Law Violates Constitution. Public
communication bulletin, January 19, 1990.

Alaska Department of Labor
1989 Employment, Unemployment, Wage and Population Statistics: Kodiak.
Pamphlet.

Barsch, R.L.
1985 Karluk River Study. Commissioned by the Kodiak Area Native Association.
The Kodiak Region - Page 709

I


Befa, H.    !
1970 An Ethnographic Sketch of Old Harbor, Kodiak: An Eskimo Village. Arctic
Anthropology 6(2):29-42.

Black, L
1977 The Konyag (The Inhabitants of the Island of Kodiak) by loasaf [Bolotov]
(1794-1799) and by Gideon (1804-1807). Arctic Anthropology 14(2):79-108.

Chance, N.A.
1984 Alaska Eskimo Modernization. In Handbook of North American Indians,
Vol. 5. D. Damas, ed. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, pp.
646-661.                                                                                  3

Clark, D.
1966 Perspectives in the Prehistory of Kodiak Island, Alaska. American Antiquity
33(1):358-371.

1984a Prehistory of the Pacific Eskimo Region. In Handbook of North American               I
Indians, Vol. 5. Di Damas, ed. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press,
pp. 136-148.

1984b Pacific Eskimo: Historical Ethnography. In Handbook of North American
Indians, Vol. 5. D. Damas, ed. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press,
pp. 185-197.

Craig, P.                                                                                      3
1988 Memorandum from the Alaska Department of Fish and Game re: Groundfish
Industry in Alaska.

Cultural Dynamics, Ltd.                                                                       I
1986 A Description of the Social and Economic Systems of the Kodiak/Shumagin
Region. Technical Report No. 122. USDOI, MMS, Alaska OCS Region, Social          ' .
and Economic Studies Program.

Davis, N.Y.                                                                                    I
1970 The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Five Pacific Eskimo Villages as
Revealed by the Earthquake. In The Great Alaska Earthquake, Human Ecology
Volume. Washington, D.C.: National Research Council, pp. 125-145.                        3

1979 Kodiak Native Sociocultural Impacts. Western Gulf of Alaska Petroleum
Development Scenarios. Technical Report No. 41. Prepared for USDOI, BLM,
Alaska OCS Office.
I

Davis, N.Y. (continued)
1986 A Sociocultural Description of Small Communities in the Kodiak-Shumagin
Region. Technical Report No. 121. USDO, MMS, Alaska OCS Region, Social
and Economic Studies Program.

Davydov, G.I.
1977 Two Voyages to Russian America, 1802-1807. Richard A. Pierce, ed.; Colin
Bearne, trans. Materials for the Study of Alaska History, No. 10. Kingston,
Ontario: The Limestone Press.

Dixon, M., W. Myers, P. Book, and P. Nice
1983 The Changing Alaskan Experience: Health Care Services and Cultural
Identity. Western Journal of Medicine 139(6):917-922.

Endter, J.
1989 Unpublished field notes, AOSIS research.

Fienup-Riordan, A.
1983 The Nelson Island Eskimo. Anchorage: Alaska Pacific University Press.

Fortuine, R.
1975 Health Care and the Alaska Native: Some Historical Perspectives. Polar
Notes. Occasional Publication of the Stefansson Collection. Dartmouth College
Library, Hanover, New Hampshire, pp. 1-42.

Griffin, J.F.
1989a Fathoming the Bottomfish Bonanza. Alaska Business Monthly. 5(3):26-35.

1989b On Guard. Alaska Business Monthly. 5(8):37-45.

Hill, PJ.
1986 Infrastructure Investment in the Kodiak City Area. In Cultural Dynanics, Ltd.
A Description of the Social and Economic Systems of the Kodiak/Shumagin
Region. Technical Report No. 122. USD01, MMS, Alaska OCS Region, Social and
Economic Studies Program, pp. 353-395.

Holmberg, H.J.
1985 Hohnberg's Ethnographic Sketches. Marvin W. Falk (ed.); Frita Jaensch,
trans. The Rasmuson Library Historical Translation Series, Vol. I. Fairbanks:
University of Alaska Press.

Hofmeister, J.
1990 Unpublished field notes, AOSIS research.
The Kodiak Region - Page 711





Hrlck,A.I
1944 The Anthropology of Kodiak Island. Philadelphia: Wistar Institute of
Anatomy and Biology.3

Huggins, E.
1981 Kodiak and Afognak Life, 1868-1870. Kingston, Ontario: The Limnestone
Press.
Jordan, R.3
1984 Archaeology at Karluk, Kodiak Island, Alaska. Research application to the
National Endowment for the Humanilties.

Kodiak Area Native Association (KANA)
1985 Overall Economic Development PlnigReport.

1986 KANA 1986 Annual Report and 1987 Directory of Services.

1987a KANA Cultural Center and Museum. KANA Kasitaq: Newsletter of theI
Kodiak Area Native Association. April 1987.

198Th KANA Directory of Services a-nd 1987 Annual Report.3

1988 KANA Directory of Services and 1988 Annual Report.I

Kodiak Area Native Association and the Alaska Department of Fish and Game,
Subsistence Division
1983 Kodiak Island Area Local Fish and Game Resource Guide. Kodiak ChamberI
of Commerce. December 1983.

1989 City of Kodiak and Kodiak Island Borough Community Profile. Prepared forI
the Southwest Alaska Municipal Conference by the Kodiak Chamber of Commerce
with assistance from the Kodiak Island Borough and the City of Kodiak, January
1989.1

Kodiak Chamber of Commerce
1989 Annual Report, 1988-1989.I

1989 City of Kodiak and Kodiak Island Borough Community Profile. Prepared for
the Southwest Alaska Municipal Conference by the Kodiak Chamber of CommerceI
with assistance from the Kodiak Island Borough and the City of Kodiak, January
1989.5




The Kodiak Region - Page 712

Kodiak Consolidation Committee
1989 Consolidation Report. With Assistance from the Kodiak Island Borough
Clerk's Office and the Alaska Department of Community and Regional Affairs.
May 15, 1989.

Kodiak Daily Mirror
1989 Leave Something for the Alaska Family Operations. March 7, p. 3.
1989 Exxon Offers Kodiak No Assistance for Now. April 5, p. 1.
1989 Fishermen Organizing to Help Protect Critical Areas. April 6, p. 1.
1989 Scientists Survey Beaches. April 7, p. 1.
1989 Oil Retreating; Fishermen Switching to the Offense. April 11, p. 1.

1989 Editorial. April 14, p. 2.
1989 Slick Threatens $3.2 Million Herring Fishery. April 17, p. 3.

1989 Villagers Want Independent Analysis. April 17, p. 1.
1989 Exxon Ready to Start Writing Checks. April 18, p. 1.
1989 Old Harbor Tribal Council President Advises Exxon to Include Six Villages.
April 20, p. 3.
1989 Canneries Short Help. April 20, p. 12.
1989 Don't Sign Exxon Partial Release Form. April 24, p. 1.
1989 Chignik Frantic as Oil Gets Closer. May 1, p. 1.
1989 More Bird Deaths, 7 Vessels Look for Sea Otters. May 1, p. 2.
1989 Exxon Plan May Not Support Help for "Lightly Oiled" Places Like Chignik.
May 21, p. 1.
1989 "Oiled" Mayors Meet with the Vice President. May 5, p. 1.
1989 12 Chignik Boats Sign with VECO. May 5, p. 4.

1989 Anything But Normal Salmon Fishery in PWS. May 8, p. 4.
The Kodiak Region - Page 713

Kodiak Daily Mirror (continued)
1989 "We Don't Believe Words Anymore..." Village Rep Blasts Exxon, VECO. May
10, p. 8.

1989 Mousse Spatters Nyak Bay Beaches. May 11, p. 1.

1989 IRS Advice on Boats Used for Oil. May 11, p. 4.

1989 At Karluk: That's Our Biggest Fear - If We Lose This Fish. May 12, p. 1.

1989 Fishermen Are Mad Exxon Waited Until the Oil Hit. May 12, p. 7.

1989 New Claims Form More Acceptable to Fishermen. May 15, p. 4.

1989 Closed Session to Consider Co-op Fishery. May 23, p. 1.

1989 Setnetters Plead to Do Inshore Cleanup: "We Have the Skiffs, Engines,
Radios, Cabins and Experience." May 24, p. 1.

1989 Business Briefs. May 24, p. 6.

1989 Letter to the Editor. May 25, p. 2.

1989 Dead Bird Count Now 8,465. May 25, p. 7.

1989 Workers Badmouth Exxon as They Clean Up the Beach. May 25, p. 8.

1989 Kodiak in a Double Bind. May 25, p. 6.

1989 After Threat, Exxon Clears Out. May 26, p. 1.

1989 Oiled Mayors Ask for Formal Plan of Reimbursement. May 26, p. 1.

1989 Now We Learn Oil Spill Jargon. May 26, p. 12.

1989 Hundreds Protest Slow Cleanup Here. May 30, p. 4.

1989 Will There Be Enough Tenders for Oiled Fish? May 30, p. 7.

1989 Cleanup Shoddy. June 5, p. 2.

1989 Salmon Postponed to June 16: F&G Concurs with Group. June 5, p. 1.

1989 Exxon Declines Mayors' Request. June 6, p. 2.
The Kodiak Region - Page 714

Kodiak Daily Mirror (continued)
1989 Villagers Angry Over Short Pay from Veco. June 8, p. 1.
1989 Island in the Line of Fire; on Shuyak the Enemy Keeps Coming. June 8, p. 2.

1989 C.G. and Governor Endorse Plan for Exxon to Buy Back Oily Debris. June 8,
p. 4.
1989 Oil Impacts Old Harbor. June 8, p. 5.

1989 Oil May Sink or Return Like a Yo-Yo. June 12, p. 1.

1989 F and G, Fishermen at Odds. June 12, p. 1.

1989 McAlpine Recommends Salmon Shut Down; Fishermen, Processors Support
No Opening. June 14, p. 3.

1989 Oiled Mayors Meeting with Exxon Fails Again. June 14, p. 4.

1989 Salmon: Off Again. June 15, p. 1

1989 Oiled Mayors To Maintain Resolve. June 19, p. 3.

1989 Exxon Says No to Bounty Bags. June 20, p. 1.

1989 Filipino-Americans Meet Thursday. June 21, p. 1.
1989 VECO Has Spent $3 M Here in Two Months But Slow Payment Has Hurt
Some Vendors. June 22, p. 2.
1989 It's 3 Months and the Spill Gets Bigger Daily. June 23, p. 4.

1989 Effects on Bears Are Being Studied. June 23, p. 5.

1989 Exxon to Change Vessel Contracts. June 27, p. 1.

1989 Ouzinlde Villagers Report Headaches from Oil Spill. June 27, p. 4.

1989 Exxon on Contracts: "Take It or Leave It." June 29, p. 1

1989 Crews Organize for Claims. July 17, p. 1.

1989 Processors Want Face-to-Face Talk. July 26, p. 1.
The Kodiak Region - Page 715

Kodiak Daily Mirror (continued)
1989 Letters to the Editor. July 27, p. 2.

1989 Claims Meeting Saturday. July 28, p. 1.

1989 Checks for Eagle, Second Payment of $2,000 for Others. July 31, p. 1.

1989 Situation Is Insult to Fishermen. August 2, p. 3.

1989 The Spill's Hidden Cost: 700% Increase in Cases at Mental Health. August 3,
p. 1.

1989 More Stress, More Calls for Police Assistance. August 3, p. 16.

1989 Something is Missing: The Joy of Catching, Smoking Fish. August 4, p. 1.

1989 Letters to the Editor by Forrest Gould, "Some Gaps in the Claims Process."
August 8, p. 2.
1989 Karluk Lodge: Spared by Oil But Hampered by Aftermath. August 11, p. 1.

1989 Port Lions Fired Up Over Incinerator. August 15, p. 1.
1989 Test Burn at Viekoda Today; ADEC Tries to Find Alternative Site. August 18,
p. 1.
1989 Exxon Announces Winter Cleanup Program; Commissioner Kelso Calls it a
"Blizzard of Numbers". August 21, p. 8.

1989 DEC Calls for Oil Cleanup to Continue throughout Winter. August 25, p. 8.

1989 Villagers Don't Buy It; Move the Incinerator Away from the People. August
29, p. 1.

1989 49,000 Reds and Silvers Will Go for Subsistence Use. September 1, p. 1.

1989 Villages Hedge over Exxon's Winter Plan. September 5, p. 1.

1989 For All Practical Purposes, Exxon Has Demobilized. September 7, p. 1.

1989 Borough Says Viekoda Site Not Consistent. September 8, p. 1.

1989 Unused Incinerator to Leave Kodiak. September 11, p. 1.
The Kodiak Region - Page 716

Kodiak Daily Mirror (continued)
1989 KANA Says No to Fish Distribution Program. September 12, p. 1.

1989 Community Healing Celebration at Ram Site Saturday. September 14, p. 4.

1989 Exxon Insists Shores Stable as They End Summer Cleanup. September 15, p. 7.

1989 Public Invited to Wings Open House. September 19, p. 10.

1989 Akhiok Still Strong on Resolve. September 21, p. 1.

1989 Letter to Editor: Wants to Give Credit for Cleanup. September 29, p. 17.

1989 Navy Memories Influence Voters. October 2, p. 1.

1989 Thoughts on Home Port Vote. October 2, p. 2.

1989 Native Center Will Tap the Skills of the Past. October 4, p. 3.

1989 Mental 111ness Alliance Growing. October 4, p. 6.
1989 City Orders Campground Closed for Four Months. November 10, p. 1.
1989 Limited Entry Still Opposed. November 24, p. 1
1989 A Night on the Town: The Police Point of View. November 29, p. 1

1989 Borough Contracts Study of King Crab Habitat. November 29, p. 9

1989 High Price for Taking Care of Street Drunks. December 1, p. 1

1989 Life Can be a Dizzy Blur: The Men on the Street. December 6, p. 1.

1989 Many View Detox Center as a First Step in the Right Direction. December 8,
p. 1.

1989 Assemblymen Call for Vote on Consolidation. December 13, p. 1.

1989 Mayors Propose Ways to Help Pay for Detox Center. December 27, p. 1

1990 Davidson Receives Borough Wish List. January 3, pp. 3, 11.

1990 Conventions Bring in Dollars. January 5, p. 5.
The Kodiak Region - Page 717

I

Kodiak Daily Mirror (continued)
1990 Many Lessons Learned from Spill. March 23, p. 10.

1991 150,000 Acres for Sale on Afognak Have Forester, Conservationists Working
Together to Find Funding. May 31, p. 1.

1991 Is Logging Hurting Hatchery Streams? June 4, p. 1.                                 1

1991 Near Island Projects on Track. June 4, p. 1.

1991 KCA Waiting for Zoning Approval Before Opening New Detox Center. June
4, p. 3.                                                                                t

Kodiak Island Borough
1988a Kodiak Island Borough Annual Report. April 8, 1988.                               3

1988b Kodiak Island Borough Coastal Management Program. Concept Approved
Draft Reprint; revised incorporating Addendum No. 1. Community Development             I
Department.

1989 City of Old Harbor: Comprehensive Plan and Capital Improvements Program.           3
First Draft. Community Development Department.

1990a Kodiak Island Borough, 1989 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report,
February 1990.

1990b Kodiak Island Borough Annual Report. April 13, 1990.	ï¿½

1991 Kodiak Island Borough Annual Report. January 11, 1991.	1

Kodiak Island Borough School District
1989 Kodiak Island Borough School District, Revenue Report, February 1989.              3

1990 Kodiak Island Borough School District, Fact Sheet, January 15, 1990.

Langdon, S.J.                                                                               I
1986 Commercial Fishing. In Cultural Dynamics, Ltd. A Description of the Social
and Economic Systems of the Kodiak/Shumagin Region. Technical Report No. 122.
USDOI, MMS, Alaska OCS Region, Social and Economic Studies Program,
pp. 5-149.

Langdon, S.J. and M.L. Miller.
1983 Social and Cultural Characteristics of the North Pacific Halibut Fishery. Draft
report submitted to the North Pacific Fishery Management Council.	3

The Kodiak Region - Page 718	i
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Lisianski, U.
1814 A Voyage Round the World, 1803-1806. London: John Booth and Longman.

Mason, R.
1988 Russian Orthodox Church Readers in Kodiak Area Villages. Paper presented
at the 1988 Kodiak Cultural Heritage Conference.

1991 Unpublished field notes, AOSIS research.

McGinley, B.A.
1989 Joint Ventures in Fisheries. Pacific Fishing. 10(2):34-40.

McNabb, S.
1987 The NANA Region. Alaska OCS Social Indicators System: Secondary Data
and Key Informant Summary for Schedule A Communities. Submitted to USDOI,
MMS, Alaska OCS Region.

Merck, C.H.
1980 Siberia and Northwestern America 1788-1792. The Journal of Carl Heinrich
Merck. Richard A. Pierce, ed. Fritz Jaensch, trans. Kingston, Ontario: The
Limestone Press.

Mulcahy, J.
1988a Knowing Women: Narratives of Healing and Traditional Life from Kodiak
Island, Alaska. Ph.D. Dissertation. Department of Folklore and Folklife,
University of Pennsylvania.

1988b Unpublished field notes, AOSIS research.

Near Island Task Force
1987 Near Island Comprehensive Development Plan.

Oleksa, M.
1982 Three Saints Bay and the Evolution of the Aleut Identity. Anchorage: Alaska
Pacific University HCRS Village Histories Project.

1987 Alaskan Missionary Spirituality. New York: Paulist Press.

Oswalt, W.H.
1967 The Alaskan Eskimos. New York: Chandler.
The Kodiak Region - Page 719






Payne, J.I
1980 Kodiak Non-Native Sociocultural Impact Study. Technical Report No. 39.
Prepared for USD0O, Bureau of Land Management, Alaka OCS Office,
Anchorage.
1986 Sociocultural Systems of Kodiak City. In Cultural Dynamics, Ltd. A
Description of the Social and Economic Systems of the Kodiak/Shumagin Region.U
Technical Report No. 122. USDOI, MMS, Alaska OCS Region, Social and
Economic Studies Program.

Pleschner, D.B.
1989 Kodiak Flatfish: Evolution of a Fishery. Pacific Fishing. 10(2):40-45.I

Roppel, P.
1986 Salmon from Kodiak: A History of the Salmon Fishery of Kodiak, Alaska.
Alaska Historical Commission Studies in History No. 216.

Smith, B.
1980 Orthodoxy and Native Armericans: The Alaska Mission. Syosset, NY:
Orthodox Church in America, Department of History and Archives, Historical
Society Occasional Paper No. 1.
Southwest Alaska Municipal Conference
1989 Developing Southwest Alaska's Fisheries Economy: A Guide to CommunityI
and Regional Growth. Report prepared by Graystar Pacific Seafood, Ltd., and
Coopers and Lybrand.

State of Alaska
n.d. Old Harbor Airport Environmental Assessment. Department of Tra-nsportation
and Public Facilities. Draft copy.
Taylor, K.I.3
1966 A Demographic Study of Karluk, Kodiak Island, Alaska, 1962-1964. Arctic
Anthropology 3(2):2 11-240.

U.S. Census
1990 Census of Population and Housing, Alaska. Preliminary report. U.S.
Department of Commrerce. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

1980 Census of Population and Housing, Alaska. U.S. Department of Commerce.
Washington, D.C.: Governiment Printing Office.3




The Kodiak Region - Page 7201

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
1987 Kodiak National Wildlife Refuge Comprehensive Conservation Plan,
Environmental Impact Statement, and Wilderness Review. Final Report.

n.d. Alaska Wildlife Refuge Exchanges: The Native Perspective. Brochure.

Will, A.
1981 A History of the City of Kodiak. Submitted to the Alaska Historical
Commission.
The Kodiak Region - Page 721

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Karluk

Curtiss Takada Rooks
Karluk - Page 725

Karluk- Page 726

KARLUK

Table of Contents

I.  Historical Background ..................
729
II. The People ................................................ 735
A. Impressions After the Spill ............................... 735
B. Household Organization and Kinship ......................... 738
C. Social Activities .740
Il. The Village .............................
A. Village Government.
B.  Human and Social Services ............
C. The School.
D.    Associations and Organizations .........
...... 742
...... 742
...... 749
...... 749
...... 749
..............
..............
..............
IV. The Economy ...............................................
A. Housing ..............................................
B. Subsistence ............................................
C. Commercial Fishing ......................................
D. Wage Labor ...........................................
E. Tourism ..............................................
F. Future and Planning .....................................
750
750
751
753
754
755
756
V. Ideology and Influences of Change ................................ 757
VI. Effects of the 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill .......................... 761
References Cited ...........................















Karhuk - Page 727
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KARLUK
I.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The history of settlemients at the mouth of the Karluk River on the southwest side
of Kodiak Island is long and varied. The abundance of salmon and steelhead in the
river, marine invertebrates in the ocean waters nearby, and a wide-variety of residential
and migratory sea mammals in quest of marine invertebrates and migratory fish, made its
mouth a prime settlement location for subsistence extraction. Native peoples have
occupied this site (now known as Karluk) since at least 4000 B.C. (Barsh 1985). Harbor
seal rookeries and haul out areas and the nesting areas of sea otters were abundant in
the Karluk region in the 18th century. These animals were the primne targets of the
Russian traders who arrived at what is now Karluk in 1786 and established a trading post
there. The local population was Koniag (also known as Kaniagmiut) Esldmos, Alutiiq
speakers' whose congeners resided on the Alaska Peninsula northwestward across
Shelikof Strait from Kodiak Island. In at least the 17th century, and probably earlier,
Koniag Eslimos and Aleuts practiced slave-taling (see Townsend 1983:120-132 for an
assessment of the pre-Russian practice). Slaves were used to hunt for sea mammals and
sea otters and to prepare the pelts and skins for trade throughout Native trade networks.
Slaves also hunted for, and maintained the households of, wealthy families.
The Russians established a trading post at Karluk for several reasons, most of
them obvious: strategic resources were abundant and localized; Natives knowledgeable
about the area occupied a viable community there; and Natives produced by-products
from their extractive pursuits--skins and pelts in particular--that they exchanged through
Native trade networks. Russian traders took advantage of these circumstances, all of
which benefited their own interests. They seized the opportunity to intervene in the
Native trade networks that connected island to mainland residents. They also seized the



1Alutiiq was formerly known as 'Pacific Yup'ik; one of three Yup'ik Eslimo languages spoken in Alaska. The
other Yup'ik languages are 'Siberian Yup'ilW spoken on St. Lawrence Island, and 'Central Yup'ik' which has
three mainland dialects: Cuy, Chevalk, and Central (see Woodbury 1984). Kaniagmiut are currently referred to
as 'Koniag.'
Karluk - Page 729






opportunity to adopt the local Native practice of slavery, using slaves for their ownI
purposes and also conscripting local Natives to provide labor for them (Townsend
1983:127-129). Whether the residents of Karluk, in particular, were treated harshly by
Russian traders is not known, although the harshness--even the brutalizing and
murdering of Koniag persons by some Russian traders in the late 18th century--is well
established.
In addition to acquiring slaves from the Koniag while also forcing the Koniag to
hunt for them, three of the most brutal Russian traders relocated Aleut Natives from theg
Aleutian Chain to Kodiak Island (Lantis 1970:282-284). These Aleuts became
"indentured servants" according to Lantis (1970) and Townsend (1983). In establishing3
hegemony over the local Natives, creating a trading post, conscripting local labor, and
perhaps relocating Aleuts to Karluk, significant changes were wrought in daily affairs,5
including the subsistence pursuits of local Natives.
Nearly a century later, commercial fishing altered Native life and local culture.
Within two decades of America's purchase of Alaska in 1867, Karluk had become "the
most important fishing station in Alaska, and perhaps on the whole Pacific" (Porter5
1890:79). Five canneries were located in the village before the turn of the century.
Commercial fishing operations throughout the Kodiak area were owned and operated by
non-Natives, as were the canneries established at Karluk. The Karluk canneries
provided some employment to local Natives, while expropriating Native land and the fishj
that Natives had traditionally harvested and exercising dominion over both.
The canneries created jobs and drew more than 1,000 non-Natives to Karluk byf
1890. The majority were seasonal residents, but some remained year-round. Non-
Natives outnumbered Natives by a Tatio of 5.5:1 at that time (180 Natives). The fishing
fleet that sold to the canneries was neither wholly owned nor operated by non-Natives or
by the cannery comparies. Some Natives were selling portions of their salmon catches to
the canneries; and most, if not all, Natives were surviving by harvesting naturally
occurring resources. By the late 1890s, they were harvesting those resources in fewer3
favorable locales than they were a generation earlier--prior to the advent of the


Karluk - Page 730ï¿½

canneries in prime locations on the river and before the influx of commercial fishermen
and cannery workers.
Although Natives were selling portions of their catches to the canneries, this is not
to suggest that Natives and non-Natives alike sought jobs in the industry and were hired
at equal rates for equal pay. In 1896, 34 Natives were employed in the canneries. In
1897 not a single Native was employed in a cannery. Davis (1979), the principal
ethnographer-historian of the region, was unable to discover the reason why Natives were
not hired. She (Davis 1979) suggests that alcohol abuse may have been a factor in
causing cannery management not to hire Natives. The Russian Orthodox Priest
Shalamov visited Karluk in 1896 and reported that Natives were being devastated by the
importation of alcohol by cannery workers (Davis 1979).2 On a return visit in 1898,
Shalamov commented that alcohol abuse in the village had increased; and the Native
population had been further devastated. Whatever the cause for the failure to hire
Natives at the canneries, there were many negative consequences to Natives from the
establishment of the canneries in Karluk and from the use of Karluk by commercial
fisherman as a staging and offloading area. If alcohol abuse by Natives was the factor
that caused them not to be hired, the social dislocations that accompanied the
introduction of alcohol do not appear to have been addressed by, nor were conditions
improved by, cannery officials or govermnment agents. Shalamov's reports described
Natives being murdered, raped, and assaulted by cannery workers and fishermen, and
suffering from a proliferation of disease introduced by these non-Natives.
The canneries had many negative consequences for Natives; but they also
contributed to the development of the local infrastructure, much of wh ich was paid for
and staffed by the Federal Government. Cannery buildings, docks, and housing were
constructed; and as early as 1890, Karluk boasted a Government schoolhouse--one of the
earliest schools on Kodiak Island (Davis 1979). Tle record is unclear as to whether the
school was created for the children of cannery management and laborers, or whether it



2 Nancy Yaw Davis (1979) is the source for the Shalamiov reports.
Karluk - Page 731

was founded to educate the local Native youth, or both. Photographs of the school's
student body, found in Porter's 1890 study, indicate that most of the students were
Native. From this we can infer that education of Native children was at least one of the
charges given to the school's administration. However, despite this apparent charge, the
strength of the commitment was short-lived, because the school apparently was closed
when the non-Natives departed (Davis 1979). Thus, we can assume that the education of
Native children was important only as Ion'g as non-Natives found it profitable to
expropriate the resources of the immediate locale.3
Overall, the growth of the salmon industry brought prosperity to non-Natives and
various dislocations to Natives. As the canneries increased in number, Native fishermen3
found themselves in ever stiffer competition with better capitalized non-Native
fishermen. They also were caught between competing canneries. Natives were coerced
and threatened into selling their catch to one cannery or another. Spawning stock
returning to the Karluk River dwindled. Capital obtained from fish and fish by-productsI
flowed away from Karluk while very little remained. The industrial development in
Karluk, but also in neighboring villages, ravaged the resource base on which the Native
population depended while transforming the villages into smnall industrial camps
donminated by non-Natives and occupied for only a few months each summer.I
By 1911, the 4-decade boom of commnercial fishing and canning at Karluk had
busted. The canneries had relocated to other areas of Kodiak Island, principally Larsen5
Bay about 20 miles away, leaving Karluk abandoned as a processing site. The non-
Natives who had resided in Karluk also relocated. Most Natives remained, harvestingI
resources as their ancestors had done. A few natives owned commercial equipment and
continued to fish du-ring the salmon season, hauling their catches to the canneries at
Larsen Bay.
The next boom Karluk experienced was natural. In 1912 Mount Katmai erpe,3
dumping ash 18 inches deep over the region. The effects on the flora, fauna, and people
were not overcome for several years (Federal Field Committee for Development and5
Planning in Alaska 1968:20).
Karluk - Page 732

Following the loss of the canneries in 1911 and the eruption of Mount Katmai in
1912, U.S. Census data records that the Karluk village population (194 in 1940)
increased less than 8 percent over the next 28 years. With the onset of World War II
the population began a steady, slow decline to 81 at the time of the Exxon Valdez
foundering on Bligh Reef in 1989. A few families relocated to Larsen Bay and Kodiak
City after the spill, with the population plunging by 12 percent to 71 in 1991 and another
15 percent to 60 in 1992. There is no evidence that the great Alaskan earthquake of
1964 speeded the exodus from Karluk, although the village suffered from its effects. The
relocation of a few families to Larsen Bay and Kodiak City since 1989 may represent
little more than a continuation of the out-migration that has occurred over the past 5
decades--quickened to be sure, by the oil spill. For the most part, relocation has been to
larger communities with a greater variety of services, better transportation, more
complex infrastructures, and more employment opportunities.
Historically, Karluk was located at the mouth of the Karluk River with
settlements on either side of Karluk Lagoon. Old Karluk, the original village site, stood
on the northeast bank while the more recent Karluk site was located on the lagoon's
southeast shore. The two sites were connected by a spit and a bridge built by residents.
On January 7 and 8, 1978, a ferocious storm with gale winds over 100 miles an hour
breached the spit at the mouth of the river and destroyed the bridge. Karluk was
declared a disaster area.
Remnants of the old village site remain in a very bad state of repair. There is a
center with a rather amorphous layout of houses and other structures around it. The
houses are located in close proximity to one another, each being defined by unique
touches that accentuate its distinctiveness. A few houses are built into the hills above
the main section of the village, about 50 to 100 yards away. On the highest point above
the old village site sits the Russian Orthodox Church. The layout of the old village
suggests an intimate setting in which a village member had little structural privacy, yet
the individual nature of the buildings gives evidence to personal autonomy and taste.
Kariuk - Page 733





The residents are ambivalent about the help they received after being declared aI
disaster area following the storm of 1978 and becoming entitled to Federal assistance.
Representatives of several Federal and State agencies became involved in the cleanup
and resettlement of Karluk. Plans were not hatched nor policies implemented over-5
night. Residents reported that discussions with government representatives were
frequent, lengthy, and often confusing. In the view of the residents, they reluctantly
agreed with the Federal Govemrnment's recommendation that the village be relocated and
constructed on higher ground about three-fourths of a mile inland from the Old Karluk           f
site. More than 20 houses were built at the new location with Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) funds. The new location separated villagers from their traditionalI
homes and their church.
'Me church, in particular, had been a principal reason for which villagers werej
most reluctant to relocate from the old village site. The Ascension of the Lord Russian
Orthodox Church was built in 1888 during the height of the comnmercial fishing boomI
and over a century after the Russians established themselves at Karluk. It is apparent to
all interested observers that the Russian Orthodox Church has provided solace, and its
priests and lay helpers have provided guidance to Karluk residents for over a century.
The church building, which is the oldest standing church in Alaska, symbolized thisI
important part of Karluk history. It was also the case that Karluk residents did not want
to be separated from the homes into which they had invested time and energy to make
distinctive.
Many of the pre-1978 buildings remain in a sort of ghost town on the southwestI
village site. Remnants of the old ca-nneries and their docking facilities are still
prominent. The Ascension of the Lord Russian Orthodox Church remains i-n use,I
although it has suffered extensive water damage. A statewide campaign for funds for
restoration of the church was begun in 1991. Early response to this campaign has been
encouraging, although contributions have been modest (Reeves 1992:A1,A6).
Karluk - Page 734

II.    THE PEOPLE
II.A. Impressions After the Spill
We intended to incorporate Karluk into our social indicators study in 1988 but
were unable to do so because of persistent foul weather during January of that year.
Our research design, coupled with financial constraints, did not allow us to enter the
village until 1990, a year after the spill. At that time we were able to administer
questionnaires to one adult in each of 12 households (about 50% of the vilage's
households at the time) and talk with some of the village leaders, but we were unable to
administer protocols or stay for a sufficiently long period to speak with persons
representing all of the village's institutions. Not until 1991 did we have sufficient funds
to administer protocols and engage in more protracted and deeper interviewing, much of
it open-ended, with the residents of Karluk. At that time we also administered
questionnaires to persons in 5 households we had not interviewed in 1990. By 1991 we
had interviewed an adult in 85 percent of Karluk's households. Although we have
spoken to the majority of adults in Karluk, because we spent so little time there in 1990,
this report is based on fewer observations than the reports for other villages, with the
exception of Tatitlek. As a consequence, the following report is narrative in form.
There are several places below where information is scanty, so the generalizations are
impressionistic. Yet the impressions seem to be of a piece with the empirically
warranted generalizations, so the impressions are presented here. They should be
understood as concluding hypotheses that require confirmation.
In any event, in the winter of 1991, the Karluk population was 71 persons
comprising 20 households. Adults represent roughly 50 percent of the population, and
the ratio of females to males is about 1:1. Virtually all permanent Native residents of
Karluk identify themselves as Aleut3 despite any degree of mixed Koniag-Aleut,


s The people of Karluk refer to themselves as Aleut rather than Koniag. This is a common practice on the
island. In addition, they identify their language as Aleut [there are two Aleut languages, Eastern and Western],
rather than Alutiiq (see Footnote 1). It is certainly possible that Aleuts were relocated to Karluk in the late
18th century, and it is plausible that they married Koniag women (only Aleut men were relocated). Yet there
(continued...)
Karluk - Page 735

Russian, European, or Asian ancestry they might have. During the winter of 1991, thereU
were two non-Native residents in Karluk; only one resided there year-round.4
Initial discussions with villagers, particularly residents over 50 years of age, were
not simple affairs. Villagers reported that some social science researchers and historianss
have misrepresented life in Karluk. These experiences bave taught the villagers ca-ution.
Some elders no longer talk with social scientists. A mute reception from elders is rather
chilling, but it also calls for some understanding; and understanding is dffficult to obtain
if conversation is not forthcorming. Much of what was learned in the village did not
require conversation on delicate topics; but with a little time, some information that
appears important to understanding Karluk after the spill was gathered.
First, and ever so obvious, we learned that Karluk is in dire economic straits.
Faced with no immediate prospects for economic development, most young people of the
village must decide between financial solvency through wage employment elsewhere and
living in their home community. Some leave the village to earn mnoney to assist relatives5
left at home. Others leave in frustration, intending never to retuirn.
Although some out-migrants claim they will not return, many do return. Some do
so because of family obligations--an ailing parent or overburdened sibling needs
assistance. Others return because their attempts to make livings outside the village haveI
met with failure. For some the migration out and return to the village is a cycle in
which returning to Karluk is used to gain balance before attempting to live on the
outside again.
Above all, it appears that the basic reason behind the actions of most returnees is
that Karluk is home. It is the place where children are reared, relatives and friends are


(... continued)
is little evidence that the local language is either Eastemn or Western Aleut. Linguists (see Woodbury 1984)
identify the language spoken in, Karluk as 'Alutliq.' The Kodiak Regional Cultural Center uses Alutiiq (Pacific
Yup'ik) for the language of Kodiak Island Native residents. Although the local convention for referring to
residents of their language is 'Aleut, I use 'Alutiicf when referring to the language and Koniag when referringI
to the ethnic background of the people of Karluk.

4This person was married to a Karluk Native.j

Kariuk - Page 7361

buried, resources are harvested, stories are told, history, is recounted, and lives are lived.
To returnees, Karluk represents a place where they feel safe, a place to regain balance, a
place in which they fit, and a place where they belong. One respondent talked about
her return as a celebration of life. For this person, the return to Karluk was precipitated
by her victory over alcoholism. Now sober, she has realized the importance of the
village, stating "I came home because I wanted my children to know Karluk and because
this is where I am from.'"
The downside of Karluices situation is quick to impress an observer. Village life
appears to be rife with conflict. A sense of fatalism appears to prevail among the village
youth. A second impression soon alters the first. After a few days of discussions and
observations and interviewing, it is apparent that residents care deeply about their village
and that adults are ifilled with pride and hopefiulness for it. This sentiment appears to
account for the emotional conflicts that swirl around issues of village governance.
Factions in small villages or on Indian reservations usually comprise two groups
competing for power and control. Factions can form and dissolve rather quickly, or they
can persist for generations. But whether membership in factions changes in relation to
issues (known as 'pervasive') and are short-lived, or whether membership in a faction is
firm and the faction is pitted against its opposit e on various issues as they arise (known
as 'schismatid), their confrontations can be divisive. Factions compete in Karluk over
some issues, yet a second level of conflict may be more important for the well-being of
the community. Teenagers and young adults express frustration with the inability of
village leaders to provide economic opportunities for village residents. Their frustration,
to be sure, is rooted in financial deprivation but also in a desire to remain in the village.
It is my distinct impression that many of Karlukc's youth would choose to stay in Karluk if
jobs were available and they could earn enough income to meet minimal needs.
In this regard, it is certainly noteworthy that al young adults in Karluk have
resided in places other than Karluk. Karluk does not have a high school, so at about age
14 all adolescents are sent away to high school. Most students are sent to Kodiak City;
.Karluk - Page 737

others are sent to Chemawa, a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BLA) school in Oregon's
Willamette Valley. At both locations, the youngsters live in dormitories.
Relocation for high school is usually the first encounter with culture shock for
erstwhile Karluk residents. Boarding school life provides freedom from direct
observation by parents and family. Many of the young adults with whom I spoke said
that boarding school was where they first enjoyed unrestricted access to alcohol and
drags. One young man described early adventures at high school during which partying
went from an occasional activity to a lifestyle. He noted, "At school, in Oregon, there
was so much freedom. I start smoking pot and then it becaine a problem. I had to
leave. Right now I'm home trying to get settled. Then I want to get some job training,
maybe in Seward." Some Karluk high schoolers become dependent on alcohol or other
drugs. According to Impact Assessment, Inc., (1990) researchers, 55 percent of all the
adults they interviewed in Karluk during the summer of 1989 reported that alcohol and
drug abuse were serious problems for the community.
Among Karluk's young people, the Native language rarely is used except for a few
words or phrases. MSiddle-aged Natives can communicate in Alutiiq. They use the
languiage primarily to talk with elders. Within our sample, none of the younger people
were satisfied with their Native language skills. Of those who speak Alutiiq, only I
person--a 64-year-old--was completely satisfied with his skill in the language. There are
no formal programs or classes where these young people can learn the language of their
elders.
II.B. Household Organization and Kinship
In March 1991, there were 20 households in Karluk. Most households included
nuclear families; a few comprised single mothers with their children. The availability of
HiUD housing made it possible for nuclear famiilies and single-parent families to occupy
independent houses. However, independent houses do not imply independent and
autonomous social units. Despite separate residences, kinship ties among people in
separate households provide the st-ructure for the exchange of goods and services,
ranging from food to babysitting. To understand domestic relations in Karluk, it is
I
Karluk - Page 738

necessary to understand how people in separate houses are related and how the relations
are expressed in behavior.
For example, a man who resides alone in a house goes to his sister's house--a
single parent with children--each morning at dawn to prepare breakfast for his sister's
family. He returns to her house for lunch and dinner as well. These siblings occupy
different houses, but they comprise a single functioning social unit. The brother and
sister rely on one another for certain domestic activities much as a couple in a nuclear
household might. Sharing resources and labor are vital components of kinship relations
in Karluk. Sharing extends through kinship networks whether or not kinspersons reside
in the same structure.
In all Native households, nieces, nephews, cousins, siblings, and visitors share
frequent meals without formal invitation. This occurrence is so common that it often
goes unnoticed by village residents. For example, during an interview a respondent was
asked a series of questions regarding the n-umber of meals shared with relatives not
living in the same household. Despite the fact that the respondent's nie'ce had just
finished eating there, the answer was "none." When queried about lunch with the niece,
the interviewee responded, "Oh yeah, I never think about her, she eats here all the
time." Close residential proximity and cultural traditions make the household part of a
larger social unit such that distinctions about individual members becomes blurred.
Kinship forms the basis of social relationships. Two kidn groups dominate the
village. A third family that had, been influential in the village during the 1970s and early
1980s has relocated in Larsen Bay. However, intermarriage between the families serves
to connect most individuals in the village. Currently, young adults look outside the
village for marriage partners, and some of their spouses are Natives; some are not. In
most cases where a resident villager has married an "outsider," the woman is from
Karluk and the man is not. That a non-Native male chooses to reside in his Native
wife's village is not unusual and occurs in smiall villages throughout our sample. What
seems unusual is that Native males from outside Karluk choose to reside in their wives'
horme village. This type of post-marital residence pattern was not observed in the other
Karluk - Page 739





Native villages I visited. The in-marrying males (those who m'arry Karluk women)--I
Native and non-Native--are quite active in village issues.

II.C. Social Activities
Visiting constitutes the most recurrent social activity in Karluk. Even in the
harsh, cold winds, one sees neighbors bundled up and traveling between homes. A hot
cup of coffee or tea awaits visitors, and a game of cribbage or Parcheesi usually is at
hand. Visiting usually brings together members from two or three households in
someone's house. Several adults reported that they enjoyed walks to visit others at the f
old village site, where they would often reminisce about the adventures of their youth.
Subsistence activities in Karluk are social activities; thus, they serve two functions:I
(1) securing needed foods (see Sec. IV.B, Subsistence) and (2) affirming the collective
culture of the village. During the winter months, the men go out in groups to hunt, fish,I
and gather wood. On these often rigorous excursions, the men have time to enjoy one
another's company along with sharing the fun of the "chase." Additionally, these forays
provide the basis for stories shared among all village members--a vital part of the oral
tradition of the Aleut (Koniag) culture.
Summertime brings subsistence activities to all villagers. While the men and
older youth, usually males, engage in fishing, the women and children gather berries and
clean and "put up" fish. Here again, subsistence activities constitute social gathering.
The household visits of the winter, predominantly engaged in by women, are replaced by
subsistence task gro-ups.: While attending to tasks, women are able to visit. Excursions
away from the village provide the adventures for the women's stories.                             f
Social activities in the form of subsistence tasks provide valuable opportunities for
intergenerational bonding and sharing knowledge, and for bringing together multipleI
households. In this way, information and emotional support is exchanged while villagers
assist in the very survival of their neighbors.I
Informal activities for children included watching television and videos and
searching for artifacts along the river bed and near the old village site. Gender-specificI
activities also were witnessed. Elementary school-age boys often were seen heading for _
Karluk - Page 740

the river with fishing rods in hand. The boys with whom I spoke bragged about past
catches, declared who among them was the best fisherman, and expressed pride in
bringing food home for the household. I do not have as much information about the
village-based activities of the elementary school-age girls. Several of the older girls (in
junior high) were accomplished game players; and as with adults, visiting and game
playing were frequent informal activities.
Formal social activities included various children's events at the gra de school,
women's night, and men's night. As with most villages, the school's multipurpose
auditorium/gymnasium provides facilties for evening activities for the children of the
community. Basketball, tag, and other games are played. These activities are geared to
younger children, because the village school provides only kindergarten through 10th
grades; high-school-aged youth do not reside in the village during the school year.
.Organized by the village Commiinity Health Resource counselor,5 women's night
activities consist of arts and crafts (beading, latch-hook-rug making, crocheting, and
knitting), game playing (cards, Parcheesi, and the like), conversation, a shared meal, and
occasionally a topical discussion. The location of the meeting rotates weekly between
the women's homes. Each woman takes her turn as hostess. The wormen look forward
to this formal gathering despite frequent informal visiting throughout the week. It
appears that the convening of all women in the village reaffirms their common identity
and provides a fonun for discussing their collective concerns. The rotating of the
obligation to host the gathering serves to alleviate social-status distinctions by allowing
each woman the opportunity for validation as leader and member of the group.
Men's night brings the men together in larger groups than the task groups that
hunt or fish together. Men's activities tend to be less organized and less frequent than
those -sponsored by women. Gatherings usually are at the school gymnasiumn, and
basketball is the game of choice. This is particularly popular among the young males.



5 The Community Health Resource Counselor is a professional position sponsored and paid for by the, Kodiak
Area Native Association (KANA), the Kodiak region's non-profit corporation.
Karluk - Page 741





Ill.  THE VILLAGEI
The new village, now less than 14 years old, follows a housing formula approved
and funded by HUD.  Each home has essentially the same layout and architecture.  The
houses are very similar. to other HUD houses throughout village Alaska. The village is

laid out on a rectangular grid with all homes arranged in two rows. A boardwalk built in'
1983 runs along an east-west tangent down the center of the rows. The village is
approximately 300-yards long. The flat and treeless site offers no landscaping to lend
character to a given residence. Most homes are painted a deep reddish color with a few
homes painted blue or brown. At the west end of the central walkway are located the
village offices, post office, and village store. Perched above and to the south of the
village is the school. All in all, the "new" village stands in stark contrast to the
uniqueness of its precursor.
111.A. Village Government
Karlu'k remains one of the few Alaska villages that did not incorporate as a city.                        3
The village government is the Tribal Council, and its authority comes from the 1934
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), as revised for Alaska tribes in 19386 and as revised5
again for Alaska tribes after the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act



6 The IRA has a particularly complex history in Alaska which, prior to the passage of ANCSA, had several types
of Federal-Native arrangements. In southeast Alaska several IRA tribes occupied reservations whose land was       I
held in trust. There were also several'Reindeer Reservations' owned by IRA tribes. Most IRA governments
did not possess reservations whose land was held in trust (impaired title). In brief, the 1934 IRA was extended
to Alaska in 1938 (52 Stat. 393). The IRA created non-shareholder corporations with constitutions. The
intention was to establish constitutional "democratid' governments in which all onrolled members were
enfranchised. The intention was also to create limited sovercignty and self-governance for Native governments,
but not to dissociate them from the Federal Government or to Uimit Federal obligations to the ERA governments,
henceforth calld'tribes.' The BIA provided a boilerplate constitutional document to all potential tribes which
they were free to alteir, within limits, and ratify. They could also reject the provisions of the IRA. Upon ratifying
a constitution, an IRA governmnent could then ratify a charter, which gave the tribal government the authority
to conduct business as a corporation and to borrow Federal fands to do so. AJI decisions rendered by an IRAI
government were (and. are) subject to the veto power of the Secretary of the Interior. One of ANCSA's
provisions was the dismantling of all IRA governments under the provision of 52 Stat. 393. Villages could create
new IRA governments but not as corporations of non-shareholders with land held in Federal trust. The new
IRA governments provided access to BIA and other Federad grant and assistance programs, and provided for
governance of Natives. Yet if village populations are mixes of Natives and non-Natives, IRA authority extends
only to Natives.
Karluk - Page 742

(ANCSA) in 1971. ANCSA dissolved all MA govemnients while allowing for the
~creation of new IRA governments much different from those that preceded them.
Although 20 years have passed since Karluk's original IRA government was dis'solved,
the village has not written a new constitution for its current HUA government. The
current IRA government doubles as the village's not-for-profit corporation, which is
another option made available by the provisions of ANCSA. A major task confronting
the Karluk IRA government is drafting and passing a constitution to replace the
boilerplate document made possible by ANCSA when the original IRA government was
dissolved.
Because Karluk has an IRA government, local politics are complicated:
enfranchised membership is based on tribal enrollment, not village residency. Thus,
power is distributed beyond the geographic boundaries of the village, which can generate
conflicts, particularly regarding tribal land issues (see discussion below).
The advantage of the HUA government doubling as the village non-profit
corporation is that the Karluk Tribal Council can gain access to programs and services
for the village that are made available through Federal grants. Most of those grants are
gained in conjunction with KANA, the regional non-profit corporation. The Karluk
Tribal Council also can gain resources and administer Federal programs available to
tribes through the BIA.
Ile tribal council of Karluk consists of the council president, vice chair,
secretary/treasurer, and two non-officer members. Two men and three women held
these positions during the winter of 1991. 'A man served as council president and women
filled the remaining council officer positions. All were members of the same kinship
group. To convey the flavor of village politics, let us summarize three issues the Tribal
Council faced during the winter of 1991 and the positions that were struck on these
issues: (1) village debt and fiscal management; (2) economic development and wage-
labor opportunity for village residents; and (3) tribal land ownership and reconveyance.
It is interesting how the Exxon Valdez oil spill, including the increase in fuel prices,
Karluk - Page 743





cleanup employment, and the way in which workers used the funds they eamned asI
cleanup workers are woven into the political exchanges that animated villagers.
The first issue is especially poignant because of its simiilarity to problems
experienced by the electorates and the political amateurs who attempted to lead them 2
decades ago in the energy boom towns of the American West (see Little 1978: 63-85;
Gold 1978; Jorgensen 1981). At fiist glance the. contexts for energy boom towns and for
Karluk are very different. 'Me former comprises small, rural towns -undergoing rapid and
large-scale industrial developments. Karluk is a little Native village responding to an oil
spill that damaged its economy and its environment.
Charles Perrow (1984) would classify the Exxon Valdez oil spill as a "normal3
accident." The responses in Karluk and in other villages I have studied to the spill are
similar to local responses to rapid, large-scale industrial developments in rural areas--I
areas with modest infrastructure, few resources, a paucity of skilled labor, little access to
power, and little access to capital. Elected leaders in rural areas are invariably political
amateurs, people who may be held in high esteem locally but who are relatively ignorant
of large corporations, have little access to state or Federal sources of power, have littleI
access to capital, exercise little suasion beyond their home community, and are absolutely
powerless to resolve large problems, either political or econormic. While addressing large3
problems beyond their influence, they are overrun by the immediate, pressing problems
that affect their constituents as a consequence of normal accidents or during periods of5
boom growth that is controlled by persons or corporations whose decision-makers are
located outside the area.I
Extremely cold temperatures, rough seas, and high fuel-oil prices coalesced in the
early winter of 1991, causing an increase in fuel consumption and-rendering oil tankers3
unable to offload and the Tribal Council unable to pay for the village's fuel. One village
leader attributed the village's plight to the.Exxon Valdez oil spill, which prompted Exxon
Karluk - Page 744

to increase the price of its oil.7 (Whether the escalation of fuel prices throughout the
United States was a consequence of the oil spill, oil prices shot up immediately following
the spill.) Karluk requested and received the status of State disaster area, maling it
eligible for emergency loans. The village received and allocated over $50,000 from the
State Fuel-Oil-Emergency loan progranm, a large debt for a small village with no obvious
means to generate income. Tle village's financial embarrassment caused residents at a
March council meeting to question the village leadership's fiscal management. In
response, tribal leaders explained that there were two primary causes for the village debt.
First, due to a misunderstanding about the profit statas of the village power company,
the village had to pay the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) a large sum in taxes and
penalties. (The leaders, nevertheless, held to their contention that the IRS erroneously
levied the taxes.) Second, many individuals in the village failed to pay their heatinig and
electric bills for 3 or 4 years.
Villagers, particularly young males, wanted to know why their leaders were not
better educated about the tax status of Karluk's utility, making such statements as, "This
shouldn't have happened in the first place." At no time did the young males display any
empathy with the village leaders' misunderstanding of the complexity of the tax issue.
As for the nonpayment of utility bills by some village residents, several young men
were openly critical of the leadership for not collecting monies from delinquent villagers
immediately following the spill cleanup in the fall of 1989. Some debts were owed by
persons who gained employment in the cleanup. One man explained how he had worked
on the cleanup in Karluk and then relocated to continue to work on the cleanup so as to
earn enough money to pay off personal and family debts. He saw no reason why all



7Fuel oil prices rose 18 percent--from $90 to $107 per barrel--during summer 1989. These prices remained high
through early 1991 despite the loss of the "boom" wage rates avaialable for oil spill cleanup and the absence of
work in the village. Whether price hikes and the maintenance of high prices for oil is solely attributable to the
spill does not yield a simple answer. Most Alaska villages have a single supplier, but whether Karluk is
dependent on a monopsonist supplier or whether there is competition for their business is not known. If there
is competition, it is not known whether competitors collude on prices. Whether discounts are given to villages
that purchase more oil than Karluk is not known.
Karluk - Page 745






members of the community did not do the same or why the Tribal Council had not
insisted that debtors do so. As the criticisms mounted, village leaders concurred and
offered in their defense that chaos reigned after the spill and during the clean up process.
Collecting back debts was not a priority to village leadership when they faced so many
problems beyond their skills and resources to resolve.
It was not established that all persons delinquent in their fuel payments to the
Tribal Council had worked on the cleanup. In 1990 we learned that 4 households among
the 12 in our sample had mem-bers employed in spill-cleanup-related work. The Alaska
Department of Fish and Gamne survey of Karluk households that year reports that 11
persons gained some employment in oil-spill-related work (Fall 1990). It is evident that
the jobs were not evenly distributed among Karluk households. Nor did the younger
critics express empathy with the Tribal Council for allowing some of their fellow villagers
to heat their homes either when they were unable to pay for it, or when they used funds
available to them for purposes other than their utility bills. It is interesting that the
Exxon Valdez oil spill was specified as a maj'or cause of the village's predicament in
regard to its delinquent fuel oil bill, as well as the source of income through cleanup
employment that could have assisted residents in clearing fuel debts owed to the village's
utility. There is little doubt that oil-spill-related work was important to Karluk residents:I
42 percent of all jobs in the community from April 1989 through March 1990 were spill-
related.
The discussion tumned to seeling remedies for nonpayments and to the
eliminat ion of village debt. Although many solutions were proposed for both, no
resolutions emerged.
Young men dominated the next topic before the Tribal Council--Jobs and
economic development. 'The tribal president announced that Karluk had secured funds
to repair local housing and that job applications were available. Two other projects were
in the offing--construction of a bulk-fuel tank and a feasibility study for a boat harbor.
Should either materialize, they could provide work for the local residents.




Karluk - Page 746

Villagers, speaking from experience, expressed concemn that the projects the
president mentioned would not include local hires, even when skilled craftsmen were
needed-and locals possessed the requisite expertise . They knew that in the past jobs
most frequently went to non-Natives off the benches of the union halls in Anchorage and
Fairbanks, so they reasoned that the future would be like the past. They were told that
certification of skilled labor training was required for the housing repair jobs and that
few nonskifled positions were available. The credential requirements infuriated the
villagers. Village officials had no say in establishing the qualifications for employment or
in the hiring process, so they had no power to give assurances about the potential for
hiring locals. Thus, prospects for summer work were negligible for village residents.
The final issue discussed at -the Tribal Council meeting focused on a land
conveyance agreement8 with Koniag, Inc., the regional for-profit Native corporation.
Tle Tribal Council sought advice about what to do with the land it was to receive
through conveyance:- (1) divide the land in severalty among tribal members (resident
and nonresident); (2) place the land in trust for the village; (3) sell the land and divide
the proceeds among the shareholders; or (4) lease the land long-term to the Bureau of
Land Management with a wilderness-retention clause.
Although this issue appeared to have the greatest long-term significance to
villagers, it was not an issue that yielded to a quick or simple solution. Villagers offered
no concrete proposals. It is reasonable to surmise that an issue dealing with ownership






8ANCSA mandated that every village shall have a village for-profit shareholder's corporation and these
corporations shall 'receive some regional land through conveyance. As an enticement to get individual Kodiak
for-profit village corporations to join together in a regional for-profit corporation (the present Koniag, Inc.), each
village was offered regionally owned lands adjacent to the village in exchange for the right to act on behalf of
the villages as a Kodiak collective. While the entire agreement is too long and complicated to detail in this
report, suffice it to say that Koniag, Inc., needed the cooperation and support of all Kodiak vilages to become
a viable entity. ANCSA also'provided for the conveyance of land from regional corporations to city governmnents.
Throughout the, Kodiak region most villages adopted forms of city governmnent through State charter, and these
governments received land through conveyance. Inasmuch as Karluk did not adopt a city form of government,
although it is a member of Koniag, Inc., the land conveyance issue is complex. Whether the IRA government
should receive the land conveyance, or whether conveyance should take some other forma, was the issue discussed.
Karluk - Page 747





of the territory in which the residents were born and reared, as were their parents andI
grandparents, would not yield to facile solutions.
The desire for jobs is an immediate concern, as is misfeasance and
mismanagement by the public sector. What was evident at the meeting is that persons in
attendance did not demonstrate expertise to assess the consequences of the several
alternatives for the conveyance, but there was an-undercurrent that impressed me:
Natives were reluctant to make a decision that could dissociate them from their home,
their space.
Outside the council meeting villagers expressed concerns about land conveyance,
which raised the specter for residents that nonresident enrolled tribal3
members/corporate shareholders will choose projects for short-term gains that portend
irrevocable damage to villagers. Nonresident shareholders outnumbered residentU
shareholders in 1991, and the discrepancy between the two has increased since then. A
tribal initiative to sell upriver land could result in the loss of resource areas traditionally
used by residents, the degradation of spawning areas for anadromous fish, and even the
loss of hunting and fishing rights. If a shareholder does not live in the village, this may
not be a concern; but to village residents, the prospects of the sale of land in fee-simple
represents a major threat to their access to subsistence food and changes to places about3
which they hold special memories and to which they have assigned significant symbols.
This land is not recognized as a commodity, per se.3
The issues villagers discussed with their Tribal Council in the winter of 1991 point
out Karluk's inability to exercise political influence. Leaders in other Native villages3
throughout Bristol Bay, Kodiak Island, and the Alaska Peninsula with which I have first-
hand knowledge exress simiilar frustrations. Even legislation that seeks to ensure "thigh"3
wages, such as the Davis-Bacon Act (designed to keep locally hired people working on
federally funded projects from being exploited (40 U.S.C. SS 276a-276a-5), backfires
against local Natives. The $25-per-hour rate established by the Davis-Bacon legislation
causes contractors and subcontractors not to hire untested and untried local labor. TheyI
hire persons from outside the village and often outside the region, selecting workers who
Karluk - Page 748

by union membership and verification meet the credentials established for the local
projects. Most persons hired are White. Natives are passed over and become even
more dependent on government programs because they have few opportanities for wage
labor. The local Native government is powerless to influence the hiring of Natives, and
this powerlessness demoralizes villagers.
III.B. Human and Social Services
KANA serves as the regional human-services agency for Karluk. It provides the
village with a year-round community health resource counselor, a health aide, a
preschool program, a gymnasium supervisor, and a Village Public Safety Officer (VPSO).
Generally speaking, Karluk Natives hold all positions except that of VPSO.
The community health clinic is open 6 hours a day, Monday through Friday. Five
to six persons per week use the services of the health aide. Doctors and dentists make
regularly scheduled visits to the village. Emergency evacuation to hospitals or facilities
outside the region is provided when needed.
KANA provides instructional programming and entertainment events for the
village. For example, high-school and college counselors hold information sessions two
to three times a year; and during income-tax season, a tax specialist assists residents.
Also, Santa Claus makes his yearly visit to Karluk via a KANA-sponsored helicopter.
III.C. The School
Karluk's village school provides education for grades kindergarten through 10th
grades. Enrollment numbered 23 in January 1990 and 25 in January 1991. Distribution
of students over the grade levels is fairly even. In 1990, boys outnumbered girls 14 to 9;
and in 1991, the ratio was 16:9. The principal, two teachers, local-hire aides, and a
janitor comprise the school staff. The principal, a non-Native married to a Karluk
Native, is a year-round resident of the village.
III.D. Associations and Organizations
The Lord of Ascension Russian Orthodox Church provides the only formal
organization in the village that is not political. Most Native village members
acknowledge some connection with the church. Roughly 70 percent of the village women
Karluk - Page 749






form the Sisterhood Women's Auxiliary. This group looks after the church building andI
plans most of the church's social events. A most imnportant current task for church
members is the restoration of the church building, which, as reported above, is severely
threatened by water damage. There is no resident priest, yet villagers remain active and
hope to have one stationed in the village soon. Currently a priest from Kodiak City
visits about once a month.
Karluk celebrates both the traditional western Christmas and the Russian
Orthodox Christmas, the latter being more significant. Villagers spoke with pride and
excitement about the Russian Orthodox tradition of "tstarring." (Starring is similar to the
Protestant Christmas caroling tradition.) Easter is an especially important ceremonial in
Karluk, including Lenten restrictions such as the abstinence from red meats and, for
many, alcohol. The adherence to Russian Orthodox values and traditions varies by
individual.
IV.   THE ECONOMY
Karluk is a poor village with few sources of income other than transfer payments.
Our winter 1991 sample reflected the generally low income levels, with 9 of 11
respondent households recording annual incomes of less than $20,000. All 9 were Native
households. Tle 2 respondent households with larger incomes have at least I non-
Native adult residing in them. Both non-Native residents are teachers.
Infrastructure is very modest. The docks once used by canneries are no longer3
usable and there is no pier. Oil storage facilities are limited, requiring frequent ftiel oil
deliveries. Oil barges cannot or will not make deliveries when seas are high and
transporting and offloading are dangerous.
IV.A. Housing
The bomes in Karluk are a basic HiUD type consisting of three- to four-bedroom
units, designed as single-family dwellings. Most are prefabricated and shipped to Karluk
on barges and then assembled. Originally designed for Lower-48 environments, these
homes are ill-equipped for Karluk's environment. Insufficient insulation and theI
prevalent high winds in the area account for high heating-fuel use. Because almost every


Karluk - Page 7503

household has either children or elders, the need for maintaining moderate temperatures
within houses is imperative. The inability to obtain fuel oil during the winter of 1991
portended serious problems that were av'erted by State loans (described in See. ll.A).
Wood-burning stoves augment the oil-heating systems in each home. The young
men comb the beaches for wood drifting in from as far away as the Washington coast.
Driftwood provides an adequate alternative fuel supply for most homes, but severe
weather often hampers the villagers' ability to collect wood. Some storms deposit
driftwood several miles from the village onto the' beaches of Shelikof Strait. During
inclement weather or high seas, the villagers cannot access these beaches.
IV.B. Subsistence
The harvest of wild foods (plants and animals) for subsistence engages Karluk
residents year-round. Subsistence pursuits are crucial economic activities in Karluk
households. These activities are deeply embedded in the kinship and social organization
as well as the sentiments of local Natives. Any separation of economic activities from
social and ideational activities is for analytical purposes only. People plan for coping
with the rigors and dangers of fishing and hunting before they undertake harvesting
activities. They have experienced adversity in these pursuits and thus prepare for the
worst. The planning and preparation, as well as the conduct of the activities, are
considered enjoyable by Natives. The joy, as well as the work and the distribution of the
proceeds, is shared among kinspeople and friends.
Most of the mnen in Karluk engage in hunting, fishing, or wood gathering during at
least a few days in each week of the year in order to provide for their families, wider
networks of kinspersons, and elders in the village. Salmon, which are abundant off and
on from June through October, and deer, which are plentifuil year-round, provide the
major sources of protein for Karluk residents. Seals are a preferred species, and to bag
one is prized. Waterfowl, mainly ducks, also are preferred and add variety to villager
diets. The mountainous terrain surrounding the village makes inland hunting difficult,
except along the course of the Karluk River. Deer are generally hunted from skiffs as
they forage near the water's edge along the Strait or along the river. When drifting and
Karluk - Page 751





looling for deer, or when cruising the coast and looking for deer, Karluk hunters oftenI
carry shotguns as well as rifles, prepared to bag seals or ducks should the opportunities
arise.
Hunting fr om skiffs while drifting or cruising is almost always done in small
groups of two to four'men. There are 7 skiffs in the village, so members of two-thirds of
the 20 households must share with persons in households that own skiffs in order to drifft
down the river or along the coast. Kinship, friendship, and need form the basis for the
formation of hunting groups.
Weather plays a major role in the subsistence pursuits of the Karluk villagers.
Because hunting generally is restricted to skiffs, blowing wind and rough seas greatly3
affect the frequency and increase the danger of subsistence outings. This is particularly
true of winter hunting and fishing. Additionally, weather influences the delivery of3
freight of all kinds, especially food and fuel, from outside the village, as strong winds
prohibit airplanes from landing and high seas make barge portage impossible. Thus,
subsistence summer stores and winter harvesting are vital -to the survival of Karluk
residents.3
Beach seining along the lower Karluk River is the prevalent form of subsistence
salmon-fishing technology that takes place during the summer and fall months as salmon              f
accustom themselves in the tidal regions before moving farther upstream to spawn. Four
smokehouses service the village for preparing king salmon, seal, and any other meats3
that cannot be air-dried. Much of the prepared meat, whether smoked or air-dried, is
then stored in freezers at villagers' homes. In the fall during the silver salmon and3
steelhead spawning runs, many residents fish with rod and reel. They do so as a
subsistence activity and because it is fan to hook and land a big fighting fish. The3
distinction between subsistence and sport fishing is one of intensity. Sport.or "fan"
fishing occurs after sufficient stores for the winter have been harvested. Sport fishing for3
salmon and steelhead often entails cormpetitive comparisons of the size and number of
eac h person's catch.  In the winter months when the seas are calni, fishing with rod and3




Karluk - Page 7523

reel or jigging for flounder, halibut, and cod augment food from the summner stores and
winter hunting, as do market-purchased meats.
Berry picking is a social activity that facilitates harvests of several resources other
than berries. Villagers hike to Sturgeon Beach (south of the village) or to Seven Mile
Beach (north of the village) to gather berries and firewood and to hunt deer and birds as
opportunities allow. Picnics often accompany these outings, stories are told about
previous excursions, and the sites of certain incidents in villager memories are noted and
the memories recaled. The resources gathered on these excursions are generally stored
for winter use.
IV.C. Commercial Fishing
In 1991, only I commercial beach-seining permit was held in the village, and that
permit holder had not fished for the past 2 seasons (1989 or 1990). By comparison, in
1980 villagers held 2 to 3 purse-seine permits, 9 to 10 beach-seine permits, and 3 set-gill-
net permits (DOWL Engineers 1981). I was told that most permit holders sold their
permits to non-Native fishermen. 'My informants did not know the prices obtained. A
few Karluk Native permit holders relocated to Larsen Bay.
Inasmuch as cornmercial fishing was the major source of private sector income in
Karluk, the relocation of some permit holders and the sale of pernmits wiped out most
private sector income in the village. The reasons for the relocations are rather
transparent. It is expensive to operate and maintain fishing equipment, particularly to
buy new technology but also to pay for increasing fuel costs (see Jorgensen 1990:190-
202). There are no buyers and no fish processing plants in Karlukc, but both are found in
Larsen Bay, 2 hours distant by sliff, and in several other Kodiak Island locales. Fishing
from a base in Karluk always requires long-distance hauling of the catch if there are no
offshore processors; and as the Karluk fleet dwindled, there was little likelihood that
offshore processors would operate nearby.
As for sales of limited-entry permits, highly capitalized non-Natives can offer
Natives high prices, prices they cannot afford to turn down, especially when permit
holders are laden with debts fromn a previous fishing season and when they need
Karluk - Page 753

~~~~~~~II


equipment repairs and new equipment for the coming season. The highly capitalizedI
buyer will operate bigger and faster boats than the Native operated, boats that are
loaded with advanc ed technology. Some Karluk residents almost surely sold their
permits because of large debt loads and long distances to buyers. I could not ascertain
how many of the sales occurred as a consequence of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill,
perhaps because the permit holders relocated after selling. As a not irrelevant aside,
Natives who fear the consequences that might befall them should land conveyed to the
village be placed on the market can observe the consequences of permit sales and the3
relocation of permit holders and draw a conclusion from the analogy.
WV.D. Wage Labor
In 1978, the public sector in Karluk had 5 year-round jobs, only some of which
were full-time--a cormmunity health representative, 2 health aides, I tribal clerk, and I
postmaster, and 3 seasonal jobs--1 school janitor and 2 school aides (Barsh 1985).
Underemployment, which takes many forms (pa rt-time year-round, seasonal, piece-workc,
short-term projects), is characteristic of marginal, rural economies dependent on the
public sector for survival.
Windfall employmnent occurs frorm time-to-time, but is not predictable, such as the
job opportunities created by the foundering of the Exxon Valdez. During the summer of3
1989, prior to the spill'there were about 15 jobs of all kinds in the village. Most were in
the public sector and most were part-time. When the oil slick and oil balls ("turdst1)3
began fouling the beaches near Karluk in April 1989, work related to the Exxon Valdez
oil spill brought short-term employment to at least 11 villagers. The total number of3
persons (26) with gainful employment represented a peak for the village. Some of the
cleanup work was local, and some required that workers -relocate for brief periods to3
other areas contaminated by the oil slick and oil balls. Spill-related work left just a little
bit slower than it arrived, but its effect was considerable in a town starved for3
employment and cash, as we make clear above.
In 1991, specific employment--without disasters--was much as it had been in 1978.I
There was a modest increase in employment over 1978; but as was the case 13 years


Karluk - Page 7543

earlier, almost all employment in Karluk was in the public sector or depended on it, and
most of it was part-time. In winter 1991, there were 9 year-round jobs, predominantly
part-time; I community health representative; I health aide; I tribal clerk; 1 postmaster;
I fuel delivery person; I power plant operator; I airline agent; I airstrip and road
maintenance person; and I local store clerk. About six seasonal positions were available
in the public sector (school janitor and school aides). There was no VPSO in Karluk in
1991.
The tiny amount of private-sector employment within the village is concentrated
in the guiding of visiting hunters and fishermen. Outside the village, a few men are crew
members of fishing boats worling out of villages other than Karluk.
Ile local store in Karluk is owned jointly by a Karluk non-Native resident and an
absentee investor. Family members operate the store, which is stocked with most
essential food items. It also provides snacks, candies, and movie rentals. Most villagers
purchase at least some of their food through bulk orders placed with Kodiak-based
supermarkets.
IV.E. Tourism
In addition to the store, the sole other private-sector business in Karluk is
tourism. Karluk is renowned for its king salmon fishing, a favorite among sportsmen,
and also the other four Pacific salmon species and steelhead. The huge Kodiak brown
bears, the largest of the subspecies, are also numerous as a're deer. All of these animals,
but particularly kIng salmon, draw a few sportsmen to Karluk. The Karluk Lodge,
operated by an absentee owner, does most of the business in the 'Village. It appears to
be operated without contact or assistance from the village. Residents spoke very little
about the lodge and seem content with their coexistence.
A local Native entrepreneur has opened a "lodge" and guiding operation during
the summer months, housing sportspeople in extra bedrooms in his house or in tents.
This entrepreneur uses family members as guides and service providers for his patrons.
A few residents rent rooms and provide meals for casual visitors, employees of the
regional corporations, and researchers. The Karluk Lodge does not operate in the
Karluk - Page 755





winter. Employees of State and Federal agencies normally stay in a room at the schoolI
or in residents' homes.
IV.F. Future and Planning
No long-term economnic development plans existed as of March 1991. Discussions

about development possibilities revolved around building a boat harbor and docking
facility. Such a facility would enhance the village's ability to attract tourists and might
prompt Native commercial fishermen back to the village or prompt locals to become
commercial fishermen. The building of a boat harbor and docking facility does not
appear likely in the near future. Karluk has no capital to fund such a project. In order
to improve the local infrastructure, including larger fuel-oil-storage facilities, and to
maintain its airstrip and roads, Karluk would have to rely on funding from the State and
Federal Governmnents to undertake capital improvement projects.3
In any event, development of a harbor near Karluk would be extremely expensive.
Hfigh seas make a Shelikof Strait facility impractical; thus, to gain protection from1
storms, the mouth of the Karluk River would need to be dredged in order to provide
vessel access to a docking facility in a sheltered location upriver near the current village3
site. The ecological coinsequences of a project of this scale would have to be carefully
studied, particularly with regard to the effects on the Karluk River salmon and steelhead3
populations.
In 1988, Karlules Tribal Council and an employee of KANA developed plans to 3
obtain a grant to fund a village-owned sportfishing lodge. According to Impact
Assessment, Inc. (1990:66), the person responsible for the plan left KANA during the3
spill and the planning came to an abrupt halt. This rather modest proposal was not
mentioned to me in 1991. Such a lodge could provide some employmnent for cooks,3
guides, maintenance people, and a manager for 4 or 5 months each year. A very few
jobs can make a big difference in a village with 20 households.9 By early 1992 the3


9The Alaska Department of Fish and Game tallied only 18 households during its survey for 1992; so two
households have either moved out of the village or coalesced with other households in the village since March
1991.3


Karluk - Page 7563

documents were being pulled together and the village was seeldng to complete the
proposal and submit it for a grant.
The village government continues to work on developing and organizing its files
and ledgers. The updating of the tribal roll (the list of enrolled tribal members), the
framing and ratifying of a new constitution, and the closing of all open grants will allow
the village to request funding from Federal, State, and regional sources for infrastructure
maintenance and enhanced social services.
V.  IDEOLOGY AND INFLUENCES OF CHANGE
At the turn of the century Karluk was in the twilight of its brief period as a
bustling cannery center. Eighty years ago the fish processing boom ended in Karluk; and
faster than it grew, the village withered. In the interim its residents have endured three
natural disasters and one normal accident: the ash from Mt. Katmai, the shake from the
great Alaska earthquake, the violent storm of 1978, and the oil from the Exxon Valdez.
Some benefits have come to the village from the growth of the public sector since the
passage of ANCSA, but a sustainable private sector economy is not one of them. The
resilience of the villagers who have stayed in place while fellow villagers have relocated
is remarkable, although the pace at which famnilies have relocated from the village since
mid-1989 (9% per year) is a bleak harbinger. It is my impression that those who stay do
so because of their love of the space in which they extract the resources that sustain
them; the coTmmunity with which they share that space; the memories they recount about
places within their space; and their affection for the church that binds them together.
And even for those who leave, their ties to the village, to their kinspersons, and to the
Ascension of the Lord Russian Orthodox Church draw them back for Easter, Christmas,
Orthodox Christmas, and other significant events.
The residents of Karluk expressed deep emotion when referring to their village.
Sturgeon River and Sev'en Mile Beach, for example, are important to subsistence
extraction and as locations for famaily and village outings. The old village site, now
abandoned, continues to be held dear by those who grew up there; and the survival of
the Ascension of the Lord Russian Orthodox Church is a major concern of villagers.
Karluk - Page 757





Their collective well-being is tied to its maintenance. Outside influences from CzaristI
Russian traders to fish processors from the Lower 48 states expropriated Native
resources, exploited Native labor, and donminated Natives off and on for more thanI
I century. The passage of ANCSA at the behest of United States (Standard Oil of Ohio,
Exxon,'ARCO), Dutch (Shell), and British (British Petroleum) oil interests had the effect
of increasing public-sector transfers and public-sector employment, while absolutely
limiting villager access to the naturally occurring resources on which their lives have
been based for centuries. The new dependency is nothing like the old dependencies.
Large, structural, economic forces aside, lives in Karluk are played out on a real,
every-day, particularistic level. Prominent among the influences that have changed3
Native practices and sentiments in the past 2 centuries are (1) the Russian Orthodox
Church, which had the effect of obliterating traditional beliefs, replacing them with3
Christian beliefs, and providing salve for wounds inflicted by the Czar's merchants and
traders, a salve that seems to work about as well on the wounds inflicted by agents
working under the umbrella of democratic capitalism; (2) alcohol, for which any
entrepreneur, dim-witted or bright and regardless of intent, can find a market; and3
(3) new technologies that facilitate secure travel, increase the probability of success on
the hunt, and contribute to comfortable lives. As for the last, Karlukes Natives neverI
have had access to capital to allow them to purchase the technology that would allow
them to compete successfully and on a sustained basis in the commercial fishing
enterprise. And the consumption of alcohol apparently rendered them uncompetitive at
a very early stage in the developmnent of the fisbing'industry in Karluk. This is not to say3
that Karluk's Natives sought to enter the commercial fishing enterprise on a tooth-and-
claw basis. After all, the annual period of commercial salmon, steelhecad, and marine-3
invertebrate harvests conflicts almost exactly with the period of most intensive
subsistence harvests. Karluk Natives are now, and always have been, subsistence3
barvesters.
Adherence to the principles of the Russian Orthodox religion provides spiritual3
glue for the commnunity. The church baiding renovation project gives the people a


K,arluk - Page 7583

positive activity that averts their attention from the persistent problemns that the village
faces. Adherence also provides a means for putting personal and factional disputes
aside, if temporarily. This pull of the restoration project and the observation of religious
ceremonies is so powerful that residents who have relocated to other villages on Kodiak
Island return to Karluk and participate with vigor in the renovation project. They are
happily welcomed by Karluk residents who appreciate their efforts. While adherence to
doctrinal practices and traditions of the Russian Orthodox religion varies by individual,
church membership provides a strong sense of identity. Furthermore, the shared
profession of faith serves to connect the Karluk residents with Russian Orthodox Aleuts
throughout Kodiak Island, the Alaska Peninsula, the Kenai Peninsula, and the Aleutian-
Pribilof Islands.
At present, alcohol is often cited as the most detrimental influence on persons
and households in the village. Village residents noted that alcohol and other substance
abuses plague some individuals in their community. They were especially saddened
about the youth who encounter such difficulties., In 1991, there were no village-based
substance-abuse programs.
As for technology, Eskimos and Aleuts have always sought new technologies that
work better than old technologies, whether it be polarized and insulated goggles rather
than snow goggles, 20-foot aluminum skiffs with twin 55-horsepower outboard engines
rather tha,n bidarkas (2-seat kayaks), or electronic beaming devices to guide mariners to
port through dense fog rather than memory and kidnesthetic sense. In the recent past,
two technologies in particular have influenced Karluk villagers--the airplane and
television.
Tle airplane allows villagers more frequent contact with the outside, increases
access to nonsubsistence goods, provides a means for residents to leave the village with
relative ease, and expands the scope of travel. As in other small villages, daily mail
service reduces the isolation that marked village life in the past. While personal contact
with those outside of Karluk has certainly increased, so has access to markets via the
mail order catalog. Consumer goods and fashions are no longer beyond the means of
Karluk - Page 759





the villagers. Such access frees young people from the necessity of learning traditional
skills such as sldn sewing. Thus, contact between generations may lack the discipline and
urgency it did in the past, when such interaction involved the transference of survival

Air freight has had a similar effect. If the weather allows, a telephone call to the

market in Kodiak can replenish one's food stores within I to 2 days. Although
subsistence continues to provide the majority of meat proteins in villager diets, villagersI
enjoy the variety of (very expensive) foods available in Kodiak City. Households in3
which food stamps are crucial to sustenance must rely on store-bought goods, modest
extracting activities, and whatever foods local residents share with them. Some cash is3
required to conduct subsistence hunting and fishing. Skiffs, outboard motors, 4-wheel all-
terrain vehicles, snowmachines, fuel, guns, rifles, ammunition, nets, rods and reels,3
sleeping bags, lanterns, portable stoves, knives, hatchets, caches, freezers, and the like
require cash to purchase and to maintain. If a person or a household cannot pull
together the resources necessary for successful extraction activities, they must receive
resources from others, share meals with others, and rely on transfer payments and3
processed foods.
Most villagers with whom I talked traveled to Kodiak City more than once each3
year. Such trips were rare prior to the development of a landing strip at Karluk.~ When
funds can be marshalled, villagers mnight even travel to Anchorage to shop. Such3
excursions often are combined with other purposes, such as medical checkups.
Television and other forms of electronic media are pervasive in Karluk. Many of3
the older respondents commented that television has changed relations within the village
because people no longer visit as much. However, the most common objection to3
television is that children watch too much of it. Adults said their children seem beguiled
by the glamorous lifestyles they see on television, claiming that appreciation of their3
Native heritage has been diminished because of it. A Karluk youth, it is suggested,
focuses at least one eye on Los Angeles, whereas the other eye--not to mention the feet,3
hands, and stomach--remains on the Bush.


Karluk - Page 7603

VI. EFFECTS OF THE 1989 EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL
Oil from the.Exxon Valdez spill of March 24, 1989, began fouling beaches and
rocks on Kodiak Island in mnid-April, about 1 month before the kidng salmon bega-n to
enter their spawning waters. Salmon comprised about 65 percent of the total subsistence
harvests by Karluk's residents for the preceding decade. The percentage of salmon in
the total subsistence harvests for Karluk households was 76 percent in 1991 (Fall 1990:
Table 5). At first'blush the increase in salmon procurement suggests that the oil spill
increased the amount of salmon available to Karluk residents for harvest. Given the
restrictions placed on commercial salmon fishing by the Alaska Department of Fish and
Game (ADF&G),"' there were many more salmon available to some commercial
fishermen (set-netters) and -to subsistence harvesters than in almost every year since
1982.11
One question is, if the proportion of salmon harvested for subsistence increased,
what resources decreased? Seals, which comprised about 8 percent of previous harvests
comprised 2 percent of the 1989 harvest. Birds dropped from 4 to 2 percent, and other
fishes from 10 to 6 percent (see Fall 1990:Table 5). Sea mammals and many varieties of
ocean birds, especially diving birds, suffered from oil contamination. The evidence that
they die from toxicity is not great, although toxins remain stored in the livers of sea
mammals longer than in the livers of fish. The problem for seals is that when they are
coated with oil, they often freeze to death. Birds covered with oil cannot fly; and they,
too, die. The reason Natives give for the reduction in harvests of birds and sea
mammals and certain ocean fishes is that they are contaminated. In particular, seal oil,
so prized and eaten with dried salmon, smoked salmon, smoked blackmeat, and all
manner of"greens" (edible wild plants) and berries, was feared to be contaminated.


10Aes within the spills oil slick were closed to fishing; drift net fishing was prohibited; the duration (in hours)
and numbers of openings were reduced.

11 Following the extension of the U. S. territorial boundary to 200 miles offshore, salmon stocks returning to
spawning waters increased from 1978 through 1982. New technologies and new agreements that made greater
harvests on the high seas beyond the territorial limit possible but that also made larger harvests possible near
the Alaska coast, reversed the trend.
Karluk - Page 761





A second question is quantity: how many pounds of resources were harvested perU
household? In 1989 Karluk residents harvested 237 pounds of wild resources per person,
38 percent less than the amounts harvested 3 years earlier (Fall 1990:Table 4). So the
proportion of salmon increased, but the proportion of wild foods harvested per capita
plunged. There is little doubt that the reduction in the size of the harvest was influenced
by the spill: ADF&G's restrictions on commercial fishing increased the availability of3
salmon and fear of tainted resources influenced residents to harvest fewer sea mnammals,
ocean fishes, and birds than in previous years. The spill undoubtedly influenced harvests3
in another way: 11 persons in the village gained spill-related employment during the
summer of 1989, thereby restricting the harvesting activities of every one of the 11 during3
the period in which the most intense subsistence extraction occurs. Twenty-five percent
of the households in our 1990 sample had at least one member who temporarilyU
relocated from the village for spill-cleanup work in 1989.
It is not clear that the oil spiii is the sole cause for the reduction in the amount of3
wild resources harvested by Karlukes residents. According to ADF&G surveys, Karluk
residents harvested 832 pounds of wild resources per capita in 1983, 381 in 1986 (54%
less than 1983), and 237 in 1989 (38% less than 1986). The trend began at the timne the
size of the salmon stocks returning to spawning waters in,Alaska began to dwindle. It is3
surely the case that resources other than salmon were not harvested because they were
presumed to  be tainted. Whereas 100 percent of Karluk households harvested wild3
plants and 93 percent harvested salmon in 1989, only 57 percent harvested seals. As for
use of the resources that were harvested, 14 percent of the households discardedI
resources because they were thought to be contaminated (Fall 1990:Tables 7-10). Thus,
fewer resources were harvested because of fear of tainting and because able extractors3
were working on the spill cleanup; and fewer of the ha'rvested resources were retained
because they were presumed to be tainted.3
No one we spoke to in Karluk claimned that they lost property, such as a boat or
buoys or nets, because of the spill. Yet one-quarter of the people with whom we spoke
said someone in their household suffered a financial loss because of the spill (those


Karluk - Page 7623

persons could not engage in some aspect of the commercial fishing industry). All filed
compensation claims with Exxon. By a ratio of 2:1 the claimants thought that the
compensation they received was adequate.
No one claimed that they, or; their families, were forced to relocate from the
village because of the spill--with the exception of the persons who gained cleanup
employment. On the downside, 25 percent of the households claimned that at least one
person had lost employment because of the spill.
The simple facts with which I began this section provide one glimpse at the
consequences of the spill: subsistence harvests went down, temporary employment went
up, tainting was feared, most losses were adequately compensated. It is appropriate to
dig a little deeper and convey an impression of the context in which the spill was
addressed and the way in which decisions were made.
The cleanup activities orchestrated in respo-nse to the Exxon Valdz oil spill were
similar to the creation and abandonment of the canneries in Karluic at the turn of the
20th century, and the framing, enacting, and implementing of ANCSA as it pertained to
Karluk. Cleanup activities associated with the spill overwhelmed the village of Karluk.
Fairly isolated since the loss of the canneries in 1911, the village, bereft of infrastructure,
was besieged by representatives of Exxon; the regional corporations; and Kodiak Island
Borough, State, and Federal Governments. Although they wore different hats and
sought to control different aspects of the spill's consequences and the cleanup operation
to take place nearby, the various roles played by various representatives were confusing
and intimidating to the residents, particularly to local officials. The corporate and
government representatives were followed by reporters from the print and electronic











Kariuk - Page 763





media, the Oiled Mayors'2 legal personnel, and several research teams. As one villageI
official stated:
So many people were telling us what to do and what not toI
do, who to let in the village and who not to let in the village.
It was very confusing. Finally, we decided to keep the
reporters out. I remember getting on the radio when a plane
showed up and telling the pilot that if there were any
reporters on the plane don't think about landing. They are
not welcome here!
In late April the Tribal Co-uncil president sought equipment and supplies through3
KANA, Exxon, and eventually VECO, the firm contracted by Exxon to direct the spill-
cleanup. He was deeply imnmersed in spill-cleanup logistics while trying to assist villagers3
with their mounting problems and complaints. A boom at the mouth of the Karluk
River desired by the villagers was put in place and used to skim oil from the tidewater.3
T'he Tribal Council president who had worked so hard on logistical issues left the village
for 2 months during the cleanup operation, and the VPSO was assigned as the local3
VECO coordinator (Impact Assessment, Inc. 1990:65).
Karluk residents wanted to deal directly with Exxon but could not do so. They
reluctantly worked with VECO, which used the local school for a few meetings.
Residents aver that the local VECO coordinator was prej'udicial in his hiring practices3
and unable to maintain reasonable working relations with the beach-cleaning crews.
Impact Assessment, Inc. (1990:67), report that the VPSO officer assigned. to coordinate
VECO operations in Karluk subsequently was fired from his VPSO position. The part-
time janitor and the part-time tribal crerk left their jobs for better remuneration in





12 The Oiled Mayors group (an ad hoc subcommittee of the Alaska Conference of Mayors) was composed
primarily of the mayors of villages and cities impacted by the Exxon Valdez oil spill. This group was represented
by Lloyd Miller, an attorney, in its legal actions against the Exxon oil company. Additionally, this group, with
the assistance of a grant from the Alaska Department of Community and Regional Affairs, funded a study
conducted by Impact Assessment, Inc., on impacts of the oil spill on communities most affected by the spill (seeI
Impact Assessment, Inc. [1990], "Economic, Social, and Psychologica Impact Assessment of the Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill.! LaJolla, California).

Karluk - Page 764

cleanup employment. Although school was in session for another 2 months, neither job
could be filled until the cleanup work was concluded.
There is little doubt that many of Karluk's residents, particularly the leaders,
reacted to the stresses created by the situation. In the winter of 1991, 2 years after the
spill, the members of the Tribal Council felt that they had not recovered completely
from the deluge of outsiders. They expressed a prolonged weariness. The elected
leaders of the Karluk community were powerless to select the VECO coordinator, hire
cleanup crews, oversee cleanup operations, house temporary workers and visitors, or
satisfy complaints. In the opinion of Karluk residents, it did not matter whether an
outsider was worling for Exxon or VECO or for Native interests--the village's
sovereignty was proved nominal. By 1991, the consequences of the 1989 oil spill
extended to issues that at first glance did not appear to be connected to the spill at all.
A large portion. of the income that was earned from spill-cleanup employment was
spent outside the village. Food, dry goods, and supplies of many kinds were ordered
from Kodiak City and Anchorage, where prices are lower and choices much greater than
in Karluk. Some of the earnings were spent on vacations out of the village.
Exxon and VECO regarded the spill-cleanup operations as an economic windfall
with positive benefits for villages like Karluk; but village leaders in Karluk contend that
the wage labor provided by the spill cleanup has had long-term negative consequences
for the village. Young men who earned wages from $16 to $25 per hour during the
cleanup are dismayed at the $7 to $8 per hour the village pays when it garners grants
and contracts to provide employment for local residents. On their part, village leaders
confide that these young men overvalue their labor. (I heard similar opinions frm
village leaders in several small villages in the spill area.)
Elected leaders anticipate that projects that will benefit the village and for which
they have struggled for funds, such as the fishing lodge whose planning was interrupted
by the oil spill, will not be constructed when funds are available. The young me n do not
view occasional stints of piecework at half the cleanup pay rate as good opportunities.
In 1991, at least, the memory of cleanup pay was still fresh in the minds of many
Karluk - Page 765





residents. Some had secured'some cleanup work in the spring of 1990. The contrastI
between spill-cleanup wages and public-sector wages (and opportunities to ear-n those
wages) in Karluk was part of what was at issue during the Tribal Council meeting I
attended in March 1991. Many youths act as if Karluk's future is bleak and village.
leadership cannot make it bright. That the youth question authority is not the central
issue; youth in most cultures challenge leaders. However, the intensity and tone of the3
challenges in Karluk seem un-usual, especially given the Aleut culture where kinship ties
and age are revered.3
Village officials described additional indirect effects of the income earned by
several villagers from the.Exxon Valdez oil spill. Residents and leaders claim that3
vendors servicing the village have raised prices because of the high wages received by
Karluk residents. The price of freight, particularly of fuel oil, was given as one example.3
Infation plagues boom towns and towns suffering from natural disasters or normal
accidents. Inflation surely accompanied the spill in all the villages I visited that wereI
directly affected by the spill and its cleanup. Inflated prices were reflected in higher
rents, increased prices of dry goods, transportation, and food. Oil was not the ornly3
commodity to become dearly priced. The high rates of pay generated by spill-cleanup
operations had a variety of effects on individuals within the village: inflation affected the3
entire village.
I do not have sufficient evidence to evaluate inflation in Karluk beyond some3
comparative prices from the local store, the price increase in oil, and the complaints of
residents. The reports of village residents about price increases are important and canI
be described. Village leaders realize that they must purchas.e oil for village needs,
including ho-usehold uses. They well recognize that prices have jumped and have3
remained high. They also report that cleanup activities increased costs of all kinds in the
village, while cleanup dollars earned by local residents generally were spent outside theI
village. Village leaders feel trapped by businesses they cannot control and powerless to
assist villagers. The villagers' euphoria generated by VE-CO employment and incomne




Karluk - Page 7663

gave way to the realities of price gouging. In the long run, the villagers were unable to
get ahead, despite boom wages.
The bureaucracy created by the spill severely strained the few resources of the
village. Village government staff worked many additional hours to deal with spill-related
charges, payments, and documentation. Subsequently, village government business did
not receive full attention or was left unattended. Demands on village personnel continue
today as leaders respond to researchers and requests by regional and State officials
regarding oil-spill litigation and impact studies.
There is no good time for a massive oil spill, but the Exxon Valdez spill occurred
at a difficult time for the residents of Karluk. There was confusion and ignorance over
the land conveyance owed to the village by Koniag, Inc. (Kodiak region Native for-profit
corporation), and fear and dismay about Karlukes economic future. The spill, it appears,
allowed some residents to leave; and the consequences from the spill pushed others to
leave--21 persons or 25 percent of the population left in a little over 2 years.
The degree to which the spill exacerbated existing factions is not known;
nevertheless, villagers reported that the spill drained emotions, energy, and resources
away from the mediation of their community's problems.
Karluk - Page 767






References Cited
Ackerman, R.
1985 Karluk River Stuidy. Prepared for Kodiak Area Native Association.

Barsh, R.L.
1985 Karluk River Study. Kodiak, Alaska. KANA, p. 32.I
Davis-Bacon Act
1964 40 U.S. Code ss. 276a-276a-5. (Public Law 88-349 (1964).
Davis, N. Y.3
1979 Western Gulf of Alaska Petroleum Development Scenarios: Kodiak Native
Sociocultural Impacts. Technical Report No. 41. USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS
Office, Social and Economic Studies Program.3

DOWL Engineers
1981 Karluk ComTmunity Profile. Prepared for Alaska Department of Community
and Regional Affairs.
Fall,J. A.3
1990 Subsistence After the Spill: Uses of Fish and Wildlife in Alaska Native
Villages and the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. Paper read at the 89th Meeting of the
American Anthropological Association. November. New Orleans.

Federal Field Committee for Development and Planning in Alaska
1968 Alaska Natives and The Land. Washington: U. S. Government Printing3
Office.

Gold, R.I
1978 Social Impacts of Strip Mining and other Industrializations of Coal Resources.
Institute for Social Science Research, University of Montana, Missoula.

lInpact Assessment, Inc.
1990 Economic, Social, and Psychological Impact Assessment of the Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill. Final Report. Prepared for Oiled Mayors Subcommittee, AlaskaI
Conference of Mayors. LaJolla: Impact Assessment, Inc.

Jorgensen, J. G.I
1981 Social Impact Assessments and Energy Developments. Policy Studies Review
Special Issue. Donald D. Stull, A-kira Yamamoto, and Felix Moos, eds.

1990 Oil Age Eskimos. Berkeley: University of California Press.



Karluk - Page 7683

Lantis, M.
1970 'The Aleut Social System.4 1750 to 1810, from Early Historical Sources." In
Margaret Lantis, ed. Ethinohistory in Southwestern Alaska and the Yukon. pp.
139-301. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.

Little, R. L.
1978 "Eniergy Boomtowns: Views from Within," In Joseph G. Jorgensen et al., Native
Americans and Energy Development. pp. 63-85. Cambridge: Anthropology
Resource Center.

Perrow, C.
1984 Normal Accidents. Living With High-Risk Technologies. New York: Basic
Books.

Reeves, S.
1992 "Transcending the Tides of Time." The Anchorage Times (February 16):
A1,A6.

Townsend, J. B.
1983 "Pre-contact Political Organization and Slavery in Aleut Societies." In Elizabeth
Tooker, ed. and Morton H. Fried, organizer, The Development of Political
Organization in Native North America. pp. 120-132. Washington, D.C.: American
Ethnological Society.

Woodbury, A.
1984 "Eskimo and Aleut Languages." In David Damas, ed., William Sturtevant, gen.
ed. Arctic, Volume 5, Handbook of North American Indians. Washington, D.C.:
Smithsonian Institution.
Karluk - Page 769

Old Harbor

Curtiss Takada Rooks
Contributions from Joanna Endter, Ph.D.
Old Harbor - Page 771

!
I
Special Note
I
The Social Indicator data on Old Harbor were gathered over a 4-year period. Joanna L.
Endter, Ph.D., was responsible for an earlier draft of the Kodiak Region Key Informant
(KI) Summary and is one of the co-authors of the Schedule C Kodiak KI Summary. I                  I
have utilized Dr. Endter's reports and writings in sections of this report. Special note is
given to her primary authorship of Section IMI.C (Old Harbor Village Corporation) and             I
to her contributions in Section IMA (City Government).
!
!
I
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Old Harbor - Page 772

OLD HARBOR
Table of Contents
I.   Historical Background ...............
The Setting .......................

II. The Village .......................
A. The People .... ...............
B.	Household Organization and Kinship
C.	Social Activities ................
D.	Associations and Organizations ....
E. The School ...................
F.   Social Services .................
. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
775
............... ............ 776
. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .
. .. . . . . .	777
. . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . .. .
. .. . . ....	778
.. . .. . . . . . . . . .. . .
.. . .. . . .. .	781
. . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . .
.. . .. . . .. .	781
. .. .. . .. . . . . . .. . . ..
. .. . . . ..	782
..................... ..... 782
. . . . .. . .. . . .. . . . .
.. . . . .. . . .
783
HI. Village Government ..............
A. City Government ............
B. Old Harbor Tribal Council ....
C. Old Harbor Village Corporation
.....	784
.....	784
.....	788
.....	789
IV. The
A.
B.
C.
D.
Economy ................................................
Basic Economy and Employment ..............................
Subsistence ......................  .......................
Tourism ................................................
Economic Future ..........................................
79
0
79
0
79
1
79
3
79
4
79
4
V. Ideology and Influences of Change ......
VI.  Effects of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill ...............
A Effects on Households and Individuals ..........
796
797
800
805

................




................




.................
B.   Effects on Subsistence and Commercial Fishermen.
C. Effects on Village Institutions ................
VII. Conclusion......................................

References Cited .....................................
807
809
Appendix A: Old Harbor Claim Summary ..................
.............   811
LIST OF TABLES

1.   Adjusted Market Basket Prices for Old Harbor with Two-Store Village Average for
Food Items .................................................. 792
Old Harbor - Page 773

Old Harbor - Page 774

OLD HARIBOR
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The written historical record begins with Grigori Shelikov's establishment of a
Russian American settlement in 1784 (Davis 1979; Cultural Dynamics Ltd 1986). This
settlement became known as Three Saints Bay and served as a staging area for the
Russian far trade. Subject to geological disturbances, the settlement was destroyed by a
tsunami in 1788, followed by two very damaging earthquakes in 1792. The settlement
then was relocated to what is now Kodiak City in 1793. Althouagh the record is not clear,
most certainly the relocation involved only non-Native people; the Natives remained in
Three Saints Bay to rebuild their lives. The next mention of a settlement in this area
occurs in 1893, when the census refers to the settlement by the name Staruigavan,
meaning "old harbor" in Russian.
Anthropologist Harumi Befu (1970), based on the 1890 U.S. census report, notes
that prior to the turn of the century Old Harbor was a small village. Befu further
outlines that between 1900 and about 1925, the village remained modest in size with its
growth cycle beginning during the mid-1920s. Old Harbor grew from a 1920 census
count of 84 to 337 in 1985--roughly 300 percent (Cultural Dynamics Ltd 1986:180). In
1926, Old Harbor's first school was established; and in 1931 a post office was built in the
village. On Good Friday in 1964, an earthquake followed by devastating tidal waves
(tsunami) wiped out the entire village except for two houses and the Russian Orthodox
church building. The survival of the churchi building proved an important sign to the
people of Old Harbor and in large part inspired the residents to rebuild on the village
site.' A small neighboring village, Kagayak, also was destroyed; and a handful of its
surviving villagers decided to relocate in Old Harbor. Other Kaguyak Natives relocated
to Akhiok (Davis 1970).



1See Nancy Yaw Davis, "The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Five Pacific Eskimo Villages as
Revealed by the Earthquake", in The Great Alaska Earthquake of 1964 (National Academy of Sciences:
Washington, D.C., 1970) for a detailed treatment of Old Harbor Native attitudes and decisions relating to
relocation and resettlement after the 1964 Earthquake.
Old Harbor - Page 775






LA.  The SettingI
Located on the southeast coast of Kodiak Island, Old Harbor sits on a flat between
Sitkalidak Strait and steep mountains. Across the strait eastward from the village isI
Sitkalidak Island, which protects the village from the open seas, while Sitkalidak Strait
provides ready access for the village fishing fleet. The cliffs above the village provide
homes for bald eagles, giving visitors breathtaking opportunities to observe these
powerful raptors that inhabit the area year-round. Ptarnmigan, ravens, sea gulls, and song
sparrows are among the birds that join the eagle in nonmigratory residence. Over 120
species of birds call Kodiak Island a temporary home in their migrations. Ducks, geese,
a-nd swans (among others) make seasonal stops in the area around Old Harbor.3
Brown bear, the largest of the land mammals in the Old Harbor area, are a
common sight around the village dump site and streams during summer. Deer, an3
introduced species, are the major subsistence land mammal, while rabbits also are
hunted. Some Old Harbor residents are able to hunt elsewhere in Alaska and bring3
back elk moose, and caribou to add to winter land mammal stores.
T'he sea, however, dominates Old Harbor both in subsistence and cash economy
participation. Salmon and halibut are maj'or sources of subsistence foods and
commercial catch. Herring, along with bottom fish such as cod, round out the3
conumercial stock. Crab (dungeness, tanner, and king), clams (butter, razor, and horse),
sea urchins, cockles, geoducks, scallops, mussels, bidarkis, octopus, and shrimp compriseI
the marine invertebrates that augment the fish proteins and add variety to the
subsistence diet. Due to overfishing in the region, marine invertebrates such as the kidng3
crab no longer comprise a major commercial harvest.
Sea mammals such as seats, sea lions, and sea otters can be found off the coast of3
Old Harbor; and residents continue to hunt seals and sea lions for food. Though not
hunted by the Old Harbor Natives, whales and porpoises also can be found inI
neighboring waters.





Old Harbor - Page 776

Onshore, the hins are a rich source of sailmonberries and cranberries in summer
and fall. Grasses cover the hills above the village, while willows and ferns can be found
along the creek and river drainages. Few trees spot the landscape.
The present-day village is dividedt into three residential areas--"downtown," "new
town," and "uptown." The traditional village site was downtown. New town and uptown
are newer areas spread among the rollig foothills to the northeast of downtown.
II. THE VILLAGE
Old Harbor represents one of the larger small villages in the AOSIS sample. The
1990 U.S. Census reports a population of 284. The 1991 winter census, conducted with
the assistance of a city office employee, numbered only 248. Variation in seasonal
residence could account for this discrepancy since a number of individuals spend winters
outside of the village. Also, a few households resided outside of the village while adult
members received advanced professional or academic training. In all, some 13
households were absent in the winter of 1991; and it was expected that these residents
would return in the spring or upon completion of training.
Old Harbor is affluent by Alaska Native village standards. Wealth accumulated
through participation in the fishing industry has enhanced the economic well-being of its
residents. However, fishing income and the market economy have not totally replaced
the Native traditions of Old Harbor. Sharing continues to be vigorously practiced, and
financially successful villa gers invest their earnings locally.
Divided into three distinct housing areas, the village is spread across a considerable
area reaching approximately 2 miles end to end. The downtown area--the original
village site--houses the airport, school, city offices, Sitkalidak Lodge, library, former clinic
(relocated in summer 1991), city pier, city harbor, post office, two stores, and the Russian
Orthodox church that presides over the area. New town includes the new clinic, day care
center, and tsunarmi shelter and is primarily residential. Uptown is entirely residential.
Old Harbor - Page 777






IL.A. The PeopleI
The population of Old Harbor is predominantly Natives who refer to themselves as
"Aleut.112 Historically, contact with outsiders resulted in a number of interracial unions
between Native women and non-Native men that produced offspring. Almost all mixed-
blood individuals consider thernselves Natives. In some cases, the non-Native ancestry is
known and preserved. For example, a few of the families with Scandinavian ties have
researched their European roots and possess genealogies and birth records tracing their
kinship connections throughout Alaska. However, this knowledge does not seem to be3
equated with ethnic or racial identity as much as it does with family history. In cases
where the "father" is unknown or has abandoned the family, identification with non-3
Native ancestry tends to be publicly eschewed. Some mixed-blood adults related
childhood incidents wherein they were teased because of their mixed-blood ancestry byI
other children who considered themselves to be of purely Native ancestry. If a child's
father was a resident in Old Harbor, the teasing was usually avoided.3
Today, interr-acial marriages continue to occur; but unlie the past, these unions
also involve Native men married to non-Native women. The childhood stigma of mixed-
blood ancestry experienced by adults does not seem to be an issue for current nmixed-
blood children. Perhaps this is because most of the non-Native parents of the mixed5
children are intimnately involved in village activities.
Generally, the non-Natives and their families who reside in Old Harbor are either
fishermen, school personnel, lodge employees, or church officials.
Since the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) and the3
introduction of limited-entry fishing permits, more families have blended their traditional
values with those of the market econoiny. One extended family that has accumulatedI



2Scholars have established that the indigenous peoples of Kodiak Island are in fact Pacific Eslimo of the
Koniag group with linguistic ties to the Yupik Eskimo language (Davis 1970; Dumond 1965). Today the Native
language of Kodiak is recognized as Alutiiq (formerly known as Pacific Yupik).
Because the people of Old Harbor refer to themselves as "Aleut," I also use this term (in quotes), though
most times I use the word Native. It is my feeling that self-determination by the Old Harbor Natives supersedes
other scholarly considerations for this report.I

Old Harbor - Page 7783

wealth reported investing heavily in the village and also is seeking long-term financial
opportunities. While these families have succeeded financially, there remains a strong
commitment to the village and its people. The families recognize an obligation to
support other community members. As a family member stated, "I'll give anyone from
the village a chance to earn a living on the [fishing] boat."
Additionally, this family network combines resources to capitalize younger family
members as they come of age and begin to fish independently. For example, virtually
every younger member of the family has started out fishing in the same 20-foot wooden
boat, where they gain experience as skippers and financial managers.
Housing patterns within Old Harbor reflect some general differences in
socioeconomic circumstances. The uptown section houses some of the more affluent
residents and homes are generally large. The residents of downtown tend to be elderly
and less financially successful. School personnel also tend to live downtown. The new-
town residents generally are younger families now coming of age. As development
continues, new town will most likely become the center of the village. The new health
clinic and day care center--scheduled to open in late spring 1991--are located here.
The possession of a limited-entry commercial fishing permit is a clear division
between socioeconomic groups. Those residents who do not hold permits generally serve
as crew members for villagers with permits. The ability to obtain a commercial fishing
permit is limited by the fixed number of permits issued, the cost of acquiring an existing
permit (about $140,000 in 1991), and the lack of available venture capital. Some
villagers view this as creating a socioeconomic structure that locks them in a position of
dependency on permit holders for their financial livelihood. This was a source of
frustration for some young men who do not have access to a permit.
While crew members can earn a reasonable living--many earn $20,000 to $30,000,
there are few avenues for upward mobility. The only real possibilities for financial
independence for these individuals lie in leaving the village or achieving success in
education and returning to the village as teachers.
Old Harbor - Page 779






Youth in the village see fishing as defining the economic future of Old Harbor.I
Although most young men see the 'big" money made by more successful fishermen as too
great an opportunity to pass up for altemnative career possibilities, a few were exploring
technical-trade education and college. One young man had recently received a Kodiak
Area Native Association (KANA) scholarship to attend the University of Oregon. He
planned to maj'or in 'secondary education. Young women find opportunities in villageI
and regional government and in'the school system. They appear to see a college
education or some altemnate post-high school training as essential for their future.3
However, not all youth in the village envision their futures with optimnism. During class
discussions with high-schoolers, I heard a number of students express a great deal of3
anger. When talking about their interests and futures, few if any saw themselves as
owners of boats or businesses. Some of these students looked forward to leaving Old
Harbor upon graduation, but they did not have clear goals or concrete plans for maldng
a living.3
As a whole, however, Old Harbor high-schoolers are very aware of village issues.
An analysis of essays written by the students on village leadership revealed that virtually3
all the students could identify the major issues facing village government. Like their
parents, the. youth were conceemed with improving the infrastructure of the village for3
future and long-term economic development. WVhile this awareness could be interpreted
as simply a parroting of their parents' concerns, it would be too simplistic to see these3
essays in that light. Many of these students have had the opportunity to travel outside of
their village and Alaska. They know of economic opportnities elsewhere. This3
knowledge, along with the economic activism of their parents, has informed them of the
economic requirements fo-r a viable village in the future.
Conversations with students convinced me that concerns over the long-term. welfare
of the village were real. While a number of students realized they would have to leaveI
the village for further education, the majority of those with whom I talked desired to
eventually live in Old Harbor.




Old Harbor - Page 7803

II.B. Household Organization and Kinship
The majority of the households in Old Harbor appear to be nuclear families. This
seems to be more a function of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) housing, which
has provided low-cost housing, than of traditional practices. In a number of households,
multiple generations reside; in others, siblings live together due to economic hardships
encountered by at least one sibling. Where economic conditions allow, single parents
maintain separate households. Despite the prevalence of single-family households,
kinship ties appear strong. Visiting and sharing link the households emotionally and
economically.
As is the case in virtually all Alaska Native villages, most families in Old Harbor
are related. Almost all of the Native and many of the year-round non-Native residents
are related either by marriage or by birth on at least second- or third-cousin levels.
Among the 22 winter 1991I respondents to the AOSIS questionnaires, only the 3 non-
Natives worldng at the school or church did njot have extended family living in the
village.
II.C. Social Activities
Subsistence activities also are social activities. Task' goups for berry picking, clam
digging, sea urchin harvesting, hunting, and fishing all allow for socializing. These task
groups vary in composition and can cut across kinship lines. Some are primnarily, though
not exclusively, single-gender, e.g., berry picking for females and fishing or hunting for
males. Both men and women participate equally in other activities. Individuals are free
to join a variety of different task groups from day to day. Occasionally, subsistence
activities are combined with family outings such as picnics.
T'he Russian Orthodox church is the religious and social center in Old Harbor.
The church brings together virtually all menibers of the village as they celebrate religious
holidays and traditions. For example, "starring"' (alin to the Protestant caroling) is a
major activity during the Russian Orthodox Christmas season. Another important church
event is church camp for the village youth--involving a pilgrimage to Three Saints Bay
Old Harbor - Page 781

(south of Old Harbor), a place that has both religious and historical significance to OldU
Harbor Natives because it was the location of the first Russian trading post.
Adults generally spend their leisure time with their immediate families. Villagers
spoke of regular family picnics and outings during the warmer months. Winter activities
are home-centered and involve watching TV or video movies. Interaction with others
involves primarily kinship ties. Visiting is the most frequent informal activity. DuringI
the daytime, the lodge restaurant serves as the central meeting place for most people
who meet friends for coffee or share a meal together. Evening activities include home3
visits and steam baths.
Young people enjoy playing sports. Every week night during the school year3
features various games at the school gym. Early in the evening, the younger children
play. ATound 8:00 p.m., the high-schoolers and younger adults take over and basketball3
becomes the game of choice--complete with up-to-date electric timekeeping and an
electronic scoreboard. Teams are co-ed, although males are the primary participants.I
II.D. Associations and Organizations
The Russian Orthodox church provides the primary nonkin-based organization in
Old Harbor. The church is very influential, and virtually all Natives are members. The
presence of a priest-in-residence and the local church building provide the village with3
activities, such as daily prayers, beyond the Sunday service. The Sisterhood, a women's
church auxiliary group, is active. Members participate in the selling of homemade craftsI
to raise monies for various church projects. Govemnance of the church and its activities
is shared between the priest and a local church board.3
II.E. The School
In February 1991, the Old Harbor, school bad 76 students in Grades K through 12.5
Villagers participate with the administration in governing and developing policies for the
school. The 1990-199 1 school year marked the first time in 3 years that the school board
had been able to meet regularly throughout the year. The five elected members of the
1990-199 1 school board consisted of three men and two women--either Alaska Native orï¿½
married to an Alaska Native. The school principal also sits on the board. Local


Old Harbor - Page 7823

participation is vital to the school and accounts for the school's receptiveness to local
cultural concerns.
Teachers at the Old Harbor school appear very concerned with the fuiture and
cultural identity of the children. Many focus lesson plans and general class discussions
on career opportunities. They do not hesitate to ask visitors in the village with a variety
of career backgrounds to speak with the junior- and high-school classes about their
occupations. Unfortunately, the spread-out geography of the village has limited active
interaction between teachers and parents. One villager noted that when everyone lived
downtown, teachers would frequently stop by to visit. Still, the teachers try to become
involved in the village; and many participate in traditional activities such as "steaming"
(steam baths) with locals. One teaching family has adopted an Old Harbor Native child,
who is now one of three children in the fam3ily.
II.F. Social Services
Social services in Old Harbor are provided by KANA. Medical and health care
heads the list of programs and services. Through KANA basic health care is provided by
a local health aide; and doctoTs, nurses, and dentists make regular visits to Old Harbor.
Physicians and nurses rotate through the village one to two times a month, while dentists'
visits are less frequent. The Old Harbor health clinic is equipped primarily for
outpatient treatment needs; and the new health clinic has the ability to function as an
infirmary, if needed. Serious cases are treated in the regional hospital at Kodiak City,
while the most serious are referred to Anchorage's Alaska Native Hospital. Because of
the physical size of Old Harbor, the health clinic offers a shuttle service for those
without transportation.
Meals for the elderly is another social programn that is sponsored by KANA.
According to the program director, winter 1991 saw regular attendance by 15 elderly,
while 27 elders (13 males and 14 females) were registered with the program. The
program serves dinner, Monday through Friday, at the Senior Citizen Center located
above the city offices. Shuttle service transportation is offered. No meals were being
horne-delivered during my visit.
Old Harbor - Page 783






A pre-school program also is available in Old Harbor. This progranm, also fundedI
by KANA, generally runs from around 9:00 a.m. to mid-afternoon. Winter 1991
enrollment numbered 12 girls and 8 boys. The availability of this program is vital for
parents, especially mothers; it allows mothers the freedom to work in wage jobs or in
family enterprises. Perhaps the greatest benefit of the program is socialization of the
children. Pre-1964 earthquake housing pattemns in the downtown area allowed children
to interact easily with all the other children in the village. Since the rebuilding of Old
Harbor, residents of the village have increasingly been spread across the housing areas,S
maldng it more difficult for pre-school-aged children to play casually with one another.
Today, the pre-school brings all of the village's pre-school-aged children together andI
serves to break down separation caused by the distance between the housing areas.
Other KANA-sponsored programs include income-tax-filing assistance, collegeI
counseling and scholarships, Indian Child Welfare programs, alcohol abuse counseling,
and fanmily violence shelter and counseling programs. All of these programs are based in3
Kodiak City but provide both regular and need-based visits to Old Harbor. Lastly, with
KANA's assistance, Santa Claus finds his way to Old Harbor.I
111. VILLAGE GOVERNMENT
Governance and village planning are provided by three organizations in Old3
Harbor. Foremost is the city government, followed by the Old Harbor Village Council
(the Bureau of, Indian Affairs-recognized Native governmaent), and the for-profit Old3
Harbor Native Village Corporation that is involved in village economic development
issues.3
III.A. City Government
Old Harbor is a second-class city with a strong mayoral form of government. The
city government is totally run by local residents; during winter 1991, all personnel were
Native. Village government in Old Harbor has been extremely stable. The mayor,
during the winter of 1991, had been in office for over 20 years. This stability may
account for the village's ability to cope with many changes over the years. Moreover, the




Old Harbor - Page 7841

mayor's experience with both public and private institutions assisted the village in maldng
its needs and concerns heard in larger political arenas at both regional and State levels.
Infrastructure improvements and long-term economic development were the
greatest concerns to the Old Harbor city government in winter 1991. Deteriorating
infrastructure is a mnajor concern for almost all rural Alaska communities, and Old
Harbor is no exception. Declines in State and Federal revenues to Old Harbor help to
explain the deterioration of infrastructuire and adniinistrative services. For example,
State municipal assistance, the largest source of revenue for Old Harbor, has declined.
From FY 1987 to FY 1988, this decrease was partially offset by maintaining the same
level of State revenue sharing, increases in the raw fish tax (the 1988 fishing season was
particularly lucrative), and the receipt of several grants. Old Harbor anticipated a
decrease in total revenues (from $239,159 to $195,357) and expenditures (from $257,550
to $204,766) from FY 1988 to FY 1989. The nonexistent fishing season in 1989 due to
the Exxon Valdez oil spill resulted in no raw-fish-tax revenues.
Since at least winter 1989, the city has tried to raise additional revenues locally by
collecting boat harbor and moorage fees and delinquent sales taxes (the city has a sales
tax of 3%91). The city also considered charging local consumers for water, sewer, and
garbage, which in the past have been charged to floating processors and boats that
stopped in Old Harbor but not to local residents (Alaska Department of Community and
Regional Affairs [DCRA] 1988:A13-A16; 1989). The collection of fees and taxes in a
rural village where residents are friends and relatives is a much more difficult task than
may be imagined. During the February 1991 city council meeting village trustees
continued to grapple with this issue, now at least 2 years old. In particular, they
addressed the collection of harbor fees. Part of the fee-collection difficulty lies in the
city officials' knowledge of individual village residents' financial situations. Often they
know who is in financial trouble and, as a result, do not insist on payment. In fairness to
others not in financial trouble, the officials do not press anyone else to pay. In this way,
no one is shamed because he or she cannot pay.
Old Harbor - Page 785





In Old Harbor, the collection of fees and taxes appears to be antithetical to NativeI
cultural norms. Sharing, not extraction by means of taxation, dominates relations among
village members. In a way, the absorption of costs by the village for community projects,
like the harbor, can be interpreted as a form of contemporary sharing. In the past, if a
family or person in the'village did not have resources (e.g., food), others in the village
would share part of their provisions with the needy. Today, cash as well as food is the
greatest need of indigent and some elderly villagers. The "letting slide" of tax bills, which
seems to be a political norm in village Alaska, can perhaps be viewed as a proxy fora
sharing in that the needy have their obligations met by the collective body by means of
the village government's absorption of costs or revenue losses. When viewed from this              f
perspective, it is hardly surprising that the Old Harbor city government continues to
debate the issues of fee and tax collectio'n. However, dwindling State finances and theI
continued bleak outlook for world oil prices (Alaska's prime source of revenue) mean
less fiscal assistance for villages from State sources and create the need to raise revenues3
from withina local communities.
Turning again to the specific infrastructure problems of Old Harbor, social5
indicators research conducted in 1989 notes that the sewage treatment system was not
operating and sewage was being dumped into Sitkalidak Strait after minimal treatment3
(Endter 1989, fieldnotes). I was unable to ascertain if this problem had been remed ied
in 1991. Further,, village officials contend that the small, 24-vessel harbor built by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the State of Alaska needs to be enlarged and
redredged. Also, the large cargo dock near the village's fuel reserve tanks is3
deteriorating and may become unusable for larger vessels, such as fish processing boats.
State and Kodiak Borough officials were present in Old Harbor during my winter3
1991 visit to assist village leaders in laying the ground work for moving forward on
infrastructure improvements and the village's long-range economic development plan.                f
This plan includes the building of a new airport, a land swap with the Russian Orthodox
church for beach-front and docking properties, and relocation of the city dump. DCRA
personnel advised the City Council on requirements the city would have to comply with


Old Harbor - Page 786

if it desired to move forward on these programs. State officials were keen on helping
the City Council identify extramural capital project funding sources.3
Village leaders also were concerned about securing a less expensive energy source.
Village electricity presently is provided by fuel-oil-powered generators. This makes
electricity very expensive, not only for residents but also for potential business ventures.
However, these energy concerns were centered not only on economic development. The
mayor expressed fears about upcoming State funding cutbacks to an energy assistance
program for individual residents--a program that has subsidized Old Harbor's energy
costs. Should this program be cut significantly, many of the eld.erly and less affluent in
Old Harbor would suffer greatly. Leaders spoke about a variety of altemnatives ra-nging
from sponsoring a capital project, to running electric lines across the island from the
Terror Lake power grid near Kodiak City, to developing a hydroelectric facility in the
mountains above Old Harbor.
During winter 1991, the city government was in the final phase of constructing a
new health clinic and day care center (now complete) in the new-town section of the
village. Also, a tsunami shelter located next to the new clinic was being finished.





















3The relationship between the City Council and the DCRA seemed quite solid and trusting. This is
particularly noteworthy because the DCRA most often is a major means of access to politica power. within the
State Government's administration for rural villages in Alaska.
Old Harbor - Page 787






LII.B. Old Harbor Tribal Council4
The Village Council conceems itself with the general welfare and administration of
social programs for the residents. Winter 1991 activities were dominated by a re-
organization effort. Following the oil spill, the previous council president resigned. At
that time (1989), the tribe had a number of program grants that were left unattended.
As a result, these grants were not closed out. The new leadership, with the assistance of
DCRA officials, was able to close out grants and begin the application process for new
grants.5
One pa-rticular interest of the Village Council was the involvement of village yo-uth
in tribal affairs and Native culture programs. During winter 1991, the Village Council, inI
concert with the City Council and the for-profit corporation, agreed to sponsor two high
schoolers to attend a Native youth leadership training workshop in Juneau during the
upcoming spring. Also, the Village Council president was exploring funding for youth to
participate in regional and village Tribal Youth Council projects.3
Village Council concerns also were focused on the emotional needs of the village.
During my visit, the leadership discussed the possibility of securing a fLill-time, onsite5
counseling psychologist for the village. Leaders felt that Old Harbor was large enough
and that issues were widespread enough to warrant such coverage. Of primary conceem
were alcohol abuse and family counseling, but there were no discussions of specific cases
during the council sessions. instead, leaders talked about preventive measures and
alluded to problems experienced by other Native villages in the region and throughout
Alaska. Leaders feel that the acquisition of a psychologist would alleviate many of theI



4The 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) and its 1938 revision sought to establish "democratic ! ' I
governments for all Indian tribes, to establish a direct link between the Federal Government and also to
empower the Indian people. When ANCSA was enacted, Alaska Native villages were given the right to choose
between incorporating as Alaskan cities or as Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA,) IRA governments. Those villages   I
that incorporated as Alaskan cities did not, however, lose IRA "tribal councils," which protect the rights of tribal
members as Native Americans and ensure their access to BIA and other Federal grant and assistance programs.
Old Harbor opted for city status, and the Old Harbor Village Council serves as the IRA-established
governing body or "tribal council." Thus, the residents of Old Harbor use the term "village council"'synonymously
-with "tribal council" and the term "village council president" synonymously with 'tribal chief."


Old Harbor - Page 7881

problems cornmonly faced in Alaskan Native villages and give residents a place to turn
to. Leaders were just beginning the process of researching grant possibilities to acquire
such services.
III.C. Old Harbor Village Corporation
The Old Harbor Village Corporation is the for-profit corporation organized under
ANCSA. The corporation originally had 330 people enrolled. In 1975, the corporation
joined with two other village corporations to form Kodiak Island Seafoods, which
purchased the Alaska Packers Association facility in Larsen Bay. Kodiak Island
Seafoods was unable to make the cannery profitable. Koniag, Inc., purchased some of
the stock in 1978 and took over the facility in 1980 when it merged with the three village
corporations. 'Me facility was sold in 1982 to a group of local fishermen with backing
from a large Seattle company (Roppel 1986:225). Old Harbor Corporation also is
involved with Koniag, Inc., and other Kodiak village corporations in the Afognak Joint
Venture. Old Harbor Village Corporation was involved in the 1980 merger and
subsequent 1984 de-merger of Koniag, Inc., and several village corporations, after which
the Old Harbor Village Corporation was reorganized.
Presently, Old Harbor Village Corporation is negotiating a land exchange with the
Federal Government for oil and gas rights in ANWR. It is seeking to exchange 90,000
acres, or 78 percent of the original entitlement of 115,200 acres that it received under
ANCSA, for mineral rights in ANWR. The corporation's main source of income at the
present time is the lease option payments it receives from an oil company for the rights
the corporation hopes to obtain in ANWR if the land exchange goes through.
Old Harbor Village Corporation had looked into investing in fisheries projects in
Old Harbor. One shareholder explained that they wanted their own fish processing
outfit in order to provide local employment, benefit the village, help each other get
better boats and newer equipment, and gain some bargaining power. In this way Old
Harbor Natives could fish for their own corporation instead of for the non-Native
processors. But they could not do this without capital investment from outside the
village, and they continue to come up against the established seafood companies that
Old Harbor - Page 789

have power and influence with the banks. Discussions with local residents revealed the
opinion that local and regional banks are reluctant to provide loans to small businesses
that would compete with their established clients. Instead of attempting to profit from
the fish processing enterprises that have been the basis of Kodiak City's wealth, Old3
Harbor Village Corporation's only altemnative was to explore possibilities for production
of a gourmet seafood item for a small, specialized market. They have not yet chosen to
do this but continue to weigh the pros and cons of such an investment. Additionally, city
and village corporation officials report that they have sought negotiations for obtaining
venture capital from both national and international investors.
IV. THE ECONOMY3
IV.A. Basic Economy and Employment
Salmon fishing provides the mainstay of the Old Harbor economy, though a few3
boats now fish year-round, participating in crab and winter bottom fishing along with
spring herring fishing. Commercial fishin 'is the major source of income for individual3
villagers. This, in turn, provides revenues for local government because residents have
more disposable income to spend in local stores to generate greater sales tax.revenues,
even if inconsistently collected. Commercial fishing also provides direct revenues to the
city. When a floating processor ties up at the village dock, the city shares its raw-fish-tax
revenue with the State. In addition, laborers from the floating processor insert cash into
the local economy by shopping in village stores and eating at the village restaurant. '
Because of the prowess of its fishing fleet (based on net earnings, perhaps the most
successful rural fleet on Kodiak Island for the past two decades), Old Harbor has aI
reasonably strong economy (Cultural Dynamics Ltd 1986:127-128). Many successful Old
Harbor Native fishermen have rei-nvested heavily in the village rather than outside of the f
community. This has created jobs and the basis for fuirther economic development.
Presently, all (2) stores and services are owned and operated by village residents; 3
and all but one are Native-owned or co-owned. Old Harbor supports a cable company, a
fuel oil company and distributor, a lodge and restaurant, and two stores. A pool hall and




Old Harbor - Page 7901

video game parlor for the youth also is operated. All of these enterprises employ a total
of 10 to 15 villagers in full- and part-time positions.
The public sector provides the other source of emploIyment--roughly 20 positions.
Jobs at the school, city office, senior citizen center, post office, health clinic, and day
care center are almost all occupied by Native or non-Native affines.
The two local stores and larger bulk orders from Kodiak and Anchorage augment
the subsistence-dominated diets of Old Harbor with a variety of complementary
consumer goods. The competition between the stores, along with villager access to bulk
markets (e.g., COSTCO in Anchorage) via air freight, have kept prices reasonable. The
social indicators market basket average food cost for the two Old Harbor stores totaled
$67.25 (see Table 1).
IV.B. Subsistence
Although Old Harbor is fairly affluent for a rural Alaska village, subsistence
continues to play a. major role in the lives of its residents. In winter 1991, residents who
relied heavily on seafoods such as salmon, halibut, clams, crab, and sea urchin also
consumed waterfowl and deer. Harbor seal and sea lion are favorites in Old Harbor;
however, villagers told me that the 1990-199 1 harvest and availability appeared to be
down. Berries of all varieties, including salmonberries, blackberries, and cranberries,
comprised the largest source of nonprotein subsistence foods, although leafy vegetables
like wild parsley also were harvested.
During winter 1991, 21 households in Old Harbor were admniHstered AOSIS survey
questionnaires. Of those 21 households, 9 were selected for a second, in-depth key
informant (KI) interview. All of the 9 KI households reported that greater than 25
percent of their yearly protein intake came from subsistence foods; 2 of the 9 KI
households reported 25 to 49 percent, 3 reported 50 to 75 percent, and the remnaining 4
reported that greater than 75 percent of their annual dietary protein intake was from
subsistence foods. One respondent in the 25- to 49-percent category indicated that
recent illness restricted his households subsistence activities, and their usualI level of
protein intake from wild foods was around 80 percent.
Old Harbor - Page 791

Table 1
ADJUSTED MARKET BASKET PRICES FOR OLD HARBOR WITH TWO-STORE
VILLAGE AVERAGE FOR FOOD ITEMS

Two-Store
Commodity                    Harold's Store       Walt's Store	Average


10 lb White Flour	$7.20	$6.75	$6.98
12 oz Evap. Milk	1.10	1.25	1.18
1 lb Onions	0.95	0.75	0.85
48 oz Cooking Oil	6.35	4.25	5.30
6-Pack Cola	5.00	5.00	5.00
10 lb Sugar	6.45	8.25	7.35
18 oz Corn Flakes	4.45	5.45	4.95
18 oz White Bread	2.40	2.25	2.33
1 lb Bacon	3.70	4.25	3.98
3 lb Coffee	12.00	10.75	11.38
1 lb Butter	3.25	3.25	3.25
12 qt Milk Powder	11.35	8.25	9.80
22 oz Punch Mix	4.55	5.25	4.90

Total	$68.75	$65.70	$67.25
Source: Rooks 1991.


The evidence for heavy reliance on subsistence foods provided by the KI interviews
appears to be supported by the more general survey questionnaire data. Of the total 21
households interviewed (KIs included), 13 reported eating at least one meal in which
subsistence foods were a prominent portion of consumption 2 days prior to the survey.
Of the 8 households that did not eat subsistence foods, 2 were living in or visiting Kodiak
City at the time of the survey and emphasized that had they been in Old Harbor,
subsistence foods would have been part of their daily diet. These findings, consistent
with data from previous Old Harbor social indicators interviews, indicate that reliance on
Old Harbor - Page 792

and usage of subsistence foods is an ongoing, important aspect of Native life in this
village.
This reliance on subsistence underscores the important point that increased wealth
or income does not necessarily lead to a decrease in culturally held practices, such as the
eating of subsistence foods. It is very possible that the opposite might be the norm:
where Natives have the financial resources (i.e., they own skiffs, boats, and other fishing
equipment) to actively participate in subsistence harvests, they rely on subsistence foods
as the core of their own diets and sha-re them widely throughout the community. Where
financial resources are scarce and there is a greater dependency on government transfers,
proteins purchased at the grocery store appear to have become more important, although
the Natives prefer subsistence foods. Tlis is not to say that poorer Natives in the
villages do not depend heavily on subsistence foods. They do, but the changing
economic system and restrictions on transfer-payment expenditures (i.e., food stamps)
have impacted the poorest Natives more adversely with regard to subsistence practices.
IV.C. Tourism
Tourism is the newest industry in Old Harbor. Two local investors and their
affinal kin, using proceeds from their fishing operations, have invested well over $100,000
(cash) in the renovation and development of the Sitkalidak Lodge. The lodge offers
private and bunkhouse rooms, with food service provided by the lodge's restaurant, which
also is open to the public. Investors are negotiating fishing and hunting vacation-package
deals with regional hotels and airline servces. The lodge is primarily a family-ran
operation with a few nonfamily members hired as cooks and waitresses.
In concert with the lodge improvements, a few residents have certified themselves
as charter skippers. L,ady Luck~ charters, owned and operated by a Native resident, is
based in Old Harbor. Other residents serve as guiides for local fishing and hunting.
Tourism also may revive traditional arts and crafts skills, and shop openings are
possible. Classes in grass-basketmaldng and various forms of carving are attended with
enthusiasm. One Old Harbor artist is noted throughout Kodiak Island for her jewelry
and photography.
Old Harbor - Page 793

IV.D. Economic Future
T'he future of Old Harbor's economy lies in its ability to develop its private sector,
but first infrastructure concerns must be addressed. During winter 1991, the city was
negotiating a land swap with the Russian Orthodox church that would give the city a
valuable strip of shoreline. This access would allow the development of improved
docling facilities, opening the way for a variety of potential maritime industry interests.
The city also is seeling approval and funding for a -new airport with large-airplane
capabilities.5 Should these improvements be made, village leaders are hopeful of
coaxing a land-based fish processing plant to locate here. Other options, such as
shipping-container storage and glacier bottled-water production, also were beingI
discussed. The short-term outlook for Old Harbor's economy is positive, in part because
local Native residents have invested heavily in village enterprises.3
V. IDEOLOGY AND INFLUENCES OF CHANGE
Many things have contributed to change in Old Harbor:  the division of housing5
areas into three locations, technology, commercial fishing, and intermarriage with non-
Natives to name a few. Yet it seems that Old Harbor has accommodated the changesj
while maintaining a sense of itself as a Native village.
Tle housing division seems to have created some difficulty. Some residents report
that the distances between them impede a number of traditional activities, particularly
visiting. They say that a person needs transportation to visit friends or relatives across3
town. Rather than spontaneous drop-ins, one must call ahead to announce the visit so as
not to waste the trip. -Telephoning has made the process a bit more formal. Distance3
has made the visiting less available, especially for the elderly and children. As noted
earlier in this report, teachers now also find it mnore difficult to "stop by" for informalI
chats with parents.
The new housing areas, coupled with technology, have contributed to the loss of                i
some past village activities. Long-term Native residents told about the time when
5~~~~~~~~~~~~
Since my winter 1991 visit to Old Harbor, approval for the new airport has been obtained and construction
of the facility was scheduled to begin in November 1992.5

Old Harbor - Page 794

everyone assisted in the delivery of fael oil to each home. All of the males age 5 and
above would gather on the beach and roll the 55-gallon drums of fuel oil to each home.
Though a difficult and somewhat arduous task, it was a time when everyone in the
village joined together. Today, oil is distributed by a delivery service. The geographic
locations of homes, particularly in the hills, and the addition of new technology (i.e., fuel
trucks, lifts, and storage tanks) have made the delivery service both necessary and
possible. Some residents described feeling a sense of loss, however, regarding such now-
obsolete communal village tasks and the interdependence they required.
Television is another technological advance that has had mixed reviews. Parents
and teachers complain about the amount of time children spend in front of the TV.
Elders say that TV watching has impinged on visiting practices. Most adults also worry
about the children's sense of identity as television brings a Hollywood view of life, as
evidenced by the fads and fashions of village youth. Tle children see very little in
mainstream TV programming that validates the Native way of life--and some youth seem
to have developed unrealistic expectations about life and opportunities elsewhere. Even
some adults succumb to television's alluring fantasy. But television assists the villagers in
staying current with the world outside of Old Harbor and Alaska. Children learn of
different places and parents stay abreast of world news and changing economic trends.
Technology, bowever, has improved the everyday life of the villagers. Improved
boats and fishing equipment provide larger and more profitable fishing seasons for the
village fleet. Power skiffs provide transportation for winter halibut fishing and deer
hunting. Navigational equipment and radios have made fishing somewhat safer.
Telephones allow for convenient and foul-weather visiting. Additionally, family members
and friends can maintain contact after they have left the village. Airplanes link Old
Harbor with the outside world by bringing daily mail (weather permitting) and air-freight
deliveries; by providing transportation for medical personnel, evacuation, and other
social services; and by opening the village to outside visitors and tourists. Lastly,
automobiles, trucks, and snow machines give Old Harbor residents greater mobility.
Old Harbor - Page 795

Harvesting of wild foods and commercial fishing are the economic mainstays of the
village, and participants provide important role models of skil and responsibility for the
youth of Old Harbor. Sharing, both in terms of providing jobs as crew members of boats
and in distributing subsistence foods to anyone who needs them, is widely practiced. The
financial success of some of the fishermen has not caused them to abandon the village or
their cultural values as they give back to the village in terms of financial investment and
jobs. Other villagers bave learned traditional Native crafts and are passing on these
skills, sometimes in formal classes. Villagers who have gained academic educations often             f
return to the village as teachers, lay church readers, and the like, thus providing a variety
of role models for career choices. Importantly, adults in the village, regardless of theirR
area of expertise, express through their actions and words a strong commitment to the
village and their traditional values. In this way, the youth can see that Westemnf
influences need not be antithetical to the survival of Old Harbor or their ethnic heritage.
Non-Native residents of Old Harbor also have influenced this village but perhaps
not as much as.the village has influenced them. Natives in Old Harbor have welcomed
these newcomers as neighbors, friends, and family. Non-Natives work actively in theI
development of the village and serve diligently in a variety of public offices. Yet these
non-Natives do not try to make Old Harbor into a non-Native town. They respect and5
participate in the values and attitudes of the village. Many of the non-Natives bring with
them particular skills and knowledge. They employ their knoWledge not solely for
personal gain but share their talents with the village. Many also have invested their
money in the village, declaring Old Harbor home.3
VI. EFFECTS OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL
The effects of the March 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill on the village of Old Harborï¿½
are evident on multiple levels. For the purposes of this study, the effects are categorized
into first-, second-, and third-level effects that are not mutually exclusive but rather







Old Harbor - Page 796

overlap to some degree.6 First-level effects are generally those that occurred during the
spill crisis and cleanup or immediately following the cleanup. There was a time lag
between when the spill crisis and the cleanup period occurred and when second-level
effects became apparent. Third-level effects are generally those that resulted as
consequences of first-level effects, This terminology wa.s chosen in order to emphasize
that each level of effect was a. direct consequence of the spill--whether immrediate, time-
lagged, or in response to earlier effects. Still other effects (e.g., sorrow) are
immeasurable.
VI.A. Effects on Households and Individuals
Tle spill caused a great deal of chaos in Old Harbor. Fears that village beaches
would be oiled consumed residents. Tribal and Village Council presidents from Kodiak
Island had brought back reports of the devastation in Prince William Sound. As the Old
Harbor Village Council president Tecounted:
At first we didn't realize or think the spill would impact Kodiak,
and in Old Harbor people were in denial about the possibility.
Anyway, KANA organized a trip for the Tribal Council presidents
to fly to Valdez. We flew out of Seward, all th e [tribal] presidents.
While traveling to the spill, there was lots of nervous joking--then
we saw the oil and then everybody was suddenly quiet. Now the
spill was real. From then on the joldng became quite resentful
toward Exxon. It seerned that everyone was scared or something.
It was awful. Valdez was chaotic. When we returned home, things
got serious and real!

Not long after this trip, the Old Harbor Village Council president sighted oil north
of Old Harbor while flying home from Kodiak. "It was like long, awful, snaking fingers,"
he reported. Crews were immnediately signed UP to battle what now seemed inevitable:
oiled beaches in Old Harbor. In this atmosphere charged with fear and panic, all normal
routines seemed trivial. Additionally, comnmercial fishermen were faced with the loss of


6 1 have refrained from using the terms "direct" and "indirect oil-spill effects' to avoid the idea that direct
effects somehow are more pertinent or real to the villagers. Similarly, I have not used the terms "primary,'
'*secondary," "tertiary" and the like because of the connotation that any effect other than primary ones are
somehow less important or devastating.
Old Harbor - Page 797





their livelihood. Many jumped at the opportunity to earn income that was bound to beI
lost because of fish closings. Faced with impending financial doom, all -normal seasonal
thoughts and tasks were subsumed with the scramble to provide for families as well as -
meet financial obligations incurred during the winter months.
No one with whom we spoke in Old Harbor felt that the oil spill has had long-term
positive effects on the community. Village leaders indicated changes in subsistence
activities and cases of depression among residents that occurred as a result of the spill.
All the Natives in our sample suffered both, financially and emotionally deleterious
effects from the spill. The two non-Natives reporting no financial losses resulting from
the spill were not residents of the village or spill-affected areas in 1989.3
First-level effects on individuals are divided into two categories--financial and
emotional or spiritual. Roughly half (9) of the respondents felt that they had incurred a
financial loss as a result of the spill. Those who felt they had not incurred a loss
generally were not engaged in the fishing industry or were not present in the region atI
the time of the spill. Old Harbor's economy is almost solely dependent on commercial
fishing (salmon, herring, halibut, crab, and cod). Only participation in the Bristol Bay
herring openings prior to the.Exxon Valdez spill kept the 1989 fishing season from being
a complete loss for the several highly capitalized fishermen who routinely participated in
the herring opening. Other Old Harbor fishermen who did not have the equipment to
facilitate a journey to Bristol Bay could only seek work on the cleanup and accept3
whatever compensation was offered by Exxon and VECO. Most of these "smaller"
operators accepted a $30,000 compensation offer from Exxon with the perception thatJ
this was to be an initial payment, with additional payments to be made during the claims
process. For some, -no additional payments were forthcoming. Only 2 respondentsS
reported feeling adeq-uately compensated by Exxon, and 6 reported not receiving any
compensation at all. These 6 respondents were generally crew members rather thanV
permit holders.
Emotional and spiritual first-level effects prevailed throughout the village. In3

talking with respondents and village leaders, this became quite evident. As one leader A
Old Harbor - Page 798

stated, ". .. something [subsistence foods] you've had for all your life ... taken for
grated ... suddenly (was] taken away [by the spill] . . .." The presence of oiled wildlife
and fish caused great concemn among Old Harbor residents. Local leaders told us that
many people did not harvest subsistence foods from the sea in 1989 because of the fear
of using "oiled' foods. The older people were particularly frightened. Villagers reported
that since the oil spill, the fish were acting strange, e.g., humpies were jumping out at
locations where they had never jumped previously. Also, many complained that while
fish (particularly salmon) flesh was red and healthy looldng, the sldn on the fish looked
old and dry. The sea urchin harvest also was reported as being lower. Strange fish
behavior, bad fish sldn appearance, and low sea urchin numbers all reinforced the
contamination fears of the residents. Some older residents were reported to have said,
"We'll never have fresh fish." The experience was so difficult for many residents that, as
one leader noted, they "want to pretend it didn't happen." They seem to feel it is better
to put the spill out of their minds than to think about its consequences.
Second-level, long-term effects can be seen in..the attitudes of some young
children.7 Traditional foods, already challenged by television advertising and Western
influences among the village youth, were further challenged by the oil spill. In winter
1991, adults reported that the younger children, especially those of elementary- and pre-
school-age, declared traditional food "yuklde." Adults attributed this response to a lack
of consumption of subsistence seafoods during the summer of the spill and a reflection of
adult fears of contamination. In a rapidly changing world in Native villages throughout
Alaska, subsistence-harvest activities and traditional foods are one of the important links
of shared experiences between generations.
The spill and the tension in the village during clea-nup operations impacted family
relations in Old Harbor. Without fishery openings, cleanup employment became the
only source of income for almost all village residents. Cleanup employment was not


7This section is based on conve rsations with a small number of parents becuse a survey of all households
with children was not possible. These generalizations are based on the observations, perceptions, and fears
reported by these parents in 1991.
Old Harbor - Page 799





Firegular1' in the sense that residents could apply for a year-round, 8-to-5 job. Crews wereI
often called up on a moment's notice. Residents who were unavailable when the call
came out were passed over for the next available person. Thus, the sumimer was markedI
by waiting and hoping. As one resident explained, "You waited and waited and waited
because you didn't want or couldn't afford to miss out on anytbing."
The waiting made for tense and anxious moments in households. Village leaders
repo-rted that relations between husbands and wives became strained as depression and
anxiety increased. The waiting suspended normal activities, e.g., projects around the
house were left undone. Also, when work was available, it was a totally different type of
work that created stress even though the individuals were employed; people became1
short-tempered. Some community members said that this anxiety also affected children
when parents had less patience and the normal summer activities were abandoned.
"Summers in Old Harbor," explained the Mayor, "are busy, but all the timne you see
families going off to have picnics. Enjoying nature. That didn't happen during the spill.ï¿½
People were too afraid of missing a chance to work." The mayor explained further that
he felt there was little quality time shared between parents and children during the spill
summer. Normally, fishing is the major source of employment--fathers went off to fish,
and mothers stayed homae with the children. Older children, once they are large enough,
would sometimes accompany the father or other kin, usually an uncle. Smaller children
and mothers would gather berries, put up fish, and perform other tasks. During summer
1989, both fathers and mothers went to work on the spill; and children were left at child
care. Important interaction between children and parents was lost. Moreover, timeI
spent together was tense.
VI.B. Effects on Subsistence and Commercial Fishermen f
For some individuals, however, the spill was an economic boom, with wages as
high as $18.00 per hour. The wages paid by VECO allowed a number of individuals whoR
previously did not have employment opportunities or did not fish to earn some money.
Tlese new wage-earners tended to view the spill as an opportunity, while fishermen felt
quite displaced. Local leaders informed us that the fishermen became upset at the


Old Harbor - Page 800

nonfishermen. Fishermen perceived nonfishermen as not understading "the situation"'
and asserted that the nonfishermen were not empathetic to fishing losses and the threats
to fishing interests. While the open statements of animosity abated, one respondent
described the ill will created by the friction caused by the spill as "bibernating."
Although we were unable to verify this, locally owned stores most ce.rtainly received
increased earnings during the spill, as did those enterprises involved with housing and
feeding Exxon and VECO personnel.
Second-level effects on individuals ranged from the loss of boats to income-tax-
payment difficulties. The most devastating second-level effect was the loss of fishing
boats. Many of the older fishermen with small wooden boats were not able to fish or
hire their boats out to VECO during the spill. A,s a result, these individuals took jobs on
the cleanup and accepted the $30,000 initial payment from Exxon.! Financially, the
wages eamned and the initial compensation payment assisted these fishermen. However,
an unforeseen consequence resulted. Because these fishermen did not "need" their boats
during spring and summer 1989, they did not do the routine maintenance that normally
accompanies preparation for fishing season. Boat engines were not overhauled or
started, and corking of boat hull seams and caulking of other leaks were not done.
Without this maintenance, a number of these older wooden boats sank during winter
1990 storms.
Some people might say that the owners of these older boats should have known
better, that they should have performed these preventive maintenance measures
regaTdless of circumstances. Such thinking is uninformed. Many of the losses were
incurred by older men in Old Harbor--Native men who have seasonally responded to
these tasks all their lives. Spring brings on the tasks of spring, such as maintai-ning boats
in anticipation of the summer fishing season. Tfhe Exxon Valde.z spring of 1989 was



In order to expedite compensation for fishing losses, Exxon mnade "initial" payments or advances of $30,000
to permit holders who proved they had fished during the previous 3 years. These payments were made without
full documentation of 'actual Imses.' Application for, and full payment of, compensation were to be made at
a later date after the crisis period.
Old Harbor - Page 801





unlike any spring in their existence. There would be no fishing season; thus, there wasI
no need to work on the boat a-nd they needed to work on cleanup to earn money.
Also, these men had never failed to maintain their boats in the spring. Thus, theyI
had no way of "knowing" what would happen to their boats in a winter following a spring
where they had not maintained their boats. No one, not even the "experts" sent in toI
assist with spill impacts, anticipated the boat sinkings.
The victims of such losses are not "big-time" commercial fishermen; they are Native
men who earn enough to provide for their families and stay off welfare. They fish to
survive in a world where cash income is a necessity. With the loss of their boats, these
men lost their means of support. Additionally, their crew members lost their source of3
employment. Because they are not "big producers," these fishermen cannot get loans for
new boats from the canneries or fish processing outfits; neither do they have cash savings3
for such a purchase. Virtually no fishermen in Kodiak can secure a bank loan for a
boat. Today, these older Native men must attempt to hire on as crew members for3
established boats that usually already have established crews. A few are trying to come
back by leasing boats and "lending" their perinits to nonpermit-holding boat owners.
However, it remains to be seen if these strategies will prove successful. Long-term
prospects may be bleak, and many fear that victims of such losses will have to sell their
permits to obtain income in the future.
It is difficult for these men to talk about the loss of their boats. In a conversation f
with one individual, age 57, he merely acknowledged losing the boat. Despite repeated
questioning, he spoke very little about it, nodding impassively when I asked if he had lost
his boat in the winter after the spill. Hints of embarrassment at having lost his boat
were detected although he never so stated. Perhaps as a result of this embarrassment,3
along with the lack of any information about claims procedures, he did not file a claim
with Exxon for the loss of his boat. Additionally, the feeling was that because the boats i
had sunk during the winter (1990) after the spill, it was too late to file a claim. Because
neither these men nor Exxon anticipated such losses, no provision was articulated for f
Old IHarbor - Page 802

claims of this nature. To date (winter 1991), there is no official knowledge of or
accounting for these losses.
The terms "small," "medium," and "large" are used to differentiate between the
commercial fishing operations in the village of Old Harbor. These categories generally
are based on the level of capital investment (size of boat and equipment) and/or earning
power (seasonal catch). Small fishing operations are those with 38- to 40-foot older
wooden boats powered by a single engine, with little or no navigational equipmnent.
These outfits fish the areas near Old Harbor, and the sldppers' net earnings are
appro,ximately $30,000 per year. Medium operations have new and better equipped
boats than the small outfits. These boats may have fiberglass hulls, two engines, and
some navigational equipment, but they are not equipped for longer ocean voyages.
However, their range is greater than that fished by small operators and net earnings are
between $40,000 and $70,000 per year. Large operations have the biggest and most
expensive boats with long-range voyage capabilities. Tlese boats are 48 feet or longer
and sport twin 350-horsepower engines or single 800- to 900-horsepower engines. Net
earnings for large operators are in excess of $70,000 per year.
Small- and medium-sized ope'rators, whether or not they lost their boasts, were
impacted at income tax time. The initial cash payments of $30,000 and taxable cleanup
wages brought unanticipated ta difficult ies. At least two primary difficulties arose.
Despite being acquainted with the income tax process, some fishermen were confased by
the $30,000 cash advances. In essence, they interpreted the advances to be similar to
nontaxable government transfer payments. Because their fishing season had bee-n taken
away by the spill, they did not interpret the $30,000 compensation as wages. After all,
they had. not "worked" for the money and they reasoned that, accordingly, there was no
need to set aside money for taxes based on "earned" income.
For others who anticipated that the $30,000 might be taxed, many did not set aside
enough cash reserves to pay their taxes. These operators calculated their 1989 "set-aside
monies" based on past experiences. In the past, earnings of $30,000 (i.e., payment
received from canneries for their fish) were not a taxable figure because business
Old Harbor - Page 803

~~~~~~II


expenses that were deducted left a considerably smaller taxable-earnming figure. In 1989,
there was uncertainty about business-expense deductions since the operators did not
know when and if they would be able to fish. As it turned out, the normal calculations
of cash reserve set aside for taxes proved insufficient.
T'here are fuirther examples of the kinds of errors that occurred in the context of a
totally new and unprecedented event. No one charged with assisting the villagers with
the spill impacts anticipated either the misinterpretation of the cash advances or the
cash-reserve miscalculations. As a result, both the counsel given by "experts" and the
actions taken by some of the fishermen resulted in inadequate tax planning in 1989.
Third-level effects on Old Harbor's fishermen came primarily in two forms. 'Me
first affected mainly the medium-sized fishermen1 who are moderate producers for the
canneries. As such, they are able to receive cash advances and multi-year loans forj
capital improvements. Canneries and fish processors with outstanding debits against
fishermen for 1989 could not place a lien on monies earned by fishermen from ExxonI
and VECO. The failure of fishermen to pay their debts during the 1989 fishing season
left the canneries and fish processors "cash-poor" for the opening of the 1990 season.S
One medium-sized fisherman reported that in 1991 he was still unable to secure a capita
improvement loan despite prespill promises from the cannery. While he understood the3
cannery's position, the respondent was clearly upset at the delays and saw it as cutting
into his earning potential. He also noted that while financing for himn is difficult, the3
trickle down of loan money to the smaller fisherman is almost completely dry.
Shortages in fishing industry cash flows have left even less capital investment fundsR
available for small producers. The long-term effects are potentially disastrous for this
group. Small operations generally have the oldest equipme-nt and, subsequently, survive3
by constant maintenance, rebuilding, and upgrading because they cannot afford to buy
new boats. Such maintenance is almost always financed by advances from the canneries               3
or by the canneries' mechanic shops. Without this source of financing, shortcuts are
taken in order to fish the current season. Such shortcuts lead to major breakdowns or5
maintenance in the fuiture and, perhaps, to the loss of boats or missed fishing seasons.


Old Harbor - Page 804

Tle second third-level effect that impacted all fishermnen in Old Harbor was the
huge profits mnade by the Kodiak City fishing community from hiring out their boats to
VECO. The cleanup work allowed many of the mediumn-sized fishernien in Kodiak to
upgrade to larger boats with increased navigational ability. In winter 1991, Old Harbor
fishermen reported that since the spill this had resulted in more crowded conditions in
their normal fishing sites. With these newly equipped fishermen able to travel longer
distances at higher speeds, more Kodiak fishermen now come to Old Harbor sites when
there are reports of "hot"t salmon runs. Increased numbers result in longer waiting lines
for fishing sets and reduced catch for the smaller Old Harbor operators who depend on
multiple sets. Tle increased numbers cut down on the number of sets the small
operators can make during the time-limited openings.
VI.C. Effects on Village Institutions
Village institutions suffered first-level effects. As in all villages affected by the
spill, city government personnel found themselves overworked and overwhelmed. Exxon
and VE-CO set up their operations in the city offices; and although they paid rent for the
space, their presence disrupted the normal flow of business. Apparently the city was still
attempting to collect final payments for the rented spaces in winter 1991. In a
November 1991 claims report9 to KANA, city officials estimated mi-nimal losses in labor
and rent costs to be $67,022 (see Appendix A).
Beyond the inconvenience and imposition of outsiders in the city office, city
officials found themselves constantly battling rumors in the community. During the
cleanup operations, rumors dealing with Exxon reimbursements--particularly the
possibility of Exxon reneging--caused great concern among villagers. City personnel
spent many hours engaged in fact-finding missions and dispelling falsehoods. As a result,
less attention was paid to routine city business, although there appear to have been no
major consequences to city government. Hfowever, the Old Harbor city govern-ment is



9This claims report was included in a KANA report requested by Lloyd Miller, attorney for the Native
villages in claims suits against Exxon. Copies of the KANA report were provided to the author by KANA staff
with the understanding they would be presented in this chapter.
Old Harbor - Page 805





particularly stable (see See. IMA, City Govermnment) and thus survived the stresses of the


spl.A second-level effect was the potential loss of revenue to the city. The lack of a
fishing season also may have cost the village revenues generated by floating fish
processors that tie up at the Old Harbor pier and operate as land-based processors.
However, this is speculation because no agreernents for tie-ups are made prior to the
fishing season; and tie-ups vary from year to year. The spill eliminated any possibility of
such revenue in 1989.t
City officials believe that the spill had yet another third-level effect on the people
of Old Harbor. In summer 1989, the Kodiak Housing Authority was to begin residential
repairs by increasing the insulation and painting houses in the villages, starting with
Akhiok. Old Harbor was to receive housing maintenance assistance in summer 1990. As1
of winter 1991, the housing maintenance project still had not reached Old Harbor. Old
Harbor officials attribute this delay directly to the spill because cleanup activities drainedI
the labor and financial resources from Kodiak Island. The additional cost of the delay is
being borne by regional institutions and Old Harbor residents. At minimum, the delay3
has resulted in inflation and increased wage and material costs to the maintenance
program. Additionally, it is reasonable to assume that minor repairs have increased in I
severity due to normal wear and tear. For example, a roof leak that requires patching in
1989 or 1990 may require replacement in 1991 or 1992. Individual residents have had to3
bear 2 additional years of high heating costs without improved insulation. In many ways,
this deferred mnaintenance problem is much like the situation of the small fishermen who 3
lost their boats--an extraordinary event so disrupted normal life that ordinary activities
were displaced, resulting in greater lo-nger-termn harm.3
The Village Council government suffered more appreciably than did city
government. First-level effects entailed the virtual shutting down of Council operations.I
The president of the Village Council was hired by VECO as the "village coordinator,"
while other staff went to work on the cleanup. This loss of Village Council staff to spill-I




Old Harbor - Page 8063

related activities resulted in a lapsing of virtually all. grants administered by the Council,
leaving Old Harbor's Council ineligible for new grants--a second-level effect.
Old Harbor Natives feel as though they have lost out on grant opportunities
because of the chaos caused by the spill and its negative effect on Village Council
administrative obligations. One example cited was the Council's loss of a $17,000
Suicide Prevention Program grant (see Appendix A) that was denied--according to new
Council administrators--because of the Council's unclosed grants and abandoned
bookkeeping. It has taken 2 years for the Village Council to recover. In winter 1991,
the new Council leaders worked long hours attermpting to close out previous grants and
contracts in an effort to restore their eligibility for programs such as the Suicide
Prevention Program. Village Council officials estimnated that a portion of their budget
losses (including grant losses plus direct costs) amounted to at least $100,000.
Council leaders also imply a third-level effect--a loss of face. They feel that the
image of the Old Harbor Village Council has been tarnished because of the potential for
the Council to be perceived as incapable of grants administration. Beyond the potential
financial and service losses that such a perception might entail, it appears that the
character of the Old Harbor Native people has been impugned. They are a proud
people and their success as fishermen bas underscored their ability and motivation to
work hard.
VII. CONCLUSION
Old Harbor's residents will not soon forget the trials of the.Exxon Valdez oil spill,
and they will not let the spill detract them from making a better life for themselves and
their children. To be sure, the spill has wrought many devastating effects, both financial
and emotional, to the village.
Financially, this commnercial-fishing-dependent village lost individual and
institutional revenues. Perhaps no one felt the loss as heavily as the older Native males,
who with the loss of their fishing boats found themselves stripped of their livelihood.
Families suffered strained relations. The fear of oil-fouled foods and the lack of a
full subsistence season left inadequate winter subsistence stores. More than depriving
Old Harbor - Page 807

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Natives of their wild foods, lower subsistence food stores, fewer processing sessions, and
curtailed harvesting impinged on the intergenerational teachings that subsistence
activities provide, thus widening the generation gap. Likewise, some friendships were
severely tested.
Village governments, both City and Tribal Village Councils, were tuirned upside
down as leaders and staffs were drawn away from their normal duties. Opportunities
were lost and social programs were sacrificed in order to cope with the chaos brought by
the cleanup activities.
The Natives of Old Harbor are no strangers to tragedy. Following the destruction
of their village in 1964, but bolstered by their religious faith, Old Harbor Natives rebuilt
their homes and their lives. In the samne way, Old Harbor residents will survive the
effects of the 1989.Exxon Valdez oil spill. During'the winter of 1991 the people of Old
Harbor were concerned primarily with looldng forward. Backed by a successful
commercial fishing fleet, the village's economic outlook seems solid as villagers look to
diversify their economy. Plans move forward for infrastructure and capital
improvements.
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Old Harbor - Page 808

References Cited
Alaska Department of Commuinity and Regional Affairs
1988 Impacts of Declining Revenues on Alaska's Smaller Communities. March
1988: A13-A16.

1989 An Update. Impacts of Declining Revenues on Alaska's Smaller
Commuinities. March 1989.

Befli, H.
1970 "An Ethnographic Sketch of Old Harbor, Kodiak: An Eskimo Village,"
Arctic Anthropology, VI-2, 1970.

Cultural Dynamics, Ltd
1986 A Description of and Economic Systems of the Kodiak/ Shumagin Region.
-Technical Report No. 122. Anchorage: USDOI, MMS, Alaska OCS Region,
Social and Economic Studies Program.

Davis, N. Y.
1970 "The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Five Pacific Eskimo Villages
as Revealed by the Earthquake," The Great Alaska Earthquake of 1964,
Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences.

1979 Kodiak Native Sociocultural Impacts. Western Gulf of Alaska Petroleum
Development Scenarios. Technical Report No. 41. Prepared for the USDOI,
Bureau of Land Management, Alaska OCS Office.

DOWL Engineers
1981 Old Harbor Brochure. Prepared for Alaska Department of Community and
Regional Affairs, 1981.

Dumond, D. E.
1965 On Eskaleutian Linguistics, Archeology, and Prehistory. American
Anthropologist, 67 (Part I: October).

Endter, J. L.
1989 Alaska Social Indicators Study. Personal fieldnotes.

Porter, R.
1893 Report on the Population and Resources of Alaska. Ilth Census, 1890.
Washington, D.C.: USDOI.
Old Harbor - Page 809

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Rooks, C. T.
1991 Alaska Social Indicators Study. Personal flednotes.

Roppel, P.
1986 Salmon from Kodiak: A History of the Salmon Fishery of Kodiak, Alaska.
Alaska Historical Commission in History No. 216.










































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Appendix A
Old Harbor Claim Summaryl

























1 The following are copies of documents provided to the author by KANA staff with the understanding they
would be presented in this chapter.
Old Harbor - Page 811

Kodiak                                                                                                      1
Area                      1
__N'at~~ive	402 Center Avenue
Native	Kodiak, Alaska 99615
Association	Phone (907) 486-5725



MEMORANDUMI


TO:	Lloyd Miller, S,C,S,M & M

FR:	Jana Larsen, Health & Social Services Dir  t

DATE:   December 12, 1991

RE: Trans-Alaska Claim

Enclosed is KANA's claim for damages, etc. as a result of the Exxon-Valdez
Oil Spill. This is the best we could draft with short notice.

Actually enclosed are several claims.   KANA has submitted one as a result                          I
of services that were lost or denied and each of the villages (except
Akhiok) has submitted an individual claim for the impact they felt indi-
vidually.

If you have any questions, please contact me.
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Village: old Harbor

The most measurable negative effect of the Exxon Valdez oil
spill on the village of Old Harbor was the collapse of the Tribal
Council administrative body due to many of the extenuating
circumstances already well document ini official studies initiated
in response to the oil spill such as the series of studies and
findings compiled and published it reports from the Oiled Mavors
study. (Executive Summarv: Economic. Social and Psvcholoaical
ImiDact Assessment of the Exxon Valdez Oil S-oill; lmDact Assessment.
Inc.)
Tn the case of Old Harbor, the disfunctioning of the
administrative core of the Tribal Council, and the loss of several
Tribal Council members to various other oil spill-related duties,
basically rendered the Tribal Council inoperative, or at leAst,
operative at such a diminished capacity as to restrict its
performance towards such' goals as financial management, grant
proposal writing, grant reporting and other revenue generating
ef forts upon which myriad health and social programs at the village
level were dependent.
The Tribal Council was able to maintain at least a minimum
presence in the village through allocations from the City Council,
a separate entity from the Tribal Council. A significant portion
of this claim addresses' reimbursement to the City Council for
funding used to for salaries for a variety of clerk-level positions
maintained by the Tribal Council from March, 1989 to present.
Additional reimibursements are also due for rental space for the
Tribal Offices.
Due to the governing structure of the Tribal Council, the
current Tribal Council President, Fred Christiansen, performed some
of the higher level administrative duties prior to assuming them
directly upon his election as the president. That work effort has
also beeni accounted for within this claim.
The cost to remedy the situation in Old Harbor is based on: 1)
the projected costs to provide the clerical support needed to
deliver the administrative infrastructure to the self-sustaining
level it could have been had it not been disrupted by the spill.
Based upon a current assessment of the Tribal Council, its current
president estimates an 18.month recovery period. To monitor and
assist in that timeframe, the Tribal Council president's salary and
.5FTE schedule have been incorporated into this claim.
An equally significant impact of the oil spill on the
capabilities of the Tribal Council i-s reflected in the delinquency
of filing of g-rant reports to comply with the granting agency's
close-out requirements. At least one grant was denied (Suicide
Prevention Grant) for $17,000 because of the disfunctioning status
of the Tri-bal Couincil administration at that time.   This lost
fur-ding opportunity is expressed within the c'laim.
Lastly, the "image" of the Old Harbor Tribal Couancil and its
ability to be accountable for grant administration has been
Old Harbor - Page 813

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severely blemished by the disfuncti oning of that body as an
extended result from the affects of the oil spill. Such a "black
eye" on the village council can have a signif icant negative impact
on their accountability f or other critical grant opportunities.
While that may be an unmeasurable factor in terms of actual dollars
awarded, it is clearly a f actor that would have some bearing on
their abilities as perceived by a gjranting agency.



OLD HARBOR CLAIM SUMMARY:

1. Labor cost reimbursement to City of old Harbor .....$ 27,422
2. Rent reimbursement to City of Old Harbor ........$ 39,600
3. Cost to "remedy" disfunction/instability of Council ...$ 74,685
4. Loss of Suicide Prevention ProaTram aTrant ........  17.0o0
ToTAL..........................$158,707
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CLAIM NARRATIVE, OLD HARBOR TRIBAL COUNCIL
1. Reimbursement to City of Old Harbor for payroll to various part-
time positions  (six) throughout term of oil spill to present
(March, 1989 - December, 1991) ...........................$ 27,422
2. Reimbursement to City by Tribal Council for offices rented from
City of Old Harbor at rate of $1200 per month for duration of spill
to current ............................................... $ 39,600
3. Cost to re-establish and stabilize Tribal Council administrative
accountability is based upon the following time frame and personnel
I     structure:
a. One full time (1.0 FTE) Administrative Assistant @$7/hr for
18 mo. (18 mos. x 176 hours/mo. x $7.00/hr.) .........$ 22,176

b. Fringe based upon 15% of total salary ............$ 3,326
c. One 1.0 FTE clerical position @$6/hr ..............$ 19,008
d. Fringe based upon 15% of total salary .............$ 2,851
e. One half time (0.5 FTE) Tribal Council Administrator
based upon 18 mo. x 88 hrs./mo. x $15/hr .     ............$ 23,760
f. Frinae based uDon 15% of total salary .............S 3.564
TOTAL ........................ ........................$74,324

4. Community-based Suicide Prevention Program grant proposal was
denied because it did "not adequately meet the criteria established
for  this  program."  That decision  was  based  on  insufficient
documentation, the absence of which was grounds for denying the
award. It was determined that there was marked disfunction within
the Tribal Council at this time: "...unless the coordinator, the
council and the community are committed to working together on the
project, thinas tend to fall aDart,...that appears to be what
happened [in FY90] in Old Harbor." (Diana McBride for Susan Soule,
Prog. Coord., Rural & Native Services, DHSS*). An opportunity to
work toward a reapplication at a future date was expressed by the
I      Department of Health and Social Services and technical assistance
was offered to the Tribal Council in preparation for a new
application ................................................$17,000
*(support documentation available)
TOTAL CLATM/OLDHARBOR ....................................$158,707
Old Harbor - Page 815

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Chignik

Curtiss Takada Rooks
Chignik- Page 817

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CHIGNIK

Table of Contents
I.	Historical Background ...............

II.	The Setting .......................

II.	The People .......................
A. Dual-Residence Families ..........
B. Household Organization and Kinship .

IV.   The Village .......................
A. The Regional Government .........
B. The Village Government ..........
C. Social Services and Schools ........
D. Associations and Organizations .....

V.	The Economy .....................

VI.	Ideology .........................

VII.	Effects of the 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
A. Closure of the Fishery .............
B. Economic Consequences for Fishermen
C. Social Consequences ..............
D. Institutional Impacts ..............

VIII.  Conclusion ........................

References Cited ........................
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Chignik - Page 820

CHIGNIK
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
No written documentation exists recording the origin of Chignik,l which--translated
from Alutiiq--means "wind." One origin story credits five sisters with very large families
as founding the village (USDOI, BLM 1979). Previous to the founding of Chignik, a
village named Kaluak was located on or near Chignik's present site. Kaluak was
destroyed in the late 1700's during the Russian fur-trade boom (Environmental Services
Limited 1982). One of the first written accounts of Chignik cites its use in 1888 as a
salmon-salting station for barrelling and shipping. In 1890, the village's population was
recorded at 193 (Morris 1987). Since 1888, commercial fishing has dominated the
village's cash economy.
Located at the head of Anchorage Bay on the south shore of the.Alaska Peninsula,
Chignik was a choice site for the installation of two canneries in the late 19th and early
20th centuries (Morris 1987; Environmental Services Limited 1982). Until the past
decade, Chignik relied on the canneries for much of its infrastructure. For example, the
Alaskan Packers Association cannery, currently the Aleutian Dragon Fisheries, provided
a water source for the village during the times it was in operation. Otherwise, Chignik
residents packed in needed water (USDOI, BLM 1979). Electricity also was provided by
the cannery. Thus, the impact of the cannery on the village's economy extended beyond
wage labor or the purchase of Native fishermen's catch.
Socially, the canneries have produced a steady outside influence on the people of
Chignik by bringing in cannery workers each summer. Intermarriages have been quite
common. Generally, the marriages involved village women with men from the outside.
A number of these men settled with their wives in Chignik (Morris 1987). The men
were Scandinavian, Italian, Chinese, Japanese, Mongolian, Hawaiian, and Filipino



' Today, three villages--Chignik Bay, Chignik Lagoon, and Chignik Lake--are located in close proximity to
one another. Chignilk Bay is the historical reference noted here and the site of the Social Indicators study.
Chignik Bay is commonly referred to as Chignik by most people in the region. Throughout this report, I use
Chignik to designate Chignik Bay unless otherwise stated.
Chignik - Page 821





(M orris 1987; Environmental Services Limnited 1982; USDOI, BLM 1979). Evidence ofU
the Scandinavian marriages can be found in the sumnames of the prominent families such
as Skonberg and Carlson. Russian names like Stepanoff also are present. No evidence,
through surnames, of the Asian intermarriages seems to have survived. This suggests2
that Asians either took local names, their descendants took their mother's family name?,
or their descendants relocated.
11. THE SETTING
Tucked away in the protection of Anchorage Bay, Chignik is located in a
spectacul-ar setting; and breathtaking scenery dominates every venue in the village.
Whether admiring the majestic mountains rising out of the sea or gazing at the backlit3
winter sky over the ridge behind the village, the viewer is overwhelmed by the area's
natural beauty. Indian Creek runs the length of the village and provides access to the
mountains behind Chignik. The hills and meadows surrounding Chignik support an
abundance of grasses, berries, and leafy greens.
Three IrChigniksIt--Chignik, Chignik Lagoon, and Chignik Lake--comprise a village
network in which fishing and hunting areas are shared. These villages are connected by
the Chignik River, which feeds Chignik Bay (located immediately beyond Anchorage
Bay). There also exists kinship connections among residents of the three Chignik3
villages. Chignik and Chignik Lagoon appear to have most of these connections, with
only a few relations residi-ng in Chignik Lake.3
The ocean waters in the vicinity of Chignik teem with fish species that have both
subsistence and commercial value to Chignik residents: all five Pacific salmon, halibut,3
herring, Pacific cod, and smelt. All of these fish species are used as subsistence
resources, a-nd ma-ny are harvested commercially. A wide variety of marine





2 Following the World War II imprisonment of Aleuts and Eskimos of Japanese descent, some Japanese
descendants took their Native parents' names. We speculate that this an attempt to "shake off' the
embarrassment and trauma of the imprisonment. Such trauma was documented among Japanese Americans
during the redress and reparation hearings.3

Chignik - Page 8223

invertebrates are found in the region, including octopus, crab (tanner and dungeness),
clanms (butter, razor, steamer, and horse), mussels, sea eggs, chitons, and cockles.
The Dolly Varden, freshwater rainbow trout, and grayling are abundant in the
freshwater lakes and streams.
Sea. otters are common, and harbor seals and sea lions haul out in the area.
Harbor seals and seal lions, and their by-products, provide the bulk of the Native sea
mammal subsistence usage. Grey, minke, kiler, and humpback whales; northern fur
seals; and harbor and Dall porpoises make appearances during seasonal nmigrations
through the waters off this section of the Alaska Peninsula. Seal oil and/or seat fat are
subsistence foods used by many Chignikc Natives.
On land, brown bears, caribou, and mnoose make up the large game. Arctic and
snowshoe hares, porcupines, beavers, foxes, ermines, minks, and muskrats are among the
small mammals in the area. Wolf are also present in the area. Caribou is the largest
source of land mammal protein for Chignik residents (Morris 1987).
Many birds reside in or migrate through the Chignik area. Ducks, both sea and
freshwater, of many varieties and Canada geese make regular visits. All told, some 10
varieties of inigrating ducks and three varieties of geese are harvested by the Chignik
residents. Other sea birds such as cormorants, puffins, murres, galls, and terns have sea
colonies on local shores. Rock ptarmigan and ravens winter in Chignik. Bald eagles,
peregrine falcons, hawks, ospreys, and owls make up the resident raptors (Environmental
Services Limited 1982).
111. THE PEOPLE
The population of Chignik seems to be divided into four groups: (1) fish-
processing personnel, (2) non-Native educators and public-sector employees, (3) Native
fishermen who winter "out," and (4) Native fishermen who winter "in."
The fish-processing-perso-nnel group is composed of year-round management or
caretaking personnel and temporary or -seasonal labor. The interaction between these
persons and the villagers occurs over a wide range of situations from personal friendships
to village politics. For the most part, the interaction seems to work well for both the
Chignik - Page 823






processing plants' employees and the Natives. Seasonal labor mnust be treated as aI
separate case. Temporary workers comnprise a variety of individuals: somne are
semiskilled laborers who return annually, and some are college students on leave or
precollege youth working to save money for college. Processing-plant management
actively intervened when workers violated community sensibilities.. They were
particularly guarded against alcohol and drug violations. Conversations with village
residents regarding relations with processing-plant personnel indicated that the two
groups generally get along quite well. Villagers did suggest, however, that summer
temporary workers are involved in more serious social problems than are winter workers,
including drug use and relationships between male plant workers and young women inI
the village. No complaints about female plant workers on either the summer or winter
crews were expressed.
The presence of the fish-processing plants has resulted in interracial marriages
between Native villagers and plant personnel. In the cases for which we have3
information, Chignik Native women married ?,OUt,,,3 and the families have chosen to
remain in Chignik. Based on interviews and conversations with 1991 winter residents,3
most of the Chignik Native men who marry out also are seasonal residents of Chignik
and maintain residences in Kodiak or Seattle.3
One of the processing plants sponsors a picnic for villagers and plant employees
each summer in an effort to enhance good will. Plant workers are welcome to3
participate in the evening sports recreation at the school gym or other facilities. Rousing
games of pickup basketball and volleyball between participants drawn from the plant and3
the village occur on most winter nights.
in talldng with villagers, no o-ne exressed dissatisfaction with the fish-processing3
plants or their year-round workers. The relationships seem to be very good. In fact, in
3~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The term marrying 'out" has two connotations in the villages of Alaska. The first connotation refers to
the practice of marrying someone from outside of one's village, usually from another region. The second
connotation refers to the practice of marrying someone from outside one's racial (or ethnic) group. (This secondI
connotation has wide usage among ethnic studies scholars and by minority group members throughout the U.S.)
My use of marrying "out" in the text includes both connotations.3


Chignik - Page 824

the village census, members from the management teams of both plants were included as
residents by the village administration. Not all'processing-plant employees were so
designated. The workers who are considered village residents frequently interact with
the villagers. At least one plant employee is actively involved in the village government.
Other non-Natives in Chignik a-re generally educators or public-sector employees.
The educators tend to be in residence only during the school year, when the housing
provided by the school district (with partially subsidized rent) is available. Although
teachers in some other villages who wanted to remain over the summer have found
private-housing rentals, my interviews did not indicate that any school administrators or
teachers lived in Chignik year-round. Outside of the educational setting, these non-
Natives have little formal association with the village, although a few had established
informal social ties.
INon-Natives employed in other public-sector jobs were much more active in village
life than the school personnel. In some cases, the nature of the employment (e.g., city
administrator) requires this interaction. However, not all community ties were "~job
related."' Some of the non-Native public-sector workers were very active in religious
organizations as well as village electoral politics.
IIIA. Dual-Residence Families
A group of Chignik Natives resides outside of the village most of the year,
returning during the summer to fish commnercially. But, because they are Chignik
"'residents," tribal members, and corporate shareholders, they continue to have political
and economic power in the village. The current heads of the village for-profit
corporation and the fishermen's association spend winters away from Chignik. Some
respondents suggested that this arrangement accounts for some of the political instability
of the village government (see Sec. IV.B, The Village Government). Year-round
residents, although kinspersons of those who winter out, sometimes take exception to
summer returnees seeking to run things. The most common reason expressed for dual
sumimer-winter residence was schooling for the children. Parents felt that larger cities
provided better educational opportunities, pa-rticularly for high-school-aged children.
Chignik - Page 825





Kodiak, Anchorage, and Seattle w ere named as major seasonal residences. However,I
Chignik school officials indicate that the disruption of children's education and lives by
dual residences may present unanticipated problems.I
Dual-residence children begin the school year in Chignik. Educators suggest that,
because students know they will be leaving soon, there is a tendency for the students notI
to give their full effort. Some of these stadents actually will attend two or three schools
during the winter. When the students return to Chignik in the spring, they are primed
for the fishing season and again find it difficult to concentrate on their stadies.
According to the educators, the excitement of the returning dual-residence students
affects year-round students as well, generating an overall attitude of impatience in
anticipation of the upcoming fishing season. It appears that the most often-reported goal
for wintering outside of Chignilk is not being accomplished by relocating after the fishing
season.
Another issue involvng the children of dual-residence families is their relationship
to children who reside in the village year-round. Respondents reported that the dual-
residence children displayed a sense of superiority because they have more experience3
living outside the village than do their year-round counterparts. Perhaps another
contributor to this attitude is the knowledge on the part of the dual-residence children3
that their families generally have higher incomes than many of the year-round residents.
T'he relocation of children from the village also introduces identity issues for these3
children. Semiannual moves may rob children of a strong sense of identification with
their village, their traditional culture, or their ties to their Native relatives. Because the
village is poorly understood on the outside, dual-resident children learn to evaluate the
village from an "outsider's" perspective that accentuates the negative qualities theyI
perceive about traditional and village life.
The current study did not allow us to understand fully the dynamics facing the3
younger generations of Native villagers. However, if attachment to Chignik as home
wanes among the dual-residence youths, and if year-round villagers learn to devalue their3
traditional life, significant changes are unavoidable. Understanding the youth in Chignik,


Chignik - Page 826

and indeed in all the rural Alaskan villages, is a crucial aspect of understanding the
impact of future economic and social development.
III.B. Household Organization and Kinship
Men dominate many decisionmaling positions in Chignik Village affairs, and this
pattern also characterizes some aspects of family life, particularly the harvesting of fish
and game. Women's power seems vested mainly in the family and through interpersonal
relationships, rather than in public positions. Elders, regardless of gender, also are
vested with decisionmaldng influence.
Commonly, households consist of nuclear families with both parents present. In
some cases, single mothers and/or single adult children also reside with their parents.
Most young couples have their own homes, usually Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), and several older males reside alone. Despite separate homes, family and
kinship ties appear to be quite strong. Respondents described four major extended
families, two of which are more dominant politically and economically. Each of the four
families is related to every other family group, forming a village-kinship network. The
family networks tend to organize traditional activities such as sharing, gathering, hunting,
fishing, and visiting.
Most socialization occurs along kinship and family lines. However, there are non-
kidn-based activities, such as the use of school and community facilities for nighttime
activities. In winter, volleyball and basketball in the school gym draw many villagers
along with processing-plant employees and an occasional transient researcher. People of
all ages attend, and the youngsters and nonplayers serve as the appreciative crowd.
Early in the evening, activities are organized for the youngsters at the community center.
Chignik - Page 827






IV. THE VILLAGEU
Chig-nik, with an estimated February 1991 population of 92,'4 iS subject to
considerable outside influences. Revenue from the fishing industry contributes to higher
personal incomes and supports more infrastructure-improvement projects than in many
small Alaskan villages, particularly those with no viable local industry. The distribution
of personal income from commercial fishing plays a major role in the political and social
dynamics of the village.
IV.A. The Regional Government
In 1991, Chignik joined the newly formed Lake and Peninsula Borough regional
government. Previously, Chignik, wlhile belonging to the Bristol Bay Native Association3
(BBNA) (see below), was unaffiliated to a regional or borough government. The Lake
and Peninsula Borough promises to offer protection for the school district to which3
Chignik belongs and to provide services for future land and resource development.
Although borough membership will cost Chignik raw-fish-tax revenues totalling3
approximately one-half of the current percentage received, the services gained should
compensate the village for the losses in at least two ways. First, assistance in land and5
resource development will bring direct additional reven-ues to Chignik as doors open to
new forms of economic development.  Second, it will allow Chignik to share the expense3
of big-ticket items,such as zonig  testing, and surveying for new waste-dump sites.
Besides increased services, borough membership will provide Chignik residents an3
additional layer of self-governance with which to lobby State and Federal entities for






4T'he Social Indicators Study population estimate was conducted with the assistance of city officials and isI
at variance with both the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G) and U.S. Census estimates. The
ADF&G estimates in 1990 place the population at 120, while the U.S. Census projected a 1990 population of
188. Most likely the ADF&G estimate is the, best, while the Census estimate grossly overcounts the number ofI
residents. Discrepancies between the Social Indic-ators Study estimate and the ADF&G population figure can
be accounted for by two primary factors: (1) the seasonal residence of Chignik residents who winter out, and
(2) turnover of social service personnel during the winter of 1991. Seasonal migration patterns are erratic, and
"hard" population counts are difficult at any given moment. We sought to count the vilagers residing in the
Chignik that winter. Additionally, a number of non-Native service-provider positions were unfilled or in
transition during our visit. Each of the previous position holders had resided in Chignik with their families.3

Chignik - Page 8283

entitlements. This additional political power and inclusion in regional decisions may be
the greatest gain for the village.
IV.B. The VWlage Government
During the winter of 1991, Chignik's village government had been in turmoil for at
least the previous 2 years. The village has a mayoral form of government. In the 18
months before my February 1991 visit, the village had three mayors, three city clerks,
and three city administrators; and the village public safety officer (VPSO) had come
under increased pressure to relocate. Though specific reasons for such a high turnover
are unknown, most interviewees blamed intense internal politics for the instability.
Attacks occasionally became personal. State of Alaska, Department of Community and
Regional Affairs (DCRA), officials suggested that while intense internal politics account
for much of the turmoil, pre-existing problems were exacerbated by the Exxon.Valdez oil
spill, which occurred in 1989. According to the DCRA officials, city government
employees and officials were severely stressed and workloads increased during the time
of the spill and cleanup activities. Workloads increased from 8 to as high as 18 hours
per day at the outset of the spill, levelling off to 11 to 13 hours per day during cleanup
operations. Tle city official who worked as the village spill coordinator has left Chignik.
Part of the instability problems involve the tension between Native year-round
residents and summer residents. As noted above, the summer residents tend to have
power by virtue of their commercial success, and they hold the key positions such as
village for-profit corporation president and fishermen's association leader. On their
return, it is not uncommon for Native summer residents to exert their influence in local
matters involving government expenditures and village development. Such action
appears -to anger year-round residents, who have been worldng throughout the winter to
solve village problems.
Kinship plays an important role in the village government and politics. Native
village, residents comprise a large kin network whose members are related by birth and
through marriage. Most distantly related persons are second cousins. Three families
play important roles in village leadership. One family seems to dominate the village
Chignik - Page 829






government in both elected and appointed positions. Another family exerts leadership inI
the tribal and corporate organizations. The third famaily has been important in village
affars in the past and well may be instrumental in the future, as the younger members of
this family are now being drawn into village-leadership organizations. A fourth famfily
appears to have little influence or role in village governance.
When dealing with outsiders, the Natives band together and acknowledge kinship
ties. Villagers also have the ability to divorce city business from personal business. They
can argue with one another at a city council meeting, complete with name calling; then,
later that evening, they may visit each other's family, telling stories and laughing. This is
baffling to some outsiders, who sometimes misinterpret this behavior as duplicitous.3
Individual personalities seem to play a large role in village govermnment. Presently,
there seems to be no charismatic Native leader who can actively mediate between the
various factions and complex social factors of the village. Over time, non-Natives have
moved to the village and have taken positions of responsibility. Because of theirU
outgoing personalities and seeming expertise, the villagers sometimes have allowed
newcomers to gain power and authority. However, this creates tensions when the5
outsiders go too far. Retrenchment on the' part of the villagers results in hurt feelings
and sometimes bitter political battles, after which the outsiders leave. In some cases, the3
outsiders have built coalitions and attempted to further entrench themselves in the
community.3
Ile city government consists of the mayor, city council, city clerk, city
administrator, and VPSO. The mayor and council members are elected by the village,3
and the two administrative positions are hired by the council. The mayor is the primary
city official and exercises ultimate responsibility for the everyday operations of the3
government. The city administrator, subordinate to the mayor, is delegated the
responsibility for the everyday administration of council policies, compliance with various3
State and Federal regulations, and overseeing the fiscal management of city funds. The
mayor and the council set policy and approve the city budget. According to the StateI
DCRA office, a referendurn election was held in 1989 to switch the village governance


'Chignik - Page 8303

from the current mayoral form to "a city-manager system. The referendum was initiated
to deal with (1) the inability of the city council and mayor to attend to daily activities
during the summer due to fishing-season demands and (2) unclear lines of authority and
delegation of authority during the summer absences and recesses. The city manager
proposal was defeated.
The city-manager form of government invests a great deal of power in a non-
elected administrator hired by the city budget. While it provides expertise and stability,
this form of government places a layer between villagers and the operations of the
village government. The city government provides one of the few avenues the Native
villagers have for exercising power in their lives. It appears that to give away that
amount of power for the city manager form of government, most likely to an outsider,
was considered too great a sacrifice.
IV.C. Social Services and Schools
Chignik employs two full-time emergency personnel, the VPSO and his assistant.
The VPSO is a certified Emergency Medical Technician instructor and conducts classes
for villagers during the winter. The village has a fire engine and well-stocked medical-
emergency suapplies. According to the VPSO, the Exxon Valdez oil spill and the fervor it
created motivated the villagers to upgrade the community's capacity to deal with, such
disasters. This included acquiring medical supplies as well as materials to make booms
to protect against future spills. Additionally, the spill inspired the VPSO to develop
village action plans for potential future disasters.
T'he village health clinic offers the services of a physician's assistant (PA) in
addition to the health aide. The PA receives more training than a village health aide but
is not a physician. The health clinic provides basic health services, x-ray technology, and
other technical analysis. I was unable to obtain infor-mation regarding medical
consequences of the spill or on the general medical well-being of the village.
The BBNA, whose social-services budget was $2,672,884 in 1990 (BBNA 1990:7);
provides most formal social services in Chignik. Services available in Chignik include a
meals program for the elderly, which served 565 meals in 1990 (BBNA 1990:11); the
Chignik - Page 831

Indian Child Welfare Program, which recorded two cages (families) involving six children
in 1990 (the nature of these cases was not disclosed) (BBNA 1990:19); and the Summer
Youth Employment and Training Program (SYEPT). Offsite (in Dillinghiam and other
locations) programs available to Chignik residents include vocational rehabilitation,
employment and training, a Family Violence Program, and higher education. The 1990
Family Violence Program reports that it received'an unspecified number of clients from3
Chignik (BBNA 1990: 16).
Because of Chignik's distance from Dillingham, the headquarters of BBNA, and the3
expense to travel to and from DilHingham, Chignik village officials claim their community
has received fewer and fewer services as BBNA budgets tighten.3
Chignik has its own school that provides instruction for grades K thrpugh 12. As
mentioned above, school attendance fluctuates during the year in accordance with3
seasonal family migrations. School officials noted that, overall, the program is solid. A
constant concern is the relationship between parents on the one hand and the school3
administration and teachers on the other hand. The principal cited the transiency of
teachers as a major obstacle for developing relations between the school and the village.3
Teachers seldom stay in Chignik longer than 2 years. The reasons for this were not
articulated by school officials.3
IVYD. Associations and Organizations
Chignik has few formal associations. The three that predomiinate are the3
fishermen's association, a nondenominational (largely Protestant) church, and a Russian
Orthodox church.3
Most of the local fishermen belong to the Chignik Seiner's Association, which
includes fishermen from Chignik, Chignik Lagoon, Chignik L-ake, and the closest villages3
to the southeast, Ivanof Bay, and Perryville. Tlis organization negotiates fish prices with
the local processing plants. The Seiner's Association is fairly informal; a-nd the head of
the Association, a Chignik Native, is not a winter resident. In response to the Exxon
Valdez spill, the Association closed ra-nks in its negotiations with outside entities and1
even retained a lawyer to oversee their interests.


Chignik - Page 8323

Although the Seiner's Association unsuccessfiully lobbied to keep the entire Chignik
fishery open during the spill-cleanup period, it did successfulfly negotiate leasing fees for
local boats working on cleanup activities commensurate with other spill-affected areas.
According to newspaper accounts, VECO and Exxon offered a much lower leasing rate
to the Chignik fishermen to use their boats in the cleanup operations. The fishermen
stood strong and eventually received a fee equal to that of the Kodiak fishing fleet.
It is unclear if this level of cooperation and collective action among the Seiner's
Association members was maintained following the passing of the spill crisis. Indications
are that the Association reverted to its informal operations. During my winter 1991
visit, however, the membership was concemned about impending low fish prices. But the
group had not yet began to explore collective strategies. At least one year-round village
resident was in the process of outfitting his boat for winter bottom-pot (pollock and cod)
fishing to make up for anticipated low salmon prices for the 1991 season.
The nondenominational Protestant church in Chignik provides one of the major
nonkinship-based organizations for people. Led by a non-Native, the nondenominational
church and its members have been very active in villagewide issues ranging from school
library content to the start of a Christian radio station. Because the leadership of this
church also is quite involved in village governance, it is difficult to separate church and
individual influence. However, religion plays a major part in the views and roles of the
church leadership in nonchurch positions. Additionally, the leadership of the Protestant
Church, and presumably its members, engage in evangelical activities. This outreach is
not restricted to villagers, and plant employees receive equal attention.
The Russian Orthodox church provides another nonkinship-based organization1 and
it appeared that members from all major Native family groups in the village belonged to
this church. Without a local priest or a local building for services, Russian Orthodox
services are seasonal; and the church members expend a great deal of energy preparing
for the various seasonal activities. Despite the lack of consistent or formal weekly
services, the Russian Orthodox respondents expressed enthusiasm for their religious
affiliation. Their participation in the church appears to be equal parts cultural. and
Chignik - Page 833





devotional. Church members observe traditions and celebrations but do not seem to beI
ruled by church doctrine in their daily lives in the sense that they are not guided by a
strict list of proscribed actions. However, the people do live a life marked by New
Testament notions of Christian charity.3
V. THE ECONOMY
Chignik is dependent on commercial fishing for both village and personal income.g
The raw-fish-tax receipts provide the village with a steady income; and the increased
winter bottomfishing, which has made the land-based processors year-round operations,
should provide increased financial stability.
Although I did not get an actual count of the number of permits held by village3
Natives, it seems that few have sold their commercial-fishing permnits. Those without
permiits serve as crewmembers for Native permiit holders.I
Other sources of employment are the school system, fish-processing plants, the city,
and the local store; and village residents are employed in each of these operations.3
Many households of winter residents have two wage eamners. In the majority of the
households interviewed, both the husband and wife were gainfully employed.3
T'he homes in Chignik have most of the modem conveniences, although a few
homes do not have telephones. Long-distance telephone service is periodically disr-upted3
due to weather conditions. Telephone communications are generally complemented by
VHF radio systems. No families seem to suffer extreme poverty, and mutual assistance3
among village members is prevalent.
During the winter 1991 study period, half of the Chignik respondents reported less3
than 25 percent of their household diet consisted of protein from the subsistence harvest
of wild foods such as fish or game. However, if taken at face value, this percentage3
would be misleading. A closer analysis of bouseholds reporting low percentage of
subsistence protein in their total diet reveals that half of the households are non-Native.3
The other half comprise households of older Native bachelors who can no longer harvest
subsistence food resources as they did in their younger days, when--they said--harvested3
proteins accounted for more than three-quarters of their diets. All households reporting


Chignik - Page 8341

that over 25 percent of their diets consisted of subsistence-harvested proteins were
Native. Seafood resources (predominantly various species of fish) rather than la-nd
mammals, make up the majority of the subsistence foods consumed by the people of
Chignik. Seabirds and plants augment their diet, as do sea mammal by-products such as
seal oil and fat.
Commercial foods are provided by two means: (1) bulk orders from retail outlets
in Anchorage; Seattle; and, during the summer, from Kodiak (transported by fishing
boats and surnmer-only airplane service) and (2) the two local markets. Purchase of the
larger consumer goods, such as outboard motors and sldffs, is not possible in Chignik.
The markets are owned by non-Natives--one is owned and operated by Chignik Pride
and the other by an individual in Kodiak. Overall, Chignik's port location and the
competition between the two stores keep prices reasonable relative to other more
remote communities. The stores are frequented by residents of the neighboring villages
of Chignik Lake and Chignik Lagoon.
Employment in Chignik is provided by the fish-processing plants, local markets,
school, State transportation, airlines agent, post office, and city government. In winter
1991, approximnately 13-5 village residents--8 women and 5 men--were employed in local
jobs, not including the VPSO, city admfinistrator, and health clinic specialist. Of these 13
residents, 4 were non-Native (3 are white and I is Filipino), and only 1 of the 4 was not
a member of a Native household. The VPSO, his assistant, the city administrator, and
the health-clinic specialist were white males, one of whom had married into a Native
household.
In winter 1991, four Native village women were employed by the fish-processing
plants, and a fifth worked as a store clerk. A non-Native woman served as a
receptionist, and two women were cooks/bakers. No village residents worked on the
fish-cleaning lines at the plants. Line work did not seem to be viewed as desirable by
the Chignik Native residents; however, historically this has not been the case. One


5 This number does not include fish-processing-plant management, school teachers, and school
administrators. No discussion is offered for these groups.
Chignik - Page 835





Native female resident recalled worling "on the line" as a high-school student about 101
years ago without receiving any negative feedback from her peers. Management at the
plants did not express any reservations about local hires but stressed that they rarely get
a request for line work.
Historically, the fish-processing plants (previously cannenies) provided employment
for Native males. One of the elders explained that his father worked in the canneries
about 50 years ago. Every summer, the family would row across the bay to Chignik from
their winter home in Ocean Beach. Adults began seasonal work in- the canneries, and3
the children would attend school. Each fall the family would catch a tow back to Ocean
Beach with an outgoing fishing boat. It seems that a number of Native males worked inI
the cannery during that time.6 Today, this elder is a permit holder and fishes with his
son, to whom he has turned over the captaincy of their boat.3
Apart from commercial fishing, there is limited private-sector employment in the
village. The local markets employ two village residents, and one market employs anI
additional worker during the busy summer fishing season who is brought into Chignik
from the Lower 48. Most Natives tend to work for public agencies as school aides,3
maintenance workers, city administrative employees, etc. These jobs provide steady
work; and, with the exception of the city clerk and postmaster, employees still can3
participate in the fishing season.




6 James VanStone, in Eskimos of the Nushagak River (Chapter 4), documents the historical participationI
of Eskimos in the canneries of Bristol Bay. In particular, he notes the development of the Bering Sea
Fishermen's Union as a local of the Alaska Fishermen's Union in 1937, which included the Native canneryI
workers. One, of the agendas of the union was "to achieve precedence for residents" (p. 79) in the canneries.
Following World War 11, the canneries in DWinigham hired increasing numbers of Natives and a cannery at Ekuk
pioneered all Native crews in the late 1940's. VanStone also states that the issue of Native hire was a
territorywide issue that was addressed by the territorial govemnor's office as early as 1912. It is reasonable to
assujme then that Chigniks canneries were affected by the territorial influences, as well as cannery practices
elsewhere, including Bristol Bay, and that Native employees were, therefore, not uncommon.3


Chignik - Page 8361

VI. IDEOLOGY
Chignik Natives expressed remorse that there are few Aleut7 speakers left in their
village. On the heels of the loss of the Aleut language, they witnessed the introduction
of modern technology. Yet, the elders are able to see this new technology as both
helpful and detrimental. Technology definitely has 'unproved both subsistence and
commercial fishing. In homes, electricity, running water, and oil heating, among other
conveniences, have improved the quality of life, but at a cost. The elders noted that as
children their lives were full of chores--chopping wood, carting water, etc.--and they
observed that by contrast, some children now have no chores to give them discipline.
Rather, the children have a surfeit of free time, and this free time is not used
constructivelyn--they simply watch television. Moreover, the children also attempt to
emulate what they see on television and videos, as evidenced by the fashions they wear
and the idioms they use. One elder cqnimented that children were not the only ones
affected. Adults turn to television for escape as well. Rather than going out and visiting,
it is easier to sit and watch television.
While the concerns of these elders sound similar to those voiced elsewhere about
the younger generations, the examples of behavior given by the elders in Chignik seem to
illustrate what they perceive as a fandamental threat to Native values and ideology. A
valued aspect of the Native culture has been the sharing of resources as well as the sense
of collective responsibility and obligation that has been essential to family and
community survival in the demnanding Arctic and Subarctic environment. In essence,
Native culture was very "other" oriented. While sharing still is highly valued and widely
practiced today among the year-round residents of Chignik, the elders were fearftil that
the youth of the village are becomning more individualistic in their outlooks because they
have been raised on television and also because they have been influenced by a highly




7The Native language in Chignik is variously referred to as Aleut, Alutiiq, and Pacific Eskimo (Woodbury
1984:53). Natives residing in the Aleutians, on the Alaska Peninsula, and Kodiak island were all termed Aleuts
by the Russians in the late 18th century, and it is coTmmon for Natives of these areas to refer to themselves and
their language as Aleut.

Chignik - Page 837





capitalized commercial-fishing industry that is regulated through access to individuallyU
owne d permits. Most of the elders felt that technology per se was not bad, but that the
people have failed to adjust the benefits of technology to serve the value system that has
sustained Native life in the past.
Another major change in the lives of Chignik villagers was the Alaska Native
Clams Settlement Act (ANCSA). Many respondents perceived ANCSA as an overnightj
development that fundamentally changed the relationship between the land and the
people. According to one Chignik elder, "Used to be you could build or walk anywhere3
you wanted, and there was no such thing as someone else's property." This elder's views
reflect the concerns of other respondents who felt that villagers were becoming3
increasingly individualistic and selfish with the growing emphasis on private-property
ownership. The elders indicated that prior to ANCSA, people certainly used their cabins3
and set-net sites, etc., but this did not include the notion of individually "owning the
spot." Almost every Native respondent felt that what made Chignik special was the place3
itself; the natural environment--including salmon--has value that cannot be approached in
commodity terms.3
VII. EFFECTS OF THE 1989 EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL
VIT.A. Closure of the Fishery3
Chignik experienced direct and indirect effects from the 1989.Exxon Valdez oil
spill. The direct effect with the greatest impact was the closing of a major portion of the3
Chignik fishery as a result of the patchy oil sheens, mousse, and tarballs that drifted into
the area. 'Me closing of the fisheries increased tension and bad feelings on a number of3
levels. Fishermen who expressed the greatest criticism of the fishery closure reported
they often had seen more oil sheen from barges blowing their bilges in the straits. They3
felt the closuare was not in their best interest and may have been motivated by concerns
other than the quality of the salmon.
The degree to which the closure affected individual fishermen varied by the size of
the fishing operation. Small fishing operations--rnm by fishermen employing 125-fathomI
purse seines from 38- to 40-foot boats powered by I50- to 200-horsepower singleu
Chignik - Page 838

engines--seemed to have suffered the mnost deleterious effects. Intermnediate and large
fishing operations were reported to have had fewer negative inipacts. Fishermen in
intermediate to large operations own boats at least 48 feet long with either twin engines
(350 horsepower per engine) or with an 800- to 900-horsepower single engine. These
boats have large holds in comnparison with 38-foot craft and also have hydraulic winches
to operate 250-fathomn purse-seine nets.
T'he largest fishing operations (highliners), even though restricted from fishing, had
opportunities not available to the smaller operators. The large operators reported that
they received adequate compensation from Exxon for fishing losses, and a number also
were able to hire out on spill-cleanup activities in areas where small boats could not
travel. These factors conibined to allow the largest operators to escape financial harni.
T'he degree and nature of the effects to the fishermen, however, are questioned by
many in the village. According to the local fish-processing personnel, the "good"'
fishermen maintained their normal catch, while the "poor" fishermen also performed
normally. By poor fishermen, I assume the processors were referring to small fishermen
because, based on responses from the Social Indicators sample, they were the only ones
claiming economic harm from the spill. My interviews indicate that the claims of the
small operators are substantiated, at least in part.
Of the waters normally fished by the Chignik fleet, only Chignik Lagoon was open
for salmon fishing during the spill. This created difficulties for the small Chignik
operators because fleets from other villages also were directed to the Lagoon, increasing
the number of boats fishing there. Also, a number of the operators of "smaller" large-
and intermediate-sized boats were forced to fish the Lagoon. Thus, local small
fishermen were faced with overcrowding along with two new sources of competition.
Some of the complaints voiced about the crowded conditions in the lagoon included
(1) interference by other fishermen while setting nets, (2) running over other fishermen's
lines, (3) long queuess for short set periods, (4) pressure to perform at peak


A queue is a waiting line: Although this word is not commonly used in America, I use queue here so the
reader will not confuse a waiting line (queue) with a fishing line (fishing equipmaent).
Chignik - Page 839





proficiency,9 and (5) the luck of the draw left some fishermen with fishing opportunitiesI
when the salmon were not running.
The crowded situation and the unfamiliarity of outside fishermen with the lagoon
increased accidents as well as reports of interference. None of the fishermen with whom
I spoke felt the interference they experienced was intentional; b-ut the effects were real
and harmful, particularly for small fishermen with limited equipment.
The longer queues hurt everyone fishing on the Lagoon. Fishermen not only had
fewer opportunities to set their nets, but the length of time (for each set) they had to fish
also was shortened from "normal" conditions. Additionally, the long queues created
pressure on small fishermen, particularly those with older equipment, because anyI
equipment failures had much greater repercussions than in a normal year. For example,
one resident told me that his engine broke down just prior to one of his turns to set his
nets. Because he could not get out to set, he had to return to the end of the queue. In
normal conditions, he may have been able to get his boat running before im'ssing his turn
and, at the very least, would have had a shorter wait to set his nets following engine
trouble.3
These imnpacts of the longer queues resulted in claims of smaller catches by some
of the operators, particularly the smallest operators. Some evidence for such claims were
substantiated by a tender,10 who reported that she was unable to make as much money
during the spill and, as a result, was able to secure a financial award from Exxon.                    i
VII.B. Economic Consequences for Fishermen
All respondents in the Social Indicators sample who were commercial fishermen,3
either as permit holders or crewmembers, reported a financial loss to household income


9A missed opportunity in the longer queue meant significantly shorter fishing timne; thus, fears of engine
problems or other factors slowing down the boat were increased.

10 A tender is an intermediary in the fishing process. The tender buys fish from the small fishing boats and
then tzransports and sells the fish to the processors. By selling to tender, though for a lower price than is paid
by the proc-essor, the small fishing boat with limited storage capacity can return to the queue quickly and avoid
the long haul to offload fish, which costs time, fuel, and wear and tear on the boat and engine(s). Sales to the
tender are cost beneficial because the loss on the'selling price is made up in quantity. Simply put, for the small
fishermen, less time on the water to fish means less fish caught and less return on investment.I
Chignik - Page 840

as a result of the oil spill. These individuals also indicated that they received little or no
compensation from Exxon. All of the permit holders in the study-sample were smiall
operators, and in each of these households either the respondent or the respondent's
spouse was Native.
The information regarding the financial losses of local fishermen suggests that small
Native fishermen in Chignik incurred greater losses than large fishermen. The small
fishermen had few options and opportunities to compensate for the volume of fish they
could not harvest, yet the debate about harm to these fishermen persists. The small
fishermen feel wronged by the. situation.
My imnpression is that many smal operators did not keep sufficient records to
satisfy Exxon Corporationes requirements for processing legitimate claims to revenue loss
as a result of the spill whereas the larger operators did. It is possible that because the
smaller operators sell to intermediaries while on the water, other things became more
important than what seemed uinnecessarily detailed bookkeeping. Because their records
were insufficient, small operators were left to rely solely on income-tax returns,
something on which most people and businesses attempt to reflect the lowest taxable
income (and most corporations, such as Exxon, also seek to report the lowest possible
income).
'The reliance by small operators on income-tax returns for maldng their Exxon
claims more than liely underrepresented their gross incomes and, subsequently, their
Exxon claims. Moreover, these small operators are less likely to see the need to keep
detailed operating-cost records. On the other hand, large operators sell direct to the
fish-processing plants and may have relied on the fish processors' books, which are kept
by trained managers and accountants. Perhaps documentation for the larger operators
was more easily obtained, although I do not know the so urce of their information. Also,
larger operators, who mainly winter in Kodiak or Seattle, seem to have more experience
dealing with institutional and corporate bureaucracies; a few have' expanded their
business ventures beyond fishing. These experiences made the entire claims process
somewhat more familiar to them and may have given them an additional advantage over
Chignik - Page 841





the small operators. Perhaps this is why the large operators expressed little sympathy forI
the small operators' plight.
Another source of contention for small operators was the bumper harvest
experienced in 1988, which may have produced optimistic views of the profit potential for
1989. Thus, the difference between what the small operator earned and what that
person thought they could have been earned was increased. This most certainly added to
the frustration levels, according to several respondents who were not commercial
fishermen.5
Small operators were not the only affected members of the Chignik fishing
community. Fishing in the lagoon proved detrimental to some of the larger operators as
well. Some boats were too large to be used to fish in the small lagoon. The
consequnences to the largest and smallest operators were not the same, however. The
largest boat operators often were able to secure reasonable financial compensation from
Exxon and/or rent out their boats for cleanup activities. Compensation procedures
appear to have been better suited to business practices characteristic of the largest
operators. The smallest operators not only benefited the least from the compensation3
process, but they also had the narrowest financial margin with which to absorb the losses
of even one disrupted fishing season.5
Among the respondents who reported that they did not lose income as a
consequence of the oil spill were two managers of the local fish-processing plants and a3
commercial fisherman whose major source of income was from employment in the
district's school system. It is not surprising that the processing-plant managers did not5
report losses because they were salaried employees. The commercial fisherman has a
smal operation and participates in fishing as a secondary income source to augment his5
public-sector job. He was able to catch enough fish to meet his 1989 economic needs.
Other respondents who did not report losses as a consequence of the spill were not
engaged in commercial-fishing-related occupations. Two were teachers or administrators
at the school; a-nother worked at the school, and her spouse worked for the city. Two of3
the households that reported no losses were Native.


Chignik - Page 842

VII.C. Social Consequences
Emotional strain from the spill was evident throughout the village. Arguments
persisted regarding the extent or existence of financial loss caused by the oil spill. The
most common argument among the people of Chignik revolved around the conflicting
perception of individual losses resulting from the spill. For example, one person might
claim harmn from the spill while talldng with others, yet another villager would
Uimmediately refute the claim. The school principal noted that most of the disturbances
between children, in town and at school, stemmed from quarrels about a parent's or
relative's "truthful" claim of financial daimage. One parent commented that she noticed
that her children showed signs of anxiety and that intersibling squabbling had increased.
On another level, the conflicts can be seen in socioeconomic terms as well. In
Chignik, there is a tendency to equate large fishing operations with skill. This results in
large operators being seen as good fishermen, while small operators are seen as less
skilled or poor fishermen. This labeling affects both the attitudes and actions of non-
Native operations within the village and permeates the traditional relationships among
village residents. During the spill, period, the "good"/large operators were able to hold
their positions as successful fishermen relative to their home village residents. The
llpoor"/small operators found themselves in a position of powerlessness because their
claims were not legitimized by either the corporations (Exxon and the fish-processing
plants) or sometimes even their own kinsfolk who are large operators.
Tle dynamic between the small operator and large operator is a fragile one. Large
operators, because of their productivity, reportedly receive priority over the small
operators from the fish-processing plants, which in turn provide numerous services
ranging from fuel sales, to boat and engine repair, to loans for capital improvements, to
fishing equipment. The small operators feel this favoritism shown by the processors
keeps them from getting ahead. For example, they reported that if both a large and
small operator need to have an engine repaired, the large operator's boat generally wfll
be repaired first eveni if the small operator comes in first. This places the small operator
at a disadvantage by further fimiting time on the water to fish. Complaints by the small
Chignik - Page 843





operator often are met by plant personnel and large operators with either cost-benefit
reasoning or cynicism regarding the abilities and motivation of the small operator.
The large operators and small operators, though both Natives, appear to have
differing outlooks about fishing. Large operators winter outside of the village and view
fishing as a business venture. From their earnings they sustain dual reside'nces and
reportedly have made additional business investments. Tlese large operators seem well
schooled in the worlings of the cash economy.
Small operators tend to live in the village year-round and view fishing as a means
of acquiring cash to "make it through the winter." A bumper year not only provides for
winter needs but allows the small operator to purchase more luxury goods or take tripsI
outside the village. Small operators did not report a desire to secure large bank
accounts and acquire numerous business investments. Instead, their emphasis was onj
sharing and helping other year-round residents in the village. The Chignmk smal
operator's view of makdng money as a subsistence good is consistent with information5
regarding Native involvement in cash economies reported by respondents from other
Alaska Native villages in the Social Indicators study (Jorgensen 1990:311).
As with any society, there are some differences of attitude and economic
circumstances among the Natives in Chignik. One example is the level of participation3
in the cash economy by Chignikes large and small fishermen operators and the attendant
differential access to resources. These differences in and of themselves are not5
necessarily a negative factor in village life. However, serious misinterpretations about
motivation and work ethic occur when Western market-oriented economic values are5
presumed to apply to any observed differences in behavior. For example, one
interviewee explained that large operators are seen as hardworking and focused. Small3
operators, on the other hand, are seen as not "busting their butts" during the fishing
season in the same way as the larger fishermen. This negative view of the small
operators, who are primarily Native, is compounded by the fact that many of the large
operators also are Natives. 'Me small operators are supposedly content to makeI
"enough"; as a result of this attitude, they are labelled unfocused at best and, at worst, as


Chignik - Page 8441

lazy.'1 This seemingly clear comparison between two Native groups, one motivated
and one not, causes the attitudes of small operators to be misinterpreted as ambivalence.
But such a comparison is not warranted as individuals within the two groups may not
share the same world view about cash, nor do they have the same financial needs.
The crisis resulting from the Exxon Valdez did, however, offer at least one area of
social comity within the village. When threatened by outside forces and abnormal
conditions, the fishermen banded together to present a united front to "outsiders,"
especially Exxon. Newspaper accounts reported that Chignik-a-rea boat operators had
been offered substantially less rental rates by Exxon, via VECO, than similar boat
operators in Kodiak. Responding to this discrepancy, the fishermnen's association,
normally informal, acted formally in securing fair prices for boat rents from Exxon.
Additionally, the association--through the cooperation of its members--organized lotteries
for boat hires and queuing in the Lagoon. Tlese actions reaffirmed the commonality
between fishermen, small and large.
VII.D. Institutional Impacts
On an institutional level, the City of Chignik experienced financial losses through
greatly reduced raw-fish-tax revenues. The two Chignik land-based fish-processing plants
pay a State raw-fish tax on each pound of fish processed. The State then remits one-half
of the amo-unt paid by the two processors to the Chignik city government. In a letter to
Govemnor Hickel, the Chignik city government estimated a portion of its losses in
revenue at over $390,000. The lost tax revenues were to be used for a variety of
purposes. The most prominent use was to be for costly capital-improvement projects
prior to Chignik-s making the full fiscal transition to the newly formed Lake and
Peninsula Borough in 1992. Upon Borough membership, Chignik and all its sister cities
will share in Chignik's raw-fish-tax revenues. While Borough membership will bring
vario-us benefits to Chignik, it will reduce city revenues in the short run. This makes the



 During my fieldwork in other Native villages, primarily in the Bristol Bay and Kodiak regions, non-Native
residents often characterized Native workers as being satisfied with doing a "good enough"' job, rather than
striving for "lexcellence."1
Chignik - Page 845






reimbursement of lost fish-tax revenues due to the spill-induced shortened fishing seasonI
even more important. The institutional losses also included administrative costs of city
officials whose time and energies were syphoned off to deal with the Exxon Valdez oil-
spill crisis. As of winter 1991, the city government had not fully estimated the totals of
these costs. Tle Department of Community and Regional Affairs confirmed that
Chignik village officials did experience increased workloads and long er working daysï¿½
during the crisis and an increase in related administrative duties during the post-spill
period.
Local businesses also suffered adverse effects from the oil spill and the resulting
truncated fishing season. Tle fish-processing plants did less business, as indicated byI
the loss in raw-fish-tax revenues. Additionally,. the plants appear to have suffered
secondary long-term effects as a result of reactions to the spill in the international
salmon market. For example, in February 1991, one of the plants had over $1 million in
product in storage due to market oversupply in Asian markets, particularly in Japan.3
This caused the plant to absorb the storage costs as it waited for more opportune market
prices. At least two factors related to the.Exxon Valdez oil spill may have encouraged
the Japanese stockpiling: (1) the fear of future major spills that would make thern
vulnerable and (2) the ability to buy and store salmon cheaply in 1989 (the spill season)5
and 1990 due to fears of "tainting," which served as leverage for lower salmon prices.
Partially as a result of the Japanese stockpiling, salmon prices for the 1991 season were
expected to remain low, which means lower revenues in the short term for the
processors.3
Chignik's two land-based fish processors expect it will take some time to, recover
losses related to the oil spill, but neither indicated that they were in danger of closing.5
However, a floating processor, which previously operated on Chignik Lagoon, has
withdrawn; and a number of small Chignik operators who formerly contracted with the
floating processor recently have contracted with the Chignik land-based operations.
The local markets also faced several potential impacts related to the oil spill;I
however, the absentee owners were not available for interviews regarding the specifics of


Chignik - Page 8461

profits or losses. First, many of Chignikes year-round residents had less disposable
income to spend at the markets. Second, the truncated fishing season resulted in fewer
numbers of seasonal laborers being needed by the fish-processing plants, and this
reduced the potential clientele at both markets. These potential revenue losses may
have been buffered somewhat by the arrival of Exxon and other spill-related personnel
who lived in Chignik temporarily during the cleanup period.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Chignik has long been impacted by "outside" influences. The presence of the
canneries, which now are fish-processing plants, has been and continues to be a source of
constant influence. Technology and the media also serve to introduce change at a rapid
pace. In the midst of these constant sources of change, the Exxon Valdez oil spill sent a
shock wave of major proportions throughout every facet of this small village.
The spill's closing of the Chignik fisheries resulted in revenue losses to the village
government, local businesses, and individuals. To be sure, these financial losses have
negatively impacted Chignik and will continue to be a factor in the fiscal well-being of
the village. However, what comes to the fore has been the spotlight on the differences
in Chignik, particularly within the Native populatiow: small versus large fishing
operations and year-round versus summer residents, along with Native versus non-Native.
This spotlight extended also to the play and interaction of the village Native children,
jeopardizing long-term relations among them.
In any study such as this, it is easiest to focus on the tangible and thus measurable
effects of a disaster. Tallying the dollars lost, hours worked, and the like does indeed
give us an indication of the damages suffered by a community. Yet, the crisis resulting
from the.Exxon Valdez spill damaged at levels that do not lend themselves to easy
measurements or understanding. In Chignik, the magnification and perhaps acceleration
of the differing world views among Natives in the village represents the dilemma. How
do we, as a society, measure and compensate for lost friendships, increased teasing and
animosity among children, and tension within families brought about by the Exxon
Valdez oil spill?
Chignik - Page 847

I
I
The situation in Chignik gives evidence to the enormity of the Exxon Valdez
disaste r. Beyond the dollars lost in petroleum products, commercial-fishing harvest, and
environmental devastation, the Exxon Valdez spill deeply affected the lives of Chignik's
residents at their core--the interpersonal and kinship relations that are the essence of
Native communities.






































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Refereinces Cited
Bristol Bay Native Association
1990 Annual Report, Directory of Programs and Services. Dillingham: Bristol Bay
Native Association.
Davis, N. Y. (cultural Dynamics, Ltd.)
1986 A Sociocultural Description of Small Communities in the Kodiak-Shumagin
Region. Prepared for USD01, MMS, Alaska OCS Region, Leasing and
Environment Office.

Environmental Services Limited
1982 Chignik community profile. Prepared for Alaska Department of Community
and Regional Affairs, Division of Community PlnIng

Jorgensen, J. G.
1989 The Oil Age Eskidmo. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Morris, J. M.
1987 Fish and Wildlife Uses in Six Alaska Peninsula Communities: Egegik,
Chignik, Chignik Lagoon, Chignik Lake, PerryvilUe, and Ivanof Bay. Prepared for
Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Subsistence, Juneau, AK.

USDOI, BLM
1979 Western Gulf of Alaska. Petroleum Development Scenarios: Kodiak Native
Sociocultural Impacts. Technical Report No. 41. Anchorage: USDOI, BLM,
Alaska OCS Office, Social and Economic Studies Program.

VanStone, James
1976 Eskidmos of the Nushagak River. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Woodbury, Anthony C.
1984 Esldmo and Aleut Languages. In The Handbook of North American Indians.
Vol. 5, Arctic. David Damas, ed. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution.
Chignik - Page 849












As the Nat~~~~~~~~ionspicplcnevto
agency, the Department ofthe Intro
has respons~~~~~~~~~ibltfomotoounai-
ally owned publ~~~~~~ic ad n aua
resources. Th~~~~~~~~isicuefotrnth
wisest use f our land nd water re











prsevn the enatironmeprntial cosratindcl
tual valespniiiyfrms of our nationalpik-n
histouriaplces, Thsanclde prostering frthe
wienjyet oflie thoug outadoadoatr recrea
trsrion. The Denpironmenta andese ourle-


ergy and mineral resources and works
to assure that their development is in theI
best interest of all our people. The De-
partment also has a major responsibility
for American Indian reservation com-
munities and for people who live in IslandI
Terriories under U.S. Administration.




3 6668 00000 9375