Assessing networked coastal zone management programs

[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]

POW SEA GRANT COL@EGE PROGRAM REPRINT
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Assessing Networked Coastal Zone
Management Programs,,,/

Stephen M. Born. and Allen H. Miller

From Coastal Management 16:229@243,-:C-911*1*
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57.2
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no.88-853
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Coastai Managemeru, Volume 16, pp. 229- 243 0892-075318 $3.00 - .00
Printed in (he U.K. All rights rtsemed. Copyright Z 1989 Taylor & Francis

Assessing Networked Coastal Zone
Management Programs

STEPHEN M. BORN

Department of Urban and Regional Planning
and Institute for Environmental Studies
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Madison, Wisconsin 53706

ALLEN H. MILLER

Sea Grant Institute/Advisory Services
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Madison, Wisconsin 53705

Abstract During the early development of the national coastal zone management
program there was no federal prescription with regard to how coastal states should
proceed in establishing their programs institutionally. At one end of the spectrum was
the California model--a new coastal "superagency" with power not only to plan, but
to regulate development. At the other end of the spectrum was an approach which
relied on existing agencies and authorities and improved policy development and co-
ordination; this approach was described as "networking. "
Many coastal advocacy groups, academics, and bureaucrats viewed the net-
worked model with skepticism. With more than a decade of experience, we here re-
view and critique the efficacy of this approach to coastal management, Lessons
learned from experimentation with networked coastal management programs may
provide important lessons for other regional land and water resources management
efforts.
Keywords: coastal zone managemen-t; institution; network

Introduction

In enacting the 1972 Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), Congress acknowledged
that the existing institutional arrangements for managing these regional environmental
and economic systems were inadequate. As noted in the act, "the key to more effective
protection and use of the land and water resources of the coastal zone is to encourage the
states" to assume their full authority for natural resources management and development
control, in cooperation with federal and local governments and other affected interests.
For their part, the states viewed the federal program as a means to advance programs
already dealing with coastal management elements, or to apply federal funding to fledg-
ling state efforts.
Prior to amendments to the federal law in 1976 and 1980, the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act was process-oriented, as opposed to providing very specific substantive policy
direction. There has never been a federal prescription with regard to how coastal states

229

230 Stephen M. Born and Allen H. Miller

should proceed in establishing their programs and management structures institutionally.
At one end of the "institutional arrangements spectrum" was the California model. In
1972, California created a new " superagency"- the California Coastal Commission-
with sweeping comprehensive authority not only to plan, but to regulate development
(Fischer, 1985; Healy and Rosenberg, 1979; Hildreth and Johnson, 1985; Hill, 1982).
This new entity captured programs and responsibilities located elsewhere in state and
local government, and with its broad scope of authority for planning and management, it
emerged as a powerful, largely centralized (in spite of six regional counterparts) manage-
ment agency. In short, the.California model represented an institutional solution to the
problems of fragmentation and dispersion of land and water management authority. I r
Some states, such as North Carolina, followed this approach (Owens, 1985). At the other
end of the spectrum was an approach which relied on existing agencies and authorities
and improved policy development and coordination to achieve coastal management ob-
jectives. This approach- perceived as "soft" by some observers-was described, albeit
rather loosely, as networking. Several states, including the cases presented herein, gener-
ally followed this approach.
This classification scheme, of course, is somewhat artificial. Some degree of net-
working is inherent in all regional resource management programs. No single govern-
mental entity controls everything, and therefore coordination with other programs and
levels of government is a necessity. Thus even programs like California's rely exten-
sively on interagency and intergovernmental coordination.
There have been some preliminary efforts to assess the progress and effectiveness of
the national Coastal Zone Management (CZM) Program (Brower and Carol, 1984;
Coastal States Organization, 1985; J. Amer. Planning Association, 1985; Miller, 1983;
OCZM, 1979; U.S. GAO, 1976, 1980, 1986), a few reviews and evaluations of multi-
state regional accomplishments of CZM (Great Lakes Basin Commission, 1979; Hfldreth
and Johnson, 1985), and numerous descriptions and assessments of various state pro-
grams (for example, Heikoff, 1977; OCZM Section 31@ Evaluations; Owens, 1985).
There appears to be little analysis, however, to discern whether the institutional context
-the orga nizational entities and the rules-has influenced the relative success of state
coastal management programs. Given the controversy about organizational form and
management structures during the early life of the national CZM program, and the skep-
ticism with which many coastal advocacy groups, industry associations, academics, and
bureaucrats viewed the networked model for state coastal management programs, we
believe it is timely to review-after more thaa a decade of experience-this approach to
coastal management. Our effort is necessarily exploratory and subjective. Our intent is
twofold: one, to develop a relatively simple assessment scheme; and two, to apply the
methodology in evaluating whether organizational form has been an obstacle to the suc-
cess of state coastal programs. Our focus is on' assessing networked programs, not on the
efficacy of networked vs. centralized programs. We enter into this assessment with some
trepidation, recognizing the great number of environmental, political, and contextual
variables which are difficult to normalize and which mask the effects of the single vari-
able of management structure (Craine, 1971; Heikoff, 1977).
We believe the subject is important not only to coastal zone management but to all
U.S. natural resources management initiatives. In the broadest sense the question is how
to achieve the goals of integrated resource management within a heterogeneous institu-
tional structure. The establishment of powerfifl regional institutions- unified adminis-
trative entities with relatively comprehensive functional responsibilities and a broad
scope of implementation powers (like the California Coastal Commission, the Tennessee

Assessing Management Programs 231

Valley Authority, the Adirondack Park Agency, and the Twin Cities Metropolitan
Council)-as responses to regional environmental and developmental problems tends to
be a political rare event in the United States (Derthick, 1974). Therefore, lessons learned
from experimentation with networked coastal management programs may provide more
general guidance for designing politically acceptable and viable institutional arrange-
ments for other regional land, water, and development management efforts.2

Study Approach

The Networking Concept

Networking has many connotations. It was originally conceived by the Federal Office of
Coastal Zone Management (OCZM) as a way for states which already had substantial
control over coastal activities and areas to somehow bind their coastal policies into the
existing network of -management controls; i. e ., states could meet the federal requirements
for program approval by interconnecting existing state statutes and policies (Lowry,
1985; Matuszeski, 1985). More states could thus pursue program approval by demon-
strating that they had general state authority over resources and uses identified in the
Federal act. In a draft "threshold paper" to guide states on organizational arrangements
(OCZM, ca. 1976), OCZM. acknowledged that several state agencies-a designated
"lead agency" notwithstanding- will be involved in coastal program implementation,
and that therefore a "network" or linkage between and among the relevant organizations
would be a requirement for program approval. OCZM noted that organizational net-
working could take a number of forrris, identifying legislation, executive orders, planning
and coordination mechanisms, and interagency agreements among the possible means.
The present operating definition of networking used by the Office of Coastal Resources
Management (OCRM)-OCZM's successor- suggests a program characterized by the
separation of policy, planning, and enforcement functions and authorities among state
agencies or between state and local governments (McCleod, telephone interview, 1986).
For purposes of this study, a networked program has the following attributes:
(1) The program emphasizes making preexisting authorities work better and in a
more coordinated manner;
(2) The designated "lead agency" has broad policy formulation and coordination
responsibilities and a horizontal orientation, i.e., is concerned with cross-cutting
issues and functions, in contrast to4a vertically-oriented line agency organized
around a comparatively narrow mission;
(3) The "lead agency" tends to be an Executive Department staff agency vs. an
operating agency;
(4) The. "lead agency" relies significantly on other state agencies and/or local gov-
ernments, i.e., program management is dispersed, especially regarding regula-
tory powers, and there is no unified program administration.

Case Selection Considerations

Because of the exploratory nature of this assessment, we elected to limit the number of
states in our analysis. We screened state programs using the above characteristics of
networked programs, relying initially on program literature and personal contacts at state
and federal levels. We further reduced the pool of state programs by attempting to get a

232 Stephen M. Born and Allen H. Miller

representative sample of coastal programs in terms of geography and coastal problems
and issues. Sufficient program history and experience from which to draw conclusions
and availability of information further limited the sample. Finally, programs that had
undergone substantial organizational shifts and were being conducted in a very complex
institutional and political environment (e.g., Florida) were eliminated based on the
premise that such factors would obscure the focal points of this study. Based on these
considerations, Maine, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Wisconsin were selected as case net-
worked programs useful for testing our methodology and for preliminary assessment of
the efficacy of the networked approach to coastal zone management. While the limited
number of cases may raise questions regarding the representativeness of the sample, we
believe it adequate for these purposes.

Methods and Sources of Information

Information for this study was obtained from both written and interview sources. Litera-
ture reviewed for each case state included formal journal and other published articles,
national summary documents, final environmental impact statements for each state pro-
gram, OCZM Section 312 evaluations, state program publications and reports, and se-
lected press coverage. Approximately twenty telephone and personal interviews were
conducted in each state.3 Interviewees in each state were chosen to represent various
perspectives: lead agency staff and program managers; staff and managers from cooper-
ating state agencies, commissions, and departments; planners from regional commissions OF
and local governments; local elected officials; citizen influentials involved with the
coastal program; representatives of development-oriented interests (utilities, chambers of K
commerce, port officials, industry and real estate spokespersons) and organized environ-
mental interests; and OCRM program staff. For both program clarification and assess-
ment purposes, a relatively open-ended set of questions attempted to elicit perceptions of
major accomplishments/failures of the program, strengths/shortcomm'gs, perceived
reasons for program success or lack thereof, and level of program/management structure
awareness. The limitations of so constrained a set of views and biases are obvious, and
we have tried to incorporate such information with caution.

Evaluation Criteria 0.

Problems of attribution (did the coastal management program cause an observed effect?
to what extent was it responsible?) and measurement (what to measure? how?) pervade
institutional evaluation (see Ingram and others, 1984). Given the flexibility accorded the
states, no uniform data was required of states for evaluative purposes. Like an earlier
assessment.of the national CZM program (OCZM, 1979), we believe that the degree of
goal attainment is one appropriate indicator of program accomplishment, as measured by
substantive coastal outcomes and desired institutional changes. Substantive outcomes in-
clude such tangible results as increased access, added protection for critical coastal re-
sources, enhanced recreational opportunities, urban waterfront revitalization, improved
port facilities, etc. Institutional changes include legislative and policy improvements,
budgetary commitments of state resources for coastal management, organizational and
procedural changes, and increased opportunities for meaningful public participation. The
degree to which desired change occurred (program success) must be measured within the
context of unique constraints and obstacles to effective implementation which exist in a

Assessing Management Programs 233

particular state (Goetze, 1981; Mazinanian and Sabatier, 1981). For example, no mean-
ingful assessment of progress under the Maine coastal program could be made without
consideration of the very strong "home rule" tradition of local governments in the state,
or in the Oregon program without consideration of the difficult fiscal and economic con-
ditions prevailing there in recent years and the implications for expeditious implementa-
tion of certain- resource -protection elements of that program.
A final cbnsideration in our assessment of state programs relates to constituency satis-
faction. To what degree is there correspondence between institutional actions and their
outcomes and the preferences of coastal management constituents? (See Goetze, 198 1,
for elaboration of this issue.) The "constituency" for state coastal management programs
is heterogeneous and diverse, and could be construed to include all residents within the
coastal 'zone, as well as all parties with an interest or stake in coastal management.
Accordingly, we did not seek or expect wholesale endorsements or indictments of state
programs; after all, one interest's regulatory burden is another's protective insurance.
Instead, we tried to garner a sense of the degree of program satisfaction from an array of
"constituents" including their awareness and knowledge of the state coastal program,
their views of major accomplishments and failures, and their opinions about the overall
functioning of the program.

Program Descriptions

The four networked programs selected are summarized in Table 1. This summary de-
scribes the programs as documented in the final Environmental Impact Statements and
approved by the Department of Commerce. Changes have since occurred in all the pro-
grams. Wisconsin, for example, no longer has a Citizen Advisory Committee, and the
Office of Coastal Zone Management in Massachusetts is now established by legislation.
Our purpose is to measure effectiveness of networked programs using such change as one
measure of effectiveness. The original programs are therefore provided as a point of
reference. Table I allows a general compaxison of programs. A few supplemental notes
are in order to better understand some of the distinguishing characteristics of programs.
The Oregon program differs from the other three in that the policy-making body, the
Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCD Q, is an independent commis-
sion; members are appointed for staggered fixed terms, thereby providing it with some
degree of autonomy from the Governor. (The Director of the Department of Land Con-
servation and Development, the lead agency a& administrative arm of the Commission,
serves at the pleasure of the Commission.) Secondly, LCDC has very specific statutory
authority for the development of statewide land and water goals and for the approval of
local comprehensive coordinated plans (CCPs). State policies clearly prescribe the con-
trol of local comprehensive plans, somewhat similar to the California program. The
coastal program is set within this larger land use planning scheme. Like all networked
programs, Oregon relies on other state authorities vested in twelve separate state agencies
for implementation (Oregon FEIS, 1977). The councils in the other three states are all
advisory with regard to coastal policy, coordination, and program implementation.
The Massachusetts program, unlike the other three, has a management structure akin
to an environmental superagency (Haskell and Price, 1973). The designated lead agency
is the Office of Coastal Zone Management, a unit within the Office of the Secretary of
Environmental Affairs. The Environmental Affairs secretariat, a cabinet office, provides
for uniform administrative oversight and coordination of the state's four primary oper-

234 Stephen M. Born and Allen H. Miller

Table I
Summary of Four Networked Coastal Management Programs
MAINE MASSACHUSETTS

State Planning Office, Maine Executive Coastal Zone Management Office,
Department Executive Office of Environmental
Affairs (EOEA)

Governor's Coastal Advisory Committee. Coastal Resources Advisory Board
0
Membership represents the general (CRAB) appointed by the Governor,
C
>., public, the legislature, regional representing a broad array of citizen
C planning commissions, the University interests.
W
of Maine and state agencies.

Regional planning commissions
responsible for coordination of Regional Citizen Advisory Councils
citizen Participation.

Thirteen core laws address water Thirty-eight distinct policies in
quality standards; activities on tidal seven general areas of concern. These
lands; local shoreland zoning; land policies address: protection of
use planning in unorganized areas. coastal wetlands, air and water
subdivision standards, site location quality, hazard areas, sand and gravel
for large projects, air and water mining, urban waterfronts, coastal
quality standards. solid waste recreation. energy facilities,
CC disposal standards, stream alteration, commercial fisheries, offshore oil,
Ia
oil transport and spills9and renewable waste discharges, historic resources.
L.
CL marine resources. and visual access.

'0C
"a
Dept. of Environmental Protection EOEA Departments
Dept. of Marine Resources Environmental Quality and Engineering
Environmental Management
Dept. of Transportation
Land Use Regulation Comission. Metropolitan District Commission
Dept. of Conservation Fisheries. Wildlife.and Recreation
Towns Vehicles
Food and Agriculture
Energy Facilities Siting Council
Martha's Vineyard Commission

Executive Order and MOAs Executive Order and MOAs

1975 Creation of the Executive
1969 Exec. Order: cooperation
to resolve coastal conflicts Office of Environmental Affairs
1970 Siting Law (EOEA)
CL 1970 Petroleum Act
CLI I
r 1971 Mandatory Shoreland Zoning
-C

September 1978 April 1978
0
cn
UL. Federal $1,700,000 Federal $1,200,000
CL
State $ 422,000 State $ 307,000

Assessing Management Programs 235

Table I (Continued)

OREGON WISCONSIN

Department of Land Conservation and Coastal Management Program, Department
Development of Administration

Land Conservation and Development Coastal Management Council (CMC)
Commission (LCDC), appointed by the appointed by the Governor. Comprises
leadership from state agencies,
Governor, consisting of citizen
members from each legislative local governments, tribal
district. Oversight of compliance governments. the University of
with land use goals. Wisconsin.
IWO
Involvement in preparation of local Citizen Advisory Committee
plans. Statewide citizen interest representing coastal interests.
groups.

Nineteen statewide land use goals with Thirty-three laws address water and
four specific coastal goals addressing air quality, coastal natural areas,
estuarine resources, coastal wildlife habitat, fisheries manage
shorelands, beaches and dunes, and ment, flood plain zoning, solid waste
ocean resources. Over 20 laws disposal, mandatory county shoreland
implemented by 12 state agencies. zoning, water access in subdivisions,
dredge and fill from lake beds, farm
W W Counties and cities required to land preservation, energy facility
prepare plans consistent with goals siting, planning coordination and
for acknowledgement by LCOC. state-local cooperation.
12

X Division of State Lands Dept. of Natural Resources
Dept. of Energy Dept. of Transportation
Dept. of Forestry Dept. of Local Affairs and Development
0
co0
Dept. of Environmental Quality Public Service Commission
Dept. of Geology and Mineral Counties
Industries
Dept. of Fish and Wildlife
Counties and cities

statutory and MOAs Executive Order and MQAs

Ch
1967 Beach Bill enacted 1966 Mandatory shoreland zoning
C 1971 OCCDC established
> 1973 Land Use Bill enacted
0
L
CL
CL 2
-CC

May 1977 May 1978
0 4
Federal $1,050,000 Federal $1.275,000
CL
CL State $ 325,000 State $ 485,000

236 Stephen M. Born and Allen H. Miller

ating environmental agencies as well as the Department of Food and Agriculture. To gain
a fully comprehensive coastal program, memoranda of agreement (MOA) with line
agencies, both inside and outside this secretariat, were necessary (Massachusetts FEIS,
1977).
Wisconsin and Maine represent the purest networked forms, relying on a state plan-
ning unit within the governor's executive management agency for program management
and implementation. These entities had the least direct implementation authority of our
case examples.
All four of the programs work with local units of government by providing technical
assistance, information, or grants. Each utilizes some form of regional (substate) admin-
istrative/planning arrangement to bridge the gap between state and local government.
Maine, Oregon, and Wisconsin additionally rely on local authorities to carry out their
programs, including mandatory shoreland zoning, subdivision review, or enforcement of
local plans.

Findings

We pursued three general areas of inquiry in this analysis: (1) Did the coastal program
precipitate institutional change? (policy, organization, budget and/or process); (2) Did the
coastal program precipitate changes in land and water uses? (patterns of use and/or re-
source protection); and (3) Did the coastal program satisfy its constituents? By inquiring
into both institutional change and change in uses we address both the means and the end
results. For this summary review, brief examples are used to illustrate the broad array of
accomplishments in all four of the state programs reviewed.

Insdiudonal Change

At this stage in the evolution of coastal zone management, we expected and found far
greater institutional change than changes in development patterns and resource use. All
four programs demonstrate change; new policies are being made, budgets are being re-
aligned, organizations revised and processes improved. Clearly networked coastal man-
agement programs are not obstacles to institutional reform.
We find major coastal resource policy change, stimulated by the coastal programs, in
all case states. The following examples are illusfttive. In Massachusetts, staff work of
the MC!ZM led to a 1980 Governor's Executive Order to increase protection of the state's
barrier beaches, including priority acquisition of barrier beaches, limitations on sewer
and water extensions, exclusion of water supply and sewerage treatment facilities, and
limitations on funding of projects which would encourage growth and development. The
knowledge and experience gained in Massachusetts was subsequently applied in passing
the federal Coastal Barrier Resources Act of 1982, Another. significant policy change in
Massachusetts is the 1983 amendments to the Tidelands Act. These amendments require
that private development in certain coastal areas proceed only if public benefits are de-
rived-a precursor to expanded public use of the coast. Another example of providing a
statutory base for coastal policy is Maine's 1986 Act to Enhance the Sound Use and
Management of Maine's Coastal Resources. This act legislatively established nine policy
goals based largely on objectives previously developed by Maine's Committee on Coastal
Conservation and Development.
Wisconsin Coastal Management Program (WCMP) staff research in 1981 indicated

Assessing Management Programs 237

that western water shortages, coal slurry pipelines and other possible diversions were
emerging issues not only in Wisconsin, but in all the Great Lakes states and provinces.
Through the governor and the newly-formed Council of Great Lakes Governors, the issue
was brought before states and provinces adjacent to the Lakes, resulting in the signing of
a "Charter of Principles" in January 1985. The eight governors and two premiers agreed
to act in concert on water quantity matters and initiated a number of technical activities to
facilitate mutually beneficial practices (Great Lakes Governors Task Force report, 1985).
State legislation in Wisconsin was passed in 1985, with support of staff work in the
WCMP and the state's Department of Natural Resources, giving the state, for the first
time, the approach and requisite authority for water quantity management.
Oregon's Division of State Lands (DSL) adopted administrative rules for estuarine
mitigation in 1984, following agreement of three state agencies (Department of Energy,
DLCD, and DSL) to coordinate estuarine mitigation banking. The interagency coordina-
tion and the development of the necessary legal framework to allow mitigation banks, to
provide methods for assigning mitigation credits, and t6 provide loan funds for the actual
mitigation evolved through three years of financial support and coordination from the
OCMP.
Wisconsin state law on dredge disposal has been interpreted to preclude the disposal
of clean dredged material in the open waters of the state. The resultant impact is an
inability to use clean materials for beneficial purposes, such as beach nourishment, and
increased costs to local governments who are responsible for disposal. A WCMP-initi-
ated interagency task force, extensive staff research and two multiyear in-water demon-
stration projects with detailed monitoring have led to a reassessment of the state disposal
policy and the preparation of a bill for legislative consideration.
Some policy changes take years. In the mid 1970s, the levels of the Great Lakes were
extremely high, causing extensive shore erosion, damage to shore properties, and even
the loss of residences. The Corps of Engineers estimated damages in Wisconsin on the
order of $16 million. Over a three-year period, the WCMP initiated extensive field work,
geotechnical studies, engineering analyses, evaluations of alternative-policies, and devel-
opment of model shore protection ordinances. By the time this work was completed, lake
levels had declined and the public concern diminished. In spite of major WCMP efforts,
there was little in the way of immediate demonstrable accomplishments. In 1986, Great
Lakes water levels exceeded all previously recorded levels; high levels continued in
1987. A flurry of activity resulted throughout the Great Lakes states and provinces. Wis-
consin coastal legislators were vying for intrgauction of shore erosion legislation. The
vast amount of sound technical work and policy analysis, now separated from its genesis
by ten years, was "dusted off." With little recognition that it was a Wisconsin Coastal
Management Program product, this work is underpinning current policy action.
Policy change is often manifested in state budgets through the commitment of addi-
tional state fiscal resources. In 1979, the Maine Coastal Program (MeCP), along with the
governor's office, began developing policy initiatives for coastal development. The
maintenance of fishing piers emerged as one major policy, giving rise to follow-up bud-
getary change. Research by Maine's coastal program staff on maintenance of fishing
piers led to a $ 10 million bond issue to repair or renovate seven coastal piers. In the early
1980s Bath Iron Works (BIW), Portland, began planning a major new facility in Boston.
MeCP and the City of Portland ultimately convinced BIW to remain in Maine, coordi-
nated state and federal permits and supported various studies instrumental in completing
the port development project. Maine voters approved a $15 million bond issue for the
BIW project, resulting in an estimated 1,000 additional jobs in the Portland area. MeCP

238 Stephen M. Born and Allen H. Miller

played a similar role in the industrial park/port facility development at Searsport. Staff
studies of development cost, costibenefit studies, and preliminary plans helped to facili- OF
tate this project. Again voters approved a $13 million bond issue to aid in the construc-
tion of the facility (Keeley, telephone interview, 1987).
The Massachusetts legislature authorized an $18 million bond issue in 1983 and es-
tablished the Coastal Facilities Improvement Program in the MCZM. The program reim-
burses coast@l communities for up to 50 percent of total project cost to plan, construct,
maintain, and improve public coastal facilities. In January, 1985, grants totalling $8
million were provided to nineteen communities; nine communities received over
$500,000 (MCZM Review, 1985).
A program to maintain Wisconsin's commercial ports, the Harbor Assistance Pro-
gram, was authorized in the late 1970s, providing the Department of Transportation S I
million a year in state ftinds and an additional $1 million in bonding authority to assist
local governments in renovating and maintaining commercial port facilities. Substantial
input to this legislation came from studies done by the WCMP prior to federal program
approval, under section 305.
Organizational changes stimulated by coastal programs are significant. In Massachu-
setts, forty-one cities surround the Boston Harbor with a common sewerage service pro-
vided by the Metropolitan Development Commission since the 1940s. A governor's
committee on Boston Harbor Water Quality and a lawsuit initiated by the City of Quincy
precipitated the creation of the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority in 1983.
Harbor clean-up began under a schedule developed by a court-appointed special master
with over 100 tasks scheduled in 1987. MCZM staffed the committee and worked with
the legislature to create the new authority. These efforts not only led to organizational
change, but also helped leverage several million dollars of new state and federal funding
for habor clean-up; the Massachusetts legislature authorized $35 million for fiscal 1985.
In Wisconsin, a Waterways Commission with bonding authority to aid communities
in the development of public water recreation facilities was created. New regulatory staff
for Great Lakes shoreland management were added to the Water Regulation and Zoning
program. Staff for a new Great Lakes water management unit represent ftirther Wisconsin
organizational change influenced by WCMP efforts. Massachusetts reports additional
staff for its Wetlands Protection Program in 1978 and, most significantly, the legislative
establishment of its Office of Coastal Management in 1983.
1 All states report procedural changes, best illustrated by the processing of permits with
the Corps of Engineers and exemplified by Oregon's monthly State Water Interagency
Meetings (SWIM), established to share information between state and federal permitting
agencies. Representatives of the Corps of Engineers, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
National Marine Fisheries Service, the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, DLCD,
and DSL are regular participants. Similar efforts exist in the other three states.

Changes in Land and Water Uses

The results of these reforms are beginning to be visible through protected wetlands and
barrier beaches, management of hazard areas, and renewed ports and urban waterfronts.
It is likely that these changes will be more evident ten years hence. The following ex-
amples represent successful on-the-ground outcomes associated with development and
land and water uses.
Maine's Departments of Marine Resources and Environmental Protection, with sup-

Assessing Management Programs 239

port from the MeCP, began in 1981 to clean up economically important shellfish-pro-
ducin, waters along its 4,000 miles of coast (the 1980 harvest value of Maine clams was
$8.5 million). Over 3,000 discharges were identified, affecting 12,000 acres or 30 per-
cent of Maine's clam resources. The abatement program was based on a precise moni-
toring program and, where necessary, enforcement action. The benefits of this program
are suggested in one small area of the Maine coast, the Harpswell area, by comparing
$1,000 in abatement costs with a $37,000 increase in shellfish harvest.
In association with the Coastal Barrier Beaches Executive Order noted earlier, the
MCZM worked with the Federal Emergency Management Agency to purchase storm-
damaged properties from willing owners and transferred them to state and local govem-
ments; for recreational purposes under a provision of the National Flood Insurance Pro-
gram.
All of Wisconsin's Great Lakes communities have undertaken some sort of waterfront
renewal program since 1978. The role of the WCMP in each of these has varied but has
included technical assistance through regional planning commissions and grants for data
collection, plan development, market studies, and construction of piers and walkways
through Coastal Energy Impact Program (CEIP) funds. The City of Washburn (popula-
tion 2,000) is an outstanding example. Aided by the WCMP-funded staff of the regional
planning commission and various WCMP grants, the city developed and built a $4 mil-
lion waterfront- including a marina, restaurant, motel, boat repair facility, dry storage,
and condominiums. In the City of Port Washington, the WCMP funded a land use plan
required by the Corps of Engineers prior to construction of a new recreational marina.
Coastal funds provided for the acquisition of technical data necessary for the City of
Superior to proceed with construction of a marina/motel complex. Superior also built a
public picnic area and four fishing piers (CEIP funds). In Racine, a grant to conduct a
wave run-up test of a breakwater model saved the city about one million dollars in unnec-
essary construction costs. In Kewaunee, a WCMP-funded waterfront plan has led to
extensive renovation, increased public facilities, two new marinas, a motel, and a restau-
rant, and additional improvements are planned.
The Wisconsin work with which we have personal familiarity is typical of work done
"behind the scenes" in support of coastal communities in the other states. Maine reports
similar support to seventeen community waterfront projects, Massachusetts well over
twenty. In Oregon, because of OCMP, the thirty-four coastal comprehensive plans were
fast-tracked and completed two years ahead of t* remainder of the state, establishing the
framework for subsequent development activities (Ross, 1987; for additional discussion
of *the Oregon Land Use program and its impact on land use patterns, see O'Sullivan,
1986).

ConsdWnt Sadsfacdon

Despite differences in organization or program emphasis, several common threads ap-
peared among the four programs when constituents were asked their opinions of coastal
program successes and problems. There is general recognition in all states that coastal
programs have been instrumental in improving and/or streamlining permitting processes.
Oregon is typical-local officials, as well as developers, describe the project application
process as "acceptable and fairly quick." In all four cases, line ag ency "constituents"
questioned the role of the coastal management programs in trying to influence line
agency functions. Some recognize that the programs have helped them achieve agency

240 Stephen M. Born and Allen H. Miller

objectives, but then suggest that the program would be better housed in their agency! In
Oregon, agency representatives questioned DLCD's role as an "umbrella" agency when
they "are supposed to be a sister agency." "Poor enforcement" was a uniform comment
in all states, but most pronounced in Maine, a strong home-rule state. Negative percep-
tions about diminished public participation after initial program implementation were
common to all states but Massachusetts. Comments from special interest groups were for
the most part predictable. Regulations were viewed as "too tough" by some developers
and "too soft" by some environmentalists. Several commented that states were not ad-
dressing the big long-term coastal issue of cumulative impacts of development.
The most frequent response was that these "programs lack visibility." Even the
Massachusetts program with its relatively high public exposure was considered by several
interviewees to need greater visibility to be successful. In summary, constituents' com-
ments reflect the nature of these lower-profile networked approaches where implementa-
tion is largely carried out by others than the lead coastal management agency.

Conclusions and Implications

This study represents a preliminary attempt, using state coastal management programs, to
ascertain whether the networking of existing institutions can be a viable means to address
resource management issues. Each of the four programs reviewed here can point to sig-
nificant accomplishments in improved public policies and governmental processes. Each
has made substantial progress towards meeting their coastal management goals. These
achievements are linked more or less directly to the existence of the coastal management
program, increased state and local coastal activities and focus, enhanced coastal issue
awareness and support, strengthened coastal staff capacities, and new funding. Clearly
state decisions to pursue coastal zone management via a networked program, largely
reliant on the extant institutional framework, have not prevented these accomplishments.
In short, networked programs have generally been successful in bringing added resources
to bear in addressing coastal management issues.
Networked programs, in their efforts to be more comprehensive, however, encounter
more difficulties in implemeniation and attribution.
� Networked programs, more oriented to the setting of public policy or im-
provement of processes, are frequently separated from the implementation
of such policies and procedures by line agebties with narrower program
responsibilities or by local governments; this often makes their contribu-
tions invisible.
� The degree of program success appears to reflect the support, recognition
and commitment of the governor and/or legislative leadership.
� Line agencies sometimes question the role of the more comprehensive
networked coastal management program in matters deemed to be propri-
etary. Achieving coordination among state agencies -especially with re-
gard to permitting decisions consistent with coastal plans and policies -is
difficult.
� Networked programs relying on coordinated arrangements imply credit-
sharing among participants; success is often credited to entities within the
network as distinct from the coastal program itself.
� Much "behind the scenes" work of the lead agency is commonly unre-
cognizable.

Assessing Management Programs 241

While these problems are not unique to networked programs, it is clear that net-
worked programs must give special consideration to (1) their relationship with the polit-
ical leadership, and (2) their constituencies. The unrecognizable " behind-the- scenes"
activities make 'the program vulnerable to political attack and thus the need for strong
support from key elected officials. Programs tied to this political leadership are, how-
ever, vulnerable with changes in leadership. This shortcoming may be an asset in dis-
guise-political accountability can lead to a program that is responsive to changing
issues, priorities, and fiscal realities- therefore, a more robust and durable program.
Our case examples illustrate this situation, although it is too early to draw conclusions
regarding long-term sustainability and survival.
Success in implementing networked programs seems to demand special public partici-
pation and constituency development efforts. It is difficult to sustain strong public in-
volvement throughout the life of a broadly-focused vs. single-interest program. Public
constituencies may be well-versed and able to respond to individual laws, in contrast to
overall coastal management programs. Given this, it is not surprising that networked
programs with their maze of laws are not perceived by the citizenry as the instruments of
change. This problem is exacerbated for the public by the inadequate tracking and docu-
mentation of program accomplishments. In our study cases, where strong public involve-
ment efforts were curtailed, program identity and support suffered.
One question not addressed in our study and a fertile area for further research is the
comparative resiliency of networked programs vs. more centralized resource manage-
ment programs during a period of growing federal fiscal austerity. Reductions in federal
support for coastal zone management during the 1980s, initiated with the advent of the
Reagan administration, placed additional burdens on states to sustain viable programs.
How did the institutional arrangements affect the state's ability to continue to address a
growing number of coastal resource management issues? As the country continues to
wrestle with its budget deficit, such an evaluation will have application not only to
coastal zone management but to other resource management programs as well.
In conclusion, we believe that the experience with networked coastal management
programs provides some insights and guidance for addressing other major regional re-
source management and development problems. In the United States there is (1) a general
political unwillingness to establish unified regional planning and management entities
with strong implementation powers which usurp authority from existing institutional
actors, and (2) great difficulty in sustaining such arrangements in those comparatively
few circumstances where they now exist (e.g., see Fischer, 1985, regarding the uncertain
long-term future of the California Coastal Commission). Networking existing units, laws,
and programs to accomplish more comprehensive objectives, i.e., changing the behavior
and activities of established agencies and local governments, not only may be a more
politically acceptable way, but often the only realistic opportunity for undertaking such
management challenges through public institutions.

Notes
1. Although the Califomia program provided for returning permitting authority to local govem-
ments upon completion of approved local plans, the early phases of the program typify the "hard"
centralized approach.
2. An anlogous debate has gone on for years regarding the most effective and efficient institu-
tional arrangements for managing river basins; for ftirther information, the interested reader is
referred to Wandschneider, 1984; Wengen, 1981; White, 1957.
3. Interviews were conducted by teams of graduate students in a University of Wisconsin-Mad-

242 Stephen M. Born and Allen H. Miller

ison "Water Resources Policies and Institutions" seminar; the authors appreciate the additional
research assistance of Ms. D. DeLuca.

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