[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]
OCS Study
MMS 92-0052
Technical Report No. 155                             Contract No. 14-12-0001-30300



Property of CSC LIbraE



Social Indicators Study of Alaskan Coastal Villages






IV. Postspill Key Informant Summaries

Schedule C Communities, Part 1
(Cordova, Tatitlek, Valdez)


U. S  DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE NOAA
COASTAL SERVICES CENTER
2234 SOUTH HOBSON AVENUE
CHARLESTON, SC 29405-2413


Submitted to:

U.S. Department of the Interior
Minerals Management Service
Alaska OCS Region
Anchorage, Alaska


Human Relations Area Files
February 1993
i~
Im e

I -

_   y-

This report has been reviewed by the Minerals Management Service and
approved for publication. Approval does not signify that the contents
necessarily reflect the views and the policies of the Servce, nor does mention
of trade names or coTmmercial products constitute endorsement or
recommendation for use.








Alaska OCS Environmental Studies Program


Social Indicators Study of Alaskan Coastal Villages
IV. Postspi]11 Key Informant Summaries. Schedule C Communities, Part 1.




Human Relations Area Files
New Haven, Connecticut









Prepared by Joanna Endter-Wada, Jon Hofmeister, Rachel Mason, Steven McNabb, Eric
Morrison, Stephanie Reynolds, Edward Robbins, Lynn Robbins, and Cur-tiss Takada Rooks.
Joseph Jorgensen was the principal investigator and project manager. The authors
appreciate the efforts of the Mlinerals Management Service technical editors in Anchorage
Who helped edit this report.
Febiuary 1993

Table of Contents
Table of Contents ......... ..................................

Acronyms ..................................................

Glossary ...................................................

INTRODUCTION
........   V
.......  xv
I.  Overview .......................................
A. General ...................................
... . .. . ......5
. ... .. . . .....5
 B.    Alaska Social Indicators Research Design ...... ..........
.......  7
Organization of the KI Summaries ..................
II.

mII
 
..............    11
Socioeconomic Characteristics of Schedule C Communities
... 13
IV.   Schedule C Social Indicators Analysis: Selected Results of
Exxon Valdez Items .............................

V.  Discussion ....................................
...............16

...............21
References Cited ....................................
25
MIXED COMMUNITIES

VALDEZ
I. Overview .............................
A. History ..........................
B.	Early History to the Earthquake .......
C.	Valdez: Descriptive Overview .........
33
33
33
41

45
45
53
56
61
63
68
.......




.......
..... ..
.......
o..........

...........

...........

...........




.o.........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
H. The Economy ..............................
A.   The Valdez Economy: Brief Overview ........
B. Transport ..............................
C.	Commercial Fishing .......................
D.	Fish Processing .........................
E. Food and Lodging/Tourism/Boat Charter ......
F.   The Public Sector ........................
V

I
I
Table of Contents (continued)
I
II.  The
G.
H.
I.

HI. The
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
Economy (continued)
Small Businesses ........................................
Housing .............................................
Conclusion ...........................................

Sociology of the Spill and its Effects .........................
Social Relations, Social Tensions, and the Spill ................
Jobs, Oil, Economic Institutions, and Social Divisions ............
Development, the Environment, and Social Conflict in Valdez.
The Spill: Divisions and Conflicts ..........................
The Problems of Stress ..................................
Crime ...............................................
The Spill: Perceptions and Understandings ...................
Community Involvement With the Oil Industry .................
Commitment and Investment in Valdez ............... .......
.... 69
.... 72
.... 75
I
.... 77
.... 77
.... 78
.... 89
.... 92
.... 98
... 104
... 108
... 116
... 120
I
I
I
I
References Cited.
...... 126

EFFECTS OF THE 1989 EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL ON CORDOVA  I
I
I. Introduction ...........................................
A. Cordova .........................................
Historical Overview .................................
Eyak ........................................
Chugach Eskimo ...............................
Non-Native Economy ...........................
Development of the Fishing Industry .............
Activism and Formal Organizations .............
Fishi;ng as a Wav of Lif ................
....... 133
....... 135
....... 135
....... 136
....... 137
....... 138
....... 139
....... 141
1
..1
42
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Population and Demography .................................
Social Organization ........................................
Subsistence.
Cordova's Economy ........................................
Fishing .............................................
The Seafood Processing Industry ..........................
Government .........................................
Retail Trade and Service Sector ..........................
Transportation, Communications, and Utilities ................
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate .......................
Construction .........................................
143
147
148
151
153
160
163
164
165
165
165
vi
I
I

Table of Contents (continued)
Cordova's Economy (continued)
Tourism ........................................... 165
Forestry ............................................ 166
Oil, Gas, and Coal Development ..........................
	16
8
Science and Education .................................
	16
9
Deep Water Port ...................................... 169
Copper River Highway ................................. 169
Bearing River Road ................................... 169
Future Economic Trends .................................... 170
II.  Alaska Natives in Cordova ................................
A. Population........................................
B.	Cultural Identity ...................................
C.	Organizational Complexity ............................
D.	Economic Development Policies .......................
Views on Resource Development .......... .............
Eyak Corporation ..................................
Chugach Region ...................................
Fishing ..........................................
E.	Struggles Over Land Conveyances ......................
F.	Eyak-Anglo Social Relations ..........................
Discrimination and Segregation ........................
G.	Political and Economrnic Relations: Cordova-Eyak ..........
H.	Effects of the 1989 Oil Spill
...........................
Summary .........................................
.......
172
....... 174
.......	176
.......	186
.......	188
.......	188
.......	195
.......	196
.......	197
.......	197
.......	201
.......	202
.......	205
.......	207
....... 225
III.  Effects of the 1989 Oil Spill on the Fishing Community ..
A. First Response .............................
B.   Conflicts Generated by the Spill Cleanup .........
Fishermen Become Oil Cleanup Contractors ......
Conflicts Over Cleanup Money ...............
Conflicts Over Contracts .....................
Conflicts Over Changes in Fishing ..............
Health Hazards ............................
The Cleanup Does More Harm than Good .......
226
233
240
240
242
244
247
249
251
...............
...............
...............
...............
...............
...............
...............
...............
...............
vii

I
I
Table of Contents (continued)
C. Fish Claims .............................................. 253
1989: A Record Year ........................................ 253
Exxon's Voluntary Settlement Policy ........................... 253
Low Fish Prices ....................................... 259
Low Fish Quality ...................................... 264
Fish Quantities .......................................268
Exxon Claims Advances ................................. 272
A Case Example ...................................... 279
The TAPAA Fund ......................................... 281
D.   The Hatcheries: Prince William Sound Aquaculture ............... 283
General Background ....................................... 283
The Oil Spill .................... 286
E. Cleaned Beaches .......................................... 292
F. Alyeska Contingency Plans for Future Spills ...................... 303
G. Competition With Valdez ................................... 306
H. Environmental Ethics ...................................... 309
I
I
I
I
I
I
IV.  Private Sector Economic Impacts of the Oil Spill (Non-fishing) ............
A. Introduction .............................................
B. Labor Shortages ..........................................
C. Housing Shortages .........................................
D. Gasoline ................................................
E. Conflicts Within the Business Community .......................
F.  Conflicts Between VECO and Local Business Owners ..............
G. Fish Processors ...........................................
Bankruptcy of the Copper River Fishermen's Cooperative ...........
Background ..............................................
The Oil Spill and the Coop's Bankruptcy ........................
H. Fishing Gear Suppliers .....................................
I. Hotels and Motels ...........
J. Grocery Stores and Food Suppliers ............................
K. Childcare Providers ........................................
Conflicts Within the Childcare Community .......................
316
316
321
322
323
324
344
345
345
345
346
349
354
362
366
370
373
378
383
393
I
I
I
I
I
I
e*.$..e*ooeee$s..
e....o.o.....oeo.
**ee,ee.e*a.e....
V. City
A.
B.
C.
Government Impacts ......................
Cordova as Spill Cleanup Contractor ..........
Other Costs .............................
Political Controversies: The Suit Against the City
I
I
I
viii
I
I

Table of Contents (continued)

VI. Summary............................412
A. City Government Impacts...................412
Cordova as Spill Cleanup Contractor...............413
B.   Private Sector Economic Impacts of the Oil Spill (Non-Fishing).....413
Conflicts Between VECO and Local Businesses...........414
C. Impacts to the Fishing Community................414
The Oil Spill Cleanup.....................414
Fishermen Become Oil Cleaniup Contractors..........414
Conflicts Over Cleanup Money...............415
Conflicts Over Contracts..................415
Health Hazards.....415
The Cleanup Does More Har Than' G'o'o'd...........415
Conflicts Over Fish Claims ..................415
The Hatcheries: Prince William Sound Aquaculture Corporation ....417
Cleaned Beaches ......................417
D. Spill Impacts on Alakan Natives in Cordova............417
References Cited.......................

P FERIEPHERY NATIVE COMMvUNiTIES

TATITLEK

Table of Contex-ts
....419
I. Preface.............................429

HI. Background ....................I.......430

HII. Effects of the.Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Through 1991 ............431
A. The Economy........................431
B. Perceptions of Fault for the Oil Spill ...............432
C. Human Intervention .....................432
D. Subsistence.........................433
E. Leadership .........................435

References Cited...........................436
ix

Acronyms
AANHS
ABE
ACES
ADCRA

ADF&G
ADH&SS

ADOC
ADOT&PF
Alaska Area Native Health Service
Adult Basic Education
Alaska Community Engineering Services
Alaska Department of Community and Regional
Affairs
Alaska Departmaent of Fish and Game
Alaska Department of Health and Social
Services
Alaska Department of Corrections
Alaska Department of Transportation and
Public Facilities
Alaska Department of Labor
Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission
Alaska Federation of Natives
Areas Meriting Special Attention
Administration for Native Americans
Alaska Native Claim Settlement Act
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
Alaska National Wildlife Refuge
Alaska Outer Continental Shelf Social Indicators Study
Alaska State Housing Authority
Arctic Slope Regional Corporation
Association of Village Council Presidents
Arctic Women in Crisis
Bristol Bay Area Health Corporation
Bristol Bay Housing Authority
Bristol Bay Native Association
Bristol Bay Native Corporation
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Land Managenient
Bering Straits Native Association
Bering Straits Native Corporation
Bering Strait School District
Bethel Village Native Corporation
circa
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
Community Health Aide
Capital Improvements Program
Crisis Intervention Response Team
Coastal Management Corporation
Consumer Price Index
ADOL
AEWC
AFN
AMSA's
ANA
ANCSA
ANTILCA
ANWR
AOSIS
ASHA
ASRC
AVCP
AWLC
BBAHC
BBHA
BBNA
BBNC
BIA
BLM
BSNA
BSNC
BSSD
BVNC
ca.
CETA
CHA
CIP
CIRT
CMC
CPI
xi

I


Acronyms (continued)                                         I

CRSA	Coastal Resource Service Area
DOL	U.S. Department of Labor
DWI	driving while intoxicated
EDA	Economic Development Administration
E~~~~~~~~~~~~~IS
ELS	Environmental Impact Statement
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
F.I.R.E.	Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
FAA ~~~~~~~~~~~~I
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FCZ	Fisheries Conservation Zone
FTE	Full-time equivalent
FWS	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
FY	Fiscal Year
HESS	Health, Education, and Social Services (Task Force)
HS	High School
HUD	Housing and Urban Development (U.S.)
ICAS	Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope
ICWA	Indian Child Welfare Act
IHS	Indian Health Service
IRA	Indian Reorganization Act
ISER	Institute of Social and Economic Research
KANA	Kodiak Area Native Association
KCA	Kodiak Council on Alcoholism
KCC	Kuskokwim Community College
KDC	Kikiktagruk Development Corporation
KI	Key Informant
KIC	Kikiktagruk Inupiat Corporation
KTC	Kodiak Tribal Council
KVSN	Kodiak Village Services Network
MMS	Minerals Management Service
NAB	Northwest Arctic Borough
NANA	Northwest Alaska Native Association Corporation
NOL's	Net Operating Losses
NSB	North Slope Borough
NSHC	Norton Sound Health Corporation
NWASD	Northwest Arctic School District
NWTC	Northwest Tribal Council
I
OCS	Outer Continental Shelf
OED	Office of Economic Development (U.S.)
OEDP	Overall Economic Development Plan
P.L. ~~~~~~~~~~~I
P.L.	Public Law
PHS	Public Health Service
1

I

Acronyms (continued)

QI	Questionnaire Informant
REAA	Rural Education Attendance Area
RELI	Resident Employment and Living Improvements
(program)
S.A.F.E.	Safe and Fear-Free Environment
SIC	Standard Industrial Classification
SOS	State-Operated School
SRC,	Social Rehabilitation Center
SWAMC	Southwest Alaska Municipal Conference
U.S.	United States
U.S.S.R.	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UIC	Unemployment Insurance Compensation
UIC	Ukpeagvik Inupiat Corporation
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
USDOI	United States Department of the Interior
VECO	VECO, Inc.
VPSO	Village Public Safety Officer
XCED	Cross-Cultural Education Development
(program)
YKHC                             Yukon-Kuskokwim Health Corporation
XiI
I

I
I
Glossary
Affines
Kin who are related through marriage; "in-
,laws" without a blood-relationship.
I
I
Avunculate
A privileged relationship with an uncle (often
including residence in an uncle's home).

A non-lineal kinship system in which the
families of the mother and father are not
differentiated, nor are the children of brothers
and sisters.

In social science termiinology, a group of
persons who comprise a distinct sample defined
by properties such as age.
I
Bilateral
I
Cohort
I
I
Colaterals
Siblings of core members of a Idnship group
(such as a nuclear family) and children of one's
own siblings.
I
Consanguines
Kin who are related by blood (in contrast to
affines).
Deme
An intermiarrying population that forms a
sociopolitical unit.
Dendrogram
A "tree diagram" that depicts relative degrees of
relatedness and distance.
I
Emic
Refers to facts that are defined in terms of
their cultural classifications.
Intermarriage within one's own bounded social
group.
Endogamy
Etic
Refers to objective facts whose reality is
independent of cultural classifications.
I
Exogamy
Marriage outside one's own bounded social
group.
I
I
X]i
v
I
I

Glossary (continued)
A technique for dating divergence of languages
or dialects, based on rates of retention of
common words.
GLottochronology
An Eskimo mens' house, usually used also for
ceremonial purposes; this term is associated
with Yupik societies (the Ifiupiaq variant is
usually rendered as qargi).
A group of persons related to a common ego in
a cognatic descent system; such persons are not
all related to one another inasmuch as they are
defined in terms of their relationship to a single
person (i.e., such a system is ego-focused as
opposed to ancestor-focused systems).

A unilineal descent (kinship) system that
defines relatedness and group membership by
common descent through females.
Kashim




Kindred






Matrilineal
Matrilocal
Post-marriage residence with or close to a
woman's mother's kin.
Neolocal
Unrestricted post-marriage residence (i.e.,
spouses may reside where they choose).
Inflammation of the middle ear.
Otitis media
Patrician



Patrideme
A corporate descent group, usually named,
often consisting of several lineages and jointly
controlling property and/or privileges, defined
by common descent through males.
An intermarrying population that forms a
sociopolitical unit organized around patrilineal
kin groups.
Patrilineal
A unilineal descent (kinship) system that
defines relatedness and group membership by
common descent through males.
xv

I

Glossary (continued)                                              I

Patrilocal                                 Postmarriage residence with or close to a man's
father's kin.                                             I
Sodality                                   An association or society (note: society in lay
or generic terms, not society in social science           I
terms).
Syncretic                                 Refers to the merging or fusion of differing
concepts, principles, or philosophies.
Virilocal                                  Postmarriage residence with or close to
husband's kin.
I
!
!
I
!
!
!
!
!
!
xvi
I

Postspill Key Informant Summaries

Introduction






Steven McNabb

INTRODUCTION

Table of Contents'
I.    Overview ............................................ 5
A. General .................................................5
B.  Alaska Social Indicators Research Design .......................7
II. Organization of the KI Summaries ................................ 1t
m11.	Socioeconomic Characteristics of Schedule C Communities .............. 13

IV.	Schedule C Social Indicators Analysis: Selected Results of
Exxon Valdez Items ...........................................16

V. Discussion ..................................................21
References Cited ..................................................25
List of Tables

Table 1. Perceived Changes in Game and Fish Populations Subsequent to Spill

Table 2. Domestic Economic Consequences of the Spill .................

Table A. Schedule C Sample Characteristics, Questionnaire Only ..........
... 17

.... 19




...l 24
List of Maps

Map 1. Schedule C Study Region .......................................7













1This table of contents (TOC) reflects only the Key Informant (KI) summaries for Schedule C communities
in Part 1. There is a separate TOC as a guide to the KI summaries of the other Schedule C communities in Part
2 (Kenai, Seldovia, Tyonek, Kodiak City, Karluk, Old Harbor, and Chignik Bay).

Introduction
I . OVERVIEW
I.A. General
Two years before the infamous foundering of the Exxon Valdez on Bligh Reef,
the Minerals Managerment Service contracted a large social indicators project among 30
coastal Alaskan villages from Kodiak Island in the south to Kaktovik on the arctic coast.
The research team created a sampling design for this large study with the sole intention
of providing valid analyses of the consequences of exogenous factors, including oil-
related factors, on village economies, societies, and households. The design is complex,
embracing several data sets drawn from several samples interviewed over four research
waves. The design is simplified here for quick comprehension.'
in 1988, while conducting the second year of field research pursuant to the
original research design, we made our firSt Tesearch visits below the Alaska Peninsula,
conducting interviews in the villages of Kodiak City and Old Harbor. We retumned to
those villages again in the winter of 1989, completing our second wave of research there
only days b efore the North Slope crude oil began spewing from the raptured hull of the
Exxon Valdez. Tle oil slick and,blobs of oil began washing up on Kodiak Island
beaches only 3 weeks after the foundering. None of the Prince William Sound, Cook
Inlet, and Alaska Peninsula villages directly affected by the oil, other than Kodiak City
and Old Harbor, were included in our 30-village samnple.
On an emergency basis, the Minerals Managerment Service moved as fast as
possible to secure funds to study the affected villages. As a consequence, our research
assignments increased in size and became more complex. O'ur research design was
modified and our inquiry expanded to determine the consequences of the spill to the
residents of the affected villages. (Endnote 1)





'The research designs, for the original S'ocial Indic-ators project begun in 1987 and for the Exxon Valdez spill
area project begun in 1989 are explicated ftuly in Social Indicators Project 11. Research Methodology. Design,
Sampling, Reliability, and Validity (1993), and Social Indicators Project V. Research Methodology. Design,
Sampling, Reliability, and Validity for Villages Affected by the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (1993).
Introduction - Page 5





Although we had been to the Kodiak Island villages in February, we returned inI
the summer of 1989. We also studied eight Cook Inlet, Prince William Sound, and
Alaska Peninsula villages and--as control groups--two small villages that had not been
directly affected by the spill, one in the Aleutians and one up the Nushagak River in
Bristol Bay. Tle data we had collected in Kodiak City and Old Harbor prior to the spill
provide an important baseline for the postspill analysis of Kodiak Island comrmunities.
We were not so fortunate for other villages in the spill area.
In the initial phase of the Social Indicators Study, we established Schedule A and
B datasets. Schedule A consists of sample communities in the North Slope, NANA,
Calista, and Aleutian-Pribilof Islands regions. Schedule B consists of sample3
communities in the Bering Straits, Bristol Bay, and Kodiak regions (see Human
Relations Area Files 1992a and b). Comprising Schedule C are communities in the
Kodiak, Prince Williarn Sound, and Cook Inlet regions that are part of the oil-spill
component of the study. The Schedule C reports (Part I and 2) present ethnographic
summaries of selected communities in the spill zone. Map I depicts the Schedule C
study area.
This introduction describes the political-economic contexts of the State and the
regions in which Schedule C communities are located. 'Me political-econonuc contexts3
are instrumental in allowing us to account for several key social and economic relations
that shape Schedule C commrunities. The KI summaries that follow the introduction are3
descriptive ethnographies of spill-affected villages that provide substantial detail beyond
the information provided here. We do, however, provide some results from the first3
wave of research in Schedule C communities subsequent to the spill in 1989 that will
facilitate understanding of the village ethnographies that follow.3
The sample communities of Schedule C are Valdez, Cordova, Tatitlek, Seldovia,
Kodiak, Old Harbor, Chignik, Sand Point, Unalaska, Saint Paul, False Pass, Nikolsli,I
Atka, Dillingham, Togiak, Manokotak, Naknek, Kenai, Tyonek, and Ekwok. Karluk, on
Kodiak Island, was added during 1990. Tatitlek was studied only once in 1989. The3
comnuunities identified above that are in the Bristol Bay and Aleutian-Pribilof Islands
regions north of the Alaska Peninsula were sampled mainly as "controls"' for the oil-

Introduction - Page 63

- I     - - -                                                                                                 ' -   - - :r     - - m-  -







Map Location



I                                                To Anc e horage  aldez
Tyonek

enai



* Ekwok	Seldovi





isii o~ S~ H~arluk	odiak Kd

-.a	'5|	Old Harbor

_ "                 Chignik              ~
SCHEDULE C
COMMUNmES





affected villages. They are s eparated from the villages most intensely affected by theI
physical oil spill. The villages north of the Alaska Peninsula could be viewed as having
not received the "intervention"' or "treatment" (i.e., physical oil spill) in experimental
terms, although such a view would disregard social and economic consequences to
persons residing in areas adjacent to the spii1. Two new control communities (Ekwok
and False Pass) were added in 1989; the other control communities (Sand Point,
Unalaska, St. Paul, Nikolsld, Atka, Dillingham, Togiak, Manokotal-, and Naknek) were
drawn from existing Schedule A and B samples. In our subsequent waves of research,
2~~
the control communities were eliminated for logistical, cost, and scientific reasons.2
Schedule C communities can be divided into groups on the basis of geographic proximity
and administrative boundaries (see Map 1). Prince William Sound communities are
identified as Cordova, Valdez, and Tatitlek. Cook Inlet communities are Tyonek,I
Seldovia, and Kenai. Kodiak communities are Kodiak, Old Hfarbor, Karluk, and
Chiignik.3
I.B. Alaska Social Indicators Research Design
Each village is studied at several points in time to determiine whether changesg
have occurred among the items that we measure between research waves. To select
villages for our samnples, we classified all villages in the spill area by several "theoretical
contrasts." This is called "stratifying" a universe that we intend to sample. We wanted to
make sure that each of the village types we considered to be theoretically important5
would be included in our sample. For example, commercial fishing is extremely
important in some villages in the spill area, but not all.I





2 The study team quickldy discovered that the social and economic effects of the spifl extended far beyond
the area of physical contamination. The ANCSA regional corporation that secured the greatest volume of oil-I
spill-cleanup employment, for example, was NANA in northwest Alaska. Other evidence (such as the shipment
of subsistence salmon to affected communities from Togiak and possible commercial-fishing impacts as far north
as Unalakleet) supports our concern that the definition of "controlr communities is quite complex. We
abandoned the concept as a feature of Schedule C research design, although we continue to examine the
characteristics of communities distant from the spill from time to time.

3 Chignik is not aligned with Kodiak Island in an institutional sense, but it is adjacent to thi area.
Introduction - Page 8

To account for these differences in villages, one of the primary features we used
to classify villages before selecting our sample was whether they gained more than 60
percent or whether they gained less than 40 percent (there w as nothing in between) of
their total incomes from commercial fishing-related businesses. We refer to the different
types of villages as "theoretical contrasts" between Commercial Fishing, and
Noncommercial Fishing villages. We also classified as Bjbjï¿½I villages that (1) had well-
developed transportatio'n services and complex and well-developed infrastructues and
(2) provided many services; and we contrasted these Hubs with Periphei villages that
had (1) poorly developed transportation services, (2) modest infrastructures, and.(3) few
services. We classified villages along other dimensions, but those we have mentioned
should make the point. Every village in the spill area was classified along each of the
above dimensions we created as "theoretical contrasts." When we selected villages for
our sample, we assured that each half of each theoretical contrast (for instance,
Commercial Fishing/Noncommercial Fishing and Hub/Periphery) was represented by
several villages. The contrasts allowed us to determine whether the oil spill affe-cted
sinmilar types of villages in similar ways, and possibly why those effects would be s'imiar
(or different).
The research design also calls for a "Pretest" sample comprising respondents
interviewed once and only once, and al,"Posttest" sample--conducted at a later date--
comprising respondents who have not been interviewed previously and who are
interviewed once and only once.
To accomplish this, in the summer of 1989--after selecting the sample villages--we
entered each study village, mapped all of the housing structures in the village, and
assigned a number to each house. Next, we consulted a table of random numbers and
selected a sample from all of the occupied housing structures; and then we interviewed
an adult in each house. During that first research wave after the spill, we carefully noted
each household that was selected for the sample by location and number. We did so
because the postspill sample of 1989 is actually a "Pretest Sample" in our research
design. To call a sample a "Pretest" (even though it is postspill), anticipates that we will
draw a "Posttest Sample" at a later date. In our research design, we took care to make
Introduction - Page 9






sure that persons drawn for the "Pretest" samnple were not selected again and interviewedI
in the "Posttest" sample.
We assured that pretest respondents did not appear in the posttest samples by
"inot replacing" the pretest households into the population from which we drew our
posttest samnple. This was easily accomplished by checking our original'maps and not
selecting any house that had been selected for the pretest sample. Additionally, if a
pretest respondent had relocated and that person's household was then selected for the
posttest sample, we simply did not reinterview that person or anyone else in the house.3
This procedure is called "sampling without replacement": once interviewed, a person is
not returned to the samnple to be selected again. We followed this procedure so that weI
could avert the problem of "reactivity," meaning that a person's response may be
conditioned by a previous response to the same question--hence introducing subjective3
bias into the results.
It is important to note that although we have just claimed that we selected a5
"Posttest" sample from a population that excluded all "Pretest" respondents, we also took
care to interview some respondents as many as four times, others three, and some two.3
Persons selected for reinterview comprise "Panels." We created our panels through the
following process: We had the names and house locations of each respondent in each3
pretest sample, so when we returned to a village to select and interview a posttest
sample, we both selected the posttest sample and drew at randoin a small sample of3
re-spondents from the pretest sample that we had interviewed the previous year. The
smal samples, or panels, comprise about 30 percent of the original pretest respondents.
We asked these 30 percent the identical questions we had asked them the previous year.
And if we retumned a third time, we asked these identical respondents the identical
questions for a third timne. In this fashion we could determine whether changes had
occurred to a subsample of respondents from our original pretest sample. But we '
couldn't know whether any differences we discovered represented changes that had
occurred, unless we could compare responses of panel members with responses ofI
persons interviewed in the posttest samples. The comparisons of panels with pretest and
posttest samples, then, gave us a means to test threats to validity posed by reactivity,I

Introduction - Pag'e 105

regression, and other factors. If those threats do not materialize, we are able to account
for change.
Our research design, which employs an objective instrument--a forced-choice
questionnaire--also employs a more subjective instrument--which is a rather open-ended
protocol, or list of topics about which informants respond. Respondents to
questionnaires must choose among a set of predetermined choices for each question, but
the protocol, respondent can provide expansive answers to questions. It is incumbent'
upon the researcher to classify the responses of, the persons they interview. It is evident
that the protocol is more subjective than the questionnaire, but it is also deeper and
allows for greater understanding than the questionnaire. The objective strength of a
questionnaire can be lessened through the trivializing of topics. In our design, we
compensate for the weaknesses of the questionnaire with the strengths of the protocol,
and vice versa.
II. ORGANIZATION OF THE KI SUMMARIES
The Schedule C KI summaries are organized as two documents. One is devoted
to Prince William Sound and the other to- Cook Inlet and the Kodiak Island area. These
summaries focus on communities (in contrast to Schedule A and B summnaries for the
first phase of the MMS Social Indicators study, which focused on samples of communities
within regions). In part, this organization of reports is merely convenient. -The
Summaries are too long to collect in a single docurment, and two documents make
packaging easier. The organization also is logical: one document focuses on
communities adjacent to the Exxon Valdez spill itself, and another addresses
communities some hundreds of kilometers away. Tlis section also explains in more
detail the aspect of organization described in Section 1--the division of commnunities into
Hikib~ n   eihr villages. Additionally, Nativ  and .Mixe villages are discussed.
Schedule A and B Social Indicator research clearly showed that Hubs and
Peripher villages behaved differently along many paramneters. As stated in Section IL
this contrast (HLub versus !E~Ph y) is one of the principal theoretical contrasts used in
our analysis. Hubs are centers of administrative and economic infrastructure. They are
socially complex in terms of ethnic and economiic cross-sections; generally display greater
Introduction - Page 11

internal diversity as well as disparity at domestic and institutional levels; and control
larger shares of regional resources, especially jobs and revenues. Peripher villages tend
to be more homogeneous; are more likely to have large Alaska Native populations; are5
served by hubs in terms of utilities, transportation, and services; and are relatively
impoverished compared to hubs. Hubs tend to be villages whose populations a're more
than 25 percent non-Native (Mixed), and Peripher villages tend to be more than 75
percent Native (Native). The Native versus Mixed contrast is therefore similar, but
empirically the contrast produces somewhat d ifferent (though complementary)
distinctions. Analyses of Native villages expose pronounced economic, environmental,
and cultural differences rooted in Alaska Native ideologies about the land, reso-urces andI
their uses (most notably, sharing of those resources), and social cooperation. Those
distinctions are evident in Peripher villages because they are often Native villages, butI
they are not defining features of the periphery.
The sizes of the KI summaries for Hubs and Mixed communities (such as Kenai
and Valdez) are immense in comparison with the reports for smaller villages. We are
concerned that this difference in sheer volume may suggest that the large communities
are somehow more important. This is not so; the larger conumunities required a longer
term of field research because they are larger, hence the results of that field effort (more3
interviews, more observations, and more collected reports and other secondary data from
the commnunity) require longer descriptive reports. To give appropriate attention to the3
Native and Peripher communities, the KI summnaries for those villages are assembled
separately in each volume, resulting in a tandem and balanced organization of textI
despite the uneven sizes of the individual reports. So for each area in the Schedule C
region, we have created a parallel set of chapters. For Prince William Sound (Part 1),5
chapters for Valdez (Rub, Mixed) and Cordova (Periphery, Mixed) are mnatched by a
separate chapter for Tatitlek (Periphery, Native); for Cook Inlet and Kodiak (Part 2),3
chapters for Kodiak City and Kenai (Rub, Mixed) are matched by separate chapters for
Tyonek, Seldovia, Karluk, Old Harbor, and Chignik (Periphery, Native).




Introduction - Page 123

1II. SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SCHEDULE C COMMUNITIES
Social impacts are seldom experienced uniformly. Social categories that generally
are salient in social systems often are salient in specific instances of social change; in this
case, change prompted by an industrial disaster. For example, social impacts often vary
by age and sex (Freudenburg 1984). To the extent that impacts place strains on
domestic income, affect patterns of expenditures, or impose stress on municipal services
and infrastructures, one would expect to detect differential impacts on persons,
households, and communities that vary along those dimnensions. Analyses of our data
already have revealed clear differences in the effects of government policies and
programs in site communities that correlate with socioeconornic characteristics of those
commnunities (McNabb 1990). Thus, it seems reasonable to exarmine the characteristics
of sites before seeling to interpret social impacts. Here we offer, some general
observations abo'ut Schedule C communities based on our research.
There is one commnon denominator among the Schedule C comimunities, and that
is the role of household transfers--welfare, such as Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC)--and government funds that support transfer jobs--the cook in the
school kitchen, the postmaster, the teacher's aide. Oil revenues collected by the State
pay for most of these jobs. Yet Schedule C communities also exhibit great economic
diversity. Most importantly, there are fundamental differences among these communities
based on private enterprise. Where private-sector opportunities are abundant and
private-sector incormes are high, commnercial fisheries are often prorninent. Commercial
fishing and private-sector enterprise are closely related in much of rural Alaska. Some
communities with significant petroleum-industry employment--such as Valdez and Kenai--
have notable commIercial fisheries, but they are miinor compared with other private-
sector economic activity. Our analyses show that the "oil towns" (Kenai and Valdez) are
sociologically distinct from other sample communities.
Differences in the local, prevailing mix of private-sector and public-sector
opportunities are underlined by differences in the distribution of unemployment
compensation in rural Alaska. Bear in mind that unemploymnent insurance compensation
(UIC) is paid only to persons who worked during specified annual quarters, hence not all
Introduction - Page 13

unemlplyed persons are classed as unemployed.4 Unemployment compensation is a
measure of the breadth and diversity of local economies in rural Alaska. If people don't
have the opportunity to work for several quarters, they won't receive UIC, even if they
are unemployed. Transfers that fund many of the most desirable jobs in rural towns--the
school janitor, cook, teachers' aides, health aides, postmaster--comprise a relatively
uniform common denominator among all villages. If those persons are laid off or fired,
they will receive UIC. But their numbers are low overall. The UIC levels represent
levels of unemployment only in the presence of a strong and stable private sector. Most.
rural villages do not have strong and stable private sectors, but the larger hubs with
relatively significant fisheries econom-ies--such as Cordova and Kodiak--and "oil towns"--
such as Kenai and, Valdez--show higher levels of UIC (controlling for population
differences) (see Alaska Department of Revenue 1985, 1988). The fisheries econom
per se (or the petroleum induistry) does not account for this pattern alone. Rather, the
secondary and tertiary industries supported through or related to fisheries or petroleum
do. These include chandlery operations, repair and services, groceries, to urism,
construction, light manufacturing, and miscellaneous services rarnging from barbers to
veterinarians.
Government transfers are a crucial source of funds that support both private- and
public-sector activity, and those transfers are not uniform among the villages, nor are
they uniform for any one village over time (Alaska Department of Conumunity and
Regional Affairs 1989). These fluctuations are predictable. State revenues underwrite a
wide range of activities and services. The rather uniform comrnon denominator arnong
revenues received by all communities--municipal assistance and other entitlement
programs fuinded on a per capita basis--doesn't lead to a common pattern of fuinding
overall. The reason for the variation is that'entitlement programs comprise a relatively




4See McNabb (1989). This study contrasts "real" and "official" unemployment in northwest Alaska, showing
that both discouraged unemployed persons and some unemployed persons who are seeking employment are
eliminated from the official roll of the "unemployed." Those official rolls always ignore the discouraged
unemployed who no longer seek employment, but active job seekers are supposed to be classed as unemployed.
Introduction - Page 14

modest source of funds. In these comparisons, they are counterbalanced by substantial
revenues that are subject to the great fluctuation: capital-improvement grants.
These grants pay for airport improvements, new roads and schools, utility services,
municipal buildings, flood-control projects, and a wide range of other improvements wit
a high front-end cost that few if any communities can afford without assistance. Tlese
improvements are funded in pulses by the legislature and are tightly governed by the
availability of oil revenues. In addition, they represent political decisions and powerful
constituencies that may be better positioned to advocate and then secure large capital
improvements. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, these improvements also provide
jobs. It is one of the fascinating ironies of life in Alaska that residents receive free in-
kind transfers (new schools, utilit ies, and the like) and, in some communities, get paid to
install them, too.5 Although capital-improvement grants are erratic and one small
village may receive far in excess of its pro rated share one year, larger communities tend
to receive disproportionate capital revenues and operating expenses (including
entitlements).
In sociological terms, Alaskan hubs are "central places" that exhibit "urban bias,"~
which entails disproportionate growth in the tertiar (administrative, government
support) sector and a pattern of reinforcing feedback in the economny that tends to
increase their domination of periphery communities and place ever higher demands on
State coffers. The basic dilemrna of economic life in rural Alaska is very limited real
and sustainable economic growth; perpetual reliance on-transfers and (indirectly) oil
revenues; and uneven, erratic patterns of opportunity in rural comnmunities that have only
the slightest connection to concrete economic assets, such as a labor force or demand for
goods and services. Where they exist in any abundance, private-sector opportunities tend.
to be secondary offshoots of public-sector activity or the one key private-sector industry:







In small villages, the, available labor force may not be used for a variety of reasonis, and this indirect
benefit probably is most pronounced in large towns and cities.
Introduction - Page 15






fishing. The fishing communities are therefore in a unique category for our purposes.65
T'his brings us to the rationale for the Schedule C program: the Exxon Valdez oil spill.
IV.  SCHEDULE C SOCLAL INDICATORS ANALYSIS: SELECTED RESULTS OFI
EXXON VALDEZ ITEMS
Several questionnaire items seek to measure self-reported changes that areU
directly associated with the Exxon Valdez spill. Because commercial fishing sustains the
economies in many sites and also because subsistence harvests and distributions ofI
renewable resources support and reinforce Alaska Native social systems and provide

important sources of food, reported opinions about changes in fish and game populations
warrant attention.
Of the respondents, 30 percent indicated that game populations had diminished
since the oil spill, and 44 percent indicated that fish populations had decreased (only 3%
and 13%, respectively, offered the opinion that the populations had increased).7 When
the same respondents were asked to review the previous 5 years and respond to the
same question, 26 percent suggested that gaine populations had decreased over this
interval, whereas 22 percent noted a decline in the fish populations. Respondents
therefore register greater perceived decreases in these resources subsequent to the spill.
This pattern is not uniform across commnunities, as Table I demonstrates.
This pattern suggests that proximity to the spill alone does not account for
perceived exposure, resource impacts, or risk: small communities (Tatitlek and Chignik,3
for instance), communities close to the most pronounced visible effects of the spill
(Valdez, Cordova, and Tatitlek), and communities with dominant fishing economies (for3
instance, Cordova) are most apt to register perceived decreases. When those factors
coincide, the tendency to perceive decreases appears amplified. The two control sites5
distant from the spill (False Pass and Ekwok) apparently are not immune from this
pattemn, although the proportion of responses indicating decreases is relatively low. The3



6 In fact, one analytic contrast we employ is commercial-fishing versus noncommnercial-fishing communities.

7These are not dichotomous items. Respondents may offer opinions of decrease, increase, no change, or
no decision.I
Introduction - Page 16

difference between test and control communities is statistically significant in the case of
perceived reductions in fish populations.8

Table 1

PERCENTa OF RESPONDENTS WHO PERCEIVED CHANGE OF GAME AND FISH
POPULATIONS AFTER EXXON VALDEZ SPILL AND OVER A 5-YEAR INTERVAL

Game	Fish	Game	Fish
Decrease	Decrease	Decrease	Decrease
Community                      Since Spill	Since Spill	Over 5 yrs.	Over 5 yrs.


Kodiak	50	36	29	14
Old Harbor	25	50	50	50
Tyonek	27	47	27	33
Kenai	15	27	36	13
Seldovia	25	31	13	19
Valdez	35	52	26	25
Cordova	40	69	6	10
Tatitlek	71	79	14	7
False Pass	0	30	40	70
Ekwok	35	18	29	24
Chignik	40	53	40	60
Karluk	29	43	17	50
Source: AOSIS schedule C questionnaire data.
a Numbers refer to percent of respondents who indicated "yes."


Some social impacts of the spill have received ample documentation, notably those
related to cleanup employment, which mitigates some direct economic impacts but also
may introduce tensions due to differential employment or perceived collusion or
collaboration on the part of cleanup workers and damages for direct losses (see Impact



s In this Introduction, differences are considered significant if the probability of the occurrence due to
chance is less than or equal to 5 percent based on Chi-square tests.
Introduction - Page 17

Assessment, Inc. 1990). We sought to assess these economic impacts and attendant
dislocations that were occasionally incurred by inquiring whether (1) respondents gained
employment as a result of the spill; (2) respondents relocated for work associated with
the spill; (3) respondents lost employmenit consequent to the spill; and (4) property was
lost or damaged as a result of the spill and, if so--or if other losses occurred (related to
employment or commercial fishing)--how adequate was the compensation (if any)
received from Exxon.
Table 2 summarizes these responses by community.9 Differences between test and
control sites are statistically significant for cleanup relocation and perceived adequacy of
compensation for losses.
Note that the communities displaying the m'ore pronounced pattern of economic
imnpact (cleanup jobs, relocation, losses, etc.) tend to be located in close proximiity to the3
spill; tend to be smaller; and tend to be commnunities (chiefly smal ones) dominated by
commercial-fishing economies and, moreover, boasting the least diversified econonlies.3
Leaving fine nuances and exceptions aside for now, the picture that begins to emerge is
one of vulnerability, despite some economic cushion provided by oil-spill work, for
smaller coinmunities with undiversified resource-export economlies.
There is some evidence that perceptions of responsibility or allocation of blame3
may differ between natural and industrial disasters; and, in-any case, those perceptions
may influence opinions about impact severity, potential for mitigation, and effectiveness
of mitigation measures. They also may influence confidence in institutions and the
course of the psychosocial or "therapeutic" resolution of the disaster among affected5
populations (see Button 1990).'(0 The questionnaire sought to assess perceived

9~~~~~~~~~~~~

Some instances of lost work are due to restrictions on commercial fishing. In some commuinities (Chignik,
for example), most or all instances are due to these restrictions.
10 There is no consensus on this issue, however, and the relationships between natural and industrialI
disasters are by no means clear. Some evidence suggests a clear distiction, mainly in terms of the greater
likelihood of sociocultural disruption and corrosive rather than integrative tendencies in the post-disaster period.
This is an argument that now is frequently posed in litigation by plaintiffs in technological disaster cases.
Introduction - Page 18g

Table 2
PERCENT' OF RESPONDENTS REPORTING
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE SPILL


No Spill    Relocate for	Lost	Loss- Inadequate
Community	Work	Work	Work	Damage	Payment


Kodiak	93	0	14	0	21
Old Harbor	75	0	0	0	0
Tyonek	60	40	0	0	100
Kenai	87	8	16	3	32
Seldovia	56	31	19	6	25
Valdez	52	13	9	0	67
Cordova	50	15	35	6	69
Tatitlek	29	64	36	0	43
False Pass	100	0	0	0	0
Ekwok	88	12	0	0	0
Chignik	73	20	47	7	67
Karluk	43	43	43	0	43


Source: AOSIS schedule C questionnaire data.
a Numbers refer to percent of respondents who indicated "yes."
responsibility by permitting respondents to identify all parties (singly and jointly) thought
to be responsible for the spill. The responses included "unavoidable accident," "captain
(Hazelwood)," "technology," "Exxon," "State of Alaska," "Federal Government," and
combinations of factors. The State of Alaska was identified most often as the
responsible agent, but this response was most pronounced in communities closest to the
spill (Valdez, Cordova, and Tatitlek). Responses in communities farther removed from
the spill emphasized Exxon negligence and errors on the part of the ship's captain.
Differences between test and control communities are statistically significant.
(Similarities in scores may not be due to the same factors. For example, Valdez is an
"oil town," and residents may have blamed the State of Alaska due to loyalties to the oil
Introduction - Page 19





industry; Cordova residents may have blamed the State of Alaska for other reasons,5
such as failure to protect the local environment. These are hypotheses.)
T'he discussion of socioeconomic characteristics of site communities showed thatI
these communities are far from uniform despite some common features that may
introduce common backdrops against which spill impacts mnay operate. Our preliminary
examinations suggest that all sociocconomiic variables are not equally salient in this
connection. Several variables warrant attention: respondent age, race, and sex;
household size and household type; employrnent history, and employer industry. The
following observations summarize some of our initial analyses of Schedule, C data.
Comparisons of cross-sectional contrasts and perceived spill impacts show that:g


1.   Younger respondents are more apt to identify decreases in fish populations
consequent to the spill, they are more apt to report mixed feelings about the
benefits of oil exploration, and they are less apt to report positive benefits of oil
exploration.

2.   If they secured cleanup work, Alaska Natives were more likely than non-Natives to
be relocated for work; and, in any event, they were more likely to lose work as a
result of the spill than were non-Natives. They. are slightly more apt to reportI
losses associated with the spill, they are far more skeptical of the potential benefits
of oil exploration, and they are more likely both to assign blame for the spill to the
skipper of the ship and to identify multiple responsibilities'for the disaster.
3.	No distinctions based on sex are evident.

4.	Respondents representing larger households are more apt than others to report
decreases in game populations. They also are more apt to report employmnent
associated with the spill for themselves or other household members and are more
likely to report relocation for that work. On the other hand, they are more likely
to report employment losses in the household as a result of the spill.5

S.   Households that generally can be considered unstable or decaying (e.g., at a
terminal point in the domestic cycle) are more apt to report decreases in gamne
populations after the spill, and also are more apt to have household members
relocate for spill employment, but they are less likely to have lost employmnent as a-
result of the spill.5




Introduction - Page 20

6.   Respondents with relatively little work over the preceding year are less likely to
have secured spill employment and, if they secured employment, are less likely to
have relocated for that work. (But these relationships are somewhat curvilinear,
such that underemployed and fully employed r.espondents are similar in their
responses.)

7.   Respondents employed in government, Native'organizations, local trade and
construction, and fishing are more apt to report relocation for spill-related work,
but private-sector workers (notably in fisheries work) are most apt to have lost
work as a result of the spill. Private-sector eniployees are more apt to report poor
compensation for losses. Non-Federal public-sector employees and fisheries
workers are most likely to express skepticism about the potential benefits of oil
exploration.
V. DISCUSSION
Preliminary analysis shows that spill proximity and perceived or actual exposure
and associated impacts are not perfectly correlated. Although this and other research
does detect that relationship (which is pronounced in the case of subsistence harvesting
activity; see Fall 1990), it probably is mediated and occasionally counterbalanced by
other factors. Perceived declines in natural resources are most often registered in smal
communities, communities closest to the spill, and dommunities with relatively dominant
fisheries economies. When those factors coincide, the tendency'to perceive decreases is
amplified. Although smaller commrunities are more often than not predominantly Alaska
Native, race or ethnicity per se does not account for this pattern.
Similarly, spill-related economic impacts (spill cleanup and related employment, job
relocations, losses of employment, property damnages, compensation for damages) tend to
cluster in cominunities close to the spill, which are smaller, dominated by commercial-
fisheries economies, and have the least diversified economies. This situation poses
benefits and risks. On the one hand, these communities are presumed to have been
impacted, and they were subject to mitigation mneasures and attendant economic benefits,
mnainly jobs. On the other hand, mitigation measures and economic benefits often may
entail costs, such as relocation for work and other dislocations. It appears that larger,
diversified communities are better situated to evade or avoid some effects of this disaster
and, for whatever reasons, their inhabitants tend to perceive less severe or less
widespread biological irnpacts than those perceived by residents in periphery
Introduction - Page 21





communities. This is because (1) the main body of socioeconomic literature documentsI
the domination of hubs (regional centers) with well-developed service, trade, and
admninistrative infrastructures and (2) hubs therefore are more econornically diversified
than other communities even ff they too have prominent fisheries econormies.
The political-econormic dimensions of this "impact dilermma" of structured inequality
in spill consequences also are revealed in the response patterns of several respondent
classes. Younger respondents are more likely to note fish reductions and to express
pessirnism about oil exploration. Natives are most apt to be relocated if they secure
work, more apt to lose employment, more apt to face property losses, and are far more
skeptical than others about the benefits of petroleum development. Larger households5
report both employment gains and losses, which may be predictable because menibership
(hence vulnerability to changes of this sort) is larger.j
Relatively unstable households, such as single-parent households, are more liely to
report relocation associated with spill-related work. One may argue that residents of3
unstable households seek economic resources for good reason, because they typically are
underendowed in an economic sense. For some, of these households, however, relocation3
may be synonymous with dislocation. For instance, half of all the single parents in our
sample relocated for cleanup work, meaning that most of their children were placed in3
transitional-care situations that may introduce stress. Our field teams observed that
some residents were evicted so their landlords could charge higher rents to nonresidents,3
hence relocation may have been involuntary in some cases.
Respondents with meager work hi stories were less likely to secure spill-related3
employment; hence those with the most employment assets received more benefits than
others, and existing inequalities were reinforced. This and related factors -undoubtedly3
are responsible for the sense of relative impoverishment decried by many area residents
in the popular press and in documentary films. Despite the fact that residents with
spotty work histories may be the least qualified and least reliable, their failure to obtain
"fequal opportunity" created public and private dilemmas in impacted communities.3
Respondents employed in public-sector and fishing occupations reported more relocation
for spill-related employment; but private-sector workers more often lost work, and when
Introduction - Page 22

U        ~~~they reported property or other* losses, they were apt to express dissatisfaction with
compensation.
The blend of public-sector and limited private-sector skepticism, work relocation,
and employment loss is partly explained by the following observations. First, in small
communities (which already have been identified as vulnerable), spill employment drew
away some local government officials and bureaucrats, placing immense service and
administrative burdens on those who remained, who now dealt not only with routine
matters but also the bureaucratic impacts of the largest oil spill in U.S. history.
Commercial fishing was restricted, leading some commercial-fishing workers to assume
I        ~~~jobs with parties directly or indirectly affiliated with Exxon. Moreover, tensions between
those who accepted spill jobs and those who eschewed such jobs tended to disrupt
f         ~~~customary social networks, which often are key channels of mutual support and
collaborative assistace, especially in small and predominantly Native communities.
3             ~~~~Cataclysmic and radical social change seldom occurs. More often than not, those
events and situations that catalyze profound change rework the existing social structure
I ~~and create a variation on a theme. This background analysis hints that the Exxon
Valdez spill may be reproducing an existing or latent social reality--in a sense, replaying
3         ~~~an "old script"--that now is characterized by underdevelopment in the rural regions,
dominance of urban centers that are able to mobilize great resources, and
3         ~~~marginalization of Native and un- or underemployed residents who lack substantial
political power. Because similar patterns have emerged in many of the accounts of great
3 ~~~technological disasters (Bhopal, Chernobyl, etc.), this is not at all surprising. It is likely,
however, that the documentation of the.Exxon Valdez spill will reveal that an
3         ~~~interpretive framework for detection of the social imnpacts of the spill must be as much
political as it is economic or biological.









3                                  ~~~~~~~~~~~Introduction - Page 23

I


Endnote
In somewhat more formal terms than appear in the text, our research design is a "multi-trait, multi-method"
model that employs multiple indicators and multiple methods to counterbalance the deficits of single techniques
and optimize the strengths of all design features. A forced-choice standardized questionnaire was administered
to randomly sampled adults in households in site communities. Site samples were roughly proportional to
resident populations. Approximately two-thirds of these respondents also were administered an open-ended
protocol designed to probe responses without the restrictions of a forced-choice instrument. Each instrument           3
contained a few similar variables, permitting an evaluation of interinstrument reliability. The subsample
responding to the protocol also completed genealogies extending two degrees in both lineal and collateral
dimensions so that interdependence of responses could be assessed.  Approximately two-thirds  of the
questionnaire respondents and all of the protocol respondents were sampled twice (1989, 1991), and a new
sample nearly as large as the initial 1989 sample was developed in 1991. This analysis addresses only the
preliminary wave in the Schedule C sites that were added subsequent to the spill but includes the two Kodiak
I
Island sites that were first sampled in 1988 (Kodiak City and Old Harbor). The Schedule C sample comprises
four waves of interviews for two communities, three waves for two communities (Chignik and Tyonek), and two
waves for the remaining sites (Valdez, Kenai, Seldovia, Cordova, and Karluk). False Pass and Ekwok were
sampled only once as controls. During the 1989 season, 330 questionnaire interviews and 216 protocol interviews
were completed. Table A describes sample sizes and some characteristics of the samples.
Prior to any substantive analysis, the data were subjected to a wide range of tests to measure reliability,
stationariness, interinstrument (questionnaire versus protocol) reliability, and testing artifacts. The final analysis
uses a variety of metric and nonmetric multivariate techniques to analyze longitudinal change and variance among
groups of sites classified on the basis on theoretical contrasts. The methodology is described and the reliability
and validity tests appear in Social Indicators Project VI: Analysis of the Exxon Valdez Spill Communities.

Table A
SCHEDULE C SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS, QUESTIONNAIRE ONLY

Alaska
Community                       Sample Size	Native %	Female %


Kodiak	14	14	57
Old Harbor	4	100	75
Tyonek	15	93	47
Kenai	92	15	58
Seldovia	16	13	38
Valdez	69	1	48
Cordova	52	6	54
Tatitlek	14	93	50
False Pass	10	70	40
Ekwok	17	82	35
Chignik	15	73	47
Karluk	12	83	50


Source: AOSIS Schedule C questionnaire data.





Introduction - Page 24
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I
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References Cited
Alaska Department of Community and Regional Affairs
1989 Unpublished in-house revenue sharing computer files for the period 1986-1989,
covering fiscal years 1985, 1986, 1987, and 1988. Juneau: State of Alaska
Department of Community and Regional Affairs.

Alaska Department of Revenue
1985 Federal Income Taxpa.yer Profile, 1978, 1981, and 1982, By Alaska Community
and Income Level Filing Status. Juneau: State of Alaska Department of Revenue.

1988 Federal Income Taxpayer Profile, 1983-1985, By Alaska Community and
Income Level Filing Status. Juneau: State of Alaska Department of Revenue.

Button, G.
1990 The Assignment of Responsibility and Blame in a Chronic Technological
Disaster:. The Case of the.Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. Paper presented at the 1990
meeting of the American Anthropological Association, New Orleans.

Fall, J.
1990 Subsistence After the Spill: Uses of Fish and Wildlife in Alaska Native
Villages and the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. Paper presented at the 1990 meeting of
the American Anthropological Association, New Orleans.

Freudenburg, W. R.
1984 Boomtown's Youth: The Differential Impacts of Rapid Community Growth on
Adolescents and Adults. American Sociological Review 49(5):697-705.

Human Relations Area Files
1992a Social Indicators Study of Alaskan Coastal Villages I. Key Informant
Summaries. Volume 1: Schedule A Regions. Technical Report No. 151. USDOI,
MMS, Alaska OCS Region, Social and Economiic Studies Program.

1992b Social Indicators Study of Alaskan Coastal Villages I. Key Informant
Surmmaries. Volume 2: Schedule B Regions. Technical Report No. 152. USDOI,
MMS, Alaska OCS Region, Social and Economiic Studies Program.

Impact Assessment, Inc.
1990 Economic, Social, and Psychological Impact Assessment of the Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill. Commissioned report for the Oiled Mayors Subcommittee, Alaska
Conference of Mayors. La Jolla, California: Impact Assessment, Inc.
Introduction - Page 25

McNabb, S.
1989 Northwest Arctic Borough Survey 1987-1989. Commissioned report prepared
for the Northwest Arctic Borough, Kotzebue, Alaska. Anchorage: Social Research
Institute.

1990 Impacts of Federal Policy Decisions on Alaska Natives. Journal of Ethnic
Studies 18(1):111-126.








































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Valdez, Key Informant Summary

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VALDEZ

Table of Contents
I. Overview ........................
A.	History ..........................
B.	Early History to the Earthquake .......
C.	Valdez: Descriptive Overview .........
............  33
............ 33
............	33
............	41
............


............


............
II.  The Economy .........
...............
A.	The Valdez Economy: Brief Overview
B.	Transport ........................
C.	Commercial Fishing .................
D.	Fish Processing ....................
E.	Food and Lodging/Tourism/Boat Charter
F.	The Public Sector ..................
G.	Small Businesses ...................
H.	Housing .........................
I.	Conclusion .......................
......................... 45
.........................  45
......................... 53
.........................  56
.......................... 61
........................ 63
.........................  68
......................... 69
.... ..................... 72
.........................  75
III.  The
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
Sociology of the Spill and its Effects .............................    77
Social Relations, Social Tensions, and the Spill .................... 77
Jobs, Oil, Economic Institutions, and Social Divisions ................	78
Development, the Environment, and Social Conflict in Valdez .........	89
The Spill: Divisions and Conflicts ...... ....................... 92
The Problems of Stress ..................................... 98
Crime ........................................                        104
The Spill: Perceptions and Understandings ...................    ... 108
Community Involvement with the Oil Industry ...................     . 116
Commitment and Investment in Valdez ................... ...... 120
References Cited ..................................
 
126
Valdez KI Summary - Page 31

VALDEZ

List of Tables

1. Bar Revenues, Valdez, 1974-1990...................39,

2. Profile of Employment by Sector, Valdez, 1988.............48

3.   Percent Economic Contribution to Valdez by Sector, 1988 .........51

4. Income Retention by Sector, Valdez..................53
Valdez KI Summary - Page 32

Valdez
I. OVERVIEW
LA.- History
The present situation in Valdez may be best understood in light of three mnajor
interventions, two of which were major disasters, in its recent history: (1) the earthquake
of March 27, 1964; (2) the building of the oil pipeline; and (3) the oil spill of March 27,
1989. All of these interventions--which had critical impacts on the economy, social
constitution, and form of Valdez--had a role in changing its very nature. Ironically, each
of the two disasters, the earthquake and the oil spill, had an impact on Valdez that was
in many ways as economically positive as was the pipeline.
There is little written about the history of Valdez. Sources such as the Valdez
library and the Valdez historical society do not have much in the way of either primary
or secondary source material. The best summary to date, as Heasley (1991) notes, is in
the Valdez Coastal Management report of 1984, and this is at best a cursory treatment.
A summary of Valdez's bistor~y by the Heritage Center provides some information, and a
little more can be found in vaxious brochures published by the Chamber of Commerce
for the Valdez Gold Rush Days. Additionally, interviews with some of the citizens of
Valdez resident there before the earthquake have added some greater insight into the
development of the town as we know it today.
I.B. Early History to the Earthquake
While the area surrounding Prince William Sound (PWS) has been inhabited by
Eskimos (Chugach, Yupik) and Indians (Athapaskan, Eyak, and Tatitlek), there is no
evidence of any Native settlements in the area in which Valdez is now situated.
Although first charted by Captaini James Cook in 1778, it was the Spanish who
undertook the first important exploration of the PWS area. In 1780, Don Salvador
Fidalgo--in search of the Northwest Passage--entered PWS and mnore thoroughly
investigated the Sound than Cook, mappin  much of the coast and narning such areas as
Galena Bay and Cordova. There is some evidence that Fidalgo may have ventured down
the Valdez Arm, a natural fjord that reaches 12 miles down from PWS, and reached
Valdez Bay. Whatever the case, he is credited with namidng Valdez after the NMinister of
.Valdez KI Summary - Page 33

Marine for Spain, Valdez y Barca. Fidalgo left PWS after he realized it would not yield5
the route for which he had been searching.
During the period of Russian ownership of Valdez, there was little European
activity in the PWS. The Russians did try to do some trading with th e Native peoples of
the Copper River Flats, but according to the Valdez Mliner of December 14, 1934,' the
Russian party ran into trouble. As reported in the Valdez Miner, Nicola Offmnarinoff, a
member of a Russian party of 24 that was'sent to trade with the Copper River Indians in
1863, told of that party being virtually annihilated; the few remaining survivors married

among the Native peoples of the area. As a result, little Russian activity is evident after
1863, while Native trade over the Valdez Glacier and along the Valdez coast between5
coastal and inland Natives appears to have gone on apace.
Valdez owed its foundation as a townsite to its location, which made it an3
accessible terminus for miners going to the gold fields of the Klondike. Fifteen years
after the sale of Alaska to the United States, prospectors began using Valdez as a3
gateway into the interior. From then on, the town prospered because of its location and
its potential for both real and imagined transportational links. The location of ValdezI
and the real and imagined projects for transportation that have been associated with it,
along with the series of major disasters that periodically have affected Valdez, haveI
produced both boom and bust. Boom and bust thus have become the central features of
Valdez's history from its founding until the present.ï¿½
By the 1890's, the U.S. Army had begun extensive explorations out of Valdez, and
a trading post was built in 1896. However, it was the Klondike gold rush of 1897-98 that3
created the conditions for significant settlement. Valdez became the terminus for what
was advertised throughout the U.S. as the "All-American Route" into Alaska's interior.
Although there was no permanent town, about 4,000 mniners passed through Valdez, and
a tent city developed. Some who had come for gold remained in Valdez and established3
stores and other b-usinesses.




1Cited in the Valdez Gold Rush Days (Valdez Chamber of Commerce 1989b).
Valdez KI Summary - Page 34

What made Valdez a reasonable site for access into the interior was the road
through Keystone Canyon built by William Abercromnbie after 1896, which established
access into the interior along what was called the Valdez-Eagle Trail. This road was
followed by the Washington-Alaska Military Telegraph System in 1902 and a submarine
cable to Sitka in 1905. During this period, Valdez becarme what it is today--a hub for
transportation, albeit on a smaller scale--housing as Valdez did the Alaska Road
Commission. At this time too, Valdez housed the Third Judicial District of Alaska. It
also was home to the military, which required the road to the interior and established
Fort Liscum across the bay from Valdez on what is now the site of the Alyeska oil
terminal.
Given its importance as a hub of sorts in the early 1900's, a railroad was
contemplated to speed the movenient of goods in and out of Valdez. As an example of
the relative isolation of Valdez, the record for moving mnail from Copper Center to
Valdez in 1904 was 35 hours, the average being closer to 75 hours.2
In 1899, Edward Gillette drew up plans, for a. railroad that would run through
Keystone Canyon, on over Thompson Pass, and then on to the interior of the Copper
River area. On March 6, 1902, the Valdez Prospector announced claims for $1,100,000,
which assured the building of the railroad. Legal suits over the possession of the claims
and the discovery of coal and oil in Katella as well as the involvement of copper interests
led to a major "gun battle" over who would get the railroad in 1907. The military had to
intervene, and the railroad out of Valdez was finally abandoned. H. D. Reynolds, who
owned the railroad and much of Valdez,and who had persuaded a large segment of the
population of Valdez to invest in his railroad, left Valdez at this time with a considerable
amount of the investments of Valdez's citizens. As their resources dwindled, many of the
residents of Valdez began to leave, and much of the new investment in the PWS area
went to other communities, e.g., Cordova eventually got the railroad.
By 1920, the population of Valdez was down to about 400 to It would remain at
about this numnber for the next 50 years or so because mining was no longer viable and


,2Valdez Gold Rush Days (Valdez Chamber of Commerce, 1989b).
Valdez K(1 Summary - Page 35





investment had moved elsewhere, especially Cordova--a memory and a competitive
relationship that still rankles the residents of Valdez today. As boom turned to bust, the
town settled into a series of activities that would remain fairly constant and would sustain
a small community until the announcement of the pipeline in 1969. A sense of what life
was like in this period between the late 1920's until the 1970's can be gleaned from the
memories of some of those who have been in Valdez since that period.
The recollections of long-time resident Walter Day are a good example. In 1928,
when Walter Day arrived in Valdez with his father, people in town worked for the mnost
part either at the Coast House--a small cannery processing fish caught by local Native
peoples using salmon traps--or on the Richardson Highway because Valdez remained the5
site of the Alaska Road Conunission, later to become the Departmnent of Transportation
(DOT). In the early 1930's, the Coast House closed but was replaced by the Dayvillej
Packing Company, a cannery that was located where the present oil terminal is today and
was owned and run by Day's father. The Dayville Packing Company was a small cannery3
at first, owning three or four boats worked by local Indians, but it grew over time and
provided work in Valdez until 1954 when it folded as a result of the PWS being closed to3
fishing.
In the 1940's, freight traffic from Valdez to Fairbanks over the Richardson Highway3
increased. Even though freight handling decreased after World War II, the completion
of the ALCAN Highway during the same, period and the developmnent of other new3
roads brought tourism to Valdez. .Tourism from then on has been a small but staple part
of the economy.3
With the completion of Harbor View Hospital, a State facility for the mentally
impaired, and the continued presence of the DOT and facilities for highway maintenance3
plus conasistent freight handling and tourism, the early 1960's was a period of reasonably
stable employment for the 400 to 500 residents of Valdez.3
This was disrupted by the earthquake of March 27, 1964, which devastated the
town, built as it was on. soft, miuddy grou-nd with a high water table. (Ironically, the3
muddy land initially was a boon to Valdez because boats could ground at low tide and
offload onto a dock and then leave at high tide--a relatively inexpensive mode of freight3
Valdez 1(1 Sumimary - Page 36

handling.) After the earthquake, the town was rebuilt 5 miles west on ground that was
more solid. This land had been laid out for a towusite earlier in Valdez's history and
belonged for the most part to Owen Meals, a major figure in Valdez at the time. The
shift of the townsite and the use of the old town's mile markers is why mile 0 of the new
town actually is mile 5.
The quake also had a profound impact on the population of Valdez. According to
both Dorothy Clifton and Walter Day, a considerable number of Valdez's citizens left
town after the quake, but many did not return after Valdez was rebuilt. A ~l964 Civil
Defense list of residents and their locations just after the quake reveals that less than 25
percent of the local adult population and their children remained in Valdez as it was
being rebuilt. How many of those had lived in what is called the "Old Town" and
returned to the new town of Vaidez is not exactly clear, but old-time residents suggest
that there was a significant change in the population of Valdez after the new town was
rebuilt. Many who had lived in Valdez before the earthquake did not return, and a
number of those who helped build the new town remained. According to Dorothy
Clifton, who has kept a number of records on the comings and goings of the pre-quake
residents of Valdez, at least 40 percent of the residents of the new town were
newcomers. By 1967, this number was increased with the addition of the Valdez
Community Hospital to Harbor View.
Physically, the new town differed from the old. Laid out and designed by Paul
Finfer Associates of Chicago, the design allowed for bigger houses and also for more cul-
de-sacs located along a long and parallel set of major avenues going both north-south
and east-west. What stands out in the plan and still is notable today is the absence of
any central plaza or square or any other central place in the new town.
By 1969, the miniboorm brought on by the construction of the new town was over,
and Valdez--as it had been in the past--was once again econonmically stapnant.
Government services like the hospital, a little tourism, and a little fishing made up the
basis of what little work there was. The freight business that was so important to Valdez
before the earthquake, was virtually nonexistent after the town was rebuilt, even though
some refueling and fuel shipping as well as the Highway Department remained.

Valdez KI Summary - Page 37





When the pipeline terminus was announced, the town actively sought its being
located in Valdez. According to Walter Day, who was mayor at the time and who
testified in front of Congress in support of locating the pipeline terminus in Valdez, the
issue of where to put the terminus was moot because Valdez Harbor was the only harbor
in the area that was deep enough to accornmodate the tankers that would need to access
the terminal. Once again, Valdez's location and a major event over which Valdez had
no control would lead to a remaking of the town both physically, with the expansion of
the population and townsite, and socioeconomically, with a significant shift in the3
economic underpinnings of the town.  I
With the construction of the pipeline in the 1970's, Valdez would no longer be a5
sleepy little town but a full-fledged oil boomtown dependent on the international oil
economy. Tle population exploded, reaching a high of about 9,000 to 10,000 in 1976,1
the height of the construction period for the pipeline. After 1976, the town became
more stable once again with a population of 3,000 to 4,000 (which rises to 5,000 or so3
each summer as a result of employment provided by tourism, the fish-processing plants,
constr-uction, and commercial fishing).3
Ile coming of the pipelie and a whole new population to Valdez also changed
the social life of the town. Old-time residents observe that with the creation of new3
schools, gyms, bars, hotels, and restaurants social life became more public and replaced
the more famiilial and private social world of earlier times. Life became livelier, more3
energetic, and more in tune with lifeways in more central and larger urban areas of the
State. With the pipeline also came two radio stations, an airport, and daily flights to3
Anchorage. These new services transformed social and cultural life in Valdez.
By the late 1980's, however, even with the development of two new fish processing3
plants, Valdez once again was experiencing a degree of economnic stagnation and
downturn because of a dip in the oil economy. The spill of Ma.rch 27 (ironically the3
same day as that of the earthquake), 1989, was for Valdez both a catastrophe and an
economic godsend, depending on how one would look at it.3
Evidence from gross bar receipts at one of the major bars in town with the spill
year as a base (see Table 1) gives a sense of the up-and-down nature of Valdez'sI

Valdez KI Summary - Page 383

economy over the last two decades and its reliance on major events controlled from the
outside.

Table I

BAR REVENUES, VALDEZ, 1974-IggOa


Year	Revenue	Year	Revenue


1974	.~~~32	1982	.51
1975	1.20	1983	.41
1976	1.40	1984	.55
1977	1.45	1985	.45
1978	.80	1986	.35
1979	.19	1987	.36
1980	.30	1988	.37
1981	.63	1989	1.00
1990	.69


Source: Manager of a local bar in Valdez.
'I1989 Base Year= 1.00.


While bar revenues measure only a particular sector of the total expenditures in
Valdez, the chart above does give some sense of the ups and downs- of its economy. The
chart also is indicative of the influence of maj'or interventions like the pipeline and the
spill on the economic and social life of the cormmunity--a community that also'has
undergone rapid shifts related to the ups and downs of the economy and the
demographic swings that these shifts have imtplied. (An example is the increase in single
men and women during the pipeline-construction days and the spill-cleanup period.)
Whatever one's views about the overall impact of the spill on Valdez in particular
and the area in general, the spill brought an econormic windfall, a fact disputed by few if
anyone in Valdez, no matter what their attitudes about the spill in general. It also
resulted in significant changes in the form of new jobg associated with SERVS (Ship
Valdez KI Summary - Page 39






Escort Response Vehicle Servic'e) and other  spill-prevention activities--changes brough tI
about once again by a major intervention over which the citizens of the town had no
control. During the height of the spill cleanup, over 10,000 people caime to Valdez.
They put extraordinary pressures on the townm's infrastructure, but they also brought in
extraordinary amounts of money. If not all in the town benefited from the spill--the
effects on different econormic sectors in Valdez, as we shall see, were uneven--there were
two overall economic benefits from: (1) the new monies the spill cleanup brought in and
(2) the new jobs, about 200 or so, created as a result of the spill. However, as we shall
also see, the spill had other effects on Valdez, as well as both social and political effects,
that have changed the town irrevocably.5
This short history of Valdez, while incomplete owing to a lack of historical
resources readily available, reveals a town subject to boom and stagnation resulting fromj
major interventions over which the community has had little or no control. It is a town
to a great extent defined by events from the outside, but a town now trying to3
appropriate those events into its own fabric and to find a way to define an economy and
a social reality over which the townspeople have more control. An example is the recent3
Valdez Comprehensive Development Plan by Darbyshire & Associates (1991) and
commissioned by the city to find ways to stabilize the economy and bring more localI
control. As John Devens, the former.Mayor of Valdez and President of Prince William
Sound Community College, stated in a recent speech:3
Shortly after the completion of TAPS, the community leaders of
Valdez recognized the finite nature of the oil industry and the
importance of using the new taxbase to diversify our economy andI
provide for our future. At the time, we invested some of the tax
revenues in developing our fisheries industry, promnoting tourism,
building our transportation infrastructure and further developingI
our human servces industry.

At the time, this meant floating a loan for the construction of a major dock andI
storage facility, which has yet to bring the revenues expected and has added a
considerable debt load for the city. Today, this development revolves around a plan to
expand the small-boat docking facility in town--a plan that received mixed reviews from


Valdez K(1 Summary - Page 403

re sidents and puts the town in confiict with Alyeska over the sighting of the dock. Even
though the larger plans have not met with success, the issue the town faces as it heads
for the next century is that no matter how successfLil efforts to stabilize the economy and
social composition of Valdez might be, its dependence on oil transport looms and, for
the foreseeable future, will still loom over the psyche and material reality that defines
living in Valdez. Many people not only feel their relation to Valdez is impermanent,
they also feel what one informant aptly called a "psychological transiency."
I.C. Valdez: Descriptive Overview3
Incorporated before statehood, Valdez is now a homne rule city; it is not located in
any organized borough. There are a city council. of seven members and a mayor; but
with a city manager form of government, it is the city mnanager who is responsible for the
day-to-day r-unning of the city's admn =istration and who carries out the policy of the city
council. Along with the city manager, there are 13 city departments that include--along
with the -usual city police, fire, and parks departments--a Department of Community
Development with a full-time planner, a Counseling Center, and a Heritage Center,
among others. Assisting these departments are a number of citizens' boards and
commissions, e.g., a Planning Commission, Heritage Board, etc.
The city is supported by taxes on real property of 16.21 nmills proposed for 1991 and
a hotel/motel room tax of 6 percent. The town's 1991 projected debt expenditure was
$12,856,054, which they plan to retire by 2001.4
The population that is centered around Valdez lives in three major residential
communities, i.e., Valdez itself, Alpine Woods/Nordic Subdivision, and Robe River
Subdivision, as well as in a number of smaller enclaves that spread along the Richardson
Highway as far out as at least mile 26. I have been told that some individuals who work
in Valdez live as far away as mile 56 on the Richardson Highway.



3Much of the information for this section comes from the Valdez Comprehensive Plan, Chapter 5, by George
J. Cannelos, B&B Environmental, Inc. (Cannelos 1991) and the Valdez Business Directory by the Valdez
Chamber of Commierce (1989a).

4City of Valdez, Budget Projection for Future Years, 1991 Budget Model,'in the City of Valdez Financial
Report (City of Valdez 1991).
Valdez KI Summary - Page 41






Housing, at least according to city counts,5 consists of 583 single-family units, 2251
multifamily units, 617 mobile homes, group quarters that house 93, and other places that
house 222.I
What is notable about the physical layout and form of Valdez is the interspersing
of mobile homes with stick-built houses throughout most of the town. Among the
exceptions are Mineral Creek, which is zoned for stick-built houses of high quality, and
several subdivisions that are comprised of only mobile homes, e.g., Alpine Village. The
commercial buildings vary in quality from brick structures to wood structures with
unfinished facades. On the one hand, the design and appearance of the government
buildings suggest real permanence; but on the other hand, the variety and intermixture of
other building types suggest a sense of impermanence and uncertainty about what the
town is and will be. All this gives Valdez the look of a town that has experienced boom3
and bust and is not sure exactly which--the boom or the bust--will eventually win out.
No matter what appearance it gives, for so small a town, Valdez is extremely well3
endowed with local public facilities and services. The Police Department has 21 full-
time employees, 13 of whom are full-time police officers; 9 vehicles; and a jail house thatI
can accommodate 16. According to the Chief, the officers comprise "a well-trained
group of officers--often sent to training courses in the lower 48--to do just about anything3
that a big-city police force is able to." The Fire Department has 9 full-time employees
and 19 volunteers, owns 5 engines and 2 tankers, and is able to respond to most3
contingencies including avalanches and saltwater and mountain rescue. It also has a
dive-rescue team, has at its disposal 3 ambulances and a rescue truck, and can contract3
for a local aviation service when necessary.
Educational needs are provided for by the Valdez City School District, which3
employs 6 administrators, 65 teachers, and 59 support staff. There is an elementary
school with an enrollment of 425, a junior high school with 122 students, and a high3
school with 211 students. There also is a school for special-needs students at


5snoted earlier, pending the .results from the latest U.S. Census, statistics in Valdez are rough
approximations. Given the nature of this report, they provide a sufficient if not entirely exact picture of the
community.
Valdez 1(1 Sumimary - Page 42

Harborview with an enrollment of. 62. In addition, Valdez has a 2-year college--Prince
William Sound Community College, formed in 1978 as part of the University of Alaska
system--with a number of 1-year degree programs and one 4-year degree program offered
in the Rural Alaska Teacher Education Program.
There also is a library housed in a 15,000-square-foot building in the city center
that includes a conference room, audiovisual room, study tables, and carrels and booths
for listening and typing. Since 1982, the library has acted as a support for the Prince
William Sound Community College. Along with the library, Valdez has opened a
Heritage Center, which has a museum and an historical archive and is charged with
enhancing knowledge of local history for both the schools and for citizens at large.6
Other social services include the Valdez Counseling Center, Harborview Hospital,
Valdez Comnmunity Hospital, and a Seniors' Center. The counseling center provides a
program of commaunity mental health services as Well as alcohol. and drug abuse
programs and is staffed by a Director, two counselors, and a clerk/typist. Harborview is
a State-ran facility for the mentally impaired; the community hospital, which is ran by
the Lutheran Home Services Manageinent Company, is a fully staffed hospital with 3
physicians in residence, 35 other employees, 15 beds, and an emergency roomn. The
Seniors' Center provides rooms, meals, a bus service, and recreational and social
activities for senior citizens in the community.
There are at least 11 churches in Valde.  They include a Catholic, a Baptist, and
a Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints; several evangelical and pentecostal
groups; and a number of nondenominational Christian Fellowships.
The Parks and Recreation Department employs 25 people, and the city's
recreational facilities are quite extensive. Comprising these facilities are:





6There is some, dispute over the Heritage Center. Many,older residents are critical of its performance, while
others in city gover nment have been quite pleased with its performance. Except for a brief descriptive piece on
Valdez's history, we (myself and my assistant Mfichael Howard) found it not overly useful as a research tool or
center.

7Ter is no definitive list of churches in the community, and several of the churches are run out of homes.
Valdez 1(1 Summary - Page 43

ï¿½    the Black Gold Recreational Center, originally b-uilt by Alyeska as a constructionU
camp building but now used as a multipurpose recreational facility with game
rooms and hosting a'number of activities such as dancing;
ï¿½ the Teen Center;
*    the Valdez High School, which offers public swimming, an indoor rifle range, and
an outdoor track;
ï¿½ the Herman H-utchens Elementary School, which offers gym facilities, racquetball
courts, and a hydrotherapy pool; and3
*    the Valdez Civic Center, which includes 10,000 square feet of meeting and
exhibition space, a 487-seat theater, banquet facilities, and conference rooms. It5
also has a series of campgrounds, groomed cross-country trails, outdoor tennis
courts, and softball fields.I
Complementing the recreational activities provided by the city are a private health
club with full workout facilities, 6 bars and lounges, 4 hotels and motels, about 25 bed3
and breakfasts, and 10 restaurants as well as 3 fraternal societies that offer facilities for
drinking and entertainment. In addition, there are over 35 nonprofit and private clubs in3
Valdez ranging from the Veterans of Foreign Wars and American Legion to the PWS
Conservation Alliance and Advocates for Victims of Violence. Valdez also is served by3
two radio stations, one private and one a member of the Public Broadcasting System,
and a cable television service.3
One can get in and out of town by way of an all-weather road connecting Valdez to
Anchorage 305 miles away and Fairbanks 365 miles away. Valdez also has an airport, a3
boat harbor, and the port. The airport serves two airlines, both with daily flights to
Anchorage; and it houses three car rental agencies, a gift shop, restaurant, and offices.3
There also are 18 hangers containing space for private planes. The boat harbor has 513
boat slips with fall facilities at most slips, e.g., electricity, water, and telephone. There is3
a long waiting list for slips, and a move to enlarge the boat harbor (a capital-
improvements project of about $35 miillion) has generated heated discussion within the3
town and between the town and Alyeska. Given the town's experience with a previous


Valdez LU Summary - Page 443

capitat expansion--the Port of Valdez, which- runs at a significant loss--people are a bit
suspicious of every new capital-improvements project costing so much.
Valdez also supplies water, sewage, and garba ge disposal. Electricity is supplied by
the Copper Valley Electric Association and telephone service by the Copper Valley
Telephone Comnpany.
1I. THE ECONOMY
IL.A_ The Valdez Economy: Brief Overview
A brief overvew of Valdez's economiic makeup reveals a complex mix of structural
interdependencies and socioeconomic tensions and conflicts. Four aspects of the
economy underlie the mix of interdependencies and conflicts: (1) the complex econonmic
structure related to the transport of oil; (2) the social and economic divisions between
those associated with high-paying economic sectors, most notably oil and government; (3)
the divisions between winter and summer economiic pursuits and full-time and transient
residents and workers; and (4) the diyision between outside and local economic sectors.
All four of these factors, as we shall.see in later sections of this report, mnanifest
themselves in a numiber of complex and important ways in relation to local attitudes and
understandings regarding the economy, the society, and the culture of Valdez.
Looling at these four economic areas, we find that:
ï¿½ Valdez clearly is dependent on oil and its transport through the activities of
Alyeska and associated companies for its economic well-being and for the
infrastructural and administrative amenities that Valdez can afford to provide its
citizens.
*    T'he transport of oil and the oil economy are effectively beyond the reach of local
control and, unless the oil companies decide to increase their exploration of the
North Slope, are economically unstable over the long term. Oil transport presents
a nonrenewable resource base and the threat of a declining source of both
Valdez KI Summary - Page 45





individual incomes and tax supp ort for the city (the latter threat may be in theI
process of becorning a reality).8
*    If oil transport does remain at its present scale or is at an expanded scale in
Valdez, it presents a threat both real and imagined in the form of possible
ecological damage and disaster like the spill of 1989. It also potentially threatens
more stable and more locally controllable economic activities--albeit within the3
framework of a world market--like fishing, fish processing, and tourismn.
ï¿½ While Valdez offers a large number of very high-paying jobs, it offers an equal3
number of quite low-paying jobs. This division in incomes and living standards
presents a number of important social problems and social tensions to the town and3
a series, over the long term, of serious problems for city government in relation to
such issues as housing, infrastructural supports, and the social well-being of Valdez.3
ï¿½ The split between the 3,000 to 4,000 permanent residents and the 1,000 to 2,000
extra transient residents of summer--as well as the split between industries based on3
year-round employment versus those based on transient employment--does create
rifts and tensions in the town.  Over the long term, infrastructural issues that were3
exaggerated during the spill year olf 1989 have remained and will continue to do so,
given the boom and bust quality of the economy.  For 'example, a new boom could3
occur if the gas pipeline is built or ANWR is developed. A new boom would bring
new economic and social pressures to bear on Valdez.3
In a 1989 survey done by Darbyshire & Associates of Anchorage for the City of
Valdez, a population figure of 3,686, based on the City of Valdez Financial Report, was3
estimated for the city with a mean annual employrnent rate of about 1,861.9 With a
resident per capita income of $19,937, a figure above both National and State averages,3



"See thfe City of Valdez, Budget Projection for Future Years, 1991 Budget Model, in City of Valdez Financial
Report (City of Valdez 1991).
9The estimates on population are very rough. In a later survey for 1990, the same group found a population
of 4,419. These are estimates based on assumptions about household composition and not on actual census data.
The census bureau has an estimnated population of 3,951 for 1990. All numbers in this report are therefore
estimates but are useful nonetheless for the relationships that they provide between various sectors.
Valdez KI Summary - Page 463

Valdez clearly is a relatively affluent town. If we look at the nature of employment
offered by Valdez, we can see why it is such an affluent place.'(
T'his affluence, though, is mitigated to some degree by the nature of employment in
Valdez and the split between high-paying and low-Paying jobs and the split between
stable and seasonal employment. Employment in Valdez stays at about 1,000 jobs
between October and March. It rises slowly in April, May, and June to a high of 2,500
jobs in July and August and then falls rapidly to 1,000 jobs in September. 'Me added
1,500 jobs are in the areas of fishing, tourismi, fish processing, and construction. Except
for fish processing which tends to employ Native peoples in May and June and college
students in July and A-ugust, many of the jobs in constructio.n and fishing and some in
tounism are held by people who attempt to live in Valdez year-round. Those who cannot
find work in winter find the going tough and earn significantly less tha n those steadily
employed in the oil or government sectors of the economy. According to our sample, a
larger number of seasonal workers remain in Valdez year-round than is generally
recognized, although figures on this segment of the population are not available and do
not appear as an issue in the survey of Valdez's economic situation used extensively in
this report.
Broken down by sector share of employment in order of size, we get the profile for
Valdez in 1988, the last year for which such figures are avaiable, that is shown in
Table 2.
When aggregated, we can see that Valdez's economy has three critical areas of
employment: (1) public-sector-fanded activities, which account for roughly 35 percent of
those employed in Valdez when direct government, education, and health are
aggregated; (2) transport, of which Alyeska's activities through the pipeline terrminal and
associated industries make up about 87 percent of the total or 20 percent of the



leMuch of the data for this section comes from interviews with various city officials and a draft report to the
city by, George J. Cannelos of B&B Environmental, Inc., and Darbyshire & Associates for the Valdez
Comprehensive Development Plan, 1991, hereafter cited as CVCDP (City of Valdez Comprehensive
Development Plan). Statistics are based on statistics from the Darbyshire Business Survey cited extensively in
Chapter 7, "Valdez Economic Base Study,' CVCDP, also by Darbyshire & Associates. The analysis i-s my own,
as are any of the mistakes in it.
Valdez K(1 Summary - Page 47

I
I
Table 2
PROFILE OF EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR, VALDEZ, 1988


Employment
Sector	Components	Share


Transportation	Pipeline Terminal,	22.5%
Airline and Boat Charter,
Ship Provisioning,
Stevedoring, Car Rentals,
Bus and Taxi Service

Education/Health                        Public Schools, Community                                    17.5%
College, Harborview and
Community Hospitals, Medical Services

Government                              City, State, and Federal                                     17.2%
Offices, Agencies, and Services

Manufacturinga                          Fish Processing and Other                                    11.5%
Small Manufacturers, e.g.,
Printing, Computer Assembly

Hotel/Restaurant	Hotels, Bed and Breakfasts, Bars	11.2%

Trade	Fuel Wholesaling and Retail,	8.7%
Retail Stores, Campers, Bars

Personal Services                       Professional Services,                                        4.6%
Entertainment, Community Services

Construction                            Building Contractors,                                         1.9%
Excavation, Earthwork,
Sand and Gravel, Masonry, Carpentry

Utilities	Electric, Telephone, Garbage	1.9%

Finance	Banks, Insurance, Realty	1.6%

Fishing	Commercial Fishing	1.5%
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Source: The figures are based
1991) and the CVCDP (1991).
Associates.
on the City of Valdez Financial Report (City of Valdez
The sectors are those defined by Darbyshire &
I
I
I
I
a Fish processing makes up over 95 percent of this category.



Valdez KI Summary - Page 48

employment share in Valdez; and (3) tourism and commercial fishing, which comprise
roughly 15 percent of the total employment share but which are for the most part
seasonal. All other businesses and economiic pursuits are clearly dependent on these
three sectors for their survival."1
Revenue share by sectors also makes it clear just how much oil dominates Valdez
and just how dependent Valdez is on forces that reside outside its own economic and
political domain of influence. A good exainple is oil transport, which made up about 28
percent of all revenues in Valdez in 1988. Government and education niade up about 14
percent and 11 percent, respectively, in 1988. Given the following three factors, Valdez's
dependence on oil in 1988 becomes quite clear: (1) the assessed value of oil property is
10 times that of nonoil property and the property tax is a critical component of the
town' s revenues; (2) a large number of the most highly assessed properties belong to oil-
company employees and a considerable number of students in the schools come fromn
families employed by Alyeska;12 and (3) as noted above, governmnent and education are
major employers. It can be argued that dependence has only grown with the increase in
oil-related jobs as a result of the spill, which has led to a significant increase of jobs--
estimated by most at about 200 or so--in the spill-prevention sector of oil transport such
as SERVS.
This dependence on oil transport and on decisions made outside the community is
even greater than the numbers illustrate. Revenues from oil that Valdez receives are
based on the terms of an agreement worked out between the pipeline owners and the
State of Alaska. This agreement sets up a mechanism whereby the pipeline is
depreciated over timne. As a result, the town of Valdez will over the next 10 years or so
see the taxable assessed value of oil property fall from $1,139,761,160 in 1990 to


1These figures are aggregated from the figures offered in the CVCDP (1991). Some of the numbers are
a rough estimation, as the survey does not divide economic se'ctors precisely the way I did. For example, under
fishing I include fish processing. If not completely accurate, my figures are in the ballpark and are accurate
enough for the point I am trying to make.

'ZExact numbers are not known or readily available, but because Alyeska employs 20 percent of all those
in town and indirectly supports a nuimber of other businesses in town, one can see the impact of Alyeska on the
school population.
Valdez KI Summary - Page 49






$413,672,000 in the year 2003. The ratio of oil-property value assessed for- taxation toI
nonoil property assessed for taxation will fall from roughly 12 to I to less than 4 to 1. If
net expenditures subject to property tax fall roughly 40 percent, the rise in millage on
property still will have to rise over 50 percent, even assuming only a 2-percent rise in
overall expenditures per year. New projects that might renew the Valdez tax base will
be based on decisions made in Washington regarding ANNWR and by oil and gas3
companies located in the lower 48.
From the perspectives of value-added contributed to Valdez's economy, too, oil3
again is the dominant factor in the economy if value-added is seen as the real basis for
investment in a commnunity. Transportation, in 1988, made up about 35 percent of the3
value-added contributed to the economy in Valdez. The other crucial contributors to
value-added were government services and education, which respectively accounted for3
25 percent and 28 percent of the total value-added in Valdez--but these latter sectors are
dependent on oil revenues to a critical extent, as was noted earlier. Table 3 depicts the3
econornic contribution to Valdez by each sector in 1988.
Attempts so far to overcome the dependence on oil transport have come to nil. A3
dock and a grain elevator were built to transport grain from proposed farming in the
interior of Alaska. But this scheme never took off, and Valdez was left with a dock and3
grain elevators that hardly have been used and which also have left the town with a debt
of something over $9 million.3
Today, discussion goes forward for the expansion of the dock facilities in the harbor
for small boats to increase the potential for commercial fishing, sport fishing, and3
tourism and thus hopefully diminish dependence on oil transport. (These plans, given
previous experiences, have coine under some fire.) Other new projects for the expansion3
of the economy in Valdez involve oil--such as the refinery that Mark Air has proposed
putting in Valdez and of course the possible expansion of the oil terminal if ANW*R3
drilling or proposed drilling for gas occur. Valdez also offers the only federally
designated "foreign free trade zone" in Alaska, which has been useful to vanious3
industries in the area (e.g., the canneries, which ship to Japan), and the city has about


Valdez K(1 Summary - Page 503

Table 3
PERCENT ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION TO VALDEZ BY SECTOR, 1988

Value-
Sector                         Revenue	Added              Income


Transport	32.1a	40.3a	21.2
Education/Health	10.5	12.6	20.8
Government	14.3	16.2	26.7
Manufacturing	13.1	6.3	2.8
Hotel/Resta-urant/Bar	4.0	3.3	3.3
Trade	12.2	5.0	6.8
Personal Services	2.4	2.7	4.4
Construction            i.6                     i.6	2.0
Utilities	4.1	4.0	4.4
Finance	2.8	4.1	4.6
Fishing	2.9	3.9	2.8
Source: CVCDP (1991)
aOil is 87 percent of the total of the transport sector.


3,000 acres zoned for industrial development. None of these various opportunities and
facilities, though, has yet to diminish Valdez's dependence on oil transport.
The dependence on oil also creates a clear division within the economy between
high-end and low-end income sectors. Individuals holding oil, government, and
education/health sector jobs make up roughly 55 percent of all jobs in Valdez but earn
66 percent of the total income share for residents. Those holIding jobs in the
manufacturing, hotel/restaurant/bar, and trade sectors comprise 31 percent of all the
jobs in Valdez but share in only 13 percent of the total income earned. When one adds
to that the fact that a significant portion of manufacturing income is earned by transient
summer workers, the divisions in earning capacity for peo-ple who live in town the year-
round become even more glaring. Two areas of employment, although making up a
Valdez KI Summary - Page 51

small percentage of the total, add to the already clear division in the comm-unity between
high-end and low-end incomes. These areas, fishing and finance, employ only 3 percent
of the total but comprise a little over 7 percent of the total income share in Valdez.
Surprisingly, with the exception of finance and fishing, government reveals the biggest
positive differential between employment share and income share and, as we will see
later, the attitudes toward both oil workers and government employees at times is based
on their incomes compared with others in the town.
It might be important to add that while the government and education/health
sectors receive a significant share of the total income, their contribution to the local
economy, according to the Darbyshire Business Survey (1991), as measured by the
amount of income retained in Valdez and recycled back into the economy, is significantly
higher than any other sector--especially that of oil-based income, which is higher by a
factor of about three. The issue of what individuals actually contribute to the local
economy and to the local social and cultural well-being and development of Valdez is a
constant and divisive issue in the conununity. However, this is based not so much on
statistical knowledge but on general social observations by those in the community.
What is of note is the degree to which some of the "common knowledge" about the town
is not that far off from more statistically based conclusions. The figures on income
retention, which are shown in Table 4, also reveal the extent to which most of the
significant private companies in Valdez are owned by individuals and corporations that
reside outside of Valdez or are dependent on resources that must be bought outside the
comnmunity.
What we see in Valdez is an affluent community whose affluence is dependent on
oil transport and one that must deal with clear economic divisions between the various
sectors that make up the economy. While these conclusions are not surprising for a
community the size of Valdez with the kind of economic history and profile with which it
is characterized, they should be kept in mnind as we move to a description and analysis of
the social, attitudinal, and cultural realities of Valdez.
Valdez KI Summary - Page 52

Table 4
INCOME RE~TENTION BY SECTOR, VALDEZ


sector                                    Cents to the Dollar


Transportation	0.24
Education/Health	0.71
Government	0.67
Manufacturing	0.08
Hotel/Restaurant/Bar	0.29
Trade	0.20
Personal Services	0.67
Construction	0.46
Utilities	0.38
Finance	0.58
Fishing	0.34


Source: Based on the Darbyshire Business Survey in the CVCDP (1991).


Before that, a brief discussion of somne the important sectors of the economy is in
order. It wili give us a sense of 'the everyday economic and social realities that face the
residents of Valdez and will illustrate the opportunities and problems that define the
city's economy. In examnining various sectors of the economy, we can also begin to
understand the ways in which the spill of 1989 affected both attitudes and econormic
activities in Valdez.13
II.B. Transport
Transport--which includes the pipeline terminal, the port of Valdez, air and boat
charter, the airport, and the car rental agencies--accounts for 23 percent of the jobs in
Valdez. Next to government, it is the largest source of jobs in the area. As noted earlier,
87 percent of all transport jobs or 20 percent of all jobs are associated with oil transport.


13 Some of the discussion about economic sectors will repeat data from the above discussion of the economy
in general. The discussion of sectors puts a different light on the same economic reality. Moreover, the sectors
do not necessarily repeat those found in the CVCDP (1991).
Valdez KI Summary - Page 53






About 328 people, of which about 210 are year-round residents and work full time, are
emploed b theoil-transport industry. In 1988, this industry spent about $52 million for

operations in Valdez. 1
Additionally, as noted above, oil transport is the sector of the economy that fuels
Valdez. When it is hot, the towin's economy is hot; when it is cold, as it was just before
the spill, the town's economy is cold. It also is an industry that while fueling the Valdez
economy, remains effectively outside the control of the people of Valdez. Not only is oil
ruled by world market forces, but the specific agreements that define tax liability, e.g.,3
issues of depreciation, are controlled by the State of Alaska-Alyeska agreements.
New oil exploration and piping would be controlled by the same groups and also by3
the Federal Governmnent. Thus, as discussed above, the town of Valdez is faced with a
decreasing tax base from oil as a result of agreements over which it had no say.3
Moreover, the supply of oil through the pipeline is of limited duration, and new
exploration may not bring the revenues that have been brought by the Prudhoe Bay3
development. Thus, Valdez faces a future either without any oil at all or possibly with
an oil-transport industry but lower or different revenues. Even if ANWR goes ahead, it3
still is not clear exactly hiow Valdez will benefit, although townspeople all look forward
to such a development with hope for the future.
At best, oil transport is a lucrative but uncertain base for Valdez now, and in the
future, although it is the critical base to the town's economic prosperity. While most
people interviewed do not think of the future of the oil economy, clearly those in key
economic and civic positions in the town do, looking as they are for a greater range of3
industrial and service-based activities (such as fishing, boating, and tourismn) upon which
to build the town's economy.3


14 Most statistical information is based on the Darbyshire Business Survey and on interviews with informants.3
Executives at Alyeska refused access to their area of operations and also refused to be interviewed, citing the
current litigation with the government as a reason. Although asked repeatedly, Alyeska, except in informal
interviews with some of their employees or either Questionnaire Instruments (QI's) or Key Informants (KI's),
did not participate in the study. It is also interesting to note that Alyeska's executive employees were, on the
whole, the most unwilling to be interviewed in our random survey of the town.


Valdez KI Summary - Page 543

The oil spill of 1989 has in the eyes of most people interviewed had a positive
overall economic. effect on Valdez, even though it did have negative effects on some
econornic activities in town, e.g., tourism.'-' As a result of new safety measures taken by
Alyeska, there are at least 200 new jobs in Valdez, all asso~ciated with spill prevention or
cleanup in such areas as SERVS and other spill and safety activities associated with
loading the oil into the boats.
However, while this has brought new jobs to Valdez, they are not all filled by
Valdez residents. A significant number of the new emnployees employed by SERVS are
from Louisiana on contract to Alyeska. Crews and boats come to Valdez for a specified
contract period and return to their home base in Louisiana when their term is
completed. While other jobs that resulted from the spill are held by residents of Valdez,
a number of these jobs have been cut back in the year since the spil. According to a
number of informants, at least 16 employees working on the safe-loading tankers were
dismissed during the period of research in February and March, 1990. So while most
interviewed felt the spill had added significantly to the local economy, a few had a
s-uspicion that the additional jobs associated with safety either would go the way of such
jobs in the past, i.e., as no major accidents occurred they would be eliminated, or they
would be contracted out to individuals not resident in Valdez. 16
The organization of work at Alyeska also has critical effects on' Valdez. Many, if
not most, workers at Alyeska work a 7-day-on and 7-day-off shift. This allows the
workers the option of leaving Valdez each week they are off. It also prevents them from
having much to do in town when they are on shift, given the long hours they work during
this period. Thus, according to informants, quite a number of the Alyeska employees opt
to leave Valdez during their week off and live in Anchorage--some even keep second
homes there. They do most of their shopping and entertaining in Anchorage and thus
make a much smaller contribution to the Valdez economy than might be suspected,
given their incomes. As a result, the commercial sector in Valdez, according to a


1Other attitudes about the spill and oil will be dealt with later.
16As no figures were available from Alyeska, it is dffficult to argue which scenario is more appropriate.

Valdez K(1 Summary - Page 55





number of local merchants, is neither as large nor as profitable as the gross income ofI
Valdez would have us expect.
This movement in and out of Valdez by its residents that is made possible by
Alyeska's work schedules and the fact that only about 25 cents of every dollar in the oil-
transport industry remains in Valdez effectively makes the oil-transport industry's
contribution to the economy less than it might appear from gross statistics. As the tax
contribution to Valdez diminishes--and it is through tax revenues that oil transport makes
its biggest contribution to Valdez--the contributions to the economy made by oil will
becoine, in my estimation, a mixed blessing. Valdez would not be the town it has
become without the oil industry. If the contribution from oil is lowered, Valdez mnay5
suffer from econoinic problems such as high individual rather than corporate taxation,
brought on by its requirements to provide the services and maintain the lifestyle it offers3
today. It may fa~il to maeet these requirements.
Other areas of. transport make up less than 10 percent of the income brought to3
Valdez through transport and only about 2 percent of its total income. Only the port has
the potential for sufficient growth to serve as a counterbalance to oil transport.3
However, generally idle now, the port presently has only added a large debt burden--
around $9 million--for the town; and it shows no evidence of a growth in economic
activity or impact.
Thus, while oil transport is critical to Valdez, comprising 42 percent of private-5
sector revenue and 32 percent of total revenue, its effects on Valdez are complex and
over the long term somewhat uncertain. How the industry will or will not grow, how it3
organizes its labor, the agreements it comnes to in the future with State and Federal
authorities, and the extent to which it will remain a safe and nonpolluting industry all are3
critical factors in trying to come to grips with Valdez as it exists today and as it will or
might exist in the future.3
II.C. Commercial Fishing
Although fishing has been a part of the Valdez economy on and off since at least3
the 1920's, it has never been the dominant economic activity that it has been in other
communities on PWS. Ironically, fishing, as measured by the gross revenues, hasI

Valdez KI Summary - Page 563

increased since the introduction of the oil-transport industry to Valdez. So while gross
revenues have risen, the net effect of fishing on the local economy of Valdez has
dimninished.
Nevertheless, the nature of conimercial fishing and its associated manufacture, i.e.,
fish processing, does have a significant social and political as well as economic impact on
Valdez. Many who fish are mnembers of families who have lived in Valdez since before
the earthquak  and are ergtcparticipants in the towin's lf. A numbe  of tose
associated with either the nuclear or extended famnilies in which at least one member
fishes for a living own stores in town or hold important positions in the town
governmnent, and at least one member of the six-person council fishes for a living. The
creation of the Valdez Fisheries Development Corporation with its hatchery and the
three fish-processing plants--two of which are economically stable--and the associated
boating and repair services provide Valdez with one important, if limited, and relatively
stable alternative to oil. Moreover, the seasonal nature of the fishing and fish-processing
industries has important impacts on the.social life of Valdez.
Commercial fishing makes up about 1.5 percent of the employment share and 2.8
percent of the income share of Valdez's residents as previously noted, but the
commercial-fishing industry itself is larger than these figures reveal. With 94 fishing
boats remaining in the harbor year-round, they make up only a third of the 280 boats
registered in Valdez and resident in Valdez for brief periods during the height of the
fishing season. Most of the 60 or so that do not dock in Valdez year-round are
comprised of boats owned by fishermen resident in Washington.'17
Valdez itself makes up only a small portion of the fishing that occurs on PWS.
With revenues of $5.4 million, the boats out of Valdez comprise a little less that 5
percent of the aggregate fishing iniPWS. According to,"informants, Valdez re.sidents hold
about 20 of the 610 gillnet permnits available and 12 of the 260 seine-net permits.





1Boat numbers are, from the Harbormaster's Office, and other numbers on fishing are from various
fishermen respondents.
Valdez KI Summary - Page 57





Fishing itself is highly seasonal. The peak of the season is in July and August, andU
only a few jobs remain year-round. Many of the fishermen resident in Valdez fish only as

a part-time pursuit with about seven or eight, according to informants, devoted to fishing
on a full-time basis.1
Most fishermen in Valdez own between one and three boats. For the most part,I
they fish for pink salmon. Halibut, which has a 2-day season; cod; herring; and shrimp
also are fished commercially. According to informants, in a good year a fishermnan can
gross about $1/2 to 3/4 million while those who work mainly as tenders can gross about
$1/3 to 1/2 million. No large fleets fish out of Valdez.
Fishing offers a lucrative if hard life for those who choose to make their living as3
fishermen. The risk in fishing, of course, is that the price of fish can drop precipitously
and immediately, fluctuating dramaticaly in a single season. Local fishermen have no3
control over fish prices, and the life is hard and dangerous during the period one fishes.
Moreover, another oil disaster like the Exxon Valdez spill poses a significant threat to
continued fishing on PWS.
Following the spill, fishermen played an active role in the cleanup. Fishermen
along with some tour-boat operators in Valdez were among the first out to' the spill.
Most worked at spill cleanup from the beginning; and although many worked initially
without thinking of compensation, most earned significant income in the process.
The spill and the cleanup that followed have given fishermen strong opinions about3
the risks oil poses to PWS. Of those interviewed, there was considerable agreement that
Valdez could not and should not lose the oil-transport industry given its central3
importance to the town; Valdez would not be the place it is without that industry.
Nonetheless, they all felt that to somne degree or another oil transport is a potential3
threat to their industry and the overall well-being of PWS. Because of what they believe
to be the why's and how's of the sill and what they saw as the general disorganization3
and incomnpetence during the initial and most critical stages of the cleanup, there is a



18 There is little exact information on the number of fishermen who are full time. The numbers are an
amalgam of the view of the three fi'shermen I spoke with while in Valdez.I
Valdez KI Summary - Page 58

strongly held suspicion that even with the changes wrought as a result of the spill and
lessons learned by Alyeska and Exxon, past history has shown that vigilance decreases as
time goes by. As a result, the fishermen interviewed believe that while cleanup efforts
might be better organized and While at least for now greater attention is being paid to
safety, the chances of another spill still pose a threat to PWS and the fisheries industry.
While noting that the fish from the Valdez hatchery have been unaffected by the spill as
far as is now known, there is an unease about the effects of the spill on the stores and
lhealth of wild salmon over the long term. This is because the salmon affected by the
spill have yet to return, given their normal cycle of movement.
Only two of the fishermen resident in Valdez did not participate in the spill
cleanup. One of these two fishermen did not participate by choice. The boat of the
other fisherman was, at least in Exxon's estimation, not up to the task of the cleanup.
Both fishermen argue that they lost considerable income because of the shortened season
(one boat was a tender and the other a small fishing vessel).
Those who participated in the cleanup earned as much if not more than their
a.nnual earnings from fishing. Ironically, although the season was shorte'r than usual, it
resulted in record catches and revenues. If any of those involved in commaercial fishing
were adversely affected by the spill, it was those who ran tenders and who lost income,
according to informants, because of the shortened season. As mnany fishermen both
fished and worked the cleanup, profits for the sumrrner of 1989 were for the most part
high.19
If the spill did not directly affect the profits of most fishermen for 1989 in a
negative way, the spill and cleanup did have important and, some would claim,
potentially adverse effects on.the industry. For one, the excess profits earned by many
during the spill led a number of fishermen to 'add to their fleet and to buy new boats
with the latest in fishing technology. These new boats and expanded fleets gave those
who were able to benefit from the spill a competitive edge over those who were not. All



19EFxact numbers are not forthcoming for individual fishermen. The claims here are based on a composite
of the discussions I held with a number of fishermen in Valdez.
Valdez KI Summary - Page 59






those who participated in the cleanup benefited by such participation, but they benefitedI
unevenly because contracts were negotiated individually. Depending on when one got
involved in the cleanup and the politics of the spill at the moment, contracts--according
to many--varied considerably.
According to a number of informants, the spill may destabilize the industry over
timie in a number of ways and create new tensions among fishermen both within Valdez
itself and on PWS in general. The greater number of boats, many of these with a
greater capacity and more efficient technology for catching fish, will severely affect
distribution of the catch as well as the availability of resources. The likely effect this will
have on fishermen who do not have large, fast, well-equipped boats and on the price of
fish is uncertain. What is clear is that increased tensions resulting from the uneven
benefits of the spill have created greater social conflict in the industry. Moreover, the
uneven gains from the spill have increased traditional tensions between fishermen,
particularly between the towns of Valdez and Cordova. Each town's fishermen claimn
that the other town's fishermen received greater benefits from the spill.
Further destabilization may yet occur as the industry shakes out from the impacts
of the spill. A number who bought new boats were neither fall time nor necessarily
experienced fishermen. Some of these may have miscalculated the overall cost-benefit
equation involved in fishing. Some bought boats on the assumption that the spill cleanup
would continue in 1990 as it did in 1989 and calculated costs on the basis of that
assumption.. According to mnost of my informants, others may not have held back funds
to pay their Federal taxes frbm their cleanup income, purchasing boats with money owed3
to the Federal Government. As a result, a number mnay find themselves in financial
trouble over the next few years as tax obligations are assessed and come due.3
All of these issues give a sense of instability to the fishing industry right now as
people wait to see how the effects of the spill ecologically, economically, and socially3
work themselves out. Whether accurate or not, the perceptions of instability are
widespread. Add to these perceptions fears about the current state of world prices for3
salmon and the overall effects of oil transport on the ecology of PWS and salmon over
time, and it is apparent that the fisbing industry in Valdez has been noticeably affected3

Valdez KI Summary - Page 60

by the spill in particular and the oil industry in general. Nevertheless, almost all the
informants argued that whatever perceptions and fears they have. now were not
important to them before the spill. Furthermore, the economic impacts of the spill
certainly changed the technical and economic makeup of the fishing industry. Just what
those changes. will bring is still open to question and a source of concern for niost
fishermen.
II.D. Fish Pirocessing
Fish processing, which comprises 95 percent of the manufacturing sector of Valdez,
grew significantly in the 1980's. Previous to the development of Valdez's infrastructure
and growth with the coming of the oil pipeline, fish processing had been a small part of
Valdez's economy for most of the time since the 1920's. There are some exceptions to
this generalization, e.g., there was no fish processing  during the period the PWS was
.closed to coTmmercial fishing. Today, there are three processors in Valdez. Two are
stable processors and one is not so stable. The two stable processors are Sea Hawk,
which came to Valdez about a decade ago and mostly processes fresh and frozen fsh,
and Peter Pan, which ente'red Valdez in the late 1980's and mostly processes canned
salmon. The market for fish processed in Valdez is p redominately Japan, with Europe
second and the United States last. As a result, the fish-processing industry takes fufll
advantage of the "foreign free-trade zone" at the airport.
While the industry grosses about $23 mnillion a year, an amnount much greater than
any industry generated in Valdez before the coming of the oil pipeline, and employs
about 625 people at it peak in the summer, its direct effect on the economy of Valdez is
small. Fish processing makes up about 13 percent of the revenues in Valdez but only 2.8
percent of the income of the residents. Only- about 6 cents of every dollar of gross
revenue is earned by Valdez residents, and the plants are not owned or operated by
Valdez residents. Moreover, in 1988, less than 14 percent of the fish processed in
Valdez came from fishermen who resided there.20 Many who fish out of and are
resi'dent in Valdez sell their fish to processors elsewhere on PWS.



20 These figures are from the CVCDP (1991).
Valdez K! Summary - Page 61

Given the seasonal and intensive nature of the employinent in the processing
industry, most who work for the processors in Valdez come from outside the area.
Predom-inately college students, they come to work in the peak months of July and
August and live, for the most part, in barracks provided by the processors. The industry
suffers from a great deal of turnover. In one company, turnover is over 100 percent,
with about 800 people needed to fill the 325 jobs available throughout the peak months
of July and AuguSt.2' hin May and June, jobs in this company usually are filled by area
Native peoples until the arrival of the college students who work in Valdez during the
summner.
Some pressure is put on the infrastructure of Valdez each summer with the influx
of the processing employees and others who work only in surnmer. It is not that the
town ca-nnot handle this influx, predictable as it has been over the last number of years,
but the coming of sumnmer workers is a mnixed blessing at best. It is not clear exactly
how much these residents actually spend in Valdez, living as they do in barracks and
coming mostly to save money for expenses such as college tuitions. Whatever the cost
and benefits, informants feel that processors do provide an alternative to oil for Valdez
and a base- from which to hopefully build more industry that is independent of oil.
Of all the economic activities in Valdez, the processing industry was affected as
much as any economic pursuit in Valdez by the oil spill of 1989. Not oDly was the
season shortened by the spill, it also was extremely difficult to keep ernployees, especially
experienced employees, from joining the spill-cleanup workforce, given the much higher
wages paid by VECO, the company given responsibility for the cleanup jobs. While
understandable to those who managed the processing plants, it made their work that
much more difficult and economically costly during the spill year.
Furthermore, there is some fear about the long-term effects on the worldwide
perception of Alaska's fish stock and the effects this perception mnight have on the
salmon market. According to one respondent close to the industry, there is some
evidence that sales of Alaska salmon were down in Europe and the UJnited States owing


Thes figures are from a number of informants associated with the fish-processing industry.
Valdez 1(1 Summary - Page 62

to fears about polluted fish. Whether true or not, these fears add instability to what is
an inherently unstable industry, dependent as it is on whole market prices and the
willingness of fishermen to work within the parameters of that market. For example,
from a record price for fish in the spill year, there has been a significant drop in the
price of fish and reports of a reluctance of fishermen to fish for that price in the summer
of 1991. Commercial fishing and fish processing operating in a fluctuating world market
are nonetheless an alternative to oil but a bighly unstable one.
T'he overall effects of fish processing on Valdez, however, are subtle. We must
recall that the owners of the fish-processing plants reside outside Valdez, as do most of
the boat owners who supply the processing plants. In general, the profits from PWS go,
primarily, to people who do not live in Valdez. However, the indirect effects of these
profits, while subtle, are also important to the overall economnic health of,the town.
There is, with the help of the Valdez hatchery, development research going forward
on new ways to market fish, e.g., microwave portions for the U.S. market, in order to
build more stability and long-term profitability into the processing and thus commercial-
fishing industries. The irony is that the hatchery spawns fish for fishermen from Seattle
as well as Valdez, the former being the majority of the fishermen working out of Valdez.
II.E. Food and Lodging/Tourism/Boat Charter
This category includes an amalgam of activities22- that are related to the extent
that they form an importaut if not, yet entirely developed-alternative to oil transport
within Valdez's economy. While food and lodging serve residents, traveling business
people, workers, and especially employees in the public sector, tours  underwrites te
economic well-being of the hotel industry as well as an important part of the food-service
sector in Valdez. 23
The food and lodging sector of the economy is a major contributor to employinent
in Valdez, but work in this sector is for the most part low paying in comparison with


22 1have not included bars in the discussion here because little information other than what I have already
presented was available, and most of the bars are dependent moreso on residents and transient workers than
they are on tourists.
23No exact numbers were available on the hotel and food-service sectors of the economy.
Valdez KI Summary - Page 63

either the oil-transport industry or governmnent. As noted above, this sector providesU
roughly 11 percent of employment but only 3 percent of the income to those working in
Valdez. Moreover, a significant number of persons employed by this sector are transient,
workdng only during the peak summer months of July and August.
There are 4 hotels and 25 bed and breakfasts in Valdez. The bed and breakfasts
make up only a very small proportion of hotel revenues. The Westmark, the largest of
the hotels, alo-ne earns in a peak month more than all the bed and breakfasts together.
The latter, run out of private homes, account for only about $200,000 (CVCDP 1991),
most of which is earned during the peak summer months. The hotels also earn most of
their inconie during these months servng the tourists as well as people in Valdez on
business or other work-related activities such as construction. One hotel is open only
during the peak months.5
A significant number of those who visit Valdez as tourists come with the many
tours that travel to Alaska during July and August. The Westmark Hotel itself is owned
by Holland-America Lines and serves the tours that this company brings to the area
during visits to the IPWS. There is some fear, however, that as cruise lines are able to
bring larger boats into the Sound, they will no longer need the services of either the port
or the hotels of Valdez. This potentially would lower the number of tourists who would3
actually set foot in Valdez and spend money there.
Winter tourism, an activity being prormoted by the hotels and tou-rist bureau, has
yet to take offi Japanese and Korean tours comprise the largest, if not the total, market
for winter tourism, comning in small groups throughout the winter. A new international3
sli competition in April and a carnival are events that those involved with tourism hope
will bring Valdez to the attention of tourists and tour promoters in order to increase
winter tourism.
Tourism not only provides employinent directly in the hotels and restaurants thatj
serve tourists, it also provides indirectly to the employment provided by the over 10
stores that sell crafts and other tourist items. Moreover, along with the real estate taxes3
Valdez 1(1 Suimmary - Page 64

paid by hotels, restaurants, and stores, the hotels contribute about $130,000 a year in bed
taXeS to the toWn.24
The spill had critical effects on the tourist industry as well as the food industry.
Clearly, given the rise in population during the cleanup, hotels and restaurants made an
econornic killing--they were completely fall throughout the cleanup period. But the
cleanup put great stress on the reputation of Valdez as a reliable place to visit as well as
on the management of these services.
The influx of workers during the cleanup and Exxon's need for space for its
employees to live throughout the cleanup period led to the cancellation of almost all
reservations made for tourists in the summer of 1989.25 In the case of one hotel, Exxon
effectively booked all the rooms for the entire peak summer months of the cleanup,
maling rooms unavailable to anyone bu,t Exxon personnel.
While the hotels clearly profited from such arrangements, what effects they will
have on Valdez's reputation among tourists and tour operators have yet to be seen.
Given that the spill also may have turned people away from visiting PWS, the added
complication wrought by cancellations adds to an already uncertain future for tourism in
Valdez. However, at the same time, Exxon has underwritten a considerable public-
relations campaign to overcome the adverse publicity generated by the spill, and the spill
itself has brought Valdez such extraordinary name recognition that its adverse effects
may be overcome by the positive effects of the public-relations campaign. Indeed,
according to informants, there is evidence that the spill has generated a whole new type
of tourist in Valdez, i.e., those who come to see the spill and its effects.
Ile evidence about tourism is not yet in. Some informants argue that it is down
while others say that it really has not been affected. Figures from the largest hotel in
Valdez, the Westmark, suggest a slight dip in overall revenues after the spill but not
enough to conclusively state that tourism is down. In July 1988, revenues at the
Westmark were $264,000. In July 1989, the summner of the spill, they were $273,000. In


2The tax figure is from the CVCDP (1991).
'-According to city officials, accommodation was found for those tourists who visit Valdez on a regular basis.
Valdez KI Summary - Page 65





July 1990, they were $255,000.26 The roughly 7-percent drop in revenues is notI
considered by the hotel managemen't to be significant, looking as they are to a growth
year in the summer of 1991. However, the fall in revenues must be looked at in light of
a 7-percent rise in Alaskan tourism overall for the year 1990.27
The spill had other effects on the tourist industry as well. The turnover of
employees during the cleanup, most of whom worked in the higher paying cleanup jobs
at one time or another, was "drastic" according to one hotel manager. This led to a great
amount of stress among those who managed food and lodging services during this period.
However, all stabilized in the year following the spill, and the sector is back to normalcy.
The longer term effects on tourism in Valdez are threefold: (1) the potential shift
of tour operators to tour strategies that wo-uld not involve a stop in Valdez, (2) the long-
term threat of another ecological disaster despoiling the Sound further, and (3) the3
general U.S. economy. In 1991, the war in the Persian Gulf prompted high hopes for a
strong tourist season as Americans shifted away frorm travel overseas to travel at home.j
How the recession of 1991 will affect this travel is still an open question.
Charter and tour boats mnake up a small but important segment of the tourist5
industry in Valdez. About 25 charter boats and 6 glacier tour boats operate out of
Valdez. Of these, 3 of the tour boats and 20 of the charter boats dock year-round in
Valdez. The remainder are owned and operated by individuals who do not reside in
Valdez. Only two of the charter boat operators who reside in Valdez operate ftfll timne.
The remainder operate boats mostly in the peak summer months as a sideline to their
main             ocuain.285
T'he spill had profound effects on this segment of the industry. Tourism was down
during the summer of 1989 because of the hotel ca-ncellations and the bad publicity and3
also because much of PWS was off limits to tour boats during the cleanup. A numnber of




26 These are dollar amounts from the office of the Westmark Hotel.I

27The figure for Alaska is from the boat charter association.

~These figures are from informants.I
Valdez KI Summary - Page 66g

the boat operators were able to make up the loss of income by working the spill, and in
fact earned more from this work than they conceivably could from their normal charters.
While overal the cleanup was profitable' to boat owners, the effects on tourism
remain to be seen. The 1990 season for individuals operating glacier tours was down,
although Alaskan tourism in general was up. Calls for tours were up. How the industry
will shake out is still uncertain. As one tour boat operator observed, "I can no longer
advertis-e a pristine Sound nor a pristine boat after the spill."
The spill also has changed the boat charter industry. During the spill-cleanup
period, the wages and salaries of those who worked the boats rose considerably. These
new wage rates, while not remaining at spill-summer levels, have remained above what
they were before the spill and have raised the costs of operating a charter boat. For
example, for a job that paid $6 an hour before the spill, operators now pay $10 an hour.
These new costs plus, as in the case of conmmercial fishing, the numbers of new boats
that have come on the scene because of cleanup profits have led to some uncertainty
about whether the industry can sustain this new expansion profitably.
Like tourism in general, charter boating is to a great extent dependent on the oil-
transport industry for the infrastructure in Valdez: its hotels and restaurants, the airport,
medical facilities, public services, and the like. It is also threatened by that same
industry given the dependence of boat charters and glacier tours on a clean and
nonpolluted sound.. Like many in Valdez, the relationship of those in the tourist industry
both structurally and attitudinally to the oil-transport industry is both cornplex and
ambivalent.
It is my impression that the tourist industry, although an alternative to oil transport,
is dependent on it. The levels of services Valdez offers and the economic viability of the
hotels on a year-round basis--as it is only one opens in summer--would be questionable
without an oil-transport ind-ustry. While a tourist industry could survive the loss of oil
transport--tourism was a part of Valdez before the pipeline--it is doubtful that all of the
hotels and the many restaurants would survive. The loss of oil transport would
substantially change the size and nature of tourism in Valdez. .Moreover, tourism also is
Valdez XI Summiary - Page 67





dependent on the oil-transport industry remaining free of any mnore disasters that mightI
make Valdez and the PWS a less-than-attractive destination for tourists.
II.F. The Public Sector
Oil transport generates the greatest gross and net revenues in Valdez and drives
the economy, but the public sector provides the greatest share of employment (25%) and
resident income (471%).
In a way , one could argue that oil drives the economy but the public sector, which
oil's revenues help to generate, supports it. Public-sector employment (especially
government, which comprises 27% of all resident income and where the ratio of income
to the number of jobs is 3 to 2) provides one of the highest per capita incomes by sector3
in Valdez. This is possibly explained by a. greater number of employees with
professional tra ining, although no figures are available. Additionally, while they provide5
such a high income level, public-sector revenues also provide the highest percentage of
revenue (roughly 70 cents for every dollar earned) that remains in Valdez. Thus, while5
public sectors are well rewarded and public-sector revenues high, their contribution to
the economic well-being of Valdez in direct spending also is very high in comparison3
with, for example, oil transport, which also is a high-paying sector of the economy.
During the spill, the public sector did suffer as did other areas from some
einployee turnover. Some individuals with lower paying jobs left to work on the spill
cleanup. For the most part though, the effects of the spill were not so much economic3
but psychological as the stress and fatigue of the demands forced on this sector,
especially government, by the spill became palpable. Overall, informants in this sectorI
spoke of stress and fatigue but could think of no one who actually left government
be.cause of bumnout related to the spill. Of all sectors of the economny, this sector was5
least affected econornically. The only significant effects were costs both direct and
indirect that the cleanup necessitated but which have yet to be paid back to the city. 29






29 No figures are available on this issue.I
Valdez KI Sumimary - Page 685

II.G. Small Businesses
This category includes all those activities that were labeled manufacturing minus
fish processing, construction, personal services, and trade and finance (F.L.R.E.), above,
and which are composed of a number of relatively small establishments in comparison
with the main economic activities in Valdez. Together and in total these activities
comprise about a 16-percent share of employment, income, and revenue in Valdez. This
16 percent is divided among over 150 small firms,30 most of Which employ one or two
people. The effects on the economy of Valdez of each of the areas discussed here vary
significantly. For example, while the ratio of income to employment in the finance area
is one the highest in Valdez, it is one of the lowest in the trade sector of the economy.
Trade also returns one of the lowest amounts of all its revenues to the Valdez economny
(20 cents to the dollar), while personal services and finance return about 50 cents to the
dollar.31
Manufacturing, if you factor out fish processing, contributes only about eight jobs
annually to Valdez and is an inconsequential factor in the economy. Given the foreign
free-trade zone at the airport, though, there are those in the city who would like to see
this area of the economy expand and take advantage of the zone because it would
provide a genuine and conceivably important alternative to oil transport. Yet when
calculating the possible effects of the airport free-trade zone on the economy of Valdez,
the fact that traffic at the airport is dependent on the continued existence of the oil
industry in Valdez is often forgotten.
Construction in Valdez comprises mostly small subcontractors and a number of
larger comnpanies that reside outside Valdez but come to town when construction is
booming; and it exists, except in boom times, on home construction and improvements,
public-works maintenance, and small capital-improvements projects.32 In 1988, there



3OThese figures are from the Valdez Business Directory (Valdez Chamber of Commerce 1989a).

3'The figures that follow are from the CVCDP (1991) except where otherwise noted.

32'lnformnation on construction is from the CVCDP (1991) and the responses of a number of individuals who
work in the industry.
Valdez KI Summary - Page 69

were only two contractors in town who owned their own equipment while 29 rented                   I
equipment when necessary. Aside from general contractors, there are carpenters as well
as electrical, plumbing, and heating and other specialized contractors in Valdez. There
also is a company supplying sand and gravel.
Construction is by nature seasonal and very much affected by the weather. For
small operations and for resident construction workers, bad weather can create
significant economic problems. For example, a number of respondents who work
construction spoke of the winter of 1991 as problematic because there was little snow3
and thus little work shoveling snow--a job many take during the slow winter period. This
slowdown in winter work brought economic, hardship to a number of construction5
workers who chose to live ini Valdez year-round.
Year-round residents who work various seasonal jobs such as fishing and boating
make up a part of the population of Valdez that is often hidden because they are not
part of the economiic success story that underlies the growth of Valdez. For those in3
important and necessary economic sectors who are either not able to work year-round or
who are not as well paid as those in the public sector or oil transport, Valdez is a3
difficult and expensive place to make do.33
Personal services is made up of a number of small professional or technical services3
such as law offices and engineering consultants; community services such as churches;
personal care services such as beauty shops, pet grooming shops, travel agencies, and3
barber shops; manpower services such as janitorial services; and media services such as
radio, cable, and newspapers. According to the V aldez Business Directory (1989a), there3
were over 75 such services in Valdez in 1988.
Most of these services are run by one or two people, with the largest employing5
only six to seven. When aggregated, the personal-services sector employs about 4.5
percent of the workforce and provides a greater percentage of residents' income than5
either fishing or tourism. Moreover, the great variety of personal services available in
Valdez provides a greater range of possibilities to the town than would be typical for a3


33We will look at the social issues this raises in Section III of this study.U
Valdez KI Summary - Page 703

coiniu-nity of the size of Valdez. This range of services also attests to the large
aggregate disposable income in Valdez both corporate and individual.
Trade, which coniprises 8 percent of the employment share and 12 percent of the
revenue share, provides only 6.8 percent of the income of Valdez residents (CVCDP
1991). Made up of a number of small businesses of which Foremost supermarket is the
largest, it ranges from stores that sell arts and crafts to'individuals marketing window
coverings and includes among others a health food store,,clothing shops, a pharmacy, and
a sports equipment shop. Most stores are in the areas of art sales, curio shops, and
liquor stores. A. significant number of the stores sell curios and other tourist items.
Prices in Valdez are influence-d by the transport costs because all items sold come
from either Seattle or Anchorage. Given the higher prices this generates--although
storekeepers claim prices are not substantially higher than those in Anchorage--many
people who live in Valdez do the bulk of their shopping in Anchorage because
(1) people feel that prices and choice are better in Anchorage; (2) many feel it is
necessary to escape Valdez, especially in winter, and once in Anchorage one mnight as
well shop; and (3) those engaged in shift work who have the 7 days off often have second
homnes in Anchorage or, even if they do not, spend a good deal of time there. Thus, they
do most of their shopping in Anchorage given the variety., convenience, and lower prices.
In summner, shops in Valdez do better because of tourism and also because of the large
number of transient workers living in town.
Finance in Valdez consists of two banks, five real estate brokerages and appraisers,
eight rental agencies, and an insur ance company (CVCDP 1991). With the exception of
the banks, financial services in Valdez are single-person operations, some with only one
employee. As most large business and commercial loans are negotiated in Anchorage,
the banks profit from lending services, home equity loans, and other small loans to local
businesses and individuals. The other financial services profit from local transactions in
housing and insurance. This sector is relatively lucrative for those working within it,
providing only 1.6 percent of all jobs in Valdez but 4.6 percent of all residents' incomes.
All the businesses in this sector were affected by the oil spill of 1989, but the
effects varied considerably. Small-business informants suggest that employed people
Valdez K(1 Summary - Page 71





were affected in a number of ways. Two examples follow: (1) loss of employees to theI
cleanup effort and relative instability in regard to employment throughout the period of
the cleanup and (2) the need to raise salaries during the clea-nup period, which added to
the cost of running the business.
For mnany, the spill not only brought higher costs but also a loss of revenues
resulting from lower sales. For example, some of those in the tourist trade complained
that not only did they lose out from lowered rates of tourism, but they also lost potential
sales from cleanup workers because Exxon bussed those working the spill directly out of
Valdez upon their return from their jobs in PWS. Other businesses confronted the
problems associated with employment instability and costs and were able to make
significant profit from the spill in the form of sales to the cleanup workers and other
transients who came to town and also from contracts given to them by Exxon to supply3
aspects of the cleanup effort.
Overall, what we have called the small-business sector of Valdez--while offering a3
significant arena for individual opportunity outside the direct control of either the oil-
transport industry or the public sector and also while providing a range of services that3
enriches town life--still is dependent on the income generated by oil transport and the
public sector for its survival. As of yet, none of the small businesses, with the possibleI
exception of those devoted to tourism, has been able to generate a basis of support
outside the immediate community of Valdez.
IL.H. Housing
While housing is not included within the "Economnic Base Study" for the City of3
Valdez Comprehensive Development Plani, we will review it here because it is part of the
economic realities of Valdez--a part that affects and is affected by the social attitudes3
discussed in Section III of this report.
Housing is a critical issue in Valdez. Faced by a shortage of housing in general and3
a lopsided distribution of income groups to housing types, the city government of Valdez
is developing its housing stock and working on plans in cooperation with Alyeska to5
further the production of upscale housing.
Valdez K(1 Summary - Page 72


I
Prices for houses and trailers range considerably.34 Trailers normally can be
bought for between $12,000 to $15,000, while houses in the popular price range run
between $90,000 and $110,000. Larger and better quality houses in more expensive and
controlled areas of town--for example those built in Mineral Creek subdivision, which
controls the design and appearance of houses built within its boundaries--normally cost
anywhere from $135,000 to $150,000. The most expensive houses bring upwards of
$180,000. Townhouses run about $120,000.
Rents vary as the prices of housing units vary. A low-end one-bedroom trailer win
cost $500 a month plus utilities; two-bedroom trailers run about $900 a month plus
utilities. Modular townhouse units range from $1,200 to $1,600 a month plus utilities;
apartments range, depending on their size, from $700 to $1,200 a month plus utilities.
On average, a low-end apartment or trailer will run about $950 a month including
utilities.
As of today, trailers outnumber stick-built single-family homes by over 100 units
and are interspersed throughout the community, with stick-built homes often on the same
street. Even so, the apparent wide availability of trailers does not necessarily provide
sufficient low-cost and low-end housing for the residents of Valdez who can barely afford
such housing, according to a number of informants.
The large number of trailer and trailer-type units that remain from the pipeline-
construction period when Alyeska sought to provide sufficient housing and brought in
trailers to do so has created a housing imbalance in Valdez. On the one hand, Valdez,
in the eyes of city authorities, does not have enough upper end stick-built, single-family
dwellings, which leads many upper income families to buy or rent trailers. On the other
hand, because the market for trailers includes upper income families, there is a shortage
of housing for those of lower incomes. It is of note that at least two of the respondents
on the QI sample were effectively homeless, residing as they were either with friends on
a temporary basis or living in their car and using a friend's house for kitchen and bath



34This information is based on interviews with realtors, bankers, and city officials.
Valdez KI Summary - Page 73

facilities. The imbalances in housing have been made more pressing by the expansion of
higher paying jobs associated with SERVS and other spill-prevention activities.
As a result, the city, Alyeska, and a developer are cooperating in developing 35 lots
for upper income housing to rectify the imbalances that face Valdez residents. They
seek to provide needed upper income housing, thereby freeing a similar number of lower
cost units for those in lower income brackets. It is hoped these new units will enable the
town to rid itself of the more unsightly units left over from the pipeline days and dispel
its image as a boom town. New upscale housing also will provide investment
opportwnities for those with upper incomes--many of whom city authorities argue
complain about the lack of investment opportunities in Valdez--so that they can develop
a greater sense of commitment to the town.
However,'the plan has come under much fire from residents. Some argue that the
project will not succeed because there is little incentive for upper income families to give
up their lower cost housing, especially as many also have homes in Anchorage where
they spend their time off work. Moreover, because many residents in Valdez see
themselves as impermanent, there is little reason for them to invest in upscale housing.
Ironically, although the project to build the new housing is one of the first cooperative
economic end eavors between the town and Alyeska, a number of individuals who work
for Alyeska are the project's biggest critics.
Respondents who favor the project argue that much of the opposition comes frorn
landlords who will no longer be able to get high rents for inferior housing if the project
succeeds or who are afraid that the new houses will lower the value of their own homes.
Whatever the case, the project reveals the mnany and varied economic interests that run
through the town and spin a web of interlocking, yet conflicting, economic loyalties and
ties. For example, Alyeska employees, who on most issues are fiercely loyal to Alyeska,
have become major stumbling blocks to a project that Alyeska and the city see as
necessary to the econonmic and social well-being of Valdez. Another example is that of
lower income respondents who are ambivalent about the project. They oppose th e city
helping to develop upscale housing but feel that if it will open the less expensive units to
those with lower incomes then it might serve some good. Finally, there is an irony that
Valdez K(1 Summary - Page 74

is at the core of most of the citizens of Valdez who clamor for greater action on the
housing front while generally distrusting any large-scale intervention by government or
large corporations on behalf of the citizenry.
The spill in both the short and the long terms had a number of effects on the
housing market. Some famnilies and individuals (the -exact number is not known or not
available) were hurt by the minibooni in housing created by cleanup activities. While
many deny it, there is evidence of families being evicted from housing because landlords
felt they could get better rents fromn those involved in the cleanup. A number of
informants did observe that Exxon tried not to rent units from which people had been
evicted, but others might not have been so inclined. Moreover, the cleanup did raise
rents and house prices, although the upward spiral of housing costs had begun inf 1986
after a period from 1984 to 1986 of stagnation in the real estate market. Some
informants set the rise during the cleanup at about 7 percent overall, but there are no
specific figures to back this up. Whatever the case, there is.a feeling that the cleanup
did lead to problems with housing shortages and a rise in prices. These problemns have
become more long term in effect as those associated with SERVS and other new safety-
related jobs become resident in Valdez.
Until Valdez can correct the housing and income imbalances and generate a better
range of appropriate housing types both in terms of design and price, the housing
problem in Valdez will remain, and the appearance and sense of Valdez as something of
a boom town will remain.
11.1. Conclusion
When we look at Valdez and its various economic activities, what we see is a
picture of dependency but with some potentials for alieviating at least some of this
dependency. Oil transport and the large public sector it supports account for 70 percent
of the value-added in Valdez. Even tourism, which in principle is independent of oil
transport, depends to some extent on oil revenues and the infrastructure it mnakes
possible for it s existence. If oil revenues were not available, the hotels and restaurants
so critical to tourism would have to downsize or reformulate the nature of their activity,


Valdez KI Summary - Page 75

especially in winter. Recall that the largest hotel was built for the pipeline and not for
tourism.
Nonetheless, Valdez is located in a most beautiful spot and already has a good
transportation infrastructure. Thus, there is the potential to build new industries and
expand its tourist and fishing base. The success of such potential endeavors is
questionable. It is clear that for the town to retain its infrastracture, businesses, and
activities, it requires a vibrant oil-transport industry that will'expand over the next 20
years or so. Without oil transport, the citizens of Valdez would have to rethink their
town and create a different and downsized econornic and social reality. Oil is what
made Valdez what it is today, and it stands at the center of any discussion of the
economic and the social and cultural life and ethos of Valdez.
Overall, for a community of its size, Valdez--because of the existence of the oil-
transport industry and what it is able to directly and indirectly support--is well endowed
with social, recreational, and educational infrastructure and supports. Today, it is by
national standards a well-to-do town with a strong and active economy. Whether this
provides a sufficient basis for what people perceive as a reasonable social and civic life
and how this social and civic life works in light of the physical, admninistrative, and
economic infrastructural architecture of the city is what we will turn to next.
If the history of Valdez can be typified in the late 20th century as one of boom and
bust and if the economic realities of Valdez have been to a great extent formed through
periods of boom and bust, so too does the theme of boom and bust underlie much of the
feelings residents have towards Valdez. As one respondent observed: "People here live
from boom to bust and booin again; from the earthquake to the pipeline to the spill and
then to the next boomi."
Valdez, as we have noted, exists today as it is because of oil. Most people, with the
exception of the those who resided in Valdez before the pipeline, have come to Valdez
for a good job and the econornic rewards that it may bring them. Be it the reality of a
good job or the hope of obtaining one, economic prosperity or the sense of prosperity, or
the failure to meet one's hopes for economic well-being, the job and its reward or lack of
Valdez 1(1 Summary - Page 76

reward forms the foundation upon which people in Valdez evaluate and understand their
experiences.
Because oil is the literal and metaphorical stuff that fuels Valdez's prosperity, it
forms the central factor around which attitudes and sensibilities are structured directly
and indirectly. For many, the spill and its aftermath have brought into bold relief both
the strengths of Valdez as a community and its weaknesses, as well as what is good and
bad about residing there.
It is to the attitudes, beliefs, and understandings that people have about their lives
in Valdez and the effects of the spill and the social formations that underlie them that
we now turn. What follows is a series of discussions based on observations and
interviews gathered while in Valdez. The discussions and analyses are based on
observations, imnpressions, suggestions, and positions developed over the course of my
short research in Valdez during February and Marcli of 1991. In no way are they meant
to be conclusive but are offered as a prologue for the understanding of Valdez and its
people. To them in general and to the many individuals who kindly gave of their
hospitality, their time, and their important insights, I am extremely grateful.
III. THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE SPILL AND ITS EFFECTS
III.A Social Relations, Social Tensions, and the Spill
Almost everyone in Valdez who was intervewed felt there was tension and conflict
during the spill-cleanup period but that the tension and conflict, while poisoning the
atmosphere in Valdez, was never particularly virulent, as apparently it was in other
places on the Sound like Cordova. The social divisions and conflicts that people felt
were manifest in Valdez during the aftermath of the spill replicate for the most part the
more general and constant social and econonmic relations that existed in Valdez prior to
the spill and still exist today.
Valdez is beset by a n-umber of constant if low-level divisions and tensions that are
more latent than obviously manifest. People are aware of the divisions and express
sentimnents that reflect social divisions in the community. However, these divisions
rarely, if ever, find express'o asopnpolitical or social conflicts.
Valdez KI Summary - Page 77





III.B. jobs, Oil, Economic Institutions, and Social DivisionsI
While the observations about everyday social life make no direct reference to the
structuxal relationships that underlie everyday social interaction in Valdez, they allude
most clearly to one critical attribute of Valdez life. Social relations as a stractural and
informal reality in Valdez are a function of the reasons that people come to Valdez to
live.
Valdez now, if not prior to the building of the oil terminal, is a social entity defined
primarily by its economic reason for being. If we look at our interview sample and ask
ourselves why these people are in Valdez, we find that in the majority of cases there is
one answer: the jobs they hold. Persons who were unemployed or underemployed at
the time of their interviews remained in Valdez for only two reasons: (1) because of
hopes of finding better and more stable employment or (2) because they are employedï¿½
as fishermen or construction workers through the summer and are willing to cobble
together a few jobs in winter, like snow removal, so as to provide enough income to3
support them through the year. Whatever positive features interviewees saw in Valdez,
such as its beautifLil setting or its location, one lives in Valdez to hold a job.I
The overwhelining importance of the job in Valdez and earning a living, hopefully
with real economic rewards but often only providing enough to get by, is made most3
clear by the fact that in our sample over 85 percent of those married or living with
another person had either spouses or cornpanions who also worked. What is of note is3
that the respondent's income could not be -used as a predictor for whether others in
his/ber household worked because individuals earning over $60,000 were as likely to
have a spouse, or compamion working as those who made under $30,000.
If people are in Valdez because of the work it provides, the types of work, the skills3
the various jobs require, and the incomes that these jobs provide vary significantly.
Embedded within the social fabric are economic and social divisions that divide the3
community between the "haves" and the "have-nots" and between those who work for the
major institutions in town, i.e., Alyeska and government, and those who do not.5
On the one hand were those interviewed who held jobs like janitors, cooks,
construction workers, bartenders, automechanics, medical assistants, and such and earned3
Valdez 1(1 Summary - Page 78

typically under $30,000 a year. On the other hand were those who were employed as oil
workers, government officials, teachers, and professionals such as accountants and
earned typically over $60,000 a year. Household income was similarly divided, with
about 40 percent of the households earning over $60,000 a year and 40 percent earning
roughly $40,000 a year. A surprising number, 26 percent, earned less than $30,000 a year
in a community where the per capita income is $20,000 a year. What these figures
suggest is a relatively wide division between the various households in Valdez when
income is taken into account--a division that is paralleled socially.
In Valdez, people can be divided into those who are "doing well" and those who
are "making do." The 40 percent or so of our sample who had household incomes of
over $60,000--and over 75 percent of those had incomes considerably higher than $60,000
a year35--clearly had incomes that provided the basis for a reasonably affluent lifestyle.
This is especially evident when one realizes that top-of-the-market housing was not
substantially higher than low-end housing, although high enough to put it beyond the
reach of those earning under $40,000 a year.6 While a household income of $40,000
is high by U.S. standards, costs in Valdez diminish the real economic value of such an
income. If rent and utilities on a small one-bedroom trailer run on average about $1,000
a month, then $40,000 will buy one the good life it can in other parts of the United
States. But little disposable income is retained if one tries to live in anything but the
most basic form of accommodation in Valdez with such an income. A household income
of between $20,000 and $30,000--about 26 percent of our sample--represents relative
impoverishment in Valdez.
, No one, or at least no one of whom I knew, was starving in Valdez. Being poor by
Valdez standards compared with other places in the U.S. is not poor at all; an income of
$25,000 in many locations in the lower 48 is adequate. However, one's sense of



35Income categories on the interview schedule were divided 0-10,000, 10,001-20,000, 20,001-30,000, 30,001-
40,000, 40,001-60,000, and 60,001 or more. Figures on the higher incomes are based on respondent
communications.

36Assuming some upscale Valdez house prices between $130,000 and $150,000, mortgage payments are
between $1,500 and $2,000 a month.
Valdez KI Summary - Page 79





econornic status and one's real economic opportunities are not defined absolutely. InI
Valdez, a relatively affluent and expensive conimunity, what appear to be high incomes
,by the national standard are low incomes by Valdez standards. Incomes that give one
real economic choices and some economic status in many lower 48 communities provide
little real disposable income in Valdez.
On the other side of the coin, incomes are not so skewed that there is anyone in
Valdez who can be called the richest man in town. Neither are there people who have
that much more social power as a result of their income and economic position alone.
Many people mnake high incomes in Valdez, but no one, so far a's I know, makes so much
significantly more than the rest of the community or controls so much more economically3
that by virtuie of their economic position they can be seen as part of a privileged and
ruling group. Status and soclial position in Valdez are defined by criteria other thanï¿½
wealth and income. The economic divisions in Valdez are paralleled by 'a series of social
divisions as well.3
HI-storically, Valdez, especially since the building of the pipeline, has been divided
socially between those who resided in Valdez before the earthquake and those who carneI
after. The division normally is not alluded to by respondents but does come up in two
ways:  (1) Old-time residents often are seen as snobs with a superior sense of their own3
moral self-worth because they did not come to Valdez just because of the good life
offered by the oil economy and (2) more important, the town's newer residents oftenI
complain that the old-timers maintain a too-tight control over business in Valdez, making
it difficult if not impossible for them to establish their own businesses. Whether the3
claim is true or not, several respondents argued that feeaigs that separate the old-time
residents from the more recent residents helps to erode whatever sense of conuaitment3
newer residents of Valdez have toward the community. Moreover, a number of
respondents argue that old-timers tend to resist almost all changes suggested for the3
town, seeing themselves as the only lifetime residents of Valdez and, whether accurately
or not, the only residents likely to retire in Valdez or remain when the oil-economy3
operations close down.


Valdez 1(1 Summary - Page 80

The divisions based on longevity are both broad and subtle. On the one hand,
there are those who lived in Valdez before the earthquake of 1964. On the other hand,
there are those wh'o did not. The latter are themselves divided among those who came
to Valdez after the earthquake but before the announcement of the pipeline, those who
came for the construction of pipeline and stayed, those who came after the pipeline was
completed, and those who came for the spill cleanup or after.
Among some of the pre-earthquake residents of Valdez, there is a feeling that the
social rea-lity of Valdez began to change with the building of the new town. As one old-
timaer observed:
In the old town, we had a building called the "Museum" where we
held all the group activities--especially in winter when we would
push the exhibits out of the way until summer, when we would put
them back for tourists.

When the new -town was established, people built bigger houses so
they could stay home more and entertain at home more. It
diminished the social life because instead of big gatherings for the
whole town people became more insular and cliquish and more
used to entertaining at home.

The feeling one gets when talking to residents is that each new influx of residents
transformed, if only slightly, the basis of social interaction in Valdez. For example, with
the pipeline, the community became a bit more raucous and lively, as the figures for bar
receipts in Table 1, Section I, reveal. Respondents recall a far more active social life,
with more parties and get.-togethers as well as more tension and everyday conflict
resulting from the preponderance of single men in town working pipeline construction.
With the normalization of Valdez after the pipeline was completed, a number of
respondents obser-ved, there was a shift in the makeup of population with more famnilies
and professional and technical workers who created a quieter, less socially interactive
lifestyle for the town. With the spill and'all the inconveniences it created for residents,
the insularity of famifly life was increased.
While social relations prior to the comning of the pipeline were a fanction of
location, weather, and the smallness and relative remoteness of Valdez, today, social
Valdez KI Summary - Page 81





relations are a function first and foremost of the economy and its national and evenI
international character. Valdez is no longer relatively poor, nor is it remote. While it
still is small, the relative wealth of the town provides Valdez with an infrastructureï¿½
us-ually associated with much larger places and a demographic breakdown in relation to
such characteristics as education, income, and cosmopolitanism that is not typical of a
community of 3,000 to 4,000 people. The oil economy, the wealth it attracts, the skills
and educational levels it requires, the experiences of those who work with that industry,
and the infrastructure they demnand (e.g., schools, hospitals, utilities)--along with all the3
other economiic activities in Valdez--produces a wide range of social roles and social
types. Amnong Valdez's residents are college teachers, bankers, engineers, and other3
highly educated persons. There also are stevedores, construction workers, and boat
crewmen, all of whom may or may not be higbly educated, but who, within the social
construction of our society, are viewed as a social group distinct from that of
professionals. All of this apparent variety and heterogeneity is made possible ironically3
by a single economic fact: oil.
Oil is responsible for the occupational structure of the community-and the
predominance of two major institutions, Alyeska and government. There is a division
between those who work for those institutions--who are also generally the highest paid3
members of the community--and others in the community. This division expresses itself
not only economically but also in how one positions oneself in the community and the3
roles and attitudes one holds about life there. For example, most Alyeska employees are
in Valdez because Alyeska has brought them there. Their lifestyles are very much3
conditioned by the nature of the work they do and its organization: a week on and a
week off. Their loyalties and energies are, for the most part, defined by theirI
institutional affiliation. This is not to say that many individuals who work for Alyeska
are not involved in town life; they are. But they form a central and special group3
affiliated with the most critical economic institution in the town.
Valdez KI Summary - Page 82

This became clear for me when most if not all Alyeska employees drawn for our
sample refuised to be interviewed.37 While SoMe non-Alyeska employees refased as
well, Alyeska employees and spouses were the only individuals who refused an interview
on the basis of their occupational affiliation. In Mineral Creek, an upscale subdivision of
stick-built single-family homes, a number of individuals with Alyeska affiliations,
identifiable by the trucks and other vehicles parke d outside their homes, refused
interviews, saying such things as: "My wife and I work for the oil company, please leave
us alone," or "I have worked for the oil company for 13 years," or they just slammed the'
door.
While such actions do not constituite any proof of a sense of separateness on the.
part of Alyeska employees, it is emblematic of what many in Valdez who did not work
for Alyeska--and indeed a number who did--saw as conduct that was snobbish and
somewhat distant socially by those who worked for the company, particularly those in
supervisory and professional roles.
This distance may be explained by a sense of self-importance, but it may just as
well be a fanction of the different educational, technical, and intellectual interests and
backgrounds of those who work for Alyeska. It also may be a function either of the
individual backgrounds of those who are in the oil industry and those who are not or of
the schedules that oil people work. These schedules facilitate trips to Anchorage on the
oil employees' week off. This in turn appears to divide them from the rest of Valdez,
disposing them to different lifestyles as it does. Whatever the case, and there is as yet
no evidence to -claim that one reason or another is the basis for the division, many in
Valdez recognize this divsion as a fact of life.
It is important to remind oneself that the division and the feelings it produces may
be critically related to the central role that oil plays in town and Valdez's dependence on
oil. This gives Alyeska employees a special place whether they want it or not, or



37While Alyeska allowed its employees to be interviewed as individuals, I and my assistant, Mike Howard,
were not permitted in the terminal, nor were we given any interviews with company officials. Their attorney
called and said that "wbile he had heard that our interview was fair and balanced and not anti-oil, he had advised
Alyeska officials to refuse interviews because of the suits pending in both Federal and State courts."
Valdez KI Summary - Page 83






whether or not they choose to be speciaL. They are representatives of the institution thatI
defines at least for now the very reality of Valdez. As such, they carry its baggage as
well as the e~conomic largesse associated with oil. As we shall see, this baggage became
important during the spill-cleanup period and has carried over into postspill Valdez. But
the baggage that employees of Alyeska carry is mitigated or transformed to some extent
by the problems they and other residents of Valdez face, including problems with
Alyeska.
Tle divisions between Alyeska workers and the rest of the community apparently3
have been aggravated by the policy of Alyeska, which, for the most part, has relied on
outsiders to fill Alyeska jobs. While at first justifiable by the lack of skilled oil workers3
in Valdez, the continuation of the policy has created a series of ironies. For one thing, it
has moved some emnployees of Alyeska closer to those who do not work for Alyeska.g
Both groups see new jobs that are filled not by their children, many of whom have grown
up in Valdez, but by people brought from outside the cornmunity. As a result, oil3
workers previously separated by their "outsideness" and their employment at Alyeska are,
when it comes to life-chances for their children, more like other Valdez residents in3
relation to Alyeska's hiring practices. This policy of Alyeska, according to some
respondents, has comne under review; and the company has begun to help young people3
in Valdez ready themselves for future employment in the oil industry.
While the social relations and divisions defined directly by the oil economy loom3
like a benign spectre over the community, there are other important and in some ways
equally critical social relationships and divisions that mitigate and refocus the social3
realities defined by oil.
Distance and division in Valdez are not only defined by one's work but by the3
backgrounds that people bring there. The many (over 60%)3,3 who have college degrees
come with professional and technical skills and interests and, as a result, hold high-3
paying jobs. Like communities elsewhere (Robbins 1975), such people seek each other



38 CF. Donald et al., The Stress Related impact of the Valdez Oil Spill on the Residents of Cordova and
'Valdez, Valdez Counseling Center, June 1990.I
Valdez KI Summary - Page 841

out on the basis of their interests and backgrounds. When a group is so specialized or
the institution to which that group may be associated is considered relatively neutral such
that it forms no threat to other s in the community, e.g., teachers, then the exclusivity of
the group is noted but not considered to be of any social importance to respondents as a
group. It is when such divisions are associated not only with economic advantage
(teachers ar'e well paid) but with status wrought by the importance of the source of that
status, i.e., the institution one is associated with, that the division is noted. So just as
with Alyeska, there is a sense that those who are associated with government--especially
the city government and particularly technical and professional occupations--see
themselves as special and stand a bit aloof from the rest of the community.
Social interests are often defined by one's occupation or economnic pursuits rather
than income alone. Commercial fishermen and tour boat operators see a community
that both supports and is in some ways a threat to their lifestyles. While many express
support for the oil companies and the oil industry, these same respondents often express
a sense of loss in relation to that industry. As one respondent stated quite bluntly after
talkng about the fact that the oil industry is probably a necessary part of Valdez's
economic health, "Since the spill I have come to hate the oil companies."
Other respondents also voiced similar if not as directly stated feelings about their
relationship to the oil industry and about what the coming of the Qil industry to Valdez
has meant to their own sense of gain and loss.
For many,-people the oil economy has been a boon. Investments in the conimercial
life of the town prior to the building of the pipeline have grown in value. New
infrastructure has improved the capacity to do business and earn a living, and the growth
of Valdez has inade it a more comfortable place to live. But these gains have been
accompanied by losses.
What many respondents feel they have lost is the power to control their own lives
and the power to define Valdez in ways that will guarantee the longevity and security of
their economic pursuits. For example, among members of this group one finads a higher
percentage of individuals who are actively engaged in city politics or in the various
comunittees that have arisen as a result of the spill. It is unclear whether this is because
Valdez 1(1 Summary - Page 85






many of these same individuals are long-term, pre-earthquake residents who feel aI
greater sense of involvernent in town life or because their economic interests and their
perceived loss of power over these interests to oil have resulted in a greater need to
actively participate in the formal institutions of community life. Perhaps the two are
intertwined, with the long-time residents generally feeling a greater loss of autonomny and
a greater sense of responsibility as part and parcel of the changes in their social position
in the commumity wrought by the corming of the oil economy.
Business people, who form a small but important group in Valdez, express similar3
feelings. While the oil economy adds to the potential to do business, it also disempowers
business people by operating in a fashion that ignores the needs of business. For3
example, the shift schedule at Alyeska of I week on and I week off allows employees to
shop in Anchorage, much to the detriment of local b-usiness. While not unimportant to*
the commurmty, I get the impression that the relative social position of business people is
not as important in Valdez as in other towns of its size. Rather, their social place and3
power are reminiscent of towns that are more openly and clearly company towns and see
themselves as such.3
Power and authority lie in corporate and institutional places in Valdez. The
directors of Alyeska exercise the greatest real power in the cormmunity given the centralI
role of oil transport as the linchpin of both the economic and social wheel that moves
Valdez. Another locus of authority is comprised by city government--with its various3
agencies that are funded primnarily through oil. How politically the oil industry, city
government, and the other elements of the community actually divide power is unclear to3
me, unable as I was to see it in operation while I was resident in Valdez. But I would
suggest that the key institutional players in the comnmunity also are key to understanding3
social relations, social authority, and status.
The divisions suggested here were for the most part not observed but pointed out3
by respondents. It is important to note that while Valdez is divided by the social
characteristics and honorifics associated with occupation, income, education, individual3
background, and interests, among others, the social divisions that seem to have the most
importance and actual power are twofold. First, there are those divisions associated with3

Valdez KI Summary - Page 863

income and occupation and the different interests this generates between the haves and
the have-nots, a typical and common social division in most communities. Second is the
more complex division based on institutional and occupational loyalties and interests
people see that sometimes replicate institutional divisions. At other times, they appear
to resist them. These divisions also play a critical role in the way people understand
Valdez and what happened as a result of the spill.
While we have mentioned s'ome of the tensions wrought by the economic divisions
in Valdez especially in relation to Alyeska, the deep feelings these divisions bring
evidence themselves more as a function of income and opportunity than institutional
alignment. It is clear, in speaking to people, that the power and authority of Alyeska in
many ways divides its employees from the rest of the community. The social imnplications
of shift work also separate Alyeska employees from the rest of the community in many
ways. The most hostility one sees and hears in town is that aimed directly by the have-
nots at the haves and less directly by the haves at the have-nots.
The have-nots complain bitterly about the injustices they feel they experience in
Valdez because they have no money. As evidence of their low status and position in
town, they point to the underwriting of a new subdivision for upscale housing, the lack of
social supports in town, what they feet is the rotten condition of their housing, and the
lack of real. opportwaity for local residents when compared with outsiders brought in to
fill high-paying jobs. For example, many feel that they have the skills and energy to fill
jobs like those created by SERVS and do not understand why they have been given to
people from Louisiana.
At tirnes, the haves refer to problems they believe to be caused by people who do
not hold good jobs, e.g., the problems of rowdiness, crime, and transiency. It is
interesting that many people with high-paying jobs tend to feel that those with low-paying
jobs are transient, yet my interviews reveal that many low-earners have been in town for
as long as many persons with high-paying jobs, and some even longer.
The division reveals itself in social patterns, with those who have higher incomes
gathering at venues not frequented, for the most part, by those with lower incomes. This
division is not absolute, mitigated as it is in any small town by the number of available
Valdez 1(1 Summary - Page 87






public-gathering places. But that the division exists became clear to me whenI
intervewing have-nots in the lounge of the Westmark Hotel--a gathering place for
teachers, city employees, oil workers, and other haves. They would come for the
interview, albeit often feeling unease at both the interview and the venue, and would
leave immediately afterward. At no time did I see any of the have-nots I interviewed in
the hotel lounge. The exceptions to this were hotel employees, who could be seen in the
bar during the day, usually when it was not busy, and the members of various clubs that
met at the hotel, e.g., the cribbage club had a number of low-income members.
In Valdez, the distinction between haves and have-nots is often expressed, even if
not accurately, as the division between insiders and outsiders or between those who are3
permanent residents and those who are transient. Often almost all those who are have-
nots are viewed as transient and added to a class of persons who are seen to be3
necessary but problematic by most who reside in the town--ironically even many have-
nots.3
In summer, Valdez swells from as few as 3,000 to 4,000 people to as many as 4,000
to 5,000 with the pealing of the construction, tourist, boating, and fish-processingI
industries. All these industries rely on workers who come for the months of their peak
operations. While there is a distinct economic benefit of varying degrees that accrues to3
the town, residents are divided about its overal value. For many, the transient workers
add unacceptable pressures on the town's infrastructure and add negatively to the
community's social life, crowding restaurants and other public places as they do.
Even for those who see real benefits to econormic growth from such persons and3
economic activities, the transient workers form separate and distinct social groups and a
kind of necessary but distasteful underclass that resides in Valdez over the summner.3
While not a critical social division nor one that creates great conflict, according to
respondents it does increase tensions in the community and at times has played a3
significant role in defining the social reality of Valdez, e.g., during the pipeline-
construction days and, subsequently, during the spill-cleanup period.3
The economy and its institutional nature, while creating the most critical social
divisions, also has helped to produce a number of important political cleavages within3

Valdez K(1 Summary - Page 88g

the community. The cleavages are for the most part latent, but they hold within them
the potential for serious internal conflicts within the community. In comnplex ways, they.
undercut and transcend the str-uctural and institutional social divisions that define the
central so cial reality of Valdez.
III.C. Development, the Environment, and Social Conflict in Valdez
While almost everyone is resident in Valdez for some economic gain, e.g., a job or
the hope of a job that pays well, the town is divided between those who are progrowth
and those who are not. Over the last few years, conflicts have arisen over the expansion
of the boat harbor, the underwriting and development of new housing subdivisions, the
potential expansion of Alyeska, and the development of ANWVR. The most potentially
explosive issue is that of the environment and its relation to the development of new gas
and oil fields and the potential growth of Valdez.
It is important to note that everyone with whom I spoke in Valdez is in favor of
maintaining a clean, balanced, bountiful, and healthy environmnent. All the respondents
felt we should maintain the environment to the best of our abilities and with the best for
the environment in mnind. Oil people and environmentalists agreed in general on this
point. The differences surfaced when one specifically spoke about what a good and
healthy environmnent should be, what may or may not harm the environment, and what
can be done to assure its continued well-being. Thus, the disagreements that surface
about developmnent need to be understood within this context.
The disagreements over economic development, while often heated, are limited in
their reach. During my study of Valdez, no one ever voiced the opinion that the
construction of the,pipeline should never have occurred. Nor was anyone of the opinion
that the pipeline was anything but, on mneasure, a good and positive development for
Valdez. To a person, respondents believed that Valdez would not and could not be what
it is today without the oil economy. Even those respondents who were residents of
Valdez prior to the construction of the pipeline who, in the words of one such resident,
"hated the oil companies for what they have done to Prince William Sound," admitted
that the oil economy did much that was good for Valdez. Respondents who were not
Valdez KI Summaxy - Page 89





resident in Valdez before the pipeline were cognizant that their residence th ere was dueI
to the creation of the oil-pipeline terminus in Valdez.
This said, there is still division about the necessity and the desirability of further
growth of the oil industry. On the negative side, while there were no respondents who
could be typified as, in the local parlance, "tree-huggers," there is vocal and active
opposition to greater development of the oil economy. The opposition to further growth
cites the potential for another disaster like the spill of the Exxon Valdez as one reason
for thinling hard about the further -growth of the oil industry. While the potential for3
such a disaster increases with development, the more cogent and more commonly
expressed opposition to farther growth is based on the argument t hat there is constant3
and low level, but nonetheless environmentally hazardous, pollution caused by the oil
-industry. Respondents cited such problems as benzene in the air, the frequent smal
spills,39 and the ships that enter the harbor covered with and einitting pollutants that
color the snow grey and brown. There is a deep suspicion arnong those who oppose3
more development that, given past experience, one cannot trust the oil companies to be
forthcoming about the hazards associated with the pipeline and with the shipment of oil.3
Even with the creation of the RCAC (Regional Citizens Advisory Commnittee) and other
regional watchdog committees, people remain suspicious.I
Another source of opposition to the growth of the oil industry is indirect and,
ironically, often comes from individuals who work for Alyeska. This opposition probably1
would find their inclusion as opponents to growth an inappropriate classification;
nevertheless, they do oppose many of the initiatives that accompany growth. For3
example, the opposition to the development of the new subdivision and especially
Alyeska's and the city's guarantees for the project was led by individuals who already3
owned income-producing property and were wary of the effects of such a new housing
development on both their property values and incomes.3





39Whiile I was in Valdez, there was a rumor about a spill of 10,000, 1,000, or 100 gallons of oil into the
harbor, depending on to whom one spoke. The only dispute was over the amount, not that the, spilhappened.I
Valdez KI Summary - Page 903

While not consciously antidevelopment, such forms of opposition raise questions
about how any development might be 'thought of when issues that are ancillary but
critical to such development are raised. Another example is the conflict over the siting
of a new harbor--Alyeska needs new facilities and wants them sited on one of the most
attractive hills on the harb-or, but the tourist industry and many others in town are
opposed to such a siting. As an offshoot of the above divisions, there are those who
would like to see Valdez develop in ways that make it less dependent on oil for its
economnic wealth and well-being. These people become suspicious of increasing such
dependence. Conflicts over development projects'underwritten by the city also involve
both suspicions of growth and suspicions about the city's capacity, especially given earlier
projects like the granary and port facility, to properly undertake any development
projects.
While these cornflicts are not ostensibly over developmnent of the oil industry, they
impinge on decisions, that need to be made about such development and create cross-
cutting interest groups. At certain levels of analysis and social reality, these groups put
to lie the more obvious and mnore straightforward divisions within the community that
derive from the, presence of the oil, industry. While a previous mayor was voted out of
office because he was felt to have too adamantly criticized Exxon after the Spill,40 and
while many voice opposition to the workings of the RCAC and some of its members,
these disagreemnents in regard to development are tempered by suspicions that the oil
industry may be risky to health4 and also by fears people have about too much
developmnent.
What one sees in Valdez is that beneath a seemingly simple and obvious social
structure based on the critical economic institutions in the community, there is a more
subtle and complex set of social relations, divisions, and attitudes. Crosscutting divisions
based on employment status or company loyalty are alliances, no matter how
organizationally weak, based on fears about pollution or shared views about the


40Th former mayor still believes the oil economy is a necessary and positive part of the commrunity.

41Respondents cite what they believe to be high levels of cancer among people who work at the oil terminal.
Valdez KI Summary - Page 91






development of the town. Thus, people often find themselves expressing contradictoryI
interests in the same intervew.
However, with all its complexity, Valdez is nonetheless a place where people come
to get a job, to prosper, and to raise their standard of living. It is not a place where
most people come to retire, nor is it a place where people come just for its location or
ambience, even though it has a magnificent natural setting. As such, its social3
relationships, its social and political divisions, and the attitudes and perceptions of
residents about where they belong in the commurnity and what their interests are revolveI
around the realities and perceptions that influence each individual's econonmiic position
and pursuits. It is that which defines both the simplicity and complexity of social division
and conflict42, and would come to define the underlying nature of the tensions, splits,
and conflicts that came to typify the spill.3
III.D. The Spill: Divisions and Conflicts
Tensions, divisions, and at times some open conflict during the spill and its3
aftermath were present in Valdez but, according to almost all our informants, they were
never of the virulent and even violent nature of conflicts attributed to communities3
elsewhere on the PWS. For example, Valdez respondents characterized Cordova as a
place seething with virulent and vitriolic disputes. Residents of Valdez were often quickI
to point out that Valdez did not suffer particularly bitter infighting or violent
contestations. They offered a number of reasons, reasons that are fundamental to the3
difference between Valdez and most other towns on the PWS affected by the spill.
The most important reason is that Valdez is not a commnunity that is primarily3
dependent on the PWS, except as a transportation lane, for its economiic well-being.
Commercial fishing, while present in Valdez and a small and in some ways important3
industry, is not critical to the lives of most residents. Tourism, which includes the boat
trips to the PWS and is dependent on the well-being of the.PWS, also makes up only a3
small part of the economic activities in Valdez. A generous estimate of those economic



42Recall that even the division between old and new residents is at best a division that is felt to be important
only to the degree that it appears to affect economic activity.I
Valdez 1(1 Summary - Page 923

pursuits dependent on an eclologically clean Sound makes up abouat 10 percent of the
economic activities in Valdez. An oil slick that might be disheartening and disturbing to
the conmnunity for a number of reasons was nonetheless never a real threat to the well-
being of 90 percent of the citizens of Valdez.
Equally as imnportant in abating anger over the spill, again according to most
respondents, was that almost every adult resident in Valdez who wanted to work the
spill cleanup and earn significant extra income during the summner of 1989 was able to do
so.43 A few people were able to earn so much extra income that they were able to start
new businesses. In other cases, they were able to leave Valdez and start new lives
elsewhere. Apparently unlike other communities on the PWS, the feeling in Valdez is
that if what people received from the spill cleanup wasn't exactly equal and not always
entirely fair, on measure it was equitable enough for those who actively pursued work
during the cleanup. This is not to say that there were not disappointments and feelings
among some residents that they were unfairly treated. However, it is clear in Valdez
that people recognized that there was money to be made and available to almost all of
those who chose to make it.
Moreover, it is important to recall when thinking about the effects of the spill on
Valdez that the town itself was never even threatened by the spill. We think of Valdez
when discussing the spill because of the name of the ship, the Exxon Valdez, and
because cleanup operations in the summer of 1989 were centered there. For the people
of Valdez, the actual spill was in some ways, especially if they did not participate in the'
cleanup, as abstract a reality as it was for those who watched the spill in the lower 48.
As one respondent told me: "I did not hear of the spill until my wife called, worried that
oil was seeping into our backyard after hearing about the spill in Seattle where she was
visiting relatives."




43Boats belonging to somne owners either were too small or too poorly maintained to work the spill. Persons
who weren't contracted to work the spill remain bitter about their exclusion to this day. Other respondents who
knew of this situation argued that those contracting boats were correct in their assessment of the working
capacity of those boats although they might, as some suggested, have given the owners a small payment to
assuage any feeling of losing out on the cleanup activities.
Valdez LU Summiary - Page 93





The town of Valdez and the word "Valdez" served as emblems for the spill, but theI
spill was never near the town itself. Even the liatchery was never threatened by the spill,
and fishing never stopped entirely during the cleanup. In a sense, Valdez, as one
respondent, even if a bit hyperbolically, noted: "Could have avoided the spill entirely(
and its effects if it weren't for the fact that the cleanup operations were centered here."
Centering the spill-cleanup operations in Valdez generated a number of problems
and tensions that led to divisions within the comnmunity and even open conflict, however
short-lived.3
For one, the insider-outsider division, always a part of the social reality of Valdez,
was exacerbated by the intrusion of so many outsiders into the community.  Most of the3
outsiders who came to work on the spill cleanup were socially positioned as most
outsiders coming to Valdez previously, i.e., as transients with little social position and no3
authority or say about the workings of the community. However, there were outsiders
who came to work on the spill-cleanup operations, most specifically the executives of3
Exxon and VECO, who came with great resources, authority to run the cleanup
endeavor, and a social status. Although these persons w'ere located outside the everyday3
social hierarchy of Valdez, their social position was above that of local residents, at least
in their own minds, according to Valdez residents.3
Residents felt alienated and angered by the incursion of outsiders from Exxon and
VECO who took over the spill cleanup as soon as they arrived. "Bossy," "incompetent,"3
"crut," and '"inefficient'' are just some of the terms applied to the executives from both
Exxon and VECO.3
One respondent, close to the cleanup effort, told me, "People felt abused, angered,
and pushed around by Exxon and VECO. As a result, there were threats of violence3
against Exxon and VECO employees and their places of residence although I don't
remember any violence." Another respondent put it this way:3






Valdez KI Summary - Page 941

We in Alaska always have the feeling we know how to deal with
the environment so we were angry at the arrogance of the Exxon
people and felt that they should work more closely with local
people to protect the Sound, for example, people who worked the
hatcheries. Even though VECO is from Alaska they too were
arrogant and ignored local residents.

T'he anger precipitated some incidents. Several respondents spoke of situations
where vehicles belonging to Exxon or VECO were rnm off the road and situations where
harsh words were spoken. And of course there were enough threats to alarm the Exxon
executives sufficiently that they put guards around their places of residence--an act that
for many further exemplified the distance of these executives from the rest of Valdez.
As one Valdez resident observed: "During the spill, Exxon people put guards around
themselves and their places of residence. We had to work with people like that who
were all from Texas. It was very distasteful."
A number of respondents noted that the tensions and anger that residents of
Valdez felt about Exxon and VECO were carryovers from the anger they felt toward
Alyeska". But these residents were for the most part in the minority. Although there are
mnemories of a number of incidents where people hurled petty'verbal assaults at Alyeska
employees, the latent anger people felt about the spill was rarely directed at Alyeska
employees. Most respondents were of the opinion that people who worked for Alyeska
were members of the Valdez community, and they too were as adversely affected as
those who did not work for Alyeska. Moreover, -a number of respondents added that
many Alyeska employees were as angered by the spill as those who did not work for the
company. This is borne out in interviews with a number of Alyeska employees who felt
as "put-off 'by the, oil companies as everyone else in Valdez.
More material tensions and conflict arose over the allocation of contracts and jobs
by Exxon and VECO. While for, the most part everyone,%who wanted to participate in
the cleanup effort could do so, there was some feeling that there was favoritism toward
buddies on the part VECO employees. This was coupled with the perception that
outsiders were favored and that the benefits from the cleanup were tilted away from
many Valdez residents. People spoke of contracts going to individuals who didn't even
Valdez KI Summary - Page 95





have boats but had to buy them in order to work the spill. Others spoke of differentialI
payments for the same job--a fact that no one denies and one that has been dealt with in
a new plan between the oil companies and Valdez in the eventuality of another spill
disaster. Whether the differential payments were the result of corruption or the ability
of an individual in the hectic circumstances surrounding the cleanup to negotiate the best
deal possible is open to question. But whatever the case may have been, the memory
has left many in Valdez bitter and distrustful of ouatsiders.
If there were tensions toward oil company people, there also were feelings of anger3
and distrust toward other outsiders, particularly the media, and those environmentalists
who in the words of so many in the community "invaded Valdez." Even those who were3
aghast at the spill and angered by oil comrpany incomnpetence felt the media and the
environm ental groups who came to Valdez did so with their own agendas and3
manipulated the situiation to their own advantage. Several people told of a town meeting
where a woman from Greenpeace pretended to be attacked by a local policeman for the3
benefit of the media.
While in most instances the spill did not lead to open hostility, even towards3
outsiders--and residents who were present during the pipeline days saw the spill-cleanup
period as less dynamic and disruptive than the construction period- -there are divisions of3
opinion in the commrunity about the spill's effects on the commnunity. For one, there are
still bitter mnemories about those who benefited most from the spill and fears about how3
these benefits mnight distort elements of the economy, e.g., commercial fishing. For
another, there are open conflicts with the city government about what many sa w as a3
capitulation by city authorities to Exxon, allowing them to build at will without any
permits or city oversight. At the sanie time, the city government forced those residentsI
trying to build during the spill-cleanup period to go through the permitting process. For
many, the influx of outsiders has changed the way they see Valdez. It has permanently3
transformed social life for others less likely to participate in p-ublic life, political or
social, because of the angers and the disappointments and confusions wrought by the3
spill.I


Valdez KI Summary - Page 96

Some residents recall fights while others do not; and while no one remembers any
serio-us violence or open hostility, there are many poignant tales of losses of friendships
as a result of the spill. Several people spoke of loss of close friends because of
disagreenients over the spill's effects and the role of the oil companies. For many, it
became hard to maintain friendships with those who worked for Alyeska; and those who
worked for Alyeska often found it hard to maintain friendships with those who didn`t.4
As one respondent sadly recounted: "I saw a well develop between me and MY
friends at Alyeska because of the spill. We are friends again but it is not the same, the
old hurt can't heal."
Others saw old working relationships destroyed by new economic comnpetitions
produced by the spill-cleanup effort. A number of respondents told of Ilosing friends
over competitions for contracts or the breakdown of longstanding relationships because
one or the other wanted to work the spill in ways that destroyed previous economic or
social relations. For example, several respondents sp-oke of losing people who had
worked for them for years and had become good friends. While they understood why
these people would look to the spill for new sources of income, the change in
relationship broke down old trusts and awaited a new way of relating that had not as yet
been found. The pressures on many individual relationships clearly has transformed
some of the earlier basis for social interaction and trust in Valdez but now awaits both
the time for these relationships to ,develop and a study of what they once were and now
have become.
Whether these memories of manipulation by outsiders and bitter memnories about
issues internal to Valdez and its residents refer to real events or not, they do point to a
critical internal stress and conflict among the residents of Valdez. While people in
Valdez clearly wanted to help the cleanup effort and worked hard to accomplish a
'cleanup, the fact that the cleanup effort was centered in Valdez altered their lives during



44It would be extremely edifying to return to Valdez and do a reasonably exhaustive study of present social
*networks and friendship patterns. The discussion of inadividual relations above is based on respondent testimony
and not on a study of actual patterns of interaction, except insofar as they were observed in my daily round
through the community.
Valdez KI Summary - Page 97





that period. Effectively powerless in managing'any part of the cleanup effort but wantingI
to see a successfal cleanup, residents were left with internally ambiguous and conflictive
feelings that remain to this day. Open hostility would not stand in the way of a cleanup,I
but by not expressing their angers and alienation, many people in Valdez have been left
with ambivalent memories and feelings about the spill and what it has meant to their
lives. It is, at least in my ind, too soon to know how the spill will affect the town and
those who experienced it. Only now are the internal stresses beginning to reveal
themselves within individuals. How this translates into the social order will take even
longer, I suggest, to manifest itself.
III.E. The Problemns of Stress
To understand the problems of stress that accompanied the spill in Valdez and to
put the stresses and strains of the spill into perspective, we need to be reminded of the3
changes the commnunity has undergone since the early 1970's. Although the new town
was born out of the earthquake of 1964, which had tra umatic effects on the community,3
the present population is for the most part made up of people who either arrived at the
same time as the construction of the pipeline or have comne to Valdez since. 'Me period3
between 1974 and when the spill occurred in 1989 was a rocky one with a nurnber of
important and even dramatic changes affecting Valdez. These changes transformed the3
town's infrastructure, superstructure, and population. The coming of the pipeline and
the economic and demographic boom that followed transformed Valdez from a sleepy3
little town of about 1,000 people into an active, wealthy, and vibrant community of
upwards of 10,000 people. While superficially the period of the spill would transform3
Valdez in many of the same ways that the pipeline construction did--upwards of 10,000
people camne during the cleanup, and the town experienced another economnic boom--3
people in Valdez have distinctly different memories about how those periods affected
their lives.3
The pipeline days are remembered as a chaotic but socially active time of partying
and relative social goodwill. On the one hand, it is clear from police statistics (see Sec.3
Ill.F) that mnany of the problems associated with the pipeline days, e.g., crime, drunken
driving, drunkeness in general, fighting, and overcrowding, were similar to those of the3
Valdez 1(1 Sumnmary - Page 983

spill-cleanup days but were even worse in some ways. For. example, prostitution and
drugs were present during the building of the pipeline but never inanifested thernselves
during the spill cleanup. On the other hand, people who had lived in Valdez during the
period of pipeline construction remember that timne as a period unlike the period of the
spill cleanup. They remember the latter as a basically difficult period but the former as
a happy time of prosperity, active social 'interaction and the problems notwithstanding, a
basically positive period in Valdez's history.
Whether such memories are a nostalgic distortion of reality or an accurate
recollection of the feelings and perceptions abroad at the time of pipeline
construction, 45 there are some important differences between the pipeline-construction
days and the spill-cleanup days that critically distinguish those two periods and the
effects they had on people. These differences, I would argue, are strong enough to
clearly overshadow the similarities that the two periods share.
While the spill in its way brought new econonmiic prosperity to both individuals and
the town after an economic decline, as did the building of the pipeline, there is
nonetheless a critical difference between the two events. Ile pipeline, unlike the spill,
was both desired and courted by the townspeople; it was something they wanted, for
which they had planned and for which they were basically ready. The spill had no such
attributes, unexpected and sudden as it was. Because the pipeline was planned,
infrastructure, although not entirely adequate, was put in place to receive the thousands
of construction workers who came to work on the pipeline. Moreover, as a planned
development, workers were contracted outside Valdez and came in organized groups
who for the most part were brought in by contractors who had provided for them.
As a planned activity, even though it was a mnajor imposition on the social and
physical fabric of Valdez, the demographic changes wrought by the pipeline did not
occasion the devastating effects that were caused by the spill. During the spill cleanup,
the population changed in less than a month, and people camne as individuals prompted


I5t is of note that similar fond memories are shared by people as different as old timers who lived in pre-
earthquake Valdez and own businesses in town and individuals who worked on the pipelie or were bartenders
during the pipeline-construction period.
Valdez KI Summary - Page 99






by several reasons. Some came to help the environment, and some came to make anI
econormic killing. Many persons carne without work or a sense of what they would
actuaally be doing, and with no particular place to lodge. Unlike the reasonably
controlled transformations of the pipeline-construction days, the transformations resulting
from spill cleanup--a sudden, unexpected, and massive invasion into community life--were
uncontrolled. As a result, they became a threat to the infrastructure of the town and an
annoyance, even a threat, to the everyday well-being of residents rather than the
welcome change brought by pipeline construction. For the townspeople, the rapid3
invasion of so many people all at once created excessive demands on the town's services
and infrastructure. At times, according to city authorities, the water supply was3
threatened with infection from an inability to deal with the population overload, which
led to people often relieving themselves on the streets and living in vacant lots withoutI
any facilities.
While we might want to ascribe the different memories of the pipeline-construction3
days and the spill-cleanup days to a degree of distance and the nostalgia that distance
brings, the pipeline days did create problems for the town. The response one senses to3
the spill, though, is not merely a lack of nostalgia. The suddenness of the change and
the lack of control residents had over events produced a sense of alienation and
powerlessness. In the words of a study done by the Valdez Counseling Center (Donald
et al. 1990:23): "The tremendous convergence that totally disrupted the community and3
robbed residents. of the ability to predict events in their lives with any degree of accuracy
produced extraordinary stress in their lives."3
The speed with which events changed d-uring the spill cle'anup; the fact that the
spill happened without any warning or, indeed, any expectation that such a disaster3
would ever occur;46 and the unwelcome nature of the spill and the changes it brought
almade the spill a very different exprience from the pipeline.3





46We need to recal that no spill in U.S. waters previous to that of the Exxon Valdez had been so big and
extensive.3
Valdez KI Summary - Page 1001

The effects of the spill cleanup on Valdez also were made more traumatic for the
community than the effects of pipeline construction because of a major change in the
cultural ethos and understandings of Valdez society. Valdez, which had, as one
respondent put it: "A sense of a frontier and of a rapidly changing world during the
pipeline days had remade itself into a normal, famaily oriented, and quiet community."
Rather than desiring change as they did in the pipeline days, residents for the most
part had redefined Valdez as a community where, as another respondent observed:
"People had settled down into a life. where they could feel that things today would be
like things were yesterday and would be like things tomorrow."
The spill abruptly and even violently destroyed, at least for the spring and summer
of 1989, that feeling and the psychological and cultural security it provided. As a result
and overall: "The spill and its aftermath constituted an extreme stressor for most area
residents.'47 These stresses could and did: "Cause emotional problems for most people
in one way or another" (Donald et al. 1990:17).
The problems associated with stress were not germinated out of thin air, according
to those at the Valdez Counseling Center who have-looked at the relation of stress to
the spill, but were rooted in the social and personality profile of both Valdez as a place
and the individuals who made up the community. For one thing, as many respondents
were wont to point out and one succinctly put it: "Remember, Alaska is seen as a land
of opportunity, an escape from earlier failures, so it attracts a lot of people who already
have social ills and individual problems when they come here. They are people who
often don't fit in elsewhere."
Because so many of the people employed in Valdez came as result of the oil
economy and had jobs with various oil companies before they arrived, Valdez mnight not
be exemplary of the typical Alaskan community. Nonetheless, for many who do live
there, according to the testimony of respondents, Valdez is a last chance, a place that has
provided new and better opportunities. It is a place in which one could put one's trust
that the psychological, social, and economic props of one's life would not be undercut.


47DoaIdet.al.(1990:.17), speaking of Vaildez and Cordova.
Valdez KI Summnary - Page 101





The spill, while shoring up and even cementing those props in some instances, ate
away--if not entirely at least somewhat--the props in other instances.
Economically, as has been noted previously, the spill energized a stagnant economy.
Many, if not most, individuals gained monetarily (often significantly) as a result of the
activities associated with the spill cleanup. However, economnic gains were undercut to
some extent by the effects and implications of other aspects of the spill. As one
respondent so aptly put it: "The spill left many people with a sense of betrayal by the oil
companies because they (residents of Valdez) had been told nothing like the spill would
ever happen. But it did. And when. it did, the company couldiet handle it, so we just
lost our tr-ust in Alyeska because promises weren't kept."
This in itself was not so much the problem. A loss of trust is not in itself
damaging. What made the loss of trust so problematic in Valdez and even personally3
destructive in some instances, the respondent went on to say, was that: "We live in an
oil town and there was nothing little people could do about this. So the anger and3
disappointment was tuirned inward and added to. the tensions in town and the problems
one gets from stress."3
The inwardness that the respondent speaks of was aggravated by the winter of 1990
when 46 feet or so of snow fell, intensifying feelings of entrapment and reducing chances3
for social interaction and community life.
The spill did not directly cause depression in and of itself. Incidents of family3
violence as a measure of depression actually increased after the spill cleanup was over,
as police statistics reveal (see Sec. II1.F). According to Heasley (1991:15), the Advocates3
for Victims of Violence have noted an increase in victimns of domestic violence since the
spill. During the spill cleanup, as one respondent noted: "We were too busy to know we3
had problems; we were too tired to think about them."
NVhat the spill instilled in people, which has only come to the surface in the period3
after its occurrence--and in my view will continue to surface--was a sense of instability, of
powerlessness, and of a loss of control over their lives. Many respondents spoke of a3
new cynicism toward the town, toward the oil companies, and toward the institutions of
society like government. They all failed during the spill and thus are no longer to be3
Valdez KI Summary - Page 102

trusted.. While not everyone felt this way and a significant number of respondents felt
that the institutions of society like the oil companies and the government did as well as
could be expected, almost all felt that another disaster such as the spill is probable and
that the future has been sullied by the spill.
This is not to say that pessimism dominates the mood in Valdez. Quite the
contrary. To an outsider, Valdez appears to be a friendly, lively, and healthy place to
live.
The problems caused by or related to--depending on one's viewpoint about
causation--the spill are not crippling, nor do they appear overwhelming, but they are
there. For example, the Counse ling Center saw more people in 1990 than in any
previous year. Reports of domestic violence were up, even though twice as many people
were resident in Valdez during the spill-cleanup period; and more people than ever,
according to a number of respondents, spoke of. "Being depressed although they have
good jobs," as one respondent put it. Moreover, people spoke of lost friendships and the
realization that people in. Valdez are greedy and opportunistic--concepts used by a
majority of respondents a t one point or another in our discussions--a realization that
came out of watching people's actions during the spill cleanup.
While the feelings that people revealed themselves to be less than saintly during
the spill cleanup are pervasive, they are countered by feelings that there were people
who acted rather selflessly as well. But on measure, one definitely gets the feeling, in
spealdng to people both formally and informally, that the spill created a sense of distrust,
of doubt about people's motives and of betrayal by friends and enemies alike, and that
it: "Will be an undercurrent in Valdez for years to come," as one respondent averred.
Whatever people feel about the spill now and whatever problems it has caused and
will cause, the net effect of the spill and its consequences on the individual psychological
and social psychological health of Valdez is still an unknown. It had been over a year
since the spill when I was in Valdez, and the feelings that were prompted by the spill
were just surfacing. Whether people were staying home because they had less money or
because of patterns they learned during the spill, when going out was an unrewarding
experience, is not known. Whether housing problems caused by new employment
Valdez KI Summary - Page 103






resulting from the spill are temporary or will change the fabric of social life and relationsI
in Valdez is still to be known. Moreover, the answer to the question as to whether the
economic b oom that for some is just a memory but for others has brought continued
economic advantage and still others economic problems will create new social ills and
psychological stresses still is not known.
However one feels about the spill, it is at least safe to say that, in the words of a
long-tim,e resident of Valdez: "If not everyone was burned out by the spill everyone in
town was singed by it."48
III.F. Crime
Along with the problems of daily life during the spill-cleanup period, the larger3
'population put the police force under extreme stress during this time. A force designed
to deal with the exigencies of no more than 5,000 people was asked to deal with the3
problems of a commnunity of 10,000--a community that had a large number of
unemployed transients looking for work and large representations of people not normally3
resident in Valdez. Included in the latter were environmentalists, the media,
government representatives, oil company officials, and the like. While dealing with such3
a large population clearly was a strain on an undermanned police force, police statistics
reveal that although their workload inc reased significantly, the rise in crime was less than3
might have been expected. Moreover, although the spill brought a great rise in a
number of people all coming in a short time and for a short and intense period of work,
the Valdez police were not entirely unfamniliar with such changes. Every summer there is
an influx of persons to work in construction, fish processing, and the tourist industry.3
The problem.of the spill for the police was not so much one of a qualitative shift but of
a significant quantitative shift in their workload.3
Normally, while Valdez experiences problems with crime and social disturbances,
they are not problems that overwhelm the community. In 1990, for examnple, the police3



48Burnout itself was not a major problem for most. Even those who were extremely overworked, as for
example in city governmient, were for the most part able, to handle the strains of the spill. In city governmenut
they instituted a policy of watching each other so as to avoid burnout. Some respondents told me they quit high-3
paying but high-stress jobs during the spill cleanup to avoid burnout.

Valdez KI Summary - Page 104

department responded to a total'of 5,195 calls.4  That is an average of 14 responses a
day. If we estimated the population of Valdez to be 4,000,-50 then the number of
responses equals 3.5 responses per. day per 1,000 people. Responses include everything
from inj-uries and complaints about neighbors to more serious crimes like assault, theft,
and domestic violence.
Although Valdez is not overwhelmed by crime, it is not a crime -free community.
In 1990, there were 396 arrests, or about 1 for every 100 people, assuming an average
population of 4,000. More serious crimes are problematic. For example, while there
were only 27 recorded assaults in Valdez in 1990, there were 237 thefts during that same
period. This represents a rate of 5 percent for the population.51
According to the police, crime increases significantly during the summer as
transients, often without any resources of their own, come to Valdez for work. Although
the sunmner influx increases the population incrementally, crime increases at a greater
rate than the increase in population. Moreover, maintaining order is made more difficult
for the police because many transients choose to live in tents rather than in the
bunkhouses in order to save money. This puts a strain on the comnmunity's
infrastructural resources and creates a greater potential for disturbances.
According to police, two policies to control problems in Valdez have been
instituted with some success. One is a town curfew for anyone under 18 that begins at
11 p.m. on weekdays and midnight on weekends. Tle other is a program to decrease the
number of drunk drivers. Bartenders give intoxicated patrons cards to use for free taxi
rides to their homes and then back to pick up their cars the next morning. Privately
funded, the free rides have significantly reduced the nuniber of accidents that usually
occur from drunk driving.



49A statistics relating to crime are from the year-end report by Chief-of-Police Bert Cottle to the City
Manager and were kindly supplied by Mr. Cottle.

,5OThe estimate is a rough averaging of peak and nonpeak populations for the year.

511ronically, my assistant, Nlichael Howard, had money stolen from his wallet while working out at a health
club. When the police were called, they said this was not an entirely uncommon occurrence.
Valdez KI Summalry - Page 105





One problem Valdez suffers, according to police, is that there is no sitting DistrictU
Attorney (D.A.). Rather s/he visits once a month. This has created problems for the
police in getting warrants when needed; in allowing those arrested to make deals when
the D.A. comes because of the overload; or even, during the pipeline days, to the
dismissal of charges because the D.A. had no time to prosecute all the cases at hand.
Given Alaskan law and the reduced number of active court calendar dates, police feel
the~ lack of a sitting D.A. makes law enforcement that much more difficult in Valdez,
especially at peak times like the summer and during the spill-cleanup period.
During this period, problems were exaggerated but not entirely out of the ordinary
experience the town has each year with the shift from winter to summer populations.
This is not to say that the spill summer was not extremely exhausting and difficult for
polce.Howver itis important to note that in some ways the police have had
experience in dealing with a large inmnigration in summer, but it is an inmigration that is
slower, more orderly, and much lower in the numbers of people involved than 'those who3
arrived. aft-er the spill. Although the police force was strained, the police did have some
experience in dealing with such shifts in population.3
Police problems and crime normally rise during periods of population escalation at
a rate at least equal to the rise in population. For example, the total number of
responses rose from 4,111 in 1988 to 6,734 in 1989, falling again in 1990 to 5,195.
However, arrests during these years went up from 301 to 673 and back down to 396,1
suggesting that problems within the commaunity grew proportionally more during the year
following the spill than during the time of the spill cleanup itself. Why this is the case is3
not yet understood.
Crime was not the major problerm for the police during the spill-cleanup period.3
Rather, the biggest problem was maintainiing order among the large numbers of people
who camped out, especially at the beginning of the cleanup with the large influx of3
people. At the time, snow was still on the ground, campgrounds were not yet open, and
the cleanup effort still was in organizational disarray, forcing many of those came to3
work the cleanup to sleep on city streets. According to police, up to 500 people were
put in the courthouse to sleep.I

Valdez KI Summary - Page 106

Problems created by the spill included public disorder and crime but on a smaller
scale than the comparative problems faced during the time of pipeline construction. In
1976, for example, there were 96 assaults compared with only 58 during 1989. In 1976
there were 205 bar disturbances; in 1989 there were only 130. The only category in
which the spill year exceeded comparative problems during the pipeline-construction
period was general disturbances, which went up from 54 in 1976 to 308 in 1989.52 The
problems of the spill were immense, but they were more restricted to the infrastructure
and services than they were the result of criminal or delinquent activities on the part of
visitors, residents, or long-term residents.
In many ways, crime was lower than one might expect. As many respondents
argued, everyone was so busy and making so much money that theft and other crimes
became less attractive. Crimes were lower in 1989 in some areas than they were 1990.
Most significantly, domestic violence went up from 75 calls in 1989 to 89 calls in 1990.
Theft too went up from 223 instances in 1989 to 237 in 1990. This compares with only
71 calls about domestic violence in 1988 and 160 thefts that same year. The rate per 100
persons for domestic violence and theft dramatically illustrates the rise in both in 1990,
assuming an average population of 4,000 in 1988 and 1990 and 8,000 in 1989. Domestic
violence, which had a rate of 1.7 incidents for each 100 persons in 1988, fell to .9 per 100
in 1989 and rose to 2.2 per 100 in 1990. Thefts rose even more dramatically in 1988, 4
per 100. They fell to 2.7 per 100 in 1989 but again rose dramatically, to 5.9 per 100, in
1991.
The explanation for these numbers is hot obvious. Whether it is a result of stress,
of people remaining in Valdez who came to work on the spill cleanup and fomnd
themselves without jobs after it was over, or other reasons is not known. It can be
reasonably argued that the drop in domestic violence is a function of the lowered
percentage of married couples in Valdez because presumably most of those who came to
Valdez to work the spill cleanup were single.


52There were more man days in jail in 1989, 2,660, and police responses to calls, 6,743, than in 1976 when
the figures were 520 and 4,762, respectively. However, these differences may tell us more about the changes in
town policy and people's attitudes toward the police than they do about police problems.
Valdez KI Summary - Page 107





What is clear is that Valdez, while suffering major i mpositions on its technical andI
human infrastructure, was able to come through the spill and its aftermath intact, with
imost people who worked for the city still employed by it, witb some but no maj'or rises in
crime or other problems of social disorder, and with a community still in place. On the
surface, things look fine. But as we have noted, problems still may exist beneath the
surface, particularly stress, social disillusionment, and depression. If and when these
problems may surface cannot be predicted, but my observations and intuitions suggest
they will arise. The increase in domestic violence and theft fromn 1988 to 1989 is one
indicator of stress.
The complexity of feelings and perceptions that people have about the spill and its
effects reveals some of the ambivalence people still feel about the spill and the hopes as
well as the fears that it has provoked.
III.G. The Spill: Perceptions and Understandings53-
When respondents spoke of both the positive and negative effects of the spill on
the community, they usually dealt with three important areas: (1) the attitudes of people
in Valdez toward the oil companies, (2) the social life of the community, and (3) the
economy of Valdez and the ecology of the PWS.
For many, one positive and imnportant aspect of the spill was the way it changed
how the residents of Valdez perceive oil transport, Alyeska, and the oil companies that
compose Alyeska. Respondents recalled how before the spill the attitude of people3
toward oil transport was one of complete trust in the ability of the oil comparnies to
transport oil safely and well. At worst, there was a benign sense that nothing would go3
wrong.
Since the spill, attitudes have changed. At the extremes are two diametrically3
opposed views. On one side, there are those, mostly employees of Alyeska, who have
maintained complete trust in the consortium's will and capacity to maintain a safe and3
environmentally appropriate oil-transport industry. On the other side, there are those


53 This section deals with many of the same issues dealt with above in Section IIL.E on stress and the spill,
but from the vantage point of attitudes about the spill in general. Some points are repeated, therefore, and some
points made in the section on stress are reemphasized, but from a different vantage point.
Valdez KI Summary - Page 1083

who feel that the spill revealed the consortiuin to be an institution to be distrusted--one
that has neither the will nor perhaps the capacity to mnaintain a safe, environmentally
sound oil industry. While those who have corme to completely distrust Alyeska are a
smaller group than those who have complete trust in the comnpa-ny, they are a part of the
community that had no real voice nor any real basis for support before the spill
occurred.
Subsequent to the spill, most people in Valdez fall between the two extreme
positions but in such a way as to give some credence to those who argue that one should
remain vigilant when confronted by the realities of the oil economy. The majority feel
the spill has alerted them to the dangers of oil transport and that they- and other
institutions lie government can no longer be entirely passive when dealing with the oil
companies. However, most, if not all, respondents--even those who are most distrustfuil
of the oil companies--still would reject any proposition that the risks of oil transport
outweigh the economnic gains to the community.
New attitudes toward the oil companies have created a new awareness both official
and unofficial. The creation of the RCAC and the increased vigilance of residents has
led many people to believe that one gain from the spill is the greater ability on the part
of Alyeska and the community to deal with another disaster if one should occur.
Mioreover, many respondents felt that the new awareness has increased Alyeska's
attention to safety and will ensure that the likelihood of another disaster like the spill
wili decrease significantly. The institution of SERVS and other spill-prevention actiiis
and personnel designated to avert future spills are cited as examples of new safety
precautions. The recent testing for the effects of benzene and the increased awareness
of the,possible health hazards associated with oil transport also have come under
discussion, according to respondents.
However, even though safety precautions have demonstrably increased and there is
discussion of the potential for hazards to health, a number of respondents argue that
such changes of attitude on the part of the residents of Valdez and of Alyeska are not
enough. For one, they argue, there is some doubt as to how long Alyeska will keep its
safety net in place. They cite recent cutbacks of workers responsible for the
Valdez KI Summary - Page 109





maintenance and safety of oil transfers at the terminal. They also argue that while theI
RCAC, fuinded by Exxon, is a useful watchdog, it often deals with smaller, local issues
and has not had the time nor the resources to look at the issues of the safety of oil
transport in general. Furthermore, they suggest, the spill has produced a dangerous kind
of fatalism among residents of places like Valdez, dependent as they are on oil and thus
unable to do mnuch to curb the oil companies' lack of attention to safety and proper
enviromnmental controls.
Along with a shift in attitudes, a number of respondents noted a change in the3
social fabric of Valdez, almost all of which has been negative. As noted above, a
number of respondents felt that the spill, in the words of one respondent: "Splintered
the town between those who work for oil and those who don't and those who gained
from the spill and those who didn't."
For many, the spill revealed a greed in neighbors that was disheartening. One man
spoke of being evicted from his apartment so that it could be rented to Exxon at a
higher rate, even though his wife was late in her pregnancy at the time. The perception
of greed, the continuing lawsuits between residents and Exxon, and the differential
rewards the spill brought have led not so much to open hostility that one miight see in
public but to expressions of bittemness and distrust on the part of a large number of
respondents. On the one hand, they will aver that the spill did not really change things
in town. But then they go on to speak of the avarice of so many in the commnunity, of
lost opportunities or unfair advantage given others during the spill, and other such
complaints that have, in the words of another respondent: "Led to a loss of cooperation
and communication in the community."
Differences about the role and responsibility of the oil companies also divided the
town. There were and are a numnber of people who believe. that the attacks on the oil
companies may have endangered their personal livelihood. John Devens, mayor at the
time of the spill, as was noted previously, was voted out of office because of what was
felt by many to be an overly antagonistic stance toward Alyeska and Exxon. Devens, it3
mnight be noted, always has supported the need for the oil industry in Valdez but has
argued that it needs oversight if it is to work safely and appropriately.

Valdez KI Summary - Page 110

Moreover, the spill, as we also noted earlier, changed people's attitudes about
social life because of its associated overcrowding and generally unpleasant conditions.
Along with tensions left over from the time of the spill, disagreements about the role of
oil in town and a loss of trust on the part of mnany in the good moral intentions of their
fellow residents has resulted in more and more people becoming homebodies. They
have become more insular and less commnunity oriented, according to a number of
respondents. As one observed: "During the spill we learned to stay home because it was
so crowded everywhere. Now with all the tension and such, people still stay home. It's
not the money but the feeling about the town" (which makes them stay home). Whether
people in fact stay home more now than before the spill is open to question; certainly
when visiting the town things seem reasonably active if not crowded. But accurate or
not, the feelings of change that so many respondents expressed and the sense of the
moral culpability of so many of their neighbors, has allowed for most, at the very least,
only a benign feeling toward the effects of the spill. At worst, there is a bitternes s that
threatens to undermine the character of Valdez as a community.
The social fabric has been affected in more direct ways, not only attitudinally. The
addition of SERVS and other new jobs related to safety have been welcomed for their
positive economnic and environmental effects but also have created greater strains in what
was already a strained housing market. Competition for adequate and affordable
housing has become more intense and has increased social tensions in town. Especially
affected are the splits between the haves and the have-nots and also between those in
town who see the need for planned development and those--many who work for Alyeska
but who oppose Alyeska's entry into the housing-development sector of the town--who
see planning as inimical to their investments in housing. The increased competition for
housing also has increased the perceptions of injustice and inequality that always were
just beneath the surface. This, added to feelings that there were injustices in the
allocation of contracts during the spill, has aggravated an already developed sense of
inequity felt by many in Valdez. While this is not manifest, it is constantly just beneath
the surface of what appears to be relative social harmony.
Valdez XI Summary - Page Ill






Moreover, according to a number of city officials, there has been a turnover inI
population since the spill, although the exact number is not known. A number of
residents left Vald'ez after the spill was cleaned up because the wealth they earned
enabled them to return home or to open up businesses elsewhere. At the same time, a
number of people who came to Valdez to work on the spill cleanup have remained. At
least four of the people interviewed had come to Valdez during the spill cleanup and
remnained because of the opportunities they hoped it might offer them. In addition, the
200 or so jobs that have come about as a result of the spill have added a significant
number of people to the community, even though a number of people who had resided
in Valdez before the spill were able to get some of the new jobs the spill made available.5
However, some of the new SERVS employees are frorm Louisiana and live on the boats
they brought to work as SERVS vessels. These people do not live in Valdez
permanently but return to their homes in Louisiana on a regular shift basis. Their
presence in the community has added to tensions and problerms in town primarily
through the addition of a number of socially uninvolved single males to the community.
What is of note is that the changes in the social fabric remarked on by respondents5
are all negative. No one spoke of new social energies or new potentials resulting from
the spill even though there have been a number of new businesses, like a health foodI
store and a new restaurant, that new residents have opened since the spill. What people
feel, objectively based or not, is that the social changes wrought by the spill have5
reshaped Valdez in ways that have not been for the good.
The same cannot be said for the spill's effects on the economy. In this area,I
respondents felt that the effects were for the most part positive for the community as a
whole, even in those instances where they did not personally gain from the spill.I
Almost everyone I spoke with noted the generally positive effects of the spill on the
economy of Valdez. Not only has it brought 200 new jobs to the cormmunity, but a
number of businesses were rescued by the income generated by the spill, and a large
number of individuals were able to earn a significantly larger income the year of the
spill.


Valdez KI Summary - Page 112

The pictur e of economic benefit, though, is more complex than it might appear at
first glance. Benefits from the spill were uneven both sectorally and individually. While
respondents were willing to argue that overall Valdez benefited economically from the
spill, only 48 percent claimed that they had higher household incomes as a result of spill
activities. Of the respondents, 32 percent said their incomes remained the same during
the spill year, and 20 percent actually saw their incomes go down.
Individual choice, economic strategy, and one's location in the economy were
critical variables defining whether one raised their income during the spill-cleanup period
and to what extent it was raised. Boat owners, especially those with large boats, were
able to earn extremely large sums, depending on the contract they negotiated for
themselves. The few who chose not to work the spill cleanup probably lost money
because of the shortened fishing season that summer. For some, settlements have
helped to allay losses, but others have not been able to get what they feel are adequate
settlements. Some cominercial fishermnen, because they owned a number of boats or
bought more during the cleanup, were able to both work on the spill cleanup and to fish
the abbreviated but record-breaking fishing season and also to obtain settlements for lost
time fishing. These persons who optimized all elements of economic opportunity were
able, in the words of one: "to make a killing." But others not so well located or who
were not able to negotiate the best contracts, although earning extra income during the
summer of the spill, did not do so well.
Some took their spill-related profits and were able to buy new and mnore technicaly
advanced boats, putting them in a more advantageous position than others in commercial
fishing or boating. Still too, some who never had owned boats were able to buy them
based on contracts negotiated with Exxon and thus were able to enter new economic
endeavors that previously were unavailable. All these economiic changes have added
inestimably to the economi'c complexity of Valdez. Their effects are as yet unknown, but
they may not be all that positive--both for the community i'n generaJ and for many of the
individuals involved.
The spill also added, at least temporarily, to the incomes of many in Valdez who
held low-paying jobs. Of the 48 percent of the respondents who reported a higher
Valdez KI Summary - Page 113





income during the spill year, 70 percent had held low-paying jobs such as bartenders,I
crewmen in boats, or seasonal construction workers. They then worked the spill cleanup
and earned significantly mnore than they mnight have had they remained in their pre-I
cleanup job. Some were able to mnake such a large income that they left Valdez. Others
profited, but only for that summer, returning to low-paying jobs when the spill cleanupI
was completed.
Some decided not to work on the spill cleanup. At least one such respondent
figured that if he waited, one of the more permanent jobs that were vacated by those
working the spill cleanup miight come his way. In this way he went from a gas-station
attendant to a hospital worker, which he feels brought him short-term losses but long-3
term gains.
Those who lost income earned their income from areas that were either directly oIr
indirectly hurt by the spill. A nurmber of fishermen who either couldn't or wouldn't work
on the spill cleanup lost income. So too did those who repaired or upholstered tourI
boats, those who made or sold tourist crafts, and other such summertimne pursuits. While
in a minority, they feel the spill-cleanup period to have been a time of real loss, both5
materially and morally, because the town changed so much for them during this period
and revealed their powerlessness in the light of the oil-driven economy. Others lost               1
income because they quit jobs that paid well for spill-related activities but were too
stressful. They felt the stress was too much to suffer for the economic gain--although
some are bitter now at the loss.
Many neither gained nor lost income. Those who worked for the city or Alyeska
on salary did not gain particularly from the spill, although it was a hard time for them.
While people speak of the real material gains the community received from the3
spill, they also feel that there is a downside to the economic effects of the spill. The
effects of the increased number of boats on commercial fishing still are unclear.I
Moreover, many who invested spill profits in boats and such may still lose out because of
taxes for which they forgot to calculate and which will soon come due. Somne businesses3
and individuaal respondents note that they were only temporarily saved from econornic


Valdez KI Summary - Page 114g

collapse by the spill because the spill saved them from bad economic practices that they
have continued to use.
In a sense, some of the issues that have confronted individuals in regard to the
overall benefits of the spill also have confronted the town as a whole. The spill rescued
Valdez from economic stagnation. It also may have put off thinking about the future
and what reliance on oil means. If so, the economic gain from the spill may, some
respondents point out, eventually be seen to have had more of a negative than a positive
effect.
When one adds to that what many people saw as the deleterious effects of the spill
on the environment and the threats some of these effects may pose to such as the tourist
industry, then overall the spill is viewed at best as a. mixed blessing. Few felt the
environment was unaffected by the spill, although to what degree it has permanently
despoiled the PWS still is hotly debated in Valdez and certainly open to question. But
as one respondent so aptly put it: "The spill left us with a kind of loss of virginity when
it comes to the environment and a different sense of where we live."
For some, the spill's effects on the environment will prove to be small and
unimportant. Others see the PWS if not permanently rained, certainly transformed and
no longer pristine.
Like feelings about the effects of the spill in general, disagreements about the
effects of the spill on the environment emanate to a great extent from three factors:
(1) one's experience with the spill, (2) one's economic and social position in the
community--most oil workers while certainly in favor of a cleani environment tend to see
the spill's effects as minor--and (3) one's own sense of gain and loss fromn the spill.
How people saw the spill's effects was a function of previous attitudes, the
economic location in which one found oneself (which defined what opportunities for gain
or loss were available) the experiences of the spill itself and the strategies one used to
deal with the spill and the activities associated with it. While there is a great amount of
agreenient about much of the spill and its effects on Valdez, the complexities that
underlie what is generally agreed on make the agreements less than meet the eye and
mnore open to the variety of interpretations that underlie the generality.
Valdez 1(1 Summary - Page 115

III.H. Community Involvement with the Oil Industry
The complexity of views that underlie what appear to be general agreements about
oil and the spill become apparent when dealing with the relationship of the community
with the oil i-ndustry. As has been noted a number of times, almost everyone spoken to
in Valdez agreed that the oil industry was on measure a positive good for the
community. But while people agreed that oil was a good thing, how it should be
managed and in what way the community might oversee the oil industry was a matter of
often intense disagreement.
Critical to this disagreement was the extent to which people felt the oil companies
were able to deal with the spill, especially Exxon; the extent to which either the State or5
Federal Governments were able to do as well or better than the oil industry; and the
degree to which any of these institutions were forthcoming about the spill and its effects.3
T'he impression the responses give is that it is in these areas where people are the most
divided. While more people felt that Exxon handled the spill better than either State or
Federal agencies, most felt that the jobs done by all probably were as good as they could
be but not good enough. Moreover, there was a distinct division between those who felt9
that Exxon was forthcoming about the spill and those who did not. The issues of
competence and trust play heavily in peoples' attitudes toward community involvement
but often in complex ways. When thinking about the issue, trust and competence played
off against each other in framing the way people felt about it.5
A minority of respondents argued, but often quite vigorously, that it was entirely
inappropriate for the community to involve itself in the operations of Alyeska. One
group of those who opposed such involvement did so on the basis of a principled belief
that private industry, like all things private, should remain outside the control of any kind3
of governmental interference. For them, less government was always better, and less
community oversight of Alyeska meant less government. A less ideologically driven
reason for no or as little as possible community involvement in running the oil-transport
industry given by.a number of respondents concerned the technical and professional
expertise that one needed to understand the industry. A number of people, usually
Valdez KI Summary - Page 116

Alyeska employees, argued that the community did not have enough expertise to really
oversee the industry, "to really help the situation,"' as one Alyeska employee put it.
fronically, a number of respondents who were in principle in favor of significant
comm unity involvement in overseeing the oil industry and who also were deeply
suspicious of Alyeska's good intentions and ability to safeguard Valdez agreed with those
who argued that the community needed more sophisticated input if it was to really
oversee Alyeska. They noted that without environmental and technical expertise in the
town government, it was probably self-defeating to monitor Alyeska's activities. As one
respondent arguied:
I think the community has to have a say, but the city government is
spread too thin. If it doesn't have the resources to oversee oil then
it shouldn't because it will be crippled (in its attempts at
oversight). The city needs a real environmental expert to work
with the community and even there it would be difficult for one
person to do it.

This problem notwithstanding, most residents with whom I spoke would opt for
some form of community involvemaent with Alyeska and input into their activities for a
number of reasons. From a planning and town management perspective, Valdez often
needs to know more than it does if it is to adequately plan for the future. The questions
as to whether oil will r-un and when it will, and whether exploration will go forward or
not, need to be answered if the commnunity is to plan rationally for its future. And if the
community is to use the necessary information, there must be a way for that information
to be used. When the pipeline was conceived and the TAPS agreement made,
respondents point out, the State of Alaska and the oil companies made contractual
agreements about issues such as the rate of depreciation of, oil that profoundly
influenced Valdez's well-being with no input froin or consultation with the community.
Today, Valdez must live with those agreements. It also lives in ignorance about what
new agreements, e.g., about ANWR, might affect the livelihood and future of the
community.
Less overarching and possibly less critical to the long-term future of Valdez--but
nonetheless critical to a rationally fanctioning town, respondents point out--is the need
Valdez KI Sumimary - Page 117





for the commutnity to have information about and input into Alyeska's everyday activities.I
For example, housing is a sector of the community that, if it is to function adequately for
residents, needs to be thought out and designed on the basis of Alyeska's activities andI
plans for the fature. Recently there has been mnore cooperation between Alyeska and

the city in this regard, although with oppositio n from somne landlords in town.
Other areas of town planning also need to be based on shared information and
input, respondents point out. Alyeska has wanted to build a new emergency response
center but decided on a location without involving the community. There has been
resistance because the site chosen was one. of the more special, from an aesthetic and
environmental point of view, places in the town. It also would be located on a spot that
would interfere with plans for the expansion of the boat harbor. As a result, the Harbor
Expansion Coinamittee has turned down Alyeska's request for the site, but how the City3
Council will deal with it still was an open question when I left Valdez. For respondents,
the emergency center was another case of Alyeska acting without consultation and5
creating more problems and tensions than necessary, both for themselves and for the
community. Greater cooperation as'well as community involvement and input into
Alyeska's activities would, these respondents note, create more efficient, mnore
evenhanded, and less conflictive relations with Alyeska.
Equal if not more important concerns to many who want more community
involvement with Alyeska revolve around environmental issues. There is a deep
suspicion among a majority of respondents that without community involvernent in this
area Alyeska will not be forthcoming with accurate and truthful information about the
environmnent and the community will not be able to trust in adequate environmental
oversight. Even though most of these same respondents are "pro-oil," they feel--5
especially since the spill--that Alyeska needs to know, as one respondent put it: "That
they don't hold all the cards."5
Monitoring, many respondents feel, is essential to prevent another major disaster
like the spill and also to oversee the less dramatic but equally important long-term3
effects of minor ecological problems like the constantly occurring small spills; the
Valdez KI Sumniary - Page 118

leakage of gases into the air, which stains the snow a brackish brown; and other such
problems.
Before the spill, most respondents agree, there was little or no possibility of
community oversight of Alyeska. Even during the spill there was, in the words of one
government official: "Little consultation. Exxon did not -consult but worked around the
comimunity -when maling its decisions."
This official had attempted before the spill to generate more oversight of the oil
companies by forming the Ad-H oc Committee on Oil, but with little success according to
other respondents. Since the spill, however, such committees have been more active;
and Exxon and Alyeska have been to a degree more willing to allow for community
oversight.
The cooperation between the city government and Alyeska in developing the new
housing subdivision is one such example for respondents. Another more critical example
is the creation of the RCAC, started by Alyeska in 15 communities affected by the spill
to increase commaunity involvement with the company.
The local RCAC has developed a response plan for fishermen in case of another
spill; is looking into the health risks of oil transfers, attempting to ensure that the gases
are properly inerted at the terminal; overlooking the operation of the oil-treatment plant;
and conducting a range of other such activities.
Opinion about this new involvement is divided. There are those who see it as a
positive development that will increase the town's ability to work with Alyeska
cooperatively. Others see it as a thorn in the side of the oil industry, a possible
hindrance to the proper worldng of Alyeska and a possible threat to the long-term
stability of the industry. There are still otbers who gee such committees as sops being
thrown the town--sops that are mired in meetings and other organizational and
bureaucratic impedances to real community oversight and continued community
imilitancy in relation to oil. Moreover, they argue that the community still is dependent
on Alyeska, State, and Federal experts for advice, so they still suffer fromn a lack of really
independent information on which to judge what is going on.
Valdez KI Summary - Page 119

The irony is that the issue runs both hot and cold. The community is divided about1
oversight and its uses and effects. Even among those who favor oversight, there are
those who see the need for real militancy or at least independent oversight. Others feel
that oversight would be useful if it were truly independent but are cynical about such a

possibility. In the final analysis, feelings about involvement come down to (1) feelings
about just how much control over one's life the oil companies have; (2) whether such
control is benign or potentially problematic; and (3) even if it is threatening and
problemnatic, what real individual control one can hope to have given the nature and thea
size of Alyeska and the dependence of the community on the oil-transport economy.
This division and what it suggests about Valdez as a place to live very much
influences what people feel about their commitment to the civic and economic life of the
town itself.
111.1. Commitment and Investment in Valdez
While Valdez is an attractive commurnity because of the economic opportunities it
makes available to many of its residents, it does not appear to be a community to which
people are for the most part comm-itted either ermotionally or materially. Most people
come to Valdez to work and to save, and they hope to leave better off than they were
when they arrived. Although over 50 percent of those with whom I spoke have lived in
Valdez for more than 5 years,54 when talking with people one gets the sense that no
matter how long they have lived in Valdez, for most it is not home. Rather, as one pre-
earthquake resident put it: "Most people come into town with a 10-, 15-, or 20-year plan
to make money and to return home. But it isn't a town where they plan to retire."5
But there are retirees in Valdez; I spoke with at least three. There also are
individuals who plan to retire in Valdez. I spoke with at least two such individuals.
However, with the exception of one individual who planned to retire in Valdez, all of
these individuals were resident in Valdez prior to the construction of the pipeline.5
Indeed, they were resident in Valdez prior to the earthquake of 1964. For them, Valdez


54 There are no figures available that I know of that provide an accurate picture of length of residence in
Valdez. From my own informal questioning, I would suggest that over half the population if not more has been
there for periods of over 5 years or even 8 years.
Valdez KI Summary - Page 120

was home. They said that although the winters were difficult, the Senior Center---
founded subsequent to the pipeline days with the idea of keeping people in Valdez after
they retired, although with little success, according to one respondent who was involved
with its founding--provided significant support. But even if the center were not available,
there was no place else these individuals could see themselves retiring.
Like most things in Valdez, respondents are divided about the extent to which the
people in the community are committed to the community. However, they are nearly
unanimous about one thing: conmmitment is not a function of viewing Valdez as a
permanent place to live and retire. For most, the Senior Center and its supports
notwithstanding, retirement in Valdez is not something they feel is worth looldng forward
to. As one resident who has lived in Valdez since before the earthquake put it: "Why
would anyone want to retire here? I'd certainly keep my investments here but I don't
want to be shoveling snow when I am 80."
Commitment for residents of Valdez is measured by the quality and quantity of the
investment people make in the commnunity. On this issue, there also is division. Some
argue that there is little conumitment to Valdez. Others argue the opposite and believe
that. there is commitment and that it is growing.
Those who argue that there is little commitment on the part of most of the
residents of Valdez argue that because most people live in Valdez for limited periods, be
it 10 years or 20, there is a feeling of impermanence to Valdez. They argue further that
this feeling militates against any desire to invest in the community. As one respondent
observed: "There is a lirmited optimismn here because of the, feeling of transience."
The limited optimism of which he speaks a'nd the sense that life in Valdez is
transient is magnified by the experience of boom and bust and the knowledge that the
community's' continued well-being is predicated on a healthy and vibrant oil economy.
But, as another respondent averred: "The place (Valdez) is unpredictable in its economy
so you don't know how long you will get to stay. Because you don't know how long you
will stay or be here, you won't invest in the place."
What respondents refer to over and, over, given my impression of what they mean,
is a sense of powerlessness and a lack of any real command over the destiny of Valdez
Valdez KI Summary - Page 121





because the community has become -so dependent on the oil-transport economy, anI
economy over which Valdez has absolutely no control. People often point out that to
invest in. any way in Valdez, be it emotionally or materially, is a mistake. As one
respondent put it: "Pe ople feel that the oil industry is not permanent so they feel the
town will be different when the last barrel of oil comes through the terminal." However,
this same person added: "There is probably over a hundred years left in oil."
The fact that the stated official life left in the pipeline is limited to early in the next
century adds to the sense that the good life in Valdez may be coming to an end.
Although most in authority believe that the terminal will be in operation for a long time
to comne, even the city calculates revenues on the assumption that the assessed value of5
oil property will continue to go down to nil in about 25 years. Although such stated
lirmits probably are a significant underestimate of the real longevity of an active oil-5
transport economy, they fuel the uncertainty that drives many in the community to the
position that to invest in Valdez is at best unpredictable and that committing one's
resources and life chances to its continued growth and prosperity probably is unwise. As
a result: "Many people in Valdez are already investing in homes, businesses, andI
retirement outside Valdez," as one respondent noted.
People invest outside Valdez because, as another respondent argued: "You have to
understand the history of the town, the boom and the b-ust, to sense why I think it is not
so wise to invest here. If, for example, the price of oil goes down we would be in realI
trouble here."
Along with the uncertainty goes a sense that throughout its history Valdez has been5
a relatively unstable place and offers. few real incentives to invest.
Whether the belief in Valdez's instability and the uncertainty that accompanies it is
true or not, most people in Valdez came there either looking for a job or because they
already had one. It is not a community made up of people looking for investments or a5
place to stay. Rather, it is a place made up of people who have come for work. As one
person put it quite bluntly: "You come for work and when your work is done you leave."
Even if people want to invest in the town, many posit, there is little in which to
invest and a social and economic climate that discourages investment. Many newcomers
Valdez KI Summary - Page 122

feel that there is resistance to them from people who have lived in Valdez since before
the earthquake and before the pipeline. This resistance adds to the feeling that Valdez
is at best a lucrative. way station on the' road to a more permanent and welcoming place
outside. A number of respondents said, at times-bitterly, that the "old money" in town
(the pre-earthquake residents) owns most of the businesses and prevents any new
investment. As one business person put it: "Businesses here resist other businesses
coming in."
Whether real or not, the perception of exclusion and resistance that people claim
to feel either encourages or supplies a rationalization for what clearly is a disinclination
to invest either energy or resources in Valdez on the part of so many with whom I spoke.
Another reason given for the lack of local investment in the community runs
counter to that given above. Some argue that the local investment diminished when
Valdez was left with only a bank from Anchorage rather than a local bank. As one
business person claimed: "The availability of loans for local things has become
dependent on what is happening in Anchorage where given the recession monies have
dried up."
Moreover, what there is to invest in either is too expensive, e.g, to build a house, or
is nonexistent, e.g., a house in which to invest.
All the reasons people give for not investing in the town materially may be best
explained not so much by the town itself but by reference to the kinds of people who
settle in Valdez. It is a town made up. of technicians, professional people, skilled
workers, and the service workers who provide the necessary supports. As one town
official argued: "I've ran five trade visits to Asia but I couldn' t get their money because
people here are not hungry enough. People who were looking to use our foreign-trade
zone couldn't cut deals. We are not a commnunity of entrepreneurs but people who make
good livings and play at being businessmen."
Some argue there are and have been plenty of opportunities for investment. The
problem of investment is not contingent on conditions in Valdez but a refasal to commit
to Valdez. ,For example, everyone agrees that the Senior Center provides extremely
good support, yet people say they won't retire in Valdez.
Valdez KI Summary - Page 123





So too with investment in ho-using. The' new subdivision being underwritten by
Alyeska and the city give evidence, city authorities arguie, of a cormmitment on the part
of both institutions to the town and will provide the upscale housing many complain is
unavailable. Whether it s-ucceeds or not will be a test of whether a disposition existsg
among residents to invest in Valdez, those who favor such investment argue. As one
respondent put it: "People in Alyeska claim there is no place to invest in the city. So we
will build the new subdivision to see if people want to invest."
Possibly, some argae, the support given the new subdivision project by Alyeska and
the local government and the effort by Alyeska to remove its temporary housing left over
from the pipeline-construction days will provide a greater sense of stability and                 f
permanence to Valdez. With this, the guarded optimism with which people treat Valdez,
as a number of respondents suggested, might turn into a solid optirmism and a new desire
to a commitment of resources to the commnunity.
Other respondents suggest the subdivision project will succeed beca-use they believe3
people want to invest in their community but need things that are worthy of investment.
Other respondents add--although they were in the rminority--tbat there is a strongI
inclination for people to invest in Valdez even if they do not see themselves as
permanently resident there. Because so many do stay for upwards of 20 years, there is a3
wilaigness to invest in a community where they will spend so long a period of their lives.
T'hose who believe that there is a conunitment of resources to Valdez by its3
residents point to the many locally: owned businesses and argue as one respondent did
that: "We are beginning to see some investment in town. People are investing in5
housing, they are building, they are investing in new businesses and expanding the
businesses they have." These respondents also observe that while people often talk of5
leaving and appear dispirited by the spill and the wAinter of 1990, when roughly 46 feet of
snow fell, and feel depressed every winter by the weather and the lack of light, as things        f
stabilize and as winter turns into spring, people rethink their sense of belonging. As
summner returns, people feet less alienated and more alive to the opportunities Valdez            f
presents. With this, Valdez will see renewed commitment and energy.


Valdez K(1 Summary -_ Page 124

It is hard to say who is right regarding conumitment. Looldng at the community
superficially will not provide any real clues to the issue. What creates the tension about
commitment in Valdez, I would suggest, is not apparent in the comings and goings of
daily life. Rather the problem is rooted in the particular history of Valdez with its
booms and busts and more critically its present heavy dependency on oil.
For many, there is a real conflict between the community and Alyeska and an
intemnal conflict about where their individual loyalties lie. The institutional reality of
Valdez, the fact that it is a company town while also being independent of the company,
creates complexities and problems that make commitment to the community a politically
and socially loaded act. The division about commitment that one hears from
respondents, often with contradictory messages fromn the same respondent, is a function
of each individual's perceptions and experiences as each tries to define a place for
themself in Valdez. The debate about commitment and the ambivalence it appears to
produce in the town in general and in so many individuals suggests that Valdez still is a
community seeking to define itself. It is still seeking to discover what it wants to be in
light of its social and economic history and the econormic structure of today.
Valdez KI Summary - Page 125

I
I
References Cited

Cannellos, G.
1991 Valdez Comprehensive Development Plan. Chapter 5. Spring 1991. Draft
report prepared for the City of Valdez, Alaska. Anchorage, Alaska.

City of Valdez
1991 City of Valdez Financial Report. Valdez, Alaska.

Darbyshire & Associates
1991 Valdez Comprehensive Development Plan. Spring 1991. Draft report prepared
for the City of Valdez, Alaska. Anchorage, Alaska.

Donald, R., R. Cook, R.F. Bixby, R. Benda and A. Wolf
1990 The Stress Related Impact of the, Valdez Oil Spill on the Residents of Cordova
and Valdez. June 1990. Valdez Counseling Center. Valdez, AK.

Heasley, R.
1991 Valdez Project Report. Anchorage, Alaska.

Robbins, E.
1975 Ethnicity or Class: Social Relations in a Canadian Mining Town. In The New
Ethnicity. John Bennett, ed., pp. 285-304. Minneapolis: West Publishers.

Valdez Chamber of Commerce
1989a Valdez Business'Directory. Valdez, Alaska.

1989b Valdez Gold Rush Days. Valdez, Alaska.


















Valdez K(1 Summary - Page 126
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EFFECTS OF THE 1989 EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL ON CORDOVA, ALASKA


Stephanie Reynolds

Effects of the 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil SDill on Cordova

Table of Contents
I. Introduction ....................................
A. Cordova .................................
Historical Overview.........................
Eyak ...............................
Chugach Eskimo ......................
Non-Native Economy ..................
Development of the Fishing Industry..
Activism and Formal Organizations...
Fishing as a Way of Life .....................
Population and Demography .................
Social Organization .........................
Subsistence ...............................
Cordova's Economy .........................
Fishing .............................
The Seafood Processing Industry ..........
Government .........................
Retail Trade and Service Sector ..........
Transportation, Communications, and Utilities
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate .......
Construction .........................
Tourism ............................
Forestry ...........................
Oil, Gas, and Coal Development ..........
Science and Education .................
Deep Water Port ..................
Copper River Highway .................
Bearing River Road ...................
Future Economic Trends .....................
133
135
135
136
137
138
139
141
142
143
147
148
151
153
160
163
164
165
165
165
165
166
168
169
169
169
169
170

172
174
176
186
188
188
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196
197
197
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.e...... ...

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..... .....

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... ..... ..
. ... ......
.- ... .. ....
II.  Alaska            Natives in Cordova ............
A. Population ...................
B. Cultural Identity ..............
C.	Organizational C     omplexity .......
D.	Economic Development Policies .
Views on Resource Development..
Eyak Corporation .............
Chugach Region ..............
Fishing .....................
E.    Struggles Over Land Conveyances .
......................
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Cordova - Page 129

I

I
Effects of the 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil Shill on Cordova
Table of Contents
(continued)
I
I
II.    Alaska Natives in Cordova (continued)
F.    Eyak-Anglo Social Relations ....
Discrimination and Segregation ..
G.	Political and Economic Relations:
H.	Effects of the 1989 Oil Spill .....
Summary ...................
........................... 201
........................... 202
Cordova-Eyak ............... 205
........................... 207
........................... 225
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HII.   Effects of the 1989 Oil Spill on the Fishing Community ................
A. First Response ..........................................
B.  Conflicts Generated by the Spill Cleanup ......................
Fishermen Become Oil Cleanup Contractors ...................
Conflicts Over Cleanup Money .............................
Conflicts Over Contracts ..................................
Conflicts Over Changes in Fishing ...........................
Health Hazards ........................................
The Cleanup Does More Harm than Good ....................
C. Fish Claims ............................................
1989: A Record Year ....................................
Exxon's Voluntary Settlement Policy .........................
Low Fish Prices ...................................
Low Fish Quality ..................................
Fish Quantities ....................................
Exxon Claims Advances .............................
A Case Example ...................................
The TAPAA Fund .......................................
226
233
240
240
242
244
247
249
251
253
253
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259
264
268
272
279
281
283
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286
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306
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D.    The Hatcheries: Prince William Sound Aquaculture .............
General Background .....................................
The Oil Spill ...........................................
E. Cleaned Beaches ........................................
F.  Alyeska Contingency Plans for Future Spills ....................
G. Competition With Valdez .................................
H. Environmental Ethics ....................................
IV.   Private Sector Economic Impacts of the Oil Spill (Non-fishing) ..........
A. Introduction ........................................,..
B. Labor Shortages ........................................
C. Housing Shortages.
D. Gasoline ..............................................
316
316
321
322
323
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Effects of the 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil Suill on Cordova
Table of Contents
(continued)

IV.    Private Sector Economic Impacts of t4ie Oil Spill (Non-fishing) (continued)
E.	Conflicts Within the Business Conmmunity............324
F.	Conflicts Between VECO and Local Business Owners .......344
G. Fish Processors ......................345
Bankruaptcy of the Copper River Fishermen's Cooperative......345
Background ..............I..........345
The Oil Spill and the Coop's Bankruptcy ............346
H. Fishing Gear Suppliers ...................349
I. Hotels and Motels .....I................354
J.  Grocery Stores and Food Suppliers ..............362
K. Childcare Providers ....................366
Conflicts Within the Childcare Community............370

V. City Government Impacts......................373
A.  Cordova as Spill Cleanup Contractor..............378
B. Other Costs .......................383
C.  -Political Controversies: Ile Suit Against the City.........393

VI. Summary...........................412
A. City Government Impacts..................412
Cordova as Spill Cleanup Contractor..............413
B.     Private Sector Economic Impacts of the Oil Spill (Non-Fishing) ....413
Conflicts Between VECO and Local Businesses ..........414
C.  Impacts to'the Fishing Community...............414
The Oil Spill Cleanup ...................414
Fishermen Become Oil Cleanup Contractors ........414
Conflicts Over Cleanup Money .............415
Conflicts Over Contracts ................415
Health Hazards ...................415
Tle Cleanup Does More H-arm Than, Good ........415
Conflicts Over Fish Claims .................415
The Hatcheries: Prince William Sound Aquaculture Corporation    ..417
Cleaned Beaches .....................417
D.  Spill Impacts on Alaskan Natives in Cordova...........417

References Cited...........................419
Cordova - Page 131

Effects of the 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil SuillI on Cordova

List of Tables

Cordova Population, 1910 to 1990...............

City of Cordova Elementary School Enrollment .........

Cordova Retail Prices...................

Cordova Labor Rates...................

Catch and Gross Earnings of Cordova Residents by
Fishery in 1986 ......... ............

Cordova Employment and Payroll in 1988 ...........

Weekly Grocery and Energy Costs for a Family of Four ......

Average Price in Dollars Paid to Fishermen for
Salmon, Prince William Sound, 1979-1989 .1..........

Commercial Salmon Harvest by Species fromn
All Gear Types, Prince William Sound, 1971-1990 ........
1

2

3

4

5
144

146

150

151


154

155

170
6

7
8
254


1255
9
10
Ex-vessel Estimated Values in Dollars of Gross Earnings in the Limited

Prince William Sound Fisheries, 1987-1988 ...........256
Cordova - Page 132

EFFECTS OF THE 1989 EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL ON CORDOVA
I. INTRODUCTION
T'his report provides an ethnographic portrait of Cordova, Alaska, through the
lens of Cordova's response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill of March 24, 1989. The goal of
th is research was to furnish a vehicle through which Cordovans could chronicle impacts
which they experienced as a result of the oil spill. Local news coverage and interviews
with residents comprise the principal data base. Evaluations of background sources are
embedded in the text. This introduction prefaces the ethnographic report with a brief
overview of Cordova and its history.
This paper is an interim report which Principal Investigator (PI) Joseph G.
Jorgensen will use in analyzing data for a large comparative study, described below. In
its present format, the paper includes extensive interview and press citations, intended to
maximize the PI's ethnographic understanding.
The Stud
Qualitative ethnographic data were collected between February 11 and March 13,
1991, as part of an extension of the Alaska Outer Continental Shelf Social Indicators
Study (AOSIS). The study applies multi-method, multi-data sets to develop a system of
socialI indicators which will measure social change and distinguish between external and
internal causes of change. In particular, the AOSIS seeks to discriminate between social
change caused by Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) activities and other social changes.
Beginning in 1987, the Social Indicators Project sampled 31 western Alaskan
communities, from Kodiak Island in the south to the coast of the Beaufort Sea in the
north. Cordova, on Prince Williwn Sound, was not included in the original sample
because Mfinerals Management Service (MMS) leasing in that region was not anticipated
(Jorgensen 1990, oral comm.). With the cataclysmic Exxon Valdez oil spill, a contract
modification in the summer of 1989 allowed post-spill AOSIS research in Cordova and
nine other spill-affected communities.
Analyses of data collected in questionnaires and protocol interviews as part of the
AOSIS in Cordova a're not available at the time of this writing. -Data from prior studies,
Cordova - Page 133






cited in this introduction, may be compared with 1991 AOSIS results. Most informato
in this qualitative instrument was collected by the author, for the 1991 Key Informant
Summary for Cordova.  Research Assistant and Questionnaire Interviewer (QI) Mike3
Howard, in Cordova for the last week of field research, produced seven institutional
interviews. The author, as Key informnant (KI) Interviewer and field supervisor,
conducted 37 institutional interviews. Cordova resident Art Miller and Mary Lynch also
served as QI's; Rose Axvidson and Kate Beanm, both local residents, consulted briefly on
the sample.g
The Sample
Cordova's sample was drawn by random selection from a list of residential properties.3
Tlis created some unique problems. Due to high residence seasonality in Cordova,
many properties were not occupied. Also, some entries were multiple unit dwellings3
(such as the State of Alaska Housing Authority) and some were single family residences.
Twenty-four Key Informant interviews, given to a randomly selected sample of3
winter residents, comprise a partial basis for this report. Two were carried out by Nlike
Howard and the author, and 22 were conducted by the author. In addition, 443
institutional interviews represent the following entities:'
City Government (includes spill offices) (8)
Animal Rescue (1)I
Electrical Cooperative (1)
Fish Hatcheries (3)3
Fishermen's United (1)
Fishermen's Claims Office (1)
Fish Processors (1)3
Eyak Non-Profit Corporation (3)
Eyakc Profit Corporation (1)
Chugachi Profit Corporation (1)I
Tatitlek Profit Corporation (1)
law Enforcement (1)


1These figures address the representativeness rather than the size of the sample. Six of the 44 institutional
interviews were with KI's. On the other hand, five KI's gave partial institutional interviews which are not listed
here, as did countless other residents questioned informally. Two individuals gave two institutional interviews
each. Commercial fishermen, although representative of the fishing industry, are not counted with "institutional"
informants.


Cordova - Page 134

Education (3)
Social Services (1)
Alaska Department of Fish a'nd Game (1)
Churches (3)
Financial Institutions (2)
Other Private Businesses (9)
Childcare (1)
Harbor Operations (1)

Also, two individuals widely acknowledged as "experts" in Eyak cul.ture were interviewed
by the author.
The method employed in selecting institutional respondents was to request local
persons to direct me to individ-uals who were knowledgeable about the oil spill, or who
in their estimation had been "helped or hurt" a great deal by the spill and its aftermath.
IA. Cordova
.Cordova is a commercial fishing village located in southeastern Prince William
Sound between Orca Bay and the Gulf of Alaska. The city lies at the foot of Mount
Eyak and is bounded by Orca Inlet to the west, Mt. Eccles to the south, and Lake Byak
to the east. Much of the land surrounding Cordova is in the Chugacb National Forest.
Cordova is isolated both by land and water, and residents in general do not anticipate
major expansion.
Cordova borders the contrasting ecological regions of Prince Williamn Sound to
the west, and the Copper River Delta to the east. Prince William Sound forms a
complex system of bays, lagoons, fjords, glaciers, and barrier islands, while the Copper
River Delta is a tidal marshland spotted by forests and traversed by channels of the
Copper River draining into the Gulf of Alaska. Cordova's unique and breathtaldng
beauty is highly prized by residents, who.demonstrate exceptional sensitivity to their
environment.
Historical Overview: Prior to European contact, the Cordova area was inhabited
by Chugach Eskimos in the Prince William Sound region, and Eyak and Tlingit Indians
in the Copper River region (Johnson 1988). Relatively little is known about early Eyak
settlers (Johnson 1988; Hanable and Workman 1974; Krauss 1980; Birket-Smith and de
Cordova - Page 135

I


Laguna, 1938, cited in Payne 1983). Key ethnographic accounts on the Chugach, Eyak,              I
and Tlingit include Birket-Smith and de Laguna (1938), de Laguna (1956, 1972), and
Birket-Smith (1953). Seminal linguistic research on the Eyak has been carried out by
Krauss (1980, 1982).
Eyak: The Eyaks are members of the Na Dene language family, and the
Eyak language is thought to have evolved from proto-Athabaskan more than 3,000 years
ago (Krauss 1982). Eyaks were probably an inland people who migrated down the
Copper River to Prince William Sound at some point in the distant past (Johnson 1988).           I
There they co-existed with the maritime Tlingit, often joining them in battling the
Chugach (Johnson 1988). Eyaks were partially assimilated by the Tlingits, learning both          5
languages. Both cultures were organized into the clan systems of Eagle and Raven, and
Eyaks and Tlingits jointly occupied villages from Cordova to Yakutat (Johnson 1988).             3
The present Eyak village, in Old Town, Cordova, was founded in 1893 by survivors of
smallpox and scarlet fever epidemics who fled from the Eyak village of Alaganik
(USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979).
European contact with the Eyaks occurred through Russian fur traders, who
established a post at Nuchek in 1793 on Hinchinbrook Island (Stratton 1989).
Development of a non-Native salmon industry and canneries on the Copper River in the
late 1800's, as well as the coming of copper mining and the railroad at the turn of the
century, was detrimental to the Eyak population. Eyaks were not employed at the
canneries, and diseases imported by white and Chinese workers decimated the
population (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979). Eyaks were excluded from
railroad construction jobs as well, and by 1910 an Eyak population numbering 100 to 200
(between 1818 and 1890) was reduced to approximately 50 persons (USDOI, BLM,
Alaska OCS Office 1979).
Early monographs describe Eyaks as subsisting primarily on clams, mussels,
salmon, goat, and bear (Stratton 1989).2 Eyaks also fished for halibut, trout, whitefish,
I
2Stratton's study provides an excellent summary of past and present subsistence practices of Natives and non-
Natives.

Cordova - Page 136
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and eulachon. They gathered seaweed, and preserved several kinds of berries. Seals
were harvested on land, ice, and water. Eyaks trapped fox, lynx, mink, marten, muskrat,
and weasel. Ducks, grouse, ptarmigan, and spruce grouse were hunted (Stratton 1989).
Chui!ach Eslimo: The Chugach Eskimo probably miigrated over the
Alaska Peninsula to the Prince William Sound area about 1300 AD. Tley were a more
maritime culture than the Eyak. Sea mammals were an important food, including seal,
sea lion, sea otter, and whale. Whale hunting entailed considerable cere.mony (Stratton
1989).
'Me Chugach fished for all types of salmon, grinding and fermenting chum salmon
eggs and drying, smoking, and compacting silver salmon eggs (Stratton 1989). The
Chugach also fished for herring, halibut, red snapper, and cod. They hunted mountain
goat, bear, weasel, mnink, and land otter. Shellfish were naost important in winter and
early spring, as s-upplies of dried salmon were depleted. The Chugach hunted gull1s,
cormnorants, and eagles. They gathered many types of berries as well as seaweed,
Kamchatka lily, roots, and greens. They dried and preserved plant foods using a variety
of methods (Birket-Smith 1938; and de Lagunta 1956, cited in Stratton 11989).
The Chugach became involved in the Russian fur trade after battling Russian
efforts to infiltrate the area (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979). Soon after, the
Russian trading post at Nuchek became a center for the dispensation of Russian
Orthodoxy. Elderly Cordovan Natives still recount resentment over their assignment of
Russian names. Some remember the exodus from Nuchek to Cordova in 1925-1930, in
fear of an epidemic.3
With increasing participation in the fur trade, the Chugach began to lose access to
their means of production. Russian traders established themselves in Prince William
Sound as sea otter populations in the Aleutian Islands and the Kodiak area declined
(Stratton 1989). They shifted their strategy of domninance over time from violence to
inducing Native indebtedness and dependency on the trading company (Hassen 1978,


3The considerable intermarriage in Native groups in the Cordova area is discussed in Section 11. Many
respondents recounted both Aleut and Eyak lore.'
Cordova - Page 137

cited in Stratton 1989). As the Chugach spent more time hunting otter to pay off debts
and procure supplies, they had less and less time available for subsistence harvesting.
The Chugach were dependent on the credit system for their daily needs by the time
Russian domination gave way to a rivalry between the Alaska Commercial Company and
the Eastern Fur and Trade Company (USDOI, BLM, Al aska OCS Office 1979).
This credit system continued with the institution of the cannery system (USDO1,
BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979) and with mining employment after the decline of the fur
trade at the turn of the 19th century (Hassen 1978, cited in Stratton 1989). With the
close of mining around 1930, commnercial fishing became the primary economic support
(Hassen 1978, cited in Stratton19).
Non-Native Economy: Cordova's econorny developed in conjunction with
various forms of resource development. As these phases of development waxed and
waned, the town persisted. Cordova was founded in conjunction with local copper
mining, which crashed within tbree decades of its beginning in the early 1900's.
Cordova's economy shifted to fishing at that time. Despite the unpredictable nature of
nonrenewable resource development in the area, and the predictably erratic nature of
the fishing industry, Cordova's year-round resident population has remained fairly stable
since the town's inception.
Oil was discovered in 1894 in Katalla, 50 rmiles southeast of Cordova (Stratton
1989:27). Coal was discovered in 1896, 60 miles east of Cordova. Copper was
discovered in Prince William Sound in 1887, between Valdez and Cordova, and the
Ellamar mine was opened in 1902 3 mniles northwest of Tatitlek (Stratton 1989:28). The
mnining of coal attracted the railroad industry, which planned to haul copper. The 1898
Alaska gold rush brought prospectors to Valdez and Cordova, en route to the interior.




I1t is interesting to see in Cordova the degree to which commercial fishing is viewed by Natives and non-
Natives as a means of production which enables them to retain substantial control over their lives. Commercial
fishing overlaps subsistence fishing, and many Cordovans enjoy a blending of a subsistence lifestyle with
participation in a cash economy. In the wake of the 1989 oil spill, fears for the loss of this mode of life, more
than economic losses, agitate Native and non-Native Cordovans.
Cordova - Page 138

Cordova was founded in 1906, in conjunction with plans for construction of the
.Copper River Railway, connecting Cordova's port with rich copper fields to the northeast
(see Janson 1975, as cited in USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:30). The railroad
was completed in 1910, and shipped more than $175 million of copper ore to Cordova
for shipment south for smelting until the Kennecott mines closed in 1938 (Janson 1975,
as cited in USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979). The Ellamar coal mine had already
closed in the late 1920's, with the onset of the depression. After the Kennecott mines
shut down, the railroad closed a year later, in 1939. The collapse of these industries had
a limited effect on Cordova because at the time salmon production was at record levels
(Janson 1975, cited in Payne 1983). From this period on, Cordova relied on its
commercial salmon industry (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:28). An excellent
history of Cordova's fishing industry appears in Payne (1983).
Develonment of the Fishing Industry: Intensive development of
Cordova's salmon industry occurred with a high demand for canned salmon during World
War I (Payne 1983:42). This effort depleted the salmon stocks, especially those:on the
Copper River. Payne (1983) cites the following description of this enterprise:
From 1914 there was an increase in the delta district of about
450% in the amount of gear used, while the increase in the
catch of salmon was only about 120%. At the up-river fields
the catch in 1917 was 600% greater than in 1914, while there
was an increase of 1,000% in gear for the same season
(Bower 1919:32-33).
Natives who relied on salmon for subsistence purposes complained bitterly over
the depletion of stocks, but were not listened to at first (Payne 1983:42-43). During
1915, 1916, and 1917, Native residents objected to commercial fishing on the Copper
River, claiming that they were being deprived of their subsistence (Bower and Allen
1917a:19-20 and 1917b:26-27, cited in Payne 1983). The Bureau of Fisheries believed
that there was no clear evidence of deprivation, stating that," ... at present, caribou,
moose, and mountain sheep are plentiful in localities and a supply of food secured from
these animals may be substituted in part" (Bower and Allen 1917a:20, cited in Payne
1983).
Cordova - Page 139






The 1915 grievances led to an on-site investigation, however, in which few salmonI
were found to reach the upper Copper River spawning grounds (Bower 1917b:27, cited
in Payne 1983). The Bureau of Fisheries noted continuing Native complaints in 1917,
but doubted the veracity of Natives' reports that they were destitute (Bower and Allen
1917a:23, cited in Payne 1983).
A 1917 Bureau of Fisheries report, however, expressed concern about depletion of
Copper River stocks. The Bureau initiated nieetings with salmon packers and
Government representatives which resulted in comprehensive Govefrnment regulation of3
Copper River salmon fishing. Regulation began in 1919, and the salmon run for that
year improved dramatically (Payne 1983:43-44).3
Fishing profits have fluctuated widely over past decades, but have stabilized
somewhat since the establishment of local hatcheries (discussed with fishing). Harvest3
levels plunged sharply during the 1950's, associated with adverse weather conditions, and
the fishery closed in 1954, 1955, and 1959 (Payne 1983:160). In the 1960's, the State of3
Alaska took over management of fish conservation from the Federal Government (Payne
1983). The 1964 earthquake had a detrimental effect on Cordova's fishery, reinforcing5
management and research to increase stocks. Catches in the 1960's, even with the effects
of the 1964 earthquake, were nevertheless higher than those of the 1950's (PayneI
1983:160-165).
The early 1970's again saw adverse weather conditions, forcing closures of some3
fisheries in 1972 and 1974 (Payne 1983). Tlese closures, following the closures in the
1950's, the earthquake in 1964, and new threats perceived from the pipeline terminal inI
Valdez, led to the development of hatcheries. The hatcheries provided a stabilizing
effect, although damages fromn the 1989 oil spill have threatened the fishing industry once3
again.
Rapid energy development was anticipated in 1974-1977 in association with OCS3
development (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:84). Such development was
controversial at that time and created substantial social tension, but it did not materialize3




Cordova -Page 1405

in Cordova, and the city focused economic efforts toward the development of the
comm.ercial fish industry.
Activism and Formal Orgyanizations: Cordovan fishermen have
attempted to exercise control over their means of production, through organized efforts
over time.   During the initial stage of the industry, individual fishermen were brought
to Cordova by the canneries (Payne 1983:77). At that time, the canneries set prices,
which were as low as 8 to 10 cents per salmon. Some of these fishermen settled in
Cordova and formed a union as salmon prices dropped after World War I (Payne
1983:78). The union lasted until the Depression, when a decline in prices spurred
formation of a new union in 1933 (Payne 1983). Cannery workers joined this union in
1934. Strikes in 1933, 1934, and 1935 sparked strike brealdng, picketing, cornpany
unionism, violence, and arrests (Casaday 1937, cited in Payne 1983).
This union eventually split into unions of fishermen, cannery workers, and clam
diggers (Payne 1983). The fishermen's union became the Cordova District Fishermen' s
Union (CDFU), an organization that featured prominently in this report. The CDFU
carried out price negotiations from the 1930's to the 1950's, as well as political activities
that included legislative bids and efforts towards marine resource control (Payne
1983:78).
The Federal Trade Commission halted CDFU's price bargaining activities through
application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1955 (Payne 1983:78-79). The rationale for
the Federal actio-n was that fish pass interstate lines and so fall under the statute.
Fishermen had been excluded from the Shermnan Anti-Trust Act by the Fishermen's
Collective Marketing Act of 1934, which recognized need for cooperative efforts among
fishermnen. But a 1955 updating of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act declared that fishermen
were independent businessmen, and so could not strike against processors (Payne
1983:206).-5 Processors in turn are not allowed to set or discuss prices with each other.




5This appears to ignore the interests of boat crews, who also suffered disproportionately in Exxon's claims'
settlement policies, as shown in this report.
Cordova - Page 141






In response to the Federal cease and desist order, the fishermen formed aI
marketing cooperative, the Cordova Aquatic Marketing Association (CAMA) (Payne
1983:79). The CAMIA could not initiate strikes, but members could apply social pressure
on fishermen who fished during price disputes (Payne 1983.)
The CAMA split in the 1980's due to disagreements during price negotiations and
was replaced by separate organizations for gear types: the Prince William Sound Seiners
Association and the Prince William Sound Alliance, for gillnetters (Payne 1991:12).
Activities of the CDFU declined with the creation of CAMA (Payne 1983:79), butI
the organization was revitalized through its political initiative in opposing the oil pipeline
terminal at Valdez in 1971 (discussed with fishing). Now called the Cordova District3
Fishermen United (CDFU), the organization has brought suit along with the Wilderness
Society and the Friends of the Earth to stop the pipeline. In recent years, CDFU has3
continued its political activism, as described in the discussion of the 1989 oil spill.
Fishine as a Way of Life: Fishermen (and other Cordovans) in 1991 described3
fishing as a "way of life'" more than an econonmic enterprise. Com petitiveness was
acknowledged, but respondents articulated regret that circumstances dictated this.3
Informants deplored recent increases in competitiveness brought about by increasing
capitalization of the, industry in general, a-nd by the oil spill in particular. Commnitment3
to each other's welfare was expressed as a key value.
A 1980 survey showed that fishermen view fishing as a treasured way of life,3
chaxacterized by conflicting forces of intense competition and cooperation (Payne
1983:82-85). Competition between fishermen iricludes the upgrading of boats and gear,3
and may include illegal activities such as creek robbing and setting nets to intercept fish
headed toward other fishermen. In seining, aggressive captains may try to out-maneuver3
other boats, risking being rammed (called "seagulling"). Fishermen reportedly often
dissemble as to their successes in fishing to prevent being followed or "seagulled" the3
next year. Payne quotes one informant as saying: "You only have the summer to make
your living, but you have all winter to get your friends back"' (Payne 1983).5




Cordova - Page 142

Cooperation and mutual commitment, however, are the other side of this coin. In
1980, 84 percent of a sample of fishermen reported that they had received assistance
from other fishermen, and 92 percent stated that they had provided assistance (Payne
1983). Fishermnen organize in informal work groups, teach each other skills, and loan
equipment without question, despite their competition during fishing season (Payne
1983).
Eighty-two percent of the fishermen in Payne's 1980 survey consider fishing a "way
of life" (Payne 1983:86-87). Over 77 percent said that they would not want to leave
fishing for a land based job. Valued attributes of this way of life include independence
and good income. Negative factors include bad weather, government interference, and
competition and greed in the industry (Payne 1983). Respondents in 1991 commonly
voiced these complaints in relation to the 1989 oil spill.
When the 1980 sample of fishermen was asked if they would like their children to
become fishermen, 78 percent said yes (Payne 1983). Demographics for fishermen
reporting in 1980 include that 89.4 percent are male. The mean age is 37.9 years for
drift gillnet permit holders, and 42.1 years for purse seine permnit holders. Of fishermen
with some college education, approximately 52 pe'rcent have begun or completed an
advanced degree. The majority are married (65.6%), 24.1 percent are single, and the
remnainder are separated, divorced, widowed, or living together (Payne 1983:63-65).
By ethnic groups, most fishermen are reportedly Americans of Scandinavian,
Greek, or Finnish descent (Payne 1983). A sub-group of individuals of Russian
extraction maintain many cultural customs such as Russian as a first language. These
persons are respected as exceptional fishermen. Of commercial fishermen, 92.7 percent
identified themselves as non-Native in 1,980. The majority of cannery workers are Anglo
or Filipino (Payne 1983).
Population and DemoLxraiDhv: Studies describe Cordova's year-round population
as remnarkably stable since the town's inception (see USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office
1979:43; Payne 1983:46; Stratton 1989:36). 'Me following figures show some fluctuations,
Cordova - Page 143

I
I
but Payne, for instance, points out that there was a population difference of only 13
people in Cordova between 1910 and 1950 (Payne 1983:48) (see Table 1).

Table 1

CORDOVA POPULATION, 1910 TO 1990
I
3,
I

Percent
Year                 Population                    Change

1910	1,152
1920	955	-17.00
1929	980	+2.60
1930	938	-4.30
1950	1,165	+24.20
1960	1,128	-3.20
1970	1,164	+3.32
1980	2,241	+ 92.40
1985	2,307	+2.90
1990	2,612	+ 13.20
I
I
I
I
I
I
Sources: Stratton 1989:29; Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G) 1985;
Alaska Department of Labor 1987; Birket-Smith and de Laguna 1938; de Laguna 1956;
Hassen 1978; City of Cordova 1990b:8.


The apparent increase in population between 1970 and 1980 has been attributed to the
stabilization of the fishing industry due to diversification and the construction of the
hatcheries, and to population increases in Alaska due to Trans Alaska Pipeline (TAPS)
construction (see Stratton 1989:30) but Cordovan officials in 1991 cited winter residency
at approximately 1,200 people, due to the seasonal residency of many fishermen, with
summer population between 5,000 and 6,000. (This huge influx of people strains the
city's saturated housing resources, discussed in the Cordova economy portion of this
report). Because a Cordovan address has economic advantages in holding local permits,
increases in legal residency may not reflect year-round residence: Payne reported in


Cordova - Page 144
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a
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1980 that 18 percent of those claiming Cordovan residency were actually in Cordova less
than the 6-~month criteria (Payne 1983:228).6
Real.fluctuations in population parallel major econormic developments, but
decreases appear milder than increases, especially in recent years. According to city
officials, population increases, however, are limited due to housing shortages.
With the establishment of Cordova in 1906 in relation to energy developments,
population in Cordova and contiguous areas increased from 395 in 1900 to 1,293 in 1910
(Payne 1991:9). There was a 17 percent population decrease during the World War I
era, during which a heavy demand for c'anned salmon depleted stocks. The Ellamar
coal mine closed and the depression hit in the late 1920's. The Kennecott mines shut
down in 1938, and the railroad closed in 1939, yet Cordova's population dropped by only
4.3 percent between 1929 and 1939. Catches varied from the 1920's through 1940's
(Payne 1983:5), as population increased 24 percent between 1939 and 1950. Catches
dropped dramatically in the 1950's (Payne 1983), but population dropped by only 3.3
percent. The 1964 Good Friday earthquake had devastating effects on the fishing
industry (Payne 1983), but population between 1960 and 1970 rose 3.3 percent (this may
reflect an influx of people from Chenega, which was hard-hit by the quake). As noted,
recent large population increases after the hatcheries were established may not reflect
actual year-round residence.
Elementary school enrollment also suggests that the doubling of residency between
1970 and 1980 might not precisely measure winter occupation. Elementary school figures
show a decline for that period, although this might also reflect a decrease in numbers of
children per household as well as winter absences (see Table 2).








6There are substantial population fluctuations over time, when measured by percentages. Perhaps the
emphasis by ethnographers on the stability in Cordova's population reflects the impression of tenacity which is
apparent in the attitudes -of many residents. To the ethnographer, the spirit of the place and the love of
inhabitants for it are striking: Cordova appears to hang precariously at the edge of the sea, but to hang tough.
Cordova - Page 145

I
Table 2
CITY OF CORDOVA ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT


Year
(Begin)	Enrollment


1974	518
1975	558
1976	529
1977	494
1978	484
1979	463
1980	431
1981	407
1982	440
1983	401
1984	374
I
I
I
a
I
I
Source: Mundy, Jarvis, and Associates 1985:13, 18.


The above figures show a 28-percent decline for the decade, but this trend appears
to have reversed in recent years. According to the Cordova School District, elementary
school enrollment figures for 1988-1990 were as follows: October 1988: 440, May 1989:
436; October 1989: 441, May 1990: 456; October 1990: 428.
Stability in year-round total population corresponds with a core citizenry that is
strongly attached to the town, its lifestyle, and its wilderness environment. A significant
proportion of CordOvans are native residents or long-term residents: approximately 18
percent are Alaska Natives, 25 percent are native Cordovans, and 60 percent are heads
of households who have lived in Cordova for more than 10 years (Stratton 1989:36).7



7Survey and census information is somewhat contradictory; data from the KI' and QI surveys may be
substituted here.


Cordova - Page 146
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Residents are also well-educated; in the early 1980's, 55 percent of adults reported
some college education, with only 15 percent not completing high school (Payne
1983:50). Prince William Sound Community College is located in Cordova, with ties to
the University of Alaska; if respondents' bookshelves are indicative, Cordovans are well
read.8
The median age of Cordovans in 1989 was reported at 31 years, older than the
1984 State median of 27.5 years (Stratton 1989:33). Males comprised 52.6 percent of the
population. Of 547 people surveyed in 1989, 18 percent were Alaska Native. These
included combinations of Eyak and Chugach Eslimo (self-identified as Aleut), and other
Natives who had moved into the area (Stratton 1989).
In length of residency, a 1989 sample showed a mean residency of 13.5 years, a
median of 8 years, and a range of 1 month to 69 years (Stratton 1989:3 6). More than 14
percent of heads of households surveyed had lived in Cordova all of their lives, and over
half of these were Alaskan Natives. Over 46 percent of heads of household surveyed
had lived in Cordova for 10 or more years. Twenty-three percent of the samnple were
resident in Cordova for 4 years or less (Stratton 1989). Approximately 25 percent of the
sample were born in Cordova, 30.7 percent were born in Prince William Sound
(including Cordova), and 7 percent were born elsewhere in Alaska. Over half (58%) of
the sample population was born in the United States outside of Alaska (Stratton 1989).
Social Omranization: In a 1989 survey, average household size was 2.7 persons
(Stratton 1989:33). Ninety-eight percent of households were nuclear family groups or
single persons; 76.3 percent had 2 or mnore people. Larger households included extended
fam-ilies or multiple roonunates (Stratton 1989).
Housing is a combination of single famil houses, trailers, and apartment units.
Land shortages within the city lirmit the construction of new houses. City officials, in
attempting to accommaodate increases in numbers of seasonal workers, have focused on
expanding campgrounds and bunkhouses. In a 1975 study, there were 585 housing units



8Cable television is a recent offering in Cordova.
Cordova - Page 147





in Cordova (excluding Eyak Village), with 51 percent single fam-ily homes, 29 percentI
multiple family residences, and 21 percent mobile homes (Alaska Consultants 1976, cited
in USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:44).
Clubs and service organizations in Cordova include the Elks and Moose (with
women's auxiliary organizations), the Pioneers of Alaska, the Weavers and Spinners, and
the Historical Society.
Cordovans often say that the city has "an equal number of churches and bars."'
More churches were counted, representing the following denominations: Assembly of3
God, Baptist, Catholic, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Church of God of
Prophecy, Eastern Orthodox, Episcopal, Jehovah's Witness, Church of the Nazarene,3
Lutheran, and the non-denominational Little Chapel.
Cordova has a wide range of services for its small population. City services include3
a hospital, public library, museum, community swimming pool, harbor, public works,
water and sewer, police and fire departments, and refu.se, which was taken over by the3
city in November 1989 (City of Cordova 1990a). Other government services include a
mental health clinic and alcohol and social services. Cordova has an elementary school,3
a high school, and a community college.
Subsistence: Subsistence harvesting is important in Cordova's local economy both3
in material and social terms (Stratton 1989). Sharing anrd bartering are extensive and
part of a community intimacy which is highly valued by Cordovans. One respondent3
noted that "Cordova would be a good place to be if you were broke--you'd never starve."
Cordovans are ensconced in a cash economy, but underlying this is a social framework3
where people take care of each other. They share and trade food, services, and other
materials, as needed. Benefits. are given when residents fall ill; friends take sick3
neighbors into their homes to nurse them. If equipment breaks down, help promptly
materializes:3
The local people adapt to take care of each other. The old ones,
the sick ones. Sharing money, help, food.. Whatever is needed.
We know who is in need. For insta-nce, womnen with no one to


Cordova - Page 1483

hunt or fish. We give it to them every year, without expecting
anything in retun ...

The commercial fishermen take part of their catch home, and give
it to those that need it, so everybody gets enough fish.

The importance of sharing in Cordova is evident in the greater proportion of
households using resources than harvesting them: over 75 percent of households gave
away resource~s in 1985, while 92.7 percent of households received harvested resources
(Stratton 1989:ii).
Cordova has a high cost of living, and subsistence harvesting contributes
substantially to family food supplies. (Natives emphasize subsistence more than non-
Natives, who nevertheless rely on harvested foods to supplemnent store-bought goods).
According to a 1986 survey, food cost 25.6 percent more in Cordova than in Anchorage
(Stratton 1989:52).
Retail prices for the following items-, averaged for two Cordova markets, were
recorded for the AOSIS in 1989 and are shown in Table 3. Cordova labor rates are
showni in Table 4.
In 1985 Cordovans harvested a mean of 151.7 pounds per capita of wild resources
(Stratton 1989:iii). Salmon accounted for the largest proportion of this: 39 percent. of
the harvest weight was salmon, 27.3% was game, and 22.6 percent was fish other than
salmon (Stratton 1989). The majority of salmon consumed (62.7%) was from
commercial harvests (Stratton 1989).
The sharing of salmon by commercial fishermen is culturally important. Many
respondents complained in 1991 that recent trends toward intensive capitalization of
fishing have made it increasingly difficult for fishermen to share salmon. Respondents
described this as culturally and socially abrasive, as the sharing of salmon is an ethical
imperative and a source of pride for commercial fishermen.
Cordovans understand their economic vulnerability as a "one-produce town," but
they desire the persistence of their lifestyle, which they believe has been threatened by
the oil spill. Residents rely in part on subsistence harvesting, but they are enmeshed in a
Cordova - Page 149

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Table 3

CORDOVA RETAIL PRICES
I
I
I
Price
Commodity
10 lb flour
12 oz evaporated milk
1 lb onions
48 oz oil
6-pack cola
19 lb sugar
18 oz corn flour
18 oz bread
1 lb bacon
3 lb coffee
1 lb butter
12 qt powdered milk
22 oz punch
12-pack diapers
Coleman lantern (small)
2-D batteries
1 gal Blazo
Ax handle
1 gal gas
1 qt motor oil (10-40 wt.)
35 hp outboard
16-ft skiff (aluminum)
$6.64
.92
.92
2.60
3.64
3.85
2.63
2.89
6.59
12.47
2.89
14.25
4.00
6.80
35.00
2.99
8.99
16.99
1.96
2.95
3,500.00
3,000.00
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I
Source: Field notes 1989.
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Table 4
CORDOVA LABOR RATES


Labor Category (Hourly Rate)	Price


Net hanging	$50.00
Rough carpentry (construction)	20.00
Electrical repair	50.00
Engine repair	48.00
Welding	50.00
Plumbing	48.00


Source: Field notes 1989.


cash economy which they believe is essential to the town's survival. That economy relies
on fishing, which residents consider vital to their town's identity.
Cordova's Economy: Cordovans believe that their town would vanish without its
fishing industry. City officials and residents also appreciate that their economic
development is largely subject to factors beyond their control in the form of external
economic, political, and environmental forces. Economic diversification, however,
remains controversial. Cordovans value their present way of life; they like their town the
way it is. Recent community efforts have been aimed at protecting and stabilizing the
fishing industry, rather than diversifying the economy.
Prior to the oil spill of 1989, Cordova's economy was considered by economists to
be relatively stable (see City of Cordova 1990b; and USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office
1979:127). The employment trend shows expansion over the last 25 years, with the
greatest increases in the State and local government sector, but with Federal
Government employment decreasing (Stratton 1989:39). The economy grew modestly
from 1980 to 1988.
Cordova - Page 151





The Exxon Valdez oil spill of March 1989, however, has "caused severe economicI
disruption and dislocation" (City of Cordova 1990b:8). The $500,000 shrimp andg
$200,000 sablefish seasons in Prince William Sound were closed for 1989; in early April,
the $12 miilion Prince William Sound Herring fishery was closed; in May the Eshamy
District, Main Bay, and parts of the Montague District were closed to salmon fishing.
These closures impacted local businesses in an inconsistent manner. Many
businesses suffered financial losses while other businesses realized financial gains as a
result of economic activities associated with the spill cleanup. Other businesses made3
approximately the same profits but on different merchandise, so that normal business
practices and business-client relations were disrupted.3
The three largest sectors of Cordova's economy, in terms of numbers of jobs and
payroll, are, respectively, the fishing industry (harvesting and processing); the government3
sector (Federal, State, and local); and the retail and service sector. The fishing industry
renders substantial economic support to the latter two sectors. Over half of the1
governmnent jobs and payroll are local, and the local government relies on fishing
revenues in the forin of sales tax and intergovernmental tr ansfers (primarily, the raw fish3
tax). The retail and service sector provides support industries for the fishing sector.
Fishing revenues are subject to world market forces. The Japanese, who own large3
fish processing plants and who comprise a major market for local harvests, exercise the
predominant influence. Seattle based fishing interests are inter-woven with Cordova's3
fishing industry: each fishing season brings an influx of fishermen from Seattle, and the
cannery workers' union is based in Seattle. Urban centers such as Los Angeles comprise3
large markets, particularly for the high quality frozen fish produced by local processing
cooperatives.                                                                                        3
State and Federal legislation and regulation have strongly influenced fish revenues
and the character of fish harvesting in recent years (notably through the transfer of some3
fisheries to limited entry and, through the 1974 Non-profit Hatcheries Act).
Federal laws governing oil development also are significant, and these, in turn, are3
influenced by interrelated public and private proponents of oil development and by world


Cordova - Page 152g

economnic and political forces. Alaska oil revenues, in the form of intergovernmental
transfers, provide a significant (though perhaps not critical) portion of city government
revenues. On the other hand, environmental disasters such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill
threaten the existence of Cordova's fishing.industry and th.e city itself. Residents
currently recount with bitterness the 1971 suit by Cordova fishermen to prevent the
pipeline terrminal at Valdez: "We won the Supreme Court case, but we lost in Congress."
Cordovans are aware that they cannot control oil development, and many believe that
they have more to lose than to gain from it. Their position of relative powerlessness has
not stopped their activismi, however (discussed with oil spill impacts to the business and
fishing communities).
Fishing: Cordova is the center of fishing and fish processing for a 38,000 ni 2
area (City of Cordova 1990b). Located on Orca Inflet in eastern Prince William Sound,
Cordova is nearer the commercial fishing grounds, especially those of the Copper River
and Bering River, than other Prince William Sound communities (City of Cordova
1988:18). In 1986, 50 percent of Prince William Sound drift gill net permits and 44
percent of purse seine permits fished were owned by Cordova residents (City of Cordova
1990b:11). That year, 399 Cordovan permit holders harvested over 39 million pounds of
seafood, worth $23 miillion (City of Cordova 1990b:12).9 This was the fourth largest
community harvest in Alaska (City of Cordova 1990b:11). Cordova was the eleventh
leading fishing port in the U.S. in dollar value of the catch in 1988 (City of Cordova
1990b).
While salmon forms the backbone of Cordova's fishing industry, other fisheries
generated nearly $10 million in gross earnings for Cordovans in 1986 (see Table 5).
Fishing dominates Cordova's ec6nomy, and most Cordovans believe that their town
would cease to exist without its fishing industry. Fish harvesting provides more jobs than
any other source, and commercial fishing and fish processing together provide nearly half
of the jobs in Cordova (See Table 6).


9Of 1,357 total fishery permits held for Prince William Sound in 1985, 609 were held by people with Cordova
addresses (Stratton 1989:44-45). Not all permits are fished each year.
Cordova - Page 153

I
Table 5
CATCH AND GROSS EARNINGS OF CORDOVA
RESIDENTS BY FISHERY IN 1986a

Permits	Total Harvest	Earnings
Type of Fishery                       Fished	(millions/lbs)	($ millions)


PWS Drift Gillnet	265	7.4	8.9
PWS Purse Seine	108	15.9	4.2
Herring Pound	51	0.1	0.7
Bristol Bay Drift Gillnet	10	0.5	0.6
Herring Purse Seineb	12	2.5	0.6
Halibut Longlinec	44	0.7	1.0
Tanner Crab	7	0.3	0.5
Dungeness Crab	5	0.5	0.5
Blackcod Longline	9	0.2	0.2
Misc. Other Fisheries	158	11.1	5.8

TOTALS	669	39.2	23.0


Source: Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, cited in City of Cordova 1990b:12.

a Totals for 399 Cordova-based permit holders.
b Bristol Bay fishery only.
c From vessels 5 tons and over.

















Cordova - Page 154
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Table 6
CORDOVA EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLL IN 1988

Annual Average	Total Payroll          Average
Employment Category               Employment	($ millions)      Annual Salary


CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT

Private Sector
Manufacturinga	224	5.9	$26,339
Retail Trade	138	2.1	15,369
Services	112	1.1	10,181
TCUb                      )	83	2.4	28,835
FIREc	24	0.5	21,463
Construction	19	*                     *

Government
Federal	38	1.1	29,941
State	90	3.5	39,078
Local	174	4.8	27,344
Total Government	302	9.4	32,121

OTHER EMPLOYMENT
Seafood Harvesting	355	17.5	49,296
U.S. Coast Guardd	61	1.7	27,505

GRAND TOTAL                                1,360	41.6	30,588
Source: Data cited in City of Cordova 1990b:10-11. From Alaska Department of Labor
(ADOL), The McDowell Group, and Alaska Seafood Industry Study: A Technical
Report.

aManufacturing employment is primarily seafood processing. The ADOL includes all employment by
Cordova-based processors, even if the employment occurs elsewhere in Alaska.
b Transportation, communications, and utilities.
c Finance, insurance, and real estate.
d In addition to basic pay, Coast Guard personnel receive allowances for housing and cost of living which
varies according to number of dependents and other factors.
Cordova - Page 155

I


Moreover, support industries rely heavily on the presence of a fishing population                    I
(City of Cordova 1990b:8; Payne 1983:52; Stratton 1989:39). Fishing is Cordova's
principal basic industry, and there is a very high ratio of basic to secondary employment
in Cordova.  In 1978, the ratio of basic to secondary employment was close to 1.0 to 0.5,
compared to a national norm of 1.0 to 1.5 (Payne 1983:50).1ï¿½ The basic sector of
Cordova's economy apart from fishing (such as the Eyak logging operation) is not large
enough to support a community (Payne 1983:52).
While government employment is substantial, these operations rely on community                       3
infrastructure created by the fishing industry (Payne 1983:52). Local government, the
leading public sector employer, is dependent upon revenue generated by the fishing                        3
industry; for instance, raw fish tax accounts for approximately 25 percent of the
community budget (City of Cordova 1990b:8).n                                                               I
In addition to being Cordova's largest employer, commercial fishing yields the
largest average annual salaries ($49,296). This is followed, but not closely, by State
government employment ($39,078); Federal Government employment ($29,941); and
transportation, communication, and utilities employment ($29,835). Private sector
employment is generally less lucrative, although average figures cited in the table above
do not reflect the very large salaries of a few successful entrepreneurs.
Cordovans view their economic dependency on fish as critical to a way of life which
they wish to preserve. In the recent past, residents have been opposed to nonfisheries-
related growth (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:109). Twelve years ago, they
expressed fear of domination of fish harvesting by nonresidents (USDOI, BLM, Alaska
OCS Office 1979). They continue to express these fears. Cordovans believe that



'OA "basic" industry here is one which produces exports and is therefore influenced by forces external to the
local economy; "secondary" industries support basic industries and are directly subject to local economic
dynamics.

iiThis figure fluctuates from year to year, with large variations in quantities and prices of fish harvested.
For instance, according to the City of Cordova Approved 1990-91 Budget, in 1987-1988, the raw fish tax as
intergovernmental revenue provided $570,574 of $5,920,767 in total revenues (p.2; p.7). In fiscal year 1988-89,
the raw fish tax provided $1,294,703 of $8,409,837 in total city revenues (City of Cordova 1990a).         3


Cordova - Page 156
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increasingly more fishing permit holders reside outside of the state, during the off season,
maintaining an official Cordova or Alaska residence in order to avoid higher permit fees
(Stratton 1989:45; respondent communications). While the majority of Alaska rural local
residence fishing permits are held by Cordovans, there was a 14-percent drop in the
number of rural local permit holders between 1975 and 1985 (Stratton 1989:46).2
Cordovans report a rise in competition and in capital investment in high technology
equipment in recent years. The transition of salmon and herring fisheries to liied
entry and the sale of limited entry permits for increasingly higher prices have aggravated
this trend (Stratton 1989). Often fishermen must fish each season in order to meet loan
payments on their permits; thus, adding to the competition (Stratton 1989). Respondents
report concerns that this increasing competition and capitalization of fishing will alter
their way of life. The oil spill has reportedly accelerated this process, as some fishermen
used spill cleanup money to upgrade their equipment. 13
Fishing dictates the highly seasonal nature of Cordova's economy. Cordova's local
population fluctuates each year in tandem with the cyclical nature of the fishing industry.
For revenue sharing purposes, the city estimates its year-round population at 2,612
residents; during fishing season, the resident population is "conservatively estimated to be
around 5,000" (City of Cordova 1990b:8). While some Cordovan fishermen maintain
residency only for economiic purposes, others conunonly leave for extended periods
during the winter, to "escape boredom and the weather." Accurate cenasus on winter
residency and peak summer population are not available, but city officials have estimated
the winter population at approximately 1,200.
Most of the seasonal workers fill jobs directly related to the fishing industry; others
fill jobs in support service industries such as restaurants, hotels, and retail stores.


12 Alaska rural local permiits are held by residents of small communities such as Cordova, Tatitlek, Whittier,
and Chenega; residents of larger communities such as Valdez and Seward hold local urban residence permits
(Stratton 1989).

13The effects of the oil spills made, here on fishing are discussed elsewhere. The point that Cordova's
economic dependency on fishing, while making the community vulnerable to such disruptions as the 1989 oil spill,
is nevertheless inherent to a valued way of life.
Cordova - Page 157






Government agencies, such as the ADF&G, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS),I
and U.S. Forest Service (USFS), also employ seasonal workers (City of Cordova
1990b:8).
There were about 1,300 jobs in Cordova during 1988, but peak employment during
fishing season.was over 2,000 (City of Cordova 1990b:9). Fish harvesting is Cordova's
largest employer, accounting for 355 jobs annually; during the commercial fishing season,
two to three times that number of Cordovans hold such jobs (City of Cordova 1990b).
Commercial fishing accounted for more net earnings than any other industry in 1988, at
$17.5 million. Seafood processing is Cordova's second leading industry, employing an
annual average of 224 workers (600 during fishing season) and providing $5.9 million in3
payroll (City of Cordova 1990b).
Overlaying these regular seasonal cycles are irregular fluctuations in fishing3
revenues over time. While Cordova's fishing economy has been relatively stable over
the past decade, the fishing industry is routinely erratic (City of Cordova 1990b:12).3
Incomes of skippers and crew members vary dramatically, as catch rates and prices vary
from year to year; price fluctuations within the last 10 years have reached 146 percent3
for the gill net fishery and 264 percent for the seine fishery (City of Cordova 1990b).
These fluctuations reverberate throughouit the local economy.1
In recent years, fish revenues have generally increased due to the transition of the
salmon and herring fisheries to limited entry and the creation of a local hatchery--the3
Prince William Sound Aquaculture Corporation (PWSAC) (Stratton 1989:46).'4
Limited entry and resource management have res-ulted in larger runs of fish in recent3
years, with correspondingly higher fish quotas (Stratton 1989). Since the passage of the
Non-profit Hatcheries Act and the establishment of PWSAC in 1974, salmnon hatcheries3
have appreciably increased fish harvests (Stratton 1989).15




14 The development of PWSAC is discussed with impacts of the oil spill to the fishing community.3

1-5There are hatcheries at Cannery Creek, Main Bay, Port San Juan, Esther Island, Solomon Gulch, and
Paxson.3

Cordova - Page 158

While increases in the catch are thought to drive prices down, the trend in recent
years has been a steady rise in overall fish revenues (Stratton 1989:47). Comparing 24-
year average dollar values of salmon harvests (frorn 1960-1986) with 10-year average
values (from 1976-1986), the 10-year average is typically double the 24-year average
(Stratton 1989:48).
Nevertheless, dramatic yearly fluctuations are predictable features of the fishing
industry. For instance, the pink salmon harvest value in Prince William Sound went
from $44,000 in 1972 to $3,009,000 in 1973. In 1981, the ex-vessel value was $38,198,000;
in 1982 it was $15,600,000 (Stratton 1989:49).
Residents recognize such fluctuations as beyond local control. They commonly
describe fish profits as less predictable than the weather (on which they depend, in part).
Harvest sizes are subject to the weather, enhancement efforts, State and Federal
resource management, environmental disasters such as the 1964 earthquake and the 1989
oil spill, and so on. Fish prices are subject to world market forces; competition from
other regions; domination of the industry and price controls by transnational
conglomerates; public percepti'ons of the product; and so on. Cordovans in 1991 often
referred to a botulism scare in the early 1980's (which drove prices down) as an analogue
to the 1989 oil spill.
Many forces beyond local control constrain expansion of the fishing industry,
including enviro=mental degradation, fish prices, competition from farmed fish, and
illegal high seas fishing (City of Cordova '1990b:18).
Fishing is expected to continue to be the mainstay of Cordova's economy, and is
expected to grow due to the activities of PWSAC (City of Cordova 1990b:16). The
PWSAC plans to increase the number of fish released and also will take over two State
hatcheries in 1990-199 1 (City of Cordova 1990b). The PWSAC and the ADF&G are
evaluating possible new remote release sites in eastern Prince William Sound. Officials
believe that the Cordova small boat harbor could be expanded, and the city has
waterfront industrial and commercial land available for new processors and support
Cordova - Page 159





industries. The city currently pla ns to upgrade its marine facilities, but such upgradesU
are dependent on funding sources (City of Cordova 1990b).
The Seafood Processing Industrv: The seafood processing industry is the
third largest employer in Cordova (City of Cordova 1990b:12). Four major processors
and one small processor are located there. Employment in the city's seafood processing
industry over the 10 years prior to the oil spill ranged from a high annual average of 325
jobs in 1979 to a low of 133 jobs in 1984 (City of Cordova 1990b:13). This fluctuation
has lessened somewhat in recent years as processors have diversified, and the hatcheries
have becorme a stabilizing factor. But salmon is expected to continue to dominate the
industry, so that a seasonal and yearly fluctuation is expected to remain characteristic of3
employment in this sector (City of Cordova 1990b).
Some business leaders fear that Cordova is losing its status as the center of the3
Prince William Sound fish processing industry. A number of processors have in recent
years located outside of Cordova, at times in Valdez (Cordova Times, March 7, 1991).3
Some entrepreneurs believe that local government leaders have not offered enough
incentives (such as lower utility rates) to encourage processors to locate in Cordova.3
Some fishermen maintain thaat Cordova is falling behind other communities in its ability
to provide support services and housing needed for the fish processing industry (City of3
Cordova 1990b: 17; respondent communications). Sources in 1986 reported that
Cordova's high cost of living was motivating more fishermen and their families to3
become seasonal residents, while the high cost of utilities was causing some processors to
relocate to other Prince William Sound communities in order to operate mnore5
economically (Stratton 1989:30). Respondents in 1991 expressed sim-ilar views.
Relations between fishermen and the fish processing industry are focussed in part3
through the PWSAC. For instance, in anticipation of low fish prices in 1991 (with pink
salmon prices dropping to 15-20 cents a pound from 30-35 cents a pound in 1990), the3
PWSAC attempted to recruit foreign offshore floating processors into Prince William





Cordova - Page 160

Sound (Cordova Times, March 7, 1991).16 Such efforts are regulated by Federal and
State laws, which in turn are interrelated with national and international economic
interests. The PWSAC also is seeking additional fish markets in the Soviet Union and
China, but economic difficulties in both countries could restrict sales (Cordova Timnes,
March 7, 1991).
A limiting factor in attempts to raise fish prices by introducing new competition lies
in post-spill economic woes experienced by the old competition. The bankruptcy of the
Copper River Fishermen's Cooperative, and the rumored bankruptcy of Chugach
Fisheries, Inc. and their suit against Exxon are described elsewhere. Some other
processors are reportedly facing financial difficulties, and some fishermen are
experiencing difficulties in finding advance buyers for the 1991 season (Cordova Times,
March 7, 1991). While North Pacific Processor, Inc. and St. Elias Ocean Products, as
well as Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc. in Valdez declared plans for fall operations during the
1991 season, other buyers were pulling out as of March, including one processor with
offices in Cordova, a processor in Antchorage, and two Valdez processors (Cordova
Tirmes, March 7, 1991). The additional competition for fish which foreign offshore
processors represent could cause reductions in the operation of onshore processors
(Cordova Times, March 7, 199 1).
Local government interests clash with PWSAC's plans to attract foreign floating
processors. If onshore operations are cut, the number of workers will be reduced; a
reduction in seasonal labor population would reduce sales tax revenues. Also, city
officials worry that they could lose raw fish tax revenues if fish are not processed in
Cordova (Cordova Times, March 7, 1991).





'6The PWSAC reportedly needs 54 cents a pound to cover costs, and wanted to open at 72 cents a pound;
when PWSAC put out their hatchery fish, none of the five major canneries in the area would bid on them. The
Japanese wanted to pay 15 cents a pound for pink salmon, so PWSAC management wrote to the Governor and
requested permission to bring foreign processors into the area. WVhile leftover stock from last year could keep
,prices down, the Japanese also market roe, which 'is a high priced delicacy in Japan. Local fishermen think the
Japanese, processors are taking advantage of the oil spill, and conspiring to bring prices down.
Cordova - Page 161






Japanese control within the processing industry causes concern among manyI
Cordovans. Residents are disposed, toward local activism and formation of cooperatives,
and some view the Japanese as a remote entity, extensively networked with worldwide
ma rkets and not dependent on the survival of Cordova. Residents believe that the
Japanese corporations would maximize profits by setting low prices, rega-rdless of the
effect on Cordovans. Many respondents in 1991 expressed resentment over the "secret
settlements" between Exxon and the large canneries, which they believe were en-meshed
in a broader context of political and economnic issues beyond the scope of local interests
and knowledge. Respondents hypothesized that Exxon may have offset generous
payments to the big processors by more niggardly claims settlements for local residents.3
Some respondents fear increasing control by a more homogeneous Japanese
interest over time, which would result in less competition and lower fish prices. The3
validity of this notion is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is possible that a
traditional pattern of interownership of processors has nioved toward a more singular3
controlling interest by Marubeni Corporation of Tokyo. In 1978, the three major
canneries operating in Cordova were thought to be partially Japanese owned  (USDO1,3
BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:52). Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd. and Mitsubishi Shojiku
formed a consortium with New England Fish Company and created Orea Pacific Packing3
Company in Cordova in 1966 (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:52). In 1979,
Morpac, Inc. was controlled by a joint venture of Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd., and Mitsui3
and Conipany, Ltd.; Marubeni Corp. and Marubeni America Corporation owned partial
interest in North Pacific Processors and St. Elias Ocean Products (USDOI, BLM, Alaska
OCS Office 1979:53). Currently, Cordova's two externally owned processors, St. Elias
Ocean Products and North Pacific Processors, are reportedly owned by Maruabeni3
Corporation and both have the same address. Two more canneries have reportedly been
approved by the City Council, both licensed in Tokyo.3
The Japanese interest has brought increased diversity within the fish industry, a
benefit to Cordovans. Herring and salmon roe (previously a waste product), and roe on3
kelp are considered delicacies in Japan.


Cordova - Page 162

Chugach Natives, Inc., acquired the Orca Cannery in 1979. Cordova also has a
processing cooperative run by local fishermen, the Coper River Fishermen's
Cooperative (CRFC), and a small Byak packing plant.,
Government: While Cordova is widely described as exclusively "a fishing
town," government jobs comprise a significant aspect of the local economy, and also
provide seasonal and long-range econoniic stability. Few residents describe government
as nearing the economic importance of fishing, and this may be because Cordovans
believe that the town would fold altogether without the fishing industry. Nevertheless,
goverrnment -jobs account for a large segment of the economy, with local government.
being the largest public sector employer. In 1988, local, State, and Federal government
jobs accounted for 302 jobs and $9.4 mnillion in payroll (City of Cordova 1990b:10).
Local government accounted for approximately half of the government employment, with
an annual average of 174 jobs and a payroll of $4.8 million; State government provided
90 jobs and $3.5 million in salaries; and Federal civilian positions accounted for 38 jobs
and a payroll of $1.1 million (City of Cordova 1990b:10). In addition, 61 U.S. Coast
Guard (USCG) jobs provided $1.7 million in payroll (City of Cordova 1990b:10).
City officials intend to encourage State and Federal governments to do business in
Cordova, but constraining factors include,the high cost of living, a housing shortage, and
the lack of highway access (City of Cordova 1990b:17). Due to the housing shortage, the
trend is for State and Federal agencies to construct their own housing, which means lost
revenues for the city and local landlords (City of Cordova 1990b:18). As with other
major sectors of Cordova's economy, external forces determine the presence of the
public sector: budgets in Juneau and Washington are currently decreasing, and city
officials expect a decrease in government eniployment in the near future (City of
Cordova 1990b: 17).
Municipal government is the largest employer in the public sector, as noted, with
jobs in administration, education, library science, and public works. State government is
the second largest public employer; the ADF&G has significant inumbers of employees in
Cordova (City of Cordova 1990b:17). Other State presences in Cordova include the
Cordova - Page 163





Department of Transportation and Public Facili ties, Alaska Court System, University ofI
Alaska, Department of Environmental Conservation, Marine Highway System, Division
of Youth and Family Services, and Department of Publ ic Safety. Main FederalI
Government employment is with the USFS and the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA); also present are jobs in the USCG, FWS, Postal Service, and projected
employment (suminer of 1991) with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) (City of Cordova 1990b:13).
While the city relies on intergovernmental transfers for revenues, some State
support is dispersed on a regional basis. City officials often complain that they receive
less than their share of such funds and that proportionately more remains in Valdez.3
Simailar local sentiments toward State government were reported in 1979:
One former State official aptly capt-ured this feeling when he
stated that Cordova has long felt like the "orphan" of StateU
goverrnment - dependent upon state transportation, harbor and fish
and game regulation for its livelihood and continuance, yet
hampered in its ability to bargain by a climate and economy thatI
are energy demanding and time consuming. An 'old time resident
put it somewhat differently when he stated that "most Post-
statehood votes (in Cordova) have been protest votes. OurI
weighted vote doesn't count for much" (USDOI, BLM, Alaska
OCS Office 1979:59).1

Retail Trade and Service Sector: Other important sectors in the Cordova
economy include retail trade (138 jobs providing $2.1 million in payroll), service sector3
businesses (112 jobs and $1.1 million in payroll), and transportation, communications,
and utilities (83 jobs and $2.4 mnillion in payroll). Minor industries include construction,3
finance, insurance and real estate, and the timber industry.
Cordova has two grocery stores, a convenience store, two clothing stores, one gasU
station, three liquor stores, a furniture store, a drug store, a bakery, five to ten
restaurants (reflecting seasonal variation), and six bars (City of Cordova 1990b:13).I
Business organizations, such as the Cordova Chamber of Conunerce, are discussed

elsewhere.


Cordova - Page 164

Employers in the service sector include the Cordova Community Hospital, social
service personnel, and two major hotels. A significant number of businesses service the
fishing industry, including fishing supply stores, net sales and mending shops, hardware
stores, and boat and engine repair shops (City of Cordova 1990b: 14).
Transuortation. Communications. and Utilities: Alaska Airlines employs
personnel, as does Wilb-ur's Airlines, a commuter service providing three flights a day.
Tlere are also several charter services, and taxi and limousine companies. Both the
telephone and the electrical service are cooperatives. Cordova Telephone Cooperative
employs most of the communications workers;,the Cordova Electric Cooperative employs
most utility workers (City of Cordova 1990b:14).
Finance. Insurance. and Real Estate: Cordova has two banks and one
insurance agency. There is no local real estate office. Most insurance and all real estate
transactions are carried out in other cities, such as Anchorage and Seattle (City of
Cordova 1990b: 14).
Construction: Eight or nine general contractors live and do business in
Cordova. Several of these employ a number of workers (City of Cordova 1990b:14).
Tourism: Studies f-requently cite tourism as potentially of economic
significance, especially if the Copper River Highway is constructed (see for instance,
Payne 1991; City of Cordova 1990b; Stratton 1989; City of Cordova 1988; and Alaska
Consultants 1976). Cordova sits in a spectacular physical setting, located between two
major ecological systems (Prince William Sound and the Copper River Delta).
Recreational opportunities include hiking, camping, hunting, fishing, kayaking, boating,
skiing, and wildlife viewing. Historic attractions from the early mining era of the 1900's
(such as the "Million Dollar Bridge") exist as well. There currently is a small visitor
traffic for fishing, hunting, bird watching, and the lee Worm Festival (City of Cordova
1990b: 14).
While Cordova is recognized as having tremendous undeveloped potential as a
tou'rist area, its inaccessible location is cited as a constraining factor (City of Cordova
1988:35). City planners believe that a seasonal influx o'f recreational tourists would be
Cordova - Page 165






problematic at this time (City of Cordova 1990b: 15). The seasonality of tourism could
amplify the already seasonal nature of Cordova's fishing economy. City leaders worry
that the addition of large numbers of summer jobs in the tourist industry could create
increased off-season unemployment (City of Cordova 1988:36). The alternative of
transient labor would strain Cordova's already saturated housing facilities; there is
already a lack of housing and accommodations for the yearly influx,of fishing industry
workers, and touarism would exacerbate this problem. Such seasonal accomnmodations as
exist are not only scarce but expensive in a town known for its high cost of living.
Also, the community lacks a consensus on whether tourism is desirable (City of
Cordova 1988:18). A substantial number of residents oppose completion of the Copper3
River Highway, in large part because they appreciate Cordova's remote setting and do
not want floods of visitors.3
Existing tourism employment is not reported, although Cordova draws a significant
nurnber of visitors. Cordova ranked as the 20th most visited community in Alaska,
according to a McDowell Group tourism industry study, drawing 11,600 visitors in 1985
(City of Cordova 1990b:14). Cordova's visitor industry stems primarily from business3
travel, often related to the seafood industry or government activities (City of Cordova
1990b).3
Forestry: Timber harvesting is expected to remain an insignificant sector of
Cordova7s economy altbough the industry generates divisive political currents. Current3
harvesting by the Eyak Corporation is met with vociferous disapproval by non-Native
residents, who object to clearcutting. Eyak respondents are indignant at this attitude,3
given the non-Native record on environmental protection. 17
After the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), the Native communities3
of Eyak, Tatitlek, Chenega, Afognak, Ouzinkie, and Port Lions selected lands from
within the Chugach National Forest; Kodiak Village Corporation, Port William, Litnfik,
and Afognak were also eligible for land selections as of 1988 (City of Cordova 1988:34).



17 See See, H Alaska Natives in Cordova.3


Cordova - Page 1663

Eyak CIorporation began timber harvesting in the Sheridan Glacier area in 1988 on
a reserve of about 360 million board feet and is harvesting at a rate of 15 to 18 million
board feet a year (City of Cordova 1990b:15). Thley plan to continue cutting at that rate
for the next 10 years. The timber operation employs about 20 workers, but only a few
are Cordova residents. The timber harvesting has little effect on Cordova's local
economy (City of Cordova 1990b).
The long-range economic potential for timber harvesting appears minor, due to the
type of timber, a small sustained yield capacity, and a slow reforestation rate. The
Chugach National Forest, established by Congress in 1907, takes in the coastal areas
around Prince William Sound, areas of the eastern Kenai Peninsula, and Afognak Island
(City of Cordova 1988:33). In the Cordova area are overmature mixed stands of western
hemlock and Sitka spruce, with hemlock the predominant species rather than the more
valuable Sitka spruce (City of Cordova 1988). The USFS estimates a sustained yield
capacity of operable timber stands in the entire Chugach National Forest of 72,800,000
board feet annually, less than the annual production of major sawmills in Southeast
Alaska (City of Cordova 1988). Reforestation rates have been estimated at 100 years
(Stratton 1989:50).
The ANCSA greatly reduced the amount of timnber under the control of the USFS,
who must mnanage this resource on a sustained yield basis. In 1988 the USFS planned to
harvest 6.3 million board feet annually for 5 years and then 10.6 mnillion board feet
annually for the following 5 years (City of Cordova 1988:34). This is a mnore modest
effort than current Native logging.
While Eyak Corporation owns considerable commercial forest lands around
Cordova, it is difficult to transport logs to ships, and currently logs are rafted to an in-
water transfer site (City of Cordova 1988:20). The rafts are reported to be hazards to
small boats traveling between Tatitlek and Cordova; one death occurred in March 1991
when a skiff overturned after striking a raft.
Logging, like fishing, is subject to external controls such as the international timber
market, State and Federal legislation, and competition from elsewhere. Cordova
Cordova - Page 167






residents oppose expansion of the timber industry onto State or USFS lands (City of3
Cordova 1988:20; respondent cornmunications).
Oil. Gas. and Coal DeveloDment: Economic studies have recommended local
coal and oil development as an option for diversifying Cordova's economy (see Mundy,
Jarvis, and Associates 1985:ii). Nevertheless, Cordovans do not anticipate major
involvements in local energy developmnents. In 1976, the Federal Government held a
lease sale for outer continental oil and gas in the northern Gulf of Alaska; Cordova felt
little impact (City of Cordova 1988:30). Studies conducted in 1974 to 1976 concerning
potential outer continental shelf oil and gas development cite land shortages as a major
obstacle to development of Cordova-Eyak as a service base for offshore oil (USDO1,3
BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:85). Many Cordovans opposed the prospect of rapid
energy development and population increases, and representatives of the city and CDFU
joined state efforts to delay OCS leases (Cordova Times, March 11, 1976, cited in
USDOI, ELM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:85).
In 1986, the Alaskan Crude Corporation proposed to drill ten wells in the Katalla
oil fields, planning to ship the oil through Cordova (City of Cordova 1988:30). Low oil
prices and the lack of a road linking Cordova to the oil fields brought Katalla
development to a standstill (City of Cordova 1988). The Katalla field is small, and city
planners do not predict direct employment benefits from development (City of Cordova
1988). City officials perceive possible potential indirect employment from oil storage, as3
well as lower local fuel costs (City of Cordova 1988:32) although these benefits might not
materialize.3
In 1981, Chugach Natives, Inc. entered into a partnership with KADCO, a Korean
firm, to explore the Bering River coal fields. Exploratory drilling on Chugach Natives,3
Inc. lands identified 62 m-illion tons of anthracite coal (City of Cordova 1988).
Development would require a road linking the Copper River Highway to -the mine area
and this has not occurred. City planners anticipate few local benefits (City of Cordova
1988).3




Cordova - Page 168

Science and Education: City officials and many residents would like to see
Cordova emerge as a science and education center (City of Cordova 1990b:18). Seed
money has been provided for the Copper River Delta Institute and Prince William
Sound Science: Cente'r, which would carry out research projects and draw an influx of
faculty and research staff, and possibly some spin-off businesses (Cordova Times,
February 14, 1991). These developments are limited due to housing shortages and the
high costs of living and doing business in Cordova. Also, outside economic forces such
as the availability of research dollars will be definitive (City of Cordova 1990b:19).
Deen Water Port: A recent feasibility study appears to indicate that
construction of a deep water port is technically feasible but unlikely for economic
reasons(City of Cordova 1990b:20). Future construction of a deep water port (especially
in combination with a highway) could alter the economic face of Cordova considerably.
The port is currently controversial because the immediate major beneficiary would be
the unopular ti-rber industry. In this respect, the three participants in the feasibility
study, (Cordova, Eyak Corporation, and Chugach Alaska Corporation), might have
conflicting goals for the development of a port (City of Cordova 1990b).
CoDner River Highwav: Construction of the Copper River Highway would
connect Cordova to the Alaska road system. Residents are deeply divided on this issue,
and a city s-urvey was being conducted at the time of this research. The presence of the
highway could provide residents with convenient access to the outside, increase tourism,
reduce shipping costs, and lower the cost of living. The project is subject to State and
Federal politics and funding, and local officials have recently found economic prospects
for the highway in the near future unfavorable (City of Cordova 1990b:21).
Bearing River Road: Construction of a Bering River Road would provide
access to extensive coal fields, an oil field, and timber stands. The USFS recently
solicited proposals for drafting an Environmental Impact Stat ement for construction of
this road. However, the coal, oil, and timber in this region are in remote'areas, and
shipment to market is problematic. Whether Cordova were to be selected as the port
from which to ship these raw materials would be a corporate decision, and whether these
Cordova - Page 169

I
I
resources are exploited is largely contingent on market forces. Economic feasibility of
exploitation of these resources appears unlikely (City of Cordova 1990b).
Future Economic Trends: Economiic studies have predicted no new employment
opportunities in Cordova (Mundy, Jarvis, and Associates 1985:19). Employers are
expected to continue to follow cyclical hiring policies in consort with the seasonal nature
of the fishing industry. The probability of a new basic industry selecting Cordova 'as a
base is considered low due to the high costs of living and doing business there, notably
high energy costs (Mundy, Jarvis, and Associates 1985:i). Compared with other
communities, for instance, weekly grocery costs for a family of four and energy costs
were reported in 1985 as shown in Table 7.

Table 7

WEEKLY GROCERY AND ENERGY COSTS FOR A FAMILY OF FOUR
I-
I
I
I
I
I
I

Energy
Grocery                        Costs
Community                         Costs                    (per KWH)


Yakutat                     - $92.67	$.250a
Cordova	85.40	.190
Skagway	74.34	.175
Valdez	62.99	.220
Anchorage	55.17	.060
Seattle	49.12
I
I
I
I
I
I
Source: Mundy, Jarvs, and Associates 1985.
a Plus$ $18 per month.


Lack of highway access is related to higher costs, as shown by the higher costs in
Yakutat and Cordova, which are accessible only by air or sea.




Cordova - Page 170
I
I
I
I

'Me loss of retai sales (through purchasing outside of Cordova) has been noted as
significant (estimated at $4.3 million for local ho'useholds) (Mundy, Jarvis, and Associates
1985:iii). Nonresidents in Cordova (such as seasonal fishermen and cannery workers)
purchase approxidmately $935,000 in goods annually (Mundy, Jarvis, and Associates 1985).
A negative economic trend which worries some Cordova-ns is a repprted loss of
dominance in the fish processing industry, as noted. In 1985, 50 percent of Prince
William Sound processors were scheduled to operate in Cordova (Mundy, Jarvis, and
Associates 1985). However, Cordova's high cost of living and the economic incentives
offered by other cornmunities (such as free utilities and land for nominal fees) are
drawing processors to communities such as Valdez, Seward, and Whittier (Mundy, Jarvis,
and Associates 1985:25).
In developments since this research period, Govemnor Hickel has begun
constr-uction on a road which would connect Cordova to Alaska's highway system. Such
a road could have substantial effects on Cordova's character and residents remain
strongly divided on this issue. The future of the enterprise is still in doubt. The
following article from the Los Angeles Times emphasizes how Cordovans, despite
geographical isolation and local activism, could still see their town "turn into something
else:"
there are those who favor a road, and none favor it mnore than
Alaska's combative governor, Walter J. Hickel. A former U.S.
secretary of the Interior and a longtime real estate developer
elected as an independent last year, Hickel has made building. a
road to Cordova one of his top priorities.

Last summe'r, with no notice and with HI-ckel's blessing, state
highway crews began carving out a gravel road along an 82-mile,
long-abandoned railroad bed 'between Cordova and the nearest
settlement, Chitina. In the rush to get the work done, debris was
dumped into the salmon-rich Copper River and its tributaries ...

The federal-government is threatening to take the state to court
for failing to stop the road work and for allegedly violating the
Clean Water Act. The Ahtna Indians sued, claiming bulldozers
were plowing near ancient burial grounds. Recently, a special
Cordova - Page 171






prosecutor was appointed to investigate whether criminal charges
should be filed against highway workers for damaging fish habitat.
Legislators are up in arms because Hickel never got their approval5


One argument against the road is that it would further hurt fishing,
partly by luring tourists here and creating a big new sport salmon
fishery, cutting into the commercial fishermen's take.

Another argument is that Cordova should remain a quiet part of
the world .. . "A lot of people, including me, came here because of
the way Cordova is. They don't want it to turn into somethingI
else," said [one resident]... Still, many people in Cordova see the
road as progress ... (Los Angeles Times, December 2, 1991:A5).

II. ALASKA NATIVES IN CORDOVA
A relatively comprehensive description of Alaskan Natives in Cordova appears inI
Northern Gulf of Alaska Petroleum Development Scenarios Sociocultural Impacts
(USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979). Tle following is drawn primarily fromn that
source, comnbined with updates from 1991 fieldwork.
Eyak "identity loss" has been a factor in attempts to deny them Native recognitionI
and rights by Federal agencies under ANCSA and by Exxon after the 1989 oil spill. This
report argues that Eyak respondents retain a philosophy and way of life which isI
distinctly Native, and that prior analyses of identity loss have overernphasized historical
data and neglected contemporary comparative data on ideology, social and kin networks,5
and subsistence practices.
According to Eyak leaders, Exxon claimed that Eyak Village was not "impacted" by5
the 1989 oil spill. Results here show that Cordova Natives suffered the same negative
consequences experienced by non-Natives. These include social disruptions, higherI
prices, shortages of rental space, and business impacts such as the economiic difficulties
of fish processors based in Cordova. Stressed more by respondents are cultural impactsI
particular to Natives, such as the looting of burial and historical sites. The most intense
concerns relate to subsistence foods and practices.I




Cordova - Page 172

Natives were and still are unable to obtain many s-ubsistence foods. They were and
still are afraid to eat subsistence foods that they do obtain. They worry about future
adverse health effects'from subsistence foods that they have eaten since the 1989 oil
spill. They worry about continuing damage to their environment and way of life, and
they discount Exxon's assurances that their food supply is safe.
S-ubsistence practices, including sharing, are integral to a way of life which con-nects
Natives with their past and with each other, both in a spiritual sense and in terms of
extending kin ties. These practices entail a spiritual philosophy as well as social and kidn
relations. Respondents describe- their cultural identity as inclusive of the earth, wildlife,
cultural practices, and people. All of these are viewed as interdependent. When oil
threatens wildlife it threatens Native "life."
Eyaks expressed diverse views on whether resource development is moral.
However, respondents agreed that humans cannot "manage" natural resources--which
only God can manage. Due to this conviction, statements endorsing resource
development appear somewhat fatalistic. Those opposed to development of resources
agreed that only God can manage them, but expressed fears that human attempts to
manage could obliterate the Native environment and way of life. Because of an
expressed belief that all aspects of Nature are critically interdependent, these
respondents described the entire world as jeopardized by development of resources such
as oil.
On describing the effects of the oil spill, respondents were divided: some said that
they were afraid to talk about it; others expressed gratitude and relief that, finally,
somneone had come to hear their views. Some Eyaks said that they were troubled
because their people were afraid even to discuss such things with each other.
Most local Natives interviewed in 1991 virtually refased to discuss corporate
matters (Chugach, Eyak, and Tatitlek). Reluctance was explained as necessary secrecy
because of litigation with E-xxon. However, it was my impression that Cordovan Alaskan
Natives are resentful and fearful of negative Anglo attitudes toward their corporate
activities. Somhe appeared speechless with indignation over criticisms of their
Cordova - Page 173






development policies, noting that their pursuit of profits is mandated by non-Native law
and that the non-Native record on environmental protection is abominable.
A hesitancy to speak out on issues appeared to be generalized, so that reluctance
to talk about the oil spill was intermingled with fear of discussing other corporate issues.
Many Eyaks appeared to be troubled by the policies of non-Native corporate
management.
Eyak political relations with the Ci ty of Cordova have traditionally been strained.
Eyak Village was annexed by the city over strong Eyak protests while Eyaks were
fighting for Federal recognition under ANCSA. Natives lack any substantial voice in city
government, while Cordova City Council members have reportedly sat on Eyak and
Chugach corporate boards. Native funds have benefitted the city economically, with little
recognition by non-Native residents.5
Despite historical and contemporary intergroup tensions between Natives and non-
Natives, individuals are unified through a shared lifestyle, extensive intermarriage, and5
occupancy of a small settlement surrounded by a vast wilderness. Many friendship and
kin networks exist between the two cultural groups, and ignorance and suspicion of one           .
another is markedly less apparent than in many rural areas near Indian reservations in
"the lower 48." However, Eyaks readily point out past discrimination and contemporaryI
prejudice.
II.A. Population5
Cordova has a heterogeneous Native population which presently includes Byaks,
Aleuts, Eskimos, Hawaiians, and other American Indians. Eyaks are recognized.as the5
predomlinant indigenous group. Cordova's Eyak population, in contrast to the non-
Native population, grew between 1960 and 1970: the Eyak population was 41 in 19505
and 48 in 1960, but increased to 349 by 1970 (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office
1979:44). According to village leaders, Eyak population in 1985 was 397. This number3
decreased after the oil spill, as some individuals who made money on the oil cleanup
temporarily relocated. These people have reportedly began to return. Eyak governmnent3




Cordova - Page 174ï¿½

representatives cited the population in 1991 as 265 Eyak residents (210 adults and 55
children).
It is not known if the population increase between 1960 and 1970 relates to an
infl-ux of residents from Chenega after the 1964 earthquake. However, many Chenegans
have returned home, while Eyak population in Cordova has remained relatively stable.
The increase in population after 1960 may (or may not) reflect a different self-
reporting by persons with mixed ancestry. In 1991, some respondents who were less than
half Eyak considered themselves Eyak, whether or not they held corporate stock. While
a substantial n-umber of Eyaks have non-Native ancestry, many identify more with their
Eyak descent. Some expressed an ethical imnperative to take pride in a Native heritage:
It's important to know that you're a Native and be proud of it, no
matter how much Native blood you have. My father was fall-
blooded [Western European], but when, I look in the inirror I see
my mother. I see a Native.

According to Village leaders, the Byak Corporation requires a one fourth blood
quotient, but the Eyak Village service area has no such requirements. The government
is currently compiling enrollment figures for the Bureau -of Indian Affairs (BIA,). In any
case, there are reportedly only two full-blooded Eyak residents left in Cordova, both
elderly.
Eyaks comprise approximately 25 percent of winter residents, reportedly being
more likely than non-Natives to remain in Cordova after fishing season. Eyaks tend not
to belong to the raajor groups who absent themselves during the off season (such as non-
resident fishermen who maintain a Cordova address for economic reasons and wealthy
fishermen who spend winters in warmer climnates).
ISome miigration of Natives occurs, however. Natives mnigrate seasonally or
permnanently to Anchorage for visiting, shopping, or jobs. Natives more often inigrate to
Anchorage, while non-Natives tend to visit or reside in the Seattle area (USDOI, BLM,
Alaska OCS Office 1979:111-112; respondent communications).
Cordova - Page 175






LI.B. Cultural IdentityI
Eyak "identity loss" has been widely reported, relating in part to unanswered
questions about their past (see See. I.A.1 Historical Overview; see also USDOI, BLM,
Alaska OCS Office 1979; and Johnson 1988):g
Dr.:Krause at the University of Alaska has classified Eyak
language, but it's a language of its own. No. one knows where 'We
come from. We're not Athapaskans or Tlingits. "Eyak" is not an
Eyak word. It means "mouth of the river" in Aleut. That's where
the villages were.

Eyaks expressed concern over the question of their historical roots; eld ers do not
remember any Eyak dances, for instance, although they remember games and sports.I
Some leaders consider renewal of cult-ural heritage a solution for social ills:
The young people here don't know who they are, and that's why
there are drug and alcohol problems. We're going to start culturalI
heritage classes for them next month.

Leaders expressed faith and determiination that Eyak identity would persist:I
We wouldn't lose our identity. We're a strong people. We deal
with mental health, alcoholism, and suicide. A lot of Native kidsI
don't know their identity. So we have gatherings and teach the
cultuire so they'll know who they are. There, are a lot of Natives
with White coloring; it's hard for them to understand who they are.
I have heard similar statements by Natives in Tonga, Fiji, Cook Islands, New Zealand,
Mexidco, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, and California. Feelings of cultural loss
and beliefs in the significance of traditional culture to individual well-being are not
measures of cultural identity loss. Natives the world over appreciate that they have been
overwhelmed by a super-ordinate culture, yet retain faith in their distinct identity andI
worldview.
Post-contact epidemics and natural disasters severely decreased the population.3
The effects of Anglo contacts on identity loss is described in a Federal field study
entitled Alaska Natives and the Land:3




Cordova - Page 176

Because the territory of the Eyaks was the center of much activity,
including salmon canneries, mineral exploration, railroad
construction, and trading enterprises commencing as early as the
1880's, the Eyak traditional way of life was seriously disrupted.
Judging from their decline in numbers, their adjustment to
changing conditions imposed by non-Natives was far from being
successful, although a willingness to marry outside of their tribe
may have been an iimportant element in the fairly rapid loss of
their identity (Federal Field Committee, 1978, as cited in USD0OL
BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:90).

On the other hand, Eyak "identity loss" may be overstated. A comparative
examination of ideol ogy demonstrates that Eyak respondents have a coherent cultural
philosophy that differs markedly from that of non-Natives but which coincides with that
of other Native groups. Also, social and kin networks with Natives in other villages,.
often carried out in subsistence practices, demonstrate a cultural unity with those groups
and outweighs similarities with non-Native Cordovans.~-
While many B-yak respondents expressed regret and unquenched curiosity stemming
from gaps in knowledge about their past, Native identity was expressly acknowledged.
Tle following statement refers to the effects of the oil spill. Eyaks shared with other
Native groups the experience of suffering and loss because they share a common
environment, way of life and spiritual philosophy. In part icular, respondents described
craving for subsistence foods as a racial characteristic (inbred, or in the blood), similar to
Navajo descriptions of "mutton hunger:"'8
It's been inbred in us from childhood: the spirituality and kinship
we feel one to another. A oneness we feel among each other.
What affected the other villages we could feel. We felt their loss.
It's not Christianity: t's a oneness, a spiritual feeling among
ourselves.

We have White blood, but the Native blood comes out and we
have to satisfy that part of us. Salmon eggs - it's inbred. The
Native blood: he part within must be satisfied.




is See Shoepfle et al. 1979. This phenomaen'on is discussed again in Section IL.H Effects of the 1989 Oil Spill.
Cordova - Page 177






This is a way of life for us, not just subsistence. It's part of us.193
We are part of the earth. We respect it.

The last statement shows how Eyaks consider cultural identity as equivalent to aI
way of life which is comprised of subsistence harvesting and values pertaining to this. To
be Native is to hold- these values: Natives leave seeds for regrowth; the White manI
leaves nothing and will lose everything. A shared identity is delineated, with the earth,

that yields subsistence, the way of life that subsistence harvesting comprises, and the
people who live this way of life:
SUBSISTENCE COMES FROM THE EARTH.
SUBSISTENCE (HARVESTING AND FOODS) IS A WAY OF LIFE.5
THIS WAY OF LIFE IS PART OF THE PEOPLE.
THfE PEOPLE ARE PART OF THE EARTH;
THEREFORE:
SUBSISTENCE IS PART OF THE PEOPLE AND THE EARTH.I
THIS WAY OF LIFE IS PA-RT OF THE PEOPLE AND THE E-ARTH.
Cordovan Natives uniformly emphasized subsistence foods as well as practices in5
describing Native identity:

Subsistence harvesting is still part of the identity here. It's our way5
of life, so it's part of our identity ... Once a month we have a
luncheon of Native foods. Mostly for the elderly who can't get
things themselves.  We use fins; they make us feel good inside.I
They go in fish soup. Nutritionists have finally decided there's
nutrition for elderly people in fish soup. It has a calming effect on
unruly kids.
Subsistence harvesting, described as -"our way of life" and "our identity," actively3
connects Eyaks to their heritage, according to respondents. That is, this way of life is
shared by past and present Eyaks, and is intrinsic to being Eyak. Eyak identity is notI
regarded as a function of blood quantum, but of a perceived unity with other Eyaks and



19 Underlines reflect vocal emphasis.5


Cordova - Page 178

other Natives. Subsistence harvesting also comprises a connection between the people
and the earth; it is a form of respect for the earth. This respect for the earth (including
the life which it supports) entails a value system where the earth and its resources are
not equatable to money values. Likewise, one's heritage and identity are not
exchangeable with money values:
I think a unified spirit connects all American Natives. I1 feel it
whenever I meet American Indian people. We all feel the same
way about things.

The subsistenice foods are related to our heritage. They connect us
to our heritage.

How could you put a money value. on things: food, the things that
we have? Because it's free. If you're a subsistence user you can't
put an economy value on these things.

My father trapped and fished, but my mother and I lived off the
land. We went duck hunting in a pond behind our house. I
trapped with my father and ate bear meat. Once a year we took
strawberries and rhubarb to town and sold them and bought rice.
We canned from our garden.

When we trapped we ate the muskrat and beaver and porcupine
and lynx. That's better than chicken. Jam, fruit. That shows how
we treated the land. When fiddlehair ferns came up in summer
we'd eat them in bacon grease. Salmon berry sprouts, fall of
vitamin C.

That's our connection with the earth and we respected it. We feel
differently about subsistence than non-Natives.

The wanton waste at the city dump shows the difference between
Whites and Natives. They take the breast meat off the duck. We
used it all. We eat stomachs and hearts of king salmon. We
smoke it, freeze it, can it, dry it, until there's nothing left.

Here we weren' t allowed allotments because we were part of the
National Forests. Even after eating all the fish (except some of the
intestines) we feed the bones to the sea gulls. Even the bones are
used. We even eat the fish eyes. They're tasty.
Cordova - Page 179





Regardless of the degree of Native blood, it's different for us.I
Real subsistence users would never throw parts of the game away.

We've gone out and gotten heart, liver, etc. that others have
thrown.away. Bake the seal flippers, braid the seal gat, eat the
liver, dry the skin and make slippers (mnukluks). Make buttons out
of moose horns. Moose and sealskin garments, purses, hats. BearU
gat parkas: they're water proof.

Now, with modern stuff, you just buy it. But that doesn't affect3
me.
It means more than food. It's our way of life. It's inbred. Such a
part of us.

Traditional subsistence practices also were emphasized in addressing questions
about respondents' "memories" about special places. This question in the KI protocol3
was intended to refer to personal mnemories, but Eyaks often referred to past cultural
practices, particularly subsistence harvesting. Such statements demonstrate a sense of
continuity between past and present subsistence practices. For instance, hunters used to
need slill with bows and arrows because this was their livelihood; now, they need skill             (
with a rifle, for the same reason:
They used to go out to sea in kayaks. Now they call them bidarkis.
Our name was kayak; kayak was a seal. Which a kayak was made
out of. So the name is for the seal.

They used to go out for days to hunt sea otters. Somnetimes theyI
got caught in a storm out there. The sea was 'way high, and the
island down below. They'd look at Kayak Island; from, there it
looked like a kayak. They thought it was another boat. The
current took them over to Kayak Island. They used to paddle all
over to visit relatives, then paddle home.
Bigger boats they made out of sea lion skins. Great big boats. To
haul freight with. I forget what they used to call them. TheyI
paddled them too. It held whole families. Kayaks held one, two
or three [persons].





Cordova - Page 180

Old man ____had a boat: six feet high, and thick: four inches
thick. I couldn't even haul it. He said you had to be strong, to
haul the boat and to pull a speedy bow.
He had 102 little knife marks in the bow. He said, "That's how
many sea otters I killed with that bow and arrow. " That's all we
used to hunt with. You had to be good with it, because tliat's your
livelihood.
Now I've got to be good with a rifle because I have only so many
shells. We needed more money for more shells. So you had to be
good with a rifle too.
You used to -see a sea otter traveling and the boats would go
around in a ring around the sea otter. And we'd all shoot at it.
The first arrow doesn't kill it. But the first arrow to go into the
otter meant that it was your sea otter. Every body else helped kill
it, but it's yours because you had the first arrow in.
Contemporary cultural training of Native youngsters is likened here to traditional
practices:2(
Kids are taken out [at spirit camp] and shown how to camp and
hunt, and [people] teach them. In my days, my people used to do
that with us. Take us out and teach us how to hunt, fish, and so
on. They were Spirit Camps.

Someone who knew would teach us how to do things, how to live.
I used to go hunting with a deaf and dumb guy, -___.He'd
know exactly how to do things: make a camp, work. I got so I
could understand him.

He was a good hunter! We'd sleep out on the beach, build a fire.
Dig a wbole in the sand. Our length head to toe. About two feet
deep. Cut spruce ratches and lay then in the hole for a mattress.
We only had one blanket. But under the ground, you sleep real



20,,Spirit camnps," referred to here, have been set up by the Alaska Native Resource Development Company
of Anchorage, to teach Native youths traditional technologies such as smoking fish, tanning hides, and so on.
Presently The North Pacific Rim Corporation (TNPR) has a proposal for a cultural renovation program which
would set up spirit camps in vilages, and is seeking grants to implement this. The TNPR planning committee
is also contemplating a return to more traditional village organizations, with chiefs and councils of elders
(Cordova Times, February 14, 1991:9).
Cordova - Page 181






warm under the ground, and the cold air went right over.U
Branches over and under keep you warmn.

We learned to dry fish. Dried salmon; had to be held in theI
mouth, too hard to chew. It'd break your teeth. Don't drink
much water when traveling; just wet your mouth. And a piece of
dried salmon in your mouth vwill last all day long. You don't
starve.

When you go traveling, always look back, to see your way home.I
Make a mark whenever you go. Because in fog and snow you can
get lost 15 minutes from your house.I

Watch for creeks because they run one way. Down to the beach.
After you get to the beach you have to know where your camp is.
So have marks everywhere on the beach.

One time I was hunting deer out there. Following a fresh deer3
track. So I rushed and forget to look where I was going.

I stopped and looked and my tracks were covered already. It was3
just snowing! After awhile I ran into a strip of timber and
followed a creek. It took me to a big bluff. I couldn't get down. I
hadn't been to that place before so I didn't know where I was, andI
I couldn't see anywhere. But I stood up and faced the cliff down.
I thought: Cordova is to my left. I went left and found my partner
in 1/2 hour. Otherwise I'd have had to stay out in the snow allI
night.

Animals show you a lot of things if you can read their signs.I
Where water is. Certain places animals will take you to. But if
you follow a deer here, he'll take you to hell!3

T'hey can really travel! I followed a deer once and he out-smarted
me. He was following me, ten feet behind me, the whole time. I
turned around and saw him, just looking at me, and then I said,
"You don't want me to shoot you. You were just playing with me!"

And I couldn't shoot him. I just let him go. He was laughing at3
me. Just playing a trick on me. Animals will play with you.

While memories emphasize subsistence, other cultural features were referenced:



Cordova - Page 1823

We had two or three religions here: Chenegan, Yakutat, Tlingit.
Tley'd have an Olympics and invite other religions over to pl'ay
Aleut games. Rock throwing, arm wrestling, ear pulling, and so
on. For weeks and weeks. Furs would be won, kayaks, bows and
arrows. Some people would get cleaned out. And next year the
other religion would have it.

During winter time, everybody had a good time. Everything was
free:- the food, and so on. But the games were for prizes. And
they fought hard for them. The wrestling, and so on, until the other
guy couldn' t move. It was a lot of fun. Tree hauling, all kinds of
gamnes. If you won a lot of stuff, they'd plot against you, or your
village, for next year. It was between the villages.

They made it all work. But some were evil and mean. They
fought wars all the time. Over practically nothing. If there was
nothing to do they'd start a war with some other village.

I lived on Makarka Point. I was born in Duchet, but they had that
flu that killed everybody. I didn't have a mother so____
raised me. My dad took me out and that saved me from the
sickness. Everybody but a couple people died.

When the Russians camne in there was nothing but Aleuts. They
called you anything they wanted to. It could be an animal. So you
had an Aleut name. But the Russians baptized everybod  and
gave them Russian names for last names. The Russian couldn't
say the Aleut narnes, So our last names were given to us by the
Russians. I have no Russian blood, even though I have a Russian
name.

In addition to continuity in subsistence practices and Native blood, respondents
often described sorne congruity between precontact and Christian religions:
We talk to our Elders, and it's hard to comprehend how they lived
in underground houses .~ith their whole famnilies. How could they
have lived? Kids would be fighting. Two little smoke holes: one
to praise and thank the spirit for good hunting.
I was so pleased to hear that, because I always thought that they
acknowledged something there. We call it God.

The following statement by another respondent echoes this recognition:
Cordova - Page 183






I think a lot of things happened in the early days. They had theirI
own way of living. They didn't know about God even. But they
still had a feeling that somebody did things to this world.j

They saw the mountains and animals. So they figured out there
was a ruler somewhere. Must be from up above. Can't be from
below. They knew there was two things: a god and a good. They
weren't religious. They just lived on what they knew themselves.
Tlen they figured out there was a ruler. They asked: who made3
that moon? That sun?

They lived in smoke houses and smoked fish. A hole where the5
smoke went out, you could see the sky through. And sit by a low
table. And old man would look through that glory hole and tell
the Man above that, "We're gonna' eat now."They believed in
something above, and that was Nature. And then the Russians
come and brought religion.

We knew that religion before the Russians came. But we didn't
have a name for it. They used to say, "On yo-ur left side is a bad
spirit. But the one on the right is the. one you should listen to."I
They knew good and bad.

Years ago the old people said there was a bad spirit on earth here.I
Not a Devil or God. Tley never saw a Devil. The bad was in you
and me. Or the Good.3

When people were against one another the people themselves had
a bad spirit. The people used to fight, but not a war. Just for
tools, or a woman. Killed each'other for what they had.
But they knew that in later times they would have big wars: a
power we know nothing about, that we. can't control. So we haveI
to know which side to belong to.

Some people start a war over nothing: greedy, wanting power. It's
happening right now and will keep on happening until the end of
the world.3

T'hose old people used to tell us that. They knew that, and it's
happening now. Those old people never had no schooling, but3
they knew things.



Cordova - Page 184g

Respect for Eyak forbears and their way of life was uniformly expressed.
Respondents often described their forbears as prescient, having knowledge and
forecasting ability not shared by conte'mporary humans. These elders advised the young
to maintain their cultural knowledge and ethics; the statement below demonstrates how
some have attempted to do this:
They told us our language would be taken away from us. They
said not to forget our language, even when the schools tried to
take it away, and tell us we didn't know anything.

They said keep up our knowledge: how to live, what plants to use
for medicine. "You'll need that."

The doctors here, they ask and I show them roots and plant's to
cure a certain sickness. When I was a little kid, I wasn't interested,
but when I got older I thought: Why didn't I pay more attention?

I know some things. The medicines from plants around here is
lots better that the staff you get from the doctor. The plants had
Aleut names, but I can't remember ...

They used to use seines and get all wet when you put them in the
water. One guy came out of the water and got sick and couldn't
move. Couldn't walk from rheumatism, from being in the water.

Somebody (a Native from Yakutat) came up to see him. He came
back with some roots and leaves and made some tea. He wouldn't
take money for it. But the tea cured the rheumatisnm, and it never
came back. Even when he was old.

Me and my wife used to go pick leaves and made tea. Just
something to drink so we wouldn't get sick. Wild currents. They
grow all over.

I was going trapping one time, and there was an old Native lady
here. She was married to a White man. She had two boys. We
went out trapping and she said, "We have to get our medicines
now. 'Don't buy any cold medicines. Get medicine for your cuts,
but leave the cold medicine to me."

She told us about these wild currents. They grew all over. It was
fall, where the currents fell off the stems. She said to cut the
Cordova - Page 185





stems and take them and scrape the brown skin off. Under is aI
green sap. Shave off the green sap in strips and collect a pile of it
and boil it up. She said, "You'll need one gallon, the color of light
tea. To use it, listen close and write it down: in the morningI
before breakfast, each one take 1/2 cup. Then eat breakfast
before drinking it. After breakfast drink the 1/2 cup juice. It's
bitter. If you drink it before you eat you'll get sick.
But 1/2 cup after breakfast each, and none of us got sick. Even
though it was icy, wet, rain, and sleet, and none of us got sick even
though we was out all winter long.

Sorme plants cure pneumonia. Devil's Club. It cures pneumonia.I
The Aleuts had lots of stuff that worked, but lots of stuff that
didn't work. They lost a lot of relations, too. Old man _____. I  a
grew up with him. He raised me. He used to come around town
with all this stuff.

He used to read the clouds and the stars to see what would
happeni. I asked him, "What do you do when you go outside?
What are you reading?"I
He says, "You're interested, but you can't do it. I go out and read
the clouds and read the stars. You have to understand to do it.
You won't learn it. I won't even tell you, but I watch the stars and
clouds and read what the weather will be like." They would read
the different layers of clouds, and how the stars twinkled.
II.C. Organizational Complexity
While Eyaks retain a strong sense of Native identity, the loss of some aspects of
traditional culture and the presence of different Native groups in the area may hinder3
integration of the structural complexity dictated by ANCSA. Newly created
organizations include two Native for-profit corporations, the Eyak non-profit BidarkiI
*Corporation, the Eyak Youth Center, and the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) Tribal
Council. Respondents in 1979 felt that these group affiliations had a splintering effect3
socially (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:92). In 1991, respondents complained
of social fragmnentation where individuals were afraid to meet commnunally and discuss3
their political and econornic concerns; some expressed feelings of futility. More



Cordova - Page 186

hormogeneity in the Native community nmight mnitizate the social stresses produced by the
ANCSA reorgainization (USD01, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:93). Religious
heterogeneity exists as well (see "Ideology"), although the Russian Orthodox Church is a
central focus of social organization for many Natives.
Cordova houses headquarters for two Native profit corporations and one non-profit
corporation formed under ANCSA: Eyak Corporation and its non-profit affiliate the
Bidarli Corporation, and Tatitlek Corporation. Roughly 150 members of Tatitlek
Corporation lived in Cordova in 1979 (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:61).
Counting all members of Chugach Region, Inc., there were at least 500 Alaskan Natives
residing in Cordova in 1979 (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:61)1
Eyak Village formed a new IRA Council under provisions of the Indian Self-
Determination Act of 1975. Eyak leaders had rejected the IRA political framework
earlier, correctly deducing that it imparted increased1 power to the Secretary of the
Interior:
We never accepted an IRA government. At the time, I studied it
and came to the conclusion that the IRA government gave the
Secretary of Interior more power over us. So we voted it down.
The IRA Council consists of a president and five elected members. Activities
include ownership and management of office headquarters for Eyak Corporation, Bidarki
Corporation, and a community health aide who is part of North Pacific Rim' s Health
Department program. A community service worker administers food stamps and energy
assistance. Eyak government leaders are working on enrollmnent figures for the BIA.
The Eyak government also seeks and administers block grants and government aid
programs; currently plans for cultural classes sponsored by the non-profit corporation are
underway.
The Bidarki Corporation administers programs at the Eyak Youth Center. Other
non-profit activities include helping the Salvation Army food bank locate persons in
need, and joint missions for clothes collectiorns and referrals.


21 Current figures were not available because the recent census combined Cordova with other areas.
Cordova - Page 187






Economic activities of the profit corporations (regional and village) are discussed inI
Sec. 11.1) Economic Development Policies. The Eyak Corporation has an elected nine
member board; the village holds elections every 2 years. Corporation enterprises include
timber, a marina, commercial buildings, and a traier court (which government leaders
described as not lucrative). I
Tatitlek has maintained close relations with Eyak over the years and houses their
profit corporation headquarters there. Their IRA village council is headquartered in
Tatitlek. Residents of both villages maintain close ties through family visiting, a common3
fishing tradition, exchange of harvested foods, and joint church meetings. Many from
Tatitlek and Chenega still maintain close ties to the Russian Orthodox Church in Eyak,3
relocated from Nuchek in about 1925 (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:65).
Organizational complexity mandated by ANCSA is not the only way in which3
Federal relationas with Eyak complicate respondents' lives. The topic runs throughout
this report, but a common complaint concerns administration of Indian Health ServiceI
funds. These run out in Cordova after the first few days of each month. Natives
needing medical care often wait until the first day of the following month, and then join3
a long line at the hospital clinici. Some fly to Anchorage at their own expense.2
II.D. Economic Development PoliciesI
Views on Resource Develountent: While the provisions of ANCSA mandate that
the Eyak Corporation produce profits, members are ensconced in a subsistence fishing3
lifestyle. Members of Eyak Corporation were split on development in 1979 (USDOI,
BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:62). Some favored development, some were forI
maintenance of a traditional fishing village economy, and others espoused a "back to the
land" philosophy which would preclude economiic development and relations with the3
non-Native community.





220One respondent claimed that hospital overhead is taken out of Alaskan Native funds disproportionately,
leaving little for walk-in patient care. This is unconfirmed information but warrants further research.3


Cordova - Page 188I

Eyaks in 1991 are still split on resource development. Interestingly, they are in
accord on whether humans can "manage" resources. Most said that, ultimately, only God
manages resources, or that Nature manages itself.
The following statements by two Eyak political leaders show acceptance of some
resource development, since the people "have to have an economy of some kind." A
fuindamental Native conviction is applied to oil development: you should share resources
widely, and they will come back to you; the farther the resource goes, the more powerful
the force of return on the investment.2 Respondents here describe resource
development as "living off the land," and they express moral concerns about the earth.
Economic profits are not emphasized per se, but the importance of an economy which
supports everyday living is recognized: "Existence is a big part of our lives."
The view that only God can manage resources is used here to rationalize the
morality of resource extraction: humans are not at Nature's helm. No one can predict
the effects of development; God will control the earth which renews itself. Humans
cannot fully understand God's intentions; they are occupied in a struggle to survive.
These beliefs give the following endorsement of resource development a fatalistic quality
which strongly contrasts with Anglo entrepreneurial enthusiasm:
Ouestion:
How do you feel about oil development?
First ResDondent:
We still have to have oil.
Second ReSDondent:
Le-t's have seal oil.

First ResDondent:
Timber and oil are part of our lives. We have to have an economy
of some kind. We can't. go back to our aboriginal life, our early
days.




23This belief is also discussed in See. II.H. Effects of the 1989 Oil Spll.
Cordova - Page 189






Second Respondent:I
We're living off the land. They're cutting down our trees and
paying us for it.3

First Respondent:
I was never against the pipeline. Our oil is going all over. The
whole world needs it. We identify with everybody. Why are we
fighting for Kuwait? Our synthetics, tires, shoes, and so on: it al
comes from oil. Cotton comes from the earth too.3

Ouestion:
Do you think there's a difference between renewable and non-3
renewable resources?

First ResTpondent:3
I never thought much about that effect on Nature. Existence is a
big part of our lives.

The earth is constantly changing. How can we say anything is non-
renewable? God who made everything may say it's renewable.
There may be a way earth will renew everything.I
God had to make everything: the earth.and its beauty. Inside
each person there is a spirit, and that spirit believes in God.I
T'here's so many mysteries God has given us, so we can't say what
will happen. We can't predict a 110 mile per hour wind. It could
take the trees and roofs. We had one once, and it was scary. YouI
couldin't do anything until it stopped. Then it was beautiful.

We cannot predict a non-renewable resource. How can we sayI
that anything won't go back to the earth? That's where it came
from. We started as dirt, and we finish as dirt. I'm not an
evolutionist. I came from an egg and sperm, not a piece of slime.
All things--plastic--it came from. the earth; it will go back.3

Question:
Do you think that people can inanage resources?3

First Res-Dondent:
No. We can't manage, we can't predict., Whether the oil is going
to be there, or anything.



Cordova - Page 1903

Second RespDondent:
The synthetics may turn back into oil.

First Resnondent:
There's too many people managing. And some [management] isn't
right. Native people don't want to be managers. We have too
much to do in our daily life.

The following respondent is opposed to oil development, and the inquiry elicited a
story containing a number of implicit messages. The account that follows shows a
continuity between traditional subsistence practices and contemporary ones; different
weapons are used, but the dangers and skills required are the same. While it is difficult
to live by hunting, Native people are able to do so. Before interference by State and
Federal regulation, Natives -used subsistence practices which were satisfactory and
satisfying; the respondent is angered over non-Native intrusions which have curtailed
and threatened this way of life.
Like the two Eyak respondents quoted above, the following respondent does not
believe that humans can manage resources. Contemporary attempts to do so are
associated with fears of culture a-nd resource loss. This respondent also resembles the
previous two respondents in not embracing capitalistic values. He believes that animals,
for instance, cannot be "owned" in an economic sense. One makes use of them to
survive. A sense of "belonging" involves an interrelatedness of animals and humans in
subsistence which comprises "my life" and "my way of living." Animals and humans were
created together when the world was made.
The statement that follows expresses intense concern over the effects of oil
development on animals. Eyaks hold strong positive sentiments toward the animals in
their environment, and questions which referenced extinction of animals appeared to
shock informants to the point of causing physical as well as mental discomfort.
Moreover, since all aspects of Nature are crucially interrelated, if one aspect is
destroyed, the whole can be lost.
Ouestio:
Is oil development good?
Cordova - Page 191






Answer:I
No. I don't think so. The people here before, they had an awful
time getting by. They had no guns. They had to eat, and they had
to use spears.
Not too long ago I had a guy living with me here. He said we
should go out and look for bear. Black bear. They're easy to get
in summer at the creeks eating fish, but in the winter they're
hibernating. They used to get bear in their dens with bow and
arrows, knives, spears. I said I wouldn't go in a den, even if the
bears were sleeping.

We went up the road and saw a black bear. He went into his den.-
We watched it for 2-3 days. That fall, pretty late, this guy said,
"Let's go get that bear in his den," so I went with him and weI
found his den. He had it -covered up with branches in the front.
He had a flashlight and we both had rifles. He went in and found
the bear. I told him, "We don't need meat that bad," but he said,I
"I like bear." I said, "What if he wakes up?" He said, "He'll be
dead by that time." I said, "Bear season's closed."

But I couldn't talk him out of it. He took off his coat and said, "If
he comes running out, you shoot him." I said, "I thought you were
going to shoot him." He said, "Well, if he gets away, you shootI
him."

After awhile I heard a "boom" and then ____'s feet come out
through the hole. Then I dragged him out and we dragged the
bear out of the hole. I-e said it was sound asleep. He touched it,
looked at it. People used to do that, but it was tricky. SomeI
people got killed when the bear woke up.

The bears in Tatitlek and Chenega will walk right through theI
village. Sorne of the old people in Chenega were smart hunters.
They took me goat hunting.3

We came to a village and there were 50 goats playing. We
watched them for a half hour. They had some kind of game.
They'd dig a hole and then stick their horns in the hole. They'd
run to the hole and put their horns in: "Click."
A goat will outrun you on a climb, but on a level you can outrun a
goat. So we went down and chased the goats. But you have to


Cordova - Page 192g

watch out for their hornis. So five of us went down and chased
them. They said, "Don't shoot them, just chase them." We got five
goats, one each, and headed them off and blocked their way from
climbing the mountain.

We used to trap here. They used to use deadfalls but then they
outlawed them. I trapped foxed, mink, every winter. We each had
different trapping sites. Two men worked together on a particular
place.

Each family would choose a place on the creek, and put salmon up
there in summer and then trap there in winter.' All over the Sound
you could go and everyone knew where they were.

The Forestry Service burned everv one of those Native camps
down. And put up cabins. But tie Native camps, the village
camps: everybody knew where they were when those were there.
There was lots of room for everyone. But they were all taken
away from us.

They outlawed the deadfalls. They were good. You had to use
steel traps. I don't know why, but they outlawed all that Aleut
stuff. And those deadfalls worked good and didn't cost you a cent.

Ouestion
What do you think would happen if some of the animals became
extinct?

Answer:
I don't know how much the oil did to those animals. A lot of ducks
were killed. Seals. I know there's a lot of Natives are afraid to
eat that stuff because they know what happened to it. They
inspect it, but they're still afraid. You don't know what's going to
happen to the people who eat it.

That oil just killed billions of "grayboots" on the rocks. Killed
everything off, even land animals. They go down to eat kelp
because they need salt. A lot of them ate crude oil on the kelp.
Clams with oil. Of course there's hardly any butter clams or razor
clams left. I used to go get grayboots every year. Now I don't.
You used to go get all the razor clams, butter clams, cockles you
want. Now there's none. In fact, I hardly eat seal now. Just once
in a while the boys get one.
Cordova - Page 193






T'he people in Chenega are afraid to eat the things they get. II
don't blame them.

Question:                                                                              I
What would happen if there were no game?

Answer:
It affects all the others and people too. You have to watch all of
them. It ruins the whole thing. No matter what kind of animal it3
is.I

And you never know: the second oil spill could happen any time.
Ships spilling ballast water out all the time. Right in ValdezI
Harbor. The more oil they want to find, the more will leak out.

Question:
Do you think that people can manage resources?

Answer:
I imagine they could. I don't know how. How could they do it?

T'he Aleut people are quite afraid they can never do what they
used to do. So I don't know how they can manage [resources].
T'he Eskimos: there's lots they don't have. They have to fight forI
everything they want.

Question:                                       It
Who do the resources belong to? Does anyone own them?

Answer:I
I doin't know if animals belong to anyone. But everyone makes use
of them. I wouldn't say that an animal belongs to me unless I kill
one. Then it's because it's my life and my way of living that I haveI
to eat that animal.

But still I wouldn't sa'y they belonged to us. We make use of themI
to live. Their skins, and so on. But no one owns.the animals
before they get them [when they're alive].3

Even now I don't get enough Aleut food. I get to needing it and
get some once in a while. But now we're leery to eat it.3




Cordova - Page 194

Ouestion:
What if there were no animnals?

Answer:
Geeze! Had to be the end of it, I guess. What would the world
be good for? To kill all the animals! When the world was
created, the animals were created too, just like human beings. If
the animals were taken away, that~ would be the end of it.

What would we do without animals? I like animals. I love
animals, even if I donet eat them. Of course, you've got to learn to
keep away from some: wild bear, and so on.

Evak Cormoration: Logging by Chugach and Eyak Corporations in 1991 is
described in Sec. I.A.6 Cordova's Economy. Logging is currently the major economic
enterprise of the IEyak Corporation, but the mnove toward timber development met
internal opposition (USD01, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:57). It appears an unlikely
source of long-term econormic benefit, as noted, and has become a source of controversy
locally among Natives and between Natives and non-Natives.
Logging yields bigger dividends than other economnic enterprises. For instance, one
shareholder with a thousand shares receives a regular dividend of $200 to $300 every 3
months ("It's enough for a carton of cigarettes and a case of beer.") Last December he
received $1,800 from timber alone. These timber dividends are reportedly increasing
with each payment. He receives relatively little income from the Chugach Regional
Corporation. His last shareholder's check came 2 years ago in 1989.
Income from corporations varies according to how much stock a person holds.
Respondents sa-id that each person started with 100 shares automatically. Stock holdings
increase through inheritance; persons born after the 1970's receive stock only through
inheritance. Respondent estimates of income from Eyak Corporation approximated $100
a month, with irregular timber dividends currently ranging from $1,500 to $1,800.
By comparison, non-Native financial officers of the Eyak Corporation reportedly
make about $90,000 a year and up.
Cordova - Page 195






Chugach Region: Chugach Region, Inc. has equivocated somewhat on rapid energyI
development. It has pursued energy development at times but has also shown interest in
fishery related development. Some economic diversification has occurred but on a small
scale. Chugach Region appears to recognilze negative local sentiments against rapid
energy development, while also acknowledging its mandate as a for-profit corporation.
Leadership of Chugach Region, Inc. changed in the mid-1970's, as it became clear that3
OCS development, favored by prior leaders, would not occur (USDOI, BLM, Alaska
OCS Office 1979:18).1
From 1976 to 1977 Chugach Region, Inc. pursued feasibility studies and joint
ventures in the expectation of development of offshore drilling in the Northern Gulf of3
Alaska (USDOI, ELM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:66). ley Bay was proposed as a
potential OCS service base (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:66). During this3
period Chugach Natives, Inc. pursued a boundary dispute with Sealaska, Inc., establishing
the 14 1st Meridian as the southern boundary of Chugach Natives, Inc. (USDOI, BLM,3
Alaska OCS Office 1979:38). Once the boundary was established, Chugach Region
moved to develop Icy Bay. They made contracts with Phillips Petroleum for oil3
exploration, using Bomhoff Associates of Anchorage for development planning and
Anchorage Helicopters for support services for offshore drilling rigs. Chugach Region3
also showed interest in potential OCS lands in the Yakatat area (Chugach Natives, Inc.
1975, as cited in USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:38).24
Cordovan Natives were willing to take oil jobs during the construction of the
pipeline. In the late 1970's, Eyak and Chugach Natives got lucrative pipeline jobs as aI
result of efforts by their regional corporation, the Alaska Federation of Natives, and
Alyeska Native hiring provisions (Chugach Natives, Inc. 1975, as cited in USDOI, BLM,3
Alaska. OCS Office 1979:40).
Chugach Region has also showed continuing interest in fisheries development,3
acquiring Orca Cannery in Cordova. The regional corporation has maintained an interest


24 Chugach Natives, Inc. is the profit corporation representing Chugach Region (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS
Office 1979:42).3


Cordova - Page 196g

in developing a bottomfishing industry, as well (Chugach Natives, Inc. 1975, as cited in
USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:66).
Chugach Fisheries, Inc. is reportedly on the brink of bankruptcy. Chugach
corporate spokesmen refused to discuss this and the regional corporation is currently
engaged in litigation against Exxon. Chugach Region like the Eyak Corporation has non-
resident management: Larry Cambronera of Seattle is vice president of Operations.
Other economic diversification has been fairly minimal. The corporation employed
nine staff in 1978 (Chugach Natives, Inc. 1975 as cited in USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS
Office 1979:66). They acquired expanded office housing in Anchorage for Chugach
Natives, Inc., North Pacific Rim, Chugach Development Corporation (a wholly owned
subsidiary of Chugach Natives), and Chenega Corporation. Chugach Region through
Chugach Development Corporation bought majority stock in the Sunshine Plaza Mall, a
shopping mall in downtown Anchorage.
Chugach Alaska Corporation of Chugach Region ranked as the 13th highest in
revenues of Alaskan owned and based businesses in 1989 (The Cordova Times, October
18, 1990:8). Chugach also took advantage of spill cleanup opportunities, setting up a
joint venture with NANA/Marriott to provide catering and housekeeping services for oil-
spill cleanup camps. While Chugach-NANA/Marriott was a temporary venture, it
ranked 33rd among Alaskan businesses in revenues in 1989, declaring $29 million in
revenues (Cordova Times, October 18, 1990:8).
Fishing: Natives have concerns over the increased capitalization of fishing
(following increased fish harvests from Limited Entry and PWSAC), particularly the
permit system and the high cost of permits. Traditionally, fishing was passed on as a
lifeway from father to son, and the permit system threatens this tradition. If a fisherman
is forced to sell his permit during a bad year, reentry for children is difficult to finance
(USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:84).
II.E. Struggles Over Land Conveyances
Both Eyak Village and Chugach Region engaged in a series of litigations related to
land conveyances stipulated in ANCSA. Cordova Native leaders were involved during
Cordova - Page 197






the early 1970's in Alaska Native efforts to claim aboriginal lands (USDOI, BLM, AlaskaI
OCS Office 1979:35). They initially orgarnized with the nearby Tlingit, and later with the
Alaska Federation of Natives. In 1966, a group of Cordova Natives incorporated the
original Chugach Native Association and sent a member to represent Chugach Region in
the emerging organization of Alaska Native Groups (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office
1979:35).3
Chugach Natives, Inc. represents a small population and relatively few villages in
.the region, and the association fought for years to establish the legitimacy of somei
villages for entitlement under ANCSA (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:36).
Chenega, for instance, had been completely destroyed by the Good Friday Earthquake of3
1964, yet residents who moved temporarily to Cordova, Anchorage, and Tatitlek
maintained a commnitinent to return. Chenega was granted village status under ANCSA3
in 1974.
Eyak Village appealed for village status for 2 years. Their decision to reject an3
IRA government, based on what was considered to be sound reasoning at the time,
hindered their pursuit of Native village status under ANSCA. Eyak Village finally won3
recognition and the right to have land conveyed in 1974 (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS
Office 1979:37).3
1.For Eyaks this was a gain, since they had previously been disenfranchised and
enveloped in a non-Native area as its poorer class:I
We used to be segregated: Eyak Village and Cordova. The
Native Village of Eyak was recognized by the Department of the
Interior. Land claims [under ANCSA] forgot about Eyak Village,I
so they had to meet with them and get recognition. We had to
have 'Whites and Natives testify. We had to fight hard for it.3

It was a problem. We had no IRA government. You have to
jump through the hoops of the Federal Government to be an IRA3
government.
The last statement demonstrates that some local Anglos, whatever their motives,3
supported Eyak's fight for Native status.



Cordova - Page 198

The Eyak struggle for recognition, however, occurred conjointly with a battle
against annexation by the City of Cordova. Shortly after the 1971 passage of ANCSA,
Cordova attempted to annex the Eyak area, then known as "Old Town." Eyaks objected
strenuously, and their incorporation was carried out after a long dispute which was finally
settled by the Alaska State Legislature in 1972 (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office
1979:37). Eyak respondents are still bitter over their appropriation by the City of
Cordova:
They took our land. Not much from Eyak. We're in Chugach
National Forest. So it was all Federal land anyway. But the city
took us through annexation. We just own our two buildings. Now
our two cemeteries are city-owned. Fortunately, the Russian
Church owns their church's land ...

We were incorporated by Cordova against our wishes.. Eighty-five
percent voted "no" on that. So our only sovereign lands are where
our Council Buildings are. And there are corporation lands.

During this time Eyak fought both the city and the USFS in a series of litigations.
The USFS aligned with the Cordova Chamber of Commerce on many issues. The USFS
fought Eyak's recognition under ANCSA, maintaining that Eyak did not qualify for lands
under the Act's provisions (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:37). In original
hearings and an a ppeal over annexation in 1974, testimony in support of Eyak's status
focused on Native commitment to their community and a history of segregation and
prejudice which they had endured at the hands of those who now wanted to appropriate
th em. Eyaks felt that their recognition as a separate village had been hampered by this
segregation and prejudice (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:37).
For instance, Eyaks cited a history of discrimination against Native workers by the
canneries. Testimony before,the Native Claims Appeal Board over Eyak's village
designation claimed that the village's decline was related to hiring practices which
favored Chinese over local Eyak laborers (U.S. Forest Service vs. Village of Eyak,
Recommended Decision and related summary of testimony, ANCAB # VE 4-89, p.12' as
cited in USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:55).
Cordova - Page 199

In addition to favoring Chinese over Native workers, the canneries alsoU
discriminated against Natives by not promoting them (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office
1979:55). This system of discrimination in the canneries was still in place in 1979, when
hiring practices and training programs appeared minimal (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS
Office 1979:55). Currently, the canneries employ many Filipino workers; some Natives
work in the canneries, but salaries are low compared to earnings from fishing.
While the canneries may have favored non-Hyak workers in hiring, leading to a
village decline, Eyak employrnent in non-Native enterprises such as canneries and copper3
mines may have contributed to personal declines in health for some. Many older Eyak
respondents recounted work in canneries and mines from early childhood, under less3
than ideal conditions:
I started working in the cannery when I was eight and a half years
old, until I was 63. Then there was an ammonia leak in the bigI
freezer where they packed crabs and fish, and it got into my lungs
and I got asthma. Our tears were just coming out in the bone
picking room. They put up canvas, but it came in just the same.
They didn't pay me. I never even thought of suing. Never heard
of suing peopl'e before. The doctor made me quit working. It's
easier now; before, it's mostly hard work.

Eyak Corporation sued the USFS in 1976 for removing gravel from their lands1
without prior consultation. The suit was settled in U.S. Circuit Court, with Eyak
Corporation's written consent established as required prior to gravel sales during the
freeze on Eyak selections (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:37).I
Chugach Region also carried out lengthy negotiations over their land conveyances.
T'hey contended that 60 percent of their original land entitlement, if within the Chugaclh3
National Forest boundary, would have been in "deficiency lands" (glacial ice and snow,
inconsistent with a coastal people's aboriginal land claim) because of prior State
selections (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:38). In 1975 Chugach Natives, Inc.
filed litigation against the Secretary of the Interior, settling out of court in 1977.1
Cordova - Page 200

Land freezes related to stalled conveyances to Chugach Region and to the Eyak,
Tatitlek, and Chenega corporations caused frustrations and dissension between Native
and non-Native residents (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:77).
The Cordova Chamber of Commerce support for USFS opposition to the Chugach
effort to exchange land in Chugach National Forest generated controversy (USDO1,
BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:60). The splitting into local factions over this issue
echoes dissensions over 1989 negotiations with Exxon. The Cordova Chamber of
Commerce, unlike many, is small and was often attended more by local government and
media workers than by business owners in 1979 (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office
1979:59). Some respondents in- 1991 described the Chamber as a "small tea party,"
consisting of the president and her supporters, rather than being a group representing
local business interests. So, Native-White relations here could be represented as more
multi-faceted than a simple dual. division between traditional Natives and Anglo
Cordovan entrepreneurs.
Ongoing interference by State and Federal regulators in the status of Eyak lands
still evokes anger:
Environmentalists want to make Prince William Sound a
wilderness area. That would deny subsistence use. It would
deplete hunting and fishing. They're trying to make Native owned
land into wildemness. That's encroachment.
II.F. Eyak-Anglo Social Relations
Relations between the Eyak and non-Native comnmunities are characterized by
pressure cooker stresses (with some lack of cohesiveness in the Native community).
Extensive intermarriage and a more simnilar lifestyle in recent times have mitigated
interpersonal differences between Natives and non-Natives while inter-group tensions
remain.
The ANCSA caused new stresses between Eyaks and non-Natives. Rapid
organizational changes mandated by the Act were paired with torpid land conveyance,
and no lands were conveyed from 1971 to 1978 (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office
1979:93). Disputes over land entitlements in'clude concern over hunting and fishing
Cordova - Page 201





rights, annexation of Eyak lands within the City of Cordova, illegal gravel extraction onI
Eyak lands in 1976-1977, and disagreements over land management plans. These have

been addressed in the courts but have resulted in social tension and an absence of land
conveyance.
The USFS opposition to Eyak's village designation and to Chugach Region's land
exchange proposal (to compensate the Region for an excessive amount of glacial3
designated lands) increased social tension between the Eyak Corporation and groups that
supported the USFS, most notably the Chamber of Commnerce (USDOI, BLM, Alaska
OCS Office 1979:94).
Major Native-Anglo tensions in 1991 include: (1) Native fears that oil development3
will result in destruction of their environment (and therefore their subsistence practices;
(2) negotiations with Exxon over spill comnpensation; (3) fear and uneasiness over3
enforced incorporation and the policies of a non-Native corporate management; (4)
conflicts over clearcutting timber; (5) resentment of Federal and State interference with3
traditional subsistence practices; (6) continuing bitterness and suspicion toward the
USFS; (7) anger from city jurisdiction over Natives (stemming from Cordova' s3
annexation of Eyak village); and, (8) resentment that Natives do not have an equal voice
in city government.3
Discrimination and Se2reffation: Prior to the 1950's, racial distinctions were made
on the basis of different fishing styles, different church affiliations, different residence3
patterns, and income differences. The relative poverty of Natives reinforced social
segregation (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:79).3
From about 1940 to 1955, segregation in the community included discrirmination in
the canneries and in the schools. This has been reduced somewhat in recent times with3
an end to formalized segregation, the ANCSA settlement, and a more year-round fishery
with a local cannery work force (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979).3
The first school for Native children in the Cordova area was established in 1925
and located in Byak. It operated until the 1950's when it was closed in order to begin3
integrated programs. Still, residents in 1979 complained that recent tracking programs


Cordova - Page 202

had produced de facto segregation with under -representation of Natives in gifted
programs (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:93).
A grant for cultural heritage programs in the schools was a provision of ANCSA,
but these programs are not conspicuous in Cordova. As noted, Eyak leadership is
pursuing grants for cultural heritage,classes to be sponsored by their non-profit
corporation. In a 1991 interview, the new community college dean, a Native American,
expressed his appreciation of cultural differences and their importance to education.
-The passage of ANCSA, and the political activism which it spurred, may have
caused Native resentments over past discrim-ination to surface:
While the conveyance of lands opens the door to new hope and
potential prosperity to come, it also opens a flood gate of old
resentments and anxieties locked behind the appearance of docility
and accommodation for generations (USD01, BLM, Alaska OCS
Office 1979:62).

Respondents in 1991,recounted their anger over past prejudice and segregation
such as restaurant signs saying, "No Natives or dogs allowed." Eyaks resent stereotypic
attitudes about Native abilities and potential:
In the public schools they were punished for speaking Eyak. After
the spill a reporter called and asked how much Native I was. I
said half. She asked where I learned English. I said school and
college. She was amazed I was fluent.

There's stereotyping again. When Russia sold Alaska to the U.S.
we were classified as "uncivilized savages...

The book The Eyak Legends is integrated with Aleut. We speak
-  Aleut. I can understand Yupik from the Yukon River. The
legends: that was discovered in Copenhagen. I never heard those
stories when I was growing up.

We knew about how we came here and about life at Nuchek. And
how Eyaks married with Aleuts . ..
Cordova - Page 203





..In the 1940's or so they closed the BIA schools and assimilatedI
us into the public schools. It was the early 1940's. My father was
white so I had to go to White schools. It was good because I
learned to fight.
It was discrimination, boy. Those of us with White fathers had to
go to public schools. At that time the restaurants had signs: "No
Natives or dogs allowed." You had to sit in the balconies at
movies. There was segregation until; I don't know when they quit.3

There's really no date because to this day there's underlying
prejudice. There's one state trooper who doesn't like Natives. He
made that statement once. He's not a "local," but there's a lot of
discrimiination by the locals too.

Social stratification has decreased somewhat in recent times. For instance, inI
Cordova as a whole, a powerful fishery-cannery group has two stratifications:3
(1) successful fishermen and cannery superintendents; and (2) less prosperous fishermen
and cannery workers. Natives are found in both groups (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS3
Office 1979:69).
There are strong unifying factors acting on the two cultures. An early Eyak3
willingness to intermarry has continued, and presently only two full-blooded Eyak
speakers are still alive. Extensive kin and friend relations with non-Natives mitigate3
social stresses considerably. The current lifestyle has grown more homogeneous, as a
fishing economy supplemnented by subsistence harvesting is embraced by both Natives3
and non-Natives. As one resident explained:
The lifestyle 30 or 40 years ago was considerably different3
primarily due to economics .. .. I expect today we're sort of
pretty well amalgamated ... I'm not sure whether. ... which
direction the assimilation has flown (testimony, U.S. Forest Service3
vs. Eyak Village, July 16, 1974, cited in USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS
Office 1979:79).

The above statement, that assimilation may have been in the direction of a Native
way of life, is noteworthy.3




Cordova - Page 204

While inter-group resentments are still expressed, along with Eyak internal
divisiveness, confusion, and some sense of futility, Cordovans, in general, feel a strong
unity and interdependency with each other. The propensity for intermarriage has
established intercultural kin re-lations, and substantial solidarity is based on a common
lifestyle and isolation within a wilderness area. Some Anglo statements reflect their
cultural biases, such as references to Native backwardness, equating Native culture to the
past and so forth. On the other hand, many non-Native Cordovans appear to hold purely
positive sentiments and respect for Native residents. Comparing Cordova to many towns
in America's rural West, ignorance and prejudice are less pronounced.2-
II.G. Political and Econonice Relations: Cordova-Eyak
After suffering a long history of disenfranchisement, prejudice, and discrimination,
Eyaks had to battle the USFS and the City of Cordova over their village status and
entitlement for land conveyances under ANCSA. Loss of population and cultural
identity brought about by their early relations with non-Natives were cited by non-
Natives as reasons to deny their claims to Native village status and land.
As noted, Eyaks are extremely bitter over their annexation by the city. This is seen
as a single step in a long history of White confiscations:
I was born in Eyak Village by the lake. The name Eyak [for the
lake] carne from the Eyak Indians. It's Aleut for "the mnouth of the
river.'"

When the railroad went in, they took the Eyak Indians from up
near Abercrombie Canyon and moved them to Alganick and then
to the shore, where McLoughai  Traier Court is. So this area
became "Old Town." We've been here since the late 1800's when
the smallpox and other epidemiics hit Nuchek. People came here
and went to Tatitlek, and so on.

In 1971 the City of Cordova annexed us against the protests of 85
percent of the people in "Old Town."



~If the observations in this section appear equivocal, it is because we found the dynamics of Eyak-Anglo
social relations to be so.
Cordova - Page 205






In economic and political terms, Eyak relations with the City of Cordova areU
characterized by a lack of Native political voice in city government, while Native funds
contribute to the economiic health of the area. This economic contribution was never
referred to by non-Native informants in 1991, although past city leaders have shown an
eagerness to take advantage of it. While Natives do not serve on the Cordova City
Council, non-Native council members have served on the Eyak and Chugach boards of
directors (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:70; respondent communications 1991).
State funds targeted for the Native population have benefitted the City of Cordova.3
One Byak traditional leader who was instrumental in forming the Eyak corporations
described how Cordova's city manager sought his help in bringing a State housing facility3
to the city:
When they first started the corporation, we went to Anchorage and
went to a lawyer. I had to m'ake up a speech saying why weI
wanted this, but there were so many people we could -only talk for
12 minutes. They kept the IRA government.3

.... The city manager called ine and said, "We want to start
sormething here. We want [State] Housing here. For the old
people. We want jobs, money for the people. So we're sending
some people to Juneau.

So I want you to go with them and make a speech, why we needI
this. Answer questions. He said, "There's lots of old people
among the Native population and we canet get jobs here. We're
some of the last ones left, and we can't get enough help." He said
to explain the Native side.

I said anything that's good .. . We got Sunset View started [Eyak
Manor, or Sunset View Apartmnents, State of Alaska Housing
Authority]. We got some jobs for old people, working for the city.I
Tley tried to hire me first.

Native funds helped establish the PWSAC (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office3
1979:56). PWSAC was founded in 1974, aided by the City of Cordova, the City of
Valdez, local Native corporations, and seed money from a loan from Chugach Region,3
Inc. Members of the CDFU contributed $.02 per fish, with matching funds contributed


Cordova - Page 206

by local processors. The PWSAC's first 5 years of operation were based primarily on
local funding.
In 1991 Eyaks appeared politically segregated, almost as if they had not been
annexed by the city. This is despite a substantial presence of the Eyak population,
especially during the off season. Because Natives tend to stay in Cordova during much
of the winter, winter residence was estimated as about 25 percent of the population in
1979 (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:63); informants cited sinilar estimates in
1991.
Former apathy of Eyak residents is thought to have given way to more activism
regarding Native issues after ANCSA (see USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979), but
this activism did not appear to spread into non-Native city government. However, one
Native representative was appointed to the Oil Spill Response Commnittee in 1989, some
time after it had begtn operating, showing some belated city recognition of Native
concerns as a minority voice. Joint participation in other areas (such as feasibility studies
for development) are described in Sec. I.A.6 Cordova's Economy.
II.H. Effects of the 1989 Oil Spill
Both Eyak and Chugach corporations have claims pending against Exxon. Chugach
Alaska Corporation filed suit against Exxon in U.S. District Court on April 19, 1989.
Plaintiffs included Eyak Corporation, Tatitlek Corporation, Chenega, and Port Graham
Development (Cordova Times, August 31, 1989:7). The North Pacific Rim, Inc. filed suit
against Exxon in U.S. District Court on April 19, 198-9, on behalf of Eyak Native Village
and others in the region (Cordova Times, August 31, 1989:7).
While Eyak~ spokespersons declined to detail the economnic effects of the 1989 oil
spill due to pending litigation, leaders did direct me to individuals who could explain
cultural and social concerns.
Eyak government leaders complained that after the 1989 oil spill Exxon simply
refased to recognize their Native group. The oil company took the position that
Cordova Natives were not adversely affected by the oil spill, and, consequently, refused
to provide food and services which were provided for Natives elsewhere:
Cordova - Page 207





During the "Oiled Mayors" study, Exxon declared that we were not
"impacted." (It's a new word: impacted.) So they didn't provide
to us the same services that they did to others, like fuel or food. I
heard that in Valdez they brought groceries and no one used them,
so they had to throw them in the trash. There are people here
that could have used that food.3
We're filing a claim with Exxon. All that is secret because of the
litigatio.n.3

Exxon omitted Eyak Village when the company held presentations during July of
1989, to inform Native Alaskans that the oil spill had not "negatively impacted theirI
health and food supply" (News release from Exxon Company, U.S.A., July 31, 1989,
published in Cordova Fact Sheet, August 2, 1989:1). Exxon delivered shipments of fishI
during the sunumer of 1989, to Tatitlek and Port Graham, but not Eyak Village (Oil Spill
Chronicle, ADEC and Alaska Governor's Office, September 19, 1989, as cited inI
Cordova Fact Sheet, September 26, 1989:3).
Hyak leaders, accustomed to being overlooked through experience with FederalI
agencies who had denied t hem Native status under ANCSA, agitated for recognition.
One promninent leader voiced Eyak concerns to the media and to FederalI
representatives. She cited adverse effects (discussed in more detail below) such as social

disruptions, econornic impacts, corporate and govemrnment disruptions due to lost office
space, loss of Native foods, and fears for the future. This person, like other Eyaks, views
the intentions and abilities of public representatives to understand Native concerns with
considerable cynicism:3
After the spill I was chosen as a spokesperson to see Dan Quayle.
I told him I was quite insulted that he only gave us 20 minutes,
when he gave the press an hour.3

I said, "We've been here for hundreds of years. Our lineages go
back here that far. We are all related to each other here. WeI
have been here for centuries, and you only gave us 20 minutes. It's
iusulting."

'Me Federal Government doesn't recognize our claim, but the
State does.3
Cordova - Page 208

There was terrific social impact. We had our offices taken away
from us. Our prices went up. We felt invaded. People who f~ely
on Native foods from other areas don't get them as much, and are
worried about what they eat ....

I went on [a nationally broadcast television talk show] as a
spokesperson after the spill.

Natives (like non-Natives), were particularly indignant that a corporate entity, in
the form of Exxon's agent VECO, could overwhelm them within their own home
territory evicting them from their offices:
When the spill just star.ted, everyone was taken over by the oil
spill, when that big money came to town. They took all the offices
away from people. They thought they'd need more people on the
staff for mental health. We were told to move out, that they
needed our office. Now Eyak village is building a new office.

The Eyak government could not regain their office space, due to increased rental
prices after the oil spill. The Eyaks were forced to find funding to construct a new
building, which they now must maintain. As a result, Eyak govemnment files were placed
in storage and unavailable for 2 years; some were destroyed when water leaked into the
bottom of the filing cabinets.
After the spill we couldnt get office space for less than $800-1,200
a month. They took over our small office that was $300 a month.
So we had to build this new office. We got grants, and now we
have to maintain. the building.

Our files were in storage for 2 years. So we're going through it all
now. It's bringing back so much history.

The health representative and family service representative will
mnove in here this month. As soon as we get a sewer.

Eyak officials and Native persons in spill-related positions were much more likely
than non-Natives to cite health effects due to the oil spill or cleanup work. This may be
because non-Native Cordova fishermen are extremely anxious that the public view fish
from Prince William Sound as uncontanminated. Eyak leaders received complaints of
Cordova - Page 209





mental and physical health effects on spill workers; some were suspicious becauseU
persons injured in cleanup work were not treated locally:
First ResDondent:I
The mental part too: we had three in the hospital, mental cases. Some
of the spill workers showed me the sores on their necks and the fumes3
from working the spill. Three were affected.

Second ReSDondent:3
Funny, here: very few who were hurt on the cleanup were brought here.
They were taken to Anchorage.

First ReSDondent:
The three mental cases were~ from the trauma of seeing the animals
dying. The morning after the spill I got calls from the elderly saying, "I3
feel like someone has died, like a part inside me is gone."'

Intense cultural concerns were generated by the trespass of cleanup crews on
Native historical sites, as the president of Chugach Alaska Corporation describes:
Chugach's tangible cultural resources are -also being damaged.
Many such resources are fouled with the residue of the Exxon
Valdez. Others are inadvertently trampled or disturbed by Exxon's
hordes of beach crews. We are only beginning to wrestle with howI
these sites, important to our shareholders, can be restored
(Testimony before a Fisheries Subcommittee, House Merchant
Marine and Fisheries Committee, at a meeting held in Cordova onI
August 10, 1989; as cited in Cordova Fact Sheet, August 12,
1989:3-4).3

The Eyak Corporation published an August 13, 1989 resolution condemning the looting
of burial and historical sites by cleanup crews, demanding canc ellation of a planned3
displa by the Exxon Valdez Cultural Resource Program of stolen artifacts, and
demanding immediate return of all artifacts. The resolution notes the "complete lack of3
respect" inherent in such pilfering, which constitutes criminal theft:
WHEREAS, the Eyak Corporation board of Directors has been3
apprised of the planned display of archaeological material and
artifacts collected by the so-called Exxon Valdez cultural resource

program in the Prince William Sound; and



Cordova - Page 210

WHEREAS,the Eyak Corporation shareholders working on the oil
disaster cleanup effort have observed and reported to the Board
numerous acts of oil disaster workers being in possession of
artifacts, desecration by the same of our historical burial sites and
looting by the same of old sites of native habitation; and. ..

WHEREAS, there is a general lack of knowledge by the public
about the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act and that land so
conveyed is in fact private land and that removal of any objects or
artifacts is in fact criminal theft; and

W'HEREAS, these acts are further evidence of the complete lack
of respect and consideration for the Native peoples of the P-rince
William Sound and other Alaska Native coastal communities;

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that the Eyak
Corporation DEMAND that Exxon immediately: return al
artifacts found in the Prince William Sound and other Alaskan
Native coastal communities, CANCEL the display of
archaeological material collected by the Exxon Valdez Cultural
Resource Program scheduled for Monday, August 14, 1989, in
Valdez, Alaska, a-ad IMMEDIATELY institute and strictly enforce
a program for protecting our lands from pilferage and looting by
the oil spill disaster workers (Cordova Fact Sheet, August 15,
1989:2).

Cordova Natives generally scoffed at Exxon's assurances that their subsistence
foods were safe. Respondent statements from 1991 show continued alarm concerning
the quantity and quality of the Native food supply. Exxon press statements appear to
dissemble somewhat on this point:
Exxon has completed an information program t'o reassure Native
Alaskans that the oil spill in Prince Williarm Sound has not
negatively impacted their health and food supply.

The progranm, which was presented during July in response to
concerns raised in native villages, reached some 600 residents who
live in eight remote villages and depend on fishing as their primnary
food source. Villagers helped coordinate the meetings, which were
well attended and well received by local residents ...
Cordova - Page 211





During the meetings, Exxon officials urged residents to continueU
their subsistence food gathering, since mnore than 300 tests
conducted by the Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, and the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration showed no evidence of toxicity
in fish. Toxicological and industrial hygiene concerns were also
addressed during the i-nformation sessions ...
The presentations were reviewed and endorsed by a number of
organizations, including the State of Alaska Public Health Service,
the Alaska Oil Spill Commission, Kodiak Area Native Association,
the Alaska Native Medical Center Public Health Service, and3
North Pacific Rim (News release from Exxon Company, U.S.A.,
July 31, 1989, published in Cordova Fact Sheet, August 2, 1989:1).

Possibly, if audience members did not shout death threats at Exxon officials, as did
non-Native Cordovan fishermen who attended similar meetings, the above presentations3
appeared "well received." But Native press statements contrast sharply with E-xxon's rosy
depiction. The Chairman of Chugach Alaska Corporation c'omplained of many Exxon
failings (noted by Cordovan business owners elsewhere in' this report.
We were optiniistic this spring that we could establish a reasonable
working relationship with Exxon and its contractors.I
Unfortunately, Exxon has proven to be obdurate, intractable, and
exceedingly difficult to work with. Many of its early promises have
proven to be hollow rhetoric. Its reactions and responses to
proposals are painfully slow. ... Further, there is no consistency to.
its ultimate responses. Assurances given at one level are
frequently contradicted at another. The result is ever increasing
frustration and bitterness. (Testimony before a Fisheries
Subcommittee, House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee,
at a meeting held in Cordova on August 10, 1989; as cited in
Cordova Fact Sheet, August 12, 1989:3-4).

An Eyak leader echoed this frustration and bitterness in a resolution adopted
unanimously by approx-imately 3,000 Natives at an Alaska Native Youth Convention and
Elders' Conference held in Anchorage in October 1990 (The Cordova Times, November
1, 1990:4). The resolution stated that "our darkest nightmare came as none before [when
the Exxon Valdez spilled its] black tide of oil, gushing onto our beaches, fouling the



Cordova - Page 2121

clean waters, and threatening our land, animals, and birds" (The Cordova Times,
November 1, 1990:4). The resolution called for Alaskan Natives of Prince William
Sound to "support ... the Alaska Federation of Natives ... to ensure just compensation
for the damage from the Exxon Valdez oil spill" (The Cordova Times, November 1,
1990:4). It stated, "Exxon promised to make us whole again .... We want to be whole
again"' (The Cordova Times, November 1, 1990:4). The president of Eyak Corporation
stated for the press:
I'm trying to send a message to the oil company. They need to
come in and clean up their mess. We worked well with them in
the past, and we can work with them again in the fature. We don't
have time to spend in litigation day in and day out. It's time to
get on with our lives (The Cordova Times, November 1, 1990:4).

Exxon's urgings in July 1989, for Natives to "continue their subsistence. food
gathering" appear to be at odds with Federal and State data available at thetie2
For instance, the U.S. Food -and Drug Adininistration (FDA) reported in August
1989 that foods that looked or smelled oily were toxic (Cordova Fact Sheet, September
1, 1989:1-2). The study was based on thirteen samples of subsistence resources harvested
in May 1989 near Tatitlek, Chenega Bay, English Bay, and Port Graham. The FDA
cautioned that additional monitoring was needed (Cordova Fact Sheet, September 1,
1989: 1-2). The Federal report happily conformed with an earlier (May 5, 1989) Alaska
Department of Health and Social Services Bulletin urging that "if the resources smell or
taste of petroleum, they should not be eaten. If they appear clean by these methods,
they are almost certainly safe to eat" (Cordova Fact Sheet, September I,' 1989:1-2).
During this same time period, the State of Alaska Epidemiology Bulletin
(September 22, 1989) declined to endorse the safety of the food supply absolutely
alihough it projected a very low risk. The State here appears to hold the presumption,




26Federal and State studies were more optimistic than some other scientific studies (see Sec. III Effects of
the 1989 Oil Spill on the Fishing Community). A major flaw in such studies, according to some analysts, is that
very few harmful agents are tested for. The Federal study cited here tested for polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons
and aliphatic hydrocarbons; crude oil, let alone the agents used in the cleanup, contains thousands of chemicals.
Cordova - Page 213





consonant with Western scientific and legal ideology, that food is safe until it can beI
proved unsafe beyond a reasonable doubt:
Based on all information provided by experts and agencies to date,I
at this time we know of no constituents of the oil that are known
or suspected to accumulate in fish that might result in human3
illness or disease from eating the fish.

We are unable to provide absolute assurances at this time and are
working to have better information as our highest priority. As
more information becomes avaiable, we will provide additional
reports.

Toxicity to humans from exposure to crude oil, especially
weathered crude oil is very low ... There are many components,I
comprised of thousands of different chemnicals, in crude oil.
Human health concemns have focused most intensely on one
chemical family, aromatic hydrocarbons, because some of theI
chemicals in this family are known to cause cancer after long term
exposure to high levels, and the levels of aromatic hydrocarbons
can be measured accurately at very low levels (part per billion).I
Testing for arornatic hydrocarbons is a reliable way to detect
evidence of oil contamination in seafood and other subsistence
foods.

... Risk from exposure to aromatic hydrocarbons due to the oil
spill in food cannot be said to be zero, but the contribution to
levels of aromatic hydrocarbons in food not obviously
contaminated with oil as a result of the oil spill are so low as to
constitute no basis for public health concemn (Cordova Fact Sheet,I
September 30, 1989:1-2).

Despite State determninations of no public health concern, Natives were and continue toI
be afraid to eat subsistence foods.
A circle of sharing of Native foods between villages is a major factor whi ch ExxonI
officials ignored in assessing spill impacts, according to Eyak leaders. Because other
areas of the Sound were oiled, Cordova Natives were not able to get the subsistence
foods which they needed:





Cordova - FPage 214

There's a system of sharing of foods between the villages:
Chenega, Tatitlek, and Cordova. So we're impacted there. In
Chenega they have to go out 60 miles now to get seal, and even
then the livers seem contaminated. So they aren't getting as
many. ..

Tlere was real concern. They say we weren't impacted, but
because of sharing we were impacted.

Everyone was afraid of the food. For example no herring spawn in
Tatitlek, where we get it.

Deer were dying on Hawlins Island, because they were eating the
seaweed. Quite a few deer died. And that affected the meat for
that winter. The mussels and clams are still questionable, where
the oil hit. The livers contain all the toxin. They're not safe.

Respondents described their need for Native foods, unavailable after the spill, in
terms similar to Navajo descriptions of "mutton hunger." That is, people experience a
strong physical need for particular subsistence foods which cannot be satisfied by other
foods:
I really missed my Native foods after the spill. Lots of things I
would get before from relatives elsewhere. We'd get clams,
octopus, crab, shrimp, and herring. And we haven't gotten that for
the last two years. The last time I got herring was two years ago,
on March Ist. And the spill was March 24th.

I got some herring and brought it home and called some of the
elders and asked if they wanted some, and they said, "Would I
ever!" Kelp too because the elderly can't just go to the store and
get those things. They have to wait until somebody goes and gets
it for theim.

Roe-on-kelp doesn't taste the same now. We don' t eat the food.
We wonder: is it safe? The things that we're used to eating. I
always wonder.

..When you're used to eating those foods and you go without
them, then your body just craves them. Like the seal. For seal
you go to Chenega, way down on the Sound. My friends there
said, "I can't even remember the last time I ate seal. Before I used
.Cordova - Page 215






to send you seal from Chenega, now you have to send me sealI
from Cordova."

I think the spill kill-ed them all. Before the spill, whenever anyoneI
would come on the plane they'd bring pieces of meat for people.
But that's not the same now.

One of the newspapers said one of the ladies said they were tired
of eating chicken. Your body gets tired of the food you can eat in
the stores.
Another person, an elder, describes how a lack of subsistence foods would result in
physical illness:
I think people would get sick without [Native foods]. I would. I
get so hungry for them. I keep looking for some clams to satisfy
the old stomach. I told my cousin I was starving for clams.

To share Native foods       w    dlisan ethical imperative, based on a "spiritual unity"
among Natives in different villages as described in Section II.B. Cultural Identity. Below
an Eyak elder explains how this ethic assures survival in that what is shared will "come
back to us double." As often occurs in interviews with Eyak elders, the explanation is3
couched in a longer story. Implicit in the account is a perceived continuity and unity in
sharing of practices for subsistence food production; sharing as a mode of social
relations; and cultural ethical imperatives related to sharing. The oil spill, according to
this elder, disruipted all of the above by destroying wildlife. and so preventing Natives
from harvesting and sharing foods:
I never saw razor clams and butter clams since that time. I've
been talking to people. The people won't gather and talk about it.
And crabs too. They don't come around here anymore. We used
to go and fish for them. People are too scared of the oil now. We
eat lots of seal meat. And it doesn't taste the same. Ducks and
stuff: I never see ducks or geese going over anymore. And seaI
gulls are getting scarce.





Cordova - Page 216

If there were no Native foods: I'm lost without it, but you're
seared to eat them now. I can tell by the looks of the clams, but I
don't get any. I don't think people are hunting'. The rabbits like to
eat stuff that grows on the beach.

It's important for the people, for the animals to be well. Store
food is not the same as Nature's foods. The people lie Native
foods'. Even White people do . ...

Now nobody brings me anything because they're not eating them.
Like hooligans: nobody's bringing them and they should have been
here this month ...

Even now I can tell the Eyak smoker how long to smoke [fish]
before putting it in the jars. You have to pick the wood: green
alder has tar in it. You have to get the alders a year early and use
them the next year. If the bark is starting to come off, it's an old
tree, and that's the kind to cut. No green alders: that'll make you
sick. You see White people's smoke houses: they're all black
from the tar. You have to know your alders. If you don't know
them, cut them in the fall.

You need heat. Just smoke the fish so the bugs will stay off it,
then you need heat.

Aldrich is good too. Purple pine cones and pine nee dles. But you
hardly see those trees anymore. I've got one out here, but it's
dying.

And you don't burn it too fast. It gets too dry. Smoke fir one and
a half days, then a little heat. Put a tin between the fish and the
heat. If it's sunny take the fish out in the sun. It dries the fish.

Game is just as important to us now [as to past generations]. We
like it. I put up fish to give it away to my kids or to those that. like
it.

My friend got me a whole deer and I cut it all up and packaged it
for them. Before, when they catch king salmon they ask me which
one I want to salt and put up.
Cordova - Page 217






My friends look after us, the older people. The fishermen thinkI
we're gook luck. Fishermen always try to beat each other to give
me fish first. (That's White people's idea. It's cute.)3

Our idea is that if we give anything it will come back to us double.
It will always come back to you on your table.

Sharing is an essential aspect of Native social relations, and could not proceed
without subsistence harvesting:U
We always treat each other with somnething to eat. Beca-use
everybody cares for each other. ___'s parents never forget me3
if they've got cod fish that they know I like. And I share it with
others . ..

We take care of each other. People check up on mne. They know
I'm alive.
It would be harder to take care of each other if people wouldn't
hunt or fish anymnore.

If people could not carry out their social relations through sharing, personal
identities could be adversely affected; for instance, generosity could be replaced withI
greed:
Ouestio:
What would happen if there were no garne and no sharing?
Answer:3
It would be like a big war: what would be life?
Here we can live off the land--or we could before the spill. People who3
are so generous now, who want to share widely, they wouldn' t be so
generous then. Like I just got a call: someone wanted to share halibut
because sorneone had given it to them and wanted to share it widely ...I
Just like the salrnon: what would happen? Maybe everybody would
becorme greedy and wouldn't share. Just save it for myself.
..I've always thought: I'll get more. So I'll put this up for someone
else and share it.



Cordova - Page 218

I was brought up to share. My mother had ten kids. And when she died,
a lot of people cried with us.

Sharing of subsistence foods is recognized as integral to cultural traditions and
values, a fundamental part of life:
There's no seal in Tatitlek. Before the spill I'd get seal from
Tatitlek and take it to my daughter-in-law in Anchorage, and she
would send it to Port Graham to her mother. So see how far that
seal traveled? But I can't get any seal this year.

When you can't get those foods, your body craves it.

If's tied up with our traditions and values. Thaf's part of our life.
It's just tradition. When the herring hasn't come in: we just expect
it, this timne of year, we're going to eat herring. It's part of our life.

The ttaditional value of sharing Native foods widely also has spiritual connotations,
as "something deeper." Sharing widely creates and sustains social bonds which are
equivalent to kin bonds and as a respondent explains below, her mother directed, "It's
just like you're doing it for me." Life energies which are properly expended in
subsistence practices could become destructive in the void which would result if these
practices were denied to the people:
Some of the old-timers have said: "In my lifetime I'll never see
this again. I'll never be able to eat clams again from here."
I'm glad my uncle died the year of the spill. He was too old to
realize what had happened. He was 89 years old. And the food
Exxon gave to Tatitlek and Chenega was a waste. My'89 year old
uncle was given bags and bags and bags of beans. And what good
was that going to do? He had 24 boxes of cereal. He was sick,
and they brought all this food and left it in the middle of his floor.
He was overwhelmed. Relatives came and took aw'ay the food.

The people got so tired of chicken. Our bodies crave our own
food. That left a big part of their life gone, that summer.

And so many worked on the spill that they didn't prepare for
winter. Nobody put up food for winter, like we'd done all our
lives.
Cordova - Page 219






That year a part of the people was gone, inside, because they
couldin't go out and get their fish. Part of their life was gone.

There was one lady (it was in the paper) who usually fills. two
freezers, one for winter, and that year that freezer was empty.

So it was better Uncle was so sick he didn't realize what was going
on. Because he used to walk around the village a lot. And he'd
notice when the herring came in, and the ducks. They used to
walk around the point and get clams. But not anymore.

Ouestion:
Is sharing a spiritual thing?

Answer:3
I think so. It's something deeper. And we love to share.
Whenever I get somnething we share. When we get something it's
never just for me. If I get a piece of deer, I cut some up for anU
elderly woman in Anchorage. She thanks me. She's in her 70's.
And I do it because I know how it is to crave for something. I
recently sent her an ice chest full of meat and fish, jam,- bread. I
never go to Anchorage empty handed.

My mother taught me: no matter how tired you are, never say
"No" when someone brings you something. Always take care of it
and share it. Then your table will never be emnpty. If you always
feed other people, you'll never have to worry about food. SoI
whatever I get I share with lots of others. And then I get some
more.5

People who brought mne a seal were so surprised [to hear where I'd
taken it]: "That seal went that far?" I always take things to shut-
ins. Both our parents are dead, so I try to reach out to someone
else. Mom said, "It's just like you're doing it for me."
Ouest~~~~~~~~~ion
What would happen if there were no game?
Answer:
A part of our lives would be m-issing. We'd be craving something
we can't get. It would bring a void. There'd be more violence.5
Because people wouldn't be able to release their energies, that



Cordova - Page 2203

they use on hunting. Where would that energy go? It would be
turned into violence.

A day like today: they'd always go looking for seal.

Subsistence practices, engaging spiritual and kin values, are considered an integral
part of personal identity. Without these, one's identity would be fundamentally altered.
According to one Eyak'elder, deprivatio n of subsistence foods and practices could
jeopardize the existence of the people:
I think as long as there's oil around the beaches and grass, that the
animals will get sick. beer Rie to go on the beach and eat
seaweed.

It could- hurt everything. Nature as a whole.

Ouestion:
What would happen if there were no animals?

Answer:
I don't know what we'd do. We gotta have our own food.

Ouestion:-
Is it important to the culture?

Answer:
It's important to the people. Just like California: they're running
out of water. Sarne with us, with clams and other things.

Ouestion:
Do the game aniLmals hav'e a spiritual value?

Answer:
Yes, they have a spiritual value.

Ouestion:
What would happen if they all died?

Answer:
I don't know if the people could continue. I'm 79 years old and I
still want my own food.
Cordova - Page 221






We used to live out of town and get ducks, bears in their dens inI
March. Get any kind of fish. Now they hardly get any kind of
fish. Porcupine: people just throw them away. [Or use them] just
for earrings. That's not nice, because that's our food, too.
Ouestion:
Is it important to the identity of the people?

Answer:3
I would change if I didn't have my Native foods. I got seal meat
from Chenega and I'm afraid to eat it because it's oily.

I'm glad you came because I want to talk to somebody about this
spill. I can't go to meetings because I'm 80 percent blind.

The changes which could take place in personal identity without subsistence foods
and practices stem in part from personal qualities which are engaged, as noted above3
(generosity and altruism could become self-centered greed). The most frequent reason
cited for personal identity loss resulting from a deprivation of subsistence practices was3
that these are equivalent to personal identity because they are integral to culture:
The subsistence foods are a big part of the culture. We know
when we should be getting those things. The kids love thoseI


In some ways it's better this year, but we don't know how it'll be.
Or how it'll be fiv e and ten years from now. Will we even have
anything ten years from now?  How far will we have to go to getI
it? Will we be able to get it? It's hard, and you can easily get
very depressed. You have to take one day at a time. I could dwell
on that, but I can't do that. "Will we be able to get that? How will3
we be?"

Without those things, a part of us will be missing. Because we3
were raised that way.

Eagles in Chenega were grounded. One allowed itself to be3
picked up by the legs and head. There's something wrong with
those eagles.3





Cordova - Page, 222g

Particular concern was expressed for wildlife. Eyak respondents feel a special
kinship with animals, who are integral to their world, culture, and identity:
Ouestion:
Is there a kinship between the people and the animals?
Answer:
Yes. It's part of themselves. So a part of our life is gone if we
don't do those things.

Most Eyak respondents view animals as having spirits, with people responsible for
their welfare. This is in part because people, wildlife, and the earth are all critically
interrelated:
Ouestion:
Do the animals have spirits?
Answer:
The animals have spirits. I think so. I wish they would learn not
to eat the bad stuff now, that's fall of oil. I think they will go on
being hurt as long as they're full of oil. That's yet to be seen.
They're still finding dead deer around the Sound.

There's oil spilled all over now. Last week a pipe burst in Kenai.
Everything is against us here now ...

Question:
Does it hurt the people if the land is oiled?

Answer:
Oh yes. It's hurting animals. It's got to hurt people. People are
all responsible to care for the land. We watch the things like rats.
They have to be careful if they poison them, not to poison the
dogs, or the bears or nothing.

People will succeed in taking care of Nature and the animals.
People that eat seal are so used to it. Now they even can the seal
meat and blubber. We dry meat and smoke it. We didn't used to
have freezers. My mom used to put up seal meat, goat, sea gull
eggs. Everything is in seal oil..
Ouestion
What would happen if the animals died?
Cordova - Page 223





Answer:I
If more spills come the animals will die off. They won't make it fo
the mountain or hills. Like a brown bear will eat the deer meat
and that will hurt them and they'll die too. Mountains are not
affected, if no animals come back up.

Because of this critical interrelationship between humians and all aspects of nature, manyI
Eyaks believe that loss of one aspect of nature would entail loss of the whole: If you

lose on'e aspect you'll have a chain reaction.
Byaks expressed acute fears over the long-range consequences of oil toxicity, which
addressed both material health and cultural survival. Fears of culture loss are made
more poignant by the general Native view that one must experience nature in order to3
understand it. If aspects of culture are lost, descendants will never be able to know
them:     __     _3
Ouestion
Are all aspects of nature interrelated?I
Answer:
It was already proven by the oil spill. People were even scared to
eat deer. And maybe we did wrong to eat deer. Maybe we'll allI
get cancer. What will be left in 10-20 years, of our game? No one
knows.g

Or maybe the oil companies do know. But I don't know. Will my
grandchildren be able to eat any of the things I eat? Or just read
about it in books?
Ouestion:
How does a person come to understand nature?I

Answer:
You have to experience it. You can read about it, but it won't
mean anything unless you see it, taste it, hunt the deer, cut it up,
wash it, wrap it.

What good is a picture? There may be a lot that my grandson
won't be able to see.3
Cordova - Page 224

Summaxy: In summarizing cultural impacts of the 1989 oil spill, Eyaks assess very
high risks in environmental costs, past, present and future. Respondents describe all
facets of their world as a critically interconnected whole: if one aspect is destroyed, the
whole is jeopardized.
Because subsistence (used by Eyaks to refer to both specified foods and practices)
comprises a way of life for past as well as present generations, it also "connects" the
people to- their heritage. That is, the identity of past Eyaks is merged with that of
present Eyaks, since that identity comprises a single way of Iife which is inbred in both.
The resulting unity is conceptually merged with the earth, which cannot be distinguished
from its many aspects, wbich comprise subsistence, the Eyak way of life, and the Eyak
people (in terms of personal and communal identity). The reasoning is circular, in that-
everything is part of everything else.
Sharing, an aspect of a subsistence way of life, is another facet of this interrelated
whole. Sharing connects Native people with each other, both in a spiritual sense and in
terms of extending kidn ties. Sharing creates and sustains bonds which respondents
equate to kin bonds; those who share participate in a subsistence way of life which is
inborn in all of them and part of their identity; these persons are joined through a
spiritual unity; this subsistence way of life which they share entails spiritual values. As it
connects past and present Byaks, sharing "connects" people in such a way that their
identity is merged through a common spiritual way of life whiclh is innate in their "Native
blood."
Wildlife too is included in this interconnected system. Respondents perceive a
special kinship between humans and wildlife. When asked if there is a kinship between
people and animals, an Eyak elder explains, "Yes. It's part of themselves. So a part of
our life is gone if we don' t do those things." This statement dermonstrates a common
feature of Eyak interviews: respondents more frequently refer to subsistence (foods and
practices) as "our life" than "our way of life." Animals, like subsistence practices, are part
a "life" which comprises the peoples' experience, understanding, spirituality, community,
Cordova - Page 225






and identity. So, when oil toxicity threatens wildlife, it also threatens the "life" of theseU
people.
III. EFFECTS OF THE 1989 OIL SPILL ON THE FISHING COMMUNITYI
A key grievance concerning the aftermath of the- 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill was,
"Exxon was calling all the shots." The oil company "ran roughshod" over Federal, State
and local government agencies, as well as local residents, according to respondents.
Exxon's mnitigation of their losses was carried out completely at its own discretion, to
serve its own ends: respondents described a process in which Exxon continually had its
cake and ate it too. A paramount objection, for instance, was that Exxon substituted
spill cleanup costs for spill damage payinents. Another source of outrage was that, in
calculating settlements for fishermen, Exxon combined low harvest figures (based on past
catches) with low fish prices (based on the spill year which had a high harvest and weak5
market). Fish prices respond to a complex dynamic, but, in general, fishermen expect
low harv ests to generate higher prices and large harvests to produce lower prices. ForI
this reason, fishermen were furious that Exxon had it both ways by producing low
harvests and low prices.5
Cordova has depended on fishing for its existence since the collapse of the copper
mines and railroad in 1938-1939 (see Sec. I.A.1 Historical Overview). At present, most3
respondents support continued fisheries-related growth. During the 1970's, Cordova-
Eyak anticipated oil development associated with OCS exploration that did not occur,I
due to a redirection of lease-sale tracts further south (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office
1979:77). A polalrization of attitudes developed where fishing and enviromnmental3
concerns conflicted with prodevelopment aspirations. Resulting social tensions were
exacerbated by stresses arising from land freezes associated with stalled land conveyances3
to Native corporations under ANCSA (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:77).
Cordova was forced to plan for a potential 100-percent population increase, whileI
fishermen and others expended energy to. fight the proposed changes (USD0O, BLM,
Alaska OCS Office 1979:78). In the period 1976 to 1978, all municipal offices associatedI
with planning for major industrial development changed hands, and the community
Cordova - Page 226

became fragmented around land and development issues (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS
Office 1979:102).
Frustrations were high when projected oil development failed to materialize, as
both proponents and opponents lamented wasted expenditures of time and energy
(USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979,:77). Cordovan attitudes during this period
appear to have shifted away from non-fisheries-related growth. In a 1975 survey, 56
percent of the Cordovan area population stated that oil and gas development near
Cordova would be good for the community; by the 1977-1978 peniod, only 24 percent
said that such development should be strongly encouraged and 44 percent stated that it
should be discouraged (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:86-87).
Cordovans have long believed that their risks from oil development are
disproportionate to their benefits. Their environment, economy, and way of life are put
at risk by the pipeline terminal at Valdez with the main economic beneficiary being the
oil industry. As one city official and generally prodevelopment entrepreneur explains:
Oil development is not good for Cordova. It's good for Alyeska,
but Cordova gets little benefit from it. As long as the pipeline is
flowing and they're drilling ANWR, we're at risk all the time. We
get all the risk and no benefit.

We found out that they can spill 11 million gallons on you and no
one comes to your aid. There was no set up mechanismn. We had
to fight for every bit of response and funding, from everyone.

Then Exxon came in and it was like we were occupied. They took
over the government. You couldn't fish, so it changed the whole
lifestyle.

They refused to pay for any social problems (mental health, for
instance). They said, "That's not our department."

After the oil spill, Cordovans assumed mnajor risks entailed by Exxon's spill cleanup:
equipment risks, health risks, and legal liabilities associated with the status of
independent contractor.




Cordova - Page 227





Respondents believe that they have been portrayed in media coverage of the spillI
aftermath as a "bunch of complainers." Respondents are bitterly resentful of their
treatment by Exxon, and they consider their complaints justified. Many believe that the
Federal Government serves primnarily the oil industry, to the detriment of Cordova.
Cordovans view State government in a. more positive light, but believe that it cannot
control big oil interests.
Cordovans predicted a disaster such as the Good Friday oil spill when they sued
the Department of the Interior to stop the pipeline terminal in Valdez, and respondents
in 1991 were quick to point this out. In 1971 the Cordova District Fisheries Union (now
the Cordova District Fisheries United) (CDFU) supported other suits in contesting
permits and right of way provisions needed to construct the TAPS (USDOI, BLM,
Alaska OCS Office 1979:33). The CDFU, with the Wilderness Society and other
environmental groups, appealed a U.S. District Court order favoring the Department of
the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, State of Alaska, and Alyeska Pipeline Service3
Company (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:34). The CDFU challenged the right
of these groups to grant permits in violation of Congressional requirements for pipelineI
corrdors, questioned the Department of Agriculture's right to allow special land use
permnits within a National Forest, and contested the adequacy of a Federal3
Environmental Impact Statement which, they argued, should have supported an
alternative route through Canada (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:34).
Ile Cordovan fishermen pursued their legal action to the Supreme Court and won.
In response, Congress adjusted pipeline legislation in 1973, which President Nixon signed3
(Payne 1991:7). The CDFU continued to, seek power over their fishing environment, put
at risk by the oil pipeline, through exercising some control in permiit granting decisions:I
CDFU officials participated in subsequent decisions by the Alaska Coastal Zone
Management and the chairman of CDFU occupied the only Alaska seat on the nationalI
Coastal Zone Management Advisory Committee (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office
1979:34). One lesson learned frorn the Federal suit, according to informants in 1991 was3




Cordova - Page 228

that, permit powers notwithstanding, the Federal Government supported the oil industry,
which was virtually unstoppable.
The fear that Cordova would be destroyed as a result of the 1989 oil spill was
prevalent in 1991. Many expressed anger that they were not listened to 20 years before
when, in testifying before Congress when it overturned CDFU's Supreme Court victory,
Cordova fisherman Ross Mullins said, "Cordova stands a chance of becoming a ghost
town"' in the event of an oil spill (Cordova Times, April 5-6, 1989:A3). During the
1970's, Alyeska representatives assured that a major oil spill would not occur, and that if
it did the oil companies would prevent serious environment al impacts. These empty
guarantees have reinforced contemporary misgivings about oil development. A CDFU
officials explained:
I'm not in favor of oil development, the pipeline, and so forth, but
I'm realistic enough to k.now it won't go away.
CDFU fought the pipeline and won in court. So Congress voted it
in, with Spiro Agnew casting the tie vote. CDFU wanted the
pipeline through British Columbia. The suit was going on in 1971
and 1972, probably in the U.S. District Court in Anchorage.

There was testimony before a Congressional hearing, where a
fishermen used the examnple of a 250,000 barrel oil spill at Bligh
Reef. There was a 240,000 barrel spill at Bligh Reef .. .

The suit was against the Department of Interior and Department
of Agriculture. We won in court and lost in Congress.

On oil development, like ANWR,~CDFU has no formal position.
But I think people (and myself) are feeling uneasy about it because
of their claims that there'd be no spills and no envirounmental
damage, and there was.

They said they could clean it up and they didn't. We're too quick
to look for mnore oil and too slow to explore our energy policy.

Respondents generally expressed more positive views towaxd the cleanup efforts of
-State agencies than Federal agencies or Exxon, as described below. In efforts to stop the
oil terminal at Valdez, however, Cordovans viewed State government as an adversary:
Cordova - Page 229





Many people here knew this would happen someday. And weI
fought and fought against that. They kept saying they'd take care
of it if something happened, but they weren't prepared .. .3

Years ago, when we were fighting the pipeline, and we were
worried about the Sound, we fought them. But we couldn't.
You're talkng about big money against a handful of fishermen.
A group of fishermen went to Juneau to express their concerns.
But they were told not to step on too many toes, because you're
dependent on the state, as a city, for a lot of things.

After the spill we had a meeting at the high school, and one of the
Coast Guard said, "I think our record is great. A spill only
happened once in 12"yers.

I couldn't believe he said that. It shouldn't have happened at all.
But we're all at fault because nobody made sure we were3
prepared.

Valdez said they had the necessary equipment for a spill; whereI
was it? Was there ever any equipment?

... They prormised to clean the beaches and they didn't. I've gotI
that on tape. They did everything they knew, which wasn't much.
They'd never really thought about a spill. And then they tried to
put the blame on one man: the captain. It's not all his fault.
Local newspapers printed a letter from a Colorado resident in the weeks after the
1989 oil spill, which is quoted here in part because it summarizes the views of many
Cordovan respondents in 1991:
EXXON LOOKING AT BOTTOM LINE

To the Editor:3

I am writing to the good citizens of Valdez as one who has
experience dealing with Exxon. There are a couple of things you
need to keep in mind while dealing with Exxon. From my
experience in Rifle, Colorado, I believ'e that they will do whatever
is best for their bottom line. They will tell you that they areI
* concerned for people and the environment and they will have
smooth-tongued P.R. persons saying it, but don't you believe it!u


Cordova - Page 230

The federal government will be of very little help since Exxon is
such a big multi-national company. They command more federal
respect than most nations. Your best bet is to get your local
government officials who grant any permits to oil companies for
the pipeline to hold those permits hostage until Exxon cleans up
their-mistake to your satisfaction and be mindful of the human and
social costs to your community. You may have to pressure all oil
companies to get to Exxon, as they often hide behind each other.

The old axiom that I found most true in dealing with Exxon is that
if their lips are moving, they are lying (combined issue, Valdez
Vanguard, April 5, 1989 and Cordova Times, April 6, 1989:B2).

Cordovans had already tried and failed to exercise permit powers in their suit.
That Cordovans had already acquired some savvy in negotiating with the oil industry is
often reflected in submissions to their publication, Tle Cordova Fact Sheet. I cite this
publication frequently below because it reflects local perceptions of the unfolding of
events during the aftermath of the oil spill. This daily fact sheet was published by the
City of Cordova (which held complete editorial control) under direction of the Oil Spill
Disaster Response Committee and the Oil Spill Disaster Response Office. The
publication was a service initially provided by the city to VECO, Inc., at a cost not to
exceed $650 per day. The city subcontracted with Connie Taylor of Fathom Graphics,
Cordova to reproduce and distribute the fact sheet, with the editor of The Cordova
Times editing (Cordova Fact Sheet, June 9, 1989:2).7
Citations from 1991 interviews echo concerns expressed in the Cordova Fact Sheet,
and show how conflicts arising from the oil spill and cleanup have remained
consequential over the past 2 years.



2Connie Taylor, widely described as an Exxon supporter, announced at an August 1989 meeting of the Oil
Spill Response Committee that Fathom Graphics would stop printing the Cordova Fact Sheet because it was
putting out press releases and "stories" which she felt belonged in the local newspaper. She also recommended
that the committee stop faxing the public-ation to various offices outside of Cordova. Another city official
responded that the Fact Sheet "has been an effective tool to get Cordova's story out to our elected
representatives and various agency people..." (Cordova Times, August 31, 1989:A4). The city continued daily
publication of the Fact Sheet through September 1989 and resumed publication from February to October 1990
on a less frequent basis.
Cordova - Page 231





The emotional impact of the environmuental destruction caused by the oil spill
probably cannot be fully grasped by outsiders. Some Cordovans viewed the spill as
potentially bringing about "the end of the w'orld as we know it" (Cordova Times, MarchI
29-30, 1989:A3). Certainly, many Cordovans did not appear to be beguiled by Exxon's
"smooth-tongued PR persons." For instance, according to one respondent:I
People here weren't mean to the Exxon and VECO employees.
They were just people doing their jobs.
Ouestion:
Weren't there death threats shouted at Exxon representatives?I

Answer:
Oh yeah. At the first town meeting, some people did jeer at
Exxon and shout death threats. But later, no one blamed the
employees.I

T'he trauma appeared fresh in Cordovan's minds in 1991:
Color our' world black. I was nursing my son at the time, and myI
milk stopped. It blew our faith in how things work.

It was so hard to see grown men crying their eyes out. The men3
who went out to see it, tough fishermen, came back with gray
faces, tears streaming down. That was the hardest thing for me to
see.I
There's no counting the emotional cost, it's still costing. We don' t
tr-ust the capacity of the Sound to support our lives anymore. YouI
can't count on anytbing anymore ..

Many respondents hold a spiritual view of Prince William Sound which makes theI
environmental destruction all the more devastating.

Ouest                                                                                  i o
Do wilderness and nature's resources have a spiritual value for
you?I
Answer:
Yeah. I seriously believe that. I was born and raised in Cordova.
And spent all my life in the outdoors. I live here because I can
step out my door and be in the wilderness. I grew up turning over


Cord ova - Page 232

rocks to see sea critters. And after the spill: to go out and turn
over rocks and see oil oozing out--it really affects me. It's re4l
spiritual ...

And there's still a lot of oil on the beaches and rocks in places
where Ex,xon drove by and called it clean. Buit the oil is right
beneath the surface. And there are sheens across the water.
Exxon is just interested in PR and public imnage. They say if's gone
and are deliberately misleading the public.
111.A. First Response
Exxon and Alyeska's first response to the catastrophic oil spill was no response,
according to Cordovans. The oil consortium effectively blocked the initial responses of
Cordovan fishermen, who were organized and ready to protect Prince William Sound.
Especially galling for respondents was Alyeska's rationale for refusing to let Cordovan
fishermnen prevent the early spread of oil: the oil companies reportedly did not want to
incur the "liability" of using "amateurs." (Exxon later treated these amateurs as
independent contractors for the spill cleanup, forcing them to undertake accompanying
legal liabilities.) A CDFU. official recalls:
CDFU was the central focus for the fishermen's response. The
first response was to begin accumulating a list of boats to fight the
spill. But we were rejected by Alyeska.

I started to call them at 7 a.m. Their emergency number was busy.
f finally got a command center number at 9 p.m. They said they'd
call and didn't. Finally, I got sorneone and they said they couldn't
afford the liability of using amateurs.

We were also calling ADEC [Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation]. Finally, I got a call from DEC. By
Saturd'ay evening, March 25, DEC called and said they'd heard we
had boats. Could we dispatch four boats? I had 100 boats on call.
So they said to send four boats to Valdez.

The four boats that went (Sunday was Easter) got caught in the
storm. They just holed up in Valdez. DEC finally put them boom.
tending around the tanker. They came back and said they weren't
effective. The booms were not keeping the oil in at all.
Cordova - Page 233





But we got a toe in the door. Alyeska and Exxon were stillI
ignoring us.

Then DEC called and said the San Juan Hatchery was in jeopardy.I
Could we send 15 boats? They called at 7 a.m., and we got them
out in a couple of hours. Out in the boats. Nobody cared if they'd
get paid.
By then Exxon and Alyeska wanted to use us, a few boats.I

While the State agency (ADEC) was reportedly more responsive than Exxon and
Alyeska, mnany Cordovans complained that the Federal Government acted as a lackey of3
the oil consortium. Informants believe that the USCG backed up Exxon's refusal to
incur the insurance liability for an immediate local response:3
We learned some hard lessons. The Coast Guard doesn't work for
us. They work for oil and Bush and major powers that ran the3
United States. I used to think the Coast Guard worked for us, on
our tax moneys, to protect our lives. But they don't.
..Exxon blew the cleanup in the first three good-weather days
after the spill. They could have put a bounty on oil. There were
fishermen who would have gone out and sucked it up. They could1
have burned it off right away. Alyeska could have been prepared.
They never intended to clean up an oil spill.

Exxon wouldn't let the fishermen in with their suckers on'the boats
because of insurance'liability. So the Coast Guard kept them out.
Those fishermen would have put their lives on the line to save theI
Sound..
Bush had a "wait and see" attitude about Who would run the3
operation. There was no chain of command, and there was a
delay. The governor didn't have the power we thought he did.
The oil company wanted to run everything, and nobody trustedI
them. And when they were in charge they didn't know what to do.
It would be silly to be confident. We used to be naive. Now weI
don't trust.
Another respondent concurs with this characterization of the Federal Government asI
Ex.xon's flunky:

Cordova - Page 234

I have problemns with the Coast Guard. They weren't rigorous or
harsh enough on Exxon. They didn't make enough demands on
Alyeska or Exxon. With Alyeska the feds were just looking the
other way.
Alyeska: they were supposed to be the initial response. I was out
working there and their response was mninimal. They did nothing
for two days and that's another beef with the Coast Guard. They
should have made Alyeska act. But they were apathetic. So the
federal government is just as much to blame for the damage as
Exxon. The federal government should have regulated to prevent
the spill.

The state's hands were tied by the Coast Guard, who wanted to be
in charge. The State tried, under the circumstances.

Exxon tried to buy off complaints. They had no environmental
concerns; just economic concerns. They tried to pump mnoney in to
quiet complainants. They could have gotten cleanup equipment in
within hours of the spill or days, but they didn't. The cleanup was a
media show. The point was to hire all the people to buy them off.

Exxon did decide finally to use CDFU to organize their spill operations in
contracting boats for the spill cleanup. By mid-April the oil company had donated
$250,000 to CDFU, which was applied to overhead. However, this donation did not
deter CDFU officials from expressing their outrage at Exxon's dereliction in not
responding iimmediately to the spill:
Cordova District Fisherman United has sent letters to the editors
of local newspapers, the Anchorage Daily News, the Juneau
Empire and other press discussing the receipt of funids from Exxon
by CDFU. From the onset of the spill, CDFU aided the
deployment of fishing vessels volunteering to defend PWSAC's
hatcheries. Exxon subsequently offered these and other fishing
vessels paying contracts for their work. CDFU continued in the
dispatching of all vessels from Cordova, contracted and non-
contracted.
The receipt of the Exxon funds, $250,000, goes to support CDFU
office management expenses only. It has not softened CDFU's
resolve to bring attention to the delay in the oil cleanup that
Exxon and the Federal Government have demonstrated, and to
Cordova - Page 235





press for inimediate corrective action (Cordova Fact Sheet, April1
21, 1989:2) .21

A-n eloquent description of'the delay in spill response appears in CongressionalI
testimony by a CDFU official. After initi'ally ignoring the organized bid of Cordovan

fishermen to contain the spill, Exxon allowed a few of theni to boom off its tanker but
supplied them with boom that leaked. Meanwhile, Exxon officials reportedly began to
lie to the press, describing its tanker as boomed off when it was not. According to one
respondent:
March 24th at 6:20 a.m. my husband and I were awakened by aI
phone call from a fellow fisherman in Seattle, Washington, telling
us of the oil spill. We immediately caled the state troopers and
Jack Lamb, acting president of Cordova District Fisherman United
(CDFU), and suggested we coordinate with the fishermen of
Valdez, Whittier, Seward, Homer and the native villages of
Tatitlek and Chenega to help Alyeska boom off the tanker or
assist in any way possible with our boats, equipment, and
professional local knowledge of the currents, tides and weather3
patterns of Prince William Sound.

Jack Lamb called the Coast Guard, Alyeska, and other agencies inI
Valdez to let them know we were available immnediately with 20
boats, to deploy boom. No response. By midafternoon on the day
of the spill over 50 boats from Cordova and Tatitlek were ready toI
go. We still never received a phone call back despite many more
attempts to contact Alyeska. Many of the fishermen flew the spill
from 7 a.m. on throughout the rest of the day. With each flight1
report CDFU became more appalled as no efforts were being
made to boom off the tanker. We assumed Alyeska had a large
stockpile of boom material on hand ready to be deployed, when inI
fact they had only 7,000 feet of low quality boom, fit only for calm
water use. Yet, they could not even issue a command to have that
deployed.



28This CDFU press release may implicitly address the ethical issue of accepting Exxon funds. For instance,
some respondents described Exxon's $20,000 grant to the Chamber of Commerce as a bribe; many Cordovans
refused to work for Exxon on the spill cleanup because they refused to take "blood money." Here CDFU
emphasizes that, while they accepted money from Exxon in order to further cleanup efforts, this did not buy their
endorsement of the oal company's methods.3


Cordova - Page 236

At one of the early Exxon press conferences, it was announced that
boom was in place around the tanker, when in fact it was not.
This same scenario was played many times with different versions
,of the theme. Ralph Lohse and his three brothers-in-law, all from
Cordova, were worling their boats in a volunteer effort at Exxon's
request, to hold boom together around the tanker.

Even after the low quality boom was put around the tanker it
continually broke, fractured, and pulled apart as oil gushed under
it in the unusually calm weather. Ralph made repeated attempts
to contact Excon and inform them of the situation and the need
for real boom capable of containing at least some of the spill.
Tley were ignored totally. They finally gave up, returning to
Cordova when the original boom material was so broken it could
no longer contain oil, and no new boom material was forthcoming.
On their way back to Cordova, they again heard Exxon say at a
press conference that the tanker was boomed off, when in reality
the boom's only function was for show and tell .. .

..Alyeska Pipeline Company has reaped over 12 billion dollars
in profits from Alaskan crude oil at something near 2.5 million
dollars a day. It has had 16 years to prepare for an oil spill in
Prince William Sound. It seems as though the oil industry should
have spent some of those profits on researching the latest
technological advances and equipment, with field testing in all
kinds of weather, and compiling that information with the location
of materials around the world on a central computer system that
would be available for the entire world's input and use.

The oil industry's lack of proper equipment, absence of efficient oil
spill response teams, and failure to clean up its mess is deplorable
and inexcusable. Fishermen should not have to do Alyeska's job
and locate boom materials for them, arrange for transportation of
oil clean up materials, design supersucker setups to remove oil
from their unreliable skimmers, and in essence be their oil spill
response team. It is time for the government to take responsibility
and force the oil industry to account for its actions and correct
them. It is time that this planet is not just used and abused, but
protected and loved.

1989 is the 100th anniversary of commnercial fishing in Prince
William Sound. The first cannery was built in Cordova in 1889.
Although the natives had been harvesting salmon for many years it
Cordova - Page 237





was the conumercial beginning of 99 years of bounty provided byI
the beautiful, rich and renewable resources of the Sound. What a
sad, destructive, and pathetic situation fishermen and all members
of the Sound face in this historic 100th year (Testimony beforeI
the Senate Committee on the Environmnent and Public Works in
Washington. DC, cited in Cordova Fact Sheet, April 29, 1989:4).3

Exxon officials were still dissembling in July 1989, according to respondents, in
reporting to the National Transportation Safety Board that their initial spill response was3
immediate and appropriate:
1.   The grounding of the Exxon Valdez and the subsequent
discharge of 258,000 barrels of crude oil in the Prince
William Sound was caused by the delay in bringing the vessel
back into the traffic lanes following mnaneuvers to avoid ice.
2.   The manning level of the Exxon Valdez and the physical
condition of the vessel's crew were not contributing causes toI
the casualty.

3.   The role of alcohol in the grounding cannot be established.U
Exxon Shipping Company's drug and alcohol policy and its
implementation cannot be considered as a contributing cause
to the accident.
4.   . . . Exxon Shipping Company's initial response to the spill3
was immediate and appropriate....

The Oil Spill Contingency Plan and Initial Response...
with respect to Exxon Shipping Company's activities during theI
first 24 hours following the spill, the initial response and actions of
Exxon Shipping Company were swift and appropriate.3

The record indicates, from both testiimony and chronology
submittled to the Board, that within hours of the spill, Exxon3
Shipping Comnpany had mobilized appropriate personnel including
environmental experts, and had ordered and put in transit to the
site oil spill response equipment from the lower 48 states andI
abroad. Exxon Shipping Company made an immediate response
with a full, unqualified commitment to mitigate the consequences
of the spill (Cordova Fact Sheet, July 21, 1989:2-3).



Cordova - Page 238

This report, denying any delay in appropriate sPill response, was submnitted to the
National Transportation Safety Board on July 17, 1989. Staterments by the Exxon
Corporation Chairman in the Wall Street Journal on J-une 30, 1989, refer to an early
delay in the -use of dispersants on the spill, but appear to blamne the USCG for this:
In an interview with the Wall Street Journal Exxon Corporation
Chairman Lawrence Rawl said last week he wishes he had visited
Valdez sooner after the disastrous grounding March 24 of the
tanker Exxon Valdez. Persuaded by others in the company that he
might get in the way of "people who were already up to their necks
in alligators," Rawl said he now "sometimes wishes he had gotten
in the way ... Mr. Rawl wonders: If he had gone to Alaska right
away, could he have gotten the Coast Guard to decide more
quickly to allow spray dispersant rather than waiting through more
that two days of tests? Exxon argues that delay caused it to miss
its only opportunity to fight the spill with dispersants; federal and
state a-uthorities argue tests showed dispe rsants wouldn't have
worked during the period in dispute anyway" (Cordova Fact Sheet,
J-uly 7, 1989:3).29

Cordovans, as noted, expressed anger at the USCG for allowing Exxon to get in
their way, blocking their imnmediate cleanup response for what they consider trivial
reasons. A perceived general endorsement of Exxon by the USCG was a source of
resentment, and the following statement by the Coast Guard commander of the Pacific
Area exemplifies an attitude which evoked the ire of Cordovans. He maintains that
Exxon was not to blame for problems with the cleanup, and finds some culpability in the
response of Alaska State agencies:
The state of technology and the system for handling emergencies,
not Exxon Corp., are to blame for problems in cleaning up last
your's oil spill off the coast of Alaska, a top Coast Guard offcial
said. "We can blame it on Exxon but the truth is the system failed
here," said Vice Admiral Clyde Robbins . .. He said Exxon has
spent mnillions and will spend more this summner cleaning up the
mess left when the Exxon Valdez ran into a reef in Prince William
Sound last March, spilling 11 million gallons of oil .. . "They were


29This is, of course, an admission by the Exxon Corporation Chairman, that if he "had gotten in the way' by
going to Alaska immediately after the spill, he might well have determined the actions of the USCG.
Cordova - Page 239






trying to do what was right," Robbins said. "Generally speaking,I
they did everything possible to clean it up. They wanted the oil
gone. The problem was that the equipment that was needed and
necessary to do that just doesn't exist."
..Robbins also said state officials in Alaska tended to operate on
a "business as usual" basis and did not seem mentally prepared to
deal with the scope of the disaster (Cordova Fact Sheet, June 7,
1990:4).3

While Exxon attempted to direct blame toward the USCG, which in turn found
fault with State agencies, Cordovans in general desired more local control over oilI
companies operating in their environment. Most expect more oil spills:
There should be more local control. The local fishermen'sI
organization in town originally fought the pipeline because an
accident miight happen.3
And there will be more accidents. They just had one in Valdez.
They say the pipeline is corroded. The possibility is always, there.
Whether from running onto a rock, or forgetting to turn off a
valve.

The local cormmunity should have control over oil shipping andU
extracting. The. oil companies are still r-unning roughshod over the
Coast Guard and the pub~lic. This morning in the news there was3
something about shipping toxic wastes and unloading tank
washings. They just have too much money that they contributed to
the U.S., so nobody can control them ...3

There's no way they could process the ballast water as fast as
they're bringing in tankers there. HopefLilly they'll figure
something out before the environment is totally destroyed over
there.
LII.B. Contlicts Generated by the Spill CleanupI
Fishermen Become Oil Cleanun Contractors: After initially refasing to allow
Cordovan fishermen to boom off the leaking -Exxon Valdez, reportedly to avoid legal
liabilities, Exxon created a hiring policy which defined these fishermen as independent

contractors:


Cordova - Page 240

Exxon will be utilizing a number of contractors to fulfill the
additional manpower requirements as they arise. Exxon will not
be hiring directly. All hiring will originate from the contractors as
various services are required by Exxon (policy statement by Exxon
office, Cordova, cited in Cordova Fact Sheet, April 21, 1989:3).

T'he designation of contractor en tailed a substantial transfer of legal liabilities to
the fishermen who became Exxon's spill response team. Oil spill cleanup contracting
was a new profession for these individuals, and many complained in 1991 of ensuing
confusion, as well as resentment, over tax and other liabilities. For instance, contracting
boats were responsible for withholding taxes:
Agents for the IRS contacted the Valdez Emergency Operations
Center with concerns about tax liabilities for boats contracting with
VECO. Crews working on the boats are employees of the
contracted boat which places the responsibility of withholding taxes
upon the contracted boats (Lower Cook Inlet Oil Spill Protection
Update, cited in Cordova Fact Sheet, May 9, 1989: 1).

Contractors for the clean-up were also liable for worker's compensation coverage
and unemployment taxes. Employers who furnished transportation to incoming workers
were responsible in most cases to furnish return transportation (Cordova Fact Sheet,
June 6, 1989:2). New types of medical insurance were sometimes required. The health
risks of cleanup work were (and still are) largely undocumented, and future liabilities for
health impacts remain an open question. The Alaska Department of Labor attemnpted to
clatify some of these issues, well into the cleanup operation:
T'he Alaska Department of Labor is investigating,reports of health
problems (primarily nausea, dizziness, headaches, and vomiting)
among workers on the oil spill cleanup. An industrial hygienist
from the Division of Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA) has
interviewed beach crews from the USS.Juneau, and will be
conducting air monitoring and taking material samples to ascertain
*if exposure to oil is causing the reported illnesses ...

Worker's Comnpensation--It is the opinion of the Department of
labor that virtually all employment related to the oil spill is subject
to Alaska Workers' Compensation coverage. There may be
instances when some employers will need, in addition to Alaska
Cordova - Page 241





Workers' compensation, coverage for "seamen" under the JonesI
Act or for "longshoremen" under the Longshore and Harbor
Workers Act. Owners and crewmen on vessels which are normally
engaged in commercial fishing operations should be aware that the
Fishermen's Fund will not cover medical expenses incurred as a
result of non-fishing operations, and that the crew insurance
carried by most vessel owners does not satisfy the requirements of
the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act. Employers from outside
the state cannot cover their workers' compensation liability in
Alaska through extraterritorial coverage provisions of any kind;
coverage must be obtained from an insurer licensed to do business
in the state ...

Unemployment taxes--Businesses, individuals and boat owners
involved in oil spill operations should also be advised that if they3
hire individuals to work for them they are liable to payment of
unemployment taxes under the Alaska Employment Security Act.
Crews of vessels normally involved in fishing operations are not3
exempt from the Act while engaged in spill cleanup activities.
Exxon has been provided with the forms required to establish its
contr actors as employers (Cordova Fact Sheet, May 12, 1989:3).
Some respondents were irked that, while Cordovan fishermen were defined as oil
cleanup contractors, and money earned working on the spill cleanup was taxed, their
volunteer services on the cleanup were not tax deductible (Cordova Fact Sheet, May 26,
1989:3). Exxon's cleanup expenses, of course, were deductible, although legislative
attempts to require Exxon to meet Federal anti-pollution standards before deducting oil
spill expenses were initiated (Cordova Fact Sheet, June 17, 1989:2).
Conflicts Over Cleanuio Monev: A great deal of animosity was generated by the3
moral stigmna attached to working for Exxon. Cleanup workers and contractors were
called "Exxon whores," who accepted "blood money" and became "spillionaires." Most3
respondents expressed resentment towards the oil company, whether or not they gained
financially from cleanup work. Differences among 1991 respondents could be gauged by5
whether that resentment was strong eniough to cause subjects to re'fuse to participate in






Cordova - Page 242

Exxon's spill cleanup. No respondents in the fishing community expressed positive
sentiments toward the oil spill and an ensuing windfall:3
Some people wouldn't go on the spill: caled others Exxon whores.
And here's all these people around them making all this money.
It caus ed conflicts within families. There were quite a few
divorces. Kids left home. There were all kinds of changes here.
People who'd never had money before had money. Some people
thought it was the best thing that ever happened to them ...

And Exxon bought up all the supplies, and the shopkeepers gave
Exxon priority. So you'd go to the store and there was no bread
and no milk. It was little things like that, that were aggravating.
At the store they'd say, "Exxon has priority." Where you live here,
and you've been buying from them all your life.

It felt like being in a concentration camp. You felt you were
invaded and taken over.

It was very hard on those who wouldn't work on the spill. They
thought it was wrong to help Exxoni, after what had happened. But
then they were left with no money.

But those who did go were afraid they'd need the money because
they might not get anything again. Or compensation for what had
happened.

The social disruptions caused by the different economic impacts of the oil spill
were painful to all respondents in this close knit community:
The biggest conflicts among fishermen, because they were able to
Seti money, were over money. After the spill, you couldn't walk
down the street and ask people, "How're you doing?" some people
were cleaning up, and others had no jobs and no prospects (if they
couldn't fish and wouldn't work for Exxon) ...

We are the walking wounded here. Everybody keeps to himself
because the person next to him will fall down if he leans on him.


3ORespondents claimed that many who garnered large cle'anup earnings from contracting their boats left
Cordova during the winter to spend their money in places like Hawaii and California. It is unkniown whether
some big earners would have expressed different views had they been in town when this research was conducted.
Cordova - Page 243





WVhile social conflicts arose over money, respondents overwhelningly agreed thatI
money could not compensate them for the loss of their way of life, put at risk by this
catastrophic oil spill:I
Money can't substitute for loss of a lIfe style. Money can be
measured, and life style can't. It's tough to measure the humanI
factor. No on paid any attention to the human factor. People are
not a resource. State and Federal governments settle resources.
People don't crank into that formula.
Conflicts Over Contracts: Animosity among persons who wer willing to contract
their boats for the spill cleanup focussed on how contracts were obtained and who
obtained them. These animosities exacerbated other tensions associated with the oil
spill, and destroyed the communal spirit created by the fishermen's initial volunteer
response; according to many respondents:
[Tle initial volunteer response effort, which was frustrated] did
create a community closeness, but that went away as soon as
Exxon hired some people and not others. For instance, $1,000 a
day, or $7,000 a day to charter boats.

A CDFU official recalls:

Some people got contracts. People were grouped according to:

(1) those who wanted and got contracts
(2) those who wanted and didn't get contracts
(3) those who wouldn't work for Exxon.
There was much animosity among the groups. Some people went
outside the system and approached Exxon in Anchorage. SomeI
people who'd been friends all their lives.weren't speaking to each
other..

The homes had tension in them: not knowing what their finances
would be. People who'd lived here all their lives, this was their
way of life, and now it was uncertain if that would continue..
Our criteria for contracts were:
Cordova - Page 244

(1) you had the- right boat
(2) by what fishery you lost

For example, the herring fishermen had lost their whole season
and went first.

I saw no favoritism, but of course some people thought that.
Sometimes it was because we couldn't reach them on the phone.

The CDFU even published objective criteria for selecting boats for cleanup
contracts:
Boats are continuing to be dispatched from the Cordova District
Fishermen United office in Cordova (approximately 118 boats).
Criteria for deployment are as follows:

(1) Involvement in lost fisheries (any herring, shrimp, black cod
fisherman).
(2) Attendance at a boom and safety seminar.
(3) Boat must be capable of handling the job (be fueled and
ready to go).
(4) Residency status
(a) Local residents with Area E permnits.
(b) Alaska Area E permnittees.
(c) Other Area E permittees.
(Cordova Fact Sheet, April 16, 1989:3).

However, in the chaotic spill aftermath, these objective criteria could not always be
implemnented.. Respondents described how their anxiety was too extremne to wait at
home; some fishermen were reportedly pacing on the sidewalk in front of the CDFU
office, smoking and waiting to hear spill news, so that other boat owners got their
contracts because CDFU workers could not reach them on the telephone. While some
respondents described the contracting process as unfair, none charged favoritism; most
cited the turbulent nature of the spill aftermath:
Women came to work at CDFU. They were never at home
because they couldn't stand being at home. They were needed.
There were 30 more workers at CDFU after the spill. Women
mnanning phones. Calls came from all over the world--the press,
lawye-rs, fishermen, people concerned to help.
Cordova - Page 245,






While respondents believe that CDFU intended to administer contracts fairly,U
Ex:xon's motivations in constructing the contracts are perceived in a different light. A
CDFU official recounts howI
Exxon was not honest at any level. They w ere not open. They
were not forthcoming. They'd be playing us off against each other.I
Lots of different types of contracts were floating around.
Sometimes you had to sign that oil cleanup money counted against
any claim you'd make in the future. Other contracts didn' t haveI
that stipulation. Valdez got different contracts than Cordova, and
so on. They wanted to set people fighting amongst themselves.

The belief that Exxon issued diverse contracts because it wanted to set Cordovans
against each other was reiterated in descriptions of Exxon strategies in many dimensions3
of oil spill impacts. These include- business claims settlements, relations with business
organizations, fishermen's claims settlements, and relations with city government. One3
inconsistency, according to a key official at the Fishermen's Claims Office, was that those
who leased boats got higher fishing claims approved than those who did not:
Exxon made a lot of promises that they didn't keep. People -are
treated differently, and this causes dissensions. People who leased
boats for the spill got good claims too, for bigger dollar amounts:I
20-40 percent higher than others.

Many believe that Exxon used large cleanup contracts as a form of bribe, to quiet
discontent among the more vocal fishermen: "Exxon just poured a lot of money on the
oil spill." Then, according to respondents, the oil company subtracted this money from
claims payments; the perception is, then, that Exxon was bribing fishermen with their
own money:
I couldn't work the spill because my businesses were in a shambles.
Exxon hired the malcontents, then took their wages off theirI
claims. That solved those problems.

Another dividing factor in determnining who was to becorne a "spillionaire" was theI
extremely long work hours dematided by cleanup work. Fishing "openers," by contrast
may last 24 or 48 hours, or even less. Fishermen who held down other jobs were unable
to participate in the cleanup:


Cordova - Page 246

Normally with fishing there are openers where they go out and fish
and come back. Twenty-four and 48 hour openers. But on the
spill cleanup, they went out for weeks and didn't come back. Only
those in businesses that could take advantage of the, spill could
keep afloat.

A number of respondents who could not work the spill because they held other jobs
loaned or leased their boats to friends who obtained contracts, only to have their boats
damaged on the cleanup. Exxon, consistent with treating fishermen as independent spill
contractors, reportedly took no responsibility for boats that broke down in cleanup
operations, even though cleanup operations were much more stressful than normal
fishing. This was especially galling to some who had their cleanup earnings subtracted
from their fishing claims payments. A subject who could not leave his regular job for
cleanup work describes how:
The guy who leased my boat to work the spill blew the engine.
But Exxon wouldn't pay for my broken down boat. It cost $900 to
clean the oil out.

Another respondent recalls:

Before the spill, we expected a record year, and put big money into
our preparations. And we lost big instead. We leased our boat
out, and it got trashed. So we lost it.'

Another problem with Exxon cleanup contracts was slow payment (also experienced
by Cordovan b-usiness owners who made sales to VECO). A mother of a small child
remembers:
My husband signed a contract that said we'd be paid in two weeks,
and we weren't paid. We didn't have food money. I had to put a
stop on our tax payment. We. were trying to get into this house,
and our carpenters quit to work the spill, so we didn't have any
place to live, because they couldn't turn down Exxon's money.
We're going through TAPAA [Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization
Act] which will take years to settle.

Conflicts Over ChanLyes in Fishing: Some individuals did make substantial sums by
le asing their boats, and many used this money to upgrade their equipment. This in itself
Cordova - Page 247

has created lasting conflicts in this fishing community. Some perceive that those whoU
compronmised their moral principles by working for Exxon now have a lasting advantage
in fisheries that have become permanently mnore competitive due to these technical
upgrades. They see a steady shift toward mnore capital intensive fishing and limited entry
had already evoked disapproval and fears that a local fishing lifestyle could be replaced
by competitive fishing carried out by affluent non-residents (see Sec. I.A.6 Cordova's
Economy). This trend was reportedly exacerbated by spill cleanup money, and many
fishermen fear that a normal process where upgrades occur gradually, based on the
ability of the fishermen, was upset. Spill-related upgrades were not determined by
fishing skill, so that some less skilled fishermen have reportedly bought much more
expensive equipment. Respondents fear that this has made fishing more dangerous. A
CDFU official explains:
The Exxon contract money .. . on a long term basis some people
made a lot of mnoney and invested it in new boats. They have a
competitive edge over the ones that didn't, now.
Somne people got out of fishing, but I can't say why. Fishing is
more competitive now, and that adds to divisiveness that wasI
created at the time of the cleanup. There's only so many fish, so
that hurts you.

According to a fisherman's wife:

The spillionaires . .. made a quarter of a million dollars by rentingI
their boats out, and they upgraded. So they can outfish others who
didn't who now can't keep up. It also got more dangerous when
they compressed guys into a small area. So we had to buy a newI
boat, beca-use it was too dangerous.

Accordin  to one fisherman and lifelong Cordova resident:I

There's some big changes in the fishing fleets. They're more high
tech due to the cleanup and settlement money. We'll be faced
with that forever, so our fishing time will be reduced due to the
new equipment. It's too efficient.




Cordova - Page 248

It's too efficient because, say we're on the flats 12 hours. And we
can only take so many fish. So if we're too efficient we take too
much. So the solution is reduced fishing time ...

Then the navigational aids, and they ca,n move around in nastier
weather. With the oil money some boats will do 20 knots where
they could go 10 knots before.

My feeling (I'm a scratch fisherman) so the more time I put in the
less my catch will be. So it jeopardizes my abilities.

If seine fishermen have six hours in an enclosed area, in a ram and
jam situation, they have to compete in that highly competitive
situation.

But the hours are lessened whether you have the high tech
equipment or not. You can't influence management: Fish and
Game regulates the openers and closings of the fisheries.

I would say close to half the fishermen upgraded in one way or
another: new boats, gear, nets. Seine boats can cost $20,000. So
it's a substantial investment. The cleanup money was the larger
amount of people's earnings. Some settlements earlier were better
than later ones. Some 'people got good settlements and some
didn't.

Health Hazards: Unlike Cordovan Natives, non-Native Cordovans expressed less
anxiety toward adverse health effects from working on the spill cleanup (see Sec. 11
Alaska Natives in Cordova). Respondents repeatedly explained that fishermen were
more than willing to "put their lives on the line" to protect and clean up the Sound.
However, physical dangers entailed by the cleanup were nevertheless cause for concern.
Tle State Division of Public Health issued a bulletin on May 5, 1989 which claimed that
risks to appropriately trained spill-workers were low:
The bulletin states that the risks to human health depend on the
type of exposure and says.risks "are greatest to workers heavily
exposed to oil during some cleanup activities, but the risks to these
workers is considered to be low. With appropriate training and
personal protective equipment, as required by hazardous waste
regulations, cleanup activities can continue and workers can be
Cordova - Page 249





confident that their health will not be compromised" (Cordova FactI
Sheet, May 11, 1989:3).

This statemnent was quickly contested by Dr. Robert W. Rigg, regional flightI
surgeon for the FAA and a former Alaska mnedical director for Standard Alaska (BP).
His written stateinent was read at a May 13, 1989 meeting of CDFU, and excerpts were
printed in the Cordova Fact Sheet, which compared them to the State bulletin cited
above:
It is a known fact that neurologic changes (brain darmage), skin
disorders (including cancer), liver and kidney damage, cancer of
other organ systerms, and other medical complications--secondary
to exposure to--working unprotected in (or inadequately protected)
can and will occur to workers exposed to crude oil and otherU
petrochenmical by-products. Whie short-term complaints, i.e., skin
irritation, nausea, dizziness, pulrmonary symptoms, etc., may be the
initial signs of exposure and toxicity, the more serious long-termI
effects must be prevented..

Adequate chemical protective (clothing) and employee instructionsI
in the hazards and risks is of paramount importance. Adequate
ventilation and protection of skin and body parts is a must.
Compliance with health requirements is essential, but likely to be
overlooked in the rush to clean the environment. Regrettably,
long term (as well as short term) physical impairments are most
certainly goiing to surface ainong the cleanup workers.
My personal recommendation is to pull the cleanup crews off the
beaches--out of Prince William Sound, and avoid fuirther tragedy inI
the form of human suffering, illness and disease (Cordova Fact
Sheet, May 16, 1989:3).

Workers did complain in 1991 of having experienced short-term health effects (such
as nausea and dizziness), and many objected to the excessively short and cursory trainin'gU
sessions conducted by Exxon. In May 1989, Exxon expanded its 2-hour IHealth and
Safety Training session to 4 hours; by that time, 942 Cordovans had already completed
the course (Cordova Fact Sheet, May 20, 1989:3). Respondents claimed that this training
was inadequate:-



Cordova - Page 250

Deficits in health and safety training continued to trouble Cordovans in 1991.
Fishermen were angered when Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. decided not to provide
safety training for its oil spill response program. According to an Alyeska spokesman,
the omission of safety training was mandated by company lawyers. He said, "Alyeska is
pulling back on training commitments because of possible liability for any damage done
to a site by a response team" (Cordova Times, February 21, 1991:A5). Cordovans viewed
this as another example of the oil industry looking after itself rather than showing
concern for people or the environment.
Accidents occurred, and a Fishermen's Claims Office official describes a seemingly
inadequate medical response'structure:
It was.a hazardous job. There were a lot of accidents. I had quite
a few come in. A young lady spraying hot water had steam -and oil
sprayed on her face and her mouth had second degree burns. She
was just left on the Beach in Valdez, to find her way home. She
was in really bad shape.

There were a lot of eye injuri'es. And falls. The women.lasted
longer than the men.

The CleanuD Does More Harm than Good: Not the least of the frustrations
associated with the spill cleanup, described by Cordovans in 1991, was that Exxons spill
cleanup mnay have done more harm than good to their env'ironment. Respondents are
bitter that the oil companies promaised to prevent environrnental damages but were not
really prepared to do so. Cordovans had put their lives and equipment at risk in cleanup
methods that had not been well thought out or tested.
This was especially galling in that Exxon used its cleanup expenses to double as
mitigation for economic losses caused by the spill. Exxon announced that cleanup
moneys would compensate local businesses for losses caused by cancellations of fisheries,
and it subtracted these moneys in the form of net profits from business claims (see See.
IV. Private Sector Economic Impacts of the Oil Spill [Non-fishing]). The oil company
also refused claims advances to cleanup workers, described below.
Cordova - Page 251






Exxon's reimburserments for losses proceeded only for a limited period of time afterI
the spill; many who delayed in putting in claims did not receive compensation. So,3
Exxon put Cordovans (city government and business owners in particular) in the position
of pursuing cleanup work that might be causing secondary damage to their environment,3
in order to mitigate economic losses caused by the primary damage of spilled oil. This
conflict was compounded by the blackout of scientific information which was occurring
due to pending litigation.
General awareness of the harm caused by the cleanup was evident by August 1989:1
Many beaches remained blackened, but most scientists agree the
crude oil spilled by the Exxon Valdez is less damaging at this point
than the cleanup itself.
However, the task of assessing the effects of the March 24 Prince
William Sound oil spill is becomning increasingly complicated by theI
near universal preoccupation with lawsuits..

Exxon is racing to treat the oily beaches that yet remain with barge3
based, high pressure, hot-water washing units. The state has
pressed Exxon to continue this treatment on as much shoreline as
possible despite increasing evidence that the application of 110-140I
degree water is more harmfLil to intertidal species than the
presence of the weathered oil.

In a recent study by NOAA, more micro-organisms were found
alive in untreated oily beaches than in those subjected to Exxon's
harsh hot-water wash. According to scientists with the Nationalt
Marine Fisheries office, organisms residing in intertidal areas
below rocks blasted with hot water end up smothered by the3
hydrocarbon plume generated by the treatment ...

According to Cordova fisherman Riki Ott ... Hydrocarbon
components remaining in the weathered oil present a long-term
threat to the environment. Studies have shown long-term damage
to the reproductivity and growth of crab populations living in areas
near past spills, Ott said. However, she agreed the hot water
treatment was probably too harsh.

Legal issues are also complicating the search for hard answers to
the spill's tr-ue effects. Friday, this fishing village was scheduled to


Cordova - Page 2523

host a long-awaited, interdisciplinary meeting of scientists studying
aspects of the spill. The meeting was cancelled. "It was cancelled
principally because the agencies all had lawyers telling them they
couldn't come: said John Harville, director of Cordova's new
Science Center (Cordova Times, August 31, 1989:Al).
III.C. Fish Claims
1989: A Record Year: Preseasoni forecasts predicted a record commnercial harvest
of over 40 million salmon for Prince William Sound (Cordova Fact Sheet, May 7,
1989:3). Moreover, prices were "at an all time high" in 1988. The actual harvest of
sahmon in 1989 was substantially less than predicted, and prices for many species
dropped radically (especially for pink salmon, coho salmon, and chum salmon). The
following two tables (Tables 8 and 9) demonstrate this dynamic.
Residents of Cordova hold the greatest number of Prince William Sound fisheries
permits (see Sec. I.A.6 Cordova's Economy). According to Alaska's Commercial
Fisheries Entry Commission, in 1989 the following nuinber of permits were assigned:
Cordova, 634; Anchorage, 174; Valdez, 85; Homer, 83; Seward, 50 (Cordova Fact Sheet,
May 23, 1989:2). Large sums of money hinge on each year's harvests as seen in Table
10.
Due to the above forecasts, fishermen as well as business owners had, geared up for
a record year in 1989 for Cordova's commercial fishery. They were "all inventoried up,
al dressed up for the party that didn't come." As one respondent said:
The prediction was for 81 million fish for the 1989 season, half to
be caught in Prince William Sound. Very low catches for the last
2 years, so prices were up. We all thought we've'got it made! We
can't lose. So that was the feeling in town.

Everyone was gearing up our boats, expecting to get rich that
season. Then whammo! Right in the gutter.

Exxon's Voluntarv Settlement Policv: After the March 24, 1989 oil spill, the
herring, shrimp, and sablefish seasons were closed. In addition, periodic closures of
salmon fisheries occurred. Class a.ction suits against Exxon were initiated on behalf of a
number of fishermen's organizations (see below). Exxon developed a "voluntary
Clordova - Page 253


 I
I
Table 8

AVERAGE PRICE IN DOLLARS PAID TO FISHERMEN FOR SALMON,
PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND, 1979-1989


Species      1979a  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
I
I
I
King Salmon
Sockeye Salmon
Copper River
Bering River
Coghill/Unakwik
Districts
Eshamy
General Purse
Seine
Coho Salmon
Copper/Bering
Rivers
PWS
Pink Salmon
Chum Salmon
1.62	1.40
1.40	0.85
1.65	1.40	1.05	1.30
1.40	1.01	0.95	1.15
0.80	0.95	1.00
0.80	0.85	0.95
1.65
1.50
1.55
1.10
1.45	1.75	2.23	2.25

1.65	1.90	3.20	2.30
1.65	1.90	3.00	2.30
I
0.90	1.20	1.37	1.75	2.68    2.00
0.85	1.10	1.34	1.60	2.77

1.35	1.45	2.68      2.00
I
I
0.60
0.70
0.35
0.35
1.10	0.95	0.95	0.86	0.75	1.10	0.85
0.39	0.39	0.39	0.40	0.30	1.10	0.40
0.38	0.42	0.44	0.23	0.24	0.26	0.22
0.53	0.50	0.50	0.38	0.24	0.26	0.29
0.94
0.46
0.23
0.33
0.93
0.55
0.40
0.39
2.35
1.86
0.79
0.73
I
I
Source: ADF&G, Annual Management Report 1990, in progress.

a Based on processor reports, fish tickets and other sources. Prices are monitored
throughout the season and a weighted average is generally used. Prices generally do
not reflect post-season adjustments. Prices are an estimate only.

















Cordova - Page 254
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Table 9
COMMERCIAL SALMON HARVEST BY SPECIES FROM
ALL GEAR TYPES, PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND, 1971-199Oa


Year	Chinook	Sockeye	Coho           Pink	Chum           Total


1971	20,142	741,945	327,697    7,312,730	579,552	8,982,066
1972	23,003	976,115	124,670        57,090	46,088	1,226,966
1973	22,638	473,044	199,019	2,065,844	740,017	3,500,562
1974	20,602	741,340	76,041	458,619	89,210	1,385,812
1975	22,325	546,636	84,109	4,453,041	101,286	5,297,395
1976	32,751	1,008,912	160,496	3,022,426	370,657	4,595,240
1977	22,864	943,943	179,417	4,536,459	573,166	6,255,849
1978	30,435	505,509	312,930	2,917,499	489,771	4,256,144
1979	20,078	369,583	315,774	15,615,810	349,615	16,670,860
1980	8,643	208,724	337,123	14,161,023	482,214'	15,197,727
1981	20,782	786,469	396,163	20,558,304	1,888,822	23,648,540
1982	47,871	2,362,328	623,877	20,403,423	1,336,878	24,774,377
1983	53,879	908,469	365,469	13,977,116	1,048,737	16,353,670
1984	39,774	1,303,515	609,484	22,119,309	1,229,185	25,301,267
1985	43,735	1,464,563	1,025,046	25,252,924	1,321,538	29,107,806
1986	41,128	1,288,712	626,240	11,410,302	1,700,906	14,868,288
1987	41,909	1,737,989	175,214	29,230,303	1,919,415	33,104,830
1988b	31,797	767,674	477,816	11,820,121	1,843,317	14,940,725
1989b	32,006	1,175,238	424,980	21,886,466	1,001,809	24,520,499
1990b	22,163	911,607	524,274	44,165,077	967,384	46,590,505

10-Year Avg.
(1980-1989)
36,252     1,200,168      486,151    19,081,929      1,377,282   22,181,773
Source: ADF&G, Annual Management Report 1990, in progress.
a Includes catches by all gear types and hatchery sales from the Eastern, Northern,
Coghill, Unakwik, Northwestern, Eshamy, Southwestern, Montague, Southeastern,
Cooper River and Bering River Districts.
b Includes confiscated and educational special use permits. Also includes hatchery sales
harvests and carcass sales.
Cordova - Page 255

I


Table 10 I

EX-VESSEL ESTIMATED VALUES IN DOLLARS OF GROSS EARNINGS
IN THE LIMITED PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND FISHERIES,, 1987-1988"     I.

Fishery                               1987                        1988


Salmon seine	44,960,323	3~3,922,443
Salmon drift net	27,054,624	36,848,153
Salmon set net	335,038	1,560,315
Herring roe seine	4,930,463	5,937,353
Herring roe gillnet	509,803	456,278
Herring roe pound	1,836,1803,196


Source: ADF&G, Annual Management Report 1990, in progress.

a Data are derived from fish ticket files and surveys of processors.


settlement policy" over the next few months. On April 13, 1989, Don Cornett, Alaska
Coordinator for Exxon, made the following announcement:
A three step payment procedure has been placed into operation--
advances, partial payments, and final settlements--to expedite the
flow of cash.

In order to provide payments for those in need of immediate cash,
a cash advance system is in place. With minimum documentation
to establish the validity of a claim and the need for immediate
cash, advances are being made with a receipt requested and the
granting of the right to offset against subsequent settlements. 'Me
individuals receiving the advance give up none of their rights but
receive partial payment toward the ultimate amount.

Partial settlements can be effected to settle claims for events that
have already occurred such as the closing of the herring season.
Under this procedure a final settlement is negotiated, the fall
amount is paid and a release is obtained only for the event being
settled. Individuals give up none of their to claim damages from
any other events.


Cordova - Page 256
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Fin al settlements will be negotiated as soon as all the factors are
known and documentation can be finalized.

Special financing arrangements are being developed to assist in
solving the cash flow problems of businesses such as canneries.
The arrangements will be made through Alaska banks to- the
maximum extent possible.

Other steps such as maximizing the use of local procurement, local
hiring, and expedited payment processing for invoicing have also
been implemented.

All of the efforts have been put in place to mitigate, to the extent
possible, the economic impact on those individuals and companies
directly affected by,the oil spill.

We are hopeful that most can be handled to the satisfaction of the
claimants, through this process. However, for some few cases
where agreement cannot be reached, we support voluntary
arbitration by a panel to be selected by Exxon and the claimant. It
is important that the arbitration alternative be agreed by both
parties and that both are assured of a fair hearing by an impartial]
group of arbitrators. We understand legislation along these lines
was introduced this morning.

Anyone having a claim is encouraged to contact the nearest Exxon
claims office and we promise to give expeditious consideration to
their claimn (Cordova Fact Sheet, April 17, 1989:2).

Despite Exxon's declaration that expeditious cash advances and financing would be
available, many fishermen and business owners hit dire financial straits before receiving
any cash (see Sec. IV. Private Sector Economic Impact of the Oil Spill [Non-Fishing]).
Some respondents cormplained that Exxon took advantage of their financial desperation
to force them to sign releases rather than receipts. An official of the Fishermen's Claims
Office recounts:
On early claims, net hangers had to sign partial releases. And on
herring business claims, tenders signed partial releases. On salmon
claims, we got it done on a receipt bases. People were desperate
for money, so they signed releases.
Cordova - Page 257






Attorneys representing fishermen (permit holders and crew members) in classI
action suits against Exxon, concerned that some fishermen were signing releases, sent the
following notice to CDFU on June 5, 1989:
Through negotiations with top Exxon and Alyeska officials, and
with support from various governmTent officials in Washington and3
Juneau, agreement has been reached on a method by which you
can submit to Exxon's claims representatives in your local
community proof of your losses so far. -Exxon has agreed to make
immediate payment as an advance against your eventual fall
claims.3

Exxon has also agreed that you will not be required to sign any
release in order to be paid. All you will need to sign is the "Funds
Receipt and Claims Credit" form, acknowledging the amount paid.
Acceptance of this interim payment, and signing this form, will not
preclude you in aiiy way from submitting further claims for the
herring fishery or for subsequent losses.
Exxon has agreed to honor this procedure for all claimants,
whether or not you have a lawyer. You need not retain a lawyer
or pay any fees to anyone in order to submit your claim and
receive immediate payments. If you want or need help in putting
together your claimT, or in negotiating the amount with Exxon's
claims representatives, you may consult with representatives from
law firms that have filed class action lawsuits (on behalf of CDFU,I
the Prince William Sound Seiners Association and the PWS
Setnetters Association, amoiig others) ... Exxon has agreed to
pay a processing fee for legal services provided to you in
connection with your claim. Each of the firms working at the
claims offices . .. has agreed that these legal fees will be placed in
an escrow fund. These firms have agreed to provide claims
services to you as part o'f their responsibilities as class action
co-unsel, and will apply for payment from the escrow fund only as
the judge specifically approves (Cordova Fact Sheet, June 7,I
1989:3).

Exxon announced their "voluntary settlement of claims" for salmon permit holders,
modeled after their herring permit holder's claims policy, in June 1989:
Exxon announced June 22 terms for the voluntary settlement ofI
claims by salmon permit holders in Prince William Sound, Kodiak
and Lower Cook Inlet.3


Cordova - Page 2585

The guidelfines are based on extensive discussions with Cook Inet
Seiners Association, Cordova District Fishermen United, Kodiak
Beach Seiners' Association, Prince William Sound Setnetters'
Association, United Fishermen's Marketing Association, Inc., and
other groups.
Dick Harvin, Exxon's Claims Manager, said, "Our program is
designed to ensure equitable and prompt compensation if there are
spill-related sbortfals."
Harvin added., "Assistance payments will also be available under
the program's guidelines. In addition, permit bolders will not have
to waive their rights or release any claim they mnight have by
accepting such assistance. Funds received will be. an offset, against
existing and/or future claiims."

Individual salmon permiit holders will be cormpensated for their
share of the pre-season Alaska Department of Fish and Game
projected salmon harvest based on their two year historical average
share and their actual catch.

"The salrnon settlement terms are largely modeled after our highly
successful herring settlement program, under which more than 60
percent of the pound fishing permit holders' claims have been
paid," said Harvin. "We hope it will be as well received as the
herring settlement program" (Cordova Fact Sheet, June 23,
1989:1).

Hopes that Exxon's herring or salmon settlerment policies would be well received
were dashed as fishermen objected to a number of problematic features. These include
the low price paid for fish, the estimation of catch based on a prior 2-year average, and
the necessity to fish in order to file a claim.
Low Fish Prices: Low fish prices were a leading outrage, and fishermen
confronted CDFU officials, who had negotiated with Exxon on its settlement policy with
their protests. Officials of CDFU responded that there had really been no negotiations,
since Exxon simply did whatever it wanted to:
Cordo,va - Page 259






Angry fishermen demanded ex planations from CDFU presidentI
Gerry McCune in a meeting last Friday. The meeting was called
to explain the recent guidelines released by Exxon for the 1989
salmon season claims.
According to a June Daily News article, the guidelines were "a
plan worked out with fishing groups from Cordova, Kodiak and
Homer." Local fishermen questioned how the plan was arranged
and what was negotiated.3

"T'hese are Exxon's guidelines, not ours," McCune told the group of
200 fishermen. "We p-ut out proposals in and arpued like hell toI
change three of four things. They said they were going to put it
out anyway and we said, 'Okay, we'll go with this."'

The Elks' lodge dining room was filled to capacity during Friday
afternoon's meeting as fishermen attempted to understand what
the guidelines will mean to their season.3

"Sounds like we're going ahead with this program," one fisherman
said. "We're getting dictated to. I don't like it." "There's no useI
arguing with me; these are Exxon's guidelines," McCune said ....

For the past two weeks CDFU was working with Exxon on3
adequate claims settlements. (iMcCune] told fishermen CDFU
tried to change as many things as they could but talks came to a
standstill. "We're happy with the things we got," he said.
In an interview, McCune said CDFU did not negotiate with Exxon
on the guidelines. "You don't get to negotiate much when
someone lays something on the table and says this is it."'I

Besides the issue of processing claims, fishermen questioned lowI
salmon prices. "Prices should be high; this is where most of them
will be caught," one fisherman said.I

"It falls on us to prove the oil spill affected prices," McCune said.

Another fisherman said that low prices were a "conspiracy amongI
Exxon and the processors to keep prices down. We can' t accept
the burden of proof."3




Cordova - Page 260

The guidelines do not list a price value for fish in the claims. "The
bad thing is they are usi-ng this year's prices. Processors will pay
what they want to pay. People have been screaming at me for a
week about prices," McCune said (Cordova Times, July 6, 1989:A1-
5).
Cordovans did not get the support they would have liked from the State
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC). In a memo to the govemnor dated
April 13, 1989, CFEC Commissioner Phil Smith stated that the agency would not
estimate or anticipate 1989 harvest levels and prices:
To do so would be pure speculation on our part;
fishermen/businessmen and processors are in the best position to
estimate prices, while ADF&G pre-season harvest forecasts may. be
the best estimate of total anticipated harvest (Cordova Fact Sheet,
,April 20, 1989:2).

Fishermen had gone into the 1989 season expecting about 80 cents a pound for
pink salmon (see Table 8 above). Respondents in 1991 are still wondering whether low
prices offered by the large foreign-owned fish processors (who received secret
settlements from Exxon) were part of a conspiracy to offset processor and Exxon losses
at the expense of fishermen. Cordovans are angry that Exxon shifted the burden of
proof to them and that the oil spill caused fish prices to drop. Fish prices respond to an
intricate dynamic of human and natural forces, and cause and effect relations are
difficult if not impossible to prove. However, applying rationales described below,
Cordovans have little doubt that the oil spill hurt fish prices.
In July 1989, processors were paying 35 cents a pound for pink salmon, 45 to 50
cents for bright chum salmon, and 20 to 25 cents for dark chum salmon (Cordova Times,
July 6, 1989:Al). This was a big disappointment for fishermen, and CDFU announced
that it was investigating the cause forNthe low prices (Cordova Times, July 6, 1989:A1).
One reason cited for low prices was that major buyers might fear that the oil spill
would taint public perceptions of the fish. For instance, immediately after the spill,
Japanese buyers stated that if any roe on kelp held perceptible traces of oil, they would
Cordova - Page 261





not buy it (Cordova Times, March 29-30 1989:A3). Respondents likened this to aI
botulism scare in the early 1980's, which caused a radical drop in prices.
Other reasons cited for low fish prices refer to the lack of dynamics present in a
normal fishing season, that would ordinarily drive prices up. For instance, competition
was reportedly dampened because: (1) there was a lack of floating processors on the
Sound due to spilled oil and closures; (2) many people worked the spill and fewer fished;
and, (3) Exxon promised to make up the price difference at the end of the season,
lessening pressure to bargain. One respondent, recognized locally as. an expert on fish
prices, explans:
Pink salmon is our main fish here. That was the biggest effect ...I

Fish go through a 20-year cycle. In 1988 dollars, the prices went
down in 1964 [the year of the earthquake], peaked in 1974, went
down in the early 1980's [with the botulism scare], and were on
their way to a peak in 1988.

In I972-1974 the price was about 88 cents a pound for pinkI
salmon. This went down to about 25 cents in 1982-1986 because of
botulism. A guy died from a can of pink salmon in Belgium.
People thought fish were poison. You couldn't sell. it.
The fishermen used to have a union to negotiate with the
processors, to advance 90 percent of the price. There was fairI
inventory too, so the price stayed at about 25 cents fromn 1982 to
1986. So that's in people's memories.

Then in 1987 there was a low volume year and the price came up
to about 40 cents, where it was before botulism. Then in 1988,3
when all the prices were going crazy because of the yen, there was
low volume again, and the price was up to 80 cents. It had been
there before and above, from 1964 to 1981. But the price wasI
going up, and volume was low, with inventories running out.

In 1988 there were only 10 million salmon, with prices at 80 cents3
a pound. In 1989 they expected 40 million fish, at a price of 80
cents a pound or more. So, the expectations were high. What
could go wrong? People were gearing up, expanding inI
anticipation of a record year. People went crazy.


Cordova - Page 262

With the spill of 1989 ... pink salmon, there was no inventory, and
people. expected at least 60 cents a pound. The season opened at
35 cents a pound. Not too strange. For instance in 1987, the price
opened at 23 cents a pound. Through the season the floating
processors compete, so the price ends up at 45 cents a pound. In
1988 prices. ranged from 30 cents to 80 cents a pound.
After the spfll in 1989, the price opened at 35 cents and closed at
35 cents. There were no floating processors, and no dynamics of a
regular season which would force prices up. There were worries
about oil tainting the fish--like the botulism scare. One can ruined
the market for 5 years. How do you inspect 40 miillion fish? So
there was no dynamics, and no competition for fish, so no rise in
prices.

Also, lots of people worked the spill, so they weren't fishing; so no
dynamics.

And, Exxon said they'd make up the price at the end, so there was
no pressure to bargain the price up.

So, the drop from 80 cents a pound to 35 cents a pound was the
same as the drop from botulism. So the price of fish was whacked
down.

A big study for $200,000 for the class action attorneys was carried
out. If you drop the price a penny, at 40 million fish, that's $1.4
million. Each fish weighs about 3.5 lb., with pink salmon.

Botulism is fresh in everyone's mind. The price is out of control
and here it goes again. The fishermen are approaching Exxon
about prices now.

T'he price drop is a complex dynamic: no one knows for sure why
it's down. ..
In 1989 we had 30 cents a pound. In 1990, we had 35 cents a
pound. This year, they're talking 20 to 25 cents a pound. That's
below botulism prices.
Cordova - Page 263





I've compiled all the barroom bull shit. Fishermen fish, and thenI
come to the bars and talk about fishing. ... The figures I've given
you are the talk on the street. The feeling is "The fish price has
been affected."
Low Fish Oualitv: Market effects of harvesting older fish (of darker, poorer3
quality) were described with the bankruptcy of the local fish processing cooperative (see
Sec. IV. Private Sector Econonmic Impacts of the Oil Spill [Non-Fishing]). The issue ofï¿½
public perceptions of fish being safe to eat was exarmined by the Alaska Seafood
Marketing Institute:3
While DEC and ADF&G are concerned about the "technical"
quality of fish, the Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute is focusing
on the consumer's and trade market's perceptions about theï¿½
quality. "This is all about perception, not about reality," said
Merry Tuten, ASMI's executive director. The institute has
conducted polls since the spill among both trade industry personnelI
and the consurner. The trade people are concerned about the
spill's effect on fish prices, she said, and the consumer has only
recently begun to express concerns about Alaskan seafood quality
(Cordova Fact Sheet, April 21, 1989:2).

The Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute received $800,000 from Exxon to pay forI
research projects in June 1989 (Cordova Fact Sheet, June 30, 1989:4). The organization
published results from market surveys in September. While the report appears to
conclude that consumers were not affected by the oil spill, the data seem to indicate that
they were. For instance, three out. of ten consumers in the United States and Britain
said that they did not believe that Alaska seafood was safe to eat:3
Results from market surveys commissioned by the Alaska Seafood
Marketing Institute indicate that awareness of the Exxon Valdez
oil sill amnong consumers has not affected purchases of seafoodI
from Alaska.

Hundreds of seafood consumers, retailers, and wholesalers ofI
Alaska seafood were interviewed in the U.S., France, and Britain.
Similar market research is underway in Japan.





Cordova - Page 2643

In France and the United States, one household in five reported
reducing or eliminating seafood likely to have come from Alaska,
and it was not due to an association with the spill. Most
respondents mentioned priCe.31 In Britain only one household in
ten reported reducing seafood purchases.

In the United States and Britain three consumers in ten said they
do not believe Alaska seafood is safe to eat. In France, only two
consumers in ten said that.

For the trade and consumers, the principal reasons for believing
that Alaska seafood is safe is that it is inspected by federal and
state governments before it reaches them.

"We are encouraged by the results of the surveys, and see this as
one indicator of the success of our inspection and commnunication
programs," said Merry Tuten, ASMI's executive director.

The Alaska Seafood Marketing Insti tute was established in 1981
and is headquartered in Juneau, Alaska. ASMI oversees worldwide
marketing programs for Alaska's $3 billion wholesale seafood
industry (from the "Oil Spill Chronicle," ADEC, Governor's Oil
Spill Coordination Office, as cited in Cordova Fact Sheet,
September 29, 1989:3-4).

Fishermen were intensely concerned about fish quality, and their anxiety was
maintained at a high pitch as State inspectors declared short openers based on the
movement of oil throughout the Sound. Many did not have complete confidence in the
ability of State agencies to keep up with oil sightings, and some felt that the fisheries
should simply be shut down rather than risk marketing contaminated fish. (Many cited
the botuflism scare as an example of how public safety concemns could dampen a market
for years.)
Respondents were frustrated that Exxon's claims policy forced them to fish in
waters they were unsure of, in order to file a claim; the company would only pay the
difference between projected earnings from past years and whiat a fisherman earned in




3'Although, prices paid to fishermen were down in 1989.
Cordova - Page 265






1989 if (s)he fished. Fishermen felt that only Exxon benefitted economically from fishI
harvesting under these risky conditions. This caused conflict between Cordovan
fishermen and State agencies who controlled the openers:
Fishermen told the Alaska Department of Fish and Game
Wednesday they want the Prince William Sound fishery shut down.U
Resounding applause followed the statement by one fisherman that
it would be better to "shut the whole thing down and give us some
direction," than to wait for short openers with the potential forI
further contaminated fish to be harvested.

ADF&G management biologist James Brady told the crowd thatI
he heard "a lot of support" for that proposal but said he had also
heard from people needing to pay bills. "We owe it to the industry
to not burn any bridges," Brady said.
Ken Florey, Regional Supervisor for ADF&G, said the
commissioner has determined it to be in the state's best interestsI
to continue the Sound fishery. "If we can determine an area is
clean, and if we can have an orderly fishery, then we will fish,"
Florey said.
At the two-hour public meeting, the fishermen saved the brunt of
their frustrations and anger for the Department of Environmental
Conservation. Complaints ranged from being unable to contact
DEC officials when oil sightings occur to not having qualified3
inspectors and not having inspectors on the fishing grounds.

Earlier in the meeting, Brady and Florey described the eventsI
leading to the decision last week to open fishing in the Esther
Subdistrict and Cannery Creek hatchery area. Florey said the
departments had probably not commurnicated as well as theyj
should have and, consequently, a decision made 2-3 weeks ago to
not open fishing in any areas with any oil sheens was not relayed
to Cordova.
Brady announced the July 26 opening of the Esther and Cannery
Creek areas to seiners and gillnetters on July 21. On Monday, JulyI
24, a DEC overflight of the areas indicated there was an oil sheen
in the fishing area but Brady said he reviewed the reports and
determnined that "there was no appreciable risk of adulteration" ofI
the salmon harvest. He surveyed parts of the areas before the



Cordova - Page 266

Wednesday morning opener and saw no evidence of oil sheens on
Tuesday or Wednesday.

The first report of problems from fishermen did not reach Brady
until 8 p.m. Friday night. He announced the emergency closure
about 11 a.m. Saturday after making contact with two of the
vessels which had encountered oil. "I accept responsibility for the
decision to open the fishery" Brady stated.

The department will proceed in "a very conservative manner from
ieeo,  ented  Heltr said there will be a very strict
interpretation of what constitutes an oil sheen. Tle advance notice
on fishing openings was extended Wednesday from 24 to 48 hours
and regular updates will be announced Mondays, Wednesdays, and
Fridays.

Prior to any opening, good areal survey conditions will be required
and future openings will be shortened in length to avoid larger
problems should oil sheens move into an open fishing area.

E.J. Cheshier said he and other fishermen were most concerned
about their market and the impacts on it from closures due to oil.
He compared the risks of opening fishing now to those associated
with the pipeline's construction to Prince William Sound. "You
took a chance on maybe wrecldng our market" Cheshier said. "I'm
appalled that you took that chance." Prolonged applause from the
audience followed his statement.

Manny Soares, the director of the DEC Seafood Qualt Division,
said his office had only received one report of oil in previously
opened fishing areas. He said ADF&G must have verification on
any reports before deciding to close an area.

When asked what better provisions for reporting oil sightings will
be made, Soares said reports should be directed to DEC officials,
in Cordova or elsewhere.

The meeting ended with some fishermen attempting to organize
another meeting for fishermen only to draft letters or take other
action complaining about their treatment (Cordova Fact Sheet,
August 3, 1989:2-3).
Cordova - Page 267





According to respondents, Exxon's blatant unconcern over market impacts of poorI
or unsafe fish quality continued to shape its claims policy in 1990. Exxon officials
announced that the company would not honor claims from fishermen who lost their catchI
due to the State's "zero-tolerance" oil contamination policy, adopted in 1989 to protect
the reputation of Alaska seafood after the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Cordova Fact Sheet,5
April 9, 1990:5). Exxon Claims Manager Dick Harvin stated that 1990 Exxon surveys
showed that conditions had "improved quite mnarkedly" since suspension of the oil
cleanup in September 1989. Harvin said that, "Therefore, there shouldn't be any closures
and therefore we don' t have a claims policy on closures" (Cordova Fact Sheet, April 9,
1990:5). Exxon General Manager Otto R. Harrison opposed fishery closures before the
Senate Oil and Gas Conim-ittee, maintaining that monitoring the quality of fish caught
was preferred (Cordova Fact Sheet, April 9, 1990:5). Cordovan fishermen disputed theI
ability of state agencies to inspect tens of millions of fish, as mentioned. Respondents in
1990 and 1991 also disputed Exxon's characterizations of their environment as "clean" or3
"cleaned" (see below).
In seeming contradiction to Exxon's contention that environmental conditions were3
so improved that no closures of fisheries should be necessary, Claims Manager Harvin
announced that Exxon would cover clairns in 1990 regarding oil-fouled nets and gear,3
where the evidence was obvious (Cordova Fact Sheet, April 9, 1990:5). Harvin added,
"But in terins of an expensive claims program like last summer--there won't be one"3
(Cordova Fact Sheet, April 9, 1990:5). Respondents in 1991 cited gear contaminated by
oil in 1990 as evidence that fish quality continued to be jeopardized by Exxon's fouling of3
Prince William Sound.
Fish Ouantities: While low fish prices was a major source of complaint3
regarding Exxon claims payments (as well as a chief negative impact cited for the oil
spill), Exxon's determ-ination of the quantity of the catch based on past 2-year averagesI
was a further irritant. With a record forecast for 1989 of over 40 m-illion fish,
respondents wondered how Exxon could possibly justify a projection based on past3
averages. Salmon harvests in Prince Williarm Sound for 1987 and 1988 were


Cordova - Page 2681

approximately 33 million and 15 m-illion fish, respectively (see Table 9). Most
respondents concluded that the oil company did not have to justify their claims policy,
because "Exxon was calling all the shots."
Cordovans are extremely bitter that the exceptionally large forecasted harvest for
1989, rather than benefitting fishermen economically, benefitted Exxon. More fish were
caught than could have been caught under the same circumstances in previous years,
reducing net losses; and Exxon used the size of the harvest to argue for exceptionally low
fish prices in claims awards.
That Exxon continues to cite large fish returns for 1990 and 1991 to discount spill
impacts aggravates Cordovans immensely. For instance, an Exxon news release points
out:
Under Exxon's policy, fishermen are reimbursed for the difference
between their normal projected catcb, based on historical data,
versus their actual catch. While salmon seasons have been
cancelled or delayed in some areas affected by the spill, this year's
statewide salmon catch has been the second largest in history
(Cordova Fact Sheet, September 12, 1989:2).

Cordovans believe that the catches from 1989 on would have been even bigger
without the oil spill and with a better market. They further believe that the oil spill
represents one of a series of catastrophic blows to their fishing envirornment; the damage
to Prince William Sound may not be measurable only in terms of this one incident
according to this view. The denial by State and Federal agencies of making biological
data public due to pending litigation exacerbates the uncertainty. Also, many
respondents do not believe that settlements paid to the Federal or State governments
will be used to compensate their losses. One fisherman explains:
The oil spill is one of a series of stresses on the Sound: the over
fishing, followed in 1964 by the earthquake. This tilted the
southern Sound and raised the northern Sound, decimating
stocks . ..
The spill didn't touch the flats directly, but in directly it entered the
migration route of the fry. So it killed small fish and plankton
which they feed on.
Cordova - Page 269





It definitely damaged salmon stocks, but it's hard to prove. TheI
research data are still locked up by the Federal and State
governments and by Exxon, because of the suits. So nobody knows
what the researchers found.
In 1989 the environmental impact was quite severe, because
nobody knew what the long term consequences would be.I
Everybody had doubts that we could go on with a normal life as
fishermen. This question of damage is still one that hangs in the
air.
[The 1989 season] was severely impacted. We did catch some fish3
in clean areas, but we caught them late because they had to test
for oil, so the catch was way down. Fishing was severely disrupted
all the way into the market place.3

The quality of the fish was down because they'were ready to spawn
by the time they were caught.3

The fry that came out of the hatcheries swam through the
contaminated water. We will never know what the impact was. If
they weren't killed outright, they might have damage to homing
instincts, growth patterns, and so on.

We had an excellent spring with lots of plankton, so the hatchery
fish were supported by a new plankton bloom, after the oil killed
the plankton that was already there.
Pink salmon spend 1 year in the ocean and come back; the other
types take longer.
In 1990 we had a record year for survival. There was 9- percent
survival, vs. a 5.5-percent survival on the average. This wasI
because of the high plankton, but it could have been 12 percent or
higher without the oil . .. the fish were smnall. Nobody knows
why.
Ninety percent of salmon mortality occurs in fresh water. Ten
percent occurs in the ocean. The hatchery returns are over 10 fold
what Mother Nature can put out ...
Cordova - Page 270

Prince William Sound is a fragile environment. The trees take 100
years to grow. The fish are dependent on the trees, to hold
moisture in, keep temperatures the same, streams to flow, and so
on.

So, the 1964 e'arthquake was a stress on the fish, with the uplift.
Logging is another stress. The oil development here is a problem:
the plants at Valdez.

So how much can the environment stand? If you heap one stress
after another, the Sound could be jeopardized.

Exxon hasn't done anything for restoration. The restoration
problem has only been talked about.

Everybody is suing everybody. The Federal Government doesn't
even know what to charge. How much for an oiled moose?
What's the cost of a sea otter? And what do you do with the
money? Buy tanks?

So the individual claims and damages too often aren't settled: just
an initial payment for damages.

So, H-ickle wants $1.4 billion over tirme, and so on. But will the
government use the money to mitigate damnages? Who knows?

Exxon wants to settle out the claim and get out of the liability.
They have little to say about how those moneys are spent for
restoration.

You can' t restore; things are dead. Things are impacted. How do
you restore an ecosystem? Paying a bunch of money doesn't
restore the tube worms.

We still have single-hulled tankers. Who knows? You're always
going to be subject to those perils. We predicted this. Once every
10-20 years. It's statistically likely . .

My income decreased, because of the disrupted fishing season that
year and afterward. The season was closed most of the year.
Exxon made a voluntary payment for that loss, but the
disagreement is over the final settlement.
Cordova - Page 271

I'm having to estimate my consequences for the TAPS fund. And
the data is locked up so I have no way to estimate the
consequences, for instance, for the degradation that will take 10
years to restore.
No one knows what the actual damage Will be, over the years.
People will finally settle, but without the best information3
available. And, no one can really nail down what would have
been.3

If I tell Exxon $150,000, they'll pay it. But if there's really been
genetic damage to some stocks, what am I going to do with that?
So everyone is fighting over this.
Exxon Claims Advances: A great many fishermen are still pursuing3
settlements which were partially paid when Exxon began a system of claims "advances."
These cash advances were provided at the urgings of CDFU and fishermen and litigation3
organizations, who were concerned that some fishermen were being forced to sign
releases because they had no money.3
Some respondents reported in 1991 that Exxon paid these advanices, and then
refused to continue processing claim's, pending litigation. These individuals wereI
referred to the TAPAA fund, which they perceive as inadequate to cover all losses.
Respondents also believe that TAPAA claims may take years to settle.32 In general,I
subjects described their claims "advances" as constituting their "settlements" from Exxon.
The first of two Exxon claims advances in 1989 involved a set cash payment for allI
gillnet permit holders and seiners. Those working on the oil spill could not apply for
these advances:I
As a result of the efforts of the Cordova District Fishermen
United, Prince William Sound Seiners Association and the3
Plaintiff s Class Action Committee, the Exxon Claims office will
start an "advance" payment program for Prince William Sound
fishermen later this week.3





3APAclaims are discussed in succeeding sections.3

Cordova - Page 272

There are two "advance` programs, one for gillnet permit holders
and one, for seine permit holders. Gillnet permit holders will be
eligible for a $10,000 advance and seiners will be eligible to
receive $30,000.

To'obtain this advance from Exxon, the permit holder will need to
provide:

1.	A copy of their permit card.
2.	A copy of their ADF&G vessel license card, or if they lease
their boat, a copy of the lease or a statement from the boat
owner about the terms of the lease agreement.
3.   Identification of their crew members, spotter pilots and boat
payments; Exxon will deduct these shares and pay them
directly to those individuals.
4.   A copy of the second page (the summary sheet) of your
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) computer
readout.
5.   For gillnetters who usually do not have a crew, a statement
that you have no crew.
6.   To be eligible for the Advance program, you will NOT have
to show hardship, but anyone who is working on the oil spill
will NOT be eligible for an Exxon advance.

All forms needed for the "Advance" claim are a vailable through
the Cordova Fishermenes Claims Office. In addition, the
Fishermen's Claims Office has available a Notary for the sworn
statements that need to be filled out (Cordova Fact Sheet, August
15, 1989:1).

A second advance payment covered 85 percent of individuals' total claims, as
calculated by Exxon and contested by fishermen. As noted, many recounted that this 85
percent of their total claim was all that they received. Exxon reportedly refused to
process claims any further after this second payment. Again, only those who fished could
file for this claims advance:
Tle Exxon Claims office began accepting applications from
fishermen last Monday for the 85 percent Advance No. 2. The
office was swamped with applications early in the week but Clam
Supervisor Walter Moore said Thursday that the work is going
more smoothly.
ICordova - Page 273





Packets of the forms necessary to apply for this second advance1
payment are available at the Exxon Claims office on Breakwater
Avenue. Those fishermen who submitted applications for the first
advance payment do not need to resubmit their fishing recordsI
from the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission but they are
required to fill out additional forms to receive the second advance
and must submit copies of their fish tickets for the 1989 seasonI
(copies can be made at the Exxon office).

A few additional clarifications on the 85 percent Advance No. 21
program:
* All permit holders in PWS who participated in the 1989 fisheryI
are eligible for this program.
* Those who received advances in the Advance No.1I program will
have those advances deducted from their 85 percent advance
payment.3
* Also, deductions will be made for 1) their total 1989 catch; 2)
crew members and spotter pilots; 3) boat lease payments due (forI
those skippers leasing a boat); and 4) 4%, deduction for hatchery
and variable expenses.

*There are two main reasons for this second advance payment
program: 1) Many fishermen's records for past seasons, provided
by the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, are incompleteI
and require fishermen to submit additional fish tickets from past
season to CFEC for correction. Therefore, final settlements for
fishermen cannot be made until the CFEC has time to enterI
corrections received from fishermen.

2) Exxon is currently reviewing information related to the grounds
price on which the 85 percent advance is being made. There may
be a price adjustment at a future date.3
*Fishermen do not have to participate in either the Advance No,
1 or No. 2. They may choose to wait for a final settlement after
price adjustments and CFEC records have been finalized.
*Permnit holders with no prior catch history will receive "average"
amounts, equal to $28,926 for gillnetters . ... For seiners, theI
average catch is equal to $171,915. Under the Advance No. 2


Cordova - Page 274

program, fishermen are eligible to receive 85 percent of these
amounts with deductions as noted above (Cordova Fact Sheet,
September 1, 1989:1).

Under pressure from fishermen's claims attorneys, Exxon announced that it would
grant certain exceptions to its standard claims formula. These announcements are cited
below, althougyh fishermen and claims officials recounted in 1991 that exceptions were
administered in an uneven fashion.
Exxon's first announcement of exceptions to their claims formula was in response to
a letter of complaint by Cordova's Oil Spill Disaster Response Office Director. The oil
company's letter defends Exxon's standard claims formula, without addressing the key
issues of the projected increase in the size of the 1989 catch and the radical drop of fish
prices after the oil spill. It states that Exxon's program "utilizes" the ADF&G preseason
projected harvest, but (in seeming contradiction) that permit holders would be paid on
the basis of a 2-year historical average.
This statement exemplifies a general reported tendency of Exxon officials,
particularly irksome to respondents, to obfuscate issues. In discussing the effects of
averaging a 2-year catch history, Exxon's Claims Manager argues that the company had
wanted to uise a 3-year average catch, which would have "smoothed out" irregularities;
this was changed at the request of fishermen' organizations. Clearly, the size of salmon
catches has increased steadily over time (see Table 9). In this case, the inclusion of the
1986 catch (a to'tal of approximately 15 million salmon for PWS) would have simply
diluted this increase (the 1987 catch being approximately 33 million, the 1988 catch
approximately 15 mnillion, and the 1989 catch projected at over 40 million). This would
have exacerbated the difference between Exxon's projected 1989 catch and fishermen's
expectations for that harvest.
Exxon's letter notes that fishing is a "high risk business," and refers to impacts of
the Exxon Valdez oil spill as a "new" risk. This equation (of spill damages with risks)
appears to subsurne damnages caused by Exxon's oil spill under the general category of
normal risks:
Cordova - Page 275





Dear Mr. Treadwell:1

We recently received your August 30, 1989 letter concerning
"lexceptions" to the guidelines being used to administer claims fromI
salmon fishermen. We are in the process of developing procedures
to handle exceptions and will provide additional compensation to
those individuals who have extraordinary circumstances. However,
we also believe that fishermen's claims attorney's Graham Bell's
assertion that the program is unfair to 50% of the fishermen is an
overstatement.
As you are aware, fishing is a high risk business. The program we3
have put in place this year in Prince William Sound was designed
to address the "new" risks this year to the fishing season which
occurred as a result of the M/V Exxon Valdez oil spill. TheI
program utilizes the Alaska Department of Fish and Game pre-
season projected harvest with each individual permnit holder being
compensated on the basis of an average of their two year historicalI
share of the catch. Thus, it is true that a permit holder who had a
30% increase in his catch in 1988 versus 1987 will have his 1989
compensation based on a 15% reduction versus his 1988 catch.I
However, on the reserve side, the same prograrm will provide a
15% increase in compensation in 1989 to a permit holder whose
catch in 1988 dropped 30% versus 1987. The original proposalI
-which Exxon presented to the fishermen's groups representatives
on June 20, 1989 would have used three years' history as the basis
for 1989 compensation. This would have further "smoothed out"I
large changes between 1987 and 1988 performance. The program
was changed to two years at the request of the fishing groups in
the meeting.
The procedures for exceptions we are developing will address
permnit holders who have extraordinary reasons for havingI
extremely low catches in one year. It will also. address issues
involving "new" permiit holders who can prove that they have a
fishing history in the area above the average performance.

Your letter also stated that the calculation which was done to
arrive at the participation factor to use for a new drift gill permitI
holder included 100 gill netters who fish only the Copper and
Bering River districts. This statement is not correct and the
calculation excluded gill netters who only fished the flats. It was
solely based on 1987 and 1988 harvest values and drift gill permit


Cordova - Page 276

holder participation from areas in Prince William Sound other
than the Copper and Bering River districts.

In conclusion, we realize that there are legitimate exceptions to the
quidelines and intend to address those cases this year. Our
primary focus to this point in time has been to concentrate on the
overall program to insure that the majority of the people receive
compensation in a timely fashion. The guidelines do cover five
different fishing areas with approximately 2000 permit holders in
the program. As we complete this primary focus, we will move
into addressing exceptions on a case by case basis.

We appreciate the chance to discuss this issue with you and please
contact us if you have any questions.

Sincerely, Richard T. Harvin, Exxon Claims Manager (Cordova
Fact Sheet, September 21, 1989:2).

Exxon recognized two factors for consideration in determining exceptions to their
standard claims policy. One factor was significant eapital expenditures for upgrades. This
principle was reportedly applied unevenly, and the majority who upgraded were not
compensated. A official at the Fishermen's Claims Office reports:
Exxon hasnet been even-handed in paying off. As time went along
they got better. At first they were arbitrary. A major inequity was
that a fisherman who usually made $8,000 got $10,000. He went to
Exxon and said he'd upgraded his equipment, and he got another
$18,000. I tried that on 30 other identical requests with the same
conditions and Exxon said they'd pay off, but they didn't. They just
refused to act on them.

The second exceptional factor involved the adjustment of the average catch figare. Here
Exxon referred only to past years, ignoring the projected harvest increase for 1989:
As you are aware, our voluntary salmon compensation program
was developed to fairly compensate fishermen who were directly
impacted by the M/V Exxon Valdez oil spill. Our guidelines and
methods of calculation provide a fair and reasonable basis for
determnining the impact of the spill. However, as with all programs
that apply to a large population, there may be a small number of
permnit holders with extenuating circumstances who deserve
additional consideration.
Cordova - Page 277





We have isolated two groups that may need additional evaluationU
to determine if their claim should be considered in a different
manner. If you identify such cases, the files should be sent to Rich
Eichner, Jim House or Dave Henry for review and a final decision.I
The key to determining if the file should be forwarded is a pattern
of catch history which indicates that the use of an 'average', or one
of the actual,years in the calculation, is clearly at a significantI
variance with the pattern for other years.

1.   Fishermen who have had to use an "average" year, due toI
missing a year being used in the calculation, or being a new
permiit holder, may deserve additional consideration if he/she
was consistently above average in other years. Documentation
of this wvil be required.

2.   There may be fishermen who have an abnormally low year
due to an extraordinary circumstance such as medical
problem, major boat repair, or a similarly rare and3
unforeseeable event. The claimant's circumstance must
significantly affect at least one-third of the season and be
well documented.3

In addition, catch exception guidelines due to significant capital
expenditures for boat and gear upgrades are being considered.I
However, until those considerations are complete, we should
continue to deny exceptions on that basis (From a September 19
Exxon memo sent to all Exxon Claims Offices, as cited in CordovaI
Fact Sheet, September 27, 1989:1).

I-n general, respondents described a claims process which diverged from Exxon's
publicly announced policies. The application in practice of the Exxon volunteer claims
policy differed widely. One complication was that the CFEC could not provide earningsI
records for crewmen, since their data are based on delivery records (fish tickets) only; at
best, the CEEC could verify that an individual held a crewman's license in a given yearI
(Cordova Fact Sheet, April 20, 1989:2). Some fishermen reportedly worked on the spill
cleanup and also got goo d fishing claims settlements, while others who worked on theI
cleanup could naot fish and so did not receive claims. Some were compensated for
equipment upgrades while others were not. Some fishermen signed releases in order to
receive money while others only signed receipts. Some claims settlements were


Cordova - Page 278

reportedly much more generous than others. Despite Exxon's announcement of specific
policy gLiidelines, individual case settlements appeared to vary.
A Case Examule: The following case e xample, then, is not "representative;"
rather, it illustrates a situation where there were no exceptional circumstances (such as
loss. of a boat due to oil damage, loss of all fish earnings without any compensation by
someone who refused to fish an oiled Sound, complete loss of income by someone who
refused to fish and refused to work for Exxon, etc.).
This person does share one very cormmon experience of Cordovans during the post-
spill period, however. Many fishermen, private and public sector employees, and
business owners reported that, while their income for 1989 approximated that of other
years, they worked much harder for the samne money. Here a fisherman who
traditionally would have fished during short openers worked on the spill cleanup for
hourly wages which were fa-r less lucrative.
The following person is a lifelong, Cordovan resident who fishes each year in
several fisheries, with relatives. His father owns a salmon permlit. He believes that
Exxon's claims settlement left him with losses relative to previous years, to say nothing of
his expectations for an exceptionally good year in 1989:
The water was polluted, the beaches were polluted, sea life and
water fowl were destroyed. People's ability to make money and to
survive wasn't there anymore. People were sickened by what
happened. Sickened by the stupidity of it. It shouldn't have
bappened ...

My income the year of the spill decreased. I wasn't allowed to
fish. The year of the spill I made $250 fishing. The other income
was compensation and spill work.

Their compensation wasn't fair because they figured it on your
average for the past 3 years. They only paid me $13,000, but that
[amount] would have been the worst year we ever had. They
didn't pay enough.
T'he prediction was it would have been a fine year. I seine salmon,
mostly red salmon, down in the Aleutians. Here I fish pinks.
[Also, roe on kelp.] I expected close to $30,000 for the season.
Cordova - Page 279





The last three years I'd made ... every year it was over $20,000.U
Between $20,000 and $30,000 each year.

We didn't sign a release. It's still pending.U

We were . .. our lawyers were trying to get them to increase it. At
one point we got a check for $11,000. We got them to increaseI
our prediction, and they gave us another $2,800. We were going
for a class action suit, but now they have this Trans Alaska
Pipeline Fund. They sent us a paper and I sent it in.
[Exxon's] figure was based on their prediction. I don't know how
they justified it. They may have taken cleanup wages out of the
claim. I don't know.

Some people made a lot of money because of the spill and someI
didn't make any. My friend bought a boat and made $100,000 on
the spill. I had been going to buy that boat and didn't. It helped3
some people and made it horrible for others.

I made about $8,000 working the spill, but that [cleanup income]3
was, again, to please people with money. But people weren't
happy, because they wanted to clean the oil up and go fishing.
And they weren't cleaning it up.
The above claim appears to conform roughly to Exxon's policy as described by
respondents. This fisherman averaged between $20,000 to $30,000 per year, expecting
$30,000 for 1989. If his historical average is $25,000, 85 percent of this amount is
$21,250. He received $13,800 from Exxon (with the intercession of his lawyer). He
made $250 fishing, bringing this to $14,050. If, as he suggests, his cleanup wage.s of
$8,000 were added to this amount, the total would be $23,050, close to 85 percent of his
historical average.3
On the other hand, this settlement may have been based on this fisherman's
projected catch, at the artificially low 1989 prices. Seen in season totals, the 19893
forecast was 40 million salmon at an expected 80 cents per pound; Exxon's claims
projection averaged the catches for 1987 and 1988 (totalling approximately 48 million3
salmon), axriving at an average of 24 million salmon, at 35 cents a pound. Roughly



Cordova - Page 280

calculated, if this fisherman averaged $25,000 per year, at an averaged price of 60 cents
per pound (fishermen were paid an average of 40 cents a pound for pink salmon in 1987
and 79 cents a pound in 1988), that would indicate a catch of 41,667 pounds. At Exxon's
35 cents per pound, this would yield $14,584.45 in projected fish earnings. This
fisherman made $250 and was awarded a first claim of $11,000, which his lawyer argued
up to $13,800; the totaled fish earnings and award is $14,050.
It is impossible to determine how this person's claims award was, actually
calculated. However, one can easily understand why respondents believe that their
awards were too low. It can also be argued that Exxon calculated that a person who was
used to earning $25,000 per year, who expected $30,000 for 1989, and who received a
total of $22,050 in 1989 (from cleanup wages, compensation, and fish earnings
combined), might not be strongly motivated to pursue legal action for the difference.
Cordovans, however, do not believe that cleanup earnings should offset losses in fish
earnings, as mentioned. They complain that those who refused to work for Exxon for
ethical reasons suffered disproportionately.
The TAPAA Fund: During the winter of 1991, many Cordovans were absorbed in
filing TAPAA claims. On December 14, 1990 a ruling from U.S. District Court Judge
Russell Holland in Anchorage denied class action certification for lawsuits against Exxon
Corporation over the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill.
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA) was created in 1973, based
on a five cents per barrel levy for tankers shipping crude oil (Cordova Times, January 3,
1991:1). The fund as of winter 1991 contained approximately $300 million; the maximum
liability is $100 million, with $86 million coming from the fund and $14 million from the
spiller (Cordova Times, January 3, 1991:1). Liability over that amount would be paid by
the spiller, and the TAPAA could sue Exxon for reimbursement for its pro rata share of
claims payments (Cordova Times, January 3, 1991:1).
Cordovan respondents were generally unhappy about being referred to TAPAA.
Complaints included that the fund would not contain enough money for all damages,
processing of claims (including possible appeals over class action) might take years,
Cordova - Page 281






subjects could not determine true damages by the March 24, 1991 deadline, claims wouldI
be difficult to alter later, and individuals felt overwhelmed at the prospect of carrying out
necessary litigation on their own.I
While many of the law firms representing fishermen proposed that a class action

suit did not best serve individual and commnunity claimnants, Exxon had opposed class
action certification (Cordova Timnes, January 3, 1991:1)."~ The latter factor was'also
cited as a reason for fishermen's endorsement of class action.
The inherent gambles in a 2-year statute of limitation on claimns stemming from a
catastrophic oil spill were a source of concern for many. A representative of the
Fisherman's Claims and Litigation Support Office, set up to represent CDFU members
in Cordova, explains:
We have a March 24 deadline due to the statute of limnitations.
But they can alter the amount on the TAPAA form. It can beI
amended, but it's hard .. . you were crazy, for instance.

We don't know what Exxon is going to do. We're gambling thatI
the fish will come back.

We were organized for class action suits. Now we're the FederalI
TAPAA. We were formed after the spill. Exxon paid our law
offices for each claim. If you got a check from Exxon, we got one.
But they aren't keeping up their payments . . .. The lawyers also
fund this office. They got a cut from each claim. There are a lot
of problems. Each claim is different.3

In general, respondents expressed their lack of confidence in the adequacy of the
TAPAA fuind to mnitigate present and future damages:I
Uncertainty is still a big problem. People are being conservative.
I saw in the news where oil has done long-term damage to birdsI
and fish. Then we'll have long-term financial problems.







33 Cordova law firms representing fishermen include Bixby, Cowan and Gerry and that of George Harrington.3


Cordova - Page 282

Litigation is crazy; a Federal judge rules one way, a State judge
rules another way. TAPAA funds are insufficient and there's~ still
no real mechanisms to prevent another major disaster. Just a few
more escort boats ...

There's 10,000 fishermen involved in the spill, and an $86 mnillion
TAPAA fund. Fishing season in Prince William Sound is worth
$50 mi'llion. I sure hope they change the TAPAA fund before they
punch any more holes in ANWVR [Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge] ...
A widely expressed source of indignation and dismay is the withholding by
govermnent agencies of biological study results needed by individual claimants, pending
litigation. As one respondent points out, this pits the interests of citizens against those
of their public servants:
[Alaska] Fish and Game have a cap on [biological studies]. The
average guy on the street needs their data for his claim, but the
State has their claim, so you lose your public servants. So
everybody is speculating.

We got slimed, and we're going to get screwed.
III.D. The Hatcheries: Prince William Sound Aquaculture
General Background: The PWSAC is a private nonprofit corporation which
operates three sahnon hatcheries in Prince William Sound (the Armin F. Koernig
Hatchery, the Esther Island Hatchery, and the Cannery Creek Hatchery). Tle
corporation has a budget of over $10 million--a budget larger than the Cordova city
budget.
The corporation was begun in the early 1970's by Cordovan commercial fishermen,
who were concemned that their livelihood was endangered by low wild salmon returns
and the creation of the oil pipeline. One founder explains:
The stocks in Prince William Sound fluctuate widely because of
normal conditions. The State and Federal governments took over
to protect them from overfishing ...
Cordova - Page 283





[Here we] have 800 or so spawning populations. Streams are smallI
and steep. So they are easily affected, for instance by hard freezes
and droughts. The streams move a lot.3

So environmental factors here wipe out spawning more easily. So
there are large fluctuations, of highs and lows.3

In 1972 and 1974 there were smnall returns of salmon. Also, the
pipeline was built then. So the fishermen said, "Why don't we quit
fishing and go to work for the oil companies? We can't make a
living fishing."

But we wanted to turn this around. So Alaska created FRED
[Fishing Rehabilitation and Enhancement Division] to protect
fishing, in about 1972.3

Hatcheries were first set up in the 1930's, but technologies weren't
suitable. For instance, small fry were dropped directly into salt3
walter when they needed. a year in fresh water first. This changed
when the FRED came into being. The Federal Government
wanted to give the private sector a chance to help out.3

In 1974 a Private Non-profit Aquifer Act was put up by the
legislature. In 1974 we had the chance either to give up fishing orI
get into the act, using that legislation.

So we formed the Prince William Sound Aquaculture Corporation.3
I was head from 19   to 19__. We decided the state should do
half the job, and we should-ido half the job.3

Currently PWSAC is the State regional association for Area E in Prince William
Sound and the Copper River. As such, it has public responsibilities beyond the interests3
of the comimercial fishermen who are members. For instance, the State of Alaska has
requested that PWSAC take over operations of the Main Bay Hatchery and provide3
funding for the Gulkana Hatchery, transferring these State hatcheries to the regional
aquaculture association (PWSAC 1990:20). Corporate spokesmen do not anticipate that3
this will be profitable, but PWSAC has agreed in principle to the request. A company
representative describes these broader responsibilities:3




Cordova - Page 284

[We are] a private, non-profit corporation, not publicly held. It's
Area E: Prince William Sound and the Copper River. So it's a
regional aquaculture corporation. The areas were created in 1974
by the State to improve the fishing areas. We're answerable to the
fishermen and the State.

We are the regional association for Area E. We have a 45
member board, 60 percent are commercial fishermen elected by
the permit-holding private fishermnen. Those 27 people are divided
equally between gill and seine netters, with one set netter. The
other 40 percent (18 people) are representatives of Native
corporations, fish processors, municipalities, and sports users.
T'hey are appointed by their constituents. For instance, Cordova
chose its mayor.

T'he board elects an executive committee of seven in June of each
year. They conduct dafly business. Most fisheries are under a
limited entry system, because mnost fisheries were depleted by
overfishing.

There's a set number of permits available: for instance, 263
seining permits, no more. Each is worth about $300,000. They're
worth a lot because there are a set amount and no more. Gill net
permits are about $150,000. The permnit holders are the
constituency. As a regional association we're responsible to
provide fish for all the users: subsistence, commercial, sports, and
so on . ...

We don't anticipate any lost recovery at the Copper River
hatcheries. Our other hatcheries are on the tidewalls. But the
Copper River fish have to go up river 200 to 250 miles before
reaching the hatcheries. So they'll be too old for a good price.
And they won't be distinguished from the wild stock, so we can't
take a percentage. In our other hatcheries, no wild stock comes
into those area, so we can take a proportion of them.

We have to go in to the Copper River. The State asked us to, and
it's our stataary responsibility because we have this regional
responsibility. The State doesn't want to operate those fisheries
anymore.

We started with one hatchery in 1975, built another, were given
another, and a fourth will be given us by the State in a short while.
Cordova - Page 285





The Oil Spill: The 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill caused. considerable turmoil andI
disorganization for PWSAC, creating financial complexities, operational reorganization,
and extra employee responsibilities (PWSAC, 1990:4,9). The corporation incurred
substantial costs to protect its hatcheries frorn the oil, and normal business operations
were disrupted (PWSAC 1990:19). The majority of extra costs were reimbursed by
Exxon (PWSAC 1990:19). However, a weak salmon market with radical drops in prices,
bankruptcies of small processors, and the reluctance of other processors to buy the
corporationes harvests, all continue to trouble the corporation.
While the immediate organized response of CDFU fishermen did little to stem the
early oil leakage from the Exxon Valdez, due to interference from the oil industry,3
efforts to protect the PWSAC hatcheries fared better. Before oil could spread to the
hatcheries, the ADEC asked CDFU to send 15 boats to protect them; they were3
dispatched without delay. By mid-April 1989, 8,000 feet of ocean boom was in place in
front of the Armiin F. Keornig Hatchery; 1,600 feet of boom had arrived fromn Norway,3
with an additibnal 2,000 feet arriving from the Persian Gulf (Cordova Fact Sheet, April
16, 1989:4). Gunnar Gangsaas, worldng for the supplier of the boom, Norpol Marine3
Services, arrived from Norway on April 15 to assist in deploymnent of the boom (Cordova
Fact Sheet, April 16, 1989:4).3
Representatives of PWSAC were also relatively successful in persuading Exxon to
foot the bill for their protection efforts, once they had convinced the oil company that
delays would entail astronomical damages. For instance, the timing of the oil spill made
it particularly perilous for salmon runs because the fry were just about to be released3
into the ocean. The PWSAC fared better than many Cordova businesses in negotiating
with Exxon for mitigation of losses, but PWSAIC spokespeople describe a process in3
which the oil company was completely unprepared to handle the oil spill emergency, and
had no idea of the social, cultural, environmental, or commrercial setting throuigh which it3
was pumping oil:





Cordova - Page 286

The spill impacted us, but we were reimbursed $8 million by
Exxon. So only a few h-undred thousand dollars weren't
reimbursed. We're suing Exxon over that now.34

They paid for the protection of the hatcheries. We had five layers
of boom at each of the hatcheries. At Sawmill Bay we had around
the clock mopping of oil that slipped around the boom. We hired
Spill Tech, a corporation that deals with spills ...

I flew around giving press conferences all the time. It took
enormous time away from ordinary operations. We had to hire
extra employees. It was a struggle, but we were able to. We were
forced to pay them quite adequately.

For the most part we hired boats that were paid for by Exxon to
protect the hatcheries. At the beginning boats went out as
volunteers, but then they. became on payroll. Our effort, Exxon's
efforts, and the Coast Guard efforts were all coordinated.

We incurred the expenses for our boats, then Exxon sent in an
auditor who checked everything for authenticity, then they would
pay.

We had special harvest expenses which were not paid; about
$600,000. We had special harvests where we had to catch more
fish than usual because the fishermen weren't catching them. We
have "cost recovery," where we hire boats who come and catch a
proportion of our fish which we sell at about the rate the
fishermen get.

Ordinarily we catch 30 percent of our own fish who return to the
hatchery. But in 1989 we had to catch all the fish, because the
fishermen weren't catching at all. So we incurred extra costs. In
1988 the price for salmon was 85 cents per pound. In 1989 it was
35 cents p er po-und . ..






341It is interesting to compare Exxon's treatment of PWSAC with, for instance, the Cooper River Fishermen's
Cooperative (CRFC) (discussed elsewhere). The small processor was unable to argue an Exxon offer of $700,000
up to meet their $1.7 million claim, which could have kept the cooperative out of bankruptcy, according to the
CRFC management.
Cordova - Page 287





Abnormalities in herring were documented, but those were inI
natural areas, not hatcheries. We kept the oil out of our'
hatcheries, thank God. Otherwise we'd have lost them all.

The fish had just started emerging the week of the spill: 120
million fry at the San Juan Hatchery in the third week of April,
which had to be released into the sea.
We release our fry when we deem the zoa plankton to be optimal.
So we release the fry into the plankton bloom. So we've achieved
very hugh survival rates. They are fed in the pens and have food
when they're let out. They mix with the wild stock when released,
and come back with wild stock to spawn. But the wild stock goes
back to their own streams, and our fish come back to the hatchery
areas .. 3

The wild pink stock was above average in 1990. The hatcheries'
success was related to a huge and long plankton bloom in 1989. It
was warm, with weeks of bloom where usually the bloom is a few
days. So that probably explains the high survival rate of the pink
salmon.

Exxon was forthright and even-handed, once they realized we
existed. We made efforts to impress them. They had absolutely
no concept of anything in the Sound: the Natives, the hatcheries,
the fishermen.

They thought of us as Natives in a jungle with grass skirts. As far
the culture of the area, they were bringing their tankers through,
they had absolutely no idea of it. They started from ground zero.
[My husband and I] have a seine boat. My husband was out on
the, Sound. I was working 18 hours a day here. He went toI
Valdez to work. He called and said, "They just figured out they
need boats to get out on the Sound."                                                    3

They had no knowledge, no logistics, no mnanpower, no nothing to
deal with anything of this magnitude. They still don't. The only
thing they've done that is meaningful is their escort vessels. They
could mnove a loaded tanker around and keep it from hitting
anything.




Cordova - Page 288

But thaf's the only thing they've got going. The response plans are
in a shambles. The local response is not organized. So, spill
prevention has progressed, but spill response has not progressed.

No one is trained to operate equipment that is placed around the
Sound. It's all being done halfway, 2 years afterward. There's not
much existing.

The cleanup endangered our areas. We had to ask them to refrain
from cleaning in certain areas at certain times. They complied,
with total ignorance.

For instance,, when our President, Bruce Suzumoto, went to
Valdez,                     was in charge in Valdez. Bruce went
to see him to express the dangers for the hatcheries, the need for
booms, what was at stake. Frank had a good attitude. He said,
"Speak to this guy and he'll give you what you need: $ 100,000-
200,000." Bruce said, "We're thinking about $2 million to start."
So Frank gave him a business card with $1 mnillion written on the
back: his guarantee for a million dollars in the bank account by
tomorrow morning. They spent over $8 miillion by the time we
were done.

The only contribution Exxon made was. money. Logistically, they
were ,incompetent. The Coast Guard helped set the boom. We
flew boom in from ... Norway, England, and so on. Norway
makes a lot of spill equipment, and Shetland Islands, and the Gulf.
They have more on the ball regarding oil spills.

To meet its annual expenses of approximately $10 milion, PWSAC must harvest
about 24 percent of the fish returning to its hatcheries (PWSAC 1991:2). This figure
fluctuates according to the size of returns and fish prices. In 1989 PWSAC was able to
harvest and sell its quota of salmon, but it took them all from the Armnin F. Koernig
(AFK) Hatchery, rather than frorn all three of its hatcheries. This was because the AFK
hatchery was hardest hit by the Exxon Valdez oil spill, so that the district was closed and
no commercial fishery could intercept the approximately 6 inillion pink salmon returning
there (Cordova Fact Sheet, July 14, 1989: 1).
The corporation presold 30 percent of their 1989 salmon harvest (2 million pink
salmon) to Chugach Alaska Fisheries of Cordova, who agreed to pay 152 percent of the
Cordova - Page 289





average price being paid to commercial fishermnen by the 6 major local processors at thatI
time (Cordova Fact Sheet, July 14, 1989:1). The remainder of the harvests were offered
to processors who gave the highest bids. Although concrete figures are not available,
some respondents in 1991 believe that Chugach Alaska Fisheries (rumored to be on the
verge of bankruptcy with a substantial suit against Exxon) was hurt by having paid too
high a price in 1989 for salmon.
Price projections by PWSAC before the oil spill had been 60 cents a pound for
pink salmon; at this price, an estimated 5.4 million pink salmon available at AFK would
have yielded a sales harvest of about $11.3 million, which would have come close to
meeting the corporation's 1989 sales harvest goal of $11.6 million (Cordova Fact Sheet,
May 18, 1989:3). Expenses for PWSAC's 1990 budget totaled a little over $12 millfion, to
be supplied by fish sales revenues and a 2-percent .enhancement tax revenue of
approximately $1.6 million (Cordova Fact Sheet, May 18, 1989:3).
The corporation's fish sales revenues for the following years ending June 30 were:
$4,756,617 in 1989; $14,857,267 in 1990; $9,066,020 in 1991; and a projected goal of
$9,066,020 for 1992 (PWSAC 1990:14). Since PWSAC fish sales during 1989 took place
in August after the spill, the oil spill does not appear to have had a crushing economic
impact during that year. However, the aquaculture corporation has run into serious
difficulties in subsequent years which relate to low fish prices and a reluctance of
processors to buy their harvests. (The relation of low fish prices to the oil spill remains
an open question, as discussed above, but Cordovans believe that there is a relationship.)
Low fish prices, problematic for Cordovan fishermen in 1989, continued to plague3
the industry in 1990. Processors in Prince William Sound paid from 30 to 35 cents per
pound for pink salmon (Cordova Times, August 16, 1990:A5). While salmon retumns
were strong in 1990, there was a problem with quality in that large numbers of the fish
were smaller than average. Many of the pink salmon were under 2 pounds (head andI
entrais removed), compared to a normal weight in Prince William Sound of between 2.4
and 3.5 pounds (Cordova Times, August 16, 1990:A5). There is less of a market for the3
smnaller fish: European and Far Eastern buyers often reject them, and larger fish


Cordova - Page 290

traditionally command higher prices worldwide (Cordova Times, August 16, 1990:A5).
Cordovan fishermen wondered in 1991 whether the oil spill had affected the size of the
fish.
Prices for 1991 were still low, and PWSAC began to have trouble finding buyers for
its fish. In mid-December 1991, PWSAC President Bruce Suzumoto reported to the
PWSAC Board of Directors that the five major processors in the Sound had showed
reluctance to buy the hatchery-caught, cost-recovery harvests (PWSAC 1991:2). To meet
its annual expenses of approximately $10 million, the corporation projected a 23-percent
recovery of returning fish, or about 7 million pink salmon at a price of 28 cents a pound
(PWSAC 1991:2-3).
Processors in the winter of 1991 offered between 15 cents and 20 cents a pound for
pink salmon (Cordova Times, February 14, 1991:A12). At an average price of 17 cents a
pound, the aquaculture corporation would have to harvest 55 percent of its run to meet
expenses (Cordova Times, February 14, 1991:A12). Since PWSAC was already having a
hard time finding buyers, increasing its harvest size was not a pleasing option.
President Suzumoto of PWSAC announced that if prices were as low as predicted,
the corporation would have to use part of its $5 million contingency fund to meet
expenses (Cordova Times, March 7, 1991:A9). Exacerbating these problems was a carry-
over of canned salmon, which processors reportedly did not want to unload at low prices.
Suzumoto expressed PWSAC's fears that huge stockpiles of 1990 fish in Seattle could
drive prices down in 1992 (Cordova Times, March 7, 1991:A9).
Fearing that local processors might refuse to buy as much as a third of the PWSAC
cost recovery harvest, the aquaculture corporation asked Alaska Governor Walter Hickel
to allow foreign floating processors into the Sound to provide additional buyers and
perhaps drive prices up (Cordova Times, January 17, 1991:A4). The top capacity of the
State's canneries is reportedly about 85 million fish, with an estimated 110 to 135 million
fish expected in 1991 (Cordova Times, January 17, 1991:A4). In 1990 some of the
season's catch was sent to other areas for processing, but in 1991 all areas were expected
to be inundated (Cordova Times, January 17, 1991:A4).
Cordova - Page 291





Another response by PWSAC was to announce a general shift from its productionI
orientation to engage in marketing (PWSAC 1990:2). In 1991 PWSAC was investigating
markets in China and the Soviet Union, but they were not sanguine due to economic
problems in those countries (Cordova Times, January 17, 1991:A4).
While record salmon returns in 1989 to 1991 have undoubtedly caused price drops
and strains on processor capacities, Cordovans believe that their market has. also been
affected by the oil spill. A general view of PWSAC President Suzumoto is that the State
legislature should protect the fishing industry more and oil interests less:
T'he commercial fishing industry within Alaska is not receiving theI
attention and support it needs from the State Legislature to allow
it to grow and thrive in the 90's. Fishing is the second largest5
industry in the state, yet it has not attained as much recognition as
have the oil, tourism, or miining interests. The state's lack of
commitment to the fisheries enhancement program is a symptomI
of the problem. The industry mtust take aggressive steps to
educate Anchorage and interior Alaska legislators about
conunercial fishing's importance to the state's economy, presentI
and future (PWSAC 1990:2).
III.E. Cleaned Beaches 353
Cordovans complained in 1991 that Exxon did not clean up after its spill, buit
simply "poured money on top of the oil," as.part of a media show and to douse damageI
claims. Respondents point out that true "restoration" is an impossible task:
You can't restore. Things are dead. Things are impacted. How
do you restore an ecosystem? Paying a bunch of mnoney-doesn'tI
restore the tube worms.

Another person expressed it this way:
As far as valuing the eagle or otter which were damaged out there,
the money is artificial if yo-u can't make an eagle out of it. You
can't exchange money for natural things that can't be made back.
Those things are priceless. The system breaks down when you try
to p-ut a [dollar] value on it ...



35 For Native views of the post-spill environment, see Section II. Alaska Natives in Cordova.3


Cordova - Page 292

I think [the spill) had a real terrible effect on the environment, and
it'll never be the same. The oil may go away and species may
come back. But there was a large deflection in the natural order
of things.

Things have been deflected and are not on their natural course. If
I go through a trauma it passes, but it stays with you too. I cut my
thumb when I was eight, and I still have the scar.

That's just one organism: me. But in Prince William Sound, there
were untold organisms impacted by this. Birds were kilied, so
some small fish didn't get eaten. So who knows what they overall
result will be?

In 1991 residents overwhelmingly reported being angry over Exxon claims that
beaches were clean after the clean-up when Cordovans could see for themselves that they
were not. Respondents overwhelmingly reported that beaches were still oiled even after
the 1990 cleanup often -under the surface. Most residents also expressed the view that
the technology to remove the oil without environmental damage does not exist.
Cordovans generally did not embrace the view of a top USCG official, that this
technological shortfall let the oil company off the hook: "(Exxon was] trying to do what
was right. Generally speaking, they did everything possible to clean it up. They wanted
the oil gone. The problem was that the equipment that was needed and necessary to do
that just doesn't exist" (Cordova Fact Sheet, June 6, 1990:4). Many respondents declared
that given the absence of technological means to undo a major oil spill, Alyeska's
promises of 20 years ago to prevent environmental damages in the event of oil spills
were lies.
Another key complaint regarding the oil cleanup was that, "Exxon had their own
timetable." An official on the Oil Spill Response Conumittee described inspecting
"treated" beaches which appeared clean for some distance and then black; cleanup crews
had reportedly pulled up stakes halfway through because the company had allotted
certain time alowances for particular sites rather than applying a standard of cleanness.
Respondents described a process where Exxon was not controlled by State or
Federal agencies in its cleanup efforts. For instance, in July 1989 Exxon officials
Cordova - Page 293






rejected State requests to modify its mid-September deadline for ending 1989 cleanupI
operations and to maintain a work force through the winter to monitor and respond to
oil which could be released by winter storms (Cordova Fact Sheet, July 26, 1989: 1).
Also, there appeared to be no consensus within and between Federal and State
agencies, as to what constituted a "cleaned" beach. For instance, in the summer of 1990
there was disagreement over State proposed numeric standards for determining amounts
of oil which would indicate whether beaches had been "cleaned" (Anchorage Daily News,
July 30, 1990, cited in Cordova Fact Sheet, August 10, 1990:1). State Commissioner ofg
Environmental Conservation Dennis Kelso called for weight ratio standards and was
supported by Chief William Reilly of the Federal Envirornmental Protection Agency5
(EPA). The USCG Commandant William Klime did not reject numeric standards b-ut
did not endorse the State's proposed standard. The USCG Rear Adrmiral David3
Ciancaglini, Federal Cleanup Coordinator, flatly rejected the State's numeric standards
as lacking in scientific or historic foundation (Cordova Fact Sheet, August 10, 1990:1).5
Exxon, after treating beaches in 1989 according to what Cordovans described as an
arbitrary timeline, described these sites as "environmentally stable." Exxon OperationsI
Manager Otto Harrison sent the following letter to Ciancaglini of the USCG:
It continues to be our objective to leave all shorelines in Prince5
William Sound and the Gulf of Alaska "enviromnmentally stable" so
that no threat rernains to wildlife, fish or persons subsisting from
these resources. You will find that the status reviews shows thatj
all significantly impacted areas are planned to be treated and/or
signed off before the safety considerations related to severe
weather causes as operations change (Cordova Fact Sheet, August3
22, 1989:1).

Cordovans, as noted, do not believe that oily beaches represent no threat to3
wildlife. But an Exxon news release a week after the letter cited above declared the
cleanup operation `95% complete:"5
With more than 1,000 miles treated, shoreline cleanup operations
in Prince William Sound and Gulf of Alaska areas are 95%
complete, Exxon's Valdez Operations Manager Otto Harrison said
today (Cordova Fact Sheet, August 31, 1989).

Cordova - Page 294

An Exxon news release two weeks later quoted Exxon's corporate chairman as declaring
the beaches to be "what most people would consider clean:"
Exxon has conducted cleanup work on nearly 1,100 miles of
shoreline impacted by the Exxon Valdez spill, Exxon Corporation
Chairman Larry Rawl said today. Rawl said he had flown over
many cleanup areas earlier this week and walked on some of the
shorelines in order to have first-hand knowledge of the
"impressive" cleanup results before reviewing detailed winter plans.

"Hundreds of miles of Prince William Sound and Gulf of Alaska
shorelines are certainly what most people would consider clean,"
Rawl said. "A very small percent of the shorelines which were
most heavily impacted have been cleaned several times but still
have some oil residue. These areas are environmentally stable,
however, and pose no risk to fish or wildlife..

Rawl said that in terms of mniles worked a-nd personnel and
equipinent ernployed, the cleanup effort exceeded the goals set in
Exxon's April and May plans which were approved by the U.S.
Coast Guard (Cordova Fact Sheet, September 15, 1989).

During this time period (the end of the 1989 cleanup), Cordovans did not consider
most cleaned beaches to be clean. On the heels of the above press release (Labor Day
1989), eight Cordovans toured Prince William Sound beaches on an inspection
coordinated by Cordova's Oil Spill Disaster Response Office with air transport provided
by the ADEC (Cordova Times, September 14, 1989:A1-5). Sites inspected included
examples of the three cleanup m'ethods: mechanical, bioremediation, and COREXIT.
The Cordova Times printed the following impressions of participants:
Mike Anderson, city council: "I really wanted to be on the beaches
more, because we really didn't get to walk on heavily oiled
beaches. It wasn't that I didn't get mny boots oily, though ...

On Sleepy Bay, we walked on the beach and saw high tide lines.
There was also boot impact, where the beach had been trampled
and oil traied ... black footprints on the driftwood. Sleepy Bay
didn't seem clean to mne, but it was clean of life. It was devoid of
barnacles and moss ...
Cordova - Page 295





The Coast Guard was real frank with us (at the briefing) and saidU
it was only possible to get 20%1 of the spill up . ... There are still
areas that are heavily oiled and won't be cleaned at all. My
impression is that it will be more useful to go back in two or threeI
years. That's the impact. How long will it take to stabilize without
being a detriment to the environment?"3

Jeannine Buller, manager of the Valdez office of Cordova District
Fishermen United: "For some of -the beaches that have been
cleaned up, they're still awfally oily. The surfaces may loo'k clean,
but if you dig down there's oil.

Sleepy Bay at Latouche was really oily and there were lots of bags
of garbage . .. It had been mechanically treated and crews had
removed the sides of the salmon stream and replaced the rocks.5
But the oil is deep and it keeps re-oiling."

Brena Guest, deputy director Cordova Oil Spill Disaster Response5
Office: . . . "The most significant was Pt. Helen. There were a half
dozen out there with hoses, spraying down the beaches, pushing oil
in the water toward booms. There was this huge sheen of oil in
the water, and the areas they were spraying had clouds of brownish
stuff, like oil, around them. It looked pretty sad. Like the beach
was under assault ... If Exxon thinks.95% is cleaned, they're on aI
130% scale."

Marilyn Leland, executive director CDFU, Oil Spill DisasterI
Response Committee: "The beaches that were mechanically
cleaned, like Sleepy Cove, look the worst. Near the shoreline, it
looked clean, but it was like a bathtub ring .. .
On all the beaches, if you dug, you'd find oil. Also, on the
mechanically cleaned, there was a heavy oil odor. We couldn'tI
walk on the area that had been treated with bioremediation, but it
looked good on the surface.9

We flew over Pt. Helen three times, real low. It looks like a war
zone. It was overwhelmning! They looked like little ants with toy
boats. In a lot of places, it looked like the cleanup was causingï¿½
more harm that good.. ."






Cordova - Page 296p

Max McCarty, filling in for Heather McCarty of Prince William
Sound Aquaculture: "It's fï¿½---- The beaches are all the same, and
there's oil three feet down. I don't expect Exxon to do a decent
job. The beaches are beyond treatment. Maybe winter will- help,
but not as much as 20 winters. There's more oil than I ever
imagined."'

Connie Taylor, Oil Spill Disaster Response Committee:36 What I
expected to see was everything still oiled, from high tide to low
tide. I was really pleased because I didn't find that. You could
dig down in some places and not find oil; you could walk on
beaches and not get oily. Overall, it was nowhere near as bad as I
expected. You can see it's going to recover.

The beaches were pretty much the same. There were spots on
each beach that were good and spots that were bad . .. There was
soine oil everywhere we went, hard dry oil in places, but no oil in
the tide pools ... there was an obvious shortage of sea birds, but I
didn't see any dead stuff. Superficially, things look good and
winter should break down the stuff.

It was definitely ugly. I don't want to be accused of painting too
bright a picture ... but it will heal itself."

Steve Ujoka, [Native representative on the] Oil Spill Response
Commiittee: "First of all, it was my first trip out there, but I can
definitely say if that's any indication, "treated" doesn't mean
"clean." I was disappointed because I expected treated beaches to
be clean .. . (Cordova Times, September 14, 1989:A1-5).

Also, during the above timne period, Cordovans sent packages of "treated" rocks to
all members of the U.S. Congress:
Congressional aides in W'ashington, D.C., opened their bosses'
mailboxes Wednesday morning to find specially delivered packages
from Alaska. The contents: "treated" rocks from Prince William
Sound's Smnith Isl4nd.





36For a discussion of this person's role in disputes with Exxon, see the sections on political and economic
impacts of the oil spill. Her concern not to paint "too bright a picture" of the beaches is interesting in that she
is perceived as a singular Exxon supporter.
Cordova - Page 297





Every member of Congress--650 in all--were treated to the specialI
stones, care of the National Wildlife Federation. The stones,
varying in size from pebbles to rocks, were collected Friday and
packaged by a small contingent of "workers" aboard Cordova'sI
flotilla that had rendezvoused in Jack Bay for Saturday's protest
regatta in Valdez . ..

Cordova pilot Jim Brown tied his float plane to one of the fishing
boats and emerged with a dozen small plastic packets of the still-
oily stones. In assembly-line fashion, workers wearing latex gloves
then transplanted the greasy stonies into individual ziploc sandwich
bags and placed them in larger trash bags for transport ...5

Brown and a companion [had] dropped down near Smnith Island
and scooped up several hundred stones. The whole rock-gathering5
process took about 10 mninutes. Walking along the treated b'ut oily
beach, there was no scarcity of material, he said (Cordova Times,
September 14, 1989:A1).

In August 1989, Exxon representatives began challenging whether oil causing fish
closures in Prince William Sound stemmed from Exxon's spill. As with drops in fishS
prices, the burden of proof appeared n'ot to be with Exxon:
Attorneys for the Fishermen's Claims Office are seekingI
statements from fishermen who either encountered or saw
evidence of oil in the fishing area during last week's opening.
Attorney Lewis Gordon said Wednesday that Exxon is not
acknowledging responsibility for the fishing closure because, at
least, one initial water sample indicated diesel contamination.
"Unless and until it is acknowledged that Exxon Valdez oil is
responsible for the fishery's closure, we need two things from
fishermen," Gordon said. "One, we need written statements ...
and two, any fouled gear that can be tested must be" (Cordova
Fact Sheet, August 3, 1989:2).g

Exxon continued the policy of contesting whether oil belonged to the oil spill and took
over the testing procedure. The following Exxon news release appeared June 12, 1990:5
The scenario could start in a number of ways. Somneone spots an
oily sheen in Prince William Sound. A fishermnan finds oil on his
nets. A village monitor sees tarballs on a beach. Most people 'I
assume the oil is from the Exxon Valdez, even though it could be



Cordova - Page 298

diesel oil from a fishing boat, crude from Cook Inlet production, or
naturally occurring hydrocarbons from plants and animals.

The job of investigating the mysterious oil and determining if it is
from the Exxon Valdez belongs to Mike Parsons of Exxon
Research and Engineering in Clinton, N.J., and Leo Babin of
Exxon' s Research and Development Laboratory in Baton Rouge,
I-A., working in Exxon's Anchorage laboratory.

"Each type of oil has a particular chemical composition or
fingerprint," Parsons explains. "These distinctive characteristics
enable scientists to distinguish between thern... A combination of
several tests provides an identifiable 'fingerprint' of the oil,
distinguishing it from any other oil" (Cordova Fact Sheet, June 22,
1990:3-4).

Florescence tests and gas chromatography-mass spectroscopy were used, finding in spring
1990 that 79 percent of oil samples tested were not from'the Exxon Valdez.
Cordovan respondents believe that the oil presently threatening their environment
is from the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill. Most expressed concerns over other oil spills
stemming from the pipeline terminal at Valdez, but these concerns were cited in the
context of objections to the terminal and to generally irresponsible behavior by Alyeska
(including Exxon). Respondents did note that if a foreign tanker had been responsible
for the spill, the economic impact might have been much worse. For this and -other
reasons, Cordovans believe that the Federal Government, in general, is not regulating
the pipeline terminal safely:
"The entire oil industiy should dedicate furnds to research. We
need better tankers--bow thrusters, double hulls, thicker hull
plating, shorter lengths,. and, mnost importantly, containerized
cargo..

"Terminals are another problem. More oil enters the ocean each
year from a variety of sources than from major spills. The Alyeska
marine terminal is a classic example. Despite making over $12
billion in profits, Alyeska is not up to date in waste water
treatment and pollution control The entire facility must be
reviewed and upgraded as originally promised by the oil industry."
Cordova - Page 299






"Our Congressmen are creating a Superfand to clean up oil spills
and compensate affected parties. However, one billion dollars is
not enough for catastrophic spills . .. We ask that the Sup erfund
be increased to $10 billion. .
"Financial liability of tanker owners is another issue. Alaska is the
only state in the nation that allows foreign flag supertankers to
carry oil from one of its ports. Israeli-owned Liberian-flagged,
Italian-crewed ultra-large crude carriers transport 50%, more oil
than the Exxon Valdez. These tankers' owners must have the
financial capability to respond to a major spill from their vessels.
One of the alyeska owners has posted a billion dollar bond to
cover oil spills from its chartered foreign flag supertankers. Who
would pay right now if one of the many third party charter tankers
had a major spill without a billion dollar bond?" (Excerpts from5
the Regatta Protest Statement, in a news release from CDFU, in
Cordova Fact Sheet, September 12, 1989:1).

Cordovans remain suspicious of the USCG as an effective agency to monitor
Exxon's cleanup. For instance, Cordova's Oil Spill Disaster Response Office printedR
Admiral Ciancaglini's responses to questions posed by the town of Whittier regarding the
1990 cleanup. Cordova generally shares Whittier's concerns. Residents asked that3
meetings of the Technical Advisory Group (TAG) (including representatives from Exxon,
the USCG and the ADEC) be publicly held. Ciancaglini explained that this did not haveI
to be so:
Ouestion:
Why are TAG meetings closed to the public? Are not theS
government agency representatives covered by the Open Meeting
Act or Federal Advisory Committee Act?3

Answer:
I addressed this issue early in the year to all organizations, the
general public and the press. Simply put, the Government in the
Sunshine Act requires open meetings, but applies only to Federal
Agencies "headed by a collegial body of two or more members .                           I
Tlese agencies include the major regulatory commissions, such as
the ICC, SEC, FTC, FCC, etc., but do not include the Coast

Guard.



Cordova - Page 300

With regard to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the TAG
meetings are operationa in nature and consequently, they mnay
properly be closed to the public. It is important that the TAG
meeting be kept closed so that the experts can provide me their
very best recommendation about how various subdivisions should
be treated, etc. I do not want their input to me tempered in any
way. I believe that if the meetings were opened, an honest and
fall dialogue would not be conducted by TAG, some posturing may
occur and the meetings may be disrupted by others than TAG
(Cordova Fact Sheet, September 7, 1989:1).

Having declared Prfince William Sound beaches to be "what most people could
consider clean" in 1989, Exxon produced independent contract research in 1990 (by
organizations engaged by Exxon immnediately after the oil spill) which showed that the
spilled oil w'ould not have any adverse effects on plants and animals living below the
surface of the ocean:
It is extremely unlikely that hydrocarbon concentrations resulting
from the spilled oil have had or will in the future have any adverse
effects on plants and animals living below the surface of the water
column of Prince William Sound, including commercial fishery
species (From "Water Quality in Prince William Sound," by Dr.
Jerry Neff, presented to representatives of Federal and State
agencies in Anchorage, cited in Cordova Fact Sheet, April 18,
1990:1-3).

Cordovans are unsure of the spill's long-term effect on their ocean enviromnent, as seen
from the mnany interviews above. However, they fear that oiled beaches are not safe and
will continue to affect sea and, river waters. Respondents cornplained in 1991 of the
frustration of not having access to State and Federal biological studies, due to pending
litigation, that might challenge Exxon's definition of their oiled be aches as safe.
According to ADEC figures in 1990, 38 percent of 759 miles of beach still had
visible oil (Cordova Fact Sh-eet, June 7, 1990:6). A Sh oreline Assessment crew surveying
beaches in Prinice William Sound in May 1990 found that five of nine locations surveyed
had visible oil (DEC Weekly Report, May 12, 1990, cited in Cordova Fact Sheet, June
1, 1990:4). On May 12, a beach transect at the Bay of Isles revealed oil in the upper
intertidal zone with an average surface coverage of 50 percent and an average
Cordova - Page 301





penetration to 10 centimeters (DEC Weekly Report, May 12, 1990, cited in CordovaI
Fact Sheet, June 1, 1990:4).
The question of what constitutes "clean" or "cleaned" remains a key issue for
Cordovans in 1991. Cordovan residents (particularly Natives) hold stricter standards
than Exxon and Federal and State agen'cies as to what constitute an uncontamnaed
area: As the end of the second yea-r of cleanup work on the Exxon
Valdez oil spill draws near, and beach survey crews begin their
final inspections of the year, the problem (of how cle an is clean) is5
becomning a serious one.

Scientists and oil industry executives want the beaches clean5
enough to sustain life, charter boat operators want them clean
enough so oil can't be seen, and Alaska Natives, who hunt, gather
and cook here, want them clean enou'gh to eat off of.

Perhaps because they want so much more, residents of Sound
comimunities see more oil than anyone else. And they expect more
work from Exxon in cleaning up the leavings of its spill.

A group of thern, being paid by the state, in July conducted a tour3
of 105 oiled beaches. Of those beaches cleanup officials had said
did not need more treatment, the cornmunity group decided 45%'
still have oil that could be recovered without harm to theI
environmnent.

Residents of the Alaska Native village of Chenega did the same.
After checking 37 beaches on Chenega Village Corporation land
where state, federal and Exxon teams said no work was needed,
they said nine out of 10 need mnore work.
Exxon's operations manager, Scott Nauman, said their findings are
wrong. "I can't imagine that is going to be borne out by an*
objective survey," he said. But objectivity is in short supply.

Even on this beach, near the north tip of Knight Island, where aI
couple of dozen community members, a few journalists and
Nauman congregated Tuesday for the announcement of the
community group's findings, the oily gravel refused to define
itself ...


Cordova - Page 302
111111110___

GOi Evanoff, who is r-unning [Chenega Village's] beach monitoring
program, wants the beaches clean enough to eat off of--as they
used to do on beaches all over this part of the Sound. "We would
c-ut our seals on this beach," she said. "We would build a fire and
eat. It strengthens our bond of who we are as Aleut people. The
teaching, the spirit of who we are is so important. And Knight
Island has particular importance to Chenagan people."37

Although the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admiinistration
has said the oily beaches are safe for subsistence hunting and
gathe ring, the villagers aren't using them and are picnicing in their
back yards instead, said Village Council President Pete Selanoff(
Anchorage Daily News, August 1, 1990, cited in Cordova Fact
Sheet, August 17, 1990:1-2).

Cordovans are particularly angry that Exxon has used their success in protecting the
hatchery fish in 1989 to argue that the oil spill caused no environmental damage.
Respondents encounter oil on their beaches and find this situation unacceptable. Exxon
officials argue that large salmon returns are "living proof of the 'recovery' of Prince
William Sound" (Los Angeles Times, August 29, 1991:A5). In Exxon's view, oiled
beaches virtually are clean enough to eat off of, since oil is harmless:
"Because the short-term impacts of an oil spill are so great, we
assume the long-term impacts must be there--and that's not
necessarily the case," Exxon wildlife biologist Mike Barker says.
". ... There aren't any real long-term bogeymen in oil. Our
children play on oil when they play on the playground. We expose
ourselves to it every day; we clothe ourselves in it; we literally eat
off of it ... We don't suffer as a result and the organisms of
Prince William Sound don't, either" (Los Angeles Times August
29, 199 1:A5).
III.F. Alyeska Contingency Plans for Future Spills
Cordovan fishermen and representatives of PWSAC were and still are disgusted at
a reported lack of commitment by Alyeska to develop an adequate spill response
program. However, many respondents believe that fuiture responses will show some



37See Section 11 Alaska Natives in Cordova for Native views of the oil spill and ties between Cordovan
Natives and Chenegans.
Cordova - Page 303





improvement over the 1989 spill response as "some lessons were learned." Still,
Cordovans are concerned that an adequate technology does not exist to clean up a major
oil spill, and most do not believe that enough is being done to prevent one.I
Many informants cited the new tanker escort vessels as the "only thing Alyeska has
done to improve the situation." This aspect of an Alyeska contingency plan requires all u
loaded tankers to be accompanied by two vessels from the Valdez terminal to the
Hinchinbrook Entrance (Cordova Fact Sheet, July 1, 1989:1). One vessel must be an
emergency response vessel (carrying boom materials and capable of towing a tanker).a
Cordvanscomplained in 1991 that this did not constitute a preventive measure, and
they called for double hulled tankers or smaller containers (such as barrels) for oil.
Another aspect of Alyeska's contingency plan aims at improving the organization
and command structure of a spill response. Based on the Incident Command System3
used by fire departments, this plan would use local residents and their resources, such as
boats and knowledge of local waters (Cordova-Fact Sheet, July 1, 1989:1). Consonant3
with this plan, Alyeska signed a. contract in May 1990 with CDFU to provide servicesfo
local boat call-outs and negotiate fishermen's contracts (Cordova Fact Sheet, June 1,3
1990:1). Alyeska also planned to hold regular, paid training sessions for local skippers
(Cordova Fact Sheet, July 1, 1989:1), and reportedly promised to maintain equipment in
local storage containers, ready to use in the event of a spill (Cordova Times, February
21, 1991:A5).
Cordovans complained in 1991 that Alyeska had backed down on many of these
latter commitments:
There were some widened eyes and down-turned lips in Cordova
last week when it was learned Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. was
not providing safety training for its oil spill response program thisI

Also angered was Floyd Hutchins, past president of Prince WilliamS
Sound Seiners Association. "Alyeska promiised fishermen could be
involved in the program," he said. "We were to be independent
contractors," But he said Alyeska is proposing to pay only $11 toI
Cordova - Page 304

$22 per foot for vessels. "We want real pay," he said, which is $44
per foot. "The system won't work with volunteers," he added ...

Copeland [fisherman and representative of the Oil Spill Prevention
and Response Committee, a part of the Regional Citizens Advisory
Committee, or RCAC] and Hutchins also expressed frustration that
there is "no safety or personal safety equipment in Cordova to
outfit a response group in the event of a spill. We need to be
fitted with gear," said Copeland, "But there's no one willing to
provide classes or fitting." The gear is available only aboard boats
deployed in Alyeska's Ship Escort Response Vessel System, he
said.

Spokesmen for the Prince William Sound Aquaculture Corporation
were also upset because Alyeska seemed to be withdrawing from
its commnitment to provide training of hatchery staff and protection
to hatcheries in the.event of a spill.

"We expected a plan to be in place," said Hutchins. "That's why
we came to Cordova for this meeting." Hutchins winters in Idaho,
and Copeland in Washington state.

The men said Alyeska is supposed to have equipment in storage
containers here, but an inspection last Friday found them empty,
and no keys were avaiable to crews .. .

The Alaska Departmnent of Environmnental Conservation must
approve the Alyeska contingency plan by June 1, said Copeland.
"It seems the deadline won't be met," he added. RCAC opposes
approval before details such as training and equipment are
finalized, he said (Cordova Times, February 21, 1991:A5.).

After the oil spill, the Regional Citizens Advisory Commnittee (RCAC) was created
to nionitor and advise Alyeska on shipping practices, which included representatives from
PWSAC, CDFU and the city of Cordova. Alyeska agreed to fund the voluntary advisory
comm-ittee in the amount of $2 million, if Congress did not pass appropriate legislation
for the committee, and to provide "reasonable access to the terminal and its records that
aren't confidential" (Cordova Times, November 2, 1989:A1.). Whie the comniittee may
request access to Alyeska memos, studies, and internal documents, and the oil
Cordova - Page 305






consortiumn must respond within a given period, Alyeska is not bound by the conunittee'sI
advice.
III.G. Competition With Valdez
Cordovans frequently cite contrasts between their city, based on a fishing and
subsistence lifestyle, and Valdez, which they describe as "a company town" (the company
being Alyeska). The two towns have competed for development and resources since
their initial settlement during the Kennecott mining era (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS
Office 1979:40). After the unsuccessful effort of Cordovan fishermen to stop the oil
pipeline terminal at Valdez, Valdez experienced a construction boom in 1974-1975.
Valdez now has a favorable tax base, enabling key leaders to travel extensively and
advocate on the city's behalf (USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:113).
Respondents in 1991 complained that Valdez regularly receives inequitable proportions
of State funds slated for the region.
The polarization of the two towns appears to have been exacerbated by the oil
spill. Cordovans described Valdez as representing an urban industrial lifestyle and
worldview with expanding population and development. They fear that this development3
threatens their environmnent and, consequently, their town's existence. Residents depict
Cordova as a small fishing village, subsisting within a wilderness with a stable populationI
committed to each other through sharing and caring.
Cordovans believe that Exxon used Valdez as a media showcase for its spill3
cleanup, atternpting to divert public attention from the severe problems which the oil
spill created for their fishing village. Respondents feel that Valdez in general hasI
benefitted econom-ically from the oil pipeline terminal, while not assuming any of the
major risks associated with oil development. In the case of the spill, respondents view3
Exxon as pouring proportionately more cleanup money into Valdez, which was not
critically harmed by the spill. This angered Cordovans. City officials spent time andI
money on fre'quent trips to Valdez, -attempting to gain media coverage of their
predicament, and CDFU set up offices in Valdez.3




Cordova - Page 306

A report in the Santa Clara Press Democrat, reprinted in the Cordova Fact Sheet,
compared reactions to the spill in. Cordova and Valdez. The following contrasts stand
out:
Before the snill...
Valdez is a town of 3,270 with an economy that depends largely on
the oil terminal, somewhat on tourism and very little on fishing ...
It resembled a Texas oil boom town from 1974 to 1977 when the
pipeline was being constructed and has not changed much since
then.

Cordova's 2,580 residents rely almost exclusively on fishing and
seafood processing. Few tourists visit the town other than the big
game hunters and adventurous kayak aficionados. The Cordova
District Fishermen United ... filed suit in the mid-1970's to block
the pipeline because it feared damage to fishing a-reas of Prince
William Sound.

After the Exxon Valdez ran aground...
The main business of Valdez switched from oil shipping to oil
cleanup. The town tripled in population as it was inundated with
Exxon officials, news media crews, Alaskans in search of cleanup
jobs and environmentalists studying the effects of the spill. All
available hotel rooms were reserved by Exxon and restaurants
were- crowded at all hours.

Fearing oil would invade their fish hatcheries and angered that
Exxon was not placing oil containment boorms, Cordova fishermen
put up their own. The harbor is nearly empty as most boats and
crews are leased to Exxon for the cleanup. The town seerms
deserted as many residents are -out on the boats for weeks at a
stretch.

When  the inevitable T-shirts went on sale...
Those in Valdez were akin to a rock concert tour or big party.
One depicted the tanker and said: "On the Rocks." Another said
"Clean Up Crew" with oil blotted hand prints all over. Others
read: "Exxon-Valdez Oil Spill '89 ... One Slick Operation" ..

The t-shirts in Cordova shops took a pointedly political stance.
One showed an oil-soaked otter and read: "An ounce of prevention
is worth 11 million gallons of cure." The mnost popular was ... a
.Cordova - Page 307

tanker with its bow ripped open in the shape of giant jaws and
read: "Tanker from Hell."

And when thev bend an elbow at the bar...
The taverns of Valdez compete for the most potent drink dubbed
Exxon on the Rocks or Valdez on the Rocks. One bartender
confides the secret concoction consists of a splash of scotch across
Kahlua and vodka ...

The tanker crash isn't a drinking joke in Cordova..

When it comes time for reflection....
VWhile other Alaskan communities observed a Prince William
Sound Day on April 23... Valdez residents took little note...

In Cordova practically the entire community packed the school
gymnasium. . . to begin a celebration called Sound Love. Poems
were read, speeches delivered and people joined in song in anI
event broadcast over the Alaskan Public Radio Network ... (Cordova
Fact Sheet, June 3, 1989:2).

A year-long study conducted by the Valdez Counseling Center in 1989-1990 found
differences in spill-related stress symptoms and causes (Cordova Times, July 26, 1990:Al,
All). A telling result was that in Cordova the people who mnade the mnost money from
the spill cleanup (over $50,000) experienced the mnost stress; in Valdez, people making
between $500 to $5,000 reported the most severe symptoms (Cordova Times, July 26,
1990:Al, All). Cordovan respondents in 1991 who profited from the cleanup reported3
moral conflicts and distress over the plight of those who suffered greater financial
hardship.3
Another finding was that Cordovan respondents were most concerned about
negative impacts of the spill on the environment, and social disruption caused by greedW
or jealousy related to spill cleanup income (Cordova Times, July 26, 1990:A1, All).
These key concerns were expressed in 1991. Cordovans care intensely about each other
and about the natural environment in which they live and subsist. Interpersonal
relationships among this close-knit community emphasize a commitment to take care of3
one another. If a resident becornes seriously ill, a benefit will probably be held for that
Cordova - Page 308

person, and others will nurse the patient in their homes for e-xtended periods. Sharing of
food and other resources is extensive. When vehicles break down on the road, swarms
of people descend with offers of help. The i-nequities of Exxon' s cleanup and settlement
policies bothered the winners as well as the losers in Cordova.
In Valdez, the most frequently reported concern was the influx of new people
(Cordova Times, July 26, 1990:Al, All). Consonant with this, Valdezans experienced
the mnost stress early in the study, and their stress decreased over the year. In contrast,
the stress-related problems of Cordovans increased over time. Interviews in 1991 showed
that conflicts and fears stenmning from the spill and cleanup are still widespread and
intense. Overall, the study showed "a higher incidence, intensity and duration of stress as
a result of the spill than was experienced in Valdez" (Cordova Times, July 26, 1990:A1,
All).
III.H. Environmental Ethics38
IMany non-Native Cordovan fishermen hold philosophies of Nature which are
similar to those of American Native peoples in general. These often include the
following principles:
Nature is inspirited.

Spirit(s) in Nature can be sensed directly.

Nature, in its own state, is omnipresent.

Nature cannot be owned by man.




3&A coraparative study of wilderness ideology, using quantitative and qualitative methods, is underway. Here
I examine excerpts from an interview with a prominent Cordovan fisherman. This person's views express
common threads found in the philosophies of many commercial fishermen and others who gain their livelihood
in Nature.
"Wilderness" in this study is defined as "Nature as in its own state," such as surrounds Cordova on land
and sea. The concept is inclusive of man, as well as all natural resources, in its usage by respondents.
Cordovans tend to per-sonify nature, as "Mother Nature,` or "she." Hence I capitalize the term Nature.
Preliminary results of the comparative study indicate that there niay be a continuum of sample subsets,
in terms of spiritual vs. commodity values of Nature. These groups may be ordered as holding values of Nature
which are increasingly commodity-oriented: (1) Natives (non-Russian Orthodox); (2) Russian Orthodox Natives
and non-Native fishermen; (3) other non-Natives.
Cordlova - Page 309





Life is transmutable, through subsistence practices. This transmutation occursI
on a spiritual level, involving fusions of life, spirit, and destiny.

All parts of Nature are critically interrelated.

Nature comprises interwoven cycles of life(Iives) and destinaty(densities),3
maintained in an harmonious balance.
Man is morally responsible to help maintain the balance of Nature's parts.ï¿½

Man must fit himself to the aspects of Nature which surround him in order
for the whole and all of its parts to continue.

Man will be successful in subsistence practices according to whether he is
morally deserving (for instance, by only taking what he needs).

If one aspect of Nature is destroyed, all aspects could be lost.

Man is subject to Nature's laws, not the reverse. Man "manages" Nature in
preventing other men from destroying her aspects (for instance, by over-
fishing).I
Commodity values of Nature are exploitive and wrong.3

Older generations were more in tune with Nature.

Understandings of Nature are passed down over many generations.

Understandings of Nature are inborn.3

These key philosophical principles are exemplified in the following excerpts, of an
interview with a non-Native Cordovan fisherman:393
The older generation is more tuned into Mother nature. They
have a different sense of responsibility and values. The younger
generation don't know that milk comes from a cow, and they areI
more exploitive.






39sin other quotations in this report, paragraphs are provided for the reader's convenience, and do not
represent breaks unless indicated by ..


Cordova - Page 3103

Here, the lifestyle was more satisfying with less before the 1960's.
They lived here with what they had and were satisfied.

Once we were introduced to comrmodities (TV, phones, and so on),
like in New York, we wanted these things, and then conumodity
values and exploitation came in.

You kill 40 sea otters to take a 2-week Hawaiian vacation. Fifty
years ago they saw sea otters'as fur coats for the wife and kidds.

Older generations' values were geared toward living on this
country's values. Younger generations are more exploitive'.
Expectations have grown dramatically.

Demands have grown as commodities have,grown. A lot of furs
was a goal, and now a new car is a goal. It's become more
exaggerated.

Ouestion:
Is Nature spiritual?

Answer:
Yes. There's a place in the north of the Sound narned Unakwik.
Fishermen go in June and early July and leave, and it's empty until
the next year.

Natives tell stories that there's a spirit of Unakwik that lives the re.
When you go there you're really on your own. You know that to
find fish there, you have to deserve them. So you have to leave
some .. .

Nobody knows if the fish are there. You put down a net and wait.
It's a ritual experience. It's so im pressive. The splendor of the
Nature is there. The old-timers say, "You say hello to the spirit of
Unakwik. You say a prayer and promise not to plunder this sacred
place: 'I hope you will share the bounty. And I will take some
and leave some."'

You don't go in like a Nimnrod. You don't kil wantonly, and
Nature pays you back. The bears and sea otters don't run away.
You talk to the bears. Nothing is afraid,of you because ypu don't
behave like an enemy. And then Mother Nature will share with
you, and it will still be there next year.
Cordova - Page 311

Natives have inore of that feeling than commercial fishermen. But
residents here still have that feeling. You're a part of Mother
Nature, and you have to be to survive.3

Ouestion
Who creates Nature?

Answer
Ile Almiighty God creates and makes the laws of Mother Nature.
They are basic. and undisputable, though mysterious.
If you trny to fool Mother Nature she gets angry. It's a natural1
creation that follows its own predestined ways and laws built in.

Fish and Game, and Federal agencies, and Exxorn don't create that.3
They're subject to those same laws of Mother Nature. They're
exploiting a resource; the basic principle is the same. They
shouldn't destroy other parts of Mother Nature, but fit ta the otherI
parts of the system around them.

There's been vast abuses in the past, which result in destruction ofI
Mother Nature's balancing and restoration. We have to recognize
what Mother Nature needs to survive in its balance.

Man has the ability to destroy his own foundation. It's' the same
for a large and small scale. We all need to be conservationists.
Man is not the dominant species or else he will destroy the basist
for his existence.

Ouestion
What kind of person is sensitive to spiritual meanings in Nature?

Answer:I
Someone who is sensitive to taking impressions at the ice wall of a
glacier, to see Unakwik with open eyes. If you are susceptible, you
may sense the spirit of Unakwik without being told about it. TheI
spirit can be sensed.

Most o f the folklore has its source in the perceptions of people
who try to explain in works and give it meaning. And then it was
carried on over the generations.3




Cordova - Page 312

Once you destroy that environment, the stories go on, because it
was something of great beauty. When you read stories you still are
moved by that vision, and the remembering ...

People were put on this earth to mnake use of Mother Nature for
man's advantage, according to the Bible, but~ within God's laws,
which are Mother Nature's laws.

So you use, but not destructively. Mother Nature combines ever
living thing, so there's a relation here we have to pay attention to.

Ouestion:
Who does Nature, or its aspects, belong to?

Answer:
Cynically, it's who has title. But it's like the Indians say: you don't
own the land, because if you live here awhile the land owns you.

Mother Nature doesn't recognize title. It is not ownable.

You only live a short time. One generation doesn't have a right to
spoil it for the other ones. All of us live here only as long as
Mother Nature has that delicate balance.

Earth as a planet is owned by the Eternal Force that is the
beginning and end of everything.

So "ownership"' is very limited. We lay claims and have rationales,
but when you expand it over 10 generations and further, we find
our systems are poorly laid out unless they serve the continuance,
until the final end.

Every generation uses Earth for life. Temporary ownership doesn't
give the right to destroy it.

Ouestio:
What type of person appreciates wilderness?

Answer:
Someone whose values are not egomaniacal. Each religion teaches
that. Feelings and attitudes are born in. Anyone with any brains
and feelings tries to explain his relationship to his surroundings.
To relate your existence to the bigger picture.
Cordova - Page 313





Those not susceptible to Nature would be primitive, self-centered,I
,not intelligent. They don't relate their activities to the whole of
things. Even Einstein related things to the "Big Picture." Relating
our own being to the Natural Laws.
Corporate America is not exempt. They are short-sighted, goal-3
oriented, and specific purpose-oriented. They are entities who
disregard their context for their own benefit. They deny how
things fit together and they ignore a philosophy of continuance.I

There is a responsibility to the children to keep the world so that
they will be able to live in it.3

Ouestio :
How long will wilderness last?5
Answer:
Some wilderness will last forever. Even with high tech. Some
other will yield. I've seen a lot disappear in my lifetime..

There's a little wilderness in every field that farmers plow. The
world couldn't be as sterile as presented in futuristic movies.
Because wilderness is Mother Nature: as it is, wild, and things as
they are. So there's a little there, everywhere that we look..
Ouestio :
In subsistence practices, is life transmutable?I

Answer:
Fishermen don't make a lot of money. Not mnillions. But you're on3
your own: the freedom, Nature, and enough money to live an
independent life. And work four or five months and then play the
rest of the year.
The sea. .. .the adventure of fishing is a challenge. No fisherman
just does it for the money. The personal challenge is to survive at
sea. Be self-motivated and self-reliant.

... This country is vicious, and it's a kiler. You have to protect
yourself and read the signs.
Cordova - Page 314

You have to take pride in surviving a Istorm. To turn into an
emotional Alaskan it takes several years. Everything you do is
subject to the water and the land and the wind. This is the
ultimate rule..

On a small skiff with 20 feet waves, where you realize you're
totally helpless, fighting for survival like any animal, Nature is
more powerfuil than you are, and if you don't do the right thing,
you will die.
We used to have three to four deaths every year. Now we have
better equipment, radios, a helicopter, and so on. Now people are
still dying, but it's better than in the '60's. But if the weather got
bad again, like in the '60's, with 120 mile per hour winds, people
would die again. That risk is always there. You have to be
prudent and be a good judge ...

The fish navigate currents to get upstream to spawn. You have to
read their road maps and learn how they behave. You have to
understand the salmon. Each species and type behave differently
and have differe nt personalities. The fish have instincts, and are
conscious. They have celestial obser-vations, observe sunlight, the
earth's magnetism, and so on. They smell the water.

Subsistence people are dependent on those animals for their life.
They need to fish every year. If one year the fish didn't show up,
they'll die. So they realize that they must not take them all: just
take their share.

But when the White mnan comes with their cannery, they take them
all: just fence thern in and take them all.

It's the same with animals. You can't just decimate the herds.
You have to leave the young, the mothers and so forth.
The seal is the source of all life for the people. The bear is the
-source of all life for the people. So if the bear isn't there, the
people will die. If the people weren't there, the bear would die.
Because sometimes the man got the bear, but sometimes the bear
got him...

Ouestion:
Is life transmutable?
Cordova - Page 315





Answer:
You don't have to be a Native to realize a spiritual connection
between you, using a life for sustenance.3

Calories: you don't know what that is. Calories don't really exist,
on an atomic level. An animal has spirit, maybe a soul, a life cycle
and destiny. And your interdependent destiny touches theirs. Tat
life-sustaining sustenance comes from a living animal.

As a member of modern society we lose that knowledge. That
spiritual connection to your world. Then people go and kill
wantonly, disregarding the respect man has when he realizes he's3
part of these interconnecting life cycles. You don't have to de'stroy
the basis on which you live, to stay alive, although you have to take
some animal's life.3

It's the very basis of man, that he lives of. So you don't destroy the
basis of your life. Water, and so on, is the basis too. So weI
mustn't pollute it, but take care of it.
IV. PRIVATE SECTOR ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE OIL SPILL (NON-FISHING)3
IV.A. Introduction
Ibis section of the report provides a qualitative analysis of the effects of the 19893
Exxon Valdez oil spill on Cordova's business community. In-depth institutional
interviews and local press coverage of the spill are analyzed to supplement statistical3
data collected in QI and KI interviews. Respondents were selected by asking Cordovan
residents to direct the interviewers to business people who had either experienced profits3
or losses due to the oil spill.
The majority of Cordovan business owners interviewed in 1991 described the oil3
spill as negatively impacting their businesses. Only one entrepreneur (of 20 businesses
contacted) reported an economic windfall. This observation, while not statistical, agrees3
with data collected in April 20-2 1 of 1989 by labor economists with the Alaska
Department of Labor (Alaska Economic Trends 1989). A random telephone survey of3
23 businesses showed that no respondents foresaw any long term positive impacts on
their businesses, and only one entrepreneur reported increased business.3




Cordova - Page 316

However, it is quite possible that entrepreneurs who were severely injured by the
spill were more eager to discuss their experiences in 1991 than those who profited.
Strong negative sentiments toward Exxon are pervasive in Cordova, and some residents
described profiting from the spill as a form of prostitution. Residents also described the
period during the spill cleanup as "like living in an occupied war zone," with profiting on
the cleanup equated to collaborating with the enemy. Probably more telling is that
Cordova is a small community in which residents are strongly interdependent; sharing
and responsibility toward each other in tinies of need are emphasized. Many
respondents who profited during the spill cleanup expressed unhappiness on behalf of
those who were hurt (at times these were family members or close friends). It may be
that those who profited were less anxious to broadcast this than those who experienced
losses.
Economic repercussions attributed to the spill were not limited to the 1989 fishing
season; some of the worst economic effects are still unfolding, such as the bankruptcy of
the CRFC (a fish processor), described below. Major economic impacts in the private
sector discussed here include bankruptcies, foreclosures, lost credit lines, economic losses
due to disruptions of normal business patterns (such as losses due to unsold inventory),
business closures, and lost business and property values.
A major success of business owners' negotiations with Exxon was that Cordova
businesses were recognized as directly impacted by the oil spill, due to the city's
remoteness and its sole reliance on the fishing industry. On the other hand, Cordova
businessmen were unable to elicit any long-term commitment from Exxon to mitigate
their losses. Exxon stated that, "The real purpose in paying the claims is to bring
everyone back to the same position they would have been in had the spill not occurred"
(Cordova Fact Sheet, May 11, 1981:1). In seeming contradiction, the company refused to
recognize a fishery growth factor. This was especially hard on entrepreneurs who had
carried out expansions due to a forecast of record salmon harvests and strong prices.
Exxon did not comply with requests for wage subsidies, low interest loans to cover
cash flow problems, or consideration of lost banak loans, business values, or property
-Cordova - Page 317





values. The company refused to specify required documentation for business claims. It
appears from written statements cited here that Exxon's primary plan for mitigating
Cordova's economic impacts lay in lavish speniding on the spill cleanup, which
presumably would spread in a fair and equitable fashion throughout the Cordova
economy.
Exxon in many cases negotiated settlements, with final offers covering a proportion
of documented losses. The resulting shortfalls resulted in such impacts as bankruptcies,
business closures, and lost credit lines because Cordova's small businesses had little
capacity to weather such losses. The city has'no road access and no deep port, so
merchandise generally takes several weeks to arrive. Credit lines tend to be small, and3
stretched to the limnit as spring approaches, since merchants regularly extend credit to
fishermen through the off-season.  If, for instance, a business owner has a credit line ofj
$50,000, due in 60 days, and merchandise must be ordered 25 days in advance, there is
little flexibility to withstand radical disruptions in business patterns. Sales volumes are3
low in such a small town, so merchants must pay higher prices. for inventory. Also,
business is seasonal.3
All of these factors made Cordova's businesses especially vulnerable to the
economic disruptions caused by the cancellation of fisheries. Entrepreneurs complained3
that Exxon's emphasis on compensation for net profit losses, rather than loans to prevent
losses, caused structural damages to their businesses which continue to cripple them
today. (For instance, a loss of net profits is considered less injurious than loss of a credit
line.) Cash flow problems needed to be addr5essed quickly to avert losses, and businessI
owners complained that imnmediate loans to prevent losses were not even available from
the Federal Small Business Administration. Cordova's small business owners were3
eligible for working capital loans to offset economic losses, and between April and
September of 1989 the SBA!s Anchorage office issued over 400 applications for disaster3
loans. But by early September only 29 applications had been submitted (Cordova Fact
Sheet, September 7, 1989:1).3




Cordova - Page 318

Widesp read criticism centered an a chaotic and continually modified claims
process. Business owners complained bitterly that this process was carried out at Exxon's
discretion, with no objective agency overseeing the process. Many respondents claimed
that Exxon representatives lied to them. A generally held belief is that Exxon settled
claims more readily in the early post-spill period than later, while corporate
representatives stated that there was no immediate deadline to file claims. Some
entrepreneurs delayed filing their claimns because seemingly ambiguous statements by
Exxon over whether partial releases were final made them fearful to file until they knew
the full extent of their losses. Some delayed because they lost bookkeepers, or were too
busy due to lost employees and spill-related efforts. These respondents believe they
were treated unfairly.
Cordova's smal business owners expressed resentmnent that they were forced to sign
releases while fishermen were allowed to sign receipts. They complained that fishermen
and Native organizations could more readily attract lawyers and file class action s-uits
than they could.
Respondents stated that public attention generated by oil spills centers too much
on environmental issues and not enough on economic repercussions to small
communities affected. Many stated that government efforts address spill prevention
(which respondents believe is impossible) without sufficient emphasis on corporate
accountability for economic impacis to local communities.
The oil spill created a climate of uncertainty in Cordova; respondents expressed
fears that the town would not survive if the fishing industry were damaged. The
disruption of regular business patterns in Cordova's "fishbowl economy" appears to have
amplified these apprehensions. Residents who wish to sell businesses reportedly have
been unable to do so, even at a loss:
My parents own the laundromat and the video shop. My father
retired last year so they were trying to sell it. They had a buyer
lined up before the oil spill, but after the spill the sale fell through,
and they haven't been able to sell it yet, because everyone is afraid
to invest in the economy, because the fishing industry may be
devastated and everyone will have to move away, and so on.
Cordova - Page 319






My parents are trying to sell their business for $250,000, and it's.I
worth $350,000. But no one will invest now, because of the
uncertainty.3

Respondents expressed the belief that Exxon deliberately fostered strife in their
community to hamper their efforts to force the oil company to redress their losses.3
Conflicts within the business comimunity arose in the process of negotiating with Exxon,
creating hostilities and distrust (which persist in 1991) between business owners in thisI
close-knit community. While Exxon carried on a cordial dialogue with the Chamber of
Comimerce, many business owners believed that their interests were not beingI
represented; these persons felt excluded from the negotiation process. Feelings of
powerlessness and frustration were expressed by merchants who concluded that they had
no means of enforcing their claims for damages; no outside agency mediated the process
of clams settlement, which was carried out at Exxon's discretion. The affected businessI
owners formed the Cordova Business Owners Association (CBOA), and attempted to

negotiate with Exxon outside of the auspices of the Chamber of Commerce. This
conflict continues to the present; it has political as well as econom-ic dimensions, as the
president of the Chamber of Commerce is suing the City Council (membership of which
includes some organizers of the CBOA). The suit has already consumed approximately a
half million dollars of the city budget.
Other conflicts described here include those between individual business persons,
business owners and VECO, entrepreneurs and Exxon, business owners and their
customners, regular employees and transient employees, and business shareholders and
their management.
These and other impacts are detailed in individual case studies discussed below.3
Factors which affected most if not all of the business community include shortages and
higher costs of labor, housing, office space, fuel, and other supplies, as boats and planes3
ordinarily servicing the community became involved in the spill cleanup.






Cordova - Page 320

IV.B. Labor Shortages
Labor shortages in Cordov~a were extreme; nevertheless, some Cordovans refused
to work for Exxon (to become "Exxon whores") on principle. Many residents were eager
to earn the $16.69 hourly spill wages, and controversies even arose over who was being
hired. VECO announced a local hiring policy which gave first preference to Cordova
residents, second preference to part-timne Cordova residents, and third preference to
other Alaska reside nts (Cordova Fact Sheet, April 19, 1989:3). Non-Native Cordovans
expressed concerns that VECO was favoring shareholders of Chugach Alaska
Corporation, but the company denied this (Cordova Fact Sheet, April 19, 1989:3). By
late April of 1989, some 75 Cordova vessels with 191 crew meimbers were worling for
VECO, with an additional 143 individuals working on the Navy ship USS Junea in
Valdez (Cordova Fact Sheet, April 19, 1989:3). The Alaska Department of Labor
opened a job service office in Cordova, but respondents in 1991 reported little success in
securing employees through this agency.
Cordova's Oil Spill Recovery Office comimissioned a study in May of 1989 which
showed that the city had lost almost one-fifth of its labor force to the Exxon Valdez
cleanup effort, with employers forced to raise wages, pay large amounts of overtime, and
go without needed employees (Cordova Fact Sheet, May 20, 1989:1). The 64 Cordova
employers participating in the survey lost 199 employees to spill cleanup operations,
representing 19 percent of the 1,145 people normnally employed by these businesses
during the spring season (Cordova Fact Sheet, May 20, 1989:1). Fish processors lost
one-third of their 226 member employee pool, while retail service and transportation
industries lost from 26 to 29 percent of their workers (Cordova Fact Sheet, May 20,
1989:1). VE-CO attempted to alleviate the shortage by allowing individuals on their
waiting list for positions. to take jobs at local processing plants (Cordova Fact Sheet, May
24, 1989:4), but the city's survey reported "help wanted" signs for 239 employees, and
employers reported that they wo-uld need 309 new employees for the 1989 summer
season (Cordova Fact Sheet, May 20, 1989:1). Ninetee-n of the 64 businesses respondi'ng
reported that they had increased wages in an effort to keep employees (Cordova Fact
Cordova - Page 321

Sheet, May 20, 1989:1). These labor shortages are described in detail in the followingU
interviews analyzed in this section of the paper.
IV.C. Housing Shortages
Cordova has a regular transient worker housing shortage during fishing seasorn,
which was exacerbated after the oil spill. The city entered the 1989 summer season with
most of its transient housing capacity (for 610 people) occupied due to an influx of
prospective spill cleanup workers (Cordova Fact Sheet, May 18, 1989:4). A city housing
study found that this would leave a housing shortage for 200 to 250 people, according to
polled agencies. The study noted that this figuire did not include "normal seasonal fishing
people or others not directly related to the polled agencies and businesses included in3
the study" (Cordova Fact Sheet, May 18, 1989:14).
This housing shortage posed a problem for employers because, as regular workersI
left on spill cleanup jobs, there was no housing for people arriving in Cordova looking
for spill work. In general, establishments which normally provided housing did notI
profit, because these were already full to capacity (the one exception interviewed was the
owner of a relatively expensive hotel who raised rates for Exxon and VECO3
representatives housed there). For other businesses, the inflow of transient people was
balanced by an exodus of local residents who left on spill work:3
Unlike Valdez, Cordova hasn't been inundated by people since
Good Friday 1989. If anything, this town of 2,000 has lost
population. The few who came to Cordova to deal with the spillI
haven't replaced the many who left earlier for nearby spill related
work (from excerpts of an article in the July issue of Alaska
Economic Trends, by Neal Fried and Holly Stinson, printed in theI
Cordova Fact Sheet, July 15, 1989:2).

VWhile many residents were absent from Cordova for extended periods during theI
spill cleanup, in general they retained their housing, so new arrivals encountered a
housing shortage. One fish processor who normally housed 100 temporary employeesI
needed housing for 50 extra workers, because his business could Rot hire the -usual 50
local seasonal employees, who had their own housing (Cordova Fact Sheet, May 20,
1989:2). Employee housing shortages are recounted in the interviews that follow; for
Cordova - Page 322

instance, one entrepreneur described in 1991 how she housed workers in her own home,
creating stress for her family. City housing programs are discussed elsewhere.
IV.D. Gasoline
A common complaint in 1991 was that "gas prices went up after the spill, and they
never went down." Gasoline prices in Cordova increased 69 percent in 1 week because
of a lack of barges available to transport it (Cordova Fact Sheet, June 3, 1989:1). The
barge which regularly transported fuel to Cordova became involved in the spill cleanup,
so that gasoline had to be brought to the city via air. Prices at the pump increased from
$1.47 per gallon to $2.49 per gallon to cover the extra freight costs. Cordova residents
are close observers of price increases and their causes. Orca Oil Co., the city's one
wholesale fuel supplier, published a price breakdown on the cost increase in the Cordova
Fact Sheet:
- Delivery charge Anchorage:	.0625 cents
--Delivery charge Northern Air Cargo:	.77823 cents
--Delivery charge Cordova:	.10 cents
--Additional cost of fuel:	.033 cents

(Cordova Fact Sheet, June 3, 1989:1)

Orca Oil Co. stated that it intended to file a claim for the additional costs with Exxon,
and, "When paid, Orca Oil will reimburse our customers for these additional costs"
(Cordova Fact Sheet, June 3, 1989:1).
Intermittent fuel shortages also were a problem, as barge transportation halted due
to the oil cleanup. In early June 1989, three to four plane loads of gasoline arrived daily
via Northern Air Cargo, carrying 4,000 gallons per load (Cordova Fact Sheet, June 3,
1989:1). The city estimated its fuel needs at 100,000 gallons of diesel and 50,000 gallons
of gasoline per week (Cordova Fact Sheet, June 3, 1989:1). Fishermen were given
priority in obtaining fuel, leaving some drivers without gas at times (Cordova Fact Sheet,
June 3, 1989:1).
Cordova - Page 323





Exxon responded to this crisis by underwriting $30,000 in barge transportation costs
and offloading fael from one of their own barges. Residents interviewed in 1991 remain
bitter over price increases.
1V.E. Conflicts Within the Business Community
The Cordova business community was virtually split in two i,n the aftermath of the
oil spill. The Cordova Chamber of Commerce cooperated closely with Exxon officials,
maintaining cordial relations with them; other business owners and city leaders,
dissatisfied with Exxon's efforts to compensate their losses, took a more adversarial3
posture. These businesses created the Cordova Business Owners Association and
attempted to negotiate with Exxon independently from the Chamber of Commerce. The5
following is a summary of the emergence and development of this cornflict in the business
community as it relates to Exxon's unfolding business claims settlement policy. TheI
delineation of this policy provides context for the discussion of individual cases offered
below.I
This controversy has continuing economic repercussions for the city 2 years after
the spill. Business leaders are often political leaders in Cordova, and this split in the3
business community is being played out in political confrontations in which the president
of the Cordova Chamber of Commnerce is suing the City Council (costing the city3
$500,000 in legal fees to date). The Chamber president has been recalled from her seat
on the City Council in a special ele ction. Tle political dimensions of this conflict will be3
discussed in Section V. City Governmuent Impacts. Conflicts within the Cordova business
commiunity and between business owners and Exxon will be discussed here.3
The position of many city leaders and business owners is, briefly, that the Chamber
of Commerce leadersbip was too symp athetic with Exxon's interests and actually3
hindered the efforts of some business owners to pursue claims:
A major conflict was between business owners and the Chamber of3
Commerce. The Chamber of Commerce was doing well
econormically with Exxon, and they weie handling the small

business claims. Exxon donated $20,000 to the Chamber.



Cordova - Page 3241


Exxon listened to the Chamber and to the people who benefitted
econormically from the splill, while those who,suffered weren't
listened to.

Cormie [Taylor] was President of the Chamber of Commerce then.
She's admitted showing Exxon city documents, while she benefitted
economically from them ...

Connie Taylor and the Associated Press, the Anchorage Daily
News, and top business leaders met after the spill and went to
Juneau for assistance. Businesses were not just those belonging to
the Chamber of Commerce. It's a tea party in Cordova, mostly
Connie's friends and supporters, a small group that doesn't do
anything. Seventy percent of the businesses in tow n are not active
members, and have $10 million in business.

So, a tele-conference with government officials, the Attorney
General, President of the Senate, a governor's candidate, and so
on (a cross-party group, very powerfal), were to meet.

Connie blew the meeting by not bringing Exxon executives to the
conference. It was her decision.41

The position of the President of the Chamber of Commerce is that the oil spill was
an unavoidable a.ccident which benefitted the town economically, due to the economic
boom created by spill cleanup activities. Exxon responded promptly and appropriately,
according to this person, and the company was, if anything, too generous and
forthcoming in paying for possible damages during the early post-spill period. This
created a "window of opportunity" for Cordova leaders to work constructively with Exxon
representatives and educate them as to how to address the city's problems. The
Chamber presideint contests the utility of adopting antagonistic postures toward the oil
company. Later in the post-spill period, Exxon purportedly did try to minimize spill
expenses, as good business practice would dictate, and company representatives "closed
their purse strings and went home." Overall, this person contends, the spill benefitted


4Since this paper cites local news coverage of events, key public figures are identified. Partial anonymity
of respondents interviewed in 1991 is maintained in that either respondents or persons referred to by respondents
are not identified.
Cordova - Page 325





the community economically. This person contends that social impacts are notI
measurable but are only value judgments. This person discounts social impacts, while
arguing that those impacts were properly addressed by Exxon. Error lay in the responsesI
of residents and ci ty adniinistrators, not in the policies and responses of Exxon:
It was a boom. Financially, it was the best thing that's 'everI
happened in Cordova. Nobody made more money in their live's. It
was a gold mnine.3

Cordova lost oppo'rtunities, in a corporate sense, to take advantage
of it. For instance, Exxon was willing to fund living spaces: tent3
sites and camper parks. It gave Cordova a $35,000 advance to
start that. Exxon would have come up with more if the city had-
spent it all on that, but the city delayed in starting the project.I

There were mnisunderstandings between Exxon and city residents.
The residents were unusually suspicious of Exxon who didn'tI
recognize this. If Exxon had realized this they would have
provided more information originally. There was lag between the
information coming in and getting out. Some information wasI
probably erroneous, but through mishap rather than by
deliberation ...

Cordova has an unusually high amount at stake because it's
created a situation where it's in trouble. It's dependent on fishing.
Valdez has three industries: fishing, tourism, and oil.
Cordova is the only conumunity that had business clainis paid by
Exxon, in recognition that we were unequally at risk.
The Chamber of Commerce wanted to work with Exxon and
explain our problems to them. They didn't have a clue as to whatI
our problems were. So we took their personnel to the various
businesses. We took one of their treasurers to the laundromat.
No one was using it because there was no herring fishing season.I
So then their representative had an understanding of what the
problem was.3

T'hey did respond appropriately. Exxon responded to the city that
they needed to know why the city needed money. The city didnet
do that.


Cordova - Page 3263

Exxon's representatives were jeered at, insulted, and there were
some [vocal] threats on their lives.

Exxon usually erred toward over-compensation. For instance the
_________Restaurant got a $55,000 settlement
where the owner's claim in Money Magazine was that his business
was worth $30,000. It's true that Exxon paid more at first, for the
earlier claims. The later claims were probably mnore
reasonable. .

I'm not really sure whether Exxon was the divisive factor. We all
wanted the greatest benefit from Exxon for the community. Some
thought the way was through threat and aggression and press
releases. I thought Exxon wanted to spend money, and we should
educate them. So the difference was the method rather than the
goal ...

I think that the spill was an accident. When you have that man y
ships, one is going to hit a rock.

What matters is, do I rectify the error as fast as possible? Exxon
didn't single out that ship to hit the rocks. They did what they
could as fast as they could, afterward.

Initially, Exxon did not try to minimize their expenses in paying for
th.e spill. Later they did. Who wouldn't try to nminimize their
expenses? That's good business practice.

People that had legitimate claims were fairly compensated. You
weren't supposed to be made better off because of the spill .. .

Economically, the spill benefitted the town. Socially, the story isn't
told, and I'm not the judge. And what can you say, good or bad?
It depends on how people spent their money--to pay a mortgage or
for alcohol. Social effects are a value judgment ...
Cordova - Page 327





Exxon announced an economic settlement policy on April 13, 1989, which wasI
described in the Cordova Fact Sheet.41 This policy statement does not address business
impacts, but addresses lost net income from inability to use natural resources:
Loss of income claims will be processed for individuals and
businesses that lose net income because of their reduced ability toI
use natural resources of Prince William Sound as a direct result of
the discharge of oil. These will include fishermen, hatcheries,
canneries and others who have been directly impacted by the
spilled oil (Cordova Fact Sheet, April 13, 1989: 2).

While secondary effects of the spill, experienced by most Cordova businesses, are not
included, a general intent to compensate for damages due to the oil spill is expressed:
We intend to provide fair, reasonable and prompt settlements to5
those who were damaged by the spilled oil (Cordova Fact Sheet,
April 13, 1989).3

Exxoin's policy statement describes a three step payment procedure involving: (1) cash
advances with minimum documentation to satisfy immediate cash flow needs, entailing a
receipt requested and the granting of rights to offset against subsequent settlements;
(2) partial settlements for completed events such as the closing of he rring season, with a3
release obtained for the settlement of the event in question; and, (3) final settlements
negotiated when all factors are known and documentation is compete (Cordova Fact3
Sheet, April 13, 1989).
T'he board of directors of the Cordova Chamber of Commerce and other city3
.leaders immediately and successfully pursued efforts to have Cordova recognized by
Exxon as a "unique community where every business is directly affected by the oil spill"U
(Cordova Fact Sheet, April 21, 1989:1). Because of the local economy's dependence on
one produ'ct--fish--Exxon Senior Vice President Ulyese LeGrange assured city businessesI
that "all reasonable claims" would be honored (Cordova Fact Sheet, April 29, 1989:1). A

verbatim transcript of the following statement made by LeGrange at a panel discussion

4t1The April 17, 1989, Cordova Fact Sheet printed excerpts from a presentation by D. E. Cornett, AlaskaI
Coordinator for Exxon Company, U.S.A., before the Senate Special Committee on Oil and Gas, Juneau, Alaska,
Thursday, April 13, 1989.3
Cordova - Page 328

held at Cordova ffigh School on April 27, 1989 appears in the Cordova Fact Sheet, April
29, 1989:42
I have a statement. It's not typed, but I'll type it and send it to
you ... I've had some of imy financial people addressing the
situation in Cordova. We were responding to the feedback from
the Chamber of Commnerce, Don Moore and some of the other
business people. And you presented us with a case that Cordova is
really a unique situation with its total dependence on the' fishing
industry. I think it was obvious though fom the feedack we got
from all of you that we have two problems.

The first was that it was clear we had some misunderstanding
about how we would treat certain claimants. Since some of the
questions that were raised were about the electric cooperative,
about some of the cannery workers and suppliers to the cannery
and that sort of thing. We were already intending to cover those
under our guidelines. We were going to treat those as directly
affected by the oil spill.

But it's also clear that we'd have to address the additional question
that you raised, and that is would we recognize the unique
situation here in Cordova. We've been wrestling with that problem
the past couple of days, assessing the situation and we wanted to
be prepared, if we could to deal with that issue this evening.

After discussion with you (addressing Connie Taylor, Cordova
Chamber of Commerce President), your offi.ce, representativ'es of a
nurnber of businesses here in Cordova, some of your town officials,
we've concluded that Cordova does represent a unique situation.
It is, essentially, a one-product economy. Local businesses are
dependent on the fishing industry in that economy.

The problem that we see arising from the cancellation of the
herring season is already on us. It is pervasive throughout your
economy and we recogn-ize that. You are aware, I think, that we
have claims guidelines in place to deal with those directly impacted
from the closing of the herring season and we're trying to process
those claims as rapidly as we can. We've made, as I say, about 100
payments already to people here in Cordova. Now, we've clarified


421he Fact Sheet often offered tapes of public meetings, for a nominal price. This illustrates the alacrity of
residents who sought to hold Exxon to their verbally stated policies.
Cordova - Page 329





with several of you those businesses that we were already preparedI
to deal with and we'll be moving ahead. We've already had
conversations with the electric coop and we'll be moving ahead
with them. What I'm adding tonight is an interpretation of those
quidelines for Cordova ...

... we're going to be treating your businesses in Cordova as
directly impacted under o-ur guidelines for the closings that have
already happened. And we'll be prepared to accept claims for
damages incurred and we want to process those claims and get
your advance payments or partial settlements or whatever you'd
like to discuss with us as quickly as possible. So, we're trying to3
respond to your plea for a special situation. We've evaluated it
and we agree with you. You have a unique situation here.
The Chamber of Commerce announced Exxon's policy quidelines for treating
business claims at a special City Council meeting on May 3, 1989. These quidelines wereI
described as the results of dialogue between Exxon senior management and the
Chamber, in a Cordova Chamber of Commerce statement printed in the Cordova Fact3
Sheet, on May 4, 1989:1:
..Chamber President Connie Taylor outlined the results of a
lengthy and continuing dialogue with Exxon which first resulted in
the announcement last Thursday, by Exxon Senior Vice-President
Ulyese LeGrange, that Cordova businesses would be considered
directly affected by the oil spill. The subsequent guidelines,
presented to the Council, were developed to define the announced
policy.

"Through the ongoing dialogue the Chamber established with
senior management in Exxon," Taylor said, "we were successful in3
helping them refine these guidelines for release today."

At the invitation of the Cordova Chamber, Curtis M. Fitzgerald,3
Treasurer, Exxon Company, U.S.A., visited one-on-one with
Cordova business persons last week. Taylor arranged visits with a
wide range of businesses representing all facets of theI
community ...





Cordova - Page 330

Cordova's economy is 106% dependent upon the fishing industry
and the oil spill in Prince William Sound had an immediate and
dramatic effect on the residents of the community. Cordova's
fishing fleet was among the first to respond to the oil spill.

Continued contacts between Fitzgerald and the Chamber resulted
in the development of the guidelines. Fitzgerald in his letter of
transm-ittal to the Chamber said, "My meetings in Cordova were
extremely informative and useful. I think you'll agree they
produced results."

The guidelines cover concerns that have been raised by local
businesses. It will now be possible for them to file claims for the
first two month period following the spill. Businesses with cash
flow problems may receive an immediate 25% of the estimated
potential claim. Businesses may choose 1988 or an average of
1986-88 as a basis for determining their net income loss for the
claim period.

Fitzgerald spoke to the future in his transmnittal letter to the
Chamber, "You also expressed concerns about the possible longer-
term effects on Cordova." He said, "At this point, no one can
know with any certainty what they may be, but we will be working
to study and assess any such longer term economic effects on
Cordova ... once we have sufficient information to reach some
conclusions,- we will deal with those assessments. In the
meanwhile, we are committed to doing the best possible job of
addressing the immediate economic impacts.

The Cordova Chamber has several projects underway to help
identify and define problem areas within- the business community,
the results of which will be shared with Exxon to aid them in their
decision making process.

"Throughout this situation that is so disturbing to all of us," Taylor
said, "we have learned that when we talk to each other, we can fix
it. It is the intent of the Chamnber to continue this invaluable
personal dialogue."

While the Cordova Charnber of Commerce took a leading role in arranging and
monitoring early post-spill negotiations with Exxon, some business owners held less than
friendly sentiments toward the oil company. Many found Exxon's proposed
Cordova - Page 331





compensation unsatisfactory, and were. distrustfLil of Exxon's stated intent to fullyI
compensate them for their losses. This more guarded posture is expressed in statements
made at a May 9, 1989 meeting of business leaders with Exxon's claims representative:I
Exxon representative Dick Harvin listened to the concerns and
questions of about 35 business owners at a meeting organized by
the Cordova Chamber of Commerce on Tuesday evening. Several
local business owners expressed fear that Exxon would not accept
claims for losses in future years and, generally, stated their mistrustI
of company statements to date.

"The previous track record of oil companies in settling claims isI
deplorable," said Bob Van Broeklin, owner of a bar and hotel.,
"We've been told we 'would be made whole.' We were told 'yes'
you're eligible to file claims, maybe, no and now it's okay again.I
Why should we believe you?"

Harvin, who is the oil spill manager for treasury and claims,I
repeatedly stated that Exxon will recognize all claims that are
losses as a result of businesses being directly affected by the oil
spill. "The real purpose in paying the claims is to bring everyoneI
back to the same position they would have been in had the spill
not occurred," Harvin said. " . . .the guidelines (in the claims
procedure) are no more than guidelines. Each business will have aI
unique situation... we want to be fair and equitable to everyone.
We need dialogue and need to talk about individual situations."3

Norm Roberts, owner of a hardware store, suggested Exxon should
publish a documeiit stating "What you've said tonight" and have it
signed by a high Exxon authority. "I believe the document should
be addressed to the people of Cordova," Roberts added. "Not to
the city, not to the Chamber of Commerce or the businessman's3
association, but to the people."

Harvin said he would attempt to write such a document. He also3
said he would be willing to return to Cordova as many times as
necessary to meet with individual businesses (Cordova Fact Sheet,
May 11, 1989:11).
In interviews conducted with Cordova business owners in 1991, it is apparent that
concerns expressed in 1989 were warranted: Exxon did not "bring everyone back to the
same position they would have been in had the spill not occurred." Many economic


Cordova - Page 332

impacts described here in 1991 interviews have not been redressed. Ironically, Exxon
cited their promise of "fair and equitable" treatment of all businesses as a rationale to
deny recognition of a fishery growth factor, as described below.
At the May 9 meeting between Exxon representatives and Cordovans, a resolution
signed by the owners of 50 Cordova businesses was presented to Exxon treasurer Harvin.
The resolution outlines six issues which signers believed Exxon should recognize in their
claims procedure:
1.   Recognition that the closure or partial closure of any fishery
will result in a loss of income.
2.	Recognition that purchasing patterns have been disrupted.

3.	Recognition of losses based on sales records for the past
three years.

4.   Recognition of losses based on increased labor costs related
to the extraordinary wages being paid to oil cleanup crews.

5.   Recognition that future growth potential, based on the fishing
economy of Cordova, is a measurable quantum and failure to
achieve that growth should be compensated.

6.   Recognition that low interest loans by Exxon to refinance
existing business debts and current cash flow problems is a
viable solution for impacted businesses (Cordova Fact Sheet,
May 19, 1989:4).,

Exxon's response to these requests is contained in Harvin's reply (July 10) to a
Chamnber letter (May 22) which contained questions about the future. Lengthy excerpts
are included below because: (1) this statement of intent was 'key in defining Exxon's
business claims policy for Cordova business people at the time; (2) sucb publications in
the Fact Sheet demonstrate how cognizant Cordovans in general were of salient issues;
and, (3) the use of quotations around verbatim Exxon statements reflects a desire which
residents often recounted in 1991, to "pin Exxon, down" and "hold them to their
promises."
Cordova - Page 333






In brief, Exxon refused to recognize a fishery growth factor, rationalizing that sinceI
fishery growth would not affect local businesses uniformly, application of a fishery growth
factor would violate the principle of "fair,and equitable" treatment of Cordova
businesses. The comnpany agreed to recognize individual growth factors. Exxon refused
to subsidize wages, arguing that this would eliminate employer incentives to control costs.
Using questionable logic, Exxon refuised to provide low interest, long-term loans because
no lone-tenm imDacts of the oil spill had been established. The company declined to
consider lost bank loans, uncompleted projects, or lost property or business values, but3
left the door open to business claims stemming from direct oil spill impacts beyond those
generated by closed fisheries.3
Exxon stated that economic damages to the Cordova business conununity should be
mitigated through local purchasing for the spill cleanup. To this end, Exxon analysts3
"supported the Chamber in preparing a products and services guide for Cordova
businesses to assure that all local purchasing opportunities were identified." Exxon also3
approved a 25-percent advance against claims for lost net income, prompt settlement of
claims for lost net income, and programs for labor and housing assistance:3
Q.   Will Exxon recognize a fishery growth factor for Cordova
business claims?
A.   "A fishery growth.factor applied to Cordova businesses does
not appear to be appropriate. From discussions with
Cordova business owners, and you as we.., it appears that theI
size of fish catches do not affect local businesses uniformly--
some businesses may do better and some may not do as well
when there is a very successful fishing season and the fleet isI
out on the grounds mnost of the time. The effects on
individual businesses would be difficult, if not impossible, to
determine. Applying such a fisheries growth factor would be
,inconsistent with the. principles previously discussed with the
Chamber of attempting to treat business claimants fairly and
equitable. Therefore, Exxon does not intend to recognize a
fisheries growth factor in settling business claims."
Q.   Will Exxon recognize an individual growth factor for CordovaI
businesses?


Cordova - Page 334

A.   "Exxon recognizes that patterns for growth of businesses may
vary from year to year based on business owners efforts in
such areas as expanding store space or seating areas, offering
a wider variety of merchandise or increasing advertising
efforts. Our claims office has recognized appropriate growth
for specific claimanits where good documentation existed."

Q.	Will Exxon subsidize wages for Cordova employers?

A.	"Exxon cannot agree to subsidize wages. Such action would
only eliminate incentives for employers to control costs. It
also could have the effect of inappropriately fixing wages at
artificial levels. Exxon has responded to the labor shortages
in Cordova by working with the Chamber to implement an
employee search program through the Job Service. In
addition, we have provided financial assistance for the
construction of temporary worker housing. Exxon will
continue to monitor the labor problems that Cordova is
facing and will work with the Chamber to monitor the results
of these programns.''

Q.	Will Exxon provide low interest, long-term loans?

A.	"Our claimns procedures do not include low interest, long-term
loans because no long-term impacts on the community have
yet been identified. In addition, the Small Business
Administration offers loan programs for qualified borrowers.
And as you know, for busin.esses that may be suffering cash
flow problems, Exxon is offering the option of a 25% advance
on claims. We hope you will agree that our claims
settlements have been handled in a very expeditious manner
which should eliminate short-term cash flow problerns for
businesses."

Q.What efforts will Exxon make'to mitigate econormic damages
to the Cordova business community?

A.   "It has been, and continues to be, Exxon's policy to mitigate
economic impacts on Cordova area businesses as a result of
the Exxon Valdez oil spill through local purchasing, our 25%
advance against, clairns, the prompt settlemen't of claims and
programs such as labor and housing assistance. The
assignment of analysts from Exxon's Treasurers group to
Cordova - Page 335






assist local businesses was to aid in the expeditious handlingU
of claims. Exxon also supported the Chamber in preparing d
products and services guide for Cordova businesses to assure
that all local p-urchasing opportunities were identified."

Q.   Will Exxon claims policy recognize lost bank loans,
uncompleted projects or lost property or business values?

A.   "At this time our claims policies do not consider lost bank3
loans, uncompleted projects or lost property or business
values. However, as I have indicated in the past, we are
willing to listen to and evaluate well documented. sDecific3
situations believed to be caused solelv bv the oil sDill. The
claims office's evaluation of these claimns may require
additional investigation including contacting other involvedI
parties such as banks or prospective property or business
purchasers."

Q.   Will Exxon recognize claims of Cordova businesses beyond
those generated by closed fisheries?

A.   "Cordova businesses were recognized as primary claimants by
Exxon because of the-'city's remote location and almost total
dependence upon Prince Williamn Sound fisheries for its
livelihood. Exxon considers Cordova businesses as. directly
impacted by the closed commercial fisheries. Exxon will also
evaluate claimns for businesses that, while not affected by theI
closed commercial fisheries, also may have been directly
impacted by the oil spill. The Chamber should direct any
business that may have a claiim as a direct result of the spill
to donate the claims office. We will evaluate and process
valid claims as long as there are losses that are a direct result
of the oil spill."
"We believe the dialogue and working relationship between3
the Cordova Chamber and Exxon have been most
productive," Harvin wrote. "We look forward to continuing
constructive and productivie coimmunications in the future."3

"Exxon has shown that they are willing to work with our
business community," Chamber president Connie Taylor said.
"And the Chamber continues to work with Exxon to enhance


Cordova - Page 336

their claims and other business-related programs for
Cordova" (Cordova Fact Sheet, July 13, 1989:1-2).

This publication of Exxon's policy statement in the Cordova Fact Sheet,
demonstrates community awareness of a constructive working relationship between the
Cordova Chamber of Commerce and Exxon.43 Exxon had made some concessions to
mitigate business losses (such as recognition that Cordova businesses were "directly"
impacted by the spill), but had refused to accommodate many demands (such as to
subsidize wages, or recognize a fishery growth factor, lost bank loans, or lost property or
businaess values).
Exxon's cordial relationship with the Cordova Chamber of Commerce was manifest
during this period by a $20,000 check from Exxon, U.S.A. to the Chamber, representing
"the sincere appreciation of Exxon for the efforts of the Chamber to assist the
community through the disruptive times associated with the Exxon Valdez cleanup
activity" (Cordova Fact Sheet, June 9, 1989:1).
Some business leaders were not content with the outcome of negotiations between
Exxon and the Chamber. Interviews conducted in 1991 demonstrate a continuing
bitterness over the perceived exclusivity of the Chamber's orchestration of the claims
negotiation process. Some exercise of control by the Chamber is illustrated in the
following announcement, describing how business owners would be selected by the
Chamber to mneet with Exxon representatives:
Tom Chrichlow and Dave Shoup from the Anchorage Exxon
Claims office will be in Cordova on Thursday, July 20 to listen to
the concerns. and suggestions of local businesses. Chrichlow is the
claims manager when Dick Harvin, the on site claims manager, is
on rotation. ..

The Chamber is also arranging a series of-private meetings during
the afternoon with individual business owners and managers.
Those interested in meeting with Crichlow should contact Chamber


43 Most constructive, perhaps, for the Chamber and for Exxon. Public sentiments toward this relationship
are discussed more thoroughly with governmental impacts. Most respondents viewed the large donation by
Exxon to the Chamber as a "bribe."
Cordova - Page 337






President Connie Taylor who is responsible for scheduling theI
meetings. Because of the time restrictions only a limited number
of individual meetings can be scheduled. Participants will be
selected to be representative of problems continuing to face the
business community ... (Cordova Fact Sheet, July 18, 1989:1).

A substantial segment of the Cordova business community banded together and
formed a new organization, the CBOA to negotiate with Exxon outside of the auspices of3
the Chamber of Commerce in an "uncompromised fashion:"
A new association for business owners in Cordova is being formed
by about a dozen founding members. The immediate objectives of3
the Cordova Business Owners Association are to initiate an open
dialogue with Exxon on business claims and to work cooperatively
with Exxon officials on alleviating long-range economic problemsI
related to the oil spill.

The original claims policy was based on the closure of the herringI
fishery with an extension to May and June. At this point, however,
there has been no commnitment from Exxon to continuae honoring
and paying business claims until the impact from the spill is over
and business patterns return to normal. Although b-usiness owners
have been allowed to submit claims to Exxon on an individual
basis, they have not been involved in the negotiations process to
secure a long-term commnitment from Exxon to make the Cordova
business community "whole" again.3

Presently, the Chamber of Commerce has been the only entity
acknowledged by Exxon to represent the entire business3
cornmunity of Cordova. The Cordova Business Owners
Association wants "to offer business owners a cohesive, positive
and uncomprornised alternative to the Chamber of Commerce andI
an opportunity to be actively involved in working toward a
reasonable, equitable claims policy with Exxon" (Cordova Fact
Sheet, July 21, 1989:1).
The fears and frustrations of many business owners are reflected in this statement
of purpose of the CBOA: members felt powerless because they had not been involved in
negotiations to secure a long-termn commitment from Exxon to mnitigate their damages.3
Founding members of the new association include owners of the Killer Whale Cafe, Club
Enterprises, Orca Oil, Hoover's Movers, Area E Fisheries and the Powder House,3


Cordova - Page 3383

*	~~Heaney Mobile Home Park, Odiak Child Development Center, Davis Super Foods,
3	~~Chitina Air Service, Cordova Drug, Cordova Commercial Company, and Laura's Liquors
(Cordova Fact Sheet, July 21, 1989:1). One month later the membership had expanded
3        ~~to include Flinn's Too Clothing for Women and Children, Flinn's Clothing and Sporting
Goods, Ambrosia Restaurant, Steen's Home Furnishings and Gifts, Windsinger Cafe,
Chitina Air Service, and Cordova Air Service, Inc. (Cordova Fact Sheet, August 23,
1989:2).
3            ~~~~The CBOA immediately pressed Exxon for a long-term commitment for claims
settlement and for recognition of a fishery growth factor. They met with little success in
I        ~~pressing these and other concerns, according to reports from members in 1991. The
following exchange of letters between the association and Richard T. Harvin, Exxon
3        ~~~Claims Manager, demonstrate this, as well as a diminished cordiality as compared with
the dialogue quoted here, between Exxon and the Chamber of Commierce:44
1                 ~~~~~August 9, 1989

Dear Mr. Harvin:

As you well know many Cordova business owners have joined the
Cordova Business Owners Association. This organization is made
3                 ~~~~~up of prominent members of the business community who
represent a majority of the retail and service merchants.

3                 ~~~~~~The intent of this letter is to establish negotiations between Exxon
management and the Cordova Business Owners Association ...

3                 ~~~~~~At this time, we feel it important for us to begin by discussion of
the following issues:

3                 ~~~~~1.   That a strong commitment from Exxon to extend the business
claims policies through this winter is essential in order to
eliminate the concern for the future that many Cordova
business owners have expressed.



44Compare, for instance, the opening sentences of Marvin's letters to the CBOA and Chamber, cited
3         ~~~inimediately below.
Cordova - Page 339






2.   That a growth factor based on the fishing economy ofI
Cordova, is a measurable quantum and failure to achieve that
growth should be compensated.3

In closing we would like to say that our frustration and anxiety
about our future is very real to us. Our lives and our businesses3
have been exposed to this disaster since March 24th and our
intentions are to be here for many more March 24ths ...

Sincerely, Cordova Business Owners Association.


August 21, 19891

Dear Jeff (Jeff Bailey):5

This is in response to the unsigned letter from the Cordova
Business Owners Association handed to me by you last Thursday inU
Cordova. Our response to the two points outlined in the letter are
as follows:

1.   The Cordova Business Owners Association should send any
businesses that may have a claim as a direct result of the'
M/V Exxon Valdez oil spill to our local claims office. ExxonI
will evaluate and process valid claims as long as there are
losses that are a direct result of the M/V Exxon Valdez oil
spill.
2.   A fishery growth factor applied to Cordova b-usinesses does
not appear to be appropriate. From discussions withU
Cordova business owners, it appears that the size of fish
catches does not affect local business uniformly--some
businesses may do better and some may not do as well whenI
there is a very successful fishing season and the fleet is out
on the grounds most of the tirme. The effects on individual
businesses would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine.
Applying such-fisheries growth factor Would be inconsistent
with the principles previously discussed with the Cordova
business community of attempting to treat business claimants
fairly and equitably. Therefore, Exxon does not intend to
recognize a fishe ries growth factor in settling business claims.3
If you continue to feel we are overlooking key factors in
arriving at that position, we would appreciate receiving from


Cordova - Page 340

you the documentation supporting such a fishery growth
factor ...

Sincerely, Richard T. Harvn, Claims
Manager
(Cordova Fact Sheet, August 23, 1989:2)

While Exxon's relations with the Cordova Chamber of Commerce remained
relatively cordial, key Chamber requests were not granted. A major complaint in 1991
was that business owners remained confused throughout the claims process, as to what
documentation Exxon would require. Many respondents recounted how Exxon changed
their standards of proof, as well as their settlement policy, over time. Exxon field
representatives changed as well; respondents stated that they would be told by one
auditor that they had a substantial claim only to have another auditor tell them a month
later that they had no claim.
A major problem for many was Exxon's demand for monthly financial statements.
Small businesses who did not keep monthly records found it difficult or impossible to
provide them, especially as bookkeepers were lost to spill cleanup work or shifted to
other duties to replace employees who had left.
T'he following letter from the Exxon Claims Manager to the Chamber of Commerce
illustrates how Exxon refused to be pinned to a specific level of documentation for all
business claims, stating, "...our claims office representative may request further
information needed to quantify or verify the claim. While I agree that it is desirable to
specify the needed documents when review of a given claim is begun, this is not always
possible."
Chamber President Connie Taylor received the following letter in response to a
Chamber request for a listing of the documentation required for buasiness claims.
Dear Connie
.Thank you for your August 31, 1989 letter concerning general
business claims.
Unfortunately, it is exceedingly difficult to provide an all
encompassing list of general-business claimant documentation
Cordova - Page 341





requirernents. Requirements differ depending on the size andI
nature of the specific business being considered. However, all
claimants will normnally be expected to provide the following in
addition to other materials appropriate for the individual claim:
1986 through 1988 Federal income tax returns
Monthly income statements for 1988 and 1989 consisting of
Sales records by month
Expense/cash disbursement records by month
1988 and 1989 bank statements by month
Sales receipts/documents
Expense invoices/bills3

Each claimant should provide any additional information which
they believe supports and quantifies the net income loss suffered as3
a direct result of the March 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill. In turn,
our claims office representative may request further information
needed to quantify or verify the claim. While I agree that it is
desirable to specify the needed documents when review of a given
claim has begun, this is not always possible. However, I assure you
that it is not our policy or practice to ask for additional documentsU
as a means of delaying compensation ..

Connie, I very much appreciate the Chamber's continuing interest3
in the Exxon claims program, and its help in commnunicating
informnation about our program to the Cordova business
community.
Sincerely, Dick Harvin, Exxon Claims Manager (Cordova Fact
Sheet, Septemnber 21, 1989:4)
The disquiet which Cordova business owners expressed over lack of definition in3
Exxon's business claims policy was also evident in late July 1989, when confusion arose
over whether business owners had signed off future claims when they signed partial3
releases for the mnonths of March through July. This issue was discussed when Tom
Crichlow and Dave Shoup from Exxon's Anchorage claims office met in Cordova with3








Cordova - Page 342

business owners, including the Cordova Chamber of Commerce Board of Directors and
CBOA (Cordova Times, July 27, 1989:Al).45
Business owners understood that the partilal releases they had signed allowed them
to file later claims. As a founder of the CBOA expressed:
What I was told, was the (partial release) left it open. 'Mere
would be future claims. I'm confused with the process and don't
want to compromise future claims. I'd rather receive a receipt [for
the money]. I don' t want to hear now that those papers I signed
was signing off on future claims (Cordova Times, July 27, 1989:Al-
9).

Crichlow's stated understanding was that there would be no future settlements for the
months in which partial releases had been signed (Cordova Times, July 27, 1989:1l). The
president of the Chamber of Commerce pointed out that four lines on the partial.
releases for businesses were left blank, but Crichlow "appeared confident that the
releases were final" (Cordova Times, July 27, 1989: 1).46
The above exemplifies the common complaint of 1991 respondents that "Exxon said
one thing at one point in time and another thing at another point in time." That is,
some entrepreneurs claim that they were told the partial releases were not final, while
they are told here that the partial releases may well be final. This common observation
by respondents, that "Exxon was not being straight with us," is manifest in another issue
discussed at the meeting cited above.
Respondents' in 1991 overwhehlmingly agreed that Exxon was more willing to meet
claims submitted in the first months after the spill than in later months. Yet, in the
following statement, business owners are assured by Exxon representatives that they'
could submit their claims at any time:



'~Crichlow, with Shoup assisting, filled in for claims manager Harvin when he was off duty, 10 days out of
40 days (Cordova Times July 27, 1989:AI-9).

460One resident asked whether business owners would hav'e received receipts if they had hired attorneys as
the fishermen had and received no answer (Cordova Times July 27, 1989:1). While trivial in import, the remark
and its appearance in local press coverage demonstrate local cynicism toward E-xxon's motives and a commonly
expressed belief that Exxon would not willingly reimburse residents fully for their losses..
.Cordova - Page 343






Business owners do not have a deadline to submit their claims.I
"There's no timne horizon for a business or an individual's right to
make a claimn," Crichlow said. "They have a right to make a claim
at any time. We've extended the Cordova guidelines for July and
August addressing net income losses." He added that Cordova is
the only community with the "unique program" (The Cordova3
Times, July 27, 1989:A-9).

Some Cordovans waited to file claims, inferring that Exxon would use the same
puidelines regardless of when a claim was filed. Respondents expressed their regret for
this decision in 1991 interviews. Reasons cited in 199.1 for delays in filing claims3
included lack of a bookkeeper, a desire to determine the total loss before filing (fear of
signing a partial release), extended absences of business owners on trips to Valdez and3
Anchorage to lobby for spill relief, and general confusion over the claims process.
IV.F. Conflicts Between VECO and Local Business Owners
Virtually all respondents expressed resentments in 1991 over the way VECO "stole
our employees." Another cormmon complaint was that the company was slow in paying3
for goods and services, exacerbating cash flow problems already created by the
cancellation of fisheries. At a meeti-ng with the Cordova Chamber of Commerce in May
of 1989, a VECO vice-president for finance and a treasurer addressed complaints over
delays in payment to many Cordova business owners (Cordova Fact Sheet, May 17,I
1989:1). He explained that the company had been unable to meet its goal of issuing
checks within 2 weeks of receiving invoices because there had been confasion aboutI
procedures; sorne invoices were mnistakenly sent to Exxon instead of VECO and vice
versa. New procedures, such as the assignment of a purchase order Dumber each weekI
for individual businesses, were being instituted (Cordova Fact Sheet, May 17, 1989:1).
Respondents in 1991 described delays in receiving paymnent from VECO, often for
2 months, as a continuing financial burden. Some found it especially galling to "front the
money for the spill cleanup" on top of other financial burdens associated with the spill.
Another conflict involves suspicions held by some that-VECO encouraged its boats
to buy provisions in Valdez instead of Cordova where prices are higher. The VECO
spokesperson at the meeting cited above assured business owners present that Exxon's3


Cordova - Page 344

directive was to purchase locally and to emphasize logistical rather than financial factors
(Cordova Fact Sheet, May 17, 1989:1). He added that Exxon monitored VECO's
purchases more closely after the first few weeks of the post-spill period.
The next section of the paper presents economic impacts in individual cases in
various sectors of Cordova's economy.
IV.G. Fish Processors47
BankruiDtcv of the Conner River Fishermen's Coonerative: Bankruptcy proceedings
of the CRFC are now in progress, an outcome of the March 1989 Exxo  Valdez oil spill
according to the Co-o'  maaeent.4   In February 1991, the Spokane Bank of
Cooperatives foreclosed on the Co-op's indebtedness; the Co-op mnanagement tried and
failed to get financial assistance from the National Marine Fisheries Service's capital
construction fund in Washington, DC. Presently, the Co-op is seeking to file for
reorganization in Anchorage, in hopes that the U.S. Bankruptcy Court will approve a
Chapter 11 plan that will allow their freezer plant, owned by local fishermen, to continue
functioning during the 1991 season. The alternative is reportedly a ruling which would
dissolve the company and force a closure.
Background: The CRFC was started in 1981 by a group of gillnet fishermen.
Members cite two main impetuses behind the Co-op's formation: (1) to "break the
strangle-hold on prices" of the few large processors in the area, and, (2) to provide a
dependable market for gillnet fish.
Gilinet fishermen catch salmon using a net which traps the gills of the fish; the
fishermen pull the fish out one by one. These fish are in good condition, suitable for


47 Chugach Fisheries, Inc. is widely rumored to be on the verge of bankruptcy, and there was a radio
announcemnent that they had filed Chapter 11. Chugach representatives refused interviews on the subject, due
to pending litigation. Larry Camibronera of Seattle, vice president of operations for the fishery, declined to make
a statement to the Cordova Times during press coverage of the bankruptcy of the CRFC (Cordova Times March
7, 1991:A-9).

4Bankcruptr-y proceedings are currently unfolding, and information here will not remain up to date.
Cooperative spokespeople announced in the first week of March that the Co-op was scheduled to file for Chapter
11 the following week in Anchorage; within 20 to 40 days of filing, creditors would have the chance to meet with
bankruptcy trustees (Cordova Times March 7, 1991:A-1).
Cordova - Page 345






freezing. In purse seining, millions of pounds of fish are harvested in nets which areI
emptied onto the boats; these fish are "squashed and good only for canning."
Prior to 1981, a few processors controlled prices and gillnet fishermen periodically
went on strike for higher prices. But once the major processors received large volumes of
seine pink salmon, the gillnetters were often left high and dry (Cordova Times, March 7,
199 1:A- 1). A group of gillnet fishermen organized this processing cooperative
specializing in frozen fish to provide alternative pricing and a dependable market for
their gillnet harvest. The Co-op offers fishermen an initial price at the dock, but gives a
price adjustmnent later in the season if the selling price goes up.
T'he CRFC is the smallest land-based processor in Cordova, buat it ships out more3
frozen salmon than any other local cormpany. Major markets include Japanese buyers
and upscale restaurants in urban centers in the United States. The Co-op has six
permanent employees and 50 seasonal ernployees, most of whom are local residents.
The Oil SDill and the Cooio's Bankrui3tcv: Although the bankruptcy of the CRFC
is occurring 2 years after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, interviews with the Co-op's
management describe a sequence o f events leading up to the current financial crisis in
which the oil spill and cleanup are conspicuous.
During 1989 there were closures on Prince William Sound due to the presence of
oil on the water; in addition, some fishermen worked on the oil spill cleanup.
Consequently, during the 1989 season the Co-op bought fewer fish than anticipated and
had lower profits. Some fishermen did fish (in fact, they were required to fish in order
to put in claims against Exxon for nmitigation of losses). Due to the closures, fish caught3
were older and darker than usual, and not of a bright, fresh-looking quality necessary for
freezing and sale to the Co-op's markets. As a result, the Co-op reportedly lost some3
inarkets and damaged their reputation for high quality frozen fish. They also ended up
with extra frozen inventory.3
Because the Co-op had sustained losses during 1989, they started 1990 already into
their seasonal credit line. While these losses were direct effects of the oil spill, the Co-3
op was unable to obtain adequate compensation from Exxon and was finally forced to


Cordova - Page 346

accept a settlement which was less than their documented losses and sign a release under
duress in order to get operating capital:
We fought with Exxon all winter. In the next spring we had to
accept the claim they offered under duress, signing a release, or go
out of business..

The original claim against Exxon was $1.7 m-illion. And it wasn't a
trumped up claim. Their first offer was $700,000, and we settled
for $1.3 million. This fell short of our docurnented losses..

The $1.3 million was all contribution to overhead. In 1990 we
went into the season already into our seasonal credit line. In mid-
June we were $1.5 million into our $1.7 million open credit line for
the season ...

Exxon gave us a hard time because we're little potatoes and they
don't have to deal with us. They had us over a barrel. We tried to
avoid signing the release. We had four or. five proposals fr them,
but they insisted'that we sign a release. We put it in the minutes
that we signed under duress, but they don't care. We can duress
all we want. We're nothing to them ...

We have a suit against Exxon, but it means nothing. Processors
were declared "secondary" effects in court. The suit will be
dropped now anyway, due to the expense.

In 1990 there were additional financial pressures for the Co-op: a record 11 buyers
were operating in Area E which forced prices up. The CRFC, a small cooperative
already in financial difficulties, could not compete in the season's "price war:"
There were 11 buyers in the Sound in 1990, driving prices up. Big
buyers can even their losses, but we couldn't. We couldn't meet
the prices. Every processor took a loss last year. But we'd had
our pegs knocked out from under us in 1989 and couldn't
survve ...

We couldn't compete for those early fish with the 11 buyers, who
had floating tenders and less overhead. They were paying top
dollar.
Cordova - Page 347






When the tenders left, the image was that the fish were worthI
90c/lb., and we only could pay 80c/lb. Even though the tenders
weren't there anymore, people still wanted 90c/lb . ..

Coops can't compete well in price wars. We can't ride out losses.
And, selling less volume, we can't take lower profit margins, like
big processors can. We lost fish again in the early 1990 season..
The Co-op, now short on operating funds, needed the early season salmon because
these yield a high price. They reportedly paid more than they could afford and still have
not paid some of the fishermen for their fish. The Co-op did not get as many fish as
they would have liked, and they had problems with their markets because they had sold
older, darker fish the previous year. As a result, they started the 1991 season heavily in3
debt and their bank foreclosed:
We lost our market for pink salmon in '89. In '90 we just didn't
get the volumes we needed. For '91 we're into our seasonal credit
line with the Spokane Bank. We're more than $1.7 million in debt
to them. So they won't extend any more credit so we can operate,I
and they started foreclosure proceedings. So. we went into Chapter


The bank said in April of '90 that we were out of the covenants of
our loan; they wanted us to have $200,000 in working capital, and
we were in the hole because of the spill ..
When the bank decided to foreclose a month ago, we scrambled
for help from the state, or anywhere. One board member got holdI
of the Marine Fisheries Service: it takes 4-6 months to do the
paperwork for long term loans. But we had 3-4 days until
foreclosure  ..
Tley wanted to help us put a loan through in 54 days. So we
spent four days putting a 60 page application together, with theI
Exxon claims and so on, and submitted it ...

The Marine Fisheries Service told us to raise a million dollarsI
from our members, then they'd loan us a million dollars. We
couldn't do it, so we're sunk ...3




Cordova - Page 348

We were outraged. The Spokane Bank only wanted $500,000 for
us to keep operating! We only have 80 members. To come up
with a million dollars in A~i?They probably couldn't come up
with $500 each right now

The frustration of Co-op management is exacerbated by their perception that
Exxon could probably have prevented the bankruptcy by meeting the Co-op's
documented losses for 1989. They feel that the $400,000 difference between their claim
and settlement is small relative to other settlements paid by Exxon:
Tle Chapter 11 probably wouldn't have happened without the
spill. We'd still have lost money this year, but we could have hung
on. The bank doesn't want that much. $500,000 would keep the
-  bank backing us ...

It's rumored that the seven major fish processors [in the area)
settled, with Exxon for $54 mifllion. Why didn't they give us at least
one more million?

Continuing conflicts are described by Co-op members that include: resentment
between members who 'worked on the oil cleanup and those who fished and supported
the company; irritation when the Co-op could not keep up fish prices in 1990;
exasperation when fishermen were not paid fully for their fish in 1990; and beliefs on the
part of some fishermen that the Co-op's financial troubles are due to bad management..
Some Co-op members report that they were asked for contributions of $8,000 each to
keep the Co-op out of bankr-uptcy; they refased, irritated that this amount approximated
what they were still owed by the Co-op for their 1990 harvest.
IV.H. Fishing Gear Suppliers
Retail suppliers of fishing gear were often able to offset 1989 lo.sses by selling
cleanup gear to VECO. However, business owners explain that the disruptions of their
normal business patterns have caused financial hardships which continue 2 years after





49Most fishermen live on their seasonal inconme from fishing all year, so that many are out of money and in
debt to local businesses just prior to the start of each fishing season.
Cordova - Page 349





the spill. Problems include unsold inventory (which Exxon would not credit as a loss,I
since stores still owned the merchandise), over-extended credit, and lower sales.
One such business owner had begun expansions shortly before the spill, and now
fears bankruptcy and plans to close up shop'and enter a new venture:3
After the spill, there was inass confusion and chaos. We sold lots
of small items for the oil spill: rain gear, and so on. So we had
normal net sales in 1989, but it was on small, turn-around items3
like rain gear and boots. Not on our normal sales items ...

In 1989 we were expecting a huge run of fish. So people ordered3
new nets but didn't fish. Many didn't pick up their web in 1989 or
1990, so it's still here in the store. So we can't afford to order new
inventory. We have no flexibility there ...
I lost $190,000 [in 19901, plus I'm carrying lots of credit on my
books. Lots of people moved out in the winter after the spill, soI
there was less business..

I sell nets, which are what really took the drubbing. It'll be3
another year or two before people will start ordering new nets.
Last summer they thought they'd work on the oil- cleanup. This
summier they bought equipmnent at the auction of spill equipmentI
in Anchorage ...

There's no way our b-usiness will survive unless [a new venture]
takes off. There's no way of taking those kinds of losses and
surviving.3

Overextended credit is described as a financial burden, and as disrupting the
established patterns in which residents of Cordova were used to doing business with eachI
other. Residents often say that Cordova has a "fishbowl economy;" we see here how
financial impacts in different sectors imnmediately spread thro-ughout the economy.3
Cordova merchants regularly extend credit to fishermen through winter and spring until
the opening of fishing seasons, but in 1989, normally solvent customers such as canneries
did not pay bills promptly. Moreover, many business owners complained that VECO
delayed paying bills for 2 months, so that Cordova businesses were forced to capitalizeI
the spill cleanup. A serious social consequence of this credit crunch was that the


Cordova - Page 350

business owner quoted below was forced to sue old and valued customers, to whom she
normally would have extended credit:
And, the $190,000 loss and unsold inventory doesn't count what
people have charged and not paid for.
Even the, canneries haven't paid me. I used to think of cannery
credits as being as good as casb. But they aren't paying me. One
fish buyer went into Chapter 11. [Another processor] still owes us
money ...

A lot of the local communities fronted the money for the cleanup.
At one point I had $300,000 riding on the books with VECO. It
took 2-3 months to get my first check from VECO ...

A lot of people here fronted that spill cleanup and credit limits
were stretched to the limit. This year the company I borrow from
is carrying me.

A lot of people in town now are operating on a cash basis only.
We're very careful now about extending credit.

And I've had to file in small claims court against old customers. A
lot of them have moved out of town. A lot of them mismanaged
their spill money and can't pay their debts now.

Like all business people intervewed, this person lost employees to the spill cleanup
crews. Like many respondents, she describes the consequent "burnout" as straining
family relations:
I had 13 employees in 1989 hanging gear for me, and after VE-CO
came in I had two. I'm stuck trying to get untrained people to
hang gear, which I'm committed to have ready, when it's a skilled
labor. It was a nightmare. As soon as I'd train someone, VECO
would steal them ..

Any problems in your personal life were exacerbated. I went
through a divorce. Lots of people got divorces. Families suffered.
There were lots of social impacts . .

There was total burnout. We're the "walking dead." There was no
let up from March 1989 until now. It never stopped ...
Cordova - Page 351





When I finally got employees at [another business I own] throughI
the State Employment, I had to house them. I had to put
employees in my home. Then I had no privacy. It was insane.3

Like other business owners, this person describes Exxon's claims process as unfair.
Exxon did not credit unsold inventory as a loss, their payment policy changed after 1989,3
and Exxon spokespeople lied:
The Exxon claims process was insane. At one point last February,3
they told us that they owed us $80,000, and we got nothing. We
weren't able to subtract the inventory outlays from the net
profits ...
The fish net I had left in inventory didn't constitute a loss,
according to Exxon, because I still had it, but that affected myI
business..

We've received nothing from Exxon except their promise: "No oneI
will suffer. We will make you whole again." That's a laugh.

I didn't put a claim in for 1989 because I grossed the same amountI
as in previous years. That was a mistake. I put in a claim for 1990
because of the low orders. I could see that I'd be hurt that
year ...
Exxon required different verification from different people. And
they made promises they didn't keep. They came and audited our
books last May. One of them said we'd lost $90,000 in one month,
but he was transferred, and the next guy said we had no claim...3

They had a disastrous impact on us, and they only want to deal
with the fishermen. Last surnmer we only had two sales from3
Exxon! VECO, so they didn't even keep trying to funnel money
into the community in 1990.

And I didn't even raise my prices for them, like people in Valdez
did. I just tried to do normal business with them . ..I

They caused me a loss in this retail store through their screwing up
the Sound, so they owe me for that, but the Federal court says,

"T'he buck stops at the water line" . .
Cordova - Page 352

Exxon wasn't honest. They said they didn't want us to go under.
They kept us going through the claims process, jumping through
their hoops, only to say, "You have no claim."

This person and her husband entered into business expansions prior to the spill, as
did other Cordova fishermen and business people, due to the high expectations for the
1989 fishing season. This respondent points out that fuirthest from her expectations prior
to the oil spill was a business failure. Now, rather than their planned expansion, she and
her husband are facing the closure of their business. Moreover, like other respondents
trying to sell businesses, they are not having great luck finding buyers:
We were committed to expanding our business in 1989, and it was
a total disaster. Net sales are the main part of [our] fishing
supply ...

Gill nets take six months to get here from Japan, and there was a
big fishing season forecast for the summer of 1989. So we forecast
big profits. We ordered huge amounts of net to hang gear on. All
of it was special ordered, with deposits.

Because we're still sitting on that, we have had no capital to work
with. And we'd just expanded into a new building, and oil prices
went up. We had already started expanding, a-nd our equity was all
in inventory ...

Our equity is still tied up in that inventory outlay which has been
sitting upstairs for 2 years. We. were conimitted to the expansion,
and now we may lose this company altogether, because we lost
$190,000 last year ..

For instance, trying to buy insurance on this building when you're
working on a ____shoestring is impossible! I mean, the money
for operating costs isn't even there  ..

We have a new seine boat, in a contract we entered before the
spill, and we haven't been able to sell our old boat. Boats aren't
moving now. We need to sell the old one to get the new one paid
for, and we have to keep insurance on both. Had we known the
situation, we wouldn't have gotten another boat. It's not
economiical now.
Cordova - Page 353





Ours was an upgrade, but we'd planned it before the spill, planning
for, the increased fish runs, to incre-a-se our productivity. A lot of
people upgraded, planning on the hatchery runs. But nothing's
moving right no
We're actively trying to sell this place now, but with everything so3
low now, it's not moving .

We'd just expanded, and it wasn't because we were planning to3
sell. So the-~sale is spill-related and our leaving is spill-related . ..

Why should I be sitting on $50,000 in payment receivables, when.5
I'm juggling funds from one place to another, just to stay in
business? I had to borrow from [family members] this year and
last year to pay the bills. I've got all that inventory I'm sitting on,
and all that credit on the books, and, I can't even pay the bills.
And I have to spend money pursuing) that'claim? Why should I go
through that when I'm working so hard?
IV.1. Hotels and Motels
Divergent accounts of personal economic impacts are offered by hotel and motelI
owners. Cordova was deluged with incoming people after the spill, including
representatives of Exxon and VECO and i ndividuals eager to work on spill cleanup
crews, but many spill workers boarded on boats rather than in the lower priced motels
that are normnally frequented by the non-resident fishing fleet. Some of these latter
establishments report losses. Exxon and V-ECO representatives reportedly stayed at1
higher priced hotels, that benefitted economnically. Nevertheless, entrepreneurs who
benefitted economically overwhelrningly express compassion for those hurt by the spill.
A positive spin on economic effects of the spill is offered by the owner of a quality
hotel in Cordova where many Exxon and VECO representatives stayed. This respondent3
views the spill as an economic boon; simultaneously, he describes the spill in catastrophic
terms, likening it to the .1964 earthquake:I
T'he spill was the greatest thing that ever happened to me. The
place was plum full, but it was sad to see the cause.
As for the businesses, in the short term it was great. What
remains to be seen is if there's any long term adverse effects ong

Cordova - Page 3541

the fishing. We depend on fishing here, so if somnething adverse
happens, it could be bad for US.

In terms of my personal feelings about the spill, it's like "My
psyche and world are gone," but it would be more- severe if you
lost a inember of your famnily.

While this person express es fears of future imnpacts on Cordova's critical fishing
industry, he exresses an optimism regarding recovery from such disasters, shared by
many in the business sector:
The earthquake wiped out the whole harbor. It wiped out our
fishery, and we recovered. So, because of seeing that I'm miore
balanced.

People were killed in the earthquake. There were acres of sea
mammals, clams, and so on, that were just gone. This [spill] didn't
kill anybody. Still, it's important, but not heart-rending.

The ever-present problem of lost employees did not daunt this entrepreneur, who
recouped losses for meeting cleanup wages by nearly doubling his room rates:
You had to meet the cleanup wages. Exxon-VECO offered $17 an
hour plus room and board, so you had to meet that. I offered all
my employees $500 a week bonuses to keep them on. All those
people were fodder for the mill. VECO would come in one day
and take 'em the next.

I made more than enough to counter that expense. Exxon-VECO
stole my help, so I raised their room rates. I about doubled them.
Someone I was paying $7 an hour had to earn $15 an hour now.
And there was no notice. It was hire on the spot.

While this respondent benefitted economically from the spill in 1989, he expresses
considerable compassion for others who did not:
There was a scarcity of, labor for some, but then you work longer
and harder yourself. It only lasts for awhile, but you've got to do
it. Some people put signs on their business doors: "Thanks Exxon,
I don't have any help!"
Cordova - Page 355





'Me early parts of the spill, for the younger people who had never
had anything but sunshine and roses, it caused some stress there.
It caused some stress in families where you had two boys and one
went on the boat and one worked for Exxon. One made $15,000I
and one made $4,000. And it was working 7 days a week, 24 hours
a day. That caused stress for some households ...3

Fishermen got paid for leasing their boats, and they went on
parties, got new boats, and so on. Then they couldnf't pay their
taxes. This hit them unexpect'edly.
A very different scenario is depicted by the following owner of a motel and nearby3
bar, restaurant, laundromat, and liquor store. This person explains that he did not raise
his room rates in 1989 because he did not want to hurt (and possibly lose) his regular5
seasonal clientele. He reports substantial losses which were not reimbursed through the
Exxon claims process. More damaging, however, is the loss of his credit line, due to3
unsold inventory which he could not pay for; this calamity continues to adversely affect
his business:3
[The fishing season of] 1989 was projected to be the opportunity of
a lifetime: big volume, big prices. Tlen the oil spill hit .. . no
herring season, no fishing season. Everybody left to work the oil
spill; your employees left to work the spill. Then the people who
made big money working the spill left the following winter after
the spill. So, businesses were all inventoried up, all dressed up for
the party which didn't come ...

There was a limited claimns program for businesses but it didn'tI
take care of everything. I got compensated for March and April.
Most of our business is in May to September.3

I was loaded up in March with inventory, and the business didn't
happen because all the people went out to work the spill. I lost3
my credit rating with some of my suppliers because I couldn't pay
for my inventory until 2 months later. That effect has hurt my
business for the last year and a half.3

Exxon paid onfly on a net profit basis. For example,,in March I did
$30,000 worth of business where I normally would gross $60,000.
But I would have taken inventory and overhead costs out of that
$60,000. So I would have gotten an [additional] net profit of


Cordova - Page 3561

$10,000, and $20,000 would have paid for the inventory, expenses,
overhead, and so on.

Exxon only paid me $5,000 for lost net; nothing for my inventory.
So I missed the "gross" factor. I couldn't pay for the inventory and
I have lost my credit and suffered ever since from a shortage of
inventory...

With a small business here, supplies can take 25 days to get here.
Credit lines are $50,000 for 60 days. So without that credit line I
have a major crimp in my business due to insufficient inventory.
With less inventory, I can't sell as mnuch. After stocking up in
March, I sat for 6 weeks developing a claim, which didn't get
processed right away. So I didn't meet my 60 days and I lost my
credit line..

They didn't pay for my inventory, because I still had it. But I
couldn't sell it and couldn't pay for it. I lost my line of credit and
now I can't order in advance in time to get merchandise when I
need it, because it takes so long to ship goods in.

Since June, I'm off $100,000 in business. I've had this business
since 1974, and that's never happened before..

For my mnotel, I kept niy prices the same. I don't do business that
way. So after the spill, I still have my clientele. Because I'd have
to have raised prices on the locals too. And I didn't want to
inflate my prices for them. Those who inflated prices say we who
are now bitchin' about claims are rabble rousers.

The last statemnent echoes resentments widely expressed, over the uneven economic
effects of the spill. These asymmnetrical effects also ensued from the inequitable nature
of Exxon's claims process, according to Cordova residents.50 Respondents believe that
Exxon paid varying amounts on claims and insisted oni signatures of either receipts or
releases, based on the financial desperation of the injured parties:
So Exxon set up their "inet profit claims program." You needed 3
years of monthl financial statements , which most small businesses
didin't have. And even though this was to be the biggest year ever,


5This is also discussed in the sections on fishermen and fish processors.
Cordova - Page 357






you got paid on your history. When they paid me my claim, theyI
came with two checks. The first one I refused. They pulled out
the second one, and I took it .. .3

We were in such disarray because our employees took off. I was
in Juneau lobbying for a claims process. Exxon wanted
businessmen to sign a release for March and April. Fishermen
only had to sign a receipt5  I was in no position to refuse to sign
a release, so I had to sign. So that blew a large part of my claim.3

So all people weren't treated the same. The average guy on the
street got screwed. Natives and fishermen had attorneys. jumping
out of the woodwork on them, but not for businesses. It's all
smaller claims with lots of paper work ...

People who were ethical in their prices and looked out for all the
people got screwed. I only did about $1,000 worth of business with
Exxon. If you were an advocate, Exxon and VECO wo-uldn't dealI
with you. Exxon avoided me like the plague.

This uneven treatment by Exxon exacerbated what respondents describe as the5
chaotic nature of the claims settlement process, due to the absence of bureaucratic or
legal mechanisms to administer it. Respondents complain that attention has centered on3
spill prevention (which cannot be assured), rather than legal remedies for economic
losses which will recur with future oil spills:3
The TAPAA fund has a limit of $86 million, which won't pay the
bill. So we're sitting in the middle of a bureaucracy and nothing
has been fixed in case it ever happens again. But we've learned
not to trust the Federal and State governments..

Also, the legal process is uncertain. Judges reverse each other.
You never know if you'll be compensated. They're about to drill
again and you never know when the next spill will be. People getI
really edgy .. . there's still no real mechanisms to prevent another
major disaster. Just a few more escort boats. And no one looks at
the human damage. We were effected as much as the fish andI
birds ...



5Somne fishermen report that they were forced to sign releases; others report that they only signed receipts.
As described above, the CRFC was forced to sign a release in order to receive their claim from Exxon.3


Cordova - Page 358g

Exxon didn't provide trustworthy information. No one did. The
State didn't either. We really had no source of information unless
you went out and looked at the spill. We were caught in between
major public relation battles.

The Federal Small Business Association put out low interest loans,
but that would put us farther in the hole ... If there'd been
financing available [immediately], through SBA, everyone could
have weathered it. Exxon wouldn't make us loans, [but with the]
SBA: (1) you have to prove losses, and (2) borrow money on
losses. At least with Exxon they paid your n'et loss. What we
needed was financing, not hand outs. But immediately, so we
could make the necessary adjustments to avoid the losses. Change
stocling methods, refinance buildings, and so on .. .

The only economic help was that the city put a moratorium on the
sales tax, extending the payment date for 2 months..

Another problem was that we never knew whether a given month
would be paid. We'd get May in June, and so on, so there was
instability and defensive business practices.

I showed some net profit by September, but I did no repairs and
was in bad shape the next year, in addition to having bad credit.

For a small business that really hurts. You have to plan in
advance based on established patterns, without much cushion for.
uncertainty.

The above observation, that Cordova's small businesses have little ability to
weather economic hardships, recurs in most business interviews. Cordova has 'no road to
the outside and n'o deep port, so merchandise must be requested weeks in advance.
This leaves little flexibility for radical disruptions such as cancellations of fishing seasons.
Business is seasonal, with merchants often stretching their own credit limiits to extend
credit to local customers each year prior to fishing season. Sales volumes are low, so
merchants pay high prices for inventory:
1) A case of Teacher's Scotch, for instance, is $180. For five cases it's
$140 per case. I have to buy a half case. Here there is a big
fluctuation in business and no big volume, but your expenses stay
the same.
Cordova - Page 359





This businessman reports the usual problems with employees: loss of keyI
employees, employee burnout, larger overhead due to overtime wages, business closures
due to lack of employees, hiring of untrustworthy people, paying of trainees who left
before becoming productive, and so on. Espe-cially inconvenient, for this respondent andg
others was the loss of his bookkeeper, whose'aid was needed for filing a claim with
Exxon. This entrepreneur was afraid to meet VECO's wages, because of the -uncertainty
of the claims process:
There were horrible employee problems, and the few who stayed
were completely burned out, including me.
We couldn't match Exxon's wage, or come up with bonuses, since
we were losing business, and we've had employment problemsI
since because people now expect more money.

Here [in the bar] I have 12-20 employees. I own the bar, liquorI
store, laundromat, hotel, and restaurant. During the cleanup we
were five emnployees short. Everyone was paid overtime and
worked six and seven days a week ..
Employees have been a nightmare. You lost your crews, and then
after the:spill they went on vacation. I had people working for me
that normally I wouldn't have let in my bar! You'd take anybody
off the street. Then you spent all your time watching them. . ..

Maintenance men: the first was an alcoholic and in trouble with
the cops. I paid for his alcoholic counseling. The next one was
also in trouble with the cops, and he belonged in a mental
institution. The other employees insisted I fire him because they
were scared of him ..

My bookkeeper quit. She couldn't take the stress. I've never been
able to replace her.
You saw gobs of "FHELP WANTED" signs up and down the'street.
We asked Exxon for wage subsidies; they told us to raise wagesI
and raise your net loss, and they 'd pay for that, but we couldn't
raise the wages because you never knew what Exxon was going to
,do. They did March and April. In June they'd do May. But youI
never knew what their program would be.


Cordova - Page 3603

It changed over time, and it wasn't binding on them. You could go
broke. Technically- a claim is miitigating your damages; we didn't
know if they'd pay for raises.

To even file a claimn, you need a bookkeeper, and mnine left
because of the strain. Everyone ran out at one point, so we kept
the bar open and closed the liquor store.

You'd train people for a week, and then they'd quit. You had to
pay them even though they were never productive, and they were
irresponsible. You never knew if they'd show up. It was a
nightmare, and it's just starting to straighten out ...

I've only had two employees stay throughout, in two businesses. In
the bar I went through 10 employees; in the liquor store I went
through 15 employees; in the motel I went through three
employees. You spent all your time training new employees and
had not time to manage your business.

Like many in Cordova, this respondent likens the oil spill to the 1964 earthquake,
but he notes that the effects of the spill continue on, with uncertain social and economic
repercussions:
It was like the earthquake [of 19641. Nothing fell down, but the
effects kept on going. When you have a fire or an earthquake, it
stops. With the spill, we still don't know. Are the fish damaged?
And the cleanup caused more damage than the spill.

But we've seen no damage information by the State or Federal
govermnments, because of litigation with Exxon. Exxon gives
glowing reports. State and Federal judges are opposing eacb
other. Federal judges say you can't sue Exxon for dumping oil ...

Some employees wondered if they should sell their houses and
leave. If Cordova would survive the spill. There were no
guarantees that things could be made right ...

The town was in a turmoil. It ceased to function. Everyone was in
shock, wondering if their income and life style would be totally
destroyed ...
Cordova - Page 361





My group of customers seems to have been disenfranchised. TheyI
all moved away. People have come in, researchers, government
people. The houses are full, but it's not the same town.3

For instance, you're a researcher; I bet you don't drink like a
fisherman. You don't spend money the same way. People are
here, but the other people who made up the town have moved
away.

IVJ. Grocery Stores and Food Suppliers

Grocery stores and suppliers of prepared foods (such as bakeries) do not reportI
economic losses, because they were able to sell their regular food inventories to the
cleanup crews. However, these businesses do not report financial windfalls; rather, the3
economic season was slightly better than average, but entailed much more work.
Shortages of employees and employee burnout are predominant complaints.j
T'he owner of one grocery store, for instance, describes sales to VECO as merely
compensating for sales lost due to fishing cancellations, but she also expresses concern3
over possible future economic losses should Cordova's fishing industry be damaged:
The spill didn't hurt us a bit because what we lost from the3
fishermen's business we made up for from VECO coming in and
buying food.3

We may be h-urt in the future, if the fishing business is hurt from
the spill; if there's damage to the fish, but we won't know that until
later.
The manager of this same grocery store adopts a more negative posture: he was3
engaged in the stressful process of maintaining operations despite a shortage of
personnel. This establishment could not significantly increase wages although they3
provided bonuses for employees who stayed on. Problems include loss of employees,
burnout in overworked employees who stayed, lost work hours due to a lack of day care,3
and daily uncertainty as to whether enough employees would appear to keep the business
running:3




Cordova - Page 362

It was a tremendous strain. We went through four times the
people as usual. We couldn't get employees to hire because of
VECO, so those that worked had to work 6 days a week, 10 hours
a day. People got burned out worling the peak season from
March to September ...

We raised our starting wage by $1/hour, making it only $10/hour
less than VECO's starting wage. It mnight be someone with
retirement investment who stayed, who didn't want to lose that, but
we went through a lot of people ...

We maintained about 18-20 employees. It was hard; we went
through 60-70 employinent W2 forms for 1989 . ..

We were open from 8 AMv to 8 PM, 6 days a week. We're open
from 10 AM to 4 PM on Sunday, plus emergency openers in the
middle of the night.

Most people got 20-30 hours overtime a week. Sometimes I day
off every 2 weeks. It was hard to schedule time off because you
didn't know when the boats would come in .. .

It made it difficult. You never knew if anyone would be there
when you went to work each morning. We gave gen erous bonuses
to employees that stayed. Everyone was aware that there were
tremendous problems ...

There wasn't any day care. People couldn't work because there
was no one to take care of their kids. That was a tremendous
fiasco. The store thought of opening its own day care, but we
couldn't find employees to run it ...

,We lost 4-5 days a week because of no day care. There weren't
many easy days. They were all hard days. You still had people
trying to fish around the oil.

We were sure selling things, but it was a strain. It would usually
wind down in August, but that year it wound down in
September ...

We were fortunate. Some businesses really got hammered. For
instance, restaurants and bars, who needed people in there every
day ...
Cordova - Page 363





The sales [here] increased substantially, before the bonuses. WeI
got some advantages on freight. And we were short staffed, so
even with overtime there was less expense in terms of employee
benefits, and so on.
The business did better, the employees earned more, but they
earned it. It was hard work, and very stressful. To an extent it
helped the store, but if it wasn't so unplanned we could have done
even better. Most of it breezed right through our hands and went
to the government.
The bottom line was, the money was about the same.3

This person notes that while employees who chose to stay (such as those who
would have sacrificed pension benefits by leaving) earned extra wages by worldng 20 toI
30 hours of overtime per week, some of these people accrued financial losses relative to
previous years, beca-use they did not fish:
I stayed full-time manager here, so I couldn't fish. I lost lots of
money that way.
In addition to the strain in operations caused by loss of employees, this store
manager observed disruptions in regular business patterns when VECO workers would
buy out inventory, so that repular customers could not get groceries. This is a widelyï¿½
reported inipact, which Cordova residents describe as "like being in an occupied war
zone:" grocery store shelves were empty and people were evicted from their offices to3
make room for VECO operations:
Our regular customers couldn't get groceries sometimes when
VECO bought us ou.t. They would come in and take out a hugeI
order and clean us out without warning. Then your average little
old lady would have to wait 3-4 days for her cantaloupe.I

This respondent describes the chaotic nature of the cleanup operation from the
perspective of grocery stocking. For instance, some boat operators refLised to buy
feminine hygiene products or cigarettes for workers boarding on their boats, while other
boat operators gave away condoms and beer:5




Cordova - Page 3643

VECO hired people that weren't doing the job they were supposed
to do. They wouldn't buy a prime rib but would buy rib steaks at
$.50/pound more. They wouldn't let the workers get cigarettes, or
feminine hygiene products, deodorant, or toothpaste. But some
boat operators were giving everything away: condoms, beer. But
on,other boats you couldn't even get necessities.

This respondent, Rie others, describes continuing emotional impacts of the spill,
due to uncertainties over future effects of the 1989 oil spill, and the certainty that future
spills will occur:
No one knew what would happen. People were worried about
their future. People were tense because they didn't know if they
could pay for their boats or houses..

Now we've been t-rying to forget all that stuff. It still lingers;
there's enough people frustrated with the lack of results

Biologically, it's hard to tell the effects. Under the surface there's
still raw crude everywhere. How many years befo re we get two
headed fish? No one knows. You need 30-40 year studies. Rock
fish live for 70 years, and you need an intergenerational study. So
I don't know.

Every year you have to question whether you want to keep your
fishing operation or get out while it's still good. I've been,here 11
years ...

We were lucky it was Exxon, because their revenues are so great.
Foreign tankers owned by X, Y, or Z, 20 times removed, with
$100,000 liability. They would just say, "We're bankrupt."

It's not a question of if it'll happen again, but when.

Interestingly, while this respondent expresses fears of future economic and
biological damages stenuming from the 1989 oil spill, he is. not fearful of the present local
food supply. This attitude is widespread among non-Native respondents; Native
respondents (as this person niotes) express extreme anxieties over their current food
supply:
Cordova - Page 365






The Native people are tremendously affected, emotionally. That'sI
their pantry; is this seal going to kil me, or are these clams going
to hurt my kids?I

I don't feel uncertainty about food because I only get food from
areas that weren't impacted by the oil. If we get a fish that doesn't3
look right, we throw it out right away.

Producers of prepared foods relate similar accounts. For instance, the owner of a3
bakery states that although her earnings matched those of previous years, she worked
"three times as hard" in 1989. She couldn't keep employees and had to work 6 days a3
week rather than her usual 5 days. Moreover, her life was made miserable by other spill
impacts, such as hostilities among her friends over spill jobs, reduced community services,3
and fears of eating locally harvested foods.
IV.K.. Childcare Providers
Respondents in 1991 are still bitter over the lack of adequate childcare during the
1989 crisis. There was an increased demand for childcare in Cordova after the oil spill,3
as unemployed mothers began to work on cleanup crews. But what might otherwise
have constituted a. short-lived "boom" for childcare providers became an economic3
disaster, due to labor sho rtages. Childcare facilities (which are required by law to
maintain a fixed ratio of caretakers to children) suffered the same losses of employees to3
the oil cleanup effort that were experienced by other businesses; the normnally low pay
scales for childcare work may have even exacerbated the problem in this employmentI
sector, so, not only were prospective cleanup workers unable to place their children,
some parents who maintained their regular employment lost their childcare placementI
and m-issed work. Moreover, the labor shortage did not abate with spill cleanup efforts,
but lingered for months afterward. Respondents explained this as resulting from a
general unwillingness to work for low wages after earning higher wages on spill cleanup
crews; also, many who worked the spill used their money to leave town afterward. (As
discussed earlier, summer residency and winter absence is a regular demographic pattern

in Cordova, which was reportedly amplified during 1989-1990.)



Cordova - Page 366

A scarcity of childcare was experienced within the context of incessant parental
anxieties over the emotional impacts suffered by their children, due to the oil spill. Key
burdens for children deseribed in 1991 by parents include: children's fears and confusion
over the massive death toll to animals and birds; children's worries about the
environmnent in general and the Sound in particular; fear for the fature which might be
transmnitted to children by parents who were fearful for their way of life; absences from
the home of parents worling on the cleanup for weeks at a time; increased family
tensions (in some cases divorces) experienced by many Cordovans.
Cordova has two childcare facilities: Odiak Child Development Center is a non-
profit day care center which normally accommodates 50 to 60 children per day; Play and
Learn Child Care is licensed for about 19 children. Both centers lost employees during
the spill cleanup. Odiak lost five employees to oil spill-related'higher-paying jobs and
lost several other employees as well; Play and Learn lost three employees after the oil
spill (Cordova Times, June 22, 1989:5). The current director of one of the centers
described in 1991 how, in addition to losing business due to a lack of employees, extra
debt was incurred because the bookkeeper was shifted to regular childcare tasks for a
year after the spill, and the center was unable to muster the manpower to bill clients.
The following statement also reflects concern over the mental and emotional health of
the children, frequently voiced by childcare workers:
The center was immensely impacted. When Exxon gave the $16.69
an hour wage, the work force took off, but there were more
children needing day care. We tried to negotiate with Exxon to
prov ide our staff with an extra $10 per hour so we could meet
their wage. What an ordeal!

We got no support from the Oil Spill Response Office, so we went
to the City Council. They told (a city official] to look for a grant.
Then, before he found one, Exxon gave $18,000 for both child care
centers in town. It wasn't enough.

Both our bookkeeper and director had to do child care activities,
so the administration fell apart. We had 'no bookkeeper for a
year! We've just now finally catching up with our records and
billing ...
Cordova - Page 367

We incurred an incredible debt load because we didn't have time5
to bill. So no money was corming in. We've been hurting
financially ever since. For the first timne last month, we showed a
profit.
The children were upset and didn't understand what was going on:
missing parents [working the spill on boats], fear, anger. What was
oil?

We had some psychologists and mental health workers come downI
from Anchorage to listen to the children and answer their
questions. We had people come in from the community and the
children got to question them. "Why does the oil kill the birds?"
The children were able then to get some understanding. We also
brought in some children from Tatitlek and Chenega to participate.

We finally embarrassed Exxon into making a small contribution to5
the workshop, which was sponsored by the Susitna Girl Scouts ...

Still, today, when the children spill mnilk, they shout, "Oil spill!"3
That's the lasting effect.

And there'll be tar on the beach, probably forever. We tried toI
make it a teachable moment, about responsibility and faith. They
can't take away our life. Many of us have learned a lot of lessons.
Money can't be equated to those things.
That a childcare labor shortage endured while the spill cleanup tapered off is
demonstrated by the September 13 closure of Odiak Cbild Development Center, with
less that 24 hours notice (Cordova Fact Sheet, Septermber 15, 1989:3). The reason cited
for the closure was a staff shortage stemming from the high wages paid for oil cleanup
work (Cordova Fact Sheet, September 15, 1989:3).  Many workers apparently did not5
return to lower paying jobs. As the center's director explained, "Who's going to work for
$6.25 an hour when they made $16.69 an hour all summner? ... Those who return from3
spill work already have plenty of money and don't need to work now" (Cordova Times,






Cordova - Page 368

September 14, 1989:1).52 This director worked for a month through the Job Service to
hire teachers, but no one applied for the job (Cordova Times, September 14, 1989:1)
The Odiak Center reopened on September 14, 1989, but, still experiencing a labor
shortage, accepted only a limited number of children (Cordova Fact Sheet, September
15, 1989:3). Tle City of Cordova as well as the Exxon employer assistance program
joined with Odiak in searching for employees to bring the center back to fall capacity
(Cordova Fact Sheet, September 15, 1989:3). The Cordova City Council authorized a
grant request for approximately $17,000 for wage subsidies, to be filed with the
Department of Community and Regional Affairs (Cordova Fact Sheet, September 15,
1989:3).
Cordova, through the City Council and various committees, mounted multiple
efforts to alleviate the childcare shortage during the spill's aftermath. In April 1989 the
Cordova Child Care Task Force recornmended funding through the State 's Division of
Emergency Services for programs such as training for child care providers, direct grants
to centers, respite care for parents, and so on (Cordova Fact Sheet, April 22, 1989:3). In
May of 1989 the Cordova Children's Task Force, an ad hoc group formed shortly after
the March 24 oil spill, planned training sessions for childcare workers. The task force
received $5,000 from the Division of Emergency Services to carry o'ut the training
program (Cordova Fact Sheet, May 13, 1989:2).
Also in May of 1989, the Children's Task Force began working with Chenega and
Tatitlek to solve childcare problems, and presented a signed statement to Exxon
requesting that the oil company "supplement staff wages in Child Care Centers to create
incentive for staff to stay in their present jobs" (Cordova Fact Sheet, May 27 1989:2).
The Oil Spill Response Commnittee at this time passed a motion to support wage
supplemen ts for all businesses (Cordova Fact Sheet, May 27, 1989:2).





-52This article in the Cordova Times also describes the closure of the Killer Whale Cafe 3 months earlier than
usual because the owner could not find anyone to work. This business person had even imported family
members from another state in an attempt to stay open.
Cordova - Page 369





Other monies obtained for childcare from the Division of Emergency ServicesI
included: $8,000 for respite care; $5,000 for a youth employment program (a joint
venture between the North Pacific Rim and the USFS); $2,000 for a summer camp
scholarship fand at Cordova's Bidarki Recreation Center; land $25,000 to be divided
between Cordova's two licensed day care centers. The Children's Task Force also
received a $300 donation from a Presbyterian Church in Juneau, targeted for child care
needs of parents working on the oil cleanup (Cordova Fact Sheet, May 27, 1989:2). In
June, 1989, the Children's Task Force made respite vouchers available to parents
through the Cordova Oil Spill Response Office, for $50 per family; the Oil Spill
Response Office also offered telephone numbers of teenagers who had completed the3
caregiver training program (Cordova Fact Sheet, June 20, 1989:1, and June 29, 1989:1).
Cordova volunteer organizations also addressed the emotional impacts of the spillI
on children. The Children's Task Force sponsored a "Listen to Me" workshop, organized
by the Susitna Girl Scouts Council, in which 97 children from Cordova, Chenega Bay,3
and Tatitlek participated in a question-and-answer session about the oil spill, questioning
representatives from the State's Oil Spill Response Office, Exxon, the CDFU, the USFS,3
PWSAC, the ADF&G, the Cordova Oil Spill Response Office, and a fourth grade
teacher (Cordova Fact Sheet, July 28, 1989:2). The cbildren directed most of their3
questions to Exxon and the USFS, with their main concerns being: (1) that Exxon would
clean up the spill, and, (2) the fate of the animals and birds (Cordova Fact Sheet, JulyI
28, 1989:2). Questions included: "What is the effect of ithe oil on the wildlife?" "How
many animals were affected?" and "Why are the dead wildlife being kept in freezers?"3
(Cordova Fact Sheet, July 28, 1989:2).
Despite the abundan'ce of volunteerism, impressive commnunity organization, andI
active pursuit of monetary relief, the scale of the childcare shortage overwhelmed such
relief efforts.3
Conflicts Within the Childcare Communitv: Exxon provided an $18,000 grant in
June of 1989 to mitigate the childcare shortage created by the spill cleanup. This grant3



Cordova - Page 370

became the center of a community conflict, due to a perceived ambiguity in Exxon's
stipulations for its disbursal.
This grant was an outcome of negotiations begun during the second week after the
oil spill, between the Odiak management and Exxon. Odiak submitted a $24,000 elai
which requested wage subsidies for childcare workers. Exxon turned down Odiak's
clainm, but allowed them to submit a grant proposal for $18,000, which was approved.
Exxon then sent an $18,000 check to the city government, suggesting that the total grant
be given to Odiak, as the sole non:-profit day care facility in Cordova. However, in a
subsequent letter to the city, Exxon stated that the city could disperse the money as it
saw fit, as the intent was not to benefit any individual agency but to address a comimunity
problem.
This ambiguity in Exxon's guidelines for dispersal of the grant resulted in a
controversy over whether and how to split the fands, which drew in the Cordova City
Council, the Children's Task Force, the Oil Spill Response Committee, Cordova's two
childcare providers, and the community in general.
The position of the Odiak management was that the grant was conferred in
response to their proposal, containing specific allocations of fands according to their
needs; dividing the grant would leave Odiak with unmet needs and would prevent other
childcare providers f-rom pursuing their own grants. Odiak's spokesperson hypothesized
that Exxon deliberately equivocated in their letter of intent in order to avoid setting a
precedent for wage subsidies.5  Respondents in 1991 described Exxon's administration
of this grant as demonstrative of a general policy to foment strife among Cordovans
(with the principal example of such conflict being the suit of the City Council, discussed
,elsewhere). Eventually the grant was divided, with $13,000 going to Odiak and the
remainder to Play and Learn (Cordova Times, September 14, 1989:Al).




53 Exxon's refusal to subsidize wages is discussed elsewhere. Factors which might suggest this concern here
include: Exxon's refusal of a claim but endowment of a grant; Exxon's initial specification that the grant be for
a non-profit facility; and the later specification that the grant address a community problem while not benefitting
any individual or agency.
Cordova - Page 371





Below is an excerpt from press coverage of this controversy, offered because itI
illustrates the high level of community involvement with and awareness of such conflicts
concerning Exxon's strategies and motives and shows how emotional impacts of conflicts
between Exxon and individual agencies quickly spread in such a close-knit community.
EXXON GRANT CREATES STIRIFE
A tug-of-war is developing in the community over an $18,000 grant
Exxon gave to the city for child care in Cordova. The topic was aI
focus of hot debate during two meetings of the oil spill response
commnittee last week, the June 14 city council meetings and last
Friday's Children's Task Force meeting. In a letter to the oil spillI
committee, chairman Comiie Taylor wrote: "This grant money has
created an injury to community members in the effort to disburse
the funds."
Though the committee and city council have taken the position
they will not become involved between Exxon and privateI
enterprise, Exxon dropped the ball in their court. "This is a very
uncomfortable position to be in," said committee member Heather
McCarty. "Here we are smack between two (businesses)," repliedI
Marilyn Leland during Wednesday's oil spill committee meetings.
Chairman Connie Taylor felt differently, viewing the money as
necessary to meet the commnunity's child care needs.
During Wednesday's oil spill committee meeting Jacqueline
Fowler, director of Odiak Child Developmernt Center, presented
her case. Since the second week of the spill she has been
preparing a claim for Exxon to subsidize Odiak's child careI
workers' salaries. She said Exxon originally turned down her claim
for $24,000 but agreed to give Odiak $18,000. Fowler felt any
agreement between Odiak and Exxon would open the door for3
Play and Learn to negotiate with Exxon to meet their needs. Play
and Learn has not submitted a claim to Exxon.

"I was the only one to submit a proposal," Fowler said in an
interview. "I pursued Exxon with our specific needs. The response
conmmittee, the task force, the city or Play and Learn did notI
negotiate for child care."

I feel real concerned we're going to close the door on Play3
and Learn. We need to keep the door open so (Debra Collins)
can negotiate with Exxon. This is pitting Debbie and I against


Cordova - Page 372

each other. When we start fighting each other .. . the door
shuts"  ..

In a June 6 letter, Exxon General Manager Otto Harrison wrote,
"D. J. Moon and Milt Alverstadt ... Have been keeping us abreast
of the day care situation in your city. They recomnmended and we
agree, that Exxon make an $18,000 financial grant to the City of
Cordova to alleviate these difficulties. They further asked that at
the timne of conveying this grant to you that we suggest you
consider providing this total grant to the Odiak Child Development
Center as it is the sole non-profit day care facility in Cordova. We
are enclosing our check for $18,000 to assist the non-profit day
care center in your community."

Eight days later, a letter from D.J. Moon clarified what some
considered a confusing situation. "The City may disburse the
money as it sees fit. Our intent is not to benefit any particular
individual, agency or business but, rather, to help solve a
community problem."

According to Fowler, Exxon gave the grant to the city to -avoid
setting a precedent for wage subsidies... In a letter to the City
Council, Fowler states that "Exxon is extremely concerned about
setting a precedent for wage subsidy." . .. Originally a letter was
sent to Exxon by the committee as well as the Children's Task
Force recommending Exxon supply wage subsidies so local
employers can keep their workers from leaving to work on the oil
spill (Cordova Times, June 22, 1989:A-5).
V. CITY GOVERNMENT IMPACTSM'~
Cordova is a home rule city with an elected city council and mayor who serve
without remuneration. The mayor and council oversee activities of a paid city manager.
Elected political positions change hands frequently; these officials are not professional
politicians, and they have to carry out political duties in addition to their individual




54 The city, like the Native corporations, refused to disclose financial figures on spill impacts, due to pending
litigation with Exxon. Direct oil-related expenses in 1989 have been estimated at $951,000 (Final Report, Oiled
Mayors Subcomimittee 1990:103). Similar to business owners, city officials are only now compiling information
concerning economic impacts, having been hampered by such factors as staff shortages and turnovers, as well
as ongoing computer breakdowns. Consequently, economic inipacts to the city reported here are not exhaustive.
Cordova - Page 373






economic activities. The character of Cordovan politics, as a highly collective enterprise,I
is described in an Alaska Socioeconomic Studies Report:
People who have lived in Cordova-Eyak all mention the love ofI
"politics" and the active involvement of local residents in the
political process. Local residents joke about February as the
month to "roast officials"' and speculate as to wbich official will "get
it" this year .. 55

From another vantage point, the gossiping and criticism process
often expressed in Cordova-Eyak is a means by which the
community maintains a collective political decision process. As3
one informant suggested, a "tight rein" on officials and an attitude
of mild to open skepticism of "professional advice" keeps the
dominant and practical concerns of Cordova-Eyak in the forefrontI
and prevents overly ambitious leadership from transforming the
community into something the majority would dislike. By
regLilating the role of City Manager and other key positions whichI
in more urban places usually involve considerable authority, to one
in which the community's concerns are served first and foremost,
the Council and (throuagh it) the community majority maintainsI
maximurn control over the decision making process (USDOI,
BLM, Alaska OCS Office 1979:68-71).3

Compared to the general population, elected officials are reportedly more
prodevelopment. For instance, city government leaders tend to favor such projects as3
construction of a deep water port and a highway connecting Cordova to the rest of
Alaska. However, these officials are notably reluctant to force such preferences on theI
local populace. For instance, in March 1991 a survey was conducted to determnine
whether a majority of Cordovans supported construction of the Copper River3
Highway.5 Interviews indicated that the desires of residents rather than city officials
would prevail.3






55 This pattern emerged in 1991.3

'S6The results of this survey were not available at the termination of this research. Respondents were divided
on the issue which generated deep feelings.3


Cordova - Page 3743

In describing the role of city government in Cordova's spill response, Cordovans
often said they felt as if they were living in a "war zone" or "concentration camp," under
"imartial law." Buttressed by the USCG, Exxon was a superior, parasitic, often hostile
power in this view. The oil company had fouled Cordova's environment, threatening the
present and fature livelihood of residents and the existence of the city itself. Upheld by
the USCG, Exxon prevented residents from protecting their environment in the first days
after the oil spill. During the cleanup, Exxon and its agent VECO took over offices and
"occupied" their town, according to Cordovans. VECO determined the content and
availability of goods in Cordovan stores (discussed in See. IV. Private Sector Econornic
Impacts of the Oil Spill [Non-Fishing]). City officials stated that the oil company was not
even-handed in dealing with communities affected by the spill; they believe that their
lobbying efforts prompted an increasingly adversarial posture in Exxon:
The city was in good shape before the spill. We had the money to
spend. We can weather a few storms ... There was a surplus in
our Permarient Fund of $2 million. There was a $1 million pledge
for school construction, which would, have been reimbursed at 80
percent by the State. The budget was about $3 mnillion, with about
$800,000 for emergencies that came up. So we had money to
lobby, and so on.

So we weren't as much under Exxon 's control as other city
governments. So we didn't end up on Exxon's good guy list.

The Kenai Borough got $2 miillion up front. In Cordova, they said:
"Submit your bills and we'll pay.if we feel like it." . . . Exxon just
paid you to shut you up. Those paid off didn't support the ones
still hurting. It was like martial law.

The view that Cordova was powerless in its dealings with Exxon due to Federal
policy is discussed at length with spill impacts to the fishing community. Political leaders
echoed this concern, again focussing on the USCG as a Federal agency which failed to
exert power over Exxon. A letter sent by the Chairman of the Oiled Mayors
Subcommittee to Alaska Senator Ted Stevens on August 9, 1989 voices this complaint:
Cordova - Page 375






Dear Senator Stevens:I

..At a meeting of the Subcommittee on August 3, 1989, Capt.
Richard J. Asaro, Marine Safety Officer of the United States CoastI
Guard, stationed in Anchorage, attended the meeting to discuss
with the Mayors Conference a number of matters... As the
minutes of the meeting reflect:
"Capt. Asaro stated that Exxon had already expended far in excess
of the ship owner's limnit of liability. Attomney Jamiin spoke inI
opposition to the perception voiced by Capt. Asaro, stating that
pursuant to CERCLA and the Clean Water Act, Exxon was3
responsible for returning the environment to pre-spill conditions,
regardless of the cost. Attorney Harris asked Capt. Asaro whether
his statement represented his personal opinion or the opinion of3
the Coast Guard; if indeed Capt. Asaro was voicing the opinion of
the Coast Guard, the misconception would greatly impact the
agency's dealings wi th Exxon."3

Subsequent to this meeting, Capt. Asaro telephoned Mr. Harris in
response to Mr. Harris' questions as to whether the statementI
represented the opinion of the Coast Guard. Asaro advised that
after conference with Juneau, he has been informed by the Coast
Guard that Exxon does have a limit of liability, a limit establishedI
by the TAPS liability fund of $100 million (43 U.S.C.A. 1653). Of
course, as you are aware, -that legislation relates to the
establishment o;f a specific fund for strict liability, and is not anI
absolute limitation as to any liability of Exxon.

Ile attitude of Exxon in dealing with our Subcommittee has beenI
that their reimbursement of expenses to municipalities are
voluntary acts of generosity. While we recognize that there may be
litigation as to the exact extent of Exxon's liability, we are deeplyI
concerned that the candid and forthright statements: by Capt.
A saro reflect an attitude on the part of the Coast Guard which
strongly suggests that they, too, believe Exxon's expenditures over
$100 mnillion are acts of voluntary generosity... (Cordova Fact
Sheet, August 29, 1989:1-2).3

Exxon was able to superimpose the dynamics of a market economy on municipal
governments which were unable to enforce rules of democratic government on Exxon.3
The oil company dealt with small cornmunities affected -by its spill as if they were


Cordova - Page 376

independent contractors, while local leaders objecte d that this would mean their
municipalities would be compelled to act in Exxon's best interests. Exxon's reported
uneven treatment of communities during the spill aftermath was perceived as an attempt
to "divide and conquer" the local populace. Each city alone (or all combined for that
matter) lacked the power to control an entity of Exxon's magnitude. Being forced to
become, in essence, employees of Exxon, small communities feared that they had lost
control of their own fates:
Anchorage, AK--A plan for standardized reimburserment presented
by the mayors and Chiefs of more than 15 coastal communities
affected by the Exxon Valdez oil spill has been rejected by Exxon
officials. According to Bob Brodie, chairman of the Oiled Mayors
Subcommnittee of the Alaska Conference of Mayors and City of
Kodiak mayor, Exxon representatives Dutch Holland and Wiley
Bragg indicated that Exxon would not sign an agreement to
reirnburse local governments for expenses incurred directly as
result of assisting in the clean up efforts. Prior to the 12:00 noon
meeting with Exxon officials, representatives from Cordova,
Valdez, Seward, Whittier, the Kenai Peninsula Borough, the City
of Kenai, Larson Bay, Seldovia, Chenega Bay, Port Grahani,
English Bay, Lake and Peninsula Borough, Aleutians East
Borough, the City of Kodiak and the Kodiak Island Borough
assembled in Anchorage to review a counter-agreement suabmitted
late yesterday by Exxon.

The Mayors and Chiefs unanimously voted to resubmit its
agreement to Exxon and not accept Exxon's counter-proposal. "We
feel we submitted a fair and equitable agreement," said John
Devens, mayor of Valdez. "We want uniformity and Exxon
appears to want discord and division. We are not now, nor will we
be satisfied until Exxon recognizes our needs as mutual and worthy
of real consideration."

According to Devens, "The purpose of our agreement is,to provide
a simple, yet uniform system for reimbursement by Exxon of the
actual costs incurred in helping Exxon and others mnitigate what is
clearly the biggest disas~ter in Alaska in recent history." Exxon
officials indicated at that meeting they were not authorized to sign
any agreernent unless it was "mutually agreed upon." In comparing
the two agreements, Devens indicated that the two agreements are
so unlike, "that it is not even possible to do a direct comparison of
Cordova - Page 377





the two let alone come to a mutual agreement." The concept ofI
the mayors' agreement was to provide a mechanism for
reimbursement of expenses the governments were incurring in the
course of providing municipal services necessitated by the various
responses to the Exxon Valdez oil spill," said Devens. "The Exxon
counter-proposal is, in fact, an agreement to employ each
municipality as an independent contractor of Exxon to provide
services to Exxon. Tlis contractor relationship, in which the cities
would actually go to work on behalf of Exxon, means the cities
agree not take actions that could result in conflict with Exxon's
best interests."

The Mayors felt strongly that the langtiage of the Exxon agreement
represented Exxon's attempt to "divide and conquer" leaving the
cities and villages with little or no control over their own financialI
destinies (Cordova Fact Sheet, May 27, 1989:1).
V.A. Cordova as Spill Cleanup Contractor
The position of Cordova, vis-a-vis Exxon in the spill response, resembled that of an
involuntary, non-profit, independent contractor. The city was constrained to provide3
services and facilities for Exxon's spill cleanup; Cordova's economic structure was
threatened by the spill and supplanted by the cleanup. Moreover, citizens felt bullied by3
Exxon a-nd VECO, and powerless to prevent these entities from overwhelming them (see
discussions. of fishing and other economic impacts). The city's ex~penses for this spill
response were sometimes reimbursed, at Exxon' s discretion, but profits were not
structured into the arrangement. Unpaid city leaders were not reimbursed for their timne,I
and paid city officials did not receive remuneration for the extra workload entailed by
the spill response. Elected city officials experienced the spill as a double hardship; they3
were required to work extra hours and travel extensively. on behalf of the city, often
neglecting the impact of the spill emergency on their own businesses:3
Since I [was elected] in October of 1989, I didn't have a travel card
[for personal use], beca-use I didn't go anywhere. I'm approaching
80,000 miles of travel, just for the city. It's always a meeting about
the spill. I'm a non-paid [official], so when I leave, my businesses
suffer...3





Cordova - Page 378

Most people here are individual business persons who don't wor k
for others. They're all leaders, not followers. So, there's too many
chefs: fishermen, business owners. So it's difficult representing
the people in Cordova. It's a hard job, and takes a lot of effort. I
don't want to run for [election] again because my businesses
couldn't stand my being gone for 2 years.
In maling the transition to the new role of spill cleanup contractor, normal
government operations broke down. As one city official recalls:
Tle main impact for the city was we lost a year of our normal
activities: our normal mode of government brok'e down. There
was the media, funding, spill operations, studies, compensation,
and so on, all to deal with.

And now we're paying for it. We have a broken computer system'
for instance. Ordinary operations broke down because we lost a
lot of our resources .. .

Exxon didn't provide trustworthy information. No one did. The
State didn't either. We really had no source of information unless
you went out and looked at the spill. We were. caught in between
major public relation battles.

At first no one paid any attention to Cordova, because we were 60
miles from the spill. We explained to them that our whole
economy was based right in the middle of the spill!

So we went over to Valdez and talked to the mnedia about this, but
we weren't the center of attraction by any means.

The city had to mount an immediate spill response, with no assurance of financial
reimbursement. Exxon provided voluntary, partial remuneration for spill impacts, at its
own discretion and on its own timetable. In general, Exxon appears to have helped fund
city infrastructure and superstructure operative in the spill cleanup (such as bunkhousing
for cleanup workers and an oil spill response committee). Exxon appears to have been
disinclined to reimburse other economic imipacts to the city (such as lost bond
opportunities and fish taxes, expenses of elected and appointed officials, or litigation).
Cordova - Page 379






Expenses of Cordova's spill response included supplying boom to protect theI
PWSAC hatcheries, travel by public officials, lobbying, mitigation of labor and housing
shortages caused by Exxon's cleanup activities, the formation of special spill response
comumittees, the puablication of a daily fact sheet, and litigation. City officials were
particularly distressed that Exxon declined to address litigation expenses, which became
substantial for Cordova, as discussed later:
Mead Treadwell, Director ,Cordova Oil Spill Response Office:
"The Cordova 1988-89 city budget was $4.7 million and the city has
already spent $800,000 responding to the spill, and is likely to3
have another $700,000-800,000 in oil-spill related expenses . . . The
expenses, to date, have included boom materials, work to mitigate
the labor and housing shortages for the response office staff,3
publication of the Fact Sheet, and legal fees unrelated to
litigation ... The city's entire budget for legal fees this year of
$50,000 only covered the first month of expenses after the spill."
Treadwell focused on the limited sources of funds for cities for
response-related expenses, particularly for economic assessments3
and legal fees which Exxon has stated it will not accept (Cordova
Fact Sheet, July 3, 1989:3).

Complaints about the voluntary nature of Exxon's reimbursements of the city's spill
expenses appear in a letter which Cordova Mayor Erling Johansen sent to President3
George Bush in August 1989:
One of the uppermost conceems in the minds of Cordovans whoI
had their last remaining Prince Wlilliam Sound seining district
indefinitely closed last week due to oil in the water is why are we
talking about packing up the cleanup, leaving the Sound, when3
there is still oil on the water and oil on the beaches leaching back
into the water?

*..A second question we are grappling with as individuals is what
price do we have to pay for using energy in the United States?
We suggest one very important price is protection of communities.I
We have discovered, the hard way, we are unprotected.

'Me City of Cordova has a $4 million general fu.nd budget and has3
had close to $800,000 in expenses since the spill. Our spill has
included providing extra housing, protecting our salmon hatcheries3


Cordova - Page 3803

when others would not, responding to the loss of 20% of the labor
force to cleanup efforts, and distribution of information. We
created the Cordova Oil Spill Disaster Response Committee to
bring the varied concerns and productive ideas of key
representatives of the community, and have staffed an office
dedicated to responding to the short and long term needs of
Cordova's citizens caused by the Exxon oil spill.
Where, you might ask, does the money come from? The answer is
Exxon - in some ways willingly, in some ways begrudgingly, in some
ways not at all. The point is their funding of the City's response
has been voluntary. Until the law is changed - either at the state
or federal level to allow local governments access to spill
contingency funds -reimbursement of our response costs will
continue to be voluntary...
The spill has been, in many respects, a war scene. Thousands of
tons of material, hundreds of men were to be moved through
Prince William Sound - and may be needed again - in short
order.

This disaster, like the Challenger, like Three Mile Island, cost the
nation billions and endangered lives for what was, ultimately, some
small and human reason (Cordova Fact Sheet, August 8, 1989:2-3).

The city formed the Cordova Oil Spill Disaster Response Committee on April 17,
1989, to make recommendations to the council for city actions related to the oil spill and
to oversee resulting city operations (Cordova Fact Sheet, April 19, 1989:1). This
committee was funded by a variety of sources, including the ADEC, Exxon, the Alaska
Department of Community and Regional Affairs, and the City of Cordova (City of
Cordova 1990). The five member committee included representatives from the city, the
Chamber of Commerce, CDFU, the fish processors, and PWSAC. Connie Taylor, from
the Chamber of Commerce, was elected chairman (Cordova Fact Sheet, May 6,
1989:3).57




57After the resignation of Taylor on July 13, 1989, two new members were appointed, representing: (1) the
community at large, and, (2) the Native community (Cordova Fact Sheet July 18, 1989:1).
Cordova - Page 381





Under the direction of the Oil Spill Disaster Response Committee, the cityU
published the Cor dova Fact Sheet, which was distributed to all Cordova post office box
holders beginning April 13, 1989. Ile City of Cordova retained editorial control,
becoming an independent contractor of VECO in providing this publication:
The City of Cordova and Veco, Inc. have signed a letter ofI
agreement which reads in part, "The City of Cordova will please
provide the following service: A daily fact sheet on the oil spill3
and recovery activities in the -area covering all relevant aspects of
local interest to be distributed in the Cordova area by bulk mail to
all households and through a distribution to key locations within3
the community, on a daily basis through June 18. The cost is not
to exceed $650.00 per day. (Cordova Fact Sheet, June 9, 1989:2).

Another vital service which the city had to provide for Exxon's spill cleanup was
housing for the incoming flood of potential cleanup workers. Exxon cooperated with the3
city in this enterprise, agreeing to reimburse the city for $2,000 for the cost of a housing
needs survey (Cordova Fact Sheet, May 6, 1989:3). The city learned that it would be             3
required to house an additional 350 employees to fill job vacancies resulting from spill
operations by June 25, 1989 (Cordova Fact Sheet, June 2, 1989:1). Interim City Manager3
William Weinstein proposed to Exxon that the city establish: ,(1) a "tent city" of 100 tent
platforms with water bibs and toilets; (2) a campground/trai-ler facility with 50 sites with3
water, toilet, and shower facilities; and, (3) the use of the Bidarki Recreation Center as a
bunkhouse accommodating 50 employees (Cordova Fact Sheet, June 2, 1989:1). The city1
requested that Exxon contract directly with Bidarki Corporation (the Native non-profit
corporation) for needed renovations, and contract with the City of Cordova to pay3
approximately $188,000 for provision of the other two facilities (Cordova Fact Sheet,
June 7, 1989:2).3
Exxon signed a contract with the city for $145,000 for improvements to the Bidarki
Recreation Center and management of a temporary 70-person bunkhouse at the center3
through October 1, 1989 (Cordova Fact Sheet, June 21, 1989:1). Other contract
negotiations continued, but Exxon informed the city that it had signed a contract with a3
private supplier, North Pacific Processors to provide bunkhousing. The Bidarki


Cordova - Page 382

bunkhouse opened in mnid-July with 52 beds available (Cordova Fact Sheet, July 29,
1989:1). After the bunkhouse was disassembled in late September, lasting benefits fromn
the renovations included new shower and locker roomn facilities, a small
kidtchen/concessionaire area, and improved fire sprinkler and fire alarm systems
(Cordova Fact Sheet, July 29, 1989:2). Respondents recount that a severe housing
shortage remained throughout the spill aftermnath, but the housing of workers was a need
to which Exxon responded. It did so, however, at its own discretion and on its own
terms, negotiating with public entities as if they were private entities.
Reimbursernent fromn Exxon for spill expenses proceeded largely after expenditures
were made. Tlis mneant that the community, like individual business owners, had to
capitalize Exxon's spill cleanup:
The Cordova City Council received and accepted a check from
ExKon Co. USA for reimbursement of expenses related to the
March 24 oil spill. Tle check, totalling $36,074.55, wlas received
the last week of June and covers expenses the city invoiced Exxon
for throuagh May.

In a letter accompanying the check, Exxon community liaison
Monte Taylor noted that Exxon found "many of the items in this
invoice to be inappropriate for Exxon funding under the guidelines
established even during the early negotiations with the Alaska
Conference of Mayors." However, "primarily because we had not
issued specific guidelines on reimbursable vs. non-reimbursable
expenses or how the $100,000 advance issued on May I could be
spent," Taylor said Exxon chose to reimburse all iterns except for
two which should be collected from other sources and two other
items which should be submitted as claims to Exxon ... (Cordova
Fact Sheet, July 12, 1989:1).
V.B. Other Costs
Economnic impacts of the spill which were not related to Exxon's cleanup operations
went largely unredressed. For instance, lost bond opportunities were simply the city's
tough luck; one official recalls a bond issue that was not passed:
They were going to do a bond issue for a new school and decided
not to put the bond up because of the uncertainty [caused by the
oil spill]. It wouldn't have passed [if it had been put up]. At that
Cordova - Page 383





time there was a State program that would have reimbursed 801
percent of the cost ($7-8 million) for a new elementary school.
That program has since been repealed.

The current elementary school leaks badly, has lots of asbestos, is
not handicapped-accessible. It's 30 years old and not well built.
There is no playground space.58
After the spill, the school had hired extra teachers to handle the
students and then people left and enrolhnent was down. The
school was left with the new teacher for the year.

T'he special election for -a bond to rebuild portions of Mt. Eccles Elementary School was
reportedly cancelled because the city council was uncertain that the city could meet the5
economic demands of the oil spill. The council was aware that delaying the bond put the
project in jeopardy, since State funding might be repealed. The 80-percent state
reimnbursement of a $7-8 million bond would represent a $6 million loss to Cordova, due
to the oil spill:
Tuesday's special election for financing the rebuilding of portions
of Mt. Eccles Elementary School has been indefinitely
canceled ... The effect on the city's bonding capacity if theI
election were held would be "playing with fire," said Mead
Treadwell, director of Cordova's Oil Spill Recovery Office. "We
don't want to put a cloud on this city's capabilities."I
Councilman Mike Anderson voted against the motion, citing
increasing construction costs and decreasing reimbursement fundsI
from the state. "The state budget is going down and facilities
construction is going up. If we're canceling, it has to be noted it's
because of the Exxon Valdez oil spill," Anderson said (CordovaI
Times, June 15, 1989:Al).

Currently city officials are trying to estimate this loss as part of its litigation againstI
Exxon.
Lost fish tax was a principal grievance. Raw fish tax, an intergovernmental revenueI
from the State, provides an estimated 20 to 25 percent of the city's operating income


5SVisits to the school confirmed this account.3


Cordova - Page 384

according to city officials. Tle fish tax is collected based on the calculated value of fish
processed locally, with the State normally retaining 50 percent of revenues. Decreases in
the fish tax in Fiscal Year 1990 have been reported (Oiled Mayors Subcommitt ee
1990:97), while record revenues had been forecast for 1989 and 1990 (see Sec. III Effects
of the 1989 Oil Spill on the Fishing CommuDity). Exxon reportedly refused
compensation for lost fish tax, and blocked city efforts to gain State compensation. One
official recalls:
There was a bill up in Juneau that the State would. cormpensate us
for lost fish tax. The State would be compensated by Exxon.
Exxon officials testified that there was no need for this bill because
Exxon would handle the compensation with the cities directly. So
far, we've received no money for fish tax compensation.

They thought it would be easier to deal with the cities separately,
thaii through the State. So far none of the cities has been
compensated for fish tax.

Across the board they made promnises they didn't keep. We have
never signed a release for Exxon.

Despite reported assurances by Exxon that it would compensate commrunities for lost fish
tax, Cordova found Exxon less than forthcoming in doing so:
The following letter was sent to Mayor Ban Brocklin from David
E. Shoup, Exxon Claims Office.
Thank you for your letter of May 3, 1990 concerning claims for lost
processor fish tax revenues.
I share your view that last week's Juneau hearing was beneficial: it
cleared the way to begin dialogue. As I told the Senate Finance
Committee, Exxon is prep~ared to mneet and discuss the merit of
these claims. Additionally, I understood Attorney General Bailey
to say that his office would be willing to participate in such
discussions, and it will not be necessary to resolve the fish tax issue
only in conjunction with resolution of the State's law suit.
Furthermore, it was obvious from Steven Kettel's comments that
the Department of Revenue does an effective job of collecting the
relevant data, and it appeared that the Department would be
willing to assist in the process once it has received the full data
Cordova - Page 385






needed to deal with the 1989 fisheries. Finally, as your May 31
letter indicates, Cordova and presumably the other municipalities
in the areas directly impacted by the spill are anxious to address
the mnatter.
I suspect you are correct in your observation that there will be
some issues on which the various participants will, at least initially,
have differing views. Furthermore, I amn sure that, by frankly
discussing them among the group, we can all gain a better
understanding of the perspectives of the others.

For example, you appear to have the misconception that under
Exxon's voluntary claim settlement program all Prince, William
Sound claimns are being settled on the basis of ADF&G's preseason
1989 salmon forecast. In fact, seafood processor claims are being5
settled and releases obtained on the basis of ADF&G's post season
salmon run assessment, and it would appear that this is also the
correct basis for discussing the processor fish tax. There willI
probably be other issues where fuirther discussion is necessary.59

You indicated it would be helpful to Cordova if Exxon would
commnit, within the next two weeks, that an amount of no less than
$400,000 to $500,000 would be paid to Cordova before mid-August.
While we are willing to address the lost fish tax issue in an openI
manner, we are not iri a position to conclude that upcom-ing
discussions among all the involved parties, including your sister
municipalities, will necessarily result in a payment to Cordova ofI
the magnitude you requested. Thus, we feel your request is
premature ...

The following letter was sent by Mayor Van Brocklin to Mr. David
E. Shoup, Exxon Claims Office.

... we know very little about ADF&G's post season salmon run
assessment for Prince William Sound. If you have that data, could
you send it to us so we can do the homework necessary for theI
next step: We are somewhat concerned to learn that processor
and fishermen's claims may each be processed on different bases.
We are further concerned about our missing tax revenues being
dependent on what could be long continuing and confidential



59This issue is discussed with impacts to the fishing community.


Cordova - Page 386

negotiations between Exxon and processors.   (Cordova Fact
Sheet, May 21, 1991:2).

Lobbying and litigation were large expenses for Cordova, which were not addressed
by Exxon.0 For instance, city officials attempted to make the point legislatively, that
they did not want Cordovans to foot the bill for infrastructure and superstructure which
supported Exxon's disaster response:
The city spent a lot of money on the spill. We have the "Flagstaff
Amendment." Cordova lobbied in Washington, DC to change the
Flagstaff Amendment, retroactive to Feb. 1, 1989. Saying the party
causing a natural disaster will be liable for any costs incurred, even
though the city operates anyway. We paid $80,000 in work based
on that. Just lobbying on that bill.

In Flagstaff a chemical fire was cleaned up by the city, but was
called "normal operations." We authorized $187,000 for the spill
cleanup. Our [general fand] budget's only about $3 mnillion. The
first day of the spill we authorized $200,000 for the Aquaculture to
buy boom to protect our hatcheries. Eventuially we were paid back
by the State, who may have been reimbursed by Exxon. Later
Exxon dealt with PSWAC.

But we exerted power.'way outside our boundaries to protect the
hatcheries, which produce 70 percent of our gross income in the
last 3 years before the spill, so we were quite panicky at that time.

You ca-n't compile data with the existing staff. You have to have
delegations in the State and Federal offices until you get results.

Now we're trying to pass legislation in Juneau for if this ever
happens again. Get some State funds available. We spent all our
time looking for funding, rather than doing something about the,
problem ...

Here the oil cleanup cash register ran over our town and didn't
drop any change. And we may have long-term economi damage.
We're the only city that screamed before and after the spill. Our
fishermnen sued ALYESKA and even stopped the pipeline, back in



60Litigation is discussed at length below, in relation to a suit filed against the city.
Cordova - Page 387

the 1960's. We thought we were well prepared for this nightmare,
but we weren't even close.

We knew we'd be unprotected if oil was running through theI
Sound. Now, no one in Cordova will ever think that there's
enough protection for major oil spills.

By June 1989, the Oiled Mayors Subcommittee of the Alaska Conference of
Mayors concluded that Exxon. would not provide funds necessary to maintain affect edI
community governments in the wake -of the spill emergency (Cordova Fact Sheet, June
28, 1989: 1). The conmmittee found that Exxon insisted on negotiating with communitiesI
on an individual basis, and refused to reimburse vital costs related to the welfare of local
citizens. These include costs of legal research, representation, and social and econormicI
impact studies. In particular, small communities such as Cordova lacked the resources to
even assess economic impacts, let alone force Exxon to provide compensation. The
Oiled Mayors Subcommittee, finding Exxon nonresponsive on these social impacts,
requested aid from the State:
The "Oiled" Mayors have not reached an agreement with Exxon on
reimnbursements for municipalities affected by the spill. Exxon hasI
indicated it prefers to negotiate settlements with each community
involved on an individual basis . ..I

RESOLUTION

Whereas, the oil spill of T/V Exxon Valdez occurring March 24,
1989 presented an economic emergency to many Alaskan
community governments,

And whereas, Exxon Corporation has stated it will reimburse
community governments impacted by the Spill for certain costs
incurred, but has stated its principle not to pay other costsI
community governments must necessarily incur to protect the
financial welfare of its citizens, including costs of legal research,
representation, and economic and social impact studies,
And whereas, assessment of the darnage of the Exxon Valdez oil
spill on affected communities remains part of a necessary
einergency first response, and is an important part of ensuring that


Cordova - Page 388

the citizens of Alaska are not left with long term costs arisi-ng from
the oil spill disaster,

And whereas, while local governments lack the financial means to
undertake proper assessment of these costs, they wish to cooperate
with each other and with the State of Alaska which does have the
means to help communities mneet the need for assessment,

Now therefore be it resolved that we, the leaders of community
governments affected by the Exxon Valdez call upon the State of
Alaska to immediately make ftnds avaiable as required to
community governments for economic assessment and legal
representation from emergency and other funds appropriated to
deal with the Exxon Valdez oil spill ... (Cordova Fact Sheet, June
28, 1989:1).

The Alaska Department of Comm unity and Regional Affairs (DCRA) responded to
the need for emergency funding for communities imtpacted by Exxon's oil spill, stating
that its effects "have and will continue to stress the already extended abilities of
communities to provide even the basic essential services" (Cordova Fact Sheet, August 2,
1989:3). The department noted that reimbursements from Exxon did not fully address
the needs of impacted communities (Cordova Fact Sheet, August 2, 1989:3). The State
provided a grant program with $1 million, fo'r projects such as planning, multi-community
coordination to address spill effects, and operation of public facilities and services
(Cordo'va Fact Sheet, August 2, 1989:1-2). The grant program disallowed projects
related to litigation (Cordova Fact Sheet, August 2, 1989:1-2).
Cordova applied for a DCRA grant, r eceiving $45,750 for a mnental health clinician
and programs addressing human impacts of the spill (such as stress and marital conflicts).
The city also received a grant for $16,936 to assist Cordova's two licensed child care
facilities (Cordova Fact Sheet, September 29, 1989:1). This grant was inadequate to
meet the crisis which child care operators were facing, having lost employees to,the spill
Cordova - Page 389





cleanup (see Sec. IV Private Economic Impacts of the Oil Spill [Non-Fishing]).61 inI
general, Cordovan officials described State grants as helpful, but insufficient to address
spill impacts on their city's economy.
Work overloads and burnout of public employees were not "costs" addressed by
Exxon. For instance, personnel in the police department suffered because staff shrunk
due to loss of employees to the cleanup, while workload increased due to stresses
associated with the oil spill and cleanup. An admninistrator describes how personnel had
to maintain 12 hour shifts, from April 1989 to March 1990:1
Lots of information isn't available because of the computer,
problem.

A main impact was labor, and that's one reason we haven't been
able to do a formal study of how it impacted Law Enforcement.
We haven't had the manpower. We lost dispatchers to oil spill
work almost immediately. Our clerical dispatch staff was really
hurt. It was September of 1990 until we got our fall staff back. So
we're still digging that out.
There wasn't a great increase in numbers of arrests, but a great
increase in severity of arrests. More felonies, more volatile
situations: anger was high. So we had more prisoners in jLil for
that reason. We couldn't release thern on their own recognizance,
and we're a short-termn facility here*
This year will be the first year in 2 to 3 years that we'll be able to
even do an annual report. We are just beginning to even stabilizeI
the staff.

The correlation of severity of crimnes with the spill is the enormityI
of the influx of a lot of people into the area, from all over the
country looking for work.3

We haven't seen the full impact of the spill yet because there's
been enough employment to keep people going, so far. If theI



61 Exxon also provided a sniall grant to the city, to address the childcare shortage created by the spill cleanup
(discussed with economic impacts). Again, the oil company responded to a need related to its cleanup (cleanup
workers needed childcare), but left the major cost to public entities. The overall result was insufficient funding.3


Cordova - Page 390

fishing is off one season, then people will react. They'll feel
threatened and stresses will come out at that time.

It's hard to say what hurts and what doesn't hurt people. If you
threaten people and take their livelihood away, you hurt people.
The fishermen have been threatened. Their livelihood has been
threatened, but because all that money was thrown on, they were
still able to feed their families.

In future years, this impact may come down on them if the fish are
hurt. Then we'll see a reaction. It'll take years and years and
years to realize the full irnpact.

There are still oiled beaches out there. What effect will that have
on the environment or the fish? Other things: several eagles were
seen around the lake around December and January. They aren't
usually there now. So people notice those changes and wonder.

If the fishing ind-ustry goes belly-up, we'll all be hurt--the city
administration included. There's no other industry to pick up the
slack.

The new Annual Report, for April 1990-1991, won't take in the oil
spill period. It's due in April, for the City Council.

We suffered bumnout something fierce. From April 1989 to March
1990 we all had 12 hour shifts. It was rough.

The assessment of economic impacts was hindered in all city departments, due to
loss of staff. But in Cordova a breakdown of the computer system exacerbated these
difficulties, which i-n turn hampered city personnel from addressing the computer
problems:
Glenn Hargin has been in town since February 2 trying to fix the
computer down at Cordova City Hall. He's a good choice for
doing the job, since he created the system-36 program of ledgers
and bookkeeping back in 1985-86.

..officials have complained for months that they can get no
information from the system,and have no idea how much money
they have in the bank. "The first year it was installed, we had
excellent audit," [Hargin] said. "but at some time the controls were
Cordova - Page 391






compromised." That means that someone put something into theI
computer the wrong way, and "normal controls were not
maintained, thus maldng it hard to call up files and recover
information. It got progressively worse," he said. ... He said it
will take him until early sumrmer to get it all straight again...

His first task--now completed--was to restore the payroll system.1
That is now "in balance," he said. His next problem is unravelling
the ledger system, which has not been'updated for five years. And
the third phase will be to restore the capital projects program
(Cordova Times, February 14, 1989:A9).

This problem hampers current attempts to compile a TAPS liability claim by the March
24, 1991 deadline.3
Another frustration in assessing econoinic impacts of the spill to the city, according
to officials, is that some increases in city revenues may be results of economicallyI
disruptive or inflationary factors. The spill and cleanup generated multiple expenses and
reimbursements which city officials are still attempting to sort out. Disruptions in3
Cordova's "fishbowl economy" are discussed with economic impacts of the spill.
Increases in sales tax revenues in cases of inflation (such as higher oil prices) are notI
perceived as portents of present or future economic health:
Sales tax was up this year. Why? Because our oil prices doubled.
So it's not a sign of a healthy economy. It's been a cold winter.
Oil prices were up, and lots of sales taxes were generated, but the
gas stations could go up 20 percent while the bars would be down
50 percent, and still the overall figure is the same.

The city can't release breakdowns of sales tax, as that's confidentialj
for each business.

The above account is born out by statements from social service workers, who reportedI
that Cordovans have suffered greater.economic hardships after the spill:
People are coming in earlier this year for food stamps. At the3
Salvation Army, they're amazed at the people coming in. Before
the oil spill people came at the end of March and April. But after

the spill, lots are coming earlier, and there are more people . .



Cordova - Page 3921

In January there were 18 applicants for Energy Assistance. This
included long term residents who never would have applied before.
The price of oil was raised, of course.
V.C. :Political Controversies: The Suit Against the City
In characterizing Exxon's strategy in approaching communities affected by the spill,
the Oiled Mayors Subcomimittee's Final Report states that the company had no standard
formula, attempting to appease local government leaders by establishing personal
relationships between them and Exxon representatives (1990:90). These representatives
would meet all requests of their local contacts, "with the understanding that such action
was highly unusual and must not be seen as a precedent for other communities without
compromising the granting of future requests" (Oiled Mayors Subcommittee Final Report
1990:90). The report quotes a local resident:
I tell you what the most difficult thing to deal with was, and that
was Exxon would send people into the communty... someone
characterized it once as sort of a virus that was entered into the
community. ... and "they would go search out key leadership and
try to convert them to Exxon's side, and mechanisms that were
used I think included trying to get some Exxon money in their
hands, and there was probably other things. They would identify
what would get somebody's attentio n or what was important to
somebody and then they would try to feed them so they would get
them on their side (Oiled Mayors Subcommittee Final Report
1990:90).

This assessment of Exxon's strategy mnatches respondent accounts of relations
between Exxon representatives and a key Cordovan city official, who eventually-brought
suit against other city offi cials. The city underwrote their legal expenses and becanie a
co-defendant. The suit had cost the city approximately $500,000 in legal fees by the time
of this research.62
The contention, that Exxon's tactic was to establish personal relations with city
officials in order to circumvent duly constituted community agencies, is supported by an


6Discussion of the ramifications of this conflict in Cordoya's business community appear in Private Sector
Economic Impacts of the Oil Spill. As in that discussion, the name of the plaintiff appears here, as a matter of
public record. Press citations identify sources, but respondent communications from 1991 remain anonymous.
Cordova - Page 393





affidavit filed by a former acting city manager, in relation to the lawsuit. Here it appearsI
that Constance Taylor, who sued the city, played some role in such a strategy:
A former acting city manager of Cordova was asked to meet
privately with Exxon Corp. officials shortly after the 1989 oil spill.

Malcolm D. MacMaster, presently the sewer and waterI
superintendent of the city, made the declaration last week in an
affidavit filed in the Alaska Superior Court, Third Judicial District,
in Cordova. It was an addendum to his earlier sworn testimony in
,pre-trial depositions being taken in the Taylor vs. Van Brocklin et
al. lawsuit ...
MacMaster said he was appointed acting city manager in July 1989,
replacing outgoing city manager William Weinstein.                                     5

"Within hours after I became acting city manager, Constance
'Taylor, while she was chairman 'of the Oil Spill Disaster ResponseU
Committee, came to my residence, met with me privately, and
asked me if I would meet privately with Exxon representatives,
with respect to the city's relationship with Exxon in dealing withI
the oil spill,", he stated in the affidavit.

He also said Taylor "told me that the city of Cordova should not
collect information to sue Exxon, but should simply have faith in
Exxon and deal with Exxon in good faith. She told me that Exxon
wanted to meet with me and deal with me rather than the Oil Spill
Response Office."

Copies of MacMaster's affidavit were released to the press by city
officials at the request of the city council..

Defendants in the case have avowed that Taylor's case is a screen,
and that she is being used as a ploy of Exxon to gather information
about the city's proposed litigation strategy in the city's attempt to
recover estimated economic losses caused by the spill.
Recently the court denied a subpoena request by Van Brocklin to
order Exxon to surrender documents that would show Taylor's
dealings with Exxon since the spill. Such documnents, the judge
ruled, would be irrelevant to the case.3




Cordova - Page 394

MacMaster said in his affidavit that it was his 'clear understanding
from the council" in 1989 "that I was to deal with the day to day
management affairs of the city, and that matters directly relating to
the oil spill, oil spill recovery, and dealings with Exxon were to be
handled on behalf of the city by the city's Oil Spill Response
Office."

Taylor, he said, had been appointed head of the Oil Spill Disaster
Response Commnittee, which was created by ordinance to be an
advisory body to the council to deal with the oil spill emiergency.

MacMaster said Taylor "set up a meeting with Exxon
representatives D. J. Moon, Milt Alberstadt, and myself. Connie
Taylor also attended. These Exxon representatives told me they
wanted to deal with me as actin city manager and not with the
Oil Spill Response Office."

He added, "I advised them that they should deal with the city's Oil
Spill Response Office, as per the city council's instruction, unless
they had problems in dealing with that office, in which case they
could contact me" (Cordova Times, December 13, 1990:A1,7).

On May 23, 1990, Constance Taylor (President of the Cordova Charnber of
Commerce, first president of Cordova's Oil Spill Disaster Response Conumittee, and
Cordova City Council member), sued Mayor Bob Van Brocklin and council members
R.J. Kopchak and Jeff Hawley for alleged violations of the Alaska Open Meetings Act
(Cordova Times, June 28, 1990:Al). The suit claimed that these city officials had met
privately to discuss issues outside of regular council meetings. On June 23, 1990, the
Cordova City Council voted to spend $75,000 on the individual legal defenses of these
officials (Cordova Times, June 28, 1990:AI). The city's insurance carrier declined
coverage for the defendants (Cordova Times, June 28, 1990:A1). The city council had
previously voted $25,000 for the lawsuit, but this had proved insufficient to begin a legal
defense. Individual defendants experienced the suit as a form of harassment and
expressed concerns that they could not afford their own legal costs:
According to Van Brocklin, who said he had done some "attorney
checking" after that meeting, the $25,000 originally voted on by the
council was not enough to retain attorneys for the defendants in
Cordova - Page 395






the lawsuit. "Twenty-five thousand dollars isn't going to start 'thisI
thing at all," the mayor said. He said a substantial amount of the
$25,000 would be spent to transcribe previous council minutes
which Taylor and her attorney had requested in her lawsuit ...
[Council member Doug] Lape said, if the city was not going to
back a council member in any lawsuit, "he wasn't going to be
sitting" on the council much longer. [Council member R. J.]
Kopchak said he believed that anyone who served in public office3
must be indemnified ... He said he has never violated the ONIA
and thought it was an "absolute shame that personality and
political differences ... have given rise to what Ifeel is the5
harassment of some public officials in a very unspecific
way" . .. Kopchak said it was unfair to expect a volunteer public
official to pay for a lawsuit filed against them in their officialI
capacity. "This is insane you guys. This is really foolish. I'm
heartbroken about it all ... but you can bet, I'm not going to pay
a dime out of my money. I just can't," Kopchak said ...
[Taylor] maintained that the city is not named as a defendant in
the lawsuit and said the city has nothing to gain by intervening'I
since she'is "only asking" for an order requiring public business to
be held in public and that council members live up to the oath
they took when they were sworn in, to uphold the laws of the state
of Alaska. Taylor reminded the council that the city would be
liable for the defendants' attorney costs and could be liable for her
attorney costs (Cordova Times, June 29, 1990:A1-2).
Respondents in 1991 overwhelmingly supported the city's assumption of legal defense
costs; most pointed out that no one would serve in city government if the city did not
indemnify its officials.5
City officials denounced the suit, claiming that it was a waste of money and that
Taylor was collecting information regarding the city's potential claims against Exxon.
Some pointed out that the suit was adding an additional burden to city employees
already besieged by the oil spill emergency:I
A lawsuit pending against the mayor and two councilmen is a
"terrible waste of money and time," Mayor Bob Van Brocklin told
the city council September 4. The city has already "spent overI
$125,000, and it'could go to a quarter of a niillion," he said ...



Cordova - Page 3965

The mnayor said questions asked by Taylor and her attorney during
testimnonies by witnesses dealt "with the (EXXON VALDEZ) oil
spill and how mnuch mnoney the city could expect to get from
Exxon." Van Brocklin said when the city develops its claim for lost
revenues fromn the state raw fish tax, "we have to be careful. It
could hurt the fishermnen, the canneries and the city."

..Councilman John Wheeler said, "I'd like to ask Connie to
reconsider and drop her lawsuit. It's going to cost the taxpayers a
lot of money. It's a no-win situation." He said, "City Hall is in a
turmnoil" over the case, and employees "don't have time to do their
daily business" because of being diverted to other matters related
to the case (Cordova Timnes, September 20, 1990:A5).

The city entered the suit as a defendant on August 23, 1990 on the advice of City
Attorney Everett Harris. Taylor amended her suit on September 7, charging "city
officials" with violating the city charter by spending money without public notice or
council approval (Cordova Times, November 15, 1990:A8). Harris proposed to Taylor's
attorney David Shoup that both parties drop the matter and not try to collect attorney's
fees from each other; the defendants agreed to concede that the complaint was filed in
good faith (Cordova Times, November 15, 1990:A8). Harris also suggested to Shoup
that after 5 months of discovery there had been no evidence of wrongdoing. Shoup
replied, in part, that evidence existed that the oil spill response office had spent money
without council approval (Cordova Times, November 15, 1990:A8).
At roughly this point, the city manager inquired of the city attomney as to the
consequences if the city decided not to fand any further legal fees for the defendants
(the city had just appropriated $189,000 in legal fees in addition to $200,000 already
spent (Cordova Times, Novermber 15, 1990:Al). In reply
Harris said if the city failed to defend council members, it would
leave them "to defend at their own expense," and thus "might
discourage . .. citizens .. . from serving on the city council in the
future." He also said, "If the defendants should decide not to
defend themselves . .. further," then Taylor would win the case by
default, and the defendants would likely have to pay her legal fees.
Harris said he believed "it is important to resist interference by any
Cordova - Page 397





court in the day-to-day affairs of the city" (Cordova Times,
November 15, 1990:8).

Taylor was conspicuously pro-Exxon during the spill aftermath, by all accounts (seeI
See. IV Private Sector Econonmic Impacts,of the Oil Spill [Non-Fishing]). Respondents
in 1991 expressed a widely held belief that her suit was a device to aid Exxon, by
creating conflicts within the community which would consume time, energy, and money,
diverting the attention of res idents and officials away from their battles with the oil
company. Many residents complained of joint activities by Taylor's attomney and Exxon's
attorneys. Some proposed that Taylor's lawyer was turning over city documents to Exxon
in order to sabotage city litigation against the oil company. A particular sore point was
that "her attoTneys are Exxon's attorneys:" David Shoup represented the Exxon Claims
Office in negotiations witb the city (discussed above, see Cordova Times, May 21,5
1990:2). Some respondents described Taylor as an "Exxon spy," whose receipt of a
$20,000 Exxon donation to the Cordova Chamber of Commerce constituted a "bribe."
Respondents overwbelmingly expressed resentment and disgust over the cost of the suit
to the city. Taylor was recalled fromn her position on the city council in February 1991.f
Taylor maintained in a 1991 interview that her suit was not related to the oil spill,
but to openness in government. She pointed out that she is not requesting a monetary5
award from the city and did not foresee that the city would assume the individual
defendant's court costs. She has had to bear her own court costs. She contended that
had she'wanted to provide city documents to Exxon, sbe could have done so more easily,
as a council member, before the suit.163 Sbe feels compelled to pursue the case in court,5
in part because she would like to be declared a "public interest litigant," and so bave her
court costs reimbursed:                                                                             '
My side of the suit is that people in the country have a right to
know what their goverrnment is doing. People in Cordova have
been excluded from knowing what their government is doing.


63Taylor emphasized repeatedly that city documents were public information, so that it was not wrong to turnI
thera over to Exxon; her position appears to be that cooperation with Exxon would produce the largest
settlements.
Cordova - Page 398

That's my interest. The bottom line is, still, that you can't force
people to know. But the suit should require the government to
make the information available.

I don't feel the lawsuit is related to the spill. Some of the issues
that were discussed behind the scenes were spill-related, some
were not. The divisiveness out of the spill would have come up in
any case.

I ran for the council after the spill. I got involved with the Oil
Spill Response Committee, and this renewed my interest in local
politics, and then I ran for city council. (I came here shortly after
the earthquake, but not because of the earthquake.)

The major divisiveness in the city government predates the spill.
The suit should result in a more careful following of the law by city
government.

The State law states that elected officials conduct business in
public. I'm not asking for monetary damages, so there's no
contingency fee for the lawyers. I had to bankroll this myself.
Wheni the time comes, people have to stand up for their freedom
in this country. It's the right of self-governnment in America.

I'm just asking for a court order to force them to meet in public.
Nothing in the law provides for any economic damages. If I'm
viewed as a public interest litigant I could get my fees refunded.
That isn't dep endent on my winning.

I dildn't perceive that the city would spend a half million dollars on
the defense. I don't approve of the city spending the money on the
suit. I'm in no position to stop them. If I withdrew the suit, then
they could counter-sue for "frivolous suit," "damage to reputation,"
and so on.

I think it's hilarious that they think Exxon is benefitting from the
s-uit. Before I was suing, I was on the city council and had access
to.all the documents. The suit just put me under the spotlight and
impeded my access to those documents. If I was an Exxon spy, I
was in a better position before the suit.

And we only have documents that are public information. We've
never asked for any confidential information. The company had
Cordova - Page 399





plenty of accountants who could have gotten that public
information better ~than I could have.

The fact remains that I had access to all the i'nformation the city
has, before the lawsuit. Why not gather the information secretly
and sell it? 'Why file a lawsuit? It's a ludicrous idea.3

I don't see any other solution than going to trial. Without a public
presentation of the evidence, no one can know what's been going
on. That would leave things unresolved and leave an open wound.
Depositions will be taken almost every day in March [1991]. AndI
10 days in trial, it's estimated..

If Cordova had handled Exxon better, they'd be in better shapej
now. But the window of,opportunity has closed. Exxon's closed its
purse strings and gone home.

One code violated was that any expenditure over $300,000 requires
a council vote. And huge sums were spent without council votes.
There's a whole raft of city codes involved. Today we filed anj
amended complaint detailing 6 to 12 code violations. It was given
to the court in the last hour. The court house, above [the] grocery,
will have a copy next week. It will be public information. Ask the
clerk to see the file.. .

The issue is that people have a right to know what the government
is doing. Other issues are pulled in to detract from the real issue.

The money is one issue, and part of spending so much is a strategy
to make me look like the villain: it's my fault that they spent the
money.5

Withdrawal was never a real option, and the settlement offers
always said some form of, "You're a rat fink for ruining our lives."
They recognized my good faith, ,but didn't admit guilt. The result
would be just to drop the suit and walk away.

The public interest litigant issue would become a non-issue if II
dropped the suit. If I win, the court will order them to pay my
legal fees. I'm asking for that. That's substantial for me. Not a
half mnillion dollars, but substantial.


Cordova - Page 400g

I've had a lot of support from people in town. Some of it is
personal, and some for the issue. One person I don't know has
called me two or three times to lend support.

A defendant in the case argued that Taylor deliberately sabotaged the effort of
other city leaders to press their claims against Exxon. He pointed out that Cordova is a
small town ran by a vol-unteer council. Leadership rotates under normal circumstances,
and all major city positions changed hands during the spill aftermath, This defendant
noted that, in responding to a sudden disaster of the scope of the 1989 oil spill, it would
not be surprising if the amateur politicians comprising the city council made some minor
procedural errors. He believes that Taylor is using the discovery process to channel
crucial information about the city's spill claims to Exxon:
The suit against Connie is costing $500,000. There's no counter
suit yet. The "open meetings" lawsuit against the mayor and two
other council members: those guys and myself were not in the
same social circles and did not meet secretly. The meetings [of
city leaders in private] did not happen.
Now she's auditing every transaction of the council during the oil
spill. The city formed the Oil Spill Response Committee,
representing a cross-section of town. Connie Taylor became
president. A bunch of us business guys went to Juneau and
learned that she was opposing everything we did. So we set up a
tele-conference with some state officials. Exxon was in town,
invited by Connie, and she made sure they didn't go to the tele-
conference. So that split us up and created bad feelings. Marilyn
Leland and others had requested the conference, and Connie took
it upon herself to block it.

She has blocked all actions which would aid us in making claims
on Exxon. And she has admitted giving city information to Exxon.

Tle City of Cordova hasn't compiled information for a claim
against Exxon. They're coming down to a deadline for TAPAA
funds. March 24 is-the deadline.' So a week ago we hired counsel
to assist us in putting information together.

Connie always focuses on. procedure over substance to slow down
city council business. She also circumvents the council ...
Cordova - Page 401





My attorneys got $30,000 a mnonth. We tried to subpoena Exxon
for all the information Connie Taylor gave to Exxon. The judge
didn't allow it.3

But Connie has gotten information about the city by discovery
which goes to Exxon. Exxon tried to settle the suit between niyself
and Connie. We wouldn't take it because we didn't want to admit
something we hadn't done.

She now has a discovery that's totally spill-oriented. "Unnamed
officials did improper actions." She's subpoenaed every city action
related to the spill from day one. The Oiled Mavors' ReDort is3
being subpoenaed by Exxon, as the raw data ...

Exxon paid $20 to 30 million in fishermen's claims and Connie toldI
Exxon that fishermen might be oiling their nets.6'
in a little city like this, we have seven volunteers for city leaders.p
They have no training. The city says, "Let's let this bunch do it for
a while." We went through three city managers in nine months.
Of course we didn't always dot i's and cross t's. And she's opposedI
to a jury trial.-

The charge, that the discovery process focusses on oil spill impacts, was echoed by
city leaders not named in the suit. The waste of much needed city funds is a prime
source of aggravation:I
The mayor and another council member are being sued by a
council member. The documents she wants for her suit, by
discovery, are all focussed on the spill and documents dealing with
Exxon.                                                                                 5

She claims Exxon was an underdog. Cordova is picking on Exxon.
The $500,000 [the city's legal costs] is about 10 percent of the
annual general fund budget.I
The community at large will suffer: Council Street is falling apart.
We need a retaining wall on Davis Street. Browning Street is
falling in. We need to put in a bulkhead. Those are three things
right off the top of my head.3


64Taylor explained this action to mie as merely telling Exxon what she had heard to be true.3
Cordova - Page 402

The ftirnace in this building is dangerous. If's on the second floor
and the floor is oil-soaked. We need to get it off the second
floor.65 This building leaks water and heat. We want to put
parks in town, landscaping vacant areas. It's a long list.

We're anticipating that the suit will come to trial on June 10. We
hope that will bring it to end--that there will be no appeals.

We're afraid that, and she's acknowledged that, some city
docunients have been turned over to Exxon. We have a claim
pending against Exxon for damages stenmming from the suit.
March 24 is our deadline. We're filing against the TAPAA fund.
We're under that decision. We won't be able to inqcrease the claim
later.

The financial burden of the suit was reportedly exacerbated by economic impacts of
the oil spill. Lower fish prices would result in lower raw fish taxes for the city; attempts
by PWSAC to invite foreign processors into Prince Williamn Sound, in order to stimulate
higher fish prices, could have the same'effect:.6
Cordova faces drastic cuts in revenues in 1991, if salmon prices
plunge as anticipated. And it could mean loss of jobs at City Hall,
as well as a delay in patching a leaking roof and replacing a faulty
furnace ...

City Manager Nancy Gross said in an initerview last week that the
city might face as much as a 50 percent drop in revenues for its
operating budget.

And there are fears that some fishermen with huge mortgages on
their boats could face financial disaster.





6-The example of the furnace demonstrates how dire financial emergencies can be for small cities which
operate on meager budgets. The floor under the furnace at City Hall is indeed soaked with oil; upon
encountering it, this respondent rushed into a nearby office to report this threat to public safety and was
informed that everyone was already aware of it.

66City officials were in the process of compiling figures on spill impacts at the time of this research. Actual
city budget figures are inflated for the post-spill years, due to spill expenses and compensations; they do not
necessarily reflect economic health or whether funds available for city infrastructure and superstructure have
shrunk.
Cordova - Page 403





Gross said a fish price drop, plus drains on the city coffers by the
Taylor vs. Van Brocklin et al. lawsuit, may mean cutting back
personnel and public services this year ...3

PWSAC President Bruce Suzumoto, in a letter Dec. IS to Gov.
Walter J. Hickel, said local onshore canneries were glutted and3
could not process some 44 million pinks caught last season ..

Objecting to the PWSAC proposal, Gross, on instructions from the
city council, fired another letter to Hickel pointing out that foreignI
offshore processing vessels will take revenues out of the state and
mean loss of raw fish taxes to the city. She said such taxes makeI
up about 20 to 25 percent of the city's operating income, or
between $750,000 and $1 mnillion per year. She told this
newspaper that amount could go as low as $100,000 this year, if5
on-shore canneries only process Copper River red salmon this
year. The processors have said they won't handle the pinks
because of the stockpile, she noted ...3

With less canning and less fishing, Gross said the city also expects
a drop in its sales tax, which represents about 35 percent of theI
operating budget. The population normnally doubles to around
5,000 or 6,000 people in full swing, but she said these workers may
not show up this year ...
With only $1.5 million left in undesignated monies, and about $1
million left in its permanent fund, the city cannot face a drain likeI
the lawsuit without cutting back she said.

The lawsuit money--about $450,000--could have fixed the leakingI
roof at City Hall, where buckets are placed in some offices to
catch the drips; or it could replace a faulty furnace which nowg
poses a fire hazard, said Gross.

Possible cuts would include eliminating about four new job
positions created last year, not hiring replacements when someone
quits or retires, not replacing vehicles that wear out, and either
cutting or delaying other services..3

The city may have to increase fees for things like subdivision maps,
building permits, and building inspections. It may have to impose
a tax in motor vehicles, increase property taxes, and place a tax on
personal property (Cordova Timnes, January 10, 1991:A1, 9-10).


Cordova - Page 4041

The belief that Exxon had a hand in the lawsuit was widespread among city
officials. Defendant Mayor Van Brocklin, through his attorney, attempted to subpoena
information from Exxon, concerning its relations with Connie Taylor. Reportedly in
response, Exxon lawyers submitted a settlement proposal to the Cordova City Council,
which was rejected:
The Cordova City Council--apparently rejecting a proposal for an
out-of-court settlement--has instructed City Atty. Everett Harris to
"vigorously defend the lawsuit" brought against the mnayor and two
councilmen by Counc.ilwoman Connie Taylor.

The proposal for a settlement came from an Exxon Corp. law firm.

The tersely worded instr-uctions, proposed in a motion by outgoing
councilwoman Marilyn Leland, carne after a closed-door special
session of the council at noon last Thursday. The motion was
unanimously adopted ...

Tle special session, closed to the public and the press, was also
off-limits for Taylor, who sat outside until the council opened the
doors again for its public motion. The council has ruled she would
have a conflict of interest if she sat in on an en camnera session
called to discuss the lawsuit.

The executive meeting was called because of a proposal by Don
Bauermeister, an attorney in the offices of Bogle and Gates,
Anchorage. The law firm represents Exxon Corp. Bauermeister
suggested the city and Taylor agree to settle the matter out of
court, Taylor's attorney, David Shoup, said.

... there has been speculation during recent pretrial depositions
for discovery--during which witnesses give testimony under oath--
that Exxon may somehow color the case. The speculation has
been based on deposition questions by attorneys for the plaintiff,
asking about possible future oil spill recovery from Exxon...

Taylor's attorney, David Shoup of Anchorage, said Bauermeister
"was trying to see if the case could be resolved before all parties,
including Exxon, are forced to sit through numerous Exxon
depositions which were requested by Bob Breeze." Breeze is Van
Brocklin's attorney (Cordova Times, October 18, 1990:Al, 10).
Cordova - Page 405






The court denied Van Brocklin's subpoena of Exxon documents concerning its
relations with Connie Taylor, ruling that they would be irrelevant to the case:
A subpoena from Cordova Mayor Bob Van Brocklin demandingI
papers from Exxon Corp. was rejected Dec. 6 by Superior court
Judge Peter Michalski in Anchorage, according to a report in the
Anchorage Times.
Robert Breeze, Van Brocklin's attorney, sought all the company's
records which would reveal "any form of communication" between
Councilwoman Connie Taylor and Exxon following the Exxon
Valdez oil spill on March 24, 1989...3

Exxon attorneys said the information sought by Van Brockldin is
irrelevant to Taylor's case. To search out such papers would meanI
going through more than 9 million documents related to the oil
spill, said Exxon attorney Don Bauermeister, and would impose an
undue burden on the company.
Judge Michalski agreed and refused to order Exxon to turn over
the documents. Breeze and City Attorney Everett Harris arguedI
that Taylor is using her lawsuit to help Exxon gather informnation
which would relate to pending civil litigation over the spill. In
papers filed with the court, Breeze said, "The question is whether
she is serving as a conduit for Exxon to obtain information that
Exxon cannot otherwise obtain" (Cordova Times, December 13,
1990:A7).

Fear and frustration over escalating expenses and uncertain future liabilities3
stenuming frorn the lawsuit were expressed by city officials as costs mounted. The council
threatened a mass resignation in January 1991. This demonstrated the disruptive and3
intimidating power of the suit, which respondents attributed to Exxon:
Voices quavering with emotion, eyes red with feeling, the Cordova
City Council almost came unglued at its first regular session of


With his nose almost touching Councilwoman Connie Taylor's,
Councilman Jeff Hawley yelled, "I'll quit if you will!"

... Other council members at the meeting also talked of resigning.
The whole question exploded unexpectedly when Taylor introduced


Cordova - Page 406

a motion--not on the regular council agenda--to place an initiative
petition on a public ballot Feb. 18. That is the date the couiici
has set for a public special election on a recall petition to unseat
Taylor.. .

Taylor circulated her own petition--which would limit spending on
the lawsuit--and collected enough signatures to file it in the city
clerk's office Dec. 21. But a letter from City Attorney Everett
Harris, dated Jan. 2, informed the council that Taylor's petition
was not legal and could not be put on the ballot.

Taylor, in introducing her motion to by-pass the attorney's ruling,
said placing the added initiative petition on the ballot would give
the public a chance to express its opinion about city spendi ng...

Councilman John Wheeler said to add Taylor's petition to the
ballot, if it is illegal, could make the whole election null and
void ...

[Councilman Bob Anderson] moved the council resign en masse
and open all seats to a new race on Feb. 18 ... Anderson said to
Taylor, "People in public ask me why it's going in. I can only point
to you, Connie. You have an axe over my head."

... Van Brocklin accused Taylor of "political terrorism." He
declared, "By everyone resigning, it means you're intimidated. I
won't tolerate it."

[Anderson] asked Taylor if she would drop the suit if they all
resigned. But Taylor persisted in stating that the only way to
resolve it is in the public forum of an open court. Councilman
Doug Lape and others asked her, "Why not the open forum of the
council?

Under repeated questioning and pressure from fellow council
members, Taylor said she could not disclose all the proofs of her
case until the trial, which is expected after April 1. Van Brocklin,
Hawley and other councilmen repeatedly asked for specific times,
places, and issues that may have been discussed privately in
violation of the OMA [Open Meetings Act], as she has alleged.
However, she refused to answer.




Cordova - Page 407





Lape said it is virtually impossible to conduct city business withoutI
minor infractions of the OMA, which pertains to municipal bodies
but not the state legislature. But he said it is not right to s-ue
someone for making nistakes ...
Councilwoman Nancy Bird compared Taylor's tactics to
"McCarthyism" and by-passing "regular court procedures" by
conducting a series of depositions in which witnesses are cross-
examined by attorneys, and coniducting discovery investigations into
City Hall archives ...

The council narrowly defeated the motion to resign en masse, 4-3,3
again with Van Brocklin breaking the tie (Cordova Times, January
10, 1990:A1, 11).

An unprecedented special election was held on February 18, 1991, in which voters
recalled Councilwoman Taylor. The recall petition, sponsored by "a group of downtown3
retail merchants, seeks to remove Taylor because she disclosed infor'mation from a
closed-door council meeting to her attorney" (Cordova Times, December 6, 1990:A2).67g
Taylor claimed that the information in question, while confidential under city policy, was
shared under attorney-client privilege. The choice of this basis for Taylor's recall is3
consonant with strong feelings of some Cordovans that Taylor was turning city secrets
over to Exxon through her attorney.t
The special recall election was put in motion despite the threat of further legal
entanglements and costs for the city, voiced by Taylor's attorney:3
Faced with the threat of "yet another legal entanglement" the
Cordova City Council last week set Feb. 18 as the date for a public
vote on a petition to recall Councilwoman Connie Taylor .. . It3
accuses Taylor of "misconduct and/or incompetence" because she
disclosed to her attorney information from a City Council executive
(closed door) meeting.
Taylor has maintained the information was relevant to her lawsuit
against the city and three councilmen, and that it was protected
under client/attorney privilege.

67Cnlcsbetween Taylor and others in Cordova's business community are discussed elsewhere. As noted,
business leaders are often also political leaders in Cordova.
Cordova - Page 408

"I believe you should reconsider your conclusion and inform the
council that moving forward with an election based upon this
petition could land the city in yet another legal entanglement,
Which likely would cost the city considerable fands in legal fees
and which the city likely would lose," said her attorney, David
Shoup, in a letter dated Dec. 5.

T'he letter was addressed to City Attorney Everett Harris, who
answered, "the council members have no choice about going
forward with the recall election ...

Shoup questioned the sufficiency [of the petition], saying, ".  The
position taken by the petition sponsors is patently ridiculous." He
said the City Council would be "acting unreasonably" if it "decides
to go forward with this recall attempt." Under the rationale of the
petition, he said, "no one could confer with an attorney regarding
anything said or done in executive session even if these things were
the subject of a lawsuit. And conferring with an attorney as Taylor
did does "not rise to the level of incompetence or misconduct" he
added.

Harris said City Clerk Lynda Plant, upon Harris' advice, had found
the document sufficient. In disregarding Shoup's letter,
Councilman Jeff Hawley--one of the defendants in the lawsuit--said
-he preferred an election date near the time when fishermen would
be in town for the Board of Fish meeting around Feb. 14. He
suggested "the last possible date," or Feb 18. The council
unanimously agreed ...

Asked later if she planned to take legal action, Taylor said she
would have to "look at it first" before deciding. she added: "To
say it's misconduct to talk to your attorney is ridiculous" (Cordova
Times, December 13, 1990:Al, 4).

A general lack of interest in the ostensible issues of the suit was apparent in 1991
interviews, and may be illustrated by the small attendance at meetings Taylor held to
explain her suit, just prior to her recall. Questioning at one of these meetings did reveal
a connection between the lawsuait anid the city's response to the oil spill, however:
Cordova - Page 409





Only a handful of citizens showed up last Friday at Home Port to
hear Cordova Councilwoman Connie Taylor explain what she
knows about the February 18 recall vote and the lawsuit she filed
last May alleging violations of the state Open Meetings Act . . .
The main questions fired at Taylor Friday came from former
Councilwoman Marilyn Leland. Leland--like several councilI
members in open session January 2--asked for specific instances
(what-when-where) of private meetings held in violation of theï¿½
OMIA.

"Where are your proofs?" asked Leland. Taylor replied, "I don't
intend to reveal my trial strategy."  . . .Leland said she had read
several depositions that have been taken in pre-trial discovery, but
has not seen "any evidence so far." . .. When Leland asked aboutI
alleged city code violations, which Taylor brought into the suit in
an amendment last fall, Taylor said some of them "may have been
made in secret meetings."
In a list of 13 points sent to City Council, January 25, Taylor said
the city had entered into a contractual agreement without councilI
approval "to participate in the regional Citizens Advisory
Committee (RCAC)." Leland argued that the city's participation
in the RCAC was at the invitation of the Alyeska Pipeline ServiceI
Co. in Valdez, and that it did not involve a contract ...

Referring to Taylor's 13-point list, radio reporter Ellen Lockyer
told Taylor, "It seems more like nitpicking than proof of anything."

... "You're wrong to do this," said Leland. "The people areI
backing away. They're calling it craziness." Leland added, "there
are seven people here (at this meeting). That's how tired they are
of it." "I'm tired too," said Taylor (Cordova Times, February 14,I
199 1:A5).

The recall vote of Councilwoman Taylor demonstrates that despite the
overwhelming disgust expressed by respondents over the expense and triviality of ber suit
Taylor enjoyed some support. After counting 60 absentee ballots, the vote was 310 for
removal of Taylor and 187 opposed (Cordova Times, February 28, 1991:Al). Many

respondents explained the result (that Taylor was not recalled by a larger margin of


Cordova - Page 410

votes) as a reflection of personal sympathies for Taylor rather than a measure of support
for her suit.
While Taylor had pledged not to contest the election results, she did pose some
procedural objections (Cordova Times, February 28, 199 1:A5). Responses by the council
demonstrate the vulnerability of volunteer city officials to slight procedural errors, as well
as the confusion which can arise over liability:
The Cordova City Council en countered two surprises when it met
last week to certify the results of the Feb. 18 recall election. First,
certification was stalled by a clerical error at a special meeting
held an hour before the council's regular session ... And then,
Councilwoman Connie Taylor, ousted by the vote, warned the
council to mind its "p's and q's` in counting 60 absentee ballots,
saying there had been some irregularities.

Taylor had indicated the week before that she did not intend to
contest the election results, but her letter saying the city code had
not been properly followed during the process caught some council
members off guard...

Delay in the first special session was caused by an error in worling
on the agenda cover sheet for the special meeting. Tle error was
first spotted by Taylor, who asked the meaning of the working,
which said the council was meeting as the canvass board to "certify
the election board." City Clerk Lynda Plant admitted the word
"board" should not have been included, and apologizes to the
council.

..Taylor questioned whether three election judges had been
appointed for the election, as required by the code. She also
questioned whether the results of the election were reported "no
later than 8 pnm`--also as specified in the code.

Further, Taylor, who several weeks ago said she had no plans to
contest the recall petition, said the grounds for that petition were
not only incorrect but also outside the bounds of the code. She
said the -petition accused her of incompetence on the basis of
sharing secret city information with her attorney. But pointing out
that what she tells her attorney.is protected under special privilege;
she said such confidence does not "constitute either mnisconduct or
incompetence."
Cordova - Page 411

She concluded: "It is important for the City Council to considerU
seriously the implications of the actions it is contemplating."

Asked by various council members if thei r actions were in jeopardy3
of being fouind illegal, or if the election might have to be held
again, Plant said there were no problems in the procedure ...3

(Councilman) Anderson said he is concerned that as a member of
the council he has been told by the city attorney that he can't
consult his personal attorney concerning anything the council does.
He suggested the council seek an opinion on the matter from a
judge or from the attorney gene.ral (Cordova Times, February 28,
1991:A11).
VI. SUMNMARY
For Cordovans in 1991, the 1989 oil spill was still an unfolding disaster. Spill-
related problems, fears, and conflict,s were widespread. Respondents who profited from3
the cleanup r&ported moral conflicts and anguish over the plight of those who suffered
financially. Cordovans hold spiritual as well as commodity values of nature, and many3
refuised to equate money to spill damages.
Spill cleanup and damage claims processes were dominated by adversarial relations3
with Exxon, which proved traumatic. Respondents felt without recourse, as "Exxon was
calling all the shot.: Many Cordovans believe that the Federal Goverinment primarily
serves the oil industry--to the detriment of Cordovans. Cordovans view State agencies in
a more positive light, but believe that they cannot co ntrol big oil interest. Also,I
respondents doubt whether Exxon settlements paid to the State a-nd Federal governments
wi be used to compensate their losses.I
Cordovans predicted a disaster such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill when they sued
the Department of the Interior to stop the pipeline termainal in Valdez in the earlyI
1970's; respondents are angry that their fears were ignored. After the 1989 oil spill,
Cordovans assumed major risks entailed by Exxon's spill cleanup: equipmnent risks,3
health risks, and legal liabilities associated with the status of independent contractor.g
Cordova - Page 412

VI.A. City Government Impacts
Residents described life during the spill cleanup as "living in a war zone" or
"iconcentration camp," under "martial law." Federal and State agencies reportedly did not
exert control over Exxon during the cleanup process, and the oil company displaced
principles of dermocratic government with market dynamics. Exxon and its agent VECO
took over offices and "occupied" their town, according to Cordovans. The city
experienced lost bond opportunities, employee losses and burnout, breakdowns in normal
governnment operations, housing shortages, lost raw fish taxes, and extraordinary litigation
expenses. One pro-Exxon city council member brough suit against other council
members and the city, reportedly as an outgrowth of spill-related political conflicts. This
suit had cost Cordova $500,000 by the time of this research.
Cordova as SDill CleanuD Contractor: Cordova served in the spill response as an
involuntary, non-profit, independent contractor for Exxon. The city was constrained to
provide services and facilities for Exxon's spill cleanup. City officials had to mnake
expenditures and await reimbursements, the.reby capitalizing the cleanup. Unpaid city
leaders were not reimbursed for their time, and paid city officials did not receive
remnuneration for the extra workload entailed by the spill response.
VI.B. Private Sector Economic Impacts of the Oil Spill (Non-Fishing)
The spill affected Cordovan businesses unevenly, as Exxon reportedly substituted
spill cleanup costs for spill damage payments. Businesses not involved in the cleanup
were hurt disproportionately. Economic impacts of the oil spill in the private sector
include bankruptcies, foreclosures, lost credit lines, economic losses due to disruptions o f
normal business patterns, business closures, and lost business and property values. The
cleanup resulted in shortages of labor, childcare, ho-using, and commodities. Exxon did
not comply with requests for wage subsidies, low interest loans to cover cash flow
problems, or consideration of lost bank loans, business values, or property values.
Widespread criticism centered on a chaotic and continually modified claims process.
Business owners complained that this process was carried out at Exxon's discretion, with
no objective agency overseeing the process. Many claimned that Exxon representatives
Cordova - Page 413





lied to them. Assurances made at one level of management were often violated at
another; there was frequent turnover of Exxon field representatives who often violated
prior verbal agreements.I
Conflicts within the business community arose during negotiations with Exxon,
creating hostilities that persisted in 1991. While Exxon carried on cordial relations withI
the Cordova Chamber of Comnmerce (donating $20,000 to its operation), some business
owners believed that their interests were not being represented. These business owners
formed the Cordova Business Owners Association (CBOA) and attempted unsuccessfully
to negotiate with Exxon on their own. This conflict had political ramifications,
precipitating a suit by one city council member against the other council members.
Conflicts Between VECO and Local Businesses: Virtually all business owners
complained that VECO "stole our employees." Exxon's cleanup contractor reportedly3
delayed payments for goods and services, exacerbating cash flow problems already
created by the cancellation of fisheries.3
VI.C. Impacts to the Fishing Community
*  Fishing forms the bulwark of Cord ova's economy, and Cordovans fear that the3
spill's long-term effects could cause the collapse of their fishing industry. Residents
believe that their town will cease to exist if this happens.3
The Oil SDill Cleanun: Exxon and Alyeska reportedly blocked the imimediate
response efforts of Cordovans organized through the Cordova District Fishermen United3
(CDFU). Especially galling for respondents was the rati'onale for refusing to let
Cordovan fishermen prevent the early spread of oil: the oil companies reportedly did3
not want to incur the liability of using "amateurs."
Fishermen Become Oil Cleanuu Contractors: After initially refusing to allow3
Cordovan fishermen to boom off the leaking Exxon Valdez, Exxon created a hiring
policy that defined these fishermen as independent contractors. This designation3
entailed a substantial transfer of legal liabilities to the fishermen who became Exxon's
spill response team. Many complained of ensuing confusion and resentment over tax and3
other liabilities. Exxon, consistent with treatinig fishermen as independent spill


Cordova - Page 414

contractors, reportedly took no responsibility for boats that broke down during cleanup
operations, even though these operations were more stressful on equipment than normal
fishing.
Conflicts Over Cleanun Monev: Great arnimosity was generated by the moral
stigma attached to working for Exxon. Cleanup workers were called "Exxon whores,"
who accepted "blood money" and became "spillionaires." Somne refused to work for
Exxon on moral grounds.
Conflicts Over Contracts: Animosity among persons who were willing to
contract their boats for the spill cleanup focussed on the form of contracts and how
contracts.were obtained. The CDFU published objective criteria for selecting boats for
cleanup contracts, but in the chaotic spill aftermath these criteria could not always be
imnplemented. Exxon reportedly made no effort to apply a uniformn contract policy.
Many believe that Exxon used large cleanup contracts as a form of bribery to quiet
discontent arnong the more vocal fishermnen. Exxon reportedly subtracted this money
from subsequent claims payments. In this perception, Exxon was bribing fishermen with
their own money.
Health Hazards: Spill cleanup workers experienced adverse health effects,
and many objected to Exxon's short and cursory training sessions. Deficits in health and
safety training continued to trouble Cordovans in 1991, as Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.
declined to provide safety training for its oil spill response program in 1991. According
to an Alyeska spokesma'n, the omission of safety training was mandated by company
lawvyers in order to avoid liability for any damage done to sites by response teamn.
The Cleannu Does More Harm Than Good: Not the least of Cordovan's
frustrations over the spill cleanup was that it may have done their environment more
harm than good. Cordovans had to pursue cleanup activities that might by damaging
their environment to mitigate economic losses caused by the spilled oil.
Conflicts Over Fish Claims: Based on preseason forecasts predicting a record
commercial salmon harvest in 1989, fishermen and business owners had geared up for a
rec ord year in Cordova's commercial fishery. After the oil spill, the herring, shrimp, and
Cordova - Page 415

sablefish seasons were closed. Periodic closures of salmon fisheries occurred. ExxonU
announced their "voluntary settlement of claims" for salmon permit holders in June 1989.
Fishermen objected to problematic features of the claims settlement process. InI
calculating settleinents for fishermen, Exxon combined low harvest figures (based on past
catches) with low fish prices (based on the spill year which had a high harvest and weakI
market). The necessity to. fish in order to file a claim was a major concern, due to fears
of contamination and market damage. Market effects of harvesting older fish, du e to
frequent closures, reportedly contributed to the bankruptcy of the Copper River
Fishermen's Cooperative (CRFC), a fish processing cooperative formed by Cordovan
fishermen.a
Respondents described a claims process that diverged from Exxon' s publicized
policies. Some fishermen reportedly worked on the spill cleanup and also got good3
fishing claimns settlements, while others who worked on the cleanup co'uld not fish and so
did not receive claims. Some were c ompensated for equipment upgrades while, others3
were not. Some fishermen signed releases in order to receive money while others only
signed receipts. Some claims settlements were reportedly much more generous than3
others.
Many fishermen are still pursuing settlements that exxon partially paid through3
claims "advances." Cleanup workers could not apply for advances, and only those who
fished in 1989 could file. Many recounted that Exxon refused to process claims any3
further once these "advances" were paid. Respondents were then referred to the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA).3
In winter 1991, many Cordovans were agonizing over filing their TAPAA claimns,
due on March 24, 1991. Cornplaints included that the fund would not contain enough3
money for all damages, processing of claims mnight take years, individuals could not
determine true damages by the deadline, claims would be difficult to.alter later, and3
individuals felt overwhelmned at the prospect of carrying out necessary litigation on their
own. A reported blackout of scientific information due to pending litigation was a3
further irritant.


Cordova - Page 416

The Hatcheries: Prince William Sound Aauaculture CorBoration: Prince William
Sound Aquaculture Corporation (PWSAC) is a private nonprofit corporation established
by Cordovan fishermen, which operates salmon hatcheries in Prince William Sound. The
1989 Exxon Valdez spill caused considerable turmnoil and disorganization for PWSAC by
creating unforeseen financial complexities, forcing operation reorganization, and adding
extra employee responsibilities. The corporation incurred substantial costs to protect its
hatcheries from the oil, and naormal business operations were disrupted. Exxon
reimbursed most extra costs. However, a weak salmon market, with radical drops in
prices, bankruptcies of small processors, and a reluctance of other processors to buy the
corporations' harvests, all continue to trouble the corporation.
Cleaned Beaches: Cordovans complained in 1991 that Exxon did not clean up its
spilled oil, and that State and Federal agencies did not control Exxon's cleanup effort.
There appeared to be no consensus within and between Federal and State agencies as to
what constituted a "cleaned" beach. Cordovans, particularly Natives, hold stricter
standards than Exxon and Federal and State agencies as to what constitutes an
uncontaminated area.
VILD. Spill Impacts on Alaskan Natives in Cordova
Exxon reportedly claimned that Eyak Village was not "impacted" by the 1989 oil spill
and refused to provide food. and servces that it provided for Natives elsewhere. Eyak
leaders complained to the media and to legislators. Impacts include social disruptions,
higher prices, shortages of rental space, economic difficulties for the Chugach fish
processor based in Cordova, and disruption of government operations. Chugach Alaska
Corporation, Eyak Corporation, and Eyak Village sued Exxon.
Cultural impacts particular to Natives, such as looting of burial and historical sites,
were emphasized. The most intense concerns related to subsistence foods and practices.
Natives were and still are unable to obtain mnany subsistence foods. They were and still
are afraid to each subsistence foods that they do obtain. They worry about future
adverse health effects from subsistence foods that they have eaten since the 1989 oil
spill. They worry about continuing damage to their environment and way of life.
Cordova - Page 417

I
I
Exxon reportedly ignored the circle of sharing relationship, where Native foods are
shared between villages, in assessing spill impacts. Because other areas of the Sound
were oiled, Cordova Natives were not able to get the subsistence foods that they needed.
Subsistence practices, including sharing, are integral to a way of life that connects
Natives with their past and with each other, both in a spiritual sense and in terms of
extending kin ties. Respondents describe their cultural identity as inclus-ive of the earth,
wildlife, cultural practices, and people. The oil spill reportedly continues to threaten
Native "life."
Both Natives and non-Natives experience devastating social, economnic, and political
effects of the oil spill that are still ongoing. Both Native and Non-Native groups report
that their continued existence in Cordova has been threatened. Bases for this fear vary
between the two cultures in that an Eyak spiritual philosophy of nature stipulates
pragmnatic concerns regarding persistence.




























Cordova - Page 418
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References Cited
Alaska Consultants
1976 City of Cordova Comprehensive Development Plan.

Alaska Economic Trends
1989 Economies in Turmoil. July.

Birket-Smith, K.
1953 The Chugach Eskimo. National-Museets Publikations-fond, Copenhagen.

Birket-Smith, K., and F. de Lagana
1938 The Eyak Indians of the Copper River Delta, Alaska. Levin and Munksgaard,
Copenhagen.

Bower, W. T.
1919 Alaska Fisheries and Fur Industries in 1918. Bureau of Fisheries Document
872. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC

Bower, W. T. and H. D. Allen.
1917a Alaska Fisheries and Fur Industries in 1915. Bureau of Fisheries document
834, U.S. Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

1917b Alaska Fisheries and Fur Industries in 1916. Bureau of Fisheries document
838, U.S. Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

Casaday, L. Wilde.
1937 Labor Unrest and the Labor Movement in the Salmon Industry of the Pacific
Coast. Ph.D. Dissertation in Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley.

Chugach Natives, Inc.
1975 Annual Report. Anchorage.

City of Cordova.
1988 Comprehensive Development Plan.

1990 a Annual Report July 1, 1989-June 30.

1990b Overall Economiic Development Plan.

Cordova Times.
Various. dates.
Cordova - Page 419






City of Cordova
Various dates, Cordova Fact Sheet

De Laguna, F.
1956 Chugach Prehistory - The Archaeology of Prince William Sound, Alaska.
University of Washington Press, Seattle.3

1972 Under Mount Saint Elias, The History and Culture of the Yakutat Tlingit.

Federal Field Committee for Development Planning in Alaska
1978 Alaska Natives and the Land. October.

H-anable, W. S. and K. W. Workman
1971 Lower Copper and Chitina Rivers: An Historic Resource Study. History and
Archaeology Series Number 5, Miscellaneous Publications, Office of, Statewide5
Cultural Programs, Alaska Division of Parks.

Hassen, H.3
1978 The Effect of European and American Contact on the Chugach Esldmo of
Prince William Sound, Alaska, 1741-1930. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
Wisconsin, Milwaukee.
Janson, L. E.
1975 The Copper Spike. Alaska Northwest, Anchorage.
Johnson, J. F. C.
1988 Eyak Legends. Chugach Heritage Foundation, Chugach Alaska, Anchorage.
Jorgensen, J. G.3
1991 A Brief Description of the Social Indicators Project, 1987-1991. (Interim
AOSIS Project Description).

Krauss, M. E.I
1980 Alaska Native Languages: Past, Present, and Future. Alaska Native Language
Center Research Papers, Number 4, University of Alaska, Fairbanks.5

1982 In Honor of Eyak: The Art of Anna Nelson Harry. Alaska Native Language
Center Research Papers, Number 4, University of Alaska, Fairbanks.                        3

The Los Angeles Times.
Various dates.I




Cordova - Page 4203

Mundy, Jarvis and Associates.
1985 Economnic Analysis for the City of Cordova. Seattle.

Oiled Mayors Subcommittee.
1990 Economic, Social, and Psychological Impact Assessment of the Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill. Impact Assessment, Inc., Anchorage.

Payne, J. T.
1983 The Effects of the 1964 Alaska Earthquake on the Cordova, Alaska,
Commercial Salmon Fishery: An Anthropological Perspective. Ph.D. Dissertation,
Washington State University.

1991 Social and Economic Characteristics of Cordova, Alaska, and the Effects of the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (Interim AOSIS Draft). Social Indicators Study, Human
Relations Area Files, Minerals Management Service. 1991.
Prince William Sound Aquaculture Corporation.
1990 Annual Report.

1991, PWSAC Sound Quarterly, February 1991. Cordova.

Schoepfle, M. C., K. Y. Begishe, R. T. Morgan, J. John, H. Thomas,.P. Reno, J. Davis,
and B. Tso.
1979 A S tudy of Navajo Perceptions of the Impact of Environmental Changes
Relating to Energy Resource Development. Final Report. Division of Research
and Development, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C.
(Contract No. 68-01-3868. Navajo Community College, Shiprock Campus,
Shiprock, New Mexico 87420. May 25.

State of Alaska, Dept. of Fish and Game
1985 Alaska Habitat Management Guide, South Central Region, Vol. II,
Distribution, Abundance, and Human Use of Fish and Wildlife. Juneau:
ADF&G, Div. of Habitat.

1990 Alaska Fish and Game Annual Management Report, 1990. In progress.

State of Alaska, Dept. of Labor
1987 Alaska Population Overview, 1985 Estimates. Juneau: ADOL, Administrative
Services Div., Research and Analysis.

Stratton, L.
1989 Reso-urce Uses in Cordova, A Coastal Community of Southeentral Alaska.
Alaska Department of Fish and Game Technical Paper Number 153, Anc'horage.
Cordova - Page 421

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I
USDOI, BLM, Alaska OCS Office
1979 Alaska OCS Socioeconomic Studies Technical Report Number 36, Bureau of
Land Management.

Valdez Vanguard
Various dates.
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Tatitlek



Eric Morrison

Preface by Steven McNabb-

TATITLEK

- Table of Contexts

I. Preface ...................................................... 429

II. Background .........430
m. Effects of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
 A. The Economy .............
B. Perceptions of Fault for the Oil
C. Human Intervention ........
D. Subsistence...............
E. Leadership ...............
Through 1991
...........
Spill .......

...........

...........

....e     .......
431
431
432
432
433
435
..........


.......o...


..........


.o........
. .. .. .. .. .
. .. .. .. .. .
References Cited ...........436
Tatitlek - Page 427

TATITLEK
I. PREFACE
This chapter describes Tatitlek in the context of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. By this
we mnean that the oil spill is the central organizing concept for the report. The summary
contains some historical and other background material, but its primary purpose is to
describe basic social and institutional features of life in Tatitlek that must be grasped in
order to understand how the oil spill was experienced. This is not an ethnographic
sketch nor socioeconomic profile about Tatitlek. Indeed, our study tearm was unable to
conduct as. much research as we planned in Tatitlek, so the information base we draw on
here is extremely fragmentary.
Eric Morrison, the researcher for Tatitlek, was invited by community leaders to
conduct his assigned research in Tatitlek during 1989, and he did so without hindrance.
However, he had been in Tatitlek for less than a day during his 1991 field excursion
when he was asked to leave by village officials who were responding to the instructions
of attorneys representing Tatitlek and other communities in pending litigation for
damages related to the oil spill. Since anticipated litigation would focus on evidence of
oil spill imnpacts, research data that were not possessed and controlled by the litigants
were considered potentially dangerous. As such, much social research in spill
communities came to a virtual halt after 1990. This event curtailed our field research in
Tatitlek and eliminated the community from some phases of the analysis that required
1991 data. This situation is ironic inasmuch as Morrison, anTingit from southeast
Alaska, was well known in Tatitlek and had conducted work there before.
By Morrison' s estimation, Tatitlek's population had been stable over the latter part,
of the 1980's, but between 1980 and 1990 the population grew enormously (from 68 in
1980 to 119 in 1990--75%). The proportion of Alaska Natives (mainfly Alutiiq of Pacific
Yupik heritage) also grew over this interval, from 78 percent of the population in 1980 to
87 percent in 1990 (Alaska Department of Labor 1991; U.S. Department of Comimerce
1982). Despite its proxirnity to Cordova and Valdez, its economic infrastructure is
limnited. For instance, there is no community store for groceries and dry goods, and
Tatitlek - Page 429





residents must shop outside the town or order goods for delivery. Subsistence foodI
harvests are vitally important to residents inasmuch as they provide important sources of
protein, calories, m-inerals and vitamins, and sustain in g'reat part traditional ideologies of
reciprocity and sharing and relationships between individuals, their kin groups, and the
larger environment. Morrison's report describes how the Exxon Valdez oil spill affected
the community through its impacts on these and other features of the social system: the

fragile infrastructure, diet and food preferences, and relationships between persons,
institutions, and the environment.3
11. Background
Tatitlek is a predominantly Alutiiq community considered by residents to be the3
oldest continuously inhabited conimunity in Prince William Sound. The population has
been stable at around 100 in recent years. The population count done during a recent3
research site visit by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game was 101 in 1989 (Fall
1990:5). The 1990 census indicates a population of 119 (Alaska Department of Labor3
1991). The most significant factor in recent history that has impacted the community is
the 1964 Good Friday earthquake which destroyed nearby Chenega, causing some3
residents to move to Tatitlek. Some Tatitlek Natives are married to Alaska Natives from
other regions, some of whom met while in boarding schools. There has been no3
significant inmigration by non-Natives.
'Me community economy is based largely on subsistence hunting and fishing,3
although many of the men are commercial fishermen who fish seasonally for salmon and
some shrimp. The boats and gear. are not as new and sophisticated as those found in3
surrounding non-Native comimunities. Wood boats are often used rather than alunminum
craft; cash is used largely to pay for conveniences introduced in the past two decades;5
and the community infrastructure is modest, evident in low income housing, and minlimal
electrical, sewer, and water utilities. Hunting and food gathering patterns are largely3
traditional, being done in groups, usually fam-ily and extended famifly members. Food is
still provided for elders and those unable to hunt, fish, or gather. Elders in this3
community are identified as those over 50 years of age. Elders over 60 are few. In the


Tatitlek - Page 430

past, subsistence excursions often meant extended overnight trips to camps. Presently
very few subsistenc,e trips require overni'ght passage. This is probably due to improved
eq-uipment and changes in TeSOUrCe patterns: outboards and guns with scopes are used,
and expansion of the Sitka deer introduced to the area in the 1930's provide more
nearby resources. The community has retained its Russian. Orthodox tradition although
in the past 2 years the Assenibly of God made some inroads.
111. Effects of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Through 1991
lIII-s The Economy
The economy for the community is like mnany other Alaska Native villages. There
is one village health aide, an assistant health aide, school aids, and janitorial and kitchen
-help at the school. Garbage collection is carried out by workers who also are
responsible for maintenance of village equipment (trucks and electrical generators). The
men are generally conimercial fisherman whose season runs from July through August
and the rest of the year is spent in subsistence. Some of the women go to nearby
communities (Valdez, Whittier, Cordova) during the tourist season to earn cash through
jobs such as kitchen helper, waitress, or hotel maintenance and cleaning.
The village economy was significantly impacted by the oil spill. While incomes
were drastically inflated during the cleanup effort, the income derived from the spill has
been significantly or totally diminished. During the employment boom, households
bought luxury items, large televisions, VCR machines, satellite dishes, and stereos.
Residents also spent money on travel out of the village. Little or no savings were
realized from the earnings of the oil spill work. The loss of income has caused some
families to sell their appliances to make ends meet and has caused friction within
famnilies. Some temporary marital separations may have resulted.
About half of the adults worked on the spill 6 weeks or more. Most appeared to
be boat owners and their iminediate faminiies. About half of the remaining adut
worked a week or less, and a smal number did not work at all. (Tho se essential for the
maintenance of the community and the elderly and children apparently worked the least,
if at all.) Despite the apparent disparity in incorme, there was a widely shared belief that
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the village could be healed through mutual support. People in the community sensedU
that economic conflict did exist; however, that conflict was not common.
III.B. Perceptions of Fault for the Oil SpillI
The consensus was that the responsibility for the spill did not rest solely on the
shoulders of the captain of the Exxon Valdez and that, furthermore, assertions that he
was solely responsible were deceptive. The efforts by Exxon, the Federal Government
through its various agencies, and the tribal non-profit North Pacific Rim were perceived
as inadequate or non-existent; the State of Alaska, the regional for-profit ANCSA
corporation, Chugach Alaska, and Tatitlek Corporation (the village ANCSA corporation)
were perceived to have been very visible in assisting the community and to have had the5
concemns of the comrnunity at heart in their efforts to mnitigate the spill.
T'he spill was seen as an unusual event but an event that will occur again in the3
future (estimated range from within a decade to within the next 100 years). However,
this spill was perceived as a lesson for everyone concerned (Federal, State, oil3
companies, the community) and. that the reaction to another spill will be more rapid and
efficient. Older Tatitlek residents have noted environmental damage done by other3
events such as World War II construction, pre-1960's canneries and salteries, and of
course the Good Friday earthquake, since these events also taught lessons.3
In 1991 the village showed concern over the State of Alaska Department of Fish
and Game releasing information about subsistence patterns and contamination of fish3
and game to the public. This release of information is perceived as being harmful to the
legal course of action by the village against Exxon.3
III.C. Human Intervention
The greatest degree of anger and frustration was expressed over the "human"' spill3
into the community. The community expanded enormously during the spill cleanup.
First seen, were the reporters who came to Tatitlek not only from across the country but3
fromn around the world. It did not matter where the news people came from or their
particular field of media, they all were insensitive to the community, arrogant, frightening3
to the children, and abusive to the elders. Reportedly they chased children and elders


Tatitiek - Page 4323

*        ~~~into homes, attempted to take pictures through resident's windows, and laughed at
people who were caught off guard.
The second "human" spill came from the investigators and researchers who came to
Tatitlek to do social, cultural, economic, psychological, and biological research. Again,
the commnunity felt that the researchers were unconcerned, about the community and
3         ~~~were there only to procure information to fulfill their requirements and/or personal
interests.
3             ~~~~The third "human" spill represented the oil spill workers or persons who camiped
out in or near the community looking for work who drained the community of its
resources and patience. This group did not draw the frustration and anger that the first
two did, however.
3             ~~~~Agitation was consistently expressed over a lack of organization. Many individuals
perceived more organization should have been in place to alleviate many of the
3         ~~~circurnstances and assist in many of the problems that arose as a result of the spill. The
organization mentioned frequently as the one that should have shouldered this
responsibility was the North Pacific Rim.
The personal and family conflict and the pressure associated with the spill has not
3         ~~~been dealt with through responsive counseling services by any agency. An additional
factor that brought stress on the commnunity was the designation or apparent designation
3         ~~~of the Valdez oil terminal as a possible terrorist strike location during Operation Desert
Storm. Three of the four students who attended Mt. Edgecumbe Boarding High School
3         ~~~located in Sitka, Alaska during the Desert Storm crisis returned home and finished their
academic year through correspondence due to a concern tha~t they be near their families
3         ~~~during a crisis posed by terrorist threats close to home (Tatitlek does not have a high
school).
3         ~~~III.D. Subsistence
The region was severely impacted by the 1964 Good Friday earthquake. The
3         ~~~quake caused uplifting that lead to a severe decline in halibut, sea mammals, sea birds,
salmon (except pink), and nearly the complete extinction of some indigenous sellih
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The community felt the beginning of recovery when the spill struck. Consistently, theI
community believed that bottom fish and shellfish were severely impacted by the spill.
In that same vein, local residents were afraid to harvest local foods even after being toldI
by experts that the subsistence food was safe to harvest. Exceptions to this pattern were
a few young mnen who expressed the feeling that being part of the land they wouldI
harvest and suffer the consequences, saying in effect that if the ecology was destroyed
they would see no reason to live. The comnmunity health aide received donated fish and
other subsistence food from Chugach Alaska and the villages of Angoon and Tyonek.
The residents were particularly gratefal for this gesture and appreciated visits by
executive officers of Chugach Alaska. Exxon also donated some of the food supply left3
at the end of the spill cleanup seasons.
The Alaska Department of Fish and Game subsistence survey in 1987-19883
indicated an average harvest of wild foods of 353 pounds per person. In 1988-1989 the
subsistence harvest survey of wild foods yielded an average figure of 652 pounds per3
person (Fall 1990). I believe the 1988-1989 survey best reflects the true intake of wild
foods at Tatitlek; hence, there may not have been an increase in harvests and
consumption between 1988 and 1989. The 1987-1988 survey was not trusted by some
residents--the conununity perceived Fish and Game as only an enforcement agency. This3
perception may have biased results and limited participation in the survey. The 1989
report indicated the distributions of harvests by food products as follows: salmon (35%),3
other fish (22%1/), game (12%), marine mammals (20%), marine invertebrates (7%), birds
(2%), and wild plants (3%).3
Of all the rural communities near the spill, Tatitlek has shown the largest
subsistence intake decline in the year following the spill, from 652 pounds in 1988-19893
to 207 pounds in 1989-1990, a difference of 445 pounds or a 68.3-percent decline.
Eighty-two percent of the households reported that their traditional food supply was the3
foremost concern. During my short visit in 1991, it was noted that the harvest (deer,
fish, etc.) that was available was taken with restraint because of the belief that the3
renewability of the species was fragile. The seafood harvest season that had not yet


Tatitlek - Page 434

arrived (salmon, balibut, shellfish) was anticipated with anxiety concerning the size of the
return and the health of the species. The health concerns varied from genetic mutations
to species carrying toxic'chemicals that could impact the health of the community. Fall's
(1990) Alaska Department of Fish and Game report states that a few Tatitlek residents
traveled to other areas in Prince William Sound well outside the regions impacted by the
oil spill. This decline in subsistence, reliance on store bought groceries, and other
economic hardships related to the oil spill increased personal and famnily friction and
stres s. (Although some household in'comes increased as a consequence of spill clean-up
employment, reduced subsistence harvests that resulted in higher grocery bills probably
offset higher incomes.)
III.E. Leadership
The village of Tatitlek is an Indian Reorganization Act village consisting of, a
council and a chief. 'Mere is no municipal government in Tatitlek. The council does
receive support from the village ANCSA corporation, but most of the daily operations of
village government are being done by the elected chief tbrough direction by the council.
In respect to the oil spill, the chief has been the sole contact and negotiator
between the community and outside influences and agencies. The North Pacific Rim
ha.d employees to screen news, researchers, government agents, and other representatives
but it was bighly evident to this researcher that the chief was shouldering a great deal of
the burden of spill work, public relations, and negotiations. This was evidenced further
by the lack of knowledge of political and. econornic activities and relationships between
the village and other organizations and agencies. In a sense, virtually everyone seemed
to be woirking in a vacuumn, and outside agencies, such as North Pacific Rimn, provided
insufficient assistance to beleaguered, lone village officials.
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References Cited
Alaska Department of Labor
1991 Alaska Population Overview: 1990 Cens-us and Estimates. Juneau: Alaska
Department of Labor.

Fall, J.
1990 Subsistence After the Spill: Uses of Fish and Wildlife in Alaska. Native
Villages and the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. Draft Report. Anchorage: Alaska
Department of Fish and Game, Division of Subsistence.

U.S. Department of Commerce
1982 -1980 Census of Population: General Pop-ulation Characteristics, Alaska.
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
































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