potential effects of increasing oil tanker size on Narragansett Bay an advisory report to the Coastal Resources Management Council

[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]

COASTAL ZONE
Coastal Zone INFORMATION CENTER
information
Center

Technical Paper Number 24

THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF INCREASING
OIL TANKER SIZE ON
NARRAGANSETT BAY

An Advisory Report to the
Coastal Resources Management Council

July, 1972

THE RHODE ISLAND,
STATEWIDE PLANNING PROGRAM

265 Melrose Street
HE Providence, Rhode Island 02907
752
.R4
P67
1972

Property of library
u.s. deparTmENT OF COMMERCE NOAa
coastal services center
2234 south HOPSON AVENUE
charleston, sc 29405-2413

The Rhode Island Statewide Planning Program, a division of the
Department Of Administration, is the central planning agency for
state government. The work of the Program is guided by the State
Planning Council, comprised of state, local and federal representa-
tives. The objectives of the Program areto plan for the physical,
economic., and social development of the state; to coordinate the
activities of governmental agencies! and private individuals and
groups. within this framework of plans and programs; and to provide
planning assistance to the Governor, the General Assembly, and the
agencies of state government.

This technical paper is one of a series prepared by the staff
of the Statewide Planning program. These papers present, information
developed through selected phases of work of the Statewide Planning
Program to the pr0gram committees and staff, the participating state,
local, and federal agencies and to others interested.

Program activities are assisted by federal grants through the
Integrated Grant Administration Program. This publication is based
upon publicly-supported research and may not be copyrighted. It may
be reprinted, in part or in full, with the customary crediting of the
source.

PREFACE

This brief report outlines the possible ramifications of the

growth of the world tanker fleet, both in size and in numbers, and

this growth's subsequent effect on Narragansett Bay. An advisory

report prepared at the request of the Coastal Resources Management

Council., its purpose is to provide information to the Council in a

problem area of current concern. Due to time limitati6ns.,; the data

is not as complete as might be desired, but it is felt that the data

t.-%.@it has been compiled will be sufficient to give a good indication

of possible trends as a result of this growth.

A detailed bibliography is included in this report and is recom-

mended as a source of further development of this topic if deemed

necessary.
This'paper was prepared by Mr. Thomas A. Corboy , Tunior Planner.

The graphics were prepared by Mr. Mansuet Giusti and Mr. Peter

'Ouimette, and the text was typed'by Mrs. Vikki Lecuivre.

CONTENTS

Page

Preface . . . . . . . o . . . . . . . . . .

List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

List of Figures . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . vi

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

PART

ONE: TANKER FLEET GROWTH . . . . . . . . . . . 2

TWO: EFFECTS OF FLEET GROWTH ON BAY TRAFFIC . . . . . 10

THREE: POSSIBLE POLLUTION PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . 14

FOUR: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . 16

Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Bibl iography . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. 21

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1 Scale for Estimating Tanker Construction Costs
in the U.S. (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Tankers Built: 1941-1970 . . . . . . . . . 5

3 Drafts of Tankers Built: 1941-1970 . . . . . 6
4 Tankers on Order as of June, 1971 7

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1 Channel Depth Required.for Various Tanker Sizes
(DWT) . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

2 Major Shipping Channels of Narragansett Bay 12

INTRODUCTION

The Suez Crisis in June, 1967., forced the major oil companies

to look into the feasibility of an alternate route for the shipment

of both crude and refined oil products. As a result of this incident-

and also due to the resultant savings, major oil companies now appear

committed to an era of so-called "supertankers". Even if the Suez

Canal were to be re-opened and the political climate somehow stabi-

lized, it is doubtful that the oil companies would revert to smaller

ships which could pass through Suez fully loaded. The main reason

for this lies in the fact that the cost per barrel of oil shipped

is greatly reduced by the use of these larger tankers. It now

appears that these ships will grow not only in size but also in

number and in their percentage of the world's tanker fleet.

As these ships continue to grow, especially in terms of their

draft, a re-evaluation of the petroleum traffic on Narragansett Bay

is needed to determine what effects this growth will have in the

areas of port adequacy, congestion, and possible pollution problems.

PART ONE: TANKER MEET GROWTH

Although present data is incomplete, th ere is enough informa-

tion available to make the following statement; the world tanker

fleet is growing in total tonnage at a-rapid.pace, and the bulk of

this growth is being caused more by an increase in tonnage per ship

than by an increase in the number of ships themselves. In other

words, tankers are growing larger, and are doing so at an increasing

rate. There are four reasons for this growth in size:

1) The capital cost for higher payload - it is, up to a point,

cheaper per ton to build a very large tanker than a smaller,

conventional one.

2) Propulsion costs do not go up proportionately with size.

3) Automation has reduced crew sizes, enabling fewer men to.

move more oil.

4) The cost per barrel of shipping petroleum products is

reducedwith the use of larger ships. This point is a

reflection of points 1-3 above.

This growth has been a continuous one since the end or World

War II. In 1959, more than 37 percent of the world fleet consisted

of ships over 25,000 dead-weight tons (dead-weight tons is a measure

of everything a ship carries, including cargo, stores, etc., ex-

pressed in long tons), and 16 percent were rated at more than 35,000

DWT. By 1964, one-fifth of the world's tankers had capacities of

30,000 DWT and up.

In terms of number of ships, the world tanker fleet "M '1971

numbered nearly 4,000 vessels., compared with about 3,200 in 1960.
In terms of deadweight tonnage the world fleet grew by 14.8 percent
during 1970, compared with 13.2 percent in 1969. The average tonnage
of tankers over 10,000 DWT at the end of 1970 was 46,897.
Some 340 new tankers were scheduled for delivery in 1971, with

more than 100 of them in the supertanker class of more than 200,000
DWT. This growth in size can be seen in the fact that in 1950,
30,000 tonners were the pride of the fleet. In 1971, a 370,000 DWT

tanker was launched and two 447,000 DWT vessels are scheduled to go
into service in 1973. It is important to remember that when speaking
of these larger ships in the 250,000 to 400,000 DWT class, we are
also including Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC) which, although they

play a major part in the oil industry, may be of little significance

in future planning for Narragansett Bay in that there are no refin-

eries in the area and the small amounts of crude.oil that are

brought into the Bay would probably not necessitate the use of a VLCC.

In terms of size, there has been a rapid growth in the average
size of the world tanker'fleet. The average tonnage of tankers in
the 10,000 DWT and over class as of June, 1971, was 50,195 DWT. This

compares with only 46,897 DWT six months earlier. i-,,jew ships delivered

in the first half of 1971 averaged 141,693 DWT and vessels on order

as of June 30, 1971 averaged 161,534 DWT.

The main reason for this steady growth in size is one of

cheaper construction cost and cheaper transportation cost. The

following table shows that as ship size increases the cost of con-

struction*per ton'-decreases:

Table 1

SCALE FOR ESTIMATING TANKER CONSTRUCTION
COSTS IN THE U.S. (191-11)

Deadweight Tonnage Cost per DWT Estimated Total Cost

50,000 $409 $203450,000

310 31,000,000

200,000 231 46,200,000

300,000 199 59,700,000
4oo,ooo 178 71,200,00@O

The most recent census of the world's tanker fleet available

gives figures as of De cember 31, 1970. The following tables give

the age, DWT and draft of the 4,232 tankers in use at that time.

It can be seen that the use of larger, deeper ships started in the

mid nineteen sixties, and has increased, especially in the 200,000
to 249,999 DWT and 250,000 to 299,999 DWT classes.

The John I. Jacobs and Company Ltd. has listed the following

tankers being on order as of June, 1971. Again, this breakdown

shows that the move towards large ships has not abated and that

these ships seem to be firmly entrenched as the heart of the world?s

future tanker fleet.

This present and future growth of "supertankers" has been

S
purred not only by the economics of larger ships but also by the

fact that both the United States and Europe are finding themselves

in the position of having to import more and more oil as their needs

increase. It is forecasted that by 1980 the United States will have

to import at least 13 million barrels per day, or 55 percent of its

Table 22

TANKERS BUILT 1941-1970
(Weight in Deadweight Tons)

Year Under 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 125,000 150,000 2009000 250)000 300POOO 350,000
Built Total 20,000 39,999 59,999 79,999 99,999 124,999 149,999 199,999 249,999 299,999 349 999 And Oveir

Prior to
1941 81 78 3
1941 6 5 1
1942 20 17 3
1943 63 42 21
1944 82 55 27
1945 98 60 38
1946 8 7 1
1947 12 11 1
1948 20 19 1
1949 54 30 23 1
1950 74 45 27 2
1951 85 62 23 -
1952 102 77 22 3
1953 167 112 50 5
1954 216 141 68 7
1955 164 103 53 6 2
1956 145 67 67 9 1 1
1957 195 74 92 24 2 3
1958 247 88 ill 43 2 3
1959 247 78 105 55 7 - 2
1960 202 71 81 44 5 - 1
1961 167 63 41 54 6 3 -
1962 169 65 39 51 4 8 1 1
1963 146 45 13 59 19 8 2 -
1964 199 47 25 55 48 21 3 -
1965 209 66 21 28 71 14 9 -
1966 182 51 14 16 54 25 16 4 1 1
1967 171 83 11 2 18 30 20 2 4 1
1968 214 ill 25 2 8 18' 17 5 12 14 - 2
1969 265 138 35 3 4 15 10 1 14 37 4 4
1970 222 86 35 1 6 7 6 8 5 57 11 -

TOTAL 4,232 1,997 1,077 470 257 156 87 21 36 110 15 6

Table 33

DRAFTS OF TANKERS BUILT 1941-1970
Draft (Weight in Deadweight Tons)
in Under 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 125,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000 350,000
Feet Total 20,000 39,999 59,999 79,999 99,999 124,999 149,999 199,999 249,999 299,999 349,999 and Over

10 1 1
11 3 3
12 20 20
13 39 39
14 90 90
15 106 106
16 94 94
17 108 108
18 135 135
19 105 105
20 139 139
21 63 63
22 46 46
23 16 16
24 31 31
25 35 35
26 34 34
27 43 43
28 130 129 1
29 74 72 2
30 414 360 54
31 421 275 146
32 177 38 138 1
33 160 7 153 -
34 155 3 151 1
35 155 2 150 3
36 171 - 154 17
37 114 1 79 33 1
38 172 - 24 147 1
39 144 1 20 113 9 1
40 122 1 4 80 36 1
41 104 - 1 50 53 -
42 90 - -- 10 72 8
43 49 - - 14 28 7
44 68 - - 1 27 37 2 1
45 21 - - - 13 8 - -
46 42 - - - 11 27 4 -
47 33 - - - 4 21 8 -
48 24 - - - - 16 8 -
49 43 - - - 2 22 18 1
50 15 - - - - 4 11 -
51 15 - - - - 3 12 -
52 12 - - - - - 12 -
53 10 - - - - - 5 3 2
54 19 - - - - 1 3 5 3 7
55 8 - - - - - 4 3 1 -
56 9 - - - - - 5 4
57 3 - - - - - 3
58 5 - - - - - 4
59 9 - - - - - - 3 6
60 7 - - - - - - 5 2
61 4 - - - - - - 2 2
62 49 - - - - - - 4 45
63 20 - - - - - - - 20
64 11 - - - - - - - - 11
65 15 - - - - - - - 2 6 7
66 6 - - - - - - - 1 5
67 9 - - - - - - - 9
68 8 - - - - - - - 6 2
71 1 - - - - - - -
81 6 - - - - - - - 6
TOTAL 4,232 1,997 1,077 470 257 156 87 21 36 110 15 6 0

Table 44

TANKERS ON ORDER AS OF JUNE, 1971
Size Group, DWT Number Total DWT

10,000-12,999 4 46,500
13,000-16,999 11 167,900
17,000-19,999 3 55,800
20,000-24,999 39 go6,8oo
25,000-29,999 61 1,679,500
30,000-34,999 31 961,500

35,000-39,999 7 247,800
4o,ooo-44,999 - -

45,000-49,999

50,000-59,999 - -
60,000-69,999 9 616,800

70,000-79,999 - -
8o,ooo-89,999 5 400,000

90,000-99,999 6 585,300
100,000-124,999 15 1,746,990
125,000-149,999 22 2,931,700
150,000-174,999 3 465,000
175,000-199,999 2 383,4oo
200,000-249,999 108 24$460>400
250,000-299,999 137 36,311,200
300,000 + over 16 5$408,400

TOTAL 479 77s374,900

total demand, mainly from the.Eastern Hemisphere. By 1985, it is

estimated that as much tanker tonnage as now exists in the entire

world trade (153 million DWT) will be required to supply U.S. energy

import needs alone. A study done for the U.S. Department of Trans-

portation predicts that by 1983 the major routes for transporting oil

will be served solely by 300,000-ton to 500,000-ton tankers. Most

of todayl,s under 100,000-ton fleet will merely distribute oil to

refineries from the central unloading points, or from refineries to

markets. The effects of this trend will not be felt immediately in

Rhode Island due to such factors as time of construction, expected

life of present fleet ships, and the time required to construct new

major off-loading points for these larger ships. In terms of plan-

ning, this means that Rhode Island should have ample time to inves-

tigate this trend and plan for the future.

While this rush to larger, deeper, and wider tankers appears to

be unchanged, there are some factors which experts1feel. will slowly

level off this growth. Foremost among these are inflation and

construction terms. Shipbuilders are asking for down payments

of 10 to 40 percent of the price of a new vessel as tanker construc-

tion moves into a seller's market. Some yards want substantial

progress payments as well. Inflation has caused cost per DWT to

double in the last five years, and some yards are demanding escala-

tion clauses in their contracts.

Another negative factor is the lack of adequate mooring and

storage facilities. Most major ports in the U.S. can handle ships

having up to 40 foot drafts. None, however, can handle the new breed

of tankers requiring more than 70 feet of water.
In response to this problem, Congress has directed the U.S.
Army,Corps of Engineers to study the construction of Atlantic coast

ports which can handle tankers such as the six new ships for which

construction contracts were awarded by the federal government in
June, 1972. These ships, scheduled for completion in 1975 or 1976,
will have drafts of 67 to 70 feet. At the present time only one.

port in the contiguous 48 states, Seattle, can accommodate these

ships.

The Corps of Engineers study will not be completed until,

June, 1973. However, six sites have been identified as having the

best potential: Machias Bay and Casco Bay (Portland), Maine,,*
Raritan Bay (the Port of New York),, Delaware Bay and Cape Henlopen,
Delaware.,. and Norfolk, Virginia.

Local regulations, too, are beginning to affect tanker movements
into port areas. For example, the State of Delaware has passed a

coastal zone law which would prohibit, among other things, the con-

struction of an off-shore terminal facility.

PART TWO: EFFECTS OF FLEET GROWTH ON BAY TRAFFIC

As oil tankers grow larger in total deadweight tons they also

increase in another aspect that is critical to traffic on the bay.

This critical aspect is one of draft. As can be seen from Tables

2 and 3, oil tankers are being built with greater capacities and

resultant deeper drafts. Figure 1 shows the approximate channel
depths required as the size of ships increase. While these depth/size
comparisons are not exact, they are close enough to serve as a useful

guide. It should also be pointed out that for safety purposes
channels must generally be 5 to 10 feet deeper than the maximum draft

of the vessels using them.

The present traffic on Narragansett.Bay consists of both ship-

to-shore oil transfers and ship-to-ship, or "lightering", transfers

prior to a ship-to-shore operation. The two main channels on the Bay

are the Providence River Channel and the Mount Hope Bay-Fall River

Harbor Channel, highlighted in Figure 2 in black. The Providence

River Channel varies in width from 600 feet to 1,700 feet, with

depths ranging from 32.1 feet to 40.0 feet, measured at mean low

water. It is 9.4 nautical miles long. The Mount Hope.Bay-Fall

River Harbor Channel varies in width from 400 feet to 1,100 feet,

with depths ranging from 32.0 feet to 37.2 feet, measured at mean

low water. It is six nautical miles long. This means that for

practical purposes tankers, whether they be ocean-going or "lighters"
are restricted to a draft of approximately 35 feet at low tide.

Larger ships can use this channel with the size increasing as the

5
FIGURE I

CHANNEL DEPTH REQUIRED
FOR VARIOUS TANKER SIZES (DWT)

75
001*'v

65
ood

45
OF

25
10 40 70 100 130- 160 190 220 250 280 310

TANKER SIZE-THOUSANDS OF DWT

P OVIDE FIGURE 2

MAJOR SHIPPING CHANNELS
OF NARRAGANSETT BAY
POSSIBLE ANCORAGE FOR VESSEL-TO-VESSEL TRANSFER Y,
WATER DEPTH 65 FEET OR MORE AT MEAN LOW WATER
=MAJOR SHIPPING CHANNELS

t@V
@y

j@ Al,

VL
I'll .. . . ...
@,42
12@

%
7 17

4--

%
Z. -04 . .....

J
ul@

'4
A i

all,

'4t

V
.1 .7"

-;Xz
voo 01

tide rises. However, as a general rule., no matter how large a super.

tanker that can be accommodated, the necessary "lightering" that

follows will be limited to ship of 35 feet draft.

If one were to assume that this lightering is to continue

within existing draft limitations, the next question would concern

the size of ocean-going tankers that the Bay can receive. Figure 2

shows an area highlighted by diagonal lines which represents those

waters which have a depth of 65 feet or greater, measured at mean

low water. This area is, in effect, the East Passage of the Bay.

Using Figure 1 as a guide, it could be concluded that a tanker of

some 200,.000 DWT could safely use this route. As with the channels,

a rise in the tide increases th e draft, and therefore the capacity,
of a ship using this passage. It would appear that 65 feet is a
good, but not maximum, working figure when talking of ship sizes for

the lower Bay.
With the increased demands for petroleum products and the growth

of ship sizes, it would appear that "lightering-I will not only con-
tinue to play a major role in the Bay's shipping traffic, but will
probably increase. Although dredging is an alternative to this, it

does not appear to be a very attractive one, from the points of view
of either financing or ecology. The cost of deepening either the

passage or the channels would be prohibitive and even if it were

financially possible, it would present serious ecological probl ems.
it is extremely doubtful that material dredged from the bottom of the

present channel would meet Environmental Protection Agency standards

for disposal.

PART THREE: POSSIBLEPOLLUTION PROBLEMS

Pollution of our waterways'with oil products is ca used by three

main factors: bilge pumping, transfer leakage, and collisions.

The expected increase in traffic on the Bay could affect all three

of these areas. Increased traffic by lighters or visits by larger

ships could increase pollution caused by bilge pumping. This is now

the greatest cause of oil pollution on our waters. It is caused by

the fact that ships must take in sea water as ballast and must store

some of it in empty oil tanks. When preparing to reload with oil,

these tanks must be cleaned and the oil-water mixture which results

must be disposed of. In.many cases it is simply pumped overboard,

although efforts are being made to reduce this problem.

The probability of transfer leakage, whether ship-to-ship or

ship-to-shore, will be increased with the advent of more traffic on

the Bay. With ships growing larger, more "lightering" will be

needed and more lighters per main tanker will be required, thus in-

creasing the risk of transfer spillage. However, tighter controls

and new techniques could be a positive factor.

It seems reasonable to assume that transfer leakage is more

likely to occur on a ship-to-ship transfer than a ship-to-shore

transfer, since the latter involves a stable platform at one end of

the operation. It would also seem reasonable that leaks from a

ship-to-ship transfer would be more difficult to clean up, since

they would tend to occur in more open waters, rather than in sheltere@3..

harbors.

In the area of collisions, some authorities feel the la.-ger

ships will reduce the total number of ships carrying oil and thus

reduce the chances of a collision and resultant spill, while others

feel that these larger vessels will cause more "lightering",'and

therefore, will acutally generate more traffic in the already

crowded harbors. It would appear that Narragansett Bay would fall

into the latter category but it is difficult to determine just how

much more traffic these supertankers will generate.

In an area related to collisions, there are those who feel that

the newer supertankers are actually underpowered in that some ships

have increazed capacity twelvefold while increasing horsepower only

threefold. On the other hand, there are those who feel that the

smaller tankers in the world fleet, which are usually older ships,

are not as maneuverable as they once were and pose a hazard to safe

navigation.

PART FOUR: SUMMARY AND COI-ICLUSIO14S

The world's oil tanker fleet is presently growinr; both in numb--j.

and in ship size and indications are that it will continue to do so.

The effect of this growth on Narragansett Bay will probably be one

of more oil tanker traffic, for while ship sizes are growing, the

demand for petroleum products is growing at an even faster rate.
The Bay's East Passage has the ability to handle shipping of 65 feet

at mean low tide, with deeper drafts possible depending on the tides.

The two major channels in the northern part of the Bay are limited

to ships of approximately 35 feet in draft. It appears that ship-

to-ship transfer will b e c :) ir, e a major portion of the Bay I s oil-

related traffic and will probably grow as the size of ships increase-.

unless such transfers are prohibited. There is a trend to build the

newer tankers longer and wider., so that the drafts may become stabi-

lized while the volume increases. This would mean more traffic in

the form of lighters.

The possibility of increased pollution is, of course, evident

as traffic increases but this does not mean that it has to occur.

Tighter control measures and new anti-pollution techniques are a

definite factor in these considerations but it is difficult to gtLul-e

their effect In a report of this length.

Assessment of Rhode Island's position is also complicated by

recent and possible future developments outside the state. Con-

struction of a refinery in the Bahamas by a consortium of nine (,il

producers,, the existence of deep-water ports in Clanada, tiie

construction of deeD water terminals on the Atlantic coast of the

United States, the e.xport policies of mid-eastern and South American

crude oil producing countries, and the oil import policies of the

United States can all affect the volume of petroleum products handled

in Narragansett Bay., and the type and number of ships carrying these

products.

Evaluation of the future courses,of action available to Rhode

Island must also consider possible changes in the local situation.

At present, there are no.o,il,re,fineries on Narragansett, Bay, Mount

Hope Bay, or their tributaries. Consequently, little or no crude

oil is now shipped into the area by tanker.. If an oil refinery were

located.on any of these waterbodies., much larger tankers (and pro-

bably the VLCC type ships) would have to be accommodated than those

expected 'to be used in the@transportation of "finished" petroleum

products for the next few years. Since the Coastal Resources Manage-

ment Council has jur1sdiction over the location of oil refineries

within that part of Narragansett Bay and adj.oining waters within

Rhode Island, the factor of tanker size must be considered in making

any decisions,on location of refineries. However, the location of

a refinery in the VAll River area, over which Rhode Island has no

direct control,, would have essentially the same impact on the size

and number of tankers operating in Narragansett Bay.

Under existing conditions, with no oil refineries located ir

this area., there are five basic alternative courses of action open

to Rhode Island in dealing with the problems posed by the use of

increasingly larger tankers. These are;

1) Permit ship-to-ship transfer of oil. This would maintain

or improve the position of Narragansett Bay as an oil

handling port (now the fourth largest in New England),

but would run the maximum ri sk of an oil spill polluting

waters in the lower Bay.

2) Prohibit ship-to-ship transfer of oil in Narragansett Bay.

This would substantially reduce the pollution hazard, but,

as discussed previously, increasing shipdrafts will

eventually cause traffic to shift to other ports, thus

increasing the cost of oil in Rhode Island and reducing

an-important economic activity.

3) Prohibit ship-to-ship transfer until the use of larger

tankers makes it absolutely necessary. This would defer the

pollution potential, but careful timing would be essential,,

and the situation could change too rapidly to-respond under

thia policy. This alternative must be considered an interim

approach. It would gain-time to formulate other solutions

or to benefit from Improved technology for vessel-to-vessel

transfers, until the use of larger tankers is so wide-

spread as to demand selection.of one of the other alterna-

tives.

Limit the ship-to-ship transfer of oil to cargo destined

for a Rhode Island port; prohibit use of the Bay as a

sheltered anchorage for trans-shipment to, ports out of

state. This would reduce the exposure to pollution hazards

to some extent and yet maintain the state's economic position.

5) dredge channels to: permit ship-to-shore transfer. This

alternative. would probably not be technically feasible

due to cost and pollution factors involved,

If either the first or fourth alternatives is selected, this

activity should be confined to a designated transfer area in which

all ship-to-ship operations would, be required to take place. Such

an area has been designated for the Coastal resources Management

Council and is shown on the map, highlighted by cross-hatched lines,
south of gould island. continuous policing of the area, including

standby spillage control equipment, should be considered.

More detailed study of such, factors as the total oil storage

capacity of facilities located on the bay , detailed maps of such

storage areas and their water approaches, the engineering feasibility

and environmental problems of dredging, parts of the passage to make

traffic management easier and safer, and a thorough study the

feasibility of establishing a central ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore _

facility for the Bay should be incorporated into the Council's

resources management plans and programs as these are formulated,

regardles of the alternative selected.

FOOTNOTES

1 "The New Breed of Tankers" Petroleum Today Fall, 1971,P. 16.

2 Department of Commerce, "A Statistical Analysis of the World's
Merchant fleet, 1972.

3 Ibid..
4 "World's Tankers Grow in size, Number", The Oil and Gas Journal,
September 27,1971,P. 64.
5 `Issue: Are Changes Needed in Harbor Planning?"', Water spectrumrum
Spring, 1971, P. 6.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PERIODICALS

"Big,bigger, Biggest", Aramco World, July-August, 1966, p. 14.
"Europe's Shipbuilders up anchor", Business Week, October 14, 1967,
p89.

"Shipping: The big-Tanker rush", Newsweek, November 6, 1967, P.77.
"Europe's Oil Men Grab for new supertankers" Business Week, April
6,1968, p. 120.
"Unwanted oil",Sea Frontiers, July-August, 1968, p. 221.
"Supplying the '70's - the supertransport era" U.S. News & World
Report, January 12, 1970, P.89.
"World Tanker Fleet, backlog mushroom", The Oil and Gas Journal,
April 6, 1970, P. 72.

"Nixon Launches Plan to Control Spills", The Oil and Gas Journal,
May 25, 1970, P. 58.

"Shipbuilders scent big revival in orders", U.S. News and World
Report, June 1, 1970, p. 18.
"The Lush Era of the Tanker tycoons", Newsweek, October 19, 1970,
p. 94.

"Delaware Bay Terminal Complex Pushed", The Oil and Gas Journal,
January 25, 1971, P.94.
"Unique Tanker Design A Boom to Ports?", The Oil and Gas Journal,
February 1, 1971, p.50.

Growing Problem of Oil Spills - Reasons and Remedies",U.S. News and
World Report, february 8, 1971, p. 52.

"The Oil Bombs" Nation, February 22, 1971, p. 229.
"Shipyards Bustling with Tanker Orders" The Oil and Gas Journal,
Apr1 5,1971 , p.48.

"Shipyards bustling with tanker orders" the oil and gas journal, april 5,1971, p. 48.
"The great ocean sweepstakes " , sea frontiers, may-june, 1971, p.146.

"Supertanker Ports Urged for U.S. East Coast", The Oil and Gas
Journal, June 28, 1971, P. 45.

"A Giant Alternative to the Suez Canal", Fortune, August, 1971,
P. 117.
"Racing to Build Supertankers", Business Week, August 7, 1971, p. 45.

"World's Tankers Grow in Size, Number", The Oil and Gas Journal,
September 27, 1971, p. 64.
"The New Breed of Tankers", Petroleum Today, Fall, 1971, P. 16.
"Watching Washington: Here Come the Tankers, Ready or Not", The Oil
and Gas Journal, November 1,1971, p.27.

"U.S. Pushes Tanker-Construction Funds", The Oil and Gas Journal,
November 29,1971 p.42.
"Big Doesn't Mean Efficient", New Republic, November 20, 1971, p.26.

"port Growth Policies Abroad", Water Spectrum, Winter, 1971-72, p.2

"U.S. Has Leading Role in Effort to Design New Type Oil Tanker,
Commerce Today, March 20,1972, P. 13.

"World Tanker Fleet Shows Small Surplus", The Oil and Gas Journal,
April 3,1972, p. 24.

REPORTS

Governor's Task Force on Marine and Coastal Affairs, February 18,
1971. Coastal Zone Management for Delaware, P. 3-1.

OTHER

Department of Commerce. A Statistical Analysis of the World's
Merchant Fleets, 1972.

DATEDUE

GAYLORDINO. 2333 PRINTED IN U.S.A.

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