Institutional arrangements for Great Lakes management past practices and future alternatives : an executive summary

[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]

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Institutional Arrangements
for
Great Lakes Management

Past Practices and Future Altematives

An Executive Summary

Michael Joseph Donahue, Ph.D.
November 1987

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.G7 Michigan Sea Grant College Program
D68 MICHU-SG-87-200E
1987 COASTAL ZONE

INFORMATION CENTER

Institutional Arran ements
for
Great Lakes Management

Past Practices and Future Altematives

An Executive Summary

Michael Joseph Donahue, Ph.D.
November 1987

Michigan Sea Grant College Program
MICHU-SG-87-200E

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Michael J. Donahue is a former Sea Grant researcher and is a student of
Great Lakes organizations and policy development. His study, titled
Institutional Arrangements for Great Lakes Management: Past Practices and
Future Alternatives, is the culmination of an intensive multi-year effort
while a Research Associate at The University of Michigan in 1984-86.

Dr. Donahue currently serves as Executive Director of the Great Lakes
Commission, a position he has held since July 1987. He previously served as
U.S. Office Director and Head of Research with The Center for the Great
Lakes. Earlier appointments in policy analysis, regional planning and
administration included those with the Great Lakes Commission and Great
Lakes Basin Commission.

Dr. Donahue holds a doctorate in Urban, Technological and Environmental
Planning from The University of Michigan and graduate and undergraduate
degrees from the University in public policy and resource management.

The views, findings and recommendations expressed in this document are those
of the author in his capacity as a Sea Grant researcher and should not be
attributed to those of any past or present employer or institution discussed
within.

@1986 Michael J. Donahue, Ph.D.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A note of appreciation is extended to the Michigan Sea Grant College Program
for its financial support of this study and to The Center for the Great Lakes
and the Great Lakes Commission for contribution of "in-kind" services.
Appreciation is extended also to the members and staffs of the International
Joint Commission, Great Lakes Fishery Commission, Great Lakes Commission,
Council of Great Lakes Governors, and the former Great Lakes Basin Commission
for their cooperation and assistance in providing information, reviewing draft
material and study elements and expressing an interest in resultant findings
and recommendations.

The study document was submitted as a dissertation in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Urban, Technological
and Environmental Planning in The University of Michigan. Acknowledgment is
therefore in order for members of the author's dissertation committee, in-
cluding Professor William B. Drake (Chairman) and Professors Jonathan W.
Bulkley, George F. Francis, and Katherine P. Warner.

This publication is a result of work sponsored by the Michigan Sea Grant
College Program, Project No. #R/RP-2 with Grant No. #NA85AA-D-SG-045 from the
National Sea Grant College Program, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration, U.S. Department of Commerce; and funds from the State of Michigan.
The U.S. Government Is authorized to produce and distribute reprints for
government purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation appearing hereon.

PREFACE

The decade of the 1980s has witnessed a re-birth (or perhaps reconfirmation) of
a regional environmental ethic and a new-found appreciation of the contribution
of the Great Lakes to the region's economy. A sense of regionalism - a shared
interest among and between the Basin's state, provincial and federal jurisdic-
tions - has re-emerged in unprecedented strength and placed Great Lakes
resource management and economic development considerations high on the policy
agenda of the region's leaders.

This re-emergent "regional consciousness" has, in turn, prompted concerted
attention toward the "institutional ecosystem" for Great Lakes management. A
sense of immediacy has been brought to bear on a long-standing yet long-ignored
need - a need to understand the roles, responsibilities and interactions of
publicly funded, multi-jurisdictional organizations; to assess their individual
and collective ability to address resource management needs; and to devise
alternative means of strengthening this Great Lakes "institutional ecosystem."

Presented within are key excerpts from an exhaustive study to address these
pressing needs. This Executive Summary provides a summary overview of the full
report text, with a primary emphasis on findings and recommendations for
strengthening the Great Lakes "institutional ecosystem." Institutions of prin-
cipal focus include the International Joint Commission; Great Lakes Fishery
Commission, Great Lakes Commission, and Council of Great Lakes Governors.

The reader will find this Executive Summary of value as an overview of study
objectives, methodology, findings and recommendations. Chapter Eight is ex-
cerpted from the full text and presents a set of baseline goals and objectives
for Basin management and generates a checklist of structural and operational
characteristics for institutional design. This information provides the frame-
work for a subsequent detailed assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of
the collective and individual institutional approaches to Basin management.

Chapter Nine is the culmination of the research effort, and is also excerpted
from the full text. Four scenarios for institutional revision are offered on a
continuum between acceptance of the status quo and outright elimination of
present arrangements in favor of a new and substantially different one. The
merits of each scenario are discussed and an extensive series of recommended
actions is presented. The chapter is followed by an Epilogue suggesting a
research agenda for further work in this area.

The intent of this Executive Summary is to present the region's policy makers
and opinion leaders with a concise listing of recommendations for strengthening
the structure and operation of the regional institutions identified earlier.
The reader is urged, however, to consult the full text for the historical
perspective and analytical framework from which the recommendations emerge.
The Appendix presents a detailed review of the contents of the full report.

It can be argued with confidence that the "window of opportunity" for positive
institutional change has seldom been open wider. Rising political interest in
critical regional issues and the emergence of an informed and active public
have generated the requisite momentum to secure desired change. There is,
however, a critical missing element which, left unaddressed, renders this
momentum meaningless. This element has three components: a clear articulation
of present institutional inadequacies; a sense of desired direction in insti-
tutional revision; and a strategy for securing acceptance and implementation of
those revisions. It is the intent of this study - via the Executive Study and
full text - to shape this missing element.

For a copy of the 'Full Report, contact Michigan Sea Grant College Program, 2200 Bonisteel
Blvd, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 (3131764-1138). Ask for publication number MICHU-SG-87-200T
and send a check or money order for $20.00. Additional copies of this Executive Summary
can also be obtained for $6.00.

CONTENTS

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

LIST OF FIGURES * , * * * . . * * * , , * * * * , * , , , , , , vili

LIST OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

SUMMARY OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Background
Methodology
Findings and Recommendations

SECTION THREE: ALTERNATE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR GREAT
LAKES MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

CHAPTER EIGHT: GOALS, OBJECTIVES AND PARAMETERS FOR THE COLLECTIVE
INSTITUTIONAL EFFORT: DEVELOPING A BENCHMARK . . . . . . . . 238

Introduction
Goals for Great Lakes Management: Developing a
Context for Institutional Change
Toward a Benchmark for Institutional Design and
Operation
Statements of Finding - The Collective
Institutional Effort
Statements of Finding - The Individual
Institutional Effort
International Joint Commission
Great Lakes Fishery Commission
Great Lakes Commission
Council of Great Lakes Governors

CHAPTER NINE: SCENARIOS FOR INSTITUTIONAL REVISION: RECOMMENDATIONS-
AND RATIONALE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280

Introduction
A Summary Perspective on the Structure and Operation
of the Great Lakes Institutional Ecosystem
Scenario One: Preserving the "Status Quo"
Scenario Two: An Incremental Approach to
Institutional Change
Scenario Three: Substantive Revision of
Present Institutional Arrangements
Scenario Four: Dramatic Single Step Revision
A Strategy for Implementing Scenario Recommendations

EPILOGUE: TOWARD A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR CONTINUED
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324

APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

- Table of Contents Full Report

- Bibliography

LIST OF TABLES

Table

22. Goals and Objectives for Great Lakes Institutional Efforts . . . 241

23. Checklist of Institutional Parameters for Great Lakes
Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

vii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

5. Organization of a Hypothetical "International Great
Lakes Basin Commission .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322

viii

I
t
I
I LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1
a - Table of Contents - Full Report

Bibliography
1,
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1)
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1,
I

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11
ix
I

SUMMARY OVERVIEW

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR GREAT LAKES MANAGEMENT:
PAST PRACTICES AND FUTURE ALTERNATIVES

Background

The magnitude and complexity of the Great Lakes system and its socio-
economic attributes are exhibited in terms of governance as well. The
Great Lakes system is a shared, multi-purpose resource used and managed at
every level from municipalities to the international arena. Two federal
governments, eight states and two provinces share the Basin. Literally
hundreds of governmental entities are charged with the management of some
aspect of the resource, including municipalities, county health boards,
state departments of natural resources, over a dozen federal agencies (U.S.
and Canadian) and several regional and international bodies as well. The
latter two possess important coordinative, policy development and catalytic
functions in the operation of this "institutional ecosystem." Principal
among them are the International Joint Commission, the Great Lakes Com@-
mission, the Great Lakes Fishery Commission and the Council of Great Lakes
Governors.

The role of regional (i.e. , multi -jurisdictional) institutions - in the
Great Lakes Basin and elsewhere - has historically been an evolving and
often uncertain one. They tend to exist rather uncomfortably in the system
of federalism, and as mechanisms of the political jurisdictions, tend to be
devised and instituted with political expediency and inadequate sensitivity
to goal setting and development of measures of success. This observation
is particularly true in the Great Lakes Basin, where a long-standing yet
poorly articulated sense of dissatisfaction with its regional institutions
is observed and, yet, little attention has been paid to the systematic and
comprehensive review of regional resource management needs and the insti-
tutions required to provide for them.

In the past several years, numerous developments have emphasized the need
for such a review:

0 The continuing maturation of the "ecosystem approach" concept for
Great Lakes management.. Resource managers are becoming in-
creasingly aware of the interrelatedness of the Great Lakes and the
concomitant need for an integrated, systems-oriented management
approach. This has prompted a rethinking of traditional management
approaches reliant upon issue-specific authority and political
jurisdictions.

0 The accelerated movement and dynamic nature of the institutional
ecosystem for Great Lakes management. In the United States, the
"new federalism" philosophy has seen state assumption of many

research, regulatory and planning functions once undertaken and/or
funded by the federal government. Concurrently, we observe an
unprecedented level of activity in regional government (e.g., for-
mation of the Council of Great Lakes Governors and the Great Lakes
Environmental Administrators) and the business, citizen and private
foundation sector (e.g., formation of The Center for the Great
Lakes and Great Lakes United). As the various agencies and organi-
zations attempt to define or redefine their respective roles, an
understanding of the existing institutional network and associated
needs is imperative.

� The nature of interstate and International issues emerging in the
Great Lakes region. The region's jurisdictions are being con-
fronted with increasingly complex economic and environmental chal-
lenges of a regional nature. Transboundary air pollution, toxic
contamination, and Seaway maintenance and expansion are but a few.
Addressing them requires a careful examination of the institutional
arrangements currently or potentially available on a binational
scale.

� The political context in which resource management problems are
defined and addressed. Given the jurisdictional complexities of
Basin resource management, the institutional network does not
simply address problems and issues; it also can redefine, ignore,
create, solve or exacerbate them. For this reason, an under-
standing of this network - its strengths, weaknesses and potential
- is as critical as understanding the problems and issues them-
selves.

A growing recognition of these and related concerns was expressed at the
June 1982 Governors' Water Resources Conference on Mackinac Island. By
unanimous action, the Great Lakes governors and premiers passed a resolu-
tion recognizing that present institutional arrangements for binational
cooperation - such as the Great Lakes Commission and International Joint
Commission - "need to be strengthened" to effectively address current
issues.

These developments form the impetus for this study entitled, "Institutional
Arrangements for Great Lakes Management: Past Practices and Future
Alternatives."

Methodology

The thesis upon which this investigation is premised is as follows:

The evolution of effective institutional arrangements for Great Lakes
management has been hampered by an inadequate understanding and analysis of
past and present regional institutions and their respective roles in
addressing Basin needs. As a consequence, we find a resultant failure to
incorporate positive attributes into the establishment of new management
institutions or the revision of existing ones. A systematic review of the
evolution of past and present institutional arrangements will facilitate
the identification and analysis of management strategies and organizational
characteristics that hold promise for Great Lakes management. They can

then be integrated into new or existing institutional arrangements to
enhance Great Lakes management capabilities. The corresponding goal is to
encourage the orderly and informed evolution of the Great Lakes "institu-
tional ecosystem," and in so doing, advance both the efficiency and
effectiveness of regional resource management efforts.

A systematic review and analysis of the evolution of past and present
institutional arrangements for regional resource management in the Great
Lakes Basin was conducted in the interest of attaining five objectives
supportive of this goal. The objectives are:

1) To provide an historical perspective on the form and evolution of
past and present institutional arrangements for regional resource
management as well as examine the range of approaches employed in
the United States and Canada,-

2) To identify organizational characteristics and management strate-
gies associated with those institutions that may have current or
potential applicability to institutional arrangements in the Great
Lakes region;

3) To explore the linkages between the components of the Great Lakes
"institutional ecosystem" and identify alternate means for
strengthening them;

4) To develop a list of guidelines, parameters and organizational
criteria that might be considered the essential components of a
viable institution or set of institutions; and

5) To design alternative institutional arrangements which might be
incorporated into, replace, or otherwise augment existing arrange-
ments to encourage the orderly and informed evolution of the Great
Lakes institutional ecosystem.

To meet these objectives, four principal information sources were
incorporated into the study methodology; the literature (theoretical and
applied); personal interviews with selected individuals with professional
interests or responsibilities in regional resource management; a question-
naire survey administered to a broad selection of same; and observation and
analysis of relevant institutions.

The nine tasks associated with this methodology were pursued sequentially
as follows:

1) Literature search and review - theoretical and applied - with an
emphasis on case studies and institution-specific analysis;

2) Selection of institutions for review;

3) Development of a methodology for analysis of selected regional
resource management institutions and their programs;

4) Identification and systematic review and analysis of selected Great
Lakes management institutions and their interrelationships;

5) Identification and systematic review and analysis of selected
institutional forms and existing institutions in other geographic
areas with potential applicability to Great Lakes management needs;

6) Structure and conduct of interviews with selected individuals with
professional interests or responsibilities in Great Lakes Basin
management;

7) Administration of survey questionnaires to a broad group of re-
gional resource management professionals to further refine output
of interviews;

8) Specification of guidelines, parameters and organizational charac-
teristics with potential applicability to the Great Lakes institu-
tional ecosystem and its attendant components; and

9) Design and justification of alternative institutional arrangements
for Great Lakes resource management.

Findings and Recomendations

While study findings and recommendations focus ultimately on this latter
task - design and justification of alternate institutional arrangements
the study yielded an array of findings in other critical areas as well.
Presented below is a synopsis:

A. The Search for the "Ideal" Institutional Arrangement for Great Lakes
Management 1Z

It is found - in both the literature and the opinions of practitioners
that there exists no "ideal" institutional arrangement at present, nor have
specifications for a comprehensive prototype arrangement been brought
forward for serious consideration. Constraints in the search include: an
historical superficial attention to fundamental Basinwide resource manage-
ment goals and needs by resource managers; divergent philosophies (i.e.,
lack of consensus) within the Great Lakes constituency; the uniqueness
(physical and political/jurisdictional) of the Basin; the absence of a
benchmark for assessing institutional adequacy; and the inadequacy of
evaluative mechanisms for assessing institutional performance and effecting
change.

B. A Rationale for the Complexity of the Great Lakes Institutional Eco-
system

The study documents the complexity of this institutional ecosystem through
the inventory and analysis - of its component parts and the interactions
among them. The notion of a complex system as an unequivocally inefficient
one is rejected, and a rationale for the complexity presented. Causal
factors include the physical characteristics of the Basin's hydrologic
system; the multiple-use properties of Basin resources; the complex
interface between hydrologic and political boundaries; the adaptation of
the institutional framework to "new knowledge;" and the inherent nature of
governmental behavior in a resource management setting. The latter in-
cludes a tendency toward institutional inertia; a preoccupation with

newness" (i.e., the political appeal of creating new institutions as
opposed to addressing the inadequacies of existing ones) ; an historical
proclivity toward "crisis response" management; and the experimental nature
of regional resource management.

C. Essential Parameters for Regional Resource Management Institutions

A social research and development methodology was systematically applied to
the literature to elicit consensus findings as to regional resource
management parameters essential for effective institutional structure and
operation. Forty-nine "application concepts" were generated, addressing
the following areas: management philosophy; participatory management;
management functions; role of the management entity in the institutional
ecosystem; physical jurisdiction; breadth of authority; mem-
bership/constituent relations; and compatibility of form and function.
These application concepts were presented as a theoretically and opera-
tionally sound "checklist" to guide institutional design and revision.

D. An Assessment of Alternate Institutional Forms

An extensive literature review and series of case study analyses yielded a
total of fifteen generic institutional forms for prospective application in
a Great Lakes management setting. While recognizing that all forms are not
distinct and variations between them do occur, the following listing was
found to reflect the range of institutional forms presently available for
consideration: 1) interstate compact; 2) federal-state compact; 3) state-
foreign power compact; 4) interstate council/commission; 5) federal/state
commission; 6) international treaty/convention/agreement; 7) federal
regional council; 8) federal regional agency; 9) basin interagency
committee; 10) intrastate special district; 11) single federal
administrator; 12) international commission; 13) international court; 14)
federally chartered or private corporation; and 15) nongovernmental
organization. The preponderance of these forms were drawn from the U.S.
literature; associated institutional forms in Canada for regional resource
management were referenced as appropriate under these general headings.

Each of these generic forms was investigated to provide: 1) a description
of key structural and operational characteristics; 2) a brief history and
present status of the development of the institutional form; 3) an
examination of the strengths and weaknesses on the basis of specified
criteria; 4) an assessment of potential applicability to Great Lakes
management (singly or in combination with other forms); and 5) likelihood
of being implemented given present institutional arrangements and the
political/procedural aspects of institutional change.

When examined in its totality, this "universe" of generic institutional
forms yields a series of observations pertinent to the Great Lakes manage-
ment effort. Those of particular significance include: '

1) It is clear, as many authors have concluded, that there is no
single institutional form indisputably capable of accommodating all
Great Lakes management needs in and of itself. Rather, a collec-
tivity of forms must be utilized, or a variation of existing forms

developed which incorporates the positive attributes of many into
one.

2) Despite the omnipresent dissatisfaction which has accompanied the
evolution of institutional forms in the Great Lakes region, such
forms are actually quite advanced when compared to those developed
in other regions. In many respects, the Great Lakes region has
been an innovator in "experimenting" with some of the "stronger"
institutional forms (e.g., compact, international commission,
treaty/convention/agreement). Hence, the value of an introspec-
tive examination of institutional evolution should not be dis-
counted; it is at least as enlightening as an analysis of institu-
tional arrangements in other regions.

3) Despite their structural rigidity and often limited mandates, most
institutional forms do exhibit substantial operational flexibility.
For example, the structure of a given institution may forbid formal
binational membership, yet informal arrangements might be developed
to the point that structural limitations are but an inconvenience
(as opposed to an insurmountable obstacle) to Basinwide management
activity.

4) The generic institutional forms reviewed can be assembled on a
continuum ranging from the formal and highly structured mechanisms
(e.g., compacts, international commissions, treaties/con-
ventions/agreements) to those of a more informal and loosely
structured nature (e.g. , federal regional council, basin-
interagency committee, nongovernmental organization). From a
comparative standpoint, the former tend to be long-standing, well-
established, somewhat routinized and comfortably settled into a
"niche" in the institutional ecosystem which dictates their
operation and areas of emphasis. The latter tend to be shorter-
lived; flexible (and sometimes uncertain) in assuming their
institutional niche; adaptive to emerging needs; and more reliant
upon the motivation of their members than established reputation in
advancing the regional resource management effort. While both
extremes on this continuum are found to have characteristics
applicable to the Great Lakes management effort, the likelihood of
implementation (for political reasons) is heavily skewed toward the
latter.

5) Despite their distinct traits, certain strengths and weaknesses
tend to emerge repeatedly when the various institutional forms are
analyzed. For example, most lack: co-equal, U.S.-Canadian repre-
sentation; autonomy in carrying out resource management functions;
broad, inter-jurisdictional representation (domestic or bi-
national); public participation mechanisms; incentive systems for
active membership involvement; binding authority; and a compre-
hensive planning function. Conversely, most provide: a forum for
information exchange; a sensitivity to transboundary, Basinwide or
regional concerns; consensus building mechanisms; a degree of
flexibility in addressing emerging needs; and advisory, research
and coordinative services to member jurisdictions. While no single
institutional form embodies all the positive attributes, it appears

that an "institution building" exercise drawing from the various
forms available would be a significant contribution to the Basin
management effort.

6) When the various generic institutional forms are examined in light
of an appropriately derived set of the institutional parameters or
"application concepts," their prospective contributions to the
Basin management effort are found to be varied. For example, based
on the strengths/weaknesses cited:

a) The federal regional agency, intrastate special district, and
single federal administrator forms are found to be entirely in-
appropriate as lead institutions in a binational basin manage-
ment setting, and of questionable value as supporting ones.

b) The interstate compact, interstate council/commission, federal-
state compact, federal/state commission, federal regional coun-
cil and Basin interagency committee forms do exhibit desirable
characteristics for Basin management, but their domestic em-
phasis makes them more appropriate as supporting, rather than
lead institutions.

c) The state-foreign power compact and international treaty/con-
vent ion/agreement devices do hold promise as a framework for
binational Basin management, provided, of course, that they
authorize the establishment of an appropriate institutional
form.

d) The international court concept has no applicability as a lead
management device, but may be of value as a "last resort"
mechanism should other institutional mediation efforts fail.

e) Nongovernmental institutions provide essential support services
and monitoring and catalytic functions, but due to their
nature, are not candidates for a leading role in Basin manage-
ment.

f) The international commission form, based on a treaty or agree-
ment, is the preferred candidate for a lead institution role,
provided that it reflects the various institutional strengths
interspersed throughout the other institutional forms identi-
fied.

These findings, coupled with the inventory/analysis of generic institu-
tional forms, provide an appropriate baseline reference source for subse-
quent analysis of those forms presently employed in Great Lakes resource
management.

E. Perspectives on Great Lakes Institutional Arrangements and Needs - The
Personal Interview Approach

A series of twenty, in-depth personal interviews were conducted with
leading Great Lakes policymakers and opinion leaders to elicit attitudes

and ideas associated with present arrangements and potential alternatives.
Among others, consensus findings included:

1) the "mixed" performance of the collectivity of Great Lakes manage-
ment institutions and predominant strengths and weaknesses deter-
mining that performance;

2) the marginal responsiveness of these institutions to present and
emerging management needs;

3) the complementary nature of goals across institutions but the
attendant absence of the required linkages;

4) the inadequacy of institutional activity in the areas of Basin
research and planning, data gathering and analysis, and regional
advocacy, among others; and

5) the relative satisfaction with fundamental institutional missions,
with a view toward extensive refinement (by incremental means) of
present arrangements.

Findings also addressed the relative strengths and weaknesses of the four
institutions focused on (the International Joint Commission, Great Lakes
Commission, Great Lakes Fishery Commission and the Council of Great Lakes
Governors), and key management functions and structural/operational
characteristics warranting integration into the institutional framework.

F. Perspectives on Great Lakes Institutional Arrangements and Needs - The
Survey Questionnaire Approach

A survey questionnaire was administered to a cross section of individuals
associated with the Great Lakes management effort, augmenting the personal
interviews and yielding: a perspective on the adequacy of the overall
management effort; an assessment of the mandates and functions of
individual institutions; thoughts on characteristics of the "ideal" insti-
tutional arrangement; and the means by which these characteristics might be
incorporated into the present framework. Key findings elicited from the
109 survey respondents include:

1) Views on Existing Great Lakes Institutions and Institutional
Arrangements

a) Present institutional arrangements for Great Lakes management
were viewed as less than satisfactory by approximately 70% of
respondents, with the preponderance finding the arrangements to
be marginal at best.

b) Although duplication of effort and conflicting goals among
these regional institutions are not perceived as significant
problems, most respondents (75%) believe that current levels of
coordination and cooperation are inadequate.

c) While the overall adequacy of management functions pursued by
the collectivity of Great Lakes institutions might best be

termed as "marginal," the strongest areas consisted of policy
development, impact assessment and coordination. Pronounced
weaknesses were found in monitoring/surveillance, public parti-
cipation/education and enforcement.

d) Dissatisfaction with present institutional arrangements centers
around perceptions of too many institutions; fragmentation of
authority; poor inter-institutional coordination; and a tenden-
cy toward "turf protection."

e) With regard to perceptions of individual institutions and their
missions. 71% of all survey respondents with an opinion found
the performance of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission to be
satisfactory. Other figures were: International Joint Commis-
sion - 44%; Council of Great Lakes Governors - 31%; Great Lakes
Commission - 30%.

f) Duplication of effort among Great Lakes institutions was found
to be of concern to just over 20% of the respondents; most had
"mixed" opinions or viewed the various mandates as "comple-
mentary."

g) Organizational strengths and weaknesses (of both a structural
and operational nature) were identified for each of the four
institutions of principal concern - with respect to their
potential in addressing the breadth of Great Lakes management
needs. Results for each institution, in order of frequency,
are as follows:

International Joint Commission

Strengths include: binational membership; technical capability;
firm legal framework (i.e. , Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978); sense of "history" (i.e. ,
firmly established); prestige and positive public profile;
Basinwide orientation and subscription to the "ecosystem approach;"
joint consideration of U.S. and Canadian concerns; consensus
building vehicle; and independence and impartiality.

Weaknesses include: lack of authority for program initiation,
implementation or regulation; lack of initiative and follow
through; politicized appointment and decision-making process;
staffing/funding inadequacies; lack of state representation;
failure to exercise full authority under existing mandate; and
inconsistent and inadequate leadership.

Great Lakes Commission

Strengths include: co-equal state representation; value as a
coordinative device; legal authority under the Great Lakes Basin
Compact; use for interstate advocacy; staff capability and dedi-
cation; and ability to address a broad range of economic develop-
ment and environmental issues.

Weaknes*ses include: limited mandate and absence of implementation
authority; inadequate Canadian representation; limited state
interest and support; inconsistent/inadequate state involvement and
leadership; unclear direction at membership and staff levels; lack
of follow-through and impact; inability to achieve consensus; low
public profile and level of support; singular focus on issues; poor
caliber or inappropriate selection of commissioners; and
staffing/funding inadequacies.

Great Lakes Fishery Commission

Strengths' include: Basinwide orientation; binational parti-
cipation; technical capability; clear focus and manageable mandate;
record of accomplishment (i.e., sea lamprey eradication); and staff
dedication.

Weaknesses include: narrow mandate and focus; narrow focus within
fishery management (e.g., preoccupation with sea lamprey control,
production rather than habitat management orientation); low profile
among the public and resource management community; inadequate
funding base; lack of implementation and management authority; and
focal point for "turf battles" among cooperators.

Council of Great Lakes Governors

Strengths include: high level representation and decision-making
authority; political "clout;" high public and media profile; quick
response capability; forum for interstate coordination.

Weaknesses include: lack of defined plan of action; lack of
continuity-and follow-through; lack of co-equal representation by
all Basin states; politicized nature; inadequate staff size and
expertise; inadequate coordination with other regional institu-
tions; absence of statutory authority; actual/potential turnover in
membership and staff; and absence of full Canadian representation.

2) Views on Desired Great Lakes Institutions and Institutional
Arrangements

a) Given the opportunity to design the "ideal" regional institu-
tion, most respondents would select a binational compact com-
mission with an appointed state, provincial and federal mem-
bership; a Basin-oriented jurisdiction; and a comprehensive
management focus with some autonomy but accountable to member
jurisdictions. Management functions would be broad based, with
special emphasis upon Basin planning, regional policy develop-
ment, coordination, data collection, impact assessment and re-
search/issue analysis.

b) A small majority of respondents (55%) favored a centralized
institutional arrangement in which all principal management
functions were consolidated into a single lead entity. The
balance found a decentralized,. multi-institutional approach to
be more desirable.

c Issue areas of relevance to the desired institution, in order
of selection, include: water quality; water quantity; levels
and flows; air quality; fish and wildlife; and coastal zone
management.

Those with lower rankings include: drainage; flood plain
management; soils; geology; and forest/vegetation.

d) A small majority of respondents (53%) preferred allocation of
management functions by level of authority (e.g., one institu-
tion responsible for regulation and enforcement, another for
planning). The balance exhibited a preference for allocation
by resource area (e.g., one responsible for fisheries, one for
water quality).

3) Means to Implement Change

a) In an "ideal" sense, consolidation or major revision of
existing agencies is the preferred approach to institutional
change (50%) followed by incremental change to existing agen-
cies (23%) and creation of new institutions (18%), among
others. Given political realities, however, incremental change
was viewed as most realistic (76%), followed by consolidation
of existing agencies (10%) and creation of new institutions
0%). Almost 10% of respondents believe that political reali-
ties prohibit any type of change at the present time.

b) Prevailing obstacles to institutional change, listed in order
of frequency include: resistance by political jurisdictions-
unwilling to sacrifice autonomy; lack of political will; fun-
ding/resource constraints; resistance by existing regional
institutions and uncertainty over institutional needs.

c) Suggested structural and operational revisions to the four
institutions of concern focused on the areas of membership/co-
operator arrangements; appointment process; authority; coord-
ination/integration; administration; scope of concern; and
institutional status. (Refer to text for detailed discussion
of suggested revisions within each category.)

4) Miscellaneous Questions

a) Responses yielded no single institution which the majority
viewed as capable of serving as a "prototype" for addressing
Basinwide resource management needs. The now-defunct Great
Lakes Basin Commission was identified by 13% of the respon-
dents, followed by the International Joint Commission and the
Delaware River Basin Commission. However, the 67 responses
were scattered over 38 institutions.

b) The desirable characteristics commonly associated with this
range of institutions included: research capability; broad

issue orientation; firm legal basis and broad authority; co-
ordinative/consensus building forum; long-term planning and a
standard of professionalism.

C) Respondents identified 226 present and emerging resource
management needs in the Great Lakes Basin. Assembled into nine
resource categories, they are as follows in order of frequency:
water quantity management; water quality management; toxic/
hazardous waste management; institutional/policy needs; mari-
time concerns; air quality; coastal zone/land resource manage-
ment; economic development; and ecosystem management. Of the
above, the most frequently mentioned issue was that of Great
Lakes diversion and consumptive use, followed by concern over
toxic contamination of the resource.

G. Recommendations for Institutional Revision

The literature review, personal interviews, questionnaire survey and
analysis of the four principal Great Lakes institutions yielded an exten-
sive listing of individual and collective institutional strengths and
weaknesses. Based on this listing (presented in detail in text), a series
of recommendations are developed and categorized within four scenarios for
institutional change.

Scenario One: Preserving the "Status Quo" -- This option calls for the
continuai7i-on of The long observed "natural evolution" of the institutional
ecosystem; an evolution influenced by a progression of discrete events and
issues as opposed to concerted "outside" manipulation of the institutional
structure. This option is rejected on the basis of historical observation;
a regional institutional environment which resists substantive positive
change; and the sheer magnitude of the Basin management task and its poli-
tical, social, environmental and economic aspects.

Scenario Two: An Incremental Approach to Institutional Change -- This
option accepts the fundamental legitimacy of existing institutional ar-
rangements and advocates a series of modest operational and structural
revisions to bring these arrangements in line wi 'th Basin management needs.
Recommendations for the collective institutional effort (i.e. , the four
regional institutions of concern) include, for example:

1) Endorse a common set of goals and objectives for the use, manage-
ment, and protection of the resources of the Great Lakes Basin.

2) Establish a framework for information exchange and joint action.
Hold periodic "summit" meetings of key regional institution
staff/officers to prepare and cooperatively implement a joint
strategy.

3) Establish a regional information collection, storage and retrieval
system.

4) Create a framework to monitor and coordinate Great Lakes research
activity; identify and prioritize needs; and allocate responsi-
bilities.

5) Generate inter-institutional support for a Great Lakes Information
Referral Center.

6) Designate inter- institutional liaisons as a means to strengthen
linkages.

7) Formalize an Interagency Personnel Agreement process to facilitate
staff exchange among Great Lakes institutions and state/provincial
federal agencies.

8) Establish intra-institutional evaluation processes for periodic use
in assessing progress in achieving objectives and guiding necessary
revisions in structure and/or operation.

Recommendations for individual institutions, numbering several dozen, are
focused largely in the areas of priority setting; Basin planning;
establishing internal evaluation mechanisms; broadening public input;
establishing lines of accountability to, and expectations of member politi-
cal jurisdictions; applying principles of ecosystem management to program
activity; reviewing and exercising all organizational capabilities under
mandate; assessing organizational resource requirements; strengthening
inter-institutional linkages; clarification of roles vis-a-vis other insti-
tutions; strengthening the binational focus; and others.

These and other options are offered as the appropriate first steps in
desired institutional change, as they are viewed as largely politically
acceptable and implemented with a relative minimum of institutional disrup-
tion, economic cost and time requirements,

Scenario Three: Institutional Change Through Substantive Revision -- This
option, while accepting the fundamental legitimacy of current arrangements,
calls for sweeping operational and structural revision to better address
identified management needs. Among numerous others, recommendations
include:

1) A federal/state counterpart to the Canada-Ontario Agreement for
binational water quality management.

2) Formal and co-equal provincial affiliation with the Council of
Great Lakes Governors and the Great Lakes Commission.

3) Amendment of the Great Lakes Basin Compact to provide Great Lakes
Commission membership with some level of standard setting, regu-
latory and enforcement capability.

4) A comprehensive planning mandate for the International Joint Com-
mission.

5) An operational merger of the Council and Great Lakes Commission
which leaves the compact intact yet integrates staff and individual
programs.

6) An international Great Lakes Agreement which broadens the Water
Quality Agreement focus, the role of the International Joint
Commission Great Lakes Regional Office, and recognizes
state/provincial roles in carrying out the terms of such an
Agreement.

These and other recommendations are offered as positive steps to augment
and expand upon the incremental recommendations presented earlier. The
substantial political obstacles to implementation are recognized, however,
as are the economic costs, time delays and institutional disruption in-
volved with many.

Scenario Four: Dramatic Single Step Revision -- This scenario calls for
elimination of the present institutional ecosystem in favor of a new and
significantly different arrangement. The "ideal" institution for Great
Lakes management is presented; a binational treaty organization with an
appointed state, provincial and federal membership; a Basin-oriented juris-
diction; a comprehensive planning and management focus with standard set-
ting and limited regulatory and enforcement powers; and a staff with some
autonomy but accountable to member jurisdictions. Management functions are
broad based, with special emphasis on Basin planning, policy development,
coordination and data collection. Provided within the overall institutio-
nal framework are state, provincial and federal caucuses.

This institutional option is presented as a hypothetical one, recognizing
the political obstacles associated with its development. However, it
serves as the embodiment of desired characteristics, and as such is offered
as a benchmark for guiding and evaluating less dramatic revisions.

The recommendations within these scenarios are presented to regional policy
makers as a means to systematically strengthen an institutional arrangement
presently incapable of addressing current and emerging issues in a fully
effective and efficient manner.

SECTION THREE: ALTERNATE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
FOR GREAT LAKES MANAGEMENT

Introduction

At this point, it is important to emphasize that all preceding discussion
has had a decided emphasis upon the description, interpretation and
analysis of institutional activity in Great Lakes management. Any
presumption of institutional inadequacy - at either the individual or
collective institutional level - was studiously avoided from the outset.
Rather, areas of strength and weakness emerged through the examination of
the literature; input from personal interviews and interpretation of
responses from a broad-based survey of regional policymakers and opinion-
leaders. These sources also provide the means to construct a set of
guidelines, or benchmark, for use in the design, evaluation and refinement
of a given institution or set of institutions.

As will be discussed, one of the many consensus findings which emerged from
earlier analysis pertains to the evolutionary nature of regional resource
management and the need for Great Lakes jurisdictions to overcome the
constraints which have thwarted its maturation. One such constraint, for
example, is the historical inability of political jurisdictions to
translate the tenets of the "ecosystem management approach" into
institutional process. Wendall and Schwann (1972) explain, "The insti-
tutional labyrinths that seemed perfectly logical as they were designed
over the years were suddenly seen as clearly inadequate when the
environmental issue emerged. Public policy officials have a new
"ecological" approach to resource problems. Natural resource and pollution
problems are seen to interact in ecological systems requiring common
governmental solutions. " This, and other findings and observations on
present institutional arrangements, make it abundantly clear that nurturing
the status quo will serve only to compromise the region's potential and the
use and protection of its resources, Cadieux (1979), in fact, provides a
most appropriate theme for the final chapters of this study in stating that
We should be considering new arrangements which will respond to present
challenges, build on proven techniques and institutions and combine or
blend them with new ones which will serve our present and future
requirements."

This section, via its two component chapters, provides a point of
transition between the documentation of institutional needs and the
adaptation of the present institutional structure to accommodate them. In
Chapter Eight, the previous analyses (i.e., literature review, personal
interviews, survey questionnaire) are drawn together to elicit summary
statements of finding on a individual and collective institutional basis.
Based on these findings, a goals and objectives statement to guide Great
Lakes institutional activity is offered, as is a "checklist" of desirable
structural and operational characteristics,

236

237

This information provides the basis 'for Chapter Nine discussion. in which
specific options for structural and operational revision to the present
Great Lakes institutional ecosystem are presented under both incremental
and comprehensive change scenarios. Recommendations are offered, their
rationale presented, and the likelihood of their implementation given
political/institutional constraints explored.

The analytical framework and recommendations presented in these closing
chapters address the central theme of the study hypothesis, which maintains
that the "evolution of effective institutional arrangements" can be aided
by the integration of appropriately derived organizational characteristics
into new or existing arrangements.

CHAPTER EIGHT

GOALS, OBJECTIVES AND PARAMETERS FOR THE COLLECTIVE
Introduction INSTITUTIONAL EFFORT: DEVELOPING A BENCHMARK

In earlier discussion, several factors which constrain or otherwise
complicate the search for the "ideal" institutional arrangement were
presented, including: superficial attention by policy makers to resource
management goals and needs; the absence of a benchmark for institutional
adequacy; and the inadequacy of evaluative mechanisms for assessing
institutional performance.

Clearly, any effort to institute or otherwise advocate structural or
operational revisions to a given institution in the absence of defined
goals is at best ill-advised. Craine (1972) made this point quite clear in
his institutional arrangements study for the Great Lakes Basin Commission.
Some years earlier, the Water Resources Council (1967) stated that "before
a new institutional arrangement is established in any basin, the needs of
the basin should be determined and the major outlines of a basin
comprehensive plan for the conservation and management of the basin should
be clearly seen."

It is further argued that any such revision may be of questionable utility
if neither the pre- nor post-revision performance of the subject institu-
tion can be adequately evaluated in light of defined goals and objectives.
The Federal Council for Science and Technology (1968), in its study of
national water resource policy and political institutions, was emphatic in
documenting a need "to establish effective means of providing a continuing
assessment of institutional effectiveness so that needed changes -
particularly in new programs and policies - can be quickly identified."
The Council went on to make an observation that remains relevant almost
twenty years later: "It is not at all clear that we have the knowledge to
implement a program for early and adequate evaluation of institutional
performance. It seems abundantly clear that we should develop adequate
techniques to accomplish this task."

In recognition of the magnitude of these constraints, they are afforded
substantial attention in this chapter, and provide the basis for an
analysis of individual and collective institutional approaches to Great
Lakes management. Specifically, the chapter seeks to interpret and
synthesize information presented in preceding discussion; analyze the
overall institutional framework and its component parts; and through
identification of attendant strengths, weaknesses and institutional needs,
provide a basis for the options presented in Chapter Nine.

238

239

Goals for Great Lakes Management: Developing a Context for Institutional
Change and confirmed through personal
As evidenced in earlier discussion
interviews and the survey questionnaire response, the goals espoused by the
four regional institutions of concern are largely compatible; tending to
overlap or, at the minimum, complement each other. They are, by and large,
broad statements advocating the protection and enhancement of the resource
via multi-jurisdictional cooperation. As indicated in Chapter Three and
Appendix A, the goal statements of the Great Lakes Commission and Council
of Great Lakes Governors bear great similarity in their breadth, focus on
an economic development/environmental protection balance; and an emphasis
on cooperative state action. The goal statements of the International
Joint Commission and Great Lakes Fishery Commission place a primary
emphasis on resource management and protection (as opposed to regional
economic development), tend to be more explicitly defined, and focus on the
international level.

While the compatibility of these various goal statements is fortuitous in
the context of the overall Great Lakes management effort, two difficulties
are apparent. First, despite this compatibility, a dominant, central theme
for the collective management effort does not emerge. Rather, each
institution largely formulates its own programs in pursuit of its own
goals, either independently or with some nominal level of cooperation and
coordination with other institutions. While the relative dearth of
cooperative efforts has generally not been shown to foster inefficiency due
to duplication of effort, the failure to consolidate already limited
resources in pursuit of common objectives does have efficiency and
effectiveness implications. A case in point is the observed hesitancy or
unwillingness of the Great Lakes Commission (with its technical expertise)
and the Council of Great Lakes Governors (with its advocacy influence) to
fully join forces in active, vocal representation of the region at the
Congressional level.

A second difficulty is the nature of the institutional goals themselves.
As noted, they tend to be broad, open-ended and subject to variant
interpretations. This is particularly true of the Great Lakes Commission
and Council, which are not bound by the specificity of a Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement or Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries. The result is a
goal statement which tends to be selectively pursued and programs which
defy evaluation because the goal statement does not lend itself to
measurement.

The relative compatibility of goals across these institutions presents a
substantial yet largely untapped opportunity to enhance the overall
regional management effort. The missing element is a single, unifying
statement of goals and objectives for the region; a statement which draws
from and consolidates those embodied in' the individual institutions. Such
a statement, cooperatively derived and approved by consensus, would provide
the common focus under which all individual institutional goals, objectives
and programs would be pursued. Further, it would provide the means by
which individual institutions could evaluate their contribution to the
overall management effort; determine those areas warranting further
attention, and identify opportunities for enhanced effectiveness via

240

cooperative efforts, Finally, it would demonstrate - to Basin and non-
Basin interests that the Basin jurisdictions and their regional
institutions share common convictions and can form formidable alliances to
pursue their goals.

Such a statement is not without precedent. In fact, the Great Lakes Basin
Plan, prepared under the auspices of the Great Lakes Basin Commission,
consisted of a series of policy-oriented elements approved via consensus of
its U.S. state and federal member agencies. More recently, the Great Lakes
Charter, and in particular the broad management principles embodied within
it, has served in such a capacity for the states and provinces. The Great
Lakes Toxic Substances Control Agreement, approved by the Great Lakes
Governors in mid-1986, with formal provincial adoption forthcoming, serves
in a similar capacity.

As envisioned, this statement of management principles would consist of a
single goal statement and a series of supporting objectives which include
those presently espoused by the regional institutions of concern.

An acceptable goal statement for the collective regional management effort
can be derived by reviewing the goal statements of individual institutions
in light of comments received via the personal interviews and survey
questionnaire responses. The following is suggested:

"To enhance the public health and welfare of Basin residents
through: the restoration and maintenance of the integrity of the
Basin ecosystem; the orderly development and management of its
resources for sustainable and equitable use; and common stewardship
via binational, public-private sector partnership."

This carefully fashioned statement is a composite of various concepts
embodied in the individual regional institutions, but is more than simply a
sum of the parts." Unlike other goal statements, it rejects the notion of
merely "balancing" competing interests. Rather, it recognizes the
inseparability of economic development and environmental quality goals.
Further, it acknowledges the concepts of ecosystem management, sustainable
use and equitable access by the range of resource users. Finally, it
embraces the notion of universal stewardship which transcends both national
boundaries and agency jurisdictions. Such a generic statement for the
collective Great Lakes management effort poses no conflict for individual
institutional goals while providing a single focus for all.

Specific objectives under this broad goal statement might best be
categorized under the headings of Basin Planning and Management; Resource
Development and Promotion; and Intergovernmental Relations, Again turning
to existing institutional objectives and those generated via personal
interviews, survey responses and related analysis, the objectives presented
in Table 22 are offered for consideration.

Recognizing that such a goal and objectives statement must evolve to
address emerging needs, and can undoubtedly be embellished upon, it is
presented here to provide a fundamental focus for discussion of
requirements for institutional design and operation.

241

TABLE 22

GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR GREAT LAKES INSTITUTIONAL EFFORTS

Goal: "To enhance the public health and welfare of Basin residents
through: the restoration and maintenance of the integrity of the
Basin ecosystem; the orderly development and management of its
resources for sustainable and equitable use; and common stewardship
via binational, public-private sector partnership."

Objectives:

1. Basin Planning and Management

a) to restore and maintain the quality of Great Lakes waters and re-
lated resources through the development, implementation, promotion
and coordination of appropriate programs, practices and technology.

b) to maintain an updated comprehensive plan for the protection,
development and sustainable use of the water and related land
resources of the Basin.

c) to provide a central repository for the collection, storage and
analysis of resource data.

d) to conduct research in support of ongoing management functions and
undertake issue analyses and special studies.

e) to develop environmental standards for Basin-wide application and
provide the regulatory and enforcement capability to ensure their
attainment.

f) to maintain a monitoring/surveil lance program capable of providing
an historical data base on the status of the use and quality of the
Basin's resources.

g) to provide a locus for the avoidance or resolution of disputes
among and between resource users and the jurisdictions with
resource management responsibilities.

h) to promote consistency among and coordination of resource
management programs and policies pursued by individual Basin
jurisdictions.

i) to educate and inform Basin residents of the nature and conse-
quences of resource use and encourage active involvement in all
aspects of the planning and management process.

j) to acknowledge the ecosystemic nature of the Basin and its
resources and pursue management programs reflective of it.

242

2. Resource Development and Promotion

a) to provide for environmentally sound regional economic development
through programs to facilitate sustainable use and development of
the Basin's resources.

b) to foster, through regulatory, policy and related management
efforts, a balance among the various resource user communities.

c) to publicize and promote, on a domestic and international scale,
the Basin's resource-based economic attributes; including among
others the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence Seaway; port facilities; water-
based trade and tourism; and quality of life attributes.

d) to stimulate new, environmentally sound regional economic deve-
lopment through the design, implementation and coordination of
plans, programs and special studies.

3. Intergovernmental Relations

a) to provide a forum for Interjurisdictional information sharing,
issue analysis, program coordination, regional policy development,
and promotional and advocacy activities.

b) to serve as the Basin's spokesman in an active and aggressive
advocacy program on issues of concern, directed at appropriate
levels of government.

c) to provide information, research and advisory services to member
jurisdictions and other constituents.

d) to maintain a binding arbitration function on matters referred by
the parties (i.e., jurisdictions) to a Basin resource management
dispute.

e) to maintain an updated inventory of ongoing Great Lakes research,
establish priorities and recommend areas for additional emphasis.

f) to maintain an updated inventory of Great Lakes resource management
programs, identify strengths and weaknesses and recommend areas for
additional emphasis.

g) to ensure co-equal United States and Canadian representation in all
facets of Basin planning, management, policy and coordinative
efforts.

Toward a Benchmark for Institutional Design and Operation

Numerous authors in the area of Great Lakes management have proffered
listings of the "ideal" characteristics of a regional resource management
entity. For example:

0 The Interuniversity Seminar on the Great Lakes coordinated by
Francis and Dworsky (1971-72) highlighted the importance of

243

jurisdictional considerations; enforcement powers; fiscal adequacy;
staffing adequacy; administrative discretion; flexibility;
visibility; accountability; and structural compatibility.

� Bilder (1972) calls for the incorporation of "dispute avoidance and
adjustment arrangements" into new and existing institutions. He
also presents "principles of environmental management" com prised
of an institutional sense of environmental responsibility; diverse
approaches to diverse problems; the generation and use of "factual
knowledge;" predictability; flexibility; lowest level solutions;
non-legalistic solutions; and coordination.

� An International Joint Commission-sponsored workshop on anticipa-
tory planning (1979) called for the creation of a "Basin-wide
intelligence operation which monitors changes in ecosystem quality
in a number of different ways and exercises surveillance over
ongoing activities-and new initiatives which tend to impact most
heavily on the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem."

� Allee, Capener and Andrews (1975), in their analysis of basin
governance systems, advocate a re-examination of jurisdictional
representation, a review of how to internalize the externalities of
individual actions; development of an information capacity; the
building of consent by facilitating interjurisdictional accommoda-
tion; and reconciling local and regional interests.

� The U.S. Water Resources Council (1967) sets forth criteria which
include: regional orientation, project construction capability;
financial adequacy; comprehensive planning; flexibility (i.e.,
evolution and amendment); and an ability to foster inter-
jurisdictional cooperation.

� Hines and Smith (1973) find that operational efficiency of a water
management institution is dependent upon the physical dimensions of
the hydrologically defined area (i.e., congruity of area and
function); flexibility in determining geographic jurisdiction;
population density; comprehensive mandate; and local support.

� Booz, Allen and Hamilton (1970) in a study for the Office of Water
Resources Research, identified the following: the formulation,
analysis and implementation of a comprehensive range of alterna-
tives; a close relationship between planning and implementation;
solution of internal disputes; coordination of private, local,
state and federal planning and decisionmaking into a unified basin
program; public participation at all stages of the
planning/management process; analyze and influence related land and
water uses; and operation over a logically complete geographic
area.

� The Environmental Studies Board of the National Academy of Science
(1970) presents seven "requirements" for effective environmental
management: long-range planning; an early warning (i.e.,
anticipatory) function; monitoring capability; quick reaction field
function; quick reaction analytical function; education and

244

professional training; and communication between researchers,
policymakers and the public.

Any such recommendations, however, must be reviewed with caution. In many
cases, they were generated as a reaction to the perceived failings of a
single institution (such as the International Joint Commission) and consist
primarily of measures to address those failings. Little attention has
historically been given to the generation of parameters for the Great Lakes
institutional ecosystem in its entirety, or for implementation of the
broader set of Basin-wide resource management goals and objectives beyond
those espoused by individual institutions. The application concepts
presented in Chapter Four constitute a step in that direction in that they
reflect consensus findings in the literature as opposed to an assemblage of
parochial viewpoints from distinct research efforts. The same can be said
for the findings elicited from the personal interview (Chapter Six) and
survey questionnaire (Chapter Seven) efforts.

Drawing from these various sources, and interpreting them in light of the
aforementioned Basin-wide goals and specific Great Lakes management needs,
a checklist of institutional parameters is presented in Table 23. Unlike
other efforts of this nature, however, it is designed as benchmark for
assessing the collective characteristics of Great Lakes institutions, as
opposed to those of only a single institution. This orientation reflects
the fact that institutional design and operation is but a means to an end;
efficient and effective Basin management. The number of institutions in a
given Basin setting, or the allocation of management functions among them,
is essentially immaterial if this "end" is achieved efficiently and
effectively.

TABLE 23

CHECKLIST OF INSTITUTIONAL PARAMETERS
STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS FOR GREAT LAKES MANAGEMENT

1. Definition of Mandate

a) Institutional goals and objectives must be consistent with, and
supportive of those for the overall Basin management effort.

b) Objectives should complement those of other institutions while
avoiding duplication.

c) Goals and objectives, where possible, should lend themselves to
evaluation to provide indications of progress over time.

d) The institutional mandate should be specific yet flexible to
accommodate emerging management needs.

e) The mandate should be given a degree of formality and longevity
through use of legislation, treaty, compact, articles of incor-
poration or other legally recognized means.

245

2. Geographic Area of Concern

a) Authority should extend throughout the drainage basin of the Great
Lakes/St. Lawrence River system.

b) Acknowledgment of, and sensitivity to the resource management needs
of non-Basin portions of Basin jurisdictions should be maintained.

3. Membership

a) The institutional ecosystem should be consensus -based, and provide
equitable membership and voting arrangements for Canadian and
United States levels of government, including the two federal
governments, eight states and two provinces,

b) In those instances where institutional membership is appointed, a
legislative confirmation system should be instituted, as well as an
opportunity for public input throughout the selection/confirmation
process.

c) Representation from the citizen, private sector and sub-
state/provincial levels should be secured by providing, through
advisory committees or other means, direct access to institution
members.

4. Breadth of Authority

a) Regional institutions should be fully accountable to their
membership and responsive to its consensus decisions.

b) Singly or collectively, regional institutions should have
comprehensive authority to address the broad range of resource
issues and uses within the confines of the Basin.

c) While ultimate accountability to political jurisdictions is
appropriate, those jurisdictions should vest the regional
institution(s) with any and all management functions that can be
administered more efficiently and effectively on a Basin-wide
rather than political jurisdictional basis.

5. Financing

a) Appropriations from member jurisdictions should provide the basis
for financing institutional operations. Acquisition of
public/private grants, donations and contracts is an appropriate
supplement provided that the objective pursuit of prescribed goals
and objectives is not compromised.

b) Full participation and voting privileges should be contingent upon
a given member jurisdiction's full financial contribution to
institutional operations.

6. Staffing Arrangements 246

a) Staffing should be conservative, but appropriate for mandated
functions.

b) Detailing of member jurisdiction staff to institutional activities
should be vigorously pursued.

c) An emphasis on staff training and development should be maintained
to secure and retain quality staff with a sensitivity for member
jurisdiction needs and perspectives.

7. Management Functions

The collectivity of Great Lakes institutions should provide for:

a) Centralized data collection, storage and analytical capability;

b) An in-house research or research coordination capability to
address/analyze emerging issues;

c) An extension service capacity to advise, educate or otherwise
inform member jurisdictions and constituents of relevant issues;

d) Regulation and enforcement functions in those areas where
centralized, Basin-wide administration is more efficient and effec-
tive than individual jurisdictional approaches. At the minimum, a
role in recommending environmental quality/resource development
standards for uniform adoption is appropriate.

e) A forum for dispute avoidance, and where necessary, an
arbitration/conflict resolution mechanism;

f) Comprehensive, Basin-wide planning for the protection and
development of the resource base;

g) An in-house moni toring/survei 1 lance capability, or a role in
coordinating such among relevant Basin jurisdictions;

h) Coordination of policies and programs among members jurisdictions
and other relevant public and private sector entities with shared
interest in management of the resource base;

i) A public participation program designed to inform, educate and
solicit input from interested parties at all stages of the
management process;

j) An advocacy/lobbyist role directed at points of political influence
(as appropriate for a given institution), for the purpose of
enhancing progress toward stated goals and objectives for Great
Lakes management;

k) A consensus building mechanism providing for regional policy
development on issues of concern to member jurisdictions; and

247

1) A special studies function to undertake impact assessments and
otherwise address emerging issues.

8. Resource Focus

a) The resource base in its entirety - the components and interactions
among them - should be within the realm of institutional interest.

b) Principal focus should be directed at those areas of the resource
with pronounced transboundary implications (e.g., water quantity;'
water quality; levels and flows; drainage; aquatic resources; air
quality; coastal zone management); their linkages and associated
socio-economic issues.

OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS

1. Role in the Institutional Ecosystem

a) Before a new or revised institution is set in place, a clear
demonstration of need must be evident in light of existing
institutional capabilities and Basin management goals and
objectives.

b) A new or revised institution must be set in place in such a manner
as to avert or otherwise minimize disruption of ongoing
institutional activity.

c) Informal linkages among regional institutions should be fostered to
ensure complementary and mutually supportive programs.

d) institution must display a sensitivity to (and accommodation of)
the methods, biases and constraints within which political
jurisdictions approach Basin issues.

e) A sensitivity and responsiveness to the needs of public and private
sector entities beyond member jurisdictions should be pursued in
recognition of their role in the overall Basin management effort.

2. Pursuit of Mandate

a) Full authority under institutional mandates should be exercised;
selective attention to areas of authority should be pursued only in
light of an overriding rationale.

b) Rigidity in program design should be avoided in favor of
institutional flexibility to address emerging issues.

c) An anticipatory posture should be nurtured to avoid historical
11 crisis response" management tendencies.

d) Areas for potential institutional activity should be assessed in
light of goals and objectives to ensure their relevance.

3. Membership/Constituent Relations 248

a) Responsiveness to the needs of member jurisdictions should be of
paramount importance in both day-to-day operations and long-term
planning.

b) The institution should serve as a catalyst for interjurisdictional
regional activity, but take every opportunity to credit member
jurisdictions for successes achieved.

c) Informal, interpersonal linkages between the institution's staff
and member jurisdiction representatives should be nurtured.

d) The institution should approach its coordinator/catalyst role
subtly, to ensure that member jurisdictions regard it as a
mechanism to serve rather than lead them, even if the converse is
true in some respects.

4. Stature and Credibility

a) Objectivity in agenda setting, analyses and policy development must
be pursued and a reputation in that area fostered among membership
and constituents.

b) Building institutional support through promotional/public relations
activities is essential to institutional stature and credibility;
approaches include developing political linkages; utilizing the
media to disseminate information; and maintaining a program open
and accessible to the interested public.

C) A sensitivity to Basin-wide priorities in agenda setting and an
integrated approach to environmental and economic development
aspects should be pursued to ensure a broad support base.

d) In maintaining an open planning and management process, full
disclosure of the rationale behind all decisions - particularly the
unpopular and controversial ones - is advised.

e) The interest and political will of member jurisdictions must be
nurtured to maintain support for regional management efforts.
Voluntary and compulsory incentive systems should be investigated
and applied, as appropriate.

5. Management Philosophy

a) The ecosystemic attributes of the Basin and its resources should be
acknowledged and reflected in planning and management programs.

b) Long-term planning and pursuit of Basin management goals should not
be sacrificed for short-term considerations designed only to
enhance the institution's stature.

249

c ) The institution should be wary of "capture" by special interests
and any tendency to compromise its objectivity in pursuit of its
mandate.

d) Coordination of disparate management functions (e.g., planning and
implementation) should be pursued at the intra- and inter-
institutional level to ensure consistency of approach toward Basin
management goals and objectives.

e) While acknowledging ultimate accountability to member
jurisdictions, the institution should exercise some degree of
autonomy and discretion in the interpretation and application of
stated regional policies.

The differentiation between structural and operational characteristics is a
critical one for two principal reasons. First, as discussed in Chapter
One, resource management needs cannot be addressed with certainty simply
through the passage of legislation, creation of institutions or the
development of programs. It is the nature of their application - the
translation of goals to action - which is the ultimate determinant of
success, however measured. Even an institution with a broad mandate and
comprehensive, authoritative power can be rendered ineffective if
operational requirements are not met. Conversely, even the most
structurally constrained institution can assume a pivotal role in Basin
management if its operational requirements are pursued fully and
vigorously,

Second, securing operational revisions in a given institutional system,
while often difficult, is infinitely easier than securing structural
revisions. For this reason, it provides an area of available yet largely
untapped opportunity for efforts at institutional change. This is
particularly true in light of analyses (see Appendix A) which found
substantial variance between activities presently pursued by Great Lakes
institutions and those that could be pursued under existing authority.

Because it reflects only those parameters emerging from the study effort,
this listing should be construed as comprehensive yet not exhaustive.
While additional detail is possible, it can be argued with conviction that
an institutional ecosystem reflecting the parameters identified can serve
as a model for Basin management.

Statements of Finding - The Collective Institutional Effort

Drawing upon the descriptive analyses presented in Chapter Three and
Appendix A, the collective characteristics of the four institutions of
concern can be examined in light of the stated parameters to assess their
structural and operational adequacy in meeting the goal and objectives
statement. This assessment is provided below, highlighting strengths and
weaknesses, and providing a focus for the recommended revisions presented
in Chapter Nine.

250

A. An Assessment of Structural Considerations

1) Definition of Mandate

a ) While the individual institutional mandates do not necessarily
conflict, an overall Basin management strategy providing a
common and central theme for their pursuit does not exist.

b) The complementary nature of the various mandates is evident,
but inadequate coordination among them compromises the
potential benefit of joint action. For example, the Basin
management effort would benefit from closer Great Lakes
Commission/Council of Great Lakes Governors cooperation in the
pursuit of interstate initiatives. The Great Lakes Fishery
Commission and International Joint Commission share an interest
in habitat issues but have demonstrated little historic joint
activity in that area. Duplication of effort has not been a
significant problem among any of these institutions, but in the
absence of more formalized coordinative arrangements, could
become an issue.

c) Goals and objectives for the various institutions do not lend
themselves to evaluation, and historically there has been
little effort to do so. Institution-specific analyses have
been limited at best, and broader Basin-wide analyses virtually
nonexistent. Beyond arrangements such as the mandated review
of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, evaluative require-
ments/mechanisms have not been incorporated into institutional
design.

d) Generally speaking, flexibility in management activity is
provided in institutional mandates. While management authority
is of the "soft" variety, discretion in the selection of issues
is substantial. The real issue is that of political will; do
the member political jurisdictions exercise the flexibility
provided for in institutional mandates?

e) The institutional ecosystem is well established; it is an ever-
changing, dynamic system with many "newcomers," but most
principal regional institutions have been in place for decades.
The four institutions of concern are based on formal legal
authority (i.e., treaty, compact, convention, articles of
incorporation) and, as such, lend a sense of permanence and
continuity to interjurisdictional resource management
considerations.

2) Geographic Area of Concern

a) While all institutions exhibit a sensitivity to Basin concerns,
inadequacies exist in the areas of comprehensiveness and equity
of jurisdictional representation. For example, the GLFC and
IJC possess a binational, Basin-wide mandate, but their
flexibility in responding to the range of management issues is
limited by their mandate. The GLC and Council, on the other

251

hand, possess great flexibility in selecting their issues, but
lack the binational focus and equitable U.S.-Canadian
representation.

b) Because all the institutions of concern are membership entities
accountable to political jurisdictions, they do exhibit a
sensitivity to the resource management needs of non-Basin
portions of Basin jurisdictions.

3) Membership

a) The GLFC and IJC provide for equitable U.S. and Canadian
representation. The GLC is clearly lacking in this area, while
the Council provides for Canadian representation in selected
activities. Other than the IJC, however, none have provided an
ongoing forum for discussion and action on a wide range of
shared issues.

b) The appointment process has been widely considered a problem
area for all institutions except the Council, where the
governors themselves serve as members. A perceived need for a
more open nomination/review process for IJC appointees has been
articulated by many in the United States, for example.
Concerns over the consistency of GLC state appointment
processes have long been expressed, as has concern over the
stature and participation levels of appointees. The latter
concern has been raised with the U.S. Commissioners of the GLFC
as well.

c) Informal avenues for nongovernmental organization input do
exist within the process of each institution, but no formal
public participation programs are presently active. Similar
limitations are experienced by sub- state/provincial government
jurisdictions.

4) Breadth of Authority

a) Accountability of regional institutions to their membership is
not an issue - at least not in theory. All have mandated
requirements or established procedures governing the selection
of issues to be addressed and the nature of any resultant
action. In practice, however, institutional priorities can be
shaped not only by member jurisdiction attention to Basin
management needs, but by passive indifference, turf protection
concerns, or desires to focus on areas of ready agreement
rather than potential confrontation.

b) Taken collectively, the institutions of concern -do have the
authority to address Basin issues in a comprehensive manner;
their broad mandates provide for this. However, the extent of
this authority is quite limited. With few exceptions, the
regional institution itself has no unilateral authority to
render binding decisions or exercise regulatory/enforcement
functions. Further, there exists no standing requirement that

252

the broad range of issues be addressed; selective attention to
particular issues is the rule rather than exception.

0 The fact that "hard" management functions are generally not
vested in the regional institutions themselves reflects the
historic unwillingness of the political jurisdictions to
compromise their autonomy.

5) Financing

a) Appropriations from member jurisdictions are the principal and,
in most instances, exclusive means of institutional financing.
While such arrangements are viewed as desirable, little
emphasis is placed upon alternate funding sources (e.g.,
grants, endowments, public and private contracts) to augment
limited funding levels.

b) All of the institutions of concern have experienced some level
of difficulty in securing contributions from member
jurisdictions - even in those instances when the "holdouts"
retain an active role in institutional activity. State
contributions have been an issue with the GLC and Council; GLFC
and IJC concerns have centered around allocation formulas and
federal funding levels.

6) Staffing Arrangements

a) Staffing within and across all institutions is modest at best
and generally considered too limited to accomplish prescribed
objectives.

b) The "detailing out" of institutional program activity to member
jurisdictions - through their representation on committees and
task forces - has been an effective means of augmenting limited
staff size. Through their representatives, member juris-
dictions of the IJC, GLFC and Council are oriented as much (or
perhaps more) toward undertaking work themselves as they are to
directing regional institution staff. The GLC, at least in
recent years, has been characterized by a comparatively limited
level of direct membership involvement in program activity.

c) ith some notable exceptions, the institutions of concern find
it difficult to secure and retain the services of highly
qualified personnel. In many cases, financial, personal
development and promotion opportunities cannot compete with
those in other settings; a comparatively high turnover rate and
difficulty in attracting and retaining mid-career professionals
can result.

7) Management Functions

a) A centralized data collection, storage and analytical
capability is not presently provided for. The present
orientation is toward coordination in this area, advocating

253

consistency and the collection of data for issue-specific
purposes rather than broader historical ones.

b ) A research coordination capability exists within each
institution although it is practiced only selectively and
primarily by the IJC and GLFC. Present in-house research
capability is limited primarily to policy research and the
assemblage and interpretation of existing data or that
collected by other jurisdictions.

c) The advisory/extension service capability is exercised by all
institutions of concern, but in a limited and largely reactive
manner. Inquiries are responded to but programs to actively
seek out target groups are not provided. Further, these
services are oriented toward member jurisdictions and
constituents in the policy/management arena rather than the
public at large.

d) Regulatory and enforcement functions within the regional insti-
tutions themselves are essentially nonexistent with the
exception of quasi-judicial authority vested in the IJC.
Recommendatory powers in terms of standard setting are
exercised.

e) All- the institutions of concern, by virtue of their existence
and operation, provide a forum for interjurisdictional dialogue
and therefore dispute avoidance. Formal arbitration/conflict
resolution procedures (e.g., voting procedures, Article X of
the Boundary Waters Treaty), are largely shunned, reflecting a
desire to avoid areas of potential conflict for those in which
consensus can be generated. Fundamental differences have
historically in many instances been addressed outside the
regional institution arena.

f) Comprehensive planning at the Basin-wide level is not presently
pursued by any institution.

g) The monitoring/surveillance function in terms of water quantity
and quality considerations is pursued by the IJC, which has
substantial coordinative responsibility in that area. Similar
though less extensive activity is pursued by the GLFC for
fishery management considerations. Policy and legislative
monitoring - at the state, regional and federal level - is a
focus of the GLC and Council.

h) Policy and program coordination is a strength within each
institution and among its member jurisdictions. Coordination
of such between regional institutions is generally considered
to be less than adequate.

i) A formal, continuing public participation program is not
provided for by any of the institutions of concern.

254

j) An overt advocacy/lobbyist role for the region is provided for
by the GLC and Council. The mandate exists; concern over the
extent, effectiveness and direction of such activity is of
continuing concern.

k) Institutional effectiveness in consensus-bui 1 ding is a
strength. Even though all institutions of concern have
provisions for majority-rule voting, work is almost exclusively
accomplished by consensus. This is significant given the fact
that the lack of binding authority or enforcement power means
that a dissenting jurisdiction is not compelled to comply with
any given decision.

1) All institutions possess a "special studies" function for
issues within their area of responsibility. Again, political
will to utilize this function for a given issue is the critical
concern.

8) Resource Focus

a) The collective institutional effort does not provide for
consideration of the Basin's resource base in its entirety.
The institutions of concern either lack a full Basin-wide focus
(i.e., GLC, Council) or operate under a mandate with principal
consideration of only a subset of the range of resources in the
Basin(i.e., GLFC, IJC).

b) Due to the ecosystemic nature of the Great Lakes and the nature
of the region's political and hydrologic boundaries, most
institutional activity does focus on issues with transboundary
implications.

B. An Assessment of Operational Considerations

The operational parameters presented earlier, by their very nature,
might best be described as "abstractions" in comparison to the
structural parameters. They are concerned with institutional process
and perception and, as such, can introduce an element of subjectivity
into any assessment effort. As suggested in earlier discussion,
however, operational considerations play a major role in determining
the adequacy of institutional performance. Further, adjustments to
operational characteristics may provide an effective and politically
viable means of achieving institutional change in a prescribed
direction.

Presented below is a series of observations on the Great Lakes
institutional ecosystem; each corresponds to the similarly identified
operational parameter presented earlier. The statements reflect the
researcher's observations based upon the interview, survey
questionnaire and literature review efforts presented in earlier
chapters.

255

Role in the Institutional Ecosystem

a) Only rarely is a clear demonstration of need established prior
to the creation of a new Great Lakes institution or the
revision of an existing one. Rather, political expediency,
displeasure with an existing institution or other motive is the
motivating force. As a consequence, attempts to reconcile
responsibilities and needs among institutions is undertaken
after the fact rather than in the form of an "institutional
feasibility study" prior to any such institutional
manipulation.

b) Temporary disruption of the institutional ecosystem is
inevitable upon entry of a new component (i.e., institution),
particularly when that component has a broad and flexible man
date. This was certainly the case with the entry of the Great
Lakes Basin Commission in the early 1970's and the Council of
Great Lakes Governors some ten years later. Minimizing such
disruption - perhaps through the aforementioned "institutional
feasibility study" approach - has historically been given
little consideration.

c) Informal linkages among the institutions of concern are
fostered to an extent at both the staff and membership level.
In some respects, the inter-institutional memberships resemble
the interlocking directorates observed in corporate. structures.
Nonetheless, these linkages can be tenuous and have
historically been used as an information transfer device rather
than a means for extensive cooperative action.

d) Great Lakes institutions have long exhibited a sensitivity
toward, and ability to accommodate the methods, biases and con
straints of the political jurisdictions within the Basin. Pro-
ficiency in this area is attributable, in large part, to the
fact that these institutions draw their authority from and are
accountable to these political jurisdictions. Hence, sensi-
tivity and responsiveness to them is a matter of institutional
survival. Second, the institutions of concern - as well as
their predecessors - have recognized the subtleties of pro-
moting Basin management despite long established political
jurisdictional practices.

e) Great Lakes institutions - both singly and collectively - have
failed to provide the means for open and extended interaction
of public and private sector interests in their activities.
All institutions are proficient at coalition building and each
has its following of supporters and critics. In a broader
sense, however, public participation programs are conspicuously
absent. The last concerted attempt at such was the Public
Information Work Group of the Great Lakes Basin Commission.

256

2) Pursuit of Mandate

a) As previously documented, Great Lakes institutions, through a
process of evolution, actively attend to only a subset of their
mandated authority. Selective attention is defensible; a means
to allocate scarce resources, focus on areas of expertise,
avoid duplicative or marginally effective areas of involvement,
and accommodate membership preferences and directives. In
practice, however, little attention has been paid to the
rationale behind such selective attention, or whether the
perceived gain at the individual institutional level is
realized at the greater expense of the overall Basin management
effort.

b) Flexibility to accommodate changing priorities is an inherent
and often demonstrated operational characteristic in Great
Lakes institutions. Generating and directing the political
will to exercise such flexibility is the critical
consideration.

c) Advocacy of an anticipatory posture has long been supported by
Great Lakes institutions in concept, but organizational
resources, the magnitude of Basin problems and institutional
tendencies toward the "crises response mode" have limited its
application.

d) Through their membership and staff, institutions constantly
screen areas for potential activity, using criteria which
include not only an assessment of relevance of goals and objec-
tives, but political pressures, potential gains, institutional
advancement and the like. Due to the absence of goals and
objectives for the institutional ecosystem as a whole, the
screening process is not as responsive to Basin management
needs as it could be.

3) Membership/Constituent Relations

a) Great Lakes institutions have historically been responsive to
the needs of member jurisdictions; when those needs can be
determined. Difficulties in this area are evidenced by long-
standing difficulties of the GLC membership in reaching
consensus on priorities; and the unresponsiveness of the
federal governments to the recommendations of the IJC.
Historically, the regional institutions themselves have found
it generally necessary to generate priorities internally for
membership consideration rather than serving merely as a
vehicle to implement them once identified by that membership.

b) A number of observers have attributed the downfall of the Great
Lakes Basin Commission, in part, to its failure to credit
member jurisdictions (rather than itself ) for successes
achieved. While its closing was, of course, attributable to a
presidential Executive Order disbanding all Title II
commissions, it has been suggested that this tendency

257

discouraged member states from organizing vocal opposition to
the impending closure. Such a tendency is studiously avoided
by the GLFC, and by virtue of their mandates, is not an issue
with IJC and the Council. it seems apparent that the GLC could
nurture a sometimes indifferent membership with a similar
approach.

c) Informal, interpersonal linkages between the staff and
membership of the various institutions are reasonably well
developed and, with nurturing, could be invaluable in promoting
cooperative efforts.

d) A similar comment to that in "b" is appropriate. Basin
political jurisdictions are willing to support existing
institutions provided they remain responsive and accountable to
them.

4) Stature and Credibility

a) The institutions of concern share a positive reputation in
terms of technical expertise and analytical objectivity.
Experience has shown that perceptions of subjectivity - when
they do occur - are often tied to misinformation among
constituents. For example, there is a common misperception
that the Great Lakes Commission is an "economic development and
shipping agency" lacking in environmental responsibilities.
Such instances suggest that these institutions might undertake
a "marketing" function to publicize and clarify their mandates
and explain to their broad constituency the rationale behind
their decisions.

b) Public relations/promotional efforts as a means to enhance
stature and credibility receive little attention among the
institutions of concern. The one exception is that of the
Council, which by virtue of its membership, has inherent media
appeal. The Great Lakes Commission has made sporadic attempts
to attract coverage - usually in relation to annual/semi-annual
meetings - but retains a very low profile and level of
recognition. The International Joint Commission does enjoy
periodic substantial coverage, often related to issuance of
board reports, the conduct of meetings, and high profile issues
(e.g., lake levels, toxic contamination problems). The Great
Lakes Fishery Commission neither seeks nor receives extensive
coverage, preferring a lower profile than that of its
cooperating agencies.

Each institution has its distinct public relations/promotional
needs, and merely increasing the extent of medi-a coverage is
not a panacea. However, it is clear that such coverage does
provide significant untested potential in enhancing stature and
credibility.

c) The Council and Great Lakes Commission alone possess a broad
mandate for the pursuit of environmental and economic

258

development concerns. Historically, however, the emphasis has
been on balancing two disparate interests rather than
recognizing their inseparability. This recognition has taken
significant steps forward with the signing and continuing
implementation of the Great Lakes Charter.

d) Due to their "soft management" approach and desire to focus on
areas of consensus among their membership, the institutions of
concern seldom draw heated debate, and in many cases not even
the concerted interest of their constituents. This relative
dearth of controversy notwithstanding, none of the institutions
can characterize their planning and management processes as
f, open;" the public is not excluded by policy, but efforts to
invite and encourage its involvement are lacking.

e) Incentive systems for nurturing the interest and political will
of member jurisdictions vary widely and at any given time might
include turf protection; information acquisition; or a true
desire to effect positive change in a cooperative manner.
Interest in the various institutions by their respective
membership can and does vary widely as a function of the issue
at hand or the institution itself. The IJC engenders
substantial interest in the region but has characteristically
evoked little formal response from the two governments. The
level of interest in Great Lakes Commission activities by its
membership has varied widely with the issues but has been
viewed as a probfem on occasion in past years. The Council has
been highly selective in setting its agenda and, in so doing,
has engendered sustained interest among its members. The Great
Lakes Fishery Commission, by virtue of its substantial (and
measurable) success, has sustained a high level of interest
among its members as well.

5) Management Philosophy

a) Beyond the language in the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement, the "ecosystem approach" is not explicitly
identified in institutional mandates. The concept - in some
fashion - is pursued more by the IJC and GLFC than the Council
or GLC, by virtue of the former's physical /biological resource
management responsibilities. The Council and Commission do
take into account the broader implications of their actions,
but lack any studied effort to apply ecosystem management
concepts.

b) It is clear that long-range planning can be a secondary consi-
deration to present and near-term concerns - even when an
institution is vested with planning responsibilities. The GLFC
Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries,
as well as the Remedial Action Plan process coordinated by the
IJC are notable exceptions. The Council is clearly moving
toward a planning mode under certain provisions of the Great
Lakes Charter. The Great Lakes Commission maintains a

259

monitoring and response mode focusing on U.S. federal
policy/legislative developments; planning is not an ongoing
function.

c) The danger of institutional "capture" by a given interest group
is generally not a problem, given that appropriations are
received from member jurisdictions, and the institution is
accountable to its membership.

d) Within any given institution of concern, coordination of
disparate management functions is not an issue of great import,
given limitations in authority, programs and staff size. Coor-
dination between institutions, however, has been a weakness
that has limited the collective Great Lakes management process.

e) The nature of mandates and established procedures have allowed
all institutions of concern to exercise some degree of
discretion in interpreting and applying stated regional poli-
cies. In many cases, areas of prospective institutional ac-
tivity are generated from within and brought before the member-
ship for approval. Of principal concern in recent years, how-
ever, has been the Great Lakes Commission/Council of Great
Lakes Governors relationship. The Commission has found its
discretionary activities constrained by its membership's desire
to "wait and see" what-the Council does before acting. This
relationship is presently (and most appropriately) the focus of
concerted attention by the two organizations.

Statements of Finding - The Individual Institutional Effort

Having reviewed the collective institutional approach in light of the Great
Lakes management goal and objectives generated, a similar review focusing
upon individual institutional efforts is appropriate. Again, it is
emphasized that this review is not a performance evaluation comparing
institutional achievements with mandates. Rather, it is an assessment of
the institution's demonstrated structural and operational compatibility
with the set of broader goals and objectives presented. As such, it
provides the basis for specific recommendations offered in Chapter Nine.

Presented below, on an institution-by-institution basis, is a review of
past institutional analyses and a listing of principal strengths and
weaknesses generated from the literature,- personal interviews, survey
questionnaire and researcher analysis in light of the stated institution-
wide goals, objectives and parameters. The list of weaknesses for each
institution is a selective one, consisting of those whose resolution is
likely to lead to substantive positive change, both within the individual
institution and more generally, the institutional ecosystem. It is
recognized, however, that there is opportunity for improvement in all areas
(see listing of parameters), and such opportunities should be pursued in
conjunction with those highlighted.

OCLC: 31158893 Rec stat: n
Entered: 19940922 Replaced: 19940922 Used: 19940922
Type: a Bib lv1- m Source: !J Lan: eng
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Desc: a Int lvl: Festschr: 0 Illus: a
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5 100 1 Donahue, Michael Joseph.
6 245 10 institutional arrangements for Great Lakes managemenL past
practices and future alternatives an executive summary / ;c Mich,wl Joceph
Donahue. ill
7 260 [Ann Arbor, Mich.] :b Michigan Sea Grant College Proqram,
1987, (c19861.
8 300 130 p. in various pagings : :b ill. ; :c. 28 cm. gi
9 440 0 MICHU-SG ; g:v 87-200E ji'l
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13 650 0 Ecosystem management Cz Great Lakes.
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6 245 10 Institutional arrangements for Great Lakes man,.%t-.-.,mer-,t , -Ib pcist
practices and future alternatives :c Michael Joseph Donahue. jj'j
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1987, c1986. 6Q
8 0300 x, 0394 p. : 6g:b ill.
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11 504 Bibliography: p. 3405-394. 2ji'4l
12 651 0 Great Lakes 40p Management. 161
13 710 2 Michigan Sea Grant Prugram. 2jj

260

International Joint Commission

The form and function of the International Joint Commission has, without
question, received far more attention than that of the other three
institutions of concern combined. This level of focus is attributed to
numerous factors, including the binational implications of the Boundary
Waters Treaty and the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements; the longevity
of the IJC itself, its principal role in Great Lakes management concerns
relative to other institutions; and the fact that it has long been hailed
as a unique and innovative device for the resolution of transboundary
disputes and coordination of management of a shared resource.

Over time, this stature has established the IJC as a focal point drawing
accolades for progress in Great Lakes management and, more frequently, as a
target of criticism when this progress was not viewed as forthcoming. The
preponderance of criticism (and therefore recommendations) has been
directed at the "lack of teeth" in the IJC mandate and its inability to
overcome the constraints of two federal governments that tend to be
unresponsive to the management needs of the Great Lakes.

A brief review of some of the more notable analyses of the International
Joint Commission follows-

� A U.S. Republican House Members Report, appearing in the Congressional
Record (1965), called for renegotiation of the Boundary Waters Treaty
.to broaden.IJC functions. Recommendations included: 1) inclusion of
Lake Michigan in the definition' of boundary waters; 2) empowering the
IJC to make recommendations relating to continental development of
water and energy resources; 3) establishing the IJC as a "permanent
institutional location" for international discussion of foreign policy
questions; 4) placing a priority emphasis on water levels and pollution
studies; and 5) assuming the lead role in fulfilling "the obvious need
for comprehensive advance planning in the development of water
resources."

� Jordan (1969) found shortcomings in that the IJC lacks specific
jurisdiction over basin boundary pollution matters; cannot control the
timing, extent or nature of the investigations it undertakes; must
await a reference; lacks power to direct or coordinate the research or
information gathering by domestic agencies; and lacks power to give
effect to standards and measures it recommends.

� Bilder (1972) suggested strengthening the IJC through the formation of
an advisory board with broad Great Lakes-related agency representation;
or an "internationalized Great Lakes Basin Commission" combined with a
new binational interagency committee on Great Lakes pollution. Powers
would include establishing pollution standards; approving and licensing
waste disposal facilities; and initiating complaints of non-compliance
before courts and agencies in both countries.

0 The Great Lakes Basin Commission (1975) stated that the IJC prerogative
required expasion to permit investigation of problems on its own
initiative.

261

� The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Canadian Parliament
(1975) called for elimination of the reference requirement; an
extension of power to permit publicizing of all recommendations; and
the assumption of enforcement powers.

� Dworsky (1972) cited a need for better definition of IJC authority (in
terms of resource management rather than boundary disputes); improved
communication with the Great Lakes Fishery Commission; and a shortening
of study periods.

� Dworsky and Swezey (1974) called for a broadening of IJC functions
through the creation of five boards: 1) air; 2) water quality; 3) lake
levels; 4) navigation; and 5) a Great Lakes Operations Office. A Great
Lakes Policy Unit, comprised of the commissioners and senior level
board officials, would be established. The Commission itself would be
comprised of eight full-time members with staggered and fixed terms,
additional staff support; a mandate to conduct hearings and access to
the court systems of the two countries.

This approach would provide the IJC with the necessary policy making
and administrative authority to carry out its coordinative
responsibility; exercise a mediation function; free itself from treaty
constraints; facilitate binational planning and program coordination;
recommend long-range priorities for data collection and analyses to
assist in the investigation, planning and construction of projects; the
coordination of ongoing research; and a close working relationship to
all relevant Great Lakes jurisdictions.

� Francis (1973) found that "the [International Joint] Commission has
neither the authority nor the resources with which to undertake a
planning function, much less to develop a program designed to attack
the mismanagement of the boundary waters." Principles for change
include a bilateral arrangement comprehensive in nature; structured to
carry out certain policy, planning and management functions; and a
capability to "overcome the incongruity between political and physical
boundaries."

� Zile (1974) presented a three-step process for reform of the IJC: 1)
grant lake level authority in a role other than that of harmonizing the
various interests involved; 2) formally enlarge an open decision system
to include citizen group interests; and 3) provide that members with
the most input into the organization perform the "harmonization"
function.

� The Science Advisory Board of the IJC (1979) recommended an anti-
cipatory planning function, calling for: 1) U.S. and Canada con-
firmation of their expectation that the IJC advise them on unmet
current or emerging problems; 2) a continuation of an anticipatory
process for the IJC; 3) creation of a special panel or advisory board;
4) support for an integrated ecosystem management approach and its
implementation; and 5) provision of an IJC information and analysis
capability on a Basin-wide basis.

262

o The U.S, General Accounting Office (1982) recommended provision for
formalized federal responses to IJC recommendations; continuity of U.S.
leadership through five-year staggered terms; a restructuring of the
Water Quality Board arrangement to ensure additional U.S. federal
agency input; and the development of management plans and meeting
arrangements to ensure a clear direction for U.S. federal agency input
into the U.S. section of the IJC.

Institutional Strengths and Weaknesses

The analysis of the structure and operation of the International Joint
Commission, in light of the Great Lakes institutional goals, objectives and
parameters identified, yields the following principal strengths and
weaknesses.

Strengths

1) The goals and objectives of the International Joint Commission, as
presented in the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and the 1978 Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement, are consistent with the broader Basin
goals and objectives presented earlier in this chapter. In fact, the
Treaty and Agreement are rightfully considered the farthest reaching
and most insightful initiatives of their time and, in many respects,
remain today as models for binational resource management.

2) The IJC maintains.a unique role in Basin management, and by virtue of
its longevity and availability to the two governments, provides an
available and capable (if underutilized) institutional resource by
which to focus binational attention on shared issues.

3) The provisions in the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, coupled
with their mandated review, provide the IJC with an evaluative
capability unequaled by any other Great Lakes institution.

4) The legal basis and formality of the IJC mandate is a firm one, given
the legal/political stature of the treaty and agreement devices and the
inherent incentives of the signatory parties to attend to their
provisions (at least when it is politically expedient to do so).

5) The IJC's Basin boundary sensitivity, despite the limited authority
exercised, has been a positive step in transcending political boun-
daries to address multi-jurisdictional issues.

6) The IJC's emphasis on equitable U.S./Canadian representation is a
decided strength, as it is practiced in the areas of staffing and
funding as well as membership.

7) The Commission's structure and process ensure that.clear lines of
accountability to the federal governments are maintained. Hence, all
activities derive from and are pursued in support of the directives of
the governments.

8) The breadth of IJC functions under the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement is commendable; particularly the much needed emphasis upon

263

interpretation of water quality data, research needs and monitoring and
surveillance requirements.

9) The IJC has demonstrable value as a consensus -bui Idi ng forum where
members are North Americans first and Canadians and Americans second.
Its quasi-judicial function; the availability of Article X for binding
arbitration; and the extensiveness of its board and committee
structure, despite their limitations, ensures its stature as the
leading coordinative/deliberative binational body.

10) The reference device, despite its failings, provides the governments
with a special studies capability for the range of issues under IJC
purview.

11) The IJC's growing recognition and conceptual development of the prin-
ciples of ecosystem management to Basin problems has brought a new
level of sophistication to Great Lakes institutional efforts.

12) Through its designation of "Areas of Concern" and the pursuit of an
associated Remedial Action Plan process, the IJC has demonstrated an
ability to focus its efforts on those Basin issues with pronounced
transboundary implications.

13) The IJC has long demonstrated a responsiveness and adaptability to the
needs of the governments - when those needs have been articulated. The
reference process has a demonstrated value in that respect. Further,
the Commission's structure and process also ensure that it remains a
vehicle of the governments rather than an institution with an inde-
pendent mandate.

14) The IJC has enjoyed a continuing positive reputation for its technical
expertise and the objectivity and reliability of the information
provided.

15) An element of prestige is associated with an appointment to an IJC
board or committee, and the Commission benefits substantially from the
active work and dedication of these individuals. Many serve, in
effect, as part of an "extended staff."

Weaknesses

1) While the unique nature of the IJC mandate precludes any substantial
danger of duplicative efforts by other institutions, coordination is a
weakness. Additional inter-institutional cooperation would provide
mutual benefits and strengthen the overall Basin management effort.

2) The IJC1s ability to respond promptly to emerging management needs is
constrained by a rather laborious and time consuming reference process.
While some flexibility in this area is provided by Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement provisions, the absence of a broad "standing
reference" to initiate investigation of emerging issues - at some level
- precludes a proactive posture. As a consequence, the IJC can be
circumvented to address pressing issues (e.g. , Niagara River Toxics
Committee, Upper Great Lakes Connecting Channels Study).

264

3) The questionable status of Lake Michigan under the terms of the
Boundary Waters Treaty has added an element of jurisdictional un-
certainty to binational water quantity management efforts.

4) While state and provincial input into IJC activities is provided via
board and committee membership, the IJC structure provides a hierar-
chical "top down" approach. State/provincial involvement in the
development and renegotiation of the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement, for example, has been lacking. This matter is accentuated
at the sub-state/provincial level.

5) The nomination process for commissioners is a closed one, in that non-
federal Great Lakes interests and the public in general are not
involved in nomination, confirmation or open hearing activity. An
inherent skepticism of appointees at the sub-federal level is an
observed result. Further, the inordinate delays in appointments,
attendant prolonged vacancies, and the lack of staggered terms have on
occasion brought the work of the IJC's Washington and Ottawa offices to
a virtual standstill.

6) The accountability of the IJC to the two governments has been impeded
by the latter's historic unwillingness to formally acknowledge and
respond to Commission recommendations. The virtual absence of feedback
constrains both implementation of these recommendations and the IJCIs
ability to develop and implement a program of work sensitive to the
needs of the governments.

7) Although the IJC enjoys more authority than other Great Lakes insti-
tutions, it is nonetheless an instrument of the governments and
generally lacks the authority to do more than provide advice, recom-
mendations and status reports to them.

8) Staffing for the IJC's Great Lakes Regional Office is modest at best
and the budget has been virtually constant for the last five years.
Further, time consuming and complex classification and administrative
procedures, coupled with the frequency of commissioner vacancies,
prolongs the decision making process and leads to staff vacancies and
insufficient attention to prescribed programs and broader policy
issues.

9) The IJC focus is on coordinative, advisory, recommendatory and
monitoring functions and, although this focus lends it an inherent
expertise in Basin-wide standard setting, regulatory matters and the
oversight and direction of jurisdiction programs, it lacks the
authority for any involvement in those areas beyond its limited quasi-
judicial authority.

10) Although a public information function is central to the mandate of the
Great Lakes Regional Office, once a pioneer in this area, recent years
have seen a virtual absence in any such activity beyond conference
planning and information inquiries. Further, substantive public input

265

into program activity (beyond board and committee appointments) has
historically been sporadic 'at best.

11) Within the IJC framework, the Regional Office director maintains
accountability to the Commission for programs and budgets, while the
boards (i.e., Water Quality, Science Advisory) retain actual control
over them. This arrangement has proven awkward and inefficient.

12) Beyond that pursued under the general auspices of Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement (e.g., Remedial Action Plan process, Great Lakes
International Surveillance Plan), the IJC maintains no planning program
focusing on the Great Lakes ecosystem and its long-term protection, use
and development.

13) Although the Treaty and Agreement provide substantial flexibility in
addressing the range of transboundary resource management issues, IJC
involvement in such has often been constrained by a lack of political
will exhibited by the two governments. The examples cited in *2 are of
note.

14) Concerted efforts at fostering informal linkages with the range of
institutions involved in Great Lakes management have been lacking,
constraining the IJC's ability to enhance its own programs as well as
raise its stature and positive image within the Great Lakes
institutional ecosystem.

15) The inherent potential of the IJC as a Basin management tool is
constrained by an historic reticence of traditional political juris-
dictions (i.e., the two federal governments) to legitimize bi-national
1. experimentation" in resource management.

16) Despite past intentions and extended discussion of such, an antici-
patory planning function has yet to be embraced and reflected in IJC
program activity.

17) Despite its unparalleled importance in the Great Lakes management
effort, the IJC retains a low recognition level. Even public entities
with Basin management responsibilities exhibit only a limited
understanding of the nature and extent of the IJC mandate. This
limitation can adversely impact the IJC's ability to pursue that
mandate.

18) Continued and concerted efforts to incorporate a socio-economic
sensitivity into the range of IJC programs are lacking. Advances are
being made, yet such considerations remain ancillary ones.

19) While IJC structure discourages its "capture" by any given interest
group, its membership, appointment process and operational charac-
teristics sensitize its programs to political developments at the U.S.
and Canadian federal levels. This sensitivity is such that a change in
government - in either or both countries - can bring IJC activity in
Washington, DC and Ottawa offices to a virtual standstill or result in
new program priorities and/or the termination of former ones. Program
continuity (and therefore institutional effectiveness) is problematic.

266

Great Lakes Fishery Commission

Although established over thirty years ago, the Great Lakes Fishery
Commission has been the subject of comparatively little institutional
analysis. While this observation is generally applicable to all Great
Lakes institutions (with the possible exception of the International Joint
Commission), there are other contributing factors. The Fishery Commission
undoubtedly possesses the most explicitly defined and specific mandate; one
that lends itself to evaluation. These characteristics have provided it
with a distinct niche in the institutional ecosystem, a clear focus and a
sense of continuity in program operation. By the nature of its work it has
assumed a relatively low profile. It has neither the mandate nor the
aspiration to assume the lead role in addressing the full range of resource
management requirements in the Great Lakes Basin. Yet, it contributes
substantially to those efforts and possesses a number of structural and
operational characteristics that warrant consideration and possible
adaptation by other institutions.

The most recent and perhaps only in-depth outside analysis of the GLFC was
conducted by the U.S. General Accounting Office in 1985. The GAO "found
the GLFC has generally carried out its responsibilities effectively and
contributed significantly to improving the Great Lakes fishery." The
Commission's sea lamprey control efforts were identified as its "single
greatest accomplishment." Operational strengths identified included its
role as sponsor and facilitator (as opposed to manager); a research program
with a demonstrated positive impact; an effective consensus building
process, and a coordinative capability whereby, "...th& parties are more
aware of each other's concerns and less likely to act independently."

Per ceived deficiencies included poor U.S. commissioner attendance at
meetings in recent years; possible conflict of interest in the awarding of
research contracts to those with Commission affiliation; lack of timely
research results on contracts; and an excessive unused fund balance. In no
cases were those matters found to have a debilitating adverse impact on
Commission performance, nor did the GAO find "evidence that the U.S. was
adversely affected by absenteeism" of commissioners. It was noted that
provisions to appoint alternate commissioners "may be too cumbersome."
Suggested operational adjustments included requiring request for proposals
on large contracts; requiring research progress reports; applying unused
funds against the next year's budgeted expenses and establishing a working
capital fund.

Institutional Strengths and Weaknesses

At this point, it should be reemphasized that the following is an
assessment of the institution's structural and operational characteristics
in light of the overall Basin management goal and objectives presented
earlier. It is not a performance evaluation examining programs in light of
the institution's own goals and objectives.

Strengths

1) The goals and objectives- of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, as
presented in the Convention on G*reat Lakes Fisheries, are consistent

267

with the broader Basin goals and objectives presented earlier in this
chapter.

2) GLFC goals and objectives complement those of other Great Lakes
institutions, and there are substantial areas of shared interest,
particularly with the International Joint Commission.

3) The Fishery Commission mandate provides measurable goals and objec-
tives, particularly in the areas of lamprey control; maintenance and
enhancement of fish stocks; and dissemination of research results.
This is a principal GLFC strength and critical institutional charac-
teristic which is largely absent within other institutional efforts.

4) The conve ntion device lends the GLFC legal standing and provides it
with the stature and continuity necessary for the successful conduct of
its work.

5) Although its concerns focus on a single resource - the fishery - the
GLFC does maintain a Basin-wide orientation which transcends the
limitations of the individual political jurisdictions.

6) The GLFC does provide for equitable U.S.-Canadian membership; each
government possessing a single vote and being represented by a
delegation of commissioners.

7) Although appointments are made only by the federal governments,
representatives from state, provincial and private interests are also
selected. Further, the various technical committees appear to ensure
broad representation from the various levels of government and academia
as well. 1 1
8) Through its lamprey control program, research program and coordinative
activity, the Commission pursues fishery management functions which

could not be undertaken efficiently through the numerous individual
jurisdictions with fishery management responsibilities.

9) Technical committees and boards are comprised of numerous leaders in
their field and, by virtue of their active interest and involvement in
Commission deliberations, substantially strengthen the Commission
program.

10) The conduct and coordination of fisheries research is a decided
strength, as it provides the Commission with a capability to address/
analyze emerging issues. Further, it places the Commission in the role
of a forum and pool of expertise for fisheries research. It is able to
direct and prioritize research via distribution of research funds.

11) While lacking in regulatory and enforcement authority, the Commission
is empowered to develop and implement measures directed at sea lamprey
populations.

12) While comprehensive planning for Basin resources is not within the
purview of the Commission, the development (under the aegis of the

268

Commission) by the fishery agencies of the Joint Strategic Plan for
Management of Great Lakes Fisheries is a significant accomplishment.
The plan, signed by twelve fishery agencies, may well provide a model
for application to other issues and other institutions.

13) The Commission structure and operation - primarily by virtue of its
technical committees and boards - provide a coordinative arrangement
which appears to involve and accommodate the interests of the range of
public and private sector representatives.

14) The Commission's simple "consensus only" decision making approach is a
sound one, as it requires a firm commitment on the part of both
governments before an initiative moves forward.

15) Funds for research support and special studies are substantial in
comparison to other Great Lakes institutions and, in conjunction with
its coordinative role, provides the Commission with considerable
influence in directing and prioritizing Great Lakes fishery re-search.

16) By its nature, management of the Great Lakes fishery is a transboundary
issue, and the composition of the Commission and its committees ensures
a binational as well as interstatefocus.

17) The clarity and specificity of the Commission mandate ensures it a
distinct niche in the institutional ecosystem and minimizes any
disruption to ongoing institutional activity.

18) The nature of fisheries management requires the Commission to assume an
anticipatory posture; the Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great
Lakes Fisheries provides the framework for doing so.

19) The Commission's forte is its ability to serve as a catalyst for
interjurisdictional regional activity while taking every opportunity to
credit its membership and cooperators for successes achieved.

20) The Commission - through its programs and research efforts - has
pioneered the "ecosystem management" concept and explored its appli-
cation in fisheries management.

21) The nature of the Commission's mandate encourages a long-term planning
orientation. Such plans are less prone to pre-emption by short-term
political considerations than those of other Great Lakes institutions.
This is due to the Commission's charge as well an open-ended
appointment process which de-politicizes - to an extent - Commission
deliberations.

Weaknesses

1) Clearly, the principal weakness of the Fishery Commission in addressing
the broad range of management issues is its limited mandate. By
design, its focus is limited to fishery management considerations.
Comprehensive Basin planning and management are not provided for.

269

2) The Commission lacks an appointment process that permits open nomi-
nations, legislative confirmation and public input throughout the
selection/confirmation process. Further, the open-ended appointment
process tends to buffer commissioner sensitivity to outside input and
the federal governments, and limits the development of new ideas and
initiatives which might be brought forward with a periodic change in
membership or renomination process,

3) While the Commission does provide an "extension service" capacity to
advise, educate or otherwise inform members and cooperators of
relevant issues, this service does not presently extend to the broader
interested public. Further, there is no formal public partici-
pation/information program incorporated into the Commission's process.

4) Informal linkages with other Great Lakes institutions warrant
strengthening, as all share some interest in and responsibility for the
management or promotion of the fishery.

5) The Commission's low profile and recognition level - particularly among
the general public - may reduce or otherwise discourage a sensitivity
and responsiveness to public/private sector interests beyond those of
members and cooperators.

6) This low profile and recognition level, while desirable in some
respects, can interfere with the building of institutional support,
stature and credibility.

7) Even within the Commission's limited mandate, it appears that interests
can be narrow. Broader issues which affect the fishery (e.g., water
quality; coastal management; diversion/lake levels; health effects)
have not, but could benefit from Commission involvement. Further, such

involvement would strengthen sometimes rather tenuous ties with other
Great Lakes institutions.

G.reat Lakes Commission

The Great Lakes Commission has long served the region as a coordinator and
representative of the collective views of the eight Great Lakes states on a
range of environmental, resource management and economic development
issues. Yet, it was not until the early 1980's, with the formation of the
Council of Great Lakes Governors, that the impetus developed for a careful
and comprehensive analysis of its institutional capabilities. Prior to
that time, such concerns were of a limited nature and did not result in
substantive institutional change. For example, some institutional
questions were raised throughout the 1955-68 time period as the Commission
worked to secure membership from all eight states as well as Congressional
consent. Additional discussions focused on the Commission's interface with
the Great Lakes Basin Commission when the latter was formed in 1972.

A renewed interest in Basin issues at the gubernatorial level developed in
the early years of this decade. With the formation of the Council, and
attendant questions regarding duplication of effort and the relative
effectiveness of the two institutions, attention was focused on the

270

structure and operation of the Commission. Three important initiatives
have come forth since that time. The first was a Commission-prepared
background paper presented at the Great Lakes Governors' and Premiers'
meeting on Mackinac Island, Michigan in 1982. The paper, while limited to
a series of questions and options to guide the rekindled interest in Great
Lakes institutional design, does provide a foundation for further analysis.

In 1984, the Michigan delegation to the Commission submitted, for
consideration, a discussion paper focusing on perceived inadequacies in the
areas of image; role or function; agenda; structure; and meeting
arrangements:

0 Image - The delegation suggested that image problems resulted from
widespread ignorance of the Commission's role; a widespread perception
of ineffectiveness; and a lack of state support. Recommendations in-
cluded additional emphasis on promotional/publicity efforts; an
accounting of accomplishments; and the appointment of "highly competent
and prominent commissioners and advisors."

0 Role or Function - Problems cited included an excessively narrow
perspective pro@o`ting individual state interests; an overly reactive
posture; an unfamiliarity with the problems and policies of member
states; an inordinate allocation of time "fine-tuning" resolutions;
weak and compromising resolutions; and questionable performance of
committee chairs. Recommendations included: a reassessment of regional
priorities; seeking coalitions outside of the region and government;
developing a pro-active posture; developing better linkages with
national and regional governors' groups; focusing its resources on
research; increasing reliance on member states for staff assistance;
strengthening resolutions; and better coordinating the work and roles
of committee chairs.

0 Agenda - The delegation cited the lack of a formalized, ongoing
priority setting process; found a focus "excessively oriented" toward
the short term; and inconsistencies among member states in advocating
their interests.

0 Commission Structure - Problems identified included inadequate staff
resources; an "unwieldy and excessively hierarchical" committee
structure; delayed decision-making processes; and lack of Executive
Committee familiarity with key issues. Recommendations to address
these included: staff assistance by member states; streamlining the
committee process; encouraging the executive director to make routine
decisions; and appointing committee chairs to the Executive Committee
in an advisory, non-voting capacity.

0 Meeting Arrangements - Two problems were identified - the questionable
timing and number of meetings, and the lack of active participation at
those meetings. Moving the annual meeting to March (to provide for
timely discussion of the federal budget); and efforts to attract more
informed participants to meetings were recommended.

This discussion paper focused the states' attention on key concerns and did
lead to some modest 'operational revisions (e.g., committee restructuring,

271

re-scheduling meetings). More importantly, however, it brought the
question of the Commission's institutional capabilities to the forefront of
regional deliberations.

The culmination (or perhaps continuation) of these efforts and the interest
they aroused was a November 1985 commissioned "Study of the Relationship
Between the Council of Great Lakes Governors and the Great Lakes
Commission." Prepared by State Research Associates, the study responded to
a February 1985 Council resolution noting "the potential for duplication of
effort, inefficient use of public resources and public confusion over the
identities of the two organizations." The Council further noted that
"significant reforms in the structure and organization of the Great Lakes
Commission would strengthen its abilities to address regional resource
management issues."

Following a series of interviews with Great Lakes state and provincial
officials which elicited a number of the institutional strengths and
weaknesses identified in earlier chapters, the report presented and
evaluated five options for improving the relationship of the two insti-
tutions of concern:

1),"Mothball" the Great Lakes Commission by phasing out programs or
withholding dues payments; redirect state funding to the Council along
with current staff resources.

2) Expand Council membership to include New York and Pennsylvania;
establish it as Executive Committee of the Commission; merge/coordinate
organizational resources of two institutions.

3) Restructure the Commission via appointment of all governors to state
delegations; provide for gubernatorial membership on Commission's
Executive Committee; keep Council in present form and use Commission
where eight-state agreement is desired.

3a) Same as "3" except that governors would appoint top level staff to
Commission: the same aides who serve on Council's Executive Committee.
Each would serve as chairman of their state's Commission delegation.
Co-location of Council and Commission staffs would be explored.

4) Negotiate a memorandum of agreement between the two institutions
providing for clarification of roles; staff coordination and agenda
setting.

An analysis of comparative advantages /d is advantages lead to the recom-
mendation that option 3(a) be pursued. As of mid-1986, efforts in that
direction were under consideration.

Institutional Strengths and Weaknesses

The analyses discussed above, although limited in scope, do highlight a
number of the strengths and weaknesses in evidence when the structure and
operation of the Commission is reviewed in light of the broader goals,
objectives and institutional parameters presented earlier.

272

Strengths

1) The goals and objectives of the Great Lakes Commission, as presented in
the Great Lakes Basin Compact, are consistent with the broader Basin
goals and objectives presented earlier. They demonstrate, in fact, a
firm understanding of the interrelationship between regional
environmental protection and economic development requirements, and the
public health and welfare criteria which provide the focus for their
pursuit.

2) The Commission's broad mandate, coupled with its task force structure,
provides a substantial degree of flexibility in focusing on emerging
issues.

3) The Great Lakes Basin Compact, as a legal agreement among states and
ratified by Congress, provides a firm legal basis for, and a sense of
longevity and continuity to, the operation of the Commission.

4) By virtue of its membership, the Commission is sensitive to the
resource management needs of non-Basin portions of Basin jurisdictions,
and the impact of those needs in interstate priority setting exercises.

5) The Commission structure and operation provides for full accountability
to member states. Responsiveness to the membership is demonstrated in
those instances where decisions and directives are clear.

6) Although its authority is limited to "soft" management functions, the
Commission mandate does provide for attention to a broad array of
regional issues.

7) The Commission provides a forum for coordination among the eight Great
Lakes states, with opportunities for involvement by federal (U.S. and
Canadian), provincial and private sector interests.

8) The Commission has a demonstrated capability in monitoring and
surveillance activity as it relates to public policy and legislative
developments affecting the Great Lakes.

9) The Commission's potential capability as a regional advocate is
significant, given its interstate coordinative, consensus building
mandate and historical focus at the U.S. federal legislative and policy
level.

10) The Commission's decision making process, which strives for consensus
but provides for majority rule, is a sound one.

11) The technical expertise of the Commission is well recognized, as is the
objectivity and quality of the research materials it prepares.

12) While the Commission lacks a fully integrated program recognizing the
inseparability of environmental protection and economic development
goals, it has demonstrated the capability to balance both concerns in
its agenda setting.

273

Weaknesses

1) While the Commission's goals and objectives do complement those of
other institutions, the issue of duplication in program efforts and
related initiatives is a relevant. one in terms of its relationship to
the Council.

2) The goals and objectives of the Commission do not lend themselves to
evaluation, as they are broad and can be difficult to measure (e.g.,
coordinating, assisting, advising, recommending). Hence, a benchmark
for gauging institutional performance has not been available.

3) In strict terms, the Commission's geographic area of concern is limited
to the U.S. portion of the Great Lakes Basin. Issues or problems
originating in Canada (or by Canadian governments) which influence
state interests are within its purview, but the Great Lakes Basin
Compact limits Commission interaction with the federal and provincial
governments of Canada.

4) Commission membership is limited to Great Lakes states and provides
only a limited, indirect means for Canadian involvement. Involvement
by U.S. federal agency representatives on an observer basis is provided
for, but has historically been quite limited.

5) The appointment process for state delegation members is a closed one in
that it is either fixed by law or provided for through gubernatorial or
legislative appointments. There is no formal nomination, confirmation
or hearing process which provides for broad input into the appointment
exercise.

6) Staff responsiveness to directives of the membership is constrained by
a frequent lack of clarity in Commission decisions.

7) The Commission is vested with no management functions beyond basic
coordinative/information sharing/advocacy activities. It has not been
employed to undertake "hard" management functions even in those
instances where it might operate more efficiently/effectively on a
Basin-wide basis than separate efforts of the various political
jurisdictions.

8) While the Commission does receive state appropriations, they are
limited, and timeliness in state dues-paying has been an issue. Even
though other means of financing are permitted (e.g., grants, contri-
butions), they have not been vigorously pursued.

9) Full participation and voting privileges are afforded even to those
states in arrears on dues, thus eliminating a major incentive for
timely contributions. Presently, only the chairmanship is forfeited
for tion-payment.

10) The inability of the Commission to draw substantially from member
jurisdictions for active staff support is a decided weakness, parti-
cularly in light of the assistance received by other Great Lakes
institutions.

274

11) The Commission does have a research coordination capability, but beyond
periodic compilation of research activity in the region, exercises no
coordinative or priority setting role.

12) An information "extension" service is provided for member jurisdictions
and, on request, to others who make inquiries. However, there is no
public outreach program that functions on a broad and continuing basis.

13) The Commission possesses no regulatory, enforcement or standard setting
authority, nor has it had substantive involvement in coordinating or
promoting such.

14) The Commission's planning authority has not been applied on a long-term
comprehensive basis, focusing instead on short-term, issue-specific
considerations.

15) An advocacy/ 1 obbyi ng function is central to the Commission's role,
although general lack of effectiveness is widely perceived as a
significant institutional weakness.

16) The Commission's role in the institutional ecosystem has become
increasingly unsettled since the formation of the Council, and while
this has not necessarily weakened the collective institutional effort,
it has precluded the level of mutual benefits which might be realized
under a close cooperative working relationship.

17) Linkages with other Great Lakes institutions do exist, but are informal
and exercised only sporadically.

18) Authority under the Great Lakes Basin Compact is exercised selectively;
some issues have historically received more attention than others.
While this is appropriate in the sense that efforts must be targeted to
stated priorities, it is unclear whether the Commission is fully aware
of the range of, and flexibility under, its mandate.

19) The Commission lacks an anticipatory posture. Rather, it favors a
reactive stance focused on U.S. federal legislative and policy
activity.

20) The Commission, in its efforts to gain greater stature and a higher
profile, actively seeks recognition of its accomplishments. While this
can be a positive action, it can undermine institutional support if
member jurisdictions are not rightfully recognized for their role in
those accomplishments.

21) The Commission has long had a low recognition level among the general
public and in some areas of the governmental arena. Media interest has
been minimal. Misconceptions abound with respect to its goals and
emphases. Within the Commission, little effort has been expended to
publicize and clarify its efforts.

22) The Commission compares favorably with other institutions in its
demonstrated ability to address both economic development and and

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resource management concerns. However, the effort is more one of
"balancing" competing interests than integrating them. Movement in the
latter direction is required.

23) Member jurisdictions have, on the average, demonstrated a rather casual
interest in, and attitude toward participation in Commission
activities. The political will necessary for strong and continuing
Commission leadership has been demonstrated only infrequently. In
recent years, the majority of its membership has clearly preferred to
vest its political energy in Council initiatives. The Commission has,
in some cases, preferred to follow the Council's lead rather than
exercise its own leadership capabilities.

24) The Commission program has not embr aced the "ecosystem management"
concept; preferring instead a focus on federal legislative and policy
actions on a piecemeal and issue-specific basis.

25) The Commission has long had a decided interest in and orientation
toward Great Lakes maritime issues, devoting a substantial amount of
its energies in that direction. This has come at the expense of
regional environmental and resource management considerations,
prompting it to become widely characterized as an "economic develop-
ment" agency.

Council of Great Lakes Governors

As the most recently established of the institutions of concern, the
Council enjoys a stature, public profile and level of expectation that will
long ensure the importance of its role in the Great Lakes institutional
ecosystem. Its initiatives - such as the Great Lakes Charter - are
indicative of its potential, and have generated a seldom observed
excitement in Great Lakes issues by public and private sector interests
alike.

As an institutional form, however, the Council has yet to be fully tried
and tested. Its potential is clearly a function of the political will of
its members and can therefore be tenuous. In the opinion of some, its
operational strengths are countered by its structural weaknesses.

To date, the only analysis examining the Council's characteristics was that
of the previously discussed "Study of the Relationship Between the Council
of Great Lakes Governors and the Great Lakes Commission." While the focus
of that study was clearly skewed toward the strengths and weaknesses of the
latter, several findings concerning the Council were presented. The
Council was lauded for: its ability to generate political and policy
consensus on key regional issues; its ability to initiate programs and
projects with multi-state applications; its political se nsitivity; as a
forum for discussion among the governors and premiers; and for maintaining
an agenda-setting process sensitive to regional needs. The lack of full
representation by New York, Pennsylvania and the Great Lakes provinces was
an item of concern. Study recommendations, however, focused almost
exclusively on GLC revisions and provided little guidance for future
Council activity.

276

Institutional Strengths and Weaknesses

Presented below is a series of strengths and weaknesses suggested by
examination of Basin goals and objectives in light of the Council's
structural and operational characteristics. Though the process was
constrained by the brief existence of the Council and the absence of past
analyses, numerous key strengths and weaknesses did emerge.

Strengths

1) The goals and objectives of the Council, as presented in its bylaws,
are consistent with the broader Basin goal and objectives presented
earlier in the chapter. They are indicative of a firm understanding of
the interrelationship between regional environmental protection and
economic development requirements.

2) The Council's mandate permits it substantial flexibility in setting and
pursuing its agenda; a flexibility ensured by its membership's standing
as the chief executive officers of the Great Lakes states. Given the
political will, actions can be forthright, decisive and effective.

3) The Council, again by virtue of its membership, has a demonstrated
political sensitivity to region-wide (i.e., political jurisdiction) as
well as Basin needs and priorities.

4) Representation from the private sector and sub-state/provincial levels,
though limited, is provided through task forces and similar
arrangements on an issue-specific basis.

5) As an instrument of the governors, the Council is fully accountable to
its membership and responsive to its consensus decisions.

6) Although its authority is limited to "soft" management functions, the
Council mandate does address a broad array of regional issues.

7) Although the state dues structure is modest at best and all states do
not presently contribute, the structure is in place and outside funds
are actively sought to augment contributions.

8) The Council benefits substantially from the active support and
contribution of individual state staff resources; in this respect it
serves as a "model" for other Great Lakes institutions.

9) The Council has demonstrated effectiveness as an information-sharing
and consensus-building forum. As a dispute avoidance or conflict
resolution mechanism it is untested, as issues selected for open
consideration to date by the governors have not been fundamentally
divisive. The committee and task force levels, however, have a
demonstrated capability to address such matters.

10) While the Council lacks a comprehensive planning function, the Great
Lakes Charter and Toxics Agreement initiatives represent significant
policy planning efforts and suggest potential for continued,* broadened
efforts.

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11) The Council's coordinative capability is a particular strength, as the
institution's stature and influence (in and of themselves) provide an
incentive for broad and active participation by the Great Lakes states
and provinces.

12) Regional advocacy efforts, when pursued, have a demonstrated effec-
tiveness by virtue of the influential nature of the Council membership
acting in unison.

13) The Council has exhibited an expertise in targeting key regional issues
for special studies.

14) While the Council is highly selective in attending to regional issues,
its rationale for doing so is clear, and it approaches its task with a
firm sense of its role and purpose.

15) The signing and implementation of the Great Lakes Charter demonstrates
the Council's anticipatory capabilities, serving as a model for such to
other Great Lakes institutions.

16) The Council performs the coordinator/catalyst role quite well, pro-
viding a "showcase" for its membership and crediting members for
successes achieved.

17) The Council is effective in building support for its initiatives;
support which is virtually guaranteed by virtue of its careful
selection of issues; the stature of its membership; and its media
appeal.
18) Political will is the driving force behind all Council activity, and
though subject to future variation, has been substantial to date.

19) While the ecosystem approach is not an integral component of the
Council program, it is recognized in the Charter and will likely be
reflected in implementation of the Toxics Agreement and future
environmental planning and management initiatives.

20) The Council has demonstrated sensitivity to both the environmental and
economic characteristics of issues it has addressed, avoiding overt
biases or "capture" by a given interest or interest group.

Weaknesses

1) While the Council's objectives complement those of other Great Lakes
institutions, the issue of duplication in program efforts and related
initiatives is a relevant one in terms of its relationship to the Great
Lakes Commission.

2) The Council's goals and objectives do not lend themselves t6 evalua-
tion, as they are broad and difficult to measure. A benchmark for
gauging institutional performance has not been available.

3) The Council lacks the legal formality (e.g., compact, treaty) of other
Great Lakes institutions, relying on a substantial but tenuous
foundation of political will as its impetus and very existence.

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4) Full membership is limited to the six westernmost Great Lakes states,
thereby constraining the input of two additional states (New York,
Pennsylvania) and two provinces (i.e., Ontario, Quebec), with a vested
interest in management of the resource.

5) The Council is vested with no management functions beyond basic
coordinative/information sharing/advocacy/policy activities. It lacks
the authority to undertake "hard" management functions even in those
instances where it might operate more efficiently/effectively on a
Basin-wide basis than separate efforts of the various political
jurisdictions.

6) While the Council does receive state appropriations, they are limited
and all member states do not presently contribute. Further, full
participation and voting privileges are afforded even to the state(s)
in arrears on dues, thus eliminating a major incentive for timely
contributions.

7) Staffing arrangements are overly conservative and unsettled. Two
separate office locations are maintained and future arrangements are
unclear. An extended lapse in executive director appointments was
experienced. In-house technical expertise is limited. Staff retention
has been a significant problem.

8) The Council provides an information " extension" service to member and
cooperating jurisdictions, and on request, to others who make

inquiries. However, there is no public outreach program that functions
on a broad and continuing basis.

9) An open, public participation process h as not been established for
Council initiatives. The Great Lakes Charter process, for example, has
been criticized for its "closed door" development.

10) While formation of the Council was undertaken in response to a
demonstrated need, it is questionable as to whether an entirely new
institution was required. Opportunities to adapt existing institutions
(e.g., Great Lakes Commission) were not fully explored.

11) The creation of the Council resulted in some disruption of the institu-
tional ecosystem; the Great Lakes Commission role has become in-
creasingly unsettled. While this has not necessarily weakened the col-
lective institutional effort, it has precluded the level of mutual
benefits that might be realized under a close cooperative working rela-
tionship.

12) Linkages with other Great Lakes institutions have been established, but
working relationships and cooperative efforts require additional
strengthening.

13) Interactions with public and private sector interests beyond the
state/provincial levels must be expanded to broaden sensitivity and
responsiveness to the range of Great Lakes issues under the Council
mandate.

279

14) An open planning and policy making process is presently lacking;
agendas tend to be set with limited "outside" input and policy
development pursued in a similar fashion.

15) The Council tends to approach its mandate on an issue-by-issue basis;
further attention to the "ecosystem management" philosophy and its
recognition of the interrelatedness of Basin uses and impacts is
required.

CHAPTER NINE

SCENARIOS FOR INSTITUTIONAL REVISION:
RECOMMENDATIONS AND RATIONALE

Introduction

The preceding chapter, through presentation of goals, objectives and
organizational parameters for elements of the Great Lakes institutional
ecosystem, serves a pivotal role in the transition from a descriptive
analysis of present arrangements to an exploration of options to revise,
replace or otherwise strengthen them. The review of collective and
individual institutional strengths and weaknesses in light of those
parameters was the principal vehicle of this transition.

In this ninth and final chapter, the culmination of all preceding discus-
sion is reflected in the presentation of specific recommendations directed
at advancing the Great Lakes management effort through structural and oper-
ational revision of its institutional arrangements. In so doing, the fol-
lowing is provided: summary statements of key findings; documentation of
the need for institutional change; presentation of recommendations and
rationale for institutional change under alternate scenarios; and an exami-
nation of the political implications of change under these scenarios, A
discussion of continuing research requirements in this area is presented in
an Epilogue.

The format for the presentation of recommendations for institutional change
is reflective of the four principal alternate scenarios available:

1) A "status quo" scenario in which change evolves from within the
institutional ecosystem in the absence of concerted "outside" mani-
pulation;

2) An incremental approach which accepts the fundamental legitimacy of
current institutional arrangements while pursuing limited operatio-
nal and structural change toward a prescribed set of long-term
goals.

3) A substantive change approach which also accepts the fundamental
legitimacy of current arrangements yet seeks, through sweeping
operational and structural revision, a substantially revised man-
agement framework; and

4) A dramatic single-step revision where the present institutional
ecosystem (or at least a number of its components) is rejected in
favor of a new and significantly re-directed institutional arrange-
ment.

280

281

The objectives of each scenario are presented, accompanied by an assessment
of political feasibility and the corresponding likelihood of imple-
mentation. Institution-wide and institution-specific recommendations are
offered, their rationale presented and where appropriate, an implementation
strategy defined. The comparative advantages /disadvantages of the alter-
nate approaches are explained.

A Summary Perspective on the Structure and Operation of the Great Lakes
Institutional Ecosystem

A summary perspective or point of reference for the consideration of the
alternate scenarios can be drawn from the cumulative discussion of preced-
ing chapters. Rather than reiterate that lengthy discourse, however, or
focus on the minutiae associated with institution-specific 'concerns, a
listing of findings is readily extracted to document the need for insti-
tutional change. The following are offered:

1) Present institutional arrangements are viewed as less than sat-
isfactory by a substantial segment of those directly involved with
them, as indicated via personal interviews and survey responses.
Perceptions among the general public, aside from ignorance or
indifference, indicate marginal satisfaction at best. As a
consequence, present arrangements lack the intensity of interest
and support necessary to realize their full potential.

2) Great Lakes institutions have evolved over time, each responding to
a distinct set of events and perceived needs. None has a
comprehensive, Basin-wide focus, nor is the collective effort
designed or able to provide that focus.

3) None of the institutions examined has exercised all powers under
its existing mandate, nor has a concerted effort been made to
explore the potential benefits of close coordination and cooper-
ative efforts.

4) When examined in light of the goals, objectives and organizational
parameters for Great Lakes management identified in Chapter Eight,
the individual and collective institutions, despite significant
strengths, demonstrate structural and operational inadequacies
which compromise their potential.

5) Despite significant inroads into acceptance of regional governance
and the ecosystem management approach, Great Lakes management
efforts remain largely in the hands of the traditional political
jurisdictions, while regional institutions serve in a modest,
underutilized and often uncertain capacity.

6) Historical attention to Great Lakes institutional design and
evaluation has been sporadic at best, constraining the evolution of
the regional management effort. As a consequence, technical and
scientific capabilities in Great Lakes management are clearly
outpacing innovation in public policy discourse and institutional
design. "Cris is-response " tendencies are firmly entrenched;
anticipatory/proactive postures have been resisted.

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7) A review of the institutional ecosystem, and in particular its
regional institutions, finds compatible goals yet a management
system lacking a common focus.

These and other findings arising through the course of the study justify
the development of alternate scenarios and associated recommendations.

Prior to presentation of these recommendations, however, a critical point
warrants emphasis. Institutional inadequacies cannot be "legislated away"
simply through the creation of a regional institution or alteration of its
operational and structural characteristics. Rather, successful pursuit of
Basin goals and objectives, however measured, demands an institutional
arrangement with a sensitivity toward the Basin's environmental, economic
and social needs and the political support and will of those in leadership
positions. When present, political will can transcend even the most
restrictive institutional form. When absent, even the most innovative form
can become impotent. While operational and structural characteristics can
serve as inducements for political support of a given institutional effort,
they provide no guarantees. Hence, the "human factor" in determining
institutional success remains a great variable.

Scenario One: Preserving the "Status Quo"

The scenario suggested here pertains to the long observed "natural"
evolution of the institutional ecosystem; evolution influenced and directed
by a natural progression of events and issues as opposed to concerted
"outside" manipulation of the institutional structure. The theory is that
these events and issues, as they arise, will sensitize existing
institutions to unmet needs and induce an appropriate compensatory
response. Advocacy of the "status quo" approach is an endorsement of the
existing institutional ecosystem and a vote of confidence in its ability to
sense, adapt to and address emerging issues. As such, this scenario
rejects the notion that manipulation of structural and operational
characteristics of a given institution should take place as one component
of a "grand design" for the entire institutional ecosystem. Therefore,
recommendations to that end are deemed inappropriate.

Endorsement of the "status quo" can be soundly rejected on the basis of
earlier discussion. Three principal points warrant consideration. First,
and very simply, historical observation leads one to the conclusion that
institutional evolution in the absence of a focus or common rationale may
be little more than a re-positioning of individual institutions without
moving the collective institutional effort forward. Second, the "environ-
ment" in which Great Lakes institutions operate is not conducive to a posi-
tive evolutionary process. The enduring federalism philosophy; the self-
preservation instincts and inertial tendencies of existing institutions;
the experimental nature of regional management; the absence of benchmarks
for institutional assessment and design; historically modest levels of
political will; and divergent philosophies among the political jurisdic-
tions are among those factors which discourage unaided institutional evolu-
tion from taking place in such a manner that substantial progress is ob-
served. Third, the sheer magnitude of the regional management task - in
terms of resource use and political, social and economic considerations -

283

can be an insurmountable one in the absence of a reasoned strategy for
effecting institutional change.

Even now, in an era of increasing attention to, and concern over the
adequacy of Great Lakes institutions, institutional change is driven more
by issue-specific needs and political considerations than by thorough
assessment and understanding of Basin management goals and objectives and
the means to achieve them. These observations provide the basis for
rejecting the status quo scenario and investigating alternate scenarios in
which gradations of manipulation are employed to reconcile Basin goals and
objectives with the institutions designed to pursue them.

Scena,rio Two: An Incremental Approacb to Institutional Cbange

This scenario accepts the fundamental legitimacy of existing institutional
arrangements and advocates a series of modest operational and structural
revisions to bring those arrangements in line with the Basin management
goals and objectives presented earlier. Such revisions are those which can
be implemented with a relative minimum of political investment, economic
cost and time delay.

Presented below are recommendations for the individual and collective Great
Lakes institutions of concern. Drawing largely from Chapter Eight
discussion of institutional strengths, weaknesses, goals and objectives
founded on research embodied in earlier chapters, these recommendations are
accompanied by a statement of rationale and an indication of implementation
opportunities and constraints likely to be encountered.

Recommendations - The Collective Institutional Effort

1) Endorse a common set of goals and objectives for the use, management
and protection of the resources of the Great Lakes Basin. The pre-
scribed mandates of the four regional institutions of concern, while
diverse, are generally complementary and supportive of a common
(although unarticulated) set of goals and objectives. The joint prepa-
ration of such a set of goals and objectives, followed by formal recog-
nition and endorsement by all jurisdictions with a Great Lakes manage-
ment role, would constitute both a symbolic gesture of shared commit-
ment as well as a practical foundation for future cooperative action.
The goals and objectives statement presented in the preceding chapter
is suggested as a framework.

Such an action, given its non-binding status and inevitable "least
common denominator" nature, can be expected to be politically accept-
able. In a sense, this action parallels the Great Lakes Charter ap-
proach, although having a broader focus and seeking regional institu-
tions as well as political jurisdictions as signatories.

The key to implementation will be a lead institution or group of
individuals willing'to spearhead the effort; the Council of Great Lakes
Governors may be the appropriate choice. Securing the interest and
active support of the two federal governments will be a significant yet
necessary challenge.

284

2) Prepare a biennial "State of the Great Lakes" report under the joint
authorship and concurrence of Great Lakes institutions and their member
jurisdictions. Cooperatively prepared, this report would constitute a
definitive annual statement on the status of the resource, current
programs and priorities, problem areas and accomplishments, and an
action agenda for the following year and beyond. Individual plans of
institutions would be specified and have a common.focus, addressing the
previously recommended "common set of goals and objectives for the use,
management and protection of the resources of the Great Lakes Basin."

The report (and report development process) would provide its
contributors with an opportunity to approach resource management goals
from an integrative perspective reflecting the variety of institutional
mandates and goals in the Basin. Further, over time it would provide a
comprehensive benchmark for assessing progress and revising programs
accordingly.

This initiative would not supplant institution-specific annual reports
now prepared, but provide an overview for integrating the totality of
such information under shared goals for management of the resource.
The report development process would be undertaken by the collectivity
of regional institution directors as part of an on-going coordinative
process.

3) Establish a framework for information exchange and Joint action through
the conduct of an annual Great Lakes Policy Summit. The. institutions
of concern, in lacking a formal framework for information exchange and
joint action, have failed to take full advantage of their common
interests and pool their. resources, as appropriate. This should be
remedied with two actions. The first is holding an annual meeting
among Great Lakes institution directors and senior staff to identify
their respective priority concerns for the upcoming year, share work
plans, explore cooperative opportunities and address any duplication,
overlap or overlooked program areas. The second is the scheduling of
joint meetings between the institutions of concern. Each institution
should plan, on a rotating basis, to hold a joint meeting with another
once each year.

Modest yet sporadic advances in these areas have been made in past
years; an indication of the political feasibility of fully implementing
this recommendation. An initial summit meeting of the institutions'
officers and key staff is needed to open discussion and establish a
process for membership endorsement and subsequent planning of the joint
meetings. This initial summit, as a major event, could be used as a
11signing ceremony" for the previously suggested common set of goals and
objectives.

4) Establish a regional information collection, storage and retrieval
system. Each of the institutions of concern has its own areas of
special expertise, and its resources (e.g., staff, data base, library)
in those areas are of tremendous potential value to other institutions
and the region in general. Access to and knowledge of availability are
the key constraints. A computer-based inventory of available materials
even in a rudimentary form - would improve inter-institutional

285

accessibility to the specialized "in-house" libraries and holdings of
the individual institutions. Such an inventory will be of increasing
value as staff resources are challenged by limited budgets; broadening,
multi-disciplinary issues; and time limitations for research.

Collaboration among the institutions to establish such a system would
appear to be without serious obstacle. The principal f actors may be
the extent to which their respective computer systems are compatible
and their ability to agree on the form and substance of the information
system.

An organizational meeting of the information officers of the various
institutions would constitute the necessary first step in examining the
feasibility of such a system. Discussions among the technical staff
and policy officials of the respective institutions would be required
to operationalize the system.

5) Create a framework to monitor and coordinate Great Lakes research acti@
vity; identify and prioritize needs; and allocate responsibilities.
While each institution has some coordinative role in this area, a
single Basin-wide system accommodating multi-disciplinary interests is
lacking. As a consequence, multiple statements of "priority" research
needs are in circulation at any given time. A standing committee or
council with broad membership drawn from academia, government and the
private sector is required. Further, that assemblage must be aware of
the variance in research mandates among the various Great Lakes-related
entities and exhibit the stature and credibility needed to influence
research patterns.

Aspects of this framework are presently in place through the Inter-
national Association for Great Lakes Research and the Council of Great
Lakes Research Managers under the auspices of the International Joint
Commission. Further, the proposed Great Lakes Amendment to the U.S.
Clean Water Act recognizes this need in its provision for a Great Lakes
Research Office within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion. At present, however, the framework is not complete and lacks the
ability to perform the needed functions.

This prioritization and coordination effort is best undertaken within a
multi-institutional framework, perhaps with a single coordinative
entity such as a Sea Grant Program, the Great Lakes Sea Grant Network
or a reconstituted Council of Great Lakes Research Managers.

6) Inter-institutional support for a Great Lakes Information Referral
Center. The lack of active public information services among the
institutions of concern contributes to their generally low public pro-
file and attendant public confusion over their respective responsibili-
ties and capabilities. Further, fragmentation of authority precludes
the existence of an active centralized source for directed inquiry.
All Great Lakes institutions would benefit from support of a Great
Lakes Information Referral Center. Modestly staffed and funded via
these institutions as well as academic and foundation grants, the
Center would base its services on the previously referenced regional
information, collection, storage,and retrieval system. Fielding calls

286

from any source from citizen inquiries to private firms or government
agencies, the Center would respond to the inquiry directly or refer the
caller to the appropriate source.

This Center could be modeled in part after a service of the same name
supported by the Great Lakes Basin Commission and the Michigan Sea
Grant Program in 1979-80. That service met with some success, although
disbanded before it was able to fully establish itself. Support f or
such an effort is likely, although willingness to commitment funds will
be questionable among the institutions of concern. Foundations and
academic institutions are likely sources, at least initially. Such a
Center is most appropriately housed within an academic or non-profit
organization (e.g. , The Center for the Great Lakes; Great Lakes Sea
Grant network) with strong ties to, and direction provided in part by
the regional Great Lakes institutions and their member jurisdictions.

7) Establish a "Great Lakes Office" or its equivalent in all Great Lakes
states, provinces and relevant federal agencies. Advancements in
focusing jurisdictional attention on Great Lakes issues have been
demonstrated in Michigan and New York, and other states (e.g. , Ohio)
are considering such an office. The Great Lakes Program Offices in
U.S. EPA and Environment Canada have played positive roles at the
federal level in this regard as well. It is recommended that the
remaining jurisdictions establish such an office and use it for both
intra- and inter-jurisdictional coordination and policy-making
purposes.

8) Increase involvement of nongovernmental organizations in various coord-
inative and policy development efforts. The four governmental
institutions of concern, in assessing their own collective
capabilities, should determine those areas in which nongovernmental
organizations can make a substantive contribution. Examples include;
use of the International Association for Great Lakes Research for
policy and socio-economic as well as scientific research pursuits; The
Center for the Great Lakes for coalition-building and special studies;
Great Lakes Tomorrow and Great Lakes United for public education and
participation; and various industry associations for soliciting
industry contributions /reactions to policy development initiatives.
One means to pursue this opportunity is through nongovernmental sector
involvement in the Great Lakes Policy Summit recommended earlier, and
thereafter in any subsequent coardinative activity.

9) Establish a "Visiting Scholar" program in all institutions of concern.
The Great Lakes institutional ecosystem will thrive only through the
infusion of new ideas and initiatives, and perspectives from those who
are relatively new to it. For this reason, a "visiting scholar"
program should be instituted within each institution. A one or two
year "endowed chair" should be established, permitting outstanding
academic, business or public officials to contribute their talents to
the Great Lakes management effort.

In many instances, existing staff resources could be allocated to
provide for such. Further, this type of function would expect to draw
foundation and corporate donor interest.

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10) Designate inter- institutional liaisons as a means to strengthen
linkages. The Great Lakes policy community is, in many respects, a
rather small one, and significant overlap is found in the membership,
advisors and cooperators of the various institutions. Each institution
would be well served by identifying individuals with a dual designation
and appointing them as liaison between the two. So designated, they
would serve as coordinator and contact to ensure that each institution
is well informed of the other's activities and opportunities for
cooperative effort.

Several members of the Great Lakes policy community presently serve in
such a capacity on an informal basis; support for formalizing such an
arrangement is expected to be readily achieved. It would be incumbent
upon staff directors to identify such individuals and secure their
cooperation as well as the approval of the membership.

11) Formalize an Interagency Personnel Agreement process to facilitate
staff exchange among Great Lakes institutions and state/provincial/
federal agencies. To varying degrees, Great Lakes institutions are
subject to problems of staff turnover, staffing size limitations and
sensitivity to the interests and needs of their membership. To better
utilize the pool of Great Lakes expertise, strengthen inter-
institutional ties and promote professional development, an exchange
program between and among the regional institutions and relevant
federal, state and provincial agencies is recommended. For example, a
state could allocate a staff person to the Great Lakes Commission for a
given project, or an IJC staff member could join the Fishery Commission
staff on a temporary basis to work on fishery/water quality issues.

Such a program could be modeled in part after that sponsored by the
Great Lakes Basin Commission in 1979-80, where GLBC fund allocations to
the states could be accepted in funds or "in-kind" (i.e., personnel)
contributions. Properly designed, such a program could be instituted
on a substantial scale at nominal cost.

Recommendations - The Individual Institutional Effort

A. International Joint Commission

1) Conduct a major, periodic review of the terms of the Boundary
Waters Treaty and Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement in light of
current and emerging binational management needs. A review of the
Treaty, including an assessment of its current and potential
application, as well as the need and desirability of its amendment
or renegotiation should be undertaken in the near term and
periodically thereafter, perhaps every three years. The intent is
to ensure that IJC efforts are targeted at critical issues; that
Basin jurisdictions (and in particular the federal government) are
fully aware of that potential; and that its ability to provide for
a response to emerging Basin problems and issues is periodically
assessed. A similar arrangement for the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement is advisable; perhaps a more frequent and open version of
the Agreement review anticipated for 1986-1987.

288

Such a review should be sponsored by the federal governments and
involve state and provincial participation, but be conducted with
outside assistance to ensure a broad and objective review. The
National Research Council/Royal Society of Canada review of the
Agreement in 1985-86 provides a useful model.

2) Broaden and strengthen tht Council of Great Lakes Research
Managers. Established under the auspices of the IJC's Science
Advisory Board in 1983, the Council is designed as a forum for the
exchange and coordination of research information among research
agency and institute directors in the Great Lakes Basin. Further,
it is the missing link between Science Advisory Board
recommendations and their potential application. Broadening its
limited membership and strengthening or initiating activity in the
areas of research coordination, inventory and prioritizing would
assist the IJC in focusing its own research related activities, as
well as those of other institutions, agencies and academic units in
the Basin. The Science Advisory Board should take immediate action
to provide the Council with the membership, authority and resources
necessary to fully develop its potential.

3) Revitalize the Great Lakes Regional Office's Public Information
Office and pursue an aggressive outreach program. Although the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement calls for a public information
function within the Regional Office, the program has been de-
emphasized in recent years and lacking in staff c.ontinuity, .
Further, the outreach element is more aptly described as a
response-oriented activity than an initiatory one. A strengthened
and aggressive program is needed to raise the Commission's public
profile, more effectively educate its constituents and provide an
avenue for citizen input into the programs and activities of the
Commission. Support for a revitalized program must be voiced in
the Commission's Washington and Ottawa offices, as the Regional
Office can exercise at best only limited discretion In initiating
the effort.

4) Streamline committee structure and process and relate more directly
to Commission priorities. The committee structure under the
Science Advisory and Water Quality Boards has grown unwieldy over
time and, in some instances, the relationship of committee
activities to Board priorities and overall Commission
responsibilities has come into question. A recent action by the
newly appointed co-chairmen of the Science Advisory Board to
abolish all committees in preparation for a new structure as a
positive step, provided that the new structure is implemented with
due speed; continuity with respect to ongoing efforts is safe-
guarded; the new structure is founded firmly on the Commission's
mandate; and former members are retained, as appropriate, to
provide some sense of continuity to preceding efforts.

A comprehensive review of the board and committee structure is
recommended, with consideration given to the replacement,
consolidation, elimination or modification of current arrangements.

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This review should include a careful examination of the Science
Advisory and Water Quality Boards; their mandate; relationship to
the Commission and each other; their membership; past performance
and future direction. Careful attention should be paid to the
concerns highlighted in the 1985 National Research Council/Royal
Society of Canada review of the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement.

5) Improve timeliness of report and study preparation. Commission
effectiveness and credibility are compromised by an arduous and
time consuming process for issuing reports and special studies.
The length of the reference process - from development to reporting
stages - has been highlighted as a particular concern. While time
delays associated with certain studies may, on occasion, be
unavoidable, inordinate delays have been observed. Careful
attention to information needs, resource requirements and the array
of other obstacles and requirements in the earlier stages of such
efforts will assist in timely issuance of reports.

Addressing this matter will require action at both the federal
level (e.g., an expedited reference process) and the IJC board and
staff level (e.g., priority setting and resource allocation
efforts).

6) Formal presentation of Commission findings and recommendations.
The Commission process calls for transmittal of IJC studies and
annual reports to the two federal governments for review and
possible action. The lack of a formal presentation "event" invol-
ving high ranking federal officials, however, provides little
impetus for federal agency reaction. Further, formal written re-
sponses to IJC recommendations are rarely received.

Establishing a formal presentation meeting on at least an annual
basis should be considered as a means to promote federal agency
coordination of, and reaction to relevant recommendations. An open
meeting with media coverage would be desirable. Arrangements f or
such would appropriately be made by members of the U.S. and
Canadian sections of the Commission.

7) Assume a lead and aggressive role in the development and applica-
.tion of the ecosystem management concept. With the signing of the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, the Commission formal-
ly recognized and endorsed the ecosystem management concept and
established a framework and vehicle for its application. Given
this, it is recommended that the IJC assume an aggressive. leader-
ship role In developing the concept and working with other regional
institutions and Basin jurisdictions in the interest of broadening
its use and application.

Such an effort would be an appropriate assignment for a specified
committee of the Science Advisory or Water Quality Board, with a
broad-based, multi-disciplinary representation.

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8) Broaden and expand the planning function with a special emphasis on
longer-term anticipatory planning. Commission planning can and
should be expanded substantially under the present terms of the
Agreement and Treaty. The Commission's present data collection and
analysis capability provides the foundation for such. Of
particular value is the longer-term, anticipatory planning
capability demonstrated by the Commission in its recently issued
Great Lakes Diversion and Consumptive Uses Study. Carefully
targeted to key issue areas and pursued with board or committee
oversight, Commission planning studies could have a substantial
influence in the direction of state, provincial and federal Great
Lakes policy.

The Commission, in conjunction with its Science Advisory and Water
Quality Boards, is well-advised to review the Agreement, Treaty and
Board mandates to determine the opportunities and needs for focused
planning activity and the means by which it can be pursued.

9) Review staffing- and budgetary needs in the Regional Office and
assess overall- oroanizational requirements. The adequacy of the
staffing and budget levels of the Commission's regional office has
long been questioned in light of the responsibilities it is charged
with under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. Inordinate
delays in filling staff vacancies have been of concern as well. An
assessment of such is needed, as is a subsequent decision (if
appropriate) to secure additional funds or otherwise re-allocate
existing resources to priority needs.

Also of concern are organizational Issues relating to the
relationship between the boards and the office director and the
overall level of accountability of the regional office to
Washington and Ottawa offices. Such a review should be undertaken
in conjunction with the Treaty/Agreement review process called for
earlier.

10) Prepare and maintain an inventory of institutional responsibili-
ties and program activity under the terms of the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement. In cooperation with the state, provincial and
federal governments, the Commission should maintain an updated
document which identifies and describes state, provincial and
federal responsibilities (implicit or explicit) under the
Agreement; relevant laws, programs and intergovernmental
arrangements; staffing and funding levels; and any related infor-
mation describing the framework for, and commitment of agency re-
sources to the provisions of the Agreement. Such a document would
serve as a valuable reference source as well as providing a vehicle
for assessing individual and collective agency commitment to the
Agreement. - On the U.S. side, the federal-state consultation and
interaction involved in compiling the document could serve as an
informal counterpart to the activities pursued under the Canada-
Ontario Agreement. Preparing the inventory can be justified under
the terms of the Agreement and would best be pursued as an activity
under the Water Quality Board with principal input from the U.S.

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EPA Great Lakes National Program Office and the Environment Canada
Great Lakes Program.

11) Explore alternate dispute avoidance and resolution techniques.
When the two governments are unable to reach a decision on a
divisive issue under the Agreement, they lack well-defined alterna-
tives to the strictures of the binding arbitration function
embodied in Article X of the Boundary Waters Treaty or the
provisions of the Hague Convention. Yet, such disputes are
increasingly likely to arise as pressing transboundary issues
emerge. Negotiation, conciliation, fact-finding and related
techniques should be developed and made available through the
Commission as a "first line" approach to avoiding or resolving
disputes. Such techniques would provide a welcome alternative to
the more rigid and politically unacceptable approaches and would
allow the discussion to proceed under the Commission "umbrella."

Development and application of these techniques will require the
concurrence and support of the Commission through the governments.
Amendment of the Treaty or Agreement would not be mandatory, as
existing provisions provide the necessary basis.

12) Develop and apply the socio-economic component of ecosystem man-
agement to activity under the Agreement. The Commission has long
demonstrated an interest (although often latent) in the socio-
economic aspects of Great Lakes water quality management.
Indications of this are seen in the committees of the Science
Advisory Board (e.g., Societal Aspects Committee), the direction of
Commission-funded investigations and the interests of the Commis-
sion as expressed in reports and special studies to the
governments.

This emphasis must be strengthened and integrated into all aspects
of the Commission's studies and related activities if ecosystem
management is to be practiced in its true form. To do so, such a
committee must be maintained and its interaction broadened with
other disciplines represented on Commission committees. Further,
board and staff selection should be pursued to ensure adequate
representation of socio-economic considerations.

B. Great Lakes Fishery Commission

1) Establish a public information function and outreach program. The
nature and specificity of the Fishery Commission mandate provides
the institution with a readily definable public clientele - sport
and commercial fishermen principal among them. Yet, the
Commission's low profile and lack of a public education/involvement
program compromises its potential and hinders full development of a
potentially substantial base of support.

A staff -coordinated public information program, drawing on the
expertise of cooperating agencies, should be established by action
of the Commission. A periodic newsletter should be considered as
an element of this program. An active outreach component would

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serve as both a public education tool and a vehicle for soliciting
public input into the programs and deliberations of the Commission.
A public advisory committee is an option as well.

Provided that such a program is carefully targeted and draws upon
cooperating agencies for assistance, it is expected that it could
be implemented with limited staffing and budgetary resources and
without a substantial re-allocation of Commission priorities.

2) Periodic formal review of the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries
and related Fishery Commission proLrrams. While a one-time review
of such was mandated in Convention language and a number of
program-specific audits and internal analyses have been conducted,
a formal periodic review is in order. Conducted every 3-5 years as
an "internal audit," for example, this review would serve as a
check on the scope, direction and effectiveness of Fishery
Commission programs and bring to light any needed revisions to
these programs or the Convention itself. Further, it would provide
the opportunity to assess programs in view of emerging issues and
fisheries-related efforts underway by other regional institutions
and state/provincial/federal agencies.

The review would be initiated by the Commission itself, coordinated
by staff with input from cooperating agencies and individuals as
well as -user groups, and culminate in a public presentation.
Properly designed, this internal audit function, could be incor-
porated into the Fishery Commission program with only a modest
increase in demands on staffing, time and budget constraints.

3) Heizhten-profile of, and expand annual meeting program. To broaden
its public profile and secure a formal federal government response
to its recommendations, the Commission should consider heightening
the profile of its annual meeting. An expanded format featuring
formal presentation of, and response to Commission recommendations
would be appropriate, as would informational briefings and research
reports by academic researchers and by fisheries agencies at all
levels of government. Opportunities for dialogue with the general
public would be appropriate as well.

Instituting such a format can be undertaken at the discretion of
the Commission, as the Convention requires an annual meeting but
makes no stipulation as to its format and content.

5) Strengthen linkages with the International Joint Commission and
explore opportunities for cooperative action. While linkages do
exist in terms of a formal liaison arrangement, and coordination at
the program level is observed, the complementary nature of the
institutions' mandates indicate that opportunities for cooperative
action are substantial. Through periodic meetings of senior staff
and joint meetings of the two Commissions, such opportunities
should be identified and pursued. Issue areas to be focused on
might include, among others: toxic contaminants in the fishery;
impacts of lake level fluctuation on the fishery; water quality and
habitat management.

293

This initiative should follow internal Fishery Commission dis-
cussion and decisions regarding a broadened interpretation of its
mandate, as recommended above.

6) Maintain support for socio-economic research and application in an
ecosystem management setting. The Fishery Commission should foster
its growing reputation for, and support of research into the social
and economic aspects of fishery management and more generally, re-
source management. This support, through grants for research and
symposia, has had a demonstrated impact in developing the socio-
economic dimension of ecosystem management. Continued emphasis in
this area, coupled with efforts to involve a broader range of re-
source managers, scientists and policy makers is recommended.

C. Great Lakes Commission

1) Institute periodic comprehensive review of Commission programs in
light of Great Lakes Basin Compact provisions. In a fashion
similar to the IJC and Fishery Commission recommendations presented
earlier, the Commission should adopt a policy calling for periodic
comprehensive view of its programs in light of its mandate as
presented in the Basin Compact. Conducted internally (i.e., by
member states) every three years, such a review would serve to 1)
inform (or remind) member states of compact provisions, 2) assess
the scope and direction of current Commission programs, and 3)
determine and act on dormant capabilities as necessary. The review
could also be used to assess the adequacy of compact language and
provide a means for suggesting amendments, when and if necessary.

Establishing a review policy could be promoted by the Executive
Committee and approved by the full membership. A special committee
could be appointed for a finite term at the beginning of each
review cycle.

2) Establish a priority-settin& process for Commission activity and a
system of accountability to ensure adherence. A formal and pro-
cedurally explicit priority-setting process involving all member
states should be instituted on an annual basis. This process would
culminate in the adoption - at the annual meeting - of an explicit
set of priority concerns for the upcoming 12-month period, the
mechanisms to address them (e.g., task force), and a set of measur-
able objectives. Revisions/ amendments could be considered at the
semi-annual meeting, if necessary, as that meeting would be used to
monitor and report on progress and adjust strategies. Upon formu-
lation of a prioritized action agenda, the chairman of each state
delegation would sign the document, which would thus become a
matter of record and Commission policy. The chairman would also be
required to submit an annual report documenting his state's contri-
bution to meeting priorities set and commitments made the preceding
year.

As with the periodic program review recommendation, establishing
this process would require the approval of the membership and a
designated authority (e.g., Executive Committee) to oversee. The

294

accountability aspect would remedy a long-standing problem of un-
clear priorities and charges of Commission unresponsiveness brought
by state members.

3) Clarify the Commission-Council of Great Lakes Governors' relation-
ship through detailed study and a subsequent Memorandum of Under-
standin . If the two institutions are to co-exist without substan-
tial structural and operational revision, a clarification of roles,
responsibilities and interrelationships is necessary to remedy what
is best described as an untenable situation. A follow-up to the
State Research Associates' study is recommended to explicitly
identify regional program needs, allocate responsibilities between
the two institutions and define cooperative arrangements. A Memo-
randum of Understanding outlining their respective roles in generic
fashion (e.g., advocacy, legislative tracking, research coordin-
ation, policy development) should be jointly approved and serve as
a guide for each in program development and pursuit of initiatives.

Based on existing characteristics and capabilities, it is advised
that the Council serve primarily in a broad agenda setting,
consensus building and policy-making role. The Commission, while
assisting in these functions as well, would focus its efforts pri-
marily toward implementing such policies, providing technical
assistance and advice to the states and the Council, and
maintaining program coordination, data collection, issue research
and legislative monitoring capabilities. The Commissioa should be
considered, at least under current arrangements, as a preferred
"institutional home" for maintaining programs under the Great Lakes
Charter and Great Lakes Toxic Substances Control initiatives.
Regional advocacy, promotional activity and federal agency/
Congressional liaison should be shared but closely coordinated
functions.

The Memorandum of Understanding should be prepared via a special
task force comprised of GLC state delegation chairmen and the
Executive Committee of the Council.

4) Secure active and sustained participation (non-voting) from provin-
cial and U.S./Canadian federal agencies. The Commission should
make a concerted effort to secure participation of a designated
observer from Ontario, Quebec and each U.S./Canadian federal agency
with an interest in G-reat Lakes management matters. These
individuals should be invited to participate in or observe all
Commission functions, provide information and liaison services, and
voice agency concerns and ideas for consideration by the
Commission. Cooperative state/provincial/federal initiatives
should be pursued as appropriate (e.g., data collection programs,
research coordination).

This recommendation can be addressed through the expansion and
reactivation of the Commission's Technical Advisory Committee on
Research and Development (established in 1982), addition of federal
and provincial representatives to task forces or formation of a
separate arrangement.

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5) Improve effectiveness of advocacy efforts by funding a Washington-
based staff person. A full-time, Washington-based Commission
lobbyist position should be created to improve the effectiveness
(i.e., impact) of Commission positions. Historically, the Commis-
sion has had only a limited presence at the federal level and
follow up on its many resolutions and position statements has been
questionable and in some instances, nonexistent.

This staff person could work out of the Washington office of the
state chairing the Commission and would be responsible for legis-
lative tracking, liaison and advocacy. The individual would be
fully accountable to the Commission and report to the Executive
Director and Chairman. Funding for the position could, at least
initially, be drawn from the substantial reserve funds left to the
Commission upon termination of the Great Lakes Basin Commission.

6) Initiate program development function as means to augment limited
state appropriations. The Commission should make full use of
compact provisions providing broad discretion in securing operating
funds. To augment modest state appropriations, consideration
should be given to securing (on both a project specific and general
operating basis) foundation grants and corporate donations.
Prospective requests should be formulated by staff, as appropriate,
and presented to the Executive Committee (or a newly created com-
mittee) for approval prior to submittal.

An appropriate first step would be the designation of a Commission
committee or task force on development and the formulation of
guidelines and policy for pursuing "outside" funding.

7) Amend Bylaws to suspend voting privileges for states in arrears on
dues. Suspension of voting privileges for non dues-paying states
should be considered an inducement for timely state appropriations.
This is a more viable option than any legal recourse which might be
taken under compact provisions. Such a measure would provide a
deterrent to the historical tendency of some states to go into
arrears, and would therefore reduce budgetary and fiscal planning
uncertainties.

8) Encourage active state involvement in the issue identification,
research and analysis process. Commission effectiveness and the
relevance of its programs should be strengthened by abandoning the
present process in which issue development is largely staff
responsibility and commissioners and advisors serve largely in a
reactive mode. A more formalized issue identification and
screening process - in which the states are principles and the
staff is secretariat - should be instituted. (See recommendation
on priority-setting process.)

Further, the Commission should consider an "in-kind" contribution
system in which each member state would allocate a designated
amount of staff time to work with counterparts and Commission staff
in the identification, research and analysis of issues. This in-
volvement should include the preparation of Commission member (as

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opposed to staff) authored reports, issue papers and resolutions.
To augment a limited staff, state commissioners and advisors should
also be used extensively to represent the Commission at Congres-
sional hearings, conferences, etc.

The limited level of involvement (and expectations of) state
delegations in day-to-day Commission process should be considered a
priority concern and receive concerted attention, in open forum, at
a Commission meeting.

9) Replace present research compilation activities with a broader
regional research and water planning coordination program. The
Commission should serve as an information clearinghouse and
coordinator for the range of Basin-related research and planning
activity undertaken or sponsored by member states. As such, it
would provide the information needed for member states to collec-
tively determine Basin research needs; promote consistency of ap-
proach in the development of state water plans; develop positions
on federal research funding proposals; provide a screening device
for potential issues; and others.

A standing committee or task force with representatives from each
member state should be established for this purpose. Commission
staff should serve as secretariat and provide liaison to the inter-
institutional research coordination body recommended earlier.

10) Revise or expand staffing arrangements to provide a public informa-
tion/extension service. To strengthen its stature, credibility and
recognition level, as well as make full use of its technical
expertise and knowledge base, the Commission should develop and
staff an aggressive public information/extension program. Such a
program should include a regularly scheduled newsletter with broad
distribution; outreach activities, including business, citizen
group interaction and media relations; and support for and
involvement in the Great Lakes information referral service
recommended earlier.

11) Formalize a public involvement process to assist in shaping and im-
plementing Commission programs. Nongovernmental participation in
Commission activity should be broadened and formalized to assist in
raising and screening issues for potential Commission considera-
tion; to serve as a sounding board for prospective actions; and to
assist in disseminating decisions and associated information.

Two approaches should be investigated. The first is a public
advisory committee comprised of nongovernmental delegates appointed
by member states. The second is a similar committee, but appointed
by the Commission as a whole on a Basin-wide basis -rather than
seeking equal representation from each state. All major Great
Lakes user and interest groups should be represented. Further, a
portion of each Commission meeting should be allocated to a report
of this committee and the opportunity for any other interested
individual to make a statement or otherwise address the Commission.

297

Such a committee can be established by action of the Commission
under the terms of the compact, provided that it be advisory in
nature.

12) Assume, in some form, the Great Lakes Basin Plan process initiated
by the Great Lakes Basin Commission. The Commission should pursue
its Basin planning mandate provided for in Article I of the Compact
yet largely ignored in favor of more reaction-oriented approaches.
A policy planning approach - such as that reflected in the issue-
specific elements of the now dormant Great Lakes Basin Plan -should'
be adopted. These elements, laying out policy statements approved
by the Commission, would serve as non-binding guidance to the
states, as well as being available for consideration by federal and
provincial agencies or nongovernmental Great Lakes interests.

Properly devised, this new orientation would require only minimal
alteration of current staff process, provided that state
involvement become more extensive. This policy planning process
would be a valuable means to reorient a historic Commission focus
on resolution writing and occasional position papers.

13) Develop a new profile emphasizing that the Great Lakes Commission
is an extension of the states and not an independent entity. The
fact that the states are the Commission and the staff its secre-
tariat must be re-established to ensure the active interest and
support of member states in Commission activities. Some states
have long regarded the Commission as a quasi -autonomous, distinct
entity rather than a state forum. To some, the staff became
synonymous with the Commission and the states but a third party
observer and an occasional participant.

Characterizing the Commission in its proper light - as an organi-
zation of the states - should be pursued through the following:

a) Heighten Commission profile by presenting its actions and
accomplishments as those of the membership as opposed to the
staff;

b) Involve commissioners, advisors and other state representatives
in day-to-day Commission efforts, including research, report
and issue paper preparation, resolution writing and preparation
and presentation of testimony.

c) Increase reliance on Commission members to serve as organi-
zational spokesmen; and

d) Per an earlier recommendation, establish a system of expec-
tations and accountability to ensure that individual state
participation is active and contributory.

Commitment to this new profile for the Commission will require a
collaborative, staff and member state effort on a continuing basis
across all program areas.

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14) Move from "balancing" of economic development and environmental
concerns to integrating them. The Commission should reject any
tendency to categorize issues as either economic development or
environmentally oriented, addressing them separately in committees
or task forces with a similar division of commissioners/advisors to
attend to them. Rather, a multi-disciplinary, multi -perspective
approach should be pursued; an ecosystem approach in which all
ramifications of a Commission decision - environmental and economic
- can be reviewed. While the consensus building process - at least
in the initial stages - will be more divisive, it will also be more
insightful and sensitive to Great Lakes management objectives.

This integrative approach can be pursued through careful issue
definition; drawing from broader member state interests in
task force appointments; and developing a checklist of questions to
guide discussion and ensure that parochial tendencies are set aside
In favor of broader Basin considerations.

15) Revitalize and heighten political profile and influence through
commitment of state leadership and staff resources. Member states
should commit to the active participation of designated commis-
sioners (or top advisors) throughout the Commission's activities.
Reliance on mid or lower level agency representatives for all acti-
vities beyond information gathering/coordination efforts should be
avoided. Further, designated commissioners should provide an
active liaison/advocate function for the Commission within their
state. Revitalizing the Commission's political profile demands
membership representation with the knowledge and authority to make
decisions with confidence on behalf of the state.

Responsibility for addressing this recommendation lies with the
individual state delegations, although the Commission should also
consider bylaw/policy actions to ensure that member states fulfill
their commitments with conviction. A more restrictive proxy ar-
rangement is one alternative to encourage active, high level repre-
sentation.

16) Pursue new image to shed "special interest" reputation. The Com-
mission must shed its special interest (i.e., commercial navi-
gation) reputation if it is to function as a viable institution for
the broad range of resource management concerns in the Basin.
Whether deserved or not, this reputation has compromised potential
cooperative opportunities with other interests (governmental and
nongovernmental) and in some cases encouraged alienation or con-
frontation. While attention to commercial navigation concerns is a
most appropriate function, Commission activity should be appor-
tioned more equitably among the Basin's other interests, as speci-
fied in the Compact.

The Commission should re-evaluate its charge with this in mind and
examine other areas and opportunities for promoting the informed
use and management of the lakes. The compact/program review pro-
cess recommended earlier would provide an appropriate vehicle.
Further, the Commission should initiate an outreach program (also

299

discussed earlier) to improve its image by dispelling any miscon-
ceptions; clarifying its mandate and investigating opportunities to
broaden its emphasis. P-articular attention should be paid to the
nongovernmental environmental community, which has historically had
limited association with the Commission.

Developing a new image, as with developing a heightened profile
(discussed earlier) will require the continued commitment of staff
and member states, as well as concerted external activity (e.g.,
media relations, interest group liaison). Given present state
attitudes toward the Commission, such an effort would be a viable
one, with success dependent upon the extent of political support
behind it.

D. Council of Great Lakes Governors

As with all other "incremental" recommendations presented in this section,
those for the Council are designed to complement and be pursued in concert
with those for other institutions. This point is particularly important in
light of the substantial similarities between Council and Great Lakes
Commission mandates. In several cases, recommended program and
coordination-oriented initiatives directed at the Commission could be
addressed by the Council if the former chose not to act on them.

1) Clarify the Council-Great Lakes Commission relationship through
detailed study and a subsequent Memorandum of Understanding.

(See Great Lakes Commission recommendation *3)

2) Grant full membership status to New York and Pennsylvania and
associate membership status to Ontario and Quebec. Such an action
would confirm the Council's commitment -to a Basin-wide and bi-
national resource management approach and formalize a relationship
that has developed throughout its water-related activities. It is
an essential requirement for immediate action if the Council is to
realize its substantial potential. As an organization that
addresses broad policy issues in a largely non-confrontational and
consensus building manner, it is unlikely that the broadened
membership would adversely influence any goals or objectives pre-
sently held by the six-state membership.

Implementing this recommendation will require some discussion among
the present membership and a change in Bylaws and Articles of
Incorporation.

3) Develop a long-term program plan to add specificity to goals
presented in Articles of Incorporation. The Council, through a
Program Development Committee or some variation thereof, should
prepare a multi-year program plan for addressing priority issues.
Such a plan would not only assist the Council in determining its
own organizational needs and evaluate progress, but provide other
institutions with an indication of direction and an opportunity to
plan their activities accordingly. Further, it would provide a
framework for the longer term initiatives now underway, including

300

the Great Lakes Water Management Program under the Great Lakes
Charter and the implementation of the Great Lakes Toxic Substances
Agreement.

4) Stabilize funding base and staffing/office arrangements. The
Council must foster a sense of permanence in its organizational
structure if it is to establish itself as a driving force for
regional cooperation and promotion over the long term. The
present modest funding/staffing base must be evaluated in light of
the long-term program plan recommended above. It is suggested that
a single, non-rotating Council office be established to ensure
continuity of staff and services. With regard to staffing, it is
further recommended that member states consider staff support in
the Council office as an "in-kind" contribution to augment the
modest size of the present staff. Finally, it is recommended that
the Executive Director be an appointee of the Executive Committee
as opposed to the Council Chairman, and continuity in that position
be encouraged irrespective of chairmanship changes.

5) Use Great Lakes Charter as a model for other future elements of a
Basin management plan. The Great Lakes Charter should serve as the
prototype for subsequent related initiatives on a range of regional
issues. The Council should consider these initiatives as elements
in an ongoing Basin Plan Process, and commit to continuing develop-
ment of such a plan. Elements should be pursued in order of
priority with Council and staff capabilities in development and
implementation a primary consideration. This process should be
closely coordinated with activities of the Great Lakes Commission
and pursued cooperatively to the extent possible.

Committing to this process is a substantial long-term decision
warranting extended discussion of Council goals, objectives,
organizational resources and inter-institutional relationships
(present and potential) . Such a discussion and subsequent
decision, however, is needed if the benefits of the Great Lakes
Charter process are to be realized in the broader range of resource
management needs. Further, the sensitivity of the Charter and
accompanying Council report to ecosystem considerations is
significant and should be applied in broader fashion.

An investigation of this function must be pursued in light of GLC
recommendations to ensure that planning efforts are cooperatively
pursued or allocated to one or the other.

6) Open up Council process to permit broader input into program and
policy development activity, The Council should avoid the "closed
door." Charter development approach which excluded non-member input
throughout all but the final ratification stage. While task force
and working group sessions need not be restructured into a form of
public hearing, periodic opportunities for input should be budgeted
into key segments of all initiatives.

301

While an open policy such as this may engender additional debate
and discussion, it may also serve to garner support for a given
initiative and its implementation after adoption.

7) Expand promotional role to serve as principal spokesman and
advocate for region. The Council should make maximum use of its
membership stature and inherent media appeal in serving as the
region's principal spokesman and advocate. While the more tech-
nical program activities are best pursued by Council task forces
and committees, the Council membership - through regularly sche-
duled and well-publicized meetings, signing ceremonies and related
activities - should publicize and promote the region and the co-
operative activities of its jurisdictions. A presence in
Washington, D.C., either in lieu of or in conjunction with the GLC
is a necessity.

8) Develop dispute avoidance and resolution techniques for use in
addressing potentially divisive regional issues. While the Council
is appropriately focused on issues amenable to consensus during its
early years, its future focus should also turn to one of addressing
the more divisive issues equally in need of resolution. Consider-
ation should be given to the use of the Council as the forum for
resolution of issues among high-level state officials.

This future role should be considered as the long-term program
planning recommended earlier proceeds. Dispute avoidance and reso-
lution techniques should be developed under the auspices of the
Council at that time.

9) Sponsor study of institutional requirements for long-term oversight
of charter implementation and related future initiatives. The
Council must act on its own finding that the institutional require-
ments for Charter implementation do not presently exist. A study
should be undertaken to identify those requirements and determine
whether a present institution should be revised accordingly or a
new institution or framework set in place. Special attention
should be given to the current and potential Council-Great Lakes
Commission interrelationship and the opportunities therein.

Such a study should be commissioned in the near future to ensure
that momentum under the Charter is maintained.

10) Expand public information capabilities. Due to the Council's
growing profile in the region and its involvement in issues of
broad concern (e.g., water diversion, toxic contamination), a staff
level capability to respond to inquiries and maintain an informa-
tion outreach program is essential. Instituting such a program is
recommended, as is linking it clearly to other inter- and intra-
institutional programs recommended earlier. Some form of public
advisory committee should be considered as well.

11) Conduct periodic review of Council programs in light of mandate.
As recommended for other institutions, a periodic review (perhaps
every three years) should be conducted by the membership to

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1) reexamine mandated responsibilities; 2) assess the scope and
direction of current programs; and 3) determine and act on dormant
capabilities, as necessary.

This review could be mandated via Bylaw revision or adoption of a
policy statement to that effect.

Scenario Three: Substantive Revision of Present Institutional Arrangements

As noted, the "incremental change" recommendations presented under Scenario
Two are predominantly operational adjustments of a comparatively minor
nature. Because most can be implemented within existing arrangements with
a relative minimum of institutional disruption and political debate, they
do hold great promise. They are therefore offered as the necessary first
steps in strengthening the Great Lakes institutional ecosystem.

There is, however, a second tier of institutional concerns that transcends
operational issues and questions instead the more fundamental structural
framework of this institutional ecosystem. For even when a given
institution or set of institutions is fully operational and meeting any
established efficiency/effectiveness criteria vis-&-vis stated goals, the
performance is for naught if those goals are misdirected or insensitive to
resource management needs.

Scenario Three recommendations accept the fundamental legitimacy of current
arrangements but recognize that some sweeping (and perhaps politically
controversial) operational and structural revisions are in order as we move
toward a substantially revised regional management framework.

The following recommendations, to be considered after (or as) Scenario Two
recommendations are initiated, seek also to bring current institutional
arrangements in line with the goals, objectives and organizational
parameters outlined earlier.

Recommendations - The Collective Institutional Effort

The recommendations for incremental change in this area, as indicated,
advocate stronger linkages between regional institutions and the joint
pursuit of basic information gathering, prioritization and program
coordination functions. Bolder initiatives are needed as well, recognizing
that such incremental changes cannot address the more substantial
inadequacies associated with present regional resource management efforts.
The following are recommended for consideration.

1) Establish a U.S. counterpart to the Canada-Ontario Agreement to
formally and explicitly recognize U.S. state/federal responsibili-
ties in Great Lakes management. While the role of the states in
Great Lakes management has historically been a significant one,
their standing vis-A-vis the federal interest has been poorly
defined and of questionable equity. For example, the states have
lacked a direct voice in negotiation of the binational Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreements, while assuming a large responsibility for
meeting the U.S. commitment. Further, the "new federalism"
philosophy has returned many programs (but few dollars) to the

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region, where states bear implementation responsibilities under
federal laws.

A U.S. counterpart to the Canada-Ontario Agreement is needed to
formalize federal/state relationships under the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement in terms of implementation as well as review/
amendment/renegotiation efforts. Specification of the state role
will assist in assessment of budgetary needs, provide a benchmark
for evaluating efforts and guide the development of interstate
arrangements to meet expectations embodied in the federal/state
agreement.

Support for such is best initiated among the states in consultation
with U.S. EPA in the interest of preparing a mutually acceptable
statement of agreement.

2) Establish a Great Lakes Environmental Endowment Fund for use by
regional institutions and political jurisdictions with Great Lakes
management responsibilities. As an alternative to accommodating
uncertain and often dwindling budget allocations for Great Lakes
management activities, the region's political jurisdictions - at
all levels - should consider support for an endowment fund to
provide continuity and expansion of regional programs. Supported
through various means (e.g., environmental penalties and f ines,
resource use royalties, assessments, private and foundation
grants), the fund would be targeted at critical regional issues and
serve to sustain inter-jurisdictional efforts (e.g., Basin-wide
monitoring, planning, research) historically beset by funding
difficulties.

Great Lakes state and provincial primacy in fund administration is
preferred to ensure that priority regional needs are met. Some
form of federal sanction is desired, however, in order that the
fund might be the recipient of fines, penalties or other
assessments originating at the federal level. It is emphasized
that such a fund be used to supplement, as opposed to subsidize or
replace existing funding sources for resource management programs
and regional institutions.

The Council, Commission and/or Great Lakes Environmental Ad-
ministrators would be appropriate forums for developing and
pursuing the idea, with state, provincial and perhaps federal
legislation required to operationalize such a fund.

3) Negotiate a new international Great Lakes Agreement which broadens
the Water Quality Agreement focus and recognizes state/provincial
roles. The signing of the Great Lakes Charter and subsequent
state/provincial concurrence on the principles of a Great Lakes
Toxic Substances Control Agreement has demonstrated a breadth of
binational, state/provincial cooperation that goes far beyond water
quantity/ quality concerns alone. To more fully acknowledge the
11 ecosystem approach" to Great Lakes management and secure a greater
degree of formality and commitments to these recent (as well as
future) agreements, the federal governments, in consultation with

304

Basin states and provinces, should work toward an international
Great Lakes Agreement incorporating water quality, quantity and all
other ecosystem elements considerations into a single document, and
vesting similarly expanded authority in the Great Lakes Regional
Office of the International Joint Commission. Such an Agreement
should be negotiated to retain and expand upon the strengths of the
1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement while accommodating water
quantity and other related considerations as well. Agreements at
the state/provincial level should be maintained concurrently to
cover those arrangements not appropriately included in the inter-
national Great Lakes Agreement where signatories include the
federal governments.

The 1986-87 mandated review of the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement of 1978 provides a convenient and most appropriate oppor-
tunity to initiate discussion of this recommendation.

4) Conduct an operational merger of the Council of Great Lakes
Governors and Great Lakes Commission which safeguards the integrity
of the Great Lakes Basin Compact yet integrates resource-related
programs of the two institutions. This recommendation warrants
special and detailed attention given the present emphasis and
concern over Council-Commission interrelationships (a current
arrangement generally believed to be untenable) and the substantial
yet unrealized potential suggested by alternate arrangements.

The review of mandates, structure, operation and demonstrated capa-
bilities of the two institutions (See Appendix A) provides the
analytical perspective and basis for the recommended arrangement.
It is clear that, despite similar mandates, both institutions have
distinct strengths and weaknesses. To adequately address Basin
management issues, they "need" each other; yet this need has to
date been unfulfilled. The Council, for example, enjoys a poli-
tical profile, media appeal and influence well beyond the Commis-
sion's demonstrated capability. Conversely, the Commission has a
level of technical expertise and broad-based coordination and
legislative monitoring unmatched by the Council.

Based on these observations of similar mandates and mutual interde-
pendence, some of the more commonly expressed alternatives for
institutional revision can be rejected. For example:

0 "Nothballing" the Great Lakes Commission while keeping the
compact intact but dormant would serve no justifiable purpose,
as the Council would have to assume many present and essential
Commission functions. Inefficiency is the only apparent
outcome.

0 If the Council was abolished, and with it an avenue for direct
gubernatorial participation in Basin issues, the management
effort would revert to "business as usual" with the Commission
- a source of long-standing dissatisfaction with several states
and an arrangement which, in and of itself, compromises Basin
management potential.

305

0 Maintaining both institutions with stronger ties is an improved
option, and might include efforts to co-locate staff and vest
policy direction in a single Executive Committee. Yet, such a
step would appear to be based more on political realities
(i.e., what can be done) then on Basin management needs (i.e.,
what should be done). Even now, with a tremendous overlap in
commissioners, advisors and cooperators between the two, coor-
dination and cooperative action is clearly inadequate.

In terms of positive, incremental change, the recommended action (as noted
earlier) is to recognize areas of potential overlap, define the universe of
Basin management needs; and subsequently allocate and coordinate functions
through a comprehensive Memorandum of Understanding. Then--and only then--
should co-location and uniformity of Executive Committee membership be
considered. These should not be viewed as solutions in and of themselves,
but as a means to implement the Memorandum of Understanding and the
solutions embodied within it.

In terms of substantive change, an operational merger of the two institu-
tions is recommended, premised on the idea that: the Great Lakes Basin
Compact must be maintained in some form; gubernatorial involvement must be
sustained; and technical and coordinative capability must be provided for.
The following measures should be taken:

a) Consolidate the two institutions and their present programs into a
single one, renamed the "Great Lakes Basin Commission" or "Great
Lakes Council" or some other acceptable name to demonstrate a
merger and avoid confusion with either of the existing
institutions.

b) Using the existing Great Lakes Basin Compact as the institutional
base, amend it to limit institutional membership to the governors
themselves. Allow each member (i.e., governor), to appoint a five-
member delegation authorized to represent him and cast his vote.
Delegates would include the directors of the State Departments of
Natural Resources and Transportation; one member each from the
House of Representatives and Senate; and a member at large.

c) Approve Bylaws placing strict limits on the use of proxies and
requiring that a majority of a state's delegation (in the absence
of the governor) be present for that state's voting privilege to be
exercised.

d) Consolidate Council and Commission staffs in a permanent office of
this "new" Institution and establish a permanent field office in
Washington, D.C.

e) Integrate the present functions of both institutions into the new
one as a minimum initial effort, subsequently broadening them per
recommendations presented earlier (e.g., Basin planning, standard
setting).

f) Expand the funding base by substantially raising membership dues
and securing alternate funding sources. Expand staff size

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accordingly and make liberal use of "in-kind" state services (e.g.,
interagency personnel agreements).

g) Provide for a chairmanship on a two-year, rotating basis, with the
head of the delegation from the "chair state" serving as chairman
of the Executive Committee, comprised of the gubernatorially desig-
nated delegates.

h) Organize expanded staff into sections which include, among others,
technical support and research; advocacy/public relations; policy
and program development; Basin planning and interstate liaison.

Once the structure is in place and the institutional programs and services
outlined, every effort should be made to secure provincial membership,
federal agency cooperation, and broadened programs and authority per the
recommendations presented earlier.

This arrangement, patterned in part after the Delaware and Susquehanna
River Basin Commissions, and drawing from other arrangements as well, would
consolidate resources, reduce institutional complexity and provide a more
integrative approach to Basin management.

Recommendations - The Individual Institutional Effort

A. International Joint Commission

Recommendations for substantive change are direcied at previously identi-
fied structural and operational weaknesses and generally fall into five
categories: federal/state/provincial relations; scope of authority; member-
ship/appointment process; functions and organizational resources. They are
presented below as steps which preserve the basic premise of the Boundary
Waters Treaty and International Joint Commission while providing for sub-
stantive revision. Most would require revisions to the Treaty itself or,
at the minimum, a departure from current Commission policy or procedure.

Federal/State/Provincial Relations

1) Require a formal federal government response to Commission
recommendations. The Commission is empowered only to offer advice
and recommendations to the two federal governments; there exists no
reciprocal requirement for responses to those recommendations.
Historically, responses have been sporadic at best and the absence'
of such a requirement has provided the federal governments with a
means to ignore or delay consideration of pressing issues. A
mandatory response process, preferably through a public forum, is
recommended to strengthen federal accountability on Great Lakes
issues and heighten the impact of Commission actions. Establishing
such a requirement is best achieved via specific language in an
amended Boundary Waters Treaty or Great Lakes Water Quality Agree-
ment but can be achieved through a statement of intent or policy
issued by the federal governments as well.

307

2) Secure high-level state and provincial representation in all
appropriate Commission functions and formalize a state and pro-
vincial role in the negotiation, amendment or interpretation of all
binational agreements formulated or administered by the Com-
mission. The Commission, in consultation with the U.S. Department
of State and the Canadian Department of External Affairs, should
formulate policy providing Great Lakes states and provinces with a
substantial and well-defined role in all matters which directly or
indirectly impact state and provincial responsibilities in Great
Lakes management. Such policy should provide a substantive state
and provincial role in any effort to review, amend or re-negotiate
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement or any related future
agreement. In turn, the states and provinces should acknowledge
the importance of Commission deliberations by directing high-level
officials to participate in them.

3) Specify regulatory and enforcement functions of the federal
governments under the terms of the Boundary Waters Treaty, Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement and any future agreements. While the
Treaty and Agreement set forth standards and criteria for bi-
national Great Lakes management, specific references to regulatory
and enforcement mechanisms for these standards and criteria within
each government are not provided. Specification of such through
Treaty and/or Agreement revision, exchange of notes or other formal
expression of policy is recommended as a means to establish a
system of accountability and a benchmark for assessing progress.

Scope of Authority

4) Extend the Commission's quasi-judicial powers to other areas,
including Great Lakes water quality considerations. Through Treaty
revision, grant the Commission standing authority to rule on bi-
national water quality disputes, direct federal resources toward
specified Areas of Concern, and approve/deny applications for Great
Lakes water uses where such use may have substantial water quality
or other environmental implications in the boundary waters.

5) Negotiate a new international Great Lakes Agreement which broadens
the Water Quality Agreement and recognizes state and provincial
roles.

(see recommendation #3 under preceding discussion)

6) Grant the Commission broad standard-setting authority for Great
Lakes water quantity, quality and related environmental considera-
tions. Through Treaty revision and expanded use of the Agreement
device, grant the Commission standing authority to set binding
minimum standards to guide Basin management efforts of the two
federal governments and state/provincial jurisdictions.

7) Extend Commission authority to all boundary water tributaries and
include Lake Michigan in the definition of such. Recognizing that
Great Lakes tributaries are an integral component of a single,
binational ecosystem and that Lake Michigan is hydrologically

308

indistinguishable from Lake Huron (a recognized "boundary water"),
the Boundary Waters Treaty should be amended to extend Commission
authority over them.

8) Establish a "consistency requirement" mandating federal, state and
provincial governments to demonstrate consistency with extant
Commission plans, standards or guidelines when publicly funded
projects or water uses with substantial Great Lakes impacts are
proposed. Modeled after the consistency provisions in U.S. federal
coastal zone legislation and commonly seen in local development
ordinances, the consistency requirement would strengthen Commission
influence in the orderly development and management of the lakes.

9) Expand the Comm ission's monitoring function to provide oversight
and coordination of federal initiatives. The Commission should be
granted an oversight and coordinative authority to strengthen
federal accountability to, and vigorous pursuit of the terms of the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement and related future agreements.
Such authority would provide an incentive presently lacking under
current arrangements.

10) Ensure federal responsiveness to Commission-generated Great Lakes
research priorities. Through a revised Water Quality Agreement or
other binational arrangement, the federal governments should em-
brace a policy promoting consistency between Commission-generate-d
research priorities and the Great Lakes research agendas of appro-
priate agencies and federally-supported institutions.

11) Formalize a means for direct interaction between the U.S. and
Canadian Commissioners and the broader range of federal, state,
provincial, local and non-governmental interests in the Basin. The
Commission should establish a procedure to enhance accessibility to
Commissioners during program development and priority setting pro-
cesses, during the actual conduct of its studies and after findings
and recommendations have been formulated. Periodic public hearings
at the "field level" throughout the Basin should be held, and ex-
panded opportunities provided for public interaction and discussion
during business meetings of the Commission. Other options include
establishment of a public advisory committee and/or broadened
representation on boards and committees.

Membership/Appointment Process

12) A new appointment p ocess for Commissioners should be established
to ensure uninterrupted, cUable and responsive leadership for the
Commission. Dissatisfaction in some sectors has long been ex-
pressed with respect to the political nature of appointments, ex-
tended vacancies, limited accessi-bility and perceived unresponsive-
ness. While these concerns may, in some cases, be overstated, a
revised appointment process and membership arrangement would
strengthen the Commission's leadership and, hence, resource manage-
ment capabilities. The following actions are recommended:

309

a) An open nomination/appointment process providing the community
of Great Lakes interests with input into the selection of
prospective Commissioners;

b) Staggered appointments and specified, longer terms to provide
continuity of leadership despite changes in administrations;

c) Full-time (or increased) appointments for all commissioners;

d) The formulation of basic criteria for screening candidates and
providing an appropriate diversity of representation in each
section.

These revisions should be reflected in an amended Boundary Waters
Treaty or terms of operation for the Commission, as appropriate.

Functions

13) The federal governments should grant the Commission a "standing" or
"open" reference to provide for a continuing, comprehensive Basin
planning function. The Commission is an appropriate institution to
assume and expand upon the Basin planning function once undertaken
by the Great Lakes Basin Commission. Such a function should be co-
ordinated through the Regional Office under the auspices of a new
board or committee, with broad inter- and non-governmental repre-
sentation, capable of integrating the disparate, issue-specific
activities under the Commission's present program.

Special emphasis should be placed on long-term anticipatory
planning, as the Commission is the regional institution best suited
- both structurally and politically - to undertake such a function.
A progress report on the planning process should be prepared
periodically by the appropriate board or committee in addition to
the planning documents themselves. This function, of course,
should complement and be coordinated with any Basin planning
function undertaken by the other regional institutions of concern.

14) The Commission's reference requirement, as it now stands, should be
revised in favor of one which provides the Commission with a degree
of autonomy in selecting appropriate study topics itself, or
choosing to act on a reference request without the concurrence of
both governments. While attention to jointly referred issues
should remain a priority, the Commission should not be constrained
from addressing other critical issues which, for political or other
reasons, do not enjoy the support of both governments. This flexi-
bility is essential if the Commission is to embrace a pro-active,
anticipatory planning process.

15) Provide the Commission with a research mandate and expand its
capability to support outside research. The role of the Regional
Office, largely limited to one of monitoring and coordination,
should be expanded to provide even a modest in-house research capa-
bility to support and respond to its present programs and stated
research priorities. Further, the adequacy of funding levels to

310

support outside research-related efforts through the Science
Advisory and Water Quality Boards should be assessed in light of
present programs and needs as well as emerging issues and prospec-
tive new programs and responsibilities (per other recommendations).

16) Secure explicit recognition of, and a statement of federal
commitment to, the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement through ne
or amended U.S. federal legislation. The Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement is not explicitly referenced in any existing U.S. federal
legislation, although measures to that effect have been put for-
ward. Such recognition is needed to further formalize and
strengthen the U.S. commitment to the provisions of the Agreement.
Support for appropriate legislative language is warranted.

17) Through restructuring of boards and committees, balance the
standing emphasis on dispute resolution and management
considerations with added focus on the resource itself. The Com-
mission should consider alternate models for board and committee
structure which focus its work more directly on the resource of
concern. The "lake committees" approach adopted by the Great Lakes
Fishery Commission, or some variation thereof, should be con-
sidered. For example, the work of the Commission's socio-economic
and ecological considerations committees could be integrated into a
single committee where a interdisciplinary approach is focused on a
certain Basin resource (e.g., water, air) or the collectivity of
resources within a sub-basin.

Staffing/Funding Arrangements

18) A thorough review of organizational requirements in the Commis-
sion's Great Lakes Regional_Office should be undertaken in light of
present and prospective resp2nsibilities, and appropriate adjust-
ments made. Current staffing levels are appropriately viewed as
only marginally adequate in addressing prescribed functions.
Funding is modest as well, with pronounced limitations, for
example, in funds for research and conference support through the
Water Quality and Science Advisory Boards. An objective, outside
assessment of organizational requirements should be undertaken to
determine present needs as well as those associated with the
assumption of additional or revised functions per the recommend-
ations contained herein.

B. Great Lakes Fishery Commission

Recommendations for substantive change in the structure and operation of
the Great Lakes Fishery Commission are limited in number when the present
arrangement is examined in light of the parameters for institutional design
presented earlier. Three principal reasons are identified. First, unlike
the other regional institutions of concern, the Fishery Commission has a
limited and quite specific mandate - one that precludes it from becoming a
"lead" institution in comprehensive regional resource management with any
semblance of its present structure and operation. It was neither designed
for such nor has the aspirations for assuming such a role. Hence,
proffering a series of recommendations for extensive revision is

311

inappropriate. Rather, the focus is better placed upon means by which it
can more efficiently and effectively address its given, albeit limited,
mandate.

Second, the review of the Fishery Commission's role in the Great Lakes
institutional ecosystem indicates that what it does, it does well. it
appears that the several incremental revisions recommended earlier address
the great majority of institutional weaknesses identified and capitalize
upon opportunities to strengthen linkages with other elements of that
institutional ecosystem.

Third, this review indicated that much can be learned from the identified
strengths of the Fishery Commission's structure and function (e.g. ,
measurable goals and objectives; broad representation and active
participation; planning capability; committee arrangements; research
support). It is clear that it is better to incorporate these strengths
into other institutions than attempt to broaden the Fishery Commission into
something it was never intended to be.

There are, however, several rather substantive revisions which the review
indicated would complement the incremental revisions recommended earlier.
They are as follows:

1) Review present funding arrangements to ensure equitable and
adequate U.S.-Canadian contributions. The Fishery Commission's
funding arrangement stipulates that the U.S. and Canada contribute
to its support on a 50/50 ratio for administration and general
research and a 69/31 ratio for sea lamprey control and research.
This latter ratio represents the historic commercial catch of
whitefish and lake trout between the two countries. Because of
this ratio, a reduction in one government's allocation would re-
quire a similar reduction in the other's. While these arrangements
have not been a significant problem in the past, the funding
formula should be reviewed -and possibly revised to more accurately
reflect the two governments' interest in the fishery, as well as to
provide either with the option of providing additional funds
(beyond a minimum required share) to support Fishery Commission
work. Further, a careful review of funding needs should be
conducted, and appropriate adjustments made, in light of emerging
needs and the increasing importance of the fishery to the Basin as
a natural and economic resource.

2) Revise appointment process to broaden representation, set finite
terms, openup the nomination process and establish basic criteria
for screening candidates. Various levels of dissatisfaction have
been expressed over time with regard to matters such as the Fishery
Commission's narrow perspective on fishery management, marginal
U.S. commissioner attendance at meetings and the open-ended ap-
pointment process which may constrain the introduction of new ideas
and emphases which accompany periodic membership turnover. While
these matters were not found to be of widespread concern during the
interview and survey process, there is cause for considering the
following:

312

a) An expanded number of commissioner positions to permit broader
representation among public agencies and user groups;

b) Finite and staggered appointments to provide continuity of
leadership despite changes in administrations;

c) The formulation of basic criteria for screening candidates (in
those instances where not designated by official position) and
providing an appropriate diversity of representation in each
section.

d) An appointment process requiring federal legislative confir-
mation of appointees.

These measures would strengthen internal operations while
broadening representation and public profile.

3) ExRand programs and revise Convention, if necessary, to broaden
mandate beyond production-oriented fisheries concerns. The Fishery
Commission should consider broadening its interests and program
activity to address other resource issues which affect the fishery
but have broader significance in ecosystem management as well.
These areas may include, among others, water quality, coastal re-
sources, diversion and lake levels; aquatic habitat; and human
health considerations. In addition to strengthening the basis of
its own programs, such an effort would be a valuable contribution
to the programs of other regional institutions and provide an op-
portunity for cooperative activity.

Initial consideration of such might best be pursued at the
committee level (e.g., Board of Technical Experts) and subsequently
brought forward as the theme or central focus of an annual Commis-
sion meeting for discussion and an implementation plan.

These revisions, although not calling for a comprehensive Basin management
function for the Fishery Commission, will benefit its current programs and
their contribution to the collective institutional effort.

C. Great Lakes Commission

As established earlier, the Great Lakes Commission mandate - through
provisions of the Great Lakes Basin Compact - is a broad one with the
potential to address Great Lakes management in a comprehensive, Basin-wide
manner. For this reason, a number of substantive structural and
operational steps (some calling for a dramatic departure from present
practice) are recommended to better position the Commission to address the
institutional parameters developed earlier.

The recommendations presented below are particularly applicable should the
Commission and Council remain separate and distinct entities rather than
undergoing the operational merger suggested earlier. Should such a merger
occur, however, such recommendations would remain appropriate, although
modification to some may be necessary to accommodate the attributes the
Council would bring to such a consolidated arrangement.

Again, it is emphasized that these recommendations are presented as
necessary measures to achieve Basin management needs, while recognizing
that political and operational considerations may pose substantial ob-
stacles.

1) Secure U.S. and Canadian federal legislative approval of a compact
.amendment providing for full provincial membership and extending
Compact jurisdiction throughout the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence Basin.
A comprehensive, Basin focus cannot be achieved until co-equal
state and provincial participation is realized, as envisioned when
the Compact was adopted by the states in 1955. Efforts to secure
ratification of the necessary amendment should be supported. Once
achieved, operational adjustments within the Commission structure
can be undertaken to ensure that the states retain all coordinative
and advocacy functions in which provincial participation may not be
necessary or appropriate. Similar arrangements could be made with
respect to the' provinces. Distinct state and provincial caucuses
within the Commission structure could be established for that
purpose.

2) Provide the Commission with broad standard-setting authority across
.Basin jurisdictions and require those jurisdictions (states and
Rrovinces) to adhere to a "consistency requirement". Through
Compact revision, the prospective state-provincial Commission mem-
bership should be empowered to exercise a consensus-driven standard
setting authority over the resource management areas stipulated in
the Compact. Under this arrangement, the membership would commit
to establishing consistent standards within their individual juris-
dictions.

A variation on this arrangement, focusing specifically on water
quality, was pursued in the late 1960s by the Commission
membership, but dropped after extended debate and the signing of
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972. It is recommended
that such an approach be reconsidered in light of present and
anticipated needs.

3) Standardize commissioner appointments across member jurisdictions.
To ensure consistent representation and level of expertise across
all member jurisdictions, a standardized appointment process should
be established. It should provide for a minimum of five
commissioners per jurisdiction, these being the director of the
Department of Natural Resources (or its equivalent); director of
the Department of Trangportation; a member of the House or
Assembly; a member of the Senate; and a gubernatorial appointee.
Consideration should also be given to expanding state delegations
by a member or two to provide for additional gubernatorial
appointees to represent the public-at-large.

This measure will strengthen the knowledge base of the collective
Commission membership and increase its use as a forum for
coordination and interaction among those of similar position in the
various jurisdictions. Enacting the measure will require amendment
of Compact language in most of the states. If the size of state

314

delegations to the Commission is to be increased beyond five,
amendment of Congressionally ratified Compact language would be
required as well.

4) Enact strong measures to ensure high-level (i.e., Commissioner)
re2resentation at Commission meetings. Standards outlining expec-
tations and participation requirements of commissioners should be
adopted by the Commission to avoid the long-observed tendency to-
ward delegation of all responsibilities to lower level agency staff
often lacking authorization to suggest or react to major new ini-
tiatives or policy positions which arise during meetings. One of
many options which might be adopted would require a quorum of a
state's delegation to be present at a Commission meeting for that
state to have full voting privileges. Limitations on the use of
proxies might also be established, such as requiring they be in
writing, received by the Commission prior to the meeting and
limited to one or two per state delegation for any given meeting.

These standards or policies could be incorporated into Commission
Bylaws through action of the membership.

5) Initiate a process for formal presentation of resolutions and
position statements to the Congress and federal agencies. The
long-standing but largely ineffective practice of transmitting
packets of resolutions, with little follow-up, to target agencies
and members of Congress should be replaced with a more intensive,
personalized approach. Soon following scheduled meetings of the
Commission, a formal presentation of the adopted resolutions and
policy statements should be scheduled in Washington, D.C. for
agency and Congressional representatives, as well as other
interested groups and the media. Follow-up from the Commission
office and the (recommended) Washington-based lobbyist would be
pursued on individual issues.

6) Reinstate the Great Lakes Basin Plan process initiated by the Great
Lakes Basin Commission and subject all Basin jurisdictions, in-
cluding the federal government, to a consistency req irement.
Although existing language in the Compact provides for a planning
function (at least in the U.S.), amendments would be required to
expand that function Basin-wide and require Basin jurisdictions to
demonstrate consistency with the plan when contemplating publicly-
funded initiatives or approving private initiatives in relevant
areas. Canadian concurrence at the provincial and federal levels
would be necessary as well. If pursued with vigor, this planning
process would make significant inroads toward integrated management
of the Great Lakes system.

7) Expand the funding/organizational resource base by in creasing, as
appropriate, member jurisdiction dues, acquiring project-specific
grants and acquiring "in-kind" services from member jurisdi2tions.
The present dues structure must be revised if any recommended, as
well as existing, functions are to be fully undertaken. A reali-
stic assessment of present arrangements must be made and revisions
pursued. Further, each member jurisdiction should commit at least

315

a half-time equivalent technical/policy position to work solely on
regional issues under the purview of the Commission.

While the still-substantial funds transferred to the Commission at
the closing of the Basin Commission can be drawn upon to support
expanded activities, such an arrangement is but temporary. A
scheduled increase in state dues put into effect in recent years is
modest and clearly inadequate in light of these expanded
activities. Thus, even to maintain existing activities, once Basin
Commission funds are exhausted, consideration of this recommenda-
tion in the near future will be required.

8) Expand and reorganize staffing arrangements to better address
current and recommended functions. As presently constituted, staf-
fing arrangements accommodate the coordinative, information gather-
ing, secretariat and analytical components of the Commission's
operation. Other functions, however, require additional emphasis,
including advocacy, media relations, public sector liaison, program
development and Basin planning, among others. To an extent, it
appears that capabilities of the staff are not translated into
actions or products that receive recognition and response beyond
those individuals associated with the Commission. Actions to be
considered include a reordered (and ideally expanded) staffing
arrangement to provide a public information/media relations
officer, a Basin Plan manager, task force secretary(ies), research
manager, data base manager, and a full-time Congressional rela-
tions/lobbyist. At the minimum, three additional staff members
would be required to adequately address present and recommended
functions.

D. Council of Great Lakes Governors

Recommendations for substantive change within the structure and operation
of the Council require several introductory observations. First, as the
newest of the Great Lakes institutions of concern, the Council remains in
its formative stage; functions have not become fully routinized or the role
in the Great Lakes institutional ecosystem fully developed and defined.
Hence, to pass judgment or advocate wholesale revision at this point in
time is both premature and of speculative benefit to the overall Great
Lakes management effort.

Second, it is recognized that any effort to revise Council structure or
operation must be pursued in light of revision efforts directed at the
Great Lakes Commission. As vehicles of -the states with related missions,
consideration of recommendations for revision of the two are inextricably
linked.

Third, it is recognized that the Council, despite its broad mandate, has
chosen to focus quite selectively on but a few key issues at any given time
(e.g., Great Lakes Charter, toxics agreement) as opposed to seeking a
comprehensive role which embraces the totality of Basin resource management
issues and functions. To do so (as in the case of the Fishery Commission)
would entail substantial structural and operational change well beyond
original intentions when the institution was established.

316

As indicated earlier, the "operational merger" of the Council and
Commission is the preferred means of effecting substantive change in the
present Council composition (see discussion earlier in this chapter).
Should the Council and Commission remain separate and distinct entities,
necessary resource management functions will need to be allocated appro-
priately to ensure that the Basin needs are addressed.

Given such a scenario, and assuming that the Commission recommendations
presented earlier are pursued, there are but a few substantive revisions
for the Council recommended at this time beyond the incremental revisions
presented earlier.

1) Grant full membership status to the provinces of Ontario and Quebec
as well as all Great Lakes states. Provincial membership would
fully acknowledge the already integral involvement of the premier
and ministry representatives in the programs of the Council.
Further, it would strengthen state/provincial relations by placing
all heads of state on a co-equal basis. Within this revised mem-
bership structure, separate state and provincial caucuses would be
available to address domestic issues as they arise.

This arrangement should be examined and guided by a special Council
Task force. It would require amendment of the articles of
incorporation.

2) Enact consistent state and provincial leZislation formally recog-
nizing and voicing support for the Council and its mission. To
broaden political support for Council activity and provide a means
to ensure continuity despite change in administrations, state and
provincial legislation should be enacted to formally recognize the
Council. A task force should be formed to draft appropriate model
legislation and' include in it any provisions to amend and
strengthen the current mandate and operations, per recommendations
presented herein and others that may emerge from task force discus-
sion.

3) Increase the staff and funding base substantially and internalize
coordination and implementation of all Great Lakes Charter, Toxics
Agreement and future initiatives. While capabilities presently
exist to develop and secure approval of such agreements, the
Council has recognized that it is not presently structured to pro-
vide necessary follow-up on a continuing basis (e.g., maintenance
of a computerized data base under Charter provisions). Hence, if
the Council and Commission remain separate entities or otherwise
fail to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding detailing alloca-
tion of related functions, organizational resources within the
Council must be expanded. Options to be pursued include substan-
tially increased membership dues, aggressive grantsmanship at
federal and foundation levels, and special legislative appropri-
ations on a project specific basis. In-kind contributions, such as
interagency personnel agreements with member jurisdictions, should
be pursued as well.

317

It must be emphasized that these measures are designed to strengthen as
opposed to fundamentally change the Council, assuming the substantial
recommendations for the Great Lakes Commission are pursued. If the
Commission, through inaction or policy decision, chooses to reject those
recommendations, the Council should seek to pursue them itself, adapting
them as needed.

Scenario Four: Dramatic Single Step Revision

The final point on this continuum of institutional change is that of
dramatic, single step revision; the elimination of the present institu-
tional ecosystem in favor of a new and significantly different one. In
presenting this scenario, it is assumed that the four Great Lakes insti-
tutions of concern are disbanded, as are all other Basin-oriented ar-
rangements (e.g., agreements, memorandum of understanding; binational work
groups). Political and organizational constraints are set aside; a free
hand at institutional design for Basin management in a binational, system
of federalism is provided.

In reality, of course, such an action is neither politically feasible nor
operationally sound. However, if the institution designed serves as the
embodiment of desired characteristics for Basin management, it can serve as
a useful (and heretofore nonexistent) benchmark for guiding and evaluating
less dramatic revisions.

Presented below in outline form is such a "benchmark" institution,
accompanied by a rationale for the characteristics selected. The design
seeks to accommodate the institutional goals and parameters outlined
earlier and reflects the discussion and findings associated with the
literature review, personal interviews, survey effort and analysis of
present institutions and generic institutional forms. The reader will note
that the documented strengths of existing institutions are reflected in the
design, complemented by new elements. For purposes of discussion, this
"ideal" institution will be termed the "International Great Lakes Basin
Commission," (IGLBC)

Goals and Objectives

The goal of the IGLBC, stated earlier in a different context, is "To
enhance the public health and welfare of Basin residents through the
restoration and maintenance of the integrity of the Basin ecosystem; the
orderly development and management of its resources for sustainable and
equitable use; and common stewardship via binational, public-private sector
partnership." Corresponding objectives, as presented in Chapter Eight,
relate to Basin planning and management; resource development and
promotion; and intergovernmental relations.

Institutional Structure

The IGLBC would be established under the terms of a binational treaty
arrangement in which state, provincial and federal jurisdictions are
afforded co-equal authority in the drafting, negotiation and execution of
treaty provisions. Supporting federal -provincial and federal-state

318

agreements would be maintained to detail and formalize domestic relations
for each of the signatory countries.

This arrangement (or some variation thereof) received strong support in
personal interviews and the survey effort, while its legitimacy from an
institutional standpoint was confirmed in the analysis of generic
institutional forms.

Membership

Membership would be comprised of the eight Great Lakes states, two
provinces and two federal governments. Commissioners would include the
appropriate governors and premiers, as well as the U.S. secretaries and
Canadian ministers responsible for federal departments and ministries with
a Great Lakes management responsibility.

Each Commissioner would be served by a delegation of up to five members
providing technical support and advisory services as well as acting on
behalf of the Commissioner, as authorized. Each delegation would be served
by a Commissioner-appointed chairman. In the case of the States, the
delegation would be comprised of those individuals listed earlier (e.g. ,
directors - Departments of Natural Resources and Transportation; members -
State House and Senate; and a gubernatorial appointee selected from the
local government or private/citizen sector) . A modified arrangement for
the provinces would be established. At the federal level, delegation
members would include senior personnel responsible for Great Lakes programs
as well as one at-large member selected from the local government or
private/citizen sector by the appropriate Commissioner.

Each member jurisdiction would be afforded one vote in all deliberations.
Meetings of the entire membership would operate on a consensus basis, with
provisions for majority rule if consensus is unattainable and prompt
resolution required.

Such an arrangement would provide for broad jurisdictional representation,
decision-making authority and a balance between political impact and
technical/managerial expertise. The "at-large" members, in that they can
be appointed from outside government, will ensue a broader user/interest
group representation.

Geographic Scope

The scope of authority would include the five Great Lakes, the St. Lawrence
River, and all connecting channels and tributaries. On the land side, the
focus would be on the drainage Basin of the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence River
system.

This designation would remedy the jurisdictional limitations imposed by the
Boundary Waters Treaty and fully recognize the primacy of hydrologic (i.e.,
systemic) considerations over political jurisdictional ones.

319

Management Functions

The IGLBC would be authorized through the binational treaty to pursue the
following functional areas: data collection and analysis; research/issue
analysis; advisory and extension services; regulation and enforcement;
arbitration/conflict resolution; Basin planning; monitoring and
surveillance; interagency coordination; public participation and education;
advocacy; policy development and impact assessment.

Guidelines for the implementation of each functional area would be
established, recognizing the existing responsibilities of member juris-
dictions. For example, regulation and enforcement functions would provide
for IGLBC standard-setting authority consistent (at the minimum) with
current federal law and an enforcement mechanism tied in with those of
member jurisdictions.

Resource Focus

The IGLBC resource focus would be broad-based, but oriented specifically
toward water and related land resources, including areas such as Great
Lakes water quantity and quality; coastal zone management; aquatic
resources; air quality; land use planning, etc. At the minimum, coordi-
nation; monitoring and surveillance; data collection and analysis functions
would be ongoing for all areas, with policy development; issue analysis;
advocacy and related special services undertaken to address a pressing
problem or issue.

Level of Autonomy

By virtue of its membership, the IGLBC would be intrinsically sensitive to
and reflective of the management preferences of the collective
jurisdictions. However, the treaty language would provide for a level of
autonomy not presently enjoyed by membership-based regional institutions in
the Great Lakes Basin. The management functions detailed earlier would be
pursued as a matter of course, and the institution's staff would have the
authority to initiate special studies and investigations (at some level)
even in the absence of consensus approval by member jurisdictions. Policy
development, advocacy activities and other major initiatives would require
consensus agreement. One area of authority of particular consequence would
be a binding arbitration function available to resolve disputes between
member jurisdictions upon joint referral.

Intra-Institutional Arrangements

Within the IGLBC, a caucus structure would be established to permit
separate deliberations among the state, provincial and federal (U.S. and
Canadian) membership. Each caucus would have selected semi-autonomous
powers and would control a portion of the total IGLBC budget for its own
use (e.g. , research projects, coordination meetings), should the concur-
rence of the remaining membership be lacking or inapplicable for a given
issue. The caucus arrangement, for example, would permit differences of
opinion among various levels of government to be formulated, aired and
perhaps subjected to the arbitration/conflict management function called
for earlier.

320

Each of the four caucuses would have the discretion to set up its own
operating/decision-making structure within the overall limits of the IGLBC
power.

This caucus arrangement is essential if the IGLBC is to successfully
integrate Basin management functions while acknowledging the strong
currents of federalism in both countries and accommodating differences of
opinion and process among the various levels of government. It is adapted
in part from the state caucus component of the now defunct Great Lakes
Basin Commission operation.

Committee Arrangements

A series of standing committees, comprised of one delegate from each member
jurisdiction, would be established in key functional areas, including:

0 Finance and Administration: Budgeting; personnel; office manage-
ment; contracting and related matters; operational policies.

0 Basin Planning: Development and maintenance of Basin Plan.

0 Program Coordination: Intra-institutional relations and program
coordination across member jurisdictions.

0 Information/Advisory Services: Data collection and analysis;
library and record maintenance; intra-institutional research and
advisory services.

0 Extension Services: Public relations; information dissemination;
public/community/private sector relations; education programs and
public participation; arbitration/conflict resolution.

0 Special Studies: Oversight of special studies and investigations
of priority concern.

0 Policy Development: Development, maintenance and dissemination of
all policy; advocacy programs and public/private sector relations;
negotiation of all intergovernmental agreements and memoranda.

Others would be added, or those above consolidated or adapted, to respond
to institutional requirements over time. Each standing committee would
designate issue-specific task forces, as needed, to address current issues
of concern. Committee assignments would entail a two year term, with the
chairmanship alternating between Canada and the U.S. and the federal and
state/provincial levels.

Staffing Arrangements

The IGLBC would be headquartered in an appropriate Basin jurisdiction near
the Canada-United States border, with field offices in Ottawa and
Washington, D.C. Staffing at field offices would focus primarily on
extension, information acquisition, policy dissemination and advocacy
functions, with the balance of functional activity pursued at the head-
quarters office.

321

Staffing arrangements would be generally categorized in the same manner as
committee arrangements (see above), and include both permanent staff and a
substantial contingent of member jurisdiction and "outside" personnel
assigned on various loan programs. Staff size would be a function of need
but anticipated to be substantially larger than any of the four Great Lakes
institutions of concern at present. Collectively, the staff would exhibit
a multi-disciplinary character, have substantial experience at the
political jurisdictional level prior to assuming an IGLBC position, and
have a commitment to (or incentive for) a long-term association with IGLBC.
The Chairman would serve at the pleasure of the IGLBC on a six-year
appointment, alternating between a U.S. and Canadian citizen. The Vice
Chairman would be drawn from the membership on a rotating basis and would
be the head of the delegation of a given jurisdiction.

Financin

Principal financing mechanisms for the IGLBC would include annual and co-
equal appropriations from the two federal governments and a similar
arrangement (at a lesser but proportionate level) at the state-provincial
level. Where possible, multi-year commitments would be arranged to ensure
program continuity. Special study and project specific activity would be
funded through jurisdictional appropriations or grants (govern-
mental /foundation) aside from the annual appropriation process. Finally,
the IGLBC would draw from a Great Lakes Endowment Fund financed by
foundation grants, individual and corporate donors, and an agreed upon
percentage of penalties and fines assessed in the Basin for environmental
and resource management violations. Such an arrangement would diversify
the funding base and provide for growth and flexibility in institutional
development.

The institutional arrangement discussed above is presented in organ-
izational chart form in Figure 5. It should be emphasized of course, that
additional detail is warranted and special attention to the incorporation
of the operational parameters presented in Chapter Eight is essential.' As
presented, however, the arrangement reflects many of the key institutional
characteristics identified in the course of the study, and as such, is of
value as a benchmark in assessing institutional change on a more modest
scale within observed political and organizational constraints and the
evolving set of Basin management requirements.

mom

Figure 5

ORGANIZATION OF A HYPOTHETICAL
INTERNATIONAL GREAT LAKES BASIN COMMISSION'

UNITED STATES CANADA
FEDERAL-STATE TREATY FEDERAL-PROV.
AGREEMENT AGREEMENT

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL J_fCAN@ADIAN
GREAT LAKES S
SECTION SECTION
BASIN COMMISSION

r
FEDERAL STATE FEDERAL PROVINCIAL
DELEGATION DELEGATION DELEGATION DELEGATION
CAUCUS CAUCUS CAUCUS CAUCUS

ADVISORS rADVISORS
I CHAIRMAN

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
COMMITTEE

PROGRAM INFO/ lr%eTEN- SPECIAL POLICY
BASIN ADVISO ION STUDIES/
PLANNING COORDIN. SERVIC VICES SERVICES DEVEL.
fE 4SECRE
EE

FINANCE

ADMIN.

323

A Strategy for Implementing Scenario-Recommendations

As presented, Scenarios One through Four offer alternatives for securing
institutional change ranging from a "status quo" approach characterized by
unplanned, reaction-oriented change to a comprehensive approach where
current arrangements are rejected in favor of a substantially different and
carefully devised institutional device. The former has been discredited as
compromising the evolutionary potential of the Great Lakes institutional
ecosystem. The latter is found to be a desirable benchmark for guiding
institutional change, but as a radical departure from the status quo, of
questionable merit as a goal in the near or even longer term.

Learning from past experience (Scenario One) and articulation of goals in
.the "ideal" sense (Scenario Four), a staged implementation process for
Scenarios Two and Three is recommended. The incremental changes embodied
in Scenario Two, beyond their intrinsic value as positive steps, serve to
position the various Great Lakes institutions - and the political
jurisdictions they serve - for the more substantive revisions recommended
in Scenario Three. The desired framework is in place and the necessary
steps to achieve it carefully charted. The critical element is a matter of
nurturing and focusing the political will and sustained commitment for
positive change.

EPILOGUE

TOWARD A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR CONTINUED INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

In documenting the importance of institutional considerations in providing
for the protection, development and management of the resources of the
Great Lakes Basin; Chapter One discussion alluded to the historic and
chronic deficiency in related research. While the explanation for the
dearth of research activity will not be reiterated, it is important to note
that the need has never been greater. The "window of opportunity" for
institutional change is indeed open wide at the present time (for reasons
stated earlier), but without the necessary institutional research, this
opportunity may be misdirected, compromised or altogether lost.

This examination of alternate institutional arrangements seeks to ease this
deficiency with detailed study of regional (i.e. , multi -juri sdi ctional )
institutions for Great Lakes management and the means to strengthen them
through structural and operational revision. Yet, they constitute but one
element of the institutional ecosystem; other aspects of the federal system
for binational Basin governance are deserving of attention as well.

Presented below is a descriptive listing of a number of related areas of
institutional research designed to complement and build upon that presented
herein. Importantly, research such as this will contribute not only to a
presently modest research base, but provide the support and direction for
implementing many of the recommendations presented earlier:

1) Regional institutions are a critical element in the federal system
for binational Basin governance, yet by no means the only element.
A broad examination of the federal system for water resources
management - in the U.S. and Canada - is needed to document trends,
assess implications for the Great Lakes, and determine how
regional, multi-jurisdictional institutions can best position
themselves to accommodate such change.

2) The nongovernmental organization has rapidly assumed a prominent
role in Great Lakes management, not only as a governmental "watch
dog" but as a means to assume vital functions (e.g., coordination,
special studies) once undertaken by public institutions.
Additional investigation of this evolving role and its potential
for strengthening the institutional ecosystem even in an age of
declining public funds is of paramount importance.

3) This study, because it focused primarily on structural and opera-
tional considerations, must be supported with an examination of
process considerations. This is a matter of moving from the issue
of what innovations must be implemented to how they must be imple-
mented. For example, while an environmental standard-setting

324

325

authority for regional institutions is recommended, further
examination of the scope and procedural aspects of such authority
is warranted. Thus, it is recommended that additional attention be
paid to the process whereby the various scenario elements are
applied in the institutional ecosystem.

4) As discussed, the key to positive institutional evolution is found
in the use of intra-institutional means to measure success,
evaluate performance and carry out necessary revisions. The study
documented the importance of such and recommended means to
establish the proper institutional environment to nurture such
evolution. Further attention must be paid to specific evaluation
mechanisms and techniques for application at the intra- and inter-
institutional level.

5) As indicated in the discussion of generic institutional forms for
regional resource management, much can be learned from the
multitude of in and out of Basin institutions presently or formerly
in operation. Expanded case study analyses of those generic forms
with some applicability to Great Lakes management needs are
warranted.

6) Great Lakes Basin governance demands the reconciliation (or perhaps
accommodation) of two substantially different federalisms. The
characteristics of U.S. and Canadian systems of government with
respect to resource management are distinct, as are overall politi-
cal trends that influence them. Further research - conceptual and
applied - in examining this system of binational federalism is
warranted.

7) Implicit in the study is the assumption that significant environ-
mental problems and resource management needs do exist in the Great
Lakes Basin. Yet, beyond discussion of survey results, they are not
examined in detail. To ensure that the recommendations for institu-
tional revision are responsive to these problems and needs, a
"test" is needed. A specific issue (e.g., transboundary air
pollution, diversion, Basin research priority setting) should be
selected and reviewed in light of these recommendations to ensure
that its various dimensions can be adequately addressed within the
revised institutional framework.

8) Researchers as well as policy officials have been guilty of
"thinking small" with regard to institutional change. Political
reality is indeed an important consideration in institution
building, but should not constrain creative thought. Scenario Four
should be developed and discussed in additional detail, as should
other creative suggestions for substantive change.

9) The "new federalism", in passing programs and responsibilities on
to lower levels of government, has accentuated the role of sub-
state/provincial entities - long regarded as the "forgotten citi-
zens" in the community of Great Lakes management interests. This
statement applies to non-governmental entities and the private sec-
tor as well. Yet, these various sectors provide the foundation for

326

comprehensive Basin planning and management. Additional attention
to the role and potential of these sectors in the broader Basin
management arena is long overdue and perhaps never more critical
than at present.

10) The Title 11 river basin commission system - and specifically the
Great Lakes Basin Commission - have been the focus of little study
since their demise in 1981. Yet, that system provided the most
comprehensive regional planning and coordination mechanism to date
in the United States. Further, the "ideal" institutional arrange-
ment described within this study, despite its unique characteris-
tics, has striking similarities to the Great Lakes Basin Commission
structure and operation. Thus, it is recommended that additional
research be focused on the Title II commission arrangement, its
strengths and weaknesses, and its applicability to present and
emerging needs.

In closing, it is recognized that any presentation of findings, recommenda-
tions and research priorities has only limited value unless fully and ag-
gressively pursued by the community of Great Lakes decision makers and
opinion leaders. It is therefore recommended that these individuals, both
individually and collectively, carefully consider study recommendations in
the interest of forging a strengthened institutional arrangement responsive
to the myriad management needs of the Great Lakes Basin.

I
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I APPENDIX
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Table of Contents - Full Report

CONTENTS

DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LIST OF TABLES viii

LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

LIST OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I

Background
Methodology
Findings and Recommendations

SECTION ONE: CHARACTERIZING THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR
GREAT LAKES MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

CHAPTER
ONE THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING FOR GREAT LAKES MANAGEMENT . . . . . 19

The Role of the Institution in the Policy Process
The Role of the Institution in the Great Lakes
Policy Arena
Presentation of the Hypothesis
Goal and Objectives
Statement of Approach
A Note on Study Scope and Definitions
Contribution to the Research Base and
Attendant Limitations
Dissertation Format

TWO THE GREAT LAKES ECOSYSTEM - PLACING THE PHYSICAL
RESOURCE AND MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK IN PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . 36

Introduction
Physical Aspects of the Great Lakes System
Economic Aspects of the Great Lakes System
Political Aspects of the Great Lakes System -
A Conceptual Framework

A-1

THREE THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING FOR GREAT LAKES MANAGEMENT:
COMPONENTS AND ATTENDANT LINKAGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Introduction
The Complexity of the Great Lakes Institutional
Ecosystem - An Overview and Rationale
International Institutions/Mechanisms for Great
Lakes Management
International Mechanisms in Perspective
Distinguishing Characteristics
Regional Institutions/Mechanisms for Great Lakes
Management
Regional Mechanisms in Perspective -
Distinguishing Characteristics
United States and Canadian Federal Institutions/
Mechanisms for Great Lakes Management
The U.S. Federal Role in Great Lakes Management
The Canadian Federal Role in Great Lakes Management
State and Provincial Institutions for Great Lakes
Management
Sub-State/Provincial Institutions for Great Lakes
Management
Nongovernmental Institutions for Great Lakes
Management
Closing Statement

SECTION TWO: A DETERMINATION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS FOR GREAT
LAKES MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

FOUR ESSENTIAL PARAMETERS FOR GREAT LAKES INSTITUTIONS:
INTERPRETATIONS FROM THE LITERATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

Introduction
The Social Research and Development Process
Essential Parameters for Regional Resource
Management Institutions
Management Philosophy
Participatory Management
Management Functions
Role of the Management Entity in the
Institutional Ecosystem
Physical Jurisdiction
Breadth of Authority
Membership/Constituent Relations
Compatibility of Form and Function

FIVE ALTERNATE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR GREAT LAKES
MANAGEMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF GENERIC INSTITUTIONAL FORMS 122

Introduction
Interstate Compact
Federal-State Compact
State-Foreign Power Compact
Interstate Council/Commission

A-2

Federal-State Commission
International Treaty/Convention/Agreement
Federal Regional Council
Federal Regional Agency
Basin Interagency Committee
Intrastate Special District
Single Federal Administrator
International Commission
International Court
Federally Chartered and Private Corporations
Nongovernmental Organizations
Concluding Observations

SIX PERSPECTIVES ON GREAT LAKES INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS:
THE PERSONAL INTERVIEW APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Introduction
Methodology
Professional Background of Interview Subjects
Articulation of the Appropriate Goal for Great Lakes
Management
Adequacy of Existing Institutions
Desired Characteristics of a Great Lakes Management
Institution
Means to Implement Desired Revisions to Great Lakes
Institutional Arrangements
Concluding Observations

SEVEN PERSPECTIVES ON GREAT LAKES INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS:
THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196

Introduction
Methodology
Questionnaire Design
Background on Respondents
Views on Existing Institutions and Institutional
Arrangements
Views on Desired Institutions and Institutional
Arrangements
Means to Implement Change
Miscellaneous Questions
Summary of Findings

SECTION THREE: ALTERNATE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR GREAT
LAKES MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

EIGHT GOALS, OBJECTIVES AND PARAMETERS FOR THE COLLECTIVE
INSTITUTIONAL EFFORT: DEVELOPING A BENCHMARK . . . . . . . . 238

Introduction
Goals for Great Lakes Management: Developing a
Context for Institutional Change
Toward a Benchmark for Institutional Design and
Operation A-3

Statements of Finding - The Collective
Institutional Effort
Statements of Finding - The Individual
Institutional Effort
International Joint Commission
Great Lakes Fishery Commission
Great Lakes Commission
Council of Great Lakes Governors

NINE SCENARIOS FOR INSTITUTIONAL REVISION: RECOMMENDATIONS
AND RATIONALE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280

EPILOGUE: TOWARD A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR CONTINUED INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324

APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385

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